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The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official view of the World Food Programme or the Government of Kenya.
ASSESSMENT OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND COMMUNITY-BASED TARGETING OF WFP’S CASH AND FOOD FOR ASSETS PROGRAMME IN KENYA
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Arid and semi-arid lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBT</td>
<td>Community-based targeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA/FFA</td>
<td>Cash and Food for Assets Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Cooperating Partner</td>
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<td>CRM</td>
<td>Customer Relationship Management</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>County Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Coping strategy index</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT-OVC</td>
<td>Cash Transfers to Orphans and Vulnerable Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Food consumption score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Food distribution point</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDHS</td>
<td>Kenya Demographic and Health Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFSSG</td>
<td>Kenya Food Security Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Long rains assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Management Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Drought Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NREGA</td>
<td>National Rural Employment Guarantee Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCT</td>
<td>Older Persons Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMT</td>
<td>Proxy means test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PwSD-CT</td>
<td>Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRA</td>
<td>Short rains assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
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Executive Summary

This report provides an in-depth assessment of the targeting mechanisms used for the cash and food for assets programme by WFP and the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA). It aims to answer the following questions: How effective are the targeting mechanisms in reaching food insecure and vulnerable households? What are the costs of targeting? What systems exist for dealing with grievances and appeals, and for monitoring of targeting? The methodology involved a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches, including: key informant interviews with different stakeholders; field research in 11 communities across three counties; and statistical analysis of data from Kenya’s 2014 Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), the twice-yearly food security assessments known as the long and short rains assessments (LRA/SRA), and other administrative sources.

WFP Kenya launched the asset creation programme in 2003 as a means of gradually reorienting its programmatic focus from delivering emergency food assistance in drought-stricken or food insecure areas towards restoring and building natural and physical assets that can boost communities’ chances to withstand recurrent shocks. Initially, those working on the assets were given a food ration to help meet their food consumption needs (known as food for assets). Since 2011, WFP and the NDMA have been rolling out the use of cash as the preferred transfer modality in semi-arid lands (known as cash for assets). The asset creation programme uses a combination of two types of targeting mechanisms: the first one defines the geographical boundaries of the programme and allocation of resources, while the second one selects households using community-based participatory methods (see Section 3 of the report for a detailed overview of the different steps in the targeting methods and processes). The programme is currently reaching approximately 117,000 households across 13 counties in the country.

EFFECTIVENESS OF GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING IN REACHING FOOD INSECURE LOCATIONS

At the outset, WFP and the NDMA apply an initial geographical filter by limiting the programme to the drought-prone arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). This report concludes that the exclusive focus on the ASAL region cannot be fully justified based on data on measures of food insecurity generated by the 2014 KDHS. While it is true that the ASAL region as a whole has somewhat higher levels of food and nutrition insecurity compared with the non-ASAL region, the difference is not particularly large and conceals wide disparities between individual counties. A significant number of non-ASAL counties are also highly food insecure, and actually perform worse than some of the ASAL counties. Moreover, because of differences in population density, some 43 to 64 percent of the total number of acutely and chronically malnourished people and food insecure households in the country are living in non-ASAL areas and are excluded from the programme by design.
Within the ASAL region, the programme has been successful in achieving a high degree of inter-county horizontal equity. The allocation of programme resources (beneficiary numbers) between counties is fully driven by the long-term results from Kenya’s long and short rains assessments, averaged over a number of years. The programme is active in those ASAL counties with the largest numbers of food insecure people, and it allocates more resources (programme beneficiaries) to counties with more food insecure people than to counties that are less food insecure. Nonetheless, three issues merit further attention. First, our statistical analysis of the correlation between data from the LRA/SRA and the KDHS indicates that there are some outliers, i.e. some counties are receiving more resources than expected and others less. Second, there is a surprisingly low correlation between data from the LRA/SRA and core WFP indicators such as the food consumption score and the coping strategy index at the county level. Third, there is no official, recognised mechanism to account for population growth in the allocation process. Yet, it is estimated that the national population has grown by nearly 20 percent since the latest census conducted in 2009.

Within ASAL counties, the exact mechanisms for selecting and allocating beneficiary numbers to sub-counties, food distribution and villages are poorly documented and remain somewhat of a ‘black box’. This is not uncommon when decision-making is decentralised to lower levels. The report was unable to fully to assess the targeting performance of the asset creation programme within counties, mostly because no representative survey-based data on food (in)security exist for these lower-level geographical units. Other studies looking into the geographic targeting of the country’s national social security programmes — which target on the basis of poverty — have found that the selection of locations is highly correlated with poverty, but that the poorest locations do not necessarily receive more resources to cover their greater number of poor households than less poor locations.

**Recommendations:**

1. Explore the feasibility of expanding the cash for assets programme to counties with high levels of food and nutrition insecurity outside of the ASAL region.
2. Put in place practices to better guide and document the criteria used at sub-county level to select programme areas and allocate beneficiary numbers.
3. Put in place a mechanism to account for population growth and internal migration when estimating target numbers of beneficiaries for (sub-)counties.
4. Further investigate the reasons behind the low correlation between data from the long and short rains assessment on the one hand and food security indicators such as the food consumption score and the coping strategy index on the other hand.
5. Collaborate with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics to ensure that future national household surveys include adequate modules on food and nutrition security to enable further in-depth analysis and expansion of the evidence base.
EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY-BASED TARGETING IN REACHING FOOD INSECURE HOUSEHOLDS

Community-based targeting (CBT) appears relatively successful in selecting households that are, on average, more ‘vulnerable’ than others as measured by their food (in)security status, proxies of wealth, and levels of education. This is confirmed by results from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Apart from a few isolated cases, inclusion errors appear to be low. The majority of respondents interviewed — government officials, WFP staff, implementing partners, community members, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries — described the community-based targeting process as fair and transparent. Respondents were also overwhelmingly more satisfied with the community-based targeting processes used for the asset creation programme than with other targeting mechanisms used by other social protection programmes, in particular proxy means testing.

By far the most common issue raised by community members is that the quota for the number of beneficiaries is inadequate. In other words, the perceived needs of a community frequently surpass the allocation to that community. This is exacerbated by the low coverage of other social security programmes in most programme areas. As a result, many vulnerable households who objectively fit the selection criteria for the asset creation programme are left out, leading to perceptions of exclusion errors and feelings of resentment. In a context of widespread poverty, it is therefore better to view the selection processes as ‘rationing mechanisms’ rather than ‘targeting mechanisms’. In areas where the programme still uses food rather than cash, feelings of exclusion among non-beneficiaries are somewhat mitigated by cultural practices of sharing (as food is more readily shared with others than cash).

Other factors that may cause exclusion errors include weak communication and mobilisation in the run-up to targeting processes, and community biases against or discrimination of certain groups. Contrary to the CBT guidelines, some chiefs do not invite all community members to the public baraza, but rather pre-screen and pre-select potential households based on subjective criteria (possibly to keep the number of participants in the public barazas more manageable). In several areas, programme staff and local leaders highlighted the exclusion of persons living with HIV and AIDS. There were also reports of persons with disabilities as well as those living in remote villages being excluded from the targeting process because they could not attend the public barazas. Moreover, negative stereotypes associated with divorce, single motherhood, and widows returning to their parental village frequently surface during public discussions to select beneficiaries.

Recommendations:

6. Continue strengthening the oversight and implementation of targeting processes in line with the new CBT guidelines, including ensuring that notifications about planned targeting exercises are adequately managed and disseminated via multiple channels.

7. Develop additional guidance and sensitise cooperating partners and facilitators of public barazas to the risk of discriminatory and negative attitudes towards certain groups, such as persons living with HIV and AIDS, disabilities, single mothers, divorced women and widows returning to their paternal village.
8. Consider leveraging WFP’s considerable expertise and experience with community-based targeting to inform and strengthen other social transfer programmes using similar selection mechanisms.

9. In collaboration with the National Social Protection Secretariat, start reviewing options for putting in place referral mechanisms so that labour-constrained households identified during community-based targeting processes could be enrolled onto other unconditional transfer programmes.

GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS AND MONITORING OF TARGETING

Grievance mechanisms — also called ‘dispute’, ‘complaints’ and ‘accountability’ mechanisms — play an important role in improving the transparency and accountability of social transfer programmes, especially in relation to targeting and the receipt of benefits. Likewise, participatory monitoring and auditing of community-based targeting outcomes is important to ensure that systematic weaknesses can be identified and dealt with. Grievances and complaints are currently managed on three different levels. The first one consists of community validation of the list of households selected for the programme. The second level consists of local complaints committees, which are meant to receive and resolve complaints from any community member or, if the complaint cannot be addressed locally, escalate it to WFP or its cooperating partners. The third level is WFP’s Helpline.

The grievance system has a number of strong features, including the availability of multiple channels for receiving complaints. However, it is not geared towards resolving appeals against exclusion during targeting. A significant weakness is that those handling appeals at the local level are usually the same people overseeing the targeting process. Yet, good practice in appeals would indicate that those responsible for decision-making should not be responsible for dealing with appeals. In reality, appeals about exclusion are difficult to resolve because of the fixed quota allocated to communities – which means that any successful appeal would require a household to be removed from the programme – and because of the lack of objective criteria to determine eligibility and the absence of records on the reasons for selection/rejection of households. Indeed, international experience suggests that it is rare for programmes using CBT to have effective and rights-based appeals mechanisms.

There is little systematic monitoring of the outcomes of community-based by WFP or its coordinating cooperating partners. WFP has recognised this weakness and is starting to put in place the building blocks of a participatory auditing system, outlined in the updated CBT guide. The emerging efforts to start developing a monitoring system of community-based targeting are encouraging. But, the proposed methodology and tools for verification and analysis need further critical thinking and elaboration. For instance, the mechanism focuses mostly on identifying inclusion errors and does not adequately address the issue of exclusion errors.

Recommendations:

10. Allocate a small contingency quota so that valid appeals can be dealt with without having to drop other households of the programme.
11. Dedicate adequate time, resources and training to further develop and implement the monitoring and reporting system outlined in the new CBT guidelines.

**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TARGETING**

There is strong historical and international evidence that governments are much less willing to fund programmes for the “poor”, with significant funding usually linked to schemes that are regarded as entitlements. Therefore, by branding the cash for assets programme as a *safety net for the poor*, there is a risk that it may not be easily adopted and funded by the government of Kenya. There is significant value in building assets in communities that are agriculturally marginal and vulnerable to climate change with its concomitant natural shocks (such as droughts and floods). But, there is no imperative that the cash for assets programme should be seen as a safety net or even as social security (except in a broader sense).

**Recommendations:**

12. Consider a ‘re-branding’ of the programme to build stronger national ownership and public support. Instead of viewing the programme as a *safety net for the poor*, two potential alternative options are:
   - Stressing that it is an infrastructure programme or focusing on the asset-building aspect of its design. This could be placed within a broader brand of a programme that is focused on addressing climate change; or
   - Promoting the programme as an “employment programme” that is addressing issues of high unemployment or underemployment, potentially focusing on younger people, among whom unemployment is the greatest challenge.
1. Introduction

This report provides an in-depth assessment of the geographical and community-based targeting methods used for the cash and food for assets programme by WFP and the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA). It aims to answer the following questions: How effective are the targeting mechanisms in reaching food insecure and vulnerable households? What are the costs of targeting? What systems exist for dealing with grievances and appeals, and for monitoring of targeting? To set the scene, this introductory section starts with a short overview of the programme context, salient features of the asset creation programme, and outlines the structure of the report.

1.1 Programme context

Kenya has an estimated population of 46 million in 2015 with an average annual growth rate of 2.6 percent (UN DESA, 2015). Around three-quarters of the population live in rural areas. The country is ranked 145th out of 188 countries worldwide on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2015). It has the 9th largest economy on the African continent and is classified as a lower middle-income country. Poverty and inequality are widespread, with close to half of the population living below the official poverty line according to the latest available data. Moreover, there is a significant degree of ‘churning’ around the poverty line, with large numbers of households moving in and out of poverty repeatedly (Radeny, van den Berg, & Schipper, 2012).

Over 75 percent of Kenya’s population is directly dependent on land and natural resources for their livelihoods, which are highly vulnerable to weather shocks and the effects of climate change, such as alternating droughts and floods (Odero, Reeves, & Kipyego, 2015). The availability of productive farmland is, however, limited: less than one-fifth of the country’s territory has high or medium potential for rain-fed agriculture. The rest is arid or semi-arid land where food production is constrained by lack of access to water, land degradation, low uptake of modern agronomic practices, and regular shocks. Levels of food and nutrition insecurity are high and the country has been a regular recipient of large-scale international emergency food assistance for decades. Some 26 percent of children under five are stunted as a result of chronic malnutrition (KNBS, 2015).

In recent years, Kenya has made good progress in developing and expanding its national social protection system. The Constitution has established the right to social security, and a National Social Protection Policy is in place. The government and its development partners are implementing five main social transfer programmes: the Older Persons Cash Transfer (OPCT); the Cash Transfers to Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC); the Persons with Severe Disability Cash Transfer (PwSD-CT); the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP); and the Cash and Food for Assets Programme (CFA/FFA). Together, these schemes provide regular cash transfers to around 661,000 households (Figure 1). In addition, WFP provides emergency food assistance to approximately 100,000 households and operates a school feeding programme in collaboration with the Ministry of Education.
1.2 The asset creation programme

WFP Kenya launched the asset creation programme in 2003 as a means of gradually reorienting its programmatic focus from delivering emergency food assistance in drought-stricken or food insecure areas towards restoring and building natural and physical assets that can boost communities’ chances to withstand recurrent shocks. This shift in focus was driven by the realisation that decades of external assistance had prevented starvation and loss of human life, but that responses to address recovery, resilience building and longer term development had largely been neglected.

The assets created by the programme aim to give families the ability to not only withstand shocks, but also become independent of food assistance, producing surplus food and achieving diversified, sustainable livelihoods. Asset-creation projects vary from one location to the other; they are identified and implemented by communities with the technical support of WFP’s implementing partners and government. Activities typically involve: harnessing runoff water; building or rehabilitating shallow wells, water pans, and dams; constructing or repairing small irrigation schemes; building terraces to stop soil erosion; repairing feeder roads; planting trees and tree nurseries; and destroying invasive plants.

Initially, those working on the assets were given a food ration as a form of compensation (known as food for assets), equivalent to 75 percent of a balanced 2,100 kcal daily diet for a six-person household (composed of cereals, pulses, vegetable oil, salt, and supercereal). Since 2011, WFP has been rolling out the use of cash as the preferred transfer modality in semi-arid lands (known as cash for assets). Cash disbursements are meant to cover 50 percent of household food needs and amount to an average of KES 2,500 per household per month. Transfers values are revised when local food prices increase or decrease by more than 10 percent.
Table 1: Overview of the cash and food for assets programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme objective</th>
<th>Build resilience and enable people, households, communities and counties to meet their own food and nutrition needs.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target population</td>
<td>Food insecure households in arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeting methods</td>
<td>Combination of geographical and community-based targeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting frequency</td>
<td>Retargeting is done every three years (aligned with WFP’s PRRO cycle).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer value</td>
<td>Cash or food to cover 50% of household food needs in semi-arid lands and 75% in arid lands. Values are adjusted when local food prices increase or decrease by more than 10%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer frequency</td>
<td>Monthly but only during lean seasons (9 months per year in arid and 8 months per year in semi-arid lands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionalities</td>
<td>Fulfilment of standard work norms equivalent to 18 hours per week on water harvesting or soil and water conservation assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme coverage</td>
<td>Combined coverage of CFA and FFA ≈ 117,000 households in 2014/15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme management</td>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP) and National Drought Management Authority (NDMA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme implementation</td>
<td>NGOs (cooperating partners) and county governments.</td>
</tr>
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</table>


Table 1 provides an overview of the salient features of the cash and food for assets programme. A more detailed description of the history of programme and its characteristics can be found in WFP (2013). This report focuses explicitly on assessing the targeting methods used to identify beneficiaries, which rely on a combination of geographical and community-based targeting. We do not consider the broader impacts of asset creation activities on food insecurity, livelihoods and the ability of households and communities to withstand shocks.

1 The programme can also include households without able-bodied adults as up to a fifth of the beneficiary quota allocated to villages may be allocated to labour-constrained households, who can receive the benefit without having to work on the assets (although this practice is now being discouraged by WFP as other unconditional cash transfer programmes are expanding).
1.3 Structure of the report

The report is broken into seven sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the methodology used in the research, which employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Section 3 describes the targeting methods and processes that are used to identify beneficiaries in the cash and food for assets programme. Section 4 assesses whether the targeting methods are effective in reaching the intended beneficiaries. It does so by: examining whether the areas selected for the programme are indeed the most food insecure; comparing the food security status and other characteristics of selected beneficiaries with those of non-beneficiaries in the same communities; and summarising perceptions of targeting effectiveness by community members and other stakeholders. Section 5 considers the broader costs of targeting, including administrative, private, social, psycho-social, incentive, and political costs. Section 6 looks at systems for dealing with grievances and appeals, and for monitoring of targeting. Finally, Section 7 provides conclusions and recommendations.

Throughout the report, we use the terms ‘cash and food for assets’ (or its acronym CFA/FFA) and ‘asset creation programme’ interchangeably. NGOs engaged by WFP to contribute towards the implementation of the programme are referred to as cooperating partners. Analysis at the sub-national level was carried out using the new geographical boundaries established under Kenya’s Constitution in 2013, i.e. counties and sub-counties (not districts and divisions). Food distribution points (FDP) are locations recognised as a central, public meeting place for a number of surrounding villages within walking distance (a legacy term from the time when WFP only delivered direct food aid that is still being used today).
2. Methodology

This section provides an overview of the methodology used in the research, which employed a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. It begins by reviewing the techniques used in the qualitative field work and different research sites, followed by a description of the quantitative methods used to analyse data from national household surveys and administrative sources to inform the assessment of the performance of the geographical and community-based targeting of the asset creation programme.

2.1 Qualitative field research

The qualitative field research used three techniques to collect information: key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and in-depth individual interviews based on semi-directive question guides. The tools were designed to capture perspectives, insights and experiences from a variety of stakeholders at different levels including:

- Key informants at the county and sub-county level, including programme staff from WFP and its cooperating partners (World Vision, Caritas, Action Aid, and the Red Cross Society); members of the programme coordination committees; and representatives from relevant government departments (such as the National Drought Management Authority, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Social Development).
- Key informants at the community level, including chiefs; assistant chiefs; village elders; members of the local project committees and complaints committees; and other key local figures (such as religious leaders, school teachers, and health workers).
- Focus group discussions and in-depth individual interviews with beneficiaries of the cash and food for assets programme, selected to represent a mix of men and women, different livelihoods (agriculture, agro-pastoralism, and pastoralism), social or ethnic groups.
- Focus group discussions and in-depth individual interviews with non-beneficiaries of the programme, including a mix of community members who were just above the ‘cut-off point’ for selection; those who had complained about being excluded from the programme; those who were previously on the programme but were not re-certified during the last targeting exercise; and those who are not considered vulnerable and therefore not eligible for the programme.

Key questions were structured into different thematic clusters covering, among others, contextual information on the socio-economic setting, sources of vulnerability, and the asset creation programme; respondents’ experience with the different steps in the programme’s targeting processes; perceptions of targeting performance; views on the costs and benefits of targeting; and linkages with other social protection programmes.
Field research took place in three counties (Marsabit, Kilifi, and Kitui) and 11 communities within those counties (see Figure 2). The selection of research sites was undertaken in close consultation with WFP and represents a mix of different socio-economic and cultural settings:

- **Marsabit County**: Information was collected from key informants in the sub-county of Moyale and communities in Ellebor, Bori and Kinisa. Poverty rates in this arid region are very high (around 80 percent) and livelihoods depend mainly on livestock and the cultivation of drought-resistant crops. A large share of the population is nomadic. Frequent inter-ethnic clashes are a key source of insecurity. The food for assets programme has been active in Moyale since 2009, with World Vision as WFP’s cooperating partner.
Assessment of the geographical and community-based targeting of WFP's Cash and Food for Assets programme in Kenya

▪ **Kilifi County:** Information was collected from key informants at county and sub-county levels and communities in Magarini, Mongotini and Kaloleni. Some 67 percent of the population are living in poverty and the county has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the country. Common livelihoods include marginal mixed farming and cash or food cropping. The food for assets programme started in 2009 and switched to cash for assets in 2012. The programme is implemented with the support of two NGOs: World Vision and the Red Cross Society.

▪ **Kitui County:** Information was collected from key informants at the county-level and villages near Kawelu, Kwa Vonza, Mikwa, Muselele, and Ngomeni. Some 63 percent of the population in Kitui are living below the poverty line and livelihoods depend mostly on a mix of farming and livestock. WFP shifted from general food distribution to food for assets in 2009 and to cash for assets in 2011. Caritas and Action Aid act as WFP’s cooperating partners.

Table 2 provides an overview of the number of males and females that participated in the research activities by county. Overall, 37 focus group discussions were held with groups of beneficiaries and groups of non-beneficiaries with an average number of 12 participants per focus group; 60 key informant interviews took place that were attended by 3 people per meeting on average; and 13 in-depth individual interviews were conducted with beneficiaries. Some 57 percent of all respondents were female and 43 percent were male.

The field team included six researchers organised into teams of two (one international and one local researcher). A two-day workshop was held in Nairobi on 9 and 10 November 2015 to familiarise the field researchers with the cash and food for assets programme and to review data collection methods for conducting interviews, including note-taking, maintaining a non-judgemental approach, listening skills, balancing discussions and picking up on emerging themes. Field work was carried out over an eight-day period from 12 to 19 November 2015. Each team covered one county and staff from WFP and/or its cooperating partners provided assistance with logistics, communications, and translation. Oral consent was sought from respondents prior to interviews. The fieldwork was followed by a consolidation workshop in Nairobi on 20 and 21 November 2015. County-level field reports with supplementary information are available upon request (Gul, 2015; Schjoedt, 2015; Watson & Kabare, 2015).
2.2 Quantitative analysis

Secondary analysis of Kenya’s 2014 Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) was carried out using the statistical package Stata/SE 14.1 to inform our assessment of the targeting performance of the cash and food for assets programme. The KDHS is a nationally representative household survey that is conducted every five years. Topics covered include, among others: child and maternal health, family planning, health knowledge and behaviours, and nutrition. The 2014 KDHS is the first such survey to provide estimates for selected demographic and health indicators at the county level. The sample was designed to have 40,300 households from 1,612 clusters spread across the country (see KNBS, 2015).

The 2014 KDHS was invaluable for our research for a number of reasons. It is the first national survey to include a module on food security developed by WFP. Household respondents were asked on how many days during the seven days preceding the survey they had consumed items from various food groups (staples, pulses, vegetables, fruits, meat, dairy, oil, and sugar). They were also asked if there were any days in the seven days preceding the survey when their household did not have food or enough money to buy food. Respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the latter question were asked to indicate how many days in that week their household had to rely on coping mechanisms such as eating less preferred food, borrowing food, reducing the number of meals, reducing the size of meals, and/or reducing what adults ate in order for small children to eat. Responses to the different questions were used to calculate core WFP indicators such as the food consumption score (FCS) and the coping strategy index (CSI).

The KDHS also collected anthropometric measurements of children under five to assess their nutritional status. The height and weight data were used to compute three summary indices of nutritional status: height-for-age (stunting), weight-for-height (wasting), and weight-for-age (underweight). In this report, we present measures of food and nutrition insecurity for each of Kenya’s 47 counties to examine the effectiveness of the geographical targeting of the cash and food for assets programme and to triangulate information from the long and short rains assessments.

Another unique feature of the 2014 KDHS is that it is the first national survey to contain questions on the receipt of cash transfers and social assistance, including whether or not households were participating in WFP’s cash and food for assets programme. These questions were part of the ‘long’ household questionnaire that was administered to one-third of the full sample. We use this data to inform our assessment of the performance of community-based targeting, by analysing whether beneficiaries of the asset creation programme are, on average, more food insecure and poorer than non-beneficiaries living in the same communities.

To do so, we use the KDHS dataset to construct a comparison group of non-beneficiaries living in the direct vicinity of programme recipients. Our subsample is restricted to enumeration areas that contain households that are receiving cash or food for assets. Enumeration areas are the operational geographic units for the collection of census data and cover all areas of the country. Each enumeration area contains around 100 households on average, typically covering a village or part of a village (KNBS, 2010). The KDHS sampling frame selected 1,612 enumeration areas from the 2009 Census spread across the country, and then selected 25 households per enumeration area for interviewing. Our final subsample used for the
analysis in this report consists of 1,039 persons living in villages (enumeration areas) where the programme is active, out of which 177 are beneficiaries and 862 are non-beneficiaries. While the results presented in this report are instructive, they do need to be interpreted with caution in light of the relatively small number of beneficiaries captured in the sample of the KDHS.

In addition to the 2014 KDHS, the report utilises data on the average number of people in need of food assistance as estimated by the long and short rains assessments (LRA/SRA). These assessments are carried out twice a year at the end of the rainy seasons (August and January) by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) and bring together data from a wide range of sources, including satellite imagery, drought monitoring information, nutrition surveillance data, price data, and food security outcome indicators from 90 sentinel sites (KFSSG, 2015). The report also uses information from WFP’s Food Security and Outcome Monitoring reports as well as administrative data from WFP’s Helpline on grievances and complaints associated with the asset creation programme.
3. Overview of targeting methods and processes

This section describes the targeting methods and processes that are used to identify beneficiaries in the cash and food for assets programme. WFP and the Government of Kenya use a combination of two types of targeting mechanisms: the first one defines the geographical boundaries of the programme and allocation of resources, while the second one selects households using community-based participatory methods. The targeting design of the programme builds on several decades of Kenyan experience with seasonal food security assessments and targeting of emergency food aid. For instance, guidelines for community-based targeting were first developed for the 1992 drought emergency operation and have been updated several times since then. Figure 3 on the next page provides a schematic representation of the different targeting units, selection criteria and decision-makers involved in the cash and food for assets programme.

3.1 Geographical targeting

3.1.1 Arid and semi-arid lands
Geographical targeting involves allocating resources to geographical areas using information that is thought to be a good indicator of the extent of poverty or, in the case of the asset creation programme, food insecurity. At the outset, WFP and the NDMA apply an initial geographical filter by limiting the programme to the drought-prone arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). Kenya has 24 ASAL counties, which constitute over 80 percent of the country’s land mass and about a third of the total population. Out of the 24 counties, eight of them are classified as arid and 16 as semi-arid. The arid counties are predominantly pastoral, with limited crop farming, and food availability is constrained by poor roads and long distances to markets. Communal conflict in some arid counties exacerbates food insecurity. The semi-arid counties are mostly agro-pastoral, in which integrated crop-livestock production systems are common. They are somewhat less food insecure compared with the arid counties, but highly dependent on seasonal rain-fed crops. Production tends to be limited by the low uptake of modern agronomic practices (WFP, 2015b).

3.1.2 Targeting across ASAL counties
The next level of targeting involves directing resources to those ASAL counties with the highest levels of food insecurity. Over recent decades, Kenya has established a system to regularly assess food security known as the long and short rains assessments (LRA/SRA). The assessments are carried out twice a year at the end of the rainy seasons (August and January) to provide answers to the following questions: Which ASAL counties are food insecure? How severe is the situation? How many people are in need of food assistance? Who are the food-insecure people in terms of socioeconomic characteristics? And why are people food insecure? (IPC Global Partners, 2012). Methodologically, the assessments use a common analytical framework to consolidate data from a wide range of sources, including satellite imagery, drought monitoring information, nutrition surveillance data, price data, and food security outcome indicators from 90 sentinel sites (KFSSG, 2015). The process is coordinated by the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) with participation from all relevant government ministries, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs.
The results from the LRA/SRA are used by the Government of Kenya and WFP to inform the geographical allocation of resources for general food distribution and the asset creation programme at the county level. For instance, according to the 2015 LRA, an estimated 1.1 million people were acutely food insecure and in need of food assistance during the period September 2015 to February 2016, ranging from 4,000 people in Mbeere to 171,000 in Wajir. While beneficiary caseloads for general food distribution are updated twice a year after the completion of the assessments, allocations for the asset creation programme are more stable and based on the average numbers over the last five years, with each single asset creation project lasting for at least 12 months (WFP, 2012; 2013). Currently, the programme is active in 13 ASAL counties (see Figure 4).
3.1.3 Targeting within ASAL counties

Since food security information below the county level is limited, the KFSSG leaves the definition of intra-county food assistance needs to the County Steering Committees (CSGs). These local level committees are comprised of the County Governor, County Commissioner, representatives of the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) and other sectoral ministries, UN agencies, WFP’s cooperating partners, and civil society organisations. The CSG has the authority to allocate target number to the sub-county level, but cannot exceed the total number provided by the KFSSG. Each LRA/SRA report comes with detailed county reports that are used to inform decision-making at this level.

Next, Sub-County Steering Groups further disaggregate the target numbers by making allocations to food distribution points (FDPs), which are locations recognised as a central, public meeting place for a number of surrounding villages within walking distance (WFP, 2015a). FDP is a legacy term from the time when WFP only delivered direct food aid that is still being used today. Sub-County Steering Groups typically comprise of sub-county administrators, ward administrators, chiefs, assistant chiefs, UN agencies, NGOs and WFP’s implementing partners.

Overall, the exact mechanisms used for intra-county allocations are poorly documented and remain somewhat of a ‘black box’. There appears to be significant variation in the criteria used to allocate target numbers to Sub-Counties and especially FDPs. According to key informants interviewed as part of this research, allocations are based on population size but also local knowledge of the food security situation (such as performance of the last harvest or water availability), levels of interest from communities and local leaders, technical feasibility of asset creation activities, and potential for quick wins in the locations under consideration. More recently, allocation decisions have also started taking into account the presence and coverage of other interventions and cash transfer programmes.
3.2 Community-based targeting

Based on the decisions of the Sub-County Steering Group, the Sub-County Commissioner sends an official letter to each chief in charge of a targeting area, notifying them of the new or expanded programme, and requesting that they facilitate the targeting exercise. (In Kenya, each location has a chief, appointed by the State.) The chief, assisted by WFP’s cooperating partner and community leaders, will then notify his or her community members and schedule a baraza (public meeting) at the FDP to define targeting criteria and select beneficiaries. During our interviews, respondents indicated that these barazas are attended by anywhere between 100 and 1,000 villagers and tend to last one day or a day and a half at most. Facilitation is in the hands of WFP’s cooperating partner and the area chief.

The process starts with the nomination of an Interim Selection Committee (ISC). Each village and (if relevant) interest group in the area puts forward one or more nominee and consensus is sought about the composition of the ISC. The ISC’s task is two-fold. First, the ISC is responsible for drawing up a prioritised list of targeting criteria, in consultation with WFP’s cooperating partner. They are meant to reflect local notions of food insecurity and vulnerability. The proposed selection criteria are then validated and refined in the baraza. Second, the ISC recommends a village-level breakdown of the total number of beneficiaries allocated to the FDP, which is typically done based on population size. WFP’s CBT guidelines stipulate that the ISC should be gender balanced and representative of the composition of the community, including marginalised groups such as persons living with disabilities or chronic illnesses. The total number of ISC members should be odd, so there is a majority in the event that matters go to a vote.

In the next step of the targeting process, the baraza splits into smaller groups representing the individual villages to identify households that meet the targeting criteria, taking into account the quota that was allocated to each village. These discussions are facilitated and supported by the ISC member(s) nominated by the village. Groups may consider and select villagers not present at the meeting but deemed to be vulnerable as per the criteria. They can also include households without able-bodied adults as up to a fifth of the quota may be allocated to labour-constrained households, who can receive the benefit without having to work on the assets (although this practice is now being discouraged by WFP as other unconditional cash transfer programmes are expanding). Once finalised, the villages’ lists are consolidated and presented back to the general baraza for validation and endorsement. The meeting then comes to a close and the ISC is dissolved.

In the final step of the process, the selected beneficiaries are invited to elect a Project Committee that will be in charge of overseeing the implementation of the asset creation activities. The Project Committee registers all beneficiaries by recording the name and sex of the head of the household as well as basic demographic data of household members. Other tasks include, among others, deciding what type of community assets will be build, supervising the quantity and quality of work, helping to facilitate food distributions (for FFA) and opening of bank accounts (for CFA), and reporting on progress to WFP’s cooperating partner (WFP, 2015a). Beneficiaries also elect a Complaints Committee that deals with grievances or escalates complaints to the cooperating partner or WFP. Committee members are provided with training sessions to help them perform their tasks.
4. Effectiveness of targeting methods in reaching food insecure locations and households

This section assesses whether the geographical and community-based targeting methods used in the asset creation programme are effective in reaching the intended beneficiaries. It first examines whether the areas selected for the programme are indeed the most food insecure as measured by data from the annual long and short rains assessments as well as new representative data from Kenya’s 2014 Demographic and Health Survey. Next, it reviews the outcomes of community-based targeting by comparing the food security status and other characteristics of selected beneficiaries with those of non-beneficiaries in the same communities. Finally, we summarise qualitative findings on the perceptions of targeting effectiveness by community members and other stakeholders.

4.1 Effectiveness of geographical targeting

4.1.1 Arid and semi-arid lands

At the outset, WFP and the NDMA apply an initial geographical filter by limiting the cash and food for assets programme to the drought-prone arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL). This is, of course, not unexpected: the programme is part of WFP’s Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) — titled “Bridging Relief and Resilience in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands” — that provides support for up to 1.3 million Kenyans in the ASAL recurrently hit by weather shocks and food shortages. The programme grew out of a desire to gradually scale down emergency food aid in favour of recovery activities that are meant to help reduce risk and enable households and communities to meet their own food and nutrition needs. Nonetheless, it is instructive to examine if the ASAL are indeed the most food insecure areas in the country as a first step in assessing the geographical targeting of the cash and food for assets programme.

Tables 3 on the next page compares the prevalence of food and nutrition insecurity in Kenya’s ASAL and non-ASAL areas. It includes five different measures of food insecurity collected in Kenya’s 2014 Demographic and Health Survey:

- **Food consumption score (FCS):** This is a composite indicator including dietary diversity (the number of food groups consumed by a household over a seven-day period), food frequency (the number of days a particular food group is consumed), and the relative nutritional importance of different food groups. The FCS is intended to describe short-term food security at the time of data collection. Food consumption scores are divided into poor, borderline, and acceptable food consumption groups.

- **Lack of food or money to buy food:** This indicator refers to the percentage of households that report not having enough food or money to purchase food in the seven days preceding the survey.
Coping strategy index (CSI): This is a composite indicator of the frequency and severity of coping strategies that households adopt when facing a lack of food or money to purchase food. It includes five standard coping strategies: eating less-preferred, cheaper foods; borrowing money from friends or relatives; reducing the number of meals eaten per day; limiting portion sizes of meals; and restricting consumption by adults in order for small children to eat. A higher CSI score indicates a higher level of food insecurity.

Acutely malnourished children (wasting): This indicator refers to the percentage of children under five who are too thin (i.e. their weight-for-height Z-scores are below minus two standard deviations from the median of the reference population). Wasting represents the failure to receive adequate nutrition in the period preceding the survey and may be the result of inadequate food intake or a recent episode of illness causing loss of weight and the onset of malnutrition. Children who suffer from wasting face a markedly increased risk of death. According to the World Health Organisation, prevalence rates between 5-9 percent are regarded as poor, 10-14 percent as serious, and equal to or above 15 percent as critical.

Chronically malnourished children (stunting): This indicator refers to the percentage of children under five who are too short (i.e. their height-for-age Z-scores are below minus two standard deviations from the median of the reference population). Stunting reflects chronic nutritional deficiency, aggravated by illness. It is an important predictor of child development and is associated with reduced school outcomes. According to the World Health Organisation, prevalence rates between 20-29 percent are regarded as poor, 30-39 percent as serious, and equal to or above 40 percent as critical.

Table 3: Prevalence of food insecurity in ASAL and non-ASAL areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ASAL</th>
<th>Non-ASAL</th>
<th>National average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households with poor or borderline food consumption score</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households that report lacking food or money to buy food</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean coping strategy index score</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five who are acutely malnourished (wasted)</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five who are chronically malnourished (stunted)</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KDHS 2014.
taken as a group, the arid and semi-arid lands experience on average somewhat higher levels of food insecurity according to all five measures compared with the non-ASAL areas, but it is not a very large difference. However, these averages hide very significant disparities between counties, as shown in Figure 5 which ranks all of Kenya’s counties according to their prevalence of food and nutrition insecurity.

The data presented in Figure 5 are revealing in several ways. First, around half of the ASAL counties have relatively low levels of food insecurity as measured by core WFP indicators such as the food consumption score and the coping strategy index. This may reflect differential patterns of rainfall performance, crop production and food prices in the weeks and months before data collection took place.
It could also be that food assistance and other interventions were successful in improving food security in these counties.

Two, most, but not all, ASAL counties experience high levels of \textit{acute} malnutrition. In fact, the top ten counties with the highest levels of child wasting are all located in arid and semi-arid lands. When looking at levels of \textit{chronic} malnutrition (as measured by the prevalence of stunting among children under five), the picture is more mixed with nine ASAL counties actually performing better than the national average.

Three, food insecurity does not only affect arid and semi-arid lands. Many non-ASAL counties also have significant levels of food insecurity, often higher than the better-performing ASAL counties. This is true for four of the five indicators of food security, but less so for acute malnutrition. Moreover, depending on the measure, between 43-64 percent of the total number of malnourished children and food insecure households in the country are living in non-ASAL counties (see Figure 6). This is because non-ASAL areas tend to be more densely populated than ASAL areas, so even when the relative level of food insecurity is lower, more people may be affected in absolute numbers.
Overall, we conclude that the exclusive focus of the cash and food for assets programme on arid and semi-arid lands cannot be fully justified if we consider only the data on food insecurity generated by the 2014 KDHS. If the programme were to select the same number of counties using an objective set of criteria based on the KDHS, then some non-ASAL counties should be included and some ASAL counties excluded. However, the decision to target the asset creation programme on the ASAL was also informed by other factors, including the historical legacy of underinvestment in the ASAL, recurrent exposure to climatic shocks, as well as budgetary constraints faced by WFP and its partners.

A large proportion (43 to 64 percent) of both acutely and chronically malnourished people and food insecure households are living in non-ASAL areas and are excluded from the programme by design. It could be argued that the exclusion of food insecure people in non-ASAL areas goes against the principle of horizontal equity, which requires that those who are alike in all relevant characteristics should be treated similarly (Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2004). Adherence to the principle of horizontal equity requires either that programme resources go to all counties in proportion to the extent of food insecurity (or poverty) or that the allocation of resources for other programmes rectify the situation. However, the geographic coverage of other social protection programmes in Kenya is also focused on the arid and semi-arid lands. Previous studies have found that people in poverty living in non-ASAL counties are statistically much less likely to be included in a social transfer programme than those living in the ASALs (Republic of Kenya, 2012). This points to a need for broader expansion of the national social security programmes across all areas of the country.

4.1.2 Targeting across ASAL counties

The next level of targeting involves allocating beneficiary numbers for the cash and food for assets programme across ASAL counties. WFP depends on the assessments of the long and short rains to determine the number of people needing food assistance. This subsection therefore looks at three questions: Is the asset creation programme active in those counties with the highest needs as identified by the rains assessments? Are more resources being allocated to those counties with greater needs?
How accurate are results from the rains assessments when compared with food insecurity data from other sources?

Figure 7 ranks the ASAL counties according to their food insecurity status, as measured by the average number of people in need of food assistance during the five-year period from March 2011 to February 2016 according to the long and short rains assessments. The figure shows both the relative and absolute number of people requiring assistance at the county-level. It also highlights those counties where the asset creation programme and/or general food distribution is implemented. Overall, it is clear that the programme is active in those ASAL counties with the largest numbers of food insecure people (in absolute terms and largely in relative terms too). This confirms that the selection of counties is indeed fully driven by data from the long and short rains assessments.

Moreover, the number of CFA/FFA beneficiaries allocated to each country is strongly correlated with the results from the seasonal assessments. Figure 8 presents a scatter plot that shows the relationship between the estimated number of people in need of food assistance and the number of CFA/FFA beneficiaries at the county level. The scatter plot includes the least-squares regression line (and its 95 percent confidence interval) and the R-squared (R2) value, which is a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression line. Our analysis indicates that there is a strong positive correlation ($r = 0.76$) that is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). Nearly 60 percent of the variation in CFA/FFA beneficiaries between counties can be explained by food assistance needs. In other words, the asset creation programme allocates more resources to counties with more food insecure people than to counties that are less food insecure.
These findings suggest that the programme has been successful in achieving a high degree of inter-county horizontal equity. It also takes into account the presence of other social protection programmes, as evidenced by the fact that counties with a somewhat lower than predicted number of CFA/FFA beneficiaries (such as Marsabit and Mandera) are covered by the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) and/or receive general food distribution.

Overall, the effectiveness of WFP’s geographical targeting at the (sub-)county level depends heavily on the ability of the long and short rains assessment systems to estimate accurately measures of food security and the number of people in need of food assistance. The long and short rains assessments are widely cited by the Government of Kenya, UN agencies, donors, NGOs and other development partners and there appears to be general consensus that they are technically sound (Bagnall-Oakeley, Hoogendoorn, Philpott, & Rubanda, 2011; Harmer, Harvey, & Odhiambo, 2012). In consultations conducted as part of our research, most of the stakeholders interviewed described the results as “evidence-based” and “usually correct, based on scientific analysis that gives a good picture of the impact of a drought”, yet few respondents, if any, were able to fully explain the methodology used to derive the beneficiary caseloads.

However, previous WFP evaluations have criticised the lack of objective verification of the needs assessments that inform geographical targeting of food assistance and asset creation programmes (Bailey, Shoham, Sharp, & Westendorf, 2006; Simkin, 2008; WFP, 2006). To our knowledge, there has been no assessment of the accuracy of the estimated beneficiary caseloads to date, although a Retroactive IPC Quality Review of Kenya’s seasonal assessments is scheduled to take place in 2016 (IPC, 2016). In order to triangulate results from the seasonal assessments with other statistical evidence of food insecurity, we compare the average percentage of the population requiring assistance as estimated in the long and short
rains assessment in 2014 with other measures of food insecurity derived from Kenya's 2014 Demographic and Health Survey.

Figure 9 presents the scatter plots that show the relationship between the estimated beneficiary caseloads derived from the seasonal assessments and four food insecurity indicators collected in the 2014 KDHS described earlier. The analysis is done at the county-level because the 2014 KDHS was designed to produce representative estimates of these indicators at the county level. So, each ASAL county appears as a blue dot fixed by the values of both variables. The scatter plots also show the least-squares regression line (and its 95 percent confidence interval) and the R-squared (R2) value.
Statistical analysis indicates that there is only a very weak positive correlation ($r = 0.11$) between food assistance needs as estimated in the seasonal assessments and the mean coping strategy index scores derived from the KDHS, and this correlation is not statistically significant ($p = 0.61$). Likewise, the correlation with the food consumption score ($r = 0.23$) and self-reported lack of food or money to buy food ($r = 0.32$) is weak and not statistically significant (p-values of 0.27 and 0.13, respectively). These are striking results, particularly because the CSI and the FCS are core corporate indicators used by WFP to assess food security.

There is, however, a strong positive correlation between the estimated food assistance needs and acute child malnutrition at the county level ($r = 0.69$) that is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$). In other words, counties with higher levels of child wasting are significantly more likely to receive higher beneficiary caseloads. In fact, almost half of the variation in estimated food assistance needs between counties can be explained by levels of child wasting. There are some outliers though: the proposed beneficiary caseloads for Isiolo and Mandera in the 2014 rains assessments seem relatively high, while the estimated food assistance needs in West Pokot and, to a lesser extent, Machokos appear to be too low.

Previous studies have reported a number of other potential concerns regarding the seasonal assessment process (Harmer et al., 2012). For instance, the assessments use population figures from the contested 2009 census (Leftie & Otieno, 2010). In the case of northern Kenya, there is significant variation in estimates of population size, particularly due to the high mobility of pastoral communities. Moreover, the assessments do not cover all areas comprehensively: areas at risk of conflict (such as northern Turkana and the border areas of Wajir and Mandera) and urban slum populations are largely missed. Another important concern is that there is no official, recognised mechanism to account for population growth in the estimates of the number of food insecure people. According to the 2009 census there are some 38.6 million people in the country. Yet, projections for 2015 indicate that the population has grown to around 46 million (UN DESA, 2015). This means that target numbers and beneficiary caseloads may underestimate the true number of food insecure people if they are not adjusted for population growth (and internal migration patterns).

### 4.1.3 Targeting within ASAL counties

The last step in the geographical targeting involves the selection and allocation of beneficiary numbers to sub-counties, food distribution points and villages. As mentioned in section 3.1.3, the exact mechanisms used for intra-county allocations are poorly documented and remain somewhat of a ‘black box’. This is not uncommon when decision-making is decentralised to lower levels. Targeting of sub-counties appears to be largely driven by data from the long and short rains assessment, while allocations to food distribution points also take into account qualitative criteria such as technical feasibility and communities’ interest in asset-building activities. The distribution of beneficiary numbers to villages within the catchment area of a food distribution point is done during the public baraza, often on the basis of population size.

Due to data constraints, it is unfortunately not possible to assess the targeting performance of the asset creation programme within counties. In other words, we cannot establish whether areas (sub-counties, FDPs and villages) with higher levels of food insecurity are more likely to be selected for the programme, and whether the most food insecure areas receive higher beneficiary quotas. This is because no
representative survey-based data exist for these lower-level geographical units. Another constraint is that the geographic markers used in WFP’s database of beneficiaries were not yet fully aligned with Kenya’s new administrative boundaries at the time of this study. Other studies looking into the geographic targeting of the country’s national social security programmes — which target on the basis of poverty — have found that the selection of locations is highly correlated with poverty, but that the poorest locations do not necessarily receive more resources to cover their greater number of poor households than less poor locations (Republic of Kenya, 2012).

4.2 Effectiveness of community-based targeting

Assessing the effectiveness of community-based targeting poses several conceptual challenges. For instance, there is no reason to believe that local notions of poverty and vulnerability at the community level will be the same as those developed by a national government agency or development partner (Conning & Kevane, 2002). Because communities typically develop their own criteria independent of one another, community-based targeting may result in differences in targeting outcomes across different locations. A key question, then, is whether targeting performance should be judged against the objectives set by WFP (which focus on food insecurity) or against community preferences. In our analysis, we attempt to do both by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. Either way, targeting errors are difficult to quantify because eligibility criteria are only vaguely specified. An additional complication arises from the use of quotas that limit the number of beneficiaries that communities can select for the programme.

4.2.1 Comparison of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in CFA/FFA areas

This subsection examines whether beneficiaries of the asset creation programme are, on average, more food insecure and poorer than non-beneficiaries living in their direct vicinity. Or, put differently, whether community-based targeting is successful in selecting the most food insecure and vulnerable households within the community. As explained in section 2.2, we rely on data collected as part of the 2014 KDHS. The analysis is carried out on a subsample of 1,039 persons living in communities (enumeration areas) where the asset creation programme is implemented. While the results are instructive, they need to be interpreted with caution in light of the relatively small number of beneficiaries captured in the sample of the KDHS.

Table 4 on the next page compares food and nutrition outcomes between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in sampled areas where the programme is active, using six different measures of food security. The data suggest that CFA/FFA beneficiaries have significantly worse food security and nutrition outcomes than non-beneficiaries living in the same communities and villages.
Table 4: Food and nutrition insecurity among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in sampled areas where the asset creation programme is active

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CFA/FFA beneficiaries</th>
<th>Non-beneficiaries</th>
<th>Statistical significance of difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households that report lacking food or money to buy food</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>Very strong (p &lt; .001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean coping strategy index (CSI) score</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Very strong (p &lt; .001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean food consumption score (FCS)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Not significant (p = 0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five who are wasted (low weight-for-height)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Not significant (p = 0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five who are underweight (low weight-for-age)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Strong (p &lt; .01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five who are stunted (low height-for-age)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Marginal (p = 0.049)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Secondary analysis of KDHS 2014, based on a subsample of enumeration areas (clusters) that contain CFA/FFA beneficiaries. Statistical significance based on p-values from two-tailed Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests (α = 0.05).

Figure 10: Differences in wealth status between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in sampled areas where the asset creation programme is active

Source: Secondary analysis of KDHS 2014, based on a subsample of enumeration areas (clusters) that contain CFA/FFA beneficiaries.
According to the 2014 KDHS, some 85 percent of beneficiaries live in households that report lacking food or money to purchase food, as compared with 58 percent of non-beneficiaries. Beneficiary households also have a higher score on the coping strategy index (26 compared with 18). Moreover, the share of children under five years of age who are underweight is 2.3 times higher in beneficiary households (41 percent) as compared with non-beneficiary households (18 percent). Young children in beneficiary households are also more likely to be stunted (52 percent versus 32 percent). The results are statistically significant for at least three of the indicators used.

Figure 10 shows the distribution of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in sampled areas where the programme is active by national wealth quintile and decile. Each quintile (decile) comprises one-fifth (one-tenth) of the total population, with quintile (decile) one referring the poorest 20 (10) percent of the population. The ranking variable is the DHS wealth index, which serves as a proxy for a household’s long-term standard of living.

At least two conclusions can be drawn from Figure 10. The first one is that both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the sampled areas are overwhelmingly poor. This is because the programme is active in areas with high levels of poverty as a result of the geographical targeting. Another conclusion is that beneficiaries are more likely to be very poor than non-beneficiaries. Some 85 percent of beneficiaries are located in the poorest quintile, compared with 70 percent of non-beneficiaries. The result is even stronger when looking at the distribution by decile: 68 percent of beneficiaries are among the poorest 10 percent of the population (decile one) as compared with 46 percent of non-beneficiaries.

Figure 11 highlights differences in the educational profile of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in the sampled areas. Household heads of beneficiary households are typically less educated than non-beneficiaries. For example, 71 percent of the sampled household heads in the asset creation programme...
have no education, compared with 50 percent among those that are not in the programme. Moreover, the school attendance rate among children 6-17 years in beneficiary households is 13 percentage points lower compared with their peers in non-beneficiary households (75 versus 88 percent). These results are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

In our analysis, we also found that beneficiaries are more likely to live in female-headed households (52 versus 41 percent, $p = 0.26$); more likely to live in households with at least one orphaned child (26 versus 14 percent, $p = 0.11$); less likely to own agricultural land (45 versus 60 percent, $p = 0.13$); and they tend to own a smaller number of livestock or animals (12 versus 20, $p = 0.31$) compared with non-beneficiaries. However, these differences are not statistically significant.

4.2.2 Perceptions of targeting performance

Another way of assessing the performance of community-based targeting is by examining the perceptions of beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and other stakeholders in areas where the programme is active. In this subsection, we summarise their views on the fairness of targeting outcomes, coverage and inclusiveness, and exclusion errors.

4.2.2.1 Satisfaction with the outcome

The majority of respondents interviewed for our research — government officials, WFP staff, implementing partners, community members, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries — described the community-based targeting process as fair and transparent. The relatively high levels of satisfaction can be explained by two factors. First, it is generally believed that “the community knows best” and that communities are able to select the most vulnerable households with a high degree of accuracy. As one member of the County Project Steering Committee in Kilifi put it: “The communities are almost always right. They know who is who, so it is best left to them.” Another said that: “Everybody in the village knows each other and everybody knows who is more pressed than others.”

Second, the public nature of selection (in particular the public barazas) makes community members feel more consulted and this may increase their satisfaction, even if they do not fully agree with the targeting outcomes. In other words, community participation strengthens local buy-in and legitimises the targeting results. Respondents were also overwhelmingly more satisfied with the community-based targeting processes used for the asset creation programme than with other targeting mechanisms used by other programmes such as proxy means testing.

The degree of satisfaction was, however, not uniform across locations. Field research with non-beneficiaries in Kilifi county revealed feelings of resentment, largely because non-beneficiaries often did not understand why they were not selected for the programme. This points to a fundamental challenge when targeting is done in a context of widespread poverty: it may be perceived as unfair or inconsistent because material differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries tend to be small. In Moyale, on the other hand, feelings of resentment and exclusion among non-beneficiaries appear to be mitigated by the cultural practice of sharing. Most community respondents noted that FFA beneficiaries share their food rations with their neighbours and relatives, or that non-beneficiaries help selected households with the asset creation activities in exchange for food.
These findings support the idea that satisfaction with community-based targeting processes is influenced by the size and heterogeneity of communities (Cosgrove, Hannigan, Kidd, & McPherson, 2011). Smaller communities tend to have better knowledge of their members and may be more able to differentiate between households, while members of the same clan are less likely to challenge each other in public barazas. Moreover, due to sharing mechanisms between clans and kinship groups, those who miss out may be more likely to accept exclusion if they know they might still benefit indirectly from their relatives and neighbours included in the programme. In larger communities and those with different clans, there tends to be more contestation on the merits of specific households.

4.2.2.2 Sources of targeting errors

Our research points to three key factors that may cause exclusion errors in the community-based targeting processes for the cash and food for assets programme: the quotas on the number of recipients to be selected in a geographic area; community biases against or discrimination of certain groups; and weak communication and mobilisation in the run-up to targeting processes. Inclusion errors appear to be minimal, with the exception of a few isolated incidents of small-scale nepotism.

Insufficient allocation of beneficiaries

By far the most common issue raised by community members across different locations is that the quota for the number of beneficiaries is inadequate. In other words, the perceived needs of a community frequently surpass the allocation to that community. As a result, many vulnerable households who fit the selection criteria for the asset creation programme are left out, leading to perceptions of exclusion errors.

In Bori, for example, male beneficiaries estimated that only about 25 percent of the eligible poor were covered by the programme. In Kinisa, beneficiaries said they would prefer a universal scheme because of the high percentage of households that were extremely vulnerable. Respondents also noted there was some ‘awkwardness’ during the food distribution days as they felt they needed to share with non-beneficiaries who are equally vulnerable. Several respondents in Moyale argued that the programme should not be limited to the poorest households, but should also cover those in the ‘vulnerable middle’ who, in objective terms, are still living in extreme poverty.

From a programmatic viewpoint, addressing the problem of (real or perceived) undercoverage is difficult for a number of reasons. First, it may well be possible that the target numbers derived from the long and short rains assessment are not particularly accurate at the sub-county level and below. In fact, there are no household surveys or other sources that provide objective disaggregated data on food security at very low geographical levels. Second, the target numbers are meant to reflect the estimated number of people in need of food assistance. Locally defined targeting criteria, however, typically take into account a much broader set of vulnerability dimensions. Third, WFP is forced to put a cap on the number of beneficiaries due to budget constraints. The vast majority of people are living in extreme poverty and would benefit from social transfers. But, funds are limited so rationing has to be undertaken. The issue of undercoverage is therefore the result of a combination of exclusion errors by design and implementation errors in geographical targeting.
Exclusion of some groups
Using community-based targeting does not always mean that the most vulnerable groups are going to be included. Some groups may be less involved in community life, underrepresented in public meetings or, even if they do attend, lack the confidence to speak up and express their views.

Indeed, it is important not to view communities as harmonious and homogenous entities. Communities comprise a range of, often, competing kinship and social networks and it is not uncommon for individuals and families to be social excluded, with this social exclusion potentially playing out in community decision-making, where more powerful voices can dominate (Kidd, 2015a). As Platteau and Abraham (2002) note:

“Rather than idyllic ‘village democracies’ whose members interact in a free atmosphere of trustful cooperation based on well-accepted social norms, [communities] appear as repressive societies where mutual control is constantly exercised, suspicions are continuously entertained about others’ intentions, inter-personal conflicts are pervasive, and a rigid rank-based hierarchical structure governs people’s life.”

In each context particular groups are more likely to remain excluded. In Kitui and Kilifi, programme staff and local leaders highlighted the exclusion of persons living with HIV and AIDS. The problem is two-fold. On the one hand, persons living with HIV are often reluctant to disclose their status and will therefore only be selected if they meet other targeting criteria set by the community, such as caring for an orphan. It is equally common that people suspected of having HIV or AIDS are ridiculed and stigmatised by other community members and therefore stop participating in public meetings altogether. On the other hand, there’s a need to come up with ways to identify and assist those with AIDS already on the programme, for whom hard physical labour is not suitable. For example, programme staff in Mwingi pointed out that small groups of people who disclosed their status are working on lighter tasks such as tree planting.

In our field research, there were also isolated reports of other groups feeling excluded from the targeting process because they could not attend the public barazas. In Moyale, some respondents from remote villages mentioned long travel times as a constraining factor. In Kitui, two persons with disabilities complained about their exclusion (but were later added to the programme after intervention from the Chief Assistant). Nonetheless, the majority of respondents believed (rightly or wrongly) that even if some vulnerable people were not able to come to the meeting, they would be represented by someone else and their interests would be taken into account.

Cultural beliefs and negative stereotypes frequently surface during public discussions to select beneficiaries. In Kilifi, for instance, single women described how they were heavily criticised by other community members because of negative connotations associated with divorce, single motherhood, and widows returning to their parental village (See Section 5.4).
While probably not widespread, lack of a national ID card could potentially act as a barrier to being selected during the barazas. Holding an ID card is not a formal requirement for eligibility, but beneficiaries of the cash for assets programme do need to have an ID card for opening a bank account (or nominate an alternate with an ID). One female beneficiary in Kitui told the research team that another community member “who deserved the aid more than me” was left out because she did not have a card. It is possible that in some locations those without an ID are screened out whenever there are other community members who do have an ID card and also fit the selection criteria, but tough choices have to be made because of the quota.

**Weak mobilisation**

Another potential source of exclusion errors is weak communication and mobilisation in the run-up to targeting processes. Contrary to the CBT guidelines, there is evidence that some chiefs do not invite all community members to the public baraza, but rather pre-screen and pre-select potential households based on subjective criteria. It may be that they are simply trying to keep the size of public meetings more manageable. But, such pre-screening is not transparent and fuels perceptions of bias. One female non-beneficiary in Kilifi stated: “The CBT used to be taken seriously and the village elder actually went from door to door. Now it’s all rhetoric. They invite the ones they want, they favour their own”. Another man said: “If you have iron sheets roof, nobody comes to your household […] Or they might say ‘Pass that house, they do fry food’”. Overall, several respondents recommended that notifications about planned targeting exercises should be better managed and disseminated via multiple channels.

**Favouritism**

A commonly cited concern in the literature on community-based targeting is the danger of nepotism or other types of favouritism leading to inclusion of persons who should not be eligible (and therefore the potential exclusion of eligible individuals or households). Overall, based on the findings from our field research, there is no reason to suspect that elite capture or favouritism is happening on a significant scale. We did, however, come across isolated incidents of small-scale nepotism.

In Kitui county, WFP staff mentioned at least two cases where people who were not among the most vulnerable had been included in the programme, including in one case the wife of a local chief. They were removed from the programme as soon as the inclusion error was detected. In another location, a WFP staff member acknowledged that “targeting was not well done here. Some people are in the programme who should not have been, but they [participants in the focus group discussion] are afraid of telling because of power or something.” In Kilifi county, respondents pointed to the risk of collusion during targeting and validation processes, with better-off people supporting the nomination of a certain household in exchange for a payment. In another location, non-beneficiaries accused the village elder of abusing his role in the targeting process and selecting himself as a beneficiary. Others complained that there was no voting in the public baraza as the village elder would simply nominate persons without contestation.
5. The broader costs of targeting

A full analysis of targeting methods should not only examine their effectiveness in reaching the intended target population, but also consider the wider costs and consequences of targeting. This section therefore reviews the broader costs associated with the targeting processes of the asset creation programme, including administrative costs, private costs (e.g. travel and time spent in transit), social costs (e.g. erosion of community cohesion), psycho-social costs (e.g. stigma and loss of self-esteem), incentive costs (e.g. behavioural change to meet the targeting criteria), and political costs (political acceptability).

5.1 Administrative costs

Administrative costs include expenses for collating and assessing data and information that enable programme implementers to make decisions about eligibility as well as costs for implementing targeting processes.

The administrative costs associated with the geographical targeting processes of the asset creation programme are fairly limited. This is because geographic targeting is based on existing information from Kenya’s well established system of long and short rains assessments. WFP does incur costs for capacity development of national institutions and county governments to assess and analyse food and nutrition insecurity, but it does not invest in additional data collection activities specifically for the asset creation programme. The entire process of targeting and allocating beneficiary numbers within counties and sub-counties takes between two and three weeks according to key informants, but it is difficult to quantify the human resource costs because the process relies on existing staff who have other responsibilities too.

Community-based targeting also has relatively low costs. In terms of staff time, a single targeting activity typically requires 2 days for a staff member of the implementing NGO to help facilitate the public *baraza* and set up the project and complaints committees and another day or so to finalise paperwork. WFP and NDMA staff tend to spend one day for every two to three locations to monitor the targeting process. Other administrative costs are passed on to the community, as local actors (chiefs, assistant chiefs, village elders, community members) are not paid for their time or expertise and do not receive assistance in covering travel costs.

The administrative costs of WFP’s targeting method are significantly lower than those associated with other national cash transfer programmes in Kenya (CT-OVC, CT-OP, CT-PWSD and HSNP). For example, Cosgrove et al. (2011) found that the HSNP programme used up to 8 staff members to facilitate meetings in large sub-locations. Moreover, other programmes do not use a ‘pure’ form of community-based targeting, but add an additional layer by applying a proxy-means test (PMT) to the lists of beneficiaries put forward by communities. As a result, much more resources are needed for training of staff at different levels, administering and processing the PMT questionnaires, computers, transport and communication, as well as validation and appeals. Moreover, available evidence indicates that the proxy-
means test formula used in Kenya, as elsewhere, is associated with high targeting errors and increases the social costs of targeting (Calder et al., 2011; Gelders, 2016).

5.2 Private costs

Private costs associated with targeting include expenses for transport, time spent in transit and community meetings (with the associated loss of income or other forgone opportunities), and potential fees for obtaining necessary documentation.

Villages are typically located within walking distance of the FDPs where public barazas take place, though participants from more remote villages may need to travel up to two hours by foot. Community meetings tend to last one day or a day and a half. For some, especially women, this means having to make trade-offs and forgoing housework. In Kilifi, respondents emphasised that they did not eat the whole day during the last targeting exercise as no food was offered. Private costs for obtaining documentation are minimal in principle, as holding a national ID card is not a prerequisite for being selected. However, beneficiaries of the cash for assets programme do need to have an ID card for opening a bank account (or nominate an alternate with an ID).

All in all, most beneficiaries interviewed considered the private costs to be small compared with the benefits of the programme. Those who were not selected though often expressed frustration: “If they knew they did not have enough slots, why did they waste our time inviting us for the baraza?”, asked one non-beneficiary in Kitui.

5.3 Social costs

Targeting creates a clear division between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households and often increases social tensions in communities. As one NDMA official in Kitui put it, “there was a sort of rift between those selected and not selected for the programme.” A beneficiary explained that, “Initially those not selected were not speaking to us. There is conflict because everybody wants to get on the programme.”

Most respondents agreed, though, that tensions subside and relations normalise fairly quickly, even if non-beneficiaries still feel excluded (as a result of the quota). In Moyale, sharing of food benefits with non-beneficiaries was also mentioned as a factor that mitigates the social costs of targeting.

Transparency in decision-making, or the lack thereof, is a key determinant of social conflict and dissatisfaction arising from targeting processes. In this respect, community-based targeting was compared favourably with other targeting approaches used in the country. One government official said that “If we didn’t use community-based targeting, the animosity would be greater. It is more acceptable when it is done openly. Otherwise people will ask, ‘why were you selected and I was not – did you bribe someone?’” Community members in Moyale, when asked about their experience with the targeting of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) — which uses a proxy means test, said it caused
an uproar because they did not understand the targeting results. Respondents generally prefer the process used for the asset creation programme because “you shouldn’t go to outsiders for this sort of targeting”. These findings are similar to previous research on the HSNP that found that the PMT was not credible with communities and was not politically acceptable. “We don’t want a computer to pick our poorest, we know better than anyone else who is needy here and we should be able to identify them” (Fitzgibbon, 2014). Likewise, qualitative research on the targeting of the CT-OVC programme indicated that communities, local leaders and government officials could not understand the results of the PMT (Calder et al., 2011). One chief stated that the selection process “was beyond explanation.” The most frequent refrains from all involved at the local level was that “God decided”, “the computer decided”, and “Nairobi decided”.

5.4 Psychosocial costs

Potential psychosocial costs from targeting include stigma and the exacerbation of negative self-perceptions as a consequence of the public scrutiny that potential beneficiaries are subjected to during public barazas. The psychological costs of the targeting process vary across locations. In the relatively small and homogenous communities in Moyale, beneficiaries said they felt no shame during the selection process because “we all know each other” and “everyone is poor” after all. In Kilifi and Kitui, on the other hand, several respondents described the targeting process as very unpleasant or even humiliating. In one location, some community members did not participate in the public baraza because of the stigma attached to poverty.

Cultural beliefs and negative stereotypes frequently surface during public discussions to select beneficiaries. In Kilifi, for instance, single women described how they were heavily criticised by other community members because of negative connotations associated with divorce, single motherhood, and widows returning to their parental village. “That day I heard the most hurtful things I have ever heard in my life and from people who know me. I never imagined they thought that way about me”, said one female respondent.

It could be argued that the public nature of the selection process goes against a rights-based approach and potentially constitutes a violation of the right to privacy, which is enshrined in the Constitution of Kenya. Article 31 of the Constitution states that “Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have (a) their person, home or property searched; […] (c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or revealed […]”.

There does not appear to be much stigma associated with participation in the asset creation programme itself. A programme administrator in Kitui reported that beneficiaries had been given nicknames such as “gaturu” (squirrels) and other terms linked to nature of the asset-building works — digging — but most considered this as trivial. More frequently, beneficiaries said that participation in the programme improved their economic independence and reduced the impact of stigma — they feel less inferior to those they depend on for support during difficult times and more respected by their community members because “now our word means something when we promise to pay [e.g. school fees].”
5.5 Incentive costs

Incentive costs (also referred to as indirect costs) occur when households change their behaviour in an attempt to become or remain beneficiaries of a programme. For example, a programme only open to those below a certain income threshold may undermine incentives to work and increase earnings especially among households close to the cut-off point.

In our field research, we found little or no evidence to suggest that households are manipulating their behaviour in order to be selected for the asset creation programme. Benefit levels of the cash and food for assets programme are probably too low to deter people from engaging in other economic activities. Another reason is that there is no fixed set of eligibility criteria that are known to everyone, making it hard for households to strategically alter their behaviour before targeting processes take place. Selection is done during relatively open and transparent community processes, so households may have less incentive and opportunity to provide false information. This is in contrast to survey-based methods used by other social protection programmes such as the HSNP; respondents in Moyale openly stated that many community members lied during the survey in an attempt to get onto the programme.

Perverse incentives are likely to be stronger at the level of local governments and administrators. Geographical targeting of WFP’s asset creation programme — and food assistance in general — is driven by data from the long and short rains assessments. This means there is an incentive for County and Sub-County Steering Committees to overestimate levels of food insecurity in order to get a greater share of the pie. Simkin (2008) and Bailey et al. (2006) note that political pressures have generally been resisted, largely because the food security assessments are carried out through multi-agency structures that involve a wide range of national and international actors. Harmer et al. (2012) report anecdotal evidence of local politicians interfering with the geographical targeting of food aid and the selection of implementing NGOs. However, some authors have argued that the food and cash for assets programme is less susceptible to political interference than general food distribution because beneficiaries have to work on asset-building activities, so benefits cannot be presented as free gifts from local politicians (Bagnall-Oakeley et al., 2011). Overall, there is no statistical evidence to verify to what extent manipulation of data may or may not be occurring.

5.6 Political costs

Political costs of targeting have to do with the level of political support, or the lack thereof, for the targeting approach of a programme (and as a result, its long-term sustainability and political viability). While it is difficult to measure and quantify political costs, there is a strong consensus in the literature that they play an important role in social protection programmes. Fitzgibbon (2014), for example, describes the significant challenges that were encountered during the design of the second phase of the HSNP, because the proposed targeting methodology yielded results that were not politically acceptable.

There is broad support for the concept of community-based targeting across different levels of government. Most politicians favour community-based targeting as they believe allowing communities
to choose beneficiaries is clear, transparent, and drastically reduces complaints. As one high ranking official from the Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Services put it: “We cannot throw away community-based targeting in Africa. Maybe in South Africa and Egypt, but not the rest of the continent. Communities are the starting point for targeting.”

**Appropriate design and effective implementation can help increase the political benefits (and minimise the political costs).** In the past, local politicians have occasionally opposed the programme because of their preference for general food distribution. Some even incited communities not to work on the asset-building projects, claiming that it is a form of slavery (WFP, 2013). In other instances, delays in cash disbursements led to politically-induced demonstrations (WFP, 2013). Such examples of political conflict have less to do with targeting per se, and more to do with transfer modalities and effective operations. In our own field research, most community respondents compared the operations of the programme favourably with other government-run schemes, which are considered to be more unreliable. Trust in government operations is often weak. In the words of a village elder in Moyale: “If the money comes directly from the source to us, then OK; if it passes through an NGO, OK maybe, but not the government.”

**However, the main political costs for the programme would be related to any desire for the government of Kenya to step in and eventually (co-)fund the programme.** There is strong historical and international evidence that governments are much less willing to fund programmes for the “poor”, with significant funding usually linked to schemes that are regarded as entitlements (Kidd, 2015b). Indeed, social transfers can be made conditional on work because governments are attempting to address their unpopularity among the majority of citizens by demonstrating that they are not “handouts” but that beneficiaries are working for their cash.

Therefore, by branding the cash for assets programme as a *safety net for the poor*, there is a risk that it may not be easily adopted and funded by the government of Kenya. There is significant value in building assets in communities that are agriculturally marginal and vulnerable to climate change with its concomitant natural shocks (such as droughts and floods). But, there is no imperative that the cash for assets programme should be seen as a safety net or even as social security (except in a broader sense). Therefore, to encourage public support and funding of the programme, WFP could consider changing its “brand.”

Two potential brands that may be more attractive to a government – or, indeed, bilateral donors – include:

- Stressing that it is an infrastructure programme or focusing on the asset-building aspect of its design. This could be placed within a broader brand of a programme that is focused on addressing climate change.
- Promoting the programme as an “employment programme” that is addressing issues of high unemployment or underemployment, potentially focusing on younger people, among whom unemployment is the greatest challenge.

These brands are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Indeed, many public works programmes are often branded as “labour-intensive infrastructure” programmes, with the stress on the infrastructure. But, they
could offer a much more positive image – and, indeed, vision – for the programme than it being perceived merely as a “safety net for the poor” which is often of little political interest to governments.

Furthermore, re-branding could open up opportunities for re-thinking the beneficiaries of the programme and their selection. Given that the community-based targeting is, to a large extent, a rationing mechanism that selects a small number of households from a much larger number of equally deserving households, rationing could be undertaken in a different way, including focusing on younger people, incorporating self-targeting which is managed through the wage rate or, as happens in southern Africa, using lotteries for selection (linked to self-targeting). A further alternative may be to examine the potential for building an Employment Guarantee Scheme – such as NREGA in India – which guarantees a minimum number of days of work to each family per year, once again rationing according to wage rates. However, a EGS has the significant advantage of being branded as an *entitlement* which may create a greater likelihood of government funding.

Of course, changing the brand and the selection mechanism may require broader changes to the programme design. But, exploring the potential for change – or undertaking pilots – may be a realistic option initially. It would also be necessary to ensure much closer links to other social security schemes so that those that cannot benefit from the asset/employment scheme due to their vulnerability are able to access alternative programmes.
6. Grievance mechanisms and monitoring of targeting

This section reviews the grievance mechanisms in place for the asset creation programme, as well as monitoring procedures to assess the accuracy of targeting exercises. Grievance mechanisms — also called ‘dispute’, ‘complaints’ and ‘accountability’ mechanisms — play an important role in improving the transparency and accountability of social transfer programmes, especially in relation to targeting and the receipt of benefits. Likewise, participatory monitoring and auditing of community-based targeting outcomes is important to ensure that systematic weaknesses can be identified and dealt with.

6.1 Grievances and complaints

Grievances and complaints are currently managed on three different levels. The first one consists of community validation of the list of households selected for the programme. During the targeting exercise, each individual village in the catchment area of the food distribution point comes up with a prioritised list of households considered to be eligible for the programme (see Section 3.2). These village lists are consolidated and presented to the public baraza, where any community member can raise concerns and challenge the list if he or she feels that a household was unfairly included. The second level of the grievance mechanism consists of local complaints committees, which are meant to receive and resolve complaints from any community member or, if the complaint cannot be addressed locally, escalate it to WFP or its cooperating partners. The third level is WFP’s Helpline that anyone can call to request information, to report operational problems, or to flag wrongdoing in relation to a WFP programme. With each new targeting exercise, WFP raises awareness of the Helpline during barazas and by disseminating leaflets, posters, and radio announcements.

6.1.1 Community validation

The evidence on the effectiveness of community validation of beneficiary lists is mixed. People often find it difficult to strongly oppose or disagree with their chief, assistant chief, or village elders. For instance, some of our respondents said that they would not publicly oppose beneficiaries put forward by a village elder out of fear that the elder might ignore them for other development projects. Likewise, people are unlikely to contest the inclusion of members of their kin or neighbours so as to avoid interpersonal conflict (and the ability to benefit indirectly from the programme as sharing especially of food is common). Previous studies have therefore described community barazas as ‘rubber stamping exercises’ (World Bank, 2013). However, other community members interviewed highlighted how the baraza acts as a form of peer review between villages where discussions on the merits of selected households can be held more freely. Indeed, several respondents recalled how people were removed from the beneficiary list during the public validation exercise. This means that the two-step process of first drawing up lists for individual villages and then discussing them at the baraza with members from other villages may go some way towards encouraging more active and genuine validation.
Of course, as indicated earlier, there are large numbers of deserving households that fit the criteria of the programme and whose non-participation is rarely challenged in the *barazas*. However, it is likely that, given the quotas of beneficiaries, communities – and households – accept that there will be many losers and challenging decisions is unlikely to be successful, especially in a context when the majority of beneficiaries are also recognised as deserving.

As is normal in CBT mechanisms, there is no written record kept of the reasons for the selection or rejection of households or the programme. And, since there is no written record, there is also no record of the reasons for selection or rejection available in the programme’s Management Information System (MIS). The absence of records on decisions significantly weakens the auditing and monitoring process, as well as undermining appeals mechanisms. WFP cannot, for example, easily review the selection of beneficiaries by visiting households, since it does not know the criteria or rationale for why the household was chosen (apart from a general statement that they are among the “poorest”).

Keeping an audit trail of decision-making is more complex in a CBT than in other targeting mechanisms. A PMT, for example, keeps a record of the household assessment on the MIS and can show the reasons for selection/rejection (even though, as noted elsewhere, due to design issues, the PMT frequently delivers the wrong result). Furthermore, it is very simple to keep a record for the reason for selecting someone in a universal programme: for example, in an old age pension, the age of the pensioner – and the identity card – are all that is needed. Introducing good record-keeping into CBTs would, necessarily, increase the cost of targeting – and suitable mechanisms would have to be designed – but it would increase transparency and make for more effective monitoring and appeals mechanisms.

### 6.1.2 Local complaints committees

The local complaints committees deal mostly with grievances about programme implementation, not exclusion during targeting. In several locations where field research was conducted, there was either no complaints committee or significant overlap in membership between the complaints and project committee. Moreover, members of complaints committees are nominated by programme beneficiaries themselves, so there will be a potential conflict of interest. This is because adding an incorrectly excluded household to the programme means dropping another household due to the fixed quota allocated to communities. Complaints committees are often not the first port of call for those seeking redress; rather, people who feel left out tend to approach their village elders or chief. Most complaints are resolved locally and eventually dropped. But, all of this means that those who hear the appeals are the same group as (or closely connected to) those who supervised the original decisions. Another concern is that appeals are largely oral and rarely written down. As a result, there is little or no record-keeping of complaints submitted through the second tier of the grievance mechanism and there is no module in the MIS to facilitate recording and monitoring of appeals.

### 6.1.3 WFP’s Helpline

WFP established the Helpline in 2012 and is investing significant efforts to expand its coverage and improve awareness of its existence during sensitisation and community outreach activities. The Helpline is staffed by professional, multi-lingual operators, familiar with WFP’s programmes and supported by a CRM system, referral pathways, and a network of field staff for resolving issues. Most calls
received about the cash and food for assets programme, however, are about entitlements, or complaints about delays in payments (see Table 5). Only 2 percent of calls received were about queries related to inclusion or exclusion errors during targeting and registration.

It was noted during our field research that at least one of the implementing NGOs has its own phone number that people can call to request information and submit complaints. This may potentially be confusing for community members and will also lead to fragmented record keeping of grievances received.

Overall, the current grievance system has a number of strong features, including the availability of multiple channels for receiving complaints. It is appropriate for dealing with grievances about the implementation of the programme, such as delays in cash disbursements (for CFA) and food delivery (for FFA) or complaints related to the asset-building activities. However, it is not geared towards resolving appeals against exclusion during targeting. In reality, appeals about exclusion are difficult to resolve because of the fixed quota allocated to communities – which would mean that any successful appeal would require a household to be removed from the programme – and because of the lack of objective criteria to determine eligibility and the absence of records on the reasons for selection/rejection of households. In a context of widespread poverty and food insecurity, many vulnerable households that are excluded from the programme may have cause to complain, although few will actually do so. Complaints are usually dealt with locally and eventually dropped.

A significant weakness is that those handling appeals at the local level are usually the same people overseeing the targeting process. Yet, good practice in appeals would indicate that those responsible for decision-making should not be responsible for dealing with appeals. Furthermore, international experience suggests that it is difficult to set up an effective appeals mechanism in a context of fixed quotas and budgets (and it is rare for programmes using CBT or PMT to have effective and rights-based appeals mechanisms).
One option WFP could explore is the allocation of a small contingency quota so that valid appeals can be dealt with without having to drop other households of the programme.

### 6.2 Monitoring of targeting

Frequent and participatory monitoring of community-based targeting outcomes is important for a number of reasons. Without it, it is very difficult to assess how well the targeting system is working because selection criteria are defined locally and will differ from one location to another. Community-based targeting, by its nature, does not generate the types of objective, quantitative data about beneficiaries (and non-beneficiaries) that make it possible to analyse targeting accuracy. Indeed, as described earlier, it does not even provide a record of the reasons for the selection/rejection of households. Additional monitoring systems are needed to provide analysis on the effectiveness of targeting. Moreover, regular monitoring can help communities to review and adjust local targeting practices.

In our research, we found little or no evidence that systematic monitoring of community-based targeting is being undertaken by WFP or its cooperating partners (or indeed, any of the national social security programmes). WFP has recognised this weakness and is starting to put in place the building blocks of a participatory auditing system, outlined in the updated version of the Community-Based Targeting Guide (2015). The idea is that WFP selects a random 10-percent sample of selected households to verify whether they meet the established targeting criteria. If less than 10 percent of sampled households appear doubtful, the list of beneficiaries is considered final. If more than 10 percent of the sampled households do not seem to meet the criteria, the targeting exercise is considered null and void and the process must be repeated before any community members can receive assistance (WFP, 2015a, p. 18). Reporting guidelines for cooperating partners have also been beefed up. Progress reports submitted to WFP should now include a description of the following elements (WFP, 2015a, p. 19):

- Preparatory measures taken before the targeting exercise (how households were informed, how the community was sensitised and mobilised for targeting).
- How information that has passed from the county level (where geographical targeting takes place) to the community level (where CBT takes place).
- How the different local actors (such as government structures and faith-based organisations) were engaged.
- How the cooperating partner ensured a no-bias approach to representation on the interim selection committee.
- How the criteria for targeting selection were decided upon and the measures taken to ensure accurate reporting of household size.
- How it was explained to less vulnerable groups/persons why they were excluded from the programme (i.e. that they did not meet the criteria or due to resource constraints).
- How representative project committees were selected.
- How complaints and feedback were handled and resolved.
The emerging efforts to develop a monitoring system of community-based targeting are encouraging. But, the proposed methodology and tools for verification and analysis need further critical thinking and elaboration. Apart from detecting obvious inclusion errors, the monitoring should probably be less about verifying whether individual households meet the selection criteria, and more about assessing the quality of the targeting process and how it is perceived by community members. After all, it is well recognised in the literature that quality of implementation matters tremendously to the targeting outcome (Coady et al., 2004). This implies interviewing not only selected households, but also non-beneficiaries and other local stakeholders involved in the targeting process.

Furthermore, the proposed monitoring mechanism focuses only on inclusion errors. It will not address the question of exclusion errors. However, given the minimal differences between households, it is evident that in every community there will be large numbers of households whose claims for inclusion are just as valid as those of beneficiaries. Caution would have to be taken in opening up a potential “Pandora’s Box” which would allow community members to challenge decisions. Nonetheless, there should be efforts to identify households that could be considered to be clear omissions, due to their high levels of poverty or vulnerability. In particular, there should be a concern to determine whether socially excluded households have been unable to access the programme (due to the fact that they are socially excluded).

Other questions that need to be addressed as the monitoring system evolves, among others, include:

- Who will be responsible for monitoring targeting outcomes (WFP or the cooperating partners)?
- Should it be announced at the beginning of the targeting process that an auditing exercise will take place afterwards, so as to incentive (deter) all those involved to maximise (compromise) the quality of the process?
- How to minimise the burden (of time and travel costs) for households that are selected for interviews?
- How will paper-based information from questionnaires be captured electronically and centralised for monitoring and learning purposes?

WFP will need to allocate adequate time, resources and training to move this agenda forward.
7. Conclusions and recommendations

Based on the preceding analysis, this chapter summarises the key findings of the report and puts forward recommendations related to the targeting of the cash and food for assets programme.

7.1 Effectiveness of geographical targeting

7.1.1 Overall assessment

The report assessed whether the areas selected for the asset creation programme are indeed the most food insecure as measured by data from the annual long and short rains assessments as well as new representative data from Kenya’s 2014 Demographic and Health Survey.

The exclusive focus of the cash and food for assets programme on arid and semi-arid lands cannot be fully justified based on data on measures of food insecurity generated by the 2014 KDHS. While it is true that the ASAL region as a whole has somewhat higher levels of food and nutrition insecurity compared with the non-ASAL region, the difference is not particularly large and conceals wide disparities between individual counties. A significant number of non-ASAL counties are also highly food insecure, and actually perform worse than some of the ASAL counties. Moreover, because of differences in population density, some 43 to 64 percent of the total number of acutely and chronically malnourished people and food insecure households in the country are living in non-ASAL areas and are excluded from the programme by design.

Within the ASAL region, the asset creation programme has been successful in achieving a high degree of inter-county horizontal equity. The allocation of programme resources (beneficiary numbers) between counties is fully driven by the long-term results from Kenya’s long and short rains assessments, averaged over a number of years. The programme is active in those ASAL counties with the largest numbers of food insecure people, and it allocates more resources to counties with more food insecure people than to counties that are less food insecure. Nonetheless, three issues merit further attention. First, our statistical analysis of the correlation between data from the LRA/SRA and the KDHS indicates that there are some outliers, i.e. some counties are receiving more resources than expected and others less. Second, there is a surprisingly low correlation between data from the LRA/SRA and core WFP indicators such as the food consumption score and the coping strategy index at the county level. Third, there is no official, recognised mechanism to account for population growth in the allocation process. Yet, it is estimated that the national population has grown by nearly 20 percent since the latest census conducted in 2009.

Within ASAL counties, the exact mechanisms for selecting and allocating beneficiary numbers to sub-counties, food distribution and villages are poorly documented and remain somewhat of a ‘black box’. This is not uncommon when decision-making is decentralised to lower levels. It was unfortunately not possible to assess the targeting performance of the asset creation programme within counties, mostly because no representative survey-based data on food (in)security exist for these lower-level geographical
units. Other studies looking into the geographic targeting of the country’s national social security programmes — which target on the basis of poverty — have found that the selection of locations is highly correlated with poverty, but that the poorest locations do not necessarily receive more resources to cover their greater number of poor households than less poor locations.

### 7.1.2 Recommendations

1. Explore the feasibility of expanding the cash for assets programme to counties with high levels of food and nutrition insecurity outside of the ASAL region.

2. Put in place practices to better guide and document the criteria used at sub-county level to select programme areas and allocate beneficiary numbers.

3. Put in place a mechanism to account for population growth and internal migration when estimating target numbers of beneficiaries for (sub-)counties.

4. Further investigate the reasons behind the low correlation between data from the long and short rains assessment on the one hand and food security indicators such as the food consumption score and the coping strategy index on the other hand.

5. Collaborate with the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics to ensure that future national household surveys include adequate modules on food and nutrition security to enable further in-depth analysis and expansion of the evidence base.

### 7.2 Effectiveness of community-based targeting

#### 7.2.1 Overall assessment

The report assessed the performance of community-based targeting using a combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. Statistical analysis was carried out based on data from the 2014 KDHS to compare the food security status and other characteristics of selected beneficiaries with those of non-beneficiaries in the same sampled areas. The report also drew on qualitative field research on perceptions of targeting effectiveness by community members and other stakeholders.

Community-based targeting appears relatively successful in selecting households that are, on average, more ‘vulnerable’ than others as measured by their food (in)security status, proxies of wealth, and levels of education. This is confirmed by results from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Apart from a few isolated cases, inclusion errors appear to be low. The majority of respondents interviewed — government officials, WFP staff, implementing partners, community members, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries — described the community-based targeting process as fair and transparent. Respondents were also overwhelmingly more satisfied with the community-based targeting processes used for the asset creation programme than with other targeting mechanisms used by other social protection programmes, in particular proxy means testing.
By far the most common issue raised by community members is that the quota for the number of beneficiaries is inadequate. In other words, the perceived needs of a community frequently surpass the allocation to that community. This is exacerbated by the low coverage of other social security programmes (especially the CT-OVC, OP-CT, PwSD-CT) in programme areas. As a result, many vulnerable households who objectively fit the selection criteria for the asset creation programme are left out, leading to perceptions of exclusion errors and feelings of resentment. In a context of widespread poverty, it is therefore better to view the selection processes as ‘rationing mechanisms’ rather than ‘targeting mechanisms’. In areas where the programme still uses food rather than cash, feelings of exclusion among non-beneficiaries are somewhat mitigated by cultural practices of sharing (as food is much readily shared with others than cash).

Other factors that may cause exclusion errors include weak communication and mobilisation in the run-up to targeting processes, and community biases against or discrimination of certain groups. Contrary to the CBT guidelines, some chiefs do not invite all community members to the public baraza, but rather pre-screen and pre-select potential households based on subjective criteria (possibly to keep the number of participants in the public barazas more manageable). In several areas, programme staff and local leaders highlighted the exclusion of persons living with HIV and AIDS. There were also reports of persons with disabilities as well as those living in remote villages being excluded from the targeting process because they could not attend the public barazas. Moreover, negative stereotypes associated with divorce, single motherhood, and widows returning to their parental village frequently surface during public discussions to select beneficiaries.

7.2.2 Recommendations

6. Continue strengthening the oversight and implementation of targeting processes in line with the new CBT guidelines, including ensuring that notifications about planned targeting exercises are adequately managed and disseminated via multiple channels.

7. Develop additional guidance and sensitise cooperating partners and facilitators of public barazas to the risk of discriminatory and negative attitudes towards certain groups, such as persons living with HIV and AIDS, disabilities, single mothers, divorced women and widows returning to their paternal village.

8. Consider leveraging WFP’s considerable expertise and experience with community-based targeting to inform and strengthen other social transfer programmes using similar selection mechanisms.

9. In collaboration with the National Social Protection Secretariat, start reviewing options for putting in place referral mechanisms so that labour-constrained households identified during community-based targeting processes could be enrolled onto other unconditional transfer programmes.
7.3 Grievance mechanisms and monitoring of targeting

7.3.1 Overall assessment
Grievance mechanisms — also called ‘dispute’, ‘complaints’ and ‘accountability’ mechanisms — play an important role in improving the transparency and accountability of social transfer programmes, especially in relation to targeting and the receipt of benefits. Likewise, participatory monitoring and auditing of community-based targeting outcomes is important to ensure that systematic weaknesses can be identified and dealt with.

The current grievance system has a number of strong features, including the availability of multiple channels for receiving complaints. However, it is not geared towards resolving appeals against exclusion during targeting. A significant weakness is that those handling appeals at the local level are usually the same people overseeing the targeting process. Yet, good practice in appeals would indicate that those responsible for decision-making should not be responsible for dealing with appeals. In reality, appeals about exclusion are difficult to resolve because of the fixed quota allocated to communities – which means that any successful appeal would require a household to be removed from the programme – and because of the lack of objective criteria to determine eligibility and the absence of records on the reasons for selection/rejection of households. Indeed, international experience suggests that it is rare for programmes using CBT to have effective and rights-based appeals mechanisms.

Currently, there is little systematic monitoring of the outcomes of community-based by WFP or its coordinating cooperating partners. WFP has recognised this weakness and is starting to put in place the building blocks of a participatory auditing system, outlined in the updated CBT guide. The emerging efforts to start developing a monitoring system of community-based targeting are encouraging. But, the proposed methodology and tools for verification and analysis need further critical thinking and elaboration. For example, the proposed monitoring mechanism focuses mostly on identifying inclusion errors and does not adequately address the issue of exclusion errors.

7.3.2 Recommendations

10. Allocate a small contingency quota so that valid appeals can be dealt with without having to drop other households of the programme.

11. Dedicate adequate time, resources and training to further develop and implement the monitoring and reporting system outlined in the new CBT guidelines.

7.4 The political economy of targeting

There is strong historical and international evidence that governments are much less willing to fund programmes for the “poor”, with significant funding usually linked to schemes that are regarded as entitlements. Therefore, by branding the cash for assets programme as a safety net for the poor, there is a risk that it may not be easily adopted and funded by the government of Kenya. There is significant value
in building assets in communities that are agriculturally marginal and vulnerable to climate change with its concomitant natural shocks (such as droughts and floods). But, there is no imperative that the cash for assets programme should be seen as a safety net or even as social security (except in a broader sense). It is therefore recommended to:

12. Consider a ‘re-branding’ of the programme to build stronger national ownership and public support. Instead of viewing the programme as a safety net for the poor, two potential alternative options are:

- Stressing that it is an infrastructure programme or focusing on the asset-building aspect of its design. This could be placed within a broader brand of a programme that is focused on addressing climate change; or

- Promoting the programme as an “employment programme” that is addressing issues of high unemployment or underemployment, potentially focusing on younger people, among whom unemployment is the greatest challenge.
Selected references


