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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Policy and Institutional Context

1. Major contextual shifts, including climate change, increasing inequality, more frequent natural disasters and increasingly protracted conflicts, have influenced global policy reforms. The 2013 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2016, calls for collective action to support country-led efforts in achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

2. The WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 sought to reposition WFP from a “food aid” to a “food assistance” agency. The subsequent WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021 places WFP firmly in support of the 2030 Agenda, and particularly in contributing to the achievement of SDG 2: “End Hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”. It focuses on reaching those in greatest need first, while ensuring that no one is left behind.¹

3. To meet the demands of this new environment, WFP has launched the Integrated Road Map (IRM). This redefines the organisation’s architecture as well as its country strategic planning process under the WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021.

1.2 Operations Evaluations

4. The WFP series of operations evaluations supports its corporate objective of accountability and learning for results. Since mid-2013, the series has generated 58 evaluations of operations across the six regions in which WFP operates. The evaluations assess the appropriateness of WFP operations, their results, and the factors explaining these results. The series will close in mid-2017.

5. Within the Southern Africa region, evaluations were implemented in seven countries from 2013 to 2017: Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 11 operations had combined requirements of over USD 994 million, targeting over 11.5 million beneficiaries from 2013 to 2017.² Of the operations:

- Eleven operations of the 51 currently active in the region were evaluated under the series. Evaluations covered 22 percent of the regional portfolio of operations and 31 percent of the regional operational budget.

- Five operations evaluated were protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) and four were country programmes (CPs). Two development programmes (DEVs) were also evaluated.

1.3 Purpose and Objectives

6. This Synthesis of Operations Evaluations for the Southern Africa Region brings together the findings of 11 operations evaluations, conducted from mid-2013 to mid-2017. The synthesis aims to:

- Enhance efficient and effective use of evaluation evidence and learning in programme development

- Help facilitate the country strategic plan process for the Regional Bureau of Johannesburg

• Create a concise, regional-friendly ‘body of evidence’ analysis to inform the upcoming development of the regional evaluation strategy

1.4 WFP in the Southern Africa Region

7. The Southern Africa region directly confronts many of the global contextual shifts above. A third of the population is food-insecure, seven of the countries have stunting rates above 33 percent and the region is highly vulnerable to climate-related disasters. The El Niño phenomenon has increased food insecurity in the region significantly.

8. Whilst countries in the region shift towards middle-income status, more than half the population still live below national poverty lines. Social protection is therefore becoming a critical concern of governments. All seven countries in the region covered by this report, for example, have social protection policies or frameworks in place, though at different stages of maturity.

9. WFP supports 11 countries in the Southern Africa region. Its role is both extensive and evolving:

• Eight protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) are currently being implemented across the region; 11 country/development programmes (CP/DEVs); 3 emergency operations (EMOPs); and 13 trust fund programmes (TFs).

• Following the declaration of the El Niño Level 3 corporate emergency covering seven countries in the region, WFP scaled up operations in 2016, reaching 15 million beneficiaries that year, almost double the number reached in 2015.

• 80 percent of WFP total beneficiaries for 2016 were in Malawi, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar.

• 86 percent of total beneficiaries in 2016 were reached through general distributions and school feeding (68 percent and 18 percent respectively).

10. As social and economic development takes hold across Southern Africa, the role of WFP is shifting from direct implementation to technical assistance and capacity development – where conditions permit. It is particularly aligning with government led/owned social protection programmes.

1.5 Contexts of the Operations Evaluated

11. Key features of the region are as follow:

• Stability and fragility: Operations in Zambia, Swaziland and Lesotho were implemented within comparatively stable operating environments, but those in Madagascar, Mozambique and Zimbabwe faced governance and political challenges. In Malawi, a corruption scandal affected aid relationships, and both Malawi and Zimbabwe faced financial crises, including high inflation.

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3 Terms of Reference.
4 Global Nutrition Report 2016: Madagascar=49.2%; Mozambique=43.1%; DRC=42.6%; Malawi=42.4%; Zambia=40%; Tanzania=34.7%; Lesotho=33.2%.
7 DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Republic of Congo, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
8 Source: RBJ Budget Revision (BR’s) Plans for the Integrated Road Map (IRM), supplied by Regional Bureau Johannesburg.
• **Economic contexts:** Operations were implemented in four low-income countries (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) and in three middle-income countries (Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia).

• **Activities/modalities:** The operations comprised a range of activities and modalities. Specifically:
  
  o Aside from capacity development, most operations implemented multiple components, other than the Swaziland 2012-2017 DEV, whose activities were focused on nutrition.
  
  o Operations in Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe served refugee populations, but none were solely focused on these groups.
  
  o The designs of ten operations included nutrition\(^{11}\) activities, reflecting a strategic priority for the region, though these were only implemented in eight operations. Five operations planned and implemented school feeding activities and eight food assistance for asset/food assistance for training (FFA/FFT), though these were only implemented in seven. General distribution was designed and implemented in only 5 out of 11 operations.
  
  o Capacity development was designed and applied (though to varied extents) in all 11 operations.
  
  o Seven operations included cash or voucher transfers.

• **Policy frameworks:** WFP operations in the region engaged with a wide range of policy platforms for food security. These included policies and frameworks on: rural and socio-economic development; nutrition; disaster risk management; agriculture and land rights; food fortification; TB and HIV and AIDS. WFP also engaged with national social protection policies and frameworks (see “Findings”, below).

• **Strategic partnerships:** Operations also formed a wide range of strategic partnerships in Southern Africa. These included central ministries (e.g. of education, health, agriculture and food security, community and social development, social welfare, local government) as well decentralised government functions, national vulnerability assessment mechanisms, national nutrition councils and disaster management authorities. Other partnerships were formed with a broad spectrum of United Nations agencies and with international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Annex 1 lists the strategic partnerships identified per country within evaluations (though recognising that these date back in some cases to 2014).

12. Table 1 below presents the operations’ main features:

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\(^{11}\) Including HIV/AIDS activities.
## Table 1: Features of operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of evaluation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Value (USD million)</th>
<th>% funded at evaluation</th>
<th>% funded overall</th>
<th>Target beneficiaries</th>
<th>General distribution</th>
<th>Nutrition</th>
<th>School feeding</th>
<th>Food assistance for assets/training</th>
<th>Capacity development</th>
<th>Local Purchase</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Cash-based transfers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200065</td>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>63,500,000</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>516,000</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>◊</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200355</td>
<td>30,100,000</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>253,000</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>200422</td>
<td>11,900,000</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>250,900</td>
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<td>√</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>200287</td>
<td>113,900,000</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>2,058,674</td>
<td>◊&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>◊</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>200157</td>
<td>43,500,000</td>
<td>2011-2015</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>◊&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200453</td>
<td>246,000,000</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2,409,000</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>√</td>
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<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>200369</td>
<td>2013-2017</td>
<td>40,470,716</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>200286</td>
<td>104,000,000</td>
<td>2012-2015</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>1,204,300</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200692</td>
<td>2014-2017</td>
<td>250,018,962</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>2,888,390</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>200353</td>
<td>10,748,648</td>
<td>2012-2017</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>203,163</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200735</td>
<td>2015-2017</td>
<td>30,102,427</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>449,000</td>
<td>√&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planned</td>
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</table>

<sup>12</sup> ◊ denotes planned but not implemented or implemented to a very limited degree in terms of beneficiary numbers or duration.

<sup>13</sup> As at the time of the evaluation.

<sup>14</sup> As at the time of this synthesis for ongoing operations or as at the end of the operation for already completed operations. Note that some of the operations may have had budget revisions after the evaluation was completed. This information is therefore intended to illustrate the volatility of funding environment. The source of this information is WFP Projects Database. http://go.wfp.org/web/wfpgo/projects.

<sup>15</sup> Planned beneficiaries throughout the project's lifetime.

<sup>16</sup> *Denotes HIV/AIDS activities that are analysed/reported under nutrition.
1.6 Methodology

13. The individual evaluations analysed here applied mixed-methods approaches, including documentary analysis, review of financial data and statistics, interviews and focus groups with key informants, and other relevant methods. All methodologies were checked for quality and reliability through the operations evaluations process.

14. This regional operations evaluations synthesis applies a structured analytical framework and systematic data extraction. Evidence was rated for validity and reliability on a scale of 1 (low) to 4 (high), with only reliable evidence – scoring at least 2 – included. Findings were validated by the WFP Office of Evaluation and by the regional evaluation officer for Southern Africa.

15. Limitations of this regional synthesis are multiple:

- Five of the 11 evaluations were mid-term, limiting final results data available.
- The evidence is concentrated in the earlier period of the operations, with six evaluations completed in 2014; two in 2015; two in 2016 and one in 2017. However, in four countries (Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland), 2014 evaluations were succeeded by a later evaluation, albeit of a different operation. This has allowed for some level of insight into changes over time.
- The evidence arises from only 7 countries in the Southern Africa region, whilst WFP is currently working in 11. Although themes identified may have wider relevance, they cannot be extrapolated to the wider portfolio of WFP in the region.
2. FINDINGS

QUESTION 1: How appropriate was the operation’s design? (relevance, strategic positioning and coherence)

**Summary findings: relevance/appropriateness**

Evaluations found WFP playing a major role in the collective humanitarian response in countries in the region. WFP partnered closely with government, aligning with and sometimes planning for joint implementation of, national initiatives, particularly national social protection programmes. Even prior to the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, designs in the region reflected an explicit intent to re-align the role of WFP to act as an “enabling partner” where conditions permitted. This included a strong focus on capacity development intentions – though with highly variable approaches, and lacking the required analysis to underpin robust design.

Overall, operations were highly relevant and appropriate in terms of operation type, objectives and alignment with beneficiary needs. Weaknesses in relevance mostly occurred at individual activity level, particularly in relation to food assistance for asset (FFA) designs. Targeting was strongest when collaboratively designed with partners.

However, evaluations found mixed quality designs of operations in the region. Food security evidence bases were comparatively strong, but designs suffered from weak causal chains, limited gender analysis and inconsistent use of learning from evaluations and reviews. Designs also lacked strong internal synergies.

2.1 How appropriate was WFP strategic positioning in the region?

Overall, evaluations found WFP playing a major role in the collective humanitarian response in the region, and responding to a strong national demand for its services. It partnered closely with government, often aligning (or implementing in partnership) with national initiatives. WFP adopted an enabling role, including a strong focus on capacity development, in countries where conditions permitted. However, capacity-development intentions were not adequately informed by analysis, and lacked overarching strategic frameworks.

16. Evaluations found WFP playing a major role in the humanitarian response for countries in the region. In Malawi, for example, the 2014-2017 PRRO represented about 85 percent of the relief response for the country. In Mozambique, the 2012-2014 PRRO was a critical component of the humanitarian and development architecture.

17. Evaluations in the region also find strong national demand for WFP engagement. In common with other regions reviewed through this series, a majority (8) of the 11 operations were explicitly developed in response to a request from/designed in strong partnership with government. Examples include:

- Zambia, where the 2011-2015 CP was designed explicitly in response to the Government’s request for WFP to play a crucial role in social protection

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16 Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200286 and 200355), Swaziland (200352 and 200422), Zambia (200157), Madagascar (200735).

17 See Regional Operation Evaluation Syntheses for East and Central Africa; Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe; Asia and the Pacific; Latin America and the Caribbean; and West Africa.
18. Six of the 11 operations were also explicitly geared to help implement government programmes. These were school feeding programmes in Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi; nutrition-specific programmes in Madagascar and Mozambique; and social transfers, also in Mozambique. Government also provided funding and/or other resources to operations in Lesotho and in Zambia as part of joint implementation.

19. Also in common with wider findings from this series, 8 of the 11 evaluations found explicit intentions to re-align the role of WFP to act as an “enabling partner” in the country. These intentions were in place even prior to the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017. For example:

- In Mozambique, the CP design was explicitly focused on building national capacity through strengthening systems and structures
- In Malawi, the education and nutrition components of the CP were designed to strengthen national systems and enhance government leadership.

20. WFP built capacity-development intentions into all 11 operation designs, but with varied levels of rigour — from integration within individual programme components, as in the 2012-2014 Zimbabwe PRRO, through to framing the whole operation’s design as in Mozambique’s CP. Evaluations identified two key findings, also reflected in other regions reviewed for this series:

- Firstly, no operation conducted capacity analysis as part of the design. Instead, several operations assumed levels of national capacity - rather than verifying them. Later, these untested assumptions created challenges for implementation
- Secondly, only two operations (in Mozambique (the 2012-2015 CP and the Swaziland 2013-2014 DEV) allocated adequate financial resources.

21. Evaluations find that WFP, in common with findings from some other regions evaluated through this series, made major efforts to align behind social protection frameworks in Southern Africa. Eight of the 11 operation designs, even those formulated in 2011-2013, planned activities around a social protection lens, including social transfers, school feeding, and sometimes food assistance for assets activities (Box 1).

**Box 1: Social protection**

- In Mozambique, the CP planned to support the Government’s direct social action interventions through food, cash or vouchers as part of its social protection strategy
- In Lesotho, WFP school feeding, nutrition and food assistance for assets activities supported under the CP aligned closely with the Government’s emphasis on social protection

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19 Mozambique (200286), Malawi (200287), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Lesotho (200369) Madagascar (200735) Mozambique (200255), Zimbabwe (200453).

20 See Regional Syntheses for Asia and the Pacific, West Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.

21 Zambia (200157), Swaziland (200422 and 200353), Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200286), Zimbabwe (200453), Lesotho (200369).
2.2 How rigorous was the operation design?

Evaluations found mixed quality designs, with evidence bases comparatively strong, but with weak causal chains and inconsistent use of learning from evaluations and reviews.

22. Evaluations in this series have consistently found weak or limited evidence bases for operation design. However, in contrast, 9 out of the 11 evaluations in the Southern Africa region found the food security evidence basis for design sufficient or adequate, using a range of evidence sources, as portrayed in Box 2.

**Box 2: Sources of food security evidence applied for operation design**

- Vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) including comprehensive food security and vulnerability assessment data in all operations
- Government assessments, where considered sufficiently robust
- Data from pilot exercises
- Joint assessment mission data
- Information generated through the country strategy development process
- Findings from past evaluations and reviews

23. However, and in common with findings identified elsewhere in the series, several evaluations found weak causal chains in designs (linking WFP interventions to intended results). These particularly related to resilience activities. For example:

- In Madagascar, the 2010-2013 PRRO did not establish a clear causal chain for vulnerability. Food assistance for assets interventions were therefore not always targeted and adapted to maximize benefits for the most vulnerable socio-economic groups.

- In Mozambique, the market access component of the CP lacked a clear theory of change which connected intended results to planned outcomes.

24. Five operations, mainly dating from later in the time period covered by the evaluations, made good use of evaluations or reviews to shape design, in common with two other regions evaluated in the series. However, those dating from earlier periods (e.g. CPs in Mozambique (2012-2015) and Malawi (2011-2014)) did not take specific lessons from previous evaluations on board as frequently – something which later hindered implementation. Only three operations (the CP and PRRO in Malawi and the CP in Zambia) explicitly applied gender analysis to inform design, also reflecting wider trends from the series.

25. Evaluations from this series have consistently found weak synergies in design. This continues in the Southern Africa region, with three evaluations, two in Swaziland and one in Mozambique, finding that internal synergies were strong in operation design,

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23 Zimbabwe (200453), Zambia (200157) Swaziland (200422 and 200353), Mozambique (200286 and 200355), Malawi (200287 and 200692), Madagascar (200735).
24 In Lesotho, the evaluation of the CP does not comment, and the evaluation of Madagascar (200065) finds the evidence base for the PRRO shallow, despite studies and other resources being available.
25 Lesotho (200369), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (2000353) and Zambia (200157).
26 See Regional Operation Evaluation Syntheses for the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe; and East and Central Africa.
27 Mozambique (200286), Swaziland (200422 and 20035).
whilst four\textsuperscript{28} (two in Malawi, one in Mozambique and one in Zambia) found scope for improvement. In Mozambique, evaluations of two separate operations, conducted two years apart, saw positive change, with the evaluation of the CP adopting a more concentrated geographical and thematic approach.

### 2.3 How responsive were operations to needs?

Overall, WFP operations in the region were well-designed to respond to needs, though with weaknesses at activity level, particularly in food assistance for assets. Targeting was strongest when collaboratively designed with partners, and evaluations found weaknesses in relation to food assistance for assets and nutrition. Cash gained momentum over time as a transfer modality.

26. In line with findings from across this series, WFP operations over the period were well-designed to respond to needs. All 11 evaluations found operation types appropriate for the country context in the region. Design was informed by a final or draft country strategy in nine operations.\textsuperscript{29}

27. Seven of the 11 evaluations found the intended coverage of WFP appropriate for humanitarian needs,\textsuperscript{30} based on data available at the time. Three (one in Lesotho and two in Madagascar)\textsuperscript{31} found caseloads under-estimated or too insufficient to reach the population in need whilst in Mozambique, under the CP, WFP ambitions exceeded national capacity to deliver.\textsuperscript{32}

28. All 11 operations found the operations’ objectives and overall intent well-aligned with the needs of food insecure populations in the country. For example, in Malawi, the PRRO was aligned with the “break the cycle” narrative prevalent in the country at the time, aiming to shift from recurrent emergency to recovery and resilience-building approaches.

29. At activity level, five evaluations\textsuperscript{33} found individual activities fully relevant to needs, but, in common with some other regions reviewed through this series, six found concerns.\textsuperscript{34} For example:

- The design of food assistance for assets initiatives was questioned in four evaluations,\textsuperscript{35} with a lack of alignment with operation objectives on rebuilding livelihoods/increasing resilience/disaster preparedness in Mozambique, Lesotho and Madagascar and concerns about relevance to the needs of the poorest in Zimbabwe.
- Two evaluations,\textsuperscript{36} of the CP in Malawi and the PRRO in Zimbabwe, found concerns about relevance of nutrition-specific interventions to needs.
- The evaluation of the Lesotho CP questioned the appropriateness of using pre-school meals to enable WFP to meet the most disadvantaged and vulnerable children living with food insecurity.

\textsuperscript{28} Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200355) Zambia (200157).
\textsuperscript{29} The exceptions were Zimbabwe (200453) and Madagascar (200065), evaluated in 2014, where no Country Strategy existed at the time of design.
\textsuperscript{30} Zimbabwe (200453), Zambia (200157), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Mozambique (200355) Malawi (200287 and 200692).
\textsuperscript{31} Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200735 and 200065).
\textsuperscript{32} Mozambique (200286).
\textsuperscript{33} Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Zambia (200157).
\textsuperscript{34} Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200735 and 200065), Mozambique (200355), Malawi (200287) Zimbabwe (200453).
\textsuperscript{35} Mozambique (200355); Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065), Zimbabwe (200453).
\textsuperscript{36} Malawi (200287), Zimbabwe (200453).
30. Targeting was appropriately designed in six operations. WFP geographical targeting was especially praised where collaboratively undertaken, such as in the Mozambique and Malawi PRROs:

- In Mozambique, geographic targeting for relief and recovery activities of the PRRO was assessed as appropriate because it was collaborative, transparent, and responded to government request.

- In Malawi, local geographic coverage of the relief activities of the PRRO was established on the basis of a review of all activities by humanitarian and development assistance partners.

31. Four evaluations found activity-level targeting concerns:

- Shortcomings in food assistance for assets targeting were found in Mozambique, Madagascar and Malawi. In Madagascar, the evaluation observed that the choice of food assistance for assets sites was largely oriented towards quick and easy works, rather than on potential vulnerability impact. In Mozambique, community based targeting led to potentially high levels of exclusion and inclusion errors. In Malawi, a thorough and participatory planning process highlighted trade-offs between establishing relatively intensive pilots and extending food assistance for assets to a larger number of beneficiaries elsewhere.

- Concerns in nutrition interventions focused on coverage criteria: in the Mozambique PRRO, in relation to potential missed targeting of vulnerable groups (such as pregnant and lactating women, children under five, or people living with HIV); and in Madagascar, by implementing targeting through a national programme which applied criteria beyond nutrition, so that coverage was not fully consistent with local needs for malnutrition treatment.

32. Finally, and in common with the majority of regions assessed through this series, planned transfer modalities were assessed as appropriate in 10 of the 11 operations, though further research was advised into the potential for cash-based transfers in the 2012-2017 Swaziland DEV and the Madagascar PRRO. In Zimbabwe, the evaluation of the PRRO concluded that cash payments were not appropriate when planned for a country facing potentially high inflation.

QUESTION 2: What were the results of the operations?

**Summary findings: results**

Evaluations found data availability and quality concerns, particularly at outcome level - though output data availability has improved over time. Performance was variable across activity areas, and dependent on contextual factors, with consistent achievement in school feeding and food assistance for assets (though with significant concerns raised about the quality and sustainability of assets created).

Evaluations also identified additional results in line with the “enabling” role of WFP in the region. These included: improved policy environments, enhanced national capacities, and results in social protection and resilience. Results in gender mostly reflected a ‘quantitative’ approach.

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37 Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286) Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Zambia (200157) and Zimbabwe (200453).
38 Malawi (200692) Madagascar (200065), Mozambique (200355).
39 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Malawi (200287 and 200692), Mozambique (200355 and 200286), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Zambia (200157).
Close design-stage alliances with governments continued into implementation but
relationships with partner United Nations agencies were inconsistent. WFP willingness to
adapt under changing conditions was praised in seven evaluations, though timeliness
proved challenging. Potential for sustainability was generally low, with only two operations
taking concrete steps towards handover.

2.4 What evidence of results is available?

Evaluations found output data increasingly available over time, though weaknesses in
outcome data continue. Shortcomings in data quality and reliability, particularly at outcome
level, has impeded the ability of WFP to demonstrate results in the region and data has been
insufficiently utilised to inform planning and programming.

37. **Monitoring systems**: Evaluations in this series have found shortcomings in WFP
monitoring systems being gradually addressed over time. Operation evaluations from the
Southern Africa region reflect these findings, with 8 of the 11 evaluations, primarily those
from 2014 to 2015, critiquing the frequency and rigour of monitoring, with weaknesses often
linked to country office resource limitations.

38. The availability of output data in the region has improved over the period, with six
evaluations finding gaps, all conducted in 2014 or 2015. However, also in common with wider
findings, all 11 evaluations, including those conducted in 2016 and 2017, found gaps in
outcome data. A lack of baseline data is explicitly mentioned in four evaluations.

39. Data quality and reliability issues are raised in 9 of the 11 evaluations. Concerns include:

- Contradictions or internal errors in output or outcome data (four evaluations)
- Non-representative sample bases used to extrapolate data to wider programme
  components or wider/different populations (five evaluations)
- Difficulties applying the national capacity index, in resilience, school feeding and
  nutrition respectively (three evaluations)
- Overly limited indicators for reporting against wider intentions (for example, using
  food security outcomes to report against areas such as improved resilience) (two
  evaluations)
- Claims made for improvements in outcome data that lack rigour – for example
  attributing improved food consumption scores to WFP food transfers, which only
  supply a small percentage of a household’s food entitlements, or conducting
  measurements close to times when food consumption levels are high (two
  evaluations).

40. Shortcomings in data analysis reflect wider limitations identified through this series, being
found in eight evaluations, including:

- Emphasis on quantitative reporting (corporate) rather than the generation and use of
  qualitative information (five evaluations)

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40 Zambia (200157), Lesotho (200369, Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Mozambique (200355 and 200286), Zimbabwe (200453).
41 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065), Mozambique (200355 and 200086), Swaziland (200422) and Zambia (200157).
42 Mozambique (200355), Madagascar (200065), Swaziland (200353 and 200422).
43 All other than Zambia (200157) and Swaziland (200422).
44 Lesotho (200369) Madagascar (200065), Malawi (200287), Zimbabwe (200453).
45 Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200355), Madagascar (200065).
46 Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200286), Swaziland (200353).
47 Malawi (200692) Mozambique 200286).
48 Mozambique (200086) Lesotho (200369).
49 Malawi (200692), Zimbabwe (200453), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200422 and 200353).
• Limited use/analysis of available data, including from partners, often due to resource constraints or a lack of time (three evaluations).50

41. Four evaluations also found limited data use, arising from:

• Lack of timeliness of data, constraining its utility to operational decision-making (two evaluations)51

• Weak information flows between WFP and partners, and/or little involvement from WFP in data control and analysis (two evaluations).52

42. The relevance of corporate indicators to the operation was questioned in Lesotho and Zambia,53 where evaluations found that the WFP standard project report format did not allow for capture of all the CP’s achievements, for example, on health service utilisation/agricultural production.

43. Finally, WFP target-setting was questioned in four operations, with over-ambitious targets set in food assistance for assets (Madagascar),54 and nutrition (Swaziland,55 specifically for TB and prevention of mother-to-child transmission clients), whilst in Mozambique,56 unclear rationales and over-optimistic assumptions regarding government capacity led to ambitious targets overall. In Malawi,57 whilst output targets were realistic, the operation did not undertake regular programme reviews, which would likely have led to revised targets and in turn in higher achievements and/or higher quality of results.

2.5 What output and outcome results have been achieved, per theme/sector?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance was variable across activity areas, and highly dependent on contextual factors. Outcome data particularly was limited in availability and reliability.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General distribution:</strong> As a relief response, general distribution is highly dependent on contextual factors. Planned output targets were reached in three operations but not in two, in the absence of need for a relief response in Madagascar and funding shortages in Zimbabwe. Outcomes targets were met in two operations, but either did not meet intentions and/or attribution could not be proven in three.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutrition:</strong> Eight of the 11 operations implemented a nutrition response. Achievement was mixed, with two operations exceeding planning figures for beneficiaries. Two out of seven operations for which data was available met outcome targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School feeding:</strong> Activities were implemented in five operations, all in support of national programmes. Output targets were achieved in two out of five operations and exceeded in two, and three operations met outcome targets, out of four for which data was available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food assistance for assets:</strong> Seven of the 11 operations implemented food assistance for assets activities, with smaller planned beneficiary numbers than for other activity areas. Five operations achieved output-level targets, and four achieved outcome targets for the period, out of six for which data was available. However, all seven evaluations raise concerns about the quality and sustainability of assets created.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 Malawi (200692), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).
51 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065).
52 Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692).
53 Zambia (200157).
54 Madagascar (200735).
55 Swaziland 200353.
56 Mozambique (200286).
57 Malawi (200692).
44. All except one operation (in Swaziland) contained multiple components (Table 1, above). Beneficiaries reached varied significantly against plan in operations in Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland, due to natural disasters in Malawi/the need to address refugee food needs in Mozambique/a decision to expand the caseload in Swaziland.

45. Results against activity areas were as follows:

**General distribution**

46. Five operations implemented general distribution activities over the evaluation period, all PRROs (in Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe). The PRROs with the largest intended caseloads for general distribution were Malawi, targeting 1.9 million beneficiaries over the 2015 reporting period, and Zimbabwe, targeting just over 1.8 million beneficiaries from 2013 to 2014.

47. **Output results:** General distribution is highly dependent on contextual factors, particularly given the region’s vulnerability to climate-related disasters. Evaluations found planned output targets met in three operations due to sound collaborative targeting in Malawi, and because natural disasters occurred in Madagascar in 2015 and Mozambique in 2012; and two operations not meeting planned targets, with no relief response required in Madagascar during 2011-2013, and funding shortages encountered in Zimbabwe.

48. **Outcome results:** All five evaluations reported shortcomings in outcome data. However:

- Two evaluations, of the PRRO in Malawi, and the PRRO in Mozambique, found positive progress made towards the relevant outcome targets
- Three evaluations, of the two PRROs in Madagascar and the PRRO in Zimbabwe, found that either a causality link to interventions could not be proven or did not make a quantifiable difference to household food security.

**Nutrition**

49. Although 10 of the 11 operations had planned nutrition interventions in the region, reflecting its importance as a strategic priority in the region, these were only implemented as planned in eight. Six operations implemented nutrition-specific interventions; in Swaziland, under the 2012-2013 DEV, general food distribution activities were nutrition-sensitive; and in Mozambique, under the CP, WFP provided both nutrition-specific interventions and micronutrient powders as part of school feeding activities. In Zambia, WFP re-oriented its nutrition efforts towards capacity building activities to strengthen nutrition governance.

50. The largest numbers of nutrition beneficiaries were intended in Zimbabwe, where the PRRO targeted over 450,000 beneficiaries from 2013 to 2014, and Malawi, where the WFP CP targeted over 850,000 beneficiaries, or three-quarters of the total country needs. The CP in Mozambique also targeted over 660,000 beneficiaries.

51. **Output results:** All programmes met 60 percent or above of targets. Two operations (both nutrition-specific, the 2015-2017 PRRO in Madagascar and that in

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58 Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200355) Swaziland (200422).
59 Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200355) and Madagascar (200735).
60 With the only exception being Mozambique (200355), evaluated in 2014.
61 Due to no nutrition emergency identified in Madagascar (200665) plus Zambia (200157).
62 Madagascar 200735, Lesotho, Malawi both operations; Swaziland 200353, Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe) exceeded planning figures for beneficiaries, both due to high levels of beneficiary need. The remaining six\(^\text{63}\) did not meet planned output targets in full. In Malawi, WFP reached 70 percent of planned direct relief beneficiaries in its PRRO with nutrition-related counselling or messaging.

52. **Outcome results:** Evaluations note significant concerns in relation to the quality and reliability of nutrition outcome data. No nutrition outcome data at all was available for the Malawi PRRO. For example:

- Two operations (one nutrition-specific, the CP in Malawi and one nutrition-sensitive, the 2012-2013 DEV in Swaziland) achieved intended outcome targets, in Malawi in terms of protecting or improving nutritional status, and alignment with the Sphere standards, and in Swaziland, in terms of attendance at neighbourhood care points. In Malawi WFP was praised for its important contribution to the country’s improvements in nutritional status.

- Targets were not reached, or for mid-term evaluations were off-track, in five evaluations.\(^\text{64}\) Weaknesses noted included a lack of exit strategy in Zimbabwe, and treatment defaults in Swaziland.

**Education (school feeding)**

53. Only five operations implemented school feeding activities, all either DEVs or CPs.\(^\text{65}\) All five supported government programmes, often as part of a social protection response. The largest scale activities were in Malawi, where WFP school meals under its CP reached approximately 25 percent of all primary schoolchildren, and Zambia, where under its CP, WFP aimed to reach 280,000 primary-school pupils each year and one million pupils by 2015.

54. **Output results:** Output-level achievement was generally positive, as follows:

- WFP met output targets in Lesotho and Zambia, and exceeded planned targets in Malawi and Swaziland. This was attributed to rigorous targeting in Malawi and to a decision to extend support to the whole student body in secondary school feeding in Swaziland. In Lesotho, however, the evaluation points to concerns about inclusion/exclusion errors.

- In Mozambique, school feeding activities fell short of achieving targets, due to funding constraints in Mozambique.

55. **Outcome results:** Results were only available for four out of five school feeding interventions, with no data available to assess progress in Swaziland’s 2012-2013 DEV. However:

- Three of the four evaluations found positively, with outcome targets met in terms of attendance in Malawi and Mozambique; and in terms of enrolment and retention targets in Mozambique. In Zambia, positive progress was shown in terms of attendance, enrolment and retention, though outcome targets were not cited.

- The evaluation of the Lesotho school feeding activities found outcome targets met other than for annual increases in girls’ enrolment, but points out that

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\(^{63}\) Lesotho (200369), Malawi (200287 and 200692), Mozambique (200286) and Swaziland (200353 and 200242)

\(^{64}\) Lesotho (200369), Swaziland (200353) Madagascar (200735), Mozambique (200286) and Zimbabwe (200453).

\(^{65}\) Lesotho (200369), Malawi (200287) Mozambique (200286), Swaziland (200242) and Zambia (200157).
enrolment numbers are still far short of the target set in the national education sector strategic plan.

Livelihoods (food assistance for assets/food assistance for training)

56. Seven of the 11 operations implemented food assistance for assets activities. In Malawi, when anticipated resources for food assistance for assets under the CP were not forthcoming, WFP re-oriented to focus on supporting national structures and systems for sustainable livelihoods.

57. Planned beneficiary numbers were generally smaller than for other activity areas. The largest volume was in Zimbabwe, where the PRRO targeted 250,000 beneficiaries from 2012-2014. In Madagascar, the WFP PRRO targeted 141,000 beneficiaries from 2010 to 2013.

58. Output results: Five out of seven operations exceeded output-level targets for the period. Evaluations also found significant benefits in terms of physical infrastructure improvements, though questions were raised about sustainability.

59. The 2015-2017 PRRO in Madagascar and the CP in Mozambique did not fully achieve output targets, due partly to the onset of emergencies in Mozambique and to resource limitations in both cases.

60. Outcome results: Data was available for six operations. Of these:

- Four operations achieved positive results in relation to food consumption scores, coping strategies and increased resilience.
- There were promising results in Malawi the evaluation noted from WFP efforts to develop and coordinate multi-year plans and consolidate resilience building and social protection efforts at the district level.
- Two operations, the PRRO in Madagascar and the CP in Lesotho, did not achieve their intended aims. Food assistance for assets activities in Madagascar did not manage to stabilize the food security situation and in Lesotho, food assistance for assets/cash assistance for assets initiatives were not judged effective in supporting resilience.

61. All seven evaluations raised concerns about the quality and sustainability of assets created, and a lack of links to the operation’s resilience objectives. For example:

- In Mozambique, assets created did not increase household resilience to climatic variability, mainly because many were not directly linked to increasing resilience to natural disasters.
- In Madagascar, quality concerns meant that corrective works had to be implemented, and a lack of follow-up on the use and maintenance of the assets was noted.
- In Lesotho, the evaluation team found inappropriate choices of assets in food/cash for work projects, which were later abandoned by communities.

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66 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200265 and 200735), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200286) and Mozambique (200355), Zimbabwe (200453).
67 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200265), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200355) and Zimbabwe (200453).
68 Causality concerns were raised in Madagascar (200065).
69 Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355), Zimbabwe (200453).
2.6 What other results have been generated, beyond WFP standard indicators?

Evaluations also identify results that were not consistently captured in corporate reporting at the time, but that arose from the ‘enabling’ role of WFP in the region. These included: improving policy environments, building national capacities, and results in social protection and resilience.

2.6.1 Improving policy environments

Evaluations identify contributions to enhancing national policy environments in the region. Not all these results were captured in corporate reporting, particularly since operations were implemented over two strategic plan periods (2008-2013 and 2014-2017) with very different reporting frameworks. Examples of this are included in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Policy environment results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Education</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Nutrition</em></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Disaster preparedness/risk reduction</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Social protection</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.2 Building national capacities

Several evaluations also record significant improvements in national capacities arising from WFP support to governments in the region. Examples are presented in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Capacity development results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Food security and nutrition monitoring/analytical capacity</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Emergency preparedness

Building national capacity to develop and implement early warning systems (Lesotho, Mozambique, Madagascar, Zambia)

Helping to develop contingency planning mechanisms (Madagascar, Mozambique)

Disaster preparedness/risk reduction/management

Building infrastructure for disaster risk management/risk reduction (Madagascar, Malawi)

64. Despite these results, evaluations still found weaknesses and missed opportunities in capacity development work in the region. These included limited capacity analyses and weak strategic approaches, including the absence of a clear plan and intended results.

2.6.3 Results in social protection

65. Although national policy frameworks in the region are at different stages of maturity, evaluations found that WFP advocacy for social protection delivered some significant results. For example:

- In Mozambique, the evaluation of the CP found that WFP played an important role in advocating for social protection in a setting where frameworks were comparatively mature, with its influence reflected in significant parliamentary decisions on the national budget.

- In Zambia, where the government was strongly committed to social protection, WFP supported the national social cash transfer programme by helping the integration of mobile technology into government systems.

- In Zimbabwe, where policy frameworks were still emerging at the time of evaluation, WFP provided a critical safety net to vulnerable beneficiaries, in line with the Government’s approach to social protection.

2.6.4 Results in resilience

66. Six evaluations comment on resilience. Three found positive results, in Malawi (where the WFP approach to resilience evolved and improved throughout the two successive operation evaluations); and in Zambia, where the evolving role of WFP in capacity development helped national authorities shift away from disaster response to resilience building. In three others WFP had not sufficiently engaged with resilience frameworks.

2.6.5 Results for communities

67. Several evaluations also record significant improvements at community level, not always captured in WFP corporate reporting systems of the time. Examples include (Table 4):

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70 These reflect the findings of WFP’s 2017 Evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy: An Update on Implementation https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/b548771b6e6a4634bbd93699738d57cf/download/?_ga=2.154690808.1389589160.1493981370-1807366214.1468102552.

71 Malawi (200287 and 200692), Zambia (200157) Lesotho (200369), Mozambique (20035), Zimbabwe (200043).

72 Lesotho (200369), Mozambique (200355), Zimbabwe (200453).
Table 4: Results for communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced absenteeism/increased attendance at school (Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed dietary practices in communities (Mozambique)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nutrition</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased access to/uptake of health services (Lesotho)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced early deaths of HIV-positive beneficiaries (Malawi)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihoods</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased household income (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased agricultural production (Malawi, Zambia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased access to markets (Zambia)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversified livelihoods (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.7 Gender, protection and accountability to affected populations

Gender was inconsistently mainstreamed into operation implementation, and results were mostly reported in terms of ‘inclusion of women’. Only three evaluations reported on protection concerns, though all three found positively. Accountability to affected populations was a weakness, even in more recent evaluations.

68. Gender: Five\textsuperscript{73} out of eight evaluations\textsuperscript{74} commenting found gender-sensitive implementation modalities. However, in line with wider findings from across regions evaluated in this series, an ‘including women’ approach to gender persisted in four operations.\textsuperscript{75}

69. Results achieved were mostly quantitative, for example, ratios of girls to boys in school feeding. Targets were achieved in nine operations,\textsuperscript{76} but were missed in Lesotho and Madagascar. Only three evaluations, in Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia,\textsuperscript{77} reported qualitative gender results, including representation of women at household level/within local committees and improved decision-making over the use of transfers.

70. Protection: Only three evaluations, in Swaziland, Malawi and Mozambique, reported on protection.\textsuperscript{78} All found positively: with staff and community sensitization paying off in terms of few reported security incidents.

71. Accountability to affected populations (AAP): Of eight evaluations reporting\textsuperscript{79} only those of PRROs in Malawi and Mozambique found positively, with complaints processes (whether hotlines or through WFP staff) established. The remaining six found accountability and communication mechanisms to beneficiaries to be weak or non-functioning, negatively affecting their experience. In Mozambique, for example, the lack of an in-built grievance/complaints procedure in social

\textsuperscript{73} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (2000692 and 200287), Swaziland (200353 and 200422).
\textsuperscript{74} Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286 and 200355) Zambia (200157) and Zimbabwe (200453).
\textsuperscript{75} Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200286 and 200355) and Zambia (20157).
\textsuperscript{76} Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200433), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Mozambique (200286 and 200355) Malawi (200692 and 200287) Madagascar (200665).
\textsuperscript{77} Malawi (200692), Swaziland (200353) and Zambia (200157).
\textsuperscript{78} Swaziland (200353), Malawi (200692) and Mozambique (200286).
\textsuperscript{79} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (2000692), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286 and 200355), Zimbabwe (200453). For Swaziland (200353), cross-cutting indicators on AAP were integrated into the accountability framework. Measurement only took place in 2015, but results indicate that targets were not achieved for that year.
protection was a serious oversight, but the evaluation found that mechanisms for feedback on problems were weak across the entire CP.

2.8 WFP partnerships in Southern Africa

Evaluations found WFP engaged in close partnerships with governments in the region, where conditions permitted—though shifting to a more ‘enabling’ role presented challenges of its own. Relationships with partner United Nations agencies were inconsistent.

72. **Government partners:** In 10 of the 11 evaluations where conditions permitted, and in common with all regions evaluated through this series, ten evaluations praised the strength and collaborative nature of WFP partnerships with government.\(^8^0\) However, evaluations also identified challenges as WFP moved to a more enabling role. These included implementation through national systems, such as in the Malawi and Mozambique CPs, where WFP ability to deliver was influenced by government capacity.

73. **United Nations partners:** Relationships with partner United Nations agencies were less consistent, reflecting wider findings from the series. Four evaluations praised WFP collaboration with individual agencies\(^8^1\) but four others found mixed operational coordination and missed opportunities to partner on the ground.\(^8^2\)

2.9 Efficiency and agility in implementation

WFP faced challenges of timeliness in the region, with almost all operations experiencing pipeline breaks or implementation delays. Efforts to improve cost-efficiency were identified in four evaluations, delivering tangible improvements in one. The agility of WFP and its willingness to adapt to changing conditions was praised in seven evaluations. Transfer modalities were appropriate other than where cash was implemented in a high-inflation setting.

74. Timeliness was a challenge for the region’s operations: 9 of the 11 operations\(^8^3\) experienced pipeline breaks or implementation delays, often due to funding limitations. In response, WFP often reduced rations or the frequency of distributions. Failure to include logframe targets for timely delivery of food and cash was a missed opportunity to incentivise staff in Mozambique and Malawi.\(^8^4\)

75. Four evaluations, of operations in Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia,\(^8^5\) found efforts to improve cost-efficiency. These included: efforts to synchronize nutrition distribution plans and frequency in Malawi; placing field coordinators at decentralised levels rather than funding satellite offices in Zambia; and concentrating the transition plan for schools in Mozambique. However, at the time of evaluation only the operation in Lesotho was assessed as cost-efficient overall, with its procurement and delivery costs falling within acceptable WFP parameters. Internal synergies were

\(^8^0\) In the eleventh, Madagascar (200065), the scope for working coordination between the government and WFP Country Office was limited in 2012-14 due to the political context. By 2017, when a subsequent evaluation of PRRO 200735 took place, the political situation had improved, and national institutions were closely involved in the implementation of the operation.

\(^8^1\) Both Swaziland operations plus Mozambique (200355) and in Zambia (200157).

\(^8^2\) Lesotho (200369), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286) and Zimbabwe (200453).

\(^8^3\) Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355).

\(^8^4\) Swaziland (200422), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).

\(^8^5\) Malawi (200286); also mentioned as a shortcoming in Malawi (200287).
also a weakness: of nine evaluations commenting, seven found missed opportunities or scope for improvement.\textsuperscript{86}

76. Internal synergies in implementation reflect wider findings from the series, being generally weak in the region, although all except the 2016 Swaziland operation\textsuperscript{88} were multi-component. Of eight evaluations\textsuperscript{89} commenting:

- In Swaziland,\textsuperscript{90} the two projects comprising the operation were well-syneragised, improving effectiveness on the ground.
- In Zambia, intra-operation links across activities were “emerging”.\textsuperscript{91}
- In Mozambique, the CP\textsuperscript{92} had built synergies between the operation’s activities and those of other WFP operations ongoing in the country at the time, but these faced operational challenges to synergise in practice on the ground.
- Five operations\textsuperscript{93} did not maximise the potential of available synergies, reducing efficiency and constraining effectiveness for beneficiaries. For example, in Malawi,\textsuperscript{94} disaster risk reduction activities could have been linked with emergency relief programmes, as well as with other WFP activities ongoing in the country. Within the Mozambique PRRO,\textsuperscript{95} limited synergy and learning between technical sectors of the country office and the PRRO limited the extent to which PRRO activities contributed to rebuilding lives and livelihoods.

77. **Adaptive capacity:** The ability and willingness of WFP to adapt to changing conditions reflected the wider strength identified through this series, being praised in seven evaluations.\textsuperscript{96} Reasons for adaptations included increased caseloads due to natural disasters, changing donor priorities and the corporate shift from food aid to food assistance.

**Box 3: Improving agility**

In Zambia, swift decision-making kept the CP relevant to the improving economic and food production context. By increasing its technical assistance provision, and targeting it to areas of government priority, such as the national social cash transfer programme, WFP became a key partner for the Government of Zambia in its social protection aims

78. **Beneficiary entitlements:** All 11 evaluations found WFP delivering less food or cash than intended to beneficiaries and/or had carried out transfers for a shorter duration or with less frequency than planned. The main effect on beneficiaries was decreased effectiveness – such as in Zimbabwe – where the food received was in too small a quantity, and for too short a duration to make a quantifiable difference to household food security.

\textsuperscript{86} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).
\textsuperscript{87} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200286 and 200355), Swaziland (200353 and 200422), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).
\textsuperscript{88} Swaziland (200353).
\textsuperscript{89} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200286, 200355), Swaziland (200508), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).
\textsuperscript{90} Swaziland (200422).
\textsuperscript{91} Zambia (200157).
\textsuperscript{92} Mozambique (200286).
\textsuperscript{93} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200353), Zimbabwe 200453).
\textsuperscript{94} Malawi (200287).
\textsuperscript{95} Mozambique (200355).
\textsuperscript{96} Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200422), Zambia (200157)
79. **Transfer modalities:** All seven operations implementing cash and voucher transfers found positive effects, such as allowing beneficiaries to pay school fees and medical expenses and/or permitting more nutritionally diverse baskets of commodities to be purchased. However, financial crises in Zimbabwe and Malawi meant that inflation reduced the value of the transfer significantly.

80. For in-kind transfers, commodities provided were well-accepted by beneficiaries in five operations\(^\text{97}\) though difficulties of suitability were raised in PRROs in Malawi and Mozambique. Quality concerns were raised in three evaluations, in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland.

81. Finally, local purchase of commodities was trialled and/or implemented in six operations.\(^\text{98}\) This was highly successful in the Mozambique CP,\(^\text{99}\) where 100 percent of commodities were purchased in-country, and in Zambia, where the country office was able to support other parts of WFP work in Africa through local production. In three other operations,\(^\text{100}\) more limited volumes of commodities were procured locally, though these included 51 percent of all commodities under the Mozambique PRRO,\(^\text{101}\) and most supercereal in Malawi.\(^\text{102}\) In Lesotho, a pilot project to supply school meals activities was implemented, but quality and reliability concerns meant that large-scale local purchase could not be realised.

### 2.10 Sustainability/handover

The potential for sustainability was assessed as low or at-risk in eight operations. Just two evaluations found concrete steps taken towards handover, with the remainder finding either unconducive conditions and/or that WFP had not sufficiently planned or strategized for handover.

82. All 11 evaluations report on sustainability and handover. The potential for sustainability is assessed as low or at-risk in eight,\(^\text{103}\) mainly due to limited government capacity and/or financial commitment.

83. In common with wider weaknesses identified from this series, just two evaluations, of both Swaziland DEVs, found concrete steps made towards handover. Two, of the Madagascar and Malawi PRROs, found conditions unconducive at the time of evaluation, and that WFP had accordingly not focused on handover.\(^\text{104}\) However, two evaluations, of the Malawi CP and the Mozambique PRRO, found that WFP had planned for handover, but had also over-estimated national capacities, preventing handover as planned.\(^\text{105}\) Three other evaluations, in Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe, found lack of sufficient planning or strategizing for sustainability/handover, even under conducive conditions.\(^\text{106}\)

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\(^{97}\) Lesotho (200069), Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200287), Swaziland (200353, 200422)

\(^{98}\) Lesotho (200069), Madagascar (200265), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286 and 200355), Zambia (200157)

\(^{99}\) Mozambique (200286), Madagascar (200265), Mozambique (200355), Malawi (200287)

\(^{100}\) Mozambique (200355)

\(^{101}\) Mozambique (200069)

\(^{102}\) Malawi (200287)

\(^{103}\) Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Malawi (200692 and 200287), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200422) and Zimbabwe (200453)

\(^{104}\) Madagascar (200065), Malawi (200692)

\(^{105}\) Malawi (200087), Mozambique (200355)

\(^{106}\) Lesotho (200369), Zimbabwe (200453), Zambia (200157)
QUESTION 3: What factors affected the results?

Summary findings: factors

External factors affecting results included climate-related challenges, financial volatility, national logistical and administrative delays, political and governance uncertainty or instability and cultural issues. Funding-related concerns, such as late conversion of pledges into cash, also hindered effectiveness. While conducive policy environments (such as social protection frameworks) supported implementation, national capacity limitations were a constraint.

Internal barriers to effectiveness in the region were design flaws, targeting weaknesses, internal communication and limited human resources. However, good external communication with partners, including governments, supported results.

2.11 Internal and external factors

84. Evaluations identify a combination of internal and external factors which have affected results. External factors were as follows:

- External environment: Factors impeding effectiveness included climate-related challenges, specifically the El Niño phenomenon, financial volatility, national logistical and administrative delays, political and governance uncertainty or instability, and cultural issues such as sharing rations. Conducive policy environments, including social protection frameworks, supported implementation but national capacity limitations, including under-staffing and limited policymaking capability, prove barriers.

- Funding-related: Funding volumes ranged from 37 percent in Zimbabwe at final evaluation stage, to 59 percent in Zambia at mid-term stage (see Table 1 above). Lack of funding was the main reason for pipeline breaks, and/or the need to reduce geographical and beneficiary coverage. Operations also suffered delayed contributions delivery or delays in receiving funds after the initial commitment was made, as well as restrictions to in-kind contributions, funds earmarked for specific projects only.

85. Internal factors were as follows:

- External communication with governments, donors and other humanitarian actors supported effectiveness and was praised in ten evaluations. However, two evaluations (of the Malawi CP and the Zimbabwe PRRO) found that, whilst relationships at central level were strong, scope for better communication and coordination existed at decentralised or local level. Communication with affected populations was inconsistent and insufficient.

- Design flaws, raised in seven evaluations, hindered results. These included weak internal logics or theories of change; misplaced assumptions of national capacities; and limited gender sensitivity of design.

- Targeting weaknesses were identified in six evaluations. These related to inclusion and exclusion errors in nutrition in four cases (all nutrition-specific initiatives: Lesotho, the Malawi PRRO, and the Mozambique PRRO and CP)

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807 Mozambique (200355)
808 With the only exception being Madagascar (200065), where (partly due to prevailing political conditions at the time) the PRRO was implemented in limited communication with government and other partners.
809 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065), Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (20286), Mozambique (200355).
and in food assistance for assets in the Mozambique CP; a lack of application of agreed targeting approaches in the Madagascar and Mozambique PRROs; challenges with food assistance for assets community-based targeting in the Mozambique PRRO; and a failure to target vulnerable populations within food assistance for assets initiatives in the Madagascar CP.

- Internal communication within WFP was a barrier in three operations: Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{110} This was linked to weak internal synergies, and included weaknesses in centralised decision-making for examples noted in Mozambique.

- Limited human resources – in all cases due to funding restrictions – was identified in eight evaluations.\textsuperscript{111} This limited the specialist technical skills available to WFP. Specific gaps include nutrition in the Malawi CP and Swaziland DEV; school feeding capability in the Mozambique CP; and resilience expertise in the Madagascar PRRO. Three operations lacked capacity in monitoring and evaluation (Madagascar PRRO, Malawi CP and Mozambique PRRO).

\textsuperscript{110} Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286) and 200355 (Zimbabwe).
\textsuperscript{111} Madagascar (20065), Madagascar (200735), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200353), Swaziland (200422), Zimbabwe (200453).
3. EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS

86. Over the period 2013 to 2017, evaluations presented WFP country offices in the region with a series of recommendations for improvement. The most frequently occurring themes are shown in Table 4 (all occurring in three evaluations or more). All recommendations in the region’s operations evaluations were accepted or partially accepted by country offices, with only one (in Zambia) not accepted.

Table 4: Evaluation recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Evaluations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Enhance the role to that of an enabling partner, through capacity building and advocacy (particularly in nutrition and school feeding)</td>
<td>Eight evaluations87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Improve monitoring and evaluation/information management systems</td>
<td>Eight evaluations88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Increase emphasis on/shift the focus to resilience, linked to a robust theory of change</td>
<td>Seven evaluations89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Improve the harmonisation of activities such as <strong>food assistance for assets and nutrition with those of other actors</strong>, within social protection frameworks as appropriate</td>
<td>Four evaluations90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Consider scope for cash and voucher modalities</td>
<td>Four evaluations91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Improve accountability mechanism for beneficiaries</td>
<td>Three evaluations92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Improve the rationale for/technical design of food assistance for assets projects</td>
<td>Three evaluations93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

87. The most frequently-occurring recommendations therefore related firstly to WFP strategic positioning in the country, focusing particularly on capacity building and advocacy and in relation to school feeding and nutrition; and secondly in relation to monitoring and evaluation which, despite intensive corporate effort since 2014, still shows gaps, particularly at outcome level. Increasing the focus on resilience; acting in stronger partnership, particularly in food assistance for assets and nutrition, and adapting targeting modalities were also priorities for the region, as identified by evaluations.

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86 Recommendation 5: Food security and nutrition: Build a national expertise pool in nutrition. The recommendation was rejected on the rationale that: “DFID, Irish Aid and SIDA through the SUN Fund are already supporting the training of nutrition students at degree level - moreover, the CO does not feel it has the capacity and expertise to undertake this. However, CO will continue to build synergies with other partners such as the University of Zambia (UNZA) that are carrying out the Nutrition Degree course under the SUN Fund and the National Food and Nutrition Commission, which is coordinating all nutrition interventions in Zambia.”

87 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065), Malawi (200692), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200422), Zimbabwe (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).

88 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200353), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).

89 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (200366), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200286), Mozambique (200355), Swaziland (200353), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).

90 Lesotho (200369), Madagascar (20065 and 200735), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200355), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).

91 Lesotho (200287), Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Malawi (200692), Mozambique (200355). Swaziland (200353), Zambia (200157), Zimbabwe (200453).

92 Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Malawi (200287), Mozambique (200286).

93 Madagascar (200065 and 200735), Zimbabwe (200453).
4. CONCLUSIONS

88. The 11 operations evaluations undertaken in the Southern Africa region have provided some valuable insights and lessons from four years of operational implementation in the region. Overall, there are a number of conclusions to be drawn.

89. The role of WFP in the region is evolving – and was evolving well before the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017. Perhaps driven by the earlier WFP Strategic Plan 2007-2011, which marked a major shift for WFP from “food aid” to “food assistance”. WFP was functioning in an “enabling” role well before the advent of the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 in the Southern Africa region. Some of its operations, designed as far back as 2010, sought to deliver technical assistance, support capacity development and help build relevant policy frameworks. Others have been encouraged to move upstream, for example in nutrition and resilience, by reduced donor support for food distribution. That trend continues, as more recent evaluations point out. However, recommendations encourage WFP to continue to adapt where conditions permit, across all relevant activity areas.

90. WFP has formed strong, strategic partnerships with governments in the region. Perhaps reflecting the conducive nature of some of the governance environments in which WFP works, as well as its own strong ethos and practice of partnership with national governments, many of the operations evaluated here have been constructed on a strong basis of partnership. Collaboration has been assumed, rather than being perceived as an ‘added bonus’. Such partnerships provide strong foundations for the future.

91. Social protection is a driving force. The growing regional emphasis on social protection for different vulnerable groups, particularly as many countries in the region move to middle income status, has been adopted by WFP in many cases. However, whilst some operations have seized the emerging policy agenda to frame individual activities and on occasion operations, around it, this has not been consistently the case at activity level. Evaluation recommendations urge WFP to adapt approaches accordingly.

92. WFP is delivering effective advocacy in the region. Advocacy is delivering significant results, from helping ensure that social protection frameworks are tailored to the poorest and most vulnerable, to supporting the inclusion of nutrition concerns in food security frameworks and programmes. Its strong partnerships and relationships with government, position WFP particularly well to undertake such activities within the national environment, a role which can be capitalised on, going forward.

93. Programme design remains a weakness, with often weak internal logics, assumptions inadequately thought through or tested against available evidence, and insufficient internal coherence. This is particularly the case for capacity development and resilience activities, as evaluation recommendations reflect. Yet these aspects are critical to WFP strategic intent in the region going forward. Gender mainstreaming has been a particular shortcoming.

94. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks have generally been weak, as recommendations reflect, with resulting data availability and reliability concerns. Later evaluations show indications of improvement (though not always consistently), as well as an increasing tendency to apply evidence from evaluations in design. The
advent of the new strategic plan provides WFP, if supported by more consistently available and reliable data, with an opportunity to better demonstrate its achievements in the region, for example supporting national policy and capacity development where conditions permit.

95. For individual activity areas:

- **General distribution**: This has been implemented in around only half of the operations evaluated in the region, but has remained a critical aspect of the humanitarian response in the period in countries such Malawi and Zimbabwe. However, the intended logical chains from distributions to food security and nutrition results have not always been sufficiently well developed, and shortened durations of assistance, often due to pipeline breaks/funding problems, have compromised results for household food security.

- **Nutrition**: Some of WFP nutrition responses, as for example in Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, have aimed to tackle mal- or under-nutrition on a large scale. Nutrition interventions are also the most frequently implemented activity type, reflecting its strategic importance in the region. Output and outcome targets were not consistently met in full, and evaluations found concerns regarding data availability and reliability.

- **Education**: School feeding has generally supported national programmes, often as part of a social protection response. Where funding has been available, programmes have generally performed well in meeting output and outcome targets, with added results noted in terms of enrolment, participation and completion.

- **Livelihoods (Food assistance for assets)**: Food assistance for assets activities have been sometimes implemented as part of national social protection frameworks, such as in Mozambique, but have not always been sufficiently geared to resilience objectives. Although targeting fewer beneficiaries than other areas, activities have performed well in meeting output and outcome targets. However, a common theme across food assistance for assets activities is a significant concern about the quality and sustainability of assets created.

96. Finally, robust planning for sustainability or handover has not been a feature of the operations evaluated here. This occurs both at activity and operation-level. Building clear plans for exit, based on WFP strong national partnerships, and framed by a robust national strategic review within its country level planning exercise, will support WFP and its partners in achieving their collective aims for the region.
5. LESSONS

97. Lessons arising from these eleven evaluations for the Southern Africa region are:

1. **Define the country-level role of WFP in its strategic partnerships.** With eight evaluations from 2013 to 2017 in the region recommending that WFP enhance its role as an enabling partner in the country context, it would be helpful for WFP as it moves forward with country strategic planning to explicitly define its envisaged roles in its strategic partnerships. This may take place as part of the national strategic review intended as part of the country strategic planning process, but will also require close analysis at activity level. For each activity area, how can WFP comparative advantages in the region best be deployed? Where and how can it usefully build capacity, help shape the national policy agenda and act as advocate? What space exists to align with national programmes, for example in nutrition and school feeding? Where (and with what justification) does it need to retain a core delivery capacity? Where can it best apply its convening power, generate food security and nutrition data through innovative approaches to support governments, and seize opportunities for innovation?

2. **Know the ground for capacity development.** As part of the country strategic planning process, in all its country offices and in all its activity areas, WFP should base its programming on a robust analysis of national capacities in the country. This analysis forms the information base to prepare capacity development plans, not only at operation but also – critically - at individual activity level.

3. **Balance “implementer and enabler” roles.** Despite the rapid economic and social transition taking place in the region, extreme vulnerability to climate change requires swift responses as conditions arise. Even as it rightly shifts to a more enabling role, many of WFP operations and activities will need to retain flexibility for emergency response. Balancing an enabling role, where conditions permit, with continued delivery capacity where and when required, means building flexibility and contingency planning into country strategic plans and – particularly – within activity-level planning. This will facilitate quick adjustment when need arises.

4. **Scope social protection.** As part of the country strategic planning process, WFP may find it useful to conduct a detailed analysis of the role of social protection frameworks within the country context: their state of development, political dimensions and priorities, national capacities and financing. WFP country-level role in social protection, where relevant, can then be defined accordingly. HIV AIDS – a notable programmatic gap in the evaluations analysed here, but a key social protection priority for the region – could usefully form part of this analysis.

5. **Prioritise advocacy.** WFP strong partnerships in the region position it well to undertake advocacy for food security and nutrition, not only at the country level but also within key regional fora and inter-agency groups.\(^{120}\) Defining advocacy priorities, positions, communication lines and platforms, and training

\(^{120}\) Such as the African Union, Nepad and the Regional Economic Communities as well as regional inter-agency groups related to food security and nutrition.
staff accordingly, may be a useful part of country-level planning but will also provide potential benefits at regional level.

6. **Put greater investment into design.** Improving the quality of designs, in all activity areas, is a key priority arising from the evaluations analysed here. More robust logic chains, more firmly grounded in evidence produced, as well as better internal coherence, stronger accountability mechanisms and a more systematic integration of gender concerns, will benefit effectiveness and improve results. This takes investment – not only financial, but of staff time, particularly to gather and analyse the evidence base. As part of designs, all activities, especially food assistance for assets, need a plan for future sustainability, based on the capacity analysis. All require a realistic plan for transition to nationally-owned or community-owned approaches. Alternatively, if conditions do not currently permit, a clearly articulated vision is needed, of “progress towards” transition, and an explicit description of the intended contribution WFP can make towards it.
## Annex 1: Partnerships per Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>United Nations Agencies</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Training</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Lesotho Red Cross Society</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food and Nutrition Coordination Office (FNCO)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Caritas Lesotho</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Elizabeth Glazer Paediatric AIDS Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food Management Unit</td>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Solider-Med</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lesotho Vulnerability Assessment Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Bureau National de Gestion de Risques et Catastrophes (BNGRC)</td>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>CARE International</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cellule de Prévention et de Gestion d’Urgences (CPGU)</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>CARITAS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Office National de Nutrition (ONN)</td>
<td>IFAD</td>
<td>Reggio Terzo Mundo (RTM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Comité National d’Evaluation de la Vulnérabilité (CNEV)</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Interaide</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
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<td>Welthungerhilfe (AAA)</td>
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<td>Ministry of Environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Population, Social Protection and Women’s Promotion (MPSPWP)</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Management Affairs</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
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<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Valid International</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Development Aid from People to People</td>
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<td>Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Malawi Lake Basin</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<td><strong>Ministry of Health</strong></td>
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<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td><strong>Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development</strong></td>
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<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock</td>
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<td><strong>Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development</strong></td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister’s Office</td>
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<td>The Ministry of Tinkhundla Administration and Development</td>
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<td><strong>Civil Protection Committees</strong></td>
<td>The Ministry of Education and Training</td>
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<td><strong>ILO</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CADECOM</strong></td>
<td><strong>UNAIDS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>CARE Malawi</strong></td>
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<td><strong>UNICEF</strong></td>
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<td><strong>UNODC</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Emmanuel International</strong></td>
<td><strong>WHO</strong></td>
<td><strong>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</strong></td>
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<td><strong>FOCCCAD</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>World Vision Malawi</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Zambia | Ministry of Health and Child Care  
Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture  
Ministry of Agriculture Mechanization and Irrigation Development  
Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing  
Food and Nutrition Council of Zimbabwe (FNC)  
Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services  
Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC)  
Civil Protection Unit  
Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX)  
Department of Veterinary Services | Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework (ZUNDAF)  
UNICEF  
UNAIDS  
WHO  
UNFPA  
UNESCO  
ILO  
IFAD,  
UNHCR | Adventist Development and Relief Agency  
Africare  
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere  
Catholic Relief Services  
Christian Care,  
GOAL  
Organization of Rural Associations for Progress  
Plan International  
Red Cross Society  
Save the Children  
United Methodist Committee on Relief  
World Vision International  
Help from Germany  
Hope for a child in Christ  
Hlekweni |
| Mozambique | Ministry of Education  
Ministry of Women and Social Action Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security  
Ministry of Agriculture  
Ministry of Health  
Ministry of Trade and Commerce  
National Disaster Management Institute  
National Institute for Refugee Assistance | UNICEF  
UNDP  
WHO  
IFAD  
ILO  
UNAIDS  
UNESCO  
UNFPA  
UNHabitat  
FAO  
UNHCR | Red Cross,  
World Relief,  
Samaritan’s Purse  
Profamilia  
Conselho Cristão de Moçambique,  
Associação Desenvolvimento Rural M’agoè,  
Olhando Esperança,  
Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Família  
Concern Worldwide  
International Relief  
World Vision International  
Comusana  
Kukumbi |
Acronyms

AAP  Accountability to Affected Populations
CO   Country Office
CP   Country Programme
DEV  Development Programme
DRR  Disaster Risk Reduction
EMOP Emergency Operation
FFA  Food Assistance for Assets
FFT  Food Assistance for Training
GD   General Distribution
OEV  Office of Evaluation
PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery operation
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
UN   United Nations
WFP  World Food Programme