PROTRACTED REFUGEE AND DISPLACED PERSONS PROJECT: AFGHANISTAN 5086 (Exp.2)

Relief and rehabilitation in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date project approved</th>
<th>15 December 1994</th>
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<tr>
<td>Commencement of food distribution</td>
<td>1 January 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP food cost</td>
<td>32 412 800 dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total WFP cost</td>
<td>66 137 443 dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approved duration of project</td>
<td>One year</td>
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<td>Official termination date</td>
<td>31 December 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of evaluation</td>
<td>November/December 1995</td>
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All monetary values are expressed in United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.

1 The full mission report is available upon request, in English only.

2 The mission consisted of an evaluation officer, WFP/OEDE (team leader); a socio-economist, OEDE consultant; an agro-economist, WFP/OEDE; and the senior desk officer for Afghanistan, WFP/OMM.

ABSTRACT

In response to the relative stability prevailing in most regions of the country (with the exception of Kabul), WFP has increasingly and fairly successfully reoriented its assistance from direct relief to rehabilitation and even to development-type undertakings. The strategy adopted is both timely and valid: it has allowed flexible responses to changing circumstances when relief and rehabilitation run parallel. Free food distribution has been reduced gradually in order to limit the risks of continuing dependency and encourage people themselves to seek sustainable solutions. Concomitantly, the number of safety net schemes (food-for-work (FFW) and bakery projects) was increased to offset the risks of the target group’s nutritional status deteriorating. The reconstruction of infrastructure through FFW has been a vital contribution to the resettlement and reintegration of the war-torn population. WFP food aid has been widely recognized as having been a crucial complementary resource in the spectrum between relief and rehabilitation, although the degree of preference for food over cash varies from region to region and between rural and urban contexts. There is room for WFP to develop even further its own capacity and that of its implementing partners to deal with longer-term perspectives. Nonetheless, in the interest of quality, WFP’s programme should be consolidated and not be overly driven by the great overall needs of the country. Despite the absence of a functioning government and a lasting solution to the conflict, minimum strategic planning, going beyond immediate relief concerns, has been possible at the regional and sub-regional level; WFP could be even more actively involved in the process. In situations of a complete breakdown of government and administrative structures, WFP should undertake to support capacity-building of implementation partners, including national NGOs.
Note to The Executive Board

This document is submitted for consideration to the Executive Board.

Pursuant to the decisions taken on the methods of work by the Executive Board at its First Regular Session, the documentation prepared by the Secretariat for the Board has been kept brief and decision-oriented. The meetings of the Executive Board are to be conducted in a business-like manner, with increased dialogue and exchanges between delegations and the Secretariat. Efforts to promote these guiding principles will continue to be pursued by the Secretariat.

The Secretariat therefore invites members of the Board who may have questions of a technical nature with regard to this document, to contact the WFP staff member(s) listed below, preferably well in advance of the Board's meeting. This procedure is designed to facilitate the Board's consideration of the document in plenary.

The WFP focal points for this document are:

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Should you have any questions regarding matters of dispatch of documentation for the Executive Board, please contact the Documents Clerk (tel.: 5228-2641).
BACKGROUND

1. Since 1979, WFP has provided relief to the population of war-torn Afghanistan in and outside the country. In more recent years, a considerable number of refugees have returned to Afghanistan and some internally displaced persons (IDPs) have gone back to their places of origin as some areas have experienced sustained periods of relative peace and stability. In response, WFP, alongside the United Nations system and the donor community, has increasingly shifted the focus of its activities away from care and maintenance feeding for refugees in Pakistan and Iran to supporting rehabilitation activities inside Afghanistan for returnees, IDPs and the settled population.

2. The WFP-assisted protracted refugee and displaced person project (PRO) No. 5086 (Exp. 2) is intended to support the process towards peace, stability and normalization. It has been an evolving mix of relief and rehabilitation, with elements that include: a) declining, though still important, relief distribution for the internally displaced; b) food subsidy through bakery projects; c) food for work; d) institutional feeding; and e) some food for training. Two million needy people throughout the country were to benefit from WFP food aid - some 172,500 tons for 1995.

SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

3. In line with the shift in focus of WFP's assistance, the brief of this evaluation was to examine the PRO inside Afghanistan; assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran was not part of the exercise. The evaluation considered, in particular, aspects of the transition from relief to development ("continuum"). Therefore, issues of food logistics and management (despite their acknowledged importance) have been deliberately excluded.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The transition process

4. The assumption that relief assistance will necessarily enable a transition to development underestimates, to a certain extent, the "permanence" of the complex emergency in Afghanistan which has created power structures that propagate, and profit from, conflict. There is insufficient understanding of the kind of social or political structures that will mitigate violence; the selection of implementing partners and recipient communities demands a more thorough analysis of the dynamics of conflict.

5. In some parts of Afghanistan, post-relief programming nevertheless seems viable, even when such activity is wholly dependent on external funds and no formal governmental structure exists. Where relative stability has been experienced for more than a year and a half, for instance, relief and rehabilitation activities run parallel, not least because the resident population has been visited and revisited by displaced communities (returnees and
IDPs). Here, reconstruction activities tantamount to "development" - roads, canals, urban sanitation - are often undertaken by an underemployed transient work-force in need of immediate "relief". However, even where a resident population provides the bulk of the labour, it is difficult to foster notions of community participation and ownership of such projects among people who have been on the move and dependent for up to 15 years.

6. WFP’s Afghanistan programme has rightly placed emphasis on using government departments - where functioning - as implementors and has increased cooperation with NGOs demonstrating willingness to build links with local communities. This approach recognizes that development is not simply a replacement of physical and political infrastructure, but relies upon a well-defined and evolving civil society capable of furthering the prospect of empowerment and governance. However, donors, the United Nations and NGOs have yet to understand and agree upon the appropriate “entry point” where capacity-building does not simply become a technical exercise in improving service delivery or better reporting.

7. Relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction present different operational and management requirements, including local implementing capacity or substitution for it. The tools for identifying and appraising "development" projects are qualitatively different from those used for rapid relief interventions, the latter being still an important part of WFP's mandate in Afghanistan. A clear distinction should be maintained between food inputs for well defined and assessed relief needs, and food inputs intended to contribute to stability and poverty reduction. This has implications also on the staff profile required. Although WFP staff have done a highly commendable job under the circumstances - even in terms of technical expertise - the Programme needs to review staff numbers and characteristics.

**Role and effects of food aid**

8. In Afghanistan, there has been a continuing net food deficit as a result of the devastation of rural production systems and large-scale migration to urban areas. In spite of this, WFP's significant food aid interventions did not seem to have an impact - nor were they intended or able to do so in a consistent manner - upon shortfalls in production or distribution at the national or even regional level. Apart from problem areas, i.e., isolated regions (such as Badakshan), towns under siege (Kabul), or places where seasonal adverse weather conditions cut off access to supplies (in the north-east), Afghans have been able to keep trade routes with neighbouring countries open in spite of the war circumstances which may, *inter alia*, explain why malnutrition\(^1\) is not as widespread as one would have expected.

9. When carefully targeted to the most vulnerable people in an area, WFP food aid has demonstrably contributed to improvements in household food security or income. It has been particularly valuable at the early stage of resettlement of people, when their coping mechanisms are at their weakest. However, methods for assessing household food deficit -

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\(^1\) Based mainly on anecdotical evidence as very few area-specific surveys have been conducted (by NGOs).
and therefore the impact of food aid - have been rudimentary and need to be developed further.

10. It has been assumed that food for work, due to the relatively low value of the seven-kilogram ration, when compared with wages, is self-targeting to food-deficit communities and individuals. However, the acceptance of FFW is more often an indicator of the poverty of the individual, rather than of a food commodity shortage in the area. As such, it competes with market forces, allowing for monetization or consumption according to its fluctuating value.

11. Overall, food aid has fulfilled its role along the relief-rehabilitation spectrum: in the emergency relief context (IDPs), it has provided for life-sustaining short-term needs. The bakery projects demonstrate the importance of reaching vulnerable urban poor communities, while having a positive impact on market prices of wheat and wheat flour. FFW has been found to be a viable, timely and acceptable alternative mechanism for supporting rehabilitation activities. Food rations have proved to be a stable commodity in an unstable environment and, in some instances, have been preferred to short-term employment remunerated with cash. In addition, FFW has provided a "kick-start" to the kind of rehabilitation schemes that ultimately may influence food production and distribution, particularly at the district level.

**Strategies and components of the PRO**

12. Distribution of WFP relief food to IDPs continued In the absence of reliable figures for the camp population, the possibility of local people benefiting from IDP food aid and the fact that some families are no longer living permanently in the camps have led WFP to reduce the IDP rations. From Médecins sans Frontières' (MSF) monitoring of the situation, it appears that this strategy - adopted jointly with United Nations partners - produced no adverse effects on the health or nutritional status of the camp population.

13. The fact that WFP had cushioned the phasing out of general rations in the camps by giving priority to IDPs for FFW employment opportunities and the existence of a year-round bakery project in Jalalabad may have contributed to diminishing risks for the IDPs. Whether the decrease in rations actually persuaded them to return to their place of origin could not be ascertained due to the absence of figures and of studies on the importance of the various "push and pull factors" determining the IDPs' behaviour.

14. The fluctuating security situation may still warrant limited relief food distribution, as in the case of some returnees in a transit camp who could not continue their journey because of both the winter conditions and the fighting in their home area. However, relief food should not be provided to such an extent that it discourages IDPs from moving on as soon as conditions permit. Short-term skills training supported by food aid has been important, as it may facilitate their resettlement.

15. Food aid through the bakeries projects has been a successful innovative strategy to target the urban population's most vulnerable groups (IDPs, widows, war-affected and extremely poor) unable to participate, for instance, in FFW. Targeting methodologies have varied: in some instances, international NGOs, with the help of representatives of the municipality and neighbourhood leaders, have conducted house-to-house surveys. In others, the municipality, assisted by the implementing national NGOs, was responsible for identifying the most vulnerable. Overall, the process seemed fairly adequate, but it requires
continuing careful monitoring. Only in Kandahar did local authorities report problems with "fine-tuned" targeting in the recently introduced two-tier targeting system whereby a second less disadvantaged layer of the urban poor benefits from a partial bread subsidy.

16. Bakery projects have produced positive side effects: funds generated from the sale of the bread can complement WFP rehabilitation activities; and wheat and wheat flour prices on the local markets reportedly decrease and stabilize during the implementation period, to the benefit of a wider urban population. To avoid negative effects, WFP staff suspend the bakery projects when market prices fall below certain established levels - for example, at or following harvest time. Bakery projects are limited to winter periods with the exception of year-round operations in Kabul and Jalalabad, where the case-load of IDPs is high.

17. The rationale for WFP food aid to institutions (hospitals, clinics and a few orphanages), mainly in urban areas, has been that beneficiaries of such institutions are particularly vulnerable due to the absence of any nation-wide health system and the lack of public funds. While recognizing the problem, the mission had some concerns about the implementation and monitoring of the scheme, as well as its recurrent cost-funding nature and open-endedness.

18. FFW (both in urban and rural areas) has been the largest component of the Afghanistan programme and has been an adequate strategy in the transition context. Although previously unknown to the population, FFW projects have been successful in areas where village labourers can be used within easy access of the project site. By contrast, the standard daily ration of seven kilograms is more difficult to institute in Jalalabad and Herat, where FFW rations might be sold in the bazaar. Here, mainly IDPs and the rural poor are being brought into the cities as day labourers, not least because projects run by other United Nations agencies and NGOs compete for skilled labour with more attractive cash incentives.

19. In some instances, conflicting interests have led to poor practice. When building a road on the outskirts of Herat, the municipal authorities opted for the equipment-intensive approach, compromising WFP's objectives to help create employment. The municipality cannot afford fuel costs for the heavy machines and invariably sells some project food in the local bazaar to meet these costs.

20. This situation illustrates the ongoing debate in Afghanistan on "process versus product". The process of selecting the project broadly concurs with WFP's objectives. For the local authority, WFP support provides a means to an end: employment for staff, community profile for the political authority, and a much-needed road. The product thus contributes to the socio-economic recovery of the area. If the building of the road does not target the immediate vulnerable population, this may point more to a confusion of ideals along the relief-rehabilitation spectrum than to a dilemma on the ground.

21. Work norms seem to have been adopted by some implementing partners with a certain creativity in urban areas, in part due to a fluid labour market and competition with higher salaries, or fluctuations in wheat prices at some times of the year affecting the value of the WFP ration. The selection of activities, participants and the level of work norms may also respond to political pressures. Self-targeting of the most vulnerable cannot always be assumed.

22. Where projects are undertaken through contracts that evidently depend on the monetized value of the food rather than the "consumptive" value, there is an argument for
cash rather than FFW payments. WFP often finds itself undertaking projects in the absence of a more appropriate agency, not least because of its better resource position.

23. In the implementation of FFW (like other activities supported by United Nations agencies and NGOs), there has been a considerable bias towards urban areas as a result of more returnees and IDPs deciding to settle in cities because of the absence, in rural areas, of basic social services and infrastructure. In rural areas, the effects of FFW activities in terms of a poverty alleviation focus are not always clear. In infrastructure projects, land owners may, for instance, get the share-croppers to do all the work. This fulfils WFP's desire to reach the poorest, but raises questions about who benefits in the end from the assets created.

**Gender issues**

24. In Afghanistan’s well-known conservative society, war circumstances seem to have reinforced the "ideal" that women are vulnerable and need protection, which may entail even more rigid control over their movement and activities when families are displaced. Nevertheless, the situation has brought some changes to women's roles: for instance, widows and those from economically vulnerable families have been obliged to become independent economic actors, even controlling resources such as land, food aid distributions and market spaces. However, gender relations seem not to have changed so far at any fundamental level.

25. The priority of gender concerns should not be divorced from that of poverty alleviation. Thus, rural infrastructure projects play a crucial role in increasing food security for men and women alike and have a greater overall impact than, for instance, town-based weaving projects for women. Regarding participation, however, it is unlikely that women beneficiaries will be involved in the formulation and design of more than a small percentage of WFP's Afghanistan programme in the foreseeable future.

26. Even though WFP project documents explicitly identify women as part of the target group (agents and/or beneficiaries), an increase in gender awareness, particularly at the sub-office level, is required. Even in specifically designed projects, it cannot always be assumed that targeted women will necessarily have access to the increased income or wealth. The traditional carpet-weaving and dying project for women in Herat did not automatically ensure the participating women's access to, and control of, resources (the purchase of materials and sale of the carpets were organized by men); home-based women tailors graduated from a project in Jalalabad continue to earn considerably less than male tailors in the bazaar.

27. The ban on female education above the age of eight in Taliban-controlled areas has curtailed WFP-supported activities such as the construction of girls' schools and organization of literacy classes. Yet the mission noted possibilities for WFP to "continue until told not to" and to explore low-key methods of supporting such activities, perhaps home-based ones, as successfully demonstrated by several NGO programmes.

28. In spite of commendable efforts, female staffing in WFP sub-offices remains an urgent priority, particularly for the monitoring of projects currently inaccessible to male staff. There is a substantial pool of educated Afghan females in most provincial capitals who are willing and able to work for WFP, if sufficient privacy and protection are accorded to them. The fear of retribution, particularly in Taliban-controlled areas, seems to
put unnecessary constraints on sub-office staff to explore innovative alternatives. Greater support on this issue would also have to come from the country office and the United Nations system.

**Implementation capacity**

29. The country office has attempted to overcome limitations to absorptive capacity and "quality" food interventions; these include: few active local government institutions with a capacity for implementing food assistance programmes; few United Nations agencies and international NGOs have operational programmes, and they have only limited resources; WFP staffing levels do not correspond to increased requirements for project planning, assessment and monitoring, thus limiting the range and possibilities for food aid. The country office has initiated the "umbrella" approach (see further below), combined with an emphasis on larger projects while reducing the number of smaller projects that prove too difficult and cumbersome to monitor.

30. Apart from sister United Nations agencies, WFP is working through the following categories of implementing partners (who may show significant differences in approach and execution): a) NGOs with a genuine community base, management capacity and social welfare ethos; b) "contractor" NGOs; c) local regional and/or city authorities; and d) village or district community "shura". The mission expressed some concern about WFP's lack of capacity to monitor closely the distribution and targeting of food through the implementing partners.

31. Attention to proven track records has been important in the selection of implementing partners. However, project success or failure is not determined solely by the technical and managerial capacity of the implementing partner. Equally important is that capacity-building at the institutional level should reflect a shared understanding of socio-political and developmental goals by all parties (donors, implementors, participants and beneficiaries). Thus, there is a need to look closely at the capacity, perceptions, and funding strategies of the implementing partners in order to establish a programme for closer consultation and training where necessary.

32. Prior to 1990, Afghanistan had no NGO tradition other than a small number of social welfare organizations based mainly in the capital. After the signing of the Geneva Accords, the inclusion of newly-formed Afghan NGOs in rebuilding civil society was not pursued in any consistent manner. Capacity-building and funding have been irregular, and there is a broad recognition that a large majority of Afghan national NGOs were created as service agents for external donor programmes and have assimilated neither the voluntary ethos nor the internal capacity to become NGOs as such. The argument can be made that WFP should invest in capacity-building of NGOs in Afghanistan in order to help them assume a "parastatal" role, as and when peace prevails.

33. WFP has continued to make effective use of ACBAR (a major NGO coordinating body) as a "filter" for information sharing, sectoral and regional coordination, and, more recently, for the monitoring of some WFP-assisted umbrella projects implemented through NGOs. As there remains some experience with poor practice, duplication and even extortion, the mission appreciated ACBAR's efforts to “police” member NGOs and provide a more thoroughly researched data-base of NGO activities. SWABAC (another
NGO coordinating body), as a lead agency, has a similar role in pilot umbrella projects in Kandahar.

34. Given the short experience with the umbrella approach, it was not possible to assess whether it has actually met expectations. However, the approach will cut down the number of direct implementing partners accountable to WFP, while allowing for the screening of non-performing NGOs. The immediate short-term effect will be a greater use of donor NGOs, though the strategy will not discount the use of reputable national NGOs or groups of functioning governmental departments. The concept will enhance monitoring, which at present suffers a great deal from WFP's own staffing constraints. Moreover, the increase in implementation capacity, coupled with a reduction in small interventions (many under 50 tons, as this is the threshold for sub-office approval), may help to programme WFP's assistance in a more systematic way and improve its impact in a wider geographical area.

35. The impressive increase in collaboration with United Nations sister agencies (some 252 projects in 1995) seems to be attributable, on the one hand, to the recognition by partners that WFP food aid has played an important role in the Afghanistan situation. On the other hand, the Programme’s resources for the country have been at a relatively high level when compared with the limited resources available to the other agencies. WFP-Afghanistan's collaboration, through its UNILOG unit, has been very much appreciated as it has helped United Nations agencies and NGOs to transport relief materials from Pakistan to destinations inside Afghanistan at reasonable costs.

Coordination issues

36. At present, there seems to be a twin system of coordination - UNDP and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) - whose briefs overlap in the grey area between relief and development.\(^1\) UNOCHA coordinates humanitarian assistance and is responsible for the Consolidated Appeal process. UNDP concentrates on the rehabilitation and development aspects, though by its own admission is not engaged in development programming as such in the current climate of uncertainty in Afghanistan.

37. On the basis of the "Action Plan for Immediate Rehabilitation of Afghanistan"\(^2\) UNDP has increasingly played a role of coordinating activities through rehabilitation steering committees (RSCs). WFP has participated actively, both at the country and the regional level. In spite of the still unstable situation in the country, the goals of the plan seem timely and desirable: namely, to develop a management framework, progressively involving NGOs and ultimately government agencies, that will in future be a platform for more extensive rehabilitation undertaken at the national level with multilateral and

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\(^1\) Given that a combination of relief and rehabilitation activities will be required in Afghanistan for some years to come, it is important that the continued role of UNOCHA be fully reviewed and its role vis-à-vis UNDP, in particular, be clarified to the satisfaction of both United Nations agencies and the wider donor and NGO community.

\(^2\) Prepared under the leadership of UNDP and, to date, the only major programme approach for the United Nations family.
bilateral partners under a recognized government. The mission considers that WFP, as the largest single source of United Nations aid to the country and with a network of seven sub-offices, will undoubtedly benefit from more regular coordination at the field level prompted by the RSCs.

38. In seeking an appropriate level of entry for the aid establishment in Afghanistan's complex civil society, in 1995 the United Nations Office for Project Support (OPS) promoted the formation of, and exclusive implementation through, district rehabilitation shuras (DRS), arguing that the re-creation of a civic and consensual apparatus was urgent. The DRS operates below the provincial level (subject to party political/military interference) and above the village or family level (subject to parochial/individual distortion). It seems to be a pragmatic way of undertaking rehabilitation projects with a degree of ownership and community participation. Although not democratically elected, shuras apparently are representational and able to voice consensus.

39. UNDP expressed concern that some WFP rehabilitation activities at the village level undermine the process of determining and undertaking priority projects through the DRS, whose aim is to put into place structures that can address longer-term development issues, including governance. WFP-Afghanistan has argued that the exclusive use of DRSs as a starting point for project identification may not use the full potential of initiatives coming either from functioning regional authorities (Mazar, Kabul) or United Nations agencies and NGOs. While UNDP's efforts deserve careful consideration, the challenge for WFP is to locate the most appropriate channel for community consensus and to respond swiftly to any excesses.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

40. Apart from a number of detailed recommendations contained in the full report, major recommendations are:

**On transition**

- a) WFP should undertake a renewed examination of its stance on the relief and development debate. It should develop a methodology for identifying the uses and abuses of food aid in protracted emergencies and in the political economy of war.

- b) Together with other United Nations agencies and NGOs, WFP should examine the options for enhancing civil society in Afghanistan. This should be based, particularly, on identifying the linkages implementing partners have with consensual and sustainable institutions (e.g., community-based organizations, farmers' cooperatives, trade associations, local government and shuras).

- c) WFP should increase the number of staff at the field level and review the specific qualifications of staff placed in senior positions in sub-offices in order to respond to complex job requirements in the context of the relief-development continuum.
On strategies and components of the PRO

a) Support to IDPs in camps, with reduced food rations, should be pursued until the planned phase-out. Assistance to vocational activities in camps should continue.

b) WFP should promote and fund a study on the socio-economic conditions of IDPs in and outside camps to shed more light on the importance of the various "push and pull" factors.

c) The proceeds of the bakery projects (second-tier scheme) should be kept separately from other WFP accounts and should form the source of non-food project inputs for rehabilitation activities in the respective regions.

d) Limited support to institutional feeding should continue; WFP aid should avoid assuming responsibility for specific recurrent costs, such as support to hospital personnel.

e) In order to encourage resettlement of returnees in rural areas, WFP should emphasize more rural rehabilitation projects. Public works in urban areas promoted by local authorities should not take precedence over less "visible" rural projects emanating from community groups.

f) More attention should be paid by WFP and its implementing partners to targeting (geographical and by beneficiaries), even in cases where FFW compares favourably to salaried work.

On gender issues

a) WFP should make a concerted effort to recruit trained gender-sensitive female staff for sub-offices in particular.

b) In order to gauge the impact on the income levels of women through related projects, baseline information should be collected on the pre-project circumstances of the women involved.

c) While teaching women new income-generating skills, market demands should be taken as a reference point, rather than trying to match existing skills to markets that have changed significantly as a result of displacement.

d) WFP should discuss with sister United Nations agencies the possibility of conditioning the rehabilitation of a boys' school, in future, upon an equal and consecutive rehabilitation of a girls' school in the same area.

On implementation capacity, collaboration and coordination

a) In the interest of quality interventions, WFP should be very conscious of absorption limitations when programming the desirable level of food resources for Afghanistan.

b) In view of anticipated benefits, the umbrella project concept should be pursued and developed.
c) WFP should continue to explore joint programming possibilities with sister United Nations agencies that have operational programmes inside Afghanistan. WFP should, within its mandate, support even more actively coordination efforts by the United Nations system in support of regional rehabilitation programmes that have greater potential for sustainability.

d) WFP should examine more closely the appropriate level through which to channel its food aid interventions, including discussions with UNDP regarding the involvement of DRS.

e) Particularly in social programmes, WFP must pay greater attention to, and invest in, the organizational training and capacity-building of "real" NGOs with a proven track record. Similarly, WFP should monitor more closely its implementing partners (e.g., in FFW) so that they understand WFP's mandate and strategies.

LESSONS LEARNED AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

41. In complex emergencies with a complete breakdown of government and administrative structures at all levels, WFP needs to prepare itself for actively supporting the capacity-building of implementing partners, including local NGOs, through training and funding.

42. There is a need for WFP to explore ways in which funding for complex emergencies can be placed on a more secure footing. To make a substantial contribution to the transition process from relief to development, funding would have to be reorganized away from short-term or ad hoc measures.

43. In complex emergencies and the context of transition, analytic as well as managerial skills are essential to effective planning. WFP will have to consider that in the recruitment and retention of personnel, the placing, exclusively, of short-term "relief" staff may be insufficient and inappropriate in such situations that demand a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of "permanent" emergency and transition.