OPERATION EVALUATIONS SERIES

Regional Synthesis 2013-2017

West and Central Africa Region

November 2017

Prepared by Konterra:
Belén Diaz and Julia Betts

Commissioned by the
WFP Office of Evaluation

Report Number: OEV/2017/009
Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
   1.1 Policy and Institutional Context .................................................................................. 1
   1.2 Operations Evaluations .............................................................................................. 1
   1.3 Purpose and Objectives .............................................................................................. 1
   1.4 Contexts of the Operations Evaluated ....................................................................... 2
   1.5 WFP in the West and Central Africa Region ............................................................. 3
   1.6 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 7

2. FINDINGS ......................................................................................................................... 8
   QUESTION 1: How appropriate was the operation’s design? ........................................... 8
   QUESTION 2: What were the results of the operations? ............................................... 15
   QUESTION 3: What factors affected the results? ............................................................ 27

3. EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 30

4. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 32

5. LESSONS ........................................................................................................................ 34

Annex 1. Partnerships per Country .................................................................................... 35

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................. 43
1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Policy and Institutional Context

1. Major contextual shifts, including climate change, increasing inequality, more frequent natural disasters and increasingly protracted conflicts, have influenced global policy reforms. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2016, calls for collective action to support country-led efforts in achieving the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

2. The WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 sought to reposition WFP from a “food aid” to a “food assistance” agency. The subsequent WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021 places WFP firmly in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and particularly in contributing to the achievement of SDG 2: “End Hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture”. It focuses on reaching those in greatest need first, while ensuring that no one is left behind.¹

3. To meet the demands of this new environment, WFP has launched the Integrated Road Map (IRM). This redefines the organisation’s architecture as well as its country strategic planning process under the WFP Strategic Plan 2017-2021.

1.2 Operations Evaluations

4. The WFP series of operations evaluations supports its corporate objective of accountability and learning for results. Since mid-2013, the series has generated 58 evaluations of operations across the six regions in which WFP operates. The evaluations assess the appropriateness of WFP operations, their results, and the factors explaining these results. The series will close in mid-2017.

5. Within the West and Central Africa region, evaluations were implemented in thirteen countries from 2014 to 2016: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, The Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal. The fifteen operations evaluated combined requirements of over USD 2,873 million² targeting close to 18 million³ beneficiaries from 2011 to 2016. Of the operations:

- Fifteen out of 72 operations in the region were evaluated under the series. Evaluations covered 21 percent of the regional portfolio of operations and 56 percent of the regional operational budget.⁴

- Five operations evaluated were country/development programmes (CP/DEV), seven were protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), and three were emergency operations (EMOPs), two of which covered three countries each.⁵

1.3 Purpose and Objectives

6. This Synthesis of Operations Evaluations for the West and Central Africa Region aims to:

- Enhance efficient and effective use of evaluation evidence and learning in programme development

¹ WFP (2017) Strategic Plan 2017-2021 WFP/EB.2/2016/1-A/Rev.2
² Final evaluation reports of each operation (Operational Fact Sheet)
³ Including all budget revisions. Final evaluation reports of each operation (Operational Fact Sheet)
⁴ Operations Evaluations Factsheet, WFP 2017
⁵ 2012-2013 Regional EMOP covered Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Niger and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP covered Chad, Niger and Cameroon
- Help facilitate the country strategic plan process for the Regional Bureau of Dakar
- Create a concise, regional-friendly ‘body of evidence’ analysis to inform the upcoming development of the regional evaluation strategy.\textsuperscript{6}

1.4 **Contexts of the Operations Evaluated**

7. The West and Central Africa region is a heterogeneous region comprising a variety of environmental and socio-political features. The thirteen countries included in this synthesis report fall into one of the three distinct sub-regions (a) Sahel and landlocked countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal and The Gambia (b) coastal countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Liberia and (c) island states: São Tomé and Príncipe. Countries in all three sub-regions combine some or all of the following challenges:

- **Poorest countries in the world:** With the exception of Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe, classified as “medium human development”, the other eleven countries are classified as “low human development” in the 2016 Human Development Index. Three of these (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger) rank among the ten least developed countries.\textsuperscript{7}

- **Structural poverty:** Poverty in the region is linked to weak productive sectors and high vulnerability to recurrent climate-related disasters. The Global Hunger Index 2016 indicates that ten of thirteen countries\textsuperscript{8} have “serious” and, in the case of Chad, “alarming” levels of hunger. Scarce livelihood opportunities, weak national health and education systems and generalised absence of safety net mechanisms are among the reasons for high multidimensional poverty rates, which range between 0.584 (Niger) and 0.147 (Ghana) according to the Multidimensional Poverty Index.\textsuperscript{9} According to the World Bank, the percentage of the population living on less than USD 1.25 a day ranges from 23.8 percent to 62.8 percent in the region. Environmental erosion, prolonged lean seasons, frequent climatic shocks (droughts,\textsuperscript{10} flooding, infestation) and epidemics are among the challenges faced by Sahelian countries.

- **Political instability and humanitarian crisis:** The region is affected by refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) crises following political disruptions (Côte d’Ivoire and Central African Republic), resurgence of violence and the threat of instability (in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger). The region contains 1.5 million refugees and 4.9 million internally displaced persons in total.\textsuperscript{11}

- **Severe gender inequalities:** Where measured,\textsuperscript{12} the Gender Inequality Index in all countries ranks low: from 120 (Senegal) to 157 (Chad and Niger) out of 188 countries.

- **Strong engagement in the resilience agenda:** The resilience agenda in the West and Central Africa region benefits from a strong political commitment from the international and regional community. Regional platforms and

---

\textsuperscript{6} Terms of Reference

\textsuperscript{7} Human Development Index 2016, UNDP.

\textsuperscript{8} Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal.


\textsuperscript{10} On average Sahel countries face two severe droughts every 7 years or three every 10 years.

\textsuperscript{11} Source: UNHCR Population Statistics mid 2016.

\textsuperscript{12} All countries but Guinea Bissau.
initiatives include the European Union’s *Alliance globale pour la résilience, Sahel et Afrique de l’Ouest, Feuille de route régionale* (AGIR, the global alliance for resilience initiative), the United Nation’s Resilience Strategy for the Sahel, the *Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel* (CILSS, the permanent interstate committee for drought control in the Sahel) and the common agricultural policy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

1.5 **WFP in the West and Central Africa Region**

8. WFP currently works in 19 countries in the West and Central Africa region through 12 protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), 12 emergency operations (EMOPs), 15 country/development programmes (CP/DEVs) and 14 special operations (SO).

9. According to the *WFP Roadmap for a Regional Approach for West Africa* (2013, revised in 2015), WFP works in the region with a holistic approach to hunger and malnutrition, embedding short-term crisis response into long-term strategic interventions. Operations aim to provide life-saving support, while increasing access to economic and human capital development opportunities. The roadmap groups activities into two mutually reinforcing and inter-related pillars of intervention: (i) developing human capital to ensure access to social services for the most vulnerable populations and (ii) strengthening assets and access to food based on community participation and seasonal livelihood planning.

10. The evaluated operations included a variety of contexts and settings representative of the region:

- Operations were conducted in eight Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and The Gambia); four coastal countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Liberia); and one island state (São Tomé and Príncipe).

- During the period covered by the 15 operations, a number of armed conflicts (Darfur crisis, armed conflict in the North of Mali, the Boko Haram insurgencies in Lake Chad region, Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire civil conflicts) and the Sahel food insecurity crisis (declared in 2011 and 2012) resulted in massive human displacement and acute food and nutrition insecurity. Ten operations out of 15 were designed to meet needs from these crises.

- Of the 17.7 million people targeted by the 15 operations, 81 percent were concentrated in the Sahel sub-region.

11. **Activities/modalities:** The operations comprised a range of activities and modalities. Specifically:

- With the exception of the São Tomé and Príncipe DEV, all operations included a nutrition component, four of which included a focus on HIV patients’ specific needs.

---

16 Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO and Mali EMOP.
- School feeding (SF) was the second most frequent activity, included in 11 operations, followed by food assistance for assets and food assistance for training (FFA/FFT) planned in ten operations.

- General distribution (GD) was applied in eight operations including in six Sahel countries, reflecting the acute food insecurity crisis during the 2013 to 2016 period. General distribution was applied only in PRROs/EMOPs.

- With the exception of the São Tomé and Príncipe DEV, operations were multi-component. One operation (Niger PRRO) included five project activities; eight operations included four activities, and five operations included three activities.

- Capacity development activities were planned in all operations other than the three EMOPs, either as a specific activity of the operation or mainstreamed under other activities (nutrition, FFA/FFT, school feeding).

- In-kind food was used in all 15 operations, including as the only transfer modality in four. Cash-based transfers were combined with in-kind delivery in 11 operations. Local purchase of goods was intended in nine operations.\footnote{Although in one of them, Côte d’Ivoire, local purchase was finally not implemented.}

12. **Policy frameworks**: WFP operations in the region engaged with a range of policy platforms and initiatives for food and nutrition security. These include policies and frameworks on food security, nutrition, disaster risk management/disaster risk reduction (DRM/DRR) and early warning systems and safety nets (see ‘Findings’ below).

13. **Strategic partnerships**: Operations also engaged with a wide range of strategic partnerships in the West and Central Africa region. These included central ministries (e.g. of education, health, agriculture and food security, social welfare, etc.) as well as decentralized government functions, national vulnerability assessment mechanisms, national nutrition platforms and disaster management authorities. Partnerships were also formed with a broad spectrum of United Nations agencies and donors (working across the humanitarian-development spectrum), initiatives for resilience and nutrition, and international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Annex 1 lists the strategic partnerships identified per country within evaluations (though recognising that these date back in some cases to 2011).

14. Table 1 below presents the operations’ main features.
## Table 1: Features of operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Evaluation</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Target beneficiaries</th>
<th>Value at evaluation (USD million)</th>
<th>% funded at evaluation</th>
<th>Value overall (USD$ million)</th>
<th>% funded overall</th>
<th>General distribution</th>
<th>Nutrition</th>
<th>School feeding</th>
<th>Food assistance for assets / training</th>
<th>Capacity development</th>
<th>Local purchase</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Cash-based transfers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>200163</td>
<td>2011-2015</td>
<td>887,000</td>
<td>52,416,826</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66,473,374</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>33,324,642</td>
<td>Ⅹ*</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200289</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>1,630,000</td>
<td>561,612,304</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>561,640,672</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>392,256,234</td>
<td>Ⅶ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200526</td>
<td>2013-2015</td>
<td>157,133</td>
<td>16,768,838</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>27,705,300</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>16,012,090</td>
<td>Ⅹ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>EMOP</td>
<td>200525</td>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>1,304,000</td>
<td>351,300,000</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>351,290,175</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>206,467,480</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>RBD: Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger</td>
<td>EMOP</td>
<td>200438</td>
<td>2012-2014</td>
<td>1,474,000</td>
<td>170,300,313</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>202,152,500</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>136,047,328</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>200465</td>
<td>2013-2016</td>
<td>571,000</td>
<td>47,753,000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47,753,000</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>19,796,548</td>
<td>Ⅹ*</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>200247</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>960,740</td>
<td>56,339,447</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77,925,622</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>55,433,728</td>
<td>Ⅹ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200552</td>
<td>2013-2016</td>
<td>143,173</td>
<td>28,333,919</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28,333,919</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>10,711,926</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200713</td>
<td>2015-2016</td>
<td>2,257,950</td>
<td>282,099,891</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>407,272,983</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>228,600,836</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200557</td>
<td>2013-2013</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>13,897,080</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20,960,188</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>13,371,984</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200550</td>
<td>2013-2016</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>32,925,000</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>36,609,991</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>19,813,429</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>200583</td>
<td>2014-2016</td>
<td>6,854,459</td>
<td>1,002,020,926</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>868,309,164</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>277,664,367</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>RBD: Chad, Niger, Cameroon</td>
<td>EMOP</td>
<td>200777</td>
<td>2015-2016</td>
<td>668,574</td>
<td>196,580,200</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>901,534,083</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>513,352,451</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Sao Tome/Principe</td>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>200295</td>
<td>2012-2016</td>
<td>43,200</td>
<td>5,286,436</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5,711,701</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>3,023,322</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅴ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
<td>Ⅷ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ⅹ* Denotes HIV/AIDS activities that are analysed/reported under nutrition. |
| Ⅷ Denotes planned but not implemented or implemented to a very limited degree in terms of beneficiary numbers or duration. |

18 Cells with √ and shading denote activities that were planned and implemented. ◊ Denotes planned but not implemented or implemented to a very limited degree in terms of beneficiary numbers or duration. |

19 Planned beneficiaries throughout the project’s lifetime. |

20 As at the time of this synthesis for ongoing operations or as at the end of the operation for already completed operations. Note that some of the operations may have had budget revisions after the evaluation was completed. This information is therefore intended to illustrate the volatility of the funding environment. The source of this information is resource updates found in the WFP Operations Database. (http://www.wfp.org/operations/database). |

21 * Denotes HIV/AIDS activities that are analysed/reported under nutrition. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Evaluation</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Target beneficiaries&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Value at evaluation (USD million)</th>
<th>% funded at evaluation</th>
<th>Value overall (USD million)</th>
<th>Funded overall&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>General distribution</th>
<th>Nutrition&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>School feeding</th>
<th>Food assistance for assets / training</th>
<th>Capacity development</th>
<th>Local purchase</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Cash-based transfers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>CP</td>
<td>2002.49</td>
<td>2012 – 2016</td>
<td>1,778,588</td>
<td>76,165,553</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>80,943,586</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>24,512,649</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Values in millions of USD
1.6 Methodology

15. The individual evaluations analyzed here applied mixed-methods approaches, including documentary analysis, review of financial data and statistics, interviews and focus groups with key informants, and other relevant methods. All methodologies were checked for quality and reliability through the operations evaluations process.

16. This regional operations evaluations synthesis applies a structured analytical framework and systematic data extraction. Evidence was rated for validity and reliability on a scale of 1 (low) to 4 (high), with only reliable evidence – scoring at least 2 – included. Findings were validated by the WFP Office of Evaluation and by the regional evaluation officer for Dakar.

17. Limitations of this regional synthesis include:

- Three out of 15 evaluations were mid-term, limiting final results data available
- No evaluation provided a detailed analysis of gender related dimensions; however evaluations reflect gender issues more comprehensively in 2015 and 2016
- The evidence arises from 13 countries in the West and Central Africa region, whilst WFP is currently working in 19. Because of the high concentration in Sahel band countries (accounting for 9 out of 15 operations), findings cannot be extrapolated to all countries in the region.

18. The evidence is distributed throughout the period of the operations evaluation series, with five evaluations conducted in 2014, two in 2015 and eight in 2016. The results presented in this synthesis are relevant to inform the Integrated Road Map and country strategic planning processes in the West and Central Africa region.
2: FINDINGS

QUESTION 1: How appropriate was the operation’s design?
(relevance, strategic positioning and coherence)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary findings: relevance/appropriateness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WFP has acted as a major implementing humanitarian agency delivering food assistance to refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities affected by conflict and the Sahel food security crisis in the region. At the same time, it has sought to provide support to governments’ social protection and disaster risk management initiatives and programmes. Strategic positioning in the region has been relevant overall, with operation designs assessed as appropriate to address the needs of the most vulnerable in alignment with national policies and strategies. The design of operations is evidence-based to some extent, but quality and completeness of data is generally a concern, with all designs lacking gender analysis. Designs suffered from some weaknesses, including unclear intervention logics (such as applying unverified assumptions), technical weaknesses in activity component designs (particularly in FFA/FFT, school feeding and capacity development activities) and poor internal synergies. These weaknesses limited the potential effectiveness of the activities. Geographical targeting was appropriate in ten operations while limitations arose in activity-level targeting within 13 operations, resulting in some vulnerable groups being excluded from coverage by WFP operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 How appropriate was WFP strategic positioning in the region?

| Evaluations considered WFP operations highly relevant and appropriate. WFP has been a major humanitarian agency addressing the needs of those most vulnerable in the region. It has sought to contribute to the resilience agenda in the region through community level approaches and by working to build national food and nutrition insecurity tracking systems. WFP has worked to enable government leadership on school feeding programmes as a critical safety net, disaster preparedness and nutrition. Its programmes have been geared to support the implementation of national policies, strategies and action plans, especially school feeding and nutrition interventions. |

19. Six evaluations, including two regional EMOPs, found that WFP positioned itself as a major humanitarian agency delivering food and nutrition assistance in the Sahel crisis. WFP applied its logistical and technical capacity to reach populations in need in highly constrained access contexts. For example:

- In Mali, WFP stepped up to meet refugees’ and internally displaced persons’ needs when the Malian state lacked operational capacity.
- In the 2015-2016 Chad and Niger PRROs, WFP applied its leveraging capacity to mobilise the skills of different actors and promote partnerships for better coordination of operations.

20. In common with other regions reviewed through this series, evaluations of ten operations considered that WFP appropriately adopted strategic enabling roles, in line with the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017:

---

22 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
23 See Regional Operation Evaluation Syntheses for East and Central Africa; Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe; Southern Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; and Asia and the Pacific.
- WFP assisted governments in six countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal) to develop national safety net mechanisms through school feeding programmes. This was done within a broader framework aiming at transfer of competencies to ministries of education.

- Nutrition components of six operations\(^{24}\) (out of 14 with nutrition activities) were designed to strengthen national systems and enhance government leadership. Four\(^{25}\) supported governments through nutrition platforms and initiatives such as the Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition (REACH) partnership and Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative.

- WFP supported national early warning systems in six countries\(^{26}\) through seven operations.

**Box 1: An enabling approach**

| Senegal CP | An increase in budget of USD 1.6 million (or 21.5 percent) to capacity-building activities indicated a strong shift towards support for the creation of national social protection systems |
| Ghana CP | WFP actively engaged with REACH activities, an approach highly appreciated by Government and partners, in particular the critical role played by REACH in the development of the *Multi-Sectoral National Nutrition Policy* (2013-2017) and its corresponding strategies. The WFP role in the SUN platform was also seen as helpful in furthering civil society organisations and others to advocate for nutrition programming. |

21. WFP has played an increasing role in building resilience and disaster risk management (DRR)/disaster risk reduction (DRR). Seven evaluations\(^{27}\) found that WFP had adopted an appropriate positioning on building resilience and disaster risk management. A two-fold approach was applied: (i) by increasing communities’ resilience to cope with future shock through FFA/FFT activities, (ii) by investing in national early warning systems, and (iii) by supporting the capacities of national institutions to conduct and apply food and nutrition insecurity assessments and analyses in a timely manner. However, three out of the seven evaluations (the 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, the CP in Ghana and the PRRO in The Gambia) found that activities missed opportunities to contribute to improved resilience-building. For example in The Gambia, the operation applied a disaster risk reduction/management approach but overlooked the need to build communities’ resilience to natural hazards.

**Box 2: Building resilience and disaster risk management**

| The Gambia PRRO | WFP contributed to disaster preparedness by helping develop high-quality disaster contingency plans that included early warning indicators linked to types of disasters, and which designated responsibilities among stakeholders in the event of disaster response being required |

\(^{24}\) Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Gambia PRRO Ghana CP, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP.  
\(^{25}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP and Niger PRRO.  
\(^{26}\) Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Niger, The Gambia and Senegal.  
\(^{27}\) Burkina Faso DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP.
22. Reflecting the strong design partnerships arising in other regions, 12 operations\textsuperscript{28} were geared to help implement governments’ programmes in the region, by carrying out nutrition or school feeding activities through national systems. WFP also helped improve existing early warning systems as part of the Senegal CP and the 2012-2014 Chad PRRO. It also helped enhance the national system for disaster risk prevention and management in Niger.

23. Three evaluations found that WFP responded to explicit requests from governments to intervene in a food security crisis. In Burkina Faso, support was provided in three areas: food security, nutrition and agriculture, following a catastrophic period in agricultural production in 2011 to 2012. In the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP, WFP addressed refugee and internally displaced persons’ needs in Chad, Niger and Cameroon. In its Cameroon PRRO, WFP was requested by the Cameroon Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Ministry of Public Health to support rural communities and nutrition programmes through targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) and FFA/FFT activities.

24. Capacity-strengthening activities were included in the design of 12 operations, either as a specific component of the operation or mainstreamed under other components (nutrition, FFA/FFT, school feeding). However, as for the other regions in this series, only two operations had applied capacity assessments as a basis to inform design: the Niger PRRO applied a multi-agency capacity assessment on nutrition while the São Tomé and Príncipe DEV used an internal government evaluation to inform planning choices. The remaining ten operations did not conduct or apply capacity assessments.

25. Also in common with some other regions in this series,\textsuperscript{29} WFP paid attention to designing and implementing its work within broader national social protection efforts in most of the countries assessed:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Of the 15 operations, 11\textsuperscript{30} included components that explicitly sought to support national safety nets mechanisms for the most vulnerable, whether through school feeding, general food distributions or FFA/FFT activities.
  \item Nine evaluations\textsuperscript{31} stated that the operations contributed to the development of national social protection policies, frameworks and mechanisms.
\end{itemize}

2.2 \textbf{How rigorous was the operation design?}

\begin{displayquote}
WFP made systematic efforts to base the design and implementation of operations on a wide range of evidence. However, design qualities were mixed with weaknesses in intervention logics, such as applying unverified assumptions (particularly on available funding and national capacities), technical weaknesses in activity component designs (particularly FFA/FFT, school feeding and capacity-development activities) and poor internal synergies among components of the programmes. These weaknesses limited the potential effectiveness of activities. Gender was generally weak, being absent or limited in 12 operations, and without a noted improvement over time.
\end{displayquote}

\textsuperscript{28} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Gambia PRRO, Ghana PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and Senegal CP.
\textsuperscript{29} See regional syntheses for Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Southern Africa.
\textsuperscript{30} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, The Gambia PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO, Senegal CP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.
\textsuperscript{31} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, The Gambia PRRO, Niger PRRO, Senegal CP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.
26. Operations consistently applied food security evidence produced by different sources as a basis to inform the operation designs. Eleven operations used vulnerability analysis and monitoring (VAM) studies.\textsuperscript{32} However, in common with wider findings from this series,\textsuperscript{33} evaluations found great variability in the depth and completeness of assessments conducted as well as in their use by WFP. Six evaluations\textsuperscript{34} found that food and nutrition security analyses were conducted satisfactorily or very satisfactorily and nine evaluations identified gaps:

- Two\textsuperscript{35} evaluations found that while initial assessments informed the design, analysis was not revisited to confirm or readjust the relevance of the operations during implementation.
- Two\textsuperscript{36} evaluations found that food security assessments did not take into account a nomadic population’s situation, despite this group being targeted by the operations.
- Eight\textsuperscript{37} evaluations found that the design of the operations was informed by incomplete assessments that did not fully cover the different sectors addressed by the programme.

**Box 3: Sources of food security evidence applied for operation design**

- Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analyses
- Emergency food security assessments
- Emergency nutrition security assessments
- Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
- Joint assessment missions
- Rapid assessment missions
- National surveys and assessments (nutrition, food security, market analysis, education and demographic) including from early warning systems
- Household economy assessment and *enquête multisectorielle de vulnérabilité* (multisectoral survey of vulnerability)
- WFP post-distribution monitoring reports
- *Analyse intégrée du contexte* (integrated analysis of context)
- *Programmations saisonnières basées sur les moyens d’existence* (seasonal programming based on livelihoods)
- Context analysis, seasonal analysis and community planning (in line with the WFP Three-Pronged Approach)
- System Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) assessments

27. Evaluations also noted the application of unverified assumptions in design:

\textsuperscript{32} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP
\textsuperscript{33} See operations evaluations syntheses for 2014, 2015 and 2016
\textsuperscript{34} Cameroon PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal CP.
\textsuperscript{35} Liberia PRRO and Mali EMOP
\textsuperscript{36} 2012-2014 Chad PRRO and Mali EMOP.
\textsuperscript{37} Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO,2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Côte d’Ivoire DEV and 2012-2013 Regional EMOP.
• The designs of seven\textsuperscript{38} operations included the unverified assumption that the Government as main partner would either (i) acquire the necessary capacities to enable responsibilities to be transferred, (ii) allocate committed resources to activities, or (iii) provide effective implementation of activities.

• Two evaluations found that WFP had explicitly designed its operations based on an unverified assumption that donors would fund operational needs (Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon). In addition to these, seven other evaluations also point to low funding volumes\textsuperscript{39} as playing an important role in activities being cut short/expansion being prevented, or logistical and delivery problems created.

28. In common with wider findings from the series across regions, evaluations noted the following design flaws:

• Five evaluations\textsuperscript{40} found weaknesses in the design of FFA/FFT activities, which subsequently compromised the impact and sustainability of the assets created or trainings conducted

• School feeding design flaws were found in two operations. In Côte d’Ivoire, WFP could have considered a scholarship mechanism to avoid the exclusion of most vulnerable children whose parents could not afford the required community contribution for inclusion; In São Tomé and Príncipe, WFP could have adapted the design of the school feeding programme to align with the Government’s innovations that promoted local purchase.

• Of 12 operations that applied capacity-building activities, only two based decisions on capacity-strengthening assessments as indicated in paragraph 29.

29. Two evaluations refer to learning from previous evaluations\textsuperscript{41} during the design process, fewer than in some other regions.\textsuperscript{42} In Chad, the design of food assistance for assets activities in the 2015-2016 PRRO was improved by using the WFP Three-Pronged Approach following recommendations from a previous PRRO evaluation. In Côte d’Ivoire, this was a missed opportunity, with the design of the DEV failing to integrate lessons from the WFP school feeding evaluation in 2011.

30. Five other evaluations (in Ghana, Liberia, Niger, Mali, and Senegal) comment on the integration of lessons from previous experiences in the operation’s design. Of these, only the Niger PRRO was found to have successfully integrated such lessons (from purchase for progress (P4P) project) into design.

31. Eleven out of 15\textsuperscript{43} evaluations report on internal synergies in design. Of these 11, 5\textsuperscript{44} found that internal synergies had been successfully integrated into operation design, slightly more than in some other regions. Weaknesses were noted in six\textsuperscript{45} cases, with gaps relating to either geographical or activity-level convergence.

\textsuperscript{38} Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Mali EMOP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV and Niger PRRO

\textsuperscript{39} Burkina Faso CP, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Niger PRRO, Senegal CP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV

\textsuperscript{40} Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP and Niger PRRO.

\textsuperscript{41} Two evaluations (The Gambia PRRO and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV) indicate that the mid-term evaluations were not conducted as foreseen, missing an opportunity to learn from the experience and introduce correcting measures.

\textsuperscript{42} See regional operation evaluation syntheses for the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe; Southern Africa; and East and Central Africa.

\textsuperscript{43} All excluding Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO and São Tomé and Príncipe.

\textsuperscript{44} Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Niger PRRO and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.

\textsuperscript{45} Cameroon PRRO, Ghana CP, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.
Box 4: Communes of convergence (C2) in Niger

The intervention strategy of the PRRO is based on two principles: multi-sectorality and convergence of interventions. These principles guide the interventions of the operation towards the same beneficiaries and seek complementarity with other United Nations agencies engaged with the communes of convergence/communes de convergence strategy (C2).

32. Gender analysis to inform the operations’ designs was generally weak, reflecting wider findings from the series and informing the design of operations in only three cases (Cameroon PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO and Niger PRRO). There was no improvement noted over time.

2.3 How responsive were operations to needs?

Overall, WFP operations in the region were well-designed to respond to needs, including activity level choices. Geographical targeting was found to be adequate in ten operations, however activity-level targeting was weaker and led to the exclusion of vulnerable populations in 13 operations, such as nomadic peoples and/or people living with HIV and AIDS or those experiencing seasonal variations in food insecurity. Beneficiaries valued cash as the preferred transfer modality, although evaluations raised concerns regarding the rationale for fixing the value transfer under volatile market conditions.

33. In line with findings from across this series, WFP operations over the period were designed to respond to priority needs in the country context. All 15 evaluations found operation objectives and overall intent to be well-aligned with the needs of food-insecure populations.

34. Nine of the 15 evaluations found the intended coverage of WFP appropriate for assessed needs. Two operations (in Niger and Senegal) were found to be over-ambitious and attempting to step beyond WFP capacities and potential resources. The regional EMOP in Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso, was found to ground its initial refugee caseload estimations on data supplied by another actor, and eventually had to downsize coverage to adjust to actualised needs. Two operations (in Chad and Guinea Bissau) were not able to cover certain areas of the country due to the absence of cooperating partners. In Mali, data gaps in a context of significant access constraints meant that coverage could not be assessed.

35. At activity level, seven evaluations found the choice of individual activities to be fully appropriate to the needs of the food-insecure population. However, similar to some other regions evaluated through this series, two evaluations (Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe) found the choice of individual activities to be inadequate to address identified needs, whilst six found that the choice of activities was only partially relevant to needs. The following challenges were identified:

- Three evaluations found concerns regarding the appropriateness of nutrition activities: a preventive approach to moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) based on a thorough understanding of the underlying causes of malnutrition would have been useful in both PRROs in Chad and the CP in Ghana where, in

---

46 Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Liberia PRRO, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
47 Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.
48 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO and Ghana CP.
addition, micronutrient deficiencies in the northern regions should also have been addressed.

- The evaluation in Cote d’Ivoire found school feeding activities were not designed to target effectively the most vulnerable children’s needs. The evaluation of the 2012-2013 Regional EMOP found that the decision to use school feeding was not based on a preliminary assessment and did not prove to be an incentive for parents to enroll children.

- FFA/FFT was planned in ten operations and found to be appropriate in six.⁴⁹ It was replaced by unconditional cash transfers in The Gambia PRRO, and by general food distributions in the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP. In Liberia, the lack of livelihood assessment to identify needs undermined the appropriateness of FFA/FFT activities, and in Chad (2012-2014 PRRO), the fact that the activity was not connected to local development plans nor oriented by vulnerability criteria, limited its appropriateness.

36. Overall geographical targeting was more appropriate than targeting at activity level. Geographical targeting was appropriately designed in ten operations but encountered weaknesses in five.⁵⁰ Limitations included insufficient understanding of needs at sub-regional level in the 2012-2014 Chad PRRO and Côte d’Ivoire DEV. Three evaluations in the Sahel sub-region⁵¹ raised the risk of nomadic populations being excluded from WFP coverage, due to a limited assessment of their differentiated needs and a weak adaptation of intervention modalities to their nomadic lifestyles.

37. Activity level targeting experienced inadequacies in one or more component in 13 operations⁵² as follows:

- Eight evaluations⁵³ found limitations in the targeting of the nutrition components, resulting in the exclusion of vulnerable groups, such as pregnant and lactating women (in the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP), the most vulnerable children to malnutrition (in the Niger PRRO), and people living with HIV/AIDS in the Burkina Faso CP and Liberia PRRO. In the Liberia PRRO, the evaluation found that global acute malnutrition rates among targeted refugees at the time of the design did not justify the choice of moderate acute malnutrition treatment.

- Five evaluations⁵⁴ found shortcomings in FFA/FFT targeting, mainly due to insufficient understanding and assessment of household-level vulnerabilities when applied as a criteria for selection. In Ghana, community-based targeting led to potentially high levels of exclusion. In The Gambia, the evaluation noted strong resistance from communities to local-level targeting mechanisms on the basis that ‘everyone is poor’, and concluded that using community self-targeting raised bias concerns.

- Evaluations also found concerns in general distribution targeting in five operations.⁵⁵ For example, the evaluation of the 2015-2016 Chad PRRO found that methodologies used to assess vulnerability did not capture seasonal

---

⁴⁹ Burkina CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana PRRO, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP.
⁵⁰ Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, and Senegal CP.
⁵¹ Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO and 2012-2013 Regional EMOP.
⁵² The two exceptions were The Gambia PRRO and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.
⁵³ Burkina Faso CP, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.
⁵⁴ Burkina Faso CP, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Liberia PRRO and Senegal CP.
⁵⁵ 2015-2016 Chad, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
variations and were too focused on farming systems, excluding other livelihood profiles. The Liberia PRRO evaluation found that targeting criteria for general distribution should have been revised to apply vulnerability-based criteria, as recommended by a joint assessment mission in 2012.

- Concerns in school feeding targeting were identified in Côte d’Ivoire. Here, the targeting of schools included in the girls’ take home rations was considered inappropriate, since instead of prioritising schools with highest dropout rates for girls, it was directed at schools with high attendance rates in communities with better livelihood conditions. The most vulnerable schools with highest dropout rates were therefore excluded.

38. **Transfer modalities:** Use of cash and vouchers (C&V) was assessed as appropriate in 11 operations where planned. Its use was recommended in one evaluation where it was not applied (Liberia PRRO) and recommended for expansion in two operations: in the 2015-2016 Chad PRRO and 2012-2013 Regional EMOP (for Burkina Faso). However, evaluations also recommend attention to fluctuations in the transfer value (Ghana CP) and a reconsideration of the rationale for the calculation of the transfer value (Senegal CP, Ghana CP, Gambia PRRO). In The Gambia, the evaluation questions the use of unconditional cash transfers throughout the PRRO.

39. In-kind transfers were considered appropriate in nine operations out of 15 where planned, whether exclusively or combined with cash and vouchers. However, in common with one other region assessed through this series, six evaluations identified concerns in at least one activity. Challenges included lack of adequate foodstuffs for local consumption habits, capacity to transform/cook the product or greater suitability for cash and vouchers in contexts where markets worked adequately.

**Box 5: Cash transfers**

Mali EMOP: The use of food commodities in 2013 was relevant as the markets were not functioning. But in 2014, WFP did not make sufficient use of cash and voucher transfers in secondary urban centres where markets operated normally.

Ghana CP: A shift from food to cash-based food assistance for assets was relevant to the needs of the targeted group and to the livelihood/economic context, including market conditions and the banking system. But several contextual factors were not adequately taken into account to set the transfer value, including the market price of food commodities across the country’s different regions, exchange rate volatility and the local minimum wage.

**QUESTION 2: What were the results of the operations?**

**Summary findings: results**

Evaluations highlighted concerns regarding the quality of monitoring data that informs reporting on output and outcome indicators. Activity performance varied across nutrition, general distribution, school feeding and FFA/FFT components, with better results at output.

---

56 Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal CP.
57 See regional operation evaluation syntheses for the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and Eastern Europe.
58 Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP and 2012-2013 Regional EMOP.
than outcome level, general concerns about the sustainability of activities and with gender results mostly reflecting a ‘quantitative’ approach.

Results also arose from the “enabling” role of WFP in the region, particularly on social protection policy development and capacity building in nutrition, disaster risk reduction/disaster risk management, and school feeding. Evaluations found that WFP established good collaboration with national institutions and governments in most operations. However, synergies with United Nations agencies were variable.

Efficiency and timeliness were compromised by supply chain disruptions and pipeline breaks in most operations, resulting in food ration reductions, delays or suspension of food distributions or reduction of geographical coverage. WFP showed agility and capacity to adapt to changing needs and context in seven operations. Transfer of responsibilities to governments remains a challenge in most operations.

2.3 What evidence of results is available?

| Monitoring and evaluation systems were found to be robust and performing well in two operations, and improving over time in three others. However, despite these positive findings, all 15 evaluations either identified challenges with the data produced, and/or noted weaknesses in the monitoring systems themselves. |

40. Evaluations in this series have found shortcomings in WFP monitoring systems being gradually addressed over time, however, improvements in monitoring systems are less apparent in the West and Central Africa region over time. Evaluations of two operations found that systems were robust and performing well and contributed to the adequate monitoring and implementation of programmes (São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and Niger PRRO). In addition, two evaluations noted WFP efforts to improve monitoring systems by developing a monitoring and evaluation strategy in Mali and by setting up a relevant unit in Senegal. However, despite these positive findings, all 15 evaluations either identified challenges with the data produced, and/or noted weaknesses in the monitoring systems themselves.

41. Eight evaluations\(^{59}\) found weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation systems. Specifically:

- Six evaluations\(^{60}\) found understaffing in monitoring and evaluation units (including absence of a dedicated unit or sufficient staff at sub-office level) and/or weak capacities of staff responsible for monitoring tasks.
- Inadequate monitoring and evaluation frameworks, procedures and/or tools were identified by three evaluations.\(^{61}\) The latter describes overlapping systems for information processing.
- In Chad, the evaluation of the 2015-2016 PRRO noted that monitoring and evaluation weaknesses identified in a previous 2014 evaluation of the 2012-2014 PRRO (opaque beneficiary-counting, uncertainty about the quality of moderate acute malnutrition data, limits to comparability of indicator values due to use of different methodologies) had not been resolved over the course of two years.

\(^{59}\) Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO and Senegal CP.

\(^{60}\) Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO and Senegal CP.

\(^{61}\) Guinea Bissau PRRO, The Gambia PRRO and Senegal CP.
42. Data availability concerns were noted in 13 evaluations, as follows:

- Absence of regular and complete monitoring data that is disaggregated (e.g. by sex, age, region, type of beneficiary) from field assessments and post distribution reports: 13 evaluations\(^{62}\)
- Indicators to track progress on outcomes not adapted to the context, activity or nature of the change sought, including gender equality: four evaluations\(^{63}\)
- Inconsistencies between the logical framework (intervention logic and expected results) and choice of indicators and assumptions: two evaluations\(^{64}\)
- Lack of comparable data to assess trends in vulnerability in context with high seasonality of food security (harvest, lean, etc.): one evaluation.\(^{65}\)

43. In common with other regions assessed through the series, nine evaluations\(^{66}\) raised data-reliability concerns. Three of these\(^{67}\) raised concerns about data reliability, where information was collected by third party monitoring or through national health systems.

44. Positively in the region, four evaluations found examples of good use of data produced by monitoring and evaluation systems or efforts to improve the quality of monitoring data:

- Two evaluations of operations in Chad (2012-2014 PRRO) and Niger praise the timeliness of monitoring surveys, which enabled teams to appropriately inform management decisions. The quality and completeness of the information in the case of the Niger operation is considered satisfactory.
- The evaluation of the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP notes the positive innovation of the mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping (mVAM) system that allowed WFP to follow the evolution of food consumption, particularly in hard-to-reach areas.
- The Cameroon PRRO evaluation found that significant improvements had been made in reporting from the field/sub-offices.

45. Four evaluations, however, raised challenges in the utility of the monitoring data to support programme implementation. These included:

- Limited ability to assess progress over time due to changes in indicators and/or target values (e.g. following alignment with the new \textit{WFP Strategic Results Framework 2014-2017}, (2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Ghana and Senegal).
- Delays in the production of monitoring reports resulting in data being unavailable to inform either design or programmatic adaptations (2015-2016 Regional EMOP, Senegal).

46. Three evaluations found limited use of monitoring data by the operation’s management staff (Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO and Côte d’Ivoire DEV).


\(^{63}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Niger PRRO and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.

\(^{64}\) Ghana CP and Senegal CP.

\(^{65}\) Niger PRRO.

\(^{66}\) Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.

\(^{67}\) Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO and Mali EMOP.
2.5 What output and outcome results have been achieved, per theme/sector?

Uneven data availability on output and outcome indicators, particularly for nutrition and FFA/FFT activities, has limited the assessment of the operations’ contribution to nutrition and livelihood objectives. Overall, however, performance was mixed across activity areas.

- **General distribution:** Four out of seven operations that implemented general distribution met beneficiary targets and three reached between 55 percent and 77 percent of planned beneficiaries. Six operations did not attain their intended corporate outcome indicators. However evaluations found a positive contribution by food/cash distributions to increased food security of households targeted.

- **Nutrition:** Six of 13 operations that implemented nutrition activities met 70 percent or above of their targets. Seven evaluations reported that nutrition outcome targets were met, while in Liberia no effect on nutrition indicators could be expected given the limited activities conducted.

- **School feeding:** Output-level achievement was positive in six evaluations of eleven. Five achieved either enrolment or attendance rate indicators, or both.

- **Food assistance for assets/food assistance for training:** Three evaluations of eight that implemented FFA/FFT activities achieved or exceeded planned beneficiary targets, while four reached between 12 percent and 30 percent. Evaluations do not systematically report on outcome achievement, but seven found positive effects of the FFA/FFT activities: household food consumption improved, the use of coping strategies reduced, and community assets were created. Concerns were raised in six of eight evaluations about the sustainability of assets created.

47. All except one operation (in São Tomé and Príncipe) contained multiple components (Table 1, above). Beneficiaries reached varied significantly against plan in operations. Five operations were close to reaching or slightly exceeded planned beneficiaries. One operation (Mali EMOP) experienced a massive scale-up and increased caseload (from an initially planned 564,000 to revised 1,304,000) in response to the Malian state collapse and severe humanitarian crisis that resulted.

48. The remaining ten operations did not reach planned beneficiaries, mostly due to variations in caseload. Examples include: the voluntary repatriation of Ivorian refugees in Liberia; and reductions in caseload in the 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, where a substantial reduction of planned beneficiaries - up to 68 percent in Burkina and 51 percent in Mauritania - occurred.

49. Results against activity areas were as follows:

**General Distribution**

50. Eight operations implemented general distribution activities over the evaluation period. All were operations related to the refugee/internally displaced persons crisis, including the two regional and single country EMOPs.

51. **Output results:** General distribution is highly dependent on contextual factors, particularly in areas of constrained access, due to insecurity and conflict in the Sahel. Evaluations found planned output targets met in four operations, though in the case

---

68 Burkina Faso CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Sao Tome Principe DEV 200295 and Regional 2015-2016 EMOP.
69 Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
70 Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Mali EMOP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
of Cameroon the attainment refers to the planned beneficiaries only after a transfer of Central African Republic and Nigeria refugees to other operations. In three other operations, attainment of beneficiary targets was below plan, with 77 percent, 55 percent and 70 percent beneficiaries reached respectively.

52. Outcome results: With the exception of Liberia PRRO 200550, the other six evaluations report improved food security status for beneficiaries - however targets set for corporate WFP indicators of food consumption scores (FCS) and diet diversity scores (DDS) were not attained. Four evaluations report lack of reliability or availability of data to report on general distribution outcomes. Examples of improved food security are:

- Mali EMOP: Food distributions and cash transfers have increased the food security of the households targeted. Cash transfers helped cover a significant part of the food costs of households as well as other essential costs such as rent and health-related costs. They have also reduced negative coping strategies.

- Niger PRRO: Food distributions during the lean season through targeted food distributions enabled beneficiaries to reduce or avoid engaging in agricultural work or searching for firewood to sell. Evidence also shows that food prices have been more stable during distributions.

Nutrition

53. WFP planned nutrition interventions in 14 of the 15 operations, reflecting its importance as a strategic priority in the region. However the quality of monitoring is limited, with nine evaluations finding output or outcome data gaps or raising reliability concerns. In Côte d’Ivoire, due to budget restrictions and the late arrival of inputs close to expiration date, nutrition activities were replaced by a single non-targeted distribution.

54. Output results: Six evaluations met 70 percent or above of their intended targets, two of which, in Guinea Bissau and Mali, exceeded planned beneficiaries (though in the case of Mali this applies only to the patients of moderate acute malnutrition treatment). The remaining eight operations did not meet planned output targets, with São Tomé and Príncipe DEV evaluation reporting the lowest results, reaching just 35 percent of planned beneficiaries.

55. Outcome results: Two evaluations, in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, indicate that no effect on nutrition indicators could be expected from the limited activities. Seven evaluations report achievement of outcome targets. Of these, one evaluation in Guinea Bissau reported results for moderate acute malnutrition treatment but not for stunting prevention and one evaluation in Cameroon attained outcomes in two out of three years of implementation. Three evaluations reporting achievement of targets raised data concerns:

---

76 Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO and 2012-2013 Regional EMOP.
77 2012-2013 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP
78 with the only exception of São Tomé and Príncipe DEV
79 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV
80 Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP
81 Côte d’Ivoire, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Liberia, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV
82 Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO Mali EMOP, São Tomé and Príncipe
• One evaluation, (2012-2014 Chad PRRO) questions the appropriateness of the outcome indicators used.

• Two evaluations in Mali and São Tomé and Príncipe, raise doubts on outcome data reliability, particularly in the latter where the operation only reached 35 percent of planned beneficiaries. This raises questions on the likelihood of reaching outcome targets on the improving nutritional status.

56. Five operations did not attain the outcomes set.78 However in the case of the 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and The Gambia PRRO, evaluations find that nutrition activities helped improve the nutritional status of the beneficiaries even if targets were not met.

**Education (school feeding)**

57. School feeding was implemented in 11 operations in the region across different operation types, however the quality of monitoring is mixed.

58. **Output results:** Output-level achievement was positive in 679 evaluations out of 11, with WFP meeting or exceeding planned targets. In three operations,80 WFP did not attain beneficiary targets. Funding limitations in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in the reduction of beneficiaries by 26 percent whilst in Liberia, activities were suspended after the first year. In Niger, low achievement was attributed by the evaluation to overambitious operation planning at design stage, with significant scale-down needed in the light of available funding.

59. **Outcome results:** Evaluations find contributions made by WFP improved or stabilised attendance and enrolment rates:

• Five operations81 achieved either one or both school feeding corporate indicators (school enrolment and school attendance), although in Guinea Bissau, the evaluation attributed the outcomes to long-term school feeding assistance rather than arising exclusively from the WFP programme, whose main contribution was to prevent education performance indicators from declining.

• Two evaluations, in Burkina Faso and Liberia, found that enrolment and attendance rates remained the same.

• In the two regional EMOPs, the evaluations did not reflect on school feeding indicators and another evaluation in Mali questioned the validity of the indicators used in that specific context.

60. In six countries,82 school feeding activities were complemented with capacity strengthening and supporting activities aimed at the development of a national safety nets mechanism led by governments, which successfully resulted in the transfer of responsibilities in Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe. In Senegal, at the time of the evaluation, an action plan for the transition towards a sustainable national school feeding programme was being developed by the Ministry of Education. In two operations, handover did not take: in Burkina Faso, due to the absence of a transition plan and weakness in national institutional arrangements, and in Côte d’Ivoire, due to

---

78 Ghana CP, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, 2013-2016 Regional EMOP and Gambia PRRO
79 Burkina Faso, Mali EMOP, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, São Tomé and Principe DEV and Senegal CP.
80 Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and the Niger.
81 Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal.
82 Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal.
the lack of government resources. In Guinea Bissau the transfer of responsibilities was interrupted due to the 2012 coup d’état.

Livelihoods (food assistance for assets/food assistance for training)

61. Ten\(^{83}\) out of the 15 operations planned FFA/FFT activities. In The Gambia these were replaced with unconditional cash transfers and in the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP, general distribution was applied instead.

62. **Output results:** All eight operations that implemented FFA/FFT activities reported on beneficiary reached versus planned. Three operations achieved or exceeded planned beneficiaries.\(^{84}\) The Liberia operation reached 68.5 percent of planned beneficiaries during the first and single year of implementation (the activity was deactivated in the second year). However four\(^{85}\) operations only reached between 12 percent and 30 percent of intended beneficiaries.

63. **Outcome results:** Only three evaluations reported on corporate indicators, though all eight describe outcome level effects:

- In Niger, food consumption scores, diet diversity scores and community asset scores improved although attribution to the operation was considered questionable given that improvements continued after the operation’s activities came to an end.

- Operations in Chad (2015-2016 PRRO) and Cameroon did not meet intended food consumption score, diet diversity score or community asset score targets.

- Seven evaluations\(^{86}\) found positive effects of FFA/FFT activities on household food consumption, reductions in coping strategies, and community asset creation, although they did not achieve significant results in consolidating resilience.

64. Six\(^{87}\) of eight evaluations, where FFA/FFT activities were implemented raise questions regarding the quality of the assets created and the likelihood of sustainability. Design flaws resulting in reduced effectiveness included: a lack of advance consideration of maintenance costs; inadequate materials to ensure utility and sustainability; the short timeframe of the projects and/or lack of available technical support.\(^{88}\)

2.6 What other results have been generated, beyond WFP standard indicators?

Evaluations also identify results that were not consistently captured in corporate reporting at the time, but which arose from the ‘enabling’ role of WFP in the region. These include: improving policy environments, building national capacities, and results in social protection and disaster risk reduction/disaster risk management.

---


\(^{84}\) Burkina Faso, Ghana and Cameroon.

\(^{85}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP.

\(^{86}\) The exception is the CP in Senegal.

\(^{87}\) Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana and Senegal CP.

\(^{88}\) Findings on FFA/FFT echoes some of the findings of the Senegal case study of FFA/FFT Impact Evaluations series (http://www.wfp.org/node/411060).
2.6.1 Improving policy environments

65. Evaluations identify contributions to enhancing national policy environments in the region. Not all these results were captured in corporate reporting, particularly since operations were implemented over two strategic plan periods (2008-2013 and 2014-2017) with very different reporting frameworks. The results are included in Table 2.

Table 2: Policy environment results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Contribution/ Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Supporting the development of legal and policy frameworks for school feeding (Ghana, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nutrition</strong></td>
<td>Supporting the development of food security and nutrition policies (Chad through 2012-2014 PRRO, Ghana, Senegal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting the inclusion of nutrition in policies, budgets, frameworks and development interventions (Chad through 2012-2014 PRRO, Ghana, Niger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing tools, protocols and guidelines used by national authorities and partners (Chad through 2012-2014 PRRO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disaster preparedness/ risk reduction</strong></td>
<td>Helping to develop national disaster risk management policy or strategy instruments (Niger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Helping to develop contingency planning mechanisms (The Gambia)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6.2 Building national capacities

66. Several evaluations also record significant improvements in national capacities arising from WFP support to governments in the region. Examples are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Capacity strengthening results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Contribution/ Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food security and nutrition monitoring/analytical capacity</strong></td>
<td>Providing technical support to help improve food security and nutrition analysis methodologies and data management (Chad through the 2012-2014 PRRO and the 2015-2016 PRRO, Ghana, The Gambia and Niger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of food/nutrition security assessments (Chad through 2015-2016 PRRO, Ghana, The Gambia and Niger)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing geographic information systems (The Gambia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Targeting, pipeline management, monitoring and evaluations (Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and São Tomé and Príncipe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchanges with the Centre of Excellence in Brazil (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Senegal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of tools and guides (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency preparedness</strong></td>
<td>Building national capacity to develop and implement early warning systems (Chad through 2015-2016 PRRO, Ghana, Niger and Senegal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
67. Despite these results, evaluations still found weaknesses and missed opportunities in capacity-strengthening work in the region. Although 12 operations included capacity-development activities, only one (in Niger) based its design (specifically of nutrition activities) on a robust assessment of national capacities. Examples where gaps arose include:

- Côte d’Ivoire, where the evaluation of the DEV found that a capacity-development strategy document was lacking for the period of the project and that the required SABER exercise, which would have helped analyse capacities, did not take place
- São Tomé and Príncipe, where capacity strengthening exercises focused on conducting trainings that did not address broader organisational, technical, legislative and operational aspects, resulting in an approach which was too narrow to respond to the needs of the country.

2.6.3 Results in social protection

68. Nine evaluations found that the operations contributed to national safety protection policies, frameworks and mechanisms. For example:

- One operation (Côte d’Ivoire DEV) made specific contributions to the social protection national policy, advocating for the inclusion of school feeding programmes.
- Five operations contributed to the development of legal and/or policy frameworks for school feeding, which were explicitly conceptualised as a safety net mechanism (in Ghana, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal).

2.6.4 Results in resilience and disaster risk reduction/disaster risk management

69. Nine evaluations discuss the results of the operation in relation to resilience objectives. With the exception of the 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, all found that the operations’ results had the potential to bring about increased resilience in the longer term, while the operation in Chad noted that the short term food assistance for assets activities impeded any contribution to resilience building.

70. Three evaluations (the Chad 2012-2014 PRRO, operations in Ghana and The Gambia) found that disaster-preparedness activities focused on early warning systems, contingency plans and food-insecurity monitoring as discrete activities, without making connections to broader resilience-building strategies in the country.

---

89 These reflect the findings of the “WFP 2017 Evaluation of the Capacity Development Policy: An Update on Implementation” https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/b548771b66e44534bbd9369738d57cf/download/?_ga=2.154690808.1389589160.1493981370-1807366214.1468102592
90 Burkina Faso DEV, Cameroon PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, Gambia PRRO, Niger PRRO, Senegal CP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.
91 Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP.
The absence of a country office resilience vision/strategy guiding operations was also noted in Cameroon.

2.6.5 Results in local purchase

Local purchase was intended in ten operations, but in Guinea Bissau it had not started at the time of the evaluation and in Côte d'Ivoire it was cancelled due to the high prices of local products and financial constraints. Results in other eight evaluations include:

- Significant levels of local purchase, achieving at least close to 50 percent of total purchases in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Senegal operations
- Small to medium scale of local purchase in both PRROs in Chad, the Liberia and Niger PRROs, and the 2012-2013 Regional EMOP (in Niger), albeit with variations at local level in Niger PRRO.

2.7 Gender, protection and accountability to affected populations

Nine out of the 15 operations included gender-sensitive activities and three achieved intended results. However, operations mainly focused on attaining parity between men and women in the activities conducted. Only the operation in The Gambia moved beyond ‘equal numbers’ to improve power dynamics within the community, including the empowerment of women.

Only five evaluations reported on protection indicators, with four finding targets reached. Under accountability to affected populations, of four evaluations reporting, three found targets not met.

71. Gender: Nine operations out of 15 included gender-sensitive activities. The Liberia operation met all the gender targets set, although the evaluation questioned the reliability of the data. Corporate targets were partially met in three operations including (i) enrolment rates in Guinea Bissau (ii) participation rates of women in Chad (2015-2016 PRRO) and The Gambia. Five operations (in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali and Niger) did not meet gender targets.

72. In common with wider findings from the series, all 15 operations sought equal numbers of men and women in the activities conducted. However, only the operation in The Gambia aimed for, and achieved, a significant contribution to the balancing of power dynamics within the community, including the empowerment of women. In addition, the 2015-2016 Chad PRRO questioned the adequacy of corporate indicators to capture real progress on gender equality.

Box 6 Gender

The Gambia PRRO: By establishing gender-balanced cash transfer committees and training women committee members, WFP was able to improve the balance of decision-making powers between men and women.

73. Protection: Five evaluations reported on protection indicators. Targets were reached in all but one operation (Liberia). Evaluations of the two Regional EMOPs and

---

60 Burkina Faso DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.
61 Cameroon PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP and Niger PRRO.
62 Cameroon PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Liberia PRRO and Niger PRRO.
that of Liberia highlight limited attention given by the operations to protection; and in the case of Liberia the need to develop an adequate protection strategy during the phasing out of the PRRO.

74. **Accountability to affected populations (AAP):** Four evaluations reported on WFP corporate indicator for accountability to affected populations (percent of beneficiaries informed about the programme). One achieved its intended target (the PRRO in Niger) and three did not. Although the Cameroon PRRO did not track the accountability to affected population indicator, the evaluation reported that compliance mechanisms existed, and highlighted good communication flows with communities.

### 2.8 WFP partnerships in West Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluations found that WFP had established good collaboration with national institutions and governments in most operations, however, synergies with United Nations agencies were variable.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

75. **Government partners:** Ten evaluations praised good collaboration and the creation of synergies with national institutions and governments. In both Chad PRROs and in Guinea Bissau (which experienced a coup d'état during implementation), collaboration was strongest at the decentralised level. Mixed performance was seen in the Regional EMOP, with strong partnerships in The Niger and Burkina Faso, while the country office encountered some challenges with the Mauritania government. Two evaluations, in Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe, reported that collaboration with governments did not take place as intended in design, due to the absence of adequate coordination mechanisms.

76. **United Nations partners:** Relationships with United Nations agencies reflect wider inconsistencies identified through the series. In three operations (Cameroon, Mali and Niger), coordination and synergies with United Nations agencies was praised, with particularly strong synergies noted with UNICEF, FAO, UNAIDS and UNHCR. In five operations, collaboration with FAO was limited, with room for improved convergence in sustainable livelihoods/resilience-related objectives.

### 2.9 Efficiency and agility in implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the majority of operations, efficiency and timeliness were compromised by supply chain disruptions and pipeline breaks. This resulted in ration reductions, delays/suspension of food distributions and/or reduction of geographical coverage. WFP showed agility and capacity to adapt to changing needs and context in seven operations. Cash and vouchers were universally accepted where applied, though in-kind transfers encountered some challenges of acceptability, due to weak adaptation to local consumption habits and/or beneficiary difficulties in preparing certain commodities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

77. All 15 evaluations address the timeliness of the operations. With the exception of the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and both PRROs in Chad, where an efficient supply chain resulted in regular distributions, all operations encountered delays in the delivery of commodities. Reasons for inadequate supply chains and pipeline breaks were: funding restrictions, inadequate storage capacities resulting in the loss of food,

---

95. 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO.
and limitations in transport capacity. The most frequent effects of poor timeliness were reductions in/suspensions of food rations, food loss, and reductions in geographical coverage of food distributions.

78. Thirteen evaluations discuss the cost-efficiency of operations. Six find that operations were overall cost-efficient. Efforts made to improve cost-efficiency include: reducing activity overlaps with other agencies, encouraging the local purchase of goods, adopting an exchange-fluctuation coverage approach in cash transfer activities to prevent losses, promoting beneficiary contributions and/or reducing overhead costs through sharing of office space.

79. Thirteen evaluations out of 15 comment on the adaptive capacity of WFP. Findings here were less positive than in some other regions evaluated through this series: seven evaluations praise the capacity of the country office to adapt to changes in context and needs; but two (Cameroon and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP) found mixed efforts at adaptation and four evaluations found slow or insufficient adaptation of the operations to evolving needs.

**Box 7: Adaptive capacity**

- In Mali the EMOP adapted to a highly volatile context by increasing the caseload of general distribution beneficiaries
- In Guinea Bissau the PRRO management appropriately decided to provide school meals to new schools severely affected by teachers’ strikes, as an incentive for attendance

80. **Beneficiary entitlements:** All 15 evaluations report that operations delivered less food or cash than intended to beneficiaries and/or had carried out transfers for a shorter duration or less frequently than planned. The main effect on beneficiaries was decreased effectiveness: for example, in Guinea Bissau, due to funding restrictions, rations were reduced and nutrition activities were temporarily suspended resulting in low adherence levels of beneficiaries to moderate acute malnutrition treatment.

81. **Transfer modalities:** Out of the 11 evaluations that planned to implement cash and vouchers (Table 1), all but the Burkina Faso operation (which cancelled the distribution of cash due to lack of funding) found that the modality was well-accepted. In-kind transfers - used in all 15 operations - were well-accepted by beneficiaries in 9 out of 15 operations, while evaluations of the other six operations found challenges with adapting rations to local consumption habits. Food preparation was also a challenge in the 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and the Mali EMOP, as well as in the Burkina Faso CP.

### 2.10 Sustainability/transition

Transition remains a challenge for most operations. Effective handover of activities to governments occurred in only four operations. Evaluations identify weak

---

98 Exceptions are evaluations of PRROs in Guinea Bissau and Liberia.
99 Chad (through both PRRO), The Gambia, Niger, Cameroon and through the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
100 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Guinea Bissau, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.
101 Burkina Faso CP, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, and Liberia PRRO.
102 Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal CP.
103 Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, , and the 2015-2016 Regional EMOP operations.
government financial and technical capacity, plus the lack of a clear road map for transfer of responsibilities, as the main constraints.

82. Eleven evaluations\(^{104}\) out of 15 comment on the handover or transition processes. Findings reflect wider inconsistencies identified through this series. For example:

- In four operations, the transfer of activities was successfully achieved in at least one component of the programme: (i) school feeding activities in Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe and (ii) malnutrition treatment and national food security information systems in Chad (the 2012-2014 PRRO and 2015-2016 PRRO respectively).
- Although intended in the project document, handover did not take place in Côte d’Ivoire, due to government budget limitations and in Burkina Faso, where the planned transition strategy was not developed.
- In two countries, Guinea Bissau and Mali, intentions for transition were prevented by security or political crises.
- Four operations\(^{105}\) did not develop a handover strategy at design stage.
- Seven evaluations\(^{106}\) raised concerns about the capacity of government institutions to take over responsibilities. These concerns included four cases where transition had taken place (Chad - through both PRROs - Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe), questioning the sustainability of actions taken.

**QUESTION 3: What factors affected the results?**

*Summary findings: factors*

External factors affecting results included insecurity and limited access in the Sahel band, food prices and availability, and poor infrastructure rendering transport challenging. Lack of adequate funding and limited government and partner capacities also hindered the effectiveness of operations.

Positively, the Regional Bureau actively contributed to the design and implementation of several operations. Internal factors constraining results included: the lack of adequate monitoring as a means to inform programme management; design flaws and inadequate staffing and/or allocation of resources within programme components; overambitious geographical coverage; weak targeting and/or insufficient understanding of vulnerabilities.

**2.11 Internal and external factors**

83. Evaluations identify a combination of internal and external factors which affected results. External factors were as follow:

- External environment challenges, including factors hampering the effectiveness and efficiency of operations include: the Ebola crisis; insecurity, which constrained access; vast geographical coverage in the case of Sahel band countries; food prices and availability; poor infrastructure rendering transport challenging and contributing to delays in delivery and engrained social

\(^{104}\) Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and Senegal CP.

\(^{105}\) Cameroon PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO in relation with nutrition activities, Niger PRRO and Senegal CP.

\(^{106}\) Cameroon PRRO, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Niger PRRO, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and Senegal CP.
practices and norms (e.g. reluctance to send girls to school in some instances, intra-household sharing of cash transfers, etc.)

- National capacity limitations of government and other partners challenges. Limitations in government and operational partners’ capacities hindered the implementation of activities in 12 operations.\textsuperscript{107} Unrealistic assumptions regarding capacities of the government were noted in seven evaluations\textsuperscript{108}

- Funding-related challenges. Limited funding constrained performance in 12 operations,\textsuperscript{109} with funding volumes ranging from 31 percent in Senegal CP and 70 percent in Ghana CP (see Table 1). Five operations achieved between 31 percent and 50 percent of funding needs. In nine operations, lack of funding was the main reason for pipeline breaks, insufficient staffing and/or the need to reduce geographical and beneficiary coverage.\textsuperscript{110} Operations also experienced delays in the delivery of contributions after initial commitments were made.

84. Internal factors were as follow:

- Weak monitoring and evaluation systems (as described above) and poor use of recent data as a management tool to inform operation implementation resulted in reduced efficiency in 12 operations\textsuperscript{111}

- Understaffing and high staff turnover hindered the efficiency of the operation in 13 cases.\textsuperscript{112} For example, in the 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, a combination of staff movement and vacancies in 2015 hindered management capacity to steer the PRRO in a period of key budget reallocation of resources.

- Overambitious geographical coverage, weak targeting and/or insufficient understanding of vulnerabilities (as described above) negatively affected the achievement of programme outputs and outcomes in 11 operations.\textsuperscript{113}

- Support from the regional bureau was highlighted in seven evaluations\textsuperscript{114} as an important contribution to operations’ design and monitoring. The regional bureau provided guidance, tools, standardized software for programmatic, administrative and logistical management, and trainings. In the countries covered by the 2015-2016 Regional, a local extension of the regional bureau (a pop-up-hub) was established to enhance the support of the regional bureau to relevant country offices. Despite some efficiency limitations due to high staff turnover and logistics constraints, the pop-up-hub contributed to the development of regional context analysis and to the adaptation of the operation

\textsuperscript{107} Burkina Faso CP, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and Senegal CP. Note that in the case of 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, national capacity limitations are not discussed under the section External Factors of the evaluation report, but under other sections throughout the report (paragraphs 75, 97, 98, 111, 120 and 158).

\textsuperscript{108} Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Mali EMOP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV and Niger PRRO.

\textsuperscript{109} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV, Senegal CP.

\textsuperscript{110} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Niger PRRO, Senegal CP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.


\textsuperscript{112} Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.

\textsuperscript{113} Burkina Faso CP, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2012-2015 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.

\textsuperscript{114} Burkina Faso CP, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Senegal CP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
across the three countries. In three operations, however, evaluations found that the regional bureau’s support fell short of requirements.

- Logistical and/or commodity management supported effective implementation in three operations but weaknesses in these systems constrained timeliness and coverage of the response in four.

- Strong coordination and communication with partners and/or community mobilisation supported programme implementation in three operations, but in four, poor communication and coordination with implementing partners hindered performance.

---

115 Such as the introduction of cash transfer, the changes in the nutrition strategy in Cameroon and securing distribution devices (paragraph 151, Evaluation Report, IRAM).
116 Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Liberia PRRO and São Tomé and Principe DEV.
117 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO and 2012-2013 Regional EMOP
118 Burkina Faso CP, Ghana CP, Liberia PRRO and Niger PRRO.
119 Gambia PRRO, Mali EMOP and Niger PRRO.
120 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Mali EMOP, Senegal CP and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.
3: EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the period 2013 to 2016, evaluations presented WFP Country Offices in the region with a series of recommendations for improvement. The most frequently occurring themes are shown in Table 4 (all occurring in four evaluations or more). In 11 evaluations all recommendations were accepted or partially accepted by the country office. In four evaluations a total of four recommendations and three sub-recommendations were not accepted.

Table 4: Evaluation recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Improve monitoring and evaluation/information management systems</th>
<th>Twelve evaluations(^{123})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Improve internal synergies and complementarities within programme components and approaches including geographical and activity-level targeting to improve efficiency and impact of the programmes. Promote convergence with other programmes when relevant</td>
<td>Nine evaluations(^{124})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Enhance nutrition approaches and performance, including an increased attention to prevention of chronic malnutrition</td>
<td>Nine evaluations(^{125})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Enhance the role as an enabling partner through capacity strengthening and by supporting governments in preparation of policy and strategic frameworks aimed at transferring responsibilities when relevant (namely in school feeding programmes)</td>
<td>Seven evaluations(^{126})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improve quality of partnerships, including capacity-strengthening, mechanisms for adjustment of priorities, coordination, payment mechanism</td>
<td>Six evaluations(^{127})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Improve gender analysis and programming, in accordance with WFP gender policy, to address inequality and gender bias</td>
<td>Six evaluations(^{128})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reinforce country office (both at capital and sub-office levels) technical and financial capacities including on gender and monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Six evaluations(^{129})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Conduct needs-assessments to inform the redesign of new operations in evolving contexts either to continue activities or as part of phasing out</td>
<td>Four evaluations(^{130})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Improve supply chain and logistics capacities</td>
<td>Four evaluations(^{131})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{121}\) Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.

\(^{122}\) Burkina Faso CP, Mali EMOP, Regional EMOP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.

\(^{123}\) All but 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Niger PRRO and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.

\(^{124}\) Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.

\(^{125}\) All but 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO, Regional EMOP (200438) and Senegal CP.

\(^{126}\) Burkina Faso CP, Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, São Tomé and Príncipe DEV and Senegal CP.

\(^{127}\) Cameroon PRRO, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Niger PRRO, Ghana CP, Guinea Bissau PRRO, Liberia PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and Senegal CP.

\(^{128}\) Burkina Faso CP, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.

\(^{129}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, The Gambia PRRO, Liberia PRRO, Mali EMOP, Niger PRRO and 2015-2016 Regional EMOP.

\(^{130}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, Liberia PRRO, 2015-2016 Regional EMOP and São Tomé and Príncipe DEV.

\(^{131}\) Burkina Faso CP, Côte d’Ivoire DEV, Gambia PRRO and Cameroon PRRO.
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>10.</strong> Increase emphasis on/shift the focus to resilience, linked to a robust theory of change, tailored partnerships, intervention modalities and funding</td>
<td>Four evaluations(^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11.</strong> Reinforce focus on the self-reliance of populations through income generating activities and improved sustainability of community assets created</td>
<td>Four evaluations(^{33})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86. Overall, recommendations are mostly focused on the improvement of the design (#2, 3, 6, 8), operationalisation (#5, 7, 9) and monitoring (#1) of WFP programmes. Almost half of the evaluations recommend WFP continue enhancing its enabling partner role in the region.

87. In addition to the themes reflected in Table 4 above, evaluations also recommended the following in at least three evaluations each: (i) enhance the protection role of WFP, (ii) ensure adequate consideration of the needs of people living with HIV, (iii) diversify the asset-creation portfolio for stronger linkages to local production and (iv) conduct capacity strengthening needs-assessments.

---

\(^{32}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2015-2016 Chad, The Gambia PRRO and Niger PRRO.

\(^{33}\) 2012-2014 Chad PRRO, 2012-2013 Regional EMOP, Mali EMOP and Cameroon PRRO.
4: CONCLUSIONS

88. In the West Africa region, WFP interventions are primarily focused on implementing food assistance in contexts with recurrent food crises. WFP has positioned itself within the humanitarian-development spectrum in the region by adapting its contributions to respond to different needs, to volatile contexts and to face operational challenges, such as highly constrained access and weak national capacities.

89. Where conditions allowed (e.g. political stability and government buy-in), WFP applied enabling roles in the region, to deliver tangible results in policy development and knowledge transfer. However, capacity-strengthening approaches would have benefited from an improved strategic vision to deliver sustainable gains in improved government capacities and leadership. A major challenge for WFP is to appropriately balance competing priorities in the region: responding to immediate needs whilst also supporting national ownership and leadership. This difficult prioritization must also cope realistically with institutional weaknesses that further present challenges for sustainability.

90. Resilience has been at the heart of institutions and food security actors in the region since the 2011-2012 Sahel food crisis. WFP has clearly embraced this priority, as reflected in its resilience policy (2015) and Roadmap for a Regional Approach for West Africa (2013, revised in 2015), which provides an opportunity for a more consistent/strategic approach. However to date, WFP resilience-building work has yet to show significant achievement.

91. WFP has geared its operations to reinforcing social safety nets in the region, mainly through school feeding programmes. Where conditions permit, WFP has combined effective direct implementation of school feeding programmes with investments in governments’ capacity and policy development. This has successfully resulted in the transition of school feeding to government institutions in two instances; but a focus on transition remains a strong theme in evaluation recommendations going forward.

92. Despite progress, weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation systems across the region hinder the measurement of operations’ achievements, particularly of outcomes. Limited reliability and quality of operational monitoring data continues to undermine WFP capacity to reorient its programming and to demonstrate effectively its achievements.

93. Operation designs remain weak. Evaluations routinely identify weak logic in theories of change, extensive assumptions made, and limited internal consistency and convergence of activities. Stronger partnership is needed, particularly within resilience activities, to support the achievement of results.

94. Gender mainstreaming challenges WFP in the region. The main achievements of WFP are described primarily in terms of the participation of women and girls, missing the point of real gender transformation, which could be sought through enhanced attention to empowerment and attitudinal changes at community and household levels. Participatory processes, alongside increased capacity strengthening for staff, will support the design of gender-sensitive operations.

95. For individual activity areas:

- **General distribution:** Implemented in almost half of the operations evaluated in the region, it was particularly relevant in addressing refugee,
internally displaced persons and host population needs affected by food security and conflict in the Sahel. Despite the relevance of activities, output and outcome results have been hampered by operational constraints, including disruptions in the supply chain, constrained access and insecurity.

- **Nutrition:** WFP has systematically addressed nutrition needs in the region, implementing activities in 12 operations out of the 14 planned. Evaluations find that programme designs for nutrition require improvement, including a stronger emphasis on stunting prevention. Output targets have been satisfactorily achieved in almost half of the operations and outcome performance across the region remains uncertain due to concerns over data availability and/or reliability.

- **Education:** School feeding has generally supported national programmes, often as part of a social protection response. Evaluations found generally positive output-level achievement and improved enrolment rates, with attendance also improving in some cases. WFP also supported activities aimed at the development of national school feeding mechanisms led by governments, but progress on transition was limited due to capacity concerns.

- **Livelihoods (FFA/FFT):** Evaluations of operations implementing livelihood activities found that these did not consistently achieve output results, mainly due to funding constraints. Despite this, and although WFP corporate indicators were not consistently tracked, evaluations find positive effects in household food consumption, reduction of coping strategies, and creation of community assets, though weaknesses in resilience building. Almost all evaluations raised questions about the quality of assets created and sustainability concerns.
5: LESSONS

96. Lessons arising from these 15 evaluations for the West and Central Africa region are:

1. **Enhance the approach to resilience building.** Given the complexity and multi-faceted nature of resilience, WFP should develop a robust theory of change that better establishes short-, middle- and long-term outcomes and assumptions of resilience-oriented interventions in the West and Central Africa region. This should be based on an understanding of underlying causes of structural poverty and cyclical vulnerability in the region that impede sustainable development. Building on existing partnerships and alliances, as well on the conducive environment in the region for resilience work, WFP can enhance partnerships and nurture synergies with other key actors (such as Rome-based agencies) to reach shared resilience goals at the community level.

2. **Broaden support to national social protection mechanisms.** WFP has shown commitment to supporting school feeding as a critical safety net in the region. WFP could similarly consider expanding its support to other national, social-protection systems by aligning its technical expertise and aid modalities, such as cash-based programmes, to relevant national mechanisms.

3. **Invest in operation designs for increased effectiveness.** In line with recommendations of nine evaluations, WFP should invest efforts in improving the theory of change of its interventions. Assumptions and intervention logics should be based on solid evidence, including gender analysis, and revisited during implementation. Internal synergies and complementarities within programme components should be sought to increase efficiency and impact. To enhance geographic and activity convergence, WFP could learn from experiences such as Niger’s commune of convergence (C2) to enhance holistic and multi-sectoral approaches to community development.

4. **Improve monitoring and information management systems.** All evaluations reported limitations in the monitoring systems and/or of the quality, availability, reliability and/or use of data captured through them, and recommendations consistently advise WFP to take action to address concerns. Significant effort has been devoted to improving monitoring and evaluation systems, staff, technical skills and partners’ monitoring capacities, yet the return on investment in terms of significant improvement of data availability and reliability is not apparent in the evaluations of the period 2013-2016. WFP should enhance this commitment in its upcoming country strategy planning processes.

5. **Enhance the enabling role of WFP.** WFP should enhance its enabling role by further supporting governments in preparation of policy and strategic frameworks and capacity strengthening. The opportunity of country strategic processes will afford WFP the opportunity to conduct a thorough assessment of country priorities towards “zero hunger”, and, in doing so, to map relevant gaps in a governments’ policy, institutional and operational frameworks. With this knowledge in hand, and building on its strong partnerships with national institutions and with other resilience, food security and nutrition platforms and initiatives in the country, WFP can sharpen its approach to capacity building and policy influence in those areas where it has a comparative advantage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>United Nations agencies</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Département de la gestion de l’assistance alimentaire et nutritionnelle (DGAAN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction de la nutrition (DN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de l’agriculture et de la sécurité alimentaire (MASA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de l’éducation nationale et de L’alphabétisation (MENA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de la santé (MS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de l’économie et des finances (MEF)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secrétariat permanent du conseil national de lutte contre le VIH/sida et les IST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>United Nations agencies</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Directorate of Health Promotion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Regional delegations of the Ministry of Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>United Nations agencies</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td></td>
<td>IFRC International Medical Corps Plan Cameroon Public Concern</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Chad (200713) | CASGC  
CNAAR  
DNNTA  
Minister of Agriculture  
Ministry of Health  
Ministry of Health (Regional)  
(Sila, Barh, El Gazel, Kanem, Ouaddai)  
SISAAP  
Ministry of Social Affairs | FAO  
HCR  
IOM  
UNICEF | Saidl  
Sana Logone  
International:  
ACTED  
ACF  
Bambini Nel Deserto  
Care International  
Catholic Relief  
Centre de Support en Santé Internationale  
Cooperazion Internazionale  
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society  
Intermon Oxfam, International Medical Corps  
International Rescue Committee  
Lutheran World Federation  
MSF (Swiss)  
Oxfam GB  
Secours catholique et développement  
World Vision International  
National:  
ADES  
AFDI  
AIDR  
APDIF  
APSE  
ASRADD  
BASE |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agency/Institution</th>
<th>Sectors/Regional Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad (200289)</td>
<td>Commission Nationale d'Accueil et de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Rapatriés (CNAR) Ministère de Santé Publique Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Irrigation</td>
<td>FAO UNHCR UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International NGOs 28 National NGOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Action Contre la Faim Association for Economic and Social Development Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society Lutheran World Federation/Action by Church Together l’Agence Adventiste d’Aide et de Développement Oxfam Première Urgence Red Cross (Chad) le Secours Catholique et Développement World Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia (200557)</td>
<td>Gambia Bureau of Statistics Management Agency (NDMA) and related decentralised institutions Ministry of health and social welfare National Disaster National Nutrition Agency (NaNA)</td>
<td>FAO UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gambia Association of Food and Nutrition Agency Gambia Red Cross</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ghana (200247) | Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
Forestry Services Division (FSD)  
Ghana Education Service (GES)  
Ghana Health Service (GHS)  
Ghana School Feeding Programme  
Metro/Municipal/District Assemblies  
Ministry of Children, Gender and Social Protection  
Ministry of Education  
Ministry of Food and Agriculture  
Ministry of Health  
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development  
Secretariat, Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA) | FAO  
UNAIDS  
UNDP  
UNICEF  
WHO  
World Bank | ACDI VOCA  
Adventist Development & Relief Agency  
Ajinomoto  
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)  
Farm Radio International  
Food Research Institute  
International Fertilizer Development Centre  
Kwame Nkrumah University  
Northern Development Society (NORDESO)  
Opportunities for Rural Development Foundation (ORDF)  
Partnership for Child Development (PCD)  
Savana Agricultural Research Institute  
Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) movement  
SNV |
| Guinea Bissau (200526) | Ministry of Agriculture  
Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Integration  
Ministry of Education  
Ministry of Health  
National Secretariat for the Fight Against AIDS | FAO  
UNICEF | ADIC NAFIA  
ADS  
AJAM  
ALTERNAG  
APALCOF  
APRODEL  
ATAP  
Bandin  
Caritas  
Catholic Mission  
Ceu&Terras  
GUIARROZ |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Igreja Presbiteriana Evangelical Church International Partnership for Human Development</th>
<th>JOCUIM</th>
<th>Plan International Wulute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Liberia (200550)** | LRRRC  
Ministry of Education  
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare | FAO  
UNHCR  
UNICEF | Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA)  
Agricultural Relief Service  
CARE  
Caritas Palmas  
Danish Refugee Council  
International Rescue Committee  
Norwegian Refugee Council  
Save the Children  
SEARCH |
| **Mali** | Comité technique de coordination et de suivi des programmes de sécurité alimentaire  
Comité pour la Sécurité Alimentaire (CSA)  
Conseil National pour la Sécurité Alimentaire  
Commission pour le Mouvement des Populations (CMP)  
Ministère de l’action Humanitaire de la solidarité et des Personnes âgées  
Ministère de la Santé, Ministère de l’Éducation | FAO  
IOM  
OCHA  
UNHCR  
UNICEF | ACTED  
Reach Italia  
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)  
World Vision  
Welthungerhilfe  
CARE  
Africare  
Handicap International  
Islamic Relief  
Solidarités International  
Action Contre la Faim  
OXFAM |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Organizations/Agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>UNHCR, UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>ACF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADICOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MICROFI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burkinabe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IEDA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLAN International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relief</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCF-UK                                   (Goudebou),</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tomé and Principe (200295)</td>
<td>Culture et de la Formation PNASE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de la Santé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de l’Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère de l’Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Sociales</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministère des Finances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Département du Commerce et des Douanes du Ministère de Planification et Développement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acção para o Desenvolvimento de Iniciativas Locais (Zatona-Adil)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADAPPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ALISEI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ambiente e Pesca Artesanal (MARAPA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amigos da Sara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associação Instituto Socio Educativo da Criança</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instituto de Estudios del Hambre (IEH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO Helpo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quá-Téla</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZATONA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Senegal (200249) | Composante 1:  
Agence Nationale de Conseil Agricole et Rural (ANCAR)  
Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire (CSA)  
Direction de l’Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques Agricoles (DAPSA)  
Ministère de l’Agriculture et de l’Equipement rural (MAER)  
Projet d’Appui à la Petite Irrigation Locale (PAPIL)  
Secrétariat Exécutif du Conseil National de la Sécurité Alimentaire (SE-CNSA)  
Service Départemental du Développement Rural (SDDR)  
Composante 2:  
Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition (CLM)  
Direction de la Santé de la Reproduction et de la Survie de l’Enfant/Division de l’Alimentation et la Nutrition  
Ministère de la santé et de l’action sociale (MSAS)  
Composante 3:  
Division des Cantines scolaires (DCaS)  
Agence Nationale de la Petite Enfance et de la Case des Touts petits (ANPECTP)  
Ministère de l’Education Nationale (MEN), | FAO  
FIDA  
UNICEF  
WHO | Africare  
Associés du Sénégal (SAPCA-EGAS)  
Base d’Appui aux Méthodes et Techniques de l’Agriculture des autres Activités Rurales et de l’Environnement (BAMTAARE)  
Caritas  
Catholic Relief Services  
Child Fund International (CFI)  
Oxfam America  
Plan International  
Red Cross  
Réseau Africain pour le développement intégré (RADI)  
Société d’Approvisionnement, de Production, de Commercialisation et de Conseil Agricole des Ententes des Groupements Symbiose  
Terre des Hommes  
Village Pilote  
World Vision |
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Accountability to Affected Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;V</td>
<td>Cash and Vouchers (modality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDS</td>
<td>Diet Diversity Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEV</td>
<td>Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Food Consumption Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFA</td>
<td>Food Assistance for Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFT</td>
<td>Food Assistance for Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GD</td>
<td>General Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRM</td>
<td>Integrated Road Map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAM</td>
<td>Moderate Acute Malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mVAM</td>
<td>Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEV</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SABER</td>
<td>System Approach for Better Education Results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSF</td>
<td>Targeted Supplementary Feeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>