EVALUATIONS OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE AND DISPLACED PERSON PROJECTS

Agenda item 6 a)

PROJECT MOZAMBIQUE 4164 (Exp.4)

Displaced persons affected by food shortages and civil strife in Mozambique

Total food cost 21 146 020 dollars
Total cost to WFP 45 155 136 dollars
Date of approval of project October 1993
Date of first food distribution January 1994
Duration of project 28 months
Official termination date April 1996
Date of evaluation November 1995
Duration of project at time of evaluation 23 months

All monetary values are expressed in United States dollars, unless otherwise stated. The exchange rate for one United States dollar was 5.3 meticais in January 1994 and 10.5 meticais in October 1995.

1 The mission consisted of a senior evaluation officer (team leader); a nutritionist/food security specialist and technical team coordinator; a transport economist, and a macro-economist. It was co-sponsored by WFP, USAID and the European Union.

ABSTRACT

The WFP operation is part of the southern African regional response and plays a significant role in re-establishing the livelihood of the rural population affected by protracted civil war, economic ruin, and recurrent droughts. It is an example of a shift in the use of food aid from emergency to development, at the same time remaining responsive to drought and emergencies. The provision of a basic ration - together with the registration and monitoring of over one million returnees and an average of 800,000 internally displaced and affected people - enabled them to clear land, build houses and plant food and cash crops. Another 45,000 participated in small-scale food-for-work programmes for the construction and rehabilitation of essential infrastructure such as schools, health posts, water points, roads and bridges. The operation was able to respond to the recurrence of drought in 1994/95 which affected recent returnees trying to make a living. The use of local transport has had direct and indirect beneficial effects, multiplying the benefits of food aid and accelerating the building up of the rural economy. The local purchase of maize by WFP has had many expected and unexpected benefits, including support to local food production and marketing. The WFP country office and sub-offices have efficiently and imaginatively addressed the design and implementation of the operation, and coordination with the Government, donors, UNHCR and NGOs has been effective. WFP was directly involved in the management and monitoring of the decentralized and closely-knit field and headquarters operations. In consultation with the Government of Mozambique, the WFP country office played a decisive role in the continuous assessment of the emergency situation. Emphasis was placed on targeting, planning, reporting and coordination. Commodity losses have been reduced to less than one percent. Dependency resulting from free food distribution, while of concern, does not appear to be an issue at this stage. WFP continues to reduce the number of beneficiaries, from a high of 3.5 million in 1992-93 to over 645,000 in September 1995, and has worked with its implementing partners to refine estimates in spite of pressure to increase numbers for free distribution. More effort is needed, however, to improve NGO targeting and programme design to minimize dependency and facilitate sustainability for communities and the Government.
NOTE TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

1. This document contains recommendations for review and approval by the Executive Board.

2. Pursuant to the decisions taken on the methods of work by the Executive Board at its First Regular Session, the documentation prepared by the Secretariat for the Board has been kept brief and decision-oriented. The meetings of the Executive Board are to be conducted in a business-like manner, with increased dialogue and exchanges between delegations and the Secretariat. Efforts to promote these guiding principles will continue to be pursued by the Secretariat.

3. The Secretariat therefore invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff member(s) listed below, preferably well in advance of the Board’s meeting. This procedure is designed to facilitate the Board’s consideration of the document in the plenary.

4. The WFP staff dealing with this document are:

   Director: W. Kiene  tel.: 5228-2029
   Evaluation Officer: P. Terver  tel.: 5228-2030

5. Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Documents Clerk (tel.: 5228-2641).
BACKGROUND

The return of refugees and displaced persons

1. For over 16 years, civil strife has had a devastating effect on Mozambique, causing massive displacement of the population and disruption of its economic base, rural infrastructure, agriculture and social services. As of mid-1992, out of a total population of around 16 million over five million had been displaced. Of those five million, almost two million had taken refuge in neighbouring countries. The remainder were displaced within Mozambique.

2. The breakdown of the rural economy of a country, which, during the seventies, produced most of its food requirements, resulted in acute food shortages, with particularly adverse effects on vulnerable groups such as women and children. The food situation further deteriorated during 1992 following one of the worst droughts in the history of Mozambique. A serious drought also occurred in parts of the country in 1994 and early 1995.

3. The signing of the general peace agreement between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO in October 1992 led to a significant improvement in security and consequently paved the way for improvements in the economic situation. This partly resulted in the beginning of a spontaneous return of about 80 percent of all refugees and displaced people to their places of origin.

4. The year 1993 saw the first organized repatriations, with a steady rate of return for large numbers of returnees. The rate of repatriation increased throughout 1994. During this period, large numbers of refugees returned unassisted. UNHCR, in coordination with the respective governments, accelerated the rate of organized repatriation in order to assist as many as possible to return prior to the elections in October 1994 and the approaching planting season. Such movements continued into 1995, as did spontaneous arrivals, bringing the total number of returnees to over 1.7 million, with additional new arrivals numbering over 200,000 by the end of July 1995.

Project 4164 (Exp.4)

5. The project was approved in October 1993 by the CFA at its Thirty-sixth Session as part of a regional intervention (project Mozambique Regional). The regional approach provided more flexibility in the allocation of commodities and greater ability to track the movements of returnees across borders.

6. At present, commitments consist of 127,941 tons of food commodities. This amount does not include the carry-forward from protracted relief operation (PRO) 4164 (Exp.3) and emergency operation 5054, at a total cost to WFP of 45.1 million dollars, including 24 million dollars for external transport, insurance, superintendence and ITSH costs.
7. In addition to providing basic food support to returnees and the most seriously affected displaced populations, the project included two special schemes to cope with the evolving socio-economic and political situation: a) a special nutrition programme directed to vulnerable groups with high rates of malnutrition (especially among populations who were in the previously inaccessible areas); and b) the rehabilitation, through food for work, of economic and social infrastructure aiming at linking emergency with development (the relief-development continuum).

8. The 28-month operation started in January 1994 and is expected to end in April 1996. A new emergency operation, No. 5638, was also approved in early 1995 (and began in June of that year) to provide additional food commodities to cover emergency food requirements up to June 1996 for former returnees who had joined large numbers of drought-affected people.

9. The total commitment of the ongoing WFP protracted and emergency assistance is 66.2 million dollars, including commodities carried forward.

Overall developmental considerations

10. In addition to WFP food assistance, a comprehensive rehabilitation package for returnees and displaced persons in Mozambique has been developed by UNHCR. Under this programme, agricultural tools and seeds are provided, mainly through NGOs, to the returnees (and to those formerly displaced) in their home districts. Furthermore, in a joint effort between the Government, the United Nations and other agencies (which includes WFP regular development projects), programmes for the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, agriculture and social services are being implemented throughout the country. The purpose is to provide the returnees with a basic infrastructure and, since the vast majority are farmers, to facilitate their reintegration in farming activities and help them reach self-sufficiency. The Country Strategy Outline at present being finalized for Mozambique clearly illustrates the shift in the use of food aid from relief to development and famine mitigation and the phasing out of emergency assistance, at the same time maintaining a disaster-preparedness capacity.

CONCLUSIONS

11. The size of the country, its vulnerability to drought, many years of war and its ruined economy and infrastructure make it particularly difficult to assess crop production and food needs and to reach beneficiaries. It is, therefore, the overall opinion of the mission that from an emergency perspective, the design of the WFP operation was adequate and the WFP country office and sub-offices have efficiently and imaginatively addressed the various challenges faced. Over one million returnees have been helped to settle and the majority are virtually self-reliant. Around 800,000 drought-affected people have received assistance and an additional 45,000 have benefited from various small development projects.

WFP food assistance represents about 66 percent of total emergency aid. So far, the operation has distributed 191,000 tons of 242,000 tons committed (or 79 percent).
The amounts distributed include approximately 4,000 tons for the small-scale projects. The programme has substantially reduced leakage and losses to around 0.6 percent - some 1,270 tons were reported damaged.

13. The WFP office in Mozambique negotiated for a direct role in the assessment of the emergency situation. Emphasis was placed on continuous assessment and targeting, planning, reporting and coordination with donors and NGOs. WFP’s monthly coordinating meetings with the Government and NGOs have proved to be extremely valuable in improving programming and the sharing of information.

14. The provision of food and financial support has enabled the expansion of schemes to address directly the problem of food insecurity using a combination of inputs.

15. WFP, together with other donors and its implementing partners, has provided all necessary information to the Government and made commendable efforts at furthering inter-departmental cooperation, resulting in the identification of sources for the procurement of food, staff and cash. As an example of the proactive role of the WFP country office, part of commodity needs and support expenditures have been resourced directly by WFP in Maputo.

16. With the establishment of active field offices and the regular exchange of information, the WFP management has been able to decentralize its programme.

17. Although primarily an emergency operation, the project has demonstrated that the link between relief and development can be made through careful programme design and implementation. It has contributed significantly in several ways to the re-establishment of economic and social development:

   a) returnees have been able to build shelter, clear land, and plant food and cash crops contributing to household food security;

   b) it has improved food security for the drought-affected beneficiary group, many of whom were former returnees. Further provision of food has given the critical additional time needed to re-establish farms and minimum shelter and included many people who were affected by the drought in 1994;

   c) several small development projects were successfully implemented by using food from emergency resources, thus contributing to the rehabilitation of infrastructure and to the basic food needs of affected people;

   d) demobilized soldiers have begun to resettle and to adjust to rural life;

   e) roads were rehabilitated and opened and bridges reconstructed;

   f) a contribution was made to the development of agriculture and to the rural economy through the local purchase of commodities (61,500 tons of maize or 32 percent of total deliveries and 1,700 tons of pulses), thus injecting cash into the local economy while supporting local agriculture and improving the storage of surplus production;
g) the supply of seeds was improved (mostly sorghum and millet which are suited to drought-prone areas);

h) the use of local transporters and related firms (and the injection of some 20 million dollars) has benefited the development of the private-sector transport and logistics industry in four main ways:

i) it has allowed smaller operators to compete with established firms, to proliferate and to create greater capacity in the trucking and delivery sector;

ii) it has permitted operators to renew their fleets and purchase spare parts in a timely manner;

iii) storage capacity has been improved;

iv) greater competition has brought down transport rates on both tarred and dirt roads.

18. Under the current programme, food from local purchases and from overseas has provided an indispensable life-saving buffer to vulnerable families throughout Mozambique. Reports of families re-establishing farms and communities, together with those of reduced rates of malnutrition and infection since the drought of 1992, are most encouraging. Food aid has contributed significantly to a better living, human capital and has helped to create a rural safety net.

19. The programme has helped to reduce poverty and improve food security by fostering competition in agricultural markets; and it has improved rural infrastructure using labour-intensive methods for the construction and rehabilitation of, for example, schools and health posts. This effort is consistent with the Government’s poverty alleviation strategy.

20. WFP has been able to adapt to the shift from relief to development and the consequential changing needs of the programme. As an example, it has identified donors for complementary cash resources essential for the support of NGO efforts to store and deliver food, as well as to monitor and evaluate such efforts. These additional funds will improve the management of activities and the targeting of beneficiaries and facilitate the shift from direct free food to the use of food for development purposes.

21. Recognizing the need to reach returnees and drought-affected people, WFP has improved targeting by organizing workshops at the provincial level to review the issue and by building up capacity at the provincial level in partnership with NGOs.

22. A common concern of food aid programmes is the creation of dependency as a result of free food distribution. The reduction in numbers of beneficiaries from a high of 3.5 million in 1992-93 to 2.4 million in 1993-94 and over 645,000 in September 1995, with large reductions in numbers in the more food-secure northern provinces, is evidence of the changes that have occurred. WFP has worked with its implementing partners to reduce numbers in spite of continued pressure from local authorities to increase the number of affected people eligible for free distribution.
23. The registration of drought-affected people and the delivery of food-beneficiary cards have been worthwhile. Not only have they helped to improve the targeting of beneficiaries, but have also considerably limited free distributions to people who do not need emergency assistance. Registration, however, requires continuous monitoring. The seminars organized by WFP on beneficiary targeting, registration and monitoring have proved to be quite useful, although the problem remains as to how to graduate people from their existing role and how to target for more development-oriented activities.

24. Although there was no explicit gender focus in either management or implementation, it is evident from discussions that the overall programme reduced the heavy burden on women in terms of access to food and its utilization. The construction of water points, provision of seeds and tools and the means to live are significant contributions to the well-being of women and their families. In some cases, NGOs specifically targeted women and involved them in the distribution of the free food, but this was an exception.

25. Food for work is a difficult undertaking in areas where there is free food assistance. Nevertheless, the food-for-work activities within the programme have permitted a range of investments in infrastructure and are self-targeting since it is mainly the drought-affected people who volunteer to participate in the programme, which does not include a cash wage component. Despite the efforts made, the lack of national institutions or NGOs capable of technically managing the tasks has made the attainment of objectives difficult. For instance, in November 1995 only 18,119 persons were employed against a target of 35,000 set by the WFP country office.

26. Although the overall role of WFP logistics has been positive, several key issues need to be addressed regarding the future ability of Mozambique to respond to emergencies. While the private sector has developed positively, the Departamento de Prevenção e combate às calamidades naturais (DPCCN)\(^1\) has a reduced role and makes inefficient use of its fleet. There is no government entity that can now respond to a national emergency, either from a physical (transport) or coordinating point of view.

27. Local purchases by WFP, which have been effected in consultation with the Government and main donors, have boosted local production and have meant that farmers do not lose their crop surpluses and obtain cash.

28. Negotiations between WFP and the Government have made it possible to establish a floor for the purchase of maize that is not damaging to producers. Furthermore, there is no evidence that local purchases have resulted in an increase in the market prices of maize and pulses, detrimental to the poor.

29. Because of credit and transportation constraints, the commercial network is still trying to develop. The purchases made by WFP help in creating a better level of demand.

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\(^1\) Department for the Prevention and Combatting of Natural Disasters.
30. Local purchases have helped in reducing logistic costs related to transport and storage.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

31. The coordination and information role of the WFP country office and sub-offices has been instrumental in the continuous monitoring of food requirements and rapid response to the population’s needs. In emergency situations, efficiency is the principal requirement. When the emergency comes to an end and the development phase begins, other organizations can replace WFP as soon as feasible. Such institutions need to be trained so that they can provide adequate response if there is a new emergency. Major consideration needs to be given to the sustainability of relief planning and management, which could include the building up of institutions’ capacity to undertake vulnerability and food security assessments. There are 11 separate government institutions responsible for the collection and reporting of early-warning-type information. Continuing efforts to create a viable and sustainable system are necessary. In particular, the future role of DPCCN needs to be finally resolved. While not dependent on WFP action, the current function of DPCCN-Logistics (UAL) as transporters should be reviewed. With the development of private-sector trucking, DPCCN should be encouraged to divest itself of trucks. It could then become a coordinator for emergency prevention, relief and quick-action response, while maintaining strategic warehousing capacity and a role in the clearing of cargo.

32. Although much has been achieved, decentralization continues to be essential for the management and monitoring of local food distribution. Strategy and policy must be clearly developed. More could be done to involve community groups and the affected populations in the prioritization of food-for-work activities and the identification of beneficiaries. In addition, reporting on programme outputs and impact should be by beneficiary’s gender.

33. It is clear that, as partners in the distribution process, NGOs will need to improve the response to changing requirements as they move from relief to development programmes. Continued assistance will be required to improve the design and implementation of the programmes, especially in food-for-work activities. Additional resources will be needed for targeting programmes and beneficiaries and for assistance to NGOs in order to improve food security at the household level.

34. Since the WFP/FAO crop assessment missions are important tools for assessing needs, it is necessary to improve the determination of the food demand and supply situation and the number of beneficiaries requiring assistance. Needs should be determined in consultation with many sources, including WFP’s implementing partners. However, more systematic and validated information is required. The monthly meetings with NGOs should continue and support be given to various initiatives to improve the information coming from the European Union and other donors.
LESSONS LEARNED

35. When an emergency operation is under way and the organization of coordination, needs assessments, procurements, logistics, targeting systems and food distribution has been mastered, a national institution should be designated and trained to be in a position to respond efficiently to future emergency situations.

36. In all emergency operations, the possibility of local or regional purchases should be explored as a matter of routine. Areas in which purchases are made should be carefully monitored to avoid an escalation in the price of basic commodities and food insecurity resulting from excessive purchasing.
BENEFICIARIES UNDER PRO 4164-04
FAO/WFP Estimates vs. Monthly Plans vs. Actual Distribution (Jan 94 - Sept 95)

Beneficiaries

2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0

Jan 94 Mar May July Sept Nov Jan 95 Mar May July Sept
Feb Apr June Aug Oct Dec Feb Apr June Aug Oct

Month

FAO/WFP Est. Monthly Plan Actual Dist.