



Food and Agriculture  
Organization of the  
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World Food  
Programme

# Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations

A joint FAO/WFP update for the  
United Nations Security Council

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“This report reflects a continuous collective effort to monitor acute hunger. It provides not just evidence of the link between conflict and rising levels of acute hunger, but highlights the importance of humanitarian, development and peace partners working together. To save lives, we also have to save livelihoods, especially in relation to vulnerable rural people. We also must continue expanding and strengthening monitoring to guide future action.”

**José Graziano da Silva**  
**FAO Director-General**

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“Behind the numbers in this report are people, people who are suffering, people who need peace and hope – and food security. That food security is an essential factor to bringing about peace and stability, and the people who we serve know it. That’s why they often ask me for help in creating peace just as frequently as they ask me for help getting food. Let’s help them get both. The detail in this report is a call to action for global leaders to work with us to help end hunger and create peace, stability and lasting development in the regions where so many people are suffering.”

**David Beasley**  
**WFP Executive Director**

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## Contents

Executive summary . . . . .	iii
Acronyms . . . . .	vi
Rationale . . . . .	vii
Methods . . . . .	viii
Background . . . . .	ix
<b>Acute food insecurity in conflict settings: recent 2018 figures . . . . .</b>	<b>1</b>
Afghanistan . . . . .	3
Burundi . . . . .	5
The Central African Republic . . . . .	7
Iraq . . . . .	9
Lake Chad Basin . . . . .	11
Mali . . . . .	14
Palestine . . . . .	16
Somalia . . . . .	18
South Sudan . . . . .	20
The Sudan . . . . .	22
Uganda . . . . .	24
<b>Acute food insecurity in conflict settings: no available 2018 figures or significant deterioration . . . . .</b>	<b>26</b>
Colombia . . . . .	28
The Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . . .	28
Guinea-Bissau . . . . .	29
Haiti . . . . .	29
Liberia . . . . .	30
The Syrian Arab Republic . . . . .	30
Lebanon (Syrian refugees) . . . . .	31
Yemen . . . . .	32
Bibliography . . . . .	34
Annexes . . . . .	40

## Executive summary

This report provides United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members with an overview of the numbers of people in acute need of emergency food, nutrition and livelihood assistance in 22 countries/territories affected by conflict. It analyses the factors driving food insecurity and examines if those factors are a consequence of conflict and/or if they are driving further tension.

As the UNSC acknowledged in a recent landmark Resolution 2417 (2018), armed conflict and hunger are intrinsically linked. People caught up in or displaced by war are rarely able to access the food they need to live healthy and active lives – and the inability to grow or buy enough food can cause or exacerbate tensions and even create conflict. This report highlights implications for response and resource allocations to address the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity.

This is the fourth report that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have produced for the UNSC on food insecurity in countries/areas affected by conflict.

The report is produced in the context of the Global Network against Food Crises<sup>1</sup>, a multi-partner initiative committed to bringing sustainable solutions to food crises through enhanced and shared food security analysis and strengthened coordination for evidence-based responses across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

### Countries with concerning food security situations

The situation in South Sudan is extremely concerning. Although large-scale humanitarian assistance helped to contain the escalation of famine in Leer and Mayendit counties of Unity State in early 2017, this report shows that South Sudan still faces the risk of famine in 2018. In May–July 2018 almost two in three South Sudanese or 7.1 million people were expected to need urgent humanitarian food and livelihood support, 28 percent more than the projection for the same lean period a year earlier.

In the Sudan, instability, displacement and economic shocks have contributed to an increase in the percentage

of acutely food insecure people from nine percent in April–June 2017 to 13 percent a year later, forecast to increase to about 14 percent between May and July 2018.<sup>2</sup>

In Mali, escalating insecurity that is hindering the free movement of people and goods and disrupting livelihoods and access to basic services including drinking water, health services and education is compounded by lack of rainfall and floods along with high cereal prices, which have hit pastoralist communities in particular.

Nine years after the Boko Haram insurgency began in northeastern Nigeria, the situation appears to have improved compared to the same time last year, but the Lake Chad Basin humanitarian emergency remains one of the most severe in the world with millions of civilians facing high levels of hunger and malnutrition. In Nigeria's Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states around 3 million people were projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance from June to August 2018 up from 2.3 million in March–May 2018,<sup>3</sup> but well below the 5.2 million in June to August 2017.

In Somalia, there has been an improvement since the lean period in 2017, when 3.2 million people needed urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance.<sup>4 5</sup> However, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated since January 2018 as a result of the lingering effects of the 2016–2017 prolonged drought, floods and cyclone Sagar, disease and persisting insecurity. Some 2.5 million people were expected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance during the April–June 2018 lean season compared with 1.6 million in January 2018, with a 73 percent rise in the number of people classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

While there was no updated information available for six conflict-affected countries (see Annex 2), the analysis indicates a continuing or worsening of food security outcomes in Yemen, Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon (Syrian refugees) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

1 The Global Network against Food Crises was first launched on the occasion of the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 by the European Union Commissioner for Development, the Director-General of FAO and the Executive Director of WFP, to improve global coordination for prevention and response to food crises.

2 IPC Sudan April 2018 and Projected May–July 2018.

3 *Cadre Harmonisé*. Nigeria March–May 2018 and Projected June–August 2018.

4 FSNAU. Revised projection for the number of people in need, April–June 2018. May 2017.

5 FSNAU. Somalia Acute Food Security Situation Overview. Rural, Urban and IDP populations: April–June 2017, Most likely scenarios.

As Yemen enters its fourth year of conflict, it continues to be the world's worst food crisis in 2018, particularly because of accessibility restrictions, the conflict-fuelled economic crisis and disease outbreaks. Although no recent IPC data is available, at least 17.8 million people – some 60 percent of the population – are estimated to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance.<sup>6</sup>

Now in its eighth year, the Syrian Arab Republic's armed conflict intensified in early 2018 with civilian casualties in Eastern Ghouta and Idlib. As of April 2018, 5.6 million refugees were registered in five neighbouring countries,<sup>7</sup> while those unable to flee have witnessed the Syrian Arab Republic's downward spiral as widespread unemployment, economic sanctions, reductions in government subsidies, and wage cuts bring extreme poverty to many. In addition, the 2018 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission preliminary results indicate a decline in cereal production due to poorly distributed rainfall in the 2017/2018 season.<sup>8</sup> In November 2017, 6.5 million people (33 percent of the population) remaining in the country were estimated to be food insecure.<sup>9</sup>

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict-induced massive population displacements, high food prices and lack of earning opportunities along with localized floods, pests and epidemics continued to underscore a dire humanitarian situation in early 2018. It has become the African country most affected by population displacement with over 5 million people displaced in early 2018, including 4.5 million IDPs and more than 746 000 refugees/asylum seekers in neighbouring countries.<sup>10</sup>

Although this report also provides 2018 figures for Afghanistan and the Central African Republic the percentage of the population analysed is not the same as in the previous report to the UNSC, so it is not possible to state accurately whether food insecurity has deteriorated or improved. However, the analysis of the key drivers of food insecurity points to a worsening of conditions in both Afghanistan, particularly in the northeast, and the Central African Republic, where armed conflict is persisting into its fifth year and triggering massive population movements. In Afghanistan an evolving drought situation is aggravating intercommunal conflicts, displacing people and quashing income-earning opportunities, all of which undermine food security. In early 2018, food security deteriorated in

the country's northeastern region (Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kunduz and Tankhar provinces) with one in three people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance between November 2017 and February 2018.<sup>11</sup>

### **Cautious optimism in a handful of fragile states**

Iraq and Guinea-Bissau have both seen an encouraging reduction in the numbers of people requiring emergency food and livelihood support since this report was last produced, while the situation appears to be improving somewhat in Haiti and Burundi too. But the people in these fragile states have seen their resilience to shocks severely eroded by years of crises. Work opportunities tend to be scarce, local currencies weak and they still have high numbers of vulnerable displaced people. It would only take a prolonged dry spell or a political setback on the road to peace and economic recovery for a dire humanitarian situation to re-emerge.

For instance, although Iraq is heading into a new phase with hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis heading back to their communities, years of conflict have caused widespread destruction of infrastructure, enfeebled the economy and displaced several million people. Almost two million people were still in need of food security assistance in February 2018.

In the Horn of Africa, the signing of the peace agreement on 9 July 2018 between the President of the State of Eritrea and the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a promising commitment for the overall regional peace, development and cooperation in achieving resilience and food security of the populations.

### **Refugees from neighbouring countries strain host populations**

This report also looks at countries (Uganda, Colombia and Lebanon) hosting high numbers of spillover refugees and the impact that they are having on host communities. Uganda hosts Africa's largest population of externally displaced people seeking refuge from conflicts in fragile neighbouring countries, most of them women and children. Although food security has improved thanks to favourable climatic conditions, the mass influx is straining the fragile resources of host communities, causing

<sup>6</sup> OCHA. Yemen HNO 2018.

<sup>7</sup> UNHCR. Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Syrian Arab Republic 2018.

<sup>8</sup> FAO and WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic (forthcoming).

<sup>9</sup> OCHA. Syrian Arab Republic HNO 2018.

<sup>10</sup> OCHA. Humanitarian Outlook for the Great Lakes Region: January–June 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Afghanistan IPC Technical Working Group. Current November 2017–February 2018.

increased food insecurity for some local populations and creating tension with locals who feel the refugees get better access to food, healthcare, water supplies and even jobs.

### **Up-to-date food security assessments are vital**

The report underscores the fundamental need for up-to-date food security and nutrition information systems that provide near-real time assessments and monitoring of evolving and protracted situations in spite of access and funding challenges. Without accurate data, humanitarian and government actors cannot respond proportionately to meet the current needs of vulnerable people or work to prevent future crises, and the cycle between conflict and hunger will persist.

Ethiopia is among the countries not covered in this report but currently experiencing localized insecurity that is likely to jeopardize the food security of its people. In Ethiopia close to one million people are believed to have been displaced due to escalating inter-communal violence since early June 2018. IDPs are mostly settled with already food insecure relatives or residing in cramped public buildings in the most densely populated parts of the country.<sup>12</sup>

In Myanmar, sporadic fighting and limited humanitarian access in affected areas of Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states have led to internal and international displacement, which have disrupted the livelihoods and undermined the resilience of local people. Continued movement restrictions obstruct physical and economic access to food, and constrain the already scarce livelihood opportunities available to the displaced and relocated populations.

Libya's protracted political crisis and outbreaks of violence have caused displacement and affected livelihoods and access to basic social services. The contamination of unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive

device, destruction of road infrastructure, administrative constraints, abduction threats, kidnapping of international personnel and proliferation of armed groups limit humanitarian access.

In West Africa and the Sahel, political instability, conflict and insecurity in some countries are further disrupting people's usual ways of coping, hindering access and delivery of assistance, weakening food and trade flows, and causing displacement.

As highlighted by the *Global Report on Food Crises 2018*, a number of additional countries such as Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Venezuela among others face major data gaps. Investing in data collection and assessments is important to ensure needs are not overlooked.

**Unless peace and livelihoods are restored in the aforementioned countries, people in conflict zones will continue to go to bed hungry, to be unable to have enough energy to carry out their daily tasks and their children will face nutritional gaps that prevent them from growing and developing.**

This report is set out as follows. The methodology section explains the criteria for selecting the countries included in it. The background section presents the evidence that alongside climate events conflict is the main driver of acute food insecurity in the world today. It briefly explains the ways in which conflict drives food insecurity and how food insecurity can drive conflict. It then presents individual country profiles, showing the most recent 2018 numbers of acutely food insecure people in 14 countries/territories affected by conflict and analysing the drivers of food insecurity in them. The final chapter gives a shorter analysis of the latest food security related developments in eight countries for which either no 2018 data was available or whose food security situation is now relatively stable.

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<sup>12</sup> OCHA. 2018. Ethiopia: Escalating inter-communal violence displaces close to 1 million people, 27 June 2018.

## Acronyms

<b>CH</b>	<i>Cadre Harmonisé</i>
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
<b>HNO</b>	Humanitarian Needs Overview
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Phase Classification
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme



## Rationale

This is the fourth report that FAO and WFP have jointly provided to the UNSC since June 2016. It presents the number of people in urgent need of food, livelihood and nutrition assistance in 22 countries or territories that are currently experiencing or have recently experienced conflict or are hosting a significant spillover of refugees as a result of conflict or political crisis in neighbouring territories.

It is published two months after the UNSC passed a resolution that acknowledges the link between hunger and conflict, marking a recognition by global leaders that hunger will never end until peace and livelihoods are restored in many parts of the world. It is published three months after the *Global Report on Food Crises 2018* showed that in 2017, conflict and insecurity were the key drivers of acute food insecurity in 18 countries, the majority of them in Africa (11) followed by the Middle East.

This report aims to:

1. Show how the situations in 22 countries – including areas and territories – affected by conflict have evolved since the last report to the UNSC in January 2018
2. Provide the numbers of acutely food insecure people by conflict-affected country
3. Show the worst affected areas in each country
4. Examine the main drivers of food insecurity and how these are related to conflict

The overall aim is to provide UNSC members with a concise, up-to-date overview that allows them to formulate what short- and long-term actions need to be taken to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity.

## Methods

### Selection of countries/territories

For this fourth issue of the FAO/WFP joint report to the UNSC on acute food insecurity in countries affected by conflict, 22 countries/territories have been analysed.

The majority of the countries covered were selected because they have a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission and/or political mission indicating that they experience high levels of insecurity, violence and/or conflict that are likely to cause large-scale displacement of people and/or drive acute food insecurity. Some are receiving high numbers of vulnerable refugees escaping violence and conflict-induced hardship in neighbouring countries.

The selection was then refined according to the level of updated food security information available and/or the severity and magnitude of food insecurity.

Hence from this list of over 30 countries a handful was omitted because the countries do not experience food security challenges; others were discounted because of lack of data and a few further countries were included because of the severity or changing nature of the situation.

As a result, the report covers: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Lake Chad Basin (Cameroon [Far North], Chad [Lake Basin], Niger [Diffa], Nigeria [northeast]), Lebanon (Syrian refugees), Liberia, Mali, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda and Yemen.

The omission of some countries or territories under UNSC monitoring because of insufficient up-to-date data is concerning. It is vital to have food security and nutrition information systems in place allowing near-real time assessment and monitoring of the situation, in order to prevent and/or respond to food crises.

### Data sources

The data for this report chiefly comes from the latest IPC or CH analyses, which provide a 'common currency' for classifying food insecurity into different phases of severity. They use international standards that allow for comparisons of situations across countries and over time. This report includes the numbers of people in the three most severe phases considered Crisis, Emergency and Catastrophe (See Annex 1 – IPC table), who are in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. The CH tool, used in the Sahel and West Africa, uses similar standards to IPC. Populations in Stress (IPC/CH Phase 2) are also indicated where relevant, although they require a different set of actions – ideally more long-term resilience-building interventions.

For a few countries where IPC and CH analyses were not available the numbers/percentage of food insecure people in need of urgent action are estimated primarily from Food Security Cluster analyses (mainly Humanitarian Needs Overview<sup>1</sup>) to estimate the number of people in need of food assistance (Iraq, Palestine and Syrian Arab Republic). For some countries, baseline and emergency food security and vulnerability assessments from WFP, which estimate the numbers of moderately and severely food-insecure people using the CARI method<sup>2</sup> (Cameroon and Syrian refugees) are used.

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<sup>1</sup> The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) aim to support the Humanitarian Country Team in developing a shared understanding of the impact and evolution of a crisis and to inform response planning. The HNO includes an assessment of the food security situation, the impact of the crisis, the breakdown of the people in need and the required funds. Where people are at increased risk of food insecurity, assessments are conducted using accepted methods to understand the type, degree and extent of food insecurity, to identify those most affected and to define the most appropriate response.

<sup>2</sup> The CARI is used to classify individual households according to their level of food insecurity. All five indicators included within the CARI approach can be incorporated within IPC analysis; the IPC Technical Manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC Analytical Framework.

## Background

In 2017 severe hunger hit record levels according to findings from the *Global Report on Food Crises 2018*. Almost 124 million people across 51 countries faced “Crisis” levels of acute food insecurity or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above or equivalent), and required urgent humanitarian action.

The report largely attributed this 15 percent increase since 2016 to new outbreaks and intensified conflict and insecurity in countries such as northeastern Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Yemen, as well as to prolonged drought conditions that resulted in consecutive reduced harvests both in eastern and southern Africa. It found that almost 74 million people needed urgent assistance in 18 zones affected by conflict and insecurity.

In December 2017 the UN appealed for a record USD 22.5 billion to provide aid in 2018 to raise funds to help about 91 million of the most vulnerable people across 26 countries.<sup>1</sup> The UN humanitarian chief Mark Lowcock said in a statement launching the appeal that in addition to drought, floods and other weather-related catastrophes, “conflict, in particular protracted crises, will continue to be the main driver of need in 2018”. At the launch of the previous year’s appeal in which USD 22.2 billion was requested, UN humanitarian chief and relief coordinator Stephen O’Brien pointed out that more than 80 percent of humanitarian needs stemmed from protracted man-made conflicts.

Around 30 percent of the UN’s requested funds for humanitarian aid in 2018 were earmarked for the war in the Syrian Arab Republic followed by more than 10 percent for war-torn Yemen.

The UNSC Resolution 2417 passed in May 2018 acknowledges that violence and hunger are closely linked. It calls on all parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and spare farms, markets,

mills, storage sites and other infrastructure needed for food production and distribution. It condemns the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and underlines that this may constitute a war crime.

The resolution recognises the overwhelming need to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity. For instance, food shortages can fuel pre-existing grievances and trigger conflict. When people face hunger coupled with – or perhaps as a result of – poverty, lack of access to job opportunities, land, healthcare and education/training they are likely to feel despairing and angry. Those seeking to recruit people to join armed groups or carry out illegal activities can exploit such grievances. Sudden food price rises can also prompt fears of hunger, leading to riots and violence, as seen in the unfolding situation in Venezuela.

Many households in countries affected by armed conflict are unable to consistently obtain food (whether it be by home production, purchase, barter, begging or food aid) in sufficient quantity or quality to meet the energy or nutritional requirements of themselves or their families. This is because conflict disrupts productive activity, hampers trade and the regular functioning of markets, and forces people to abandon their land, homes and jobs.

People in conflict are often reliant on food assistance provided by WFP and other humanitarian agencies, but in many cases insecurity and lack of serviceable roads prevent humanitarian convoys from being able to reach them. In such dire circumstances people may face famine conditions.<sup>2</sup>

The overall aim of this report is to provide UNSC members with a concise, up-to-date overview that allows them to formulate what short and long-term actions need to be taken to break the vicious cycle between armed conflict and food insecurity.

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<sup>1</sup> OCHA. Global Humanitarian Overview 2018. By mid-June 2018 the figure had been revised up to USD 25.39 billion to assist 96.2 million highly vulnerable people.

<sup>2</sup> The definition of famine has been developed through the work of the IPC. It can be declared only when certain measures of mortality, malnutrition and hunger are met. They are: at least 20 percent of households in an area face extreme food shortages with a limited ability to cope; acute malnutrition rates exceed 30 percent; and the death rate exceeds two persons per day per 10 000 persons.

## Conflict-related factors that drive hunger and fuel conflict

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### Displacement

When people abandon their land, homes and jobs they cannot grow or afford to buy food, they face extremely limited access to public services.

### Destruction of infrastructure needed for food production and distribution

Supply routes are disrupted by, for example, road blocks and mines, so markets cannot be supplied. Agricultural land, mills, storage facilities, machinery etc are often damaged/destroyed.

### Economic collapse

Conflict prevents businesses from operating and weakens the national economy, reducing employment opportunities and increasing poverty levels.

### Disruption of trade and job losses

People face limited income opportunities and cannot afford to buy the necessities of life.

### Fuel and food price inflation

Local currencies are weakened, and supply lines disrupted making food and fuel imports more expensive.

### Humanitarian access restricted

People in conflict are reliant on food assistance but insecurity and unserviceable roads prevent humanitarian convoys from reaching them. In such dire circumstances people may face famine.

### Collapse of basic services and Government support

Conflict undermines and sometimes destroys health and public distribution systems etc leaving people completely unsupported and reliant on humanitarian support. Poor sanitation leads to outbreaks of life-threatening epidemics, particularly acute watery diarrhea/cholera, that further increase malnutrition levels.

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## Acute food insecurity in conflict settings: recent 2018 figures

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This chapter provides a country-by-country overview of the most recent numbers of acutely food insecure people and analysis of the drivers of food insecurity in 14 countries and territories affected by conflict.

- Afghanistan (northeastern region)
- Burundi
- The Central African Republic
- Iraq
- Lake Chad Basin
- Mali
- Palestine
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- The Sudan
- Uganda






**1.3 million** people requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



The northeastern region November 2017–February 2018 acute analysis, covered four out of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, namely Badakhshan, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar.

TOTAL POPULATION  
**34.7 million**

POPULATION ANALYSED  
**3.9 million**



Nationally 7.6 million people (26 percent of the population) in IPC Phase 3 and 4 required urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance from August to November 2017.

Conflict, population displacements and limited income earning opportunities as the casual labour market weakens are major drivers of food insecurity. In addition, an evolving drought situation resulting from low rainfall in winter 2017 is aggravating pre-existing challenges to food security.

- In the first half of 2018, food security deteriorated in the northeastern region compared to the 2017 post-harvest season when 23 percent of the population analysed needed urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance.<sup>2</sup>


- The latest IPC analysis, released in February 2018, classified Badakhshan in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Baghlan, Kunduz and Takhar provinces in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).
- Conflict in this region has caused huge displacements of people within and out of the provinces: Kunduz has the highest number with 20 000 IDPs, followed by Badakhshan with 9 900, Takhar with 9 100 and Baghlan with 3 900.<sup>3</sup>

## Afghanistan, northeastern region, IPC acute food insecurity situation

November 2017–February 2018

### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed
- ! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance



Source: IPC Afghanistan Technical Working Group, February 2018

1 Afghanistan IPC Technical Working Group. November 2017–February 2018.  
 2 Ibid.  
 3 OCHA. Afghanistan Snapshot of Population Movements, 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Conflict and insecurity are limiting food access

Conflict and insecurity have significantly constrained the provision of humanitarian assistance as well as imports of food in the northeastern region. Anti-Government Elements have banned all supplies in two districts of Badakhshan (Warduj and Jomgan) – including humanitarian assistance – with particularly negative consequences for the most vulnerable people in areas controlled or influenced by the Anti-Government Elements. In Kunduz, deteriorating security has led to occasional closure of markets and borders with neighbouring Tajikistan, limiting the availability of food and pushing up food prices in the region. For instance, Sher Khan Bandar is one of the main import/export points in the country and the bridge over the Amu river in Kunduz is considered a major supply route for the remote districts of Badakhshan.<sup>1</sup>

### Drought is severely squeezing food production

Badakhshan and Baghlan are reportedly the regions most affected by drought conditions. Many farmers postponed sowing their winter 2018 crops until spring because of the late onset of rainfall. The below-average cumulative snowpack and the spring rains (March–April) were not sufficient to replenish the moisture deficit accumulated in winter in the rain-fed areas, hitting subsistence farmers and wheat production in the northeast particularly hard.

Households have resorted to distress livestock selling, drilling deeper wells, borrowing money, liquidating land or migrating to cities.<sup>2</sup>

In addition, during the first half of May heavy rains in Badakhshan caused flooding and flash floods, affecting people and damaging and destroying houses.<sup>3</sup>

In April preliminary 2018 national production estimates indicated the wheat harvest was likely to be nearly 20 percent below last year's final production estimate – already almost 60 percent below the five-year average.<sup>4</sup> This is likely to result in lower food availability in northeastern provinces too where food access is already very dependent on imports.

### Growing number of displaced people and returnees lack access to basic services

As of July 2018, over 40 000 people were displaced because of conflict in the northeastern provinces – with around 20 000 in Kunduz alone. Huge displacements have resulted in an extensive breakdown of livelihoods and very limited institutional capacity to respond to or prepare for food security and nutrition crises. In addition, around 2 000 people have returned from Pakistan to these areas, putting further strain on already overstretched basic services, such as hospitals, clinics and schools.<sup>5</sup>

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1 IPC Afghanistan Technical Working Group. November 2017–February 2018.

2 FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Afghanistan, June 2018 and FAO Rapid Assessment Afghanistan 2018.

3 OCHA. Humanitarian Bulletin Afghanistan, April 2018.

4 FEWS NET. Afghanistan Food Security Outlook Update, April 2018.

5 OCHA. Afghanistan Snapshot of Population Movements in 2018.





**1.8 million** people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



The food security situation substantially improved over the last 12 months, with the population in need of urgent humanitarian assistance falling by 31 percent<sup>2</sup> between spring 2017 and 2018 thanks to improved agricultural production.

TOTAL POPULATION

**11.2 million**

POPULATION ANALYSED

**11.0 million**

**IPC 3+**

CRISIS

1.8M

from April to May 2018<sup>1</sup>

Although food security improved, around one in seven Burundians still needed assistance to meet their food needs in spring 2018 because of limited income opportunities, restricted cross-border flows of goods and people, weak local currency and outbreaks of *peste des petits ruminants*.

- From April to May, all the livelihood zones were classified in Stress (IPC Phase 2), except the commune of Kinyinya – classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) – as

a result of weather hazards and plant pests – and Bujumbura city (not analysed).


- Population displacement stemming from the 2015 socio-political crisis is still disrupting livelihoods. As of May 2018 some 50 000 people were still internally displaced.<sup>3</sup>
- An increased number of refugees fleeing the Democratic Republic of the Congo is putting pressure on the already limited resources of host communities.

## Burundi, IPC acute food insecurity situation

March–mid-April 2018

### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification


- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed



Mid-April–May 2018

### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed



Source IPC Burundi Technical Working Group, April 2018

1 IPC Burundi Technical Working Group. Projection April–May 2018.  
 2 IPC Burundi Technical Working Group. April–May 2018 and Projected June–July 2017.  
 3 IOM. Displacement Dashboard Burundi, May 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Improvements in crop yields in 2018 – but not enough to cover year-round consumption needs

Although localized dry spells, hail storms and violent winds moderately affected crop production in the first 2018 agricultural season, production levels were estimated at eight percent above the 2017 first season<sup>1</sup> mostly thanks to favourable rainfall between September 2017 and February 2018. This mitigated the negative impact of the fall armyworm attacks on maize production.<sup>2</sup>

In April, exceptionally high rainfall lifted crop prospects for the 2018B season harvest to average levels, but also led to landslides, widespread flooding and damage to infrastructure – mostly in lowland and marshland areas – and to the displacement of about 10 000 people.<sup>3</sup>

### Staple food prices still above five-year average

While staple food prices in March were 20 to 35 percent below those of the same period in 2017, most remained about 15 percent above their five-year average (with the exception of beans).<sup>4</sup> Food access deteriorated during the lean season (April–May) when households' stocks usually begin to dwindle, market reliance increases, and agricultural labour opportunities and wages decline. Purchasing power is still curtailed by a high inflation rate (14.3 percent in March) and the weakening of the Burundian Franc, which reduced cross-border trade and access to critical commodities including fuel.<sup>5</sup>

### Range of pests and diseases destroy crops and livestock

Fall armyworm and *peste des petits ruminants* constitute new shocks driving food insecurity alongside other pests and diseases that have damaged crop production for years, including banana bacterial wilt and cassava mosaic disease. Fall armyworm attacks have been particularly detrimental for maize production in the eastern commune of Kinyinya where dry conditions have facilitated pest reproduction.<sup>6</sup> As of March, *peste des petits ruminants* – reported for the first time in Burundi in December 2017 – had infected 13 000 animals and killed 8 500 in the provinces of Kirundo, Gitega, Karuzi, Kayanza, Muramvya and Mwaro.<sup>7</sup> Emergency measures implemented by the authorities included the temporary closure of sheep and goat markets and restriction of animal movements, which depleted the incomes of households that rely on livestock sales, especially during the lean season.<sup>8</sup>

### Climate disasters and insecurity uproot people from their homes

Most (74 percent) of Burundi's 187 000 IDPs were forced to abandon their homes following natural disasters.<sup>9</sup> The remaining 26 percent left as a result of the 2015 socio-political crisis. The number of refugees fleeing the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was 71 000 on 31 May.<sup>10</sup> In addition, 57 000 Burundian refugees had spontaneously returned from the United Republic of Tanzania as of March.<sup>11</sup> According to OCHA, these displaced people have affected 805 000 people in host communities, mainly in the provinces of Makamba, Ruyigi and Cankuzo. The public authorities in Burundi and United Republic of Tanzania and UNHCR have committed to repatriate a further 72 000 Burundian refugees between April and December 2018.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> FAO. *Evaluation des récoltes de la saison 2018A et mise en place de la saison 2018B*, April 2018.

<sup>2</sup> FAO and Ministry of Agriculture. *Bulletin et alerte sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle*, February 2018.

<sup>3</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Burundi, June 2018.

<sup>4</sup> FAO and Ministry of Agriculture, February 2018.

<sup>5</sup> WFP. Burundi Bulletin, mVAM, March 2018.

<sup>6</sup> IPC Burundi Technical Working Group. 2018.

<sup>7</sup> FAO. *Dashboard sur la peste des petits ruminants*, March 2018.

<sup>8</sup> WFP. mVAM, March 2018.

<sup>9</sup> IOM. Displacement Dashboard Burundi, May 2018.

<sup>10</sup> UNHCR. Regional Update, May 2018.

<sup>11</sup> OCHA. Burundi: Population Movements, March 2018.

<sup>12</sup> OCHA. *Bulletin Humanitaire Burundi*, April 2018.

# The Central African Republic



**2 million** people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



The percentage of people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance increased from 30 percent in February 2017 to 34 percent in March 2018 (1.6 million people) and was expected to reach 43 percent (2 million people) between April and August.




The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate with food insecurity reaching record levels in early 2018 as the armed conflict persists into its fifth year and triggers massive population movements. Widespread insecurity is constraining crop production (10 to 20 percent below its pre-crisis levels), and livestock rearing, and disrupting market activities and supply routes.

- Five prefectures and the eight main urban areas where major IDP concentrations are located were projected to be classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>1</sup>
- The surge in violence is causing massive population displacement: at the end of April 2018, around 670 000 people were displaced across the country.<sup>2</sup>



## Central African Republic, IPC acute food insecurity situation

March 2018


April–August 2018



### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



Source: IPC Central African Republic Technical Working Group, March 2018

<sup>1</sup> IPC Central African Republic Technical Working Group. Projection April–August 2018, March 2018.

<sup>2</sup> OCHA. *République Centrafricaine Bulletin Humanitaire*, May 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Widespread insecurity constrains crop production and livestock rearing activities

Although by mid-June cumulative rainfall was above-average over most cropping areas, and vegetation conditions generally favourable, agriculture is severely affected by the widespread conflict. It has caused large-scale displacement, input shortages and depleted households' productive assets. A reduced agricultural output for the sixth consecutive year is expected. Cassava production in 2017 was below pre-crisis (2012) levels<sup>1</sup> mainly because of restricted access to crop areas and smaller parcels of land being cultivated, particularly in conflict-affected areas. One in three households could not produce any crops in 2017.<sup>2</sup> Conflict has severely affected cattle production too. In the northwest, there have been numerous cattle raids and many herders have fled to Cameroon. In the centre-west, livestock has almost entirely disappeared as conflict has restricted transhumance. In the centre-east, pastoralist activities are thwarted by insecurity and violence in Ouaka and Basse-Kotto prefectures. Abandoned livestock are damaging crops while conflicts between farmers and transhumant pastoralists in areas bordering Cameroon, Chad, South Sudan and Sudan persist.<sup>3</sup>

### Surge in violence prompts massive population displacements

Increased violence in the northwest, centre and southeast of the country between December 2017 and January 2018 has forced an increasing number of people to abandon their homes and head for urban areas. At the end of April 2018, around 670 000 people were displaced across the country – an increase compared to the crisis tipping point in August 2015.<sup>4</sup> Over 60 percent of the displaced population lives among host communities.

### Conflict hinders food availability in markets and inflates prices

Illegal check-points and ambushes by armed groups disrupt market activities and supply routes. For instance, in Bria, Bangassou, Kaga-Bandoro and Bambari markets certain commodities such as beef, peanuts, sesame and palm oil are almost non-existent.<sup>5</sup>

Yet IDPs and host communities are highly market-reliant. Half of households spend on average more than 65 percent of their incomes on food, with the most extreme situations reported in Vakaga, Basse-Kotto and Ouham, leaving these households extremely vulnerable when food prices rise. By March 2018, prices of most staple foods (i.e. rice, maize, and cassava) were between five and 11 percent higher than in March 2017, with notable variations across locations.<sup>6</sup>

### Infestations of fall armyworm reduce crop production yields

In March 2018, a rapid assessment conducted in the rural areas surrounding Bangui and in some parts of the Ombella M'Poko province reported fall armyworm infestations in between 20 and 100 percent of the surveyed fields, according to the location. If not adequately treated, these pest infestations can result in total crop losses.

### Repeated attacks against civilians and aid workers reduce humanitarian access

In the first three months of 2018 there were 63 attacks specifically targeted at humanitarian actors, according to OCHA.<sup>7</sup> At the end of May, insecurity was particularly marked in the centre, especially in Batangafo (Ouham) and Kaga-Bandoro (Nana Grébizi) where attacks against civilians and humanitarian workers reportedly rose.

1 FAO. GIEWS Country Brief the Central African Republic, February 2018.

2 *République Centrafricaine Cluster Sécurité Alimentaire. Bulletin d'information*, March–April 2018.

3 FAO. Central African Republic Situation Report May 2018.

4 OCHA. *République Centrafricaine Bulletin Humanitaire*, May 2018.

5 IPC Central African Republic Technical Working Group. 2018.

6 WFP. *République Centrafricaine mVAM Bulletin*, February–March 2018.

7 OCHA. *Bulletin Humanitaire République Centrafricaine*, April 2018.



**1.9 million** people requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance

TOTAL POPULATION  
**37.0 million**  
POPULATION ANALYSED  
**37.0 million**



February 2018<sup>1</sup>



8.7 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance with the majority concentrated in the northern governorates.



The estimated number of people in need of food assistance has fallen dramatically from 3.2 million in July 2017.



Since the Iraqi Prime Minister officially announced the end of major military operations in late 2017 and three years after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took over significant areas of Iraqi territory, hundreds of thousands of displaced Iraqis are heading back to their communities. Although Iraq is heading into a phase of rebuilding, years of conflict have caused widespread destruction of infrastructure, enfeebled the economy and displaced several million people.

- The poverty rate in the places most affected by fighting is over 40 percent.<sup>2</sup> Achieving food security remains very challenging for displaced households in areas that were recently liberated, in areas still experiencing conflict or those returning to their homes.

## Iraq, IDPs by governorate of displacement

May 2018

### IDPs by governorate of displacement



Source: OCHA, May 2018

<sup>1</sup> OCHA. Iraq 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Conflict-driven displacement

Iraq's displaced communities face many challenges. Of the 6 million people uprooted from their homes and land since the rise of ISIL in 2014, approximately 2 million were still displaced inside the country as of April 2018.<sup>1</sup> According to mobile phone surveys conducted by WFP from January to April 2018, internally displaced households in conflict-affected areas of Diayala, Ninewa and Sulaymaniyah have lower food consumption (consume different types of food less frequently) than residents. While their food consumption has improved since the beginning of the year,<sup>2</sup> IDPs are highly likely to resort to using negative coping strategies, which may erode their ability to access food: in one study, 83 percent of IDPs living in camps and 60 percent of IDPs out of camps reported using coping strategies such as taking on debt or spending their savings.<sup>3</sup>

As many as two million displaced Iraqis are likely to return to their homes during 2018.<sup>4</sup> Although major efforts are being made by the government to facilitate returns, many vulnerable families have limited financial resources and are exhausted by living in basic accommodation and by lack of nutritious food. In newly retaken and hard-to-access areas, families have limited livelihood opportunities, which reduces their ability to purchase food and other basic needs. Displaced families face difficulties accessing the Public Distribution System (PDS), an important social safety net that entitles Iraqis to receive flour, rice and oil rations from the government. One study reported that 74 percent of residents and 90 percent of returnees to Mosul did not receive any PDS assistance.<sup>5</sup> Iraq also hosts refugees from neighbouring countries, with the majority from the Syrian Arab Republic. As of May 2018, there were about 251 000 Syrian refugees with 37 percent of

them living below the poverty line. They also face limited livelihood opportunities, depletion of savings, and low purchasing power.

### Agricultural challenges persist but food prices are stabilising

Although irregular rains from October 2017 to early January 2018 delayed sowings in parts of the country, good precipitation received in spring compensated for soil moisture deficits. However, agriculture in Iraq has been severely undermined by conflict, particularly in the cereal production belt of Ninewah and Salahadin provinces. There are indications that fields in northwest parts of Mosul and Dohuk provinces may not been sown, likely due to conflict-related constraints. Large swathes of land are inaccessible because they are contaminated with unexploded ordinance or destroyed by fighting. Machinery and irrigation structures in conflict areas are damaged. Supply chain disruptions have caused the price of fertilizers, pesticides and fuel to soar. Consequently, the cereal harvest in 2018 was projected at below the average 4.3 million tonnes. Preliminary wheat production was projected to be 14 percent below last year's level and almost 20 percent below the five-year average.<sup>6</sup>

WFP's April 2018 market report showed that food prices continued to stabilize, a process that began in November 2017. The cost of the national food basket decreased by seven percent between March and April and food is generally available across the country.<sup>7</sup> However, the purchasing power of households that are internally displaced or living in conflict areas remains significantly lower than in the rest of the country, underscoring their particular vulnerability to food insecurity.

1 UNHCR. Iraq [cited 11 June 2018] [www.unhcr.org/iraq-emergency.html](http://www.unhcr.org/iraq-emergency.html)

2 WFP. mVAM Bulletin, April 2018.

3 Iraq Assessment Working Group. Multi-cluster needs assessment, December 2017.

4 OCHA. Iraq 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan.

5 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2018–2019.

6 FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Iraq, June 2018.

7 WFP. Market Monitor Report Iraq, April 2018.



**3.3 million** people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance




Although the situation appears to have improved considerably since the same time last year, insecurity is hampering the resumption of normal life, limiting trade opportunities, disrupting livelihoods, and leaving conflict-affected families dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival.

Nigeria's Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states<sup>1</sup>


Lake Chad Basin region<sup>2</sup>

Niger's Diffa region<sup>3</sup>


**CH 3+**



**CH 3+**



**CH 3+**



from June to August 2018 in conflict-affected areas (excluding Cameroon); In Cameroon's Far North region around 1.5 million people were moderately or severely food insecure as of December 2017<sup>4</sup>



Nine years since the Boko Haram insurgency began in northeastern Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin humanitarian emergency remains one of the most severe in the world with millions of civilians facing high levels of hunger and malnutrition. The intense military operations (particularly in the northeast and southeast of Borno State in Nigeria) have displaced around 2.4 million people with large-scale population movements still recorded weekly.<sup>5</sup> Although the situation appears to have improved considerably since the same time last year, insecurity is hampering the resumption of normal life, limiting trade opportunities, disrupting livelihoods, and leaving conflict-affected families dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival.<sup>6</sup>

- For the first time since 2016, no one was classified in Famine (CH Phase 5) between March and May in the conflict-affected areas of Lake Chad Basin.
- However, a significant deterioration in food security in the area was likely during the lean season as the number of people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4) was expected to grow from 2.6 million to 3.3 million between March–May and June–August (excluding Cameroon).
- Almost 5.5 million people were expected to face Stress (CH Phase 2) food security conditions in June–August 2018 across the Lake Chad Basin region, Niger's Diffa region, and Nigeria's Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, and to need livelihood support. Another 2.3 million people were mildly food insecure in Cameroon's Far North (equivalent to Stress).

## Lake Chad Basin, CH acute food insecurity situation


March–May 2018

### CH acute food insecurity phase classification



June–August 2018

### CH acute food insecurity phase classification



Source: *Cadre Harmonisé* Lake Chad Basin, March 2018

1 *Cadre Harmonisé* Nigeria, March–May 2018 and Projected June–August 2018.  
 2 *Cadre Harmonisé* Chad. *Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle*. March 2017.  
 3 *Cadre Harmonisé* Niger. 2018 PREGEC presentation by the République du Niger Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage.  
 4 WFP. Cameroon CSFVA, December 2017.  
 5 IOM. Regional Displacement Tracking Matrix Lake Chad Basin Crisis, June 2018.  
 6 OCHA. Humanitarian Needs and Requirement Overview Lake Chad Basin, February 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Northeastern Nigeria: Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states

Despite the extreme economic and social hardships resulting from the protracted conflict, there has been a major improvement in food security levels compared with the same period last year, largely thanks to the food assistance provided by humanitarian actors.

Of the 3 million people projected to be in need of urgent assistance during the lean season, some 1.6 million people were expected to be in Borno state.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, no one is expected to face Famine (CH Phase 5) food security outcomes, compared with more than 50 000 during the same period last year.<sup>2</sup>

As of June 2018, some 1.9 million people were internally displaced in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe States<sup>3</sup> because of the conflict. Market disruptions, restricted agricultural activities, and above-average staple prices make these people reliant on humanitarian assistance and on host communities for survival. But assistance is particularly expensive and logistically challenging to deliver in the area and host communities already suffer from poor food access, high levels of poverty and malnutrition.<sup>4</sup> According to OCHA almost the entirety of Borno state, where the vast majority of those in need of humanitarian support are located, remains non-accessible to international humanitarian organisations.<sup>5</sup>

The conflict, coupled with an abrupt end to the rainy season, hampered 2017/2018 cereal production in the northeast.<sup>6</sup> About one third of households in Borno and Yobe perceived production to be lower than 2016/2017.<sup>7</sup>

Insecurity limited pastoralists' access to grazing and triggered early livestock movements, increasing competition for land.<sup>8</sup>

In Borno and Yobe, about one in every five households spend more than 75 percent of their expenditure on food,<sup>9</sup> making them extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations. Staple food prices are mostly well above average.<sup>10</sup> In the monitored markets of Yobe, food prices substantially increased between March 2017 and 2018, while in most monitored markets of Maiduguri (Borno) there were moderate to high increases between November 2017 and March 2018.<sup>11</sup>

At the end of April 2018, two cholera epidemics were reported in Borno and Yobe states.<sup>12</sup>

### Chad: Lake Basin region

The caseload of those in need of food, nutrition and livelihood assistance was expected to grow from 133 000 in March–May 2018 to 159 000 by June–August 2018 (27 percent of the population), while the number in Emergency (CH Phase 4) was expected to remain stable.<sup>13</sup>

Food availability has decreased following a reduced 2017/2018 cereal output in Chad estimated to be two percent lower than the five-year average and five percent lower than 2016/2017 levels.

The scarcity of pasture linked to lack of rain as well as conflict continues to be a major concern in the Sahelian regions. Poor body conditions of livestock are causing a significant drop in animal prices and in livestock/grain terms of trade for pastoralists, limiting their food access.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé* Nigeria, March–May, Projected June–August 2018.

<sup>2</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé* Nigeria, March–May 2018, Projected June–August 2018; *Cadre Harmonisé* Nigeria, March–May 2017, Projected June–August 2017.

<sup>3</sup> IOM. Displacement Tracking Matrix Nigeria, June 2018.

<sup>4</sup> FAO. Northeast Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe) Situation report, April 2018.

<sup>5</sup> OCHA. Northeastern Nigeria Humanitarian Situation Update, April 2018.

<sup>6</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Nigeria, April 2018.

<sup>7</sup> WFP. Nigeria VAM Market Monitoring Report, March 2018.

<sup>8</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Nigeria, April 2018.

<sup>9</sup> WFP. Market Monitoring, March 2018.

<sup>10</sup> OCHA. Lake Chad Basin Crisis Update January–February 2018.

<sup>11</sup> WFP. Market Monitoring, March 2018.

<sup>12</sup> OCHA. Northeast Nigeria: Humanitarian situation update, April 2018.

<sup>13</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé* Chad, March 2018.

<sup>14</sup> FEWS NET. Chad. *Perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire*, June 2018–January 2019.



On June 20 2018, the Lake Chad Basin region was hosting over 144 000 IDPs, over 10 000 refugees and around 40 000 returnees as a consequence of the Boko Haram crisis.<sup>15</sup>

## The Niger: Diffa region

The caseload of people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance was expected to rise to more than 118 000 in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4)<sup>16</sup> towards June and August 2018 – up from 90 000 during the previous three months.

Despite a 2017/2018 cereal production surplus compared with the five-year average (+14 percent), food security remains precarious, notably for pastoralist households as a result of severe fodder and water shortages – only 41 percent of livestock needs were covered in the 2017-2018 agricultural campaign.<sup>17</sup> This pastoralist situation has sparked an early lean season, increased concentration of livestock in certain areas, putting pressure on natural resources and triggering intercommunal conflicts. Pastoralists' purchasing power is likely to be affected by poor livestock body conditions and reduced exports of livestock to Nigeria because of the low exchange rate of the Nigerian Naira.<sup>18</sup> Pastoralists are likely to resort to negative coping strategies, such as selling animals on an unsustainable basis.

Markets in Diffa face continuous supply issues because conflict disrupts intra-regional and cross-border trade

flows. However, prices in May were lower than the previous year thanks to the good 2017 cereal output and regular imports from neighbouring countries, including Nigeria.

As of June 2018, over 250 000 people, including 129 000 IDPs, 108 000 refugees and around 15 000 Nigerian returnees were still displaced in the Diffa region because of violence.<sup>19</sup> Their food and nutrition security is particularly fragile. Further, these displaced people add strain to host communities' already stressed sources of income and food stocks.

## Cameroon: Far North region

Around one in three (34 percent) households in Cameroon's Far North region were food insecure in May 2017 (1.5 million people) due to below average cereal production (mainly sorghum and millet) in 2017, persisting civil conflict, depletion of productive assets and displacement.<sup>20</sup>

As of June 2018, there were about 240 000 IDPs in the region as well as 96 000 Nigerian refugees and over 80 000 returnees.<sup>21</sup>

Staple food prices have been on the rise in recent months. In March 2018, sorghum prices were about 50 percent above March 2017 levels and maize prices 30 percent above.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> IOM. Regional Displacement Tracking Matrix Lake Chad Basin Crisis, June 2018.

<sup>16</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé Niger 2018* in PREGEC presentation by the *République du Niger Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage*.

<sup>17</sup> *République du Niger Ministère de l'agriculture et de l'élevage*, March 2018.

<sup>18</sup> FEWS NET Niger. *Mise à jour sur la sécurité alimentaire*, April 2018.

<sup>19</sup> IOM. Regional Displacement Tracking Matrix Lake Chad Basin Crisis, June 2018.

<sup>20</sup> WFP. Cameroon CSFVA, December 2017.

<sup>21</sup> IOM. Regional Displacement Tracking Matrix Lake Chad Basin Crisis, June 2018.

<sup>22</sup> FAO. Cameroon GIEWS Country brief, March 2018.



**0.9 million**

people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance

TOTAL POPULATION

**19.0 million**

POPULATION ANALYSED

**18.8 million**



**CH 3+**

CRISIS EMERGENCY



0.9M

0.05M

from June to August 2018<sup>4</sup>



This marks a deterioration compared to the same period last year and March–May 2018 when 600 000 people<sup>2</sup> and 387 000<sup>3</sup> were respectively in need of urgent assistance.

Insecurity has spread from northern regions to the central region of Mopti and to certain areas of Segou (Macina and Niono), hindering the free movement of people and goods, disrupting livelihoods and access to basic services and displacing people. This situation is compounded by climatic factors (insufficient rainfall and floods) along with high cereal prices, which have hit pastoralist communities in particular.

- Five cercles (Menaka, Mopti, Goudam, Timbuktu and Bourem) in the centre and the north are likely to face

Crisis (CH Phase 3) food security conditions.


- Some 3.4 million people are likely to face Stress (CH Phase 2) food security conditions during the June-August lean season.
- Around 52 000 people remain internally displaced in the country. In addition, some 58 000 people had returned from neighbouring countries as of June 2018.
- The 2017/2018 agricultural campaign was weakened by pasture and water deficits in localized areas of Western Sahel and in the Niger River valley.

## Mali, CH acute food insecurity situation

March–May 2018

### CH acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed




Source: *Cadre Harmonisé* Mali, March 2018

June–August 2018

### CH acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed



1 *Cadre Harmonisé* Mali, March 2018.  
 2 *Cadre Harmonisé* Mali, March 2017.  
 3 *Cadre Harmonisé* Mali, March 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Insecurity has spread to the central region

As of March 2018, deteriorating security was creating a volatile humanitarian situation in the centre and north of the country. Attacks against schools and health centres limited access to basic services in these areas.<sup>1</sup> In February almost one in five households said insecurity and conflict-led displacements constituted the main shocks on food security and livelihoods over the previous six months.<sup>2</sup> Households in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal and Mopti were the most likely to resort to crisis and emergency coping strategies. Between mid-February and April 2018, intercommunal clashes and security deterioration in Mopti prompted 3 000 people to leave the country, and an additional 1 500 to be internally displaced. As of 30 June 2018, there were around 52 000 IDPs mostly located in Timbuktu, Menaka, Gao, Segou and Mopti – and over 58 000 refugee returnees in Mali.<sup>3</sup> There was a sharp increase in the number of security incidents affecting humanitarian workers in the first four months of the year, limiting humanitarian access to those in need.<sup>4</sup>

### Localized deficits in agricultural production

Despite above-average cereal production during the 2017/2018 agricultural campaign,<sup>5</sup> Mali's agricultural sector contended with dry spells and below-average rainfall at the end of 2017, which harmed crops and livestock in

Segou, Koulikoro, Timbuktu and Gao, and were expected to undermine the counter season harvest.<sup>6</sup> Pastoral production was particularly affected with more than half of the local communities in Timbuktu and Mopti reporting poor to very poor pasture conditions in February 2018, and more than a third of local communities in Kayes and Gao reporting poor to very poor water point conditions.<sup>7</sup> Insecurity also constrained livestock access to pasture, in particular in Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, and Menaka, which experienced floods too. Livestock conditions in fodder-deficit areas (North and Centre; Kayes and Koulikoro) were anticipated to deteriorate and prompt pastoral crises during the March to June/July lean season if pastoral movements continued to be hindered.<sup>8</sup>

### High food prices particularly bad for pastoralists

Although markets are well supplied with cereals thanks to subsidies and off-season rice harvests, conflict is preventing them from functioning fully in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti, where cereal prices were above the five-year average in May.<sup>9</sup>

The increase in food prices has a particularly negative impact on access to food for pastoralists. Due to insufficient pasture, livestock body conditions are poor, depressing livestock prices and terms of trade, and reducing pastoralists' purchasing power.

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1 OCHA. *Bulletin humanitaire* Mali, March–April 2018.

2 *Cluster sécurité alimentaire Mali*, 2018.

3 UNHCR. *Mali Situation Refugees, IDPs and Returnees*, July 2018.

4 OCHA. *Plan de réponse humanitaire 2018*.

5 *Ministère de l'agriculture*, March 2018.

6 *Cadre Harmonisé* Mali, March 2018.

7 *Cluster sécurité alimentaire Mali*, 2018.

8 *Ministère de l'agriculture*, March 2018.

9 FEWS NET. *Food Security Outlook Mali*, June–January 2019.



**1.6 million** people requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance

TOTAL POPULATION  
**5.0 million**  
POPULATION ANALYSED  
**5.0 million**



2.5 million people (around half of the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance.


Palestinians continue to be subject to a complex system of barriers, which restrict freedom of movement, undermine livelihoods and increase dependency on humanitarian aid. Restricted access to markets, land and water, settlement expansion, and the closure of the Gaza Strip have resulted in a weak economy that has failed to generate jobs and has increased poverty levels, restricting people's access to food.<sup>1</sup>

- Food insecurity is worse in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank: about 40 percent of people are food insecure in Gaza versus 13 percent in the West Bank
- In the Gaza Strip, nearly 1 million Palestinian refugees needed food assistance in the second quarter of 2017, up from around 0.9 million in the first quarter of 2015.<sup>2</sup>
- Of the 2.9 million people living in the West Bank, 0.8 million are registered refugees: 15 percent of them are food insecure, rising to 24 percent of those living in camps.

## Palestine, number of food-insecure people

November 2017

### Number of people food insecure (December 2017)



Source: OCHA, Palestine HNO 2018

<sup>1</sup> UNCTAD. The Besieged Palestinian Agricultural Sector, 2015.

<sup>2</sup> OCHA. Palestine HNO 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

The Gaza Strip has experienced an 11-year closure imposed by Israel due to security concerns after the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007. It has withstood three escalations of conflict in about 10 years. As a result, public infrastructure has been damaged, delivery of basic services disrupted and livelihoods eroded. In 2016 levels of unemployment reached 27 percent, with particularly high rates of unemployment in the Gaza Strip, reaching 44 percent in 2017.<sup>1 2</sup>

The findings of a Household Expenditure and Consumption Survey, released by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in May 2018 showed an increase in poverty indicators on the national level. The cause of this increase was the significant rise in poverty indicators in Gaza Strip: from 38.8 percent in 2011 to 53 percent in 2017.

In the West Bank, poverty rates declined from 17.8 percent in 2011 to 13.9 percent in 2017 as prolonged occupation

and continued settlement expansion continue to damage livelihoods.<sup>3</sup> The survey also found that food purchases accounted for the largest proportion of spending – at 31 percent of the total per capita expenditure – with transportation/communication and housing following behind.

Palestine's agricultural production has been substantially compromised by the conflict. Farmers have been denied access to some fertile and grazing lands, they lack control over water and face restrictions on building wells for irrigation.

Unless the political and economic situation improves, the number of food insecure people will likely remain unchanged, and may increase with new hostilities.

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1 Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 2017.

2 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018.

3 Ibid.




**2.5 million**

people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



There has been a significant improvement since the same period in 2017 when 3.2 million people were in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. However, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated since January 2018 (1.6 million in need of urgent assistance) with the number in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increasing by 73 percent.<sup>1</sup>



Food security remains poor as a result of the lingering effects of the 2016–2017 prolonged drought, the recent floods and cyclone Sagar, disease epidemics and persisting insecurity. But continued large-scale provision of humanitarian assistance and seasonal improvements to food and income sources during the *Deyr* season (October–December) improved food security outcomes in January before the situation worsened during the April–June lean season.

- Between March and June 2018, abundant rains improved the food security outcomes among several pastoral and agro-pastoral households<sup>2</sup> but in central

and northern agro-pastoral regions the food security situation remained critical.<sup>3</sup>


- Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food security outcomes remain likely between July and September in the absence of continued humanitarian assistance.
- Between October 2018 and January 2019, food security is expected to improve with most areas classified in Stress (IPC Phase 2), even though IDP settlements and pastoral areas in the northwest are still expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4), respectively.<sup>4</sup>

## Somalia, IPC acute food insecurity situation

January 2018

### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification


- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed
- Displaced population in camps (colour depicts phase classification)
- ! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance



April–June 2018

### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed
- Displaced population in camps (colour depicts phase classification)
- ! Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance



Source: Somalia IPC Technical Working Group, May 2018

1 FSNAU. April–June 2018.  
 2 FSNAU. Somalia Food Security Alert, May 2018.  
 3 FAO. GIEWS Update Somalia, Pastoral households face dire food insecurity, March 2018.  
 4 FSNAU. Somalia Food Security Outlook June 2018 to January 2019.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Consecutive poor rainy seasons depress crop production

As a result of the fourth consecutive below-average rainy season in October–December 2017, particularly in the main maize-producing area in the Lower Shabelle Region,<sup>1</sup> aggregate cereal output for the 2017 *Deyr* season (October–February) was estimated at over 20 percent below the five-year average, although well above the dismal 2016/2017 *Deyr* output.<sup>2</sup> While abundant rains in the April to June *Gu* season established and developed crops well, the torrential rainfall also triggered widespread floods, which resulted in loss of life, displacement, damage to farmland and livestock deaths in several southern riverine areas of Gedo, Hiraan, Lower and Middle Shabelle, and Lower and Middle Juba. While a substantial production shortfall of the *Gu* crop is expected, an above-average off-season harvest in September in high potential riverine irrigated areas is anticipated to partially offset it.<sup>3</sup>

### Lingering effects of prolonged drought on pastoralists

Livestock body conditions deteriorated until early 2018 following the countrywide prolonged and severe drought that lasted from mid-2016 to late 2017. Herd sizes are estimated to have decreased by 30–60 percent during 2017 due to distress sales and animal deaths.<sup>4</sup> Although heavy rains in March and April regenerated rangelands, improving livestock body conditions and increasing birth rates, herd sizes are expected to remain below normal levels throughout 2018, as the full recovery of herds requires several consecutive favourable seasons.<sup>5</sup>

### Cereal prices down, livestock prices high – but still pastoralists face food access problems

Overall, decreasing cereal prices and increased agricultural work opportunities during the *Gu* season have helped improve food access in recent months. Conversely, prices

of livestock, which declined to very low levels during the first half of 2017, surged in the second semester of the year as animals became increasingly scarce due to massive losses caused by the drought, and they remained at record levels in early 2018. Prices of livestock products followed similar patterns, with milk prices rising steadily between late 2016 and early 2018 due to reduced supplies. The combination of increasing livestock prices and declining coarse grain prices significantly improved terms of trade for pastoralists over the last 12 months. However, these potential food access gains are unlikely to be translated into solid food security improvements, as herders are engaged in repopulating their herds, have very few animals to sell and incomes are reported to be very limited.

### Natural disasters continue to force people to abandon their homes

As of June, one million people had been displaced as a result of the drought since November 2016, and a further 290 000 displaced by floods.<sup>6</sup> In addition, on 20–21 May, the tropical cyclone Sagar hit some communities of coastal Somaliland, major portions of Awdal district, and communities in Puntland with tens of thousands of people affected by flooding, displacement and the destruction of infrastructure including roads, medical facilities, boreholes and water wells in Sagar's wake.<sup>7</sup> The humanitarian situation was complicated by the displacement of 10 000 people before the cyclone's arrival following an armed standoff in Sool between forces from Puntland and Somaliland. Outbreaks of disease are commonplace, particularly acute watery diarrhea/cholera (about 4 300 cases reported between December 2017 and June 2018<sup>8</sup>), malaria and measles (4 446 and 5 739 cases respectively reported in the first half of 2018<sup>9</sup>).

1 FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Somalia, March 2018.

2 FSNAU. Somalia Food Security Outlook February to September 2018.

3 FAO. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, June 2018.

4 FAO. GIEWS Update Somalia, March 2018.

5 FSNAU. Somalia Food Security Alert, May 2018.

6 OCHA. Humanitarian impact of heavy rains, June 2018.

7 OCHA. 2018. Tropical Cyclone Sagar, May 2018.

8 Ministry of Health and WHO, June 2018.

9 OCHA. Humanitarian impact of heavy rains, 7 June 2018.



**7.1 million** people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



This represents a significant increase of 28 percent compared with the projection for the lean season period in 2017.

TOTAL POPULATION

**11.1 million**

POPULATION ANALYSED

**11.1 million**

**IPC 3+**

from May to July 2018<sup>1</sup>




Food insecurity continues to be driven by conflict and insecurity which also drive massive population displacement within and across national borders. Economic collapse, and poor market functionality also highly constrain food access. Other factors include lean season deterioration when people become more market-dependent and food price rises. Households have exhausted their livelihood strategies because of the protracted conflict.

- Some 64 percent of the population analysed were projected to be in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance.


- The areas of greatest concern are the counties of Leer and Mayendit in Unity State where conflict has prevented vital humanitarian access for lifesaving aid delivery and food security assessments.
- Pibor County in Jonglei State and Raga in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State are of concern due to loss of livelihoods and reliance on crisis livelihood strategies.
- The protracted conflict has disrupted livelihood activities and reduced the average area of land planted per household, pushing up food prices. Further, it has limited access to basic services, humanitarian assistance and caused massive displacement of people.

## South Sudan, IPC acute food insecurity situation

January 2018




### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification




Source: IPC South Sudan Technical Working Group, January 2018

May–July 2018



### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification



<sup>1</sup> IPC South Sudan Technical Working Group. January–July 2018.



## Factors driving food insecurity

### Crop production sinks to new lows following expansion of conflict

Despite overall favourable weather conditions, the 2017 aggregate cereal production was estimated to have dropped to its lowest level since the start of the conflict in 2013, at 14 percent below the average of the previous five years, giving a 26 percent higher cereal deficit for 2018 than that estimated for 2017.

The dismal performance of the 2017 cropping season was mainly due to the expansion of the conflict southwards, and its impact on plantings and agricultural operations, especially in the key growing areas of the Greater Equatoria Region and in former Western Bahr el Ghazal State. Compared to 2016, production almost halved in the former Central Equatoria State, where the widespread insecurity forced about 550 000 people to abandon their homes in 2017, sharply reducing the number of households engaged in farming.

In many areas across the country farmers are forced to leave agricultural land fallow or untended due to safety concerns, planting instead in limited spaces outside their homes or having to abandon their farms entirely. In addition to the endemic presence of common pests, fall armyworm outbreaks caused some damage to maize and sorghum crops in more than 20 counties. Food availability is also constrained by reduced imports as a result of insecurity disrupting main trading routes.<sup>1</sup>

### Depressed meat and milk production lower household income further

The conflict has disrupted livestock trade and migration routes, amplified the risk and occurrence of cattle raids, and heightened tensions between and among livestock holders and settled farmers. Damage to critical livestock infrastructure (notably the cold chain network, necessary for the viability of veterinary medicines and vaccines), have contributed to increased livestock morbidity and mortality rates. Resulting low levels of meat and milk production are affecting household income generation, food security and nutrition.<sup>2</sup>

### Food and transport costs soar as people lose income sources

Food prices in May 2018 were up to 70 percent higher than the already high levels in May last year, and up to six times higher than two years earlier, driven by widespread insecurity, a tight supply situation and a continuing and significant depreciation of the local currency.<sup>3</sup> The South Sudanese Pound continued to depreciate in April compared to the same period last year. Transport costs soared as the price of fuel increased on all monitored markets – by over 100 percent on most of them – between April 2017 and April 2018.<sup>4</sup> In December 2017, almost half of households in a WFP monitoring survey reported loss in income over the past year, mainly because their income sources had been completely destroyed.<sup>5</sup>

### Renewed fighting forces thousands to flee their homes

In early 2018, renewed fighting between government and opposition forces in multiple locations of former states of Jonglei and Unity forced thousands of people to flee their homes. By May, more than 4.3 million people – one in three South Sudanese – had been displaced since the start of the conflict in 2013, including more than 1.76 million who are internally displaced. Violence continues to hinder humanitarian access, with 80 security incidents reported during the month of April alone.<sup>6</sup> As a result, aid workers have been relocated, operations suspended and movements restricted.

### Disease outbreaks spiral

Malaria was the most reported disease as of December 2017, followed by diarrhea, fever and acute respiratory infection.<sup>7</sup> Although South Sudan declared the end of the cholera outbreak by February, in the same month a new measles outbreak was confirmed in Aweil East County (former Northern Bahr el Ghazal state) and on 12 March, an outbreak of Rift Valley fever was declared in the counties of Awerial, Yirol and Yirol West (former Lakes state). By 17 March, at least 171 suspected meningitis cases and 31 deaths had been reported in Torit County (former Eastern Equatoria state).<sup>8</sup>

1 FAO. GIEWS Country Brief South Sudan, March 2018.

2 FAO. South Sudan Emergency Livelihood Response Programme, April 2018.

3 FAO. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis, June 2018.

4 WFP. Monthly Market Price Monitoring, May 2018.

5 WFP. Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring VAM Analysis, May 2018.

6 OCHA. Humanitarian Access Snapshot, April 2018.

7 WFP. Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring VAM Analysis, May 2018.

8 OCHA. Humanitarian Bulletin, March 2018.



**6.2 million** people projected to require urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



The number of people in need of urgent assistance increased from nine percent of the population analysed in April–June 2017 to 13 percent (5.5 million) in April 2018, and it is expected to reach 14 percent (6.2 million) between May and July 2018.

TOTAL POPULATION  
**43.9million**

POPULATION ANALYSED  
**43.9million**

**IPC 3+**

CRISIS 5.6M  
EMERGENCY 0.6M

between May and July 2018<sup>1</sup>

The Sudan continues to face multi-dimensional humanitarian challenges: instability, displacement and economic shocks have contributed to a massive increase in the number of acutely food insecure people.


- Households are expected to have to apply more coping strategies to absorb rising food prices, which will negatively affect their nutrition status. The progressive depletion of livelihood assets and strategies may worsen the already fragile agricultural situation.
- Darfur accounts for about half (43 percent) of the

population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

- While unilateral ceasefires have improved the security situation across Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, some sporadic conflicts in Darfur continue to displace families – there are around 1.8 million IDPs in the region.
- The country hosts over a million refugees, mainly from South Sudan and other neighbouring countries, as well as from the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, and they lack resources and access to livelihood opportunities.

## The Sudan, IPC acute food insecurity situation


April 2018



### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

Minimal (light green), Stressed (yellow), Crisis (orange), Emergency (red), Famine (dark red), Not analysed (white), Areas with inadequate evidence (grey)

May–July 2018



### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

Minimal (light green), Stressed (yellow), Crisis (orange), Emergency (red), Famine (dark red), Not analysed (white), Areas with inadequate evidence (grey)

Source: IPC The Sudan Technical Working Group, May 2018

1 IPC The Sudan Technical Working Group. April 2018 and Projected, May–July 2018.

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Insecurity, displacement and refugee influx

For about 15 years, the Sudan's conflicts have led to small and large-scale population displacements. In some areas of Darfur, episodes of violence have often erupted between sedentary-farming and nomadic-pastoral communities fighting over access and use of land and other resources, disrupting markets and undermining livelihoods. Despite the ceasefires, armed groups fighting in Darfur in April displaced around 11 500 people, adding to the already estimated 2 million IDPs in the country, around 1.8 million of whom are displaced in Darfur.<sup>1</sup>

The Sudan also hosts around 1.2 million refugees from neighbouring countries, including 765 000 refugees from South Sudan as of June 2018.<sup>2</sup> While the conflict continues in South Sudan, the number of refugees in the neighbouring Sudan is likely to continue growing,<sup>3</sup> increasing demand and competition for resources, income opportunities and food.

### Shortfall in cereal production

Planting of 2018 crops, for harvest from October, benefited from an early onset of seasonal rains in mid-May. According to the latest weather forecasts, seasonal rains are expected to be characterized by average to above-average amounts. However, yields are likely to be affected by fuel shortages and low availability and high prices of agricultural inputs, due to sustained inflation and dwindling foreign currency reserves constraining imports.

The aggregate 2017 cereal production was estimated at 5.2 million tonnes, 40 percent lower than the record 2016 output, but still about 10 percent above the five-year average.<sup>4</sup> The output contraction was mainly due to a decline in the area planted with sorghum and millet, after farmers switched to more profitable cash crops, mainly sesame and cotton, and to drought-induced production shortfalls in Kassala, northern Gedaref and North Darfur states, where cereal production was 65–90 percent lower than in the previous year.

### High food prices

As of May 2018, prices of sorghum, millet and wheat were more than twice their year-earlier levels and at record or near-record highs across the country. The surge in cereal prices was mainly driven by the removal of wheat subsidies in the 2018 budget (which increased demand for millet and sorghum as substitutes for wheat) and the strong depreciation of the local currency, which triggered a significant rise in the general inflation rate. The removal of subsidies on electricity, coupled with limited availabilities of fuel across the country and resulting higher prices of transport, contributed to underpinning high food prices. Fuel shortages have also hindered the delivery of humanitarian and food assistance.<sup>5</sup> Vulnerable populations, particularly IDPs and refugees, with limited purchasing power will likely apply negative coping strategies such as reducing the number of meals and eating less nutritious foods, which will further increase already-high malnutrition rates.

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1 UNSC. Monthly Forecast, June 2018.

2 UNHCR. Operational Portal, June 2018.

3 OCHA. The Sudan HNO, February 2018.

4 FAO. Crop and food supply assessment mission, March 2018.

5 OCHA. The Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin, April–May 2018.




**0.4 million** people requiring urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance



This marks a 70 percent decrease since the estimate of 1.6 million acutely food insecure people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in February 2017.

TOTAL POPULATION  
**40.1 million**

POPULATION ANALYSED  
**36.1 million**



Around 4.8 million people faced Stressed (IPC Phase 2) conditions in November 2017–February 2018.

The food security situation in Uganda continues to improve despite the continued influx of refugees – mainly from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan – reaching almost 1.5 million. The improvement is mainly due to more favourable weather conditions in 2017 compared to 2016, boosting crop and livestock production in 2017 and 2018.

- The northern and northeastern subregions of West Nile, Acholi, Teso and Karamoja are the areas affected by severe food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) mainly due to the influx of South Sudanese refugees straining limited local resources, but also because of structural issues such as soil degradation and low agricultural

productivity, less favourable weather conditions, poverty, and high population growth rates.


- As of May 2018, Uganda hosted more than 1.46 million refugees fleeing conflicts in neighbouring countries such as South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- Abundant rainfall in early 2018 has improved crop and livestock production and staple food prices are below the five-year average, facilitating people’s access to food.
- Average to above-average harvests for the upcoming agricultural season are anticipated, allowing most Ugandan households to meet their basic food needs through December.

## Uganda, IPC acute food insecurity situation

November 2017–February 2018

### IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed



Source: IPC Uganda Technical Working Group, November 2017

## Factors driving food insecurity

### Daily inflow of refugees from neighbouring countries in conflict

Uganda hosts the largest population of refugees and asylum-seekers in Africa. As of 31 May 2018, it was hosting over 1 million from South Sudan, 288 000 from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, over 41 000 from Burundi and over 37 000 from Somalia.<sup>1</sup>

The number of new arrivals from South Sudan increased from an average of 170 a day in April to 245 in May. Around 1 300 refugees arrive every week from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, fleeing a recent upsurge of intercommunal violence in the northeast of the country.<sup>2</sup>

Eighty-two percent of the newly arrived population in 2018 are women and children. These refugees are totally reliant on humanitarian assistance to keep them from slipping into Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food security levels.<sup>3</sup>

The government provides all refugees with a plot of government-owned land on which to resettle and cultivate, and help them achieve self-reliance. But as the number of refugees grows, the plots become gradually smaller. The mass influx is also straining the fragile resources of host communities, causing increased food insecurity for some local populations and creating tension with locals who feel the refugees get better access to food, healthcare, water supplies and even jobs.<sup>4</sup>

The influx of refugees has also raised major health concerns. The cholera outbreak among Congolese refugees in Hoima and Kyegegwa districts was under control by May.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the continual influx of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo places Uganda at high risk of importing Ebola virus following the

outbreak of the disease there. The Ministry of Health and partners, including UNICEF, have heightened screening for Ebola at all border entry points while the World Health Organization has sent personnel protective equipment to all 14 regional referral hospitals.<sup>6</sup>

### High poverty levels and crop pests in Karamoja

The Karamoja region in the northeast is characterized by very high rates of poverty and under-nutrition, driven by recurrent climatic shocks (mainly drought), degraded environmental conditions and poor infrastructure. Two out of Karamoja's five districts (Abim and Nakapiripirit) have experienced population growth at around double the three percent national average from 2002–2014.<sup>7</sup>

Stressed (IPC Phase 2) levels of food insecurity are forecast to persist in parts of Karamoja during the April to September 2018 lean season since households have depleted their food stocks earlier than usual due to reduced own production and depend on market purchases to meet their daily requirements.<sup>8</sup> During this time, income from selling firewood/charcoal or from agricultural labour is typically low and food prices high, resulting in most poor households having to reduce the number of meals they eat each day, borrow and/or cut the quantity of food consumed.<sup>9</sup> Following the 2018 harvest to be gathered from August, food security conditions in some Karamoja districts are forecast to improve and reach minimal food insecurity.

Maize crops in several districts in Uganda were affected by fall armyworm according to field visits conducted in April 2018, but the impact was only considered significant in parts of Luwero and Wakiso districts in the Central region and in Karamoja.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup> UNHCR. Uganda operational update, June 2018.

<sup>2</sup> UNICEF. Humanitarian Situation Report, May 2018.

<sup>3</sup> FEWS NET. Projected food security outcomes, June–September 2018.

<sup>4</sup> VOA News. Uganda Pressed for Land Amid Refugee Influx. April 2018.

<sup>5</sup> FEWS NET. June –September 2018.

<sup>6</sup> UNICEF. Humanitarian Situation Report, May 2018.

<sup>7</sup> Uganda Bureau of Statistics. National Population and Housing Census, November 2014.

<sup>8</sup> USAID. April 2018.

<sup>9</sup> FEWS NET. Projected food security outcomes, June–September 2018.

<sup>10</sup> FEWS NET. Food Security Outlook Update, April 2018.

## Acute food insecurity in conflict settings: no available 2018 figures or significant deterioration

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This chapter analyses relevant information in nine conflict-affected countries for which no 2018 numbers of acutely food insecure people are available or where the situation is now relatively stable.

- Colombia
- The Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Guinea-Bissau
- Haiti
- Liberia
- The Syrian Arab Republic
- Lebanon (Syrian refugees)
- Yemen



## Colombia

For the past five decades, Colombia has endured conflict, widespread violence and natural disasters as well as environmental damage caused by the exploitation of natural resources. These instabilities have resulted in mass displacement, restricted access to basic goods and services, and they have undermined food security and nutrition, especially for rural communities. Even though food is generally available, the poor – particularly displaced and migrant households that face very limited income earning opportunities – cannot afford to buy it. Despite the signing of the peace accord between the Colombian government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia People's Army in November 2016, the country still faces territorial disputes by armed groups that continue to force many Colombians to leave their homes and undermine socio-economic development. Early 2018, 2.2 million people were in need of food and nutrition assistance.<sup>1</sup>

Over 3 000 Venezuelans, Colombians (living in Venezuela) and mixed Venezuelan-Colombian families are crossing into Colombia each day<sup>2</sup> to escape the hardships of Venezuela's current economic and political challenges. These people are mainly poor, marginalized and vulnerable, the majority of them in an irregular migratory status, lacking the right to work and access to basic services. By the end of January 2018, there were over 550 000 Venezuelans in the country, almost double the mid-2017 estimate. In addition, over 230 000 Colombians, who had been living in a refugee-like situation, left Venezuela between July and December 2017 to return to their country of origin. WFP estimates that young children and pregnant and lactating women are at particular risk of malnutrition.<sup>3</sup>

Receiving families, many of whom already face significant socio-economic challenges, particularly in the northeastern border zone, are bearing the brunt of the influx of migrants. The HNO 2018 estimates that 700 000 migrants and 2 million people in communities hosting migrants are in need of humanitarian support. Conflict and natural disasters have undermined agricultural productivity. About 85 percent of the

population as well as 87 percent of farming assets (i.e., land and livestock) are located in areas exposed to at least one natural disaster (i.e., drought, erratic rainfall, floods, landslides). In addition, much of the armed conflict has been in rural areas causing loss of land and productivity, mostly for small-scale producers.<sup>4</sup> The El Niño phenomenon (June 2015 to mid-2016) affected more than 87 000 hectares of land and depressed cotton, coffee and potato production. Although some climatic events, such as erratic rainfall, affected agricultural production in 2017, FAO reported that cereal production was estimated at 4.8 million tonnes, a record high.

## The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is affected by a severe and widespread humanitarian crisis.<sup>5</sup> It has become the African country most affected by population displacement, with 5 million people displaced as of early 2018, including 4.49 million IDPs and more than 746 000 refugees/asylum seekers in neighbouring countries.<sup>6</sup> Between June and December 2017 an estimated 7.7 million people (11 percent of the population analysed) required urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance: 6.2 million were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 1.5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>7</sup>

Conflict, high food prices and lack of earning opportunities along with localized floods, pest infestations and health epidemics, are driving the severe humanitarian situation. More than half the country (59 percent) was classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the latter half of last year with Eastern Kasai, Central Kasai, Kasai and Tanganyika provinces the most affected. Some 86 percent of those facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) were located in these provinces.

Although aggregate 2017 cereal output was expected to be average, the resurgence of violence in the town of Djugu in Ituri province could constrain food availability at the local level as so many people lost the second harvest of the 2017 agricultural season. Outbreaks of fall armyworm also damaged maize production in North Kivu and in

1 OCHA. Colombia 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan.

2 UNHCR. Venezuela Situation, March 2018.

3 WFP News. 2018. Cited 3 July 2018.

4 FAO. Colombia's Resilience Programme, 2017–2020.

5 L3 IASC system wide emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was activated in October 2017 for 6 months and expired end of May 2018.

6 OCHA. Humanitarian Outlook for the Great Lakes Region, January–June 2018.

7 IPC the Democratic Republic of the Congo Technical Working Group, June 2017. The latest IPC analysis was completed in March 2018, but is awaiting endorsement by the government for official publication.



the southeast regions.<sup>8</sup> In May, heavy rainfall blocked roads and damaged crop production during the second agricultural season.<sup>9</sup>

Conflict-induced market disruption, currency depreciation and limited cereal supplies at the national level drove up food prices – the overall annual inflation rate in April 2018 was estimated at 44 percent – severely restraining purchasing power.<sup>10</sup> Households living in 27 out of 59 monitored territories could theoretically not afford a maize-based food basket, and those living in 21 of these territories could not afford a cassava-based food basket. Households' purchasing power was particularly affected in Central Kasai, Eastern Kasai and in Kwilu.<sup>11</sup>

In the first four months of 2018 there were over 10 000 reported cases of cholera, including an estimated 235 deaths.<sup>12</sup> The epidemic is expected to persist throughout the year as a result of the collapse of the water supply system, cross-border movements, low sanitation coverage and lack of safe drinking water.

On 8 May 2018, an Ebola virus epidemic was officially declared in the Equateur province. By 1 July, 53 cases and 29 deaths had been reported.<sup>13</sup> The risk of propagation is considered high, both at the national and regional level.

## Guinea-Bissau

The overall food security situation has improved compared to previous years. According to the March 2018 CH analysis just 12 000 people (0.7 percent of the population) in Crisis (CH Phase 3) required urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance in March–May 2018<sup>14</sup> about half the number of the previous March–May. And the number was expected to decline further to 5 000 in June–August 2018 because of good income from the sales of cashews, stable market prices for rice and favourable cashew/rice terms of trade.

However, 40 years of political instability have severely undermined socioeconomic and human development in Guinea-Bissau. For the last two years the country has experienced political and institutional stalemate that has further weakened the economy.

Extreme poverty, lack of agricultural inputs, weak infrastructure, irregular rainfall and volatility of prices for locally produced commodities (cassava) underscore chronic food insecurity. Although more than 80 percent of people in Guinea-Bissau earn a living from agriculture,<sup>15</sup> the country's smallholder farmers generally do not produce enough rice to feed their families throughout the year and have to buy imported rice. More than two in three people live below the poverty line of USD 2 per day making them extremely vulnerable to food insecurity when market prices rise.<sup>16</sup>

Some localized flooding between July and September 2017 affected the harvest, pushing national cereal production to five percent below the five-year average.<sup>17</sup>

## Haiti

While improvements in the humanitarian situation have been reported over the past year, 1.3 million people still required urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance from October 2017 to February 2018. Of these 1.2 million were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 133 000 were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).<sup>18</sup>

As a result of the residual effects of the 2014–2016 drought and hurricane Matthew in October 2016, the departments of Nord-Ouest and the inlands of Grand'Anse were in Crisis and Emergency (IPC Phases 3 and 4) between October 2017 and February 2018. The rest of the country was classified in Stress (IPC Phase 2). Agro-climatic conditions have generally been normal leading to

<sup>8</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Brief the Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 2018.

<sup>9</sup> FEWS NET. Key message Update, May 2018.

<sup>10</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Brief the Democratic Republic of the Congo, February 2018.

<sup>11</sup> WFP and CAID. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, April 2018.

<sup>12</sup> OCHA. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, *Bulletin humanitaire – Numéro 7*. April 2018.

<sup>13</sup> WHO. Ebola virus disease, the Democratic Republic of the Congo July 2018.

<sup>14</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé*. March–May 2018, cited in Regional consultation on the food and nutritional Situation in the SAHEL and in West Africa as presented at the CILSS, March 2018.

<sup>15</sup> FAO. Guinea-Bissau 2018 cited 18 July 2018. [www.fao.org/emergencies/countries/detail/en/c/161542](http://www.fao.org/emergencies/countries/detail/en/c/161542)

<sup>16</sup> The World Bank. Poverty and Equity Brief, Guinea-Bissau, April 2018. According to World Bank figures 69 percent were below the poverty line in 2010.

<sup>17</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Briefs, Guinea-Bissau, June 2018.

<sup>18</sup> IPC Haiti Technical Working Group. October 2017–February 2018.

average to above-average winter and spring agricultural outputs,<sup>19</sup> so the situation was expected to improve from May 2018 following the spring season harvest.

Some localized climatic shocks included excessive rainfall in Nord-Ouest and Nippes that destroyed winter crops; late spring rainfall onset in the departments of Nord, Centre, Ouest and Nippes as well as in parts of Grand'Anse and Nord-Est that delayed spring planting; and strong winds that affected rice crops in the major rice-producing Artibonite department. The poorest households were most affected by these natural hazards.

Food basket prices mainly remained stable between late 2017 and early 2018, but they were about nine percent higher than in the first trimester of 2017 mostly due to the increase in prices of imported maize and rice and local rice.<sup>20</sup> While markets were well supplied with local produce in April, by May (pre-harvest), they lacked domestic products and were mostly supplied through imports, which pushed up food prices. Further price increases were expected due to rising fuel prices and currency depreciation.<sup>21</sup>

Despite a decreasing trend in cholera cases in 2018, the epidemic is persisting and the risk of contagion remains high. In March, there were 290 suspected cases and one reported death, up from 249 suspected cases in February but a 78 percent decrease since March 2017. Between October 2010 and March 2018, there were 819 000 reported cases and 9 757 deaths due to the cholera epidemic in Haiti.<sup>22</sup>

As of January, there were still about 38 000 displaced people in 26 sites because of the 2010 earthquake. In addition, some 12 000 people had been deported from the Dominican Republic in January alone.<sup>23</sup>

## Liberia

Fifteen years after the 14-year civil war that devastated the country ended, Liberia is making important steps towards peace, economic recovery and food security for its people.

The December 2017 presidential elections resulted in a peaceful transfer of power. Three months later the UN Mission in Liberia ended its mandate after nearly 15 years during which it supported the transition from war to peace.

Liberia currently does not have any emergency response programmes. International partners are supporting economic recovery and development efforts. In October–December 2017, 29 000 people were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and in need of urgent food and livelihood assistance, up from 14 000 in March–May 2017.<sup>24</sup> The number of people in Crisis food insecurity was expected to rise to 43 500 during the June–August 2018 peak lean season.<sup>25</sup>

Still, many issues identified as root causes of the 1989–1997 civil war remain unaddressed. Lack of public infrastructure, value chains and distribution systems means farmers struggle to market their produce.

Although endowed with fertile land and water as well as good climatic conditions, crop yields are low for a variety of reasons. For instance, less than one percent of land is irrigated, farmers lack credit to invest in infrastructure and inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers, and post-harvest losses are high.<sup>26</sup> Low yields keep the country heavily reliant on food imports, leaving the 50.5 percent<sup>27</sup> of Liberians who live below the poverty line highly exposed to food insecurity and under nutrition when food prices and exchange rates fluctuate. Poor roads and high transportation costs in rural areas limit market access for imported and local crops, often pushing up prices and exacerbating food insecurity, especially in the southeastern and north-central regions.

## The Syrian Arab Republic

The Syrian conflict has now entered its eighth year since its onset in March 2011 and in November 2017 6.5 million people (33 percent of the population) remaining in the country were acutely food insecure with another 4 million at risk of becoming food insecure.<sup>28</sup> According to an mVAM WFP survey based on 1 479 interviews in April, one in four

<sup>19</sup> FEWS NET. Haiti: perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire February to September 2018.

<sup>20</sup> CNSA. April 2018.

<sup>21</sup> FEWS NET. Haiti : perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire February to September 2018.

<sup>22</sup> OCHA. Haïti Choléra, chiffres clés 27 April 2018.

<sup>23</sup> OCHA. Humanitarian snapshot February 2018.

<sup>24</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé*. October–December 2017.

<sup>25</sup> *Cadre Harmonisé*. June–August 2017.

<sup>26</sup> FAO. Liberia National Gender Profile of Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods 2018.

<sup>27</sup> The World Bank. Liberia Overview Updated April 2018.

<sup>28</sup> OCHA. Syrian Arab Republic HNO 2018.

Syrian households had inadequate food consumption, reflecting a diet mainly of bread, rice, sugar and oil.<sup>29</sup>

As of April 2018, 5.6 million refugees had been registered in five neighbouring countries, the majority of them in Turkey.<sup>30</sup> Those unable to flee have witnessed the Syrian Arab Republic's downward spiral as widespread unemployment, economic sanctions, reductions in government subsidies, and wage cuts have brought extreme poverty to many (according to OCHA in 2017, 69 percent of Syrians were living in extreme poverty, on less than USD 2 a day).

Among those facing acute food insecurity, about 418 000 were Palestinian refugees and 420 000 were living in 10 besieged areas that are difficult for the humanitarian community to access. In a briefing to the Security Council on 29 May 2018, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator said that less than 20 percent of Syrians in hard-to-reach areas had received humanitarian assistance so far this year.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the UNSC's unanimous demand in February 2018 for a cessation of hostilities to allow for humanitarian aid access, more armed conflict ensued with civilians suffering the consequences particularly in Afrin, Damascus, Eastern Ghouta and Idlib.<sup>32</sup> According to the April 2018 mVAM WFP bulletin, residents of Duma near Damascus were facing severe lack of food, fuel, sanitation, health services and supplies after years of siege and months living under intense shelling and airstrikes. An inter-agency UN convoy managed to reach the city in mid-March, carrying food assistance for just 26 100 people.<sup>33</sup>

Despite access difficulties, the UN reached about 2.7 million people with food assistance in all 14 Syrian governorates in April 2018, including rural Damascus, Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa and Dar'a governorates, and, for the first time since 2014, began land deliveries to rural Deir Ezzor and Ar-Raqqa city.<sup>34</sup>

A steady decrease in food prices across the Syrian Arab Republic from January 2018, perhaps because of some reopening of trade routes,<sup>35</sup> meant that by April, the

average price of a standard food basket was 29 percent below the previous year. But, the average local wholesale price of wheat grain was more than double that of international markets in April and Syrians' purchasing power has been severely eroded by high unemployment and low wages as well as by the removal of subsidies on some commodities (i.e., bread and fuel), and hyperinflation.<sup>36</sup>

The 2018 Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission preliminary results indicate a decline in cereal production mainly due to poorly distributed rainfall in the 2017/2018 season. In many areas insufficient rainfall were followed by a dry spell affecting crucial stages of crop development, greatly limiting possible yields. In other areas cereal crops survived the drought – thanks to irrigation, for instance – but were damaged during spring by heavy rainfall, the consequent prevalence of fungal diseases, and hail.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, agricultural production continues to be hampered by high production costs, lack of inputs, and damaged or destroyed infrastructure such as irrigation. Furthermore, conflict-related constraints have likely impeded sowing in some fields of eastern Hassakeh, and in areas of Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir-Ez-Zor.

## Lebanon (Syrian refugees)

The population of Lebanon has grown by about a quarter in less than five years, and the influx of refugees has placed remarkable strain on the economy, public services, and infrastructure, as well as on social relations, deepening poverty and exacerbating pre-existing development issues.

Around 1.9 million people are in need of food assistance in 2018, 1.4 million of whom are displaced Syrians, 34 000 Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic and the rest Lebanese. At 3.3 million, around half of the country's population need humanitarian assistance.<sup>38</sup>

Some 91 percent of refugee households are food insecure to some degree.<sup>39</sup> About half (53 percent) of them are 'mildly' food insecure, a third (36 percent) moderately

<sup>29</sup> WFP. mVAM Bulletin April 2018.

<sup>30</sup> UNHCR. Operational Portal Refugee Situation The Syrian Arab Republic Accessed May 2018.

<sup>31</sup> UN Press Release. February 2018.

<sup>32</sup> UNSC. Monthly Forecast March 2018; April 2018.

<sup>33</sup> WFP. mVAM Bulletin April 2018.

<sup>34</sup> WFP. Situation Report April 2018.

<sup>35</sup> WFP. Market Price Watch April 2018.

<sup>36</sup> OCHA. HNO 2018 the Syrian Arab Republic.

<sup>37</sup> FAO and WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic (forthcoming).

<sup>38</sup> Government of Lebanon and the UN. Lebanon 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan.

<sup>39</sup> UNHCR. Operational Portal Refugee Situation The Syrian Arab Republic Accessed June 2018.

food insecure and two percent severely food insecure.<sup>40</sup> In 2017, 76 percent of Syrian refugee households were living below the poverty line, an increase from 71 percent in 2016. Limitations on access to the labour market and lack of income opportunities have made it difficult for refugees to meet basic needs without external assistance. Syrian households' main sources of income in Lebanon are informal credit and debt (62 percent), followed by WFP assistance (40 percent). Eighty seven percent of refugees reported having to borrow money to buy food, cover health expenses and pay for rent.

## Yemen

As Yemen enters its fourth year of widespread conflict it continues to constitute the world's largest man-made humanitarian and food security crisis. Although there are no IPC updates, according to the latest available data from the HNO report, there are 17.8 million food insecure Yemenis, 8.4 million of whom are 'severely food insecure'.<sup>41</sup> About 22 million people (three quarters of the country's population) need some form of humanitarian or protection assistance including around 2 million Yemenis who have been internally displaced since the onset of the conflict, almost all of them for one year or more.

While the humanitarian community continues to provide emergency aid, damage to infrastructure, airports and seaports (as well as the temporary closure of seaports and airports by the Saudi-led coalition for most of November 2017) have disrupted supply pipelines and increased the price of fuel and imported food, on which Yemen is highly reliant.

Comparing March 2018 with the previous March the retail price of imported rice was up by 47 percent, that of wheat grains by 40 percent and wheat flour by 24 percent.<sup>42</sup> The national average price of the monthly minimum food basket in April 2018 was 63 percent higher than in the pre-crisis period. Diesel and petrol prices have more than doubled since the crisis started, increasing transport costs of food and trucked water.<sup>43</sup>

Although supply and availability of imported key food commodities was stable in nearly all monitored governorates in March 2018, some areas are suffering from a scarcity of food. For instance, in Ad-Dale and Al Baidha, imported wheat grains, wheat flour and non-basmati rice, locally produced cereals, vegetable and fish products were scarcely available in March.<sup>44</sup>

The country continues to experience challenges with receiving humanitarian supplies. Al Hudaydah and Saleef ports, which import about 70 percent of food and 40–50 percent of the country's monthly fuel requirements, are at risk of being damaged or disrupted because of the intensified conflict.<sup>45</sup> According to a report in mid-June 2018, following warnings of an impending offensive in Al Hudaydah, Saudi and UAE-led military forces began an assault on Al Hudaydah on 13 June. Since Yemen relies heavily on imports to meet the majority of its food and fuel needs, conflict that could significantly disrupt port operations or destroy port facilities risks driving Yemen into an even more dire food security situation.<sup>46</sup> It is critical that seaports and airports remain open and accessible to allow lifesaving assistance into the country.

Even if food is available the majority of Yemenis cannot afford it. The collapse of the economy left an estimated 83 percent of the population at or below the poverty line in 2017.<sup>47</sup> Millions have lost their sources of income; public salaries have been frozen and private companies have on average reduced operating hours by about 50 percent compared with the pre-crisis period, with an estimated half of the workforce being laid off.<sup>48</sup>

Agriculture is suffering from shortages and high prices of agricultural inputs including fuel. Farmers are increasing the share of rainfed crops, which bear lower yields. Cereal production for 2017 is estimated at 450 000 tonnes, more than a 40 percent decrease from the previous five-year average.<sup>49</sup> Lack of supply means the retail price of locally produced crops (sorghum, maize, millet and barley) is following a similar upward trend to that of imported food.

Yemen has been experiencing the worst cholera outbreak in recent world history. From 27 April 2017 to

<sup>40</sup> UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP. Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2017.

<sup>41</sup> OCHA. Yemen HNO 2018.

<sup>42</sup> FSTS-FSIS. Monthly Market Monitoring Bulletin April 2018.

<sup>43</sup> WFP. Yemen Market Watch Report April 2018.

<sup>44</sup> WFP. Yemen Market Watch Report March 2018.

<sup>45</sup> FEWS NET. Continued port functioning critical as increased conflict continued in Al Hudaydah, May 2018.

<sup>46</sup> FEWS NET. Conflict in Al Hudaydah threatens ports; sustained imports needed to mitigate risk of Famine June 2018.

<sup>47</sup> The World Bank. Yemen's Economic Outlook April 2018.

<sup>48</sup> The World Bank. Working for the people of Yemen, 2017.

<sup>49</sup> FAO. GIEWS Country Brief Yemen June 2018.

20 May 2018, the World Health Organization reported 1 100 720 suspected cases and 2 291 deaths with children being the worst hit.<sup>50</sup> In early May, the country's first oral cholera vaccination campaign was launched to immunize a target of half a million people. Although the number of new cases has substantially dropped since late 2017, the collapse of basic services has left millions of people with inadequate access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene, putting Yemenis at risk of disease outbreaks, especially during the rainy season from April to August.

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# Annexes

## Annex 1. Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table for Area Classification

**Purpose:** To guide short-term strategic objectives linked to medium- and long- term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

**Usage:** Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.

Phase Name and Description		Phase 1 Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Famine
		<p>More than four in five HHs are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.</p>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</p> <p>Minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies</p>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</p> <p>Food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition; <b>OR</b> Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.</p>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</p> <p>Large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; <b>OR</b> Extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps in the short term.</p>	<p>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have an extreme lack of food and other basic needs where starvation, death, and destitution are evident.</p> <p>(Evidence for all three criteria of food consumption, wasting, and CDR is required to classify Famine.)</p>
Priority Response Objectives		Action required to Build Resilience and for Disaster Risk Reduction	Action required for Disaster Risk Reduction and to Protect Livelihoods	<b>Urgent Action Required to:</b> 		
				Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition	Save lives & livelihoods	Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods
Area Outcomes (directly measured or inferred)	Food Consumption & Livelihood Change	More than 80% of households in the area are able to meet basic food needs without engaging in atypical strategies to access food and income & livelihoods are sustainable	Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 2 or worse	Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 3 or worse	Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 4 or worse	Based on the IPC Household Group Reference Table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 5
	Nutritional Status*	<p>Acute Malnutrition: &lt;5%</p> <p>BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: &lt;10%</p>	<p>Acute Malnutrition: 5-10%</p> <p>BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: 10-20%</p>	<p>Acute Malnutrition: 10-15% OR &gt; usual &amp; increasing</p> <p>BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: 20-40%, 1.5 x greater than reference</p>	<p>Acute Malnutrition: 15-30% OR &gt; usual &amp; increasing</p> <p>BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: &gt;40%</p>	<p>Acute Malnutrition: &gt;30%</p> <p>BMI &lt;18.5 Prevalence: far &gt; 40%</p>
	Mortality*	<p>CDR: &lt;0.5/10,000/day</p> <p>USDR: ≤1/10,000/day</p>	<p>CDR: &lt;0.5/10,000/day</p> <p>USDR: ≤1/10,000/day</p>	<p>CDR: 0.5-1/10,000/day</p> <p>USDR: 1-2/10,000/day</p>	<p>CDR: 1-2/10,000/day OR &gt;2x reference</p> <p>USDR: 2-4/10,000/day</p>	<p>CDR: &gt;2/10,000/day</p> <p>USDR: &gt;4/10,000/day</p>

\*For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits must be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of a Phase classification. For example, elevated malnutrition due to disease outbreak or lack of health access – if it is determined to not be related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for an IPC classification. Similarly, excess mortality rates due to, murder or conflict – if they are not related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for a Phase classification. For Acute Malnutrition, the IPC thresholds are based on percent of children under 5 years that are below 2 standard deviations of weight for height or presence of oedema. BMI is an acronym for Body Mass Index. CDR is Crude Death Rate. USDR is Under 5 Death Rate.

## Annex 2. Acute Food Insecurity Reference Table for Household Group Classification

**Purpose:** To guide short term strategic objectives tailored to the needs of household groups with relatively similar Phase classifications, which should compliment medium and long term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

**Usage:** Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects humanitarian assistance.

Phase Name and Description		Phase 1 None	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe
		HH group is able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance	Even with any humanitarian assistance: • HH group has minimally adequate food consumption but is unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in irreversible coping strategies	Even with any humanitarian assistance: • HH group has food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition;  OR • HH group is marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with accelerated depletion of livelihood assets that will lead to food consumption gaps.	Even with any humanitarian assistance: • HH group has large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality  OR • HH group has extreme loss of livelihood assets that will lead to large food consumption gaps in the short term	Even with any humanitarian assistance: • HH group has an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even with full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, and destitution are evident
Priority Response Objectives		Action required to Build Resilience and for Disaster Risk Reduction	Action required for Disaster Risk Reduction and to Protect Livelihoods	Urgent Action Required to:		
				Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition	Save lives & livelihoods	Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods
Household Outcomes (directly measure or inferred)	Food Consumption* (quantity & nutritional quality)	<b>Quantity:</b> adequate (2 100kcal pp/day); stable <b>HDDS:</b> no recent deterioration and >=4 food groups (based on 12 food groups) <b>FCS:</b> "acceptable consumption"; stable <b>HHS:</b> "none" (0) <b>CSI:</b> = reference, stable <b>HEA:</b> No "Livelihood Protection Deficit"	<b>Quantity:</b> minimally adequate (2,100kcal pp/day) <b>HDDS:</b> recent deterioration of HDDS (loss of 1 food group from typical, based on 12 food groups) <b>FCS:</b> "acceptable" consumption (but deteriorating) <b>HHS:</b> "slight" (1) <b>CSI:</b> = reference, but unstable <b>HEA:</b> "Small or moderate Livelihood Protection Deficit"	<b>Quantity:</b> food gap; below 2 100 kcal pp/day OR 2 100 kcal pp/day via asset stripping <b>HDDS:</b> severe recent deterioration of HDDS (loss of 2 food groups from typical based on 12 food groups) <b>FCS:</b> "borderline" consumption <b>HHS:</b> "moderate" (2-3) <b>CSI:</b> > reference and increasing <b>HEA:</b> Substantial "Livelihood Protection Deficit" OR small "Survival Deficit" of <20%	<b>Quantity:</b> large food gap; much below 2,100kcal pp/day <b>HDDS:</b> <4 out of 12 food groups <b>FCS:</b> "poor" consumption <b>HHS:</b> "severe" (4-6) <b>CSI:</b> Significantly > reference <b>HEA:</b> "Survival Deficit" >20% but <50% with reversible coping considered	<b>Quantity:</b> extreme food gap <b>HDDS:</b> 1-2 out of 12 food groups <b>FCS:</b> [below] "poor" consumption <b>HHS:</b> "severe" (6) <b>CSI:</b> far > reference <b>HEA:</b> "Survival Deficit" >50% with reversible coping considered
	Livelihood Change (assets & strategies)	Sustainable livelihood strategies and assets	<b>Livelihood:</b> Stressed strategies and assets; reduced ability to invest in livelihoods <b>Coping:</b> 'Insurance Strategies';	<b>Livelihood:</b> Accelerated depletion/erosion of strategies and assets that will lead to high food consumption gaps <b>Coping:</b> 'Crisis Strategies'	<b>Livelihood:</b> Extreme depletion/liquidation of strategies and assets that will lead to very high food consumption gaps <b>Coping:</b> 'Distress Strategies'	<b>Livelihood:</b> Near complete collapse of strategies and assets <b>Coping:</b> effectively no ability to cope
For Contributing Factors, specific indicators and thresholds for inferring Phase need to be determined and analysed according to the unique causes and livelihood context of household groups. General descriptions are provided below. See IPC Analytical Framework for further guidance on key aspects of availability, access, utilization, and stability						
Contributing Factors	Food Availability, Access, Utilization, and Stability	Adequate to meet food consumption requirements and short-term stable Safe Water ≥15 litres pppd	Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe Water marginally ≥15 litres pppd	Highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe Water 7.5 to 15 litres pppd	Very highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe Water 4 to 7.5 litres pppd	Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements Safe Water <4 litres pppd
	Hazards & Vulnerability	None or minimal effects of hazards and vulnerability on livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability stress livelihoods and food consumption	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in loss of assets and/or significant food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in large loss of livelihood assets and/or food consumption deficits	Effects of hazards and vulnerability result in near complete collapse of livelihood assets and/or near complete food consumption deficits

**Annex 3. People in need of food, nutrition or livelihoods assistance, by country, for Issue N°3 (December 2017) and Issue N°4 (July 2018)**

Country information		Country population analysed*		People in need of food, nutrition and livelihoods assistance			
		Issue N°3 Dec. 2017	Issue N°4 Jul. 2018	Issue N°3 Dec. 2017		Issue N°4 Jul. 2018	
Country	Country population (millions)	%	%	People in need (millions)	People in need in population analysed (%)	People in need (millions)**	People in need in population analysed (%)
Afghanistan	34.7	84	11	7.6	26	1.3	33
Burundi	11.2	94	98	1.8	18	1.8	15
Central African Republic	4.9	64	96	1.1	30	2.0	43
Colombia	49.0	Not in report	100	N/A	N/A	2.3	5
Democratic Republic of the Congo	78.4	92	92	7.7	11	No update	11
Guinea-Bissau	1.9	67	65	0.0	0	0.0	0
Haiti	10.9	68	68	1.3	18	No update	18
Iraq	37.0	100	100	3.2	9	1.9	5
Lake Chad Basin – Cameroon (Far North)	24.3	18	18	1.5	34	No update	34
Lake Chad Basin – Chad (Lac)	15.4	4	4	0.1	14	0.2	27
Lake Chad Basin – Niger (Diffa)	22.1	3	3	0.1	9	0.1	17
Lake Chad Basin – Nigeria (northeast)	195.9	8	7	2.6	19	3.0	22
Lebanon (Syrian refugees)	5.9	100	100	1.9	32	No update	32
Liberia	4.9	90	87	0.0	1	0.0	1
Mali	19.0	100	99	0.3	2	0.9	5
Palestine	5.0	Not in report	100	N/A	N/A	1.6	32
Somalia	13.9	89	89	3.1	25	2.5	20
South Sudan	11.1	100	100	4.8	44	7.1	63
Sudan	43.9	100	100	3.8	9	6.2	14
Syrian Arab Republic	19.4	100	100	6.5	33	No update	33
Uganda	40.1	Not in report	90	N/A	N/A	0.4	1
Yemen	28.2	100	100	17.0	60	No update	60

\* Projected figures are reported for the following countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Niger, Nigeria), Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia.

\*\* Afghanistan and Central African Republic's population analysed are significantly different when comparing estimated figures in Issue N°3 and Issue N°4, and therefore these figures are not comparable.

NA = Not Applicable





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