

COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

South Sudan: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011 - 2016)

Volume II: Annexes

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
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Annex A: Map of WFP operations in South Sudan



Annex B: Terms of Reference

TERMS OF REFERENCE

SOUTH SUDAN: AN EVALUATION OF WFP'S PORTFOLIO (2011- 2016)

DATED: AUGUST 31, 2016

1. Background

1. The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed South Sudan Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) (2011- 2016), to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation questions, approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information such as a detailed timeline and map.

1.1. Introduction

2. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation. CPEs help Country Offices in the preparation of Country Strategies and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations.

3. The Office of Evaluation (OEV) will be implementing a CPE in South Sudan in 2016/2017. The Republic of South Sudan was selected on the basis of country-related and WFP-specific criteria. It falls in the category of countries where WFP has a relatively important portfolio and WFP Country Office (CO) would benefit the most from a CPE for future programming. The timing will enable the CO to use the CPE evidence in its future strategy, programme planning and formulation.

1.2. Country Context

Political-Economy

4. The Republic of South Sudan is the world's newest country. It declared its independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011 after decades of civil war, concluded through a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and a referendum in January 2011. The root causes of the conflict included growing tensions over the quest for autonomy, ethnicity, religion and resources. With a total area of 644,000 sq. km, South Sudan is land-locked and bordered with Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). The population is estimated at 12 million of which 40% are aged 14 years or younger. At the end of 2014, the population was higher by 3.6 million than the 8.35 million figure (52% female and 48% male) recorded in the 2008 census.¹ South Sudan is endowed with natural resources. In 2011, it produced

¹ UNDP 2015 South Sudan National Human Development Report page 19.

nearly 75% of former Sudan's total oil output of 0.5 million barrels per day.² Providing 98% of national budget revenues, oil has been exported through two pipelines that run to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Gross national income per capita (GNI) for 2015 was US \$790.³ For 2014, on the Human Development Index, South Sudan was ranked low at 169 out of 188 countries.

5. South Sudan's first development plan (2011-2013) allowed the Government to frame its post-conflict planning and recovery approach, promoting a shift in focus from relief to recovery. However, in December 2013, internal conflict started again, causing large displacements of people both within the country and migration to neighbouring countries. Since April 2016, the Transitional Government of National Unity has been established in line with the August 2015 IGAD-sponsored Peace Agreement.⁴ In mid-July 2016, renewed fighting erupted in Juba creating further uncertainty. Following decades of conflict, the ongoing enormous humanitarian and development challenges have significantly limited the government's capacity to provide basic social services and respond to emergencies. South Sudan has become one of the six Level 3 emergencies including Iraq, Southern Africa, Syria, Yemen, and Nigeria. Facing a structural fragility, the economy is characterized by instability, high inflation (661%), weak institutional capacity, an absence of basic infrastructure, and lack of own port to the sea. Furthermore, 60% of remote locations are inaccessible during the rainy season, and there are no electricity grid and piped clean water systems.⁵ Currently, the security situation in Juba has marginally improved. However, it remains tense and unpredictable as in other parts of the country. Clashes have been reported outside Juba, Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Equatoria.⁶

Food Security

6. South Sudan relies on livestock and farming as a main source of livelihood but only 4 % of arable land is cultivated. The incidence of poverty has worsened from 44.7% in 2011 to more than 58.5% in 2015, with a corresponding increase in the depth of poverty.⁷ The recurrent food insecurity and malnutrition crises originate from the disruption of its agricultural sector, displacement of people, destruction of socio-economic infrastructures, trade restrictions, high fuel prices, and erratic weather with frequent drought and floods. This situation has resulted in high food prices and a net-food deficit. The Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring (FSNM) report, indicates 70% food insecure and 21% severely food insecure, with further deterioration in August lean season.⁸ It is estimated that 4.8 million people – 40% of the population – remain in in emergency or crisis level food insecurity.

Nutrition and Health

7. South Sudan reveals some of the worst nutrition and health indicators in the world. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates vary seasonally - with peaks up to 30% - and also substantially across states. The July 2016 FSNM recorded a prevalence of GAM of 17.9% (WHZ<-2 and/or oedema). According to recent WFP records, the main

² UNDP 2015 South Sudan Human Development Report, According to the Oil and Gas Journal, reserves were estimated at 3.5 billion barrels of proved reserves (oil) and 2,200 billion cubic feet of natural gas as of January 1, 2014 and production in 2013 was estimated at 160, 000 barrels per day, up 416.1 per cent 2012. page

³ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD> World Bank, August 2016

⁴ IGAD, Inter-governmental Agency for Development, is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and the African Great Lakes.

⁵ WFP Country Strategy for South Sudan Page 2

⁶ WFP South Sudan Situation Report #140, august 2016

⁷ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview> Aptuil 9, 2016

⁸ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification- South Sudan August 2016

causes for death in women of childbearing age relate to reproductive health. Infant mortality rate is 135.3 per 1,000, whilst maternal mortality is the highest in the world at 2,054 per 100,000 live births. The epidemiology of HIV/AIDS is poorly documented but the prevalence is believed around 3%. A 2013 MOH study states "probably South Sudan has the highest malaria burden in sub-Saharan Africa.⁹ Moreover, the 2016 WHO's Humanitarian Response plan states that an estimated 4.42 million people are in need of emergency health care, due to the combination of conflict, economic downturn, drug shortages, lack of funding for health infrastructure and health workers, and inadequate vaccination coverage. Displacement has caused a severe shortage of skilled human resources to respond to health needs as there is only one doctor per 65,000 patients.¹⁰

Humanitarian Protection, Internally-displaced persons (IDPs) and Refugees

8. The ongoing violence in South Sudan has caused massive displacements of people. In 2012, the situation seemed relatively stable (with 732,550 refugees and IDPs in January 2012 and forecasts of 644,620 by the end of 2013)¹¹. The conflict in December 2013 has led to a substantial instability, with over 2.7 million people (1.61 million internally displaced (IDPs); 871,563 South Sudanese refugees¹² in Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, DRC and CAR; and 169,418 people seeking shelter with the UN Protection of Civilians sites) by mid-2016.¹³ The Protection Cluster coordinates humanitarian protection activities for internally-displaced persons (IDPs) on community protection, gender-based violence, child protection, protection of civilians, rule of law, mine action and land issues across South Sudan. WFP coordinates its activities with Unicef, UNHCR, OCHA, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Education

9. As stipulated in the 2012 General Education Act, the government policy states that basic education is free and compulsory. UNESCO reports indicate that "Education in South Sudan is in a dire situation. Despite the elimination of household education spending by the government through the provision of free and compulsory education, socio-economic opportunity costs remain high. Low rates of primary school completion and high gender disparities are still serious national developmental threats. It is estimated that 76% of adults, and 80% of women, do not know how to read and write. Only 37% of girls aged 6-13 years attend school.¹⁴

10. The schooling infrastructure is weak as 59.9% of primary school teachers and 39.5% of secondary school teachers are untrained. In 2013, only 41.5% of primary school-aged children and 2.3% of secondary school-aged children were enrolled in schools. Only 5.4% of the national budget was allocated to the education sector, despite the 10% required allocation under Education for All to improve education outcomes in South Sudan at all levels - adult, youth and child education, formal and informal " (UNESCO, South Sudan 2015). The national school feeding policy guideline has

⁹ Malaria control in South Sudan, 2006–2013: strategies, progress and challenges, MoH 2013

¹⁰ 2016 WHO's Humanitarian Response, December 2015, <http://www.who.int/hac/crises/ssd/appeals/en/>

¹¹ UNHCR Global Appeal 2012-2013.

¹² South Sudan Situation - UNHCR Regional Update 92 1 – 15 June 2016 reports South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia (285,356), Sudan (231,581), Uganda (229,006), Kenya (103,173) DRC (11,966) and CAR (10,454). An additional, 94,735 fled to these countries since July 2016, per UNHCR Operational Update 15/2016 1 – 15 August 2016

¹³ WFP South Sudan Situation Report #140, 13-20 August 2016

¹⁴ National School Feeding Policy Guidelines and Strategic Framework – 2012-2017 pages 8-9.

recognized the role of school feeding as a key input in the quality of education process, and in promoting school enrolment, retention and completion.

Gender

11. In South Sudan, up to 80% of farm labour is provided by women, who also head a significant number of farm households (African Development Bank, 2013a). Women are also the heads of a large proportion of displaced households. Gender based violence (GBV) has been widespread coupled with pervasive human rights violation even before the country plunged into conflict. The current conflict has seriously exacerbated the problem, with physical and domestic violence, early and forced marriage and sexual violence being reported across the country. More than half of young women aged 15-24 years have suffered some form of gender based violence. Based on the reported incidents of GBV, 97% of the survivors are female whilst 3% are male.¹⁵

International Assistance

12. Recent reports in June 2016 show insecurity, landmines, and limited infrastructure have restricted access and humanitarian activities across South Sudan. They hinder the delivery of critical assistance to populations in need, threatening the safety of humanitarian workers, particularly in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile.¹⁶ The vast geographical area of South Sudan, the extremely limited capacity of the national and local governments, and flooding magnify the challenges that the international community faces in providing humanitarian and development assistance.¹⁷ Since independence, Canada, Germany, European Commission, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and US have been providing humanitarian assistance, including \$45 million through OCHA. The US has extended the largest volume of \$1.6 billion.

13. In 2014, South Sudan was among the top 10 Official Development Assistance (ODA) countries and received US \$1.964 billion.¹⁸ Major donors have comprised Australia, Belgium, Canada, European Union Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and USA as South Sudan continues to face tremendous economic, social and political challenges, the crowded donor and NGO presence to address a combination of huge development needs and low domestic capacity.


¹⁵ South Sudan: Gender Based Violence Factsheet November 2015

¹⁶ USAID Fact Sheet #9, July 24, 2016

¹⁷ Implementation of integrated, coherent, and coordinated Support to South Sudan, UN August 2016

¹⁸ OECD 2016 Africa Edition page 2.

Figure 1: International Assistance to South Sudan (2011-2014)



2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1. Rationale

14. The evaluation is an opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its 2014-2017 Country Strategy (CS) and portfolio of operations during 2011- 2016. It is expected that the evaluation findings will inform the CO in its design of operation(s) and strategic orientation. The CPE is also expected to provide evidence of past and current performance that is useful for the design of a new Country Strategic Plan and UNDAF.¹⁹ There is an Interim Country Framework (ICF) that has been put in place for 2015-17. In 2018, there is a possibility to design an UNDAF, but most likely the ICF will be extended at that time. There has been no previous evaluation of WFP's portfolio of activities in South Sudan²⁰.

2.2. Objectives

15. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the CPE will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in South Sudan (**accountability**); and
- determine the reasons for observed success or failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in South Sudan, form

¹⁹ South Sudan UNDAF cycle was initially designed to cover 2012 – 2013, in line with the South Sudan Development Plan.

²⁰ Previous evaluations of aspects of the portfolio and the collective inter-agency humanitarian response are mentioned in page 11 below.

strategic partnerships, and improve operations, design, and implementation whenever possible (**learning**).

2.3. Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation

16. The evaluation will seek the views of, and be useful to, a broad range of WFP's internal and external stakeholders. The main stakeholder and users of the evaluation are the WFP CO, Regional Bureau in Nairobi (RBN), Headquarters Management, and the Executive Board (EB), the beneficiaries, the Government of South Sudan, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), donors and the UN Country Team. A matrix of stakeholders with their respective interests and roles in the CPE is attached in Annex 3. WFP works closely with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS), UN Country Team, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

17. In addition, WFP partners with multilateral and bilateral donors in the design, funding and coordination of delivery of food and technical assistance. They are important in the complex context of South Sudan as the CPE will give particular attention to how these agencies view the context and WFP's role in it. It should provide useful lessons for their own country portfolios and for enhancing synergy, coordination and collaboration. Cooperating partners are organizations with which WFP has collaborated directly in the implementation of its portfolio. They comprise a number of local authorities, civil society organizations as well as international and national NGOs. The evaluation is expected to enable them to enhance their strategy for collaboration and synergy with WFP, clarifying mandates and roles and accelerating progress towards replication and hand-over.

18. WFP beneficiaries are the most important stakeholder group of all: comprising food insecure households, IDPs, refugees, children under five, pregnant and lactating women, farmers, school children and participants in livelihoods activities. Data disaggregation by sex, gender sensitive stakeholder assessment and understanding of differences in gender roles are particularly important for the CPE.

19. National government partners comprise ministries and authorities such as the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education Science and Technology, Ministry of Health, & Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This CPE should enable policy makers to sharpen their view of opportunities for synergies and coordination to support national strategy; and ensure that WFP's future contributions are best attuned to national need and policy – within the ICF or any future UNDAF.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

3.1. WFP's Portfolio in South Sudan

20. WFP has been present in South Sudan since 2011. WFP CO's first CS (2014-2017) has four pillars²¹ i) meet emergency food and nutrition needs of vulnerable groups; ii) build community resilience and strengthen livelihoods; iii) enhance market access and

²⁰ The subject of the CPE will comprise the WFP Country Strategy and the portfolio of operations (2011- 2016)

food value chain; and iv) enhance access to social services in nutrition and learning. The CS includes capacity strengthening of government institutions, and enhanced partnerships for sustainable hunger solutions, as cross-cutting approach. Its portfolio has comprised one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 200572 Central, Western and Eastern Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes and Warrap), three emergency operation (EMOP 200338, EMOP 200859, EMOP 200659-Jonglei, Unity Mingkaman in Lakes, and Upper Nile) and over ten special operations.

21. Since 2011, WFP has implemented more than sixteen operations. Emergency Operation (**EMOP**) **200338** was launched in January 2012 to provide assistance to emergency and early recovery food assistance to 2.7 million people affected by conflict and food insecurity through general food assistance (GFA), nutrition prevention and treatment interventions (including HIV/TB), food assistance for assets (FFA), food for education, and market interventions with Purchase for Progress (P4P) activities. Several budget revisions scaled-up the GFA, introduced a cash modality and extended the operation to December 2013 to assist 2.85 million additional beneficiaries in 2013.

22. **EMOP 200338** was conceived as a transitional project to lay the foundation for a protracted relief and recovery operation (**PRRO**) **200572**. This operation was designed to continue the previous operations, providing assistance to 3.1 million beneficiaries during two years (Jan 2014 – Dec 2016). In December 2013, the conflict started again as the PRRO began, requiring several budget revisions to reorient the geographic focus of the activities in the non-conflict states, to postpone activities when no longer feasible, and to respond to 1.7 million additional beneficiaries.

23. In parallel, the **EMOP 200659** was launched in January 2014 to respond to immediate food and nutrition needs of 400,000 people affected by the conflict in conflict zones (3 out of 10 States). Focusing on relief activities, the operation was extended to September 2015 to reach 1.5 million additional people, includes GFA in urban populations (including UN Protection of civilian sites) and rural areas, blanket and targeted nutrition programmes, and cash based transfers (CBTs). **EMOP 200859** (October 2015-September 2016) is being implemented in response to food assistance needs of the victims of the conflict in South Sudan. With the new Immediate Response (**IR-EMOP 201007**) in July 2016, the CO will support the initial food requirements of 45,000 people according to contingency planning figures.

24. **Special Operations (SO)** for common services were conceived to complement WFP operations. They include the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS – SO 200341, SO 200523, SO 200634, SO 200702, SO 200786 (Jan.-Dec 2016), the food security and livelihoods cluster (SO 200423, SO 200775 and 200778 both Jan. 2015-Dec. 2016), the logistics cluster (SO 200361), the emergency telecommunications cluster (SO 200931 (Jan 2015-Dec. 2016); SO 200399, SO 200791), the construction of feeder roads (SO 200379 – Mar 2011- Dec. 2018) and the implementation of strategic grain reserves (SO 200267).

25. During the 2011-2015 period, a total of 345,336 metric tons (MT) of food were distributed to over 8 million beneficiaries.²² In 2016, WFP targets more than 3 million people in South Sudan, and has been providing life-saving emergency assistance for 1.6 million people directly affected by conflict, and non-emergency food assistance for a further 1.6 million people through its recovery operation. Since 2012, cash programmes provided \$3 million or 73% of planned \$5.5 million for returnees and

²² WFP South Sudan SPRs 2011-2015.

refugees. Food for Assets (FFA) activities have also been implemented. In July 2016²³, WFP distributed more than 18,000 MT to an estimated 1.45 million people in the country, the largest monthly food distribution since 2015. WFP has also pre-positioned 99,600 MT of food commodities in locations across South Sudan, representing approximately 82% of its 2015/2016 target of nearly 121,000 MT semi-urban locations around Juba, Wau, Aweil, and Yei, and amounted to only 6% of planned beneficiaries.

3.2. Scope of the Evaluation

26. South Sudan CPE covers a 5-year period, from 2011 to 2016. The evaluation will review the 2014-2017 Country Strategy, all WFP portfolio of operations implemented (2011-2016), and geographic areas covered by the portfolio, namely north, west, eastern and southern regions. In particular, the evaluation will assess one protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO), three emergency operations (EMOPs), a new IR-EMOP and over 10 special operations (SOs). The evaluation will not include operations before the transition to South Sudan that would have been included in Sudan CO before separation of the two countries. However, there will be a qualitative assessment of the transition management both from Sudan to South Sudan and from development orientation to the transition to the civil conflict within South Sudan itself. The evaluation will also look at the innovative approaches and tools, including the CBTs, P4P, and how the corporate FFA approach has promoted a more integrated and cohesive response to promoting livelihood development and strengthening community resilience to shocks. The field work will focus on a limited number of regions/sites and transparent selection criteria will be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

²³ WFP South Sudan Situation Report #140, 13-20 August 2016

Table 1. WFP portfolio in South Sudan (2011- 2016)

Operation	Time Frame	Timeline and funding level of WFP Portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016					
		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
PRRO 200572	Jan 2014 - Dec 2015 + 3 BR extended to Dec 2016	LEGEND: Funding Level			Req: 767,717,832 Funded: 68.4%	Req: 525,470,018 Funded: 68.4%	
EIMOP 200859	Oct 2015 - Sep 2016	> 75%				Req: 554,469,464 Funded: 78.1%	
EIMOP 200659	Jan 2014 - Dec 2014 + 3 BR extended to Sep 2015	Between 50 and 75%			Req: 1,058,701,498 Funded: 56.6%	Req: 599,309,535 Funded: 56.6%	
EIMOP 200338	Jan 2012 - Dec 2012 + 2 BR extended to Dec 2013	Less than 50%	Req: 705,963,228 Funded: 71.6%	Req: 505,318,230 Funded: 71.6%			
SO 200775	Jan 2015 - Dec 2016				Req: 1,953,768 Funded: 29.1%	Req: 568,010 Funded: 29.1%	
SO 200778	Jan 2015 - Dec 2016				Req: 71,042,806 Funded: 94.3%	Req: 67,006,568 Funded: 94.3%	
SO 200786	Jan 2015 - Dec 2015				Req: 117,920,606 Funded: 75.0%	Req: 88,390,125 Funded: 75.0%	
SO 200791	Jan 2015 - Dec 2015				Req: 4,474,806 Funded: 27.3%	Req: 1,221,687 Funded: 27.3%	
SO 200931	Jan 2016 - Dec 2016					Req: 663,373 Funded: 100%	
SO 200702	May 2014 - Sep 2014						
SO 200634	Jan 2014 - Dec 2014				Req: 17,317,601 Rec: 8,591,716 Funded: 50%	Req: 45,251,928 Rec: 30,476,071 Funded: 89%	
SO 200523	Jan 2013 - Dec 2013			Req: 34,187,210 Rec: 30,476,071 Funded: 89%			
SO 200423	Nov 2012 - Apr 2013 + 2 BR extended to Dec 2014			Req: 2,596,097 Funded: 34%		Req: 888,935 Funded: 34%	
SO 200399	Mar 2012 - Dec 2012 + 4 BR extended to Dec 2014			Req: 10,974,735 Funded: 41%		Req: 4,548,426 Funded: 41%	
SO 200361	Jan 2012 - Dec 2012 + 6 BR extended to Dec 2014			Req: 55,182,752 Funded: 86%		Req: 47,204,653 Funded: 86%	
SO 200341	Sep 2011 - Dec 2012		Req: 58,783,721 Rec: 42,887,226 Funded: 73%				
SO 200267	Jul 2011 - Dec 2013		Req: 93,340,135 Funded: 5%			Req: 4,549,054 Funded: 5%	
SO 200379	Mar 2011 - Dec 2013 (3 BR - extended to Dec 2018)			Req: 167,352,881 Funded: 57.9%		Req: 96,934,494 Funded: 57.9%	
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		22,512	313,033	266,966	465,880	499,527	n.a.
% Direct Expenses: South Sudan vs. WFP World		0.60%	7.84%	6.42%	9.88%	10.78%	n.a.
Food Distributed (MT)		n.a.	160,669	155,026	187,817	190,311	n.a.
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		n.a.	2,721,606	2,411,539	2,647,195	2,908,637	n.a.
% women beneficiaries (actual)		n.a.	49%	48%	55%	52%	n.a.

Source: SPR 2011-2016, Resource Situations Update to 30 July 2016, APR 2015

4. Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology

4.1. Evaluation Questions

27. The CPE will address the three main areas of focus common to CPE model, as developed by OEV. The sub-questions focus on issues of relevance to the South Sudan context, and the ongoing WFP key strategic, operational and technical issues of relevance for future positioning and programming. The evaluation team will further develop them in a detailed Evaluation Matrix during the Inception phase. The evaluation will consider the differences in beneficiaries' roles disaggregated by sex and various age. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic decisions. Question 3 will constitute the largest part of the inquiry and evaluation report.

28. **Question 1: Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy and Portfolio.** Reflect on the extent to which: i) main objectives and related activities have been relevant with South Sudan humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities; ii) objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies; iii) objectives have been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with, bilateral partners and NGOs; iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; and v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national needs and strategies and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies).

29. **Question 2: Factors influencing and Quality of Strategic Decision Making.** Reflect on the extent to which WFP: i) has analysed or used existing analysis of the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues in South Sudan - including gender equality and protection issues; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues; and iii) identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy, and how they were considered and managed when the 2014-2017 CS was developed by the CO; and iv) has analysed, or used existing analysis of, security-related risks.

30. **Question 3: Performance and Results of the WFP portfolio.** Reflect on: i) the level of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities (2011-2016) and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control such as conflict and natural disasters); ii) the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources, and decision-making iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations; iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level. The evaluation will assess the "dynamic" nature of these operations, including the extent to which WFP activities have been developmental in approach in such a conflict-prone context and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.

4.2. Evaluability Assessment

Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.

31. The current volatile and unpredictable political context of South Sudan creates major security constraints regarding availability of and access to WFP beneficiaries, cooperating partners as well as the regions where WFP operates. OEV will continue close monitoring of the situation and consultation with the CO and RBN in order to assess the practical implications of the instability on the feasibility, scope and timeline of the CPE and take appropriate action. The proposed timeline assumes that the instability will not worsen further following the July 2016 resurgence of conflict. Based on a desk review, an initial evaluability assessment has been conducted to determine the level of data availability and quality for assessing processes, results and corresponding indicators stated in the country strategy and portfolio documents. Monitoring data sets, standard performance reports, and qualitative assessment relevant to WFP's work are available for 2011-2015. Due to internal reporting arrangements, some of the data particularly for second half of 2016 will be available in early 2017. The Special Operations generally aim at being supportive of the outcomes of the EMOPs, PRROs and the objectives of wider humanitarian community in South Sudan. They are evaluable at output levels, and, to a certain extent, at outcome levels, as part of their contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of the CO portfolio.²⁴

32. In an unstable environment like South Sudan, a systematic longitudinal study can be challenging, especially in areas related to evaluating portfolio's efficiency, sustainability of WFP services and results, gender inequality issues, capacity development, resilience, humanitarian principles and protection issues. Complete and consistent trend data on these areas from 2011 and 2016 may not be available, as is the case with P4P, FFA or CBTs. The evaluation team is required to undertake further assessment of the adequacy and quality of data when developing the evaluation matrix and data collection strategy; identifying alternative approaches for data collection and designing a strong methodology to analyse all data in a rigorous manner. The evaluation will benefit from documentation available in WFP including portfolio documents, monitoring data sets, and relevant evaluation reports including the 2015 Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE)²⁵ of the Response to Crisis in South Sudan, the 2012 Nutrition Policy, WFP's emergency preparedness and response (2015), the Global Logistics Cluster (2012), and review of the FFA evaluations and the Synthesis Report 'On the Impact of Food for Assets'. There will be complementarities between the CPE and the IAHE. The CPE will provide evaluative evidence on specific food assistance related topics that the IAHE assessed. The CPE will also review IAHE's recommendations most relevant to food assistance with particular focus on coordination, complementarity and coherence of rapid and response mechanisms, contingency planning, resourcing, human resource capacity, targeting, efficiency,

²⁴ This include outcome such improving access to rural markets and essential social services, reduction in travel times, and the establishment of small-scale businesses along the roads, development of new farms, rise in employment, and improved capacity to address food insecurity.

²⁵ Report of the Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Response to the Crisis in South Sudan, November 2015

Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP), humanitarian principles, protection and resilience. OEV will establish an e-library with bibliography list which the CPE team is expected to make effective use of it; particularly the data sets as well as the standard performance reports.

4.3 Methodology

This evaluation will examine the extent to which gender and equity dimensions are integrated into WFP's policies, systems and processes.

33. CPEs primarily use a longitudinal design, relying on secondary quantitative data, and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency²⁶, effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness. Assessing the appropriateness, relevance and coherence of the design of the Country Strategy and Country Portfolio, it will review the extent of alignment with national needs; and internal and external coherence. Effectiveness of the portfolio will focus on systematic assessment of the performance and results at output and outcome levels. South Sudan is a land-locked country, and the CPE is expected to provide cost and timeliness analysis of delivering food assistance in a country facing access issues. Extensive rainy season and poor transport infrastructure along with insecurity are associated cost drivers. The evaluation should provide a comparative cost-efficiency²⁷ and cost-effectiveness²⁸ analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities e.g. CBTs versus in-kind or versus a combination of the two, in the portfolio.

34. Cost efficiency compares in-kind procurement value and logistic costs (transport, storage and handling, quality control and salaries for logistic staff – LTSH) to transport the different commodities to the respective markets with the CBT local market prices at the same point in time. If sufficient data is available a seasonal analysis should also be presented including the in-kind operational costs (partners, equipment and supplies, travel etc. – ODOC) with the equivalent CBT operational costs (C&V related costs: C&V delivery and C&V other). Attention must be paid to differentiate the start-up costs and the running costs and include depreciation calculations, if necessary. It will compare procuring locally vs procuring internationally (Import Parity Price analysis). Cost Effectiveness focuses on Omega value and/or other cost-effectiveness indicators, e.g. the in-kind vs CBT costs per percent increase in households with adequate Food Consumption Score (FCS). The team will develop a plan for assessing sustainability and connectedness.

35. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report, with annexes covering data collection instruments. The evaluation team will deepen the review and critically assess technical feasibility and data and accessibility to inform its choice of evaluation methods, taking in to account the national context. The methodology should:

- Examine the logic of the portfolio based on the common objectives arising across operations;

²⁷ A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities in order to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

²⁸ Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes. The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the omega value, a ratio between the in-kind Nutrient Value Score (NVS) divided by the full cost for the in-kind delivery basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the full CBT basket.

- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions using triangulation of information and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. A model looking at groups of “main activities/sectors” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
- Take into account the limitations to evaluability as well as budget and timing constraints. The evaluation team is required to have strong methodological competencies in designing feasible data capture and analysis plan for this CPE.

36. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and age, existing secondary data, etc.) and using a mixed method (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of tools. The sampling technique to impartially select sites to be visited and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

4.4 Quality Assurance

37. WFP’s evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The OEV evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, and CPE Coordinator will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

38. EQAS calls for carrying out gender responsive evaluations including the identification and disaggregated analyses of gender roles and dynamics, guided by WFP Gender Policy objectives and action plan, inequalities, discriminatory practices and unjust power relations. The CPE methodology will review the extent to which the CS and operations have appropriately analysed and integrated a contextual assessment of gender related gaps addressed the identified gender inequalities. In doing so, the CPE will apply OEV’s Technical Note for Gender Integration in WFP Evaluations and the UN System-Wide Action Plan (UNSWAP) on mainstreaming Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. The evaluation team is expected to assess IASC Gender Marker levels for the CO, and to systematically and appropriately reflect gender in findings, conclusions and recommendations. To enhance the quality and credibility of this evaluation, the selected evaluation firm will provide further quality checks on the draft the evaluation products, such as draft inception and draft evaluation reports, before the team leader submits them to OEV.

5. Organization of the Evaluation

5.1. Phases and Deliverables

39. The evaluation is structured in five phases summarized in the table below. The three phases involving the evaluation team are: (i) The Inception phase, with a briefing of the evaluation team in Rome (September 20-22, 2016), followed by an inception mission to Juba (late September 2016 by team leader and evaluation manager),

producing inception report - a detailed operational plan for conducting the CPE. (ii) The Main Evaluation Mission ²⁹, primary and secondary data collection and preliminary analysis with approximately 3 weeks in the field (Nov. 1-22, 2016) (iii) The Reporting phase concludes with draft CPE report by mid-February 2017, final report by end of March 2017, and final evaluation report (a full report and an summary evaluation report) that will be presented for consideration to WFP's Executive Board in June 2017. Annex 2 presents a more detailed timeline. The CO and RB have been consulted on the timeframe in order to ensure good alignment with the CO planning and decision-making, so that the evidence generated by CPE can be used effectively.

Table 4: Provisional Timeline Overview

Phases	June–August 2016	Sept–Oct 2016	Nov 1–mid Dec 2016	mid Dec. 2016 to end of March 2017	April–mid June 2017	Deliverables
Phase 1 (Preparation) Desk Review Preparation of ToR Stakeholder consultation	X					Concept Note ToR (draft and final) Contracting evaluation firm
Phase 2 (Inception) Briefing team at HQ Document review Inception mission in Juba		X				Inception Report
Phase 3 (Fieldwork) Evaluation, data collection/analysis, exit debriefing, HQ Briefing			X			Exist Debriefing Aide-memoire/ HQ Briefing
Phase 4 (Reporting) Report drafting, comments and revision				X (February 15)		Draft Evaluation Report (D1); Learning workshop
				X (End of March)		Final Report
Phase 5 (Executive Board) EB Follow up Actions EB.A/June 2017					X	Presentation of SER to EB.A./2017 Management Response, Evaluation Brief

5.2. Evaluation Team Composition

40. As presented in **annex 3**, this CPE will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant evaluation expertise. The evaluation firm is responsible for proposing a mix of evaluators who will effectively cover the areas of evaluation listed in Annex 3. The team should be as few members as possible providing a combination of the expertise and skills required. The team will consist of a combination of international, regional and national consultants with gender balance. All team members must be fluent in English. The team leader (TL) will have the additional responsibility for overall design, implementation, reporting and timely delivering of all evaluation products. The team leader should have excellent synthesis and evaluation reporting writing skills in English.

5.3. Roles and Responsibilities

41. This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV). Dawit Habtemariam has been appointed as Evaluation Manager (EM). The EM has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. He is

²⁹ An internal exit debrief with the CO is planned on the last day of the Fieldwork

responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ and the stakeholders learning in-country workshop; assisting in the preparation of the field mission; conducting the 1st level quality assurance of the evaluation products and soliciting WFP stakeholders feedback on the various evaluation products. The EM will be the main interlocutor between the team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

42. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in South Sudan; set up meetings and field visits and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. The nomination of a WFP CO focal point will help communicating with the EM and CPE team. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report. The contracted company will support the evaluation team in providing quality checks to the draft evaluation products being sent to OEV for its feedback. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

5.4. Communication

It is important that Evaluation Reports are accessible to a wide audience, as foreseen in the Evaluation Policy, to ensure the credibility of WFP – through transparent reporting – and the usefulness of evaluations. The dissemination strategy will consider from the stakeholder analysis who to disseminate to, involve and identify the users of the evaluation, duty bearers, implementers, beneficiaries, including gender perspectives.

43. All evaluation products will be produced in English. Should translators be required for fieldwork, the evaluation firm will make arrangements and include the cost in the budget proposal. A communication plan (see Annex 5) will be refined by the EM in consultation with the evaluation team during the inception phase to include details about the communication strategy. An internal reference group from main WFP's internal stakeholders at HQ, RB and CO, will be established for the evaluation to serve as contact point for communication with WFP stakeholders. They will be invited to provide comments on the main CPE deliverables. While the final evaluation report is the responsibility of the evaluation team, it will be approved by Sally Burrows, OEV CPE Coordinator on satisfactory meeting of OEV's quality standards. OEV will explore the feasibility of a workshop after the field work to discuss the draft preliminary findings and recommendations. The summary evaluation report along with the management response to the evaluation recommendations will be presented to the WFP Executive Board in June 2017. The final evaluation report will be posted on the public WFP website and OEV will ensure dissemination of lessons through its inclusion in the annual evaluation report. The CO and RBN are encouraged to circulate the final evaluation report with WFP external stakeholders.

5.5. Budget

44. The evaluation will be financed from OEV's budget which will cover all expenses related to consultant/company rates, international travels, logistics, stakeholder learning workshop and OEV staff travel.

Annex C: Evaluation Methodology

This Annex presents a summarised version of the “Evaluation Methodology” section included in the inception report.³⁰

Methodological Approach

1. The ToR state that “country portfolio evaluations primarily use a longitudinal design, relying on secondary quantitative data, and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country”. The methodology will demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (for example, stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and age, existing secondary data, etc.) and using a mixed-method approach (for example quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of tools.
2. As envisaged in the ToR, the internationally agreed evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence (internal and external), effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and connectedness will be employed.
3. The 2011–2016 WFP portfolio in South Sudan was not based on a country strategy. Largely, the strategic approach developed internally to each operation. Furthermore, strategic planning took place in a highly dynamic context. The strategic approach supported a transition from emergency relief to a developmental focus and back to a predominantly relief portfolio.
4. No theory of change (ToC) has been constructed for WFP operations in South Sudan. At this point it would be artificial and unrealistic to attempt to reconstruct an overarching implicit theory of change against which to assess the portfolio as a whole. Generic logical frameworks and theories of change for several of the activities within WFP do exist. However, for the most part these are working drafts, and of course, most were not available at the time the WFP South Sudan activities were being planned. While they provide a valuable reference point for most of the main lines of enquiry identified for the country portfolio evaluation, the evaluation must be careful to recognise that the country office cannot be held accountable against theories of change.
5. The distinction between findings, conclusions, and recommendations³¹ will be carefully observed, and reflected in the structure of the evaluation report (which will include an annex, cross-referenced to the main text, showing the findings and conclusions underlying each recommendation). This will ensure transparency in displaying the evidence the evaluation team has assembled and allow users to assess the credibility of the team's findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Thematic Areas and Cross-Cutting Issues

6. The country portfolio evaluation is a strategic evaluation. The task is to evaluate the entire portfolio of WFP over the evaluation period, not the individual operations

³⁰ See section 3, page 19 of the South Sudan CPE Inception Report.

³¹ A **finding** is an accumulation of evidence from an assessment, review or evaluation that allows for a factual statement. A **conclusion** draws on data collected and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments. Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of an operation, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results, and more generally with regard to any other strength or weakness. **Proposals** aim at enhancing the effectiveness, quality, relevance or efficiency of a WFP operation; at redesigning the objectives; and/or at the reallocation of resources. **Recommendations** should be linked to conclusions.

of which it comprised. Therefore, the evaluation approach works from an analysis of groups of activities that recur across different operations, namely: i) emergency, preparedness and response; ii) food security, livelihoods and resilience; and iii) nutrition and health. Detailed annexes outline the evaluation approach to be adopted in each of these domains.

7. Cross-cutting issues will be addressed within each of these thematic areas, namely: analytical work in support of strategic decision making; partnerships and capacity development; gender; protection; coordination and monitoring and evaluation. The evaluation will also assess the human resource (HR) challenges related to staffing of WFP offices in South Sudan.

8. Furthermore, these activities and cross-cutting issues interlock across the portfolio. The extent to which these operations reflected a common strategy and constituted a coherent portfolio is central to the evaluation.

Gender

9. As noted above, gender will be a cross-cutting line of enquiry guided by the Office of Evaluation's *Technical Note on Gender Integration* and United Nations System Wide Action Plan (UNSWAP) on gender equality and women's empowerment. The four dimensions of the *WFP Gender Policy Corporate Action Plan* will also frame the country portfolio evaluation's assessment of gender issues across the three main evaluation questions. WFP gender policy has recently been evaluated and revised. However, the action plan was the guiding framework for this evaluation period, and its four dimensions remain a valid structure for this country portfolio evaluation's assessment of performance regarding gender. The country portfolio evaluation will be cognisant of the critical findings of the recent gender policy evaluation and will assess the extent to which they are applicable to South Sudan. It will be particularly pertinent to assess the evaluation's finding that there was little evidence "of WFP contributing to transformative changes in gender relations".

Protection and Humanitarian Principles

10. Protection, humanitarian principles and accountability to affected populations (AAP) will be addressed as a cross-cutting theme of the evaluation. The evaluation will consider both the extent to which relevant WFP policies and guidelines have been implemented, and the results of these actions.

Efficiency Analysis

11. The evaluation matrix describes the team's approach to the country portfolio evaluation, including cost and timeliness analysis of delivering food assistance. The ToR also ask that "the evaluation should provide a comparative cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis of the different food assistance transfer modalities, for example, cash-based transfers versus in-kind or versus a combination of the two, in the portfolio." The only viable comparison that can be attempted is comparison between voucher and in-kind transfers in protection of civilian camps. It is also noted that efficiency analysis can be time consuming and this element will need to be kept in proportion to the demands of the rest of the country portfolio evaluation.³²

³² During the data collection phase, the approach to efficiency/effectiveness analyses was slightly reshaped based on data available and following consultations with WFP HQ. For more details, please see [Annex N](#).

Annex D: Evaluation Matrix

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
KEY QUESTION 1: PORTFOLIO ALIGNMENT AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING			
1. What has been the strategic context of food security, nutrition and aid in South Sudan?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What is the political and institutional context of South Sudan? ▪ What are the economic and social characteristics and trends (sex disaggregated)? ▪ Climatic trends (rainfall patterns) ▪ What are the key elements and drivers of South Sudan's aid relationships? ▪ What significant changes occurred in the international context relevant to South Sudan during the evaluation period? ▪ What are the relevant aspects of the WFP mission, strategic plans and corporate policies? 	<p>Standard international comparisons on economic, social and governance data, linked to South Sudan-specific assessments.</p> <p>Rainfall data</p> <p>Standard international comparisons on food security and nutrition.</p> <p>Drivers of South Sudan's policies and strategies (role of pan-African and regional forums)</p>	<p>International data sets</p> <p>Secondary material on changes in international context</p> <p>South Sudan-specific studies and reports</p> <p>Government of South Sudan and partner policy statements and plans</p> <p>IGAD documentation</p> <p>WFP policy and strategy documents</p> <p>Nutrition assessments and surveys</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Data analysis</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO, other United Nations partner agencies</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to South Sudan humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What are the food security and nutrition situation and trends? ▪ Which are the most vulnerable groups and why? ▪ Which geographical areas are most vulnerable and why? ▪ To what extent has the WFP portfolio addressed the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished by geography and group? ▪ To what extent has the WFP portfolio addressed the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition? ▪ Did the WFP portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches? ▪ How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context? ▪ How gender sensitive, balanced and proactive was the portfolio? ▪ To what extent has the WFP portfolio contributed to capacity strengthening of the Government of South Sudan? 	<p>Nutritional and food security status of population, morbidity and mortality, other relevant social indicators, and policy makers' perceptions.</p> <p>Comparison of programme data on deliveries and needs.</p> <p>Comparison of casual analyses of food and nutrition insecurity with WFP strategy and programme narratives</p> <p>Comparison against SPHERE standards</p> <p>Review of treatment of gender in CSD and programme documents</p> <p>Comparison of WFP operational objectives regarding gender with those of national policy and partner programming</p> <p><i>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</i></p>	<p>IPC</p> <p>Nutritional assessments, surveys and causal analyses</p> <p>FP FNMS</p> <p>WFP project documents and reporting.</p> <p>South Sudan Bureau of Statistics</p> <p>Health and Nutrition Cluster data</p> <p>Analytical and project documents from other agencies and non-governmental organizations</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Data analysis</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO, other United Nations partner agencies</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
3. To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Do the Government of South Sudan documents provide a clear and comprehensive framework? ▪ What is the capacity and quality of delivery through government systems? ▪ Is there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with the Government of South Sudan's policies and programmes? ▪ Did the portfolio offer a realistic and appropriate approach to capacity development of state institutions? ▪ What mechanisms exist for mutual accountability? 	<p>Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy with those set out in the Government of South Sudan's national and sector policy and planning documents <i>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</i></p>	<p>Government of South Sudan's policy and planning documents, at national and sector level. WFP strategy and programme documents. Informant perspectives (especially the Government's, at national and local levels) on alignment.</p>	<p>Document review Interviews: RBN, CO, local authorities, other development partners Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
4. To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Was the WFP strategy coherent with, and integrated in, the UNDAF/ICF? ▪ Was the portfolio effectively integrated into the SRP and its predecessor frameworks? ▪ How complementary were the strategies and programmes of WFP and United Nations partners? ▪ To what extent does WFP harmonise strategic approaches through established coordination mechanisms (UNCT, HCT, clusters)? ▪ How complementary were the strategies and programmes of WFP and other implementing partners? 	<p>Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy (CSD, PDs) with relevant partner strategies and plans and co-ordination frameworks, including the CAP, SRP and the UNDAF/ICF</p> <p>Degree of active harmonisation and collaboration achieved between WFP and partners</p> <p><i>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</i></p>	<p>WFP PDs and CSD CAP, SRP, UNDAF & ICF</p> <p>Minutes of UNCT and HCT meetings</p> <p>Other partner strategies</p> <p>WFP, United Nations and other partner and external informants</p> <p>Cluster systems (FSL, Nutrition, Protection)</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO, other United Nations and partner agencies</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>
5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What were the comparative advantages of WFP in South Sudan? ▪ How explicit was WFP strategy about maximising its comparative advantage? ▪ How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages? ▪ How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners? 	<p>Review of WFP PDs and CSD for analysis of comparative advantage</p> <p>Analysis of WFP potential to add value in the context of other actors' strengths and weaknesses</p> <p>Analysis of partnerships and WFP coordination mechanisms with different state and non-state entities</p> <p><i>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</i></p>	<p>WFP PDs and CSD CAP, HRP, UNDAF, ICF</p> <p>WFP, United Nations and other partner and external informants</p>	<p>Document review</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO, the Government of South Sudan, other United Nations and partner agencies</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with the WFP mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies)?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Is the WFP strategy and portfolio coherent with, and adapt to evolving, WFP policies and guidelines? ▪ Are there general tensions or trade-offs between WFP corporate policies and alignment with the Government of South Sudan's strategies and systems? ▪ How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Government and opposition-held areas (as one parties in the current conflict) managed? 	<p>Comparison of WFP country strategies with international standards and WFP corporate standards</p> <p>Comparison of WFP country strategies with international standards and WFP corporate standards on protection and humanitarian principles</p> <p>Analysis of reasons for any divergences with corporate strategies and policies</p>	<p>Documentation on WFP corporate strategy and thematic polices and standards.</p> <p>WFP Programme documents and CSD. WFP, United Nations and other reports on the humanitarian situation and United Nations performance</p> <p>Key informant interviews.</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO, local authorities, other United Nations agencies and donors</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
KEY QUESTION 2: FACTORS AND QUALITY OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING			
7. To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analysis of food security and nutrition issues, gender equality and protection issues?			
<p>For each of its interventions what data collection and analysis did WFP undertake in supporting decisions on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Programme planning and design ○ Targeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What efforts does WFP make to ensure that its interventions consider beneficiary perspectives? ▪ How did WFP analyse and apply information on gender equality and women’s empowerment in support of strategic decision making? ▪ How did WFP analyse and apply information on protection issues in strategic decision making? ▪ To what extent did WFP draw on other information sources, or collaborate with partners in analysis, for strategic decision-making? ▪ What are the critical data and information gaps? 	<p>Extent and quality of WFP analytical work (including food security assessments, emergency assessments, market assessments)</p> <p>Assessment of the extent to which available data and analysis (produced by WFP and others) is utilized in developing strategies and programmes</p> <p>Assessment of use of monitoring data and other information in adjusting strategies and programmes</p> <p>Quality of attention to gender and protection issues in WFP strategy, analysis, planning and monitoring.</p>	<p>Analytical work undertaken directly by WFP or in collaboration with partners.</p> <p>Other relevant analytical work to which WFP had access.</p> <p>PDs and PDM reports</p> <p>Key informant interviews</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO and donors</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
8. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?			
<p>What explicit efforts has WFP made:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition and gender dimensions of these challenges? ▪ advocating for the respect of humanitarian principles? ▪ in developing national and sub-national capacity for monitoring and analysis? ▪ In developing coordination platforms? <p>Is there evidence that WFP has</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ influenced the policy of the Government of South Sudan and/or other partners? ▪ strengthened national capacity for analysis and decision-making in areas under the Government's control? 	<p>Analysis of documentary record on WFP advocacy efforts, if any, in these areas</p> <p>Analysis of documentary record on WFP capacity development efforts in these areas</p> <p>Analysis of documentary evidence on policy developments</p> <p>Analysis of participant perceptions of the extent and effectiveness of WFP advocacy and capacity development in these areas</p>	<p>Documents on the evolution of national strategy and capacities</p> <p>WFP records including SPRs</p> <p>Key informant perceptions.</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: RBN, CO, local authorities, United Nations agencies and donors</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
9. What factors determined strategic choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) and how they were considered and managed when the 2014-2017 country strategy was developed by the country office?			
<p>To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Perceived comparative advantage ▪ Corporate strategies and change processes ▪ United Nations programming and priorities ▪ Previous programming; ▪ National policy of the Government of South Sudan ▪ Opposition priorities ▪ Resource availability, donor preferences and restrictions ▪ Organisational structure and staffing ▪ Analysis of context and need ▪ Monitoring information ▪ Access ▪ Other factors? 	<p>Process tracking of influences at play in WFP decision-making processes, with attention to factors that constrain or enhance the real effective discretion of the CO in determining the what, when, how and where of its component activities.</p>	<p>Documentation of decisions on the CSD and the design, implementation and the perceived trade-offs between programme components</p> <p>Needs assessments and analysis</p> <p>HR datasets on staffing</p> <p>Key informant interviews with participants.</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>
10. How has WFP analysed, or used existing analysis of, security-related risks and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent have corporate tools for risk analysis and mitigation been applied in South Sudan? ▪ What are the strengths and weaknesses of these corporate tools? ▪ What additional risk analysis and risk mitigation measures are implemented by the WFP CO? ▪ How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks? 	<p>Comparison of risk analyses with corporate guidance</p> <p>Analysis of security incidents and losses</p> <p>Perceptions of stakeholders on risk management arrangements</p>	<p>Corporate guidance on risk assessment and management</p> <p>Donor-specific risk management tools</p> <p>Risk analyses and mitigation plans produced by the CO</p> <p>Reporting of security incidents and losses</p> <p>Interviews with stakeholders</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO and other donors</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
KEY QUESTION 3: PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF THE WFP PORTFOLIO			
11. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What outputs were planned and what was achieved? ▪ How effective was targeting in both government and opposition-held areas? ▪ To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes – both direct outcomes and contribution to common services (UNHAS, clusters) ▪ How have outputs attributable to WFP contributed to outcomes? ▪ To the extent data are available, what impacts at the levels of joint intervention performance and sector performance are attributable to WFP activities? ▪ What were the reasons for observed effectiveness/ineffectiveness? 	<p>Direct outputs of WFP activities</p> <p>Analysis of targeting</p> <p>Contribution of WFP outputs to desired outcomes with attention also to indirect and/or unintended results</p> <p>WFP contribution to joint results and sector/national level indicators)</p> <p>Assess plausibility of WFP contribution to impact.</p> <p>To what extent are shortfalls in results attributable to internal factors (inside WFP management control) or external factors (outside of WFP control)?</p>	<p>WFP SPRs and detailed M&E reports.</p> <p>Data and existing analyses/reports on sectors in which WFP is engaged.</p> <p>Interviews with key informants, including beneficiaries.</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Data analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO, implementing partners, beneficiaries</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
12. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How economic was the provision of logistics services? ▪ For all main components (including logistics) what was the timeliness of interventions? ▪ How do the costs per output compare with international benchmarks? ▪ What is the comparative cost effectiveness of CBTs and in-kind transfers? ▪ How was information on costs factored into decision making on responses? ▪ What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time? 	<p>Economy in provision of logistics services (e.g. the use of air vs land, use of private transporters, regional fleet)</p> <p>Analysis of selected unit costs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cost per operation ▪ Cost per activity ▪ Operation and activity costs per recipient ▪ Operation and activity costs per standard ration or per kilocalorie delivered ▪ Changes in underlying cost drivers, e.g. landside transport, storage and handling (LTSH) costs <p>Cost per 1 percent improvement in food consumption score</p> <p>Comparison of cost, quality and timeliness in relation to other actors and/or WFP in other settings</p> <p>Process analysis of decision-making, drawing on documentary record and stakeholder recollections.</p>	<p>WFP records from CO and HQ systems.</p> <p>Available comparative data</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs for perceptions on efficiency.</p> <p>Interviews with engaged WFP staff to understand the decision-making process at the time, and the quality of subsequent monitoring</p> <p><i>NB efficiency assessments require prior information on results at each level of the logical framework, so findings against EQ11 will input to the efficiency analysis</i></p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Data analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO, Implementing Partners, beneficiaries</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
13. What is the extent of WFP contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to, and control over, food, resources and decision-making?			
<p>To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • access to, and control over, food and resources • responsibility for decision-making • livelihood opportunities? 	<p>Gender-sensitive analysis of coverage data for interventions within the South Sudan portfolio</p> <p>Application of the IASC gender marker as far as possible with available information base</p>	<p>WFP M&E data</p> <p>Gender marker analysis</p> <p>WFP partner reports</p> <p>Analysis of change in relevant variables</p> <p>SPRs</p> <p>Beneficiary views</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO, implementing partners, beneficiaries</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>
14. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other? ▪ What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio? 	<p>Analysis of linkages and complementarity between activities in the portfolio</p> <p>Analysis of extent to which activities in the portfolio facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of other activities</p>	<p>WFP monitoring and evaluation reports</p> <p>Interviews with key stakeholders</p> <p>Beneficiary interviews</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO, beneficiaries</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>
15. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners? ▪ To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners? 	<p>Analysis of linkages and complementarity between activities in the CP and activities of partners, especially at operational level</p> <p>Analysis of extent to which activities in the CP facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of partners' activities</p>	<p>Sector monitoring and evaluation reports</p> <p>Interviews with key stakeholders</p> <p>Beneficiary interviews</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO, beneficiaries</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
16. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?			
<p>To what extent are the benefits of WFP assistance likely to be continuing, in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enduring benefits for individual beneficiaries? ▪ Assets created with WFP assistance? ▪ Policy changes and capacity development? 	<p>Analysis of perceptions of qualified observers about how sustainable WFP-influenced change and WFP-supported systems and capacity are likely to be, and why</p> <p>Assessment of status of assets created by FFA and feeder roads</p>	<p>Project reports and evaluations</p> <p>Interviews</p> <p>Site visits</p>	<p>Document review and analysis</p> <p>Interviews: HQ, RBN, CO, Implementing Partners, beneficiaries</p> <p>Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</p>

Annex E: Evaluation Process and Timeline

SOUTH SUDAN COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION (CPE)		By whom	Planned Key Dates
Phase 1 - Preparation			
	Desk review. Draft ToRs. OEV/D clearance for circulation to WFP staff	EM	August 1-8, 2016
	Review draft ToR based on WFP feedback	EM	August 24-29, 2016
	Final ToR sent to WFP stakeholders	EM	August 31, 2016
	Contracting evaluation team/firm	EM	September 5, 2016
Phase 2 - Inception			
	Team preparation prior to HQ briefing (reading documents)	Team	
	HQ Team briefing (WFP Rome) – 3 days	EM & Team	Nov 16-18, 2016
	Inception mission in Juba and Nairobi – 7 days	EM + TL	Nov 22-28, 2016
	Submit draft inception report (IR) to OEV	TL	Dec 23, 2016
	OEV quality assurance and feedback	EM	Jan 3, 2016
	Submit revised inception report (IR)	TL	Jan 10, 2017
	Circulate final IR to WFP key stakeholders for their information + post a copy on intranet	EM	Jan 12, 2017
Phase 3 - Evaluation Mission - Fieldwork in South Sudan			
	Fieldwork (3 weeks) in South Sudan & desk review.	Team	Jan 16 – Feb 3, 2017
	Exit debrief with the CO presenting process and emerging findings.	Team	Feb 3, 2017
	Debriefing via teleconference with the CO, RB and HQ Rome staff. Preliminary findings and direction of recommendations (PPT) presented by the TL.	EM & TL	Feb 28, 2017
Phase 4 - Evaluation Report (ER)			
Draft 0	Submission of draft evaluation report (ER) to OEV	TL	March 5, 2017
	OEV quality feedback sent to the team	EM	March 8, 2017
Draft 1	Submission of revised draft ER to OEV	TL	March 12, 2017

	SOUTH SUDAN COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION (CPE)	By whom	Planned Key Dates
	OEV Director's clearance prior to circulating the ER to WFP Stakeholders. When cleared, OEV shares draft evaluation report with WFP stakeholders for their feedback.	EM	March 17, 2017
	Consolidated WFP comments (matrix), and share them with team. Team to consider them before in-country workshop	EM	March 31, 2017
	Stakeholders learning workshop - Juba	TL/EM	April 5-6, 2017
Draft 2	Submission of revised draft ER and draft SER to OEV based on the WFP comments, and team's comments on the matrix of comments.	TL	April 13, 2017
	Review of matrix and ER and draft SER.	EM	April 16, 2017
	OEV Director's clearance to send the summary evaluation report (SER) to Executive Management.	EM	April 18, 2017
	OEV circulates the SER to WFP Senior Management for comments (upon clearance from OEV's Director)	EM	April 21, 2017
	OEV sends and discuss the comments on the SER to the team	EM	May 5, 2017
Draft 3	Submission of final draft ER (with the revised SER) to OEV	TL	May 12, 2017
	Final approval by OEV. Director. Clarify last points/issues with the team if necessary	EM&TL	May 19, 2017
Phase 5 - Executive Board (EB) and follow-up			
	Submission of SER/recommendations to RMP for management response + SER to EB Secretariat for editing and translation	EM	May 26, 2017
	Tail end actions, OEV website's posting, EB round table etc.	EM	
	Presentation of summary evaluation report to the EB	D/OEV	November 2017
	Presentation of management response to the EB	D/RMP	November 2017

Annex F: List of People Consulted During the Evaluation Phase³³

Name	Affiliation		Location	Date
Joyce Luma	Country Director	WFP South Sudan	Juba	16 January
Ross Smith	Head of Programme	WFP South Sudan	Juba	16 January
Jesse Wood	Deputy Head of Programme	WFP South Sudan	Juba	16 January
Katri Kangas	Programme Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	16 January
Peter Schaller	Chief of Logistics	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Maria Bautista-Owen	Deputy Country Director	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Adham Effendi	Logistics Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Arshia Kahn	M&E Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Rehan Zahid	Programme Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Lillian Mokgosi	Gender Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Peter Kwaje	Protection Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	17 January
Ian Ridley	Head of Office	OCHA South Sudan	Juba	18 January
Thomas Styer	Logistics Officer, Fleet	WFP South Sudan	Juba	18 January
Maya El Hage	Compliance Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	18 January
Mahimbo Mdoe	Country Director	Unicef	Juba	18 January
Gatwech Peter Kulang	Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs	United Nations	Juba	18 January
Hebert Lopez	Programme Officer Safety Nets	WFP South Sudan	Juba	18 January
Abdulkadir Musse	Sr. Emergency Specialist	Unicef	Juba	18 January
Nimulen Salvaraja	Emergency Officer	Unicef	Juba	18 January
David Lugeron	Programme Officer FFE	WFP South Sudan	Juba	18 January
Tom Tombe Loro	Director, NGO Affairs	RRC	Juba	18 January
Darlene Raphael	Head of Nutrition Unit	WFP South Sudan	Juba	19 January
Julia Lewis	Acting Country Director	Concern WorldWide	Juba	19 January
Lilian Mumbi	Emergency Response Director	World Vision South Sudan	Juba	19 January
Eric Yunus	Food Programme Manager	World Vision South Sudan	Juba	19 January
Carina Vedvik Hansen	Country Director	National Research Council of Canada	Juba	19 January
Fiona Lithgow	Logistics Cluster Coordinator	WFP South Sudan	Juba	19 January
Clayton Mashapa	Technical Assistance Manager	OXFAM	Juba	19 January

³³ In total, the evaluation team conducted interviews with approximately 90 individual beneficiaries and 30 focus groups.

Name	Affiliation		Location	Date
Benard Nyataya	Livelihoods Manager	OXFAM	Juba	19 January
Andrew Damant	Country Logistics Manager	Medair	Juba	19 January
Teoman Alp	Head of Administration	WFP South Sudan	Juba	19 January
Conny Akerstrom	Deputy Chief Aviation Transport Officer	UNHAS	Juba	19 January
Pete Walsh	Country Director	Save the Children International	Juba	19 January
Erik Forsman	Air Operations Supervisor	UNHAS	Juba	19 January
Niraj Shrestha	Head of Admin & Finance	UNHAS	Juba	19 January
Richard Egwungu	Head of ICT	WFP/ETC	Juba	20 January
Solomon Welle	IT Officer	WFP /ETC	Juba	20 January
Adelina Tomas	Procurement Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	20 January
Daniel Diekhaus	Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance	USAID	Juba	20 January
Dan Detas	Disaster Assistance Response Team	USAID	Juba	20 January
Krishna Pahari	VAM Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	20 January
Augustin Madondi	Officer	Welt Hunger Hilfe	Juba	20 January
Leonidace Rugemalia	Emergency Response Unit	WFP South Sudan	Juba	20 January
Dorothy Nabiwemba	VAM Nutrition Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	20 January
Alex Kiweesi	Programme Director	Hold the Child Organization	Juba	20 January
Taylor Garrett	Food for Peace Officer	USAID	Juba	20 January
Aymen Elamin	Partnerships & Programmes	WFP South Sudan	Juba	20 January
Dimanche Amba	Field Monitor	WFP South Sudan	Juba	21 January
Kujiek Ruot Kuajien	M&E Officer	OXFAM	Akobo	23 January
Francis Sarpong-Kumankuma	Head of Sub Office	WFP Sub Office	Bentiu	23 January
Vukoni Hakim	Logistics Officer	United Nations Logistics Cluster	Bentiu	23 January
Omar Hassan Ali	Logistics Officer	WFP Sub Office	Bentiu	23 January
Mac Anyang Yuang	Head of Sub Office NBG	WFP Aweil SO	Aweil	23 January
Wario Gollo	Nutrition Officer	WFP Aweil SO	Aweil	23 January
David Purkuon	Director	Republic of South Sudan	Akobo	24 January
Harry Addor	Head of Office	Save the Children	Akobo	24 January
Bazgha Iftikhar	Education Cluster Co-Coordinator	Save the Children	Akobo	24 January
Joseph Myuntang	Governor	GRSS, State Office	Bentiu	24 January
Thomas Hoerz	Head of Office	Welthungerhilfe	Rubkona	24 January

Name	Affiliation		Location	Date
Silpano Kipygen	Project Officer	Norwegian People's Aid	Bentiu	24 January
John Chol	Project Officer	Norwegian People's Aid	Bentiu	24 January
Jean Mwkvrarina	Programme Officer	Welthungerhilfe	Rubkona	24 January
Matthew Mpitapita	Head of Sub Office	OCHA South Sudan	Rubkona	24 January
Shannon Oliver	Field Security Officer	WFP Sub Office	Bor	24 January
Alexander Goutchkoff	Monitoring Officer	AFC - CP	Maluakon (NBeG)	25/1/17
Tracey Williams	Head of Programme	ACF-USA	Maluakon (NBeG)	25/01/17
Tatek Woldegabriel	Head of Sub Office	WFP Sub Office	Rumbek	25 January
Joseph Makorou	Security Associate	WFP Sub Office	Rumbek	25 January
Mohammed Siryon	Coordinator	OCHA	Rumbek	25 January
Joyce Asha Frances	Coordinator	OCHA	Rumbek	25 January
Daniel Khon	Coordinator	PLAN International	Rumbek	25 January
Jon Deng	Coordinator	PLAN International	Rumbek	25 January
Joaquim Canelas	Air Transport Officer	UNHAS Sub Office	Rumbek	25 January
Kaviraj Khadun	Air Transport Officer	UNHAS Sub Office	Rumbek	25 January
Pamela Onyango	Field Office Coordinator	Logistics Cluster	Rumbek	25 January
Isha Wright	Head of Field Office	WFP Sub Office	Mingkaman	26 January
Bonfrey Abuni	Programme Officer	WFP Sub Office	Rumbek	26 January
Ezekiel Domkoc	Senior Security Associate	WFP Sub Office	Rumbek	26 January
Veronica Ajok	Business Support	UNHAS	Rumbek	26 January
Emmanuel Mawa	ICT Officer	WFP South Sudan	Rumbek	26 January
Luck Stephen	Logistics Officer	United Nations Logistics Cluster	Rumbek	26 Jan
Taban Lado	Logistics Assistant	WFP Sub Office	Rumbek	26 January
Robertson Odongo	Field Office Coordinator	Catholic Diocese of Rumbek	Rumbek	26 January
Isaac Karkon	State Director	RRC State Office	Rumbek	26 January
David Throp	Head of Humanitarian Financing Unit	OCHA	Juba	27 January
Rebecca Alum William	Director of Nutrition	Ministry of Health	Juba	27 January
Isaack Manyiema	Head Nutrition Cluster	UNICEF	Juba	27 January
Paul Cruickshank	Director & Representative	UNOPS	Juba	27 January
Rick Schroeder	Head of Operations	UNOPS	Juba	27 January
Perry Mansfield	National Director	World Vision	Juba	28 January

Name	Affiliation		Location	Date
Morten Petersen	Head of Office	ECHO	Juba	30 January
John McCue	Head of Operations	IOM South Sudan	Juba	30 January
Gemma Connell	Special Assistant to the Director	OCHA	Juba	30 January
Erminio Sacco	FAO AFiS	FAO	Juba	30 January
Chris Newton	IPC Secretariat	IPC	Juba	30 January
James Swakiri	IPC Secretariat	IPC	Juba	30 January
Amanda Patterson	Officer	Samaritan's Purse	Juba	30 January
Collins Enabu	Officer	Samaritan's Purse	Juba	30 January
Pieter Ndungu	Officer	Samaritan's Purse	Juba	30 January
Josiah Kiiza	Consultant (SCOPE)	WFP South Sudan	Juba	30 January
Andrea Stoutland	Emergency Strategy Coordinator	WFP South Sudan	Juba	30 January
Pios Ncube	Emergency Coordinator	WFP South Sudan	Juba	30 January
Alejandro Guzman	Consultant, Emergency Response	WFP South Sudan	Juba	30 January
Owen Davies	Consultant, Political Affairs and Access Negotiation	WFP South Sudan	Juba	30 January
Alistair Short	Coordinator	United Nations Food Security Cluster	Juba	31 January
Sarah Moussavi	Coordinator	United Nations Food Security Cluster	Juba	31 January
Philippe Besson	Director	Switzerland Cooperation Office	Juba	31 January
Ken Kazungu	Logistics Officer	WFP South Sudan	Juba	31 January
Yvonne Rohan	Head of Operations	Concern	Juba	31 January
Gebrewold Petro Yohannes	Sr. Public Health Officer	UNHCR	Juba	31 January
Nenad Loncarevic	Head of Logistics	WFP South Sudan	Juba	1 February
Valerie Guarnieri	Regional Director	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Josefa Zueco Gutierrez	Logistics Officer	WFP RBN		
Adrian Van der Knaap	Deputy Regional Director	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Ilaria Dettori	Programme Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Francis Opiyo	Programme Officer, EPR	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Lucia Di Rosa	M&E Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Fiona Gatere	M&E Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Allison Oman	Programme Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Faith Awini	Programme Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February

Name	Affiliation	Location	Date	
Stella Atela	HR Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Farirai Chataurwa	HR Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Tarek Keshavjee	Senior Regional Logistics Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	2 February
Genevieve Chicoine	M&E Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Matthew Mcilvenna	Emergency Coordinator	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Marc Kaeraa	Resilience Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Brenda Began	Resilience Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Jo Jacobsen	Nutrition & HIV Consultant	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Josefa Zueco	Programme Officer, RMBP	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Elliot Vhurumuku	VAM Officer	WFP RBN	Nairobi	3 February
Jose Odini	Chief Aviation Safety Unit	WFP HQ	Rome (via phone)	8 February
Samir Sajet	Regional Aviation Safety Officer (UAE)	WFP HQ	Rome (via phone)	8 February
Carlos Botta	Deputy Chief Aviation Service	WFP HQ	Rome (via phone)	15 February
Stephen Cahill	Head of Global Logistics Cluster	WFP HQ	Rome (via phone)	14 February
Erika Joergensen	Director of Budget & Programming	WFP HQ	Rome (via phone)	14 February
Betty Ka	Senior Budget & Programming Officer	WFP HQ	Rome (via phone)	14 February
Haidar Baqir	ICT Officer,	WFP HQ/ETC	Rome (via phone)	15 February
George Fedha	Cash-Based Programming	WFP	Rome (via phone)	17 February
Sheela Matthew	Service Delivery Officer (SCOPE)	WFP RBN	Nairobi (via phone)	20 February
Thomas Thompson	Senior Regional Logistics Advisor	WFP RBB	Bangkok (via phone)	21 February
Stakeholder Groups interviewed				
OXFAM women's group members	(individuals)	Akobo	23 January	
Cash and food for assets focal point NBG SO	(individuals)	Aweil	23 January	
Programme focal points NBG SO	(individuals)	Aweil	23 January	
Representatives of SMARF, SMOH, SMOEST, RRC for Aweil North and Aweil East States	(individuals)	Aweil	23 January	
Head Teacher, representatives of teachers, parents and CP representative	(individuals)	Aweil	23 January	
Head Teacher, representatives of teachers, parents and CP representative	(individuals)	Aweil	23 January	
Community leader and approximately 100 beneficiaries	WFP Sub Office	Rumtilt, NBEG	25 January	

Name	Affiliation	Location	Date
Men and women community leaders and approximately 70 community members and CP (JAM) focal point	ACTED	Amothic, NBEG	25 January
Community leaders and 12 beneficiaries (all women)	WFP Sub office	Udhum, NBEG	25 January
WFP voucher beneficiaries	(individuals)	Mingkam	25 January
Truck drivers (7)	WFP Convoy	Rumbek	26 January

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Annex H: WFP South Sudan Portfolio Overview

Operation	Operation Title	Time Frame	USD required	USD received	% funded
SO 200379	Feeder Road Construction in Support of WFP Operations in Southern Sudan	Mar 2011 - Dec 2013 (3 BR - extended to Dec 2018)	118,679,896	96,036,768	81%
SO 200267	Logistics Augmentation in Support of the Strategic Grain Reserve in Southern Sudan	Jul 2011 - Jul 2014	93,340,135	18,353,784	20%
SO 200341	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in South Sudan	Sep 2011 - Dec 2012	58,783,721	43,790,615	74%
EMOP 200338	Food Assistance for Food-Insecure and Conflict-Affected Populations in South Sudan	Jan 2012 - Dec 2012 + 2 BR extended to Dec 2013	705,963,227	516,409,063	73%
SO 200361	Logistics Cluster Activities in Support of the Humanitarian Community in South Sudan	Jan 2012 - Dec 2012 + 6 BR extended to Dec 2014	55,182,752	47,651,119	86%
SO 200399	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster – Provision of ICT Services in Support of the Humanitarian Community in the Republic of South Sudan	Mar 2012 - Dec 2012 + 4 BR extended to Dec 2014	10,974,736	4,548,426	41%
SO 200423	Food Security Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Continued Humanitarian Situation in South Sudan	Nov 2012 - Apr 2013 +2 BR extended to Dec 2014	2,596,097	1,032,194	40%
SO 200523	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Republic of South Sudan (ROSS)	Jan 2013 - Dec 2013	34,187,210	38,409,401	112%
PRRO 200572	Food and Nutrition Assistance for Relief and Recovery, Supporting Transition and Enhancing Capabilities to Ensure Sustainable Hunger Solutions	Jan 2014 - Dec 2015 + 4 BR extended to Dec 2017	767,717,831	590,992,812	77%
EMOP 200659	Emergency Operation in Response to Conflict in South Sudan	Jan 2014 - Dec 2014 + 3 BR extended to Sep 2015	1,058,701,498	599,309,535	57%

Operation	Operation Title	Time Frame	USD required	USD received	% funded
SO 200634	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in The Republic of South Sudan	Jan 2014 - Dec 2014	50,750,346	51,915,344	102%
SO 200702	Air Operations to Support Humanitarian Deliveries in South Sudan	May 2014 - Sep 2014	17,317,601	8,591,716	50%
SO 200775	Strengthening Food Security and Livelihood Cluster Coordination in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in South Sudan	Jan 2015 - Dec 2015+ 1BR extended to Dec 2016	1,953,768	570,815	29%
SO 200778	Logistics Cluster Activities in Support of the Humanitarian Community in South Sudan	Jan 2015 - Dec 2015	34,861,685	36,440,108	105%
SO 200786	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in the Republic of South Sudan	Jan 2015 - Dec 2015 +1 BR extended to Dec 2016	117,920,606	85,904,858	73%
SO 200931	Emergency Telecommunication Cluster Activities and Services in Support of the Humanitarian Community in South Sudan	Jan 2016 -Dec 2016	663,080	663,373	100%
SO 200791	Provision of Life-Saving Emergency ICT Services to the Humanitarian Community in South Sudan to enable them to aid the people in need.	Jan 2015 - Dec 2015	4,474,806	1,221,687	27%
IR EMOP 201007	Immediate Emergency Response to South Sudan Crisis	July 2016-Sept 2016	282,236		
EMOP 200859	Emergency Operation in Response to Conflict in South Sudan	1 Oct 2015 - Sep 2017	554,469,464	209,594,413	38%

WFP Funding in South Sudan by Donor, by Year (USD)

Donor	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
USA	1,000,000	143,509,181	147,261,827	542,999,678	309,685,275	263,570,738	1,408,026,700
United Kingdom		17,538,647	22,031,561	60,131,379	73,722,174	70,524,351	243,948,111
European Commission	4,186,047	73,292,964	27,524,095	35,671,250	40,970,143	27,173,971	208,818,471
MULTILATERAL		40,923,853	16,403,419	14,160,660	41,448,809	17,691,380	130,628,121
Canada		12,242,783	22,374,905	33,361,126	25,781,591	30,851,409	124,611,814
Germany	666,667	3,211,968	2,657,568	32,408,971	7,631,328	29,552,008	76,128,510
United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund		9,751,677	4,363,004	9,442,111	11,359,004	7,383,453	42,299,249
Japan		10,612,211	1,934,630	9,675,423	5,200,667	3,200,000	30,622,931
United Nations CERF		4,397,966	9,153,488	7,855,244	3,132,092	2,787,322	27,326,112
Norway	5,117,707	3,367,032	1,291,767	5,455,975	2,970,885	4,726,254	22,929,621
United Nations Other Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF)	10,000,000	5,446,631	6,820,000				22,266,631
Netherlands		7,143,000	4,759,000	4,759,000	4,759,000		21,420,000
Australia		12,284,239		7,050,093			19,334,332
Switzerland		2,282,767	3,007,004	3,556,455	5,838,203	3,754,237	18,438,666
South Sudan		217,452		8,727,896	4,109,566		13,054,913
Finland		1,340,483	1,309,592	2,973,136	4,237,293		9,860,503
Denmark			437,646	4,629,630			5,067,275
China					5,000,000		5,000,000
Belgium				935,829		3,329,634	4,265,463

Private Donors		686,791	217,528	431,242	721,266	1,158,070	3,214,895
Italy		1,066,667		1,326,432			2,393,098
Republic of Korea		700,000		500,000	800,000		2,000,000
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund	1,990,200						1,990,200
Luxembourg		397,728	132,626	687,758	25,483	566,893	1,810,489
Spain		621,891	965,567				1,587,457
Sweden		395,322	586,153			71,378	1,052,853
African Dev Bank					1,000,000		1,000,000
Qatar					1,000,000		1,000,000
Ireland		67,343		691,563			758,906
New Zealand				591,716			591,716
France		147,609		407,056			554,664
Austria				464,074			464,074
Cuba		117,835					117,835
Liechtenstein				112,360			112,360
Iceland				104,158			104,158
Israel		50,000					50,000
Hungary				27,174			27,174
The Cooperative Republic of Guyana		9,988					9,988
Total	22,960,620	351,824,026	273,231,379	789,137,387	549,392,779	466,341,098	2,452,887,288

WFP funding by operation (USD)			
Operation	Required	Received	% Funded
PRRO 200572	767,717,832	525,470,018	68%
EMOP 200859	554,469,464	432,877,998	78%
EMOP 200659	1,058,701,498	599,309,535	57%
EMOP 200338	705,963,228	505,318,230	72%
SO 200267	93,340,135	4,549,054	5%
SO 200341	58,783,721	43,790,615	73%
SO 200361	55,182,752	47,651,119	86%
SO 200379	167,352,881	96,934,434	58%
SO 200399	10,974,735	4,548,426	41%
SO 200423	2,596,097	888,935	34%
SO 200523	34,187,210	38,409,401	89%
SO 200634	50,750,346	51,915,344	89%
SO 200702	17,317,601	8,591,716	50%
SO 200775	1,953,768	568,010	29%
SO 200778	71,042,806	67,006,968	94%
SO 200786	117,920,606	88,395,956	75%
SO 200791	4,474,806	1,221,687	27%
SO 200931	663,080	663,373	100%
Total	3,773,392,566	2,518,110,819	63%

WFP South Sudan Staffing Breakdown by Year

Contract Type	Year					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Internationally Recruited	57	87	91	128	151	138
Continuing	1	1				
Fixed Term	17	21	20	22	36	43
Indefinite Apptm	10	9	7	8	6	4
Short Term Daily		1				
Short Term Monthly	29	55	64	98	109	91
Nationally Recruited	445	524	588	726	778	821
Continuing				2	2	2
Fixed Term			1	99	106	105
Fixed Term- UN	31	30	77			
Permanent Apptm - UN	2	2	2			
Short Term-SC WFP	405	421	442	500	563	599
Short Term-SSA WFP	7	71	66	125	107	115
Grand Total	502	611	679	854	929	959

WFP South Sudan Staffing Breakdown by Office

Duty Station	Year					
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Abyei				5	8	13
Akon	1					
Aweil	40	43	52	52	57	58
Bentiu	32	35	33	37	41	46
Bor	46	52	61	53	58	61
Bulawayo				1	1	
Djibouti				1		
Juba	184	249	277	398	467	460
Kapoeta	23	22	22	24	23	23
Khartoum	1					
Kuajok			1	2	2	2
Maban		2	27	31	26	29
Malakal	48	62	44	50	44	41
Mingkaman						1
Nairobi				1		
Nyal				1		
Rumbek	44	48	46	63	65	78
Torit	3		9	21	19	23
Wau	50	56	56	56	64	64
Wunrok	30	41	44	47	44	50
Yambio		1	1			
Yida			6	11	10	10
Grand Total	502	611	679	854	929	959

WFP: United Nations and International NGO Partners (2011-2016)

Operation type	Project activities and modalities	Start Date	Operation number	Cooperating International Agencies	Cooperating International NGOs
EMOP	GFD, BSFP	Jan-14	200659	FAO, OCHA, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, WHO, UNMISS, UNHAS	Acted, ADRA, Concern Worldwide, ICRC, JAM, Oxfam, Save the Children, South Sudan Red Cross, , WHH, World Vision
	GFD, FFA/FFT, BSFP and TSFP, ESF, TB/HIV, CapDev	Jan-12	200338	FAO, IOM, IOM, OCHA, UNAIDS UNDP, UNDSS, UNFPA, UNHAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, WHO,	ACF, ADRA, Care, Concern Worldwide, ICRC, Mercy Corps, Oxfam GB, Plan Int., Save the Children, WHH, World Vision
PRRO	GFD, FFA/FFT, BSFP and TSFP, TB/HIV, CapDev, PAP	Jan-14	200572	FAO, ILO, IOM, OCHA, UN Women, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNHAS, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNPF, WHO,	ACF, ACTED, Care, Concern Worldwide, Mercy Corps, MSF, NRC, Oxfam GB, Plan Int., Save the Children, World Vision
SO	Logistics augmentation	Mar-11	200379	-	-
		Jul-11	200267	-	-
	Cluster - Food Security	Oct-12	200423	(blank)	-
		Jan-15	200775	FAO, IFPRI, FEWS NET	Women for Women International
	Cluster - Logistics	Jan-12	200361	UNHAS, OCHA, UNOPS, IOM	-
		Jan-15	200778	UNHAS	-
	Cluster - ICT	Mar-12	200399	FAO	-
		Jan-15	200791	UNOPS, UNDP, World Bank, GIZ, UNMAO, DPKO, OCHA, UNAIDS	Malteser International
		Jan-16	200931	-	-
	UNHAS	Sep-11	200341	UNHAS	-
		Jan-13	200523	UNHAS	-
		Jan-14	200634	UNHAS	-
		May-14	200702	FAO, OCHA	Mercy Corps, Vétérinaires sans frontières
		Jan-15	200786	OCHA, IOM, UNOPS	-
	Grand Total				

Government and Donor Partners (2011-2016)

Operation type	Project activities and modalities	Start Date	Operation number	Operational Governmental Partners	Multi and Bilateral Funding donors
EMOP	GFD, BSFP	01/01/14	200659	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission - RRC), Ministry of Health	African Development Bank, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Private donors, South Sudan, Switzerland, UK, UN CERF, UN Common Funds and Agencies (Excl CERF), USA, Multilateral
	GFD, BSFP and TSFP, ESF, TB/HIV	01/10/15	200859	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission - RRC), Relief Organization of South Sudan (ROSS)	Canada, China, EU Commission, Finland, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Qatar, Switzerland, UK, UN CERF, USA, Multilateral, Miscellaneous Income, Private Donors
	GFD, FFA/FFT, BSFP and TSFP, ESF, TB/HIV, CapDev	01/01/12	200338	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (Relief and Rehabilitation Commission - RRC), National Bureau of Statistics (Food Security Technical Secretariat), Ministry of Health and Education	Australia, Canada, Cuba, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Norway, Private donors, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Guyana, UK, UN CERF, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF), USA, Multilateral
PRRO	GFD, FFA/FFT, BSFP and TSFP, TB/HIV, CapDev, P4P	01/01/14	200572	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Ministry of Health, National Strategic Food Reserve, State Ministries (Agriculture, Forestry, Tourism, Animal Resources and Fisheries)	Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Norway, UK, UN CERF, UN Common Funds and Agencies (Excl CERF), USA, Multilateral
SO	Logistics augmentation	01/03/11	200379	Strategic Grain Reserve	UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF)
	Cluster - Food Security	01/07/11	200267	Feeder Roads	Luxembourg, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF)
		15/10/12	200423	GoSS Food Security Council	New Zealand, USA
	Cluster - Logistics	01/01/15	200775	GoSS Food Security Council	Norway, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF)
		01/01/12	200361	-	European Commission, UK, USA
		01/01/15	200778	-	Canada, European Commission, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF), USA, Multilateral
	Cluster - ICT	01/03/12	200399	Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges; County authorities; State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (SMoPis)	Switzerland
		01/01/15	200791	Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges; County authorities; State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (SMoPis)	Canada, European Commission, Netherlands, Norway, South Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF), Multilateral
		01/01/16	200931	Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges; County authorities; State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (SMoPis)	Australia, Luxembourg, Private donors, Sweden, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF)
	UNHAS		01/09/11	200341	GoSS
		01/01/13	200523	GoSS	Canada, European Commission, Japan, UK, UN CERF, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF), USA
		01/01/14	200634	GoSS	Canada, European Commission, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, UK, UN CERF, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF), USA
		01/05/14	200702	GoSS	Switzerland, UK, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF)
		01/01/15	200786	GoSS	Australia, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, Germany, Private donors, Sweden, UK, UN Common Funds and Agencies (excl CERF), USA, Multilateral
Grand Total					

Annex I: Key Development Indicators - South Sudan

	Indicator	Year	Value		Source	
General	Population (total, millions)	2016	12,530,717		CIA World Fact book	
	Population growth (annual %)	2016	3.92			
	Average annual growth (%)	2010 - 2015	4		UNDP HDR 2015	
	Urban population (% of total)	2016	18.6		CIA World Fact book	
	Human development index	2014	0.467		UNDP HDR 2015	
		rank	169/188			
	Average annual HDI growth (%)	2010-2014	-0.15			
	Life expectancy at birth	2014	55.7			
Net migration rate	2010 - 2015	15.7				
Gender	Gender- inequality index	2014	n.a.		UNDP HDR 2015	
		Rank	n.a.			
	Gender development index (GDI)	2014	n.a.			
	Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	2014	730			
	Seats in national parliament (% women)	2014	24.3			
	Population with at least some secondary education, female, male (% aged 25 and above)	2014	M	F		n.a.
	2014	M	F			

	Indicator	Year	Value	Source
	Labour force participation rate (%)		n.a.	
	Primary enrolment, female, (% net)	2012	34	UNDP HRD 2014
	GDP (purchasing power parity)	2015	23.69 billion	World Bank database
	GDP per capita (PPP USD)	2015	2,100	
	GDP real growth rate (%)	2014	-0,2	
	Foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP)	2013	n.a.	
		2005	n.a.	
Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)	2013	13	UNDP HDR 2015	
Poverty	Population living below USD 1.25 a day (%)	2007	50.6%	UNDP website
	Population vulnerable to poverty (%)	2007	n.a.	UNDP HDR 2015
	Multidimensional poverty index (MPI)	2010	0.551	
Nutrition	Weight-for-height (Wasting), prevalence for < 5 (%)	2009 - 2013	Mod & Sev	UNICEF SOWC 2015
			23	
	Height-for-age (Stunting), prevalence for < 5 (%)	2009 - 2013	Mod & Sev	UNICEF SOWC 2015
			31	
	Weight-for-age (Underweight), prevalence for < 5 (%)	2009 - 2013	Mod & Sev	UNICEF SOWC 2015
			28	
< 5 mortality rate	1990	253	UNICEF SOWC 2015	
	2013	99		

	Indicator	Year	Value		Source
Health	Maternal mortality ratio (Lifetime risk of maternal death: 1 in:)	2013	28		UNICEF SOWC 2015
	Life expectancy at birth	2014	M	F	UNDP HDR 2014
			54.7	56.7	
	Estimated HIV prevalence	2012	2.7		
Public expenditures on health (% of GDP)	2011	1.6			
Education	Primary enrolment	2013	TOT	F	EMIS 2013
			1,311,467	510,161 (38.9%)	
	Primary completion rate, both sexes (%)	2011	36.7		World Bank database
	Expected years of schooling	2014	7.6		UNDP HDR 2015
	Mean years of schooling	2014	5.4		
	Inequality in education	2014	39.6		

Annex J: Food Security, Livelihoods and Resilience

Introduction

1. This annex provides detailed evaluation findings and conclusions in relation to the thematic components of food security, livelihoods and resilience and includes the food assistance for assets (through cash and in-kind), school feeding, feeder roads and purchase for progress. The food for assets and school feeding programmes ran under EMOP 200338 from 2011 to 2013 and then continued under PRRO 20057.² School Feeding is also included in EMOP 200859. P4P was started as part of a global pilot programme and was incorporated into PRRO 200572 when that ended in December 2014. The feeder road programme operates under special operation SO 200379 (Table 1).

Table 1: Operations and activities

Operation	School feeding	FFA	Feeder roads	Purchase for progress
P4P Pilot				<input type="checkbox"/>
EMOP 200338	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		
PRRO 200572	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
EMOP 200859	<input type="checkbox"/>			
SO 200379			<input type="checkbox"/>	

Source: WFP SPRs

2. The annex is based on information gathered using the methodology described in the inception report. During the inception phase a desk review was carried out of relevant documentation. The evaluation team visited South Sudan for nearly three weeks in the second half of January 2017. During the first week, interviews were held with key WFP staff, Government, other United Nations agencies, partners and other stakeholders. During the second week, the author of this annex visited North Bahr el Ghazal and consulted beneficiaries, local WFP staff, government officials, school staff, parents of pupils and partners during visits to food for assets and school feeding activities. It was not possible in the time available and given security constraints to visit feeder roads or P4P activities in the field. These activities were discussed with WFP staff and other stakeholders in Juba.

EQ1: What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in South Sudan?

3. The humanitarian and development needs of South Sudan are very large, due mostly to prolonged periods of conflict over the last 60 years. South Sudan relies on livestock and farming as a main source of livelihood but only 4 percent of arable land is cultivated. The incidence of poverty has worsened from 44.7 percent in 2011 to more than 65.9 percent in 2015, with a corresponding increase in the depth of poverty.³⁴ The recurrent food insecurity and malnutrition crises originate from the disruption of its

³⁴ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>

agricultural sector, displacement of people, destruction of socio-economic infrastructures, trade restrictions, high fuel prices, and erratic weather with frequent drought and floods. This situation has resulted in high food prices and a net-food deficit. The latest food security and nutrition monitoring (FSNM) report³⁵, indicates 70 percent food insecure and 21 percent severely food insecure, with further deterioration in the August lean season. It is estimated that 4.8 million people – 40 percent of the population – remain in emergency or crisis level food insecurity. Analysis of food security, together with trend data over the evaluation period, is presented in the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) Annex in this report.

4. Agricultural productivity in South Sudan is still low despite potential for self-sufficiency and export. The country has diverse agro-ecological zones, availability of abundant natural resources – soils, rainfall, rivers, and forests - and yet South Sudan is far from being able to feed itself. According to the *FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission*³⁶ the annual consumption of staple cereals in the country is 1,300,000 metric tons, but production was 250,000 metric tons less than this in 2015 and 380,000 metric tons less in 2016. FAO/WFP forecast that the gap in 2017 will be 400,000 metric tons, which is being partly met by humanitarian food assistance and cross-border trade.

5. It is expected that some areas will always be in deficit in terms of crop production (for example, in Greater Upper Nile, farming is carried out primarily by nomadic agro-pastoralists), while in Western and Central Equatoria it is possible to grow two crops per year and produce a substantial food surplus. However, there are few grain stores and trading of grain from producers to markets is poorly developed. Farmers are not experienced in aggregation of crops to achieve good prices and grain quality standards are low.³⁷

6. The education system is weakly supported by the Government providing low salaries and there is no government school feeding programme. According to the South Sudan schools' attendance monitoring system,³⁸ the number of primary schools in 2015 was 3,639 and secondary is 249. About 70 percent of the primary schools are government-owned and primary education lasts eight years (P1 - P8) and secondary education lasts four years (S1-S4); 1.3 million children are enrolled in primary school (38.8 percent are girls).³⁹ At the secondary stage there are 45,567 students (31.9 percent are girls). Over 90 percent of women cannot read or write. Education accounts for 1 percent of household expenditures (WFP, 2010).⁴⁰ **Figure 1** below shows the net retention rates during primary schooling. The dropout rates average 24 percent per year. A recent Education Cluster survey⁴¹ found that lack of food and early marriage were the two most important reasons for dropout. A quarter (25 percent) of all schools are open air, tent or roof only. Another 25 percent of all schools have become non-functioning since 2013 due to an increase in insecurity. Greater Upper Nile is most affected while Greater Equatoria has been affected since July 2016. Greater Bahr el Ghazal is the least affected area, but education has been substantially disrupted since 2015.

³⁵ *South Sudan FSNMS Report* - Round 18 July 2016

³⁶ (April 2015 special report and personal communication)

³⁷ CO discussions


³⁸ <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/south-sudan-schools-and-enrolment-data-2015-sssams>

³⁹ Education Management Information System (EMIS) – 2011 National Statistics Booklet - Ministry of General Education and Instruction

⁴⁰ WFP (World Food Programme) (2010) 'Southern Sudan: Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment 2010-2011'. Rome: WFP.

⁴¹ Education Cluster Assessment, South Sudan, November 2016

Figure 1: Cumulative retention rate during primary school (2010-2011)



Source: Education Management Information System (EMIS), Republic of South Sudan.

7. Teachers' salaries were increased by up to 300 percent in January 2016; a primary school teacher of grade 12 received 1,800 South Sudanese Pounds (SSP), equivalent to about USD 95 a month after the increase.⁴² In 2011, there were 13,261 primary school teachers and 1,842 secondary teachers,⁴³ of whom 12 percent were women and 88 percent men⁴⁴ (MoEST, 2011).⁴⁵ Almost half (47 percent) of primary and 57 percent of secondary teachers were formally trained. The pupil-to-teacher ratio was 50:1 in primary schools and 18:1 in secondary schools. During the field visits, it was reported that teachers were paid very little and often late; class sizes in the visited primary schools were planned to be up to 50 pupils but, where schools are popular and facilities and teacher numbers insufficient, class sizes can rise to 150.

8. South Sudan has one of the lowest densities of roads with a further constraint that 60 percent are estimated to become inaccessible in rainy season.⁴⁶ According to the *South Sudan Rural Roads Project* (UNOPS 2016),⁴⁷ The road network in South Sudan is estimated at 12,642km, consisting of 7,369km of interstate roads, 1,451km of state primary roads and 3,822km of state secondary roads. The road infrastructure was largely destroyed or left in disrepair during the protracted civil war. Some roads were rehabilitated during the period from 2007 to 2012, but ensuing conflict in 2013, heavy rains, increased levels of traffic, overloaded trucks and lack of maintenance have rendered these improvements redundant. The poor road system means that transportation of goods and people between communities, towns and regional hubs is still difficult, particularly during the rainy season, weakening government and limiting trading in all commodities.

⁴² <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57839>

⁴³ *Education in the Republic of South Sudan Status and Challenges for a New System*, The World Bank, 2012

⁴⁴ 2011 South Sudan National Statistical Booklet for Education, 2012, MoGEI

⁴⁵ Latest available

⁴⁶ WFP SO 200379 Project Proposal

⁴⁷ *South Sudan Rural Roads Project* (SSRRP) - South Sudan Road Maintenance Fund, UNOPS, 2016

EQ2: To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to South Sudan humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

9. Over the evaluation period, due to the changing security situation the extent of livelihood and resilience-building activities has changed. The WFP portfolio of activities has been relevant to the development needs. It has adapted to this changing situation and WFP South Sudan has attempted to carry out developmental programmes when and where possible, through the introduction of recovery activities and budget revisions.

10. EMOP 200338 was implemented from 2011 to 2013 during a relatively peaceful period, with a new government and in a general feeling of optimism amongst the development community. The EMOP was designed to provide a transition from emergency activities to a protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO).⁴⁸ Activities included food assistance for assets (FFA) and school meals in order to increase food security and reduce short term hunger for food insecure communities and schoolchildren throughout South Sudan.

11. WFP designed the PRRO 200572 with a view to increasing its development focus while retaining emergency operations. This was in line with the new WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017). The resilience and recovery part of the PRRO aimed at improving community resilience and livelihoods, expanding market access and the food chain and enhancing access to social services that support good nutrition and learning. These goals were to be met through a range of activities – food for assets, conflict mitigation and peace-building, school feeding and capacity development. These programmes were designed to allow the food insecure people of South Sudan to move from a general food distribution to more sustainable solutions.⁴⁹ Concurrently, WFP initiated other development activities including the feeder road special operation (SO 200379) and continued the purchase for progress (P4P) pilot programme.

12. The conflict that started in December 2013 resulted in insecurity in the Greater Upper Nile region and meant that the PRRO was unable to operate in this region. While a new EMOP (200659) was started in 2014 to address the emergency needs in these areas, it was decided to continue the resilience and recovery activities in the seven states considered to be “non-conflict”.⁵⁰ Food for assets was carried out in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal states and Western Equatoria, while food for education (FFE) also covered a larger area including all of Equatoria and Lakes during 2014.⁵¹ During 2015, food for assets activities were restarted in the remaining non-conflict states.⁵²

13. In April 2015, a third budget revision was adopted for the PRRO 200572, which extended it by a further 12 months to December 2016 with the same area of coverage and activities. This route was chosen rather than programming a new PRRO, as the conflict situation made programming difficult during 2015 and it also aligned the end of the PRRO with an expected new UNDAF.⁵³ Despite the renewed violence in July 2016, the PRRO continued its activities in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal and

⁴⁸ EMOP 200338 Project document, 2012

⁴⁹ PRRO 200572 Project document 2013

⁵⁰ Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes and Warrap.

⁵¹ PRRO 200572 SPR 2014

⁵² PRRO 200572 SPR 2015

⁵³ PRRO 200572 BR3 and NFR – 29 April 2015

Warrap but had to curtail activities in Greater Equatoria, due to an outbreak of fighting in these previously peaceful states.

14. Food for assets activities in South Sudan have been appropriately designed to respond to the development needs of South Sudan, but throughout most of the evaluation period have been rather short-term. Food for assets programmes in South Sudan aimed to contribute directly (through food or cash) to the food security of the most vulnerable members of the community in areas where food insecurity has been assessed to be high. At the same time, they were potentially capable of contributing valuable assets to the community to improve livelihoods, protect communities from weather related shocks, improve access to essential service and improve knowledge. While the food for assets activities were relatively short term (up to 6 months) up to 2015 there has now been a change towards longer term involvement with communities under the BRACED ⁵⁴ programme. These activities are designed to contribute to the resilience and stability of communities and reduce the likelihood that further interventions will be necessary. Food for assets programmes are also designed to reduce gender inequality through ensuring equal participation in activities and equal participation on organisation committees.

15. Food for education programmes have been aimed at improving the very low attendance and retention of children at primary and secondary schools, as well as contributing to an increase in the number of new, qualified teachers. They are highly relevant to the national needs. Attendance levels at schools were still low and while dropout levels were high. Increasing the enrolment and attendance of students was designed to lead to an improvement in the number and ability of newly qualified teachers.

16. Under the EMOP 200338, the objective of the food for education programme referred to WFP Strategic Objective 3: to restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods,⁵⁵ while under the PRRO the activity came under the new Strategic Objective 4: Reduce undernutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger.⁵⁶ Both objectives remain relevant to the needs of South Sudan. In some conflict areas, the food for education programme aims to provide a safe space for children while delivering food, although educational input may be reduced.⁵⁷

17. The school feeding programme is a national programme. In practice, it reaches about 20 percent of all primary schools in the country. Priority is given to schools in areas with high poverty and low food security indicators, below-average enrolment rates for girls and long walking distances. The programme does not operate in conflict areas and does not include schools that do not meet other basic requirements (e.g. only national schools with a kitchen, store, latrines and a functioning parent teacher association). Within a school, all children are offered hot meals. Food for education activities in schools are general feeding of all pupils or a take home ration for girls (girls' incentive). Schools can choose which of the programmes they wish to operate, although the girls' incentive programme is restricted to schools where there is a gender gap of more than 15 percent between the attendance of girls and boys.⁵⁸ This element of the programme addresses the strong gender gap in school attendance in many areas of South Sudan. At the request of the Ministry of General Education and Instruction,

⁵⁴ *Building Resilience to Climate Extremes and Disasters* – funded by DFID.

⁵⁵ EMOP 200338 Project document, 2011

⁵⁶ PRRO 200572 Project document 2013

⁵⁷ Staff interviews

⁵⁸ *WFP School Feeding Policy* 2013

the programme includes a feeding element for teachers who are training college students.⁵⁹

18. WFP feeder road programme in South Sudan has been designed to contribute to improved communications, trade and development within the country. SO 200379 was justified on the grounds of improved access for logistics support during 2012-2013. Since 2014, the primary justification has been access to markets. Both justifications are clearly reasonable in terms of the community needs, but there is little data available to justify the selection of the routes on either of these grounds. Suitable routes for feeder roads were selected by a steering committee led by the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges (MTRB). The roads aimed to be useable during the rainy season and provide access to communities often cut off for several months by seasonal flooding. Roads were built to standards agreed with Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges, in accordance with the South Sudan Low Volume Roads Design Manual (SSLVRDM). Complementary activities included community sensitisation and mobilisation, HIV/AIDS awareness-raising, and borehole provision. The special operation activity intended to support P4P and local procurement by increasing farmers' access to agricultural inputs and access to markets.⁶⁰

19. The P4P programme aimed to encourage the production of grain by small farms. The global pilot of P4P had the following objectives:

- To identify and share best practices for increasing profitable smallholder/low-income farmer engagement in markets
- To increase the capacity of Small Holder Farmers to produce for, and engage in, markets in order to increase income levels
- To identify and implement best practices for increasing sales
- To transform WFP food-purchase programmes so that they better support sustainable small-scale production and address the root causes of hunger.⁶¹

20. Several states of South Sudan – particularly Central and Western Equatoria - are highly suitable for crop growing and some areas can produce two crop harvests per year.⁶² The P4P programme works in those areas and aims to use WFP purchasing power to incentivize and stimulate smallholder farmers to increase their marketable surpluses by increasing productivity and reducing their post-harvest losses. As a result, the intention is to reduce their costs (production and transactional) per unit and become more competitive to access demand from WFP and other buyers.

21. Increasing production and profitability of smallholder farmers helps address the large gap in national staple food production, aligned with WFP strategy at a global level. Under the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013, the goal of strategic objective five was “to use WFP purchasing power to support the sustainable development of food and nutrition security systems, and transform food and nutrition assistance into a productive investment in local communities”. This goal was maintained for the subsequent Strategic Plan 2014-2017 with Goal 2 of Objective 3: “Leverage purchasing power to connect smallholder farmers to markets, reduce post-harvest losses, support economic empowerment of women and men and transform food assistance into a productive investment in local communities”.⁶³

⁵⁹ LoA with GRSS 2013.

⁶⁰ SO 200379 Project Document, WFP, 2011

⁶¹ *Strategic Evaluation WFP 2008-2013 Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative*, WFP, 2014

⁶² *Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan*, FAO, 2015

⁶³ *Strategic Evaluation - WFP 2008-2013 Purchase for Progress Pilot Initiative*, December 2014

EQ3: To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies in South Sudan?

22. WFP livelihood, resilience and food security objectives were coherent with and supportive of the Government of South Sudan's policies throughout the evaluation period. During the period 2011 to 2013, WFP was closely engaged with the key government departments relating to agriculture, education and infrastructure. Since the start of conflict in December 2013, the ability of government departments to formulate and implement policies and develop national agendas has been much more limited.⁶⁴

23. The key national document governing development is the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-2013 which included "achieving rapid rural transformation to improve livelihoods and expand employment opportunities" as one of its four strategic directives. Increasing crop production through increased crop area and productivity was given high priority. Food security was not specifically mentioned in the plan.

24. Until recently the Ministry of Agriculture did not have a clear agriculture policy. However, in 2016 it adopted its Irrigation Development Master Plan (IDMP) and Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan (CAMP). These plans recognise the importance of agriculture in feeding the population and contributing to the national economy. They also call for the development of private enterprises in the agricultural sector.⁶⁵ The agricultural assets created and training carried out under cash/food for assets and P4P are both aligned with these overall goals. Implementation and investment mechanisms for the two master plans have yet to be determined.

25. The Republic of South Sudan Food Security Council (RSSFSC) was established in October 2008, with the mandate to ensure the overall alignment and harmonization of food security initiatives of the various line ministries and commissions, and to provide guidance for national food security policies and programmes. The role of this council has been evolving and it is increasingly perceived as a potential platform for enhanced coordination and fostering linkages among the nine ministries that deal with various aspects of food security. It has an institutional structure that consists of three bodies: the Council, the General Secretariat, and the Technical Steering Committee.⁶⁶

WFP has in the past collaborated with this body but it is not functional at present. The *2013 Food and Nutrition Security Information System (FSIN) Capacity Assessment*⁶⁷ stated that "the evidence suggests that humanitarian clusters are the only significant fora both at national and state levels where food security information is validated and discussed among key stakeholders to support policy decisions."⁶⁸

26. The school feeding and support for students at teacher training colleges has been closely aligned with the aims of the Ministry of Education. Specifically, support to education, even in the crisis, through encouraging attendance (enrolment and retention) and by decreasing the gender gap was strongly endorsed by ministry staff interviewed. WFP assisted the Government of South Sudan in the development of its school feeding guidelines and strategic framework aligned to the General Education

⁶⁴ Discussions with CO staff and Government of the Republic of South Sudan.

⁶⁵ http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/12233607.pdf

⁶⁶ *Food Security and Nutrition Information Network – Operational Strategy* – undated (2015)

⁶⁷ *Capacity Assessment of South Sudan Food Security and Nutrition Information Systems* November 2013

⁶⁸ *Food and Nutrition Security Information Systems - Operational Strategy* - undated (2015)

Strategic Plan (2013-2017) and aims to remove all barriers to learning and promote gender equality in the education system.

EQ4: To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

27. Coherence of WFP objectives with FAO was strong. The FAO strategy was included in its country programming framework (CPF) with the sustainable development of agriculture central to its core mandate of eliminating hunger. The current FAO Country Programming Framework (2016-2017) ⁶⁹ states three priority areas:

- Sustainable increase in production and productivity realised
- Agriculture-based economic growth and incomes increased
- Increased resilience of livelihoods to threats and crisis.

28. WFP work on P4P linking farmers to markets near feeder roads is closely connected to priority areas one and two, while the food for assets and school feeding are closely related to priority area three. Joint assessments and cooperation within the Food and Livelihoods Security Cluster were also covered under priority area three. Both WFP and FAO are involved under BRACE II.

29. UNICEF is the primary United Nations agency working in education. WFP actions were complementary to those of UNICEF, concentrating on its policy related to school feeding and the implementation of large school feeding programmes. UNICEF has a broader role with three key strategic approaches:⁷⁰ 1) Education sector policy and planning – including an education act and support for the education management information system (EMIS), 2) Improved quality of education – notably safe, effective, inclusive, gender-sensitive, protective and healthy schools, and, as part of the emergency response, temporary learning arrangements that comply with child-friendly school standards and 3) Education for children and young people out of school – flexible learning opportunities for children and young people who have missed out on the first chance to go to school, or whose life circumstances do not allow them to attend formal school.

30. WFP participated in the preparation of a “resilience context analysis”⁷¹ in 2015. The report was initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development (MAFCRD), the key United Nations agencies and other development partners in the country were involved including UNICEF, OCHA, UNDP, WHO and UNWomen, FEWSNET⁷², and the World Bank. The National Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the Ministry of Health also participated from the Government of South Sudan. The analysis was designed to support efforts by MAFCRD to develop a framework for evidence-based resilience programming in South Sudan. The concept of resilience is relatively new to WFP and this work has given the opportunity for agencies and other stakeholders to agree on the key causes of shocks and stresses, on terminology, and on “proxy indicators”. It allowed WFP to work with all key stakeholders to build a coherent approach to resilience in South Sudan.

⁶⁹ *FAO Country Programming Framework for South Sudan (2016-2017)*, FAO, 2015

⁷⁰ https://www.unicef.org/southsudan/education_11103.html

⁷¹ *Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to Shocks that impact food security and nutrition in South Sudan*, November 2015

⁷² Famine Early Warning Systems Network

31. Donors were supportive in principle of efforts to increase resilience and decrease and culture of aid dependency. Donors were unanimous in their support of resilience activities, recognising that it is very difficult or impossible in conflict areas. They expressed the desire to build the capacity of communities to resist short- and long-term shocks and stresses. This is strongly coherent with the WFP resilience policy. Those supporting emergency operations welcomed the “light” conditional approach that is being applied in insecure zones as a means of weaning beneficiaries off semi-permanent food handouts, while those donors that fund food for assets activities strongly support a more in-depth engagement with communities to ensure a longer-lasting effect of the interventions.⁷³ In the current context, donors are committing more funds to emergency relief than development activities, but would like to move back to development when conditions permit.

32. DFID has funded the multinational resilience programme called BRACED,⁷⁴ from July 2015 until December 2017, which did not involve any transfers (although cash-based transfer as an incentive is planned for 2017) and aims to build resilience through much greater involvement with communities over a longer period. This programme should yield useful lessons for WFP and other stakeholders in the future design and implementation of resilience programmes, although WFP has not yet built resilience interventions with this depth of community involvement. DFID has also financed the girls’ education in South Sudan (GESS) programme that provided cash transfers to P5 to S4 girls to encourage enrolment attendance. Girls’ Education in South Sudan and the WFP food for education both work in many of the same schools. The two interventions are harmonised: WFP provides food while DFID provides a cash transfer to girls and capitation allowances to schools. DFID was planning to support teachers’ salaries over the next three years.

EQ5: To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

33. The WFP Country Office has used its comparative advantage within its mandate and strategic objectives in its programmes to reduce food insecurity through development-oriented activities. The WFP Country Office has demonstrated its strengths in logistics with a nationwide network of staffed sub offices, its technical expertise in vulnerability assessments and wide experience in designing and implementing food for assets, food for education and (to a lesser extent) P4P to implement its programmes in South Sudan.

34. Food for assets and food for education programmes have been managed by WFP in many countries of the world for over more than 50 years. This has enabled the country offices to learn how best to apply the programmes in a wide range of physically demanding and culturally diverse conditions. WFP has a comprehensive collection of manuals, standard operating procedures, policies and evaluations to support these programmes and a large number of staff worldwide who are familiar with the standard methodologies.

35. WFP has also used its strength as a trusted partner of many donors to draw funding for its humanitarian and development programmes. This means that it is more likely to be chosen by donors for new funding than other smaller and more specialist organisations. WFP has utilized its experience with cash-based transfers to

⁷³ Source: Interviews with representatives of UK, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and USA.

⁷⁴ Building Resilience to Climatic Extremes and Disasters

develop opportunities for cash-based transfers wherever possible, despite the challenging environment for these interventions.

36. The concept of resilience is still relatively new and the experience of WFP has been limited. WFP has developed a policy on resilience⁷⁵ and is now learning how to incorporate the approach into programme design, implementation and management. In order to comply with the corporate resilience policy, the country office needed to build programmes with greater community involvement from the planning stage, to combine short-term relief with long-term development goals, to work with multiple agencies to address the full range of needs and to measure long term results.

37. WFP also has comparative advantages in its size and long-term presence in-country, potentially allowing it innovate and put into practice the lessons learned. As development takes multiple years to carry out, this long-term presence is highly valuable. Despite its size, WFP still needs to work closely with partners to ensure that maximum benefit is gained from such programmes. International NGOs and other partners expressed the desire to participate more fully in the planning and design process.

38. WFP has gained experience in building roads in many countries – both as a means of improving the logistical support to food supply in humanitarian programmes and more recently in the improvement of linkages between producers and markets. WFP has used this experience and its strong connections with donors to continue its feeder road programme.⁷⁶ Feeder roads are not, however a central part of the WFP mandate⁷⁷ and it is not clear whether they provide a significant added value over UNOPS – whose core mandate includes infrastructure projects.

39. Comparative disadvantages of WFP regarding the roads programme included: 1) contracting for non-food items in WFP was much more centralised than for “traditional” food items, 2) WFP did not have an in-house expertise in engineering, so engineers must be brought in from outside whenever there is a new programme or when someone leaves and 3) WFP administrative procedures were not geared for large infrastructure projects. These comparative disadvantages are illustrated by delays in the programme and weakness in implementation.⁷⁸

EQ6: To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with the WFP mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies)?

40. Two operational trade-offs were noted which made programmes more effective on the ground, but which were not normal WFP practice. In the food for assets programme for road building, WFP has a norm for the amount of work to be carried out per day. Normally the food ration is paid per day worked provided that the norm is achieved. In North Bahr el Ghazal it was found that participants worked much harder and more efficiently if they were paid directly in accordance with the norms. In other words, a worker received a ration for 15 days of work as long as he completed the WFP norm for 15 days; if he completed the work within a shorter period and left the site he still received the full ration. This still achieved the objective of creating the asset

⁷⁵ *Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition*, WFP, 2015

⁷⁶ Source – interviews with donors.

⁷⁷ Road building is not mentioned in the Strategic Objectives or the subsidiary goals.

⁷⁸ See EQ 12.

for a fixed amount of work but also allowed the worker to carry on with other work for the rest of the period. If the work could be carried out much faster than the norms, then the norms should be reassessed.

41. The second trade-off was under food for education, where cooks often received no pay from the government or school. In this case WFP allowed the cooks to receive some of the food as payment. It was explained to the evaluators that the food would only be provided to cooks if there was an excess after the meal-time, but it was quite likely that the cooks would receive a regular portion of the food and therefore possible to reduce slightly the ration received by the intended beneficiaries. This was also a pragmatic solution to a problem of payment to the cooks. If there were no payment in kind, then the cooks might not have worked and then the whole programme would have been put in jeopardy. It was noted in one interview that teachers may have received food too, but this was not corroborated during the field visits.

42. WFP does not support any development activities in areas of opposition. This is due to access difficulties and lack of stability. Under EMOP 200859, school feeding has been operating since October 2015 in four counties of Jonglei state and also a small amount in one county of Unity state. These counties are under government control but are not yet considered safe enough for PRRO activities.

Factors and quality of strategic decision-making

EQ7: To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analysis of food security and nutrition issues, gender equality and protection issues?

43. The major sources of information strategic decision-making for resilience and livelihoods activities have been FSNMS, integrated phase classification (IPC), market assessments, CFSAM and the ALNAP. WFP works with FAO, UNICEF, other United Nations agencies, government and NGOs to produce a series of documents that are broadly accepted by the aid community. The food security and nutrition monitoring survey has been carried out twice per year during the lean season and after the rainy season. It aims to record information from 15 households in each of 28 clusters within the 10 states of South Sudan. In the June 2016 survey, 3,942 households were polled.⁷⁹ The survey is a collaborative effort involving over 35 organizations (Government, United Nations, NGOs and community-based organizations), coordinated by WFP. The data has been used to calculate food consumption and coping strategies (livelihood and asset depletion) and from this a composite household food security index is derived. Apart from food security, the food security and nutrition monitoring survey also assesses nutrition and agricultural (crop and livestock) production.

44. The food for assets programme has been designed based on food security and nutrition monitoring survey data within the constraints imposed by funding and security. Because the food security and nutrition monitoring survey cannot provide sufficiently precise data at the community level, communities are chosen in consultation with local authorities. Targeting of beneficiaries at community level is carried out on the basis of surveys carried out within the community by WFP in conjunction with the cooperating partners (CPs) and after consultation with community leaders. Community members interviewed during the field visits reported that the selection process within the community was generally fair. A committee is

⁷⁹ Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring Report (FSNMS) – Round 18, July 2016

generally formed comprising men and women. The selection of beneficiary households is made on the grounds of food insecurity, vulnerability and the ability of the household to provide one member who is able to participate in the asset creation. The design of programmes has involved community-based participatory planning through the WFP “three-prong approach” (3PA) since it was rolled out in 2013. In a WFP document on the 3PA,⁸⁰ the approach was described by the North Bahr el-Ghazal State Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Deputy Director as “a very useful tool for coordination, planning and implementation. Our government should use this calendar, together with partners and communities, to plan and implement better.”

45. WFP also carries out market surveys every month to determine market prices. These surveys are used to calculate transfer values for cash-based transfer interventions and to determine the cost-efficiency of different modalities. Together with FAO and other stakeholders, the IPC and ALNAP are produced, largely using the data collected in these WFP surveys, the SMART surveys and the CFSAM.

46. In addition to the standard surveys there are ad hoc surveys which are carried out in emergencies or to look at particular issues or areas, such as surveys to determine the appropriateness of cash and vouchers modalities. Examples of ad hoc surveys include the “Juba Urban Food Security & Nutrition Assessment - September 2016”, the “Food Security Assessment for Mingkaman in November 2015”,⁸¹ the “South Sudan Western Trade Corridor in Hyperinflation Times - Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warrap – 2016/2017”⁸² and the “Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to shocks that impact food security and nutrition in South Sudan - November 2015”.^{83,84} Some of these reports are carried out by WFP staff, while others are subcontracted to NGOs such as ACTED and World Vision.

47. The vulnerability analysis mapping (VAM) function and monitoring and evaluation are not under a single manager. WFP staff noted that potential synergies are lost, such as combining efforts on the assessment of outcome indicators at the same time as carrying out the FSNMS. It was noted by the country office that in the PRRO review document⁸⁵ that there is a growing trend to integrate monitoring and evaluation and VAM globally. However, it was also noted that the merger had been tried without success due to the fact that FSNMS is a multi-partner effort. It was further noted that merging the teams was more common in small programmes where technical capacity is low. It might be observed that at times in the South Sudan Country Office, during the evaluation period, there has been a shortage of technical staff. Regardless of whether the teams are merged, potential synergies should be sought through joint assessment and monitoring missions wherever practical.

48. Gender and protection issues have generally been well covered in the planning and programming stages throughout the evaluation period. The food security and nutrition monitoring survey looks at gender differences in food consumption patterns and surveys the extent of wasting (based on MUAC <230mm) in women of childbearing age. The diet and childcare practices of infants and young children are also recorded. The information obtained from these surveys is used to determine

⁸⁰ WFP (2014). A WFP Approach to Operationalise Resilience- Part 2: Seasonal livelihood Programming.

⁸¹ *Juba Urban Food Security & Nutrition Assessment*, WFP, September 2016

⁸² *South Sudan Western Trade Corridor in Hyperinflation Times - Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warrap*, WFP, 2016/2017

⁸³ *Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to Shocks that Impact Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan* – WFP and others, November 2015

⁸⁴ See also under EQ4

⁸⁵ PRRO 200572 review document, WFP, 2013

which, if any, activity is most appropriate for the communities. A baseline survey was carried out on protection among WFP South Sudan staff in February 2016.⁸⁶ The main issues regarding protection were seen to be:

- Issues with local authorities favouring particular groups
- Overburdening of women during activities
- Exclusion of women from decision-making committees
- Disrespect to beneficiaries by making them wait a long time for distribution in the sun
- Crowd control at distribution sites
- Safety issues for beneficiaries travelling to and from distribution sites (particularly women)
- Issues related to children

49. Many of these issues are more relevant to general food assistance and nutrition interventions but the first three in the list were noted as potential issues in food for assets activities during the field visit. In practice the communities visited did not have any complaints about these issues. Gender and protection issues are also included in outcome monitoring.

EQ8: To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

50. Partnership and capacity building with government agencies were strong during the period 2011 to 2013 but since 2014 it has been more difficult to engage with the Government at a central level than at the state level. WFP collaborated with other agencies in 2015 to produce a resilience context analysis.⁸⁷ Apart from informing the development of WFP resilience programming, the report was intended to support efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Cooperatives and Rural Development (MAFCRD) to develop a framework for evidence-based resilience programming in South Sudan.

51. During 2011 to 2013, WFP engaged with the Ministry of General Education and Instruction through technical assistance. It assisted in the development of a national school feeding strategy but it remains in a draft form. Since the beginning of 2014 it has been more difficult to engage with the Ministry of General Education and Instruction at a policy level.

52. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MoAF) is the natural partner of FAO, although WFP also engages with them through the cash/food for assets programmes, the food security analysis and through the P4P programme. The Ministry would like a closer engagement, including planning of food production activities and capacity building, but lacks suitably qualified staff at present. Engagement with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry regarding food security and the IPC is covered in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Annex.

53. Under the P4P programme WFP has equipped, trained staff and paid the running costs for a food quality laboratory.⁸⁸ This laboratory still functions effectively. Its main

⁸⁶ Baseline survey was carried out on protection among WFP South Sudan staff in February 2016

⁸⁷ *Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to Shocks that Impact Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan* – WFP and others November 2015.

⁸⁸ P4P South Sudan Factsheet 2014 and supporting CO documentation.

task is to identify grain samples which are contaminated with aflatoxin – a mycotoxin widely found in the region particularly in cereals and groundnuts.

54. WFP sub offices still work closely with state ministries both for the selection and prioritisation of food for assets activities but also, where possible in capacity building such as planning and monitoring of activities. This has become more challenging in the 2016 as the number of states has risen from 10 to 32.

55. At the state level WFP works closely with ministry representatives and has been engaged in some capacity building although, with the creation of many new states, the task has become much greater. The evaluation team interviewed staff of several ministries in North and West Aweil and other states. The ministries stated that they had been closely involved from the planning stage of activities, through targeting and implementation. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in Aweil stated that the coherence of WFP activities at the state level was very important and possibly of more direct benefit to the country than the dialogue at national level in the current security context. Food for assets is coordinated by a state-level steering committee.

EQ9: What factors determined strategic choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) and how they were considered and managed when the 2014-2017 country strategy was developed by the country office?

56. During the period 2011 to 2013 WFP livelihoods programme activities were contained in EMOP 200338. They aimed to create productive assets to enhance community resilience and provide a safety net for children through the school feeding programme. This programme was run in parallel with the feeder roads special operation and the P4P pilot. Under the EMOP they chose to include food for assets and school feeding programmes. The food for assets programme planned to reach 942,000 returnees and severely/moderately food insecure but physically-able beneficiaries, while the school feeding activity aimed to reach 440,000 children including 10 percent within the girls' incentive.⁸⁹ WFP already had many years of experience with food for assets and with school feeding in Sudan and planned to use their deep field presence, extensive logistics network, geographical outreach and food security monitoring capacity together with a strong network of cooperating partners to implement these programmes.⁹⁰

57. The general choice of livelihoods programmes available within WFP was limited to asset creation and school feeding, but within that WFP selected "simple, medium-term, community-based activities, such as grazing land reclamation, construction or rehabilitation of small irrigation, water points, grain storage facilities, fish ponds, flood control structures, school latrines and hand-washing facilities" for their asset creation. The girls' incentive was included as part of the school feeding programme following evaluations,⁹¹ which have reported that the main reasons for the high drop-out rates of girls, especially from the upper grades, were: early marriages; parents' fears about the risks of their daughters walking long distances to school, and the inability to pay school fees. Both these programmes

⁸⁹ Sometimes called Girls "Initiative" in WFP documentation.

⁹⁰ EMOP 200338 PD, WFP

⁹¹ Including: *Impact Evaluation of WFP School Feeding Programmes in Kenya (1999-2008): A Mixed Methods Approach*, WFP, March 2010 and "Does provision of food in school increase girls' enrolment? Evidence from schools in sub-Saharan Africa", Gelli A, Meir U, Espejo E, *Food Nutr Bull.* 2007 Jun;28(2):149-55

met the national needs, as no government social safety net programmes existed and schools were greatly under-resourced. P4P was continued separately until the end of 2014 as it was part of the global pilot programme.

58. The period from independence to December 2013 was relatively peaceful and during this time the country office produced the 2014-2017 country strategy, which envisaged a gradual shift from emergency relief to development operations and in this context they planned PRRO 200572. WFP had substantial experience in building trunk roads in Sudan and had the capability to carry on this role for feeder roads following independence. It planned to construct 500kms of feeder roads along routes planned jointly by WFP and the Government. The objectives were: 1) to reduce transportation costs of WFP food deliveries to facilitate food assistance, 2) to support the P4P programme by linking farmers to markets and 3) to support the government of South Sudan in the development of its road network, linking production areas to markets and thereby lowering food costs and improving food security.

59. The country strategy⁹² recognised that 40 percent of the population remained food insecure in October 2012⁹³ and the many other man-made and natural difficulties, shocks and stresses that existed. The country strategy should be implemented through the full portfolio of WFP operations and commitments in South Sudan, including a protracted relief and recovery operation to transition towards enhancing resilience to shocks while also providing relief and saving lives through emergency operations as required. Targeted construction of feeder roads was also included.⁹⁴

60. The outbreak of widespread violence in the Greater Upper Nile region in December 2013 had a major impact on the forthcoming PRRO and other WFP operations in South Sudan. In December 2013, it immediately became clear that an emergency operation would need to be launched and that it would not be possible to carry out the PRRO as planned. WFP was committed to maintain its work on rehabilitation and recovery wherever possible, particularly in the non-conflict areas, despite the life-threatening challenges it responded to in parts of the country. The PRRO focused on the assistance WFP could provide in the non-conflict-affected areas of South Sudan, whereas the EMOP was tailored to the emergency and lifesaving activities to be implemented within the conflict areas. The budget for the PRRO was decreased from USD 626 million to USD 547 million to account for the decreased scope.⁹⁵

61. The PRRO activities were reassessed in early 2014. Despite the conflict being concentrated in Greater Upper Nile it had consequences outside that area. Many partner organisations left the country and this meant that some food for assets and school feeding activities had to be curtailed or new partners found. Capacity building activities with government became impractical in the current environment and were stopped, but with the intention of restarting as soon as practically possible.

62. WFP decided to continue with both the P4P and feeder road programmes, although the latter became harder to implement due to slow decision-making by the Government, shortage of WFP engineering staff in-country and reduced access along

92 Country strategy 2014–2017 South Sudan, WFP, 2013

93 WFP/FAO Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission, February 2013

94 Country Strategy 2014-2017

95 PRRO 200572 BR1, undated 2014, WFP

some main trunk roads (e.g. to Wau). In July 2016, conflict erupted and became widespread in the Equatoria region. WFP was badly affected through looting of its warehouses and the loss of many staff members. At the same time, international partner organisations again withdrew from the country either temporarily or permanently. All activities have continued as planned, but WFP had to reduce the P4P activities in Equatoria and they also suffered many difficulties in implementing the projects due to loss of stock from the Juba warehouse (e.g. culverts for road projects) and difficulty of access.

63. WFP had started cash for assets interventions in 2014 partly as a result of participation in the BRACED 2 programme (cash only) and partly as a response to a global move from food to cash where appropriate.⁹⁶ Due to the disruption of markets and the financial crisis, these required careful management. Nevertheless, WFP continued cash distributions where security and market conditions allowed.

64. During the BR3 process,⁹⁷ the technical review considered reducing the scope of some recovery components. This was not carried out because: 1) the country office had managed the activities so far and 2) the Government was very supportive of recovery activities. During the same review, it was noted that consultations had been held with chiefs in the Abyei region. The chiefs were strongly supportive of food for assets, education and health programmes. The food for assets caseload was divided into Strategic Objective 2 and Strategic Objective 3. Severely food insecure beneficiaries are included under Strategic Objective 2 while the moderately food insecure are included under Strategic Objective 3. It was stated that the Strategic Objective 2 cohort would receive a conventional food for assets activity for their food consumption gap while Strategic Objective 3 cohort would receive a multi-year, multi-agency resilience activity.

EQ10: How has WFP analysed, or used existing analysis of, security-related risks and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures?

65. WFP development programmes under PRRO 200572 operate only in areas where security is considered to be good. Even in these areas WFP interventions can suffer from localized conflict (animal rustling and tribal conflict). Although less severe than in the conflict areas, WFP monitors the security position to ensure that operations are sufficiently safe to continue. The development activities were stopped in Greater Upper Nile at the end of 2013 and in most of Equatoria in 2016. When planning longer-term resilience operations, WFP had to consider not just the immediate threat to operations but also the longer term threat to multi-year interventions. Security is, of course, always very difficult to predict, so WFP knows that conflict may erupt in formerly peaceful areas and may lead to the termination of programmes and the loss of assets. Where possible, WFP mitigates these risks by the creation of assets that are widely accepted and needed by the communities. WFP has also changed the design of some feeder road structures to allow easier repair in the event of damage during conflict.

66. WFP continues to reassess security in all regions and will restart development operations when possible – Jonglei state has become more peaceful and school feeding and short-term food for assets activities may be reintroduced. Longer term resilience activities, feeder roads and P4P operations need a realistic prospect of long-term

⁹⁶<https://www.wfp.org/content/2017-cash-based-transfers-fact-sheet>

⁹⁷ PRRO 200572 BR3 technical review 2013

stability with no conflict and good access. The country office annual performance plans are used as the basis of risk mapping. These include security risks but also other programming risks such as political, economic and staffing risks. Although this system provides a basis for risk assessment the security situation can change much more quickly and WFP monitors this through multiple sources (including the Government of South Sudan, OCHA, UNMISS and local partners).

Performance and results of the WFP portfolio

EQ11: How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

Effectiveness of Food Assistance for Assets

67. Table 2 summarises the food and cash distributed for the main activities. The table shows that the planned food distribution in the food for assets programme has reduced each year and in 2016 is only 20 percent of the 2012 plan. At the same time the planned cash-based programme has increased from zero in 2013 to USD 6 million in 2016. The actual figures show that food distributions are around 70 percent of target overall; 2014 had the weakest performance against actual (30 percent) at the time of severe disruption due to conflict. The cash distribution doubled from 2014 to 2015 and increased again by 65 percent in 2016. cash-based transfer programming has been affected by a lack of financial institutions with sufficient capacity and coverage, lack of functioning markets with adequate supply and rapid inflation. The school feeding programme has been much more consistent in its size, after a drop from 2012, it has gradually increased up to 2016. The actual versus planned ratios have remained around 70 percent each year.

Table 2: Food distribution for livelihood and school feeding activities

Activity		FFA/ FFT	School feeding	Cash for FFA
Unit		MT	MT	USD
2012	Planned	50,663	14,179	0
	Actual	19,404	10,285	0
2013	Planned	39,187	7,264	0
	Actual	23,607	5,002	0
2014	Planned	17,957	6,690	1,903,750
	Actual	5,354	4,908	1,324,038
2015	Planned	12,399	7,799	3,596,048
	Actual	6,826	5,617	2,680,640
2016	Planned	10,373	8,954	6,000,000
	Actual	7,801	6,055	4,102,201
Total	Planned	130,580	44,886	11,499,798
	Actual	62,992	31,867	8,106,879

Source: country office data

Beneficiary Coverage

68. The number of participants for food assistance for assets and food assistance for training is presented in the table below (Table 3). Food for assets and food for training were carried out under EMOP 200338 during 2012 and 2013 and under PRRO 200572 from 2014 to 2016.

Total number of participants has been highest in 2013 and 2016 with the target number only met in 2016. Funding constraints, pipeline breaks and insecurity (at a local level) were quoted in the standard project reports as the main causes of underachievement. Participation of women has varied from 41 percent to 57 percent with an average of 49 percent.

69. The food for training programme only operated in 2013 and 2014. During that period almost 35,000 participants were involved with an estimated total of 244,000 beneficiaries (this figure includes family members of the participants). Of the participants in food for assets the proportion receiving cash was 12 percent in 2015 and 14 percent in 2016.

Table 3: Participant numbers food for assets and food for training

Year	Pl. male adults	Pl. female adults	Pl. total adults	Ac. male adults	Ac. female adults	Ac. total adults	% Ac. v Pl. male	% Ac. v Pl. female	% Ac v Pl. (total)	% Actual female v actual (total)
Food assistance for assets										
2012	70,018	64,632	134,650	39,268	27,288	66,556	56	42	49	41
2013	86,262	79,626	165,888	57,212	52,811	110,023	66	66	66	48
2014	38,940	35,945	74,885	35,684	32,939	68,623	92	92	92	48
2015	37,692	37,693	75,385	24,360	32,292	56,652	65	86	75	57
2016	40,662	45,852	86,514	55,835	55,836	111,671	137	122	129	50
Food assistance for training										
2013	0	0	0	4,346	4,012	8,358				48
2014	15,756	14,544	30,300	13,317	13,167	26,484	85	91	87	50

Source: Operation standard project reports, WFP

70. On average, the food for assets programme has reached more than 80,000 participants per year although the figure has fluctuated from 66,556 in 2012 to 111,671 in 2016. The programme size has varied over the evaluation period according to the security conditions. In 2014 there was a drop in numbers with the onset of conflict while 2016 has seen a substantial rise. When comparing actual versus planned, the ratio varies from 49 percent (2012) to 129 percent (2016). With an average family size of seven, the number of beneficiaries is estimated to be more than 560,000 per year.

71. Following the onset of conflict in December 2013 the PRRO was restricted to the seven non-conflict states. The budget was reduced during two budget revisions and the funds transferred to the EMOP in Greater Upper Nile. Donors have proved flexible in their funding of the activity, recognising the need to make programme changes when security conditions change.⁹⁸

72. Beneficiaries, cooperating partners and state-level government all strongly supported the programme in principle and valued the assets, particularly the dykes, roads and training. One small example was the statement of a woman beneficiary that the new road to their community allows them access to the local town and medical services during the rainy season. Previously it would have been very dangerous or impossible to take a sick child to receive medical attention during the annual floods. Beneficiaries reported that the training that they had received assisted them to solve problems for themselves and therefore become less dependent on aid. Most of the food for assets interventions have been short term - up to six months.

⁹⁸ CO interview

73. Table 4 shows the major outputs that have been achieved during the evaluation period.^{99 100} The absolute numbers of outputs produced within the food for assets and food for training activities over the five years is impressive, particularly the area of land cleared for agriculture, road building and maintenance, classrooms constructed or rehabilitated, ponds created, earth dam construction, stoves installed and people trained. The actual numbers are in most cases well below the plan. This results from the communities' choices of assets varying from the plan, the effects of conflict on the size of the programme and the resources available. Under the food for training programme the only planned output is the training, which exceeded the target.

Table 4: Outputs for food for assets and food for training activities

Activity	Output	Unit	Planned	Actual	Planned versus Actual (%)
FFA	Land Cleared for agriculture	ha	127,194	94,182	74
FFA	Vegetables Planted	ha	433	373	86
FFA	Feeder roads built and maintained	km	1,017	776	76
FFA	Feeder roads raised above flood level	km	42	32	76
FFA	Feeder roads rehabilitated and maintained	km	1,048	822	78
FFA	Bridges constructed	#	10	6	60
FFA	Cereal banks established	#	110	7	6
FFA	Classrooms constructed or rehabilitated	#	1,619	886	55
FFA	Community Post-Harvest structures built	#	263	36	14
FFA	Water and fish ponds constructed	#	13,297	1,731	13
FFA	Households receiving fuel efficient stoves	#	3,780	3,780	100
FFA	People trained	#	40,373	20,336	50
FFA	Shallow wells constructed	#	593	371	63
FFA	Tree seedling produced	#	8,819,669	3,816,871	43
FFA	Volume of earth dams constructed	m3	1,654,197	667,532	40
FFT	Participants in training sessions	#	42,354	45,794	108

Source: SPRs

74. The monitoring of outcome indicators in the food for assets activity has been weak, particularly before 2015. There is little firm evidence that the expected outcomes of the activities have been achieved, although there are indications of positive effects. Changes in the national security situation and the effects of the financial crisis have strongly affecting the population. These, together with delayed implementation and irregular monitoring, all mean that the underlying value of the activity is difficult to

⁹⁹ The data are aggregated for all years from the SPRs. In some cases, different measures are used in different years – these have been combined where possible. The tables include only the major outputs for each activity.

¹⁰⁰ A complete table of reported outputs and outcomes is included in annex P.

see from the evidence available. The monitoring system has used five different measures of outcome during the evaluation period, so it is difficult to identify any trends from the data.

75. The data is included as a footnote¹⁰¹ but can be summarised as follows:

- 2012 – no results measured
- 2013 – mildly positive results from the coping strategy index scores
- 2014 – no results - only baseline data collected under the new PRRO
- 2015 – food consumption scores (FCS) and dietary diversity index (DDS) were measured for the first time. Coping strategy index results were very poor – possibly due to delayed food and cash transfers
- 2016¹⁰² – more data was available but still a mixed picture, with no clear indication of a consistently positive effect over the different measures. Analysis of Strategic Objective 2 (severely food insecure) and Strategic Objective 3 (moderately food insecure) operations are separated. Again, there was no useable community asset score data. The food consumption score improved for the Strategic Objective 2 beneficiaries but deteriorated for the Strategic Objective 3 beneficiaries (due to cash distribution delays and timing data collection)

76. An observation that may warrant further investigation was that households receiving food appeared to be more food secure than those receiving cash – although not significantly so. High food prices in a period of rapid inflation, lack of availability

¹⁰¹ In 2012, the baseline survey showed that 26% of communities had functioning and available assets (Community Asset Score – CAS)

¹⁰¹ The survey was carried out in October and no follow up was carried out before the end of the year so it is not possible to measure any results from the activity.

In 2013 CAS was not recorded in the SPR as too little data was collected for reliable reporting. Coping Strategy Index (CSI) revealed that FFA recipients had slightly better results than GFD recipients and that they tended to use mild coping strategies. Possibly suggesting a greater cushion from shocks as a result of FFA participation.

In 2014 the PRRO FFA activities only began in May and only baseline data was collected during the year so there is no quantitative measure of progress

In 2015 food consumption scores (FCS) and dietary diversity index (DDS) were measured for the first time. The overall baseline FCS scores measured in November 2015 were 33%, 25% and 44% for poor, borderline and acceptable households respectively against end of project target (EOP) targets of <7%, >5.2% and >86.2%. The baseline DDS was recorded as 3.2 against an EOP of >3.3.

The CSI score of 83 (EOP= <78) indicated that FFA beneficiaries were highly likely to implement crisis or emergency coping measures; they also had a low food coping index of 12.9 (EOP = <10). This may be due to delays in the FFA activities and their related food and cash transfers as a result of funding constraints and insecurity. CAS was recorded as 60 (EOP =>80). This is believed to be the result of reduced levels of FFA implementation.

In 2016, the data on FFA with severely food insecure population (Strategic Objective 2, Outcome 2) is weak as the CAS data was again weak. Indications from a variety of sources however indicate positive outcomes:

- The number of functioning community assets rose from the baseline of 2 in December 2013 to 4 in September 2016.
- Asset creation and training continued despite insecurity and delays.
- The proportion of households with acceptable FCS improved from May (14%) to September 2016 (44%).
- From external data (FSNMS etc.), it can be seen that FCS are generally higher in PRRO areas than in the Greater Upper Nile and the proportion of households with poor FCS is lower among targeted beneficiary households than the general population.

For the FFA activity with moderately food-insecure population (Strategic Objective 3, Outcome 1) similar constraints apply to the data collection as above. FCS deteriorated from 2015 to 2016 (the “poor” category increased from 33% to 44%) while dietary diversity (3.17) was stable but low and the use of the consumption-based coping mechanism increased from 12.9% to 19.4%. This deterioration in food security is attributed in part to the overall dramatic increase in food insecurity during that period, while these differences between the Strategic Objective 2 and Strategic Objective 3 interventions is attributed in part to the timing of monitoring where the PDM occurred three weeks longer after the distribution for the Strategic Objective 3 beneficiaries than for the Strategic Objective 2 beneficiaries so the rations may have been consumed already.

The asset depletion coping index (in 2016 referred to as the livelihood coping strategy index (LCSI)) improved from 83 in 2015 to 57 (HH headed by men = 65 and HH headed by women =46). This is substantially below the EOP target (= <78) but is still described in the SPR text as high. It is not clear why HH headed by men adopt significantly more extreme coping strategies than HH headed by women.

¹⁰² The 2016 data was only made available after the field mission, so the evaluation team was not able to discuss it with the CO.

of food in markets and delays in the delivery of cash-based transfers may all have contributed to this.

77. Corporate requirements for monitoring and evaluation of outcome indicators has changed substantially during the evaluation period. The table below shows the corporate indicators for the food for assets programme. Mandatory indicators were only introduced with the new service request forms in 2014 and since then, five indicators are mandatory for Strategic Objective 3 food for assets activities while two are required for Strategic Objective 2 food for assets activities (see [Table 5](#)).

Table 5: Corporate indicators for food for assets

Year	Household asset score (HAS)	Community asset score (CAS)	Coping strategy index food (CSIF)	Coping strategy index livelihood (CSIL)	Food consumption score (FCS)	Dietary diversity score (DDS)
2012	(x)	(x)	(x)		(x)	(x)
2013	(x)	(x)	(x)		(x)	(x)
2014		3	3	3	2,3	2,3
2015		3	3	3	2,3	2,3
2016		3	3	3	2,3	2,3

(x) = no clear distinction between mandatory and optional indicators
 2 = mandatory indicators for Strategic Objective 2 of the service request form
 3 = mandatory indicators for Strategic Objective 3 of the service request form

Source WFP HQ

78. Paragraph 96 above illustrates that corporate indicators were not successfully recorded prior to 2014, except for the coping strategy index in 2013. In 2014, some baseline data was collected and in 2015 and 2016 all the mandatory indicators were recorded except dietary diversity scores for Strategic Objective 2 food for assets. However, some of the data was not sufficiently robust to be useable, while the narrative sections of the standard project reports go to considerable lengths to provide sufficient interpretation for the reader to understand the meaning of each value. The need for the interpretation has many causes – lack of access due to insecurity is probably the major cause while inconsistency of timing, inadequate sample sizes and lack of staffing also affected the quality of the data. The highly variable security situation also affects the scores as populations are severely affected by (or recover from) conflict. There is no evidence that the corporate indicators themselves were inappropriate for food for assets although for the special operations, the corporate indicator system is very weak with only the satisfaction index as an outcome indicator. The circumstances in South Sudan, however, make it difficult to achieve the mandatory targets and even when they can be achieved, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions from them due to the outside factors.

79. While the food for assets activities has a clear value in filling a food gap, it is not yet clear that they are building resilience. Field level agreements with cooperating partners do not enable them to maintain contact with the beneficiary communities for

the whole year. The current system of field level agreements are normally for six months only/ The cooperating partners do not know whether they will be involved in the activity in the following year. No commitment is made to the community that there will be follow-up activity in the next one or two years, even though the design of part of the funded programme. BRACE 2 and the Canada-funded resilience programme states that the intervention will continue in a community for more than one year. This means that, due to the current field level agreement system, the planned programme of two to three years is reduced to a series of annual interventions. Many of the potential benefits, such as willingness by the community to experiment and gradual building of trust and mutual understanding, are lost.

80. One of the methods of assessing food for assets programmes is the overall cost per metric tonne of commodity (or cash equivalent). This is a crude measure which, if used on its own, encourages short-term actions designed only to move large volumes of food with little thought for the value or quality of the asset. It is clear that this is not how the programme operates, but there remains an ambiguity in the objective of the programme as it is currently split over Corporate Strategic Objective 2 (restore livelihoods and improve household food security through asset creation) and Strategic Objective 3 (build resilience). At the implementation level, it is difficult to distinguish whether the activity is meant to meet short-term food security needs or build household and community resilience.

81. Little evidence was seen during the field mission of multi-agency actions designed to meet a wide range of needs of the community, although FAO has been involved with agricultural inputs. This is an accepted part of resilience building and a key principle of the 2015 WFP Resilience Policy.¹⁰³ It states that “the complexity of risks, the need to enhance resilience capacities concurrently, and the different levels and scales at which resilience must be built require strong partnerships among stakeholders – communities, government, external agencies, research institutions, civil society and the private sector”. In the case of FAO, the lack of partnership was blamed on lack of funding for development work, but to date WFP has not designed any multi-agency resilience programmes.

82. It was reported by an important cooperating partner and confirmed by the Sub Office that the farmer field schools created under the cash for assets programme were not as successful as those created under agricultural programmes. This was due to the beneficiaries being selected for their food insecurity rather than their experience or enthusiasm to take part in FFE activities. The FFE members within the cash for assets programmes tend not to act as a cohesive group and get the maximum benefit from the programme. Although the central purpose of the programme is to relieve food insecurity, it is also important that participants are chosen and the programme designed in such a way that the food for services is of lasting benefit to the community and if this cannot be achieved then other assets should be chosen.

¹⁰³ *Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security And Nutrition*, WFP, 2015

Effectiveness of School Feeding

Table 6: Beneficiary numbers school feeding

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2015	2016	2016
Project	EMOP 200338	EMOP 200338	PRRO 200572	PRRO 200572	EMOP 200859	PRRO 200572	EMOP 200859
Planned boys 5 to 18 yrs (on site)	252,000	267,351	150,212	132,000	25000	106,713	25,000
Planned girls 5 to 18 yrs (on site)	148,000	157,016	70,688	88,000	25000	120,336	25,000
Planned girls take home ration	40,000	40,000	20,400	21,300		26334	
Planned total children 5 to 18 yrs (on site)	440,000	464,367	241,300	241,300	50,000	253,383	50,000
Actual boys 5 to 18 yrs (on site)	270,297	160,007	135,525	131,782	7,071	97,584	21,279
Actual girls 5 to 18 yrs (on site)	158,746	93,972	63,777	87,854	7,072	97,584	21,280
Actual female take home ration	29,108	18,507	16,678	22,943		26,808	
Actual total children 5 to 18 yrs	458,151	272,486	215,980	242,579	14,143	221,976	42,559

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2015	2016	2016
Project	EMOP 200338	EMOP 200338	PRRO 200572	PRRO 200572	EMOP 200859	PRRO 200572	EMOP 200859
% Actual v planned (male)	107	60	90	100	28	91	85
% Actual v planned (female)	100	57	88	101	28	85	85
% Actual v planned (total)	104	59	90	101	28	88	85
% Actual female v actual total	41	41	37	46	50	56	50

Source: Operation SPRs, WFP

83. The school feeding programme has reached an average of 300,000 children in 600 schools (20 percent of the national total) per year under two EMOPs and the PRRO. The programme includes a de-worming programme twice a year. Despite the low attendance of girls at school, the school feeding activity has managed to achieve an overall 44 percent participation by girls over all the years by including 8 percent of the total through the girls' incentive. The PRRO has nearly met its target in each year. A recent national survey organised by the Education Cluster¹⁰⁴ found that WFP school feeding programmes were operating in 13 percent of the schools sampled.

84. Table 7 shows output in terms of school children fed during the evaluation period.¹⁰⁵

Table 7: Schools assisted

Activity	Output	Unit	Value
School feeding	De-worming treatment	#	All beneficiaries
School feeding	Maximum number of schools assisted (2014)	#	1,231

Source: SPRs

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of Health of South Sudan, Education Cluster Assessment, South Sudan, November 2016

¹⁰⁵ The data are aggregated for all years from the SPRs. In some cases, different measures are used in different years – these have been combined where possible. The tables include only the major outputs for each activity.

85. Table 8 shows the main school feeding outcome indicators' performance during EMOP 200338 and PRRO 200572.

Table 8: Outcome indicators for school feeding

Year	Period	Retention (%)			Rate of Change of enrolment (%)		
		Boys	Girls	Children	Boys	Girls	Children
2013	Previous		91	97		23	15
	Latest		98	99		-21	-4
2014	Project end target (PET)	85	85		6	6	
	Base	99	98		-4	-4	
	Previous						
	Latest	93	90		-21	-14	
2015	PET	85	85	85	6	6	-6
	Base	99	98	98	-4	-4	-4
	Previous	93	90	92	-21	-14	-18
	Latest	84	87	89	21	37	23
2016	PET	85	85	85	6	6	6
	Base	99	98	99	-4	-4	-4
	Previous	84	87	89	21	37	23
	Latest	76	79	78	26	42	28

Source: Standard project reports

86. Despite fluctuations in enrolment and retention probably caused by insecurity issues the school feeding programme has repeatedly shown positive results particularly on retention. The programme has also contributed to gender parity, partly through the girls' incentive. The outcome results by year are summarised below:

- In 2012 no outcome data was presented in the standard project report.
- In 2013 school enrolment decreased during the year by 4 percent overall and by 21 percent for girls. Retention rates increased (to 99 percent overall, 98 percent for girls).
- In 2014 school enrolment rates decreased by 21 percent for boys and 14 percent for girls. Retention rates declined to 93 percent for boys and 90 percent for girls. but remained above the end of project target (85 percent). Although school

feeding took place in non-conflict areas, the fighting was reported as having a major effect on enrolment.¹⁰⁶

- In 2015, the rate of change in enrolment increased markedly to 23 percent (girls 37 percent and boys 21 percent) against the end of project target of >6 percent. Retention rates fell a little from the previously high levels to 89 percent (girls 87 percent and boys 84 percent) but remained close to the target. The girls' incentive showed good results with an increase in enrolment of 12 percent (end of project target >6 percent) and a retention rate of 92 percent (end of project target >85 percent).
- In 2016 enrolment rates for boys and girls both improved substantially by 26 percent and 42 percent respectively. The large improvement (target =+6 percent) is attributed in part to an overall improvement in the security situation across the country and to a deteriorating food security situation in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes states, which may have led to families using the programme as a useful safety net. The greater improvement in girls' enrolment contributes to the WFP target of gender parity.
- Retention rates dropped from 89 percent in 2015 to 78 percent in 2016, below the target of >85 percent, with no significant difference between boys and girls. The drop in retention is attributed to the renewed conflict in July 2016 (before the second measurement to assess retention). Constraints in the implementation of the School Meal programme and lack of teaching staff due to insecure conditions may also have affected retention. The girls' incentive scores for enrolment (38 percent) and retention (78 percent) match the results seen for the hot meals programme in schools – probably for the same reasons.

87. The school feeding programme was highly valued for its achievements by central government, state government, beneficiaries, teachers and parents. While the main aim of the programme is a safety net to support and restore food security, it is widely reported by many stakeholders that it is also reduced the gender gap in schools and, by improving girls' retention, it is leading to a reduction in early marriage and early pregnancy. Anecdotal evidence from post distribution monitoring indicates that parents would send their children to school regardless of provision of food but this was not the view expressed by the majority of interviewees.

88. Although the programme is a safety net for WFP and does not have educational goals, it is clear that to maximise the benefit of the programme to school pupils the ability of the schools to provide education is paramount. Many schools do not have qualified teachers and many have poor buildings, no water and poor sanitation. Complementary support for schools, including cash transfers to girls and capitation allowances to girls, is provided through the DFID girls' education in South Sudan (GESS) programme.¹⁰⁷ DFID are also committed to paying all teachers USD 40 per month for the next three years. These interventions are a very valuable support to schools while the Government of South Sudan is unable to meet their needs.

89. There appear to be few secondary messages passed to teachers and pupils through the intervention. The project document¹⁰⁸ stated that the programme would “provide local and international stakeholders with information materials for educating schoolchildren and communities on the use and maintenance of water, sanitation and

¹⁰⁶ PRRO 200572, SPR 2014

¹⁰⁷ See under EQ4 for more details.

¹⁰⁸ PRRO 200572 Project document, 2013, WFP

hygiene facilities”. There was no sign during the field visits of these information materials being used in schools.

90. The same project document says that “where possible complimentary activities will include the improvement of school latrines, and hand washing facilities, the provision of water points, school gardens and the installation of fuel-efficient stoves”. The output indicators state that nearly 900 classrooms have been rehabilitated over the evaluation period compared with a target of 1,619 but there is no evidence of the other activities. School gardens can provide valuable lessons for children in the production of food and the importance of a diverse diet, although they are unlikely to be able to be able to replace a significant proportion of the food needs of the school meals programme. FAO has a programme prepared and ready to create school gardens but it remains unfunded at present. No school garden creation was noted in the outputs of the food for assets programme.

91. The girls’ incentive is highly valued as a means of keeping girls at school, but there are difficulties with transporting the food home. To alleviate this problem providing the incentive in the form of cash rather than food may be a better option.

92. Under the food for assets programme school improvement is one of the options for community assets. It was reported that communities are often reluctant to choose this option as the skilled labour and non-local materials must be funded by the community and this is difficult.

93. WFP does not use the World Bank SABER¹⁰⁹ system¹¹⁰ in South Sudan to monitor progress towards education policy reforms, although the WFP school feeding policy ¹¹¹ calls for it to be mainstreamed in national programmes. It was noted at the PRRO BR3 by the technical committee¹¹² that this tool was not appropriate now and that it should only be introduced when a more stable government is in place.

¹⁰⁹ Systems Approach for Better Education Results

¹¹⁰ <http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm>

¹¹¹ Revised School Feeding Policy, WFP, 2013

¹¹² PRRO 200572 BR3 technical review 2013

Effectiveness of Feeder Roads

94. The following outputs have been achieved during the evaluation period (Table 9):¹¹³

Table 9: Outputs for feeder roads¹¹⁴

Activity	Output	Unit	Planned	Actual	Planned vs Actual (%)
Feeder roads	Baseline surveys	#	7	7	100
Feeder roads	Road built	km	801	195	37
Feeder roads	Roads maintained	km	80	30	38
Feeder roads	Roads repaired	km	122	16	31
Feeder roads	Surveys/assessments conducted	#	78	10	87

Source: standard project reports 2011-2016

95. The feeder roads programme has completed 195km of roads, but progress has been slow and several projects remain on hold or have been abandoned due to security issues. Table 10 lists the roads built or planned by WFP under its feeder road programme. See also Figure 2 for the locations of the feeder roads.

Table 10: The status of the WFP feeder road programme

Road name	Length in km	County	State	Funding agency	Current status
Kuajok - Lunyaker	47	Gogrial East/ Gogrial West	Warrap	EU	Completed
Mundri - Bangolo	67	Mundri West	Western Equatoria	Netherlands	Completed
Pageri –Ame - Magwi	64	Magwi	Eastern Equatoria	Netherlands	Completed
Ame –Juba- Nimule Road junction	13	Magwi	Eastern Equatoria	Netherlands	Completed
Kworijik - Tendere -Buko	56	Juba	Central Equatoria	IFAD	Completed
Kangi -Kuajok	41	Gogrial West/Jur River	Warrap/WBG	EU	Ongoing- near completion

¹¹³ The data are aggregated for all years from the SPRs. In some cases, different measures are used in different years – these have been combined where possible. The tables include only the major outputs for each activity. Full output and outcome data is shown in annex P.

¹¹⁴ Data for feeder roads do not include 2016 information.

Road name	Length in km	County	State	Funding agency	Current status
Juba -Kajo KejiStructures	~12 structures	Juba/Kajo Keji	Central Equatoria	IFAD	Ongoing
Terekeka -Muni -Tombek	~18 structures	Terekeka	Central Equatoria	IFAD	Ongoing
Kuajok Bridge	160m bridge + 6Km approach road	Gogrial West	Warrap	EU	Contract stage
Tharkueng - Getti	28	Jur River	WBG	EU	On hold
Fargacika - Ngisa -Mboro - Bagari - Ngobagari - Bagari Jedid	~89	Wau	Western Bahr El Ghazal	Canada	On hold
Karich -Amok Piny -Panyijar	119	Rumbek East/ Rumbek Centre/ Panyijar	Lakes State/Unity State	SSRF	Partially completed-terminated
Aluak Luak - Akuoc Cok	46	Yirol West	Lakes State	SSRF	Partially completed-terminated

Source: Feeder Roads Project - Interim report 4 prepared for the EU, December 2016, WFP

96. As can be seen from the table above, five roads have been completed. Another 41 km of road and 20 structures on two other roads are ongoing. A further 117 km remains on hold. The road planned between Fargacika and Bagari Jedid has recently been abandoned due to ongoing insecurity and the funds will be reallocated by Global Affairs Canada to another route. The route between Tharkueng and Getti is unlikely to be completed as funds were contingent on other work and will probably not be available. In Lakes state, 165 km of roads were partially completed but the work was terminated due to insecurity. An important bridge at Kuajok with 6 km of approach road is still at the contracting stage. Its design and contracting have proved highly problematic for WFP. Moreover, delays in the programme have been numerous, due to the lengthy selection process, a lack of engineering staff in the WFP office (particularly between 2013 and 2014) and inability to work on site due to conflict from 2014.

97. Procurement procedures within WFP have also caused delays, as competitive non-food expenditures above USD 500,000 require headquarter approval (depending on the procurement process implemented). The lack of a well-maintained trunk road system reduces the value of the feeder roads and puts them at risk if they are used by heavy vehicles to bypass the trunk roads.

98. The feeder road programme has engaged the communities and local government in activities to increase the value and sustainability of the roads, but some negative issues need to be carefully considered. Three local government staff were seconded to the programme during 2014 (target 3) and 32 were trained in costing, budgeting and the implementation of rehabilitation and maintenance work over the evaluation period (target 78) in the hope that these tasks will be carried out after handover. Communities are engaged in the project in line with WFP accountability towards affected populations policy (AAP). Complementary activities include community sensitization and mobilization and HIV/AIDS awareness-raising together with local (health) authorities, UNAIDS and local NGOs where possible.

99. Some activities to train farmers' groups and establish vegetable gardens were carried out but the planned linkages¹¹⁵ between P4P, food for assets and the feeder roads programme have been minimal so far.¹¹⁶ It was reported in one interview that the roads also have potential negative issues:¹¹⁷

- New feeder roads are much better for driving than the unmaintained trunk system as the surface is undamaged, therefore long-distance trucks are using them. This may lead to rapid deterioration as the feeder roads are not designed for heavy trucks.
- Truck drivers returning to Juba are collecting large quantities of charcoal. This is leading to the destruction of woodland areas near to trunk and feeder roads.
- Thieves and fighters now have much easier access to areas along the road and so local communities are less secure and some have moved away from the roads.

100. Monitoring and evaluation: No log frame was included (or required) in the project document¹¹⁸ but one was introduced in BR3.¹¹⁹ At this stage, the operation was under the new strategic results framework and the main objective of the operation had changed from supporting logistics to supporting access to markets. This log frame includes indicators related to food security and access to markets. The standard project reports do not include any reporting against these indicators. Two surveys were carried out in 2016¹²⁰ – these form a baseline survey for four roads and a follow-up for one.

101. There were no planning documents made available to the team relating to individual roads. It is understood by the current country office staff that no assessments were carried out at the time of committing to individual routes to decide whether they were likely to be able to appropriate for developing links between farmers and markets. There is also no cost-benefit analysis available for the roads – although the roads were each considered by the steering committee led by the Ministry of Road, Transport and Bridges so it is assumed that some data was available to the committee members at the time.

¹¹⁵ PD of PRRO 200572 (2013)

¹¹⁶ Source: Interviews

¹¹⁷ It was not possible to check these reports as the information came at the end of the evaluation and no field visit was possible to the feeder road programme. However the source is very experienced in road building in South Sudan.

¹¹⁸ SO 200379 Project document 2011

¹¹⁹ SO 200379 BR3, 2014

¹²⁰ Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Baseline Report – DFATD Canada-Funded Feeder Road: Fargacika – Ngisa – Mboro – Bagari – Ngobagari – Bagari Jedid, WFP 2016 and (FRSO 200379) Monitoring & Evaluation Follow-up Survey Report, WFP 2016

Effectiveness of P4P

102. Table 11 shows outputs achieved during the evaluation period.¹²¹

Table 11: Outputs for P4P

Activity	Output	Unit	Planned	Actual	Actual versus planned (%)
Local purchase/ P4P	Farmer groups supported	#	1,012	136	13
Local purchase/ P4P	farmer groups supported through purchase	#	88	13	15
Local purchase/ P4P	Farmer supported through purchase	#	12,050	11,548	98
Local purchase/ P4P	Farmers trained	#	2,204	962	43
Local purchase/ P4P	Number of smallholder farmers supported	#	11,750	18,039	154
Local purchase/ P4P	Quantity of food purchased locally from pro-smallholder aggregation systems P4P	mt	700	462	66
Local purchase/ P4P	Quantity of food purchased locally includes some P4P	mt	5,162	4,224	82

Source: SPRs 2011-2016

103. The P4P programme has reported on outcome indicators since it became part of the PRRO in 2015. During that time, the programme has not been able to increase local production and WFP purchasing, mostly due to security issues. In 2015 at the end of the pilot programme, P4P was incorporated into the PRRO. WFP purchased 14 percent of its food from regional, national and local suppliers against an end of project target of >10 percent but only 7 percent of that total (i.e. <1 percent of the overall total) was from aggregated smallholder groups against a target of >15 percent. This was attributed to lower than expected harvest outputs, disrupted harvested activities due to insecurity and funding shortfalls.

¹²¹ The data are aggregated for all years from the SPRs. In some cases, different measures are used in different years – these have been combined where possible. The tables include only the major outputs for each activity. Full data is provided in Annex P

104. In 2016, the comparable figure for regional, national and local suppliers was 5.3 percent (all P4P) of which only 1 percent was supplied through aggregated smallholder groups. These disappointing results are mainly a result of the new conflict in the Equatoria region, which is the main surplus production region. The P4P pilot project ended at the end of 2014 and was incorporated into the PRRO. WFP intends to encourage the production of locally grown nutritious food by working with farmer organisations and using its purchasing power to acquire food. However, security constraints have limited the ability to develop the programme.

105. WFP has trained farmers and productivity gains have been made,¹²² but it is not certain that the production is profitable enough to become a significant local supplier of cereal grain. No links have yet been made with the feeder roads and food for assets activities, although these are planned for 2017. According to the plan, twelve warehouses, each with a capacity of 300 metric tons, were built during the pilot programme to facilitate the aggregation of cereal stocks for commercial sale. The sustainability of the warehouse management and farmer groups is uncertain.

106. Unlike in most programmes of the WFP, beneficiaries are not selected on the basis of food insecurity but on the basis that they are smallholder farmers in food surplus areas. The main selection of farmers was carried out before the evaluation period and there were no records available of the selection process.

EQ12. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes?

107. The food for assets programme has suffered from serious delays in the last year, partly as a result of the security situation. Cash distributions of USD 2,715,479 were made in North Bahr el Ghazal in 2016 in July, October and December, despite being planned for monthly distributions from March. This resulted in cash not being available during the lean season and considerable hardship to beneficiaries. Receiving the payments after the end of the lean season was reported several times during the field visit as well as the increased risks associated with receiving multiple payments at one time were issues reported several times during the field visit.

108. Seeds and tools were also late for the agriculture components – resulting in some crops not being able to be planted as the latest planting dates were missed. Some equipment that was looted from the WFP store in Juba was not available for the assets – an example seen during the field mission was a culvert that could not be supplied – resulting in a break in the newly built road during the rainy season.

109. Delays in the food for assets programmes have also resulted from delayed field level agreements with cooperating partners. This situation appears to be better for the 2017 season, but is clearly not an easy system to manage for either party.

110. The choice of modality had an important effect on both the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme, which was a result of many factors. The financial issues are considered in a separate annex to this report. The other major factors are:

- The wishes of the community and local government – generally cash is preferred for its flexibility, but during the recent period of high inflation this can also lead to problems as the value of the cash is rapidly eroded

¹²² CO staff and CP interviews.

- Local market development - cash is only used if there is a functioning market in operation that can supply the necessary food without breaks
- Security and protection – cash payments are liable to theft and the most vulnerable beneficiaries are less able to defend themselves
- The corporate experience within WFP- in recent years, cash-based transfers demonstrated to have a clear advantage in many situations.¹²³ During the field mission it was observed that cash is stimulating the local economy – traders in locally produced food are more common in Aweil than was the case one or two years ago. The cash programme has been more efficient overall with 99 percent of the planned cash being disbursed in 2016 compared with only 79 percent of the planned food¹²⁴
- The SCOPE system for beneficiary registration, which is not essential to cash-based transfer, but has also made the process of registration more efficient and is well liked by beneficiaries. There have been problems however, including with fingerprint recognition (discussed elsewhere), which still need to be resolved.

111. The feeder roads programme has been less efficient than it could have been. Although the final quality of the roads has been good, donors observed that during 2013-2015, WFP was slow to develop road plans and implement the contracting of work. Country office staff and donors reported that this was due to a lack of staff and slow procurement procedures. There was confusion in two schools about the mechanism for replacing broken equipment – while WFP has a procedure in place to manage replacements the school or the cooperating partners were not passing on the message about the replacement needs for worn-out or broken items of equipment needed for food preparation. Cooperating partners stated that they could deliver food directly to the schools to ensure more timely delivery and save large WFP trucks needing to make small drops. WFP Country Office stated that this could be stated in the field level agreement, but this was not clear to the cooperating partner in question. Under the P4P programme farmers observed that the time taken to make payments for grain was two to three months. This compares with cash sales to local market traders. The slow payment may be inevitable with the WFP procurement system but it is difficult for farmers' groups to adapt to this system.

EQ13. What is the extent of WFP contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

112. Project implementation has considered the gender situation in South Sudan and taken measures to narrow gender gaps and ensure women's participation in the management of asset creation activities. Many of the activities observed in the field were designed to include or benefit women. Community assets, such as roads and dykes, include everyone, vegetable production and training courses are specifically aimed at women. Among the communities visited women were well represented on village bodies that assisted with targeting, chose assets and managed the asset-creation activities. There is some risk that women will be overworked if a substantial

¹²³ <https://www.wfp.org/content/2017-cash-based-transfers-fact-sheet>

¹²⁴ Northern Bahr el Ghazal sub office report, January 2017.

increase in agricultural production is achieved, as most of the labour is carried out by women. In practice this was not reported as a problem by beneficiaries. During asset creation, it was reported by beneficiaries and cooperating partners that work hours were sufficiently flexible to allow nursing mothers and those with small children to participate in the food for assets programmes.

113. Under the school feeding programme, the girls' incentive programme strongly addresses the gender gap in education. Under the general school feeding programme, there are strong benefits for girls such that foraging for food becomes unnecessary – this is more difficult and dangerous for girls than boys. Improving enrolment and retention at school has a disproportionately strong benefit for girls in that it is believed to reduce early marriage and early pregnancy. Although these claims were made by many stakeholders no supporting data was available

EQ14. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

114. Although there have been plans to connect programmes and ensure synergies these have not yet taken place to any extent. Except in the BRACE 2 programme there have been insufficient examples of nutrition and WASH programming as part of the cash/food for assets, school feeding and feeder roads activities. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal in 2016, there was a large-scale general food assistance programme under PRRO 200572 in response to widespread food insecurity at the same time as the food for assets activity. There were some overlaps between the programmes, which caused some tension when the food for assets distributions were late.

115. One of the food for assets activities that communities may choose, is to renovate or improve schools so that they qualify for participation in the school meals programme. There was little evidence from the field programme that this has taken place and it was stated that communities tend not to select school improvement as they have to pay the cost of skilled labour and non-local building materials.

116. There has been little connection between the food for assets, feeder road and P4P programmes to date. The feeder road programme could be enhanced by encouraging commercial agriculture with new links to markets. Food for assets activities could also be encouraged alongside feeder roads to strengthen the resilience of communities. Neither of these has yet happened. Security has limited the opportunities so far. Food for assets and P4P will normally be appropriate in different areas as food for assets tends to concentrate on food deficit areas while P4P is only appropriate in food surplus areas (actual or potential).

EQ15. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

117. FAO is the principle natural partner of WFP among the United Nations agencies working in South Sudan. Although there are some synergies and joint planning, the partnership in relation to recovery and development activities on the ground has been weak as almost all of FAO programming is directed to emergency work. FAO and WFP have an active memorandum of understanding that governs their partnership. It was reported that, prior to 2014, the two organisations were much less collaborative than they are now.

118. The two organizations work closely together to manage the Food Security Cluster and produce the nationwide food security assessments: IPC, FSNMS and CFAM. Each partner has its clear roles and responsibilities and the Food Security Cluster is now jointly coordinated. Staff at WFP and FAO both reported that prior to 2014 relations between the two organisations were more difficult, despite the two organisations having similar and closely related objectives in terms of food security and agricultural development.

119. FAO reported that its funding is currently predominantly emergency related and therefore the scope for cooperation on development programmes is limited. Under the BRACE 2¹²⁵ programme FAO and WFP jointly work with food insecure populations in Warrap, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States to: Increase capacity to absorb, anticipate and adapt to climate variability and extremes, reduce vulnerability to communal conflict by increasing social solidarity and cohesion and reduce hunger gaps and improve food security. FAO provides agricultural inputs and training for agricultural development, while WFP carries out cash/food for assets activities with the same communities.

120. FAO is ready to implement projects to support agricultural development alongside WFP feeder roads and support school garden development where WFP school feeding programmes are already active, but FAO does not have funding available for partnering in this work at present. During 2014 to 2016, FAO has been unable to carry out joint programming with WFP on P4P activities due to budget constraints. It is reported in the 2013 standard progress report that in 2012 and 2013 WFP and FAO collaborated in the development of agricultural activities including school gardens, diversified livelihood education, enhancement of farms and agricultural production at the community level. This collaboration is not captured in programme indicators and no corroboration was available from country office staff.

121. WFP has not yet involved many external agencies in its resilience work. According to WFP policy, resilience needs a multifaceted approach in order to produce long-lasting results.¹²⁶ There is little evidence that WFP has been involving cooperating partners in the planning of resilience activities or using their skills and knowledge to maximise resilience-building. Both WFP and UNOPS are involved in road building, but there is little evidence of a joint approach to the work. WFP constructed trunk roads in the south of Sudan prior to independence. As it had the capacity, experience and coverage, it continued this role during the evaluation period under a special operation, but changed its focus from trunk roads to feeder roads. UNOPS also constructs feeder roads as well as many other civil infrastructure projects. Both organisations are contracted by funding organisations to build the roads following the priorities and routes determined by the government steering committee. There has been no effort from the two organisations to work together to maximise the comparative advantages of both organisations and improve the service they provide to government and funding organisations.

122. It was suggested by some donors that having two organisations bidding for contracts would keep a check on prices, but this, on its own, seems a weak argument for WFP to maintain the capacity. Donors are more familiar with WFP than UNOPS and may be more willing to commit funds to road building if WFP is involved; again,

¹²⁵ DFID funded – “Building Resilience through Asset Creation and Enhancement 2” a follow on of BRACE in which FAO was not a partner.

¹²⁶ *Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition*. May 2015, WFP

this is perhaps a weak argument to maintain the engineering capacity when WFP has many higher priorities and is not well suited to implementation of road building operations.

EQ16: How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

123. The sustainability of assets created under the food for assets and feeder roads programme is inconclusive. The quality of some of the assets in the food for assets programme is doubtful; one cooperating partner observed¹²⁷ that the technical ability of its own field staff and that of WFP was insufficient to design and implement successfully some of the larger infrastructure projects. These include roads several kilometres long and substantial flood-prevention dykes. Errors in design have led to flooding and premature structural failure. WFP cannot remain permanently responsible for operation and maintenance of the assets. Construction contracts for feeder roads included a period of up to one year during which the contractor is responsible for the quality of the road. Training of local government staff in maintenance, budgeting and administration is included with road contracts in order to strengthen their ability to maintain the roads.

124. After the one year maintenance period, feeder roads become the responsibility of the state-level governments, but they have few resources for maintenance. Similarly, for community assets under food for assets, in some cases the community is too weak to manage the maintenance (for example, on several kms of farm roads).

125. WFP does what it can to ensure sustainability through training of food for assets beneficiaries and local government staff and by ensuring that the structures are designed to need as little maintenance as possible. However, one road was seen on the field visit that was less than two years old but was seriously eroded by floods and traffic. The sustainability of the warehouse management systems under the P4P programme is also uncertain – the ownership of the structures was not clearly defined at the beginning and the farmer organisations themselves may not survive the current conflict in the Greater Equatoria region.

126. A synthesis report looking at the impact of food for assets programmes¹²⁸ found that fish ponds were the least likely asset to survive (40 percent – all others were more than 50 percent with flood protection highest at 90 percent). It is interesting to note that, in the area visited, mixed-use ponds seemed also to be among the least successful assets. There is no exit strategy for food for education activities at present. The Government of South Sudan does not have the capacity or the funds to implement or pay for a school meals programme at present, so there seems to be no easy alternative to a continuation of the current programme.

127. At present, there is no short-term exit strategy for the P4P programme. Until security is restored in the potential P4P areas, it will not be possible to build up the capacity of farmers, farmers' organisations and markets, so there is little prospect that the activity can be made sustainable. In the long-term, however, the objective is to enable these elements of the supply chain to become technically and commercially self-sustaining.

¹²⁷ And corroborated by SO staff.

¹²⁸ *Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series on the Impact of Food for Assets (2002 –2011) And Lessons for Building Livelihoods Resilience*, WFP 2014

Conclusions

Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

128. South Sudan poses many severe challenges to humanitarian and development organisations. All the sectors linked with development are under great stress, government support for agriculture, schools and infrastructure does not nearly meet the needs. Despite this there are areas where conflict is not endemic and in these areas recovery operations are highly relevant to encourage self-sufficiency and resilience to shocks and stresses.

129. The strategic development of WFP in South Sudan has changed markedly during the evaluation period in line with the security situation, access issues and the capacity of government. A mix of emergency and recovery programming has been relevant throughout. The optimism with which the PRRO was developed in 2013 was relevant at the time and WFP adapted the geographical scope of its food for assets and food for education programmes quickly to meet the changed circumstances in 2014. The feeder roads and P4P programmes continued, but faced increasing challenges due to security issues.

130. WFP has lacked a strong government counterpart throughout the evaluation period, but particularly since December 2013. In the last three years, it has been difficult to engage government and assist in the development of policy at the central level, although WFP sub offices have continued to work with state ministries at the programming and implementation levels. There is a clear coherence of strategic policy between FAO and WFP. This has become stronger since 2015. UNOPS and WFP are both engaged on road building but there is little engagement between the two organisations and they bid competitively against each other for new projects.

131. WFP has used its core strengths – assessments and logistics together with food for assets and school feeding activities. WFP is still developing its expertise in P4P and resilience programming. While it has successfully completed a number of roads, both before and during the evaluation period, it is not clear whether this is, or should be, a core function of the organisation.

Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making

132. WFP has used well its strengths in VAM and market assessments while working with partners on crop and food security assessment missions, ALNAP and IPC to determine the food security and developmental needs of South Sudan. The humanitarian community and other stakeholders are well united in their acceptance of these survey results even though the circumstances of the country mean that there are limitations on quality and access. WFP has sufficiently institutionalised procedures for incorporating gender and protection issues into the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes. Despite low government capacity, WFP has managed to keep a high profile for development issues including raising the effectiveness of the education programme through school feeding, food security through assessments and the IPC and agricultural production through P4P.

133. Food for assets, school feeding, feeder roads and P4P programmes have been active throughout the evaluation period, although the resources and geographical scope have varied. The cash-based transfer system has been introduced and increased substantially as it has become apparent that it is normally cost effective and popular with beneficiaries and markets are responsive to the increase in demand for food.

However, the cash-based transfer system can only be introduced where adequate markets and food supply chains exist together with appropriate financial partners. WFP has made a strategic choice to move towards resilience as part of a global strategy and a shift in emphasis in donor funding. Despite the emphasis on resilience, WFP has retained simpler food for assets programmes under Strategic Objective 2. P4P is a very small programme but remains relevant and WFP attempts to continue the work despite the security difficulties.

134. Despite the worsening security situation since 2013, WFP recognises the need to maintain space for livelihood/ resilience activities. It is willing to accept some risks with the programmes wherever there is a good prospect of completing the action. At the same time, it remains flexible and can withdraw from areas that become insecure or move to areas where conflict levels drop significantly.

Portfolio Performance and Results

135. During 2012 and 2013, the livelihoods programmes reached a large number of beneficiaries in all states, but since 2014 there has been little livelihood work in Greater Upper Nile and since 2016 the work in Greater Equatoria has reduced. Food for assets reached more than 500,000 beneficiaries per year while school feeding reached 300,000 children. Two hundred and fifty kilometres of feeder roads were built and the food for education programme reached 230,000 beneficiaries. Many assets were created, including land cleared for agriculture, tree planting, and vegetable gardens. Earth dams, ponds, dykes and farm roads were built and training for all of these activities has been carried out. Under P4P 12 warehouses were built and 136 farmer groups supported. The programme has contributed significant benefits to the lives of many food insecure people in South Sudan, created valuable assets and, under the school feeding programme, has encouraged a large number of children to attend primary school, while addressing the gender gap in education.

136. The outcome monitoring data for food for assets is unclear; lack of clear monitoring results, combined with conditions of rapidly changing security make it difficult to establish trends. While it is likely that the activities had a positive effect on food security through the distribution of food and to some extent through the improved assets, it is impossible to say for sure. Monitoring the food for assets programme has been very challenging, but it is essential that good data is acquired so that evidence-based programming decisions can be made. Food for assets programming now covers food gaps under Strategic Objective 2 and resilience under Strategic Objective 3. The resilience work needs multi-year field level agreements to allow long-term commitments with communities and a more multi-agency approach to ensure that all major shocks and stresses are covered. WFP has not so far committed to a full resilience programme.

137. As a result of the school feeding activity, enrolment and retention improved but enrolment has been subsequently affected more by changes in security. The girls' initiative, in particular, has made a positive contribution to gender parity in schools. There was little evidence of WFP using its interventions in food for assets, school feeding and feeder road to promote nutrition and WASH. These are promised in the project documents, but rarely carried out in practice. These interventions should be added to the programme – either through full complementary interventions with partners (e.g. UNICEF and UNDP) or WFP should develop simple teaching materials and training programmes that can get basic messages to all food for education beneficiaries. Community members and school staff were strongly in favour of

additional messages being added to the existing programmes. Cooperating partners are capable of passing on these messages at little extra cost to the programme.

138. The feeder roads programme has produced good quality roads in recent years, but progress has been very slow due to government and WFP internal delays and security problems. Some roads have been abandoned in Lakes state. WFP has been chronically understaffed with engineers. The programme is not well integrated into the other development programmes. One contributing factor to such a disconnect has been that the feeder road programme is managed within the logistics section and does not have strong ties with the programme section. South Sudan clearly needs more roads and WFP has a history of building roads in southern Sudan over many years, but if it wants to maintain this position it needs to commit to maintaining an adequate support base within the country to make sure the work is carried out efficiently.

139. The P4P programme has reduced in size due to insecurity in Equatoria. There have been no recent purchases of grain from smallholder groups, but the training programmes continue in some areas. Until the security situation improves there is not much that WFP can do to assist in the development of a viable grain market supplied by large and small farmers in South Sudan. At present, the programme can only maintain a presence in the more peaceful areas and work with farmers and farmers' groups. There are opportunities that have not yet been taken up, to start P4P activities in relatively peaceful areas near feeder roads outside the traditional P4P area of Western and Central Equatoria.

140. Efficiency of the food for assets programmes has been affected, particularly in 2016, cash programmes were very late, and in some cases agricultural inputs were provided too late to be used. This was partly due to the onset of violence in July 2016, but this is not the only cause, since most of the payments and agricultural input deliveries should have been delivered before July. The slow field level agreement system was one cause of the delay; it has been improved for 2017, but remains a lengthy process and is always likely to result in rushed programming during the second half of the dry season. A multi-year field level agreement or framework agreement might reduce the delays. Gender and protection are systemically considered in all programmes and implementation – women are well represented in community committees and in asset creation activities. The linkage between the food for assets, school feeding, feeder road and P4P activities is weak, despite the intention being made in each of the project documents.

141. Joint development programming with FAO is limited by lack of funds for this work at FAO. At present the areas of cooperation are the BRACE 2 (resilience) projects and the Food Security Cluster. There is much scope for further work on school gardens, agriculture development near feeder roads and agricultural production as part of resilience building.

142. Sustainability remains a serious issue for the assets created under food for assets and the feeder roads. Despite planning and training activities to encourage ownership and agreed operation and management procedures, it is not possible to fully ensure that the work will be carried out if communities and state ministries do not have the resources.

Issues for Consideration

143. Given the need for recovery and development work in the country, WFP should continue its development programming. The food for assets and school feeding programmes have both worked well and combine food assistance with asset creation or opportunities for learning. They also reduce the tendency for an aid-dependency culture among the population of South Sudan. For school feeding, the results are sufficiently positive to increase the programme as widely as possible and work with other partners, particularly FAO, UNICEF and possibly UNDP, to add value to the programme through school gardens, and health and nutrition education. P4P should be re-launched when security conditions allow, but in the meantime opportunities should be taken to continue to work in the more peaceful areas of Western Equatoria and develop activities in other secure areas where there is not a food deficit, particularly near feeder roads

144. It is not clear whether the feeder road programme should be continued – existing contracts should be completed, but as donors are not actively looking to develop new roads the programme may end naturally. If future contracts are undertaken, WFP should discuss collaboration with UNOPS to determine whether the strengths of each organisation could work together rather than compete.

145. WFP should clearly divide resilience activities (Strategic Objective 3) from short-term food for assets activities designed primarily to meet severe food insecurity (Strategic Objective 2). Resilience activities must involve a wider range of agencies and use multi-year field level agreements with partners. WFP Country Office should learn lessons from the BRACE programme, while also building on experience gained globally within WFP (eg. the Three - Pronged Approach¹²⁹). Where all the criteria for selection are met, cash should continue to be given preference over in-kind.

146. Monitoring and evaluation needs to be further strengthened so that the outcomes of all interventions – in particular food for assets using food and cash can be properly assessed. The monitoring and evaluation operation needs to produce data that can be used with confidence in decision-making. This will involve a greater commitment to ensuring that well-trained monitors are enabled to reach a sufficient sample of intervention sites at the correct time. Security issues are likely to continue to pose a threat to the monitoring programme, but this should not be as great a problem as in the general food assistance areas. The country office should consider increasing the size of the monitoring programme so that some missing data will not jeopardise the validity of the results. Individual studies should also be carried out – or commissioned - to study the outcome and impact of experimental (in the South Sudan context) actions so that decision-making is more evidence-based. At the same time, more intense outcome monitoring might be carried out on smaller, representative “pilot” areas of the main programmes so that the reasons for changes in indicator levels can be better understood.

147. WFP should build stronger links between the activities carried out within its development programme (i.e. food for assets, school feeding, feeder road and P4P) by combining more than one activity in a single community. It is recognised that other priorities, such as targeting, may not allow this to happen but joint programming should be strongly encouraged when annual programme plans are being developed. WFP should use its reach throughout the country to include complementary activities

¹²⁹ WFP (2014). A WFP Approach to Operationalise Resilience.

with its food for assets activities. The marginal cost of adding these actions will be far outweighed by their value to beneficiaries and communities. Activities with FAO and UNICEF, such as education on agriculture, WASH and nutrition were foreseen in the EMOP and PRRO project document, but have not been widely implemented. While WFP can never be certain in advance whether the commitments on operation and management made by government departments and by communities will be honoured in practice, WFP nevertheless has a duty to fully analyse the capabilities of future owners of any new asset to determine whether there is a realistic chance of long-term sustainability. A higher level of risk may be acceptable for Strategic Objective 2 (food gap) food for assets interventions than for Strategic Objective 3 (resilience interventions). In the latter case, the commitment to the community should be strong enough to be sure that the chance of asset failure is low.

Annex K: Nutrition and HIV

Country context

1. Malnutrition is a long-term and major public health problem in South Sudan. Across the period 2011 to 2016, national figures on global acute malnutrition (GAM) have remained high, fluctuating around the emergency threshold level of 15 percent, with limited seasonal variation. Unity and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal stand out as most affected states, followed by Warrap, Upper Nile and Jonglei. Even the substantial scaling up of relief responses since mid-2014 has not resulted in a real reduction of global acute malnutrition rates.
2. There is insufficient food availability at national level, due to poor agricultural productivity, natural disasters and weak commodity markets. Acute malnutrition rates fluctuate with the season. They are highest during the pre-harvest months from March up to May or August depending on the region,¹³⁰ which is also the main rainy season when the incidence of malaria and diarrhoea increases. This creates a double burden of vulnerability for young children. The rainy season also brings logistical constraints to the implementation of nutrition activities, hampering communication and the transport of nutrition supplies. These factors are compounded by poor resilience of households experiencing displacement, asset loss and poor access to basic services.
3. Even in the years before the current crisis, malnutrition was already a major public health problem in South Sudan, as exemplified by the results of the 2010 South Sudan Household Survey,¹³¹ see [box 1](#) below.

Box 1: 2010 South Sudan household survey findings on nutrition

The South Sudan household survey¹³² figures collected in April 2010 indicate that wasting was a very urgent problem, with an average global acute malnutrition rate of 22.7 percent and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) of 9.9 percent.¹³³ Rates were relatively lower in the three Equatorial states (around 12 percent), and somewhat better, though still worrisome, in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile (16-21 percent). Rates in the other states were extremely high, 27 percent in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, and 31-35 percent in Unity, Warrap, and Jonglei. Rates were higher among boys than girls, and in rural than urban areas, but differences are not as large as those between states. For both global and severe acute malnutrition, there is a steep inverse correlation with the mother's education status, and with the household's wealth status. It is remarked that high global and severe acute malnutrition rates remain high across the 6-59 months range (in many other countries there is a peak in the 6-23 months age group).

In the 2010 South Sudan household survey, the national stunting rate was found to be 31.1 percent,¹³⁴ with limited variation between the sexes and urban and rural areas. The inverse correlation with the mother's education is less pronounced, and absent for the household's wealth status. Similar as for acute malnutrition, the most striking feature is that of the existence of wide variation between states (peaks in Unity, Western and Eastern Equatoria,

¹³⁰ In South Sudan, agricultural production primarily is based on a one crop per year pattern.

¹³¹ The 2010 South Sudan Household Survey was undertaken with the aim to collect baseline data just prior to independence. The approach is similar as in regular Demographic Health Surveys.

¹³² Republic of South Sudan: The Sudan Household Health Survey 2010

¹³³ The 2010 figures closely match those that were reported for Southern Sudan (10 States) in the 2006 Sudan Household Survey: average GAM rate of 21.9%, and 7.0% SAM rate. Ref: Government of Sudan (2006), Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS) <http://www.ssnbs.org/surveys/>

¹³⁴ A slight decrease from the rate for Southern Sudan in 2006 (33.4%; 2006 Sudan Household Survey).

and Lakes >35 percent, while the other states all are around, or just below, the national average).

For the 0-6 months' age group, exclusive breastfeeding rates amount to 45 percent on average, while 73 percent is predominantly breastfed. The rates show little variation across sex and urban/ rural areas. It is noteworthy that exclusive breastfeeding is more prevalent in the lower wealth quintiles (but differences are not large), but at the same time increases with the mother's education level. Bottle-feeding was found to be little practiced for 6 percent of children aged 0-23 months.


About half (54 percent) of the households used adequately iodized salt (>15 ppm), while 18 percent used iodized salt that was not in line with the fortification standards. Variations between states again are very large, with the Equatorial States showing high coverage with adequately iodised salt (>80 percent); Lakes, Jonglei and to some extent Western Bahr-el-Ghazal states being close to the national average, while the other states all showed very low coverage rates (ranging from 14 percent to 29 percent).

In 2010, vitamin A supplementation coverage was found to be very low: a national average of 4 percent only, with rather limited inter-state variation. Households in the higher wealth quintiles and with mothers with higher education status were showing better results but rates were still very low (max. 10 percent).

4. A snapshot of state-level wasting rates during the pre-harvest situation in March to April 2011, which can be seen as a 'baseline' picture on nutrition for the WFP country portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016, is provided by the diagram below (figure 3)

Figure 3: Prevalence of acute malnutrition in children under 5 (2011)

Chart 2. Prevalence of acute malnutrition in children under age 5 years, March-April 2011, in selected areas in South Sudan




Source: United Nations, Republic of Sudan: 2011 Consolidated Appeal, p. 16

5. As evidenced by the results of the WFP food and nutrition monitoring system (FNSMS¹³⁵), national-level global acute malnutrition rates over past years have

¹³⁵ Since the data collection round of Nov/Dec 2014, the WFP Food and Nutrition Security Monitoring System (FNSMS) incorporates GAM and SAM rates based on weight and height data. Data are collected for a representative sample of children 6-59 months across South Sudan. Earlier on, nutrition data were included based on Mid Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) for children 6-59 months. These are not reflected here as classification results based on MUAC are not comparable to those based on the weight-for-height Z-score (WHZ).

consistently stayed close to the emergency threshold of 15 percent, with relatively modest levels of seasonal variation (see [Figure 4](#)¹³⁶).


Figure 4: South Sudan national-level global and severe acute malnutrition rates



Source: WFP FNSMS rounds 13 - 18


6. Some further analysis reveals that also at state level acute malnutrition has been rather consistent across the past years, especially for global acute malnutrition (see [Figure 5](#) and [Figure 6](#) below). Unity, Upper Nile¹³⁷, Jonglei (the three states of Greater Upper Nile) and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap (in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal) stand out as the states with highest rates. While overall there is good concurrence between the results of the FNSMS and the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) surveys, the exceptions are the increasing global and severe acute malnutrition trends in Upper Nile which are picked up in the SMART surveys but were not reflected in the findings of the FNSMS, while on the other hand the system found a sharp peak in both global and severe acute malnutrition in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal in June 2016 which was not encountered in the SMART surveys for the same period.

Figure 5: South Sudan state-level global and severe acute malnutrition rates – WFP food and nutrition monitoring system rounds 13 – 18




¹³⁶ The graphs are constructed by the evaluation team based on FNSMS reports No. 13 up to No. 17.

¹³⁷ For Greater Upper Nile, it needs to be noted that there are various gaps in the data available, presumably due to issues of access constraints due to insecurity.




Source: Prepared by the country portfolio evaluation team

Figure 6: Acute malnutrition prevalence by state and year (2013-2016: based on SMART surveys)¹³⁸



¹³⁸ The graphs are constructed by the evaluation team based on all SMART survey data that is available on the nutrition cluster website. Surveys were mostly undertaken in the period March to August.
 Ref: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/nutrition/documents/document-type/assessment-report> and <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/document/south-sudan-smart-survey-matrix-2016>



Source: Prepared by the country portfolio evaluation team

7. Multiple factors undermine nutrition in South Sudan, with the continuing conflict and low levels of development as the main underlying causes. This results in high levels of food insecurity and disease burdens combined with low health service delivery levels. Obviously, the conflict and instability in South Sudan have strong negative impacts on the food security situation, among others, as a result of reduced agricultural production, disturbed trade flows, and high rates of displacement.

8. Since the start of the crisis in 2013, aggravating factors for malnutrition have even become more prevalent. These include increased incidence of infectious disease (see box 2 below), poor access to clean water and sanitation, poor access to health care services¹³⁹ including severe disruptions in supplies and staffing, and deteriorated food security. In addition, there are concerns about the effects that trauma, sexual violence and gender based violence have on caretakers of infants and young children and the resulting impact that these may have on feeding and care practices.¹⁴⁰

9. As well described in the *2014 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Assessment*,¹⁴¹ the food security situation in South Sudan is particularly vulnerable because of: the interlinkage of armed conflict and displacement, poor productivity in key livelihood sectors such as agriculture and livestock,¹⁴² poor performance of commodity markets across the country, poor food consumption and diet diversification among most of the population. Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile are the most affected states, but food insecurity is also high in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Warrap. In Jonglei and Upper Nile, nutrition conditions were even further compounded by the suspension of nutrition programmes due to insecurity, stock-outs and looting of supplies, combined with recurrent outbreaks of diseases (see [box 2](#) below).

¹³⁹ It is estimated that only about 40% of the population in South Sudan have access to basic health care within a 5 km radius.

¹⁴⁰ Adapted from: GNC/SSNC (2014), *Lessons learned in South Sudan Nutrition Cluster, Synthesis report*, 24 September 2014 Ref: <http://nutritioncluster.net/learned-south-sudan-nutrition-cluster/>

¹⁴¹ Ref. http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC%20South%20Sudan%20-%20Sept%202014%20-%20Full%20Report.pdf

¹⁴² Caused by high levels of livestock mortality coupled with increased animal disease outbreaks.

Box 2: Health and disease in South Sudan

Prior to the crisis, infant and under-five mortality rates were already high: an estimated 75 resp. 105 per 1,000 live births. Health statistics are presumed to have further deteriorated in recent years. Communicable diseases have always been a common occurrence in South Sudan, with frequent outbreaks of cholera, measles, plus cases of other infectious diseases like kala azar (visceral leishmaniasis), rubella and hepatitis E.¹⁴³

TB is a serious public health problem in South Sudan, with an incidence of 146/100,000 (2015).¹⁴⁴ In 2015, there were 10,250 notified TB cases, 54 percent of total estimated incidence. Through USAID TB CARE I project (2010-2015) and Challenge TB (2014-2019), the ‘Management Sciences for Health’ (MSH) has been supporting the National TB programme in South Sudan.¹⁴⁵ As shown in the WHO Tuberculosis profile for South Sudan, in 2014 the treatment success rate was 71 percent (combination of new and relapse cases).

HIV is another health issue, which often presents itself in combination with TB. HIV prevalence among adults 15-49 years is estimated to amount to 2.7 percent.^{146, 147} The USAID/PEPFAR programme supports the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) and anti-retroviral treatment (ART) programmes in South Sudan. However, the coverage is small: for 2014, this support covered an estimated 6 percent of adults living with HIV (10,767 people in total).

WFP Nutrition Portfolio in South Sudan (2011-2016)

10. The overall WFP nutrition interventions in South Sudan the period 2011 to 2016 consisted of a combination of actions, with targeted supplementary feeding (TSFP) and blanket supplementary feeding (BSFP) as the main components. These programmes are directed at young children and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) in three types of contexts: stable settings, conflict-affected states, and refugee camps. The total number of beneficiaries covered by both the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes in South Sudan has steadily grown over the years. The institutional feeding programme (IFP), alongside treatment for Kala Azar, TB and HIV, initially formed a substantial component within the nutrition portfolio but it was strongly scaled down from mid-2014 onwards.

11. The targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes have seen the following programmatic evolution (also see [Table 12](#)):

- In the initial years (2012 and 2013), nutrition programmes were provided under EMOP 200338. This EMOP covered priority rural areas across South Sudan, and comprised targeted¹⁴⁸ and blanket¹⁴⁹ supplementary feeding for children 6-35 months during the lean month (March to July) for both the resident population and internally displaced. In both years, refugees in camps were covered under this EMOP’s targeted supplementary feeding programme, but for the blanket supplementary feeding programme, this was only done in 2013.

¹⁴³ Adapted from: GNC/SSNC (2014), *Lessons learned in South Sudan Nutrition Cluster, Synthesis report*, 24 September 2014
Ref: <http://nutritioncluster.net/learned-south-sudan-nutrition-cluster/>

¹⁴⁴ Ref: <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/profiles/en/> for the WHO South Sudan TB Profile.

¹⁴⁵ Ref: <https://www.msh.org/our-work/country/south-sudan>

¹⁴⁶ Ref: <https://www.cdc.gov/globalhivtb/where-we-work/southsudan/southsudan.html>

¹⁴⁷ The rates are logically higher among TB patients: 13% of the tested TB patients are HIV-positive.

¹⁴⁸ For children, the TSFP the ration scale is 92 g (one sachet) of Plumpy’Sup per day. The TSFP for PLW has a ration scale of 250 g SuperCereal, 20 g sugar, and 30 g vegetable oil per person per day.

¹⁴⁹ Ration scale for the BSFP for young children: 200 g of SuperCereal Plus per person per day. Ration scale for the BSFP for PLW same as for the TSFP for PLW.

- The EMOP 200659 (1 January 2014 to 30 September 2015) started off with just BSFP blanket supplementary feeding targeting the internally displaced persons in protection of civilians (PoC) sites and remote locations in the three conflict-affected states (Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei). It was a relief operation in response to the complex crisis conditions after December 2013. This is fully coherent with current international guidance on nutrition programming which stresses the role as part of standard responses to major food crises and as a seasonal measure to cushion the impacts of the agricultural lean season; the recommendation is to implement blanket supplementary feeding when global acute malnutrition > 15 percent, or in situations where the global acute malnutrition is 10-15 percent but with risk factors like decreased food security and/or high population displacement.¹⁵⁰ The Global Nutrition Cluster guidelines on moderate acute malnutrition prevention and treatment suggest to target the blanket supplementary feeding programme to children 6-59 months of age when both moderate and severe acute malnutrition treatment coverage is low (or when services are absent). As indicated in the Global Nutrition Cluster guidelines, no standard criteria or recommendations exist as of yet on inclusion of pregnant and lactating women into blanket supplementary feeding programmes.¹⁵¹ In case of capacity or resources constraints, the blanket supplementary feeding programme for children should be prioritized over that for pregnant and lactating women, certainly if there also is a targeted supplementary feeding programme for pregnant and lactating women with good coverage. From 2015 onwards, this EMOP integrated the targeted supplementary feeding programme sites, which in 2014 were being covered through the PRRO (see below). Rations were kept as for EMOP 200338.
- As a replacement to EMOP 200659, a new EMOP 200859 (October 2015 to December 2016) was established to continue covering needs in the three conflict-affected states in Greater Upper Nile, primarily through the integrated rapid response mechanism approach (alongside general food distributions) but also including the protection of civilian sites. In conflict-affected Greater Upper Nile region, blanket supplementary feeding is a year-round programme alongside the general food distribution and targets children 6-59 months of age, plus pregnant and lactating women. The targeted supplementary feeding programme was continued as well, and in 2016 substantially grew in size. WFP explicitly focused on facilitation of a continuum of treatment and care through good connections between the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes.
- The initial intention for the PRRO 200572 (January 2014 to December 2016) was to address protracted needs among both the resident population as well as in the refugee camps and to cover all ten states in South Sudan. While the initial approach was to undertake a large targeted supplementary feeding programme with a smaller blanket supplementary feeding programme alongside, over the three year period of implementation of the PRRO a pattern emerged where both

¹⁵⁰ Global Nutrition Cluster (2014), *Moderate Acute Malnutrition: A Decision Tool for Emergencies*, GNC MAM Task Force, June 2014. <http://nutritioncluster.net/resources/moderate-acute-malnutrition-decision-tool-emergencies-2014/>

¹⁵¹ The WFP guidelines suggest to make the decision on whether or not to include PLW dependent on available resources and capacity, taking into account the prevalence of low birth weight, prevalence of undernutrition among women of reproductive age, and the impact of the crisis on infant and young child feeding (IYCF). See: WFP (2012), *Nutrition at the World Food Programme; Programming for Nutrition-Specific Interventions*, Rome, December 2012, p.15.

components are roughly equal in scale. One of the reasons is that from 2015 onwards, the targeted supplementary feeding programme in Greater Upper Nile was transferred to EMOP 200659. The PRRO then continued to cover the seven non-conflict-affected states and all refugee camps.¹⁵² As a result of this shift, there was now a more integrated nutrition package with both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding under both operations, each with their own geographical scope. As per the joint nutrition scale-up plan developed by UNICEF and WFP mid-2014, targeted supplementary feeding coverage was quickly expanded from mid-2014 onwards. For the ‘non-conflict affected’ states, the blanket supplementary feeding programmes are undertaken during the lean season only (a five month period from March to July¹⁵³). While initially within the blanket supplementary feeding, as part of the PRRO, the focus was on children 6-35 months of age, this, from 2015 onwards, shifted to a narrower focus (6-23 months of age),¹⁵⁴ whereas the pregnant and lactating women have remained a target group throughout.¹⁵⁵ For the refugee camps, the focus in the blanket supplementary feeding programme has consistently been on covering of all children 6-23 months of age or 6-59 months when global acute malnutrition exceeded 15 percent, while pregnant and lactating women were covered throughout. Although there have been valid reasons for this differentiated approach, the resulting picture is somewhat confusing. The operation contained both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding modalities through static sites, targeted at young children and pregnant and lactating women.¹⁵⁶ While overall the ration composition and scales were kept the same as under EMOP 200338, there was a change in the package in the targeted supplementary feeding programme for pregnant and lactating women that took place in course of 2016.¹⁵⁷ There was also a food-based incentive for community nutrition volunteers.

¹⁵² The PRRO allowed admission of MAM children from around refugee camps into the TSFP.

¹⁵³ With exception of Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap where BSFP is done across the whole year.

¹⁵⁴ As indicated in the WFP Guidelines (p. 15), the default target group for a BSFP programme is 6-23 months as that is the most vulnerable age group in terms of acute malnutrition and mortality. It is stated however that, depending on the food security context and coverage and quality of the TSFP programme, the target group for the BSFP can be extended to 6-35 months of 6-59 months of age.

¹⁵⁵ This is not fully in line with the GNC guidelines that indicate that, if a prioritization needs to be made due to insufficient resources or capacity, children should be prioritised for blanket feeding.

¹⁵⁶ The TSFP focuses on children 6-59 months and PLW and in principle covers all areas where there is access. The geographical targeting approach for the BSFP is to implement it in all counties that were classified by the IPC to be in the ‘emergency phase’, plus other counties where GAM>15% if these are not captured as ‘emergency phase’ under the IPC. While in 2014 the BSFP targeted children 6-35 months, this was changed in 2015 and 2016 to targeting children 6-23 months. The BSFP in the refugee camps focused on children 6-59 months.

¹⁵⁷ In 2014 and 2015 the TSFP ration and ration scale have remained the same as described under EMOP 200338. In the second half of 2016 however, for the TSFP for PLW a gradual shift was made to the use of SuperCereal Plus. This was done as a costs analysis had revealed that in the South Sudan context with its serious logistics constraints, the provision of SuperCereal Plus, despite it being in itself a more expensive commodity, in total is 20% cheaper than a ration of SuperCereal, sugar and oil.

**Table 12: Targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes
2011-2016**

Programme	Target group	Residents (7 relatively 'stable' states)	Displaced / PoC/residents (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei)	Refugees
TSFP (Year round)	Children 6-59 months	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)	EMOP 200859 (2015, 2016)	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)
			EMOP 200659 (2015)	
	Pregnant and lactating women	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)	EMOP 200859 (2015, 2016)	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)
			EMOP 200659 (2015)	
BSFP (March-July for residents; year- round for refugees)	Children 6-23/35 months ¹⁵⁸ (residents 'stable states') / 6-59 months (GUNS) / 6-59 months (refugees)	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)	EMOP 200859 (2015, 2016)	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)
			EMOP 200338 (2012, 2013)	EMOP 200659 (2014, 2015)
	Pregnant and lactating women	PRRO 200572 (2014, 2015, 2016)	EMOP 200859 (2015, 2016)	EMOP 200338 (2012, 2013)
			EMOP 200338 (2012, 2013)	

Source: Prepared by the country portfolio evaluation team

12. The TB/HIV clients care and treatment programme /'institutional feeding programme' (IFP) within the WFP country portfolio for South Sudan 2011-2016 provides a general food ration (full basket, similar to what is provided under the general food distribution programme) targeted to support patients undergoing treatment for TB, HIV, kala azar¹⁵⁹ and/or leprosy, plus their families (household rations were discontinued in 2016).¹⁶⁰

Evaluation Findings

Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

EQ1/2: Strategic context / Relevance to needs

13. As mentioned above, the strategic context for WFP nutrition programming in South Sudan has been marked by consistently high acute malnutrition rates throughout the 2011 to 2016 period. The number of main players on nutrition in South Sudan has been rather limited: UNICEF, WFP, and some international NGOs like Save the Children International (SCI) and Action Contre la Faim (ACF) together are key agencies within the Nutrition Cluster, which involves a large network of both international and national NGOs. The cluster is the designated body to determine needs and coordinate the implementation of the nutrition response through a wide

¹⁵⁸ The programme targeted children 6-23 months in 2015 and 2016, while this was children 6-35 months in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014.

¹⁵⁹ Kala azar (visceral leishmaniasis) is a parasitic disease highly endemic in South Sudan.

¹⁶⁰ A ration for out-patients consists of 450g cereal, 50g pulses, 30g vegetable oil, and 5g salt per day, which provides 1994 kCal p.p.p.d. For the in-patients, 50g of SuperCereal and 30g sugar per day are added, which increases the total energy value to 2,251 kCal p.p.p.d.

range of smaller and larger organizations, including a range of national NGOs. For the nutrition programming in the refugee camps, the coordination lies in the hands of UNHCR with WFP and UNICEF and their implementing partners providing the nutrition services package as agreed upon.

14. Given the South Sudan country context, the WFP portfolio on nutrition over the past years has been relevant. This has primarily been confined to programmes for treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition (TSFP and BSFP), both among the resident population and internally displaced persons (including in the protection of civilians sites), and in the refugee camps (see [Box 3](#)). While in 2011 there were still relatively low projections of acute malnutrition caseloads, the shift towards emphasizing the expansion of the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes was already made in 2012. Later on, this evolved into a key focus on improving the reach-out to conflict-affected areas through rapid response teams (undertaking blanket supplementary feeding programmes alongside general ration distributions but also targeted supplementary feeding programmes through repeated “monthly” visits to the same locations,¹⁶¹ alongside prevention and treatment of moderate acute malnutrition through static sites in more stable areas.

15. A deeper understanding of undernutrition and the causality at play in South Sudan is still lacking. This has resulted in a dominant focus on treatment of acute malnutrition, both among WFP and other nutrition partners. There has been limited attention for other nutrition interventions that form part of the WFP nutrition policy,¹⁶² like prevention of chronic malnutrition, addressing ‘hidden hunger’ (micronutrient deficiencies), and more integrated food and nutrition packages together with other sections within WFP South Sudan’s programme unit.

Box 3: Nutrition within the WFP country strategic plans for South Sudan

In the period being reviewed (2011-2016) there have been two corporate strategic frameworks, and also two country strategies (one for whole of Sudan covering 2009-2012, and one for South Sudan for 2014-2017). For the nutrition components, all of these frameworks largely reflect the same programming approach, with a combination of relief, recovery and developmental aspects:

- Under Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies, nutrition has been one of the key interventions alongside general food distributions and cash-based approaches. Here, the operational focus for nutrition has mainly been on treatment of acute malnutrition through targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes for children under-five and pregnant and lactating women. This component also includes nutrition support for individuals affected by chronic illness (HIV/AIDS, TB).¹⁶³ The nutrition interventions are targeted at refugees, displaced and other conflict-affected people, and areas affected by natural disasters (with seasonal scaling up of support).
- Under Strategic Objective 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition, the interventions on nutrition are aimed at provision of access to basic nutrition services through a joint approach with UNICEF, other United Nations agencies and other partners. The operational modalities for the latter resemble the package of activities under Strategic

¹⁶¹ For static sites, the approach is to do TSFP for a duration of 90 months. As much as possible, the same approach was applied to sites covered through the rapid response teams

¹⁶² WFP (2012), WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy, WFP/EB.1/2012/5-A, 17 January 2012

¹⁶³ In the WFP Sudan country strategy 2009-2012, this element was placed under Strategic Objective 4. However, later the focus shifted to prime use of this modality as an emergency approach to save lives rather than as a more structural solution for improving medical treatment results.

Objective 1 (targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes), but with more emphasis on partnerships, integrated approaches, and capacity development.

16. Over the past years, WFP response planning has been done in close collaboration with UNICEF, based on joint projections on caseloads for curative nutrition programmes (both severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatments) based on the results of SMART surveys with fine tuning, from 2014 onwards, based on the results of the annual IPC assessment exercises.¹⁶⁴ The Nutrition Cluster (NC) has been used as an effective platform for coordination of the response within the overall nutrition community.

17. Table 13 below provides an overview of the projected annual needs for the period 2011–2016 for treatment of severe and moderate acute malnutrition among the resident population and internally displaced persons, as provided in the common appeal process (CAP) and humanitarian response plan (HRP) documents for South Sudan.¹⁶⁵

Table 13: Nutrition programmes: projected people in need and targeted

Year (Jan – Dec)	SAM treatment 6-59 months			MAM treatment 6-59 months			MAM treatment PLW		
	In need	To be targeted	%	In need	To be targeted	%	In need	To be targeted	%
2016	199,100	170,300	86%	592,900	362,400	61%	208,100	101,700	49%
2015	221,200	154,800	70%	658,800	326,400	50%	231,200	92,500	40%
2014	201,100	140,800	70%	599,000	299,500	50%	210,200	84,100	40%
2013	143,300	101,400	71%	506,800	267,600	53%	121,200	61,200	50%
2012	174,884	114,000	66%	414,000	207,000	50%	218,000	109,000	50%
2011	64,159	51,327	80%	134,500	67,250	50%	396,500	99,125	25%

Source: Prepared by the country portfolio evaluation team based on information from the South Sudan CAPs/ HRP

18. As can be seen, the coverage targets for the WFP targeted supplementary feeding programme for treatment of moderate acute malnutrition, as a proportion of projected needs, have remained more or less the same throughout the six year period, with exception of 2016, when the coverage target was increased. The WFP South Sudan annual plans over the period 2011 to 2016 show a consistent upward trend for the number of children to be targeted by the targeted supplementary feeding programme. The targeted number of pregnant and lactating women with moderate acute malnutrition to receive supplementary food through the targeted feeding programme has been more variable over the years. It is remarked that the UNICEF coverage targets for the out-patient therapeutic programme (OTP) for severe acute malnutrition treatment shows a similar pattern.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ More details on how this is done is provided under EQ4: Coherence with other partners.

¹⁶⁵ The CAP and HRP provide annual figures while the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan 2014-2015* and the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Response Plan 2015-2016*, both cover a period from 1 July 2015 to next year 30 June 2016. Figures are at national levels without disaggregation to state or county levels.

¹⁶⁶ It is not clear why the coverage targets were set differently by UNICEF and WFP. In the Sphere Guidelines, for example, the performance criteria for treatment of MAM and SAM are the same: > 50% in rural areas, >70% in urban areas, and >90% in camp situations (<http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/management-of-acute-malnutrition-and-micronutrient-deficiencies-standard-1-moderate-acute-malnutrition/>)

19. When compared with the conditions of most of the regular population in South Sudan, in the refugee camps acute malnutrition is relatively well under control, with global acute malnutrition rates ranging from 7.9 percent to 15.2 percent. The main nutrition challenges among refugees are the high stunting and anaemia rates among young children, pointing to a need to increase the quality of mother and infant and young child nutrition. However, the WFP nutrition portfolio in the refugee camps is centred on treatment of moderate acute malnutrition among children 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women, plus the more prevention-oriented blanket supplementary feeding programme that was added from 2013 onwards.¹⁶⁷

20. In South Sudan, the nutrition situation in the refugee camps is monitored through regular UNHCR SENS surveys, based on standardised methodology for data collection, analysis and reporting.¹⁶⁸ The results for the three rounds of surveys that were undertaken over last years, (Feb/March 2013; Nov/Dec 2014; Oct 2015) are presented in Attachment 1. Acute malnutrition is more or less under control in the camps in Unity state (Yida and Ajuong Thok). This presumably reflects the relatively stable camp set-ups, with regular distribution of full general food rations (and non-food items as well), plus the provision of health and other basic services.

21. The main issue is the quality of the diet for young children, which leads to elevated stunting and anaemia rates.¹⁶⁹ In the Maban camps in Upper Nile State, the situation is more severe. The last survey round of October 2015 indicated global acute malnutrition rates were near to or above the 10 percent threshold, while rates of stunting and anaemia among children 6-59 months were found to be deteriorating to worrisome levels.

EQ3: Alignment with national agenda

22. Because of the conflict that flared up again in 2013 in South Sudan, and the resulting high levels of insecurity in many parts of South Sudan, it has been rather difficult for WFP to stick to its original intentions to support the gradual integration of humanitarian health relief operations into a regular community health system that provides a basic package of health services (BPHS), as was laid down in the *Government of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015*. WFP, UNICEF and other key partners in the Nutrition Cluster have played a strong role to support the development of the recently finalised national CMAM guidelines, which are now the main programmatic point of reference for nutrition interventions in South Sudan.

23. From a national governance perspective, the main reference document is the *Government of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015* (HSDP).¹⁷⁰ The core approach is to improve accessibility to a basic package of health services (BPHS) ¹⁷¹ through the establishment of a community health programme, the

¹⁶⁷ In 2013, BSFP for PLW in the refugee camps was added to EMOP 200338. This element was continued in PRRO 200572.

¹⁶⁸ Nutrition surveys in the refugee camps are based on the standardised expanded nutrition survey (SENS) methodology. Reports: <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=251>

¹⁶⁹ WHO has defined the following classification: GAM rates [10%-15%] are labelled as a high public health problem, and >15% a very high public health problem. For stunting, the brackets are [30%-40%] for a high public health problem and >40% for a very high public health problem. For anaemia, [20%-39.9%] is labelled as a moderate public health problem while a prevalence >40% is labelled as a severe public health problem.

¹⁷⁰ *Government of South Sudan Ministry of Health (2011), Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015*, Revised Final Draft.

¹⁷¹ The HSDP builds on/integrates the South Sudan BPHS: the Government of South Sudan Ministry of Health (2009), *Basic Package of Health and Nutrition Services for Southern Sudan*, Final Draft – January 2009. It is to be noted that the Health Education and Promotion section within the BPHS contains three key elements related to nutrition: a) promotion of health-seeking behaviour through the primary health care system and its community outreach activities; b) a basic package for school health (BPSH) which was developed by UNICEF and WHO and includes passing health and nutrition messages through school;

rationalization of the network of primary health care units (PHCU), primary health care centres (PHCC), and country health departments; and the improvement of the functionality of all levels of the health system.¹⁷² The community health programme implies a shifting of tasks of the cadre of community health workers (CHWs), and gradual integration of the humanitarian health relief operations into the routine health system. Nutrition is one of the strategic objectives in the health sector development plan. The plan highlights the need for detection, early treatment and prevention of severe acute malnutrition in children under five,¹⁷³ through screening and referral, promotion of improved infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices, growth monitoring activities, supplementary community feeding and exclusive breastfeeding and nutrition education.¹⁷⁴ It also stresses the need to reduce major micronutrient disorders,¹⁷⁵ promote the use of clean water, sanitation and easy, evidence-based hygiene practices such as hand washing, and the need to strengthen immunization of children and women of childbearing age, alongside vitamin A supplementation and de-worming (the latter for children only). It is stressed that the implementation of the health sector plan requires good coherence with other sectors, the education and the water sector in particular (and agriculture and forestry for nutrition), which should be anchored in comprehensive state and county plans.

24. As a follow-up to the health sector development plan, the Ministry of Health (MoH) is in the process of finalising a new National Health Policy 2015-2024, which has a vision to “contribute to reducing maternal and infant mortality and improving the overall health status and quality of life of the South Sudanese population”. Other work in progress is the development of a detailed policy on community health care, and the new “Boma Health Initiative”.¹⁷⁶

25. More specific to nutrition is the draft South Sudan nutrition policy which has been in existence since 2009. However, the policy has not yet been endorsed and there is no nutrition-related legal framework and strategies. Accession of South Sudan to the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement took place in 2013. However, due to instability that started in the same year, there has been little progress despite various efforts to revitalize the SUN in South Sudan.¹⁷⁷

26. One of the areas of work where both WFP and UNICEF over the past years have contributed a lot is the development of a national Guidelines for Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM).¹⁷⁸ The document currently is in final draft form and ready to be adopted by the Government of South Sudan. The parts where WFP has contributed in particular, are the chapters on treatment of moderate acute malnutrition and the parts on the management of acute malnutrition in the

and c) a community-based nutrition and food security package (CBNFSP) that addresses food production, preservation, preparation and dietary practices.

¹⁷² For implementation of the BPHS, the HSDP puts the ambition forward to double the health sector staff to a total of around 8,045 in 2015.

¹⁷³ The ambition is that by 2015, a diagnostic and treatment protocol on severe acute malnutrition is developed, distributed and used in all health facilities, which includes the use of growth monitoring, supplementary community feeding and exclusive breast feeding and vitamin A distribution.

¹⁷⁴ This entails, among others, the establishment of a national nutrition committee, development of core nutrition messages, and nutrition counselling and practical support at community level (BPHS).

¹⁷⁵ Fortification of salt with iodine; fortification of flour, oil and ghee with vitamins A and D; iron and folic acid supplementation to women in the prenatal and postpartum phases; and vitamin A and C supplementation to women in postpartum as well as to children.

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Health (2015), *The Community Health System in South Sudan: “The Boma Health Initiative”*, 5th Draft, October 2015.

¹⁷⁷ Ref. <http://docs.scalingupnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/South-sudan-SUN-Movement-Annual-Progress-Report-2016.pdf> and <http://docs.scalingupnutrition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/South-Sudan-Joint-Assessment-2016.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ Ministry of Health (2016), *Guidelines for Community Management of Acute Malnutrition* (final draft), Juba, December 2016.

context of HIV/AIDS/TB/kala azar. Special features of these CMAM guidelines are the inclusion of a full chapter on prevention of malnutrition through a set of nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions, including health and nutrition education and counselling, and the system with single monthly reporting forms that cover both the out-patient therapeutic and targeted supplementary feeding services. Another special element within the CMAM guidelines, are the “expanded criteria” that are applied by the rapid response mechanism in locations where the targeted supplementary feeding programmes and out-patient therapeutic programme services are not functioning properly or there is inadequate coverage. These criteria refer to the use of ready-to-use therapeutic food like Plumpy’Nut instead of ready-to-use supplementary food like Plumpy’Sup or vice versa when the other product is not available and there are no medical complications that require treatment in a stabilization centre or in-patient department.

27. The WFP South Sudan Food and Nutrition Strategy for HIV and TB programmes¹⁷⁹ has recently been drafted with the view to be fully aligned with the South Sudan National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan 2013–2017.¹⁸⁰ The national strategic plan stresses the importance of the provision of nutrition care and support as part of the national HIV response, in order to enhance treatment effectiveness and adherence.¹⁸¹ The national plan refers to the CMAM guidelines for specific guidance on the admission and discharge criteria in relation to nutritional assistance for people living with HIV, and TB patients. It is underlined that the nutrition treatment schedule for severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition cases with HIV/TB is exactly the same as for regular cases not infected with HIV/TB. This is fully in line with WFP corporate guidance for programming of nutrition-specific interventions.¹⁸²

EQ4/EQ8: Coherence with other partners / Advocacy and capacity development

28. The coherence of WFP approaches on nutrition with those of other partners in South Sudan has been excellent, to a large extent because of effective inter-agency coordination at national and state levels through the South Sudan Nutrition Cluster (see [Box 4](#)). The Nutrition Cluster has been the main platform for nutrition response planning and programming, and has guided large nutrition relief operations across the whole country. This also comprised a centrally managed nutrition information system (see under EQ7), support for the development of the CMAM guidelines and the consequent roll-out through training-of-trainers (ToT) courses (see under EQ3), and several rounds of capacity building for Government of South Sudan staff at state-level and NGO staff on implementation of the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes.

29. The nutrition programmes in the refugee camps are based on tripartite agreements with UNHCR and the operational partner, as per the WFP/UNHCR global memorandum of understanding.

¹⁷⁹ WFP South Sudan (2016), *Food and Nutrition Strategy for the HIV and TB programmes in South Sudan* (Final Draft), Juba, December 2016.

¹⁸⁰ Government of South Sudan (2013), *South Sudan National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan 2013–2017* “Towards the achievement of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment and care by 2017”.

¹⁸¹ The terms used here is NACS: Nutrition assessment, counselling and support.

¹⁸² Ref. <https://www.wfp.org/content/nutrition-world-food-programme-programming-nutrition-specific-interventions>

Box 4: The South Sudan Nutrition Cluster^{183, 184}

The Nutrition Cluster (NC) has been active since 2010 with the Ministry of Health Director of Nutrition and UNICEF as co-chairs. At national level, the cluster coordinator team is comprised of a Nutrition Cluster coordinator, funded by UNICEF, a Nutrition Cluster co-coordinator seconded by ACF, a deputy cluster coordinator funded by WFP (80 percent time), and an information management officer funded by UNICEF, and a monitoring and evaluation specialist funded and seconded by UNOCHA. The UNICEF nutrition team (four staff positions) works closely with the Nutrition Cluster team. Additionally, most NGOs have a nutritionist who contributes to the Nutrition Cluster work. The Nutrition Cluster is supported by a strategic advisory group that is comprised of technical representatives from international NGOs, United Nations agencies, and the Director of Nutrition from the Ministry of Health. The Nutrition Cluster organizes two-weekly national-level cluster meetings. All states have coordination focal points on nutrition that are linked to the Nutrition Cluster. These usually are identified among nutrition partners active in the state. Within the Nutrition Cluster, there are three technical working groups: a) a nutrition information technical working group, b) a community management of acute malnutrition technical working group and c) an infant and young child feeding technical working group.

The L3 status to South Sudan in December 2013 tested the capacity of the existing cluster coordination team. The Global Nutrition Cluster's rapid response team provided considerable technical support to the Nutrition Cluster, among others, for elaboration of ToRs and reporting lines for the cluster coordinator and co-coordinator, and for the delineation of the responsibilities and reporting lines at national and sub-national levels.

A key lesson learned has been that there is a need for maximum transparency in decision-making on common cluster-agreed priorities and partner-level programming decisions. This in particular applies to use of the rapid response mechanism, but also entails systematic geographic coverage analysis based on the Nutrition Cluster response matrix.

Also, it was realized that the Nutrition Cluster meeting agendas need to put greater focus on supply and logistical operational issues for the various geographical locations, including decision-making on repositioning of nutrition supplies.

Another lesson learned was on the need, in an L3, for extra emphasis and support for integration of cross-cutting issues (esp. gender and accountability dimensions), replication of the WASH in nutrition programming as adopted in the Sahel, and strengthening of the infant and young child feeding programming.

30. From the partners' perspective (NGOS, United Nations agencies, and donors), the main reference document is the South Sudan Updated Nutrition Cluster Response Plan¹⁸⁵ that was elaborated in July 2014 (see [Box 5](#)). The document builds on the Nutrition Cluster strategy that was defined during the May 2014 revision of the South Sudan Humanitarian Crisis Response Plan,¹⁸⁶ and is complementary to the needs analysis, gap analysis, response tracking and operational scale-up plans per county, developed by the Nutrition Cluster in June 2014. The strategy also incorporated the conclusions from the UNICEF-WFP nutrition scale-up strategy discussions conducted in July 2014.¹⁸⁷

31. The Nutrition Cluster response plan is focused on the conflict-affected states of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity, plus Northern Bahr el Ghazel and Warrap where global

¹⁸³ -ibid-

¹⁸⁴ GNC/SSNC (2014), *Lessons learned in South Sudan Nutrition Cluster, Synthesis Report*, 24 September 2014 Ref: <http://nutritioncluster.net/learned-south-sudan-nutrition-cluster/>

¹⁸⁵ Ref. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/nutrition>

¹⁸⁶ UNOCHA (2014), *South Sudan Crisis Response Plan (CRP)*, June 2014

¹⁸⁷ UNICEF/WFP (2014), *Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan 2014*.

acute malnutrition rates are historically high.¹⁸⁸ The strategic objectives set in the plan amounted to covering 75 percent of severe acute malnutrition cases and 62 percent of moderate acute malnutrition cases.¹⁸⁹ For severe acute malnutrition children 6-59 months of age, the response consists of admission to the outpatient therapeutic programme (OTP) or stabilization centre (SC) as needed. Moderate acute malnutrition children 6-59 months of age are admitted to the targeted supplementary feeding programme. Following the start of the crisis in December 2013, the blanket supplementary feeding programme was planned to be provided alongside general food distributions in all communities reached.¹⁹⁰ It is also used as entry point for community screening for acute malnutrition and interventions like immunisation, deworming, vitamin A supplementation, and distribution of micronutrient powders (MNP) to children 6-23 months. Pregnant and lactating women diagnosed to be moderately malnourished (MAM) qualify for the targeted supplementary feeding programme, or otherwise are covered through the blanket supplementary feeding programme and micronutrient treatment (MNT) programme.

Box 5: Strategies within the South Sudan Nutrition Cluster Response Plan

- Strengthening of community outreach and referral mechanisms on acute malnutrition through increasing the number of community health/nutrition outreach workers and better training programmes for them; linking with community workers from other sectors; development of a clear and standardized incentive package for the community outreach workers; and better designed nutrition screening with more coordination between partners, better linkage with other nutrition programmes, ascertained provision of nutrition supplies to meet increased treatment demands after screening campaigns, and direct links between the rapid response mechanism (RRM)¹⁹¹ mass screening and the facilities that provide both severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatment services.
- Strengthening of existing service provision through better selection of partners taking into account capacity, presence, funding, and previous experience; intensified monitoring of services by the Nutrition Cluster partners; more bilateral follow-up between UNICEF and WFP partners to identify potential areas for expansion; and through tracking if support requests on monthly reporting forms and through other sources are acted upon.
- Expanding coverage of service through regular updating of the county prioritization matrix; regular revision of caseloads for priority locations so that supplies and other requirements can be put in place; use of 'simplified' protocols for areas where there are no severe or moderate acute malnutrition services; mapping of partner capacity profiles to identify capacity gaps, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and identification of cluster partners who can assist with capacity building activities for local NGOs; and through initiation of a discussion between UNICEF, WFP and the SMOHs on how new treatment services can be established in areas without NGO presence, with focus on priority counties.
- Improved technical capacity building through establishment of a capacity building technical working group; Nutrition Cluster capacity assessment/mapping, and development

¹⁸⁸ The total caseload in these five states was estimated to be 503,000 children (SAM and MAM cases together). The plan states that the NC will regularly update the prioritisation of counties within the five priority states. The set coverage targets are national targets, and the evolution of the nutrition response in the other remaining states is closely monitored to detect any possible deterioration.

¹⁸⁹ This is rated to be in line with Sphere standards that for both SAM and MAM indicate a coverage of >50% in rural areas, 70% in urban areas, and >90% in camp situations.

¹⁹⁰ The Cluster Response Plan indicates that in the first half of 2014, the BFSP reached over 200,000 children. The consistency was a challenge however, due to various logistics and security constraints (SuperCereal Plus must be airlifted and cannot be airdropped) combined with pipeline insufficiencies.

¹⁹¹ The RRM was established in March 2014 by UNICEF and WFP to reach children in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei who are cut off by conflict. Later on, the approach was also rolled out in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap, through community nutrition volunteers (CNVs).

of a competency framework and training action plan; and through development and implementation of a supportive supervision strategy.

- Strengthening of supply chain management and logistics through establishment of updated supply requirements for the scale-up plan; regular pipeline reporting and supply chain bottleneck analyses up to final point of delivery, including sharing of these with the Logistics Cluster; identify prepositioning areas for nutrition commodities; a capacity building workshop on supply chain management and reporting for operational partners; and through advocacy to donor on the need for additional resources as based on the gaps analysis.
- Provision of nutrition mobile responses to hard-to-reach areas through regular identification of areas where rapid response team missions are required, in coordination with the Inter-Agency Rapid Needs Assessment (IRNA) and the Inter-Cluster Working Group's (ICWG) Operational Task Force, and possibly outside general food distribution sites; establishment of nutrition-specific activation criteria for mobile rapid response team missions, and identify an appropriate nutrition in emergencies package of services; recruitment of roving nutrition officers to ensure nutrition expertise within rapid response mechanism teams; and through identification of potential partners to fill the gap after the RRT mission; document best practices and lessons learned.
- Prevention of acute malnutrition through strengthening of partners' capacity on Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) and improved IYCF programming, particularly in protection of civilian camps and other malnutrition hotspot areas; optimized blanket supplementary feeding programming with in-built screening component; and through enhanced micronutrient supplementation through development of Information Education and Communication materials and training of field staff and community workers, and coverage of children 6-23 months with micronutrient powders and pregnant and lactating women with micronutrient supplementation.
- Enhanced nutrition needs analysis, monitoring and coordination through coordinated nutrition surveillance (validated SMART surveys and rapid response mechanism screening integrated in state-specific analysis templates for consolidation of data; Food Security and Monitoring System (FSMS) analysis; IPC analysis); improved nutrition programme monitoring and tracking of achievements through the nutrition response matrix, and share results more widely including with the Inter-Cluster Working Group; enhanced coordination at national and state levels on all six core cluster functions;¹⁹² better linking with other sectors (food security, health, WASH, protection); and through improved nutrition response plan monitoring with regular inputs from partners on programme performance indicators, a well-maintained Nutrition Cluster database, and regular quality reporting.

32. Another mechanism through which strong coherence with partners has been embedded is the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan* and the consequent *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Response Plan (2015-2016)*, which have been in place since mid-2014. These plans have resulted in a well-coordinated process of expansion and further coordination of services, both through adding additional partners,¹⁹³ more focus on the 'continuum of care' and the deployment of rapid response teams, usually a joint approach involving WFP and a range of other agencies, for outreach to other locations where there is no static partner (see [Figure 7](#) and [Figure 8](#)).

¹⁹² The Cluster Coordination Performance Monitoring (CCPM) Report provides an analysis of the performance of the NC on six core functions: a) Supporting service delivery; b) Informing strategic decision-making by the humanitarian coordinator/humanitarian country team; c) Planning and strategy development; d) Advocacy; e) Monitoring and reporting; and f) Contingency planning / preparedness. Accountability to affected populations (AAP) was recently added as new element. Ref: <http://nutritioncluster.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/10/SouthSudan-CCPM-Final-Draft-08-June-2015-under-SAG-review.pdf>


¹⁹³ A number of national NGOs received considerable training in order to bring them up to speed as new WFP partner to WFP

33. Based on the South Sudan Nutrition Cluster Response Plan, the **UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)** ¹⁹⁴ was launched in July 2014. The objective of the scale-up plan was to deliver quality, life-saving management of acute malnutrition for at least 75 percent of severe acute malnutrition cases and at least 60 percent of moderate acute malnutrition cases in all children under five, and to provide access to programmes preventing malnutrition (including blanket supplementary feeding programmes, vitamin A supplementation, deworming and IYCF) for at least 80 percent of vulnerable people. The scale-up plan comprises seven strategies to address operational priorities:

- Optimise programmes with existing partners
- Expand operational partnerships
- Improve community outreach and screening/referrals
- Direct implementation through rapid response mechanism
- Provide technical support to enhance service quality
- Strengthen existing supply chain pipeline management
- Enhance needs analysis and coordination

Figure 7: Number of out-patient therapeutic (OTP) and targeted supplementary feeding (TSFP) sites by state (2015)


Map 2: Number of OTP/TSFP Sites by State (June 2015)



Source: UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan 1 Year Report, July 2015, p. 10

¹⁹⁴ UNICEF/WFP (2015), *South Sudan UNICEF and WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan; One Year Report*, July 2015. Ref. http://www.childrenofsouthsudan.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/UNICEF_WFP-Scale_Up-Nutrition-1Yr-Report-South-Sudan-2014_2015-Ver9-2.pdf

Figure 8: WFP and UNICEF nutrition partner presence (2013-2015)



Source: UNICEF/WFP, The WFP-UNICEF Rapid Response Mechanism in South Sudan: One Year on, p. 16

34. This was followed by the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Response Plan (2015-2016)*,¹⁹⁵ launched in July 2015, which was aimed at capitalising on the benefits of the investments made in the scale-up plan, and to strengthen systems established. The three objectives of the scale-up plan were maintained, but coverage targets were down-tuned¹⁹⁶ (see [Table 14](#)). The objective on needs analysis and coordination and monitoring was maintained, and a fourth objective was added on strengthening alignment and coordination between UNICEF and WFP. The seven strategies to address operational priorities were reframed as:

- Strengthening community based prevention approach
- Promoting continuum of care at site level
- Directly delivering nutrition programmes in hard to reach areas
- Capacity development (partners and government) and standard setting
- Strengthening and developing nutrition capacity and systems within Ministry of Health
- Strengthening existing supply chain and pipeline management
- Enhancing needs analysis and coordination.

35. This 2015/2016 response plan contains four programming scenarios depending on the security context on the ground, and the partner’s capacity profiles and ability to operate. In the most extreme scenario, one-off rapid response missions (if at all) are the only option to meet needs. In sites where access is feasible but where there is no nutrition partner on the ground, WFP will adopt a direct implementation approach through a series of (joint) rapid response mission visits. The intention here is to bring along a partner agency so that the implementation after some months can be handed

¹⁹⁵ WFP/UNICEF (2015), *South Sudan Joint Nutrition Response Plan* June 2015 to May 2016, July 2015. Ref. http://www.childrenofsouthsudan.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/UNICEF_WFP-Joint-Nutrition-Response-Plan-South-Sudan-2015_2016.pdf

¹⁹⁶ Coverage targets: (a) OTP/TSFP: at least 60% of SAM cases and also 60% of MAM cases in all children 6-59 months and among pregnant and lactating women; (b) BSFP: at least 30% of children 6-59 months and 40% of pregnant and lactating women in high priority areas; (c) Vitamin A supplementation: at least 75% of children 6-59 months; (d) Deworming: at least 60% of children 12-59 months; and (e) IYCF interventions: at least 30% of pregnant and lactating women and caregivers with children 0-23 months.

over to them. In the other two scenarios, there are partners on the ground, but with low or higher levels of service provision and geographical outreach. An overview of the planning targets in both plans is provided below:¹⁹⁷

Table 14: Coverage targets UNICEF/WFP nutrition response plans

Objective	Output	UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)	UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Response Plan (2015-2016)
Treatment of SAM and MAM	OTP / SC treatment for children 6-59 months	176,283	143,442
	TSFP for children 6-59 months	420,000	344,226
	TSFP for pregnant and lactating women	113,100	137,268
	BSFP for children 6-59 months	380,000	366,687
	BSFP for pregnant and lactating women	284,700	205,900
Prevention of acute malnutrition	Vitamin A supplementation children 6-59 months	1,980,069	1,712,944
	Deworming treatment children 6-59 months	1,771,640	1,226,107
	MNPs for children 6-59 months	320,347	(not included)
	MNT supplementation pregnant and lactating women	218,758	(not included)
	IYCF interventions for pregnant and lactating women and caregivers (M/F) with children 0-23 months	1,111,617	(not included)

Source: UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale Up and Response Plans

EQ5/6: WFP comparative advantages/Trade-offs with corporate strategies

36. WFP is the designated United Nations organization for treatment of moderate malnutrition, with the advantage of high leverage potential due to its size, well-established procurement and logistics functions, and the ability to offer an integrated food and nutrition package that extends from in-depth analysis of needs and underlying causes, provision of emergency nutrition support, to more preventive approaches towards both acute and chronic malnutrition. The corporate *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy* provides a strong corporate framework but there still are many gaps in terms of translation this into action at country levels, including in South Sudan. The shift towards more focus on stunting and integrated and nutrition-sensitive programming, as propagated by the corporate *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy*, has not yet been made in South Sudan. The *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy Evaluation* shows however, that this is a more general issue and is not just specific to South Sudan (see [Box 6](#)). With the new *WFP South Sudan Food and Nutrition Strategy for HIV and TB Programmes (final draft)*,¹⁹⁸ there now is a much clearer corporate guidance of when nutrition treatment support should come in to support TB and HIV/AIDS clients on medication (care and treatment), and for mitigation and as safety net for households affected by HIV and/or TB.

¹⁹⁷ See Table 2 for an overview of needs and coverage targets on annual basis as presented in the CAPs / HRPs

¹⁹⁸ WFP South Sudan (2016), *Food and Nutrition Strategy for the HIV and TB programmes in South Sudan*, Juba, December 2016

37. Nutrition is at the core of the WFP mandate and corporate strategies. The *WFP Nutrition Improvement Approach*,¹⁹⁹ the *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy*²⁰⁰ and the *Nutrition at the World Food Programme, Programming for Nutrition-Specific Interventions* guidelines²⁰¹ together provide the main nutrition-specific corporate guidance on how to ensure access to “the right food, at the right place, at the right time”. The programming focus for nutrition is structured around four intervention pillars centred on nutrition-specific interventions (treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition, prevention of chronic malnutrition, addressing micronutrient deficiencies), complemented by four pillars on nutrition-sensitive WFP programming (general food distribution, school feeding, food for work/assets/training, and others), and a last element on contribution to creation of an enabling environment through upstream technical advice and advocacy around nutrition.

38. Within the WFP country portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016, nutrition forms one of the key areas of work and one of the largest components. In the period, there have been two country strategies (one for whole of Sudan covering 2009-2012, and one for South Sudan for 2014-2017).²⁰² Despite the situation of serial and parallel frameworks that have guided operations in South Sudan, there appears to be a lot of common ground with nutrition being covered through two of the four country strategy pillars (directly reflecting the corporate Strategic Objectives):

- a. Under Pillar One: Meet emergency food and nutrition needs of vulnerable groups (reflecting Strategic Objective 1: Save live and protect livelihoods in emergencies), nutrition has been one of the key interventions alongside general food distributions and cash-based approaches. Here the operational focus for nutrition has mainly been on needs assessments and interventions for treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition (targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes for children under-five and pregnant and lactating women). This component also includes nutrition support for individuals affected by chronic illness (HIV/AIDS, TB).²⁰³ The interventions are primarily targeted at refugees, displaced and other conflict-affected people, and areas affected by natural disasters (with scaling up of support during the lean season). WFP is co-chair and has actively engaged with the Nutrition Cluster, which has been the main platform for coordination. Also, WFP has actively contributed to the development of national community-based management of acute malnutrition guidelines which were adopted in December 2016.
- b. Under Pillar Four: Enhance access to basic social services in support of good nutrition and learning (reflecting Strategic Objective 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition), the nutrition activities are aimed at provision of access to basic nutrition services through a joint approach with UNICEF, other United Nations agencies and other partners. The operational modalities resemble the package of activities under Strategic Objective 1 (targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes), with slightly more emphasis on support to policy development and capacity strengthening. Other relevant elements

¹⁹⁹ Ref. <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp214632.pdf>

²⁰⁰ Ref. <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/eb/wfpdoc061668.pdf>

²⁰¹ Ref. <https://www.wfp.org/content/nutrition-world-food-programme-programming-nutrition-specific-interventions>

²⁰² There were two WFP corporate strategic frameworks, of which the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 is the main one in relation to this CPE.

²⁰³ In the WFP Sudan country strategy 2009-2012, this element was placed under Strategic Objective 4. However, later on the focus shifted to prime use of this modality as an emergency approach to save lives rather than as a more structural solution for improving medical treatment results.

under Strategic Objective 4 in relation to nutrition are the food for education and food for assets/ cash for assets components. However, in the South Sudan country strategy, these interventions are primarily presented as a means to support education outcomes and/or as a safety net to support resilience, without direct nutrition objectives.²⁰⁴

Box 6: WFP country portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016 matched against key findings in the WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy Evaluation²⁰⁵

The *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy Evaluation*, undertaken in 2015, highlighted some key points that to a large extent appear to apply to the WFP country portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016 as well:

- Also in South Sudan, as in most WFP programmes, most emphasis remains to be put on treatment of acute malnutrition. WFP main comparative advantage overall is still perceived to lie in short-term emergencies, despite increased awareness and focus on programmes for prevention of both acute and chronic malnutrition.
- Nutrition-sensitive interventions and support to build nutrition governance are still relatively scarce in WFP programming, and South Sudan is no exception. Among others, this is seen to be the result of lack of corporate technical guidance and general scarcity of knowhow. While the *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy* is fully aligned with the Lancet framework (and as such the SUN approach), in South Sudan the focus on preventing stunting through a combination of nutrition interventions during the first 1,000 days of life from conception until age 2 has not yet really taken off. This applies to both UNICEF and WFP, as the Nutrition Cluster primarily has functioned as a mechanism for relief response planning and management/coordination, and the Government of South Sudan plans to strengthen preventive approaches (e.g. the Boma Health Initiative, and intention in the Health Sector Development Plan to establish a community health programme) did not really take off yet.
- The corporate nutrition framework explicitly commits to scale up programmes to distribute high-quality food products targeting the most nutritionally vulnerable people. Also in South Sudan, WFP has applied a standardised approach on the use of the various special products in the nutrition-specific programmes, which has been the foundation on which the Government of South Sudan's community-based management of acute malnutrition guidelines have been built. The nutrition policy evaluation recommends to seek further cross-fertilization with, for example, the WFP cash and voucher policy and the new WFP gender policy; this yet has to take off in South Sudan.
- WFP highlights the need for multi-disciplinary, multi-stakeholder partnerships on nutrition with national governments, other United Nations agencies, NGOs, the private sector, academia and donors. WFP food products often need to be combined with other action, like improved health services, to become fully effective. Capacity development of government and partners is a specific objective within the nutrition framework. In most countries, this has not yet taken off at large scale, and again South Sudan is no exception. WFP nutrition indicators in corporate strategic results frameworks have shifted from impact-level to outcome and output-levels. This indicates a closer focus on the direct influence of WFP programmes and presents opportunities to link with national monitoring and evaluation systems. In the case of South Sudan, the focus is on output data (number of beneficiaries reached), with very limited detail at the level of outcomes (see further under section 2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results).

²⁰⁴ In the WFP Sudan country strategy 2009-2012 food for education was located under Strategic Objective 3: Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations. In the WFP South Sudan Country Strategy 2014-2017 however, it is put under Strategic Objective 4 focused on increasing access to basic services. The emphasis however remains on the role of education as a key catalyst for food and nutrition security outcomes, and as community-level entry point for stability and nation-building.

²⁰⁵ Ref. <https://www.wfp.org/content/2012-nutrition-policy-policy-evaluation-terms-reference>

Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

EQ7: Level of analysis of available information as input for planning:

39. South Sudan avails itself of a range of information systems that relate to nutrition. The most important ones are the SMART and SENS surveys, and the FSNMS reports that are all regularly produced. The UNICEF causal model remains the cornerstone of the different studies and surveys that are undertaken, which reflects a primary orientation on acute malnutrition and its underlying factors. Over the past few years, the Nutrition Cluster has also undertaken a number of studies on operational aspects of nutrition treatment programmes.

40. Notwithstanding all these efforts, a deeper understanding of undernutrition and the causality at play in South Sudan is still lacking. In particular, for the 'less-conflict affected' states with high acute malnutrition rates (Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap) it is not yet very well understood why global acute malnutrition rates remain consistently high and what could be the entry points to change the situation in sustainable ways. The Integrated Food and Nutrition Security Comprehensive Analysis (IFANSCA) study that is currently being implemented is aimed to fill this gap, and to serve as basis for further nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programming.²⁰⁶

41. Because global acute malnutrition rates have been consistently high in South Sudan across a long period of time, there is a long history of implementation of programmes for treatment of severe and moderate acute malnutrition in many localities/counties, operated by a wide range of nutrition partners. This included nutrition surveillance activities across most states in the country to provide estimates on nutrition needs.²⁰⁷

42. The following primary information sources are available as input for planning by WFP in close coordination with UNICEF of nutrition interventions in South Sudan (see also [Box 7](#)):

- SMART surveys: For areas that are 'normally' accessible, there is a considerable information base on prevalence of global and severe acute malnutrition through SMART survey data. SMART surveys are undertaken by consultants or in-house capacity from UNICEF, USAID, Save the Children International (SCI), and others. SMART surveys are usually intended to be representative for a whole county, but there are also reports at the level of protection of civilians camps and some urban areas. The reports are validated by the Nutrition Cluster. The number of validated surveys per year is considerable: 31 in 2013, 23 in 2014, 47 in 2015, and 52 in 2016.
- SENS surveys: ([Table 15](#)) UNHCR undertakes these surveys in each of the six refugee camps in South Sudan, on a more or less annual basis. Various nutrition indicators are covered in these surveys. Next to data on acute malnutrition rates, these surveys also contain stunting rate information, and include

²⁰⁶ Ref. the *WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy*, and the 2013 Lancet framework that is promoted by the international Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement

²⁰⁷ Relatively less so in Central and Western Equatoria, and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal where nutrition conditions generally have been more stable. For Juba Urban, the WFP food security and nutrition assessment undertaken in August 2015 indicated a GAM rate of 12.2% and a SAM rate of 2.8%. These levels are close to the national average (FNSMS round 16, July 2015: GAM of 13.0% and SAM of 2.6%), but significantly higher than the GAM rate for Central Equatoria Rural (3.7%).

anaemia measurements among children 6-59 months of age, and women of childbearing age (15-49 years).

- Rapid response mechanism screening data: Inevitably, for ‘hotspot’ conflict areas, data on malnutrition rates is less abundant, as these areas are often not reachable for survey teams. The main information source then is formed by the screening results²⁰⁸ from the ‘in-and-out’ rapid response mechanism (RRM) teams. These data provide a snapshot of the nutrition conditions among the people that came to the distribution site, but cannot be seen as representative for the overall population in a larger area. Even so, it could be interesting to do some further analysis of these screening data.
- FSNMS reports: The WFP Food and Nutrition Security Monitoring System (FNSMS) in South Sudan was established in 2010. The system provides a wealth of information on a standardised set of food security and nutrition indicators²⁰⁹ for which data is collected on a regular basis.²¹⁰ The sampling frame is geared towards provision of information at state level (ten states). The sample size is considerable: for example, around 18 (June 2016), anthropometric measurements were taken of 4,837 children 6-59 months of age. Additionally, the system can also produce reports for smaller geographical areas, as was done, for example, for Abyei in December 2015. The FNSMS includes statistical analysis of correlations between the various indicators, and looks into trends over time. It is one of the main information sources on which the bi-annual IPC analysis is based.

²⁰⁸ Usually based on MUAC data which provides a good first measure of acute malnutrition among children 12-59 months old and PLW during screening exercises. However, proxy data on GAM and SAM based on MUAC measurements are not fully comparable with these rates based on weight-for-height.

²⁰⁹ The main groups of indicators within the FSNMS are: (a) household demographics; (b) food security data on agriculture, livestock and assets; (c) food sources, food expenditures, and food stocks; (d) food assistance received (incl. nutrition programmes); (e) coping strategies; (f) food consumption data; (g) nutritional status data for children 6-59 months and women 15-49 years; and (h) child morbidity data.

²¹⁰ Up to end 2015, there were three survey rounds per year: in March (on-set of the lean season), August (end of the lean season) and December (post-harvest). In 2016, it was decided to switch to a system with two survey rounds: one in June (height of the lean season) and one in December (post-harvest).


Table 15: UNHCR SENS nutrition survey findings South Sudan 2013-2015

Indicators	Data collection round		
	Oct 2015	Nov / Dec 2014	Feb / Mar 2013
Unity State			
Yida Camp			
GAM 6-59 months	7.9%	6.2%	7.3%
SAM 6-59 months	1.6%	0.8%	1.2%
Stunting 6-59 months	33.7%	23.9%	23.3%
Total anaemia 6-59 months	56.3%	38.8%	34.0%
Total anaemia women 15-49 yrs	30.0%	22.6%	17.0%
Ajuong Thok Camp			
GAM 6-59 months	8.4%	3.1%	6.2%
SAM 6-59 months	1.5%	0.2%	0.0%
Stunting 6-59 months	40.4%	20.5%	21.4%
Total anaemia 6-59 months	55.9%	35.9%	48.6%
Total anaemia women 15-49 yrs	34.4%	18.2%	7.0%
Upper Nile State (Maban camps)			
Doro Camp			
GAM 6-59 months	15.2%	8.1%	10.0%
SAM 6-59 months	2.3%	0.8%	1.7%
Stunting 6-59 months	42.1%	36.4%	35.4%
Total anaemia 6-59 months	54.1%	53.2%	47.9%
Total anaemia women 15-49 yrs	34.1%	25.6%	27.4%
Yusuf Batil Camp			
GAM 6-59 months	11.1%	7.6%	15.3%
SAM 6-59 months	2.1%	0.8%	3.5%
Stunting 6-59 months	55.0%	44.0%	38.3%
Total anaemia 6-59 months	55.7%	52.9%	57.3%
Total anaemia women 15-49 yrs	27.4%	22.1%	32.6%
Gendrassa Camp			
GAM 6-59 months	9.1%	8.4%	12.1%
SAM 6-59 months	2.1%	1.4%	1.4%
Stunting 6-59 months	47.8%	33.5%	27.2%
Total anaemia 6-59 months	55.8%	46.1%	32.6%
Total anaemia women 15-49 yrs	26.5%	28.3%	10.4%
Kaya Camp (previously Jammam)			
GAM 6-59 months	11.4%	7.6%	17.8%
SAM 6-59 months	1.2%	1.3%	3.5%
Stunting 6-59 months	57.7%	50.9%	45.3%
Total anaemia 6-59 months	52.9%	46.9%	54.8%
Total anaemia women 15-49 yrs	25.9%	19.9%	33.6%

43. After the onset of the crisis in December 2013, and following the IPC analysis conducted in May 2014, the Nutrition Cluster saw a need to revise its approach for estimation of the caseload for nutrition treatment per state (Figure 9). This approach for detailed needs assessment provides state-level ‘dynamic’ estimates for the number of children 6-59 months of age in need of both severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatment, taking into account the emergency phase (“minimum”, “stressed”, “acute” or “emergency”). To estimate the burden of severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition per state (absolute number of cases per state), the following formula is used:

$$N * P * K^{211}$$

Figure 9: Burden of severe and moderate acute malnutrition by state (2014)



Source: UNICEF/WFP, South Sudan Updated Nutrition Cluster Response Plan – August 2014, p. 6

Box 7: South Sudan’s Nutrition Cluster - nutrition information system

In 2013, the South Sudan Nutrition Cluster, operating under the guidance of UNICEF with the Ministry of Health as chair and WFP as co-chair, supported by donors and around 30 operational partners, established a nutrition information system that forms the backbone of the operational nutrition response framework.²¹² A key success factor behind this effective system is the increased technical capacity in nutrition and information management that was made available within UNICEF, WFP, and other partners.²¹³ The intention has always been to integrate the system within the Ministry of Health, but so far that has not happened. The system comprises the following elements:

1. Better coordinated approach for implementation of nutrition assessments, with a series of capacity development workshops on SMART survey methodology organized by Action Contre la Faim (ACF); technical backstopping by the Nutrition Cluster and its working group on nutrition information as needed; better quality assurance mechanisms based on a SMART survey protocol review and a system for validation of results; better timing of the surveys so

²¹¹ N: Population size of children 6-59 months (estimated as 19% of total population per state); P: SAM or MAM prevalence of children 6-59 months using WHZ based on the findings of local/county-level SMART surveys. The lower known prevalence rates were applied for the states in ‘minimum’ and ‘stressed’ phases, while the higher prevalence rates were applied for ‘acute’ and ‘emergency’ phases. This was done under the assumption that prevalence rates would increase with deteriorating food insecurity and associated factors. For states with no recent prevalence data available, a simulation was done using prevalence rates from states with similar characteristics; K: correction factor to account for new cases over time, for which an incidence rate of 3 for SAM and 1.5 for MAM was applied.

²¹² ENN/GNC/UNICEF (2015), Overcoming nutrition information challenges; Case Study South Sudan, December 2015. Ref: <http://www.ennonline.net/southsudancasestudynutinifo>

²¹³ Nutrition technical capacity development on nutrition surveys is undertaken as a collaboration between UNICEF, CDC and ACF-Canada.

that data is obtained for the periods when nutrition is most at risk (pre-harvest, during emergencies).

2. Better reporting system for performance of treatment programmes on severe acute malnutrition (managed by UNICEF) and moderate acute malnutrition (managed by WFP), brought together in a single nutrition information system managed by the Nutrition Cluster.

3. Better representation of nutrition in the integrated food security phase classification (IPC) analysis, and successful advocacy to also include weight-for-height alongside the mid upper arm circumference (MUAC) indicator

4. Integration of nutrition indicators and improved quality of the now-called food security and nutrition monitoring system (FSNMS), including support to training of trainers (ToT) targeting state-level focal points

44. The **IFANSCA** study was started up late 2016 with the aim to obtain a better understanding of the underlying causes behind the persistently high levels of food insecurity and acute malnutrition in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap. It is an in-depth quantitative and qualitative study undertaken through a collaborative effort involving the Ministry of Health, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, FEWSNET, SCI, ACF, and the Sudd Institute.²¹⁴ The study is based on the UNICEF nutrition causal model. Some potential underlying factors are studied, in particular:

- The considerable population of former returnees who are often moving back and forth to Sudan in search of labour opportunities in Khartoum and do not have established livelihoods in South Sudan.
- The growing urbanised population gathered around the towns that rely on petty trade and peri-urban agriculture.

It is expected that the results of the IFANSCA study will provide new input for food and nutrition programming in coming years, including potentially new approaches to tackle the high global acute malnutrition rates in these states (and potentially other areas in South Sudan as well). The study was on-going during the country visit of the evaluation mission and results were not yet available.

EQ9: Factors affecting strategic decision-making:

45. In summary, the evaluation has found that WFP strategic decision-making on nutrition was a result of the following key factors:

- The need to align with the WFP corporate policy framework and corporate memorandums of understanding with UNICEF and UNHCR. This includes the need to closely collaborate with UNICEF and other partners within the Nutrition Cluster to promote a ‘continuum of care’.
- The urgent need to increase the coverage of programmes for treatment of acute malnutrition, as indicated by the findings of the SMART surveys and the FNSMS.
- The need to differentiate programmatic approaches per type of setting within the overall protracted emergency: a) more or less stable areas of the country where integration/collaboration with the Government of South Sudan’s basic health care services in principle is aimed at; b) conflict-affected parts of South Sudan where parts of the nutrition programmes are directly implemented by

²¹⁴ *Integrated Food & Nutrition Security Causal Analysis (IFANSCA) Study*, Warrap and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, South Sudan, Study Protocol, June 2016.

WFP; and c) camp settings where nutrition service delivery is provided by partner NGOs.

46. Continuously high global acute malnutrition rates and low targeted supplementary feeding and outpatient therapeutic programme coverage rates led to a decision to aim at major scale up of coverage of both moderate and severe acute malnutrition treatments. Also, a lot of emphasis has been put on blanket feeding as a modality for prevention of acute malnutrition among nutrition target groups. There was a need to develop differentiated approaches for stable settings, conflict-affected areas (including the protection of civilian and refugee camps). In the 'hard to reach' areas, WFP shifted to direct implementation through deployment of rapid response teams as in these areas there are no implementing partners that operate "static states".

47. For areas that are 'normally' accessible, geographical targeting, prioritization and response planning is primarily guided by the results of SMART surveys. These provide malnutrition rates for a (part of a) county or other specific geographical areas (for example a protection of civilian site). Since the addition of weight-for-height as one of the nutrition indicators within the WFP-operated FNSMS by end 2014, there is another information stream that provides average global acute malnutrition, moderate acute malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition rates at state and national levels. It is not yet clearly decided however, in what way the results of this new system are to be 'triangulated' with the results of SMART surveys. Needs assessment in refugee camps is done through annual SENS surveys. For conflict 'hotspot' areas the main reference is provided by rapid response mechanism screening data, but the role these data play as input for planning is limited. This is because the data cannot be seen as representative, as they are not collected through random sampling techniques.

48. While the *Government of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015* evidently provides the overall country-level framework on nutrition interventions in South Sudan, the reality is that the level of health services implementation still leaves a lot to be desired. Nevertheless, for static sites, WFP intention has remained to seek integration/collaboration within the Government of South Sudan's basic health care services where possible. Also, WFP has continued its efforts to strengthen nutrition capacity within government and partners, both through training of trainers and through hands-on technical guidance at field level.

49. There has been close coordination with UNICEF and other partners within the Nutrition Cluster for assessment of nutrition needs and design and management of response plans. This has culminated in the two joint plans with UNICEF aimed at scaling up nutrition services in which annual coverage targets are set at national levels. Another clear result has been the finalisation of the national CMAM guidelines, which were produced at the end of 2016. There is global memorandum of understanding between UNHCR and WFP for nutrition support in refugee camps.

50. The institutional feeding programme (IFP) appears to have a rather general design, aimed at supporting national TB and HIV care and treatment programmes. With the new *WFP Food and Nutrition Strategy for HIV and TB* programmes, there now is a much clearer corporate guidance of when nutrition treatment support should come in to support TB and HIV/AIDS clients on medication.

Portfolio Performance and Results

EQ11: Level of effectiveness and enhancing/limiting factors:

51. In the first years of the country portfolio (2011 to 2013), the overall effectiveness of the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes was rated to have been below expectations. This was caused by key problems with partner capacity and low coverage, in combination with pipeline breaks (Table 16). From 2014 onwards, there has been a major shift in approach which led to better results with substantially increased numbers of beneficiaries, despite the increasingly difficult operating environment. It remains unclear what effective coverage levels have been attained (both at national, state and county levels):

- Major efforts were made to scale up coverage in the conflict-affected Greater Upper Nile areas (EMOPs 200659 and 200859), among others, through deployment of rapid response teams, and through the establishment of a large blanket feeding programme. For the non-conflict areas including the refugee camps, the focus in 2014 was primarily on the targeted supplementary feeding programmes, but also with higher numbers reached through the blanket supplementary feeding programme.
- The coverage attained in Greater Upper Nile in 2015 still remained much below the Sphere²¹⁵ thresholds, among others, as a result of pipeline breaks and increasing insecurity levels. The results in the non-conflict affected states however, started to pick up in 2015, as a direct result of the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)*, although the number of sites covered still remained somewhat below the target that was set. The performance (recovery rate), however, was good.
- Despite the increasing insecurity and looting of the Juba warehouse which in particular, affected the nutrition programmes, there has been a surprisingly high increase in the number of children and pregnant and lactating women in Greater Upper Nile that were reached in the course of 2016, in particular for the targeted supplementary feeding programme. In 2016, the recovery rates again were good. In the non-conflict affected states there was a particularly strong scale up of the blanket supplementary feeding programme, which in 2016 reached out to about one-third of all children. Despite a certain irregularity in food delivery schedules, the high blanket supplementary feeding programme coverage might have been one of the reasons why the total number of new targeted supplementary feeding programme admissions in 2016 just grew by 17 percent, although the number of targeted supplementary feeding programme sites had more than doubled.
- Although initially the institutional feeding programme served considerable numbers of beneficiaries, the programme considerably contracted in 2015. This was caused by a reduction of sites (clinics) served due to a decision to only continue to serve sites with continued antiretroviral (ARV) deliveries. The coverage of the programme increased again in 2016, with a number of new sites having been added. However, the problem of the high treatment defaulting rate has not yet been solved.

²¹⁵ The Sphere Project is a voluntary initiative that brings a wide range of humanitarian agencies together around a common aim - to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors and affected populations

52. For implementation of the *UNICEF/WFP joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)*, it was required to expand the various nutrition programmes under existing nutrition partners, and to establish a number of new partnerships, especially with national NGOs. Both agencies also substantially increased their nutrition staff at Juba-level and in the field/sub offices.

53. The coverage and quality of service delivery was strengthened rapidly. While in the first half of 2014, nutrition treatment reached in total 44,079 children with severe acute malnutrition and 40,034 with moderate acute malnutrition, coverage figures were scaled-up to 74,534 for severe acute malnutrition and 153,335 for moderate acute malnutrition in the first half of 2015. The number of targeted supplementary feeding sites grew from 274 in 2014 to 410 in 2015 (50 percent increase). The number of out-patient therapeutic sites was even scaled up from 183 in 2014 to 462 in 2015 (152 percent increase!). Over a period of 15 months, 50 joint rapid response missions were undertaken in 40 locations.²¹⁶

54. In 2014, the Nutrition Cluster undertook a state and county-level bottleneck analysis that identified a set of key factors within the environment, supply-side and demand-side that enhanced or hampered the achievement of good results for the nutrition treatment programmes:

- Environment: Social norms around food and nutrition; existing legislation and policy frameworks; the adequacy of budgets and expenditures for nutrition programmes; and, management and coordination mechanisms
- Supply-side: Availability of essential commodities/inputs; and access to adequate services and information
- Demand-side: Financial access to adequate complementary foods; and social and cultural practices and beliefs on mothers' and child nutrition

55. Another enhancing factor has been the nutrition response matrix that was compiled mid-2014. This rather detailed exercise involved information collection from agencies across the country and covered a wide range of indicators.²¹⁷ The findings were presented and summarised as a prevailing 'scenario' for service delivery and coverage in each of the counties. This in turn formed the information base for the formulation of sets of specific action points per county.

56. In 2016, the cluster undertook a nutrition gap analysis, focused on mapping of the geographical coverage of nutrition treatment programmes at *payam* level. The indicators were roughly kept the same as within the nutrition response matrix, with the addition of quantitative information on service delivery gaps (number of sites not covered) and the reasons for non-expanding. The analysis comprised the out-patient therapeutic programme, targeted supplementary feeding programme, and IYCF-E. This was complemented by information on the level of sufficiency in terms of coverage of the blanket supplementary feeding programme, the rapid response mechanism and the general food distribution programmes.

²¹⁶ The RRM missions contributed to introducing or reintroducing nutrition partners in 72% of missions.

²¹⁷ The indicators include population figures and numbers of IDPs; MAM and SAM rates; the targeted caseload and actual new admissions for OTP, SC and TSFP; Number of sites providing OTP, SC and TSFP services; accessibility issues; names of the agencies involved in OTP, SC, TSFP, and IYCF-E programmes; targets and numbers reached for the BSFP; number of RRM missions undertaken; names of the agencies involved in health, WASH, and agriculture; and the names of the partner agencies to UNICEF and WFP with the targets as per the CPA resp. FLA.

Table 16: Coverage for the WFP South Sudan nutrition programmes 2011-2013

Area	TSFP 6-59 months			BSFP 6-23 months 6-35 months 6-59 months			TSFP PLW			BSFP PLW		
	PD /BRs	planned	actuals	PD	planned	actuals	PD	planned	actuals	PD	planned	actuals
PRRO 200572 BR3; Total budget: USD 779 million; Period: 01.01.14-31.12.16												
Residents (7 states) / IDPs from Abyei	2016: 228,000 2015: 180,439 2014: 404,300	2016: 241,265 2015: 180,439 2014: 404,300	2016: 192,701 2015: 165,032 2014: 152,534	2016: (132,000) 2015: 154,772 2014: 0	2016: 146,452 2015: 127,326 2014: 41,100	2016: 261,768 2015: 132,913 2014: 48,327	2016: 96,000 2015: 57,928 2014: 90,400	2016: 101,872 2015: 57,928 2014: 114,700	2016: 107,559 2015: 79,373 2014: 58,997	2016: (132,000 for all BSFP cat.) 2015: 20,800 2014: 8,500	2016: 83,200 2015: 20,800 2014: 8,500	2016: 124,073 2015: 20,345 2014: 19,331
Refugee camps	2016: 8,265 2015: 12,266 2014: 20,300			2016: 55,100 2015: 49,940 2014: 54,000			2016: 4,872 2015: 2,863 2014: 24,300			2016: 23,200 2015: 20,800 2014: 18,500		
EMOP 200859; Total budget USD 554 million; Period: 01.10.15-30.09.16												
Greater Upper Nile (residents + IDPs)	2015: 152,000	2016: 152,000	2016: 104,136 2015: 24,942	2015: 295,330	2016: 295,330	2016: 353,512 2015: 174,050	2015: 50,000	2016: 50,000	2016: 50,000 2015: 48,201 2014: 5,636	2015: 62,542	2016: 62,542	2016: 31,190 2015: 2,380
EMOP 200659 BR3; Total budget: USD 1.059 million; Period: 01.01.14-30.09.15												
Greater Upper Nile (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei)	(139,404 for all TSFP cat.)	2015: 117,838 2014: (none)	2015: 125,160 2014: (none)	386,134	2015: 386,134 2014: 333,000	2015: 292,761 2014: 292,067	(139,404 for all TSFP cat.)	2015: 21,566 2014: (none)	2015: 58,954 2014: (none)	30,000	2015: 30,003 2014: (none)	2015: 3,507 2014: (none)
EMOP 200338 BR2; Total budget USD 706 million; Period 01.01.12-31.12.13												
South Sudan Residents	2013: 196,900	2013: 196,872	2013: 150,419	288,000	2013: 325,400	2013: 246,792	2013: 70,800	2013: 95,982	2013: 42,353	(none)	(none)	(none)
Refugee camps	2012: 207,000	2012: 206,455	2012: 135,967	2013: 50,400	2012: 288,000	2012: 230,021	2012: 109,000	2012: 100,000	2012: 113,986	2013: 5,200	2013: (25,200)	2013: (14,377)

Source: Standard project reports 2011-2016

57. As explained in section 1.2, there were three EMOPs and one PRRO within the 2011-2016 WFP South Sudan Country Portfolio that comprised nutrition elements. The results of the nutrition programmes can be summarised as follows:

- In 2012 and 2013, the WFP nutrition programmes in South Sudan consisted of both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes for young children and pregnant and lactating women, as part of EMOP 200338 that was targeted at priority rural areas across the country, plus the refugee camps.²¹⁸ Due to gaps in partner capacity and coverage, plus some pipeline breaks and late arrival of food, it was not possible to reach the intended number of beneficiaries (achievement rate for the targeted supplementary feeding programme was 66 percent in 2012, and 76 percent in 2013). Substitute nutrition products were sometimes used as needed in response to pipeline constraints.
- EMOP 200659 (January 2014 to September 2015) was targeted at the Greater Upper Nile area, and covered both internally displaced persons in protection of civilian sites and the resident population, including those in remote locations. In the course of 2014, the operations under this EMOP were quickly scaled up in line with the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)*. The main outreach mechanism was through the ‘integrated rapid response mechanism’ (IRRM), wherein partnership with other United Nations agencies and NGOs, mobile teams were deployed to hard-to-reach areas. A large blanket supplementary feeding programme for children 6-59 months²¹⁹ and pregnant and lactating women²²⁰ was established alongside the general food distributions. Air transportation (airlifts and airdrops) was the main transport mode, which increased costs and reduced beneficiary coverage. In 2015, the EMOP took over the targeted supplementary feeding programme²²¹ in Greater Upper Nile (in 2014 still under the PRRO). Some overachievement was realized for the targeted supplementary feeding programme for pregnant and lactating women.²²² Community nutrition volunteers (CNVs) received a composite food ration (cereals, pulses, oil and salt).
- Consequently, the EMOP 200859 (October 2015 to December 2016) took over and continued to cover needs in the three conflict-affected states in Greater Upper Nile, primarily through the integrated rapid response mechanism approach. In the last quarter of 2015, access to deep field locations was rather irregular as a result of insecurity, inaccessibility, and fuel shortages.

In 2015, the actuals vs. planned under the targeted supplementary feeding programme amounted to a mere 16 percent for children 6-59 months, and 11 percent of pregnant and lactating women, through a total of 90 sites.²²³ Achievements were much better in 2016, with good coverage levels²²⁴ and a targeted

²¹⁸ The specific BSFP programming choices have varied between the residents and refugee populations, and over the years. The approach for TSFP has been consistent throughout the two years.

²¹⁹ Ration scale: 200g of SuperCereal Plus per person per day.

²²⁰ Ration scale: 250g SuperCereal, 20g sugar, and 30g vegetable oil.

²²¹ Ration scale of 92g of Plumpy’Sup per day for children, and 250g of SuperCereal, 20g sugar and 30g of vegetable oil for PLW. Sugar supply was irregular as it needs to be airlifted (cannot be airdropped) which takes additional time.

²²² While the plan was to use a MUAC < 21 cm as cut-off point, many partners actually used < 23 cm. Guidance was lacking as national CMAM guidelines for South Sudan were under revision and no unified global standard exists. The WFP FNSMS round 18 report indicates that 23% of women of childbearing age had a MUAC<23cm, with no significant difference in rates between pregnant and non-pregnant women. Due to shortfalls in SuperCereal coupled with air delivery challenges, the BSFP programme coverage among PLW was much smaller than planned.

²²³ The 2015 SPR for the EMOP indicates results for a short period of 3 months only while the planning figures are for the total implementation period. The figures indicate that the coverage of the TSFP was rather good in the PoC sites (82%), and acceptable among the resident and IDP population (58%). It is not clear however how this relates to the overall low levels of actuals.

²²⁴ As per the draft 2016 SPR, the WFP CO estimates that coverage of the TSFP for children 6-59 months in 2016 was 56% of the MAM cases in the resident population and 98% in the PoC camps. This is above the Sphere standards of 50% for rural populations

supplementary feeding programmes actuals vs. planned ratio of 69 percent for children 6-59 months and 96 percent for pregnant and lactating women, through a total of 265 health centres/sites. The increased outreach of the targeted supplementary feeding programme reflects the success of the *UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)*, and the deployment of rapid response mechanism teams.²²⁵ This is despite the fact that there were some pipeline breaks for the nutrition commodities across the first half of the year, and a number of sites being inactive in the second half of the year due to the increased insecurity, especially in Unity state. The performance of the targeted supplementary feeding programme in both 2015 and 2016 is rated as good, with a recovery rate of 88 percent, which is well above the Sphere threshold of 75 percent.

For 2015, the results of the blanket supplementary feeding programme targeted at children 6-59 months were 59 percent actuals vs planned, but not for pregnant and lactating women (4 percent). The achievements in 2016, in terms of actuals vs. planned were 120 percent for the blanket supplementary feeding programme for children and 50 percent for the blanket supplementary feeding programmes for pregnant and lactating women.²²⁶ What matters more however, is the achieved population coverage among children 6-59 months.²²⁷ This is a reflection of the difficult operating environment in Greater Upper Nile, WFP South Sudan's operational capacity constraints, among others, as a result of the looting of the central warehouse in Juba in July 2016 and the prioritisation of the Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal food and nutrition crisis response which affected both commodity availability and air delivery capacity for Greater Upper Nile.

- The PRRO 200572 (January 2014 to December 2016) was designed to cover protracted needs among both the resident population as well as in the refugee camps and among the displaced in all ten states in South Sudan. It contained both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programme modalities for young children and pregnant and lactating women, plus the food-based incentive for community nutrition volunteers.
- Overall targeted supplementary feeding coverage in 2014 only amounted to 36 percent for children 6-59 months, and 51 percent among pregnant and lactating women. The main reason for the low results levels is that after December 2013 it was no longer possible for many nutrition partners to reach their operational locations. This was somewhat better for the blanket supplementary feeding programme that to a large extent is directly implemented by WFP, which, as a United Nations agency, had better access.
- As mentioned above, the targeted supplementary feeding programme in Greater Upper Nile from 2015 onwards was integrated into EMOP 200659 while the PRRO continued to cover the seven non-conflict affected states and all refugee camps.²²⁸ The targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programme actuals against

and 90% for camp settings. It needs to be noted however that the reliability of these estimates largely depends on the correctness of both the GAM rate estimates and the population figures projections that are available.

²²⁵ For 2016, the RRM included a total of 25 teams. The four WFP-staffed teams and two teams from NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) were deployable throughout the country, while the other 19 teams each had their own geographic coverage.

²²⁶ In 2016, the BSFP for PLW was only implemented through static partners and did not form part of the work for the RRM teams.

²²⁷ According to the SPRs for this EMOP, the BSFP coverage rate for children 6-59 months amounted to 88% in 2015 and 38% in 2016, which was based on a new approach to calculate this indicator. The main difference is that a more accurate (higher) projection was used to estimate the eligible population of children 6-59 months in the targeted areas. It is relevant to point out that the number of actuals nearly doubled from 2015 to 2016. The benchmarks for coverage are the Sphere target >70%, and the target of >30% that was in the WFP 2012 Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan.

²²⁸ The PRRO allowed admission of MAM children from around refugee camps into the TSFP.

planned for 2015 were satisfactory (91 percent - 104 percent for children 6-59 months, and 137 percent for pregnant and lactating women). For the targeted supplementary feeding, the actual number of sites was somewhat lower than planned (239/292) but the numbers of children treated per site in both Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap were higher than expected. The targeted supplementary feeding performance was very high, with a recovery rate²²⁹ of 91 percent. While the blanket supplementary feeding managed to reach the planned number of children, distributions were not as regular as was planned.

- In course of 2016, WFP and its partners have strongly scaled up these programmes, for the blanket supplementary feeding in particular,²³⁰ with increased follow-up through the community nutrition volunteers in order to reach the same beneficiaries multiple times. For the targeted supplementary feeding, the number of sites more than doubled (596 sites). The looting of the WFP central warehouse in Juba in July 2016, increased insecurity and displacement, and highly increased needs as a result of the Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal food and nutrition crisis strongly constrained the nutrition programmes. Nevertheless, the moderate acute malnutrition-treatment partner agencies all were successful in meeting international Sphere performance standards (apart from the default rate which stood at 17 percent while the target is <15 percent). The targeted supplementary feeding programme for the resident and internally displaced person population also met Sphere coverage standards.²³¹
- While the institutional feeding programme under the PRRO still had a considerable scale in 2014 and reached out to 61,893 people, the number of TB and HIV clients reached by the programme in 2015 highly contracted. This was a result of a sharp decrease in planning figures combined with a reduction in the number of sites, as WFP focussed its support on sites with regular supplies of antiretrovirals. The institutional feeding programme was somewhat scaled up again in 2016 when it reached 21,632 people, through 26 sites. Outcomes in terms of treatment compliance are similar as for the EMOP, with low defaulting rates for TB patients (7 percent), but not for the Antiretroviral Therapy (ART)-clients (66 percent). The latter is a major shift from the (already high) defaulting rate of 28 percent in 2015. The presumed reason for this meagre result is that the increased insecurity and cross-border migration in Eastern Equatoria (area with the highest HIV prevalence in South Sudan).

58. As summarized in the graphs below (Figure 10), the total number of children covered by both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes implemented in South Sudan as a whole has steadily grown over the years.²³²




²²⁹ According to the Sphere guidelines, the recovery rate for acute malnutrition treatment programmes is defined as the proportion of discharges from the programmes that have recovered as per the national guidelines against the total number of discharged (which is the total of discharged, recovered, died, defaulted and non-recovered).
See: <http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/management-of-acute-malnutrition-and-micronutrient-deficiencies-standard-1-moderate-acute-malnutrition/>


²³⁰ For the BSFP programme the coverage that was achieved is estimated to amount to 31% of all children, which equals the level set in the WFP 2012 Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan, although it remains well below the Sphere target of >70% for rural populations.

²³¹ WFP estimates indicate that the coverage of the TSFP for children 6-59 months among the residents and IDP population is estimated by WFP to be 65% (Sphere target for rural populations > 50%), The average recovery rate is 79%.

²³² The graphs indicate the total number of planned/ actual beneficiaries per year over the various operations and among both resident population, IDPs, and in the refugee camps. For EMOP 200859 and its predecessor EMOP 200659 which both comprised parts of 2015, the highest figures have been taken as if these represent the full year.

Figure 10: South Sudan targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes for 6-59 months planned vs. actuals





Source: Standard project reports 2011-2016

59. UNHCR reporting indicates that in the refugee camps, the targeted supplementary feeding programme together with the blanket supplementary feeding programme have helped to keep global acute malnutrition rates under control. This was despite some serious pipeline breaks in the past years, including for the general food distribution, which put nutrition conditions under stress. This is the main source of information for this country portfolio evaluation as the standard WFP reporting system does not contain a lot of detail on the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding nutrition programmes in the refugee camps.

60. A sector indicators overview for South Sudan published by UNHCR in April 2015 indicated that the performance of the nutrition programmes in the refugee camps generally is satisfactory. In two of the camps in Upper Nile, there appeared operational challenges with delays in the provision of food/ nutrition items, and a specific lack of nutrition products for both under-fives and pregnant and lactating women. This has led to many new admissions to both severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatment programmes, and recovery rates below standards.²³³

61. The standard project reports on PRRO 200572 for 2014 and 2015 only contain coverage figures and information on the outputs and outcomes for the nutrition programmes overall; there is no specific information on the nutrition programmes in the refugee camps. In the 2016 standard project report, it is mentioned that the targeted supplementary feeding programmes in the refugee camps fell short of the Sphere coverage standards.²³⁴

62. The performance for the institutional feeding programme has been relatively weak. Although in 2012 and 2013 there were still considerably high numbers of beneficiaries (over 100,000), the coverage nearly halved in 2014 and was very minimal in 2015. Results were somewhat better again in 2016. The main reasons for the meagre results under this component have been the challenges within the health sector in South Sudan, a lack of partners for the institutional feeding programme, and recurrent logistical challenges for the nutrition products.

63. Table 17 presents the results for the last nutrition-specific element in the South Sudan country portfolio, the institutional feeding programme (IFP):

²³³ Ref: <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/download.php?id=2068>

²³⁴ TSFP coverage in the refugee camps estimated to be 72% (Sphere target for camp situations: >90%).

- The programme was relatively large in 2012 and 2013, as part of EMOP 200338. Achieved coverage in these years amounted to 53 – 67 percent of the plan, which the country office explains to be the result of a lack of partners on the ground as well as the shortage of SuperCereal and sugar.
- While not part of EMOP 200659, the institutional feeding programme was reintroduced in the three conflict-affected states as a relatively small component within EMOP 200859. The coverage was very low in 2015 (751 people, 8 percent of planned), but achievements improved in 2016 when 3,776 people were reached (76 percent of planned). In both years, the institutional feeding programme covered a total of 12 sites. Treatment compliance for TB remained stable in 2016, with a defaulting rate of 9 percent (Sphere standard: <15 percent)²³⁵ while for ART this was a high 45 percent (Sphere: also <15 percent).
- The institutional feeding programme was continued in the non-conflict-affected states as part of PRRO 200572. In 2014, implementation suffered from inconsistent deliveries to sites with logistical challenges, commodity shortfalls, and a lack of reliable data on beneficiary numbers. From 2015 onwards, coverage ambitions were severely downscaled, and some data collection was undertaken to document the food security and nutrition status of people living with HIV/AIDS.

Table 17: Planned vs. actual coverage of the institutional feeding programme in South Sudan 2011-2016

Programme	Year	Number of IFP beneficiaries		
		PD (last BR)	Planned	Actual
EMOP 200859	2016	5,000	5,000	3,776
	2015	5,000	10,000	751
PRRO 200572	2016	50,000	50,000	21,632
	2015	59,930	11,986	6,228
	2014	98,900	89,600	61,893
EMOP 200338	2013	192,000	192,000	102,669
	2012	192,000	192,000	129,198

Source: Prepared by the country portfolio evaluation team based on information from the standard project reports for the respective operations

EQ12: Efficiency

64. Key issues around the operational cost-efficiency of WFP nutrition programmes in South Sudan are primarily related to the following aspects:

65. i) **Specific logistical challenges** for the special nutrition products which cannot be airdropped and thus need to be either prepositioned. This means transport by road in the dry season requiring upfront financing and the existence of supply lines that can accommodate peaks in demands²³⁶ or airlifted (with concomitant limitations in total quantities that can be transported, and the highly increased transport costs).

²³⁵ TB treatment compliance is highly important to avoid multiple drug resistance.

²³⁶ It is expected that African Improved Foods Rwanda (AIF Rwanda), a new company producing nutrition products in Rwanda that recently has been established as a collaboration project between the Government of Rwanda and DSM together with some

66. While the **composition of the ration** for the nutrition programmes for young children consists of special products. These are Plumpy'Sup,²³⁷ for the targeted supplementary feeding programme and SuperCereal+²³⁸ for the blanket supplementary feeding programme. This is not the case for the nutrition programmes for pregnant and lactating women (both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding), where the implementing agency need to prepare a premix at the distribution site through mixing of SuperCereal with sugar and vegetable oil. WFP South Sudan has recently decided to shift to distribution of SuperCereal+ to pregnant and lactating women as well (although this is a product designed for use with young children). This shift is not actually in line with WFP corporate guidance. It would make more sense to make use of an alternative 'single product' for pregnant and lactating women as replacement for the premix. The rationale for the country office is that this approach largely reduces the logistics constraints without increasing the costs²³⁹), as it very often happened that one of the components within the premix is not available, and partner agencies found the mixing at the distribution site to be cumbersome.

67. **Capacity constraints** and high numbers of implementing partners on nutrition. This is caused by the fact that very few NGOs have the capacity to cover a full county, given the very difficult operating environment. WFP, during the process of expansion of the nutrition programme, thus had to contract a range of smaller agencies to 'cover the map'. Another reason might be that the more established partners are not always flexible to switch to new geographical locations, as they need to combine their WFP field level agreements (FLAs) with other (donor-supported) programmes around food security, health and nutrition, etc. Other aspects are the UNICEF/WFP agreement to aim for one single partner for both the out-patient therapeutic and targeted supplementary feeding programmes.

EQ13: Contribution to reduction of gender inequality:

68. Gender aspects are routinely taken care of in the nutrition treatment programmes, as these are focused on pregnant and lactating women, and young children. However, it is less certain that these nutrition programmes function as a mechanism to empower women. The reality is that it easily becomes a burden for women to attend these programmes (for themselves or for their children) as it usually turns out to be rather time consuming to attend the bi-weekly sessions. It also requires the women to sometimes walk long distances to the nutrition distribution sites, sometimes even more than once a week, as there are normally different days for the targeted supplementary feeding for young children and for pregnant and lactating women. The community is not normally consulted on the design for the nutrition treatment programmes, neither men nor women.

other financial partners will become one of the main sourcing channels for SuperCereal+ for the whole Horn of Africa including South Sudan.

²³⁷ Early 2017 WFP South Sudan will shift to use of 'Acha Mum', another Lipid-based Nutrition Supplement (LNS). The WFP programmatic guidelines on nutrition indicate that for treatment of MAM among young children there is a choice between such LNS products and fortified blended foods (FBF) like SuperCereal+.

²³⁸ In the WFP programmatic guidelines, no specific mention is made on the type of products to be used in a BSFP programme that aims to prevent acute malnutrition.

²³⁹ The CO calculated that the total costs for the ration of SuperCereal+ for PLW including purchase and international transport; loading, transport, storage and handling (LTSH) costs; and distribution costs amounted to USD 17.26 per beneficiary per month. This compares very well with the total cost for the package of SuperCereal+, oil and sugar which amounts of USD 21.17.

EQ14 / 15: Level of synergy and multiplying effects within the portfolio /with other partners

69. In the period 2011-2016, the focus for WFP South Sudan has been on nutrition-specific interventions like the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes geared towards treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition. It is only very recently that the country office has started to look into opportunities for nutrition-sensitive programming. These primarily are seen to be present within the food for assets (FFA) and the food for education (FFE) programmes, but there are also ideas to spread nutrition messages during general food distributions.

70. In the 2014-2017 country strategy,²⁴⁰ the focus has been on programmes for treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition (targeted and blanket supplementary feeding), with in-built synergies with the general food distributions, especially in the case of the rapid response mechanism but also in the refugee and protection of civilian camps and in static sites in areas where relief distributions were undertaken.

71. The institutional feeding programme is an add-on and support to the TB and HIV/AIDS treatment programmes. It thus has to be managed along those lines, but that might be difficult as WFP is not actively engaged in the health sector and does not take part in the Health Cluster on a structural basis. It might be difficult for WFP to really reap synergies in this programme.

72. The Nutrition Cluster has been the main vehicle for coordination and seeking synergies with other players within the nutrition sector.²⁴¹ Since 2014, the synergies within the nutrition response are underpinned by the close coordination between WFP and UNICEF as part of the joint nutrition scale-up plans, maximising synergies where possible through joint rapid response mechanism missions, seeking to strengthen connections between out-patient therapeutic programmes and targeted supplementary feeding sites (including e.g. the approach to contract one partner that undertakes both types of nutrition treatment programmes), and the adoption of 'expanded criteria' to jointly fill coverage gaps for the out-patient therapeutic and targeted supplementary feeding programmes.

73. Opportunities for nutrition-sensitive programming were not really reaped, neither within the WFP portfolio nor in coordination with other partners. As one of the steps towards the establishment of a new WFP South Sudan country strategy, the nutrition section in the country office has recently prepared a "Concept Note on the Options for Nutrition Sensitive Programming in South Sudan". This is based on the corporate agreement within WFP to have explicit food and nutrition security objectives within all the programmes in order to comply with the newly set goal to align with SDG2. Because of the scale of the programmes in South Sudan, there is seen to be ample opportunity to pilot various approaches to nutrition-sensitive programming. Within the WFP portfolio, options for synergies are present within the programmes under Pillar Two and Four, in particular, in the non-conflict affected rural areas in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal and Greater Equatoria:

- Cash/food for assets (CFFA) programme: Main objective is to meet short-term food needs of food insecure households through a conditional food or cash-

²⁴⁰ WFP South Sudan country strategy 2014-2017.

²⁴¹ In various cases, the nutrition interventions are implemented by the partners as a top-up of their involvement in health or other recovery/development projects.

based transfer,²⁴² to restore and create community assets that enhance livelihoods and resilience against future shocks, and to improve skills and knowledge including project management capacity of farmers and agricultural market actors. Targeting and selection of activities is done through a consultative process involving state, county and *boma* levels. Due to funding constraints, WFP in 2015 was forced to downscale the food for assets component,²⁴³ but in 2016 the component has been scaled up again through inclusion of a set of multi-year food for assets activities in synergy with the resilience-oriented programmes of FAO, UNICEF and World Bank, among others. So far, there has been limited focus on integration of nutrition. New ideas are to convey key nutrition messages at distribution sites and through cash/food for assets community workers, to start up conditional cash/food transfers linked to use of health and nutrition services, and more food for training, for example, linked to literacy programmes.

- **Food for education (FFE) programme:** Main focus is on enrolment, retention and completion of education. Since 2008, there is an annually renewed agreement with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) to jointly implement school feeding. Geographical focus is on counties with high levels of food insecurity. Only schools that meet the WFP food for education standards are eligible. The 2016 plan is to provide mid-day school meals to 200,000 children and to provide a take-home ration to 20,000 girls (the girls' incentive programme).²⁴⁴ Within the back to learning campaign, education is highlighted as a cornerstone to promote a 'peace culture', and as a measure to reduce child labour and early marriage. In close coordination with UNICEF and UNESCO, some thinking is being done on how to use the food for education ration to promote better diets and dietary diversity, including improving the micronutrient content of the school meals provided and a restart of the assistance to Ministry of Education, Science and Technology for integration of nutrition education elements in the school curriculum, possibly with establishment of school gardens (where FAO possibly can come on board as well). Also, it is being envisaged to support establishment of good WASH services in the schools (e.g. through a connection with the food for assets programme mentioned above), and to scale up the systematic twice-annual deworming programme beyond schools taking part in the school meals programme.

EQ16: Sustainability

74. For the nutrition programmes in South Sudan, sustainability will not be a reality in the near future. The treatment programmes are implemented by NGO partners, and the elements on capacity development of the Government of South Sudan staff are still relatively small, among others, due to weak staffing profiles, both at national level in Juba and within the states. It is difficult to gauge whether the targeted and blanket

²⁴² Participants in food-based FFA activities and their family members receive 300g of cereals, 50g of pulses, 30g of vegetable oil and 5g of salt per person per day. Cash-based FFA provides a transfer value of USD 0.93 per person per day, which is assumed to cover the corresponding quantities of commodities as WFP food basket. However, in 2016 this did not work out as South Sudan suffered from extremely high inflation rates, and food therefore was the preferred transfer. Cash-based transfers were used when food deliveries were not possible due to pipeline breaks or insecurity.

²⁴³ In 2015, 351,485 FFA beneficiaries were covered; 56,652 FFA participants plus their household members. For 2016, the plan was to target some 256,000 foods insecure with FFA/CFA to assist them to fill the food consumption gap during the lean season, and 284,000 moderately foods insecure through multi-year FFA activities.

²⁴⁴ The on-site school meals consist of 120g of cereals, 30g of pulses, 10g of vegetable oil and 4g of salt per student per school day, while the girls' incentive comprises a monthly take-home ration of 9.9kg of cereals and 3.6l of vegetable oil per student.

supplementary feeding programmes manage to spread nutritional messages that will have a lasting effect on child feeding practices.

Conclusions and Issues for the Future

Overall Assessment

Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness:

75. Acute malnutrition is a major long-term public health problem in South Sudan. Over past years, global acute malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition rates have been rather consistent, with the states in Greater Upper Nile and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and Warrap states standing out as the most affected areas. With some exceptions, there is good concurrence between the results of the WFP FNSMS and the Nutrition Cluster-led system of SMART surveys. Stunting is not systematically monitored; available data indicate levels vary considerably but are not insignificant. Obviously, the main underlying reasons for both forms of malnutrition are the continuing conflict and the low levels of development in South Sudan, which together result in high food insecurity and disease burdens combined with low health service delivery levels.

76. While the WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy is a strong corporate framework there are still gaps to translate this into action at country levels, including in South Sudan. Although WFP thinking in the early days (prior and just after the independence in 2011) was towards more developmental approaches in line with the *Government of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015*, from 2012 onwards the focus has largely been on relief-oriented nutrition programming. Overall, over the past years there has been rather minimal attention for other elements in the WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy like stunting reduction and integrated nutrition-sensitive programming in line with the SUN approach.

77. Emergency nutrition interventions have been the focus in the Nutrition Cluster in South Sudan, as exemplified by the South Sudan Updated Nutrition Cluster Response Plan of July 2014, and the support to the elaboration and roll-out of the new Ministry of Health CMAM Guidelines. *The UNICEF/WFP Joint Nutrition Scale-Up Plan (2014-2015)* and *Joint Nutrition Response Plan (2015-2016)*, which have been in operation since mid-2014, were innovative mechanisms to expand service coverage, both for treatment (out-patient therapeutic and targeted supplementary feeding programmes, increasingly being brought together to ensure a "continuum of care" and foster cost-efficiencies) and for prevention (blanket supplementary feeding programmes) of acute malnutrition, based on a cluster-led county prioritization matrix. It was a highly appropriate decision to increase the reach-out in conflict-affected areas through establishment of rapid response teams alongside a large partner network operating nutrition programmes in static sites. The programmatic and operational connections between the blanket supplementary feeding programme as a means to prevent acute malnutrition and the targeted supplementary feeding programme as a curative programme remain to be further elucidated in order to maximise the synergies between the two modalities.

78. As part of the country portfolio, WFP has supported nutrition services in the refugee camps in South Sudan. This is in line with the global agreement with UNHCR. Despite the fact that global acute malnutrition rates in the refugee camps actually were better than among the regular population, it was still fully justified to operate a moderate acute malnutrition prevention and treatment programme (both targeted

and blanket supplementary feeding). However, insufficient attention has been paid by WFP to chronic malnutrition issues, anaemia among young children, in particular.

79. The institutional feeding programme (IFP) is another element in the WFP portfolio in South Sudan. The institutional feeding programme is now shifting to targeted nutrition support programme targeted at clients with a MUAC <23 cm (in other words, clients who are acutely malnourished). The previous approach was to provide food-based support to care and treatment programmes for TB, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases like kala azar with the aim to boost good treatment coverage and compliance. This certainly was appropriate given the high level of food insecurity in South Sudan. In a recent study, it was found, however, that HIV clients on antiretrovirals do not have a different nutrition profile, indicating that status-based targeting of HIV/AIDS clients should not be continued. From a coverage and compliance point of view, it is assumed to have been relevant to provide food rations to the caretakers of children with severe acute malnutrition being treated in the stabilization centres.

Efficiency

80. WFP is an essential player in the food and nutrition response in South Sudan. The size of the operations in combination with the enormous logistical constraints in the country require a strong organizational set-up, with effective procurement, pipelines and distribution planning based on needs, efficient logistical arrangements and access negotiations to be able to deliver food and nutrition products to the hundreds of distribution points throughout the country, and strong nutrition partners at field level, or WFP engagement in direct distribution in case such partners are not available.

81. The results of a bottleneck analysis undertaken by the Nutrition Cluster in 2014 indicate which key factors have contributed (in both positive and negative ways) to the operational efficiency of nutrition programmes in South Sudan:

- a. Management and coordination mechanisms
- b. Adequacy of budgets for nutrition programmes
- c. Existing legislation and policy frameworks
- d. Availability of the essential commodities/inputs
- e. Demand-side aspects

82. Some key elements in the WFP country portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016 that need to be highlighted in relation to efficiency are i) the strong role of the Nutrition Cluster ii); the work on the establishment of the CMAM guidelines (iii); the efforts to improve in-country supply-lines through prepositioning and airlifting of nutrition commodities, iv) the hugely increased outreach through the deployment of rapid response teams to hard-to-reach areas, v) the shift to use of SuperCereal+ for the targeted supplementary feeding programme for pregnant and lactating women instead of the food basket of SuperCereal, plus sugar and vegetable oil and high HIV/AIDS medication defaulting rates (among others caused by irregular antiretroviral supply patterns) affecting the institutional feeding programme.

Effectiveness and Impact

83. While in the first years of the country portfolio (2011-2013), the effectiveness was below expectations due to partner capacity and low coverage in combination with

some pipeline breaks, the performance significantly improved from 2014 onwards, resulting in large increases in numbers of beneficiaries reached through both the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes despite the increasingly difficult operating environment.

84. Because global acute malnutrition rates remained high throughout the whole period, it remains rather unclear, however, whether the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes together with the other relief responses (general food distributions in particular) were attaining sufficiently high coverage levels to be effective (both at national, state and county levels). A more specific issue within the nutrition portfolio is what the impact has been of the scale-up of the blanket supplementary feeding programme. In principle, the programme should have contributed to the prevention of the occurrence of moderate acute malnutrition, and this should have led to a reduction of the number of beneficiaries for the targeted supplementary feeding, but it is not clear whether this indeed has happened.

85. Global acute malnutrition rates have been relatively well under control in the refugee camps. Although the general food distributions evidently are the main factor behind this result, to some extent it can be presumed to be attributable to the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes as well, even with the occurrence of some delays in distributions due to pipeline breaks.

86. The performance for the institutional feeding programme has been relatively weak, with particularly low coverage figures for 2014 and 2015. The main reason behind this is related to the problematically low levels of service delivery in the health sector, and the fact that WFP is not regularly attending the Health Cluster. Other aspects are the logistical challenges to regularly supply the nutrition products to the sites covered by the programme, and the high defaulting rates in the HIV/AIDS programme (in the TB programme, treatment compliance on the other hand was good).

Connectedness and Sustainability

87. Although the focus in the WFP South Sudan nutrition components evidently has been on short-term relief responses in order to meet urgent needs, there also have been some elements to support policy development (CMAM guidelines) and to undertake capacity development for Ministry of Health staff (national and state levels), plus for staff from the implementing partners including a range of national NGOs.

88. Especially since 2014, most of the emphasis has been put on nutrition-specific interventions, with prime focus on prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition. In the course of 2016, a start has been made to look into opportunities for nutrition-sensitive programming, especially within the WFP food/cash for assets programme and the food for education programme, but also on how to integrate nutrition messages within general food distribution. For the programme on nutrition support alongside treatment and care for TB and HIV/AIDS clients, a shift was made in 2016 to a narrower focus on treatment of acute malnutrition, rather than the more general social safety-like approach of the past years.

89. Sustainability of the nutrition programmes in South Sudan is unlikely to be achieved in the near future. Given the instability of the country, there remains a very large (nearly 100 percent) dependence on external financing, and a very large role for NGO partners in terms of implementation of nutrition interventions.

Issues for the Future

90. For the design of the nutrition and health components within the next WFP country portfolio in South Sudan 2011-2016, it is suggested to take the following recommendations into account:

Needs assessment and analysis

- Further elaboration of the WFP FNSMS methodology for regular assessment of nutrition status among key nutrition target groups, including the integration of stunting indicators and triangulation of results with the SMART surveys system, and other relevant surveillance mechanisms, like the South Sudan Household Survey (similar to the demographic health survey).
- In addition to the work done since mid-2016, to further invest in analysis of the underlying reasons for undernutrition in South Sudan, in close collaboration/partnership with other agencies on food security and nutrition. This would be as a follow-up to the current IFANSCA study undertaken jointly by the key nutrition actors in South Sudan in two states in Greater Bahr-el-Ghazal. This should aim to further understand key underlying factors to be addressed in the relatively more stable areas in the country. If and where possible, some additional more focalised studies could be undertaken in the more conflict-affected areas in the country. This could guide priority-setting in case humanitarian conditions are worsening.

Nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programming and monitoring and evaluation

- Given the protracted emergency context of South Sudan, and in line with the WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy and other international frameworks on nutrition, it is essential for WFP, in partnership with UNICEF and other key agencies on nutrition in South Sudan as applicable, to combine humanitarian approaches with a development focus, in order to maximise synergies and results in relation to the various forms of undernutrition:
 - Maintain the (longer-term) aim to contribute to the *Government of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015*, including capacity development and other support for the roll-out of the CMAM guidelines at national, state and county levels; plus, advocacy and support for the operationalisation of the Boma Health Initiative launched in 2015. To be undertaken in close collaboration with UNICEF, WHO, and other “nutrition-in-health” partners in South Sudan.
 - Further elaboration of the ‘theory of change’ for nutrition-specific interventions to respond to both acute and chronic malnutrition, with indication of how the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes are linked and mutually synergistic. While this primarily is an issue at corporate levels, the country office in South Sudan will have to further look in to how best meet nutrition needs among both residents (so far with the focus on rural areas, but this might change in future) in more stable and outright conflict-affected parts of the country, and camp settings (both protection of civilian sites and refugee camps), and alongside the care and treatment programmes for TB and HIV/AIDS. This should entail further reflections on targeting criteria, the food products to be used (lipid-based nutrition supplement and/or fortified blended foods), the potential

for further (dynamic) scaling up and down of geographical coverage in line with needs through deployment of mobile teams alongside static sites and the system of rapid response teams, the role of community volunteers, accompanying interventions on IYCF, and the desirable/ essential connections with other community-based approaches on food and nutrition security. Preferably to be done as a joint exercise involving UNICEF and the Government of South Sudan as well as in order to cover the full community-based management of acute malnutrition spectrum.

- Start up and increase nutrition-sensitive programming in line with the SUN approach within the overall WFP portfolio for South Sudan, through the cash/food for assets and food for education programmes in particular, but also through the general food distributions and with an open eye for other opportunities (for example, a focus on stunting reduction in tandem with the targeted and blanket supplementary feeding programmes). The aim is to identify feasible and effective approaches, connected with interventions by other actors as relevant, to increase food and nutrition security (not only to meet energy needs but also to improve the quality of the diet), and to improve overall health conditions (including through WASH interventions and control of malaria and other key diseases), for pregnant and lactating women and young children in particular. Although the modalities may be different, this also applies to the refugee camps, where there is a need to focus on improvement of the quality of the diet issues, among others, as evidenced by the high anaemia rates among young children.
- Establishment of a system at the level of the Nutrition Cluster for more hands-on monitoring of the achieved coverage of nutrition programmes, with data being generated to reflect coverage against estimated needs at national, state and preferably also county levels if possible ('nutrition dashboard'). Such a system will facilitate (near) real-time monitoring of performance in terms of coverage levels achieved in relation to estimated needs at disaggregated geographical levels.

Annex L: Logistics and Common Service

Introduction

1. The thematic scope of this Annex to the World Food Programme (WFP) South Sudan country portfolio evaluation report (CPE) considers the role played by the country office's (CO) logistics department as a strategically and operationally important function that underpins programme delivery under EMOP 200859 and PRRO 200572. The annex also focuses on three inter-agency common services²⁴⁵ hosted by WFP South Sudan: the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and the Logistics Cluster (both supervised under the logistics department), and the Emergency Telecommunication Cluster (ETC) (supervised by the support services department). Those services were active respectively in special operations (SO) 200786, 200778 and 200931. The annex presents logistics findings and related issues concerning infrastructure, costs and coordination, and how this relates to the WFP portfolio and operations.
2. Due to the high turnover of staff and the dynamic nature of operations caused by fluctuations in the security situation, the evaluation team faced limitations in obtaining some information. Therefore, findings mainly relate to the period 2014 to 2016 and consider evaluation questions that are most relevant to WFP South Sudan logistics and common services.
3. South Sudan is one of the least developed and most challenging countries in the world in which to live and work. It has a population of approximately 12 million (more than 80 percent living in the rural areas) that are spread across a vast area of 650,000 square kilometres.²⁴⁶ According to the World Bank²⁴⁷ there is a road network²⁴⁸ of over 17,000 km, but only 200 km is paved. There were plans to pave the 350 km stretch of road from Juba, the capital, to Nadapal at the Kenya border but this work has been on hold since the upsurge in conflict at the end of 2013. The Government's role in maintaining trunk roads has also been on hold, which has resulted in a significant deterioration in primary road access, making some areas difficult to reach even in the dry season. During the rainy season, many areas typically can be inaccessible by road for months. In crisis periods, if food rations have not been prepositioned in time or in sufficient quantity, emergency airdrops are frequently required.
4. The upper reaches of the Nile provide 1,400 km of navigable inland waterways that can be used throughout the year, with many tributaries offering valuable transport access routes, but these cannot be used to full effect due to a lack of investment in essential barge equipment and ports. Furthermore, on-going insecurity affects the majority of the transport network, isolating communities and people in need, making the provision of humanitarian assistance extremely difficult; many areas are only accessible by air.
5. There was one rail connection between Babanusa (Sudan) and Wau (444 km), but the section inside South Sudan has largely been destroyed or dismantled. Airstrips are mostly gravel, rendering many unusable by fixed wing aircraft during the rainy season (unless properly maintained). This necessitates the expensive use of helicopters to assure humanitarian access. Seasonal flooding and insecurity remain the biggest

²⁴⁵ WFP also co-hosts (with FAO) the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, which is not evaluated in this annex.

²⁴⁶ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southsudan/overview>

²⁴⁷ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/02/09/a-triumph-over-long-odds-building-rural-roads-in-south-sudan>

²⁴⁸ Road density is extremely low at 19 km per 1,000 square km.

factors affecting storage facilities; inter-tribal conflict, armed insurgencies and cattle raiding can result in the large displacement of people and the unavailability of permanent labour. Furthermore, commercial transporters may refuse to go into certain areas due to the many risks.

6. At the time of independence in 2011, South Sudan was seen as having the potential to become a grain exporter and regional leader in food production. According to project reports, in order to support the Government's development plan that was aimed at reducing food insecurity and rapid rural transformation, WFP initiated a logistics augmentation project (SO 200267), which was to help create a national strategic food reserve (NSFR) and reduce road transport costs. The project²⁴⁹ was to play an important role in stimulating growth in the agricultural sector and enable timely responses to emergencies. Linked to this, WFP logistics also has had oversight for a feeder roads construction programme under special operation 200379.

7. However, since early 2014 the WFP logistics department's focus has primarily been on addressing humanitarian needs. On-going insecurity, in conjunction with the poor transport infrastructure, has left the humanitarian sector with limited options to deliver lifesaving cargo to people scattered across the country. It is in this challenging context that WFP South Sudan manages one of the largest humanitarian logistics operations in the world.

Evaluation Findings

Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning

EQ2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to South Sudan humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

8. Without exception, in-country interviews conducted by the country portfolio evaluation team between 16 January and 3 February 2017 confirmed that the vast majority of international aid organisations would not have been able to implement their programmes without the operational services and support provided by WFP; had such support been unavailable, the added cost and complexity of delivery would have been prohibitive.

9. In 2016, due to large-scale food insecurity and a structural food deficit,²⁵⁰ WFP logistics transported over 265,000²⁵¹ metric tons (MT) of food commodities (68,000 metric tons via air) to 3.9 million beneficiaries (under EMOP 200859 and PRRO 200572, excluding those that only received cash based transfers). Additionally, common services provided through the Logistics Cluster enabled the movement of 6,640 metric tons of non-food cargo for 117 agencies,²⁵² and through UNHAS over 78,000 passengers were transported to various locations within the country ([Table 18](#)).

²⁴⁹ Project aligned with WFP Strategic Objective 3: reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs.

²⁵⁰ See main CPE report

²⁵¹ SPRs 200859 and 200572 for 2016

²⁵² SPR 200778

Table 18: WFP / UNHAS air operations

Year	Passengers transported	Cargo (MT) airlifted / airdropped
2011	11,698	456
2012	88,224	396
2013	83,841	255
2014	68,286	58,774
2015	84,841	61,651
2016	78,064	68,771

Source: WFP Aviation Unit

10. Nominally, WFP is able to access sufficient road transport capacity to uplift up to approximately 30,000 metric tons per month²⁵³ using shortlisted commercial operators for long-haul transport from Juba and secondary transporters to complete final deliveries. Capacity is complemented through the use of WFP-owned long-haul and all terrain trucks, many of which are used for cross-line operations when commercial transporters cannot operate in certain areas; ethnicity being a key issue as some groups cannot move freely from government into opposition areas and vice versa, hence international third party contractors also need to be used. (When visiting Bentiu, the evaluation team was able to interview convoy truck drivers working for a Kenya-based company). WFP also uses riverboats and barges along the Nile, Bahr el Zaraf and Sobat rivers for both food and non-food items.

11. Cargo transport via air has (for more than three decades²⁵⁴) been a critical means of delivering humanitarian assistance in South Sudan. WFP Logistics [Aviation] has become a specialist, and innovator, in the contracting and tasking of rotary and fixed wing aircraft for air operations. As at December 2016, the country office logistics department operated nine helicopters (8 Mi8/17 and 1 Mi26) for airlift and eight (30 metric tons capacity Ilyushin 76) cargo aircraft for airdrop operations. Annual delivery capacity is approximately 70,000 metric tons.

12. To assemble this type of dedicated (non-military) humanitarian logistics capability requires significant resources, knowledge, experience and skill. While some national commercial capacity exists, it is regarded as unreliable and the aircrafts unsafe.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, South Sudanese companies cannot operate neutrally in all areas. Interviews with NGO representatives confirmed that non-United Nations agencies do use local transport companies where feasible but also must rely on the common logistics services provided through the Logistics Cluster, IOM and UNHAS. Overall, WFP logistics and supply chain operations can be regarded as strategically and operationally central to the organisation's ability to have delivered, for and with a wide range of partners, lifesaving and life preserving food and non-food assistance to many millions of beneficiaries between 2011 and 2016.

13. Of the three common services evaluated, the team found that UNHAS has been best placed to contribute to strengthening the capacity of the Government of Republic of South Sudan. Safety standards are low within the country's aviation industry and there have been significant concerns regarding incidents of near mid-air collision and

²⁵³ WFP Logistics Concept of Operations 2016.

²⁵⁴ Operation Lifeline Sudan began in 1989 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Lifeline_Sudan

²⁵⁵ Information based on UNHAS staff consulted.

communications, navigation and air traffic management. Information gathered from interviews with UNHAS staff and from standard project reports (SPRs)²⁵⁶ confirms that during the evaluation period the WFP Aviation Safety Unit organized several workshops with key stakeholders including the South Sudan Civil Aviation Authority air traffic control (ATC), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and commercial air operators, where the air traffic management system was reviewed with the intent to re-structure and decongest airspace and traffic flow in order to reduce operating risks.

14. Regular South Sudan Civil Aviation Authority, air traffic control, UNMISS and other stakeholder aviation safety meetings have reportedly served as a platform for knowledge sharing with the aim to improve aviation safety culture and reduce associated risks to an acceptable level. Such initiatives have likely contributed to the development of the Government of Republic of South Sudan's capacity to manage national aviation safety standards but the evaluation team did not verify this.

15. In the absence of certified commercial alternatives, UNHAS continues as a vital service to support humanitarian interventions in many parts of South Sudan. To ensure national capacity development, tailored aviation industry trainings have been organised, via a certified International Air Transport Association instructor, for the Civil Aviation Authority (including airport managers in different locations) and other stakeholders on aviation security, aircraft ground handling, dangerous goods and customer service. UNHAS has also provided security equipment, such as metal detectors, to the civil aviation authorities and has reviewed airfield and ramp safety standards, further providing support for airstrip rehabilitation by funding labour and materials.

16. Although South Sudan gained its independence in 2011, air space above 23,500 feet over its territory is still controlled by Sudan. Various technical air safety challenges are evident but cooperation between the two countries remains in place. Both parties are supporting an 'air traffic management' project initiated in 2016 and facilitated by WFP Aviation in collaboration the International Civil Aviation Organization the Government of Republic of South Sudan's Ministry of Transport, governments of neighbouring countries and commercial operators. ICAO is reportedly concerned about number of different actors and although the WFP Aviation Safety Unit continues as a key facilitator the project²⁵⁷ is led by the Government of Republic of South Sudan.

17. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) has offered training and capacity building services²⁵⁸ to the Government of Republic of South Sudan's Ministry of Telecommunications on the development of policy and regulations. Competent personnel were trained but subsequently were not put into positions that would enable them to provide effective oversight or management of the Government's telecommunications functions. It has since been challenging for the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster to engage further with the Government due to the deteriorating situation in the country.

18. The logistics department took over responsibility for the feeder roads special operation in 2015. At that time capacity development activities²⁵⁹ were implemented for government staff seconded from the State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (in

²⁵⁶ UNHAS SPRs reviewed for special operations: 200341, 200523, 200634, 200702 and 200786

²⁵⁷ WFP Aviation reported that the project unfortunately was delayed due to the crisis that erupted in July 2016 but was re-started at the end of the year. (WFP does not lead the project for legal reasons).

²⁵⁸ Information gathered from former ETC personnel

²⁵⁹ SPR 2015 report for SO 200379

Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria states, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap) as well as several community development officers (CDOs). WFP reported that the project had enhanced the technical capacity of ministry staff through on-the-job training in various basic road construction and maintenance activities, and has been a key partner to the Government in providing technical assistance and support to both the Feeder Roads Steering Committee and the Feeder Roads Technical Committee. Additionally, WFP supported the development of the *South Sudan Low Volume Roads Manual*,²⁶⁰ which provides a uniform national standard for the construction of low volume roads in the country.

EQ3. To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

19. At the time of independence, the WFP programme was aligned²⁶¹ with the Government of Republic of South Sudan Development Plan (2011–2013) and with emerging national transport policy. Effective Government of Republic of South Sudan leadership²⁶² having been demonstrated in relation to the feeder roads special operation. Authority for the transport sector is shared between the national and state governments, but the division of responsibilities has not always been clear and has recently been exacerbated by the increase in the number of states from 10 to 28, creating potential jurisdictional conflict.

20. The national government is exclusively responsible for customs and excise duties. Road traffic is regulated under the Road Traffic and Safety Bill, with regulation focused more on revenue collection than the promotion of safety standards and service quality.

21. The Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges has overall responsibility for transport sector policy and for the management, development, rehabilitation and maintenance of national and international roads.²⁶³ However, at present the country lacks the required institutional framework to be effective and further lacks capacity to manage and maintain any infrastructure. Meanwhile, due to on-going conflict, donors are reluctant to fund any major infrastructural development projects. In the absence of a coherent government policy framework within which to work, WFP logistics' operations remain focused on humanitarian needs.

EQ4. To what extent has WFP objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

22. There are a number of important humanitarian coordination mechanisms used by WFP logistics, UNHAS, the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster and the Logistics Cluster that can be used to harmonise strategic approaches. These include:

- The Inter Cluster Working Group (ICWG)
- The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and Operational Working Group (OWG) meetings
- The NGO Forum
- The Military & Civil defence Assets meetings

²⁶⁰ Published by the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges in 2013

²⁶¹ Via a logistics augmentation project (July 2011, Special Operation 200267), which was to help create a national strategic food reserve (NSFR) and reduce road transport costs and the Feeder Roads Project (SO 200379)

²⁶² SPR 200379, 2013

²⁶³ Information in this section gathered from the WFP logistics report 'Transport Market Assessment 2015'

- Separate UNHAS, Logistics Cluster and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster user /steering group meetings
- Sector cluster meetings (i.e. Food Security and Livelihood Cluster – also managed by WFP with FAO)
- Access Working Group meetings
- Coordination meetings in key operational locations
- Dry season planning meeting

23. A significant coordination challenge faced by the Logistics Cluster is related to the limited ability of user organisations to provide advanced (non-food) pipeline plans. In part, this is due to donor funding cycle difficulties with no-cost extensions and the lack of long-term visibility provided by donors. Such plans are essential to enable the efficient matching of logistical assets to existing needs and to take advantage of the dry season to preposition cargo in field locations. A lack of forward planning further limits the ability of the cluster to advocate for funding. Through regular coordination meetings and other communication channels, logistics cluster staff are able to mitigate some of the planning challenges, but this is time consuming and requires additional capacity to be effective – particularly in supporting smaller international and national organisations.

24. The 2015 Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the response to the crisis in South Sudan²⁶⁴ highlights that “logistics are the life-blood of the response in South Sudan. The Logistics Cluster does excellent work, but is not backed by a strategic vision for logistics in the Humanitarian Country Team or among donors. This is leading to large and costly inefficiencies”. Further, one donor interviewed commented that some sector clusters appear to have lost their ability to set strategic directions and are becoming overly complicated. “We have observed that most sector clusters tend to focus on day-to-day operational challenges and developing new tools, rather than on strategic coordination and longer term planning”.

25. The evaluation team reviewed samples of minutes from steering and user group meetings and online. They indicate that most coordination meetings are focused primarily on short term tactical and operational issues. They possibly inadequately consider longer term strategic requirements, which could consider issues. These issues include: support to local market supply chains to enable more effective cash based programming, joint food pipeline²⁶⁵ management and the related contracting of transport services, cost sharing of common logistics services, fuel supply, vehicle maintenance, infrastructure improvements to enable a transition from expensive air cargo services to cheaper ground transport, and how to foster, rather than crowd out, the development of the private sector.

26. As a co-lead for the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCM), IOM is an important partner for WFP logistics and the Logistics Cluster. It was observed (at the Bentiu humanitarian hub, visited by the evaluation team) that there is valuable logistical complementarity between the two organisations: where local transport capacity, storage and handling within and around humanitarian hubs and

²⁶⁴ *Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Response to Crisis in South Sudan* (2015) https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/26042016_final_south_sudan_iahe_o.pdf

²⁶⁵ Note: The evaluation team observed that donors such as USAID support food pipelines that are independent from the WFP pipeline (such as for CRS). In this case, close inter-agency coordination is critical to maximize the use of logistical resources and avoid over supply to certain areas (an example of this was observed in Akobo in January).

protection of civilian sites is provided by IOM, WFP and the logistics cluster focus on supporting in-bound cargo arrivals via air and road, and commodity distributions.

27. A network of partners has enabled the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) to effectively provide a range of information and communications technology (ICT) services and solutions to support the humanitarian community in South Sudan. Operational partners have included the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the NGO Forum. Through the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, a common technical strategy was determined as part of the 'Delivering as One' United Nations²⁶⁶ approach, which has fostered a sustainable ICT common services model to follow the closure of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster. In total 120 partners have benefited from Emergency Telecommunications Cluster services since its inception.

28. Globally, the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster partnered with Ericsson Response²⁶⁷ and Emergency.lu, which is a public-private partnership between the Government of Luxembourg and three Luxembourg ICT companies. Both partnerships provided additional communications expertise, equipment and resources to contribute to a better and faster response in humanitarian emergencies, which has augmented the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster's ability to establish effective services.

EQ5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

29. Having operated within the country for many years, the country office is supported by a considerable corporate logistics and food supply chain management capability that has provided significant resources to quickly adapt and scale up crucial activities.

30. As stated above, national and international commercial road and river transport capacity is used by WFP, other United Nations agencies, International Organisations and NGOs. Additionally, while the evaluation team was not able to collect details it is understood that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operates several cargo and passenger aircraft and maintains a fleet of trucks;²⁶⁸ other agencies such as UNICEF, UNHCR and many NGOs necessarily maintain significant logistics and supply chain management capabilities. To some extent, such agencies also contract air transport operators to move passengers and cargo to meet programme needs that are outside of the scope of WFP or where capacity is not available through common services provided through UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster. In such instances, there is generally good coordination around the use of assets and services via the Logistics Cluster, Inter-Cluster Working Group and other coordination mechanisms. IOM maintains a fleet of short-haul trucks and provides storage capacity to support inter-agency operations in several humanitarian hubs.

31. WFP South Sudan's comparative advantage is that its multi-modal logistics capacity underpins the ability of key implementing partners to deliver their humanitarian programmes. The common logistics services (UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster) hosted by WFP are key to the success of the overall humanitarian operation,

²⁶⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/ga/deliveringasone/>

²⁶⁷ Ericsson Response was founded in 2000 as a volunteer initiative of the Swedish telecommunications company Ericsson.

²⁶⁸ Based on observations and anecdotal information gathered

particularly regarding the needs of smaller national and international organisations. In both roles, WFP logistics can provide a critically important, flexible and neutral, delivery service throughout the country that is backed up by robust processes to negotiate safe access to sensitive areas of need.²⁶⁹

EQ6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with the WFP mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies)?

32. UNHAS continues to demonstrate its impartiality and neutrality. Of significant importance is the constant engagement between WFP/UNHAS, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and local authorities. Effective coordination with key stakeholders, including OCHA and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as advocacy support by the donor community has also been key to gaining access to locations where humanitarian assistance is required.

33. Commercial²⁷⁰ and WFP truck convoys and river barge movements are not escorted, although this may be needed for the strategically important route from the Ugandan border crossing at Nimule to Juba should the security situation further deteriorate. Although UNMISS Force Protection is mandated to provide security escorts for food convoys, the availability of vehicles and personnel is sometimes limited, which can impact on WFP ability to operate, often resulting in delays or cancelled convoys. However, WFP typically choose not to use force protection, given their humanitarian status.

Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making

EQ9. What factors determined strategic choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) and how they were considered and managed when the 2014-2017 country strategy was developed by the country office?

34. South Sudan can be regarded as a major humanitarian logistics operation where humanitarian needs continue to grow. Senior logistics staff consulted confirmed that their team faces significant challenges to meet demand and that the need to expand capability has never been greater. In a highly complex environment where local capacity is limited, teams must be deployed to multiple locations at short notice; to augment core international capacity, WFP logistics has needed to rely significantly on personnel recruited on short-term contracts.²⁷¹ Where opportunities among national and short-term staff for training and career progression are relatively limited, there can be few incentives for staff to think and act innovatively and strategically. Due to high staff turnover, vitally important humanitarian logistics capacity, in terms of skilled and experienced staff, is being lost.

35. This is also one of the major constraints faced by the wider international humanitarian response,²⁷² where there has reportedly been the lack of senior and

²⁶⁹ Access negotiations conducted by the WFP CO access team and logistics augment those of OCHA and local negotiations undertaken by NGOs

²⁷⁰ Companies operate at their own risk and are accountable for any losses incurred.

²⁷¹ HR Evaluation Data 31 December 2016

²⁷² *Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Response to Crisis in South Sudan (2015)*
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/26042016_final_south_sudan_iahe_o.pdf

experienced humanitarians within its structures, particularly (but not limited to) outside of Juba.²⁷³

EQ10. How has WFP analysed, or used existing analysis of, security-related risks and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures?

36. South Sudan has one of the most logistically demanding operating environments in the world, where safe access to key humanitarian programme locations across the country is a major challenge. The evaluation team found that through the management of essential logistics-related common services – the Logistics Cluster, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) – WFP has played a critically important, and largely successful, role in identifying and mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks. During the evaluation period, the security situation in many parts of South Sudan has deteriorated and remains volatile, particularly in the states of Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and, more recently, the Equatorias. At least 67 aid workers have been killed since conflict erupted in December 2013. In the first nine months of 2016, more than 640 humanitarian access incidents were reported.²⁷⁴

37. One of WFP logistics' key comparative advantages in South Sudan is that it has national brand recognition that has been well leveraged with both the Government and opposition groups to negotiate safe access to many sites around the country in order to deliver assistance to beneficiaries. To minimize the security risks to personnel and assets, notifications are made at all levels and regular follow-up is required for safe passage assurance.²⁷⁵

38. As much of the country becomes inaccessible by road for half of the year, the prepositioning of food assistance during the dry season for distribution during the rains is critical to the continuity of assistance and cost efficiency. The prepositioning plan relies on an extensive transport and warehousing network. A robust risk analysis is carried out for all sites each year and a transport strategy established.²⁷⁶ In high-risk areas or where procurement delays mean that deliveries are not feasible during the prepositioning window, food and non-food transport is provided through a 'just in time' approach. This normally requires the use of aircraft to either air drop or air lift commodities to distribution sites.

39. Landmines have been placed in many areas of the country and there are significant hazards from unexploded devices (UXOs). The worst affected states are Jonglei and Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria. A small number of roads in Western and Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Unity, Jonglei and Lakes states are still mined (UNMAS 2013).²⁷⁷ WFP logistics and the Logistics Cluster collaborate with UNMAS as appropriate when conducting road access assessments.

40. As well as providing a reliable scheduled passenger transport service to multiple locations in South Sudan, UNHAS plays a critical role in reducing risks to humanitarian staff working in remote locations by providing a prioritised medical and security evacuation service.

²⁷³ Due to a global shortage in human resource capacity for L3 emergencies it is understood by the evaluation team that WFP HR hopes to address such challenges for the South Sudan CO.

²⁷⁴ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-10/21/c_135772650.htm

²⁷⁵ Based on information gathered during interviews.

²⁷⁶ In 2016, the prepositioning exercise was able to achieve 85% of the planned requirements, or 102,550mt out of total 120,900mt.

²⁷⁷ <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/southsudan>

41. Stakeholders interviewed commended UNHAS for their evacuation service that no doubt has protected or saved numerous lives. A total of 5,184 evacuations were performed during the evaluation period. (See [Table 19](#)).

Table 19: UNHAS medical and security evacuations

Year	Medical evacuations	Security evacuations	Total	% Against requested
2011	53	16	69	
2012	67	43	110	
2013	298	1,326	1,624	
2014	255	1,736	1,991	
2015	285	403	688	100%
2016	174	528	702	100%
Total	1,132	4,052	5,184	

Source: WFP Aviation

42. UNHAS is currently the only approved air carrier for United Nations staff and bases its policies and procedures, staff qualification criteria, and aircraft chartering agreements on the United Nations Common Aviation Safety Standards (UNAVSTADS); jointly agreed between WFP and the Department of Field Support (DFS) under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). In addition, UNHAS operates under a number of other legal, contractual, and safety obligations.

43. Since the establishment of the WFP South Sudan Country Office in 2011, there has been close coordination between UNHAS and the Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) to ensure the timely sharing of security situation information at all destinations, resulting in well-informed adjustments to operations. Through the WFP Aviation Safety Office,²⁷⁸ operational hazard identification has constantly been implemented, relevant risk analyses carried out and mitigation actions adopted.

44. Since 2014 when a United Nations Mi8 helicopter was shot down near Bentiu, a more robust process of flight safety assurances (FSA)²⁷⁹ was put in place. The inherent risks and levels of insecurity, have prompted WFP to base a flight security officer in Juba to identify and manage the particular risks involved, including on-going monitoring of operators.

45. UNHAS maintains dedicated standby helicopter capacity, and can quickly re-task other aircraft, in order to be able respond to emergency security or medical evacuation requests. Notably, following fighting that began in Juba on 15 December 2013, UNHAS conducted security relocations for 1,326 humanitarian personnel from 22 conflict and remote locations; in July 2016, 31 security relocations were facilitated from the deep field to Juba and onward evacuation of personnel to Kenya. Following

²⁷⁸ Key personnel are based at HQ, United Arab Emirates and in Kenya

²⁷⁹ An FSA is a clearance document that indicates that the Government has assured the safety of a flight. FSAs must be obtained before any flight can be dispatched. UNHAS must acquire approved FSAs from the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM).

the July crisis there were delays in obtaining Flight Safety Assurances (FSA) from the national authorities. However, enhanced communication and coordination between WFP/UNHAS, the Government and groups in opposition (IO) has helped to significantly reduce flight cancellations caused by the lack of FSA approvals.²⁸⁰ WFP has found that direct engagement with authorities on UNHAS-related matters has enhanced the speed, effectiveness, efficiency and safety of operations.

46. Furthermore, close collaboration between key United Nations and NGO security teams has been critical, particularly in order to serve locations where unexpected fighting has restricted humanitarian access. Due to the scale of need and limited presence of UNDSS in some field locations, WFP and UNDSS agreed that security information from the WFP Security Office, other United Nations offices and the NGO Forum Security Network would be sufficient to deploy flights to such locations. This approach has supported UNHAS security risk assessments and contributed to improving humanitarian access. UNHAS confirmed that it regularly conducts airstrip assessments²⁸¹ to ensure that locations served meet safety and security standards.

Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio

EQ11. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

WFP Logistics

47. At the time of independence in 2011, South Sudan was seen as having the potential to become a grain exporter and regional leader in food production. According to project reports, in order to support the *South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013* 2011–2013 that was aimed at reducing food insecurity and rapid rural transformation, WFP initiated a logistics augmentation project (July 2011, Special Operation 200267), which was to help create a national strategic food reserve (NSFR) and reduce road transport costs. The project²⁸² was to play an important role in stimulating growth in the agricultural sector and enable timely responses to emergencies.

48. This logistics special operation planned to construct five warehouses and fund initially the institutional and human capacity to run the programme. A feasibility study recommended linking the warehouses with strategically placed satellite storage depots; the project was originally aligned with the feeder roads special operation (200379) also managed under the logistics department. Due to the upsurge in conflict at the end of 2013, the grain reserve project²⁸³ was put on hold; based on the uncertain situation in South Sudan and interviews with the country office team, plans for any follow-up operation are still to be determined. Underpinning the delivery of all country office programmes, the chief of logistics has responsibility for the WFP South Sudan logistics functions, which include the country office logistics team, UNHAS, the Logistics Cluster and the feeder roads project.

49. The landslide, transport, storage and handling (LTHS) component of the EMOP and PRRO operations accounts for USD 563 million or 55 percent of the total

²⁸⁰ The handover of FSA facilitation responsibilities from OCHA to WFP in 2015 streamlined procedures with the Government and enabled UNHAS to reduce incidences of flight cancellations.

²⁸¹ A dedicated UNDSS-funded aircraft (managed by UNHAS) enables timely assessments.

²⁸² Project aligned with WFP Strategic Objective 3: reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs.

²⁸³ The financial report closed in June 2014 and shows that only USD 2.9m of the original USD 93.3m approved budget was expended.

operational costs (USD 1,014,714) over the period 2013 to 2015.²⁸⁴ This percentage is consistent with academic²⁸⁵ research findings of similar large-scale humanitarian response operations. Between 2011 and 2016, the logistics team successfully implemented the delivery of over 1 million metric tons (see Table 20, below) of food commodities to over 2 million beneficiaries. Due to overall instability in the country and limited food production, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report (June 2016) indicated that 4.8 million people would be in need of humanitarian assistance, putting further significant pressure on the WFP logistics capacity²⁸⁶.

50. Most noteworthy is the service offered by the Rome-based Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF), which is a strategic financing platform for prepositioning food in a region or corridor based on anticipated country office demand, with the intent being to reduce delivery lead times²⁸⁷ (especially during emergencies). The model²⁸⁸ was established in 2011 and has served as a vital resource for WFP South Sudan. Approximately 70 percent of GCMF commodities are procured for country operations in East Africa, of which WFP South Sudan has received the greatest proportion (Table 20); approximately 90 percent of food resources are produced through this mechanism.

51. Once the country office has confirmed funding they have been able to source food from GCMF stocks. Currently, about 40 percent of the overall amount of food distributed by WFP, and more than 50 percent of all donor-funded purchases are made through GCMF.

²⁸⁴ This rises to 58% if external transport costs are included

²⁸⁵ Van Wassenhove (INSEAD 2006)

²⁸⁶ http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Alert_5_SouthSudan_Crisis_June2016.pdf

²⁸⁷ In 2016, country offices purchasing from GCMF received food after an average 46 days as opposed to the 120 days average under the conventional procurement process - representing a 62 percent reduction in lead-time.

²⁸⁸ The GCMF has grown to USD 350 million, enabling the forward positioning of more than 1 million metric tons of food in 2016

Table 20: Financial and in-kind food commodity donations

Year / Project	GCMF	Local purchase	In-kind	Grand total
2011	28,436	375	31,710	60,521
200338	28,436	375	31,710	60,521
2012	81,664	7,612	79,353	168,628
200338	81,664	7,612	30,013	119,288
200468			49,340	49,340
2013	67,485	1,418	87,373	156,276
200338	63,456	1,377	28,683	93,515
200572	4,030	41	58,690	62,761
2014	77,510	4,878	176,680	259,068
200572	14,996	1,884	55,270	72,150
200656	132			132
200659	62,382	2,994	121,410	186,787
2015	93,446	1,790	140,430	235,666
200572	23,724	883	72,630	97,237
200659	46,742	885	27,280	74,907
200859	22,980	21	40,520	63,522
2016	130,625	2,339	84,770	217,734
200572	33,702	913	35,010	69,624
200859	96,873	1,427	49,760	148,060
201013	50			50
Grand total (MT)	479,166	18,412	600,316	1,097,894

Source: GCMF

52. One of the greatest challenges in ensuring that there is a robust food pipeline available in time for dry season deliveries /prepositioning is related to donor (principally United States Government /Food for Peace) resourcing plans /constraints (both in-kind and for purchase).

53. Therefore, continued lobbying by WFP Washington DC office is critical - it is clear that all possible angles are constantly explored. On the one hand, United States Government plans and procurement regulations often delay the timely delivery of food stocks, which in turn can necessitate the highly expensive need for airdrops - that are also funded largely by USAID.

54. Table 21 indicates the 2016 lead-time information (GCMF vs. direct cash purchases) for South Sudan. Average lead-time gain was 54 percent, with highest results for beans, High Energy Biscuits (HEB) and Plumpy'Sup.

Table 21: GCMF Lead-time gain in South Sudan

Commodity	Direct purchase	GCMF purchase	Lead-time gain (Days)	Percentage gain
Beans	91	7	84	93%
CSB+	107	36	71	66%
CSB++	107	60	47	44%
HEB	52	0	52	100%
Maize	92	45	46	51%
Plumpy'Sup	100	13	87	87%
Sorghum/Millet	90	40	50	55%
Split Peas	123	65	58	48%
Vegetable Oil	111	26	85	77%
Average Days	98	45	53	54%

Source: GCMF

55. Overall supply chain planning is the role of country office together with the recently established supply chain planning unit and GCMF, which are both based at WFP Headquarters. The shipping unit contracts and executes plans and issues call forward instructions from the loading origin to the discharge port. This is both for in-kind donations (mainly from the United States Government) and GCMF purchases.

56. It is critical to ensure that deliveries take place at the beginning of the dry season in South Sudan, therefore effective forward planning is essential as prepositioning options for various food commodities have very different lead times. Based on interviews, it is understood by the evaluation team that there is often insufficient logistics and transport awareness, or internal administrative processes can become cumbersome, resulting in late call forwards. (Once the call forward is made and shipping instructions issued, little can be done to change these). Those involved in call forward processes should be trained and familiar with the supply chain process.

57. One challenge observed within the country office is that responsibilities for the commodity supply chain (pipeline for food and non-food) are split between several management functions²⁸⁹ with operations (budget and programming) holding the formal role for pipeline management. Due to staff constraints (see above under EQ9) at times during 2016 only two people²⁹⁰ staffed this critically important function.

58. Looting in July 2016 of the WFP Juba main warehouse exacerbated pipeline breaks. A total of 4,600 metric tons of commodities as well as vehicles, fuel and generators, was lost. This affected WFP ability to scale up to meet increasing demands. After the conflict a new storage facility was set up at the Juba airport to support air

²⁸⁹ Food procurement is managed primarily through the regional office.

²⁹⁰ Organogram for CO budget and programming.

operations and for the transit of onward deliveries via road. While this facility is more secure, it has insufficient capacity to meet storage demands.

59. As indicated above, a significant proportion of food commodities have been procured through GCMF and stocks positioned at Mombasa, Djibouti and in Tororo, Uganda. Regional GCMF inventory considers the food requirements for all counties under the Regional Bureau in Nairobi management. In close coordination with the WFP Regional Office in Nairobi (RBN) commodities for South Sudan operations are transported into the country via three main corridors:²⁹¹

- a. Southern Corridor (Kenya/ Uganda – South Sudan) has been the primary route for imports but since an upsurge in violence in Western, Eastern and Central Equatoria, road deliveries are designated mainly to Juba for transshipment to onward locations by air or road. Due to insecurity, it is not feasible to use other border entry points from Kaya into Western Equatoria and Madiopi to Eastern Equatoria. The river Nile has been used to transport supplies northbound²⁹² from Bor to Malakal and southbound²⁹³ from Renk to Malakal, although the southbound route often faces security constraints. There is potential to increase the use of river transport, particularly in the rainy season, however due to the poor serviceability of barge pushers as well as damaged ports and handling equipment, deliveries can take several weeks, or even months.²⁹⁴ During the evaluation team’s field visit, it was learned that the Japanese Government would fund a feasibility study to determine options and costs to upgrade river transport infrastructure (pusher engines, barges and ports). This study will likely be performed by UNOPS in 2017. At the beginning of 2016, WFP South Sudan Logistics with the support of WFP Uganda Logistics established a 30,000 metric tonne capacity warehouse in Tororo to consolidate commodities for onward overland transport. This facility was intended to supplement storage capacity in Juba, which was subsequently looted and destroyed in July 2016.
- b. Eastern Corridor (Ethiopia – South Sudan) Upper Nile State is primarily accessed by air, but some deliveries are also made via river and road. For example, in 2016 about 600 metric tons of food per month was required for two accessible locations (Pagak and Maiwut) and truck convoys successfully delivered cargo from Ethiopia (Nazareth); deliveries have also been successful from Gambella via the Sobat and Akobo rivers when the security situation allows.
- c. Northern Corridor (Sudan – South Sudan) Upper Nile State can be accessed by road (that is open throughout the year) and potentially via the river Nile, but insecurity is a major threat and deliveries are often hampered. An agreement with Sudan to use the corridor was extended in late 2016 but this is contingent upon WFP rehabilitating the Kosti border road (at a cost of approximately USD 1.7 million). The northern corridor has recently increased in importance; as of 2016 WFP has been able to procure 10,000 metric tons²⁹⁵ of surplus food stocks²⁹⁶ from the Sudan grain reserve. These purchases have had to be shipped

²⁹¹ Cereals requirements have been apportioned 60% for entry via the southern corridor (from Mombasa) and 40% for the northern and eastern corridors (from Djibouti and Port Sudan). Nutrition products are channelled mainly through Mombasa.

²⁹² Three barge sets are contracted with a total capacity of 4,800MT

²⁹³ Two barge sets with a total capacity of 1,600MT are on contract

²⁹⁴ River Transport Market Assessment 2015

²⁹⁵ Information obtained from country office and GCMF data

²⁹⁶ FAO Global Information and Early Warning System - <http://www.fao.org/gIEWS/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=SDN>

from Port Sudan to Mombasa (for delivery via the southern corridor) rather than transported directly into South Sudan.

62. WFP logistics considers that the three existing transport corridors into South Sudan are insufficient to meet all long-term needs in a timely and cost effective manner. In line with the current agreement between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan,²⁹⁷ two additional road corridors may be opened:²⁹⁸ El Obeid to Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal State with direct access to Aweil, and El Obeid/Kadugli to North Unity state with direct access to Bentiu.

63. Based on the prevailing security situation in the south of the country, additional corridors from Uganda could be opened but would require the establishment of further storage capacity and logistics support. In December 2016, the Regional Bureau of Nairobi logistics determined that a facility could be used in Jinja, with space 40,000 metric tons. Two other facilities in Kampala were also considered.

64. Due to insecurity since late 2013, air transportation has been the key mode of food and non-food delivery. The country office works closely with the office of national security and chief of staff to obtain the necessary flight clearances to enable aircraft to operate safely from Ethiopia and Uganda where stocks are positioned strategically²⁹⁹ to maintain steady delivery capacity into South Sudan. At the end of the evaluation period in December 2016, WFP Logistics operated eight Ilyushin aircraft (IL 76 for airdrop operations) and seven MI8 helicopters (for airlift operations), enabling the delivery of 11,792 metric tons per month (Table 22).

Table 22: Logistics airdrop and airlift capacity

Country	Location	Type of aircraft	No.	Average daily uplift capacity/ aircraft	Rotation per day	MT	Total capacity MT / month (22 days)
Ethiopia	Gambella	IL76	1	30 MT/rotation	2	60	1320
	Jimma	IL76	2	30 MT/rotation	2	120	2640
Uganda	Entebbe	IL76	2	30 MT/rotation	2	120	2640
South Sudan	Juba	IL76	2	30 MT/rotation	2	120	2460
	Wau	IL76	1	30 MT/rotation	2	60	1320
	Wau	MI26	1	12 MT/rotation	2	24	528
	Bor	MI8	2	2 MT/rotation	2	8	176
	Juba	MI8	2	2 MT/rotation	2	8	176
	Rumbek	MI8	2	2 MT/rotation	4	16	352
Total						536	11,792

Source: WFP logistics

65. With air cargo operations as a last resort for deliveries, to enable more effective access to beneficiaries via road, WFP works closely with UNMISS and local authorities to ensure the safety of critical corridors from Juba.

²⁹⁷ A Joint Technical Committee has been established by the two countries

²⁹⁸ Information based on discussions with WFP South Sudan Logistics and Regional Bureau Nairobi staff. As a result of the United Nations famine declaration (February 2017), the President of the Republic of Sudan has reportedly advised his ministries to assist in humanitarian deliveries of food to South Sudan. One new corridor from Kordofan to Unity state may be opened on a trial basis.

²⁹⁹ The support of WFP Ethiopia and Uganda is critical to the success of South Sudan air operations

66. WFP Sudan split its logistics operation into two separate units at the time of the separation of the countries in mid-2011. Its truck fleet of 170 trucks was also split, with about 100 vehicles remaining in Sudan. For secondary and tertiary commodity deliveries to and around the primary humanitarian hubs in South Sudan, a dedicated fleet of 100 specialised all-wheel drive trucks is owned and operated by WFP logistics. Of these, the Russian Government recently donated 55 Kamaz trucks. A proportion of the fleet better suited to long-haul transport is used in Ethiopia to assure the reliable delivery of cargo for airdrop operations from Gambella and Jimma in the southwest of the country.

67. In order to maximise the serviceability of trucks, light vehicles, equipment and generators, WFP logistics operates a maintenance workshop³⁰⁰ (with small spare parts store) in Juba. The original facility was looted and destroyed during the conflict in July 2016 and so a temporary workshop is being used. Due to the lack of reliable private sector capacity in South Sudan, the intent is to construct a new facility as soon as possible.

Common Services

UNHAS

68. Long distances, poor roads, insecurity and competition for limited transport resources makes air travel crucial for humanitarian agencies to access vulnerable populations. The further lack of safe, United Nations certified commercial passenger air services operating in the country makes the continued presence of UNHAS, under WFP special operation³⁰¹ 200786, essential for the implementation and monitoring of humanitarian activities. In line with WFP Strategic Objective 1 (Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies), the main objectives of the special operation have been achieved, namely to:

- Provide non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies, donor organizations and diplomatic missions, and government humanitarian staff with reliable, safe, efficient and effective access to remote and isolated programme implementation locations
- Transport light relief cargo such as medical supplies, specialized food commodities and high-value equipment (such as information and communications technologies)
- Provide adequate medical and security evacuation capacity for the humanitarian community in South Sudan.

69. UNHAS South Sudan was established in 2011 and has since been providing passenger and light cargo services³⁰² for the aid community. This has been at an estimated overall cost of USD 195 million (see Table 23 below, showing donor contributions). It serves destinations on a fixed schedule, which is reviewed periodically to adapt to changing demands while maintaining good efficiency through

³⁰⁰ Services are extended to external clients, including UNDP and WHO that operate over 70 and 50 light vehicles respectively. National staff both for the workshop and truck fleet (drivers) are employed via a private sector company, PAE, which is contracted by WFP HQ. The ethnicity of transporters impacts logistics service provision, as certain ethnic groups cannot enter from government into opposition areas and vice versa. Logistics has hired international third party contractors to lead river and road convoys and to deploy airdrop coordinators in hard to reach locations.

³⁰¹ Previous UNHAS special operations were SO 200523 (2011/12), SO 200634 (2013/14) and SO 200341 (2015/16)

³⁰² In 2016 UNHAS supported 240 humanitarian organizations, provided scheduled flights to 79 locations, transported 109,000 passengers and 1,300MT of light cargo.

optimal use of its air assets. The main UNHAS team is based in Juba with small teams at two operational hubs in Rumbek and Bor. Staff are also located in Aweil, Maban, Malakal, Rubkona, Wau, Yambio and Yida. Other destinations are supported by aviation focal points from user organizations. UNHAS aligns its services to the needs of user agencies and organises periodic meetings with a steering committee (three United Nations members, three donors and three NGOs) and user group to obtain service guidance and feedback. Staff also participate in the Inter Cluster Working Group (ICWG) and Operational Working Group (OWG) meetings³⁰³ led by OCHA where users can share information on the areas of highest need; emergency protocols are in place to handle medical evacuations and security relocations – the intent is to enhance flexibility and responsiveness to requests.

70. UNHAS conducted a review to compare the effectiveness of different aircraft and concluded that helicopters are more effective for the wet season, when most airstrips become inaccessible to fixed wing aircraft. WFP aviation therefore contracted additional helicopter capacity from 2015.

71. Interviews with a wide range of stakeholders have confirmed that the UNHAS special operations (2011 to 2016) have played a critical role in supporting the humanitarian community in South Sudan, including the WFP emergency and protracted relief and recovery operations, to reach millions of food-insecure people across the country. Donors, such as ECHO, have provided flexibility in their funding: for example - due to a perceived lack of flexibility, for UNHAS to adapt to new needs a supplemental grant was provided to enable an additional helicopter to be operated to support security assessments. UNHAS activities will continue in 2017 through a new special operation, SO 201029.

72. Table 23 indicates the donors that have contributed to UNHAS operations between 2011 and 2016. Cost recovery generated has been via per-seat fees charged.

³⁰³ Interviews revealed that during earlier years of operation, ICWG and OWG meetings were not well represented by UNHAS, resulting in potential service gaps and occasional complaints regarding responsiveness to emergency and ad-hoc flight requests (e.g. deployment of rapid response teams, immediate rapid response needs-assessments). There were also some perceptions that UNHAS has occasionally been biased towards WFP operations. However, the situation has reportedly now improved considerably.

Table 23: UNHAS Donor contributions

Description	Total USD
CAN CIDA	1,432,389
CAN DFATD	3,517,238
EEC ECHO	19,852,175
GER MOFA VN 05	4,835,242
JPN MOFA	4,350,000
KOR MOFA	100,000
NOR MOFA	221,130
SPA AECID	313,676
SWI SDC	2,496,946
UK DFID	16,729,029
UN CERF	8,735,119
UN CHF SUD	14,890,760
USA STATE/PRM	2,820,000
USA USAID/OFDA	24,296,045
Contributions per year	USD 104,589,749
Generated cost recovery	USD 103,473,897
Actual expenditures	USD 194,611,338

Source: UNHAS / WFP Aviation

Logistics Cluster

73. Key donors such as OFDA, DfID and ECHO, and a wide range of users³⁰⁴ regard the Logistics Cluster as having effectively played an essential role in enabling over 80 users within the humanitarian community to deliver their emergency response programmes, especially in conflict-affected states, and have supported long-term humanitarian logistics coordination needs in South Sudan.³⁰⁵ The services provided

³⁰⁴ Based on interviews conducted with IOM, United Nations agencies and NGOs in Juba (January 2017)

³⁰⁵ First activated in Southern Sudan in late 2010, the Logistics Cluster employs a team of 20 staff (all consultants, 60% national staff). The cluster coordinator is responsible for managing an annual budget of approximately USD 27 million

are seen (by the Global Logistics Cluster based in Rome) as unique because they fall outside of the short-term logistics coordination interventions more typically provided during a crisis response and also because the South Sudan Logistics Cluster provides operational services, which include support for the tasking (by UNHAS) of dedicated air assets.

74. The Logistics Cluster special operations have been in line with WFP Strategic Objective 1 (to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies). Activities in South Sudan have generally been well resourced and were originally funded under special operation 103422, which covered northern and southern Sudan. Following South Sudan's independence in July 2011, the restructuring of the WFP operations, and the establishment of a country office in Juba, special operation 200361 was subsequently launched in January 2012. Special operation 200778 succeeded SO 200361 in 2015. As at the end of the evaluation period, the cluster was well funded (at 106 percent of budget), DFID having made a multi-year contribution of USD 10 million covering the period 2017 to 2019. Historical trends show strong donor support with funding targets having been achieved for the last three years.³⁰⁶

75. The key priorities for the cluster have been the provision of logistics coordination, information management (IM) services and common logistics services (prioritised storage, air, road and barge transport). The services provided are intended to augment the logistics capacities of individual organisations and strengthen capabilities of the humanitarian community based on need. In coordination with other clusters (via ICWG meetings) the following services are made available on a free-to-user basis (except for road transport costs):

- Common [overland] transport service (CTS): augmentation of transport capacity through a common transport network of road and river services, in partnership with IOM, which provides local transport capacity at humanitarian hubs
- Road convoy coordination operations: as a key component of dry season planning, support provided where roads are physically passable and by working with the WFP Access Unit, risks can be mitigated through a series of coordination measures
- Common [air] transport: facilitation of air cargo capacity through the use of dedicated aircraft (contracted by WFP aviation and managed by UNHAS). In collaboration with UNOPS, the Logistics Cluster offers a strategic road and airstrip rehabilitation service in order to reduce logistical bottlenecks and improve key supply corridors
- Common warehousing: with support from WFP, and under the management of various cluster members, mobile storage warehouses have been established in several strategic locations across the country. Pre-positioning operations are a primary focus during the dry season
- Civil/military coordination: the provision of assistance and advice on convoy movement and the coordination of convoys' movements with UNMISS. As a last resort armed escorts are requested in specific areas

³⁰⁶ SPRs 200361 and 200778

- Information management: based in Juba, dedicated information management capacity includes Geographic Information Systems mapping services that help to coordinate logistics operations and support improved operational efficiency through gap and bottleneck analysis. All cargo movement requests are tasked and tracked
- The cluster convenes regular logistics meetings in Juba, Wau and Malakal and in other key locations. Information is shared online at <http://logcluster.org/ops/ssd11a> and through dedicated mailing lists (for more details, see Table 7 under section EQ12)

76. While air cargo services were initially provided in cooperation with WFP Logistics and UNHAS, in 2015, donors began funding dedicated logistics cluster aircraft (as at December 2016, 2 Mi8 helicopters and 1 Buffalo DHC5 cargo aircraft) so that these could be offered on a priority basis for users, UNHAS earlier having had limited capacity to reliably meet earlier demand. This capacity is positioned at strategic locations and used to access sites that are otherwise inaccessible by any other means. Sector cluster coordinators help to consolidate and endorse priority needs for their cluster and provide advance pipeline requirements to the Logistics Cluster for the matching of assets to needs.

77. Through interviews with NGO users and in discussion with Logistics Cluster staff, the evaluation team learned that since the provision of air cargo services started, using dedicated air assets, the cluster has become more responsive to movement requests, flexible and reliable. Dedicated air assets will likely continue to be needed for the foreseeable future, although the type and capacity of aircraft will need to be reviewed based on demand and access to all weather airstrips for fixed wing aircraft. According to a user survey conducted in December 2015, the user satisfaction rate was 88 percent.

Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC)

78. The main objective of this common service is to provide security radio telecommunications and information and communications technology services to the humanitarian community by building and maintaining reliable internet-connectivity networks and IT services. These communications services allow United Nations Agencies and NGOs in South Sudan to better coordinate assessment, rescue and relief operations independent of public infrastructure. Joint services allow for reduced service costs³⁰⁷ to individual organizations.

79. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster was activated in South Sudan in 2011, under special operation 200399, and was further scaled up in 2014 following conflict that broke out in late 2013. Security telecommunications were established in 23 locations throughout the country and 24-hour communications centres operated in 15 locations. This service³⁰⁸ included radio programming of over 2,000 handheld and very-high frequency (VHF) radios in vehicles. Radio user training was provided to over 1,200 users in South Sudan.

80. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster has liaised with the Ministry of Telecommunications for the importation of equipment and maintained an ITC

³⁰⁷ Organization-specific radio rooms are not needed, multiple VSAT stations may not be required, and fewer technical staff are needed.

³⁰⁸ SPRs 200399, 200791 and 200931

information management platform to ensure the sharing of up-to-date information. In 2016, the cluster implemented a digital mobile radio (DMR) system that provides enhanced security features such as global positioning system (GPS) tracking, text messaging, closed group calls, and direct dialling.

81. A primary funding source for the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster has been the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), with limited funding contributions from other donors³⁰⁹ during 2014 to 2015. The Government of Luxembourg and Ericsson Response have provided key donations of equipment. Since operations began, more than 200 humanitarian organizations have registered to access internet connectivity in deep-field locations.

82. An exit strategy was developed to introduce more financially sustainable services for prolonged operation in the country. Principally, cost-sharing mechanisms for security telecommunications maintenance and for internet connectivity. In 2016, the Humanitarian Internet Service Project (HISP) was implemented in five capital states: Aweil (Northern Bahr el Ghazal state), Malakal (Upper Nile state) and Bor (Jonglei state), Bentiu and Mingkaman serving 65 humanitarian organizations and 720 users.

83. Emergency Telecommunications Cluster services were deactivated³¹⁰ on 31 December 2016 and operations finally cease on 31 March 2017, with the majority of assets being redeployed. WFP (IT) will maintain the technical management of common internet services in field locations via HISP and the security radio network. The latter function reporting to the Humanitarian Country Team operations management team (in support of the 'One UN' approach) in cooperation with the Inter Agency Security Telecommunications Working Group,

84. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster operations were able to meet and exceed targets for service quality. An online survey of members conducted in September 2016 showed a significant improvement in user satisfaction against the last available baseline data (December 2014):³¹¹ 83 percent being satisfied with the HISP service, 92 percent satisfied with the provision of radio communication services, and 84 percent with radio programming services.

EQ12. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes?

85. The evaluation team found that logistics efficiencies have continuously been explored. For example, due to government regulations, all trucks carrying cargo into the country (via the southern corridor) must be cleared through Juba, which is a cumbersome and time-consuming process. In an effort to reduce the pressure on WFP Juba as the sole logistics hub, and improve the speed of last-mile delivery to distribution sites, additional fleet hubs were established in key locations³¹² such as Rumbek, Bentiu and Bor, to spread WFP-owned trucking capacity across the country allowing relief supplies to be positioned closer to people in need. This further improved operational flexibility for WFP to take advantage of access³¹³ opportunities.

³⁰⁹ Based on interviews with CHF staff, greater emphasis on fund raising by ETC /WFP would have enabled more rapid scale up of activities and placed less pressure on CHF

³¹⁰ ETC Project Closure Report, December 2016

³¹¹ SPR 200931 (2016)

³¹² Logistics concept of operations and interviews with logistics staff

³¹³ Periods between security incidents and when WFP obtains the agreement /safe passage clearance from both parties of the conflict to use the access route (clearance is given for a particular period, such as one week).

86. Approximately 60 percent of trucking needs are contracted out to private sector operators³¹⁴ with transport gaps being filled using the WFP logistics truck fleet. During a field visit to Bentiu and the Rubkona protection of civilians (POC) site, the evaluation team were able to interview convoy truck drivers that had delivered supplementary food from Juba. Their journey had taken ten days (double the normal time) because they had been stopped at 85 checkpoints.³¹⁵ At every stop, each truck driver may have to pay as much as USD 25 and up to 15 litres of fuel. Although these unofficial payments are not made by WFP and are the ‘cost of doing business’ that is factored into the private operators’ rates, it is of obvious concern to the aid community. There is also a huge negative impact on operational efficiency.

87. According to a World Bank road density study, average truck delivery times in South Sudan are 24 times higher than the current global benchmark; the average time a vehicle takes to travel over unpaved roads is 6.4 km/hour. This results in WFP having to pay very high transport rates. For example, for the route Juba to Bentiu the cost is approximately USD 350 per metric tonne (for 40 metric tonne truck payload).³¹⁶ This is more than double the rates charged³¹⁷ in neighbouring countries over a similar distance.

88. The country office³¹⁸ operates a fleet of approximately 200 light vehicles. While some of these are due for disposal, the majority are now leased under the WFP Global Vehicle Leasing Programme³¹⁹ (GVLP). The corporate fleet management system (FMS) has been in use since 2015, whereby operational vehicle data is captured and analysed to bring visibility and better control to associated costs (leasing, fuel, maintenance, spare parts, insurance and overhead costs).

89. According to the 2016 standard project report for EMOP 200859, WFP logistics adopts a ‘fall-forward’ approach to establish remote hubs and pre-position food, trucks and equipment (risk analysis permitting) in rural areas of South Sudan. This allows for much shorter transit times from hubs to final distribution points. In June 2016, the WFP South Sudan logistics team’s hard work was recognized globally when they were awarded the prestigious 2016 International Best Transport Achievement Award³²⁰ for its fleet management project. This was given at the Annual Fleet Forum Conference in Dublin, Ireland.

90. According to WFP logistics reports³²¹ at the end of 2016 there was sufficient capacity to deliver up to 28,000 metric tons of food commodities per month via road, air and river but there have been shortfalls in the timely availability of cereals and some nutritional products due to higher demand than anticipated. Principally related to the rapid increase in the number of beneficiaries in the Rubkona protection of civilians’ camp (POC) and surrounding area from 120,000 at the end of 2015 to 175,000 in December 2016. This meant that stocks prepositioned to meet predicted

³¹⁴ The majority of truck operators are based outside of South Sudan. As at the time of the evaluation team’s field visit (January 2017) there was sufficient long-haul truck capacity to meet primary demand, although private operators will not serve all destinations due to insecurity and reasons of driver ethnicity.

³¹⁵ The general deterioration of the economic situation in the country and lack of salary payment to security forces by warring parties has increased checkpoint taxation and harassment.

³¹⁶ South Sudan Transport Market Assessment 2015 and logistics capacity assessment <http://dlca.logcluster.org/display/public/DLCA/South+Sudan%2C+Republic+of;jsessionid=450D2CE5ADA0B3BE6963CC9068EDB7C6>

³¹⁷ Rates similar in DR Congo

³¹⁸ The common services hosted by WFP also use leased vehicles

³¹⁹ WFP South Sudan was the first CO to acquire light vehicles from the global vehicle leasing programme.

³²⁰ Launched in 2012, the Best Transport Achievement Award is organized by Fleet Forum with sponsorship from UPS. It recognizes the fleet manager and the organization that is an inspiring example for others.

³²¹ Concept of Operations August 2016

needs were quickly depleted, necessitating the expensive daily airdropping of 150 metric tons of sorghum (costing approximately USD 1.0 million per week³²² to deliver) at a time of year when deliveries could have been achieved at a third of the cost by road if sufficient food stocks had been built up in warehouses along the southern corridor. (Greater savings are achieved on other routes when compared to the use of air transport).

91. Despite these challenges, WFP logistics has continued to seek innovations to help reduce costs and increase efficiencies. For example, through the use of new bagging techniques, supplementary foods such as corn-soya blend (CSB) can now be airdropped. Furthermore, vegetable oil can now also be airdropped by parachute using a box delivery system which has saved an estimated USD 14 million per year, as airlift by helicopter is often no longer necessary.³²³

92. To identify on-going air transport needs, a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses is conducted on a regular basis. A web-based booking tool and financial software (E-FMA) is used by UNHAS to provide real time information on passengers and cargo for all destinations. A performance management tool is used by WFP Aviation Services, which conducts analysis of UNHAS operations by quantifying effectiveness, level of access provided and cost-efficiency, providing visibility over demand and enabling adjustments to routes and fleet composition as necessary. An Electronic-Collaborative Aeronautical Information System (E-CAIS) tool is also used to enable pilots to provide updates of airstrip conditions. This helps to determine the most efficient and effective aircraft to deploy. As at the end of 2016, UNHAS managed 28 aircraft.³²⁴

93. The feeder roads special operation³²⁵ also referenced above was launched in support of a WFP emergency operation (EMOP 200151) and the South Sudan purchase for progress programme (P4P). The primary objective³²⁶ was to reduce food transport costs by contributing to infrastructure improvements. The secondary objective was to improve access to and from agricultural production areas.

94. From a WFP logistics' perspective, the feeder roads programme has had limited value in reducing food transport costs. This is largely because of the shift in programme emphasis from development-based approaches to emergency relief. The areas that have been targeted for food assistance have either not been where the feeder roads have been constructed or the feeder roads do not always link to trunk roads. Furthermore, due to late arrival of donor funds early in the project, changing priorities and widespread insecurity, since December 2013, there have been frequent implementation delays.

95. WFP has much experience drawn from the eight-year project life of an earlier special operation 10368, the trunk road rehabilitation and maintenance programme, from which the feeder roads project emerged. In part, the success of the trunk road project was due to the strong political support that WFP received from the Sudan People's Liberation Army leader. Improved road access was clearly seen, for example by donors such as the Government of Japan,³²⁷ as supporting access to schools,

³²² Based on figures provided by WFP Aviation

³²³ <https://www.wfp.org/stories/heads-vegetable-oil-falls-sky-south-sudan>

³²⁴ Including dedicated air assets allocated for WFP Logistics and Logistics Cluster Operations

³²⁵ More details of the project can be found in [Annex J](#) in relation to food security

³²⁶ SPR 200379 2012 (Page 5)

³²⁷ Summary of the Terminal Evaluation 2013,

https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/term/afrika/c8hovm000001rp75-att/south_sudan_2013_02.pdf (Page vii).

markets and water. Unfortunately, due to a lack of investment by the Government, the benefits of the roads constructed were short-lived because they have not been maintained.³²⁸

96. In January 2016, WFP aviation was able to contract a specialised fixed-wing aircraft (Buffalo DHC5) available to the Logistics Cluster to augment the transport of larger volumes of relief cargo by air more cost-efficiently. The Buffalo has a delivery capacity of 8 metric tons, 6 metric tons greater than Mi8 helicopters normally used and 3 metric tons greater than smaller fixed-wing aircraft available. The Buffalo is also able to land on short airstrips. Following various airstrip assessments, locations that were traditionally only accessible by helicopter were served regularly with the Buffalo in 2016. The Logistics Cluster has opened a dispatch hub in Juba for fixed-wing only operations in response to deteriorating security conditions on the roads. User demands now are primarily for the use of the Buffalo, enabling greater supplies prepositioning. However, at present as there is no financial incentive for organisations to plan effectively, aircraft and other assets are sometimes not used efficiently or have to be tasked at very short notice.³²⁹

97. Effort is being made to open up additional airstrips for fixed-wing aircraft, such as by engaging local communities in airstrip maintenance (a method used during the days of Operation Lifeline Sudan) but in most cases gravel (murrum) is essential for the creation of an all-weather surface. The Logistics Cluster estimates that to rehabilitate an average airstrip would cost a minimum of USD 2 million.

98. Table 24 shows the key performance indicators that have been identified and monitored by the Logistics Cluster since 2014. Annual targets set are consistently exceeded.

Table 24: Logistics Cluster key performance indicators

Key performance indicators	Target	2014	2015	2016
No. of national and field cluster coordination meetings conducted	65	50	63	93
No. of information products produced and shared per month	150	124	170	201
No. of transport destinations	70	72	85	76
Mt moved through common services	6,000	6,033	5,837	6,640
Warehousing capacity (cbm) made available to partners	11,000	5,666	11,200	12,160
No. of users of the Logistics Cluster services	80	91	94 (79% NGO)	117 (83% NGO)

Source: Logistics Cluster Info-graphics (logisticscluster.org)

99. The evaluation team considers that these are appropriate indicators to use to enable a fair assessment of operational achievement.

³²⁸ In theory, 2,000 kilometres of roads could be rehabilitated at a cost (including the value of food aid) of approximately USD 200 million, which is equivalent to 1 year of airdrop operations.

³²⁹ Based on information gathered from Logistics Cluster staff.

EQ14. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

100. Together with the logistics department, the air and logistics common services provided through UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster offer the best example of operational synergy, where all aircraft contracted through WFP aviation (Rome) are pooled under one management function (led by the chief air transport officer in Juba). This function oversees daily flight operations and activities, as well as requirements related to aircraft service providers, allowing the WFP logistics department and Logistics Cluster to focus on aircraft tasking needs.

101. Further synergies exist between the Logistics Cluster and WFP logistics whereby transport assets, such as barges, are contracted for use by both entities. The WFP common services also rely on access negotiations undertaken by the country office access team and logistics department.

EQ15. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

102. IOM is an important operational partner in logistics. They coordinate to provide common storage, transport and commodity handling services for Logistics Cluster partners³³⁰. The Logistics Cluster consolidates cargo movement requests and informs IOM of daily requirements; cluster user organizations are then advised on the mode of transport (air, road, and river) and handling arrangements. IOM manages the humanitarian Non-Food Item pipeline, which in turn further complements the role of the Logistics Cluster, which is operationally focused on the movement of non-food cargo (for the WASH, nutrition, health and protection clusters). Among IOM and Logistics Cluster team members it was learned that there is generally good complementarity and little overlap of operations and capacity. The common transport service is free-to-user; delivering humanitarian supplies to key field locations and providing a local shuttle service from airstrips, airdrop zones and ports. For example, during a field visit to Bentiu /Rubkona, the evaluation team observed IOM and WFP trucks transporting food rations to a distribution site outside of the protection of civilian camps as part of the inter-agency 'Beyond Bentiu Initiative' that aims to support local communities. The common transport service project has expanded from delivering 2,000 metric tons of cargo in 2011 to 20,000 metric tons by the end of 2016.

103. WFP further collaborates with IOM in the use of their biometric beneficiary registration system, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). SCOPE is a similar innovative system developed by WFP that helps to manage programmes through enhanced monitoring of the distribution of cash or food. For example, in the Mingkaman cash for voucher programme it has been used to allow WFP to store entitlement information, transfer this onto cards, and track distributions from the registration of beneficiaries to the transfer of commodities. Efforts were made to expand the use of SCOPE in 2016 and to some degree this has been successful.³³¹ However, there are differing approaches to the way these registration /tracking systems are used. For example the Displacement Tracking Matrix is used to biometrically register all household members, whereas SCOPE is used only to register

³³⁰ IOM Consolidated Appeal 2016 (page 9) <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/2016-iom-southsudan-consolidated-appeal.pdf>

³³¹ Based on meetings with the CO programme team and with the SCOPE service support team in Nairobi.

the head of household. This causes re-registration challenges when family members need to separate. Further, there are technical issues related to system interoperability, such as different file formats, and the Displacement Tracking Matrix being more accurate at detecting biometric duplicates. With other agencies, such as UNHCR, also using their own registration systems there is a need for improvements in the way that such digital systems are implemented³³² to avoid wasted resources and the issuance of multiple cards.

104. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is an operational arm of the United Nations to support humanitarian and development projects globally. UNOPS has worked in South Sudan since 2005, providing partners such as WFP with project services. It specialises in the design, construction and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, including roads, airstrips, bridges, schools, clinics, and government offices. For example, in 2015, 125 km of roads including the main access road to the Ajuong Thok refugee camp were constructed.³³³ Additionally, UNOPS supports mine action activities, which complements WFP work related to humanitarian access.

105. While WFP South Sudan has recognised road engineering capabilities and experience, infrastructure development projects are not a core organisational focus.³³⁴ In this regard, the evaluation team considers that the country office could have collaborated earlier during the project with UNOPS to leverage their comparative advantage as a specialized infrastructure project implementer. For example, as part of the WFP feeder roads project, a bridge at Kuajok was designed, but construction was delayed due to project management challenges and lengthy procurement issues, as well as a failure of the design review consultant to fulfil its contractual obligations. The initial outsourcing of this work could possibly have saved considerable time and funds.

106. The Logistics Cluster had a close partnership³³⁵ with UNOPS in 2014 and collaboration since has continued in an as-needed basis. This relationship has generally worked well. For example, the Logistics Cluster conducts road assessments by traveling on selected routes to assess access, road conditions and collect GPS coordinates. This information is shared with the UNOPS Emergency Response Unit that then conducts technical surveys, physical examinations and has undertaken spot repairs as needed. Additionally, the Logistics Cluster conducts assessments in deep field locations to determine storage needs and to evaluate infrastructure and capacity (roads, airstrips, etc.).

107. In 2012, tasked by the Logistics Cluster,³³⁶ UNOPS played a critical role by undertaking emergency road and airstrip repairs. UNOPS also advised the evaluation team that in 2017 it would upgrade the Rubkona airstrip, permitting larger cargo aircraft to land there during the rainy season. The Logistics Cluster continues to engage partners such as UNOPS in discussions regarding access issues and where physical infrastructure issues may be hindering humanitarian agencies' ability to reach beneficiaries. However, due to the prevailing situation in the country, donors indicated that they are reluctant to invest in any major rehabilitation works.

108. Based on situation reports, interviews and special project reports, the evaluation team has determined that the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) has been successful in providing a range of ITC solutions to support the humanitarian

³³² This issue is related to global humanitarian operations and is being addressed at HQ level

³³³ <https://www.unops.org/english/where-we-work/africa/Pages/South-Sudan.aspx>

³³⁴ WFP has an engineering support unit at HQ level staffed with qualified engineers.

³³⁵ SPR 200361 (2014)

³³⁶ SPR 200361 (2012)

community. This has been achieved in collaboration with the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the NGO Forum.

EQ16 How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

109. The humanitarian needs in South Sudan continue to increase with little opportunity to develop logistics and supply chain mechanisms that do not rely on the international donor community for financial support. The humanitarian situation has further been exacerbated by an economic crisis, which has hampered efforts to find sustainable solutions to operational needs. This situation, combined with continuous challenges in dealing with unpredictable bureaucratic impediments, such as customs regulations, and on-going insecurity, mean that the focus has largely been on finding potential improvements to logistics and telecommunications efficiency and cost reduction (see above).

110. Among the common services operated under WFP management, there has been an element of cost sharing. This primarily concerns the operation of aircraft that are funded separately for use by WFP Logistics,³³⁷ UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster. Although aircraft are pooled and managed as one fleet under UNHAS, they are tasked and prioritised by the primary users. Operating costs are cross-charged as appropriate when an aircraft assigned to one unit is used by another.

111. UNHAS charges all passengers USD 275 per seat /flight,³³⁸ which enabled an average of approximately 53 percent of costs to be recovered. (See Table 22above). The air, storage and river transport services provided by the Logistics Cluster are provided free to users. Should donor funding be reduced for such services, UNHAS would need to increase its fees and the Logistics Cluster would need to implement a cost recovery mechanism. Although in-country staff interviewed advised that the likely effect would be a reduction in the number of users,³³⁹ it would provide a stronger incentive for users to better plan and rationalise their service requests. It would also permit greater transparency related to user accountability³⁴⁰ of donor funds provided for logistics costs.

112. While there is a mobile phone network in some locations there is limited coverage and service is unreliable. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster set up five of satellite-based internet connectivity services at key humanitarian hubs. While this was initially a free-to-user data service it was regarded as a temporary solution, particularly as the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster was to phase out at the end of 2016. Therefore, a cost-sharing model was set up in 2015 under the Humanitarian Internet Support Project (HISP). The HISP ³⁴¹ is a low-cost long-term solution offering humanitarian actors data connectivity in remote locations. The evaluation team had the opportunity to test the service in Bentiu and found that it may require increased bandwidth to more effectively cater to increasing demand. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster has successfully shifted funding for data services to a cost-sharing model, whereby charges are split among participating humanitarian organisations, the cluster having brokered services with local and global service

³³⁷ WFP logistics air assets are funded via LTSH under EMOP 200859 and PRRO 200572. Logistics Cluster assets are funded under SO 200778, with UNHAS operations funded through SO 200786.

³³⁸ This charge was increased in 2016 from £200 / seat. (SPR 200786, 2016)

³³⁹ The Logistics Cluster would also require robust financial management capability.

³⁴⁰ Anecdotal information gathered during field visits suggested that some NGOs regard the use of free-to-user services provided by the Logistics Cluster as an opportunity to save donor funds provided to them for project costs

³⁴¹ <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp289628.pdf>

providers.

113. By the end of the 2016, the HISP solution was working in five locations, with 14 HISP accounts subscribed to by United Nations agencies, 40 by international NGOs and 11 accounts by national NGOs (with a total of 720 registered users). The service will be expanded to three more state capitals in 2017. The model has significant potential as a valuable 'asset' that could be offered, for example, to schools to support education projects. It is regarded as a replicable model for common data services. (WFP IT is now responsible for HISP management).

114. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster has also invested in long-term sustainable solar energy solutions to guarantee stable and reliable power for IT and security telecommunications equipment deployed in the field. Integrating environmentally friendly solutions with emergency response approaches aims to reduce the overall carbon footprint of the humanitarian operation in South Sudan.

115. Some private sector capacity building undertaken by WFP, for example the procurement department reported conducting training in use of WFP internal electronic tender system (INTENT) for online tendering. (South Sudan was the first country office to go fully live with the system). The system works well for local vendors, but only those based in Juba that have Internet access.

Conclusions

Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

116. WFP South Sudan manages one of the largest humanitarian logistics operations in the world. It has also led three operationally key common services, the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), the Logistics Cluster and the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC). In-country interviews conducted by the evaluation team confirmed that the majority of international aid organisations would not have been able to implement their programmes without these common, highly operational, services. Without such services, the added cost and complexity of delivery would have been prohibitive.

117. Similarly, the evaluation team considers that WFP logistics and supply chain operations have been strategically and operationally central to the organisation's ability to have delivered lifesaving and life preserving food and non-food assistance to beneficiaries between 2011 and 2016. The annual average³⁴² logistics component of the EMOP and PRRO operations accounts for 55 percent of the overall operation costs. Although donors have been generous in their financial contributions to the operation, human resources are heavily stretched, which raises the question as to whether there is a cap on what can continue to be achieved.

118. Findings reference the impact of security on logistics and supply chain operations and on commercial operators in meeting beneficiary needs. The time and financial costs of this have been significant, with the current crisis likely to continue for several years. WFP will need to ensure that their food pipelines have the agility to react to changing contexts. WFP has often had to use a 'just in time' delivery approach, requiring resources that will become scarce. Strategic prepositioning plans will therefore need to become more innovative, involving key donors, to ensure that funding commitments and international food deliveries are made in time to enable the

³⁴² Based on LTSH and external transport costs calculated from compiled financial data 2013 to 2015 (excluding food value)

transport of commodities within South Sudan during the dry season when cost effective road and river options can be used. The quantity of contingency stocks of food stored in Uganda that is dedicated for South Sudan may need to be increased in order to minimise the impact of potential upstream pipeline breaks and increased downstream demand.

119. The evaluation team found that UNHAS, the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster and the Logistics Cluster made good use of existing coordination mechanisms, but noted that most coordination groups are focused on short-term operational issues and may inadequately consider longer-term strategic requirements. This in turn could be leading to cost and operational inefficiencies.³⁴³ There is a need to harness expertise from across the humanitarian logistics ecosystem in South Sudan and ensure strategic alignments³⁴⁴. These should aim to: support local market supply chains to enable more effective cash based programming, joint food pipeline³⁴⁵ management and the related contracting of transport services, cost sharing of common logistics services, fuel supply, vehicle maintenance, infrastructure improvements to enable a transition from expensive air cargo services to cheaper ground transport, and how to foster, rather than crowd out, the development of the private sector.

120. The team found that UNHAS has been best placed to contribute to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan. Safety standards are low within the country's aviation industry and some of the training initiatives undertaken have reportedly contributed to the development of the Government of South Sudan's capacity. In the absence of United Nations-certified commercial alternatives, UNHAS continues as a vital service to support humanitarian interventions. Air, and limited river transport, is often the only means of delivering humanitarian cargo to remote locations and in some cases this cannot be achieved as the security situation remains volatile.

121. Since early 2014 the WFP logistics department's focus has necessarily been on addressing humanitarian needs. However, it became responsible for the feeder roads programme (SO 200379) in 2015. In relation to the construction of a new bridge at Kuajok, the evaluation team considers that the country office may have missed an opportunity to earlier leverage the capabilities of UNOPS as a specialized infrastructure project implementer.

Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making

122. Due to high staff turnover, vitally important humanitarian logistics capacity, in terms of skilled and experienced staff, is being lost. To minimise organisational risk, future investment in building staff knowledge and nurturing existing talent will be key to ensuring the continued successful implementation of such a logistically complex humanitarian operation. Increasingly, staff will need to develop the skills to manage more complex supply chains (food pipelines) and analyse local market supply chains in order to enhance cash based programming.

123. As well as providing a reliable passenger transport service, UNHAS plays a critical role in reducing risks to humanitarian staff working in remote locations,

³⁴³ Further study in this area would be appropriate

³⁴⁴ This would further align with the spirit of the Grand Bargain

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Grand_Bargain_final_22_May_FINAL-2.pdf

³⁴⁵ Note: The evaluation team observed that donors such as USAID support food pipelines that are independent from the WFP pipeline (such as for CRS). In this case, close inter-agency coordination is critical to maximize the use of logistical resources and avoid over-supply to certain areas (an example of this was observed in Akobo in January).

providing a prioritised medical and security evacuation service. The evaluation team found that through the management of essential common services, WFP has played a critically important, and largely successful, role in identifying and mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks.

124. One of WFP logistics' key comparative advantages in South Sudan is that it has national brand recognition that has been well leveraged with both the Government and opposition groups to negotiate safe access to many sites around the country in order to deliver assistance to beneficiaries. Effective coordination with key stakeholders, including OCHA and the UNMISS, as well as advocacy support by the donor community has also been key to gaining access to locations where humanitarian assistance is required.

Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio

125. Between 2011 and 2016, the logistics team successfully managed the delivery of over 1 million metric tons of food commodities. Close coordination with the regional office in Nairobi (RBN) and with Khartoum Country Office has largely been successful in ensuring that commodities have been transported into the country via three main corridors Southern, Eastern and Northern, but it was reported that these are insufficient to meet needs. Two additional corridors from Sudan will be required in order to take full advantage of the availability of surplus stocks on grain.

126. UNHAS has been successful in aligning its services to user needs, achieved through improved customer services and effective use of periodic meetings with a steering committee and user group and the Inter Cluster Working Group (ICWG).

127. Key donors and a wide range of users regard the Logistics Cluster as having played an essential role in supporting the humanitarian community to deliver their emergency response programmes. Services provided are regarded (globally) as unique because they fall outside of the short-term logistics coordination interventions typically provided. The evaluation team learned that the cluster has become more responsive to movement requests, flexible and reliable by using dedicated air assets that will be needed for the foreseeable future, although the type and capacity of aircraft will need to be reviewed. According to user surveys, satisfaction rate is nearly 90 percent.

128. A major challenge for the Logistics Cluster is the limited ability of user organisations to provide advanced plans that are essential to match logistical assets to needs and further limits the ability to advocate for funding. To provide better incentives for planning, the Logistics Cluster may need to implement a cost-recovery mechanism. In so doing, it would also permit greater transparency related to user accountability of logistics-related project costs.

129. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster developed an exit strategy and new cost-sharing mechanisms for security telecommunications maintenance and for internet connectivity. In 2016, the Humanitarian Internet Service Project (HISP) was implemented in five states. Operations met and exceeded targets for service quality. The evaluation team tested the HISP service in Bentiu and found that it may require increased bandwidth to meet increasing demand. HISP serves as an important and replicable common services model.

130. Despite many challenges, WFP logistics continued to seek innovations to help reduce costs and increase efficiencies. For example, through the use of new bagging techniques, supplementary foods can now be airdropped. Also vegetable oil can be

airdropped by parachute using a box delivery system which has saved an estimated USD 14 million per year over delivery by helicopter.

Issues for Consideration:

- a. Increase the capacity of the Logistics Cluster to provide long-term, high-level strategic logistics coordination – ideally as a function that is distinct from the current operational and tactical coordination services provided.

Reference EQ4: To address donor concern that clusters may have lost their ability to set strategic directions, the Logistics Cluster needs sufficient bandwidth, and Humanitarian Country Team support. These aim to influence longer term inter-agency strategic supply chain management requirements including support to local market supply chains (that would enable more effective cash based programming), joint food pipeline management and the related contracting of transport services, potential cost sharing of common logistics services, fuel supply, vehicle maintenance and infrastructure improvements (that support humanitarian access).

Priority: High

Suggested action by: Country Office Logistics, Logistics Cluster

- b. Strengthen country office pipeline /supply chain management capacity to enhance logistics management capacity.

Reference EQ9: Strategic prepositioning plans need to become more innovative to ensure that funding commitments and food deliveries are made in time to support dry-season prepositioning. Country office budget, planning and logistics capacity is severely stretched; senior level staffing of the pipeline management function would enable continuous high-level strategic engagement with all stakeholders.

Priority: High

Suggested action by: Deputy Country Director Operations, Country Office Logistics. Potential to form an Integrated Supply Chain Working Group to determine requirements, resources and prioritise operational plans

- c. Increase the size of food storage capacity in Uganda dedicated for South Sudan operations in order to create a more robust emergency food supply chain.

Reference EQ11: An increase in contingency stocks of food would help to minimise the impact of potential upstream pipeline breaks and increased downstream demand. It would also alleviate pressure on in-country storage requirements in areas of high risk. (Capacity in Juba was severely reduced following looting in July 2016).

Priority: High

Suggested action by: Country Office Logistics, Regional Bureau in Nairobi

- d. Augment, where feasible, current efforts to negotiate new northern access routes for humanitarian relief.

Reference EQ11: The three existing transport corridors into South Sudan are considered to be insufficient to meet all long-term needs. Two additional road corridors could be opened: El Obeid to Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal State, and El Obeid/Kadugli to North Unity state. High level (political) lobbying will be required to assure cost effective and efficient access from Sudan.

Priority: High

Suggested action by: Country Director, Country Office Logistics, Regional Bureau in Nairobi

- e. Outsource infrastructure projects such as road construction, spot repair or rehabilitation work.

Reference EQ12 & EQ15: Infrastructure projects are not a core organisational focus. The comparative advantage of other organisations, such as UNOPS, can be utilised as specialized infrastructure project implementers and partners to better meet the needs of WFP programmes. Trunk road repair (and ideally rehabilitation) is a critical requirement. WFP has previously engaged in this activity; The Government of South Sudan has responsibility for road maintenance but has no capacity to undertake this work. A new strategy is required, which involves donors, key organisations and the private sector. Given the costs involved in moving vital food aid, WFP could act as convenor.

Priority: Medium

Suggested action by: Country Office Programme and Logistics

- f. Support study (by UNOPS) of longer-term investment in the river transport sector

Reference EQ11: Related to issue 5 above, there is potential to increase the use of river transport, but due to the poor serviceability of barge pushers as well as damaged ports and handling equipment, deliveries can take weeks, or even months. The Japanese Government will fund a feasibility study to determine options. Valuable support to and influence on the study could be provided by WFP.

Priority: Medium

Suggested action by: Country Office Logistics and Logistics Cluster

- g. Initiate a privatisation strategy if a new vehicle workshop is constructed in Juba

Reference EQ11: The original WFP vehicle workshop facility was looted and destroyed during the conflict in July 2016, so a temporary workshop is being used. Due to a lack of reliable private sector capacity the intent is to construct a new facility. A privatisation strategy that is incorporated into the operational /business plan for the new workshop could be an important development initiative.

Priority: Low

Suggested action by: Country Office Fleet Management

Annex M: Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)

Introduction

1. This annex provides detailed evaluation findings in relation to the thematic component of emergency preparedness and response through general food assistance (GFA). It also includes the role of WFP in the coordination of the food security cluster and the strategic grain reserve.
2. The operations included in this annex are shown in [Table 25](#).

Table 25: Operations included in this Annex

Operation	Start date	End date	Operation activities included in this Annex	Operation activities not included in this Annex
EMOP 200338	Jan-12	Dec-13	GFA	FFA, SF, Nutrition
EMOP 200659	Jan-14	Sep-15	GFA	FFA, SF, Nutrition
EMOP 200859	Oct-15	Dec-17	GFA	FFA, SF, Nutrition
PRRO 200572	Jan-14	Dec-17	GFA	FFA, SF, Nutrition
SO 200423	Nov-12	Dec-14	FSLC	
SO 200775	Jan-15	continuing	FSLC	
SO 200267	Jul-11	Jul-14	Strategic Grain Reserve	

Source: Standard project reports 2011-2016

3. During the inception phase a desk review was carried out of all the relevant documentation. This Annex is based on information gathered using the methodology described in the inception report. The evaluation team visited South Sudan for nearly three weeks in the second half of January 2017 and early February 2017. During the first week, interviews were held with key WFP staff, government, United Nations agencies, bilateral donors and other stakeholders.


EQ1. What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in South Sudan?

4. The proportion of the population with high levels of food insecurity is very high but also varied widely between years and states ([Figure 11](#)). The percentage of the population in IPC phase 3, 4 and 5³⁴⁶ has risen each year from 16 in 2014 to 35 in 2016. Until the outbreak of conflict in July 2016 the Equatoria states were the least affected.

³⁴⁶ "Crisis, emergency and catastrophe" - the three most severe levels of food insecurity in the integrated phase classification (IPC) system

Central and Western Equatoria are traditionally the most productive areas of the country and food insecurity is uncommon except in times of conflict. Northern Bahr el Ghazal also had a large increase in food insecurity in 2016 due to a poor crop in 2015. state is the most severely affected in each year with a three-year average of 53 percent. Jonglei, Lakes and Upper Nile have also been consistently strongly affected. The main harvest season is from September to January. For much of the country the “hungry” period is from May to August.³⁴⁷


Figure 11: Percentage of population in integrated phase classification phase 3, 4 and 5 in each state and year³⁴⁸



Source: Integrated phase classification South Sudan

5. South Sudan has structural food cereals deficit, with large deficits recorded in each year of the evaluation. **Figure 12** shows the structural cereals deficit over the last six years. On average, the deficit has been 390,000 metric tons per year. This represented about 30 percent of the national requirement, for example of 1,270.000 metric tons (2015).³⁴⁹ Poorly integrated markets – where areas of surplus production are poorly connected by ground transport routes with the main deficit areas – meant that the gap between supply and demand was not being closed.

Figure 12: National cereals deficit



Source: Annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission Reports 2011 to 2016.


³⁴⁷ FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission To South Sudan, FAO, 2016

³⁴⁸ Data not presented for years before 2014 as accuracy of previous years considered less reliable.

³⁴⁹ Annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission Reports, FAO, 2015.

6. Intra-annual variations in production appeared highly correlated with conflict, which has been most severe between 2014 and 2016 rather than climatic causes. There were no significant droughts during the evaluation period. Climatic trends can be seen from rainfall and normalized difference vegetation index patterns. Figure 13 shows the rainfall patterns for South Sudan over the period 2011 to 2016 compared with the 20 year (1994-2003) seasonal average. The plot shows that in each year of the evaluation period, the rainfall pattern was quite close to the long-term average, suggesting that rainfall variability has not been a significant contributor to the emergency.


Figure 13: South Sudan rainfall pattern 2011-2016



Source: <http://climis-southsudan.org/home/agromet>

7. Figure 14 shows the normalized difference vegetation index values together with long term average. NDVI shows the level of live green vegetation. The values varied according to the growing season and rainfall. Drought would be represented by a marked drop in NDVI compared with the seasonal average. It is clear that there is no major change in NDVI during the period at a national level; however, crop yields were observed to be low in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in 2015.

Figure 14: Normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) values for South Sudan



Source: <http://climis-southsudan.org/home/agromet>

8. During the evaluation period, the data suggests that flooding has been an annual risk, but no major health epidemics were recorded. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters maintains a database of significant natural disasters

globally.³⁵⁰ In 2012 and 2013, river floods affected 738,000 people in South Sudan. Bacterial infections affected 8,304 people during 2014 and 2015.

Figure 15: Record of natural disasters in South Sudan 2012-2016

Year	Natural disasters	People affected
2012	Flood	154,000
2012	Flood	3,000
2013	Flood	425,000
2013	Flood	156,000
2013	Epidemic	3
2014	Epidemic	5,900
2014	Epidemic	586
2015	Epidemic	1,818

Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED international disaster database

EQ2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to South Sudan humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

9. WFP emergency operations (EMOPs) were implemented in line with Strategic Objective 1 “Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies” of WFP Strategic Plan (2014-2017) and were highly relevant to the needs of the population of South Sudan. Specifically, these operations aimed to: Save lives, reduce severe food insecurity and stabilize the nutritional status of high-risk groups, including internally displaced people (IDP), conflict-affected residents, women and children, and the chronically ill. During the evaluation period, three EMOPs were implemented to meet emergency needs. Special operations (SOs) such as SO 200338 (2012 and 2103), SO 200659 (January 2014 and September 2015) and SO 200859 (since October 2015) have also been implemented by WFP. Implementation of PRRO 200572 was relevant to the recovery needs of South Sudanese as it provided food assistance outside the main emergency zone.

10. EMOP 200338 was the first operation designed by the new country office following independence. It included emergency activities to save lives under Strategic Objective 1, strengthening of government’s capacity in areas where WFP had a comparative advantage under Strategic Objective 2 and restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods under Strategic Objective 3. It was expected that WFP support beyond 2012 would be through a PRRO.³⁵¹ The EMOP was extended by 12 months to the end of 2013

³⁵⁰ Copyright data used thanks to: D. Guha-Sapir, R. Below, Ph. Hoyois - EM-DAT: International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be – Université Catholique de Louvain – Brussels – Belgium

³⁵¹ SO 200338 Project document, WFP 2011

through a budget revision.³⁵² During 2013 a PRRO was planned and approved to follow on from EMOP 200338 and operated throughout the country.

11. On 15 December 2013 fighting broke out in Juba and rapidly spread to seven of the ten states. This caused WFP to redesign its programme focus. Displaced people congregated in UNMISS bases in Juba, Bor, Bentiu and Malakal and gathered in remote locations, including areas beyond the reach of humanitarian actors. In 2014, it was estimated that 70,000 people were seeking refuge in United Nations compounds, and approximately 200,000 people were displaced, many of whom fled their homes with no resources, and needed immediate humanitarian assistance, with food, healthcare, shelter, and protection.³⁵³

12. The PRRO 200572 started in January 2014 but was greatly restricted in its ability to operate due to the widespread conflict and the need to prioritise efforts and resources to the immediate crisis. EMOP 200659 was rapidly set up for a period of three months to provide general food assistance to 400,000 internally displaced persons and a blanket supplementary feeding programme for 100,000 other vulnerable people indirectly affected by the conflict (pregnant and lactating women, children and hosts of internally displaced persons). The EMOP was extended through successive budget revisions, initially for six months and later to September 2015 to cover 1.3 million then 1.7 million and finally back down to 1.3 million general food assistance beneficiaries with a total of 568,000 blanket and targeted supplementary feeding programme beneficiaries.³⁵⁴

13. In August 2015, the Government and opposition leadership signed a peace agreement containing provisions for a new ceasefire and transitional political and security measures. However, as physical and food security did not significantly improve, WFP responded with the launch of a new EMOP 200859, to follow EMOP 200659, as over two million people were displaced from their homes, 1.5 million people inside South Sudan and more than 500,000 to neighbouring countries.³⁵⁵ At the time of planning, the EMOP 200859 Programme Director stated that the humanitarian situation remained dire and continued to worsen, with continued high risk of a food catastrophe or even famine in some areas. According to the 2015 IPC April projections, 4.6 million people were facing high levels of food insecurity between May and July 2015. This marked an increase of 2.1 million compared to December 2014.

14. The objective of EMOP 200859 was primarily to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies, (Strategic Objective 1), but also included a small element to restore and stabilize access to education for girls and boys in schools jointly supported with UNICEF (also Strategic Objective 1). It was planned to reach 1.66 million unique beneficiaries³⁵⁶ primarily through general food assistance, blanket and targeted supplementary feeding and Emergency School Feeding including cash-based transfer for the first time in South Sudan with an expected total of 150,000 beneficiaries.

15. The initial coverage included Greater Upper Nile (Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity), where food insecurity was most acute and most of the resources would be used.

³⁵² EMOP SO 200338, BR2, WFP, 2012

³⁵³ EMOP SO 200659 PD, 2014

³⁵⁴ EMOP SO 200659 BR1, BR2 and BR3, WFP, 2014

³⁵⁵ EMOP SO 200859 PD WFP 2015. (UNHCR data, also indicating that 55 percent of refugees from South Sudan are women and 45 percent are men. Over two thirds are children, and military age men are notably under-represented.)

³⁵⁶ EMOP SO 200859 PD WFP 2015 - excluding overlap between activities

It also included those sheltering in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) protection of civilian (PoC) sites. In 2016, the focus of the EMOP continued in the Greater Upper Nile region while general food assistance work was carried out under the PRRO in other states – particularly Northern Bahr el Ghazal.

16. O 200338 planned and implemented actions to strengthen government's preparedness capacity. This capacity building was valuable but will need to be repeated when the government is again able to absorb technical assistance. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) was the main counter-part for WFP, and operational arm of the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission was responsible for the provision of technical support and advice for the development of the disaster management policy.

17. After the start of conflict in December 2013 the extent to which preparedness could be included as part of the WFP programme to strengthen government was greatly diminished, although the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission remained the WFP main partner for humanitarian food assistance in South Sudan. Some capacity building work was possible in 2014 under PRRO 200572 but in 2015 and 2016 no capacity building on preparedness has been possible. On a more practical note, WFP has planned and implemented training for its own staff and those of cooperating partners (CPs) in order to manage the assessments, targeting, distribution and monitoring.

18. *FP South Sudan Gender Strategy (2015-2020)*³⁵⁷ is guided by the *Republic of South Sudan Gender Policy (2012)*³⁵⁸ and anchored on the *WFP South Sudan Gender Policy (2015-2020)*.³⁵⁹ It aims to establish transformative interventions to improve the lives of the most vulnerable people in South Sudan. In South Sudan, the need to mainstream gender in WFP operations and embed gender awareness within the culture of the country office is highly relevant. The strategy, developed by the country office, seeks to achieve at least 40 percent women staff by 2020 and envisages the provision of training of the WFP staff members, cooperating partners and government officials on adaption of food assistance to different needs men and women beneficiaries, equal participation in programmes and decision-making by women and girls in general, and aspects of gender and protection. It is cognisant that decades of conflict and negative socio-cultural practices have affected girls and women, boys and men differently and disrupted families and community structures, aggravating pre-existing gender inequalities, and placing an increased burden on humanitarian response.

19. The country office gender strategy also aims to expand initiatives such as “women for women” to reach all sub offices, and recognises that ending hunger can only be achieved if women, men, girls and boys have equal opportunities, equal access to resources and a say in the decisions that shape their future, and that gender-sensitive programmes can increase WFP effectiveness. It makes gender and age analysis a prerequisite to addressing the underlying causes of gender-based under-nutrition and food insecurity, and requires that all documents are reviewed to take into account gender and women's empowerment issues and should achieve a gender marker score of 2 (a).³⁶⁰

³⁵⁷ *South Sudan Gender Strategy (2015-2020)*, WFP 2015

³⁵⁸ *South Sudan Gender Policy (2012)*, WFP 2012

³⁵⁹ *WFP Gender Policy*, WFP, 2014

³⁶⁰ Gender markers cover aspects of programming, human resources, capacity development, knowledge products and communication, partnerships, financial resources, and results.

20. At the initiative of the Government of South Sudan, WFP initiated a special operation to establish a strategic grain reserve (SGR). In a landlocked country, subject to periodic droughts, border closures and conflict there was strong case for an emergency reserve. SO 200267 ran from 2010 to 2013 and intended to support the Government of South Sudan to develop a policy framework for the effective implementation of the strategic grain reserve and build its institutional capacity in food security information systems that are crucial for evidence-based decision making in this area. Evidence from neighbouring countries points to the utility of this initiative, for example Ethiopia established a strategic grain reserve that has been successful in addressing several emergencies since the 1990s.³⁶¹

21. The term strategic grain reserve was altered to national strategic food reserve (NSFR) during implementation to broaden its approach. The original plan aimed to construct five warehouses that would serve as strategic grain reserves to be managed by the Government of South Sudan in the future. In the context of South Sudan, where human and institutional capacity gaps are still major challenges it was decided to de-prioritize (and effectively dropped) the infrastructure component and concentrate on policy development. Due to the conflict and lack of resources and capacity within government, no plans were made to continue this work after the closure of this operation in 2013.

EQ3. To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

22. WFP emergency preparedness and responses have been coherent with those of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management considers the WFP programmes to be a great asset to the people of South Sudan. The rapid response missions (RRM) and mixed programmes in rural areas were highly appreciated as they have been meeting real needs through providing a lifeline to local authorities and beneficiaries.³⁶²

23. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission stated during interviews that the role of WFP in development depends very much on donors, but that the views from grass root areas should also be listened to, and that livelihoods projects need to be encouraged, because the emergency responses are coming at the cost of development. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission also commented that they would appreciate greater information sharing from WFP; lack of communication can cause difficulties at national and state level.

24. The Government of South Sudan introduced an NGO Act in 2016. It is too early to be certain but the act may pose a threat to the operation of WFP partner organisations and therefore is not aligned with WFP objectives. The purpose of the Bill is to establish a regulatory framework for the registration, co-ordination and monitoring of operations of non-governmental organizations in South Sudan. Amongst other provisions, the act requires 80 percent of NGOs to be staffed locally. A number of affected parties, including possible disruptions to work of NGOs, have viewed this as unduly restrictive. The United States, the United Nations and the

³⁶¹ Strategic grain reserves in Ethiopia, IFRI Discussion paper, 2011.

³⁶² Interviews

European Commission indicated that the enactment of the NGO Act contravenes the peace agreement.^{363,364}

25. Despite opposition to the act from international organisations, there have been no reports that the act has affected the implementation of projects and neither NGOs nor and other WFP cooperating partner has been denied registration, nor has any agency been requested to leave as a result of the NGO Act. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is of the view that it may take as long as ten years to implement the NGO Act and that the promotion of local staff should take place in a stepwise manner.³⁶⁵

EQ4. To what extent have WFP objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

26. WFP Country Office has supported the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster (FSLC) in order to promote coordinated humanitarian assistance. The FSLC provides an important forum for ensuring coherence amongst food security actors – starting with universally accepted, evidence-based food security assessments. At the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, the WFP Executive Director stated that it was committed to continuing its support for the global Food Security Council (FSC). The South Sudan FSLC has been active since 2005. In 2012 it had a membership of 58 partners including WFP and FAO as joint coordinators and with a monitoring and reporting officer supported by the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and managed by OCHA.³⁶⁶

27. The FSLC receives no dedicated funding from the United Nations or from Government of South Sudan. WFP has funded two special operations in support of the FSLC: SO 200423 (2012-2014) and SO 200775 (2015-2016). The objectives of SO 200423 were: i) to strengthen the capability for implementation of high quality humanitarian assistance to affected communities and ii) to promote and support the use of accurate and timely information for decision-making.³⁶⁷ Under SO 200775, two further objectives were added: to provide guidance and a strategic vision to cluster partners and to formalize inter-cluster strategic linkages.³⁶⁸

EQ5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

28. WFP has several demonstrated comparative advantages in South Sudan and has generally used them strategically to achieve its objectives. WFP has a well-established logistics capacity (discussed in Annex L) for purchasing, importing and distributing commodities within South Sudan. The in-country capacity includes assets for road transport and air delivery. Prepositioning stocks is important in areas where seasonal floods make roads impassable in the wet season. WFP has employed the logistics capability to deliver 850,000 metric tons of food over the evaluation period.³⁶⁹

29. WFP Country Office has used its strong international standing to advocate on behalf of South Sudan and the donor community; donors recognised that WFP

³⁶³ <http://sudantribune.com/spip.php?article57988> and interviews

³⁶⁴ <http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/enactment-ngo-act-and-its-implications-humanitarian-operations>

³⁶⁵ Interviews

³⁶⁶ SO 200423 Project document, WFP, 2012

³⁶⁷ SO 200423 Project document, WFP, 2012

³⁶⁸ SO 200775 Project document, WFP, 2014

³⁶⁹ SPR 2012-2016

demonstrated a capacity to negotiate with neighbouring countries, for example, the northern corridor to Sudan to supply conflict areas, and to communicate with conflict actors. They pointed out that WFP as a United Nations organization has a better understanding of micro-contexts and access-negotiation than most other organisations.

30. WFP Country Office has partnerships with more than 80 international and national NGOs that can implement actions in the field.³⁷⁰ The number of NGOs operating in South Sudan has varied markedly during the evaluation period due to conflict and this has caused discontinuities in activities in many locations.³⁷¹ Through its partnerships, WFP has managed to implement programmes in most parts of the country over the evaluation period, although the coverage of NGOs was greatly reduced in 2014. Partners noted that they are too often used as implementing organisations rather than equal partners. WFP has maintained 14 sub offices and has used this wide coverage to design and implement a wide range of programmes in all states. It also uses the network to maintain regular contact with stakeholders including government at both national and sub-national level.

31. WFP has substantial experience at the corporate level in the organisation of emergency food assistance. It uses this experience to respond quickly to changes in the situation particularly following the onset of conflict in 2013 and in July 2016. WFP also has wide experience of different modalities of operation. WFP is able to regularly reassess choices between cash-based transfers and in-kind modality according to the current conditions. WFP has used its experience from other countries to roll out its SCOPE tool for beneficiary registration. The comparative advantage of this tool is not certain as IOM and World Vision also have comparable registration tools.

32. WFP has used its large-scale and long-term presence in the country to achieve economies of scale and to establish its position as a dependable and knowledgeable partner to Government, donors and the aid community. There are few other organisations involved in emergency food relief in South Sudan. During 2016 ICRC supplied 950,000 food rations equivalent to more than 13,000 metric tons of food to beneficiaries.³⁷² These distributions are normally rapid responses to crises and often in places that are difficult for other organisations to access.

33. In order to minimise the risk to WFP and partner staff and to equipment and resources, WFP has established a strong independent capacity to conduct access negotiations in both Government controlled and in areas of opposition (IO). WFP has developed personal communications channels to 300 commanders in the field and ensures that all actions are cleared with the relevant people before the action starts.³⁷³ While other organisations (such as FAO and NGOs) reported that they have a similar network, WFP is recognized as having the most effective capacity for access negotiations outside the OCHA system and has proved reliable so far. Access that is negotiated by WFP for food also benefits other agencies in sectors such as nutrition, immunisation and seeds.³⁷⁴

³⁷⁰ CO interviews

³⁷¹ CO and NGO interviews

³⁷² https://icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/south_sudan_facts_figures_2016.pdf

³⁷³ CO interviews

³⁷⁴ CO interviews

EQ6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with the WFP mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies)?

34. WFP Country Office has not formally described the challenges to the humanitarian principles but has developed a draft access policy that acts as ruler to measure its observance of humanitarian principles. The draft access policy³⁷⁵ provides an informal outline of the main issues facing the programme:

- Conferring legitimacy to authorities (both government and opposition) on the ground
- Likelihood of direct or indirect diversion in areas with high militarization (formal or informal forces) presence
- Ability of partners and staff to be able to operate in a neutral, independent and an impartial manner
- Up-holding the do-no-harm principle and ensuring consistency with WFP policies on accountability to affected populations and protection of beneficiaries
- Manipulation of humanitarian assistance to control population movements or to achieve political objectives
- The “bunkerization,” mentality of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and their lack of willingness to gain an understanding of ‘acceptability’ for humanitarians versus the mission

35. WFP has tried to apply humanitarian principles and follow its protection policies in all its interventions but has had to make some trade-offs. Requests for assistance are vetted carefully through networks of partners and local contacts. This is to try to avoid providing assistance based on spurious requests from local commanders. When organising distributions, WFP avoids directly supplying combatants with food. WFP does not distribute to those wearing uniform or carrying weapons. However, it is not possible to discriminate against young men when they are out of uniform and in need of food assistance.

36. Payments that transport companies have to make to have access to the road network may go towards the war effort. Road checkpoints are generally manned by three to ten people in military uniform claiming to be from various military departments. Drivers of 40 metric tons trucks interviewed in Bentiu reported that the total amount they spent per truck on checkpoints for the trip up to Bentiu from Juba is about 95,000 SSP (USD 950). In addition, 1.5 litres of fuel are taken from the drivers at each of the 85 checkpoints. Usually they pay the same amounts for the return trip.

37. WFP uses the IPC reports for much of its programming. The Government of South Sudan is heavily involved in the IPC and claims ownership of it. However, there is no evidence that assessments to favour greater action in government-held territory than rebel-held areas. In addition to the IPC the local authorities (both the Government of South Sudan and those in opposition) make regular representations to WFP requesting emergency assistance in areas of acute need – for example, to respond to newly displaced communities. However, WFP routinely conducts independent assessments to verify needs prior to making distributions.

³⁷⁵ WFP South Sudan Humanitarian Access Strategy, undated 2015?

38. WFP does not compromise on protection issues in its planning. WFP is serving two main camps, or protection of civilian centres (PoC), one in Malakal (100,000 people) and one in Bentiu (100,000 people) together with others in Wau, Juba, Meiwut. Areas around these camps are controlled by combatants who pose a number of protection issues. When food is scarce outside the camps, many people are pushed to protection centres. The situation in Malakal was observed to be quite tense. Once the second city in the country after Juba and an important trading town on a main river, the city has been severely disrupted due to the volatile conflict situation in the area. Internally displaced persons in protection of civilian camps have had little or no freedom of movement since the violence in 2016. Wet feeding was considered at one camp but, due to perceived threats of poisoning or delivery of infected food by suppliers, WFP did not pursue this option. When planning distributions WFP tries to avoid drawing populations into conflict areas. In general, it also avoids distribution in urban areas as these are more risky for beneficiaries.

EQ7. To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analysis of food security and nutrition issues, gender equality and women's empowerment, human rights and protection issues?

39. The main tools used for analysing food insecurity risk in South Sudan are the FSNMS and the IPC by which the country office determines when and where to intervene to alleviate food insecurity. FSNMS are conducted twice a year, and are the main source of data for the IPC. One is conducted during the lean season (May /June) and one is conducted after harvest (November /December). Until 2014, the FSNMS was the main source of information for planning distributions.

40. The IPC analysis has been used for programming the WFP response since 2014. The IPC phase classification in South Sudan is based on two main aspects: food consumption, and livelihood changes; and under-nutrition (global acute malnutrition, severe acute malnutrition, <5 death rate, and crude death rate). Food and Nutrition Security Monitoring (FSNMS) and Smart Surveys (under nutrition and mortality) form the basis of baseline information in IPC in South Sudan. The CFSAM contributes agricultural production data to the IPC. IPC analyses are published twice a year. WFP starts its prioritisation based on the IPC which forecasts the percentage of population at state and county level in different phases.

41. Staff in the WFP Country Office briefed that in the current context the country office overlays on the IPC matrix an operational prioritisation matrix using information from other partners based on the security situation and accessibility to see where needs are most acute and where WFP can respond. The IPC tool accuracy is limited by the population estimates that are based on the 2008 Housing and Population Census. Allowances have been made for population change and migration but the result must be quite imprecise.

42. WFP has used the combined IPC-operational matrix to develop an operational plan, for both static and mobile protracted emergency and crisis responses for delivery of an array of activities and transfer modalities for each activity. Targeting has been operationalized through distribution plans prepared in consultation between sub offices and the country office. During this process, IPC prioritisation is likely to have been influenced by crisis events, security conditions and access possibilities together with local priorities across geographical administrative units. The IPC analysis is accepted by all stakeholders but has recognized limitations, including the inability to

estimate food security levels below state level. Experts consulted among WFP partners in the field made the following comments on the process:

- The FSNMS sampling framework is representative at state level and livelihood zone but insufficiently robust to provide information at county level, i.e. the level WFP is projecting its target estimates.
- WFP Country Office VAM unit staff recognised that a major limitation is the smallest geographic unit of analysis, which is only statistically representative at state level, and that programming needs a lower level of analysis, i.e. county or *Payam* level.
- The household hunger scale is too insensitive and the coping strategy index (CSI) is not being used sufficiently. There is scope to examine more closely patterns of milk and wild food consumption,
- There is little research carried out to analyse trends based on the 19 rounds of FNMS /IPC, and historical baseline data. These analyses would not improve immediate targeting but may lead to a better understanding of the factors affecting food security.

43. Other data collected by VAM provides important information used when designing interventions. The VAM unit collects and collates data on rainfall and markets including market functioning, trader capacity, prices and access to markets. This is carried out by WFP in the main towns. A monthly market report is used to adjust the amount of cash transfers. However, WFP Country Office VAM human capacity has suffered from a lack of international and national staff and a high turnover. Some tasks cannot be completed adequately by VAM (e.g. Geographic Information System and mapping) due to the lack of staff. The lack of competent national staff severely reduces the institutional memory given that the international staff remain in post for less than two years.

44. WFP is looking at using Mobile VAM (MVAM) which uses remote telephone interviews. As the network coverage is limited this has been trialled in selected protection of civilian camps, health centres, and schools. There is a very low penetration of the WFP mobile surveillance system to date, and limited use with cooperating partners. A pilot was initiated in Upper Nile State but the call centre established to collect data on basic indicators collapsed because people contacted expressed fatigue at being contacted on a regular basis without compensation. WFP is considering using airtime incentives but has not yet found a provider to make payments.

45. Rapid response missions (RRMs) are coordinated by OCHA in crisis situations, although they are very short they are often the only available source of data for planning interventions in conflict areas. FSLC coordinators commented that the rapid response missions proved to be cumbersome with a long lag time between assessment and response. The tools used for rapid response missions need to be reviewed, because those that exist are not always relevant. Further, they suggested that assessments should be more thorough; often rapid response missions are too short with just 30 minutes on the ground. There are cases where it would be safe to stay longer, for example, remote swamps that are havens for internally displaced persons relatively safe from fighting.

46. On a number of occasions rapid response missions were conducted in situations that did not seem to merit the rush. Apart from rapid response missions, the rapid

needs assessment process used by WFP involves consultation with local populations and rapid assessments through NGOs.

EQ 8. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

47. The FSLC has focussed on data that drives the national agenda on food security. WFP provided vital support to the FSLC through two special operations and these operations enabled the FSLC to perform its main tasks and thereby improve the humanitarian response. The FSLC coordinates the humanitarian response in South Sudan through regular meetings of its members at central and field (sub-cluster) level. These include a strong lead in NGO coordination. Information collection and management includes the collection, analysis and dissemination of information from many sources. These include both regular and ad-hoc assessments and monitoring of food security and the partners' responses. All major documents are made available to all via a web site. The information is used by its membership for high-level advocacy and to inform programme responses through gap analyses and coordination.

48. Partner capacity building is carried out through a series of training courses. These are designed primarily for national staff of international and national NGOs. Training has included gender and protection, cash-based transfer training and FNSMS assessment training. During 2012 and 2013 the FSLC worked closely to build capacity and develop policy related to food security; however, with the onset of conflict in December 2013 this work stopped.³⁷⁶ During 2013 the FSLC worked closely with the Government's new Food Security Council (FSC) within the Office of the President and embarked on plans to strengthen coordination activities at state and county levels. The Government also re-organized departments, and brought food security issues under one organisation. With these new developments, the cluster embarked on capacity development activities which, it hoped, would guarantee sustainability of the coordination.

49. Following the onset of conflict in December 2013, the government capacity to participate was much reduced and the FSLC has turned its attention to capacity building within the NGO community. The cluster has not engaged in emergency preparedness capacity development of national and local authorities and has not conducted any capacity needs assessments. NGO /Civil Society Organization coverage gaps are not regularly monitored. Separately from the FSLC, capacity building efforts for disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness were started in 2012, but achieved little and have not been possible at the national level since December 2013.

50. During 2012 and 2013, WFP worked with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission to develop their capacity, but given the shortage and low capacity of the staff the progress was very limited. WFP also provided technical support and guidance for the development of the disaster management policy but that did not progress after the conflict started in December 2013

51. At the state level, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission staff are responsible for the coordination of all WFP programmes. Although there are no formal capacity building programmes they are involved in the planning and implementation processes.

³⁷⁶ SPR SO 200423, 2013

52. WFP is involved in a large number of regular and one-off assessments and reports that contribute to placing issues on the agenda both nationally and internationally. WFP (on its own or jointly) has prepared and circulated a number of analytical reports that include: an Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis, CFSAM annual Reports, Food Security and FSNS Monitoring Reports, Integrated Phase Classification Updates, Early Warning Reports, Regional Impact Updates, Priority Needs and Strategy Review and Special Focus Briefs.³⁷⁷ WFP has also produced a number of internal documents to guide decision-making, including: Weekly Emergency Overviews and Operational Task Force Notes for the Record; Monthly Emergency Dashboards and Maps, Situation Reports and Bulletins, and Operational Task Force Key Action Points; Quarterly Operational Briefings, and occasional Executive Briefs and Country Briefs, and Annual Corporate Performance Reports.³⁷⁸

53. Individual studies and assessments that have contributed to the national agenda include:

- *Resilience Context Analysis - Resilience to Shocks that impact Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan* - November 2015³⁷⁹
- *Operational Strategy for Food and Nutrition Security Information Systems Capacity Development - FSNIN South Sudan Partners: FAO, FEWS NET, UNICEF and WFP*, 2013³⁸⁰
- *Juba Urban Food Security & Nutrition Assessment* – A collaborative activity of the National Bureau of Statistics with support from FAO, UNICEF, WFP and Juba Administrative Authorities - 2015³⁸¹
- *South Sudan Rapid Market Assessment* - 2015³⁸²

54. WFP Country Office also maintains the South Sudan information on the IPC web site³⁸³ and, when necessary it raises the profile of the food emergency to an international audience. An example of this was in February 2017 when famine was declared in two counties of Unity state as a result of an IPC assessment.³⁸⁴ WFP regularly shares information with stakeholders in a transparent manner by hosting regular cooperating partner meetings. The country office brings cooperating partners together once a month, which includes the sharing of information and learning experiences. Heads of sub offices also have partner meetings.

55. Donor representatives noted that they experienced very good interactions with WFP through twice-weekly donor meetings (in one case weekly meetings), on which occasions they received de-briefs and updates, including challenges and needs for additional support and extra funding. They also noted that WFP is very transparent in sharing information both in-country and through WFP Headquarters in Rome. This transparency was much appreciated despite the losses incurred (e.g. looting incident in 2016).

³⁷⁷ WFP reports are referenced individually throughout the report.

³⁷⁸ CO internal reports, WFP, 2012-2016

³⁷⁹ Resilience Context Analysis - *Resilience to Shocks that Impact Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan*, WFP 2015

³⁸⁰ FSNIN, 2013. *South Sudan Operational Strategy for Food and Nutrition Security Information Systems Capacity Development*. <https://goo.gl/DOJnbg>

³⁸¹ Juba Urban Food Security & Nutrition Assessment, WFP, 2015

³⁸² South Sudan Rapid Market Assessment, WFP, 2015

³⁸³ <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-countries/ipcinfo-eastern-middle-africa/south-sudan/en>

³⁸⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/20/famine-declared-in-south-sudan>

EQ9. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed when the country office developed the 2014-2017 country strategy?

56. The strategic choices concerning emergency preparedness and response are determined largely by needs assessments. The rapid changes in security have led to acute emergencies and the needs assessments have determined the size of programmes and led to the introduction of new EMOPS. The 2014-2017 country strategy was sufficiently flexible to allow for these developments. FSNMS and IPC assessments guide the planning of emergency operations. The level of food insecurity is used to determine the food requirements and, within the limitations of resources and logistics, the caseload and ration is formulated.

57. EMOP 200338 covered the whole country but was most active in the food insecure states of the Greater Upper Nile (. With the onset of conflict in December 2013 the country was effectively divided into two regions – the conflict affected areas, most food insecure region of the Greater Upper Nile was included in the new EMOP 200659 while the remainder of the country was covered by the new PRRO 200572. Until July 2016 this division was held, although some development activities took place in the EMOP area and vice versa. With the onset of more generalised conflict in July 2016 the geographic split was abandoned, so that both programmes can work where they are most needed. The declaration of an L3 emergency in December 2013 provided substantial benefits to the emergency work but there were also drawbacks. South Sudan has been raised to an L3 level twice by WFP and once at the United Nations level, and remains at L3 level within WFP:

- The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) System-wide L3 from 11 February 2014 to 5 May 2016³⁸⁵ (however another United Nations document suggests that the L3 continued to November 2015)³⁸⁶
- WFP Corporate L3 8 February 2012 to 14 December 2012 and 23 December 2013 to present ³⁸⁷

58. The L3 Declaration was intended as a rapid scale-up mechanism, but is increasingly viewed as an indicator of the scale of the crisis. A system wide L3 was declared to deploy adequate surge resources.. The concept of the L3 is built on sudden onset disasters; although South Sudan is in a chronic emergency. The RBN emergency preparedness and response unit convened on a twice weekly basis including the operational task force (OTF) with Headquarters, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya, elevated issues to the strategic task force. Now this meeting is being conducted on a monthly or ad hoc basis.

59. Positive effects of the declaration include:

- It allowed the Country Director to meet with the WFP Strategic Task Force and hold discussions with the WFP Executive Director and Directors of Technical Units on a regular basis. Further, it helped make decisions that would normally have taken longer, such as on staffing and funding. In particular, it helped establish priorities on staffing and reduced reassignment of staff away from the

³⁸⁵ <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc-transformative-agenda/news-public/l3-iasc-system-wide-response-activations-and-deactivations>

³⁸⁶ IASC Principals ad hoc meeting Iraq, South Sudan and Syria, 26 August 2015, Final Summary and Action Points https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/260815_iasc_principals_ad_hoc_final_summary_record.docx.

³⁸⁷ WFP Emergency Response Classifications, May 2014, WFP

country office. The declaration also proved useful in providing advance financing without collateral.

- When a WFP country office needed support the RBN emergency preparedness and response office is the first to deploy - mostly from the programme section. Usually WFP country offices do not have a separate emergency unit, but South Sudan was slightly different. The unit provided short-term surge and early warning support. Emergency preparedness and response regional staff went to South Sudan for four months in Dec 2013 as head of programme.
- The WFP L3 declaration provides the country office with prominence in terms of advocacy and prioritization of pipeline.

60. Negative effects mostly related to staffing:

- While needs were identified, there were lags in filling needs, and expansion and contraction of needs. The surge function worked well for key posts but not for all functions, for example, logistics and nutrition. The Strategic Director from the Regional Bureau in Nairobi was very useful to the country team.
- Most WFP Country Office VAM staff are under short-term contract. The L3 declaration was not very successful in meeting the staffing needs of the VAM unit. They advised that, given the working environment, WFP should seek ways to secure longer-term employment in the country office (for example, post adjustment and regular salary updates in line with real inflation).

61. The WFP Country Director highlighted there has been considerable debate on how to ensure adequate capacity and attention to a large-scale problem that is getting worse over an extended period of time. In this context, the L3 is confusing to donors necessitating another classification. Despite the L3, the senior management have been fully engaged for the last three years with emergency issues including short term planning, logistics, security and access. This has limited the opportunity for the country office to carry out strategic planning for the next two to five years.

62. Following the ending of the system-wide L3 in May 2016, the IASC instituted an operational peer review process. The operational peer review and a recent article in the Humanitarian Exchange magazine ³⁸⁸ suggested that the WFP and UNICEF had used the L3 to “over-prioritize their large-scale operations at the expense of aid quality”. The relevant text from the article is included in a footnote.³⁸⁹

EQ10. How has WFP analysed, or used existing analysis of, security-related risks and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures?

63. WFP has been developing its corporate tools for risk management over the last 12 years. These tools provide guidance for the country office to implement its risk

³⁸⁸ The South Sudan Level 3 designation: from policy to practice, Julien Schopp, ODIHPN, January 2017

³⁸⁹ “Despite its aim to reinforce collective action and strategic alignment, another unintended consequence of the L3 designation in South Sudan was that the centrality of bilateral donor investments allowed a couple of United Nations agencies to grow to the point that they were not accountable to the collective. Controlling most of the financial resources, and more importantly essential logistical assets and information on access, these behemoths became too big to challenge. Under the rubric of assisting populations, they sidestepped the system-wide decision-making structures set up after the L3 designation, often prioritising their own institutional interests over those of the collective. This was particularly noticeable with the implementation by the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) of rapid response mechanisms that lacked coordination and transparency in their implementation. This was underscored in the operational peer review conducted in June 2014: ‘concern was expressed that the over-prioritization of large-scale actors and large-scale “life-saving” operations – rightly undertaken in the initial stages of the response – has undermined the quality of aid’.”

analysis and mitigation measures. The Executive Board has approved six documents during that period:

- *2005 WFP 1st Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) policy*³⁹⁰
- *2010 Integration of ERM in the Performance Management Framework*³⁹¹
- *2011 Corporate Risk Register*³⁹²
- *2012 Risk Appetite Statement*³⁹³
- *2015 Enterprise Risk Management Policy*³⁹⁴
- *2016 Updated Risk Appetite Statement*³⁹⁵

64. The *2015 Enterprise Risk Management Policy* outlines the following principles for enterprise risk management:

- Risk management is an essential element of good governance and an integral aspect of good management practice.
- By the nature of its mandate, WFP operates in high-risk environments.
- Ownership of risk management rests with WFP management. In view of this, management will:
 - proactively manage risks to beneficiaries, employees – including staff health and safety issues – financial and other resources, assets, programmes, reputation and interests
 - determine WFP risk tolerance on a case-by-case basis while also considering the aggregate level of risk assumed
 - balance the cost of managing risks with the anticipated benefits of taking those risks
 - exploit opportunities to achieve its objectives
 - take appropriate and timely measures to contain any risks that materialize and minimize their consequences
 - ensure that risks and opportunities are managed systematically and proactively at the lowest feasible management level.

65. Risk management is to be implemented at the process level: unit level (country office, regional bureau or headquarter); and corporate level. Risks are categorized as contextual, programmatic or institutional and procedures are laid down for the assessment of risks in terms of their likelihood, impact and seriousness. The country office follows the standard corporate tools for the evaluation of risks in its programming, but this still leaves them with many difficult decisions when it comes to implementing operations in conflict areas.

66. WFP country office followed the procedures for activities and evaluated a wide range of risks and drawn up mitigating actions appropriate to each. The WFP Country Office has identified a number of threats to the performance of the organization in South Sudan and assigned risk levels based on their likelihood and impact on the operations in the country. Political instability, economic decline and poor infrastructure were identified as the main contextual risks. Delays in procurement and funding, and the capacity of cooperating partners were identified as the main

³⁹⁰ *2005 WFP's 1st Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Policy*, WFP, 2005

³⁹¹ *2010 Integration of ERM in the Performance Management Framework*, WFP, 2010

³⁹² *2011 Corporate Risk Register*, WFP, 2011

³⁹³ *2012 Risk Appetite Statement*, WFP, 2012

³⁹⁴ *2015 Enterprise Risk Management Policy*, WFP, 2015

³⁹⁵ *2016 Risk Appetite Statement*, WFP, 2016

programmatic risks. Inefficient organizational structure and lack of staff skill sets, and non-compliance with core financial procedures were identified as the main institutional risks.

67. In the third quarter operational briefing presented to the Executive Board in July 2016, the critical risks were identified as:

- Contextual risks: economic fluctuations coupled with lean season deepening food insecurity and political instability and localized conflicts with violations of ceasefire
- Programmatic risks: Pipeline breaks in time of lean season when hunger gap is the largest, WFP contractors and transporters face both security incidents and poor infrastructure and high turnover and inconsistent capacity of cooperating partners
- Institutional risks: Reputational concerns as result of volatile environment, reduced capacity to cover beneficiary needs and media attention

68. The analysis, which is done while planning a programme, enables the country office to ensure that appropriate safeguards and mitigation strategies are in place before the activity takes place. From this perspective, it is very useful to have the procedures in place. At the implementation stage, especially when planning actions within conflict zones the country office has to take decisions every day that could have life-or-death impact on staff and beneficiaries and severe loss of resources. The country office feels that there is no clear “red line” from corporate level that would assist the country office in making decisions, but since the policy clearly states that there is a balance to be struck between the cost of managing risk and the anticipated benefits, there cannot be a red line that applies in generality. For example, the policy does not state that the loss of WFP staff lives is unacceptable. The policy also states to ensure that “risks and opportunities are managed systematically and proactively at the lowest feasible management level.” This seems to preclude red lines being drawn at the corporate level. WFP has instituted mitigating measures to limit the main threats to the emergency programme.

69. The country office has prepared an access strategy, although it is still in draft form.³⁹⁶ It outlines the challenges faced to staff and resources in the face of ongoing conflict. Access negotiations are central to all visits to conflict areas. WFP has developed relationships with over 300 combatant leaders and convoys or flights will not go through or to their areas without advance permission. Prepositioning of food during the dry season by ground convoy is much less expensive than airlifting. However prepositioned food is always at risk of looting so WFP Country Office has to balance the cost saving against the risk of loss.

EQ11. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

70. Since 2014³⁹⁷ WFP planning on the number of food insecure people to target annually for *in situ* general food assistance is based on the IPC estimation of the number of people in Phases III, IV and V – adapted based on more recent displacements and nutritional updates³⁹⁸. The stated method involves targeting the

³⁹⁶ WFP South Sudan Humanitarian Access Strategy, undated 2015?

³⁹⁷ In 2011 to 2013 the estimation was based on the FSNMS data.

³⁹⁸ WFP staff indicated that for planning of distributions the IPC/FSNMS data was overlaid firstly with an analysis of access, security and partnership presence. Secondly, it was adjusted based on rapid assessments of recent displacement.

whole population in Phase 4 and 5 and a variable proportion (which varies by both geography and year) of up to 50 percent of the Phase 3 population. In theory, this provides transparency in the basis of the caseload, the assurance of a multi-agency process to confirm the figures³⁹⁹ and is under the technical leadership of Government. The IPC figures also provide a common basis of planning for other United Nations agencies. In addition, registered beneficiaries in the protection of civilian camps and refugees, who are not considered in the IPC analysis, are included in the general food assistance caseload.


71. However, in practice the data available to the evaluation team did not allow independent verification of the degree of coherence between the IPC figures and planned general food assistance beneficiaries as the different caseloads could not be distinguished. [Table 26](#) and [Figure 16](#) below show the estimated numbers of people in the three highest IPC phases (crisis, emergency and famine), and in the two highest phases (emergency and famine) in comparison with the general food assistance plan for each year.

Table 26: Numbers of highly food insecure people and planned general food assistance by year

Year	IPC phase 3,4,5	IPC phase 4,5	GFA (Planned)
2014	3,525,283	1,123,446	2,155,700
2015	3,808,000	911,000	1,822,067
2016	4,093,000	1,013,000	2,266,445

Source: IPC reports and standard project reports 2011-2016

Figure 16: Highly food insecure people and planned general food assistance by year



Source: IPC reports and standard project reports 2011-2016

72. WFP has provided general food assistance to large numbers of beneficiaries in each of the last five years through three EMOPS and the PRRO. [Table 27](#) and [Figure 17](#) show the planned and actual figures for each year.

³⁹⁹ If WFP developed the estimate independently it would leave them open to accusations of bias

Table 27: Number of general food assistance beneficiaries by operation and year

Year	Operation	Planned	Actual	%A/P
2012	EMOP 200338	349,408	883,254	253%
2013	EMOP 200338	1,232,420	1,401,786	114%
2014	EMOP 200659	1,740,000	1,434,127	82%
	PRRO 200572	415,700	450,236	108%
2015	EMOP 200659	1,330,630	1,442,692	108%
	EMOP 200859	1,404,368	1,033,639	74%
	PRRO 200572	491,437	504,066	103%
2016	EMOP 200859	1,761,805	2,282,888	130%
	PRRO 200572	504,640	1,352,106	268%
Average				116%

Source: Standard project reports 2011-2016

Figure 17: Number of general food assistance beneficiaries by operation (2012-2016)




Source: country office standard project reports

73. The total number of beneficiaries for 2016 was 3,634,994. The operations reached more beneficiaries than planned in all but two cases and on average-the actual reached was 138 percent of the plan. The gender balance was consistent with the plan in all years except 2014. [Figure 18](#) shows the planned and actual beneficiary numbers by year disaggregated by sex. The graph shows that the actual beneficiaries followed

the same gender balance as the planned beneficiaries, except in 2014, where the actual men beneficiaries were 138 percent of the plan whereas the actual women total was 97 percent of the plan.

Figure 18: Number of beneficiaries disaggregated by sex and year



Source: SPRs 2012-2016

74. Outcome indicators are recorded for all operations but as there have been three different EMOPs over a six-year period with varying beneficiary groups (internally displaced persons, returnees, camps as well as the severely food insecure) it is impossible to observe trends in the performance. This is exacerbated by the lack of consistency in scoring system over the evaluation period with food consumption score (FCS) recorded at one or three levels, dietary diversity index (DDI) and coping strategy indices (CSI) all making an appearance at different times. The standard project report texts do however supply a lot of detail and explanation about the possible outcomes of the programme and, with one exception noted below, do not make unsubstantiated claims. The following notes are largely drawn from the standard project report texts.

- EMOP 200338 2012 – Food consumption score showed that more than half the households had an acceptable score. The improvement was less than planned and it is likely that they are partly due to a favourable growing season and good harvest.
- EMOP 200338 2013 – Food consumption scores increased showing a very positive result. Again, the standard project report suggests that another good growing season resulted in increased productivity, helping to boost food consumption scores. Greater Upper Nile states had poorer results⁴⁰⁰ and this was attributed to access issues, conflict, seasonal flooding and unreliable income sources.
- EMOP 200659 2014 – A marked improvement in dietary diversity was reported and fewer households fell into the poor food consumption score category. Due to the high predictions of food insecurity due to the conflict a survey was carried out in July 2014. The survey found that “food assistance and nutrition treatment programs have mitigated the Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in 4 counties and they are now classified as Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Food assistance has also improved outcomes in major IDP concentrations (e.g. Minkaman and UN PoC areas)” The September 2014 IPC report concluded that “in the areas it has

⁴⁰⁰ Not separately reported.

reached, humanitarian assistance has reduced the number of people in Crisis and Emergency phases.”

- EMOP 200659 2015 – Food consumption scores, the dietary diversity index and the coping strategy index were recorded in the camps but logistical difficulties prevented representative data being collected from rural sites. The only indication of outcome again comes from the IPC analysis. This reported that although the number of food insecure households decreased from the previous assessment cycle (May 2015), the perceived improvement is due to the post-harvest season, and not as substantial as in previous years. In fact, the food security situation has deteriorated each period from year to year since the start of the conflict.
- More starkly the number of food insecure people during harvest periods (October to December) increased from 1.5 million in 2014 to 3.9 million in 2015 probably due to the combined and long-term effects of the conflict, worsening economic crisis, high food prices, depleted livelihood options, limited humanitarian access and a reduced harvest output. Lack of access for delivering humanitarian assistance was regarded as another reason for the worsening food security situation. The 2015 standard project report claims that “WFP's efforts to provide life-saving food assistance have been crucial in averting a looming hunger catastrophe.” Although this is likely to be true, given the depth of the crisis and the scale of the response, there is no direct evidence to support the claim.
- EMOP 200859 2015 – During the three months of this EMOP in 2015, baseline data was recorded for food consumption scores, dietary diversity index and coping strategy indices. Food consumption score data was recorded in the camps where it was found that the percent of households with poor food consumption scores was higher than in remote rural areas (38 percent against 28 percent). This is concerning since those in camps are under the protection of the United Nations. It was suggested that the causes may be 1) biases in the assessment missions with the most food insecure regions being inaccessible, 2) high levels of illness in the camps, 3) lack of access to own production in the camps and a large influx of internally displaced persons (10,800 in June alone) to the Bentiu camp between the assessment missions. The influx meant that prepositioned food was used up in half the expected time and food rations had to be reduced.
- EMOP 200859 2016 – food consumption scores, dietary diversity index and coping strategy index data was collected in 2016, but process was very difficult and the third party monitor was only able to collect 46 percent of the sample plan in the first round in June and 30 percent in the second round in September. Reliability of the data is therefore suspect.
- Nevertheless, the results on food consumption scores were positive with a reduction in poor food consumption scores and an increase in acceptable food consumption scores. Dietary diversity index improved from baseline but remained low. Households in the affected areas also had to contend with erratic deliveries due to constraints on the air delivery process organised as part of the integrated rapid response mechanism (IRRM). This may have reduced the effectiveness of the operation.

Up to 2014, preparedness activities were carried out with the Government of South Sudan.

75. The output indicators for the activities are reported below (Table 28). Under EMOP 200338 WFP worked with the government to train staff and set up food security systems. Despite the conflict, the work continued in 2014. In 2015 and 2016 emergency preparedness activities were scaled back, but WFP early warning systems and disaster risk management advisor continued to provide technical assistance institutional capacity development within the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and the Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC).

Table 28: Output indicators relating to preparedness

Operation	Indicator	2012		2103		2014		Total		
		Plan (P)	Actual (A)	P	A	P	A	P	A	P/A (%)
EMOP 200338	Number of food security monitoring systems in place	3	3	4	4			7	7	
EMOP 200338	Number of government staff members trained in food security monitoring systems	150	130	12	12			162	142	88%
PRRO 200572	Number of disaster preparedness and risk management tools incorporated in government core functions and budget					83	83	83	83	100
PRRO 200572	Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions					226	226	226	226	100
PRRO 200572	Number of food security and nutrition monitoring/surveillance reports produced with WFP support					7	7	7	7	100
PRRO 200572	Number of food security monitoring systems in place					6	6	6	6	100
PRRO 200572	Number of government staff members trained in food security monitoring systems					110	110	110	110	100

Source: Standard project reports

76. The only outcome indicator that was recorded for the preparedness activity was disaster preparedness. This was recorded as a “4” in both 2012 and 2013 but not recorded in later years. The indicators confirm that the training of government staff together with technical support in data collection through VAM was helping the Government to participate in the food security and nutrition monitoring surveys. During the field missions, interviewees were positive about the WFP programme but raised several points about its effectiveness.

77. Distributions are frequently delayed – December 2016 distributions were arriving in Akobo at the time of the evaluation in February 2017. Delays are also experienced in cash distributions. This can be serious as rapid inflation erodes the value of the cash /voucher within a few days. Salt or oil is sometimes missing from the rations. The quantity of lentils was reported as insufficient – it is needed for soup. Beneficiaries in the camps do not like to receive red sorghum – they would prefer white or yellow sorghum or rice. ICRC rations were reported to be better than WFP – with different commodities and amounts.

78. Cooperating partners reported that the programme would be more effective if there were more resources to build capacity of local authorities. This would be mostly training of cooperating partner staff. WFP has introduced cash-based transfer in South Sudan in 2014. The modality has faced considerable challenges, so the distributions have been much smaller than planned. Table 29 shows the total value of the cash and voucher distributions for general food assistance. There was a small cash programme in 2014 under PRRO 200572. The distribution was smaller than planned as many did not wish to return following the increase in conflict. Cash was distributed for food for assets in 2014

Table 29: Cash and voucher distributions by operation and year

Operation	Year	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned
EMOP 200659	2014	19,750,000	0	0
PRRO 200572	2014	1,903,750	1,324,038	69.5
EMOP 200659	2015	29,700,000	7,195,289	24.2
EMOP 200859	2015	4,927,500	1,866,422	37.9
PRRO 200572	2015	5,596,048	2,680,640	47.9
EMOP 200859	2016	25,469,100	9,562,581	37.5
PRRO 200572	2016	6,000,000	4,102,201	68.4
Overall		93,346,398	26,731,171	28.6

Source: Standard project reports

79. Under EMOP 200659, cash transfers were planned in 2014 in certain locations with suitable banking systems but this was postponed due to a resurgence of fighting. In addition, extensive preparations were made to implement commodity voucher activities in Juba protection of civilian camps and Mingkaman. These activities were, however, delayed due to beneficiaries' reluctance to accept the change.

80. In 2015 cash-based transfers (value vouchers) were introduced in Mingkaman. The value vouchers replaced 30 percent of the in-kind cereal component and were based on the market value of that component. It was then also implemented in the Juba UNMISS protection of civilian camps, replacing 50 percent of the cereal ration. WFP prepared both communities for the additional modality through community discussions, visibility items (posters) and media engagement especially through radio channels.

81. Because of the sharp decline in the country's economic situation which increased the disparity between the official /United Nations exchange rate and a parallel rate used informally, a planned expansion to replace all in-kind commodities with vouchers in these locations became cost-ineffective and was not implemented. Additionally, the financial, market and security situation did not allow for the distribution of cash instead of vouchers. This resulted in just 24 percent of the planned cash and voucher distributions being implemented.

82. Under the new EMOP 200859, the programme continued in the Juba UNMISS protection of civilian camps and Mingkaman. Security, financial and market conditions were not yet able to support the implementation of unrestricted cash transfers. In four of the UNMISS protection of civilian camps and Mingkaman, WFP also provided milling vouchers, allowing internally displaced persons to mill up to 70 percent of their WFP cereal ration. This contributed to stabilizing milling prices and maintaining a functioning market for commercial millers.

83. In 2016, unrestricted value vouchers were provided to beneficiaries in Mingkaman and the Juba protection of civilian camps to replace 70 percent of the cereal component in the food basket. WFP analysis indicated that cash-based transfers (CBT) were more cost-efficient than in-kind transfers in these locations, which are close to main markets and connected to multiple supply routes. WFP recognised that in South Sudan's high-inflation environment, the cost-efficiency of cash-based transfers could deteriorate. This risk was mitigated through regular monitoring of market prices.⁴⁰¹ WFP considered introducing cash transfers in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Greater Warrap to fully or partially replace in-kind distributions, however conditions were not found to be suitable. Large-scale distributions are expected in several states in 2017. One way to reduce the logistical burden of moving food could be to scale up cash-based transfer (CBT) programmes in some locations. NBEG and Greater Warrap seem the best candidates for assessing the feasibility of market-based interventions, given their lowest rates of insecurity so far.

84. A rapid market assessment was conducted in November 2016 to provide recommendations to fine-tune WFP interventions in these two areas.⁴⁰² The study found that:

- The prices of all goods, including food, are skyrocketing, leading to one of the worst hyperinflation episodes ever recorded. Prices were increasing due to insecurity and a crashing exchange rate.
- Trade routes to Juba and Sudan are very unstable.
- Many traders have gone out of business because their margins have been squeezed between increasingly high running costs and sluggish demand.

85. The study recommended only a small cash-based transfer intervention with flexibility to change if necessary at short notice. The result illustrates the difficulty that WFP faces the challenge of choosing between in-kind food assistance that carries high risks and costs, particularly for air delivery or cash that can only give benefit to the community members if there are functioning markets, sufficient security of movement and sufficient price stability. Targeting beneficiaries in unstable or conflict zones such

⁴⁰¹ Further details in annex relating to efficiency.

⁴⁰² *The South Sudan Western Trade Corridor In Times Of Hyperinflation, Rapid Market Assessment in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and Warrap*, WFP, 2017

as Greater Upper Nile was very difficult and required a special mechanism to be created.⁴⁰³

86. WFP and UNICEF set-up a joint rapid response mechanism (RRM)⁴⁰⁴ with a smaller level of participation also from FAO, designed to reach the hardest to reach areas and to re-open humanitarian space, using general food distribution as a way to access large numbers of conflict-affected populations, conduct registrations and allow screening to trigger services in nutrition and other sectors. The WFP-UNICEF rapid response mechanism targeted, as a priority, areas with particularly alarming food insecurity levels, and delivered an integrated package of life-saving humanitarian relief. The agencies collaborated with more than fifty local and international organisations and gathered support from donors and humanitarian partners operating in South Sudan.

87. In the first year, more than 1.34 million people were reached by WFP general food distribution, including 220,000 children under five who received blanket supplementary feeding in areas targeted under the rapid response mechanism. WFP provides a 30-day food ration and in most cases returns after two months. WFP provides a half ration for a period of two months during the rapid response mechanism. The rapid response mechanism was also an enabler in reaching significant numbers of people previously out of reach. Close to three quarters of all people serviced by WFP food distributions were reached via the rapid response mechanism. WFP and UNICEF however faced tremendous obstacles, one third of missions planned were eventually cancelled or delayed because of volatile security and a tough operating environment.

88. Since 2015, WFP has also been working with a number of static and mobile NGOs. WFP/UNICEF/FAO led the rapid response missions, but during the crisis in 2016 UNICEF pulled out. WFP now has most of the responsibility for rapid response missions. Now WFP only conducts rapid response missions with UNICEF in situation where full registration is possible. It was reported that the main added-value of FSLC was in the strong coordination of the main stakeholders and the ownership and commitment that stakeholders (United Nations and NGOs) have in the assessment process as well as their contribution to make the assessments as comprehensive and accurate as possible. The Food Security and Logistics Cluster (FSLC) has generally met its output indicator targets although in 2016, due to the conflict in Juba the number of meetings and training courses held was below target. There, outcome indicator for SO 200775 (user satisfaction) shows a drop from 82 percent (baseline and 2015) to 77 percent (2016) against a project end target >82 percent. The FSLC participates in the Food Security Cluster website.⁴⁰⁵ Regular assessment reports and other documents are promptly uploaded and notice is given of meetings and training courses. Table 30 shows the results of the FSLC against indicators.

⁴⁰³ CO interviews

⁴⁰⁴ *The WFP-UNICEF Rapid Response Mechanism in South Sudan - One Year On - Results, Challenges and Way Forward* – WFP/UNICEF May 2015

⁴⁰⁵ <http://fscluster.org/south-sudan-rep/overview>

Table 30: results of the FSLC against indicators

Operation	Output	Year	Planned	Actual	% Completed
Food Security Cluster Augmentation SO 200423	Number of bulletins, maps and other logistics information produced and shared	2012	173	167	97
		2013	90	91	101
		2014	100	108	108
	Number of humanitarian partners / Cluster participants trained	2012	57	57	100
		2013	200	120	60
		2014	200	171	86
Strengthening Food Security and Livelihood Cluster Coordination SO 200775	Number of cluster coordination meetings conducted	2015	24	21	88
		2016	34	21	87
	Number of field coordination meetings convened	2015	80	55	69
		2016	108	63	58
	Number of food security and nutrition monitoring/surveillance reports produced with WFP support	2015	3	3	100
		2016	3	2	67
	Number of inter-cluster contingency plans developed	2015	1	1	100
	Number of partner organizations participating in the cluster system nationally	2015	100	70	70
		2016	100	126	126
	Number of partners that provided updated information through the online reporting tool	2015	100	53	53
	Number of partners that took part in the monthly 5W tool	2016	72	58	81
	Number of United Nations agency and NGO staff trained	2015	100	214	214
		2016	50	27	54

Source: Standard project reports

89. Although it includes the word “livelihood” in its title the cluster is now almost entirely emergency focussed on emergency response with very little involvement in development activities. During 2013, the cluster facilitated discussions on resilience, livelihood programming and other recovery oriented activities. The FSLC also conducted workshops to integrate disaster risk management (DRM) activities into livelihood programmes. This resulted in increased awareness among partners of

resilience programming and the importance of food security cluster coordination efforts.

90. Since 2014, the emphasis has moved almost entirely to emergency coordination as a result of the scale of the emergency response and the much smaller opportunity (due to conflict and available funds) for development work.

EQ12. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes?

91. It was recognised by most interviewees that WFP has a very difficult job in the planning, transporting, distribution and monitoring of operations. While most expressed a generally positive view of the operations, there were some areas that they felt could be improved.⁴⁰⁶ It was reported that once the prepositioned food is finished there tends to be a delay before subsequent airdrops. It should be possible to coordinate more closely the ending of the prepositioned stocks with the mobilization of airdrops. In some cases, delays were due to prioritization, while recognising that this may be necessary it did cause problems for beneficiaries – if they were due distributions every two months then delays led to an interval of three or four months.

At distributions, it appeared that group representatives did not always have suitable receptacles to subdivide food. It was suggested that the process of subdivision could be better organised and some spare sacks kept available. Despite the consolidation of field level agreements since 2014, it was reported by cooperating partners that there still needs to be some further rationalisation in the field as, in some cases, WFP and more than one cooperating partner may be all be involved in Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) and process monitoring at the same location.

92. WFP fleet trucks cost the same as commercial trucks, but it is much quicker and simpler to mobilise the WFP truck, therefore WFP trucks are preferred at the local level. Also there is a need for smaller trucks for small local deliveries, or more arrangements for cooperating partners to arrange the transport. This applies particularly to the nutrition foods. The Food Security and Livelihood Cluster is the biggest cluster in South Sudan in terms of number of partners and geographical coverage. However, staffing and performance of the cluster have fluctuated considerably over the period of review

The staff of the cluster pointed out that in April 2017 there will be a full complement of staff (two coordinators and three information management officers) for the first time in at least a year. They noted however that in the past, good use was made of a Global Food Security Cluster Roster as part of the Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanisms (IARRM) to mobilise surge staffing.

93. The arrangement of having two coordinators was changed in 2016, so that now there is a single coordinator equally accountable to FAO and WFP. It was reported by both organisations that prior to 2014 difficult relations between FAO and WFP meant that the joint coordination mechanism did not work well and that the functioning of the FSLC suffered as a result.

94. Cluster staff in Juba reported that the link between the national and sub-cluster (i.e. sub-national level) was not working. Cluster staff believe that the sub-clusters are not operating but the evaluation team met them at Akobo and Mingkaman, this

⁴⁰⁶ Sources are interviews with CO and SO staff, CPs, beneficiaries and other stakeholders in the field.

reinforces the statement that the linkage is weak. Sub-clusters have been replaced sub-nationally to some extent by local coordination forums. These are a combination of state-level and county-level forums where food security and livelihood partners meet occasionally.

95. At present, there is no government co-chair of the FLSC in South Sudan, although there is a government liaison officer within WFP. Local NGOs are involved in the FLSC but their capacity is generally weak and until recently they have rarely managed to access Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) resources. There is now a target in place for national NGOs to access 20 percent of the Common Humanitarian Fund funds as a result of the Humanitarian Summit in 2016.⁴⁰⁷ During 2016, 4 of the 17 partners that received part of the USD 8.8 million Strategic Humanitarian Allocation (SHA) fund were national NGOs.⁴⁰⁸

96. At the global level the Food Security Cluster was only formed in 2010.⁴⁰⁹ During SO 200423 the level of support from the global Food Security Cluster was perceived as limited. There was little reported support in terms of guidance material, policy or training.

EQ13. What is the extent of WFP contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

97. Gender is mainstreamed in all operations; this results in a strong effort by WFP to reduce gender inequality and involve women in the planning and implementation of programmes. The focus of the gender activities is on improving women's access to resources, assets, services and markets for staple food crops. EMOPs and PRROs have targeted actions addressing gender inequalities. For example, the PRRO 200572 and EMOP 200859 both scored 2A against the IASC gender marker code indicating that the operations mainstream gender in their design and have the potential to contribute significantly to gender equality.

98. Discussions with communities are usually only conducted with chiefs, but WFP calls women and youth into discussions where possible. According to process monitoring records, the gender balance of food committees tends to be 20 percent women. However, in registrations for food there are inevitably more women than men, due to demographic and conflict dynamics. During field visits it was noted that nearly all wholesale traders are men, while in the camps many women are also involved. There may be opportunities for WFP to provide positive incentives for women to become wholesalers, although cultural norms and protection issues may pose serious barriers. WFP plays a strong role in advocacy and awareness, this is particularly valuable in a country with entrenched gender disparity. WFP raised the need for advocacy around World Rural Women's Day, through the media and at the United Nations Gender Technical Group. While this was endorsed, it was mainly WFP that undertook media activities. For the first time in September 2015 - South Sudan radio stations organized discussions and programmes around this day.

99. WFP South Sudan developed messages on WFP engagement with rural women on key themes such as early marriage. These were used on radio shows and events such as World Rural Women's Day 2016. The country office website has published several

⁴⁰⁷ World Humanitarian Summit, Istanbul, May 2016.

⁴⁰⁸ SPR 200775, WFP, 2016

⁴⁰⁹ <http://fscluster.org/page/about-food-security-cluster>

stories focusing on WFP activities related to gender and women's empowerment, and have delivered a number of speeches on the subject at key events.

100. WFP undertakes capacity building of women and youth (in a context of very high illiteracy across South Sudan), hosts or supports a series of advocacy events (such as National and International Girls Education Day, International Rural Women's Day, World Food Day), and holds meetings with academia, mothers, school children and parents to inform them on what WFP does to ensure gender equality in its country programme. WFP staff in South Sudan is predominantly men but it has some women in senior positions including the Country Director and a Deputy Country Director. In 2016, the majority of WFP staff (excluding short term staff) in the country were men - (2,918 of 3,583).⁴¹⁰ Seventy percent of internationally recruited staff were men and 83 percent of national staff were men.

101. Most women staff were deployed in Juba, with relatively few in sub-offices (only one G Level woman staff in each of Aweil, Bentiu, Malakal, and Wau). By contrast, a greater percentage of men with a wider range of grades were spread across the sub offices.⁴¹¹ WFP did not have a strong gender focus but has new policies and strategies and actively participates in a number of gender initiatives. Since December 2015 the country office has a full-time gender adviser who supports various technical units in planning, implementation, monitoring and review of the progress to gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) across programmes and operations. Measures towards gender equality are now more driven by the country office than by support from headquarters. The country office has produced several key documents including: South Sudan Gender Equality Report,⁴¹² a Gender Strategy⁴¹³ and a Protection Strategy (2016 to 2020)⁴¹⁴ and the National Girls' Education Strategy South Sudan.⁴¹⁵

102. WFP has signed two memoranda of understanding with UN Women at the level of the country office. The partnership between UN Women and WFP in South Sudan is expected to bring a more comprehensive response in support of the economic empowerment of rural women and girls through joint actions. WFP also works with UNICEF, rural women groups, and pilot initiatives such as P4P cooperatives. WFP engages its workforce, partners and beneficiary groups (for example, women farmer groups), and stakeholders on gender issues. The profile of gender has been increased through training and staff involvement.

103. Since 2011 the country office has engaged a more informed focus of efforts, with new ways of communication, and taken measures for more capacity development than in the past. Now there is more staff participation in gender meetings, Learning Management System training. The WFP Country Office has worked hard to make gender everybody's business, through showing linkages between outcomes and gender equality. It has engaged communities on their views, discussed positive and negative gender perceptions, explained the need for equal opportunities, and communicated non-violent gender messages. WFP staff have been recognized for two gender initiatives under the portfolio since 2011: Women for Women Initiative, and Men Stand for Gender Equality Initiative.

⁴¹⁰ Co data 2011-2016

⁴¹¹ CO data

⁴¹² *South Sudan Gender Equality Report*, WFP, 2015

⁴¹³ *South Sudan Gender Strategy*, WFP, 2015

⁴¹⁴ *South Sudan Protection Strategy*, WFP, 2015

⁴¹⁵ *South Sudan National Girls' Education Strategy*, WFP, 2015 for the Government of South Sudan

EQ14. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

104. The emergency preparedness and response programme has close ties with the nutrition programme especially during assessment and implementation. Because both programmes are working in the conflict-affected states, the resources and staff are frequently shared. The rapid response mission has combined the needs assessments of emergency nutrition activities with the assessments of UNICEF. These assessments typically cover food security and nutrition, water and sanitation, health and protection. WFP response typically covers blanket supply of general food assistance and CSB++ (+ plumpy Sup for treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) among children 0.5 to 5 years of age). WFP provides a 30 day general food assistance ration and in most cases returns after two months. WFP provides a half ration for a period of two months during rapid response mission. General food assistance and food for assets may be used in conjunction to maximise the benefits to the community but the common programme has not been strong.

105. The linkage in the programme between general food assistance and food for assets is not strong. Because they are generally carried out in different areas and under different operations there has been little common programming. This has changed to some extent in 2016 with the relaxation of the geographical boundaries around the PRRO and EMOP areas.

106. Beneficiaries of food for assets programmes are selected at the household level. In order to be selected for physical work there must be at least one able-bodied member of the household to carry out the work. In many communities, there are households that qualify to participate in food for assets on the grounds of food insecurity but do not have an able-bodied family member so cannot be selected. In these cases, general food assistance can be provided to ensure that the most vulnerable members of the community (e.g. widows, single mothers and the disabled) are not excluded. Food for assets “light” is an example of an activity that is between the standard food for assets and general food assistance activities. In name, it is conditional but the conditionality is not onerous. The activity is designed as a stepping stone for beneficiaries from the aid mentality to full conditionality.

EQ15. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

107. WFP works closely with partners in the coordination and management of protection of civilian camps including with several United Nations agencies including UNMISS, UNOCHA, UNHCR, IOM, WHO and UNICEF to ensure that all the requirements of the camp residents are met. WFP is responsible for feeding and uses the SCOPE system for registration. There would be substantial synergies to be achieved if a single digital registration system could be used by all agencies. In other programmes WFP works closely with other United Nations agencies but opportunities to work more collaboratively with cooperating partners are sometimes missed.

108. The rapid response mission is a joint programme between WFP and UNICEF, while the coordination of the Food Security and Livelihood Cluster is the joint responsibility of WFP and FAO. Cooperating partners often have extensive experience in planning and implementing programmes, but too often they are not involved at the design stage and are only asked to implement a standard WFP activity. WFP has

complementary feeding activities with ICRC, which has better access to some areas of the country due to its status and reputation. It is able to respond very quickly in crises and to provide a wide range of food, nutrition and medical support to the affected population. WFP is able to follow up with greater resources and longer-lasting programmes

EQ16. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

109. By their nature, emergency actions are not designed to incorporate sustainability. However, much of the emergency programme results from underlying chronic problems that need to be addressed in order to make progress. Until the conflict is resolved and a stable government is in place, it is unlikely that markets will develop to their potential, transport routes will be opened up and food production will increase towards its potential. It is therefore likely that externally supported emergency operations will need to continue for some years.

110. A major negative aspect of WFP general food assistance programmes in the past has been the entrenching of an existing dependency syndrome; this is difficult to remove, but could be reduced by reducing the unconditional general distributions. WFP is introducing conditionality to more of its programmes; even in some of the camps food for assets “lite” programmes are in place where participants at least have to attend training in order to receive food or cash. The country office recognises the need to progressively change their support for food insecure communities from general food assistance through conditional support to resilience building. It is clear that this is not possible in the middle of conflict but remains a longer term goal.

111. The protection of civilian camps will need to be phased out eventually and the residents reintegrated into their communities. The camps are not under the control of WFP, but WFP must be part of the programme to make that change when security conditions allow. There was little evidence during the evaluation that there are exit strategies in place for the protection of civilian camps and the static internally displaced person community in Mingkaman. In smaller returnee communities in North Aweil, WFP was being asked by the community to provide support for increasing agricultural productivity. This shows the need for WFP to be sufficiently flexible to open up food for assets programmes wherever they may lead to communities meeting their own food needs.

Conclusions

- There were no major droughts during the evaluation period, but there were significant floods in 2012 and 2013 and South Sudan has a chronic food deficit. Much of the food crisis remains due to human factors and in particular the ongoing conflict.
- The proportion of the population food insecurity was very high but also varied widely between years and states. The emergency became much more severe with the outbreak of fighting in December 2013; despite a peace deal in August 2015 the food security situation has continued to deteriorate. In this context the country office’s three emergency operations were clearly in line with WFP Strategic Objective 1 – to save lives.
- National capacity-building activities including the development of a strategic grain reserve and preparedness training with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

started in 2012 and 2013 but halted after the conflict started; the activities were broadly in line with Government of South Sudan's objectives.

- WFP has used its comparative advantages of highly developed logistics capacity, extensive partnerships at the field level, wide geographical coverage with highly developed access and experience in managing emergencies. Managing cash-based transfers and digital beneficiary registration were also core skills for the emergency work.
- Accurate assessment of food security has been vital to planning relevant food programmes. WFP assessments are not perfect, but are accepted by all stakeholders. The FSNMS is backed up by regular market surveys and one-off assessments. The results contribute to the IPC which is endorsed by government. FSNMS and therefore IPCs are not accurate below state level. This makes operation planning difficult at sub-state level.
- Rapid response assessment missions are alternatively used for targeting beneficiaries in conflict zones where full assessments are not possible. The rapid response mission mechanism is a crude instrument and does not provide as detailed or accurate information as stakeholders would like, but provided sufficient data to plan the emergency deliveries.
- FSLC: The joint coordination of the FSLC is well harmonised with FAO and OCHA. FSLC is providing a very valuable service to the country and WFP maximises the value of the IPC. Although there is currently no development focus within the cluster, this will be needed when more funding for development work is available.
- The system-wide L3: This status brought increased support at the corporate level to the country office and some priority in procurement, but it did not bring in sufficient qualified staff to manage the crisis.
- Risk Management: WFP has a well prepared and documented risk management policy. The country office has the responsibility for making many difficult decisions with potential life-or-death consequences for staff and beneficiaries.
- Monitoring and evaluation: Outcomes have been difficult to assess over the period partly due to staff shortages in monitoring and evaluation, but mostly due to the ongoing conflict. What data that has been produced is positive but confounded with years of good crop production. Food insecurity became much worse in late 2014 according to IPC data. In the absence of WFP interventions, it is likely that the situation would have been much worse, but there is no firm data to support this.
- Programme cost efficient: This has been good, given the difficult operating conditions. Problems with timeliness were the main complaint from beneficiaries. The cash-based transfer programme has had many difficulties due to conflict, hyperinflation and weak markets.
- Gender The country office has improved with the appointment of a gender advisor. Although staff followed corporate procedures before the advisor raised the profile of gender issues within the country office, with beneficiaries and in the news media.
- Sustainability: Continued large scale general food assistance encourages an aid dependency culture that has become well established in South Sudan over many

years. Despite the crisis there are opportunities to move from general food assistance to conditional transfers in camps and in areas where the conflict subsides.

Issues for Consideration:

- Continue to seek new ways to introduce conditionality to distributions with the aim of making all distributions in camps conditional.
- Continue to seek opportunities to introduce cash-based transfers into the programme; market development should be part of the WFP role.
- WFP needs to find ways of achieving reliable outcome monitoring in conflict situations. This may require greater resources than are currently available for monitoring and evaluation, including more training of partner organisations working in the field. It should be noted that this weakness does not only apply in conflict areas, as the food for assets outcome monitoring has similar difficulties.
- Geographical selection and beneficiary selection. These should remain based on the IPC results but at the local level WFP should continue to take information from all available sources including partners and other organisations working in the area, local authorities and the rapid response missions. The rapid response missions could perhaps be more flexible so that where security conditions allow, the assessment team should be allowed a longer time to maximise the accuracy of the assessment and the value of the mission.
- Consider exit strategies for Mingkaman and the protection of civilian camps.
- Start to introduce livelihood coordination and planning issues into the FSLC.

Annex N: Evaluation of Efficiency

Background

1. This annex refers to the quantitative analysis of efficiency as defined in the Technical Note on Efficiency Analysis (TN).⁴¹⁶ It has been carried out in order to meet the requirements of para 34 of the ToR⁴¹⁷ and follows the guidance of the EQAS guidelines. The approach is based on paragraph 83 and Annex I of the inception report⁴¹⁸ and follows advice received from WFP Headquarters during the data collection phase.⁴¹⁹ Qualitative analysis of efficiency is covered in the technical annexes – under sub-question 12. The technical note breaks down the analysis into two parts to answer the following questions:

- Is WFP doing things right?
- Is WFP doing the right things?

2. The first relates to the strategic choices between various options (e.g. types of intervention or modalities) while the second relates to operational efficiency. Two tools are recommended in the technical note in order to help answer these questions. The first is unit cost benchmarking and the second is cost effectiveness analysis. Each of these is considered in turn.

Unit Cost Benchmarking

3. This technique is based on the costs per unit (normally food) and tests whether the costs of an intervention have been kept under control. It answers the question “Is WFP doing things right?” by allowing a comparison of actual costs with WFP global benchmarks; WFP corrected benchmarks (if available) and look at trends in the actual costs over time within the evaluation period. Despite this being the recommended method for unit cost benchmarking WFP Headquarters was unable to supply global or corrected benchmarks. It was reported that there are no references of previous efficiency studies based on global benchmarks.

4. This leaves two approaches which might help understand whether WFP is spending its money wisely – firstly (in the absence of benchmarks) we could look at the absolute cost figures and decide whether the outputs and outcomes outweigh the costs. Even in an extreme situation there must be a limit to the amount of resources that can be spent to achieve a goal. Secondly, we could compare the benefits and costs over time and activities to determine whether there are significant changes that should be examined more closely. This would allow us to identify factors (e.g. seasonal

⁴¹⁶ *Technical Note on Efficiency Analysis*, WFP (Renard and Lister), 2013

⁴¹⁷ Terms of Reference - South Sudan CPE Evaluation 2011-2016, WFP, 2016

⁴¹⁸ South Sudan CPE Evaluation 2011-2016 – Inception Report, Evaluation Team,

⁴¹⁹ Note from OEV focal point for cost efficiency/effectiveness analyses, 25/1/2017

[Following explanation to OEV that the team has alpha value information from CO] “The available alpha values are enough, no need to do more calculations. A few things to look at that I think could be interesting:

- Calculations, see for example whether all operational costs were included and how they factored in the start-up costs for cash.
- See if those alphas correspond to different seasons of the year (harvest vs lean)
- Have the break down by commodity (often happens the market is more competitive for cereals and sometimes pulses and WFP more competitive in oil and salt)
- See if the fortification of WFP foods has been somehow considered, even in the narratives of the reports.
- In case the chosen modality was deemed cost-inefficient (more expensive than the alternative), have the evaluators views on the opportunity costs of that decision.

If they have the alphas (the costs), it should be relatively easy to calculate a cost-effectiveness metric (at least those based in the FCS)”

changes to the mode of transport, global commodity price fluctuations) that make the activity more or less efficient.

5. Unfortunately, the current reporting structure is by operation and does not show breakdown of costs per activity,⁴²⁰ so it is not possible to compare the cost of activities over years without confounding all the activities within an operation (e.g. the PRRO cost data would be including school feeding, food for assets and general food assistance).

Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)⁴²¹ in South Sudan

6. The cost effectiveness analysis attempts to answer the question “Is WFP doing the right things?” In order to compare the value of two modalities, the costs and benefits of both options need to be calculated and then compared. In practice the country office applies this analysis through an alpha value calculation to determine whether food in-kind or cash provides the beneficiaries with a greater nutrient value per unit cost. For in-kind commodities, [Table 31](#) shows an example of the cost calculation.

Table 31: Example of in-kind cost calculation (USD/MT)⁴²²

Cost	White sorghum	Beans	Oil	Total
FOB /MT	350.00	823.67	1,100.25	
Ext Transport	56.00	78.26	69.44	
LTHS	1,296.39	1,296.39	1,296.39	
Total USD/MT	1,702.39	2,198.32	2,466.08	
Cost in SSP/kg	123.05	158.89	178.25	
Ration/person(p) /month (kg)	15.00	1.65	0.90	
Cost (before ODOC) /p/ month (SSP)	1845.75	262.16	160.42	2,268.33
Cost including ODOC /p/month (SSP)	1,993.39	262.47	160.60	2,416.46

Source: country office VAM unit

7. A separate calculation is made to determine the cost of the same ration in the local market ([Table 32](#)).

⁴²⁰ Although FLAs include budgeted costs of partners they do not include WFP costs.

⁴²¹ This annex follows the technical note – efficiency analysis is described in Tool Guide 2: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis.

⁴²² Not all elements of the calculation are shown, example is from November 2016

Table 32: Market price determination

Konyo market	White sorghum	Beans	Oil	Total cost before ODOC	Total cost including ODOC
Cost/p/month (SSP/kg)	806	152	98	1,056	1,119

Source: country office VAM Unit

8. In this case both calculations apply to the monthly ration per beneficiary so the overall cost can be compared directly. The in-kind cost including ODOC is 2,416 SSP/p/month whereas the comparable market value is 1,119 SSP/p/month. The ratio of these two figures (termed the alpha value) is 0.46⁴²³ – suggesting a strong financial advantage for the locally purchased food. Through a cash-based transfer system, WFP supplies cash or vouchers to the value of the market price (the transfer value). Table 33 shows the alpha values as calculated by VAM for each of the locations where cash interventions have been used since September 2016 for both the PRRO and the EMOP.

Table 33: Alpha values calculated by vulnerability analysis mapping (VAM) unit


Table 3: Alpha Values (using KCB rates)									
Location	PRRO (Alpha Value)				EMOP (Alpha Value)				
	Sep16	Oct16	Nov16	Dec16	Sep16	Oct16	Nov16	Dec16	Jan 17**
Juba	0.91	0.69	0.50	0.72	0.86	0.44	0.46	0.44	0.44
Wau	1.22	0.79	0.47	0.87	1.15	0.51	0.56	0.51	0.50
Aweil	1.38	0.81	0.50	0.56	1.13	0.52	0.36	0.44	0.38
Wunrok	-			0.86		0.62	0.57	0.57	0.45
Bor		0.65	0.44		0.63	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.57
Mingkaman			0.49	0.38	1.30	0.93	0.73	0.79	0.85
Yambio				0.38				0.26	0.24

Source country office VAM Unit

9. From this table, it is clear that the alpha values since October 2016 have been below 1.0 and therefore at all locations local purchase (i.e. via cash /voucher distribution) has been more cost efficient. Figure 19 shows the data for Juba and Aweil over time plotted from the values in the table above.

⁴²³ An alpha value greater than 1 indicates that the in-kind option is more cost efficient than the local purchase (cash) option.

Figure 19: Alpha values for Juba and Aweil - Sept 2016 to Jan 2017



Source: country office VAM Unit

10. The graph shows a seasonal trend – locally purchased food is more expensive in September before the newly harvest crop is available. This favours the in-kind option in September. During the period April 2015 to March 2016, a series of cash and voucher reports⁴²⁴ were produced. These reports have not been compiled since March 2016 due to lack of staff in the country office. The reports provided trend data and assisted in the planning of interventions. The period also corresponded to the start of a period of high inflation and for the South Sudanese pound (SSP) and devaluation against the United States dollar (USD).


11. Figure 20 shows the stability of the transfer values (i.e. market prices) up to April 2015 measured in SSP and the rapid increase since then. In October 2015, the country office changed its agreement with the financial service provider to reimburse in US dollars. The latest transfer values for December 2016 are 1,175 SSP for Juba up to 2,253 SSP in Mingkaman.⁴²⁵ It is worth noting that in 2013 and 2013 (years without high inflation or abnormal currency effects) there was no strong seasonality in market prices. Seasonal effects would be seen as high transfer values during July to September. However, in 2015 and 2016 there is strong evidence of seasonality.⁴²⁶

⁴²⁴ E.g. Monthly Report on Cash and Voucher, March 2016, WFP CO.

⁴²⁵ CO VAM department

⁴²⁶ See later graphs.

Figure 20: Monthly transfer values⁴²⁷ in SSP



Source: country office cash-based transfer department

12. At the same time, following the decision of the government to float the SSP in December 2015, the SSP was devalued against the dollar from less than 5 SSP = 1 USD to more than 80 SSP = 1 USD at the end of 2016. This has reduced the transfer value when measured in USD (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Monthly transfer values in USD




Source: country office cash-based transfer department

13. With reimbursement of the providers in US dollars and free floating of the SSP the cost advantage has swung back to cash rather than food assistance (Figure 22)

⁴²⁷ The monetary value of the actual transfer – based on the cost of the food basket.

Figure 22: Monthly alpha values based on market monitoring



Source country office cash-based transfer department

14. The cash-based transfer team also calculates alpha values by commodity each month. The alpha values for Juba /PRRO during the first quarter of 2016⁴²⁸ are typical:

- Cereal 0.53
- Beans 1.24
- Vegetable oil 1.27

15. The cash-based transfer intervention for cereal is the most cost efficient of the three commodities – this is a common observation in WFP interventions as pulses and oil is not so commonly produced locally. In theory, it might be possible to split the ration and supply the cereal through cash and the beans and oil in-kind. This would however be complicated and expensive to manage, so the choice of modality decision is based on the weighted mean of the food basket. The calculations of alpha values and transfer values have all been based on the standard food basket. WFP has taken the analysis one stage further by looking at nutritional value scores (NVS).⁴²⁹ This compares the effectiveness of the modalities at transferring energy (Kcals) to beneficiaries (described by cash-based transfer as nutrient cost-effectiveness)⁴³⁰(see [Box 8](#)).

⁴²⁸ Monthly Report on Cash and Voucher, March 2016, WFP CO.

⁴²⁹ Also referred to as nutrient value score – it accounts for macro and micro nutrients

⁴³⁰ Strictly speaking, nutritional/nutrient value score is an output rather than an outcome. The appropriate outcome would be food consumption score (FCS) but this is not so easily available.

Box 8: The omega value⁴³¹

The omega value

The omega value is a mandatory method for country offices to compare the cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of alternate transfer modalities.

For each modality, the cost effectiveness ratio (CER) is the cost of delivery /outcome (nutritional value score).

The omega value is the ratio of two CERs – if the CER for cash is 200 and the CER for in-kind is 180, then the omega value for cash/in-kind is $200/180 = 1.1$.

16. Using the calculation in box 8 above, the omega value decreased from 1.18 in September 2015 to 0.85 in March 2016. The combination of rapid inflation and artificially high exchange rate caused high prices in the market in September 2015 but after the SSP was floated, the cash-based transfer became more cost effective than in-kind.

17. The country office was unable to provide outcome data (i.e. change in food consumption score) that could be directly attributable to the WFP intervention,⁴³² so true cost effectiveness is impossible to calculate.

18. WFP has only two locations where cash and food interventions have been organised in the same place, Aweil and Mingkaman, but the contextual changes, including inflation, make these comparisons very difficult. In Aweil the operational fidelity was compromised by delays in cash payments for cash for assets, and that combined with a large general food assistance scale up in 2016 that covered the same participants would make comparison of outcomes of doubtful value. In the case of Mingkaman the economic conditions have changed considerably between the two activities, again making comparisons impossible.

Observations on how Cost Effectiveness Analysis is Applied in South Sudan

19. Food baskets are prepared, wherever possible, according to the requirements of the community – the staple food in some areas may be corn while in other areas it is sorghum. In the analysis of alpha values, the in-kind and market basket prices allow for these differences so that comparisons are like for like.

20. Due to the seasonal differences in market prices and the high rate of inflation the market surveys are carried out monthly and in some cases even more frequently. The information collected captures well the changes in market prices. However, carrying out surveys more than monthly is not very useful at the operational level as it is difficult to organise the transfer of funds to traders that frequently.

21. The country office calculation of alpha values includes all the costs related to food (in-kind and local market) including delivery to the beneficiary and an allocation for other direct operational costs (ODOC). The review team was not given information on how the ODOC have been allocated by programme so is unable to verify if it was done

⁴³¹ WFP (Renard and Lister), 2013. Technical Note on Efficiency Analysis

⁴³² Discussions with CO

accurately. ODOC generally represent about 3 percent of the overall cost so the figure is unlikely to significantly affect the alpha value.⁴³³

22. The cash /voucher option does not include the costs associated with the delivery of cash, including the payments to the financial service provider. This leads to an underestimate of these costs and the alpha values. The calculations do not make allowance for the start-up costs of new modalities. The introduction of cash takes a substantial amount of work to assess the market situation and develop sufficient capacity in the finance providers. In South Sudan, the programmes are large and likely to continue for several more years so it may be reasonable to assume that the start-up costs will be substantially diluted over the implementation period.

Context for Cost Effectiveness Analysis in South Sudan

23. Apart from the quantitative measurement, there are many other factors which need to be taken into account when deciding between modalities. These include:

- Periodic shortage of commodity particularly in the region – this is expected to recur in 2017. This may make in-kind impossible or high-risk. At other times, in-kind may be available from donors when cash is not
- Community preference
- Protection issues linked to either food or cash, including gender-based violence
- Some projects are 100 percent based on cash due to donor requirements (e.g. Brace 2)
- In regions where food is generally in surplus areas (e.g. Equatoria) cash is normally a better choice than food
- In Juba, cash is preferred as beneficiaries may resell part of their ration to meet non-food needs, with a consequent loss of efficiency
- Market conditions; availability of food, creditworthiness of traders and the ability of markets to sustain supplies and respond to changes
- Seasonality issues - cash may be easier to transfer than food in the rainy season when roads are impassable. Or it may be other way round and food can be pre-positioned or air dropped but markets do not function
- At the corporate level there is strong support for cash based interventions. As stated on the WFP website⁴³⁴ “While cash-based transfer does not fit every situation, it does fit an increasing number of them. This explains the strategic shift towards cash-based transfer, now covering more than a quarter of WFP’s portfolio; it is fast, efficient, and generally secure, it offers greater choice, it stimulates trade and it strengthens partnerships with governments.”

Conclusions

24. The country office carries out monthly market surveys and assesses the alpha values in an appropriate manner, although the costs for cash distribution should be included to provide an accurate comparison of the modalities and avoid systematic bias.

⁴³³ According to a WFP Finance Seminar [“Analysis of WFP cost components” (WFP, 2007)]

⁴³⁴ <https://www.wfp.org/content/2017-cash-based-transfers-fact-sheet>

25. The cash-based transfer programme produced trend data during 2015 and early 2016 but this was discontinued due to staff shortages. Given the scale of the cash programme it would be worthwhile for the country office to be able to restart these reports.

26. High inflation has had a major effect on the value of cash transfers and the constant monitoring of prices and adjustment of cash transfer values is critical to the effectiveness of the activities. Regular assessment of alpha values is also needed to ensure that modalities can be changed if necessary.

27. The choice of transfer modality is not primarily driven by cost considerations, although it remains important to be aware of the cost-efficiency of each option. In much of the country, cash-based transfers are not a feasible option due to limited market access and many other factors. However, where feasible, cash-based transfers appear to be a preferable option from a cost efficiency point of view. Possibly, given seasonal market disruptions, it may be appropriate to consider a system that allows distributions to move between cash and food according to local conditions.

28. The lack of global and corrected benchmarking makes the advice in the technical note unusable. The value of the benchmarking is not clear given that the circumstances in each country are very different – in South Sudan the cost of air delivery of food may be expected to increase the cost of in-kind food.

29. Although the country office has a monitoring system in place for measuring outcomes, its own lack of confidence in its ability to measure the effect of its programmes is worrying.⁴³⁵

Issues for Consideration

30. Calculations of alpha values should be reviewed to ensure that all costs are properly included.

31. Ensure that there are sufficient staff to carry out technical and financial analysis of the interventions including trends.

32. At a corporate level decide whether benchmarking is worthwhile – and if so then develop the benchmarks and update them regularly.

⁴³⁵ CO interview.

Annex O: Field Mission Schedule

Date	Time	Theme	Stakeholder representative	ET member(s)
Monday 16 January 2017		Morning		
		LUNCH		
		Afternoon		
			Security Briefing	Maria Ninno
	14:30-16:00	Introduction of evaluation from CPE team	Joyce Luma; Maria Bautista-Owen; Peter Schaller; Ross Smith; Jesse Wood; Adham Effendi; Getahun Amogne; Arshia Khan; Lillian Mokgosi; Debbie McLellan; Fiona Lithgow; Rustam Makhmudov; Katri Kangas	All
Tuesday 17 January 2017		Morning		
	8:30-9:30	HoP/DHoP	Ross Smith; Jesse Wood	All
	10:00-11:00	M&E		Angus, David, Annemarie
		Staff Wellness	Teoman Alp; Head of Admin	Nick
	11:30-12:30	CD	Joyce Luma	All
	12:30-13:30	LUNCH		
		Afternoon		
	13:30-14:30	Chief of Logistics	Peter Schaller	All
	15:00-16:00	Access	Rehan Zahid, Programme Officer	All
	16:30-17:30	Gender/Protection	Lillian Mokgosi, Gender and Protection Advisor	Nick, Angus, David, Annemarie
Logistics Officer Operations		Adham Effendi	George	
	Morning			

Wednesday 18 January 2017	8:30-9:30	FFE	Hebert Lopez, Head of Safety nets and Resilience Unit; David Lugeron, Programme Officer/FFE	David, Annemarie
		Logistics Fleet	Thomas Styer, Logistics Officer (Fleet)	George
		Finance Unit	David Namulunyi, Head of Finance	Nick
		Compliance	Maya Elhage, Compliance Officer	Angus
	10:30-11:30	UNICEF/Nutrition cluster	Mahimbo Mdoe, Country Representative	Nick, Angus, Annemarie
		WFP Feeder Roads	Rustam Makhmudov, Lead Engineer; Mohamed Nishreen, Engineer	David, George
	12:00-13:00	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Distaster Management + SSRRC	Mr. Gatwetch Peter Kulang, Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs; Mr. Tom Tombe, Director of NGO Affairs, SSRRC	Nick, Angus, Annemarie, George
13:00-14:00	LUNCH at UNMISS base/Tomping + Get UN ID badges			
Afternoon				
16:00-17:00	OCHA	Ian Ridley, Head of Office	All	
Thursday 19 January 2017	Morning			
	8:00-9:00	FFA/P4P	Hebert Lopez, Head of Safety nets and Resilience Unit	David
		Nutrition	Darline Raphael	Annemarie
		Logs cluster	Fiona Lithgow, Cluster Coordinator	Angus, George
	9:30-10:00	DFID	Vicky Stanger, ag. head of DFID South Sudan; Will Helyar, lead humanitarian advisor; Shadi Fathizadeh, sr. humanitarian programme manager	Nick, Angus, David, George
	10:45-11:45	Admin/Light Vehicles	Teoman Alp, Head of Admin	George
	11:00-12:00	Ministry for Agriculture and Food Security	Hon. Kornilio Kone, Ag. Minister for Agriculture and Food Security	Nick, David
12:15-13:15	NRC	Carina Vedvik Hansen; Mary Karanja, Food Security Specialist	Nick, Angus, David	
	Concern	Julia Lewis, Acting Country Director	Annemarie	

	13:00-14:00	UNHAS		George
	LUNCH			
	Afternoon			
	14:15-15:15	Oxfam	Clayton Mashapa; Benard Nyataya	Nick, Angus
		WVI	Eric Yunusu, Food Programming Manager; Lilian Mumbi, Emergency Response Director	David, Annemarie, George
	15:45-16:45	Save the Children	Pete Walsh, Country Director	Nick, Annemarie
		ETC	Richard Egwungu, Head of ICT; Solomon Welle, IT Officer	George
17:00-18:00	DCD Support Service	Maria Bautista-Owen	All	
Friday 20 Jan 2017	Morning			
	8:30-9:30	US/FFP+OFDA		All
	10:15-11:15	GAA	Augustin Madondi, Head of Project (WFP)	Angus
		Hold the Child	Alex Kiweesi, Nutrition team leader	Annemarie
		Donor Relations	Getahum Amogne	Nick
		Procurement	Adelina Tomas, Procurement Officer	George
	12:00-13:00	VAM	Krishna Pahari, Head of VAM	Angus, David, Annemarie
	LUNCH			
	Afternoon			
	14:00-15:00	P4P	Hebert Lopez, Head of Safety nets and Resilience Unit	David
		ERU/IRRM	Leonidace Rugemalila, Emergency Response Officer	Angus, Annemarie, George
15:30-16:30	Partnerships + COMET	Aymen Elamin, Programme Officer	Angus, Annemarie	
16:00-17:00	FAO	Serge Tissot, Country Representative	UN House	
Morning				
Morning				

Saturday 21 Jan 2017	9:30-12:30 (approx)	Juba PoC	Dimanche Amba, Field Monitor Assistant, Juba sub-office	All
	13:00-14:00	LUNCH		
	Afternoon			
	17:00-19:00	Dinner with CD	Joyce Luma and team	All
Monday 23- Thursday 26 January 2017				
	Field Mission	Location	ET Members	
		Akobo and Mingkiman	Nick	
		Bentiu and Rumbek	Angus and George	
Aweil		David and Annemarie		
Friday 27 January 2017	Morning			
	9:00-10:00	OCHA/South Sudan Humanitarian Fund	David Throp; Head of Humanitarian Financing Unit	Angus, George
	9:00-10:30	Ministry of Health	Director for Nutrition	Annemarie
	10:30-11:30	National Bureau of Standards	Majak Deng Kuol, Director General; Emmanuel Lubari	David
	11:00-12:00	HR	Debbie McLellan, Head of HR	Nick
		Logistics	Peter Schaller	George
	11:00-13:00	Nutrition Cluster meeting		Annemarie
	12:00-13:00	Samaritan's Purse		Angus
	13:00-13:30	Nutrition Cluster coordinator		Annemarie
	Afternoon			
	14:00-15:00	UNOPS (Roads)	Paul Cruickshank, Director, South Sudan Operations Centre; Rick Schroeder, HoP	David, George
	15:30-16:30	UNHAS finance		George
	15:30-16:30	CD	Joyce Luma	Nick

	15:45-16:45	VAM	Krishna Pahari, Head of VAM	David
Saturday 28 January	Morning			
		IPC workshop		All
	Afternoon			
		Team meeting		All
Monday 30 January 2017	Morning			
	09:00-10:00	National Bureau of Statistics	Philip Dau Thiong Director for M&E IPC/LAF Technical Advisor and Food Security Analyses	Angus
	10:00-11:00	Ministry of General Education and Instruction	Abdullahi Ali Abdullahi, Director General for Basic Education, Ag. Undersecretary; Angui Malei Majok, Deputy Director for School Feeding	David
	11:00-12:00	IOM	John McCue, Head of Operations	George
		IMC/Nutrition	Samuel Mbuto	Annemarie
		DSRSG/RC/HC	Mr. Eugene Owusu, DSRSG/RC/HC	Nick
		OCHA/ICWG	Gemma Connell, Deputy Head of Office	Angus
	12:30-13:30	FAO	Erminio Sacco	Angus
	LUNCH			
	Afternoon			
	14:00-15:00	ECHO	Morten Petersen, Head of Office	Nick, Annemarie, George
		Concern/ BRACED	Melquisedec Gomes da Silva, BRACED Consortium Director	David
		Samaritan's Purse	Deputy Country Director	Angus
16:00-17:00	Innovations	Ross Smith; Josiah Kiiza	Nick, David, Angus, George	

	17:15-18:15	EMOP & EPR	Ross Smith; Andrea Stoutland; Alejandro Guzman; Pios Ncube; Rehan Zahid; Owen Davies	Nick, Angus, Annemarie, George
Tuesday 31 Jan 2017	Morning			
	9:00-10:00	Partnerships/ Distributions?	Aymen Elamin, Head of Partnerships unit	Nick
		LUNCH		
	Afternoon			
		Germany	Bernhard Worm, Head of Development Cooperation	David
		Switzerland	Philippe Besson, Director of Cooperation Office	Angus
		Concern/ Logistics	Yvonne Rohan	George
	15:00-16:00	UNHCR/Protection cluster	Vincent Parker, acting Country Representative	Nick, Annemarie
	15:30-16:30	Logistics	Ken Kazungu	George
	16:30-17:30	FSLC	Alistair Short, Cluster Coordinator	Angus
Canada		Anne Lavender, Head of Cooperation; Stéphane Roberge, Sr Development Officer, Food Security Team Leader, S. Sudan Development Division	David	
17:45-18:30	FSLC	Sara Moussavi, Programme Advisor, global FSLC	Angus, David	
Wednesday 1 Feb 2017	Morning			
	8:30-9:30	VAM	Krishna Pahari, Head of VAM	Angus
	9:30-11:00	Livelihoods/VAM/ feeder roads debrief	Ross Smith; Hebert Lopez; Krishna Pahari; Rustam Makhmudov; Mohamed Nishreen	David
		Nutrition debrief	Darline Raphael; Dorothy Nabiwemba-Bushara	Annemarie
		Logistics and common services debrief	Nenad Loncarevic; Adham Effendi; Fiona Lithgow; Conny Akerstrom; Richard Egwangu; Solomon Welle	George
		LUNCH		
Afternoon				

	13:00-14:30	EPR/EMOP debrief	Ross Smith; Alejandro Guzman; Andrea Stoutland; Aymen Elamin, Arshia Khan; Alistair Short; Raul Cumba; George Fominyen; Josiah Kiiza	All
	16:30-18:30	CO debriefing and presentation of initial findings	Joyce Luma; Hakan Falkell; Maria Bautista-Owen; Ross Smith; Jesse Wood; Nenad Loncarevic; Adham Effendi; Rehan Zahid; Getahun Amogne; Arshia Khan; Lillian Mokgosi; Debbie McLellan; Fiona Lithgow; Richard Egwangu; David Namulunyi; Teoman Alp; Sergio Vatalaro; Conny Akerstrom; Rustam Makhmudov; Alistair Short; George Fominyen; Katri Kangas	All
Thursday 2 Feb 2017	Morning			
	10:20	Team flight to NBO		
Friday 3 February 2017	Friday 3 Feb 2017	Morning		
	8:00 - 9:00	EPR	Matthew Mcilvenna, Francis Opiyo	Angus
	9:00-10:00	All staff debriefing	All WFP RBN	All
	10:00-10:45	Resilience	Marc Kaeraa, Brenda Began	Angus, Annemaria, David
	10:00-11:00	RD/DRD	Valerie Guarnieri, Adrian Van der Knaap	Nick
	11:00-11:45	VAM/M&E	Lucia Di Rosa, Fiona Gatere, Elliot Vhurumuku	David, Annemarie
	11:00-11:45	Procurement/Logistics/Supply chain	Josefa Zueco, Tarek Keshavjee	George
	12:45-1:30	Programme	Ilaria Dettori	Nick
	12:45-1:30	Nutrition & School Feeding	Allison Oman, Faith Awin,	David Annemarie
	1:30- 2:15	HR	Stella Atela, Farirai Chataurwa	Nick

Annex P: Output and Outcome Performance by Operation 2012–2016⁴³⁶

The Annex presents output and outcome indicators and performance by operation across the entire evaluation. While all the operations reported on outputs, some of them did not report on outcomes.

OUTPUTS

EMOP 200338

Output	2012		2013		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Hectares (ha) of land cleared	14,163	13,064	40,533	33,876	54,696	46,940	86%
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads rehabilitated (FFA) and maintained (self-help) Km 695	695	435			695	435	63%
Number of ART clients who received both individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance	4,000	6,942			4,000	6,942	174%
Number of ART clients who received only an individual nutritional food supplement	36,000	1,570			36,000	1,570	4%
Number of bridges constructed	2	1	8	5	10	6	60%
Number of classrooms rehabilitated	461	251	866	507	1,327	758	57%
Number of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3000-15,000 cbmt)	13,284	1,728	13	3	13,297	1,731	13%
Number of food security monitoring systems in place	3	3	4	4	7	7	100%

⁴³⁶ Source: Standard project reports 2012-2016

Output	2012		2013		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of government staff members trained in food security monitoring systems	150	130	12	12	162	142	88%
Number of households who received fuel efficient stoves	3,780	3,780			3,780	3,780	100%
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions (health and nutrition)	837	833	142	142	979	975	100%
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions (livelihood-support/agriculture farming/IGA)	450	460	15,942	4,802	16,392	5,262	32%
Number of pregnant/lactating women assisted	-	-	95,982	42,353	95,982	42,353	44%
Number of primary school children assisted by WFP	400,000	429,043	424,367	253,979	824,367	683,022	83%
Number of primary school girls assisted by WFP	40,000	29,108			40,000	29,108	73%
Number of primary schools assisted by WFP	1,206	1,220			1,206	1,220	101%
Number of schools assisted by WFP	1,216	1,231	827	737	2,043	1,968	96%
Number of TB treatment clients who received both individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance	3,200	2,767			3,200	2,767	86%
Number of TB treatment clients who received only an individual nutritional food supplement	28,800	6,992	27,732	23,789	56,532	30,781	54%
Volume (m3) of earth dams and flood protection dykes constructed	17	12	858,000	75,200	858,017	75,212	9%
A/P % Average							71%

EMOP 200659

Output	2014		2015		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers (milling voucher)	19,200	15,381			19,200	15,381	80%
C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers (milling voucher)	20,800	14,198			20,800	14,198	68%
Number of health centres assisted (Treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition)			247	164	247	164	66%
Number of health centres/sites assisted (GD)			1	1	1	1	100%
Number of health centres/sites assisted BSFP sites (not health centres)	500	450	120	112	620	562	91%
Number of institutional sites assisted (GD)			14	9	14	9	64%
Proportion of men exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP against proportion planned	80	29			80	29	36%
Proportion of targeted caregivers (men and women) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counselling	100	20			100	20	20%
Proportion of women exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP against proportion planned	80	32			80	32	40%
A/P % Average							63%

EMOP 200859

Output	2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of boys in WFP-assisted schools who received deworming treatment at least once during the year	13,197	-	#####	13,252	31,338	13,252	42%
Number of girls in WFP-assisted schools who received deworming treatment at least once during the year	6,197	-	#####	9,307	22,982	9,307	40%
Number of girls that received deworming treatment in government deworming campaign with the assistance of WFP	7,000	-			7,000	-	0%
Number of health centres/sites assisted	199	160	225	265	424	425	100%
Number of institutional sites assisted	15	11	15	17	30	28	93%
Number of primary schools assisted by WFP	87	47	93	94	180	141	78%
Number of targeted caregivers (male and female) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counseling			#####	116,536	#####	#####	54%
A/P % Average							58%

PRRO 200572

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving a combination of cash transfers and food	9,000	1,153					9,000	1,153	13%
C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving a combination of vouchers and food	209,000	205,303					209,000	205,303	98%
C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving cash transfers	46,000	28,770					46,000	28,770	63%
C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	617	79					617	79	13%
C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	669	86					669	86	13%
C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers (FFT cash targeting women in Yei)	1,000	1,000					1,000	1,000	100%
C&V: Total amount of cash transferred to beneficiaries	21,626,734	1,324,038					21,626,734	1,324,038	6%
Deworming: Number of boys in WFP-assisted schools who received deworming treatment at least once during the year	50,000	60,264					50,000	60,264	121%
Deworming: Number of girls in WFP-assisted schools who received deworming treatment at least once during the year	72,000	41,431					72,000	41,431	58%
FFA: Number of men government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training in basic tools in participatory community-based planning	207	207					207	207	100%

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Hectares (ha) of crops planted					408	408	408	408	100%
Hectares (ha) of land cleared	40,209	19,673	19,261	16,013	13,028	17,828	72,498	53,514	74%
Hectares (ha) of vegetables planted			220	183	213	190	433	373	86%
HIV/TB: Number of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	30	30					30	30	100%
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads built and maintained			605	444	412	358	1,017	802	79%
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads raised above flooding levels			17	15	25	19	42	34	81%
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads rehabilitated (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	353	387					353	387	110%
Kilometres (km) of gullies reclaimed					15	15	15	15	100%
Number of Albendazole Tablets (400mg) distributed			430,730	407,292	425,234	371,513	855,964	778,805	91%
Number of bicycles distributed			21	21			21	21	100%
Number of boys in WFP-assisted schools who received deworming treatment at least once during the year					132,306	115,552	132,306	115,552	87%
Number of cereal banks established and functioning	109	6			1	1	110	7	6%

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of classrooms constructed			1	1	9	12	10	13	130%
Number of classrooms rehabilitated	277	119					277	119	43%
Number of community managed post-harvest structures built			189	7	74	31	263	38	14%
Number of cooperatives societies supported			48	126	10	10	58	136	234%
Number of counterparts staff members trained in early warning systems	30	30					30	30	100%
Number of cups distributed			2,960	2,960			2,960	2,960	100%
Number of disaster preparedness and risk management tools (contingency plans, EWS, FSMS, weather and climate related tools and services) incorporated in government core functions and budget	83	83					83	83	100%
Number of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3000-15,000 cbmt)	31	23	15	12	10	11	56	46	82%
Number of farmer groups supported through local purchases	15	6	63	3	10	4	88	13	15%
Number of farmer individuals supported through local purchases			2,050	1,548	10,000	10,000	12,050	11,548	96%
Number of farmer organizations trained in market access and post-harvest handling skills			1,002	126	10	10	1,012	136	13%

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of farmers trained in marketing skills and post-harvest handling			192	126	1,000	700	1,192	826	69%
Number of women government counterparts trained in data collection and analysis on food and nutrition security	50	29					50	29	58%
Number of fish ponds constructed (FFA) and maintained (self-help)			9	4	9	8	18	12	67%
Number of food security and nutrition monitoring/surveillance reports produced with WFP support	7	7					7	7	100%
Number of food security monitoring systems in place	6	6					6	6	100%
Number of FOs trained in market access and post-harvest handling skills	15	10					15	10	67%
Number of girls in WFP-assisted schools who received deworming treatment at least once during the year					106,576	97,155	106,576	97,155	91%
Number of government staff members trained in food security monitoring systems	110	110					110	110	100%
Number of health centres constructed/rehabilitated					1	1	1	1	100%
Number of health centres/sites assisted	355	355	531	444	437	472	1,323	1,271	96%
Number of hives distributed					30	10	30	10	33%
Number of individuals trained in business skills			540	482	1,000	870	1,540	1,352	88%

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of individuals trained in lobby and advocacy			20	30	200	120	220	150	68%
Number of institution stoves distributed			9	9	3	-	12	9	75%
Number of institutional sites assisted	51	51	541	527	54	26	646	604	93%
Number of kitchens or food storage rooms rehabilitated or constructed					1	1	1	1	100%
Number of literacy centres constructed/rehabilitated			31	28	3	1	34	29	85%
Number of livestock watering points built/restored					1	1	1	1	100%
Number of men government counterparts trained in data collection and analysis on food and nutrition security	90	81					90	81	90%
Number of national assessments/data collection exercises in which food security and nutrition were integrated with WFP support	9	9					9	9	100%
Number of national safety net policies that are nutrition sensitive	5	5					5	5	100%
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions (community preparedness, early warning, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation)	226	226					226	226	100%
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions (health and nutrition)	19,847	13,895					19,847	13,895	70%

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions (livelihood-support/agriculture & farming/IGA)	2,929	2,592					2,929	2,592	88%
Number of people trained (Skills: Engineering)			1,732	1,292	6,287	6,286	8,019	7,578	95%
Number of people trained (Skills: Environmental protection)			902	660	1,311	1,326	2,213	1,986	90%
Number of people trained (Skills: Livelihood technologies)			6,653	3,681	18,961	23,597	25,614	27,278	106%
Number of people trained (Skills: Project management)					6,508	6,508	6,508	6,508	100%
Number of primary schools assisted by WFP					542	538	542	538	99%
Number of satellite collection centres supported			6	6	50	30	56	36	64%
Number of schools assisted by WFP	419	402			31	31	450	433	96%
Number of shallow wells constructed	247	125	219	170	127	82	593	377	64%
Number of smallholder farmers supported by WFP			1,750	8,039	10,000	10,000	11,750	18,039	154%
Number of targeted caregivers (men and women) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counselling					324,465	226,106	324,465	226,106	70%
Number of technical support activities provided on food security monitoring and food assistance			1,118	1,046			1,118	1,046	94%

Output	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of tree seedlings produced	6,075,669	1,696,920	1,590,400	1,315,936	1,153,600	804,015	8,819,669	3,816,871	43%
Proportion of targeted caregivers (men and women) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counselling	75	35					75	35	47%
Quantity of agricultural tools distributed (Hoes, watering cans, spades, assorted tools)	4,271	2,683					4,271	2,683	63%
Quantity of food purchased locally through local and regional purchases (expressed in MT) primarily local purchase from small traders, also P4P pro-small holders	5,162	4,224					5,162	4,224	82%
Quantity of stationary distributed (school registers provided to capture attendance and enrolment information.)	200	200					200	200	100%
Technical assistance: Number of national food security/nutrition programmes receiving WFP technical assistance	8	8					8	8	100%
VAM: Number of women government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	20	15					20	15	75%
Volume (m3) of earth dams and flood protection dykes constructed	408,000	276,000	191,140	183,500	197,040	132,820	796,180	592,320	74%
A/P % Average									80%

SO 200267

Output	2011		2012		2013		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Defined hand-over strategy			1	-			1	0	0%
Defined operational procedures of the SGR			1	-			1	0	0%
NSFR establishment legalized					1	-	1	0	0%
NSFR policy framework and hand over strategy formulated					1	-	1	0	0%
Number of government staff trained	10	12	110	-			120	12	10%
Number of government staff trained in food security information systems					300	46	300	46	15%
Number of government staff trained in the day-to-day operations of the NSFR					100	-	100	0	0%
Number of satellite deposits built			20	-			20	0	0%
Number of technical guidelines on food security information system thematic areas developed					4	-	4	0	0%
Number of training sessions/workshops organized			3	3	3	3	6	6	100%
Number of warehouses built			5	-			5	0	0%
Organizational structure and operational framework of the NSFR designed					1	-	1	0	0%
Organizational structure of the SGR			1	-			1	0	0%
Total storage space made available			#####	-			#####	0	0%
A/P % Average									9%

SO 200341

Output	2011		2012		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Average Number of hours flown per month	1020	780	1020	780	2040	1560	76%
Average Number of passengers transported monthly by air	6000	7148	6000	7352	12000	14500	121%
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	180	230	180	230	360	460	128%
Number of flights conducted for security evacuations		4		110	0	114	
Quantity of light humanitarian cargo transported			25	33	25	33	132%
A/P % Average							108%

SO 200361

Output	2012		2013		2014		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
LCA Updated (twice per year)	2	1					2	1	50%
Number of agencies and organizations using Logistics coordination services	80	93	70	81	75	92	225	266	118%
Number of agencies and organizations using storage facilities		23	23	24			23	47	204%
Number of agencies and organizations using transport services	80	93	70	57			150	150	100%
Number of bulletins, maps and other logistics information produced and shared	24	133	100	149	200	124	324	406	125%
Number of coordination meetings held on monthly basis in Juba and at state level as required (one per month)	12	42			24	59	36	101	281%
Number of Inter-Agency Logistics Capacity Assessment developed or updated			1	1			1	1	100%
Number of transport requests executed (SRFs)					400	1,289	400	#####	322%
Quantity (mt) of humanitarian cargo moved through logistics common services	27,200	5,290					#####	#####	19%
Quantity of cargo delivered versus requested (mt)	90	66					90	66	73%
Volume (m3) of cargo moved through logistics common services		18,497						#####	
Volume (m3) of warehousing capacity made available to the humanitarian community					10,000	6,860	#####	#####	69%
Volume of cargo delivered versus requested (m3)	90	90					90	90	100%
A/P % Average									130%

SO 200379

Output	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Baseline M&E surveys conducted							7	7					7	7	100%
Government staff seconded							3	3					3	3	100%
Kilometres of roads built			120	120	354	35	170	40			157	105	801	300	37%
Kilometres of roads maintained									80	30			80	30	38%
Kilometres of roads repaired	100	16									22	22	122	38	31%
National staff employed (female)								31						31	
National staff employed (male)								152						152	
Number of assessments/surveys conducted			5	4	2	2							7	6	86%
Number of assessments/surveys conducted											1	1	1	1	100%
Number of contractors who are awarded contracts							4	3					4	3	75%
Number of cross drainage structures (special constructions not included in road)											26	13	26	13	50%
Number of government staff trained			9	9	9	9					60	14	78	32	41%
Number of meetings conducted									10	4	12	12	22	16	73%
Number of staff trained	10	12											10	12	120%
Number of training sessions/workshops organized									2	2	4	2	6	4	67%
Pre-bid meetings							5	4					5	4	80%
Topographical surveys							4	4					4	4	100%
Training sessions for contractors							1	1					1	1	100%

Output	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Baseline M&E surveys conducted							7	7					7	7	100%
Government staff seconded							3	3					3	3	100%
Kilometres of roads built			120	120	354	35	170	40			157	105	801	300	37%
Kilometres of roads maintained									80	30			80	30	38%
Kilometres of roads repaired	100	16									22	22	122	38	31%
National staff employed (women)								31						31	
National staff employed (men)								152						152	
Number of assessments/surveys conducted			5	4	2	2							7	6	86%
Number of assessments/surveys conducted											1	1	1	1	100%
Number of contractors who are awarded contracts							4	3					4	3	75%
Number of cross drainage structures (special constructions not included in road)											26	13	26	13	50%
Number of government staff trained			9	9	9	9					60	14	78	32	41%
Number of meetings conducted									10	4	12	12	22	16	73%
Number of staff trained	10	12											10	12	120%
Number of training sessions/workshops organized									2	2	4	2	6	4	67%
Pre-bid meetings							5	4					5	4	80%
Topographical surveys							4	4					4	4	100%
Training sessions for contractors							1	1					1	1	100%
A/P % Average															75%

SO 200399

Output	2012		2013		2014		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Common operational areas covered by MOSS compliant security telecommunications systems					10	10	10	10	100%
Number of Local ETC coordination meetings held	12	12					12	12	100%
Number of operational areas covered by data communications services			3	3			3	3	100%
Number of organizations (UN and NGO) utilizing the deployed solutions	250	248					250	248	99%
Number of radio-rooms (COMCEN) established			10	10			10	10	100%
Number of standard kits deployed			3	3			3	3	100%
Number of trained and qualified responders on stand-by			40	35			40	35	88%
Number of UN agency and NGO staff trained			200	209			200	209	105%
Number of UN and NGO staff members both men and women trained on ETC services usage	400	450					400	450	113%
Percentage of operational areas covered by 24/7 radio rooms and security telecommunications systems	90	100					90	100	111%
Percentage of users reporting delivery of the service as "satisfactory" and within "satisfactory" timeframe. Emergency areas covered.	80	90					80	90	113%
Prepared to respond to emergencies by establishing telecommunications infrastructure and services new sites as needed	80	90					80	90	113%
Sites made operational with data connectivity					15	13	15	13	87%
A/P % Average									102%

SO 200423

Output	2012		2013		2014		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of bulletins, maps and other logistics information produced and shared	173	167	90	91	100	108	363	366	101%
Number of humanitarian partners / Cluster participants trained	57	57	200	120	200	171	457	348	76%
A/P % Average									88%

SO 200523

Output	2013		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Average Number of passengers transported monthly by air	6500	6987	6500	6987	107%
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	230	291	230	291	127%
Percentage of requests for medical and security evacuations fulfilled	100	100	100	100	100%
Percentage utilization of the contracted hours of aircraft	100	90	100	90	90%
A/P % Average					106%

SO 200634

Output	2014		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Average number of MT (food and NFI) transported per month	150	171	150	171	114%
Average number of passengers transported monthly by air	7,500	7,324	7,500	7,324	98%
Frequency of user group meetings	11	11	11	11	100%
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	270	270	270	270	100%
Number of aircrafts made available	14	17	14	17	121%
Percentage of medical and security evacuations responded to	100	100	100	100	100%
Percentage utilisation of aircraft contracted hours	100	106	100	106	106%
A/P % Average					106%

SO 200702

Output	2014		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Average MT (food or NFI) transported monthly	1991	1991	1991	1991	100%
Percentage utilization of the contracted hours of aircraft	100	98	100	98	98%
Utilisation of available aircraft capacity	1	1	1	1	100%
A/P % Average					99%

SO 200775

Output	2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of cluster coordination meetings conducted	24	21	24	21	48	42	88%
Number of field coordination meetings convened	80	55	108	63	188	118	63%
Number of food security and nutrition monitoring /surveillance reports produced with WFP support	3	3			3	3	100%
Number of food security and nutrition monitoring /surveillance reports supported by the cluster			3	2	3	2	67%
Number of inter-cluster contingency plans developed	1	1			1	1	100%
Number of partner organizations participating in the cluster system nationally	100	70	100	126	200	196	98%
Number of partners that provided updated information through the online reporting tool	100	53			100	53	53%
Number of partners that reported to the monthly cluster 5W tool			72	58	72	58	81%
Number of UN agency and NGO staff trained	100	214	50	27	150	241	161%
A/P % Average							90%

SO 200778

Output	2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of agencies and organizations using coordination and logistics services	80	95	80	118	160	213	133%
Number of contingency plans developed or updated	2	2			2	2	100%
Number of information management products produced and shared, including bulletins, maps, guidance documents, and other logistics information	180	170	50	202	230	372	162%
Number of locations served	75	86			75	86	115%
Number of Logistics Capacity Assessments developed or updated	1	1			1	1	100%
Number of national and field cluster coordination meetings conducted	48	63	50	93	98	156	159%
Number of service request forms executed	1,032	971			1032	971	94%
Quantity (MT) of humanitarian cargo moved through logistics common services	4,872	5,837	6,000	6,600	10872	12437	114%
Utilization of the contracted hours of aircraft	100	116	100	111	200	227	114%
Warehousing capacity (m ²) made available to the humanitarian community	10,000	11,200	11,000	11,420	21000	22620	108%
A/P % Average							120%

SO 200786

Output	2015		2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	250	248	250	240	500	488	98%
Number of locations served	40	77	50	79	90	156	173%
Number of needs assessments carried out	4	2	4	2	8	4	50%
Number of passengers transported			66,000	74,066	66,000	74,066	112%
Number of passengers transported monthly against planned (passenger segments)	7,000	9,533			7,000	9,533	136%
Number of passengers transported monthly against planned (passengers transported)	4,500	6,621			4,500	6,621	147%
Percentage of cargo delivered within promised lead time	90	95	90	85	180	180	100%
Percentage of passenger bookings served	95	90	95	90	190	180	95%
Percentage response to medical and security evacuation	100	100	100	100	200	200	100%
Tonnage of light cargo transported monthly	150	117	120	105	270	222	82%
A/P % Average							109%

SO 200791

Output	2015		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of administrative centres /cities provided with radio room services	11	11	11	11	100%
Number of IT officers provided with advanced FITTEST training	24	24	24	24	100%
Number of operational locations provided with radio communications services	24	22	24	22	92%
Number of operational locations provided with the Humanitarian Internet Support Project Internet connectivity services on a cost-recovery basis	5	4	5	4	80%
Number of prioritised locations provided with ETC Internet connectivity services	6	6	6	6	100%
Number of UN agency/NGO staff members trained in radio communications	400	368	400	368	92%
A/P % Average					94%

SO 200931

Output	2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P%
Number of inter-agency projects facilitated and completed	2	1	2	1	50%
Number of operational areas covered by data communications services	3	3	3	3	100%
Number of training sessions /workshops organized	3	3	3	3	100%
Number of UN agency and NGO staff trained	300	300	300	300	100%
Percentage of radio programming requests from the humanitarian community to ETC addressed	90	100	90	100	111%
A/P % Average					92%

OUTCOMES

EMOP 200338

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2012	2013
1	ART Default Rate (%)			8	1
1	CSI: percentage of households with a decreased Coping Strategy Index		84	98	96.9
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score		49.5	57	77.8
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score		29.3	25	18.3
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score		21.2	18	
1	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 3 (weight-for-height as %)		17.8		18
1	Prevalence of low mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) among children under 5		12.6	14.3	
1	Prevalence of low mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) among children under 6		12.6	14.3	18.3
1	Supplementary feeding death rate (%)		0.3	0.1	0.1
1	Supplementary feeding default rate (%)			11.3	9.3
1	Supplementary feeding non-response rate (%)			3.9	1
1	Supplementary feeding recovery rate (%)		80.7	84.7	87.8
2	Disaster preparedness index			4	4
3	CSI: percentage of households with a decreased Coping Strategy Index			99	99.04
3	Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary			23	-21
3	Enrolment: Average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled in WFP-assisted primary			15	-4
3	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score			54	60.5
	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score			27	
	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score			19	
3	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools			91	98
3	Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools			97	99

EMOP 200659

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2014	2015
1	MAM treatment default rate (%)	15		0	7
1	MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	3		0	0
1	MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	15		0	5
1	MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	75		0	88
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70	0	80	88
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	90	0	0	82
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	50	0	0	58
1	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66	0	60	82
1	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	6		0	6.4
1	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	5		0	1.44
1	Diet diversity score	3		0	2.96
1	Diet diversity score	3	3.1	4	2.13
1	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3.5		0	2.86
1	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3	2.9	3.8	2.1
1	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	3.5		0	3.26
1	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	3	3.2	4.2	2.29
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	7.6			38
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	6.3	32.8	22	28
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	8.4			42
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	6.6	33	26	33
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5		0	25
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	6	30	19	24

EMOP 200859

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015	2016
1	ART Default Rate (%)	15	6	0	45
1	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	6	6.4	15.03	15.89
1	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	5	1.44	14.29	15.27
1	Diet diversity score	3.5	2.96	3.92	4.8
1	Diet diversity score	3	2.13	4.72	4.78
1	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3.5	2.86	3.83	4.04
1	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3	2.1	4.54	4.84
1	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	3.5	3.26	4.1	4.23
1	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	3	2.29	5	4.63
1	Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	3	0	0	15
1	Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	3	0	0	-2
1	Enrolment: Average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	3	0	0	5
1	MAM treatment default rate (%)	15	7	0	8
1	MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	3	0	0	0
1	MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	15	5	0	4
1	MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	75	88	0	88
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70	88	0	38
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	90	82	0	98
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	50	52	0	56
1	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66	82	0	46
1	TB Treatment Default Rate (%)	15	9.7	0	9

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015	2016
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	85	26	48	37
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	84	21	45	36
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	88	39	55	42
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	7	37	42	49
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	7	37	45	49
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	7	36	36	50
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	8	38	10	14
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	8	42	10	15
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5	25	10	9
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	88	42	69	54
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	87	36	63	52
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	90	49	80	58
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	6	29	19	30
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	6	31	23	30
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5	27	13	29
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	6	28	11	17
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	7	33	14	18
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5	24	7	12

PRRO 200572

SO	Outcome	project end target	Base value	2014	2015	2016
1	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66	0	-	53	34
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) MAM prevention	70	0	-	70	31
1	MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	75	85	74	91	79.02
1	MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	3	0.1	0.3	0	0.01
1	MAM treatment default rate (%)	15	12	22	5	17.36
1	MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	15	3.2	3.2	4	3.31
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	90	0	-	100	72
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	50	0	44	77	65
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	6	28	29	32	15
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	5.2		-	26	56
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	89		-	43	29
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	3.8	19	32	31	17
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	7.4	37	25	33	13
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	4.6		-	23	52
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5.8		-	29	62
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	92		-	46	31
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	87		-	39	25
1	Diet Diversity Score	4.3	4.2	3.3	3.4	3.37
1	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3.1	4.4	3.3	3.4	3.35
1	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	4.5	4.2	3.3	3.4	3.38
1	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	18	19	20	6.8	14.07
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	8.4		-	42	51
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	4.2		-	21	33
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	88		-	37	16

SO	Outcome	project end target	Base value	2014	2015	2016
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	9.2		-	46	51
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	6		-	30	50
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	4.8		-	24	32
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	2.8		-	14	45
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	86		-	30	16
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	91		-	56	5
1	Diet Diversity Score	4		-	2.7	2.92
1	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	4		-	2.6	2.9
1	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	4		-	3.04	3.25
1	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	10		13.5	13.5	12.7
1	ART Default Rate (%)	15		3.5	28	66
1	TB Treatment Default Rate (%)	15		3.5	9.1	6.6
2	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased Asset Score	80	0	-	60	-
2	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	85		-	92	78
2	Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6		-	12	38
2	Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	85	99	92	89	78
2	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	85	98	90	87	79
2	Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	85	99	93	84	76
2	Enrolment: Average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6	-4	-18	23	28
2	Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6	-4	-14	37	42
2	Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6	-4	-21	21	26
3	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased Asset Score	80	0	-	60	-
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	7	35	-	33	42

SO	Outcome	project end target	Base value	2014	2015	2016
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	5.2	26	-	25	28
3	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	86.2	39	-	42	30
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	8.6	43	-	44	42
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5.2	26	-	24	42
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	4.8	24	-	24	29
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	5.4	27	-	27	27
3	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	86.6	33	-	33	28
3	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	89.4	47	-	49	31
3	Diet Diversity Score	3.3	3.2	-	3.2	3.17
3	Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3.3	3.2	-	2.79	3.06
3	Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	3.3	3.2	-	3.49	3.24
3	CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	10	11	12.89	12.89	19.39
3	CSI (Asset Depletion): Percentage of households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies	78	78	-	83	57
3	CSI (Asset Depletion): Percentage of male-headed households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies	78	78	-	74	65
3	CSI (Asset Depletion): Percentage of female-headed households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies	78	78	-	93	46
3	Food purchased from regional, national and local suppliers, as % of food distributed by WFP in-country	10	0	4	14	5.3
3	Food purchased from aggregation systems in which smallholders are participating, as % of regional, national and local purchases	15	0	12	7	1

SO 200379

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015	2016
2	Hand-over strategy developed and implemented [1=not achieved; 2=partially achieved; 3=achieved]	3	1	2	2

SO 200399

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2014
1	User satisfaction rate	80		84

SO 200634

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2013	2014
1	User satisfaction rate	80	70	81	87

SO 200775

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015	2016
1	User satisfaction rate	82	82	82	77

SO 200778

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015	2016
1	User satisfaction rate	91	90	88	89

SO 200786

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015	2016
1	User satisfaction rate	80	80	89	85

SO 200791

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2015
1	User satisfaction rate	80	72	

SO 200931

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base Value	2016
1	User satisfaction rate	80	72	83

Annex Q: Mapping of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>1.3.1 CS</p> <p>1.3.6 IRM</p> <p>Evolution of context</p> <p>2.1.1 Relevance to needs</p>	<p>The new country strategic plans use a portfolio approach to country-level planning. Para 30,31, 54, 55</p> <p>WFP invested in defining a new developmental – strategic approach through the formulation of country strategy in 2012 but did not update it with the change in context. Para 60, 190</p> <p>WFP staff indicated that the rewriting of the country strategy was not considered earlier as the existing document was considered “adequately flexible to meet the emerging needs”. WFP managers acknowledged that the day-to-day demands of coping with an acute emergency had crowded out space for strategic planning. While elements of an adapted strategic approach are included in the EMOP and PRRO, in the absence of an overarching common vision very different opinions were evident amongst WFP staff on key strategic choices. Para 68</p>	<p>The development of a country strategy in 2012/2013 was an important step in a major reorientation of WFP to support the emergence of the new country and its institutions. However, the country strategy had a disconnect between strategy and operations, and the lack of an accountability framework, which meant the country office was not compelled to update the country strategy when the context changed. While it initially served a useful purpose, unfortunately, that purpose was swiftly overtaken by events.</p>	<p>R1. WFP should:</p> <p>a. Develop a strategic framework for responding to the needs of South Sudan as a multi-year, acute crisis which acknowledges the limited capacity of the Government of South Sudan to provide leadership to the process; and</p>
<p>2.1.1 Relevance to needs</p>	<p>The evolution of the crisis is highly unpredictable. Insecurity and conflict is now widespread involving all the major tribes. The numbers of food insecure continue to grow on an annual basis with well over half the population in need of humanitarian assistance. Governance is</p>	<p>The country office was not proactive in developing a revised, comprehensive strategic approach to position itself to respond to the emerging context.</p>	

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>seriously compromised by the collapse in government finances and suspension of donor development funding. There was a consensus of interviewees that even in the best-case scenario a recovery will take years, whilst the more likely scenario is a continuation or worsening of the crisis. Para 67</p> <p>Given WFP commitment to the principles of neutrality and independence, the nature of the relationship with the Government of South Sudan (as one of the active participants in the conflict) is necessarily nuanced. Para 71</p> <p>In the current context, it is extremely hard for all actors to prevent the transfer of a proportion of the humanitarian resources into the war economy. Para 91</p>		
<p>2.1.3 Coherence with United Nations partners</p>	<p>While there was some joint programming by United Nations agencies, this was not done in the context of the UNDAF, and the UNDAF was not used as a platform for joint resource mobilisation. The UNDAF was used as a vehicle for communication rather than stimulating new strategic alignments or operational collaboration. Para 72</p> <p>The subsequent interim cooperation framework (ICF) focuses on transitional support to recovery and resilience until a new national development framework is in place, rather than articulating a</p>	<p>The complexity and scale of the challenges of a protracted emergency in South Sudan required a coordinated, inter-agency strategic response, but it is not clear who provides the overall vision and leadership for WFP to cohere with.</p> <p>United Nations coherence has been good at a formal level – as witnessed through the UNDAF and interim country framework processes – although the utility of this beyond a paper exercise is less clear.</p>	<p>b. Advocate within the United Nations system for developing an inter-agency strategic framework and a common multi-year approach to responding to the multi-year acute crisis.</p> <p>The IRM presents the opportunity to address this Rec 1.a and 1b. in 2017</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>strategic plan to respond to a protracted emergency.</p> <p>The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) is essentially a funding document rather than a strategic framework. Para 73</p>		
<p>1.2.5 Food security</p> <p>2.2.3 Factors for strategic choices</p> <p>2.3.1 Effectiveness</p>	<p>The food security situation in South Sudan continues to deteriorate, with 4.9 million (about 42 percent population) estimated to be severely food insecure (IPC Phases 3, 4, and 5), out of which 100,000 are estimated to be facing a humanitarian catastrophe. Para 22</p> <p>Logistics and pipelines constraints, as well as widespread insecurity, place an effective upper limit on the size of the operation in South Sudan. This constraint is particularly apparent for air drops, but also affects ground transport. This corresponds with the finding that WFP food deliveries have not managed to scale up in line with the doubling of planned deliveries between 2013 and 2016. Para 107</p> <p>South Sudan has not been a conducive environment for the use of cash-based transfers. Widespread insecurity creates protection challenges. Markets are weak and poorly integrated. There are few financial service providers and no electronic money transfer facilities. Hyperinflation and a tumbling exchange rate, coupled with the unwillingness of the GoSS to authorise reimbursement of</p>	<p>There is stronger positive evidence of the effectiveness of general food assistance including cash-based transfers and nutrition in preventing precipitous declines in food security, and enrolment and retention associated with school feeding</p> <p>However, opportunities to build coherence and connectedness by capitalizing on internal synergies between activities were identified but largely remained unrealized.</p> <p>A major challenge for WFP lies in positioning itself to build connectedness - the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term development and interconnected problems into account.</p>	<p>R2. WFP should improve humanitarian–development synergies by:</p> <p>a. Developing a strategy to address the underlying constraints to the expanded use of cash-based transfers (including strengthening supply chains, advocating for cross border trade and improved financial and transport infrastructure) that enables timelier, cost efficient and increased emergency assistance alongside longer-term impacts on strengthened market access and markets for domestic production.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>traders in USD constrain the ability of traders import commodities. Para 127</p> <p>Despite limitations, cash-based transfers have been efficient and effective part of the emergency response. cash-based transfers are significantly more cost efficient than in-kind transfers. CPs and beneficiaries pointed out that the cash-based transfers were more predictable and timely as they circumvented the pipeline constraints associated with in-kind distributions. Monitoring shows that vouchers greatly enhance Food Consumption Scores (FCS) and Dietary Diversity scores (DDS): The field mission observed that cash has stimulated the local economy.</p> <p>Para 138</p>		
<p>1.2.5 Food security</p> <p>2.1.4 Comparative advantage</p>	<p>Malnutrition is a long-term and major public health problem in South Sudan and the national stunting rate is 31.1 percent. Since the start of the crisis in 2013, aggravating factors for malnutrition have even become more prevalent, including increased incidence of infectious disease, poor access to clean water and sanitation, poor access to health care services.</p> <p>Para 24-25, 80</p>	<p>A major challenge for WFP lies in positioning itself to build connectedness - the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term development and interconnected problems into account.</p>	<p>b. maintaining the longer-term aim to contribute to the Government of South Sudan's Health Sector Development Plan 2011-2015, including capacity development and other support for the roll-out of the CMAM guidelines at national, state and county levels; advocacy and support for the operationalisation of the Boma Health Initiative launched in 2015 in close collaboration with UNICEF, WHO, and other 'nutrition-in-health' partners in South Sudan.</p>
<p>1.2.5 Food Security</p>	<p>Agricultural productivity in South Sudan is low and only 4 percent of arable land is cultivated. Despite the potential, the</p>	<p>A major challenge for WFP lies in positioning itself to build connectedness - the need to ensure that</p>	<p>c. Partnering with other agencies to reinvigorate and refine an inter-agency approach to building resilience that is</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.1.3 Coherence with United Nations partners</p> <p>2.1.4 Areas of comparative advantage</p> <p>2.3.1 Effectiveness</p> <p>2.3.4 Synergies</p>	<p>country has a large structural deficit in food production. Para 22</p> <p>There have been several joint United Nations agency reflections on building resilience. However, the events of 2016 disrupted the process as many local partners who were needed to lead the activities were displaced by renewed insecurity. Para 78</p> <p>WFP corporately has a long-standing and extensive experience in the planning and delivery of traditional food assistance for assets, the concept of resilience is relatively new and the experience of WFP country office is limited. Para 84</p> <p>An ambiguity remains in differentiating the outputs expected from the food assistance for assets activities as they span Corporate Strategic Objective 2 (restore livelihoods and improve household food security through asset creation) and Strategic Objective 3 (build resilience). At the implementation level, it is difficult to distinguish whether the activity is meant to meet short-term food security needs or build household and community resilience. Para 141</p>	<p>activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.</p>	<p>distinct from food assistance for assets activities, that layers multi-annual interventions from different agencies for progressive replication and rollout as conditions permit</p>
<p>1.2.3 Access to Social Services</p>	<p>WFP support to school feeding is strongly relevant to the developmental needs of South Sudan. The primary net enrolment rate in schools is 43.5 percent, and the dropout rates in primary school average 24 percent per year and a recent</p>	<p>On the development side of the portfolio the evaluation built strong synergies between maintaining school feeding and a contribution to a longer-term solution to the cycle of war in South Sudan.</p>	<p>d. Strategically promoting school feeding – within a coordinated inter-agency approach – that contributes to breaking the cycle of war and violence in South Sudan by establishing ‘safe zones’ for protection and provides a platform for multi-sectoral</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.3.1 Effectiveness</p> <p>2.3.4 Synergies</p>	<p>education cluster survey found that lack of food and early marriage were the two most important reasons for dropout. Para 18</p> <p>The school feeding programme was highly valued for its achievements by central government, state government, beneficiaries, teachers and parents. It has shown positive results particularly on retention and contributed to gender parity. Para 145</p> <p>The overall effectiveness of school feeding depends heavily on a package of complementary interventions and it was not clear that the school feeding was operating under a strong inter-agency strategic framework.</p>	<p>WFP comparative advantages are not confined to the sphere of emergency operations – but include more developmentally aligned food assistance for assets and food assistance for education activities.</p>	<p>interventions spanning health, nutrition and livelihoods objectives.</p>
<p>1.2.2 Economy</p> <p>2.3.1 Effectiveness</p> <p>2.3.4 Synergies</p>	<p>The road infrastructure was largely destroyed or left in disrepair during the protracted civil war. Some roads were rehabilitated during the period from 2007 to 2012; but lack of maintenance have rendered these improvements redundant. Some 60 per cent of the country becomes inaccessible by road during the rainy season. Para 14</p> <p>The dominant cost driver of the South Sudan portfolio is logistics. Maximizing the much cheaper use of road transport over air transport - it is critical to ensure that deliveries take place at the beginning of the dry season in South Sudan when roads are still passable. The weak trunk</p>	<p>Cost efficient logistics is the key to a cost-efficient portfolio. WFP displays a good awareness of the necessity of managing these costs and has introduced a range of innovations to drive down costs. However, given an outlook of declining resources and increasing needs, the further scale-up of cost-saving measures is required, alongside new, innovative approaches.</p>	<p>R3. WFP should further increase cost-efficiency assuming a multi-year approach to emergency response.</p> <p>a. WFP should work with other agencies, including UNOPS, to identify opportunities where targeted investment by donors in transport infrastructure could generate multi-annual cost savings on logistics costs including: cost-benefit analyses of strategic repairs of trunk roads to allow wet season access, investment in improved river transport, and investment in the maintenance of strategic airstrips to allow increased use of fixed wing aircraft.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	road network makes logistics very expensive. Para 147		b. On the basis of the results of the cost benefit analysis, develop a joint advocacy strategy to donors on limited, strategic investment in infrastructure.
<p>2.3.2 Efficiency</p> <p>2.3.4 Synergies</p>	<p>The introduction of biometric registration systems offers large potential cost efficiency gains. If SCOPE identified 1 household in 200 as ineligible - for example, due to being simultaneously registered at a second distribution centre - it would cover the costs of the registration exercise. Furthermore, it appears that the use of SCOPE generates ongoing cost savings compared to the use of manual systems due to reduced staff needs. Para 157</p> <p>WFP collaborates with other agencies operating biometric registration systems including the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, the UNHCR Biometric Identity Tracking System and the World Vision Last Mile Mobile Solution. Accelerated inter-agency cooperation is acknowledged to be necessary to rapidly expand coverage in South Sudan. Para 174</p>		c. In collaboration with partners (including IoM and UNHCR), develop a strategy for providing all South Sudanese with a digital identity that includes agreement for interoperability and data sharing between systems.
2.3.2 Efficiency	Free-to-user and subsidized common services are associated with inefficiencies due to poor planning and coordination amongst users. At present, as there is no financial incentive for organisations to	Cost efficient logistics is the key to a cost-efficient portfolio. WFP displays a good awareness of the necessity of managing these costs and has introduced a range of innovations to	d. Consider introducing an element of routine cost recovery into the logistics cluster to encourage better forward- planning and more efficient use of resources.

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>plan effectively, aircraft and other assets are sometimes not used efficiently or must be tasked at very short notice. Para 159</p> <p>Introducing a cost recovery mechanism would be to provide a stronger incentive for users to better plan and rationalise their service requests. It would also permit greater transparency related to user accountability of donor funds provided for logistics costs. Para 159</p>	<p>drive down costs. However, given an outlook of declining resources and increasing needs, the further scale-up of cost saving measures is required, alongside new, innovative approaches.</p>	
<p>2.3.2 Efficiency</p> <p>2.3.4 Synergies</p>	<p>Beneficiaries and partners complained that WFP food distributions throughout the evaluation period were unpredictable and pipeline breaks were frequent. Para 124</p> <p>In two of the camps in Upper Nile, there appeared operational challenges with delays in the provision of food/nutrition items, and a specific lack of nutrition products for both under-fives and pregnant and lactating women. Para 139</p> <p>Responsibilities for the commodity supply chain (pipeline for food and non-food) are split between several management functions with operations (budget and programming) holding the formal role for pipeline management. Due to staff constraints at times during 2016 only two people staffed this critically important function. Para 191</p> <p>Over the past 4 years over 90 percent of South Sudan's pipeline has been secured</p>	<p>The timeliness and predictability of food deliveries remains a persistent problem, attributed to a problematic pipeline and logistics limitations.</p>	<p>e. Strengthen the management of the food pipeline through:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Forming an integrated supply chain working group to determine requirements, resources and prioritise operational plans. ii. Reinforcing the staffing of the budget and programming team, in part to increase liaison with donors on food shipments. iii. Given the importance of the Global Commodity Management Facility to South Sudan, opportunities to further strengthening its contribution to the South Sudan response should be investigated.

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	through the Global Commodity Management Facility (Para 153)		
2.2.1 Use of analysis	<p>The country office demonstrated a comparative advantage in a range of data collection and food and nutrition analysis. Para 92</p> <p>There is a degree of inconsistency between the nutritional surveys and IPC surveys and nutritional assessments – with the IPC assessments reaching a more pessimistic conclusion on food insecurity. Para 120</p> <p>An understanding of the drivers of undernutrition in South Sudan is still lacking. For example, there is relatively little information on the role of caring practices and micro-nutrient deficiencies. This has resulted in a dominant focus on treatment of acute malnutrition, among both WFP and other nutrition partners. Para 94</p>	<p>Weaknesses in the country office monitoring and evaluation systems have been partially rectified from 2015 onwards but limitations continue to constrain the ability of the country office to draw evidence based conclusions on the most efficient approaches to adopt.</p> <p>WFP has started to invest in causal analyses to help design interventions that appropriately and effectively address the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition. However, more could be done to inform the design of both nutrition and resilience programming.</p>	<p>R4. WFP South Sudan should innovate to improve programme quality by:</p> <p>a. Further investment in food and nutrition related assessments and analyses including</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Further elaboration of the WFP FNSMS methodology for regular assessment of nutrition status among key nutrition target groups, including the integration of stunting indicators and triangulation of results with the SMART surveys system, and other relevant surveillance mechanisms ii. Surveillance of food security in urban areas iii. Further, invest in analysis of the underlying reasons for undernutrition in South Sudan, in close collaboration / partnership with other agencies on food security
2.2.1 Use of analyses	<p>There has been relatively limited attention for other nutrition interventions within the WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy, like prevention of chronic malnutrition, addressing ‘hidden hunger’ (micronutrient deficiencies), and more integrated food and nutrition packages together with other sections within WFP South Sudan’s Programme Unit. Para 92, 94</p>	<p>Opportunities to build coherence and connectedness by capitalizing on internal synergies between activities were identified but largely remained unrealized.</p>	<p>b. Start up and increase nutrition-sensitive programming in line with the SUN approach within the overall WFP portfolio for South Sudan, through the cash for assets and food for education programmes in particular, but also through the general food distributions, e.g. a focus on stunting reduction in tandem with the targeted and blanket supplementary food programmes.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
2.3.4 Synergies	So far, there has been limited focus on integration of nutrition with food for assets or FFE. Beyond deworming alongside nutrition interventions, further opportunities for nutrition-sensitive programming were not really reaped, either within the WFP portfolio or in coordination with other partners. Para 169		
2.2.4 Risk Analysis and mitigation 2.3.1 Effectiveness	<p>The country office has no central repository of previous risk assessments and there is no monitoring against the mitigation plan. Para 112</p> <p>WFP South Sudan faced challenges in keeping up with meeting corporate minimum monitoring and reporting requirements, especially on outcome level data. Para 146</p> <p>The monitoring systems do not report on either process indicators (how the food for assets approach has been modified to adapt to a resilience building strategy) or resilience outcome indicators (has the latent capacity of the community to respond to future shocks been strengthened). Para 146</p> <p>There are no corporate outcome indicators for the special operations except for satisfaction indices. This is a clear weakness at the corporate level. Para 146</p>	Corporate indicators for resilience and special operations are inadequate.	c. At corporate level, review indicators used for outcome and impact level monitoring of resilience and special operations.
2.3.4, 2.3.5	Building resilience requires a sustained engagement with the community.		d. Develop multi-year field level agreements with cooperating partners – these field level

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
Synergies	<p>However, food for assets interventions have been short term - up to six months. The current design of field level agreements with cooperating partners do not enable them to maintain contact with the beneficiary communities for the whole year, let alone multi-year commitments. Para 144</p> <p>Delays in the food for assets programmes have also resulted from delayed field level agreements with cooperating partners. Part of the problem is the number of field level agreements WFP must manage. In South Sudan WFP has more than 80 partners and more than 100 agreements. Para 155</p>		agreements could specify multi-year strategic frameworks with annual budget agreements.
2.2.3 Factors for strategic Choices	<p>Staffing constraints place significant limitations on WFP capacity to take appropriate strategic decisions. During the evaluation period, key positions have proved problematic to fill through the reassignment process, including the Head of Programmes. Para 148</p> <p>As South Sudan is a well-established emergency there seems little justification for continued reliance on surge rosters - rather than using routine human resource procedures. Para 109</p> <p>The rules governing the recruitment of short-term and consultant staff are placing a large administrative burden on the country office. Para 110</p>	The evaluation found that persistent delays in the recruitment of key staff has undermined the capacity of the country office, including the capacity for strategic planning.	<p>R5. Ensure appropriate and timely staffing of WFP South Sudan</p> <p>a. The WFP Country Office should commission and publish a staffing review, based on the staff needed to deliver against the new country strategic plan.</p> <p>b. The capacity of the country office human resource team should be augmented to provide the necessary capacity to support the timely appointment of suitably qualified and experienced staff – including proactively identifying and encouraging suitable staff to apply for key positions on reassignment.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
2.2.3 Factors for strategic Choices	The L3 roster helped temporarily fill several staff positions, but worked less well for functions such as logistics and nutrition. WFP does not have a standing capacity for surge deployments and roster deployments inevitably result in gaps being left in the office from where staff are mobilized. While obligations for release of staff are built into the WFP roster, how long they are released for remains the prerogative of their managers. Para 109	Same as above	c. WFP HQ should consider recruiting floating emergency staff who would be available for immediate deployment through the L3 roster.
2.2.3 Factors for strategic Choices	Key positions have proved problematic to fill through the reassignment process, including the Head of Programmes, the Head of Logistics and Head of VAM. WFP has had to rely disproportionately on personnel recruited on short-term contracts. Para 108 The reassignment process is failing to rotate the right calibre of fixed-term staff into South Sudan in a timely manner. While human resources is aware of the issue and has made changes to require that WFP staff include hardship posts every six years in their reassignment applications, the early indications from the latest reassignment process is that this may not resolve the problem. Para 108	Same as above.	d. While recognizing the measures taken by WFP HQ to improve the reassignment process, the relevant HQ department should consider further changes to the reassignment process to ensure that all staff serve in hardship postings.

Annex R: Glossary

The definitions tabulated below have been drawn from previous evaluations of WFP country portfolios and policies, from the WFP Technical Note on evaluation criteria [World Food Programme (nd)]. Evaluation Criteria Technical Note. Rome: WFP OEV, and from the OECD-DAC glossary of key terms in evaluation and results-based management [OECD-DAC (2002). Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management. Paris: OECD-DAC].

Term	How it is used in this evaluation
Activities	Actions taken or work performed through which inputs are mobilised to produce specific outputs. In common WFP parlance, activities are types of work such as school feeding or food for assets.
Appropriateness	The tailoring of activities to local needs and context, thereby increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness.
Capacity	The ability of people, organizations and society to manage their affairs successfully.
Coherence	The consistency of policy /programme elements with each other (do they complement each other in a positive way?). In a country portfolio evaluation, internal coherence refers to the components of the portfolio; external coherence refers to the relationships between the operations, activities and institutional functions of WFP and other international and national organizations, such as other United Nations agencies, donors and government ministries.
Conclusion	A conclusion draws on data collected and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments. Conclusions point out the factors of success and failure of an operation, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results, and more generally with regard to any other strength or weakness.
Connectedness	Refers to the degree to which activities of a short-term nature are carried out in a way that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account (e.g. refugee/host community issues relief and resilience).
Coverage	The degree to which major population groups facing life-threatening suffering, wherever they are, have been provided with impartial assistance and protection, proportionate to need. Requires analysis of differential coverage/targeting, inclusion and exclusion impacts on population sub-groups (gender, ethnicity, location, family circumstance).

Term	How it is used in this evaluation
Effect	Intended or unintended change due directly or indirectly to a WFP operation. These changes (results) can be at the output, outcome and/or impact levels.
Effectiveness	Measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness. Resourcing and preparedness are also relevant to effectiveness analysis.
Efficiency	Assesses the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – in relation to inputs. Generally requires comparing alternative approaches to conducting an activity, achieving an output or outcome, to assess whether the most efficient approach has been used.
Evaluability	The extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion, which depends on the clear understanding of the situation before assistance was provided, a clear statement of intended outcomes and impacts, clearly defined appropriate indicators, and target dates by which expected outcomes and impacts should occur.
Finding	A finding is an accumulation of evidence from an assessment, review or evaluation that allows for a factual statement.
Impact	The positive and negative changes produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended, affecting different population sub-groups and by gender, age, communities and institutions. Impacts can be grouped into social, economic, technical, environmental, macro (sector) and micro (household). Mixed methods, theory-based and contribution analysis are common evaluation approaches in humanitarian context where data reliability and other factors often preclude the most rigorous impact evaluation methods. The positive and negative impacts of external factors should be included in all impact assessment.
Input	The financial, human, and material resources required to implement the WFP operation.
Outcome	The medium-term results of an operation's outputs. Relates to the purpose level of the log frame hierarchy. The improved situation that a WFP operation is expected to contribute significantly to if completed successfully and on time.

Term	How it is used in this evaluation
Output	The products, capital goods and services that result from a WFP operation; includes changes resulting from the operation which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes. Relates to the output level of the log frame hierarchy.
Partners	The individuals and/or organizations that collaborate to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives. The concept of partnership connotes shared goals, common responsibility for outcomes, distinct accountabilities and reciprocal obligations. Partners may include governments, civil society, non-governmental organizations, universities, professional and business associations, multilateral organizations, private companies, etc.
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a WFP operation are consistent with beneficiaries' needs, country needs, organizational priorities, and partners' and donors' policies.
Recommendations	Proposals aimed at enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, impact, relevance, sustainability, connectedness, coherence or coverage of a WFP operation, portfolio, strategy or policy. Recommendations are intended to inform WFP decision-making, including programme design and resources allocations.
Results	The outputs, outcomes and/or impacts (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a WFP operation.
Stakeholders	Agencies, organizations, groups or individuals who have a direct or indirect interest in the development intervention or its evaluation
Sustainability	Assessment of whether an activity or its impact is likely to continue beyond the life of the intervention, socially, environmentally and financially. Notwithstanding recent development in humanitarian approaches for resilience and preparedness, many interventions are not designed to be sustainable, and hence sustainability in these situations is often linked with connectedness – the degree to which immediate response takes longer-term needs into account.

Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Population
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
ART	Antiretroviral Therapy
ARV	Antiretroviral
BDS	Box Delivery System
BR	Budget Revision
BSF	Blanket Supplementary Feeding
C&V	Cash and Voucher
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CEA	Cost-Efficiency Analysis
CER	Cost-efficiency Ratio
CD	Country Director
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMAM	Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition
CNV	Community Nutrition Volunteers
CO	Country Office
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CS	Country Strategy
CSB	Corn-soya Blend
CSB ++	Corn-soya Blend plus plus
CSD	Country Strategy Document
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
DAC	(OECD) Development Assistance Committee
DACOTA	Data Collection for WFP Reports
DCD	Deputy Country Director
DDS	Diet Diversity Score
DFID	Department for International Development
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
EB	Executive Board of WFP

EC	European Commission
ECHO	EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FFA/W/T/E	Food for Assets/Work/Training/Education
FLA	Field-level agreement
IFP	Institutional Feeding Programme
FSLC	Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FSNM	Food Security Nutrition Monitoring
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women Empowerment
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GESS	Girl's education in South Sudan
GFA	General Food Assistance
GFD	General Food Distribution
GRSS	Government of Republic of South Sudan
GUN	Greater Upper Nile
GVLP	Global Vehicle Leasing Programme
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HEB	High-Energy Biscuits
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HQ	Headquarters
ICF	Interim Cooperation Framework
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross

ICWG	Inter Cluster Working Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IO	In operation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
IRM	Integrated Road Map
IRG	Internal Reference Group
IRRM	Integrated Rapid Response Mechanism/Mission
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
LMS	Learning Management System
LTSH	landside transport, storage and handling
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance, Economics and Planning
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MT	Metric Tonnes
NiE	Nutrition in Emergency
NSFR	National Strategic Food Reserve
nd	no date
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NVS	Nutritional Value Score
OCHA	Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODC	Other Direct Costs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OED	Office of Evaluation Director
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
OTP	Out-Patient Therapeutic Programme
OWG	Operational Working Group
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PLWC	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PoC	Protection of Civilian Camps

PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RB	Regional Bureau
RBN	Regional Bureau Nairobi
REACH	Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition
RoSS	Republic of South Sudan
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SF	School Feeding
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
SO	Special Operation
SO	Strategic Objective
SP	Strategic Plan
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SSP	South Sudanese Pound
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition [movement]
TB	Tuberculosis
TL	Team Leader
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis Mapping
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WHZ	Weight for Height

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