

# COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

South Sudan: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011 - 2016)

## Evaluation Report – Volume I

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
## Fact Sheet: WFP Portfolio in South Sudan

### Distribution of Portfolio Activities and Modalities

Activity Operation	HIV/AIDS	School Feeding	Nutrition	GFA	FFA / FFT	Cash-Based Transfers
PRRO 200572	X	X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200338	X	X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200659			X	X		X
EMOP 200859	X	X	X	X		X

Source: SPRs 2011-2016


### Percentage of Planned (left) and Actual (right) beneficiaries by activity



Source: SPRs 2011-2016

### Top Donors to WFP Portfolio in South Sudan

USA (53%), UK (9%), European Commission (8%)



Source: WFP Government Partnership Division Dashboard

## Executive Summary

### Introduction

#### *Evaluation features*

1. This country portfolio evaluation (CPE) covered the WFP South Sudan 2014–2017 country strategy and portfolio of operations during 2011–2016. It assessed: WFP’s strategic alignment and positioning; the factors and quality of WFP’s strategic decision-making; and the performance and results of the portfolio. It was conducted by WFP’s independent Office of Evaluation together with an external evaluation team, with field work in January and February 2017. The team augmented available data and document reviews with semi-structured stakeholder interviews, including donor representatives and beneficiaries.
2. There has been no previous evaluation of WFP’s portfolio in South Sudan. The CPE was timed to provide evidence to inform the country office’s strategic orientation and feed into the design of its 2018–2020 interim country strategic plan.

#### *Context*

3. South Sudan became independent in 2011 following more than 50 years of conflict. The South Sudan Development Plan<sup>2</sup> provides the main policy framework to guide the country’s development. Political instability, tribal conflicts, an over-reliance on oil production, poor infrastructure and road network, high logistics costs, an import dependency and low education levels have been structural constraints to economic development. Civil service staff have only been paid intermittently and there have been scarce funds for basic operating expenses. This has limited national ownership, partnerships and the Government’s capacity to plan, implement and sustain humanitarian and development initiatives.

**Table 1: South Sudan socio-economic indicators**


Year	Indicator	Value
2015	Population living below the poverty line	50.60%
2016	Headline inflation	836%
2016	Agricultural share of gross domestic product	15%
2016	Agricultural share in workforce	78%
2016	Arable land	4%
2017	Food deficit	500 000 mt
2016	Population with access to basic sanitation	41%
2016	Primary net enrolment rate	44%
2017	Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	1 880 000
2017	Refugees	1 770 000
2010	National stunting rate	31%
2016	Global acute malnutrition rate	15.2%
2015	Maternal mortality ratio (per live births) <sup>3</sup>	789/100 000

<sup>2</sup> Government of South Sudan. 2011. South Sudan Development Plan (2011–2013): Realizing freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all.

<sup>3</sup> [http://www.who.int/gho/maternal\\_health/countries/ssd.pdf](http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/ssd.pdf)

4. The number of people estimated to be severely food insecure, as measured by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) phases 3, 4 and 5,<sup>4</sup> increased from 3.5 million to 4 million between 2014 and 2016.

**Figure 1: Historical food insecurity in South Sudan (2014–2016) IPC 3, 4, 5 (in millions of people)**



5. Gender disparities are stark in South Sudan, as measured by a range of economic, health, literacy and asset-ownership indicators;<sup>5</sup> gender-based violence is widespread among more than 50 percent of women aged 15–24 years.

**Table 2: Gender inequalities in South Sudan**

Indicator	Value	
	Women-headed households	Men-headed households
Households living below poverty line	57%	48%
Literacy rate among adult population	Female population	Male population
	16%	40%

6. In the immediate post-independence period, South Sudan received significant development assistance. But with deteriorating security and governance, official development assistance was almost suspended in 2014. Large flows of humanitarian assistance continued however, peaking at over USD 2 billion in 2014,<sup>6</sup> with the United States of America (34 percent), the United Kingdom (12 percent) and the European Community (11 percent) as the main donors.


<sup>4</sup> Phase 3 – crisis; Phase 4 – emergency; Phase 5 – famine.

<sup>5</sup> South Sudan Comprehensive Country Gender Assessment, April 2012.

<sup>6</sup> Complete data for 2016 are not yet available.

## WFP portfolio

Figure 2: map of WFP operations in South Sudan (February–April 2017)



7. Following independence, WFP developed a country strategy comprising four pillars to: i) meet the emergency food needs of vulnerable groups; ii) build community resilience and strengthen livelihoods; iii) enhance market access and food value chains; and iv) enhance access to basic services in support of good nutrition and learning. The country strategy also included a cross-cutting approach to strengthening government institutional capacities.

8. The evaluation period (2011–2016) covered three emergency operations (EMOPs), one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO), 14 special operations and two immediate-response EMOPs (see Figure 2). While the total required funding was over USD 3.8 billion,<sup>7</sup> just USD 2.6 billion – or 65 percent of the requirements – was received. Funding by operation varied from 20 percent to 112 percent of that required.

9. The main thematic components of the EMOPs and the PRRO in WFP's portfolio included:

- *Emergency preparedness and response*, which comprised assistance for returnees, IDPs<sup>8</sup> and refugees, through general food assistance (GFA) and cash-based transfers (CBTs). GFA was the largest component, covering 64 percent of all beneficiaries.
- *Health and nutrition*, which encompassed targeted supplementary feeding programmes (TSFPs) and blanket supplementary feeding programmes

<sup>7</sup> Of this funding, 19 percent was for special operations.


<sup>8</sup> This includes IDPs in protection-of-civilian camps.

(BSFPs) for host populations, IDPs and refugees, accounting for 22 percent of beneficiaries.


- *Food security, livelihoods and resilience*, which comprised school feeding (9 percent) and food assistance for assets (FFA) (2 percent) – food for training and Purchase for Progress (P4P) accounted for less than 0.5 percent.
- *Capacity development* of government institutions for early warning, food security assessment and nutrition and health policy development.

10. Special operations, accounting for 19 percent of the total required funding of USD 3.8 billion, financed common services to support humanitarian operations including cluster operations, air transport services through the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), and support to agricultural development (such as feeder roads and the establishment of a strategic grain reserve).

**Figure 3: Proportion of resources for programming versus special operations (2014–2017)**



**Figure 4: South Sudan WFP portfolio overview (2011–2016)**



## Evaluation Findings

### *Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio*

11. **Figure 4** shows the three main phases of the evolution of WFP's portfolio. Initially, the portfolio was realigned in the post-independence phase to support state-building objectives. The PRRO introduced in 2014 moved to include sustainable solutions alongside GFA in line with pillars ii, iii, and iv of the country strategy.<sup>9</sup>

12. The resumption of large-scale hostilities in December 2013 created a large increase in the emergency caseload and WFP reoriented its portfolio rapidly and appropriately. The GFA caseload increased from 883,000 in 2012 to over 2.1 million in 2014.

**Table 2: Numbers of highly food insecure people and GFA by year**

Year	IPC phase 3,4,5	IPC phase 4,5	GFA
2014	3 525 283	1 123 446	2 155 700
2015	3 808 000	911 000	1 822 067
2016	4 093 000	1 013 000	2 266 445

13. The adaptation of nutrition into the portfolio and the introduction of mobile rapid-response mechanisms (RRMs) were relevant in improving outreach to conflict-affected areas. WFP scaled up its support to common services, including the provision of air services through UNHAS and support to the Logistics, Emergency Telecommunications, Food Security and Livelihoods Clusters. WFP also continued its work on rehabilitation and recovery in non-conflict areas.

**Table 3: WFP/UNHAS air operations**

Year	Passengers transported	Cargo (mt) airlifted/airdropped
2011	11 698	456
2012	88 224	396
2013	83 841	255
2014	68 286	58 774
2015	84 841	61 651
2016	78 064	68 771

Source: WFP Aviation Unit

14. The acute crisis became protracted, with widespread insecurity and conflict. The number of food-insecure people continued to grow annually, with over half the population in need of humanitarian assistance since 2014. Governance already seriously undermined by conflict was further weakened by the collapse in financing and suspension of donor development funding. However, WFP's strategy and portfolio did not fully adapt to the challenges and opportunities of a multi-year acute crisis.

15. WFP's strategy was found to be broadly **coherent with the relevant, though limited body of national technical policies**, to the satisfaction of WFP's main

<sup>9</sup> WFP. 2013. PRRO 200572 project document.

counterparts: the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. Relevant staff from other partner ministries responsible for nutrition, health, agriculture, education and transport also identified this strong alignment. The country office adhered to its commitments to protection and humanitarian principles while maintaining engagement with the Government.

16. The South Sudan Development Plan provided a common reference point for WFP's country strategy and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), which ensured a high degree of coherence at the level of United Nations agencies. WFP actively collaborated in the development of the UNDAF, which was used as a vehicle for communication purposes but did not stimulate joint programming or resource mobilization.<sup>10</sup> WFP was an active player in formulating humanitarian response plans; however these provided funding plans rather than strategic frameworks. In evaluating the collective humanitarian response in South Sudan, the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE)<sup>11</sup> found that: i) strategic planning was inadequate, with limited inclusion of affected populations' views; and ii) its use in programme cycle management was minimal since outcomes were not identified or measured. The Nutrition and Emergency Telecommunications Clusters played an important role in inter-agency strategy development. WFP worked bilaterally with other United Nations agencies to develop common strategic approaches, notably on nutrition and building resilience. Other actors such as the Logistics Cluster were focused on short-term tactical and operational coordination.

17. The country strategy identified and capitalized on **areas of comparative advantage**, including WFP's unrivalled ability to reach scale in conjunction with its partners. It was dominated by the provision of GFA, complemented by the treatment of moderate malnutrition. Emergency response capacity was underpinned by WFP's multi-modal logistics capacity, robust processes for negotiating safe access and a nationwide network of staffed sub-offices and operational field teams. Common logistics services hosted by the country office were critical to the overall success of humanitarian operations, providing flexible and neutral delivery services backed by vigorous safe-access negotiations. The country office aimed to capitalize on WFP's considerable corporate experience in designing and implementing FFA.

18. In some areas however, it was harder to demonstrate a clear comparative advantage. At corporate level, WFP had limited skills and its capacities in road building and administrative procedures were not geared towards managing large infrastructure projects. The country office also had limited experience in longer-term, multi-sector resilience-building.

19. Despite a challenging context, WFP managed to maintain respect for its humanitarian mandate and principles. Well-informed stakeholders did not perceive government restrictions as systematic and WFP was able to serve beneficiaries based on need in both government- and opposition-controlled areas. Avoidance of routine use of force for protection helped to maintain WFP's neutrality.

20. Nevertheless, access restrictions were frequently imposed by the Government and opposition, including the Government's repeated denial of authority for WFP to deliver assistance to beneficiaries outside of Wau town.

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<sup>10</sup> R. Chiwara and P. Ajang. 2015. Evaluation of the UNDAF for South Sudan (2012–2016).

<sup>11</sup> IAHE for South Sudan, 2015.

21. The risk of the humanitarian response fuelling the conflict was significant given the sheer volume of WFP's food assistance in South Sudan's economy. This risk was especially high when humanitarian resources fell outside of WFP's direct control (for example through an imposition of fees levied on contracted transporters). However, no evidence was found that WFP allowed authorities or militias to manipulate the use of its resources.

### *Factors and quality of strategic decision making*

22. The country office led or supported a range of food and nutrition studies to facilitate strategy development and decision-making, including the inter-agency Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System (FSNMS), IPC, market assessments, refugee livelihoods analyses and ad hoc studies of the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition (such as the Integrated Food and Nutrition Security Causal Analysis).<sup>12</sup> However, the understanding of the underlying drivers of undernutrition in South Sudan was still weak.

23. Monitoring data had limited influence on strategic decision-making, partly because insecurity limited WFP's ability to collect reliable and consistent monitoring data. In 2015, reporting became more regular and standardized, and monitoring and evaluation were mainstreamed. However, guidance on monitoring of resilience-building activities and special operations remained inadequate.

24. Guided by national and WFP policies, the country office developed a gender strategy (2015–2020) which sets targets for recruitment, training, programming and reporting on gender. A strong analysis of protection issues was integrated into strategic decision-making in order to minimize the risk of exposing women beneficiaries to gender-based violence and a protection strategy was established.

25. WFP contributed to **building national capacities for monitoring and analysis** in a range of counterpart ministries, although this work slowed dramatically after 2014. Relevant initiatives included partnering with the Government on developing monitoring systems (including the FSNMS and IPC), resilience context analysis and the Juba Urban Food Security and Nutrition Assessment. WFP information, analyses and monitoring reports were widely disseminated among national audiences to build consensus on needs and responses.

26. The evaluation identified a complex array of **drivers of strategic choices**. WFP's own mandate, strategy and policies provided a starting point, along with an analysis of humanitarian and development needs, national capacities and priorities, and reflections on WFP's own comparative advantages. Resource availability was not a major constraint: the declaration of a Level 3 emergency raised the profile of the response and had a positive impact on fundraising.<sup>13</sup> However, activities such as the Food Security and Livelihood Cluster and the feeder road project were constrained by a lack of funds at specific times. Downstream pipeline limitations and logistical constraints affecting air drops and overland transport corridors limited the scale of in-kind distributions.

27. **Staffing shortfalls** significantly limited WFP's strategic decision-making capacity. Important posts proved problematic to fill through the reassignment process, including leadership positions in programmes, logistics operations and vulnerability

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<sup>12</sup> Integrated Food and Nutrition Security Causal Analysis, June 2016.

<sup>13</sup> The 2015 IAHE for South Sudan also noted this effect.

analysis and mapping, and WFP relied disproportionately on short-term personnel. While the Level 3 roster helped to temporarily fill several staff positions, it did not work as well for some specific logistics and nutrition functions.

28. The country office identified critical **risks** to performance and proposed a comprehensive set of mitigation measures in line with organizational procedures. However, there was a lack of monitoring against the mitigation plan. Additional country-based risk assessments and mitigation measures were developed to support more routine operational decision-making. A balance was maintained between managing risks and ensuring the necessary adjustments and risk appetite to facilitate operational flexibility.


*Performance and results of the WFP Portfolio*

29. **Targeting and prioritization** of food assistance were based on IPC and FSNMS analyses, and the severity of food insecurity. This was to assure multi-agency consensus on needs, government leadership and coordinated planning with other United Nations agencies. Yet significant challenges in collecting reliable data created a wide margin of error in the IPC calculations.<sup>14</sup> WFP aimed to provide monthly distributions to beneficiaries in protection-of-civilian camps and IDP camps, and to prioritize distribution to rural populations in 60- or 90-day cycles according to food insecurity. However, WFP data were available to the evaluation team did not allow an independent verification of this plan’s achievement.

30. Nutrition caseloads were established jointly with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) based on survey data from Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions, and IPC results. FFA was geographically targeted using FSNMS and IPC data, with household targeting based on community surveys by a cooperating partner and consultations with community leaders.

31. **Performance against output targets** was generally **effective**. WFP assisted an average of 2.9 million people per year (see Figure 5) – 91 percent of targeted beneficiaries. GFA and CBT accounted for more than 64 percent of beneficiaries, with 22 percent receiving supplementary feeding, 9 percent school feeding and the rest assisted by FFA, food for training and P4P.

**Figure 5: Beneficiaries assisted by year (2012–2016)**




Source: SPRs 2011-2016

<sup>14</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2016. Humanitarian Needs Overview. This was also found in the IAHE report for South Sudan.

32. **GFA** under the three EMOPs and the PRRO had an average attainment rate of 117 percent of targeted vulnerable beneficiaries (see Figure 6), but the percentage of targeted quantities of food delivered fell from nearly 80 percent in 2012 to under 45 percent in 2016.<sup>15</sup> The introduction of mobile RRM was important in scaling up emergency operations in areas where non-governmental organization (NGO) partners had withdrawn their presence because of insecurity. However, beneficiary and partner complaints showed that food distributions were unpredictable because of problems in maintaining a reliable food pipeline and full food baskets were not consistently delivered.

**Figure 6: Number of GFA beneficiaries (actual and planned) by operation**




Source: Standard project report (SPR)

33. Within GFA, the use of **CBTs** was challenging given widespread insecurity, weak markets, few financial service providers and hyperinflation. Consequently, CBTs in the EMOPs and PRRO reached an average of 70 percent and 20 percent of their targets respectively. CBT beneficiaries remained a minor part of the total caseload: only 152,671 received CBTs in 2016.

34. The total number of children covered by WFP’s targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP) and blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP) grew steadily (see Figures 7 and 8). Scaling up TSFP in 2014 was slow since it required collaborating with additional partners; increasing BSFP coverage proved more straightforward.


**Figure 7: WFP South Sudan TSFP 6–59 months planned vs. actual**



Source: SPRs 2011–2016

<sup>15</sup> SPR 2012–2016.

**Figure 8: WFP South Sudan BSFP 6–23 months, 6–35 months and 6–59 months**



Source: SPRs 2011–2016

35. **On average, FFA** reached more than 80,000 beneficiaries per year – ranging from 49 percent to 129 percent of annual targets. Funding constraints, pipeline breaks and insecurity were the main causes of underachievement in this area. Where there was competition for limited resources, life-saving interventions were prioritized.

36. Just one quarter of the planned 800 km of **feeder roads** were constructed. Lengthy selection processes, security constraints, a lack of WFP engineering staff and poorly adapted procurement procedures contributed to delays. However, the quality of the completed roads was reported to be high.

37. **P4P** activities supported 136 farmer groups and purchased 462 mt of food from 13 of these groups. This was less than 10 percent of all food procured locally by WFP and less than 1 percent of WFP’s food requirements in South Sudan. Although 12 storage warehouses were built, less than 10 percent of this capacity was used by farmer groups.

38. The **school feeding** programme reached an average of 300,000 children per year – estimated at 20 percent of all primary schoolchildren. Of these children, 44 percent were girls (the national primary school enrolment rate for girls was 39 percent).<sup>16</sup> According to reports, nearly 900 classrooms were rehabilitated, but there was no evidence of related improvements in school sanitation, school gardens or installation of fuel-efficient stoves.

39. **Performance outcomes** were assessed against the country strategy’s four objectives.

40. The emergency **GFA**, accompanied by a scaled up BSFP, can be partially credited with preventing severe food insecurity from deteriorating further into widespread famine. Common services were a critical component of WFP’s emergency effectiveness. Nutrition outcomes – as measured by the recovery rate – were good. The context constrained the roll-out of CBTs in South Sudan. However, where this modality was introduced as an integral part of the emergency response, it was significantly more cost efficient, predictable and timely than in-kind transfers,<sup>17</sup> and had potential secondary benefits for the local economy.

41. There were mixed results in **building livelihoods and resilience**. While beneficiaries valued the assets built through FFA such as dikes, feeder roads and training, the quality of tertiary roads was limited. Most FFA activities remained short

<sup>16</sup> Education Cluster Assessment, South Sudan 2016.

<sup>17</sup> In addition, the nutrient cost effectiveness of cash to in-kind transfer value (omega value) was improving in the short period (September 2015–March 2016) for which data was available (WFP vulnerability analysis and mapping, March 2016).

term, with little evidence of the complementarity layering of multi-sector actions over a sustained period needed to build resilience to shocks affecting food security. **Delays in FFA activities were caused by the late signing of field-level agreements (FLAs) with more than 80 cooperating partners.**

42. Progress in **enhancing market access and value chains was limited.** Quantitative evidence was missing and anecdotal evidence suggested that the feeder roads had little positive outcome on agricultural production. P4P outcomes have been modest and of uncertain sustainability.

43. WFP significantly contributed to **enhancing access to basic services in support of learning.** Despite fluctuations in enrolment and retention associated with changing insecurity, the school feeding programme repeatedly showed positive results, particularly with regard to retention rates (99 percent in 2013, 92 percent in 2014, 89 percent in 2015 and 78 percent in 2016). The programme also contributed to gender parity, partly through an initiative of incentives for girls. However, the overall effectiveness of school feeding depended upon a package of complementary interventions and a strong inter-agency strategic framework, which was lacking.

44. **Synergies within the WFP portfolio** were achieved with the integration of GFA and nutrition activities. But there were missed opportunities for integrating nutrition into FFA and food for education, and little operational synergy between FFA, feeder road and P4P activities.

45. Operational synergies were established with **a wide range of United Nations agencies**, including collaboration with UNICEF (through integrated RRM missions), UNHCR (on refugee operations), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (as operational partner on logistics and biometric registration systems) and FAO (on the Food Security Cluster, food security assessments and resilience-building). However, the country office could have collaborated with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to leverage its comparative advantage as a specialized infrastructure-project implementer.

46. Findings on the **sustainability of assets** created through the feeder roads were inconclusive. Maintenance plans assumed government responsibility for long-term upkeep; however the Government has limited credibility in the current fiscal context. In current circumstances, communities' ability to maintain assets built through FFA is also compromised.

47. Given severely constrained government capacity, there is little immediate prospect for the hand-over of WFP-led services to national institutions. Limited but important progress was made in using the private sector to sustain services – for example, transitioning from a free-to-user data service to a cost-sharing model for internet services through the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster.

48. In terms of **efficiency**, logistics was the dominant cost driver. Land transport, storage and handling components of the EMOP and PRRO accounted for 55 percent of total operational costs during 2013–2016.<sup>18</sup> Logistics costs were driven by the extensive use of air transport and the weak trunk road network. For the route from Juba to Bentiu, the cost was approximately USD 350 per mt on a 40 mt trunk payload<sup>19</sup> – more than double the rate charged<sup>20</sup> in neighbouring countries over a

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<sup>18</sup> This rises to 58 percent if external transport costs are included.

<sup>19</sup> South Sudan Transport Market Assessment and Logistics Capacity Assessment (2015).

<sup>20</sup> Rates are similar in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

similar distance. WFP explored options for reducing transport costs, such as: increasing the use of cheaper fixed-wing aircraft; pre-positioning commodities by road during the dry season; opening up new overland transport corridors from the Sudan; and maximizing the use of CBTs.

49. The introduction of biometric registration systems – including WFP’s SCOPE system for cash operations, WFP’s digital beneficiary and transfer-management platform – offered large potential cost efficiency gains through more accurate beneficiary registers. The cost of registration using SCOPE was estimated at USD 5 per household,<sup>21</sup> which compares to the cost of a potential inclusion error of supporting a household in an EMOP for one year of USD 1,000.<sup>22</sup>

50. Yet poor planning and coordination among users contributed to cases of the inefficient use of free-to-user common logistics services. With no financial incentive for organizations to plan effectively, aircraft and other assets were not used efficiently or deployed at very short notice.<sup>23</sup>

51. The Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) shortened the average lead time for food delivery from 120 days to 53 days; however frequent pipeline breaks resulted in poor reliability and timeliness of food deliveries. Donor resourcing plans and other constraints contributed to uneven food inflows. The responsibility for the supply chain was split between several management functions, which were understaffed.

52. The country office faced challenges in keeping up with minimum corporate monitoring and reporting requirements, and outcome indicators for monitoring resilience and special operations were weak. Weaknesses in the country office monitoring and evaluation system have been partially rectified since 2015. However, ongoing access limitations have partly constrained the country office’s ability to collect adequate outcome data.

## Conclusions

53. The assessment of WFP’s performance required a clear recognition of the extremely challenging, complex and constantly evolving operating context in South Sudan. This included significant humanitarian needs, fragile governance capacities, rudimentary infrastructure and high insecurity, impacting both humanitarian access and the well-being of communities and WFP staff.

54. WFP’s portfolio was highly relevant: it demonstrated an ability to work across both emergency and development spheres, and appropriately transitioned from responding to emergency needs to aligning itself with a state-building agenda – and back to response – in a large-scale acute crisis. A major challenge was positioning WFP to ensure connectedness – the need to ensure that short-term emergency activities were carried out taking into account longer-term development and interconnected problems.

55. The development of the country strategy helped to drive a **strategic reorientation** that supported the new country and its institutions, but this was swiftly overtaken by events. The country office was not proactive in designing a revised, comprehensive **strategic approach** to responding in the emerging context

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<sup>21</sup> Estimate provided by the WFP country office.

<sup>22</sup> The EMOP supported 253,903 households at a total cost of USD 250,490,565.

<sup>23</sup> Based on information gathered from Logistics Cluster staff.

of a multi-year acute crisis. This was exacerbated by a combination of factors, including persistent delays in the recruitment of critical **staff**, which undermined the country office's capacity for strategic planning and programming.

56. WFP ensured strategic **coherence** with government and other development partners. The UNDAF and Interim Cooperation Framework processes sought to create coherence among United Nations agencies; however they were used for consolidated reporting rather than coordinated inter-agency action. The complexity and scale of the multi-year acute crisis required stronger United Nations leadership to inspire a coordinated inter-agency response. Opportunities to capitalize on **internal synergies** were identified but largely remained unrealized. There were strong **external synergies** with several other **United Nations agencies**, which drew on complementary resources to address a range of beneficiary needs. This is an important avenue to develop since WFP programming needs to balance the need for internal synergies among operations at the household level with the countervailing risk of concentrating resources on a limited number of beneficiaries

57. WFP's assessment and analysis skills were particularly useful in programme targeting prioritization, and decision-making including the integration of protection and gender analyses. However, deeper analyses of the causes of food and nutrition insecurity could have improved programme design.

58. WFP's emergency food assistance was **effective**. WFP provided almost all food assistance in the country and was able to scale up quickly in response to needs. RRM allowed WFP to reach beneficiaries in highly insecure locations in the absence of cooperating partners. Nevertheless, the context made it harder to scale up CBTs and feeder road construction fell short of targets. There was good participation of women in WFP activities and significant attention to safeguarding against protection risks.

59. At the outcome level, GFA including CBT and nutrition activities helped to prevent a precipitous decline in food security. School feeding was associated with improved enrolment and retention. Yet livelihood interventions would have benefitted from a more predictable and sustained approach rather than annual agreements with cooperating partners.

60. Commendable progress was made in contributing to **national policy development** and technical capacities **through partnerships** with a wide range of ministries. But success was undermined by the deteriorating context. Alternative approaches to **sustainability** – including building capacity in the private sector – were slow to emerge

61. Logistics costs for in-kind delivery were crucial to overall **cost-efficiency**. WFP displayed a solid awareness of the need to manage costs and introduced a range of innovations to minimize them. Given an outlook of declining resources and increasing needs, further cost-saving measures are still required.

## Recommendations

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
1	Strategic orientation	The country strategy for South Sudan requires to be updated and brought in line with the changed country context. The new strategy should orient WFP to respond to a multi-year acute crisis, with the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing needs.	<p>1. WFP should:</p> <p>a) develop a strategic framework for responding to the needs of South Sudan as a multi-year, acute crisis which acknowledges the limited capacity of the Government to provide leadership to the process; and</p> <p>b) advocate within the United Nations system for developing an inter-agency strategic framework and a common multi-year approach to responding to the multi-year acute crisis.</p> <p>The Integrated Road Map presents the opportunity to address this in 2017.</p>	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and headquarters: 2017–2018.
2	Humanitarian–development synergies	Whilst recognizing the primacy of life-saving assistance, WFP should position itself to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a manner that takes longer-term development and interconnected problems into account.	<p>2. WFP should improve humanitarian–development synergies by:</p> <p>a) developing a strategy to address the underlying constraints to the expanded use of CBTs (including strengthening supply chains, advocating for cross-border trade and improved financial and transport infrastructure) that enables timelier, cost-efficient and increased emergency assistance alongside longer-term impacts on strengthened market access and markets for domestic production;</p> <p>b) maintaining the longer-term aim to contribute to the Government Health Sector Development Plan, including capacity development and other support for the roll-out of the community management of acute malnutrition guidelines at national, state and county levels; advocacy and support for the operationalization of the Boma Health Initiative launched in 2015 in close collaboration with UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), and</p>	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and headquarters: 2017–2018.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
			<p>other 'nutrition-in-health' partners in South Sudan;</p> <p>c) partnering with other agencies to reinvigorate and refine an inter-agency approach to building resilience that is distinct from FFA activities, that layers multi-annual interventions from different agencies for progressive replication and roll-out as conditions permit, and</p> <p>d) strategically promoting school feeding – within a coordinated inter-agency approach – that contributes to breaking the cycle of war and violence in South Sudan by establishing 'safe zones' for protection and provides a platform for multi-sectoral interventions spanning health, nutrition and livelihoods objectives.</p>	
3	Efficiency	<p>The context in South Sudan makes relief expensive to deliver, and it is difficult to ensure timely deliveries. The primary underlying challenges are constraints in economically transporting food to beneficiaries and managing the food pipeline.</p>	<p>3. WFP should further increase cost-efficiency assuming a multi-year approach to emergency response.</p> <p>a) WFP should work with other agencies, including UNOPS, to identify opportunities where targeted investment by donors in transport infrastructure could generate multi-annual cost savings on logistics costs including: cost-benefit analyses of strategic repairs of trunk roads to allow wet season access, investment in improved river transport, and investment in the maintenance of strategic airstrips to allow increased use of fixed wing aircraft.</p> <p>b) On the basis of the results of the cost-benefit analysis, develop a joint advocacy strategy for donors on limited, strategic investment in infrastructure.</p> <p>c) In collaboration with partners (including IOM and UNHCR), develop a strategy for providing all South Sudanese with a digital identity that includes agreement for inter-</p>	<p>Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters: 2017-2018.</p>

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
			<p>operability and data-sharing between systems.</p> <p>d) Consider introducing an element of routine cost recovery into the Logistics Cluster to encourage better forward-planning and more efficient use of resources.</p> <p>e) Strengthen the management of the food pipeline through:</p> <p>i) Forming an Integrated Supply Chain Working Group to determine requirements, resources and prioritize operational plans.</p> <p>ii) Reinforcing the staffing of the Budget and Programming Team, in part to increase liaison with donors on food shipments.</p> <p>iii) Given the importance of the GCMF to South Sudan, opportunities to further strengthen its contribution to the South Sudan response should be investigated.</p>	
4	Programme Quality	<p>Limitations in data and analysis continue to constrain the ability of the country office to draw evidence-based conclusions on the most efficient and effective programmatic approaches to adopt.</p> <p>Opportunities to capitalize on internal synergies between activities were identified but largely remained unrealized.</p> <p>Short-term FLAs with cooperating partners do not facilitate sustained programming with beneficiaries.</p>	<p>a) WFP should further invest in food and nutrition related assessments and analyses by;</p> <p>iv) Further elaboration of the WFP FSNMS methodology for regular assessment of nutrition status among key nutrition target groups, including the integration of stunting indicators and triangulation of results with the SMART surveys system, and other relevant surveillance mechanisms;</p> <p>v) Surveillance of food security in urban areas.</p> <p>vi) Further investment in analysis of the underlying reasons for undernutrition in South Sudan, in close collaboration/partnership with other agencies on food security and nutrition, with a particular focus on the more stable areas of the country.</p> <p>b) Start up and increase nutrition-sensitive</p>	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters: 2017-2018.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility & timing
			<p>programming in line with the Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) approach within the overall WFP portfolio for South Sudan, through the cash for assets (CFA) and food assistance for education (FFE) programmes in particular, but also through general food distributions, e.g. a focus on stunting reduction in tandem with the TSFP and BSFP.</p> <p>c) At corporate level, review indicators used for outcome and impact level monitoring of resilience and special operations.</p> <p>d) Develop multi-year FLAs with cooperating partners – these FLAs could specify multi-year strategic frameworks with annual budget agreements.</p>	
5	Human Resources	<p>Persistent delays in the recruitment of key staff has undermined the capacity of the country office, including the capacity for strategic planning. WFP relied disproportionately on personnel recruited on short-term contracts.</p>	<p>a) The WFP country office should commission and publish a staffing review, based on the staff needed to deliver against the new country strategic plan.</p> <p>b) The capacity of the country office human resources team should be augmented to provide the necessary capacity to support the timely appointment of suitably qualified and experienced staff – including proactively identifying and encouraging suitable staff to apply for key positions on reassignment.</p> <p>c) WFP Headquarters should consider recruiting floating emergency staff who would be available for immediate deployment through the L3 roster.</p> <p>d) While recognizing the measures taken by WFP Headquarters to improve the reassignment process, the relevant Headquarters department should consider further changes to the reassignment process to ensure that all staff serve in hardship postings.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from the regional bureau and headquarters: 2016–2018.</p>




## WFP Activities by States of South Sudan (2012-2016)


**General Food Assistance (GFA)**




**Blanket Supplementary Feeding (BSF)**




**Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme (TSFP)**




**Institutional Feeding Programme (IFP)/TFP**




**Food Assistance for Assets (FFA)**




**School Feeding**



**Purchase for Progress (P4P)**



**Feeder Roads**



## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Evaluation Features

#### Rationale

1. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPEs) focus on WFP operations at country level, and address the full set of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to guide future strategic and operational decision-making. Country portfolio evaluations aim to provide answers to three key evaluation questions:

Question 1: Alignment and Strategic Positioning of the WFP Country Strategy and Portfolio

Question 2: Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

Question 3: Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio.

2. South Sudan has been selected for an independent evaluation conducted by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) together with an external evaluation team as part of its ongoing series of country portfolio evaluations, which seeks to provide systematic evaluation coverage of WFP's country presence. There has been no previous evaluation of WFP's portfolio in South Sudan.<sup>24</sup>

3. The evaluation is an opportunity for the country office to benefit from an independent assessment of its 2014-2017 Country Strategy (CS) and portfolio of operations during 2011-2016 and to generate corporate lesson-learning around WFP's adaptation to South Sudan's complex and changing context. It is expected that the evaluation findings will inform the country office in its design of operations and strategic orientation. The country portfolio evaluation is also expected to provide evidence of past and current performance that is useful for the design of the country office's new interim country strategic plan (ICSP) in line with the WFP Integrated Road Map (IRM).

#### Objectives

4. The full terms of reference (ToR) for this evaluation are in Annex B. They state that evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, this country portfolio evaluation will:

i) Assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in South Sudan (**accountability**).

ii) Determine the reasons for success or failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that allow the country office to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in South Sudan, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations, design, and implementation (**learning**).

5. The intended users of the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations include the WFP Country Office, the Regional Bureau of Nairobi, Headquarters Divisions, Senior Management and the Executive Board (EB); the Government of the

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<sup>24</sup> There was an evaluation of WFP Sudan portfolio (2010-2012), but this did not consider any work undertaken in the areas now located in the Republic of South Sudan.

Republic of South Sudan (GoSS), Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs), donors and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT).

## **Methodology and limitations**

6. The evaluation was undertaken by the independent Office of Evaluation together with an external evaluation team. It involved inception visits to Rome and Juba in November 2016 feeding into the inception report, which was approved in January 2017. The main visit to South Sudan took place over three weeks in January and February 2017. It incorporated a week of visits to the states where WFP was operational and separate presentations of preliminary findings to the country office and Regional Bureau of Nairobi in Nairobi, followed by headquarters briefing by teleconference on February 28, 2017.

7. The methodology for the evaluation is set out in the inception report and summarised in Annex C, while the evaluation matrix is presented as Annex D. The evaluation process is described in Annex E, and interviewees are listed in Annex F. An extensive bibliography is provided at Annex G. The Office of Evaluation provided support on quality assurance and management of the evaluation. The main limitations experienced were: restricted access to some field locations and activities due to security constraints, limitations of data availability and a bias towards the recent years due to staff rotation. However, telephone interviews were held with key staff who had left the country office.

### **1.2. Country Context<sup>25</sup>**

8. This section provides an overview of significant political, economic and social contextual factors that have affected the WFP country portfolio in South Sudan and that are relevant to the evaluation. It also notes trends in WFP corporate strategies and policies that have shaped the context for WFP in South Sudan. An overview of the portfolio is presented in Annex H, while Annex I provides key country development indicators.

#### **1.2.1 History and Governance**

9. In 2011, the Republic of South Sudan became an independent country, following a peaceful secession from Sudan.<sup>26</sup> As a new nation, South Sudan has the dual challenge of dealing with the legacy of more than 50 years of conflict and continued instability, along with huge development and humanitarian needs. Formal institutions had to be built from a very low base and the capacity of government to formulate policy and implement programmes is still limited. In 2011, the Government of the Republic South Sudan (GoSS) conceived the Southern Sudan Vision 2040. Building on *Vision 2040, the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP)*<sup>27</sup> was adopted to guide the country's development during its first five years of independence, from July 2011 to July 2016.

10. Under the SSDP umbrella, sectorial initiatives and policies were developed. *The South Sudan Health Sector Development Plan (HSDP 2011-2015)*<sup>28</sup> includes nutrition as one of the strategic objectives. *The Comprehensive Agricultural Development*

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<sup>25</sup> Sub EQ1 (What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in South Sudan?) is addressed in this chapter.

<sup>26</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South\\_Sudan#2011.E2.80.932015](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sudan#2011.E2.80.932015)

<sup>27</sup> *Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2011), South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013*. Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all. [http://www.GOSS-mof.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RSS\\_SSDP.pdf](http://www.GOSS-mof.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/RSS_SSDP.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> *Government of the Republic of South Sudan, Ministry of Health (2011), Health Sector Development Plan*. Transforming the Health System for Improved Services and Better Coverage. <http://www.gunneweg-imprint-consultants.nl/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/HSSDPL2010-2015-SOUTH-SUDAN.pdf>


*Master Plan* (CAMP) was only released in 2016. National school feeding policy guidelines and a strategic framework are also reportedly close to finalization.

11. In December 2013, armed conflict broke out between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and those loyal to Vice President Riek Machar. After two years of conflict, Riek Machar returned to South Sudan in April 2016 and was sworn in as the first Vice President within the Transitional Government of National Unity.<sup>29</sup> However, renewed fighting erupted in July 2016, resulting in increased violence and insecurity throughout the country that is undermining post-independence development gains and has worsened the humanitarian situation.<sup>30</sup>

### 1.2.2 Economy

12. South Sudan is now entering its fourth year of civil conflict. Political instability, tribal conflicts over land resources, over-reliance on oil production, under-performance of the agricultural sector, poor infrastructures and road network, a large informal sector, high import dependency and very low levels of education remain the structural constraints on economic development.<sup>31</sup> Recent conflicts, combined with falling oil production and prices, have had a significant financial impact on South Sudan, with the 2015 gross domestic product (GDP) contracting by 5.3 percent<sup>32</sup> (Figure 1) and GDP per capita falling to USD 717, the lowest since independence.<sup>33</sup> During the inception mission, ministries reported that civil service salaries are paid intermittently and there is little money for basic operating expenses, further weakening government capacities. The administrative reorganization from 10 states, to 32 states, has further compromised the capacity of state institutions.

**Figure 1: South Sudan GDP growth rate (%) 2011-2015**



Source: Trading Economics.com

13. The inflation rate in South Sudan has reached staggering levels. According to consumer price index data released by the National Bureau of Statistics, headline inflation was at 836 percent in October 2016, while food inflation was at 1002 percent year to year. Since the South Sudanese pound was unpegged from the US dollar in November 2015, the exchange rate has plummeted by more than 2,000 percent.<sup>34</sup> The consequent economic disruption has contributed to an overall decline in food security.

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36140423>

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/south-sudan-security-council-demands-ceasefire-160711043656662.html>

<sup>31</sup> WFP (2017). *The South Sudan Western Trade Corridors in Times of Hyperinflation. Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap.*

<sup>32</sup> Trading Economics: <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/gdp-growth-annual>


<sup>33</sup> <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-sudan/gdp-per-capita>

<sup>34</sup> WFP (2017). *The South Sudan Western Trade Corridors in Times of Hyperinflation. Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap.*

14. Poor road infrastructure is also an important constraint to economic development. The road infrastructure was largely destroyed or left in disrepair during the protracted civil war.<sup>35</sup> Some roads were rehabilitated during the period from 2007 to 2012, but ensuing conflict in 2013, heavy rains, increased levels of traffic, overloaded trucks and lack of maintenance have rendered these improvements redundant. Some 60 percent of the country becomes inaccessible by road during the rainy season, which usually lasts from May to December.<sup>36</sup>

15. Outside the oil sector, the economy is concentrated in low productivity, subsistence agriculture and pastoralism, accounting for around 15 percent of GDP and 78 percent of the workforce.<sup>37</sup> Agricultural productivity in South Sudan is low and only 4 percent of arable land is cultivated. Despite the potential, the country has a large structural deficit in food production (Figure 2) with the food gap bridged through humanitarian food assistance and cross-border trade. The 2016 Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)/WFP *Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission*<sup>38</sup> forecast that the gap in 2017 will be 500,000 metric tonnes – with falling production attributed to rising insecurity. Rainfall is a major factor in determining crop performance.<sup>39</sup> However, over the evaluation period rainfall and growing conditions have been near normal (Annex M).

**Figure 2: National food cereals deficit 2011 - 2016 (per million MT)<sup>40</sup>**



Source: FAO CFSAM Report 2016

### 1.2.3 Poverty and access to services

16. In South Sudan, 50.6 percent of the population is estimated to live below the poverty line.<sup>41</sup> The ongoing violence has caused massive displacements of people: more than 3 million people have been forced to flee their homes, including nearly 1.9 million people who have been internally displaced (IDPs) and more than 1.2 million who have fled as refugees to neighbouring countries. This brings the total number of South Sudanese refugees in the region to more than 1.3 million.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>35</sup> South Sudan Rural Roads Project (SSRRP) - South Sudan Road Maintenance Fund, UNOPS, 2016

<sup>36</sup> OCHA (2016). 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview. South Sudan

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>

<sup>38</sup> FAO, *Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission Special report 2016*, as reported by the WFP CO

<sup>39</sup> FAO, WFP (2016). *FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan*.

<sup>40</sup> Source: Annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission Reports 2011 to 2016.

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south\\_sudan/en/home/countryinfo.html](http://www.ss.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/countryinfo.html)

<sup>42</sup> OCHA (2016). 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview. South Sudan

17. The conflict has significantly affected the ability of the people to access healthcare. At least one in ten healthcare facilities has been affected by the conflict, including being targeted, destroyed, damaged and occupied. It is estimated that a maximum of 43 percent of the country's 1,384 health facilities have remained operational.<sup>43</sup> Communicable diseases are endemic, with persistent outbreaks of cholera, measles, malaria, hepatitis E and kala-azar affecting large parts of the country due to poor living conditions, poor sanitation and overcrowding. Malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia are the top reasons for outpatient consultations. The coverage for all vaccine-preventable diseases remains below 50 percent, and is less than 20 percent in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile States. In 2016, 648,000 children under age 5 were estimated to be at risk of measles.<sup>44</sup> It is estimated that only 41 percent of the population have access to safe water and basic sanitation facilities.

18. Since conflict erupted in December 2013, some 1.17 million children aged 3 to 18 years have lost access to education. About 25 percent of all schools have become non-functioning since 2013 due to an increase in insecurity. The primary net enrolment rate in schools was 43.5 percent, due to conflict, displacement, lack of trained teachers, inadequate supplies and disruption of education services fuelled by the economic crisis. The dropout rates in primary school average 24 percent per year and a recent education cluster survey found that lack of food and early marriage were the two most important reasons for dropout.<sup>45</sup> (Table 1).

**Table 1: South Sudan socio-economic indicators**

Year	Indicator	Value
2015	Population living below the poverty line	50.20%
2016	Headline inflation	836%
2016	Agricultural share in GDP	15%
2016	Agricultural share in workforce	78%
2016	Arable lands	4%
2017	Food deficit	500,000 MT
2016	Population with access to basic sanitation	41%
2016	Primary net enrolment rate	44%
2017	Internally displaced persons	1,880,000
2017	Refugees	1,770,000
2010	National stunting rate	31. %
2016	Global acute malnutrition rate	15%
2015	Maternal mortality ratio (per live births) <sup>46</sup>	789/100,000

#### 1.2.4 Gender

19. Gender disparities in South Sudan are dramatic. Households headed by a woman (29%) are among the poorest, with 56.9 percent below the poverty line compared with 48.1 percent of households headed by a man. The maternal mortality ratio

<sup>43</sup> OCHA (2016). 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview. South Sudan

<sup>44</sup> OCHA (2016). 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview. South Sudan

<sup>45</sup> GoSS. Ministry of Education (2016). Education Cluster Assessment. [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/education\\_cluster\\_assessment\\_south\\_sudan\\_nov\\_2016.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/education_cluster_assessment_south_sudan_nov_2016.pdf)

<sup>46</sup> [http://www.who.int/gho/maternal\\_health/countries/ssd.pdf](http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/ssd.pdf)


(789/100,000 live births) is among the highest in the world, young women are more likely to die in childbirth than finish primary school.<sup>47</sup> Only 16 percent of the female population over 15 years old is literate, compared to 40 percent for men.<sup>48</sup> Although women conduct a significant proportion of agricultural production activities and private sector trade, their ownership of land and other property is extremely restricted under prevailing customary law.

20. The prolonged conflict has also created new security risks for women and children. Gender based violence (GBV) has been widespread, coupled with pervasive human rights violation even before the country plunged into conflict. The current conflict has seriously exacerbated the problem, with physical and domestic violence, early and forced marriage and sexual violence, including rape as a deliberate weapon of war, being reported. More than half of young women aged 15-24 years are estimated to have suffered some form of gender based violence.<sup>49</sup>

### 1.2.5 Food and Nutrition Security

21. Food insecurity has remained at high levels since 2014. Between 2014 and 2016, the number of people estimated to be severely food insecure at seasonal peaks (IPC Phases 3, 4, and 5<sup>50</sup>) increased from 3.5 to 4 million (Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Food insecure population 2014-2016 (IPC phase 3, 4, 5)<sup>51</sup>**



22. According to the latest integrated phase classification (IPC) estimates,<sup>52</sup> the food security situation in South Sudan has continued to deteriorate, with 4.9 million (42% of the national population) estimated to be severely food insecure (IPC Phases 3, 4, and 5), of which 100,000 are estimated to be facing a humanitarian catastrophe (Table 2). This is projected to increase to 5.5 million people, (47% of the national population) at the height of the 2017 lean season in July. The *Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System* (FSNMS) report for December 2016 found 67 percent of households to be food insecure, the highest post-harvest figure since monitoring started in 2010.

23. Rising insecurity makes the delivery of humanitarian assistance challenging. Reduced humanitarian access is hindering the delivery of critical assistance to

<sup>47</sup> *Comprehensive Country Gender Assessment, Government of the Republic of South Sudan, April 2012*

<sup>48</sup> *Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan, 2010.*

<sup>49</sup> *South Sudan: Gender Based Violence Factsheet November 2015.*

<sup>50</sup> Phase 3: Crisis; phase 4: Emergency; phase 5: Famine

<sup>51</sup> Data based on peak annual IPC numbers as reported in April assessments - source <http://climis-southsudan.org/dashboard> and Sudan May 2014 IPC Acute Situation Communication.

<sup>52</sup> IPC (January 2017): IPC Global Alert- South Sudan- Localized Famine and Unprecedented Levels of Acute Malnutrition in Greater Unit.

populations in need, particularly in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States. Ethnicity is an increasing factor in the conflict, making it increasingly hard for local NGO staff and United Nations staff to work outside of localized areas. Since 2013, 67 aid workers are reported to have died in South Sudan.

**Table 2: IPC population distribution (February-April 2017)**

State	Mid-2017 Population (NBS)	Phase 1 Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe	% in Phase 3, 4 & 5
Central	1,398,316	475,000	385,000	495,000	45,000	-	38.6%
Eastern	1,010,188	230,000	325,000	345,000	110,000	-	45.0%
Jonglei	1,822,086	205,000	645,000	755,000	220,000	-	53.5%
Lakes	1,113,716	320,000	450,000	355,000	100,000	-	40.9%
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	1,418,111	185,000	385,000	580,000	290,000	-	61.3%
Unity	1,124,916	140,000	390,000	420,000	170,000	100,000	61.3%
Upper Nile	1,258,323	495,000	470,000	270,000	60,000	-	26.2%
Warrap	1,448,812	385,000	665,000	210,000	65,000	-	19.0%
Western Bahr el Ghazal	545,565	85,000	200,000	235,000	10,000	-	44.9%
Western Equatoria	705,821	400,000	205,000	100,000	-	-	14.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,845,855</b>	<b>2,920,000</b>	<b>4,120,000</b>	<b>3,765,000</b>	<b>1,070,000</b>	<b>100,000</b>	<b>41.7%</b>

Source: IPC report 2017

24. Malnutrition is a long-term and major public health problem in South Sudan. The 2010 South Sudan Household Survey<sup>53</sup> found the national stunting rate to be 31.1 percent, with Unity, Western and Eastern Equatoria, and Lakes States reporting rates in excess of 35 percent. 54% of the households used adequately iodized salt (>15 ppm) and Vitamin A supplementation coverage was only 4 percent nationally.

25. Since the start of the crisis in December 2013, aggravating factors for malnutrition have become even more prevalent. These comprise increased incidence of infectious disease, poor access to clean water and sanitation, poor access to health care services<sup>54</sup> including severe disruptions in supplies and staffing, and deteriorated food security. In addition, there are concerns about the effects that trauma, sexual violence and gender based violence have on caretakers of infants and young children and the resulting impact that these may have on feeding and care practices.<sup>55</sup> National-level global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates over past years have consistently stayed close to the emergency threshold of 15 percent, with relatively modest levels of seasonal variation (Figure 4).<sup>56</sup> Unity and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal stand out as most affected states, followed by Warrap, Upper Nile and Jonglei.


<sup>53</sup> Republic of South Sudan: *The Sudan Household Health Survey 2010*

<sup>54</sup> It is estimated that only about 40% of the population in South Sudan have access to basic health care within a 5 km radius.

<sup>55</sup> Adapted from: GNC/SSNC (2014), *Lessons learned in South Sudan Nutrition Cluster, Synthesis report, 24 September 2014*  
Ref: <http://nutritioncluster.net/learned-south-sudan-nutrition-cluster/>

<sup>56</sup> The graphs are constructed by the evaluation team based on FNSMS reports No. 13 up to No. 17.

**Figure 4: South Sudan national level global and severe acute malnutrition (GAM and SAM) rates**



Source: WFP FNSMS rounds 13 – 18


26. The legal environment for the operation of NGOs has also become more restrictive. The South Sudan NGO Act, 2016<sup>57</sup> and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) Act, 2016<sup>58</sup> granted government the authority to direct (including controlling the areas of operation), supervise, monitor and evaluate the activities of NGOs. This act is viewed as unduly restrictive by NGOs, the United States, the United Nations and the European Commission.

### 1.2.6 International Assistance

27. In the immediate post-independence period, South Sudan received significant development assistance. In 2014, South Sudan was among the top ten official development assistance (ODA) countries and received USD 1.964 billion.<sup>59</sup> Under the South Sudan United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF 2012-2016) the United Nations proposed a budget of USD 1.3 billion to support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan implement the SSDP. In the wake of the deteriorating security and governance situation post 2013, developmental assistance through government institutions has been largely suspended by donors. The UNCT adopted a two-year Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) to replace the UNDAF that focusses on building livelihoods, rather than macro-level reform and is implemented through annual work plans that maximise flexibility.<sup>60</sup>

There have been large flows of humanitarian assistance over the evaluation period, peaking at USD 2 billion in 2014 (Figure 5).<sup>61</sup> The top three donors have been the USA (34%), UK (12%) and ECHO (11%).

**Figure 5: Humanitarian Aid to South Sudan (2011-2016) in USD**



Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service<sup>62</sup>

<sup>57</sup> Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2016). NGO Act, 2016.

<sup>58</sup> Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2016). Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) Act, 2016.

<sup>59</sup> OECD 2016 Africa Edition page 2.

<sup>60</sup> UNCT, Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2015). 2016-2017 Interim Cooperation Framework of the UN Country Team in South Sudan. Recovery, Resilience and Reaching the Most Vulnerable.

<sup>61</sup> Data for 2016 is not yet fully reported.

<sup>62</sup> As of December 2016

28. In 2011, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the South Sudan (UNMISS) to consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development.<sup>63</sup> Following the resumption of fighting in December 2013, the Security Council<sup>64</sup> reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement<sup>65</sup>.

### **1.3. The WFP Portfolio in South Sudan**

29. WFP has been present in South Sudan since the country's independence in 2011 and in Sudan since 1963. WFP worked at the heart of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), one of the largest relief operations in recent history, to aid those affected by the second Sudanese civil war between 1989 and 2005.<sup>66</sup> The current resurgence of conflict has once again placed South Sudan amongst the countries with the greatest humanitarian needs.

#### **1.3.1 WFP Country Strategy**

30. In the wake of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Government of the Republic of the Sudan, WFP launched a country strategy development process in 2012. This country strategy articulated WFP contribution to the UNDAF (2012-2016), as part of the broader UNCT, in support of the Government of South Sudan's Vision 2040, and the priority pillars of the SSDP. The overall vision was articulated as "A prosperous, peaceful and cohesive society, that is self-sufficient, connected and fully utilizing its resources, and is supported by a Government with the capacity to sustainably ensure food and nutrition security, and equitably extend access to essential services, for all."

31. The country strategy has four pillars. These are: (i) meet emergency food needs of vulnerable groups, (ii) build community resilience and strengthen livelihoods, (iii) enhance market access and food value chains and (iv) enhance access to basic services in support of good nutrition and learning. The country strategy also includes a cross-cutting approach of strengthening the capacities of government institutions, as well as enhancing partnerships for sustainable hunger solutions. It identified WFP comparative advantages to include: emergency response, deep field presence, purchasing power, food security analysis, strong relationship with communities and logistics.

#### **1.3.2 Overview of the Portfolio**

32. The country portfolio evaluation period (2011-2016) covers 19 operations – 3 emergency operations (EMOPs), 1 protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO), 14 special operations (SOs) and 2 immediate response emergency operations (IR EMOPs) (Figure 6). In 2011, food operations were still managed through a consolidated operation for Sudan and are not considered in the scope of this evaluation.<sup>67</sup> The total required cost of these 19 operations was USD 3.8 billion, against

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<sup>63</sup> United Nations Security Council 1996 (8 July 2011).

<sup>64</sup> United Nations Security Council 2155 (27 May 2014)

<sup>65</sup> *Intergovernmental Authority on Development-IGAD (2014). Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.*

<sup>66</sup> WFP (2013). South Sudan Country Strategy (2014-2017).

<sup>67</sup> For this reason, 2011 data on beneficiaries and distributions are not included in the graphs below

which WFP has received approximately USD 2.6 billion – or 65 percent of requirements (Annex H).

33. Development of the WFP portfolio in South Sudan has been shaped by the evolving context, leading to a significant transition in its approach. The immediate post-independence period saw WFP reorienting the emphasis of its portfolio from relief to rehabilitation and developmental objective, whilst the outbreak of the South Sudan civil war in December 2013 has reversed this process.

34. Following independence, South Sudan's development partners initially aimed to align with the objective of state building. In line with this goal, emergency operation (EMOP) 200338 (January 2012 to December 2013) had a twofold objective: i) safeguard lives and livelihoods and ii) contribute to peace and stability during South Sudan's post-independence transition period, by helping to re-establish self-reliance among food-insecure and conflict-affected populations. The main activities implemented under EMOP 200338 were: (i) general food assistance (GFA) to conflict-affected populations, (ii) food distributions and a cash reintegration package to returnees, (iii) nutrition support to those with tuberculosis (TB) and HIV, (iv) nutrition support to moderately malnourished children aged 6-36 months, malnourished children aged 6-59 months, and pregnant and lactating women (mother and child health nutrition support - MCHN), (v) school meals for primary school-age children and take-home rations for girls in highly food-insecure areas with poor enrolment and retention rates, (vi) food and cash-based incentives for community asset-creation projects (food assistance for assets - FFA) as well as market development interventions with purchase for progress (P4P) activities.


35. Several special operations (SO) were launched immediately post-independence with a developmental purpose. SO 200379, for a feeder road construction in support of WFP operations in Southern Sudan, commenced in March 2011. SO 200267 for logistics augmentation in support of the strategic grain reserve (SGR) in Southern Sudan also commenced in July 2011.

36. PRRO 200572 commenced in January 2014. This operation was designed to mark a shift from unconditional food transfers towards a more resilience-focused programming. The main activities were i) food assistance for assets, with food or cash-based transfers, ii) general food assistance, especially to refugees, iii) nutrition support to those with tuberculosis (TB) and HIV, iv) nutrition support to prevent and treat moderate acute malnutrition for pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and their children and v) school meals for primary school-age children and take-home rations for girls. The operation also implemented the P4P initiative.

37. With the start of a widespread armed conflict in the three Greater Upper Nile region states in December 2013, WFP launched the regional immediate response (IR)-EMOP 200656 for a period of three months. The aim of the operation was to rapidly respond to the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within South Sudan and South Sudanese refugees who had crossed borders into Ethiopia.

This was followed by EMOP 200659 (January 2014 – September 2015). The objective of the EMOP was to respond to immediate food and nutrition needs of people living in the three conflict-affected states (Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile) and in those sheltering in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites. The EMOP included targeted nutrition programmes as well as the provision of milling and value vouchers especially for the internally displaced persons.

Figure 6: South Sudan WFP portfolio overview (2011-2016)



38. In October 2015, EMOP 200859 (October 2015 - September 2016) succeeded EMOP 200659. It focused on the three conflict-affected states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile as well as internally displaced persons sheltering in UNMISS Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites and other settlement locations. A new IR-EMOP 201007 was launched in July 2016 for a duration of three months, to deliver high-energy biscuits to 45,000 internally displaced persons displaced due to the renewed conflict in Juba.

39. WFP also implemented an additional 12 special operations (SO) to provide common services to the humanitarian operation in South Sudan under the UNMISS umbrella, as well as directly supporting WFP EMOPs and PRRO. These were:

- Support to cluster coordination: SO 200423 and SO 200775 to support the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster (coordinating the food security sector); SO 200361 and SO 200778 to support the Logistics Cluster, (providing logistical expertise, coordination and transportation of humanitarian cargo.); SO 200931, SO 200399 and SO 200791 supported the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (provides necessary telecommunication services).
- SO 200341, SO 200523, SO 200634 & SO 200786 support the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), through which WFP provides the humanitarian community with air transport services. SO 200702 supported WFP internal air operations.

### **1.3.3 Thematic Components of the Portfolio**

40. **Emergency Preparedness and Response.** A significant component of the WFP portfolio under review has been in assisting populations affected by conflict and recurrent climatic shocks through general food assistance. This has comprised caseloads of returnees, internally displaced persons (including beneficiaries housed in UNMISS Protection of Civilian camps) and refugees. A portion of this caseload has received cash-based transfers in lieu of in-kind food aid, this applies mainly to refugees and internally displaced persons who have received both value and milling vouchers as well as cash.

41. **Health and Nutrition.** Nutrition programmes provided under EMOP 200338 included targeted supplementary feeding programmes (TSFP) plus blanket supplementary feeding programmes (BSFP) during the lean months for the resident population, internally displaced and refugees. In terms of gender, nutrition treatment programmes focused on pregnant and lactating women, with a large BSFP programme established under EMOP 200659 alongside general food assistance.

42. PRRO 200572 supported targeted both supplementary feeding programmes (TSFP) and BSFP. In addition, community nutrition volunteers (CNVs) received a composite food ration (cereals, pulses, vegetable oil and salt) as incentive for their help in identifying malnourished children and mothers and for passing on messages on good nutrition in their communities.

43. **Food Security, Livelihoods and Resilience.** WFP supported a mix of food assistance for assets and food assistance for training (FFT) initiatives in South Sudan. Food assistance for assets beneficiaries were involved in constructing bridges and dikes, rehabilitating classrooms, excavating water ponds and clearing land, with many activities explicitly designed to include or benefit women. These assets were designed to improve livelihoods, natural resource management and increased resilience to climate disasters.

44. **School Feeding.** This area of the portfolio aims to provide on-site school meals. In cases where the gender gap in enrolment exceeds 15 percent, schools can be included in the “girls incentive programme”, which provides take home rations at the end of each term. Where possible, complementary activities include blanket deworming, the improvement of school latrines and hand-washing facilities, the provision of water points and school gardens, and the installation of fuel-efficient stoves. Priority is given to schools in areas with high poverty and low food security indicators, below-average enrolment rates for girls and long walking distances.

45. Part of the period to be evaluated coincided with the implementation of the P4P Pilot Initiative (2009-2013), which included a significant capacity development component, largely implemented through partnerships. It was aimed at providing farmers with the necessary technical skills and inputs to increase yields and reduce post-harvest losses.

46. **Capacity Development.** Capacity development of Government of the Republic South Sudan (GoSS) institutions included support to building capacities for early warning and food security assessment (Annex J) and nutrition and health policy development (Annex K). The potential for WFP to work in Government of the Republic of South Sudan capacity strengthening has declined substantially since the start of 2014.

### 1.3.4 Beneficiary Coverage and Food Assistance


47. It is estimated that WFP assistance has reached more than 20 percent of the population<sup>68</sup> of South Sudan annually. Further breakdown of the beneficiary data for 2011 - 2016 indicates that general food assistance is the largest component of the portfolio under review, accounting for 64 percent of beneficiaries, with 22 percent receiving supplementary feeding, 9 percent school feeding and the balance attributed to smaller numbers of food assistance for assets and food assistance for training (Figure 7). Over the evaluation period, WFP has assisted an average of 2.8 million people per year – or 91 percent of the targeted beneficiaries (

48. Figure 8). Target groups include host populations, internally displaced persons, returnees and refugees.


### Figure 7: Planned (left) and actual (right) beneficiaries by activity (2011-2016)

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<sup>68</sup> 12.34 million (2015). World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan>




**Figure 8 : Beneficiaries assisted by year (2012-2016)**



Source: SPRs 2011-2016

49. Between 2012 and 2016, WFP distributed an average of 170,000 metric tonnes of food per year – or approximately 50 percent of the estimated annual cereal deficit. However, whilst the planned level of deliveries nearly doubled over this period, actual yearly deliveries remained largely static (Figure 9). Consequently, the percentage of targeted quantities of food delivered has fallen from nearly 80 percent in 2012 to under 45 percent in 2016.

**Figure 9: Metric tonnes of food distributed (2012-2016)**




Source: SPRs 2011-2016

### 1.3.5 Funding of the Portfolio

50. From 2011 to 2016, WFP South Sudan operations received donor contributions of USD 2,642,072,566, against a gross requirement of USD 3,848,422,131. Figure 10, below, shows the funding trends across the evaluation period. The top three donors have been: USA, who contributed USD 1,408,026,700; UK, with a contribution of USD 243,948,111; and European Commission, who allocated USD 208,818,471.

**Figure 10: Funding trends for South Sudan operations (2011-2016)**



Source: WFP Government Partnerships Division database


51. In comparative terms, funding of WFP operations in South Sudan has been good. Average funding by operation type ranges from 57 percent of total emergency operation requirements met, to 72 percent and 77 percent of special operations and PRROs respectively.<sup>69</sup> Regular programme activities and special operations accounted for 81 percent and 19 percent of total requirements of USD 3.8 billion, respectively. Special operations financed common services to support humanitarian operations,

<sup>69</sup> This calculation includes the 2017 requirements of on-going operations so is an underestimate of the final percentage of requirements met.

including cluster operations, air transport services through the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), and support to agricultural development (feeder roads and the establishment of a strategic grain reserve), (Figure 11).

52. However, funding at the individual operation level varied considerably and has varied from 112 percent of requirements for special operation 200523 (provision of humanitarian air services in Republic of South Sudan) to 20 percent of requirements for special operation 200267 (logistics augmentation in support of the strategic grain reserve in Southern Sudan). A full breakdown of funding is given in Annex H.

**Figure 11: Proportion of programme versus special operations 2014-2017**



### 1.3.6 Evolution in WFP Corporate Context

53. The WFP strategic plan for 2017-2021 aligns the organization’s work to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.<sup>70</sup> This framework explicitly seeks to maximize WFP contribution to governments’ efforts towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, including building resilience for food security and nutrition. Responding to emergencies and saving lives and livelihoods – either through direct assistance or by strengthening country capacities – remains prominent and WFP commits to working to develop capacity, exit operations and phase-out or transition programmes to national or local ownership and control.

54. The Strategic Plan 2017-2021, supported by revised financial and corporate results frameworks, guides the preparation and implementation of country strategic plans.<sup>71</sup> Under the WFP Internal Road Map approach, current programme categories and project documents will eventually be replaced by country strategic plans. These country plans will introduce results-focused portfolios of context-specific activities that address humanitarian needs and enable long term development.

55. Until now, country strategy documents have been voluntary and internally endorsed, without submission to the Board for approval. The new approach foresees an interim country strategic plan that examines approaches to achieving zero hunger, followed by formulation of a WFP Country Strategic Plan. Using a portfolio approach to country-level planning, WFP intends to integrate the strategic orientation of its

<sup>70</sup> *Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, United Nations, 2015

<sup>71</sup> Policy on Country Strategic Plans, Third Draft, Informal Consultation, 25<sup>th</sup> July 2016, WFP.

assistance with performance management and budgeting processes to improve linkages of strategic, programme and operational planning.

## **2. Evaluation Findings**

56. The main evaluation findings are organized and presented according to the three main areas of enquiry specified by the ToR (Annex B). Within each of these three sections, the evidence is organized under sub-headings that correspond to the evaluation questions agreed for the evaluation matrix (Annex D).

57. This section draws on detailed evaluation findings in four thematic areas: (i) logistics, (ii) emergency preparedness and response, (iii) nutrition and health and (iv) food security, livelihoods and resilience. Annexes J, K, L & M provide a more in-depth presentation on these topics.

### **2.1. Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning<sup>72</sup>**

#### **2.1.1 Relevance to Humanitarian and Developmental Needs**

58. South Sudan presents an extremely challenging, complex and constantly evolving operating environment. Several major transitions can be identified during the period of the evaluation that required significant adaptations in WFP strategic alignment and portfolio. WFP has had to adapt to three main phases:

- i. State-building in the post-independence phase from 2011
- ii. Responding to sudden onset emergencies from December 2013 onwards
- iii. Adapting to a multi-year crisis

##### *i. State building post-2011*

59. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, and subsequent moves to independence, ushered in a period of relative peace where WFP, in common with other development partners, sought to support the establishment of a new state. New elements were introduced into the WFP portfolio to reflect this change in context:

- The feeder road programme (SO 200379), introduced in March 2011 and initially justified on the grounds of improved access for logistics, was reoriented to promote local procurement by increasing farmers' access to agricultural inputs and access to markets.<sup>73</sup>
- SO 200267, which started in July 2011 supported the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to develop a policy framework for the effective implementation of a National Strategic Food Reserve (NSFR), had relevance to both stimulating growth in the agricultural sector and enable timely responses to emergencies.
- The initial emergency operation (EMOP 200338, January 2012 to December 2013) sought to reposition and transition WFP to a more developmental role. This had a twofold objective to i) safeguard lives and livelihoods and ii) contribute to peace and stability during South Sudan's post-independence

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<sup>72</sup>See also [Figure 6](#)

<sup>73</sup> SO 200379 Project Document, WFP, 2011

transition period by helping to re-establish self-reliance among food-insecure and conflict-affected populations.

60. WFP invested in defining a new developmental/strategic approach through the formulation of a country strategy<sup>74</sup> to consult and build consensus and partnership. The development of the country strategy was a year-long process conducted through an external facilitator that involved some 200 to 300 consultations in all states with government and international partners.

61. This country strategy underpinned the design of PRRO 200572. The PRRO aimed to move away from support to food insecure populations through general food distributions, to more sustainable solutions of improving community resilience and livelihoods, expanding market access and the food chain and enhancing access to social services that support good nutrition and learning.<sup>75</sup> The PRRO included a range of activities – food assistance for assets, conflict mitigation and peace-building, school feeding and capacity development.

62. WFP support to school feeding is strongly relevant to the developmental needs of South Sudan. As discussed above, (sub section 1.2.3 Poverty and Access to Services), attendance levels at schools are low and dropout levels are high. Food for education programmes have the potential to improve the very low attendance and retention of children at primary and secondary schools, as well as contributing to an increase in the number of new qualified teachers. However, under the PRRO, school feeding is presented under Strategic Objective 4: Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger<sup>76</sup> and school feeding is targeted to areas of food insecurity rather than low attendance.

#### *ii. Relevance to acute needs*

63. The resumption of large-scale hostilities in December 2013 created a large increase in emergency caseloads. WFP responded to this change in context through a rapid and largely appropriate reorientation in its portfolio under EMOP 200659.

64. Given the South Sudan country context, the adaptation of nutrition in the WFP portfolio has been relevant. Initially, this focussed on programmes for treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition programmes (TSFP and BSFP), both among the resident population and internally displaced persons (including in the UNMISS Protection of Civilians sites), and in the refugee camps. This evolved into a key focus on improving the reach-out to conflict-affected areas through rapid response teams. These teams undertook BSFP alongside general ration distributions but also TSFP through repeated “monthly” visits to the same locations,<sup>77</sup> alongside prevention and treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) through static sites in more stable areas.

65. WFP also scaled up operations to provide the common services of logistics and coordination. This included the provision of air services through UNHAS and support to the logistics, emergency telecommunications, food security and livelihoods clusters. Ongoing insecurity, in conjunction with the poor transport infrastructure, has left the

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<sup>74</sup> Country Strategy 2014 – 2017 South Sudan, WFP, 2013

<sup>75</sup> PRRO 200572 Project Document 2013

<sup>76</sup> PRRO 200572 Project Document 2013

<sup>77</sup> For static sites, the approach is to do TSFP for a duration of 90 months. As much as possible, the same approach was applied to sites covered through the rapid response teams.

humanitarian sector with limited options to deliver lifesaving cargo to people scattered across the country.

66. At the same time, WFP actively sought to maintain a “twin track approach”, where WFP was committed to maintain its work on rehabilitation and recovery wherever possible, particularly in the non-conflict areas. The PRRO initially focused on assistance in the non-conflict-affected areas of South Sudan, whereas the EMOP was tailored to the emergency activities to be implemented within the conflict areas. Support to school feeding continued where possible – and this remained a relevant component of the portfolio. While the conflict has affected education provision, an education cluster assessment in 2016 found that 75 percent of schools remained at least partially functional and that a lack of food was the main reason for non-attendance at school as well as dropping out of school.<sup>78</sup> WFP also decided to continue with both the P4P and feeder road programmes, although the latter became harder to implement due to slow decision-making by government, shortage of WFP engineering staff in-country and reduced access along some main trunk roads (e.g. to Wau).

### *iii. Responding to a multi-year acute emergency*

67. The evolution of the crisis is – and remains according to stakeholders - highly unpredictable. The negotiation of a transitional peace agreement in August 2015 brought hope that there would be a resumption of development activities. However, as articulated by one interviewee, the peace agreement is not functioning as it is meant to – nor has it completely collapsed. Increasingly, the crisis is taking on the characteristics of a multi-year, protracted crisis. Insecurity and conflict is now widespread, involving all the major tribes. The numbers of food insecure continue to grow on an annual basis with well over half the population in need of humanitarian assistance (see [table 1](#)). Governance is seriously compromised by the collapse in government finances and suspension of donor-development funding – as witnessed in the collapse of the health programme following the suspension of the World Bank pooled fund. There was a consensus of interviewees that even in the best-case scenario a recovery will take years, whilst the more likely scenario is a continuation or worsening of the crisis.

68. The process of writing a new WFP Interim Country Strategy Plan started in 2017. WFP staff indicated that the rewriting of the country strategy was not considered earlier, as the existing document was considered adequately flexible to meet the emerging needs. WFP managers acknowledged that the day-to-day demands of coping with an acute emergency had crowded out space for strategic planning. While elements of an adapted strategic approach are included in the EMOP and PRRO, in the absence of an overarching common vision, very different opinions were evident amongst WFP staff on key strategic choices.

## **2.1.2 Coherence with the national agenda and policies**

69. As South Sudan is a new nation, there was a limited body of national technical policies for WFP to align.<sup>79</sup> The key national document governing development is the SSDP, which states that “Achieving rapid rural transformation to improve livelihoods and expand employment opportunities” is one of its four strategic directives. Raising crop production through increased crop area and productivity was given high priority,

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<sup>78</sup> GoSS. Ministry of Education (2016). Education Cluster Assessment. [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/education\\_cluster\\_assessment\\_south\\_sudan\\_nov\\_2016.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/education_cluster_assessment_south_sudan_nov_2016.pdf)

<sup>79</sup> WFP has been influential in developing national policies see [section 1.2](#) for details.

but food security is not specifically mentioned in the plan. Where available, WFP strategies and approaches were generally well aligned with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan positions. WFP strategy aimed at the gradual integration of humanitarian health relief operations into a regular community health system as was laid down in the Government of the Republic of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015 and is consistent with the Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) guidelines.

70. Where formal policies were less well defined, interviews with the respective ministry staff found a broad perception that WFP objectives were largely coherent with national positions:

- The main counterparts for WFP are the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)<sup>80</sup> – both expressed that there was a good alignment.
- Until recently, the Ministry of Agriculture did not have a clear policy. However, it has recently adopted its Irrigation Development Master Plan (IDMP) and Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan (CAMP).<sup>81</sup> The agricultural assets created and training carried out under food assistance for assets, P4P and feeder roads are both aligned with these overall goals and supported by ministry staff.
- The school feeding and support for students at teacher training colleges has been closely aligned with the aims of the Ministry and was strongly endorsed by them during interviews.
- Suitable routes for feeder roads are selected by a steering committee led by the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges. Roads are built to standards agreed with the Ministry.

71. The resumption of conflict in 2013 has constrained the capacity of WFP to align with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan. There has been a large reduction in the capacities of the Government to formulate and implement policy. Furthermore, given WFP commitment to the principles of neutrality and independence, the nature of the relationship with the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (as one of the active participants in the conflict) is necessarily nuanced.

### **2.1.3 Coherence with United Nation Partners, Bilateral Partners and NGOs**

72. The SSDP provided a common reference point for both the UNDAF 2012-2016 and WFP Country Strategy, which ensured a high degree of coherence at the United Nations level. WFP was reported to have actively collaborated in the development of the UNDAF. However, an UNDAF evaluation<sup>82</sup> found that, while there was some joint programming by United Nations agencies, this was not done in the context of the UNDAF and that the UNDAF was not used as a platform for joint-resource mobilisation. This weakened its usefulness as a programming framework for United Nation agencies. This general finding appears to hold true for WFP – the evaluation

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<sup>80</sup> Prior to its establishment in 2006, the RRC comprised two separate factions that were merged, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (RRA) that was an organ of the SPLM, and the Relief Association for South Sudan (RASS), a unit of Riek Machar's militias from 1991 to 2003 (see [section 2.2](#) paragraph 99)

<sup>81</sup> [http://open\\_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12233607.pdf](http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12233607.pdf)

<sup>82</sup> Richard Chawara and Philip Ajang, *Evaluation of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for South Sudan UNDAF (2012 – 2016) Nov 2015*.

found that the UNDAF was used as a vehicle for communication, rather than stimulating new strategic alignments or operational collaboration.

73. WFP has been an active player in formulating and implementing the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), which replaced the UNDAF in two of the five ICF outcomes areas. However, the frame of reference for the Interim Cooperation Framework was judged by the evaluation team to be limited. It focuses on transitional support to recovery and resilience until a new national development framework is in place, rather than articulating a strategic plan to respond to a multi-year acute crisis. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) compiles most of the interventions and pledges of the South Sudan response, including those of WFP. However, the Humanitarian Response Plan was acknowledged, by senior United Nations staff in South Sudan, as essentially a funding document rather than a strategic framework.

74. In evaluating the collective humanitarian response in South Sudan, the *Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE)* also found that: i) strategic planning was inadequate including limited inclusion of the views of affected populations, and (ii) its use of programme cycle management was low, as outcomes were not identified or measured.

75. The *2013 Food Security and Nutrition Information Network (FSIN) Capacity Assessment* stated “the evidence suggests that humanitarian clusters are the only significant for a, both at national and state levels, where food security information is validated and discussed among key stakeholders to support policy decisions.”<sup>83</sup> The evaluation found that some clusters have played an important role in strategy development. The nutrition cluster has been highly effective in developing a common strategy. From the partners’ perspective (NGOs, United Nations agencies, and donors), the main reference document is the *South Sudan Updated Nutrition Cluster Response Plan*<sup>84</sup> that was elaborated in July 2014. The document builds on the nutrition cluster strategy that was defined during the May 2014 revision of the *South Sudan Humanitarian Crisis Response Plan*.<sup>85</sup> For the emergency telecommunications cluster (ETC), a common technical strategy was determined, as part of the ‘Delivering as One’ United Nations<sup>86</sup> approach, which fostered a sustainable ICT common-services model to follow the closure of the emergency communications cluster.

76. In contrast, samples of minutes from steering and user group meetings of the logistics cluster indicate that most coordination meetings are focused primarily on short-term tactical and operational issues. They inadequately consider longer term strategic requirements such as: joint food pipeline<sup>87</sup> management, cost sharing of common logistics services, infrastructure improvements to enable a transition from expensive air cargo services, and how to foster, rather than crowd out, the development of the private sector.

77. WFP has also worked on a bilateral level with other United Nations agencies to develop common strategic approaches. While UNICEF is the primary United Nations agency working in education, WFP has worked with UNICEF to identify opportunities

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<sup>83</sup> *Capacity Assessment of South Sudan Food Security and Nutrition Information Systems* November 2013

<sup>84</sup> Ref. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/nutrition>

<sup>85</sup> UNOCHA (2014), *South Sudan Crisis Response Plan (CRP)*, June 2014

<sup>86</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/>

<sup>87</sup> Note: The evaluation team observed that donors such as USAID support food pipelines that are independent from the WFP pipeline (such as for CRS). In this case, close inter-agency coordination is critical to maximize the use of logistical resources and avoid poorly coordinated distributions to certain areas (an example of this was observed in Akobo in January).

to reinforce the value of the school feeding programme in the field by adding education programmes related to hygiene and nutrition.

78. There have been several joint United Nations agency reflections on building resilience. A platform for a joint United Nations programme on resilience and recovery, centred on Aweil and Bor, was established in 2015. The intention was to establish a joint programme using common funding. WFP led a resilience context analysis in preparation for this. However, the events of 2016 disrupted the process as many local partners who were needed to lead the activities were displaced by renewed insecurity. WFP, FAO and UNHCR collaborated in developing a joint resilience strategy for refugees, but this plan was not endorsed by senior managers of these agencies. WFP, UNHCR and FAO commitments to resilience-building in refugee settings in South Sudan are embedded in the Joint Plan of Action, which was endorsed by senior management of all three agencies in 2016.

79. All donors identified a common core interest in preventing severe food insecurity and support in principle of efforts to decrease aid dependency and conditional approaches to wean beneficiaries off semi-permanent food handouts. Donors were unanimous in their support of resilience activities. However, there were very different understandings of the strategic approach to building resilience, with some donors strongly supporting a more in-depth, multi-agency and multi-year engagement with communities to ensure a longer-lasting effect of the interventions.<sup>88</sup> Several key donors were particularly supportive of the use of cash-based transfers (CBTs), including ECHO and DFID.

#### **2.1.4 Areas of Comparative Advantage**

80. The WFP Country Strategy for South Sudan – whilst re-orientating WFP to a developmental role – identified and sought to capitalize on comparative advantages of: emergency response, deep field presence, purchasing power, food security analysis, strong relationship with communities and logistics. The evaluation largely concurred with the internal analysis. WFP has an unrivalled ability to go to scale to meet needs on a national basis: in conjunction with its partners, it dominates the provision of general food distributions in South Sudan. WFP is also the designated United Nations organization for treatment of moderate malnutrition. It has the advantage of high leverage potential due to its size, well-established procurement and logistics functions, and the ability to offer an integrated food and nutrition package. This extends from in-depth analysis of needs and underlying causes, provision of emergency nutrition support, to more preventive approaches.

81. The capacity for emergency response is underpinned by WFP South Sudan's multi-modal logistics capacity. The common logistics services (UNHAS and the logistics cluster), hosted by WFP, are key to the success of the overall humanitarian operation, particularly regarding the needs of smaller national and international organisations. In both roles, WFP logistics can provide a critically important, flexible and neutral delivery service throughout the country that is backed up by robust processes to negotiate safe access to sensitive areas of need.<sup>89</sup>

82. Other associated areas of comparative advantage include a deep field-presence, including a nationwide network of staffed sub-offices and operational field teams. This

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<sup>88</sup> Source: Interviews with representatives of UK, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and USA.

<sup>89</sup> Access negotiations conducted by WFP logistics augment those of OCHA and local negotiations undertaken by NGOs. The access negotiation unit is widely viewed by stakeholders as the best in-country.

is more usually a comparative advantage of NGO partners. However, in the South Sudan context, WFP has demonstrated a high-risk tolerance, which has enabled it to project a presence into difficult-to-reach areas.

83. In addition, WFP has demonstrated a comparative advantage in the developmental areas of food assistance for assets and school feeding. WFP has considerable experience in designing, implementing and managing these programmes in many countries for more than 50 years. WFP has a comprehensive collection of manuals, standard operating procedures, policies and evaluations to support these programmes and many staff worldwide who are familiar with the standard methodologies.

84. While WFP corporately has a long-standing and extensive experience in the planning and delivery of traditional food assistance for assets, the concept of resilience is relatively new and the experience of WFP country offices is limited. WFP has developed a policy on resilience<sup>90</sup> and is now learning how to incorporate the approach into programme design, implementation and management. Corporate policy highlights the need for greater community involvement from the planning stage, longer-term approaches, the layering of inputs from multiple agencies and the measurement of long-term results.

85. The comparative advantages of WFP in building roads is debatable. It has significant experience in South Sudan, but road construction is not central to the WFP mandate and WFP staff pointed to a relative lack of in-house expertise in engineering and administrative procedures that are not geared to large infrastructure projects. These comparative disadvantages translated into delays in implementation.

### **2.1.5 Trade-Offs between National Strategies and WFP Policies**

86. The main challenge faced by WFP in reconciling corporate and national policies has been in the promotion and protection of humanitarian principles. Key principles that WFP subscribes to under this policy<sup>91</sup> include i) impartiality (WFP assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion) and ii) neutrality (WFP will avoid taking sides in a conflict and will not engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Food assistance will not be provided to active combatants). Under the humanitarian access policy,<sup>92</sup> WFP requires the free and unimpeded movement of humanitarian personnel to conduct impartial assessment of the needs of populations at risk and the delivery of assistance to respond to those needs.

87. Restrictions on movements were frequently imposed by both the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and those in-opposition in contravention of these principles. In the first nine months of 2016, more than 640 humanitarian access incidents were reported. However, well informed stakeholders did not see widespread systematic attempts by authorities to restrict humanitarian space.<sup>93</sup> The key WFP counterparts in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (MoHA) and IO led GOSS are well-versed in humanitarian principles – and expressed a willingness to defend them

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<sup>90</sup> *Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition*, WFP, 2015

<sup>91</sup> See WFP (2004) *Policy on Humanitarian Principles*

<sup>92</sup> See WFP (2006) *Humanitarian Access and its Implications for WFP*

<sup>93</sup> Important exceptions were noted, including the on-going restriction of access to the rural hinterland of Wau town.

– as many of the staff were previously employed by either NGOs or United Nations agencies.

88. Consequently, WFP has, in general, managed to serve beneficiaries ostensibly based on need, in both the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and IO areas and has been able to continue to work across lines, serving IO areas from a Juba base. It is debateable whether WFP engages in equivalent levels of development activities in GOSS and IO areas - including school feeding – but this is not strictly required by the humanitarian principles.

89. Although UNMISS Force Protection is mandated to provide security escorts for food convoys, WFP has avoided the routine use of force protection in deliveries and this has helped to project its neutrality. Commercial<sup>94</sup> and WFP truck convoys and river barge movements are not escorted, although this may be needed should the security situation further deteriorate. At a practical level, the availability of vehicles and personnel is sometimes limited, often resulting in delays or cancelled convoys, which also influences WFP decisions.

90. When political pressure was exerted on WFP in both Government of the Republic of South Sudan and IO areas, it was largely perceived (both internally and in the views of Cooperating Partners (CPs) that WFP resisted. WFP appears cognisant of the potential of food resources being used to control the movements of populations for political ends<sup>95</sup> and the need to mitigate the risk of forced recruitment of children, when large populations gather to receive food assistance. The construction of one of the WFP feeder roads was reportedly halted over fears that it could be used to facilitate the movement of troops.

91. In the current context, it is extremely hard for all actors – not just WFP – to prevent the transfer of a proportion of the humanitarian resources into the war economy. There was no evidence that WFP was negligent in allowing any of the various authorities or militias to gain direct access to the resources under its direct control. However, repeated references were made, by a range of interviewees, on the capture of aid resources by various military authorities. For example, ‘taxes’ are paid by commercial truck drivers contracted by WFP at the numerous checkpoints they pass through. Considering the volume of food that WFP moves by truck and the number of trucks involved, these taxes amount to a significant amount.<sup>96</sup> Official and unofficial taxes are reportedly proliferating, including forced contributions from salaries of NGO staff, illegal landing fees and the introduction of charges for local ‘work permits’ for international staff working in a range of organizations.

## **2.2. Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making**

### **2.2.1 Use of Food Security, Nutrition, Gender and Protection Analyses**

92. The country office has carried out a range of data collection and analysis to support strategy development, including the inter-agency FSNMS, IPC analyses, market assessments and refugee livelihoods analyses. Gender issues are addressed

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<sup>94</sup> Companies operate at their own risk and are accountable for any losses incurred.

<sup>95</sup> For example, the IO in Akobo expressed a desire to ensure that populations do not leave the country for Refugee camps but are encourage to remain within their areas of control. Equally the Government of the Republic of South Sudan reportedly favour concentrating population in some urban areas and may resist distributions in the neighbouring rural areas.

<sup>96</sup> Drivers of 40 MT trucks interviewed in Bentiu reported that at each checkpoint between Juba and Bentiu (there are currently 85 in total) they are required to pay 1,000 – 1,500 SSP (USD 10 -15 at current rates) and provide 1.5 litres of fuel. Usually they pay the same amounts for the return trip.

through the country office gender strategy and protection is covered by the protection strategy, context analysis and field mission reporting.

93. Other ad hoc surveys have been conducted to support programming. Examples of ad hoc surveys include:

- a study on food security and nutrition among people living with HIV/AIDS in 2015,
- the “Juba Urban Food Security & Nutrition Assessment -September 2016”,
- the “Food Security Assessment for Mingkaman in November 2015”<sup>97</sup>,
- the “South Sudan Western Trade Corridor in Hyperinflation Times - Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warrap – 2016/2017”<sup>98</sup> and
- the “Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to shocks that impact food security and nutrition in South Sudan - November 2015”.<sup>99</sup> <sup>100</sup> Some of these reports are carried out by WFP staff, while others are subcontracted to NGOs such as ACTED and World Vision.

94. An understanding of the drivers of undernutrition in South Sudan is still lacking. For example, there is relatively little information on the role of caring practices and micro-nutrient deficiencies. This has resulted in a dominant focus on treatment of acute malnutrition, among both WFP and other nutrition partners. There has been relatively limited attention on other nutrition interventions within the WFP Nutrition Policy. This includes, for example, the prevention of chronic malnutrition, addressing ‘hidden hunger’ (micronutrient deficiencies), and more integrated food and nutrition packages together with other sections within WFP South Sudan’s Programme Unit. The *Integrated Food and Nutrition Security Comprehensive Analysis* (IFANSCA)<sup>101</sup> study is currently being implemented in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap to fill this gap, and to serve as basis for further nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programming.<sup>102</sup>

95. WFP South Sudan appointed a full-time protection officer who assessed protection issues in relation to WFP activities. In February 2016, a baseline survey was carried out on protection among WFP South Sudan Staff.<sup>103</sup> The main issues regarding protection were seen to be:

- crowd control at distribution sites, including managing large lines of beneficiaries (54 of 92 total respondents = 59%)
- safety issues for beneficiaries travelling to and from distribution sites (particularly women) (59%)
- protection concerns related to children (48%)
- issues with local authorities only allowing certain groups to participate (47%)

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<sup>97</sup> *Juba Urban Food Security & Nutrition Assessment*, WFP, September 2016

<sup>98</sup> *South Sudan Western Trade Corridor in Hyperinflation Times - Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warrap*, WFP, 2016/2017

<sup>99</sup> *Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to shocks that impact food security and nutrition in South Sudan* – WFP and others, November 2015

<sup>100</sup> See also under EQ4

<sup>101</sup> *Integrated Food & Nutrition Security Causal Analysis* (IFANSCA) Study, Warrap and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, South Sudan, Study Protocol, June 2016 - a collaborative effort involving MoH, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, FEWSNET, SCI, ACF, and the Sudd Institute.

<sup>102</sup> The study was on-going during the country visit of the evaluation mission and results were not yet available.

<sup>103</sup> 112 respondents

- concerns related to women (harassment, overburdening of women during activities, exclusion in community meetings) (45%)
- disrespect to beneficiaries by making them wait a long time for distribution in the sun (45%).

96. This analysis influenced programme design, including the decision to further decentralize distributions to avoid women walking over long distances to collect food and the suspension of the use of vouchers in the Juba Protection of Civilian Camp. The baseline has been subsequently complemented by monthly monitoring data.

97. WFP South Sudan developed a Gender Strategy (2015-2020), which has been guided by the Republic of South Sudan Gender Policy (2012) and anchored on the WFP Gender Policy (2015-2020). This strategy sets targets for female staff ratios and the training of staff, cooperating partners and government officials on adaption of food assistance to different needs, equal participation in programmes and decision-making by women and girls in general, and aspects of gender and protection. It makes gender and age analysis a prerequisite.

### **2.2.2 Developing National and Partner Capacity**

98. WFP was found to have contributed to building national capacities for the monitoring and analysis of food insecurity and nutrition. Relevant initiatives included:

- The engagement of a wide partner network – including the Government of the Republic of South Sudan Ministries, United Nation agencies and partners – in WFP FSNMS.
- One international consultant and one national consultant were placed in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to support IPC analysis. A well-received IPC training was provided by vulnerability analysis mapping (VAM) to the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). WFP also worked with the National Bureau of Statistics on FSNMS assessments. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan officially own the IPC process.
- WFP collaborated with other agencies in 2015 to produce a Resilience Context Analysis<sup>104</sup> to better target resilience building to areas of repeated crisis. This supported efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development (MAFCRD) to develop a framework for evidence-based resilience programming in South Sudan.
- The *Juba Urban Food Security and Nutrition Assessment* was a collaborative activity of the National Bureau of Statistics with support from FAO, UNICEF, WFP and Juba Administrative Authorities.
- The IFANSCA study in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap.

99. In order to foster a shared understanding of needs, WFP has actively disseminated information on food security conditions in South Sudan. Reports include: The Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis, Comprehensive Food Security Assessment and Mapping (CFSAM) Annual Reports, Food Security and FSNS Monitoring Reports, IPC Updates, Early Warning Reports Regional Impact Updates, Priority Needs and Strategy Review and special focus briefs.

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<sup>104</sup> Resilience Context Analysis Resilience to shocks that impact food security and nutrition in South Sudan November 2015

100. WFP has contributed to policy and capacity development across a range of counterpart ministries, although many of the policies remain in draft form:

- WFP and UNICEF contributed to the development of national guidelines for CMAM<sup>105</sup>. The document is ready to be adopted by the Government of South Sudan.
- The WFP South Sudan Food and Nutrition Strategy for HIV and TB Programmes<sup>106</sup> has recently been drafted with the view to be fully aligned with the South Sudan National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan 2013 – 2017.<sup>107</sup>
- During 2011 to 2013 WFP engaged with the Ministry of General Education and Instruction in the development of a national school feeding strategy but it remains in a draft form.
- Support was provided to the SSRRC on the drafting of a Disaster Risk Reduction policy.
- The emergency telecommunications cluster (ETC) has offered training and capacity building services<sup>108</sup> to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan Ministry of Telecommunications on the development of draft policy and regulations.
- Under the P4P programme, WFP has equipped, trained staff and paid the running costs for a food quality laboratory to identify grain samples that are contaminated with aflatoxin.
- WFP sub-offices still work closely with state ministries for both the selection and prioritisation of food assistance for assets activities but also, where possible, in capacity building.
- WFP supported the development of the South Sudan Low Volume Roads Manual<sup>109</sup>, which provides a uniform national standard for the construction of low volume roads in the country. Capacity development activities<sup>110</sup> were implemented for government staff seconded from the State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure on basic road construction and maintenance activities.
- The WFP Aviation Safety Unit organized several workshops with key stakeholders including the South Sudan Civil Aviation Authority to review the air traffic management system to reduce operating risks,<sup>111</sup> aviation security, aircraft ground handling, dangerous goods and customer service.
- UNHAS has also provided security equipment, such as metal detectors, to the civil aviation authorities and has reviewed airfield and ramp safety standards, further providing support for airstrip rehabilitation.

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<sup>105</sup> MoH (2016), *Guidelines for Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (final draft)*, Juba, December 2016.

<sup>106</sup> WFP South Sudan (2016), *Food and Nutrition Strategy for the HIV and TB programmes in South Sudan (Final Draft)*, Juba, December 2016.

<sup>107</sup> Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2013), *South Sudan National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan 2013 – 2017 “Towards the achievement of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment and care by 2017”*.

<sup>108</sup> Information gathered from former ETC personnel

<sup>109</sup> Published by the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges in 2013

<sup>110</sup> SPR 2015 report for SO 200379

<sup>111</sup> UNHAS SPRs reviewed for Special Operations: 200341, 200523, 200634, 200702 and 200786

101. Partnership and capacity building with government agencies were strong during the period 2011 to 2013, but since 2014 it has proved more difficult to engage with government. The sub-division of the previous 10 states into 32 – many with no staff or infrastructure – has further complicated the task. However, interviews with Government of the Republic of South Sudan staff indicated a perception that WFP continued to engage where possible.

102. WFP has hosted or supported a series of advocacy events (such as National and International Girls Education Day, International Rural Women's Day, World Food Day), and holds meetings with academia, mothers, school children and parents to inform them on what WFP does to ensure gender equality in its country programme. WFP raised the need for advocacy around World Rural Women's Day, through the media, at the United Nations Gender Technical Group. While this was endorsed, it was mainly WFP that undertook media activities. For the first time, in September 2015, South Sudan radio stations organized discussions and programmes around this day.

103. WFP brings cooperating partners once a month to a meeting which includes the sharing of information and learning experiences. Heads of sub-office also have partner meetings. Donor representatives highlighted that they experienced very good interactions with WFP through bi-weekly donor meetings, on which occasions they received debriefs and updates, including challenges and needs for additional support and extra funding.

### **2.2.3 Factors determining Strategic Choices**

104. The evaluation found that a complex interplay of factors drove the strategic choices made by WFP. Many of these have been identified and discussed in the preceding sections. The WFP mandate, strategy and policies provide the starting point. This has been married with an analysis of the humanitarian and development needs, the capacities and priorities of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and a reflection on WFP comparative advantages in South Sudan.

105. Inevitably, the WFP strategy considers the availability of resources. Overall donor pledges to WFP operations have been good, averaging 61 percent<sup>112</sup> of the required amount across all operations. At the start of this year, WFP operations are already 70 percent funded for the first six months of 2017 and WFP is anticipating 90 percent funding by the end of the year. While overall access to resources is not currently a major constraint, it has constrained specific activities, at specific times. Financing of standalone special operations for the food security and livelihood cluster (FSLC) coordination has been sporadic and the recent decision to integrate this activity within the emergency operations provides a logical development. In the current environment donors indicated that new funding of the feeder roads operation was unlikely. While the immediate resourcing situation is relatively good, the longer-term prospects are far less certain. DFID, ECHO and USAID anticipated - at best - no increase in resources in the coming years.<sup>113</sup>

106. The declaration of South Sudan as an L3 emergency in February 2014<sup>114</sup> is viewed by WFP managers as helpful in mobilizing resources, both internally and externally, as the L3 status helps to denote the severity of the crisis. Internally the L3 declaration

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<sup>112</sup> WFP Government Partnerships Division (PGG) Dashboard, see also [Annex H](#).

<sup>113</sup> These interviews were conducted prior to the declaration of the Unity famine in February 2017.

<sup>114</sup> While the system level L3 has been revoked, WFP continues to classify South Sudan as an organization level L3 emergency.

allowed the Country Director to meet with the WFP Strategic Task Force and hold discussions with the WFP Executive Director and Directors of Technical Units on a regular basis. This access to senior decision makers was reported to have facilitated the prompt resolution of pipeline issues and prioritization in the use of WFP forward financing instruments.

107. The country office indicated that logistics and pipelines constraints, as well as widespread insecurity, place an effective upper limit on the size of the operation in South Sudan. This constraint is particularly apparent for air drops, but also affects ground transport. This corresponds with the finding that WFP food deliveries have not managed to scale up in line with the doubling of planned deliveries between 2013 and 2016 (

108. Figure 8). The proposed opening of new corridors from northern Sudan, which coincidentally currently has large sorghum surpluses, would radically alter this equation.

109. Staffing constraints also place significant limitations on WFP capacity to take appropriate strategic decisions. During the evaluation period, key positions have proved problematic to fill through the reassignment process, including the Head of Programmes,<sup>115</sup> the Head of Logistics and Head of VAM. WFP has had to rely disproportionately on personnel recruited on short-term contracts.<sup>116</sup> Opportunities among short-term staff for training and career progression are relatively limited, providing few incentives for staff to think and act innovatively and strategically. Due to shorter postings in hardship areas, vitally important capacity, in terms of skilled and experienced staff, is rapidly rotated out of country.

110. In the early days of the crisis, the L3 roster helped temporarily fill several staff positions, but worked less well for functions such as logistics and nutrition. WFP does not have a standing capacity for surge deployments and roster deployments inevitably results in gaps being left in the office from where staff are mobilized. While obligations for release of staff are built into the WFP roster, the length of their release remains the prerogative of their managers. As South Sudan is a well-established emergency there seems little justification for continued reliance on surge rosters - rather than using routine Human Resources procedures.<sup>117</sup>

111. There is a consensus that the reassignment process is failing to rotate the right calibre of fixed-term staff into South Sudan in a timely manner. While HR is aware of the issue and has made changes to require that WFP staff include hardship posts every six years in their reassignment applications, the early indications from the latest reassignment process is that this may not resolve the problem. Other changes in terms and conditions<sup>118</sup> have eroded the incentive of senior mid-career staff to deploy to South Sudan. Furthermore, the rules governing the recruitment of short-term and consultant staff are placing a large administrative burden on the country office.

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<sup>115</sup> The Head of Programme was temporarily filled by a series of secondments for two years prior to November 2014.

<sup>116</sup> HR Evaluation Data 31 December 2016

<sup>117</sup> The continued L3 status has helped the WP CO through a no poaching rule that means that WFP South Sudan staff cannot be called away to another L3 crisis – such as Nigeria.

<sup>118</sup> For example, due to system-wide changes in the United Nations, staff no longer receive assistance in basing their families in neighbouring countries.

## 2.2.4 Risk Analysis and Mitigation<sup>119</sup>

112. Risks are analysed and mitigated by the South Sudan Country Office in line with corporate procedures through several mechanisms:<sup>120</sup>

- The WFP Country Office Director makes assurance statements once a year on internal control, which includes risk assessment. This is based on a self-assessment checklist and control plan completed by country office functional managers.
- A risk register is maintained as part of the Annual Performance Plan (APP) process. Mitigation actions are included by function.<sup>121</sup>
- The WFP compliance officer is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the WFP Emergency Preparedness and Response Package (EPRP). The EPRP focuses on mitigating the effects of contextual risks that affect on-going operations, or which give rise to a need to launch new ones.
- An online EPRP tracker is used to monitor progress in implementing minimum preparedness actions in each of the main functions.

113. The WFP Country Office has identified key threats to the performance of the organization in South Sudan and assigned risk levels based on their likelihood and their impact on the operations in the country. Political instability, economic decline and poor infrastructure were identified as the main contextual risks. Delays in procurement and funding, and the capacity of cooperating partners were identified as the main programmatic risks. Inefficient organizational structure and lack of staff skill-sets, and non-compliance with core financial procedures were identified as the main institutional risks. Against these identified risks, a comprehensive set of proposed mitigation measures has been proposed by the country office. However, there is no evidence that this has stimulated action. The country office has no central repository of previous risk assessments and there is no monitoring against the mitigation plan.

114. Additional country-based risk assessments and mitigation measures have been developed by the country office to support routine operational decision making. A robust risk analysis is carried out for all prepositioning sites each year and a transport strategy established.<sup>122</sup> In high-risk areas, or where procurement delays mean that deliveries are not feasible during the prepositioning window, food and non-food transport is provided through a 'just in time' approach. This normally requires the use of aircraft to either air drop or air lift commodities to distribution sites. Since 2014 (when a United Nations Mi8 helicopter was shot down near Bentiu), a more robust process of flight-safety assurances<sup>123</sup> was put in place. The inherent risks and levels of insecurity have prompted WFP to base a flight security officer in Juba to identify and manage the risks involved, including on-going monitoring of operators.

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<sup>119</sup> See also *2016 Audit Report and Management Response*

<sup>120</sup> In the country office, there seems to be no system or central repository in place to maintain files of previous APP, Risk Register, and Assurance Statements.

<sup>121</sup> Main functions: Programme, logistics, human resources, finance, security, administration, ICT, food and non-food procurement, legal, communications, pr and advocacy, and management.

<sup>122</sup> In 2016, the prepositioning exercise was able to achieve 85% of the planned requirements, or 102,550mt out of total 120,900mt.

<sup>123</sup> A FSA is a clearance document that indicates that the Government has assured the safety of a flight. FSAs must be obtained before any flight can be dispatched. UNHAS must acquire approved FSAs from the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM).

115. An appropriate and difficult balance is required between managing risks – and documenting the measures taken to analyse and mitigate risks to demonstrate accountability – and maintaining the necessary flexibility and risk appetite to facilitate efficient operational capacity. WFP was seen to have a healthy risk appetite for the context with some room for improved documentation of risk analyses.

## 2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results

### 2.3.1 Effectiveness of the Main WFP Programme Activities

116. A full analysis of the effectiveness of the different thematic areas of the WFP South Sudan portfolio is presented in Annexes J, K, L, M and N and the main findings are summarized below.

#### Targeting

117. Since 2014,<sup>124</sup> WFP planning on the number of food insecure people to target annually for *in situ* general food assistance is based on the IPC estimation of the number of people in phases III, IV and V – adapted based on more recent displacements and nutritional updates.<sup>125</sup> The stated method involves targeting the whole population in phases 4 and 5 and a variable proportion (which varies by both geography and year) of up to 50 percent of the phase 3 population. In theory, this provides transparency for the basis of the caseload, the assurance of a multi-agency process to confirm the figures<sup>126</sup> and is under the technical leadership of government. The IPC figures also provide a common basis of planning for other United Nations agencies. In addition to addressing the needs of rural populations, WFP aimed to provide monthly distributions to refugees and internally displaced persons in camps. Detailed data available to the evaluation team did not allow independent verification of the degree of coherence between the IPC figures, protection of civilian camps and refugee numbers with general food assistance beneficiaries as the different caseloads could not be clearly distinguished. However, the data does indicate a broad coherence between needs and GFA distributions ([Table 3](#)).

**Table 3: Numbers of highly food insecure people and general food assistance by year**

Year	IPC phase 3,4,5	IPC phase 4,5	GFA
2014	3,525,283	1,123,446	2,155,700
2015	3,808,000	911,000	1,822,067
2016	4,093,000	1,013,000	2,266,445

118. Limitations of the IPC process are acknowledged and linked to the overall challenge of providing concrete data in South Sudan. The last census of the area was conducted in 2008 and all population data since that time has been based on projections. The widespread displacement during the conflict has proved immensely difficult to track. A further limitation is that the sampling frame for both the IPC and FSNMS is only reliable at state level. This makes it difficult to use the data for planning

<sup>124</sup> In 2011 - 2013 the estimation was based on the FSNMS data.

<sup>125</sup> WFP staff indicated that for planning of distributions the IPC/FSNMS data was overlaid firstly with an analysis of access, security and partnership presence. Secondly, it was adjusted based on rapid assessments of recent displacement.

<sup>126</sup> If WFP developed the estimate independently it would leave them open to accusations of bias.

distributions, given that needs inevitably vary significantly within states. WFP was found to rely quite heavily on local authorities to identify areas of needs, especially given absence of NGOs on the ground. It is recognised that there is a wide margin of possible error in these calculations,<sup>127</sup> but the evaluation views them as the best available estimates.

119. WFP managers reported that targeting took account of the severity of food insecurity through more frequent distributions in areas of higher food insecurity. The aim is to target beneficiaries in protection of civilian camps and internally displaced person camps most regularly on the assumption that they are entirely dependent on food assistance, with less frequent distributions to areas classified as IPC phase 4 and least frequently to IPC phase 3.

120. The qualitative observations from the evaluation field trips suggested that, in some communities provided with general distributions, there are significant differences in food security at household level. An approach of introducing food assistance for assets with 'light' conditionalities – to replace general food assistance – was seen in OXFAM distributions in Akobo. The conditions - such as attending literacy classes - appeared to be geared to adding value to the transfer and inclusive caseloads appear to have been maintained.

121. A range of surveillance products are used to establish nutritional caseloads. WFP nutrition response planning has been done in close collaboration with UNICEF and the overall nutrition cluster, based on Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey data and the annual IPC results. WFP and UNICEF joint projections on caseloads for curative nutrition programmes (SAM and MAM treatment) primarily have been based on the results of the SMART surveys undertaken under the aegis of the nutrition cluster. From 2014 onwards, the projections of county, state and national-level caseloads for the nutrition programmes were fine-tuned based on the results of the annual IPC assessment exercises. There is a degree of inconsistency between the nutritional surveys and IPC surveys and nutritional assessments – with the IPC assessments reaching a more pessimistic conclusion on food insecurity. The FSNMS looks at gender differences in food consumption patterns and surveys the extent of wasting (based on mid upper arm circumference (MUAC) <230mm) in women of childbearing age. The diet and childcare practices of infants and young children are also recorded. In the refugee camps malnutrition is closely monitored through UNHCR-led surveys and the information used as a basis for planning.

122. Food assistance for assets is geographically targeted based on FSNMS and IPC data within the constraints imposed by funding and security. Because the FSNMS cannot provide accurate data below state level, the communities are chosen in consultation with local authorities. Targeting of beneficiaries is carried out based on surveys carried out within the community by the cooperating partner (CP) and after consultation with community leaders. Community members interviewed during the field visits reported a fair selection process.

## **Outputs**

123. WFP has provided general food assistance, including cash-based transfers to large numbers of beneficiaries in each of the last five years through three EMOPS and


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<sup>127</sup> OCHA, Humanitarian Needs Overview (2016).

the PRRO, with an average attainment between 2012 and 2016 of 117 percent ([Figure 12](#)).

124. WFP demonstrated an impressive ability to scale up emergency operations swiftly in response to successive crises. Following the events of late 2013, the scaling up of emergency distributions started in January 2014. It has also managed to distribute food in insecure areas. Over the period 2014 to 2016, WFP introduced and increasingly deployed the mobile rapid response mechanism (RRM)<sup>128</sup> in insecure areas where NGO partners had withdrawn from a static presence. This proved to be an important innovation that contributed to the relatively even coverage of needs achieved. It was also reported to be a significant improvement on the alternative of remote management, which provided little control over the distribution of food commodities.

**Figure 12: Number of general food assistance beneficiaries (actual and planned) by operation**



Source: CO SPR

125. Beneficiaries and partners complained that WFP food distributions throughout the evaluation period were unpredictable and pipeline breaks were frequent – including distributions to refugees. The full food basket was not consistently delivered – for example, where vegetable oil was sent in advance of food commodities. Salt was reported to be consistently missing. Staple commodities were not always well adapted to local dietary preferences or the quality was questioned – for example camp residents in Bentiu asked for yellow or white sorghum in preference to red sorghum from Rwanda. WFP rations are not standardised with, and by one community interviewed judged inferior to, International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) rations, which caused some issues in transitioning caseloads.


126. Regarding nutrition, the total number of children covered by targeted and blanket supplementary programmes implemented in South Sudan has steadily grown over the years<sup>129</sup> ([Figures 13](#) and [14](#)). The initial focus was developmental and planning figures for targeted supplementary feeding programme was low. In 2014, it was

<sup>128</sup> WFP and UNICEF and others established the IRRM, the mobile team, to provide food assistance, and health and nutrition support to remote, difficult-to-access internally-displaced people fleeing the conflict between government and anti-government forces. The IRRM can reach most areas of the country and benefits from credibility based on neutrality. In the first year of operation the IRRM delivered GFA, BSFP, TFSP and emergency livelihood kits to 46 locations.

<sup>129</sup> The graphs indicate the total number of planned / actual beneficiaries per year over the various operations and among both resident population, IDPs, and in the refugee camps. For EMOP 200859 and its predecessor EMOP 200659 which both comprised parts of 2015, the highest figures have been taken as if these represent the full year.


realized that actual needs were much higher and this was translated into higher planning figures. The actual scaling up required an expansion of geographical coverage through contracting additional implementing partners. For various reasons, this could not be realized all at once. The performance of the blanket supplementary feeding programme was better: it is relatively easier to scale up a blanket feeding programme than a targeted feeding programme as the blanket supplementary feeding programme was piggybacked onto the general food assistance distributions.

**Figure 13: WFP South Sudan targeted supplementary feeding programme 6-59 months planned vs. actuals**



Source: SPRs 2011-2016

**Figure 14: WFP South Sudan blanket supplementary feeding programme 6-23 / 6-35 / 6-59 months**



Source: SPRs 2011-2016

127. In the first years of the country portfolio (2011-2013) the outputs of the targeted and blanket supplementary programmes fell short of targets. This was associated with insecurity, poor partner capacity and low coverage in combination with pipeline breaks. From 2014 onwards, there has been a major shift in approach, which has led to better results with substantially increased numbers of beneficiaries, despite the increasingly difficult operating environment. Major efforts were taken to scale up coverage in the conflict-affected Greater Upper Nile areas in 2014 (EMOPs 200659 and 200859), among others, through deployment of rapid response teams, and through the establishment of a large blanket feeding programme. The non-conflict areas was primarily on the TSFP, but also with higher numbers reached through the BSFP programme.

128. South Sudan has not been a conducive environment for the use of cash-based transfers. Widespread insecurity creates protection challenges. Markets are weak and poorly integrated. There are few financial service providers and no electronic money transfer facilities. Hyperinflation and a tumbling exchange rate, coupled with the unwillingness of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to authorise reimbursement of traders in USD constrain the ability of traders' import commodities.

Community leaders have often been resistant to the use of CBTs for a variety of reasons. Consequently, the distributions are short of target (Table 4). Cash-based transfers are currently used for approximately 114,000 beneficiaries in the Mingkiman internally displaced persons camp and to 15,000 beneficiaries in Akobo County support by Oxfam and WFP. The use of cash-based transfers in Juba protection of civilian camp was suspended in July 2016, based on protection concerns related to attacks on women leaving the camp to buy food from the wholesale market. However, cash-based transfer activities in the PRRO have been consistently more successful than in the EMOPs, achieving an average of 60 percent of target.

**Table 4: Cash based transfers by operation and year (USD) 2014-2016**

Operation	Year	Planned	Actual	% Actual v Planned
EMOP 200659	2014	19,750,000	0	0
PRRO 200572	2014	1,903,750	1,324,038	69.5
EMOP 200659	2015	29,700,000	7,195,289	24.2
EMOP 200859	2015	4,927,500	1,866,422	37.9
PRRO 200572	2015	5,596,048	2,680,640	47.9
EMOP 200859	2016	25,469,100	9,562,581	37.5
PRRO 200572	2016	6,000,000	4,102,201	68.4
Overall		93,346,398	26,731,171	28.6

Source: SPRs

129. The WFP country office has been a consistent advocate for the progressive scale up in the use of cash-based transfers as an alternative to in-kind general food assistance. WFP managers argued that it was important to maintain the capacities and systems for cash-based transfers so that they could be scaled up rapidly if and when the context became more conducive for their use.

130. On average, the food assistance for assets programme has reached more than 80,000 direct participants per year – equivalent to benefiting 560,000 household members. Participants receiving cash for assets were 12 percent of food assistance for assets beneficiaries in 2015 and 14 percent in 2016. The food assistance for training programme only operated in 2013 and 2014, and almost 35,000 participants were involved, with an estimated a total of 244,000 beneficiaries. Planned versus actual numbers are given in Table 5. Funding constraints, pipeline breaks and localized insecurity were quoted in the standard project reports as the main causes of underachievement. Interviews highlighted that when there is competition for pipeline resources the food assistance for assets is displaced by general food assistance as life-saving interventions are prioritized.

**Table 5: Participant numbers in food assistance for assets and food assistance for training**

Year	Planned male adults	Planned female adults	Planned total adults	Actual male adults	Actual female adults	Actual total adults	% Actual v Planned (male)	% Actual vs Planned (female)	% Actual vs Planned (total)	% Actual female vs actual (total)
Food Assistance for Assets										
2012	70,018	64,632	134,650	39,268	27,288	66,556	56	42	49	41
2013	86,262	79,626	165,888	57,212	52,811	110,023	66	66	66	48
2014	38,940	35,945	74,885	35,684	32,939	68,623	92	92	92	48
2015	37,692	37,693	75,385	24,360	32,292	56,652	65	86	75	57
2016	40,662	45,852	86,514	55,835	55,836	111,671	137	122	129	50
Food Assistance for Training										
2013	0	0	0	4,346	4,012	8,358				48
2014	15,756	14,544	30,300	13,317	13,167	26,484	85	91	87	50

Source: Operation SPRs, WFP

131. The outputs achieved by the feeder road programme during the evaluation period include the construction of 195km of the planned 800km of roads, the maintenance of 30km (out of 80km planned) and repair of 16km (out of 122km planned). Five roads have been completed and another 41 km of road and 20 structures on two other roads are ongoing. The quality of the completed roads, according to independent experts, is reported to be excellent.

132. Delays in the programme have been numerous, because of the lengthy selection process and a lack of engineering staff in the WFP office (particularly between 2013 and 2014). Procurement procedures within WFP have also caused delays, as competitive non-food expenditures above USD 500,000 require headquarter approval.<sup>130</sup> An important bridge at Kuajok with 6km of approach road is still at the contracting stage, as its design and contracting have proved highly problematic for WFP. Several projects remain on hold or have been abandoned resulting from security issues.

133. The P4P pilot project ended in December 2014 and was incorporated into the PRRO. From 2015 onwards, the P4P activities are reported<sup>104</sup> to have supported 136 farmer groups and purchased 462 metric tonnes from 13 of these groups, mostly in Equatoria. This equated to less than 10 percent of the food procured locally by WFP and less than 1 percent of the total food needs of WFP in South Sudan. Twelve

<sup>130</sup> Depending on the procurement process used (CO information).

warehouses, each with a capacity of 300 metric tonnes were built during the pilot programme to facilitate the aggregation of cereal stocks for commercial sale. A maximum of 10 percent of this capacity has been used. The spread of insecurity to the Equatoria region has curtailed activities in 2016.

134. The school feeding programme has reached an average of 300,000 children per year under two EMOPs and the PRRO – equivalent to an estimated 20 percent of all primary school children in the country. A national survey, organised by the education cluster in 2016, found that WFP school feeding programmes were operating in 13 percent of the schools sampled.<sup>131</sup> Despite the low attendance of girls at school, the school feeding activity has managed to achieve an overall 44 percent participation by girls by including 8 percent of the total participants received the girls' incentive. There was less evidence of fulfilment of associated secondary activities. The output indicators state that nearly 900 classrooms have been rehabilitated, but there is no evidence of the other anticipated activities, including the improvement of school latrines and hand washing facilities, the provision of water points, school gardens and the installation of fuel-efficient stoves.

135. Although initially the institutional feeding programmes (IFP) on nutrition support to patients undergoing treatment for TB and HIV/AIDS served considerable numbers of beneficiaries, the programme contracted sharply in 2015. This was caused by a reduction of clinics served due to a decision to only continue to serve sites with continued Anti-RetroViral drugs ARV deliveries. The coverage of the programme increased again in 2016, with several new sites added. However, the problem of the high treatment defaulting rate has not yet been solved.

136. Table 6 shows the key performance indicators for the logistic cluster since 2014. Annual targets are consistently exceeded. In total 120 partners have benefited from emergency telecommunications cluster (ETC) services<sup>132</sup> since its inception. Between 2012 and 2016 UNHAS has transported 68,000 to 88,000 passengers annually.

**Table 6: Logistics cluster key performance indicators**

KPI	Target	2014	2015	2016
No. of national and field cluster coordination meetings conducted	65	50	63	93
No. of information products produced and shared per month	150	124	170	201
No. of transport destinations	70	72	85	76
Mt moved through common services	6,000	6,033	5,837	6,640
Warehousing capacity (cbm) made available to partners	11,000	5,666	11,200	12,160
No. of users of the logistics cluster services	80	91	94 (79% NGO)	117 (83% NGO)

<sup>131</sup> GoSS. Ministry of Education (2016). Education Cluster Assessment. [https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/education\\_cluster\\_assessment\\_south\\_sudan\\_nov\\_2016.pdf](https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/education_cluster_assessment_south_sudan_nov_2016.pdf)

<sup>132</sup> The main objective of the emergency telecommunication cluster is to provide security radio telecommunications and information and communications technology services to the humanitarian community by building and maintaining reliable internet-connectivity networks and IT services

## Outcomes

137. The extent to which WFP activities met their objectives was assessed against the four objectives of the country strategy. WFP received uniform commendation from donors, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and IO authorities for meeting emergency food needs. It was argued that episodes of severe food insecurity in Greater Upper Nile in 2014-2015 did not deteriorate into famine - and the WFP general food assistance response can logically be attributed with at least part of the credit for this. Outcome indicators are recorded for all operations but, as there have been three different emergency operations over a six year period with varying beneficiary groups (internally displaced persons, returnees, people in camps and the severely food insecure), it is impossible to observe trends in the performance.

138. The common services were a critical component of WFP emergency effectiveness:

- Donors, such as Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), DFID and ECHO, and a wide range of users,<sup>133</sup> regard the logistics cluster as having effectively played an essential role in enabling over 80 users within the humanitarian community to deliver their emergency response programmes in the conflict-affected states and in supporting humanitarian logistics coordination needs in South Sudan.<sup>134</sup> According to a survey conducted in December 2015, the user satisfaction rate was 88 percent
- Interviews with a wide range of stakeholders have confirmed that the UNHAS special operations (2011 - 2016) played a critical role in supporting the humanitarian community in South Sudan. As well as providing a reliable, scheduled passenger transport service to multiple locations in South Sudan, UNHAS played a critical role in reducing risks to humanitarian staff working in remote locations by providing a prioritised medical and security evacuation service
- The emergency telecommunications cluster operations meet and exceed targets for service quality. An online survey of members conducted in September 2016 showed a significant improvement in user satisfaction against the last available baseline data (December 2014): 83 percent were satisfied with the HISP service, 92 percent were satisfied with the provision of radio communication services and 84 percent were satisfied with radio programming services
- The Food Security and Logistics Cluster has generally met its output indicator targets although in 2016, because of the conflict in Juba, the number of meetings and training courses held was below target.

139. Despite limitations, cash-based transfers have been an efficient and effective part of the emergency response. Cash-based transfers are significantly more cost efficient (Annex N) than in-kind transfers. Cooperating partners and beneficiaries pointed out that the cash-based transfers were more predictable and timely, as they circumvented the pipeline constraints associated with in-kind distributions. Monitoring shows that vouchers greatly enhance food consumption scores (FCS) and dietary diversity scores

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<sup>133</sup> Based on interviews conducted with IOM, United Nation agencies and NGOs in Juba (January 2017)

<sup>134</sup> First activated in Southern Sudan in late 2010, the logistics cluster employs a team of 20 staff (all consultants, 60% national staff). The cluster coordinator is responsible for managing an annual budget of approximately USD 27 M

(DDS).<sup>135</sup> The field mission observed that cash has stimulated the local economy – traders in locally produced food are more common in Aweil than was the case one or two years ago.

140. Nutrition outcomes - as measured by the recovery rate - were good. The importance of the scaled-up blanket supplementary feeding programme coverage was identified by stakeholders as an important element of the overall effectiveness of WFP operations. For example, this could help explain why the total number of new targeted supplementary feeding programme admissions in 2016 just grew by 17 percent although the number of targeted supplementary feeding programme sites more than doubled. A sector indicators overview for South Sudan, published by UNHCR in April 2015, indicated that the performance of the nutrition programmes in the refugee camps generally is satisfactory, with global acute malnutrition rates ranging from 7.9 percent to 15.2 percent. In two of the camps in Upper Nile, operational challenges appeared, with delays in the provision of food/nutrition items, and a specific lack of nutrition products for both under-fives and pregnant and lactating women. This has led to many new admissions to both severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatment programmes, with recovery rates below standard.<sup>136</sup>

141. There were mixed results in building livelihoods and resilience. Assets created under the food assistance for assets activities included land clearance, agricultural activities, road maintenance and the construction of classrooms, fish ponds and post-harvest storage. Full details of the assets are given in Annex J. Beneficiaries, cooperating partners and state-level government all strongly supported the programme in principle and valued the assets, particularly the dykes, roads and training. Investments in knowledge and skills were strongly valued by beneficiaries who reported that the training that they had received assisted them to solve problems for themselves and therefore become less dependent on aid.

142. The quality of some of the assets in the food assistance for assets programme was doubtful. It was observed and reported that the technical ability of the field staff of the Cooperating Partners and WFP was insufficient to design and successfully implement the larger infrastructure projects, such as roads several kilometres long and substantial flood-prevention dykes. This has reportedly led to flooding and premature structural failure in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. It was reported by a cooperating partner that the farmer field schools created under the food assistance for assets were not as successful as those created under the food and agricultural organization's agricultural programmes. This was because the beneficiaries were selected for their food insecurity rather than their experience or enthusiasm to take part in food assistance for assets activities.

143. An ambiguity remains in differentiating the outputs expected from the food assistance for assets activities as they span Corporate Strategic Objective 2 (restore livelihoods and improve household food security through asset creation) and Corporate Strategic Objective 3 (build resilience). At the implementation level, it is difficult to distinguish whether the activity is meant to meet short-term food security needs or build household and community resilience. Most stakeholders agree that building resilience requires a sustained engagement with the community. However, food assistance for assets interventions have been short term – lasting up to six

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<sup>135</sup> 43% HHs receiving vouchers reported 'good' FCS scores and DDS of 3.6 compared to 16% and 2.6 respectively for in-kind beneficiaries. WFP CO M&E presentation to donors, 2016.

<sup>136</sup> Ref: <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/download.php?id=2068>

months duration. The current design of field-level agreements with cooperating partners do not enable them to maintain contact with the beneficiary communities for the whole year, let alone multi-year commitments. Nor was there good evidence of successful multi-agency layering of resilience-building actions designed to meet a wide range of community needs – a key principle of the 2015 WFP Resilience Policy.<sup>137</sup>

144. Progress in enhancing market access and value chains has been limited. Quantitative evidence is missing and anecdotal evidence indicated that there has been little positive impact on agricultural production from the feeder roads. The lack of a well-maintained trunk road system reduces the value of the feeder roads and puts them at risk if they are used by heavy vehicles to bypass the trunk roads. Further anecdotal evidence identified unintended negative consequences for the environment through establishing a market for uncontrolled charcoal extraction. Experience gained from WFP in an earlier eight-year special operation for trunk road rehabilitation and maintenance programme indicated that benefits constructed roads were short-lived because the roads were not maintained - and the same risk exists for this programme.

145. P4P objectives in the original project document were to: 1) reduce transportation costs of WFP food deliveries to facilitate food assistance, 2) support the P4P programme by linking farmers to markets and 3) support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in the development of its road network, linking production areas to markets and thereby lowering food costs and improving food security. WFP has trained farmers and productivity gains have been made but are not yet high enough to ensure that farmers can profitably supply local cereal grain markets. The lack of effective transport links between the main areas of supply and demand remains a major constraint. The sustainability of the warehouse management and farmer groups is uncertain. There have not been links between the feeder roads and food assistance for assets activities. From a WFP logistics' perspective, the feeder roads programme has had limited value in reducing food transport costs largely because the areas of acute food needs and feeder road construction do not coincide and the feeder roads do not always link to trunk roads.

146. WFP has made a significant contribution to enhancing access to basic services in support of learning. The school feeding programme was highly valued for its achievements by central government, state government, beneficiaries, teachers and parents. Despite fluctuations in enrolment and retention associated with changing insecurity, the school feeding programme has repeatedly shown positive results particularly on retention – with reported retention rates of 99 percent in 2013, 92 percent in 2014, 89 percent in 2015 and 78 percent in 2016. The programme has also contributed to gender parity, partly through the girls' incentive initiative which is highly valued. Providing this in the form of cash would reduce transport constraints in some circumstances. The effectiveness of school feeding depended heavily on a package of complementary interventions and it was not clear that the school feeding programme was operating under a strong inter-agency strategic framework.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

147. WFP South Sudan faced challenges meeting corporate minimum monitoring and reporting requirements, especially on outcome level data. Insecurity on access and coverage partially limited the ability of WFP to collect reliable data. In addition, highly volatile conditions made it difficult to interpret the results obtained and identify trends

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<sup>137</sup> *Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition*, WFP, 2015

from the data. Regular and more standardised reporting and mainstreaming of monitoring and evaluation were introduced in 2015. While weaknesses in the country office monitoring and evaluation have been partially rectified, there are still areas that require further attention:

- There is little evidence on building the resilience of communities to future shocks. The monitoring systems do not report on either process indicators (how the food assistance for assets approach has been modified to adapt to a resilience-building strategy) or on resilience-outcome indicators (has the latent capacity of the community to respond to future shocks been strengthened?)
- There are no corporate outcome indicators for the special operations except for satisfaction indices. This is a clear weakness at the corporate level. Two surveys were carried out on feeder roads in 2016 and earlier surveys form a baseline survey for four roads and a follow-up for another. While the surveys do provide some evidence of the socio-economic situation, they do not to show the impact of the programme.

### **2.3.2 Efficiency of the WFP South Sudan Programme**

148. The dominant cost driver of the South Sudan portfolio is logistics. The landside transport storage and handling component of the emergency and protracted relief and recovery operations accounts for USD 563 million or 55 percent of the total operational costs (USD 1,014,714) over the period 2013-2016.<sup>138</sup> This percentage is consistent with academic <sup>139</sup> research findings of similar large-scale humanitarian response operations. Therefore, the discussion of overall cost efficiency centres on the efficiency of WFP logistics operations.

149. Critical to this equation is maximizing the much cheaper use of road transport over air transport - to ensure that deliveries take place at the beginning of the dry season in South Sudan when roads are still passable. Effective forward planning is essential, as prepositioning options for various food commodities have very different lead times.

150. The weak trunk road network makes logistics very expensive. According to a World Bank road density study, average truck delivery times in South Sudan are 24 times higher than the current global benchmark; the average speed over unpaved roads is 6.4 km/hour. This results in WFP having to pay very high transport rates. For example, for the route from Juba to Bentiu the cost is approximately USD 350 per metric tonne (for 40mt truck payload).<sup>140</sup> This is more than double the rates charged<sup>141</sup> in neighbouring countries over a similar distance.

151. The evaluation team found that logistics efficiencies have continuously been explored by WFP and several good practices were noted:

- WFP is increasing its capacity to deliver necessary air cargo more efficiently using fixed-wing aircraft in preference to more expensive use of helicopters. Local communities are being engaged in airstrip maintenance (a method used

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<sup>138</sup> This rises to 58% if external transport costs are included. Expressed in another way, LTSH and external transport costs constitute 78% of the non-food costs of the EMOP and PRRO costs over the 2013 to 2016 period.

<sup>139</sup> Van Wassenhove (INSEAD 2006)

<sup>140</sup> *South Sudan Transport Market Assessment 2015 and logistics capacity assessment* <http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/South+Sudan%2C+Republic+of;jsessionid=450D2CE5ADAOB3BE6963CC9068EDB7C6>

<sup>141</sup> Rates similar in DR Congo

during the days of Operation Lifeline Sudan) to increase the outreach via fixed-wing aircraft.

- WFP logistics considers that the three existing transport corridors into South Sudan are insufficient to meet all long-term needs in a timely and cost-effective manner. WFP is advocating that, in line with the current agreement between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan,<sup>142</sup> two additional road corridors be opened:<sup>143</sup> El Obeid to Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal State with direct access to Aweil, and El Obeid/Kadugli to North Unity State with direct access to Bentiu. This would dramatically reduce logistics costs providing year-round road access to critical areas on Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and Greater Upper Nile.
- Using new bagging techniques, supplementary foods such as corn-soya blend can now be airdropped. Furthermore, vegetable oil can now also be airdropped by parachute using a box delivery system, which has saved an estimated USD 14 million per year, as airlift by helicopter is often no longer necessary.<sup>144</sup>
- Approximately 60 percent of trucking needs are contracted out to private sector operators, with transport gaps being filled using the WFP logistics truck fleet. The country office<sup>145</sup> operates a fleet of approximately 200 light vehicles. The majority are now leased under WFP global vehicle leasing programme<sup>146</sup> (GVLP). The corporate fleet management system has been in use since 2015, whereby operational vehicle data is captured and analysed to bring visibility and better control to associated costs (leasing, fuel, maintenance, spare parts, insurance and overhead costs).

152. A generic problem was noted with the poor reliability and timeliness of food aid deliveries, which was directly attributed to frequent pipeline breaks. One challenge observed within the country office is that responsibilities for the commodity supply chain (pipeline for food and non-food) are split between several management functions, with operations (budget and programming) holding the formal role for pipeline management. Due to staff constraints at times during 2016, only two people<sup>147</sup> staffed this critically important function.

153. One of the greatest challenges in ensuring that there is a robust food pipeline available in time for dry season deliveries to support prepositioning is related to major donor resourcing plans and constraints. United States of America's government plans and procurement regulations often delay the timely delivery of food stocks, which in turn can necessitate highly expensive airdrops - that are also funded largely by USAID. DFID also noted that WFP had missed the opportunity to capitalize on the multi-year funding it provides by budgeting funds in the current year for prepositioning in following year.

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<sup>142</sup> A Joint Technical Committee has been established by the two countries

<sup>143</sup> Information based on discussions with WFP South Sudan Logistics and Regional Bureau Nairobi staff. As a result, of the United Nations Famine Declaration (February 2017), the President of the Republic of Sudan has reportedly advised his Ministries to assist in humanitarian deliveries of food to South Sudan. One new corridor from Kordofan to Unity State may be opened on a trial basis.

<sup>144</sup> <https://www.wfp.org/stories/heads-vegetable-oil-falls-sky-south-sudan>

<sup>145</sup> The common services hosted by WFP also use leased vehicles

<sup>146</sup> WFP South Sudan was the first CO to acquire light vehicles from the GVLP.

154. On the positive side, the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) has played an increasing and critical role in ensuring pipeline sustainability for South Sudan operations. Over the past four years over 90 percent of South Sudan's pipeline has been secured through the GCMF.<sup>147</sup> The average lead-time under conventional purchase is 120 days. In the above-mentioned period, GCMF has shortened this gap by 54 percent, driving the average lead time down to 53 days (Annex L). However, stakeholders commented that the GCMF could play an enhanced role if more time-sensitive funding were made available to support the mechanism.

155. The food assistance for assets programme has suffered from serious implementation delays in the last year, partly because of the security situation. The cash distributions in North Bahr el Ghazal in 2016 took place in July, October and December, despite being planned for monthly distributions from March. This resulted in cash not being available during the lean season and considerable hardship to beneficiaries. Seeds and tools were also late for the agriculture components – resulting in some crops not being planted, as the latest planting dates were missed.

156. Other delays in the food assistance for assets programme are under the manageable control of WFP. Delays in the food assistance for assets programmes have also resulted from delayed field-level agreements with cooperating partners. This situation is clearly not an easy system to manage for either party, with consequent gaps in funding for the cooperating partners. Part of the problem is the number of field-level agreements WFP has to manage. In South Sudan WFP has more than 80 partners and more than 100 agreements (field-level agreements with NGOs, and memoranda of understanding with institutions). Initially in 2014, agreements were targeted to activities (general food assistance and BSFP together, TSFP alone, FFA / FFE). This meant that in some cases partners had as many as three agreements or more. The field-level agreements have since been consolidated to reduce the number of agreements per cooperating partner and to concentrate on working with fewer cooperating partners at the county level.

157. WFP carries out market surveys every month to determine market prices. These surveys are used to calculate transfer values for cash-based transfer interventions and to determine the cost-efficiency of different modalities (Annex N). Since the South Sudanese pound has been allowed to float freely, cash-based transfers have been associated with a substantial cost efficiency<sup>148</sup> compared to in-kind transfers, quite apart from secondary impacts on improved timeliness and benefits to the local economy.

158. The introduction of biometric registration systems offers large potential cost efficiency gains – although these have yet to be calculated empirically. The cost of registering a beneficiary into the WFP System For Cash Operations (SCOPE) is estimated at approximately USD 5 per household (HH).<sup>149</sup> The cost of supporting one HH under EMOP 200659 in 2015 was approximately USD 1,000.<sup>150</sup> Therefore, even if SCOPE identified 1 HH in 200 as ineligible (for example due to being simultaneously registered at a second distribution centre), this cost saving of approximately USD 1,000 would cover the costs of the registration exercise for those 200 households.

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<sup>147</sup> According to WFP data the total volume of cash purchases made under South Sudan projects from 2012 till 2016 was 326,540 mt out of which 316,116 mt were made through GCMF.

<sup>148</sup> Alpha values are typically <0.5

<sup>149</sup> Estimate provided by WFP CO Programme team.

<sup>150</sup> A total of 253,903 HHs were supported by the EMOP at a total cost of USD250,490,565

Furthermore, it appears that the use of SCOPE generates ongoing cost savings compared to the use of manual systems due to reduced staff needs.

159. So far approximately 200,000 beneficiaries are registered under SCOPE. Efforts were made to expand the use of SCOPE in 2016 and to some degree this has been successful.<sup>151</sup> WFP collaborates with other agencies operating biometric registration systems including the International Organisation for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix, the UNHCR Biometric Identity Tracking System and the World Vision Last Mile Mobile Solution. Accelerated inter-agency cooperation is acknowledged to be necessary to rapidly expand coverage in South Sudan.

160. Free-to-user and subsidized common services are associated with inefficiencies because of poor planning and coordination amongst users. However, at present, as there is no financial incentive for organisations to plan effectively, aircraft and other assets are sometimes not used efficiently or have to be tasked at very short notice.<sup>152</sup> An element of cost sharing has been introduced by UNHAS. UNHAS charges all passengers USD 275 per seat/flight,<sup>153</sup> which enables an average of approximately 53 percent of costs to be recovered. So far, the air, storage and river transport services are provided free to users by the logistics cluster. In-country staff interviewed advised that introducing a cost-recovery mechanism would provide a stronger incentive for users to better plan and rationalise their service requests. It would also permit greater transparency related to user accountability of donor funds provided for logistics costs.<sup>154</sup>

### **2.3.3 Contribution to the Reduction of Gender Inequality Gaps**

161. The evaluation found strong evidence that the portfolio has effectively integrated gender in line with the established WFP gender goals of providing equality of access and control of food, decision making and livelihood opportunities. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Gender Marker code has been introduced to track the inclusion of gender at the programme level and both PRRO 200572 and EMOP 200859 scored a 2A.<sup>155</sup>

162. Overall, the larger number of WFP beneficiaries were women, on average 1.5 million women per year compared to 1.4 million men. WFP has succeeded in reaching a slightly higher proportion of targeted women beneficiaries (92%) compared to targeted men beneficiaries (88%) (Figure 15). The sum over all years of the men and women beneficiaries are 9.4 million and 10.3 million respectively.<sup>156</sup>

163. Gender aspects are routinely taken care of in the nutrition treatment programmes, as these are focused on pregnant and lactating women, and young children. However, it is less certain that these nutrition programmes function as a mechanism to empower women. The reality is that it easily becomes a burden for women to attend these programmes (for themselves or for their children). It usually

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<sup>151</sup> Based on meetings with the CO programme team and with the SCOPE service support team in Nairobi.

<sup>152</sup> Based on information gathered from logistics cluster staff

<sup>153</sup> This charge was increased in 2016 from USD (?)200 / seat. (SPR 200786, 2016)


<sup>154</sup> Anecdotal information gathered during field visits suggested that some NGOs regard the use of free-to-user services provided by the logistics cluster as an opportunity to save donor funds provided to them for project costs.

<sup>155</sup> A score of 2A denotes that gender analysis has been included in the project needs-assessment and gender is reflected in one or more project activities and one or more project outcomes.

<sup>156</sup> This figure is used to indicate a gender balance only as it is subject to double counting over years. The figures also reflect the greater number of women at many locations due to the war economy, displaced populations etc. Some programmes (eg FFA) report only the gender of participants, where all household members are counted as beneficiaries the gender balance is assumed to be 50:50.

turns out to be time-consuming to attend the bi weekly sessions. It also sometimes requires the women to walk long distances to the nutrition distribution sites. The community is not normally consulted on the design for the nutrition treatment programmes, either men or women.

**Figure 15: Breakdown of beneficiaries by sex (2012-2016)**



Source: SPRs 2012-2016

164. Many of the food assistance for assets activities observed in the field were designed to include or benefit women. These included building roads and dykes, which included everyone in the community, as well as vegetable production and training courses specifically aimed at women. Among the communities visited women were well represented on village bodies that assisted with targeting, chose assets and managed the asset-creation activities. During asset creation, there was evidence that work hours were sufficiently flexible to allow nursing mothers and those with small children to participate.

165. Under the school feeding programme, the girls incentive programme strongly addresses the gender gap in education. It was stated that improving enrolment and retention at school has a disproportionately strong benefit for girls, in that it is believed to reduce early marriage and early pregnancy, but no supporting data was available.

166. Discussions with communities are usually only conducted with chiefs, but WFP calls women and youth into discussions where possible. The gender balance of food committees was observed to be 20 percent female. However, in registrations for food there are inevitably more women than men, due to demographic and conflict dynamics. General food assistance, including cash-based transfers, is targeted to women.

### 2.3.4 Synergies within the WFP Portfolio

167. The strongest and most consistent internal synergy within the WFP portfolio was seen in the integration of the general food assistance and nutrition activities. The combination of general assistance with additional assistance targeted to the most vulnerable groups including children, including through the rapid response team approach, was viewed as a major factor in effectively preventing a large-scale famine event.

168. Synergies are also seen within the different logistics operations. All aircraft contracted through WFP aviation (Rome) – for internal logistics, UNHAS and the

logistics cluster – are pooled under one management function led by the chief air transport officer in Juba. This function oversees daily flight operations and activities, as well as requirements related to aircraft service providers, allowing the WFP logistics department and logistics cluster to focus on aircraft-tasking needs. Further synergies exist between the logistics cluster and WFP logistics whereby transport assets, such as barges, are contracted for use by both entities. The WFP common services also rely on access negotiations undertaken by the country office access team and logistics department.

169. WFP has identified in operational documents numerous other potential synergies within the portfolio - but there was little evidence that it had been able to follow through in realizing its' ambitions. Beyond deworming alongside nutrition interventions, further opportunities for nutrition-sensitive programming were not really reaped, either within the WFP portfolio or in coordination with other partners. As one of the steps towards the establishment of a new WFP South Sudan country strategy, the nutrition section in the country office has recently prepared a concept note on the options for nutrition sensitive programming in South Sudan. This is based on the corporate agreement within WFP to have explicit food and nutrition security objectives within all the programmes.

170. So far, there has been limited focus on integration of nutrition with food assistance for assets. New ideas are to convey key nutrition messages at distribution sites and through community workers, to start up conditional cash/food transfers linked to use of health and nutrition services, and more food-for-training, e.g. linked to literacy programmes. Under food for education (FFE) thinking is being done on how to use the food for education ration. The objectives are to : i) promote better diets and dietary diversity, including improving the micronutrient content of the school meals provided' ii) restart of the assistance to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology for integration of nutrition education elements in the school curriculum, iii) establishment of school gardens and Water and Sanitation (WASH) services in the schools and iv) to scale up the systematic bi-annual deworming programme beyond schools taking part in the school meals programme.

171. There has been little connection between the food assistance for assets, feeder road and P4P programmes to date. The feeder road programme could be enhanced by encouraging commercial agriculture with new links to markets. Food assistance for assets activities could also be encouraged alongside feeder roads to strengthen the resilience of communities. Neither of these has yet happened in part because insecurity has limited the opportunities so far. In addition, in practice food assistance for assets and P4P normally operate in different areas, as food assistance for assets tends to concentrate on food deficit areas while P4P is only appropriate in potential food surplus areas.

172. One of the food assistance for assets activities that communities may choose is to renovate or improve schools so that they qualify for participation in the school meals programme. There was little evidence from the recent field programme that this has taken place and it was stated that communities tend not to select school improvement, as they must pay the cost of skilled labour and non-local building materials.

### **2.3.5 Operational Synergies with Partners**

173. WFP South Sudan has established strong relationships with a wide range of partners, notably other United Nations agencies. WFP collaborates closely with

UNICEF in several sectors. The Integrated Rapid Response Mechanism (IRRM) is an important platform for joint working. Here, WFP provides an entry point through safe access and with food distributions (including supplementary feeding for selected nutrition target groups) acting as a magnet for beneficiaries. As UNICEF said – beneficiaries are unlikely to assemble for vaccinations alone. UNICEF has participated to various degrees by adding vaccinations,<sup>157</sup> screening for moderate acute malnutrition, WASH and education. Over a period of 15 months, 50 joint IRRM missions were undertaken in 40 locations.<sup>158</sup>

174. WFP collaborates closely with UNHCR in refugee operations. The nutrition programmes in the refugee camps are based on tripartite agreements with UNHCR and the operational partner, as per the WFP/UNHCR Global Memorandum of Understanding. Joint assessments and planning<sup>159</sup> for the camps are carried out in conjunction with UNICEF and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). They aim to comprehensively assess needs and plan integrated food assistance, WASH, education, school feeding, agriculture, nutrition, health and logistics. UNHCR noted that overall cooperation is good, although WFP food deliveries have been unreliable because of pipeline constraints.

175. As lead for the camp coordination and camp management cluster (CCCM), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an important operational partner in logistics. IOM coordinates to provide common storage, transport and commodity handling services for logistics cluster partners.<sup>134</sup> The logistics cluster consolidates cargo movement requests and informs IOM of daily requirements; cluster user organizations are then advised on the mode of transport (air, road, and river) and handling arrangements. IOM manages the humanitarian non-food items (NFI) pipeline. This in turn further complements the role of the logistics cluster, which is operationally focused on the movement of non-food cargo (i.e. For the WASH, nutrition, health and protection clusters). Among IOM and logistics cluster team members, it was learned that there is generally good complementarity and little overlap of operations and capacity. WFP further collaborates with IOM in the use of their biometric beneficiary registration system, the displacement tracking matrix (DTM), which complements the WFP electronic beneficiary management system – SCOPE.

176. FAO and WFP have an active memorandum of understanding, which governs their partnership. FAO and WFP work closely together to manage the food security cluster and produce the nationwide food security assessments IPC, FSNMS and CFSAM. Each partner has its clear roles and responsibilities and the food security cluster is now jointly coordinated. Staff at WFP and FAO both reported that, prior to 2014, relations between the two organisations were more difficult, despite the two organisations having similar and closely-related objectives in terms of food security and agricultural development.

177. FAO reported that its funding is currently predominantly emergency related and therefore the scope for cooperation on development programmes is limited. Under the Building Resilience through Asset Creation and Enhancement (BRACE 2)<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> 35% of UNICEF vaccinations have been done through the IRRM

<sup>158</sup> The RRM missions contributed to introducing or reintroducing nutrition partners in 72% of missions.

<sup>159</sup> WFP/UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission (2015) and Joint Plan of Action 2016.

<sup>160</sup> DFID funded – “Building Resilience through Asset Creation and Enhancement 2” a follow on of BRACE in which FAO was not a partner.

programme FAO and WFP jointly work with food insecure populations in Warrap, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States. FAO provides agricultural inputs and training and for agricultural development while WFP carries out food assistance for assets activities with the same communities.

178. FAO is ready to implement projects to support agricultural development alongside WFP feeder roads and to support school garden development where WFP school feeding programmes are already active, but does not have funding available for this work at present. FAO is also unable to carry out joint programming with WFP on P4P activities due to budget constraints.

179. While WFP South Sudan has recognised road engineering capabilities and experience, infrastructure development projects are not a core organisational focus.<sup>161</sup> In this regard, the evaluation team considers that the country office could have collaborated earlier during the project with UNOPS to leverage their comparative advantage as a specialized infrastructure project implementer. For example, as part of the WFP feeder roads project, a bridge at Kuajok was designed, but construction was delayed because of project management challenges and lengthy procurement issues, as well as a failure of the design review consultant to fulfil its contractual obligations. Initial outsourcing of this work could possibly have saved considerable time and funds.

## **Sustainability**

180. The issue of ‘sustainability’ can have a variety of meanings for WFP. Firstly, it can apply to finding solutions for the sustained provision of services formerly provided by WFP. Government, the private sector or other agencies may take on responsibility. Secondly, there is the question of the sustainability of the assets created by WFP operations including feeder roads and FFA assets.

181. Given the severely constrained capacity of the Government of South Sudan, there is little immediate prospect for the ‘handover’ of WFP-led services to national institutions. For the nutrition programmes in South Sudan, sustainability will not be a reality soon. Health centres are still run by county government in Warrap, elsewhere structures have been destroyed and staff dispersed. The treatment programmes are implemented by NGO partners, and capacity development of Government of the Republic of South Sudan staff are still relatively inadequate, due to weak staffing profiles, both at national level in Juba and within the States. It is difficult to gauge whether the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes manage to spread nutritional messages that will have a lasting effect on child feeding practices.

182. The humanitarian needs in South Sudan continue to increase with little opportunity to develop logistics and supply chain mechanisms that do not rely on the international donor community for financial support. The humanitarian situation has further been exacerbated by an economic crisis, which has hampered efforts to find sustainable commercial solutions to operational needs. This situation, combined with continuous challenges in dealing with unpredictable bureaucratic impediments such as customs regulations, and on-going insecurity, mean that the focus has largely been on finding potential improvements to logistics and telecommunications efficiency and cost reduction.

183. The emergency communications cluster set up five satellite-based internet connectivity services at key humanitarian hubs. This transition, from a free-to-user

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<sup>161</sup> WFP does have an engineering support unit at HQ level, staffed with qualified engineers.

data service to a cost-sharing model, was set up in 2015 under the humanitarian internet support project (HISP). The HISP successfully shifted funding for data services to a cost-sharing model whereby charges are split among participating humanitarian organisations, the cluster having brokered services with local and global service providers. By the end of 2016, the HISP solution was working in five locations, with 14 HISP accounts subscribed to by United Nations agencies, 40 by international NGOs and 11 accounts by national NGOs (with a total of 720 registered users). The service will be expanded to three more state capitals in 2017.

184. The viability of the arrangements to maintain the feeder roads are questionable. Road construction contracts include a period of up to one year, during which the contractor is responsible for the quality of the road. Training of local government staff in maintenance, budgeting and administration is also included with road contracts to strengthen their ability to maintain the roads. After that period, the roads are the responsibility the state-level government. However, the state-level government has few resources for maintenance. On a field visit, one road was seen that was less than two years old but was seriously eroded by floods and traffic.

185. The sustainability of the warehouse management systems under the P4P programme is also uncertain – the ownership of the structures was not clearly defined at the beginning and the farmer organisations themselves may not survive the current conflict in the Greater Equatoria region.

186. A synthesis report looking at the impact of food assistance for assets programmes<sup>162</sup> found that fish ponds were the least likely asset to survive (40%) – all others were more than 50 percent with flood protection highest at 90 percent. It is interesting to note that in the area visited, mixed-use ponds seemed also to be among the least successful assets and have not been well maintained by communities. The food assistance for assets programme was also responsible for constructing smaller, tertiary roads. In some cases, the community has proved unable to manage the maintenance, for example, of several kilometres of farm roads.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1. Overall Assessment**

##### **Alignment and Strategic Positioning**

187. The relevance of the WFP portfolio was found to be high in a difficult and challenging environment. WFP demonstrated the ability to work across both emergency and development spheres. It managed to make appropriate adaptations to its portfolio and appropriately transition from managing emergency needs, to aligning itself with a state building agenda, and back to a first line response to a large-scale acute emergency. It has demonstrated the ability to remain relevant to different needs in different geographies – simultaneously addressing immediate needs in areas of severe food insecurity, whilst addressing underlying causes elsewhere.

188. WFP also demonstrated a keen appreciation of the need to ensure strategic coherence with government and other development partners. Where relevant policy frameworks existed, WFP has positioned itself to align well with the Government,

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<sup>162</sup> *Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food Assistance for Assets (2002 – 2011) And lessons for building livelihoods resilience, WFP 2014*

especially prior to 2014. United Nations coherence has been good at a formal level – as witnessed through the UNDAF and ICF processes – although the utility of this beyond a paper exercise is less clear. Coherence was easier to achieve in a developmental context where the Government of the Republic of South Sudan provided the policy framework. The complexity and scale of the challenges of a multi-year emergency in South Sudan required a coordinated, inter-agency strategic response, but it is not clear who provides the overall vision and leadership for WFP to cohere.

189. A major challenge for WFP lies in positioning itself to build connectedness - the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.<sup>163</sup> With the resumption of the large-scale emergency, WFP made a commitment to maintain a twin-track approach, with space for development activities that might be scaled up once again if peace resumed. This approach was commendable. However, it generally stopped short of leveraging emergency resources to do more than meet immediate needs. On the development side of the portfolio, the evaluation built strong synergies between maintaining school feeding and contributing to a longer-term solution to the cycle of war in South Sudan.

### **Quality of strategic decision-making**

190. The effectiveness of WFP strategic decision-making was found to be mixed. The development of a country strategy in 2012/13 was an important step in a major WFP reorientation to support the emergence of the new country and its institutions. However, the country strategy had a disconnect between strategy and operations, and lacked an accountability framework, which meant the country office was not compelled to update the country strategy when the context changed. While it initially served a useful purpose, unfortunately, that purpose was swiftly overtaken by events.

191. The country office was not proactive in developing a revised, comprehensive strategic approach to position itself to respond to the emerging context. The immediate demands and pressures of the day-to-day management of a major emergency partially explained this. In this regard, the evaluation did not find evidence of the country office's engagement with the regional bureau or headquarters on adaptation of strategic choices prior to the ICSP process. However, addressing this strategy gap became overdue. The evaluation found that persistent delays in the recruitment of key staff has undermined the capacity of the country office, including the capacity for strategic planning.

192. WFP has strategically positioned itself well to respond in areas of its comparative advantage to maximise its strategic efficiency. The greatest comparative advantage was in emergency response – both through delivering its own operations and in reinforcing the overall humanitarian response system through the provision of key common services. WFP comparative advantages are not confined to the sphere of emergency operations – but include more developmentally aligned food assistance for assets and food for education activities. However, WFP may lack the corporate resources and procedures to demonstrate a comparative advantage in areas such as feeder road construction.

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<sup>163</sup> ALNAP (2006) *Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria*

193. Weaknesses in the country office monitoring and evaluation systems have been partially rectified from 2015 onwards, with coverage of the mandatory corporate indicators being attempted. However, the quality of the results is reduced by coverage and access limitations and this continues to constrain the ability of the country office to draw evidence-based conclusions on the most efficient approaches to adopt. Corporate indicators for special operations are inadequate.

194. WFP has drawn strongly on its assessment and analysis skills in designing strategic approaches. This has been particularly useful in decisions related to targeting and coverage – which draw heavily on collaborative IPC and FNSMS work. An initial urban analysis in Juba could be usefully built on. Protection and gender analyses have been well integrated into strategic decision-making.

195. In terms of connectedness, WFP has started to invest in causal analyses to help design interventions that appropriately and effectively address the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition. However, more could be done to inform the design of both nutrition and resilience programming.

### **Portfolio Performance and Results**

196. The coverage of WFP emergency food assistance was very good. WFP provides almost all the food assistance in the country. It proved able to scale up quickly in response to needs and the IRRM allowed it to directly reach beneficiaries in highly insecure locations, in the absence of cooperating partners. The available resources (including pipeline and logistics) were used to prioritize life-saving assistance, meaning that there has been a lower level of coverage of livelihood support. However, this is compensated for by the much larger number of agencies supporting these activities.

197. The effectiveness of the WFP portfolio has been generally high at the output level. Given the major security constraints, the number of beneficiaries reached, compared to targets, with general food assistance, nutrition, food assistance for assets and food assistance for education have been good. However, the context has made it harder to scale up cash-based transfers, and feeder road construction has fallen short of targets in quantity, though standards are high. There has been a good involvement of women in WFP activities in safeguarding against protection concerns.

198. There is stronger, positive evidence of the effectiveness of general food assistance, including cash-based transfers and nutrition, preventing precipitous declines in food security, and increasing enrolment and retention associated with school feeding. The limited outcome monitoring data – combined with the qualitative judgements of the evaluation – suggest that P4P, food assistance for assets and feeder roads made at best a modest contribution to building rural livelihoods. The common services have performed well with very positive user-satisfaction ratings amongst users.

199. Opportunities to build coherence and connectedness by capitalizing on internal synergies between activities were identified but largely remained unrealized. There was a greater realization of external synergies with other United Nations agencies. This is arguably the more important avenue to develop as WFP programming needs to balance the potential for synergies with the countervailing risk of over concentrating resources on a limited number of beneficiaries.

200. Logistics dominates the WFP budget – meaning that cost efficient logistics is the key to a cost-efficient portfolio. WFP displays a good awareness of the necessity of

managing these costs and has introduced a range of innovations to drive down costs. However, given an outlook of declining resources and increasing needs, a further scale up of cost-saving measures is required, alongside new, innovative approaches. The timeliness and predictability of food deliveries remains a persistent problem, attributed to a problematic pipeline and logistics limitations.

201. The WFP approach initially sought to integrate sustainability through building the capacities of the Government of South Sudan. Commendable progress has been made in contributing to national policy development and technical capacities in a wide range of sectors, including humanitarian affairs, nutrition, agriculture, transport and communications. However, the success of this approach has been undermined by the changing context. Alternative approaches to sustainability – including building capacity in the private sector – have been slow to emerge.

### **3.2. Recommendations**

202. This section presents the overall recommendations arising from this evaluation for the work of WFP in South Sudan; by the country office, with support from the regional branch and headquarters, except where otherwise stated. Several of the thematic Annexes J to N also close with suggestions for the future. These are not formulated as formal recommendations, but are supplementary inputs for WFP consideration as it plans its operations.

**Recommendation 1: WFP should develop a strategic framework for responding to the needs of South Sudan as a multi-year acute crisis, which acknowledges the limited capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to provide leadership to the process. Timing: 2017-2018.**

203. The country strategy for South Sudan requires to be updated and brought in line with the changed country context. The new strategy should orient WFP to respond to a multi-year acute crisis, with the flexibility to adapt to rapidly changing needs.

204. WFP South Sudan has – under corporate direction - initiated the development of an interim country strategy process. It is recommended that WFP should:

- a. Use the process to develop a strategic vision, in addition to the necessary administrative reorganization of existing operations.
- b. Develop a medium-term strategy to position WFP to respond to acute multi-year crisis, which acknowledges the limited capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan to provide leadership to the process.

205. Given the importance of a coordinated multi-agency response to the crisis, **WFP should advocate within the United Nations system for developing an inter-agency strategic framework and a common multi-year approach to responding to the multi-year acute crisis.**

206. The Integrated Road Map presents the opportunity to address this in 2017.

**Recommendation 2: The WFP strategy should maximize the humanitarian – development synergies. Timing: 2017-2018.**

207. While recognizing the primacy of life-saving assistance, WFP should examine opportunities for simultaneously addressing causal factors. WFP has both the capacity and mandate to work across this interface. To build stronger synergies between WFP emergency and development interventions it is recommended that WFP should

position itself to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency are carried out in a manner that takes longer-term and inter-connected problems into account. Specifically:

- a. WFP should develop a strategy to address the underlying constraints to the expanded use of cash-based transfers (including strengthening supply chains, advocating for cross-border trade and improved financial and transport infrastructure) that enables timelier, cost efficient and increased emergency assistance alongside longer-term impacts on strengthened market access and markets for domestic production.
- b. Maintain the longer-term aim to contribute to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan Health Sector Development Plan, including capacity development and other support for the roll-out of the Community Management of Acute Malnutrition guidelines at national, state and county levels; advocacy and support for the operationalisation of the Boma Health Initiative launched in 2015 in close collaboration with UNICEF, WHO, and other 'nutrition-in-health' partners in South Sudan.
- c. WFP should partner with other agencies to reinvigorate and refine an inter-agency approach to building resilience that is distinct from food assistance for assets activities, that layers multi-annual interventions from different agencies for progressive replication and rollout as conditions permit.
- d. WFP should strategically promote school feeding – within a coordinated inter-agency approach – that contributes to breaking the cycle of war and violence in South Sudan by establishing 'safe zones' for protection and provides a platform for multi-sectoral interventions spanning health, nutrition and livelihoods objectives.

**Recommendation 3: WFP South Sudan should further improve efficiency, assuming a multi-year approach to emergency response. Timing: 2017-2018.**

208. The context in South Sudan makes relief expensive to deliver and it is difficult to ensure timely deliveries. The primary underlying challenges are constraints in economically transporting food to beneficiaries and managing the food pipeline. To further promote efficiency of food assistance, it is recommended that WFP adapt its approach on the basis of delivering a multi-annual emergency response. Specifically:

- a. WFP should work with other agencies, including UNOPS, to identify opportunities where targeted investment by donors in transport infrastructure could generate multi-annual cost savings on logistics, including: cost-benefit analyses of strategic repairs of trunk roads to allow wet season access, investment in improved river transport, and investment in the maintenance of strategic airstrips to allow increased use of fixed-wing aircraft.
- b. On the basis of the results of the cost benefit analysis, develop a joint advocacy strategy to donors on limited, strategic investment in infrastructure.
- c. In collaboration with partners (including IOM and UNHCR), develop a strategy for providing all South Sudanese with a digital identity that includes agreement for inter-operability and data sharing between systems.

- d. Consider introducing an element of routine cost recovery into the logistics cluster to encourage better forward-planning and more efficient use of resources.
- e. Strengthen the management of the food pipeline through:
  - i. Forming an Integrated Supply Chain Working Group to determine requirements, resources and prioritise operational plans.
  - ii. Reinforcing the staffing of the Budget and Programming Team, in part to increase liaison with donors on food shipments.
  - iii. opportunities to further strengthening its contribution to the South Sudan response should be investigated, given the importance of the GCMF to South Sudan.

**Recommendation 4: WFP South Sudan should innovate to improve programme quality. Timing: 2017-2018.**

209. This recommendation is based on the conclusions related to factors that impacted on the effectiveness of WFP operations. It is recommended that:

- a. WFP should further invest in food and nutrition related assessments and analyses by:
  - i. Further elaboration of the WFP FNSMS methodology for regular assessment of nutrition status among key nutrition target groups, including the integration of stunting indicators and triangulation of results with the SMART surveys system, and other relevant surveillance mechanisms
  - ii. Surveillance of food security in urban areas
  - iii. Further investment in analysis of the underlying reasons for undernutrition in South Sudan, in close collaboration/ partnership with other agencies on food security.
- b. Start up and increase nutrition-sensitive programming in line with the SUN approach within the overall WFP portfolio for South Sudan, through the cash for assets and food for education programmes in particular, but also through the general food distributions, e.g. a focus on stunting reduction in tandem with the TSFP and BSFP.
- c. At corporate level, review indicators used for outcome and impact level monitoring of resilience and special operations.
- d. Develop multi-year field-level agreements with cooperating partners – these field-level agreements could specify multi-year strategic frameworks with annual budget agreements.

**Recommendation 5: Ensure appropriate and timely staffing of WFP South Sudan. Timing: 2016-2018.**

210. As one of the largest emergency operations in the world, South Sudan needs to ensure the timely appointment of the ‘brightest and the best’ staff to plan and deliver. It is therefore proposed that:

- a. The WFP country office should commission and publish a staffing review, based on the staff needed to deliver against the new country strategic plan.

- b. The capacity of the country office human resources team should be augmented to provide the necessary capacity to support the timely appointment of suitably qualified and experienced staff – including proactively identifying and encouraging suitable staff to apply for key positions on reassignment.
- c. WFP Headquarters should consider recruiting floating emergency staff who would be available for immediate deployment through the L3 roster.
- d. While recognizing the measures taken by WFP Headquarters to improve the reassignment process, the relevant headquarter department should consider further changes to the reassignment process to ensure that all staff serve in hardship postings.

## Acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BR	Budget Revision
BRACE	Building Resilience Through Asset Creation and Enhancement
BSF	Blanket Supplementary Feeding
CBT	Cash-based Transfer
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
C&V	Cash and voucher
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CD	Country Director
CAMP	Comprehensive Agricultural Development Plan
CFA	Cash for Assets
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CNV	Community Nutrition Volunteers
CO	Country Office
CP	Cooperating Partner
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CS	Country Strategy
CSD	Country Strategy Document
DAC	(OECD) Development Assistance Committee
DACOTA	Data Collection for WFP Reports
DFID	Department for International Development
DTM	displacement tracking matrix
EB	Executive Board of WFP
EC	European Commission
ECHO	EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team

ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFA/W/T/E	Food assistance for assets/Work/Training/Education
FFE	Food for Education
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
FSLC	Food Security and Livelihood Cluster
FSNM	Food Security Nutrition Monitoring
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCMF	Global Commodity Management Facility
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoSS	Government of Republic of South Sudan
GFA	General Food Assistance
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HH	Households
HISP	Humanitarian Internet Support Project
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
HQ	Headquarters
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
HSDP	South Sudan Health Sector Development Plan
IAHE	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICF	Interim Country Framework
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
ICSP	Interim Country Strategic Plan
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDMP	Irrigation Development Master Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IFANSCA	Integrated Food and Nutrition Security Comprehensive Analysis
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR EMOP	Immediate Response Emergency Operation
IRM	Integrated Road Map
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
IRG	Internal Reference Group
IRRM	Integrated Rapid Response Mechanism

LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MAFCRD	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development
MCHN	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance, Economics and Planning
MOHA	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MUAC	mid-upper arm circumference
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
nd	no date
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEV	Office of Evaluation
OFDA	Office of United States of America Foreign Disaster Assistance
O&M	Operation and Management
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RRC	Relief and rehabilitation Commission
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
QA	Quality Assurance
RB	Regional Bureau
RBN	Regional Bureau Nairobi
ROSS	Republic of South Sudan
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SCOPE	System for Cash Operations
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SF	school feeding
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve

SMART	Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition
SO	Special Operation
SO	Strategic Objective
SP	Strategic Plan
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
TB	Tuberculosis
TOC	theory of change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis Mapping
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

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