

SAVING  
LIVES  
CHANGING  
LIVES



# Somalia: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2012-2017)

## Evaluation Report: Volume I

Prepared by Nick Maunder (Team Leader), George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzarri and Marte Hurlen.

Commissioned by the

WFP Office of Evaluation

September 2018



World Food  
Programme

# Acknowledgements

Our thanks go to the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) in Rome for their constant support throughout this evaluation. The evaluation team (ET) is very grateful for all the assistance provided by Dawit Habtemariam, Michael Reynolds and Sally Burrows.

The evaluation team (ET) would especially like to thank Laurent Bukera (Representative/Country Director), Edith Heines (Deputy Country Director), Liljana Jovceva (Head of Programme), Delphine Dechaux (Deputy Head of Programme) and other staff of WFP Somalia country office (CO) and in the field for facilitating, supporting and contributing to the evaluation. Without their valuable and timely support, the mission would not have been so well informed, nor conducted so efficiently and effectively according to schedule.

Our gratitude also goes to the many respondents from the various government authorities, the donor community, the United Nations (UN) system, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society who afforded the time to participate in some very useful and informative discussions and contributed to the findings of this evaluation. The contributions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of different ages and gender in Somalia were also appreciated.

## Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the evaluation team, and do not necessarily reflect those of WFP. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the World Food Programme concerning the legal or development status of any territory, country, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

## Evaluation Management

Evaluation Manager	Dawit Habtemariam
Senior Evaluation Advisor	Michael Reynolds
Coordinator of Country Portfolio Evaluations	Sally Burrows
Director of Evaluation	Andrea Cook

# Table of Contents

<b>Fact Sheet: WFP Portfolio in Somalia</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>Map</b> .....	<b>xxiv</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1. Evaluation Features .....	1
1.2. Country Context .....	2
1.3. The WFP Portfolio in Somalia .....	9
<b>2. Evaluation Findings</b> .....	<b>15</b>
2.1. Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning .....	17
2.2. Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making .....	27
2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results.....	33
<b>3 Conclusions and Recommendations</b> .....	<b>54</b>
3.1. Overall Assessment.....	54
3.2. Recommendations .....	57
<b>Acronyms</b> .....	<b>60</b>

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Sources of evidence for the Somalia CPE .....	2
Figure 2: Population in IPC phases 3 and 4 (2012–2017) .....	4
Figure 3: Global and severe acute malnutrition (GAM and SAM) prevalence in Somalia (2013–2017) .....	5
Figure 4: ODA to Somalia (USD million a year).....	9
Figure 5: WFP Somalia portfolio and context timeline (2012–2017) .....	12
Figure 6: Planned CBTs (USD) and IKTs (MT) 2012–2017 .....	13
Figure 7: Gender and protection policy frameworks in Somalia .....	26
Figure 8: WFP Somalia GFA beneficiaries planned vs actual 2012–2017.....	34
Figure 9: TSFP beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2012–2017 .....	35
Figure 10: BSFP beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2012–2017.....	35
Figure 11: Quantity of RUSF distributed (planned vs actual) 2012–2016 .....	36
Figure 12: Support to ART and TB-DOTS (planned vs actual) 2012–2017 .....	37
Figure 13: FFA participants (planned vs actual) 2012–2017.....	38
Figure 14: FFT participants (planned vs actual) 2012–2017 .....	38
Figure 15: School meals beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2012–2017 .....	40
Figure 16: UNHAS passengers (planned vs actual) 2012–2016.....	41
Figure 17: BSFP outcomes (2012–2017) .....	44
Figure 18: UNHAS efficiency by country (2016).....	48

# List of Tables

Table 1 WFP Special Operations in Somalia .....	10
Table 2 Planned Beneficiaries by Activity, Sex, Year and Age (2012-2017).....	11
Table 3 Puntland Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Strategy and WFP Nutrition Activities (2012-2017) .....	17
Table 4 WFP's alignment with the National Gender Policy .....	19
Table 5 Comparison of WFP Nutrition Policy and Nutrition Activities .....	27
Table 6 SBCC Beneficiaries (Planned vs Actual) 2014-2016.....	36
Table 7 MCHN Centres Assisted (Planned vs Actual) 2012-2016 .....	36
Table 8 FFA Assets Created and Rehabilitated (Planned vs Actual) 2012-2016 .....	38
Table 9 GFA DDS Outcomes (2014-2017).....	43
Table 10 School Meals Outcomes (2012-2017) .....	45
Table 11 Strategic Objectives of WFP Somalia Operations.....	51

## Annexes (Volume II)


Annex A	Terms of Reference
Annex B	Field Mission Schedule
Annex C	Evaluation Methodology
Annex D	Evaluation Matrix
Annex E	Interview Checklists
Annex F	Evaluation Timeline
Annex G	People Consulted
Annex H	Bibliography
Annex I	Somalia Development Indicators
Annex J	WFP Portfolio in Somalia and Donor Funding
Annex K	List of Cooperating Partners
Annex L	Nutrition and Health
Annex M	Emergency Preparedness, Response and Logistics
Annex N	Livelihoods, Food Security and Resilience
Annex O	Gender and Protection
Annex P	Output and Outcome Performance by Operation
Annex Q	Response to Previous Evaluation Findings
Annex R	Mapping Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
Annex S	Acronyms

# Fact Sheet: WFP Portfolio in Somalia


## Portfolio Activities and Modalities

Activity	EMOP 200281	PRRO 200443	PRRO 200844
GFA	X	X	X
Nutrition	X	X	X
FFT/FFA	X	X	X
School Meals	X	X	X
HIV/AIDS and TB	X	X	X
CBT	X	X	X

Percentage of Actual (left) and Planned Beneficiaries by Activity 2012–2017



## Top Donors to WFP Portfolio in Somalia



# Executive Summary

## Introduction

### Evaluation features

1. The country portfolio evaluation covered all WFP activities in Somalia from 2012 to 2017. It assessed WFP's strategic positioning, the quality of and factors influencing WFP's decision making, and the performance and results of portfolio activities. The evaluation was timed to provide evidence to inform the design of the new WFP interim country strategic plan for Somalia.

2. The evaluation was conducted by WFP's independent Office of Evaluation together with an external evaluation team. The evaluation team carried out fieldwork in Somalia over three weeks in November and December 2017 and employed mixed methods, drawing on monitoring data, document review and semi-structured interviews of stakeholders and beneficiaries. The team did not encounter major constraints that compromised the overall validity of the evaluation.

### Context

3. The Somali Democratic Republic, established after independence in 1960, collapsed in 1991 with the outbreak of civil war. In August 2012, Somalia passed a new provisional constitution, which established a federal government. A slow but continual improvement in governance capacities has occurred since then. The Government and its allies in the African Union Mission to Somalia have continued to combat radical groups, including Al-Shabaab. The Somali New Deal Compact (2014–2016) was launched in 2013 and had five peacebuilding and state-building goals. It was replaced in December 2016 by the Somalia National Development Plan (2017–2019), which introduces national targets for employment, food and nutrition security, disaster preparedness and response and national resilience building, and a social protection framework. Sector policies developed by ministries provide further substance to strategies and programmes for addressing food and nutrition insecurity.<sup>1,2</sup>

**TABLE 1: SOMALIA SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS**

Year	Indicator	Value
2016–2017	Population living below the poverty line	6.3–6 million
2006–2017	Urban population (% of total)	35–42%
2013–2016	Consumer price inflation	4.5–1.5%
2013–2017	Agriculture's share in gross domestic product	65–65%
2012–2017	Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)	86.3–86.2%

<sup>1</sup> World Bank. 2017. Somali Poverty Profile.

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/325991506114032755/pdf/AUS19442-REVISED-PUBLIC-Somali-Poverty-Profile-Update-4-27-November-2017.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Population Fund. 2014. *Population estimation survey 2014 for the 18 pre-war regions of Somalia*.


<https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Population-Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PESS-2013-2014.pdf>.

TABLE 1: SOMALIA SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS		
Year	Indicator	Value
2012–2015	Arable land (% of total land area)	1.6–1.8%
2012–2017	Food deficit	200,000–350,000 mt
2012–2015	Population with access to basic sanitation	17.6–16.2%
2012–2017	Primary school net enrolment rate	32–30%
2012–2016	Internally displaced persons	1.35–1.1 million
2012–2016	Somalian refugee population*	1–1.4 million
2009–2015	National stunting rate (moderate and severe)	25.3–26%
2014–2017	Global acute malnutrition rate	14.2–17.4%
2012–2015	Maternal mortality rate (per 100 000 live births)	791–732

\* Including 308,700 in Kenya, 255,600 in Yemen and 246,700 in Ethiopia. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2017. Horn of Africa Somalia Situation, May 2017.

4. Somalia suffers from chronic food and nutrition insecurity with periodic acute crises. An estimated 258,000 people died of famine in 2010–2011. While conditions gradually improved from 2012, the failure of four consecutive rainy seasons coupled with conflict-related population displacements resulted in a renewed food security crisis in 2017 (figure 1). The median rates of acute malnutrition were consistently classified as critical (> 15 percent) in the southwest, serious (10–14 percent) in the northeast and poor (5–9 percent) in the northwest.

**Figure 1: Numbers of food-insecure people IPC 3 (crisis) or 4 (emergency),\* 2012–2017**




\* In Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 3 (crisis) or 4 (emergency).

Source: FAO Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, re-analysed by WFP's Somalia country office.

5. Gender disparities in Somalia are among the most pronounced in the world. Somalia is the sixth worst performing country globally for gender equality.<sup>3</sup> Early marriage and lack of education are major contributors to malnutrition. Gender-based violence is widespread and conflict has seriously exacerbated the problem, with an estimated 76 percent of survivors of gender-based violence coming from the internally displaced population.<sup>4</sup>

6. Poor tax collection capacity, a narrow tax base, the shortage of legal and regulatory frameworks and the Government’s lack of full territorial control hinder revenue mobilization, leaving the Government dependent on foreign assistance. Flows of humanitarian and development aid have been roughly comparable (figure 2).

**Figure 2: Official development assistance to Somalia (million USD per year)**



Source: Aid Coordination Unit, Office of Prime Minister, Somalia.

### WFP portfolio

7. WFP’s portfolio in Somalia for 2012–2017 comprised emergency operation (EMOP) 200281 (2011–2012), protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 200443 (2012–2015) and PRRO 200844 (2016–2018). Special operations supported the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure, and cluster initiatives. There was no formal WFP country strategy document for Somalia covering the evaluation period. WFP planned to assist between 1.34 and 3.58 million people a year, representing between 11 and 29 percent of the population. General food assistance and nutrition activities dominated the portfolio, together accounting for 75 percent of planned beneficiaries. A map and summary of the evolution of WFP’s portfolio in Somalia are shown in figures 3 and 4. Country office operations received donor contributions of USD 995,466,428 – 50 percent of the USD 1,978,048,196 required.<sup>5</sup> The top five donors have been the United States of America, which contributed 56 percent of the total received,

<sup>3</sup> OECD 2014. Social Institution and Gender Index. <https://www.oecd.org/dev/development-gender/BrochureSIGI2015-web.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2017. *2017 Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview*. <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/2017-somalia-humanitarian-needs-overview>.

<sup>5</sup> These are the figures and requirements for 2012–2017 extracted from WFP’s corporate platform for contribution statistics, the “FACTory”, on 10 April 2018. The FACTory retrieves its data from the WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS).



the United Kingdom with 10 percent, Germany with 8 percent, Canada with 5 percent and the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund with 3 percent.

8. The main thematic components of the WFP portfolio included:

*emergency preparedness and response:* general food assistance targeting drought- and conflict-affected communities, internally displaced persons and returnees, and delivered as food, cash-based transfers (CBTs) and pre-cooked meals;


*nutrition and health:* targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) programmes, blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) programmes, support to pregnant and lactating women and girls through mother-and-child health and nutrition services, social and behaviour change communication, “delivery incentives” to mothers for giving birth under medical supervision, and support to people receiving anti-retroviral therapy and/or tuberculosis (TB) directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS);

*food security, livelihoods and resilience:* food assistance for assets (FFA), food assistance for training (FFT), school meals, including take-home rations for girls, and local food purchases; and


*special operations:* support to UNHAS, infrastructure development, and aspects of humanitarian coordination.

9. References to gender issues were limited under EMOP 200281 and PRRO 200443 but increased markedly under PRRO 200844, which was approved after the 2015 Gender Policy was launched.

Figure 3: Map of WFP activities in Somalia





Date Created: 08 January 2018  
 Contact: joshua.mesa@wfp.org  
 Website: www.wfp.org  
 Prepared by: VAM, WFP-Somalia  
 Map Reference:  
 SO\_Admin/GeoPDM\_08012018\_AFP



The designations employed and the presentation of material in the map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory, city or sea, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

**Figure 4: Overview of WFP's Somalia portfolio, 2012–2017**

	Pre-2012	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
<b>Somalia relevant events</b>		 <p>August 2012: First Federal Government of Somalia</p> <p>September 2012: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud became president. First presidential election in Somalia since 1967</p>				 <p>Cholera and measles outbreaks</p> <p>2016–2017 Drought</p> <p>February 2017: Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed became president</p>		
<b>WFP response main phases</b>	<b>FAMINE RESPONSE</b>		<b>BUILDING FOOD SECURITY, NUTRITION AND RESILIENCE</b>				<b>FAMINE RESPONSE</b>	
<b>WFP operations in Somalia</b>	<b>EMOP 200281 (July 2011–Dec 2012)</b> Tackling hunger and food insecurity in Somalia							
			<b>PRRO 200443 (Jan 2013–Dec 2015)</b> Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience			<b>PRRO 200844 (Jan 2016–Dec 2018)</b> Reducing Malnutrition and Strengthening Resilience to Shocks for a Food-Secure Somalia		
	<b>SOP 105780 (Feb 2007–Mar 2013)</b> Emergency Rehabilitation Works for Logistics Infrastructure in Somalia		<b>SOP 200475 (Apr 2013–Nov 2014)</b> Logistical Infrastructure for Somalia and the Horn of Africa Corridor	<b>SOP 200637 (Jun 2014–May 2016)</b> Security Augmentation			<b>SOP 201051 (Jun 2017–May 2018)</b> Emergency Rehabilitation Work and Capacity strengthening at the Port of Kismayo	
	<b>SOP 106810 (Aug 2007–Dec 2012)</b> Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia and Kenya		<b>SOP 200507 (Jan 2013–Dec 2015)</b> Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and in Kenya			<b>SOP 200924 (Jan 2016–Dec 2017)</b> Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and in Kenya		
	<b>SOP 200344 (Aug 2011–Dec 2012)</b> Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Somalia		<b>SOP 200440 (Sep 2012–Jun 2016)</b> Food Security Cluster Augmentation in Response to the continued Humanitarian Situation in Somalia					
<b>WFP policies and evaluations</b>	<b>2008–2013 WFP Strategic Plan</b> Shift from food aid to food assistance		2014–2017 (ended 2016) WFP Strategic Plan Framework for WFP's efforts towards achieving a world with Zero Hunger. Focus on food assistance reaffirmed				<b>WFP Strategic Plan 2017–2021</b> , focus on Integrated Road Map introduced to achieve the SDGs	
	<b>Somalia CPE (2006–2011)</b>	<b>Mid-term operation evaluation of PRRO 200844 in Somalia (mid 2012–2015)</b>				<b>School meal review</b>		

## Evaluation findings

### *Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio*

10. As reflected in the EMOP and PRRO documents, WFP aligned its strategy and activities with Somalia's overarching national policies. WFP has established good relationships to ensure coherence between its own activities and programmes and those of ministries at the state and national levels. However, the depth of collaboration varied considerably.

11. In 2012, WFP planned to address the shift from food aid to food assistance by enhancing nutrition, relief activities, livelihoods and social safety nets through the provision of school meals. Working as part of the Scaling Up Nutrition network, WFP was particularly well aligned to provide structured support for the design and implementation of national nutrition policies and programmes. In the education sector, WFP was committed to implementing school meals interventions directly through government structures in Somaliland and Puntland. Education is a major national priority with the potential to break intergenerational negative behaviours. In 2012, the ministry responsible for crisis preparedness and response had only recently been established.

12. The portfolio remained broadly relevant to beneficiaries' needs throughout the evaluation period. Beneficiaries demonstrated a strong preference for CBTs, particularly unconditional cash, which gave them greater flexibility in meeting diverse needs. There was, however, limited evidence of the differentiation of programming by age, gender and diversity beyond the traditional efforts in nutrition and education interventions. There was also inadequate strategic attention to the post-emergency needs of internally displaced persons in urban areas.

13. Prior to 2012, the WFP country office had been criticized for its lack of engagement in the United Nations system and the insular management of its emergency response. The country office subsequently improved its relationships with other United Nations agencies, including by establishing close partnerships with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

14. WFP adopted an innovative approach to partnerships by formalizing strategic partnerships with three non-governmental organizations: the Danish Refugee Council, contributing expertise on age, gender, protection and diversity issues; Save the Children, on nutrition; and World Vision, on livelihoods and HIV/TB care and treatment activities. The evaluation found that this approach was starting to yield positive results.

15. However, significant fault lines continued between humanitarian and development agencies. First, perceived as being led by predominantly humanitarian United Nations agencies, the resilience agenda has not effectively bridged the humanitarian–development divide at the political level. Other United Nations agencies advocated for a more inclusive approach to building resilience that includes development agencies. Second, regarding the durable solutions framework – which was established to contribute to building the resilience of internally displaced persons and supporting their resettlement – the evaluation team found that despite its work with internally displaced persons and returnees and its leadership in resilience building interventions, WFP had limited visibility in the durable solutions initiative and working group of the United Nations country team.<sup>6</sup>

16. Differences were apparent in the strategic positions adopted by individual donors, which made it difficult for WFP to identify and align with a consensus among donors. In general, donors

---

<sup>6</sup> In the Somalia National Development Plan (2017–2019), WFP is not mentioned among the stakeholders contributing to durable solutions for assisted population in Somalia. <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/som169866.pdf>.

have shown an increasing appetite for the use of CBTs in Somalia and have welcomed WFP's shift to using this modality and supporting resilience building, although conceptual and programmatic approaches differ.

17. With WFP's support, the cluster system provided an important platform for operational coordination, although it was less effective as a strategic coordination platform. WFP contributed to the operations of the food security, nutrition and logistics clusters by providing staff for secretariat positions.

18. WFP has positioned itself to lead responses to acute food and nutrition emergencies. This role was aligned with WFP's comparative advantages, including its widespread field presence; extensive network of cooperating partners facilitating community engagement and the implementation of operations; strong analytical capacities; and unique expertise and capacity in supply chain management. However, WFP had a less preeminent role in supporting recovery and building resilience.

19. The country portfolio was well aligned with WFP's corporate policies and strategies. In accordance with its policies on humanitarian principles, WFP maintained overall impartiality and sought to respond to needs in a non-discriminatory manner, where it had access, while preserving its operational independence.

#### *Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision making*

20. The country office vulnerability analysis and mapping unit collaborated with FSNAU on assessments. Geographical targeting of WFP's assistance was transparently linked to the findings of these assessments, through seasonal analysis response plans, and to many other studies and assessments, including a causal analysis of malnutrition carried out in 2015. WFP started to provide capacity strengthening in food security analysis to the staff of state-level governments and partners in 2013. As this work is still in progress, its relationships to the larger-scale capacity building efforts of FSNAU are unclear.

21. WFP's decision making took into appropriate consideration the food security situation, WFP's mandate and policies, national policy frameworks, the conditions imposed by donors, and the changing governance context. The quality of leadership provided by the WFP senior management team was another important factor in strategic decision making.

22. WFP's difficult experiences before and during the famine of 2011 influenced the decision to invest heavily in preparedness measures with a view to averting future famines. A variety of risk management and mitigation measures were adopted, including a strict policy of carrying out physical monitoring of operations and the establishment of an effective, easily accessible and robust complaint and feedback mechanism. No major diversions of WFP food assistance were reported over the period evaluated.


#### *Portfolio performance and results*

23. While the evaluation generally found strong capacity for geographical targeting, there were concerns regarding the community-based targeting of households because social exclusion and marginalization were known to have affected the distribution and redistribution of entitlements in Somalia. Important gaps were identified in understanding of the comparative positions of beneficiary women and girls versus men and boys in rural and urban communities and differences between internally displaced persons who had arrived recently and longer-term residents in and around camps and settlements of internally displaced persons. Insufficient attention was given to

the influence of clan systems and “gatekeepers” on social exclusion and marginalization affecting distribution of entitlements in Somalia.<sup>7</sup>

24. Planned output targets for **general food assistance** were generally exceeded (figure 5); and 55 percent of WFP food assistance reached women. CBTs have become the predominant transfer modality. While initially slow to employ CBTs, WFP increased the use of CBTs dramatically from 2016 onwards. Cash started to replace voucher transfers in late 2016 and accounted for an estimated 10 percent of CBTs in October 2016.

**Figure 5: Beneficiaries of WFP’s general food assistance in Somalia, actual versus planned, 2012–2017**



Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.

25. While WFP has progressively expanded coverage in areas of south-central, as of late 2017, security concerns continued to prevent it from reaching 600,000 people classified as extremely food insecure. Reports of the food security outcomes of general food assistance are inconsistent for the period from 2012 to 2014, but from 2015 onwards, improvements in diet diversity scores (table 2) and food consumption scores (table 3) were visible within a year. In contrast to 2011, WFP has been plausibly credited with making an important contribution to preventing famine in 2017. While the levels of the shocks in 2011 and 2017 were arguably comparable, there was no evidence of widespread mortality in 2017.

<sup>7</sup> “Gatekeepers” are self-appointed intermediaries who negotiate between internally displaced persons and the humanitarian sector. Bryld, E., Kamau, C. and Sinigallia, D. 2013. *Gatekeepers in Mogadishu*. The Somalia Cash Consortium. [www.cashlearning.org/downloads/1376766704.pdf](http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/1376766704.pdf); and Yarnell, M. and Thomas, A. 2017. *On the Edge of Disaster: Somalis Forced to Flee Drought and Near Famine Conditions*. Refugees International. <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/59a72c71f5e2319b70268cdc/1504128127041/2017+Somalia+Report+Updated+Final.pdf>.

	2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up
All households	5.6	5.6	3.2	4.8	3.99	4.46	3.57	4.33
Woman-headed households	5.1	5.7	2.9	4.7	3.82	4.6	3.60	3.87
Man-headed households	4.8	5.8	3.2	4.9	4.07	4.43	3.50	4.47

Sources: WFP standard project reports 2014–2017.

Strategic objective	Food consumption score	% of households									
		2012		2013		2015		2016		2017	
		Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up
1	Poor	8	9	n.a.	10	87.5	13.8	29	11.3	56.6	46.2
1	Acceptable	56	69	n.a.	76	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	13.1	34.9
1	Borderline	36	22	n.a.	14	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	30.4	18.9
2	Borderline	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	18	26.35	34.8	14.5
2	Poor	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	40.3	22.16	34.2	34.8
3	Borderline	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	24.5	26.6	20.4	30.3	n.r.	n.r.
3	Poor	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	n.r.	30.3	34	48.1	24.24	n.r.	n.r.

\* Available food consumption score data were found to be patchy and inconsistent throughout the evaluation period. No data on aggregate food consumption scores in 2014 were available, but gender-disaggregated scores were reported: under strategic objective 1, the base value for woman-headed households with poor scores was 1.6 percent with a follow-up value of 1.58 percent, and the base value for man-headed households with poor scores was 9.4 percent with a follow-up value of 5.38 percent; under strategic objective 3 the base value for woman-headed households with poor scores was 3.2 percent with a follow-up value of 0, and the base value for man-headed households with poor scores was 13.3 percent with a follow-up value of 12.53 percent.


Food consumption score thresholds: poor = 0–21; borderline = 21.5–35; acceptable = > 35.

n.a. = not applicable; n.r. = not reported.

Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.


26. **Nutrition and health.** Targets for TSF beneficiaries were exceeded in 2012, 2016 and 2017, but results fell short in other years because of changing needs and access constraints (figure 6). BSF distributions were either close to or comfortably exceeded targets (figure 7). The numbers of social and behaviour change communication beneficiaries and of mother-and-child health and nutrition centres assisted fluctuated but came close to targets in most years. Support to the recipients of anti-retroviral therapy and TB-DOTS reached targets only in 2012 and then progressively declined because of funding constraints.

**Figure 6: TSF beneficiaries, actual versus planned, 2012–2017**



Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.

**Figure 7: BSF beneficiaries, actual versus planned, 2012–2017**



Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.

27. Nutrition outcomes broadly met targets for coverage, recovery, default and mortality rates. The TSF programme met Sphere minimum standards for performance in humanitarian response in all the key indicators (table 4).<sup>8</sup> The coverage of adequate BSF distributions increased dramatically from 20 to 81.3 percent between 2014 and 2017, with 100 percent of beneficiaries receiving adequate distributions in 2016 because of improved outreach. The coverage rates of mother-and-child health and nutrition interventions, however, were low and consistently below WFP’s own target of > 70 percent.

**Table 4: TSF programme outcomes, 2014–2017**

Coverage rate	Recovery rate	Default rate	Mortality rate
48.4–75.2% against a WFP target of 50%	Exceeded the Sphere threshold of 75%	Met the Sphere threshold of < 15%	0–1% against a WFP target of < 15%


28. There is anecdotal evidence that the one-off delivery incentive ration increased the number of women and girls attending health centres to give birth. Despite inconsistent food supplies, TB-DOTS patients receiving rations had very good treatment success and nutrition recovery rates. Among the clients of anti-retroviral therapy, nutrition recovery rates were similarly high until 2015, when default rates became very high because of the lack of food for this activity.

29. **Food assistance for assets.** Numbers of FFA beneficiaries exceeded the target in 2012 and 2013, remained close to the target in 2015–2016 and dropped significantly in 2017 (figure 8) because donors earmarked their contributions for emergency activities. WFP’s ability to create or rehabilitate the planned livelihood assets was variable.

<sup>8</sup> Sphere Project. 2011. *The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*. [www.sphereproject.org/resources/?search=1&keywords=&language=English&category=22&subcat-22=23&subcat-29=0&subcat-31=0&subcat-35=0&subcat-49=0](http://www.sphereproject.org/resources/?search=1&keywords=&language=English&category=22&subcat-22=23&subcat-29=0&subcat-31=0&subcat-35=0&subcat-49=0).



**Figure 8: FFA participants, planned versus actual, 2012–2017\***



\* Numbers of FFA participants. In standard project reports, the numbers of FFA participants were provided in 2012–2014, but were multiplied by 6, to include participants’ household members, in 2015–2017.  
 Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.

30. FFT activities were largely concentrated in urban areas and were tailored to the needs of displaced women and men seeking new skills for employment and small business development. Recovery activities did not achieve targets for improvements in food consumption scores, diet diversity scores and coping strategy index scores (table 5). However, as the related data are patchy, influenced by wider variables and reported on consistently only from 2016, it is questionable whether WFP’s outcome targets were appropriate to the context. The quality of the assets created and the training delivered through FFA and FFT could not be assessed by the evaluation.

<b>Table 5: Livelihood recovery and resilience activity outcomes</b>				
	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>
<b>Average diet diversity scores at FFA/FFT sites</b>				
<b>Recovery programme</b>				
All households	n.r.	n.r.	4.6	4.8
Woman-headed households	n.r.	n.r.	4.2	4.4
Man-headed households	n.r.	n.r.	4.7	4.9
<b>Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)</b>				
All households	n.r.	4.2	4.2	n.r.
Woman-headed households	5.72	3.9	4.9	n.r.
Man-headed households	6	4.3	4.1	n.r.
<b>Average annual food consumption scores at FFA/FFT sites</b>				
<b>Recovery programme ("other" districts)</b>				
% of households with <i>borderline</i> scores	n.r.	n.r.	26.4	14.5
% of woman-headed households with <i>borderline</i> scores	n.r.	n.r.	24	18.5
% of man-headed households with <i>borderline</i> scores	n.r.	n.r.	27.3	13.1
% of households with <i>poor</i> scores	n.r.	n.r.	22.2	34.8
% of woman-headed households with <i>poor</i> scores	n.r.	n.r.	30.8	49.7
% of man-headed households with <i>poor</i> scores	n.r.	n.r.	18.6	30.9
<b>Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)</b>				
% of households with <i>borderline</i> scores	n.r.	26.6	30.3	n.r.
% of woman-headed households with <i>borderline</i> scores	29.8	30	24	n.r.
% of man-headed households with <i>borderline</i> scores	35.6	17.6	31.2	n.r.
% of households with <i>poor</i> scores	n.r.	34	24.2	n.r.
% of woman-headed households with <i>poor</i> scores	0	49.5	8	n.r.
% of man-headed households with <i>poor</i> scores	12.53	28.1	26.6	n.r.
<b>Average annual coping strategy index at FFA/FFT sites</b>				
<b>Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)</b>				
% of households with reduced/stabilized index (asset depletion)	n.a.	35.5	56.6	n.r.
% of households with reduced/stabilized index (food)	43.7	13.2	19.6	n.r.


Dark grey boxes indicate targets achieved. Light grey, targets not achieved.

n.a. = not applicable; n.r. = not reported.

Source: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017 and CO data. No data on these outcomes in 2012 and 2013.

31. WFP **school meals programmes** are planned and implemented to address food security, rather than educational goals. WFP's school meals programme successfully exceeded planned target beneficiary numbers in all years except 2014 and 2017, when there were resource constraints (figure 9). Schools indicated a preference to be supplied with vouchers rather than in-kind food, as the basket of commodities did not always meet local preferences. There was little evidence of positive effects of school meals on food security, but retention of girls and boys and overall attendance and education outcomes did improve. The suspension of take-home rations in 2017 has not had a significant impact on girls' attendance.

**Figure 9: School meals beneficiaries, actual versus planned, 2012–2017**



Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Change in enrolment rate in WFP-assisted primary schools (%)	n.a.	n.a.	6.1	13.3	1.3	0.34
Change in enrolment rate among boys (%)	n.a.	n.a.	7.2	13.1	0.9	0.34
Change in enrolment rate among girls (%)	n.a.	n.a.	4.9	13.5	1.7	0.34
Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools (%)	94.5	95.2	97	n.r.	99	95.00
Retention rate among boys (%)	94.5	95.2	97	n.r.	98.5	95.00
Retention rate among girls (%)	94.4	95.5	97	n.r.	99.7	94.50
Gender ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted schools	0.81	0.8	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.81


Dark grey boxes indicate targets achieved. Light grey, targets not achieved.

n.a. = not applicable; n.r. = not reported.

Sources: WFP standard project reports 2012–2017.

Between 2013 and 2016, a total of 5,700 mt of cereals were purchased through local in-country procurement (figure 10).

**Figure 10: Local purchases 2013–2016 (mt per year)**



Sources: WFP standard project reports 2013–2016.

32. **UNHAS** met targets for the movement of personnel, medical and security evacuations and the movement of light cargo. The demand for air services increased in 2017 because of the escalation of relief activities. For common services, reporting was at the output rather than the outcome level, but the evaluation confirmed that UNHAS responded rapidly, efficiently and flexibly to the fast-changing needs of the humanitarian community.

33. WFP has contributed to the development of **logistics infrastructure** in Somalia by investing in port rehabilitation and the capacity strengthening of port staff. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there have been positive economic effects, expanding market opportunities in both national and international trade. However, outcomes related to capacity building were poorly monitored or reported.

34. Few linkages were observed among emergency, nutrition, livelihood recovery, resilience and school meals interventions. However, the introduction of WFP's corporate beneficiary and transfer management platform, SCOPE, with a "multi-wallet" distribution facility provided an innovative mechanism for integrating the delivery of transfers and services at the household level.

35. **Efficiency.** The country office has sought to control costs through various initiatives, including reducing delays and demurrage costs in ports through investments in port infrastructure and handling capacities; regional cost-sharing agreements on the use of the Berbera logistics hub; the consolidation of WFP nutrition activities around mother-and-child health and nutrition centres; and the establishment of a single registry to reduce overlaps in targeting. The country office's choice of modality relied heavily on qualitative considerations. Although alpha analyses<sup>9</sup> for most planned distributions indicated greater cost efficiency for in-kind food assistance, consideration of timeliness and the importance of meeting beneficiary preferences have increasingly led to a preference for CBTs over in-kind food distributions.

36. Use of the Rome-based Global Commodity Management Facility has reduced delivery lead times by 62 percent. A mass registration of beneficiaries, the distribution of SCOPE cards and the

---

<sup>9</sup> Alpha analyses measure the cost efficiency of a food assistance modality.

equipping of retailers with point-of-sale devices started in 2015 and facilitated the rapid response to the 2017 crisis. The capacity for rapid response was enhanced further by the strategic shift to CBTs, which reduced the time taken from the confirmation of a contribution to the dispatch of the assistance by nearly 50 percent compared with in-kind food assistance.

37. **Sustainability.** Work on integrating the services provided by WFP with those of UNICEF, and consolidating them in mother-and-child health and nutrition centres and programmes, coupled with capacity building of federal and state ministries of health, enabled a more sustainable approach to the provision of nutrition services. With the handover of the management of major ports to private sector operators, improvements in port infrastructure are likely to be sustained.

38. National partners are making initial moves towards establishing a national social safety net. Important contributions of WFP included demonstrating the feasibility of establishing a national-level biometric identity system and linking it to a single registry of beneficiaries and national agency interventions. Through the social protection sub-working group, WFP and UNICEF have also begun to work with the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development on developing a policy framework with the cooperation of federal and state governments. Work has also started on identifying strategies for reaching the most vulnerable populations; establishing a multi-agency nationwide registration and assistance delivery platform; and strengthening the capacities of government partners, including their capacities to develop and use social protection indicators linked to Sustainable Development Goal targets.<sup>10</sup>

39. There is little evidence of the extent to which WFP activities have contributed to rebuilding post-disaster livelihoods through sustained benefits from the assets created and increased employment opportunities, or to building resilience to future shocks and reducing risk. WFP, with FAO and UNICEF, played a prominent role in formulating a strategic approach with the introduction of a joint resilience strategy, but the strategy failed to result in programmatic innovation because of WFP's declining engagement in rural livelihoods and a reduction in FAO's field presence and because the strategy is a loose affiliation of reformulated activities confounded mainly with its FFA activities.

40. **Gender** inequalities have been a significant concern in Somalia. However, staff capacity in and responsibility for addressing gender issues were limited, and a lag was apparent in the operationalization of the most recent WFP gender policy. The capacity of staff to consider and address gender issues is still rather limited, and the potential support in this area from the regional bureau was at times left unused. Opportunities were missed for developing a more profound analysis of gender dynamics at the household and community levels, and for fully engaging with other United Nations initiatives in this area.

41. Despite WFP's well-defined data protection and privacy policies, doubts remain about the application of these policies in the field when handling sensitive data such as biometrics – phone numbers, photos and fingerprints – and in relation to the issue of informed consent from beneficiaries on the use of their data and to difficulties in managing overcrowding at registration and CBT redemption and top-up sites. A planned analysis of protection considerations in relation to SCOPE implementation was not carried out because of competing priorities and security concerns. The 2016 SCOPE guiding principles for protection do not mention protection concerns. The extent of partners' knowledge and understanding of WFP policies regarding beneficiary

---

<sup>10</sup> WFP. 2017. *WFP and Social Protection: Somalia Case Study*. <https://www.wfp.org/content/2017-wfp-and-social-protection-somalia-case-study>.

identities and information was also unclear.

42. **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E).** In the early part of the period evaluated, major data gaps and weaknesses existed in the country office's M&E system. An M&E strategy was drafted in 2014 and the reach of post-distribution monitoring improved with the introduction of third-party monitoring and telephone surveys. As a consequence, outcome reporting has improved since 2015, although challenges remain, including in capturing capacity building results. The introduction of a complaints hotline has established a degree of accountability to affected populations. In 2017, monitoring and reporting systems were further enhanced through the introduction of a digital dashboard that draws together information from SCOPE, mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping, and other WFP data systems.

## Conclusions

43. Considering the complex and challenging circumstances in Somalia, WFP has strategically positioned itself well for responding to the needs of the population. The depth of collaboration and coherence with partners varied considerably, however, and broadly constrained opportunities to capitalize on internal and external synergies.

44. The relevance and effectiveness of the portfolio were especially high. During the latter part of the period evaluated, WFP demonstrated an impressive ability to respond effectively and at scale to acute emergencies in Somalia. As a result, WFP was plausibly credited with making a key contribution to preventing famine in 2017. This was a major achievement and a dramatic improvement compared with the shortcomings in responding to the previous famine of 2011.

45. The emergency preparedness and response component was built on WFP's core comparative advantages at both the corporate and country levels, including its strong field presence, large network of cooperating partners, strong analytical capacities and proven capacities in supply chain management. In addition to building on these foundations, the country office leadership had the foresight to invest in innovative preparedness measures. The advanced registration of beneficiaries, along with the establishment of the infrastructure and agreements needed for rolling out CBTs at scale, proved critical to the timely mobilization of assistance as the food security situation deteriorated. In addition, the biometric registration system, in conjunction with reinforced monitoring systems, enabled the establishment and maintenance of strong risk management and safeguards against potential fraud and corruption.

46. Targeting of general food assistance remained challenging, however, with a need to guard against the exclusion of marginalized groups who had little understanding of or ability to claim their entitlements. The understanding and analysis of gender and protection issues in the country office were limited and the response was largely undifferentiated according to age, gender and ability.

47. Populations that were internally displaced by conflict and drought often failed to re-establish viable pastoral livelihoods. Many displaced people have instead joined the ranks of the urban poor and become increasingly reliant on long-term humanitarian aid. To address this gap, WFP responded through support for livelihoods, but there is little evidence that these activities have resulted in sustained improvements in household incomes.

48. As well as offering pathways out of dependency, WFP sought to establish a robust approach to building resilience to future crises. In partnership with FAO and UNICEF, a useful conceptual framework was developed with the aim of coordinating the delivery of safety nets, basic services and livelihoods. The operationalization of this framework was limited,

however, with limitations in the livelihood approach adopted and little progress made throughout the system towards establishing a social safety net.

49. The challenging circumstances in Somalia evolved, with increased opportunities arising for engagement with emerging national authorities at both the federal and state levels with a view to supporting their capacities to meet the food and nutrition needs of the population. In some sectors, important advances were made, most notably in collaboration on the delivery of strategies, capacities and services for nutrition. More could be done, however, including maximizing the relevance of school meals as part of a coordinated education strategy. Access to education remains severely constrained and is an under-recognized means of positive social change, including by facilitating the adoption of behaviours that underlie long-term food security. Overall, ensuring the sustainability of results has been challenging.

50. Several important lessons and good practices from the Somalia portfolio deserve wider consideration and dissemination throughout WFP, including the improved timeliness of assistance provision associated with the introduction and extensive use of the Global Commodity Management Facility; the pre-registration of potential beneficiaries in SCOPE as a preparedness measure; the successful use of cash rather than voucher transfers at scale; the feasibility of establishing a single biometric registry at scale, piloted through SCOPE; and the establishment of strategic partnerships with selected non-governmental organizations in specific thematic areas.

## Recommendations

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
1.	National safety net programme	<p>Repeated crises and continuing chronic needs are highly probable.</p> <p>Adequate preparedness is essential to delivering a timely, life-saving emergency response.</p> <p>Despite stakeholder interest, no agency has yet taken the lead.</p> <p>The programme is well aligned with WFP's comparative advantages.</p>	<p>1. WFP should provide technical leadership in developing and piloting a national safety net programme – Somali Safety Net Programme – for addressing chronic, seasonal and acute needs:</p> <p>1a. Partner with both humanitarian and development donors.</p> <p>1b. Consult closely with federal and state authorities on the design of the programme from the outset.</p> <p>1c. Draw on experiences from other safety net programmes in the region in order to inform the design.</p> <p>1d. Establish a single registry for beneficiaries, based on the interoperability of established systems.</p> <p>1e. Ensure that mobile cash is used as a delivery modality.</p> <p>1f. Ensure that referral pathways for protection cases are included.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p> <p>2018–2019</p>
2.	Strategy for assisting internally displaced persons	<p>The majority of internally displaced persons intend to remain and settle in urban areas.</p> <p>There are insufficient resources to support sustainable urban livelihoods and prevent rising urban poverty.</p> <p>Humanitarian resources may be used for the survival needs of urban poor people and internally displaced persons.</p>	<p>2. WFP should develop a longer-term approach to assisting internally displaced persons:</p> <p>2a. Include internally displaced persons as a target group in the national safety net programme.</p> <p>2b. Tighten the definition and targeting of internally displaced persons in emergency assistance programmes.</p> <p>2c. Expand urban livelihood programmes based on evidence of effectiveness.</p> <p>2d. Explore new partnerships for promoting the integration of internally displaced persons in urban communities.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p> <p>2018–2019</p>
3.	Livelihoods	<p>Livelihoods are an important pillar of an integrated approach to building resilience.</p> <p>Evidence of the outcomes or</p>	<p>3. WFP should shift the primary objective of FFA and FFT activities to creating productive assets and livelihoods:</p> <p>3a. Plan and implement FFA and FFT activities within a three-year planning</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p>




No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
		<p>sustainability of food security is weak.</p> <p>Planning and implementing FFA within annual programming cycles does not ensure sustained community engagement or sustainable outcomes.</p>	<p>cycle and strengthen coherence with national strategies and programmes.</p> <p>3b. Ring-fence resources in order to ensure continuity.</p> <p>3c. Develop an M&amp;E framework for assessing both the short- and longer-term results of FFA and FFT.</p>	2018–2019
4.	Gender and protection issues	<p>Analysis and understanding of gender and protection issues are insufficient.</p> <p>Capacities and skills for gender and protection assessments are limited.</p> <p>Programming approaches are relatively undifferentiated by age, gender and ability.</p>	<p>4. WFP should strengthen the integration of gender and protection considerations in programming:</p> <p>4a. Review the existing terms of reference for the policy officer position with a view to ensuring a more equal and visible integration of responsibilities for addressing gender and protection concerns, or establish a dedicated position for gender and protection issues.</p> <p>4b. Request a standby gender and protection officer and capitalize on the regional protection and gender adviser through more regular collaboration and exchange.</p> <p>4c. Assess the impact of various transfer modalities on intra-household and community dynamics, including gender and protection dynamics, and use the results to inform programme design.</p> <p>4d. Strengthen the capacities of cooperating partners in gender and protection analysis.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p> <p>2018–2019</p>
5.	Targeting	<p>In community-based targeting mechanisms, there is potential for significant exclusion of marginalized groups.</p> <p>Beneficiaries were unaware of the criteria for enrolment and of their entitlements.</p>	<p>5. WFP should improve the targeting of beneficiaries, including internally displaced persons:</p> <p>5a. Promote the equal and active participation of women and girls using participatory methodologies to ensure the participation of communities, including internally displaced persons, in the design of targeting criteria and entitlements.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p> <p>2018–2019</p>


No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<p>5b. Improve communication with beneficiaries on targeting criteria and entitlements.</p> <p>5c. Continue to closely monitor the distribution of programme benefits.</p>	
6.	Capacity building	<p>Conditions in Somalia are increasingly conducive to the capacity building of national institutions.</p> <p>WFP has demonstrated potential to contribute in specific thematic areas, but capacity building efforts are insufficiently coordinated with other stakeholders.</p> <p>Results are poorly monitored and reported, with limited visibility of WFP's efforts.</p>	<p>6. WFP should engage in broader inter-agency dialogue for coordinating approaches to planning and implementing capacity building efforts:</p> <p>6a. Work in partnership with relevant United Nations agencies on conducting thorough capacity assessments of selected partner ministries to provide the basis for identifying specific areas where WFP has a comparative advantage for capacity building, such as food security analysis.</p> <p>6b. In consultation with the monitoring unit at headquarters, strengthen tools and capacities for monitoring and evaluating capacity building activities.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau, headquarters.</p> <p>2018-2019</p>
7.	Nutrition and health	<p>There is a sound strategy for nutrition and health programmes rooted in strong collaboration with UNICEF as a co-implementing partner. However, opportunities for strengthening implementation and sustaining outcomes were identified.</p>	<p>7. WFP should engage with the Ministry of Health on annual strategic planning and provide support to the integration of nutrition monitoring data into the Ministry's existing health management information system:</p> <p>7a. Work with FSNAU and other nutrition cluster partners with a view to deepening analysis of the causes of food and nutrition insecurity.</p> <p>7b. Ensure that nutrition centres have a contingency plan for treating all malnourished children.</p> <p>7c. Disaggregate coverage figures to identify the differences in coverage among urban areas, rural areas and settlements of internally displaced persons, and closely monitor re-admissions to TSF programmes to ensure that stopping family rations has not resulted in children being readmitted to TSF programmes for treating malnutrition.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p> <p>2018-2019</p>

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<p>7d. Change the transfer modality for the delivery incentive from food to CBTs and consider whether to continue providing it to mothers or switch to providing it to traditional birth attendants.</p> <p>7e. Reinvigorate anti-retroviral therapy and TB-DOTS programmes by providing appropriate support for both clients and their households.</p> <p>7f. Expand social and behaviour change communication to communities and the wider public, targeting men and change agents such as community leaders.</p>	
8.	School meals	<p>Education is a strong national priority with the potential to break intergenerational negative behaviours.</p> <p>Education has the potential to address structural causes of food and nutrition insecurity.</p> <p>WFP school meals are planned and implemented to address food security rather than educational goals.</p> <p>School meals have a proved positive impact on enrolment and retention (particularly of girls), rather than on food security indicators.</p>	<p>8. WFP should position and evaluate the contribution of school meals as part of an inter-agency education strategy:</p> <p>8a. Coordinate and report on school meals as part of the education cluster rather than the food security cluster.</p> <p>8b. Align operational decision making with an education objective, such as the selection of participating schools.</p> <p>8c. Implement the postponed Systemic Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) diagnostic with the Ministry of Education.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from regional bureau and headquarters.</p> <p>2018–2019</p>

# Map of WFP Activities in Somalia



Date Created: 08 January 2018  
 Contact: [joshua.amesa@wfp.org](mailto:joshua.amesa@wfp.org)  
 Website: [www.wfp.org](http://www.wfp.org)  
 Prepared by: VAM, WFP-Somalia  
 Map Reference:  
 SO\_AdminCashFDPS\_08012018\_AAP



The designations employed and the presentation of material in the map(s) do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory, city or sea, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Evaluation Features

### 1.1.1 Rationale, objectives and users

1. Country portfolio evaluations (CPEs) focus on WFP operations at country level and address all WFP activities during a specific period. The evaluations assess the performance and results of the portfolio and provide insights to guide strategic and operational decision-making. CPEs aim to provide answers to three key evaluation questions:

Question 1: *Alignment and strategic positioning of the WFP country strategy and portfolio.*

Question 2: *Factors and quality of strategic decision-making.*

Question 3: *Performance and results of the WFP portfolio.*

2. Somalia was selected for independent evaluation by the WFP independent Office of Evaluation (OEV) and an external evaluation team (ET) as part of its ongoing series of CPEs, which seeks to systematically evaluate WFP's country presence. A previous evaluation covered WFP's portfolio in Somalia between 2006 and 2011.<sup>11</sup> A mid-term evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200443 was also conducted in 2015.<sup>12</sup>

3. The evaluation is an opportunity for the country office (CO) to benefit from an independent assessment of its strategic approach and portfolio of operations 2012–2017 and to generate corporate lesson-learning around WFP's adaptation to Somalia's complex and changing context. It is expected that the evaluation findings will inform the CO in designing its operations and strategic orientation. Specifically, the CPE is expected to provide evidence of past and current performance that will be useful for designing the new interim country strategic plan (ICSP) in line with the WFP Integrated Road Map (IRM) and Agenda 2030 for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

4. The terms of reference (ToR) for this evaluation, set out in Annex A, indicate that evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, this CPE:

- i. Assesses and reports on how the performance and results of the country portfolio align with the WFP mandate and respond to humanitarian and development challenges in Somalia (**accountability**) and;
- ii. Determines the reasons for observed success or failure and draws lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that will enable the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning WFP in Somalia, to form strategic partnerships, and to improve operations, programme design and implementation whenever possible (**learning**).

5. The intended users of the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations include the WFP Somalia country office, the Regional Bureau Nairobi (RBN), headquarters divisions, senior management and the Executive Board (EB); federal and state governments in Somalia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donors and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). Ultimately it is hoped that WFP's male and female beneficiaries, while they will not directly use the report, will benefit from the evaluation process.

---

<sup>11</sup> Somalia: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio. WFP, May 2012.


<sup>12</sup> Mid-term evaluation of the Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience June 2012 – December 2015. WFP. April 2015.

### 1.1.2 Methodology and limitations

6. The evaluation was undertaken by the independent Office of Evaluation together with an external evaluation team. It involved inception visits to Rome, Nairobi and Somalia in October 2017, which fed into the inception report, approved in November 2017. The main evaluation mission to WFP country and liaison offices took place over three weeks in November and December 2017 (see Annex B), and included a week of visits to the regions in Somalia where WFP was operational. A presentation of preliminary findings to the CO and RBN in Nairobi was followed by a briefing for headquarters by teleconference on 25 January 2018.

7. The methodology for the evaluation was set out in the inception report and is summarized in Annex C; the evaluation matrix is presented in Annex D and interview checklists in Annex E. The sources of evidence drawn on by the evaluation are shown in **Figure 1**. The evaluation process and timeline are described in Annex F. The people (male and female) and organizations consulted are listed in Annex G. The bibliography is provided in Annex H. The OEV provided quality assurance and managed the evaluation.

**Figure 1: Sources of evidence for the Somalia CPE**



8. The limitations experienced by the evaluation were: firstly, access to some field locations and activities was restricted because of security constraints, consequently there was less direct contact with WFP beneficiaries than desired; secondly, there were limitations in the availability of data, including incomplete reports at outcome and impact levels, and limited data for assessing efficiency; and thirdly, staff rotations meant that most interviews involved staff who had joined in or after 2014. While some constraints had to be accepted, the ET did not believe that they compromised the overall validity of the evaluation.

## 1.2. Country Context

9. Located at the Horn of Africa, Somalia is a low-income country. A 2014 survey<sup>13</sup> estimated the population at 12.3 million, including 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Somalia's high fertility rate and large proportion of people of reproductive age maintain rapid population

<sup>13</sup> UNFPA. October 2014. Population Estimation Survey 2014.

growth; estimates indicate that 46 percent of the population is below the age of 15.<sup>14</sup> Rates of urbanization are high; the proportion of the population living in urban areas and cities rose from 35 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2017.<sup>15</sup> The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated in 2017 that there were nearly 900,000 Somali refugees in the region, including 308,700 in Kenya, 255,600 in Yemen and 246,700 in Ethiopia.<sup>16</sup>

### 1.2.1 Economy and poverty<sup>17</sup>

10. Despite three decades of civil war, Somalia has sustained an informal economy based mainly on livestock, remittances, money transfers from abroad and telecommunications.<sup>18</sup> According to the World Bank, Somalia's gross domestic product (GDP) was projected to reach USD6.2 billion in 2016, and per capita GDP was estimated at USD450.<sup>19</sup> However, the lack of education and job opportunities is a major source of tension in Somalia's large youth cohort and makes young people vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups.

11. Agriculture is Somalia's most important economic sector, accounting for 60 percent of GDP. Over 50 percent of national export earnings were derived from livestock in 2016.<sup>20</sup> However, agricultural productivity in Somalia is low and the country faces a large structural food deficit. Even in a good year total crop production meets only 40 to 50 percent of national requirements. Food security in both rural and urban households is sensitive to fluctuations in agricultural prices; the prices of casual labour and cereals correlate strongly with levels of food insecurity.

12. Somalia scores very poorly on most development indicators, suffering from poor governance, protracted internal conflict, underdevelopment, economic decline, poverty, social and gender inequality, and environmental degradation (see Annex I). The World Bank poverty survey in 2016 (covering Somaliland, Puntland and accessible urban areas) found that every second Somali lived in poverty, and almost one in three faced extreme poverty. Poverty varied considerably across different segments of the Somali population, ranging from 26 to 70 percent, with regional disparities exceeding differences between urban and rural areas. Somalis living in IDP settlements faced the most widespread, deepest poverty; seven out of ten lived in poverty and one in two lived in extreme poverty, placing them among the poorest populations in sub-Saharan low-income countries.<sup>21</sup>

13. The World Bank survey also found that one in five Somali households had received remittances in the previous 12 months, but that the likelihood of receiving a remittance varied from 7 percent to 32 percent across regions, with IDP least likely to be recipients.<sup>22</sup> The annual per capita value of remittances, among those who receive them, is USD233. For international money transfers, Hawala<sup>23</sup> is commonly used, though remittance companies are increasingly partnering with mobile network operators to transfer money directly to mobile money accounts. Mobile telecommunications service providers have grown significantly. The services are deemed to be fast and convenient, but the system is unregulated.

---

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> [Statista](#). 2016. Mogadishu is one of the three fastest growing urban centres in Africa.

<sup>16</sup> UNHCR. May 2017, Somalia Situation 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Little nationally representative data has been collected since the outbreak of civil war, limiting the ability to comment on trends over the evaluation period. The context analysis is therefore limited to referencing specific data points.

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>.

<sup>20</sup> World Bank. [Somalia Economic update](#). 2017.

<sup>21</sup> All poverty data from Pape, Utz Johann. 2017. Somali poverty profile 2016: findings from wave 1 of the Somali high frequency survey. Washington, DC: World Bank.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Hawala is a popular and [informal value transfer system](#) based not on the movement of cash, or on telegraph or computer network wire transfers between banks, but on the performance and honour of a huge network of money brokers.


### 1.2.2 Food and nutrition security

14. Somalia suffers from chronic food and nutrition insecurity, overlaid by periodic acute crises. Two seasons of crop failure in 2010 (Deyr) and 2011 (Gu), and a collapse in livestock prices, led to famine in the Middle and Lower Shabelle and Bakool areas of southern Somalia in 2011. About 2.4 million people were estimated to be in crisis or emergency conditions<sup>24</sup> and an estimated 258,000 lives were lost between October 2010 and April 2011, including 10 percent of children under 5 years of age.<sup>25</sup>

15. After 2012, food security gradually improved. The improvement was attributed in part to rising humanitarian investment in relief and recovery, and in part to stable Gu (April to June) and Deyr (October to December) rains in the following four years.<sup>26</sup>

16. However, the failure of four consecutive rainy seasons 2016–2017, coupled with conflict-related population displacements and trade disruptions, led to a deterioration in the food-security situation, with an estimated 3.4 million in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) phase 3 or 4 in mid-2017 (26 percent of the population).<sup>27</sup> Given the forecast of a poor Gu season in April/May 2018, the situation in early 2018 was precarious (see **Figure 2**).

**Figure 2: Population in IPC phases 3 and 4 (2012–2017)**



Source: FSNAU (re-analysed by WFP Somalia).

17. Provisional figures from UNHCR indicate that more than 1.13 million individuals were newly displaced during 2017, most (893,000) because of the drought and 203,000 because of conflict.<sup>28</sup>

18. **Figure 3** shows the deteriorating nutrition situation over the evaluation period. The median rates of acute malnutrition over the evaluation period were consistently classified as critical in the South West (>15 percent), serious (10–14 percent) in the North East and poor (5–9 percent) in the North West.<sup>29</sup> Global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates among IDPs were generally higher than for host populations. For example, the 2015/2016 Deyr survey recorded the highest prevalence of acute malnutrition (based on weight-for-height Z-scores) among Dolow IDP (25

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.fsnau.org/products/quarterly-briefs>. See also Sneyers 2017 footnote 5.

<sup>25</sup> London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health. 2013. [Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by severe food insecurity and famine during 2010-2012](#). Also, [FSNAU Technical Release May 2nd 2013](#).

<sup>26</sup> Somalia has two rainy seasons (Gu and Deyr) and two lean seasons when malnutrition rates tend to fluctuate.

<sup>27</sup> FSNAU. August 2017.


<sup>28</sup> UNHCR. Somalia Fact Sheet, 1-31 December 2017.

<sup>29</sup> WHO. 2003. The Management of Nutrition in Major Emergencies.



percent GAM).<sup>30</sup> Health crises have compounded malnutrition – from January to 18 June 2017 53,015 suspected cases of cholera and 795 cholera-related deaths were recorded across Somalia.<sup>31</sup>

**Figure 3: Global and severe acute malnutrition (GAM and SAM) prevalence in Somalia (2013–2017)**



Source: FSNAU Nutrition Data 2013–2017.

19. Chronic malnutrition (stunting) over the evaluation period varied from less than 5 percent (in the North East) to 10–20 percent (in the South Central and North West) to over 30 percent (for Baidoa and Kismayo IDP).<sup>32</sup> Trend analysis suggested that the epicentres of the food-security crisis and malnutrition did not fully align, indicating that food insecurity alone may not be the cause of high GAM rates.<sup>33</sup> A nutrition causal analysis argued that “as well as insecurity, climatic and seasonal factors and, notably, poverty, dominate childcare practices and select socio-cultural beliefs remained core drivers of malnutrition in South Central Somalia”.<sup>34</sup> Poor infant and child feeding practices, combined with inadequate hygiene, lack of basic healthcare and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities, and women’s excessive workloads have had a major impact on nutritional status. Early marriage and lack of education are key contributors to malnutrition.

20. The prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies found by the most recent survey in 2009 was high.<sup>35</sup> Measles vaccination was below the recommended Sphere standard of 90 percent. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) are considered to be a low-concentration epidemic in North East and South Central Somalia.<sup>36</sup> A 2016 World Bank study showed a HIV prevalence of 0.4 percent. The coverage of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) in Somalia is 11 percent and the incidence of tuberculosis (TB) is 270 per 100,000.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>30</sup> FSNAU. Technical Series Report No. VII 65. Issued 29 April 2016.

<sup>31</sup> Food Security and Nutrition Brief. June 2017.

<sup>32</sup> FSNAU. 2016. Technical Series Report No. VII 70. Issued 21 December 2016.

<sup>33</sup> WFP. 2012. Trend Analysis of Food and Nutrition Insecurity in Somalia (2007–2012).

<sup>34</sup> SNS. 2015. Nutrition Causal Analysis, South and Central Somalia.

<sup>35</sup> FSNAU. 2009. National Micronutrient and Anthropometric Nutrition Survey, Somalia.

<sup>36</sup> WHO. 2010. Country Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014.

<sup>37</sup> <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD?locations=SO>.

### 1.2.3 Gender and protection

#### Gender

21. Gender disparities in Somalia are among the most pronounced in the world. Somalia is the sixth worst performing country globally for gender equality.<sup>38</sup> Although women produce and trade a significant proportion of agricultural production, their ownership of land and other property is extremely restricted under prevailing customary law. Women's lack of decision-making rights is considered to be one of the key contributors to food insecurity and malnutrition.

22. Of the estimated 1.5 million Somali IDP in 2017,<sup>39</sup> about 80 percent were women, children and the elderly.<sup>40</sup> Changing gender roles resulting from the ongoing conflict are manifest; 66 percent of households are headed by women.<sup>41</sup> More than 70 percent of IDP households headed by women had poor food consumption scores.<sup>42</sup> Men increasingly face difficulties in fulfilling their role as family provider.<sup>43</sup>

#### Protection

23. Gender-based violence (GBV) is widespread and has been seriously exacerbated by conflict. GBV mostly affects women and girls (99 percent),<sup>44</sup> and is particularly high in displacement settings; the IDP population accounts for an estimated 76 percent of GBV survivors.<sup>45</sup> Other protection concerns stemming from the drought, localized clan conflict and armed conflict include: extrajudicial killing, forced eviction, arbitrary arrest, and abduction and recruitment of children by armed groups.<sup>46</sup> Female genital mutilation affects 98 percent of women and girls aged 15–49, the highest prevalence in the world.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.2.4 Government strategy, policies and programmes

24. The Somali Democratic Republic, established following independence in 1960, collapsed in 1991 with the outbreak of the Somali civil war. Southern and central areas reverted to customary and religious law, and suffer long-standing, internal clan-based conflict, violence and political instability. The early 2000s saw the creation of a fledgling, interim federal administration. A new, provisional constitution, passed in August 2012, established the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the first permanent central government since the start of the civil war.

25. In 2016, the country was officially divided into six regional states: Puntland, Galmudug, Jubaland, South West State, Somaliland and Khaatumo. The relationship between the FGS and the state governments is contentious. The two relatively peaceful northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland effectively have separate governments: former British Somaliland declared unilateral independence in 1991 and the Northern Puntland region declared autonomy in 1998. These two areas have benefited from greater stability and have more capacity to deliver services. In the other areas governance is typically weaker and clan leaders continue to govern. The administration, with

---

<sup>38</sup> OECD. Social Institution and Gender Index 2014.

<sup>39</sup> UNHCR. Somalia Situation 2017. May 2017.

<sup>40</sup> OCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017.

<sup>41</sup> UNFPA. Somalia Population Estimation Survey 2014, Analytical Report Vol. 2.

<sup>42</sup> WFP vulnerability analysis and mapping mission in Somalia 2015.

<sup>43</sup> LOGiCA. 2015. The impact of war on Somalia men: An inception study. Washington DC. J. Gardner & J. El-Bushra. 2016. The impact of war on Somali men and its effects on the family, women, and children. Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper.

<sup>44</sup> GBVIMS. 2016.

<sup>45</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview: [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/161124\\_som\\_hno\\_2017.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/161124_som_hno_2017.pdf).

<sup>46</sup> UNICEF estimated that there are up to 5,000 child soldiers in Somalia, mostly recruited by al-Shabaab and clan militias. Amnesty International, the State of the World's Human Rights 2016-2017.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/events/femalegenitalmutilationday/>.

its African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)<sup>48</sup> allies, continues to battle radical groups, including Al Shabaab, for control.

26. Following the establishment of the FGS in 2012, the country launched a New Deal Compact in 2013. Under the New Deal Compact there are five peacebuilding and state-building goals: (1) legitimate and inclusive politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services. Somalis value the compact as a framework for supporting the development of state institutions and regional governments to deliver and support security, services and private-sector growth.<sup>49</sup>

27. In December 2016, the compact was replaced by the Somali National Development Plan (SNDP), which set Somalia's development goals for 2017–2019 and identified pathways to realizing the SDGs. While recognizing the need to first address security, the rule of law and governance, the SNDP also focuses strongly on reducing poverty and developing the economy, including systemic efforts to reintegrate IDP and returnees. The SNDP recognizes the need to set national targets for employment, food and nutritional security (availability, accessibility, prices), and disaster preparedness and response alongside building national resilience, including the introduction of a social protection framework.

28. Gender equality is identified in the SNDP as a key factor in promoting economic growth, developing human potential and reducing poverty. For the first time in Somalia's history, the plan has a section outlining gender-relevant goals under the Social and Development Pillar. However, Somalia is the only country in the region that has not signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

29. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADMD) in Mogadishu, the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) in Puntland and the Food Aid Coordination Agency (FACA) hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) in Somaliland are the primary official interlocutors for WFP (for relief interventions) and its partners. Ministries at both federal and state levels currently have limited human and financial resources.

30. In 2014 the Ministry of Health developed a harmonized health policy supported by detailed guidance.<sup>50</sup> The Ministry of Agriculture Strategic Plan (2016–2020)<sup>51</sup> sets strategic goals for strengthening capacity, rehabilitating agricultural infrastructure, increasing agricultural production and developing agricultural commodity marketing systems. The 2013–2016 Interim Education Sector Strategic Plan targeted equal access to quality education for all Somalis. While school feeding is part of current programmes, neither the Sector Strategic Plan nor the SNDP allude to school meals to support educational outcomes.

31. The mandate of the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWHRD) is to ensure coordination, collaboration and implementation of human rights and gender priorities but this state entity has weak capacity and its achievements have been limited.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, the last few years have seen important progress on gender, including doubling the number of women in the 2016 parliament, the integration of specific gender objectives in the SNDP and the drafting of the National Gender Policy.<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup> AMISOM is an active, regional peacekeeping mission in Somalia operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. Its mandate is to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

<sup>49</sup> Hearn, S. and T. Zimmerman. 2014. [A New Deal for Somalia? The Somali Compact and its Implications for Peacebuilding](#). New York: Center on International Cooperation.

<sup>50</sup> See Annex L.

<sup>51</sup> Ministry of Agriculture [Strategic Plan 2016–2020](#).

<sup>52</sup> UNDP Somalia Gender Equality Progress Report 2016.

<sup>53</sup> The Policy has been informed by Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. At the time this report was developed the policy was still in a draft form.

### 1.2.5 Access to social services

32. Poor tax collection capacity,<sup>54</sup> a narrow tax base, few legal and regulatory frameworks, and the government's lack of full territorial control hinder revenue mobilization. The government thus depends on foreign assistance to deliver services.<sup>55</sup> Capacity for service delivery at the state level is largely limited to the semi-autonomous areas of Somaliland and Puntland.

33. Life expectancy is low because of high infant and maternal mortality, the spread of preventable diseases, poor sanitation, chronic malnutrition and inadequate health services. Somalia is one of the worst performing countries for maternal and child mortality. The latest estimates indicate that, due to the poor availability of maternal health facilities and lack of access to community health workers, one in seven children die before turning five years of age and one in 22 women die of pregnancy-related causes.<sup>56</sup> In 2016 only 58 percent of Somalis had access to an improved source of water and only 10 had access to improved sanitation, compared to an average 69 and 25 percent in low-income sub-Saharan countries.<sup>57</sup>

34. Somalia has one of the world's lowest primary school enrolment rates in Africa. Only 30 percent of children attend school and just 40 percent of these are girls.<sup>58</sup> The situation is worst in rural areas where only 18 percent of children are in school. A recent World Bank study found that school enrolment declined between 2013 and 2016.<sup>59</sup> Nearly 75 percent of schools have inadequate facilities. Many buildings are too damaged or unsafe for use. Gender inequality is common in the education system.<sup>60</sup>

### 1.2.6 International assistance

35. The UN in Somalia is represented by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), established in 2013, and the UNCT. UNSOM and UNCT are closely aligned under the leadership of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) for Somalia, appointed in January 2014.<sup>61</sup>

36. The United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy (UNSAS 2011–2015) provided an initial five-year framework for UN development work and humanitarian, transitional and recovery assistance. UNSAS was premised on the need for long-term commitment and structured around three outcomes: equitable access to social services; poverty reduction and improved livelihoods; and good governance and human security.

37. Following the establishment of the FGS in 2012, UNSAS was suspended and replaced by the 2014–2016 Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) for the delivery of assistance to Somalia, which aligns with national priorities and is increasingly delivered by Somali institutions.<sup>62</sup> Based on the One UN approach, ISF aimed to provide a light-touch UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Somalia. ISF strategic objectives (SOs) mirrored the Somali Compact.

38. In 2016, the international community and FGS agreed a New Partnership for Somalia,<sup>63</sup> which replaced ISF with a UN Humanitarian Strategy (2016–2018) and new UN Strategic Framework (UNSF 2017–2021). The UNSF continues the themes of ISF and responds directly to

---

<sup>54</sup> Estimated at USD120million a year by the World Bank in 2016.

<sup>55</sup> African Development Bank Outlook for Somalia: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/somalia>.

<sup>56</sup> UNFPA. Somalia Newsletter, August 2017.

<sup>57</sup> Pape, Utz Johann. 2017.

<sup>58</sup> [https://www.unicef.org/somalia/education\\_56.html](https://www.unicef.org/somalia/education_56.html).

<sup>59</sup> Pape, Utz Johann. 2017.

<sup>60</sup> UNICEF and Somalia Federal Republic [Go-2-School Initiative: Educating for Resilience](#) (2013-2016).

<sup>61</sup> The Deputy Special Representative for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia also serves as the UN Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian Coordinator.


<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> The New Partnership for Somalia.

SNDP priorities with four SOs: increase the provision of basic services; improve humanitarian protection; strengthen individual and government capacity to cope with shocks; and build complementarity between humanitarian and development programmes.

39. Levels of development assistance to Somalia have been relatively stable over the evaluation period (**Figure 4**).<sup>64</sup> However, given the tremendous economic, social and political challenges, the level of assistance has been inadequate. Until debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) incurred in the 1980s have been written off by Somalia’s creditors, Somalia remains ineligible for significant concessional resources from Bretton Woods institutions. Current World Bank assistance is USD85 million a year.<sup>65</sup> The UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund was established specifically to channel UN financial and programmatic support to the NDP.

**Figure 4: ODA to Somalia (USD million a year)**



Source: Aid Coordination Unit, Office of Prime Minister, Federal Republic of Somalia.

40. The amount of humanitarian aid 2012–2017 was roughly comparable to the amount of development aid (**Error! Reference source not found.**). The top ten humanitarian donors 2012–2017 were USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, Japan, the UN Common Humanitarian Fund, European Commission (EC), China and Finland.

41. The UN Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) for Somalia aimed to reach an average of 1.1 million people in crisis and 1.1 million IDP a year during the evaluation period. Of the resources requested, only 47 percent were delivered. Access to deliver humanitarian aid has been challenging. The Islamist Al Shabaab group controls large parts of the South Central area. Road access is constrained by illegal checkpoints, poor infrastructure, clashes along major routes, and direct threats to humanitarian and commercial goods during transit. The AMISOM peace-support force deploys to provide security and takes offensive action against Al Shabaab. Coordination of international assistance occurred both through government-led coordination groups aligned to the pillars of the SNDP and, for humanitarian aid, through the cluster coordination system.

### 1.3. The WFP Portfolio in Somalia

#### 1.3.1 Overview of the portfolio

42. WFP has been operating in Somalia since 1967,<sup>66</sup> addressing basic food needs, strengthening coping mechanisms and supporting efforts to achieve food security. **Figure 5** summarizes the evolution of the WFP portfolio. Annex J provides further details of each WFP operation. The map on page xxii shows the distribution of WFP activities in Somalia as of January

<sup>64</sup> Major official development donors included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and USA. These statistics are based on self-reporting and do not capture significant donations from countries including Turkey and the Gulf States.

<sup>65</sup> Larry Elliott. World Bank and IMF, put your money where your mouth is on Somalia. Guardian, 15 October 2017.

<sup>66</sup> With WFP present since 1967, the CO has been operating from Nairobi from 1995 to 2015. In February 2015, WFP re-opened the Somalia office in Mogadishu for the first time in 20 years. WFP also maintains an extensive presence in Somalia through area offices.

2018. The main programmes in the portfolio are Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200281 (2011–2012) and two PRROs, PRRO 200443 (2013–2015) and PRRO 200844 (2016–2018). Special Operations (SOps) supported Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure and cluster operations (**Table 1**).

**Table 1: WFP Special Operations in Somalia**

SOp NO.	Date	Operation
<b>105780</b>	Feb 2007–Mar 2013	Emergency Rehabilitation Works for Logistics Infrastructure in Somalia
<b>106810</b>	Aug 2007–Dec 2012	Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia and Kenya
<b>200344</b>	Jan–Dec 2012	Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Somalia
<b>200475</b>	Apr 2013–Nov 2014	Development of Logistical Infrastructure for Somalia and the Horn of Africa Corridor
<b>200507</b>	Jan 2013–Dec 2015	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and Kenya
<b>200637</b>	Jan 2014–Dec 2014	Security Augmentation in Support of WFP Operations in Somalia
<b>200924</b>	Jan 2016–Dec 2017	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and in Kenya
<b>201051</b>	Jun 2017–May 2018	Emergency Rehabilitation Work and Capacity Strengthening at the Port of Kismayo

*Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.*

43. WFP planned to assist between 1.34 million and 3.58 million people annually. This equates to between 11 percent and 29 percent of the total population. A large number of WFP’s planned caseload were females, on average 55 percent of beneficiaries. A further breakdown of the beneficiary data for 2012–2017 indicates that nutrition and general food assistance (GFA) dominated the portfolio – collectively accounting for over three-quarters of planned beneficiaries (**Table 2**).

**Table 2: Planned beneficiaries by activity, sex, year and age (2012–2017)**

Planned beneficiaries by year by sex by activity												
Activity	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
General Food Assistance	760,970	792,030	316,050	328,950	88,200	91,800	216,090	224,910	117,810	113,190	1,071,000	1,029,000
Nutrition: Treatment of Moderate Malnutrition (TSFP)	32,800	32,800	219,349	247,351	152,750	172,250	177,600	192,400	124,320	134,680	225,600	244,400
Nutrition: Treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (TSFP for PLW)		96,000		323,300		175,000		130,000		91,000		230,000
Nutrition: Prevention of Acute Malnutrition (BSFP)	113,700	113,700	86,480	97,520	86,480	97,520	140,900	252,100	64,800	70,200	213,600	231,400
Nutrition: Prevention of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (BSFP for PLW)						64,000						
Nutrition: Prevention of Stunting (MCHN)									28,175	121,825	210,828	819,172
School Feeding (on-site)	47,000	34,000	55,000	45,000	82,500	67,500	85,500	64,500	62,400	57,600	78,000	72,000
School Feeding (take-home rations)		34,000		45,000		67,500	32,131	35,369	168,980	171,020	218,680	221,320
Food For Assets* **	9,966	5,367	21,267	21,267	45,833	45,833	235,247	244,849	148,154	142,346	119,561	124,439
Food For Training**	650	3,683	5,317	5,317	9,167	9,167	81,453	84,777	35,444	34,056	29,891	31,109

\*Food For Assets was Food For Work in 2012    \*\*Only participant numbers available in 2012–2014 SPRs


Source: SPRs 2012–2016. 2017: CO data.

Planned beneficiaries by year by sex by age*												
Beneficiary age group	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Number of children below 5 years of age	190,248	190,248	200,108	214,667	155,732	172,546	309,939	334,180	139,160	144,840	357,700	372,300
Number of children 5 to 18 years of age	285,372	285,372	140,012	128,639	89,436	77,106	150,641	140,252	208,740	217,260	536,550	558,450
Number of adults 18+	475,620	475,620	374,103	502,473	370,936	476,884	351,495	444,993	340,800	369,200	876,000	949,000
<b>Totals</b>	<b>951,240</b>	<b>951,240</b>	<b>714,223</b>	<b>845,779</b>	<b>616,104</b>	<b>726,536</b>	<b>812,075</b>	<b>919,425</b>	<b>688,700</b>	<b>731,300</b>	<b>1,770,250</b>	<b>1,879,750</b>

\*Age groups are not broken down by activity in SPRs

Source: SPRs 2012–2016. 2017: CO data.


Figure 5: WFP Somalia portfolio and context timeline (2012–2017)





44. During the review period, general food assistance (GFA) targeted communities affected by drought and conflict, IDP, Somali returnees, Yemenis fleeing conflict in Yemen and Somali refugees voluntarily returning from Kenya. GFA consisted of in-kind transfers (IKTs), cash-based transfers (CBTs) and pre-cooked meals. Over the evaluation period the value of CBTs distributed increased dramatically (see **Figure 6**).

**Figure 6: Planned CBTs (USD) and IKTs (MT) 2012–2017**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

45. WFP's nutrition portfolio included: targeted supplementary feeding programmes (TSFPs); blanket supplementary feeding programmes (BSFPs); support for pregnant and lactating women (PLW) through mother and child health and nutrition (MCHN) services; social and behavioural change communication (SBCC); incentives for mothers to give birth under medical supervision; and support for anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and directly observed treatment, short course (TB-DOTS).

- TSFPs targeted moderately malnourished children under the age of five years. TSFPs were channelled through MCHN centres where possible. In areas without MCHN coverage, TSFPs were provided through mobile clinics. WFP's approach to preventing moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) included seasonal<sup>67</sup> BSFPs, focused on IDP settlements in which there was little access to health services.
- Starting in 2015, WFP integrated preventive, food-based nutrition services into ante-natal and post-natal care to prevent malnutrition and increase the use of health services during the first 1,000 days of life.<sup>68</sup> WFP introduced a CBT (e-voucher) component for PLWs<sup>69</sup> with the aim of diversifying household diets. Behaviour change communication was scaled up at MCHN centres to increase use of nutritious foods and uptake of essential health services. In addition, a one-off incentive ration for mothers to give birth under medical supervision to promote healthy pregnancies and deliveries.
- Beneficiaries of nutrition support for ART and TB-DOTS included malnourished clients receiving ART or TB-DOTS treatment, clients receiving ART or TB-DOTS treatment and households that had members in the treatment ART or TB-DOTS programmes. WFP reduced the focus on institutional feeding in PRRO 200844 but continued to support

<sup>67</sup> Somalia has two rainy seasons (Gu and Deyr) and two lean seasons in which malnutrition tends to fluctuate.

<sup>68</sup> Mainly in Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu where mother-and-child health (MCHN) clinics are functioning.

<sup>69</sup> Value vouchers enabled PLWs to access fresh vegetables and fruit from local markets.

malnourished HIV and TB patients in treatment facilities so long as they adhered to existing protocols.

46. Food assistance for assets (FFA) activities and approaches were designed to help households and communities build assets that would reduce their vulnerability to disasters, strengthen their livelihoods and build their resilience while helping them bridge short-term, seasonal food gaps. FFA included support for building rainwater-harvesting structures for crops and pastures, shallow wells and solar pumps, *birkads* (water tanks) and erosion-control structures. In urban areas, food assistance for training (FFT) was designed to help build skills, knowledge and economic opportunities for women and men in areas such as plumbing, weaving and dyeing, information and communications technology (ICT) literacy, electronics and mobile repairs.

47. School meals aimed to: improve the nutrition of primary school-aged children by providing micronutrient fortified meals and snacks; increase enrolment, attendance and retention of pupils; and improve concentration in class. Take-home rations for girls aimed to improve school attendance, although take-home rations were phased out over the CPE period.

48. Local procurement activities were planned at a relatively small scale. Purchases from ten cooperatives started in 2014.<sup>70</sup> The main objective was to improve the quality of domestic grain production by providing an incentive to control aflatoxins. Local procurement was not designed to be a significant contribution to GFA.

49. Under SOps WFP supported UNHAS, developed infrastructure and coordinated aspects of humanitarian assistance.

- WFP operated UNHAS over the entire evaluation period. UNHAS provided humanitarian workers with flights to and within Somalia, transported light cargo, such as medical supplies, and provided medical and security evacuations.
- During the current evaluation period there was a modest programme to develop key infrastructure in Somalia. The main activity was supporting the rehabilitation of Kismayo port, which started in mid-2017. WFP's involvement in rehabilitating infrastructure was much greater prior to 2012.
- WFP also aimed to supported several key cluster coordination mechanisms, including the Food Security Cluster (FSC), the Logistics Cluster and the Nutrition Cluster from 2012 to date. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) was activated in 2012 and closed down in 2016.

50. From 2012 to 2017, WFP Somalia operations received donor contributions of USD995,466,428 against a gross requirement of USD1,978,048,196<sup>71</sup> (see Annex J for details). The top five donors were the United States of America (USA) (56 percent), United Kingdom (UK) (10 percent), Germany (8 percent), Canada (5 percent) and the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF) (3 percent).

### *1.3.2 Integration of gender and protection in the portfolio*

#### Gender

51. References to gender in EMOP 200281 and PRRO 200443 were limited to enrolling and retaining girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools, and to nutrition interventions targeted to PLWs. In contrast, PRRO 200844, approved after the launch of the WFP Gender Policy in 2015, integrated

---

<sup>70</sup> No specific reference was found of planned amounts to be locally procured.

<sup>71</sup> Source of contribution figures and requirements for 2012–2017: WFP corporate system for contribution statistics, the 'FACTORY'/WINGS. Extracted 10 April 2018.

gender more adequately, justifying the rating of gender marker code 2A<sup>72</sup> and attracting praise from headquarters for its “solid gender analysis and content”.<sup>73</sup>

52. Since 2015, WFP work on gender in Somalia has been guided by the Gender Policy as well as the Country Gender Action Plan (CGAP) developed at the end of 2016. The CGAP built on the regional gender strategy and the findings of the Somalia Gender Baseline to define priorities and needs across activities and operations for the country until 2020 with regards to gender. Developing the capacity of staff, partners and the government on gender and mainstreaming protection was specified as a priority.<sup>74</sup>

### Protection

53. Although there is no protection action plan in Somalia, two CGAP objectives have specific components on protection,<sup>75</sup> and the plan makes various references to protection, for example in relation to the WFP Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The individual in charge of gender is also responsible for the protection portfolio. Mainstreaming protection in Somalia is ensured through an operational focus on accountability to affected populations,<sup>76</sup> which includes providing information, and mechanisms for participation, complaints and feedback.

54. Finally, WFP recently developed a protocol to guide staff and partners in addressing GBV in the context of food security.<sup>77</sup> The protocol sets out WFP’s responsibility for: 1. assuming that GBV is taking place in Somalia; 2. treating it as a serious, life-threatening protection issue; and 3. taking action to minimize risks in the context of its interventions. The protocol is clear on what is within WFP’s capacity to achieve when it comes to GBV, and the criteria for referring GBV cases to service providers for specific and qualified support.

### *1.3.3 External events impacting the portfolio*

55. Major contextual factors affecting the WFP portfolio were the food and nutrition crises in Somalia. As noted in section 1.2.2, widespread crises in 2011 and 2017 book-ended the evaluation period with a period of partial recovery in between. These acute crises have compounded the ongoing chronic emergency resulting from conflict.

56. As also noted in section 1.2.4, the evaluation period saw a slow but constant improvement in governance capacity at national and state levels. This improvement has led to a growing appetite for setting policy (for example, as seen in the SNDP) and developing delivery capacity (as demonstrated by the growth in the number of MCHN and schools). In parallel there has been a continuing improvement in security and access to South Central Somalia, although access remains far from universal.

57. The evaluation period also witnessed influxes of Somali returnees whose needs required a response from WFP. Firstly, the deteriorating situation in Yemen since 2014 led to an influx of Somali returnees, and to a lesser extent Yemeni refugees. Secondly, the pace of refugees returning

---

<sup>72</sup> The Gender Marker was introduced by WFP in 2012. EMOP 200281 scored 1 and PRRO 200443 scored 2. Interestingly, all newly approved projects in 2016 scored 2a. (Source: briefing session on gender in Rome, October 2017).

<sup>73</sup> Specifically mentioned. PRRO 200844 are: consulting with men, women, boys and girls in planning, selecting and implementing activities; female participation in project management and community committees; measures to mitigate protection concerns and ensure beneficiaries safety and dignity; and behaviour change communication specifically targeted to women, men, boys and girls in order to improve household nutrition, health and hygiene practices.

<sup>74</sup> PRRO 200844.

<sup>75</sup> Objective I, output 1.1, Gender (and Protection) is integrated throughout M&E and VAM office frameworks, and Objective IV, Mainstream gender and protection considerations into existing modalities and innovations. For more details on this refer to Annex O Implementation Action Plan of the Somalia Gender Action Plan.

<sup>76</sup> In line with the Protection Policy, in 2012 WFP endorsed the five IASC commitments to ensuring AAP, with a view to reinforcing dignified programming and providing a framework for people’s voices to be captured and listened to.

<sup>77</sup> WFP Gender-Based Violence Survivor Referral and Service Protocol 2017.

to Somalia from Dadaab camp in Kenya accelerated massively after the Government of Kenya announced plans to close the camp in May 2016. Refugees continued to return to Somalia even after February 2017 when the Kenyan High Court ruled that closing the camp would be illegal. Since 2014, 110,913 Somali refugees have returned to Somalia: 72,712 from Kenya, 34,990 from Yemen and 589 from Djibouti.

#### 1.3.4 WFP country office assessment and analysis

58. A single unit in WFP Somalia is responsible for assessments and M&E. The WFP VAM unit contributes to identifying food-insecure populations and establishing the underlying causes of food insecurity,<sup>78</sup> while WFP M&E Unit is responsible for monitoring and evaluating WFP activities.

59. Within the humanitarian system in Somalia, the Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit (FSNAU), managed by FAO, has overall responsibility for assessing food and nutrition insecurity. FSNAU provides a wide range of users with information and analyses for making decisions relating to short-term food insecurity and malnutrition, and for informing development planning to address the underlying causes of food and livelihood insecurity and malnutrition. WFP VAM participates in and contributes to FSNAU monitoring processes and, as part of the IPC technical group, to IPC analyses.

60. In addition, WFP VAM carries out (both jointly with other agencies and independently) other assessments and reporting, including monitoring hotspots and markets, assessing markets, and preparing emergency food-security assessments (EFSAs) and monthly early warning reports. Situation reports, analyses of prepositioning sites and logistics corridors, and security assessments guide WFP operational activities. Despite dedicated capacity in both the CO and RBN there have been no stand-alone assessments of gender or protection issues, although they have been addressed to various degrees in other assessment processes.

61. WFP VAM also leads and contributes to analyses of the causes of food and nutrition insecurity and longer-term changes. WFP and the WFP Nutrition Unit jointly produced a report "*Somalia: Trend Analysis of Food and Nutrition Insecurity (2007–2014)*" and an updated second edition covering 2007–2017. A nutrition causal analysis was undertaken in 2015 in conjunction with the Strengthening Nutrition Security Consortium Somalia (SNS) in South Central Somalia.<sup>79</sup>

62. Two previous evaluations have been conducted – a CPE for Somalia (2006–2011) and mid-term operational evaluation of PRRO 200844 in Somalia (mid-2012–2015). Other evaluations managed by the WFP CO include a "*Strategic Review of WFP's School Meals Programme*".<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> See [VAM](#).

<sup>79</sup> SNS. 2015. Nutrition Causal Analysis Study, South and Central Somalia.

<sup>80</sup> WFP Performance Management and Monitoring Division, June 2017.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1. Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

#### 2.1.1 Alignment with national strategies, policies and programmes

63. A strong coherence was found between WFP's objectives and activities and national strategies, policies and programmes. This alignment was mediated through the overarching UN strategies - the ISF followed by the UNSF. These set out the UN role in implementing the Compact and the SNDP respectively. WFP aligned its strategies and activities –in the EMOP and PRROs – with the ISF and UNSF and, through these, with Somali national policies.

64. Strategic alignment was furthered through WFP participation in key coordination structures, the national working groups corresponding to the pillars of the national policies that were established to coordinate UN engagement with the Somalia Compact and SNDP. WFP actively participated in the most relevant coordination groups, for example, currently as co-lead of the resilience working group responsible for food security.

65. Further alignment and coordination with government has been through collaboration with sectoral ministries. WFP has successfully established good relationships that ensure coherence with a range of sectoral ministries at both state and national levels. However, the depth of collaboration has varied considerably; the best practice example of structured engagement with government policies and programmes is in nutrition, where alignment over the evaluation period was built through four main mechanisms:

- In 2014 the three health authorities (FGS, Somaliland and Puntland)<sup>81</sup> agreed to harmonize their collaboration with development partners through the Somali Health Policy.<sup>82</sup> An analysis of WFP activities demonstrates that there has been close alignment with stated goals at each level of government (see for example Table 3.

**Table 3: Puntland Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) Strategy and WFP nutrition activities (2012–2017)**

IYCF Area	WFP Activity
<b>Early initiation and exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months to achieve optimum growth, development and good health</b>	Behavioural change communication-promoting exclusive breastfeeding
<b>Age appropriate complementary feeding, with safe, nutritionally adequate foods, starting at six months while continuing to breastfeed up to two years and beyond</b>	Behavioural change communication-promoting complementary feeding Blanket supplementary feeding and maternal and child health and nutrition
<b>Appropriate feeding of the sick child</b>	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme

- In 2014, the FGS joined the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) network, which is led by WFP and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) in Somalia. WFP, in coordination with the government's SUN focal point, has participated in the SUN global movement. This, coupled with regular WFP participation in quarterly, sub-national cluster coordination and information-sharing

<sup>81</sup> National nutrition objectives are elaborated in the Somaliland Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013–2016, Puntland's second Five-year Development Plan 2014–2018 and at the FGS level through the SNDP.

<sup>82</sup> Prioritisation of Health Policy Actions in the Somali Health Sector, 2014.

meetings, has provided a platform for good advocacy and enabled WFP programmes to align shared goals, such as reducing stunting.<sup>83</sup>

- WFP has worked to strengthen coordination with ministries of health (MoHs) through Letters of Understanding that came into effect in 2015 and 2016. These have paved the way for joint programming, supportive supervision, monitoring, capacity building and data management. For example, in 2016, WFP supported government and local administration in reviewing the nutrition strategy, formulating and coordinating policy, training planners and developing nutrition interventions.
- At the programming level, WFP has contributed to the Joint Health and Nutrition Programme (JHNP), which ensures that WFP nutrition programmes align with Ministry of Health, local authority and UN agency programmes. The JHNP began in 2012 and is overseen by MoHs in Somaliland, Puntland and FGS as well as by the UN resident coordinator. The programme has targeted service delivery in nine regions in Somalia. Here, WFP has contributed to establishing state structures by investing in MCHN centres.

66. WFP has coheres with high-level policy statements on crisis preparedness and response in the overarching Compact and SNDP. However, the ministries responsible for these issues have been established only recently, and detailed policies and the capacity to deliver emergency responses are still limited.<sup>84</sup> WFP has made little progress with government institutions towards joint response programming. The MoHADM is reported to have drafted a national disaster management policy, but this has not been finalized.<sup>85</sup> At an informal level, MoHADM has expressed strong support for the shift from IKTs to CBTs because of likely secondary impacts on local economies.

67. The evaluation team found little evidence of integration of WFP's strategy or capacity to support government agriculture (crop production, livestock and fisheries), environment, food security, or livelihoods and employment ministries at the national or state levels. Even in stable contexts such as Somaliland, where FFA sites were agreed through local coordination bodies,<sup>86</sup> no attempt was made by WFP to integrate its activities with the MoA catchment regeneration plan and the Somaliland Development Fund. As a result, the fit between state-level resilience-building strategies and WFP interventions has been limited.

68. In the education sector, WFP is committed to implementing school meals interventions directly through government structures in Somaliland and Puntland. The various ministries of education perceive that there is a strategic alignment between WFP school meals and their respective education plans – even though WFP Somalia CO has been providing school meals as a food-security objective.

69. Coherence between WFP activities and the 2016 National Gender Policy is now evident, except for political participation, in priority intervention areas – economic empowerment, health, education, political participation and access to justice (see Table 4). Questions remain about the extent to which the alignment is the result of conscious effort by WFP, as the evaluation found no evidence of this. However, the WFP mandate means it is responsible for mainstreaming gender and protection programmes in its portfolio and activities.

---

<sup>83</sup> WFP. 2015. Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

<sup>84</sup> OCHA is working to strengthen the role of MoHADM and equivalent bodies in Somaliland and Puntland in coordination and regulation.

<sup>85</sup> Interview with Permanent Secretary MoHADM, Mohamed Moalim.

<sup>86</sup> FFA planning and implementation was integrated under the seasonal livelihood programming. Joint planning and complementary actors, including in government, agreed sites at local level in line with district plans.

**Table 4: WFP alignment with the National Gender Policy**

National Gender Policy		WFP Activities		
Access to Justice	Promoting and facilitating multi-sectorial cooperation to address gender-based violence and harmful traditional practices	Strengthening partners' capacities for mainstreaming gender and protection into programme design, implementation, & monitoring	WFP evaluate protection risks of beneficiaries	
			Identifying and mitigating protection issues and maximizing beneficiaries' safety and dignity	
Education	Designing and implementing programs to improve girls and boys access to primary education, laying emphasis on enrolment and retention of girls in school		WFP provides daily school meals to primary school boys and girls	
			Monthly take-home rations will be provided to households with girls who attend at least 80 percent of schooldays per month	
Economic Empowerment	Creating opportunities in rural areas to improve the economic status of rural women and men		Ensuring that gender roles were considered when selecting food assistance for assets (FFA) activities	
	Establishing vocational, entrepreneurs and skills enhancement programs and training for women and men		WFP included men, women and young people in the planning, selection and implementation of activities	
Health	Promoting reduction of maternal child mortality rate country wide by expanding maternal and child healthcare services		Women and men will be informed about providing feedback on WFP's assistance	Expanding its clinic-based approach to mother-and-child health (MCH) where access and infrastructure permit
				Giving incentives for pregnant women to deliver their babies at clinics staffed by skilled health workers
				Household rations include SuperCereal to address micronutrient deficiencies in women of reproductive age, adolescents, elderly people and older children
				Treating moderately acute malnutrition in children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women will be managed through MCH clinics by targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) programmes
		Seasonal preventive blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) to reduce the risk of children under 3 and pregnant and lactating women becoming acutely malnourished during the lean season		
		Piloting a new ready-to-use supplementary food that is based on pregnant and lactating women's daily requirements, does not require preparation and reduces the risk of intra-household sharing		
		Stabilizing and reducing the prevalence of global acute malnutrition and disparities between boys and girls under 5		
		Considering seasonality, geography and access in its assistance to children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women to reduce under nutrition		
		Engaging in curative and preventive nutrition activities, protecting the food security of vulnerable households and strengthening partnerships with humanitarian and development actors		
		Improving equal access to HIV/AIDS information for prevention, treatment and care for women and men living with HIV/AIDS		Targeted communications on behaviour change for men and women on childcare, health, food preparation and storage, immunization, and water and sanitation

2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs

70. Although there have been changes in emphasis over time, the portfolio has remained broadly relevant to beneficiaries' emergency needs. WFP responded to the 2011 famine by stepping up large-scale general food distribution under EMOP 200281. Similarly, the food-security crisis that emerged in 2016 led to a renewed focus on emergency response through the expansion of PRRO 200844.

71. The evaluation team had few opportunities to directly seek the opinions of beneficiaries on the relevance of WFP emergency assistance. However, interviews with knowledgeable key informants, such as implementing partners, unvaryingly confirmed a strong preference among beneficiaries for CBTs, specifically unconditional cash delivered through mobile money.<sup>87</sup> Cash gives beneficiaries greater flexibility in meeting their diverse needs in emergencies. WFP had also planned to distribute nutritional supplements on a large scale, principally through TSFPs and BSFPs. Given the high rates of GAM throughout the portfolio period, the evaluation team consider that these activities are relevant to beneficiary needs.

72. In addition to emergency needs during the evaluation period, there were large-scale chronic needs and demand for support to recover and rebuild livelihoods. WFP nutrition activities align well with these needs. For example, to address chronic malnutrition WFP targets PLW and children aged 6–23 months through MCHN to break the inter-generational cycle of malnutrition. However, in locations where WFP no longer provides an incentive for pregnant women to safely deliver their babies at health centres, important opportunities to include adolescent girls<sup>88</sup> may be lost.

73. Other aspects of the WFP strategy have been designed to enable communities to cope more effectively with the chronic humanitarian situation.<sup>89</sup> These include support to improve livelihoods through FFA and FFT, and support for education<sup>90</sup> through school meals and local purchases. However, partly because donors have earmarked funds for other activities, WFP has not been able to provide continuous, predictable funding to address persistent chronic needs alongside the surge in emergency needs.

74. In all the activities implemented the evaluation found little consideration of diversity issues, such as age or disability,<sup>91</sup> and limited evidence of differentiated approaches to age, gender and diversity beyond the traditional efforts in nutrition and education. This finding reflects the prevailing situation in Somalia where the needs and concerns of adolescents and youth, as well as those of other marginalized groups such as the elderly and persons with disabilities, have been largely ignored until very recently. Attention to adolescents and youth, for example, is now evident in the new UNSF, while the SNDP contains reference to marginalized groups.

75. Until the approval of PRRO 200844 in 2016, attention to gender was limited to traditional activities, such as enrolling and retaining girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools, nutrition interventions targeting pregnant and lactating women, and FFT activities targeting both men and women.<sup>92</sup> It is only in 2016 a more nuanced analysis of the differential needs, concerns, opportunities and constraints of men and women resulted in a more targeted set of activities.<sup>93</sup>

76. The importance of needs related to urbanization and IDP settlements has become increasingly apparent. Displacement has been characterized by rapid expansion of densely populated, informal settlements and IDP camps surrounding urban areas.<sup>94</sup> Surveys have

---

<sup>87</sup> SCOPE transfers require beneficiaries to go in person to the offices of implementing partners and the bank to receive their transfers – which are then provided in cash or as a mobile money credit. Direct transfers of mobile money to beneficiaries' phones – as provided by NGOs – lowered beneficiary transaction costs by removing the requirement for the first two steps.

<sup>88</sup> The importance of reaching adolescent girls is important to WFP given the relatively common practice of early marriages and strong association with young mothers and inter-generational food insecurity.

<sup>89</sup> EMOP 200281 Objectives 3 and 4.

<sup>90</sup> Although the official principal justification is as a food security safety net.

<sup>91</sup> Limited reference to the elderly can be found in PRRO 200443, in PRRO 200844, and in the 2016 CGAP. Adolescent girls are mentioned among the target groups for SuperCereal together with children and women of reproductive age in PRRO 200443. Disabled are mentioned only in PRRO 200443.

<sup>92</sup> These include literacy, tailoring, and vocational skills on one side, and phone repair, carpentry and masonry on the other, among others.

<sup>93</sup> See considerations on this in Annex O.

<sup>94</sup> [UNHCR. 2017. Somalia Durable Solutions.](#)



indicated that a large proportion of IDP are likely to remain in urban areas, adding to urbanization.<sup>95</sup> The government prioritizes urban resilience<sup>96</sup> and is calling for agencies to tackle women and youth employment.<sup>97</sup> While WFP has appropriately targeted IDP, it has provided unconditional GFA for both recent and long-term IDP, despite their very different needs.<sup>98</sup> FFT to improve the employment prospects of IDP women and youth has been a low priority.

### 2.1.3 Coherence with policies, strategies and programmes of other actors

#### Coherence with UN agencies

77. Before 2012, the WFP country office had been criticized by national stakeholders, donors and partners for its lack of engagement and inward-looking management of the emergency response. However, stakeholders interviewed praised subsequent improvements in relationships with other UN agencies and credited WFP with adopting a “*more humble and cooperative attitude*” and becoming a full, productive member of UNCT.<sup>99</sup> The improvement was attributed specifically to the change in leadership.

78. By aligning operations with UN priorities in the ISF (2014–2016), the Humanitarian Strategy (2016–2018) and the UNSF (2017–2021), WFP has positioned its overarching food-security portfolio to support the strategies of other UN agencies. However, interviews with UNCT have pointed to significant strategic differences among UN agencies, with the greatest divergence being between the humanitarian and political missions. Underlying this difference has been the perception that, in integrating the mission in Somalia in 2014, the Secretary General confounded the development and political agendas, and compromised the independence of humanitarian agencies. Additionally, UN agencies pointed to a continuing competition for funds as an underlying tension in presenting a pre-dominant narrative of a humanitarian crisis or a failure of development.

79. Despite improvement, significant fault lines have persisted and have inhibited a coordinated UN response spanning the humanitarian-development nexus. Various initiatives which could have closed the gap failed to develop inclusive partnerships.

- Firstly, the resilience agenda has not been effective in bridging the humanitarian-development divide at a political level. The initial resilience strategy was perceived to have been led by UN agencies coming from a very humanitarian position and linked closely to NGO-implemented asset building at household and community levels. Other UN agencies have advocated for a more inclusive approach to building resilience that includes developmental agencies.
- Secondly, the Durable Solutions Framework was established to contribute to building the resilience of IDP and supporting resettlement. The framework is driven by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR, UN Development Programme (UNDP) and International Labour Organization (ILO). Despite WFP work on IDP and returnees, and leadership on resilience, the evaluation found that WFP had limited visibility in the Durable Solutions Initiative and working group at UNCT level.<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>95</sup> Global Programme on Forced Displacement. 2014. [Analysis of Displacement in Somalia](#).

<sup>96</sup> [World Bank](#). 2017.

<sup>97</sup> The [Somalia National Development Plan 2017-2019](#) estimates women’s participation in the labour force at 40 percent, half that of men, and stresses the need to accelerate development by integrating women, youth, displaced, returnees economically and socially through greater employment.

<sup>98</sup> See [WFP Resources on Refugees, IDPs, and Urban Programming](#) (WFP Go) including the [Urban Programming Overview](#), and [Urban Food Insecurity: Strategies for WFP](#).

<sup>99</sup> Interviews heads of UN agencies.

<sup>100</sup> WFP is not mentioned in the NDP among the stakeholders providing contributions to support durable solutions for the assisted population in Somalia. Somalia National Development Plan 2017-2019.

80. At the inter-agency level, WFP has partnered well with several agencies. Partnership with UNICEF has developed strongly and now covers all aspects from joint analysis to joint programming approaches and jointly funded programmes. Key informants stated that the very good working relationship between UNICEF and WFP emanated from senior management of both organizations at country level. Key strategic collaborations have included:

- Collaboration to address child malnutrition, where WFP efforts in addressing the treatment of MAM through TSFP and BSFP have complemented the work of UNICEF in outpatient therapeutic programmes to treat SAM.
- WFP, UNICEF and FAO have partnered under the Joint Resilience Strategy (JRS), later developed as the Joint Resilience Programme (JRP), to strengthen community resilience in overcoming recurrent shocks and crises.<sup>101</sup> The JRP proposes a multi-sector approach to addressing malnutrition through health, nutrition and WASH interventions.<sup>102</sup>
- Coordinated delivery of transfers and services through the WFP platform for registering beneficiaries and managing transfers (system for cash operations - SCOPE). For example, in Puntland, WFP has provided food vouchers while UNICEF has provided water vouchers<sup>103</sup> and, in the South, WFP has provided food vouchers and UNICEF has provided cash.
- WFP has partnered with UNICEF in schools, where UNICEF has constructed kitchens and toilets to complement WFP school meals.

81. The evaluation noted strong collaboration between WFP and FAO FSNAU (see 2.2.1) and strategic collaboration with FAO in the framework of the JRS. However, interviews have suggested that collaboration with FAO has diminished in recent years because WFP engagement in rural livelihoods has declined and because FAO has reduced its field presence.

82. WFP is a partner in the Return Consortium, which facilitates the voluntary return of Somali refugees from Kenya. WFP has partnered with UNHCR to the voluntary return and reintegrate refugees, primarily from Kenya and Yemen. WFP has contributed to implementing the tripartite agreement between Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR by providing air transport for returnees, and food security and nutrition programmes to support their reintegration. A data-sharing agreement has allowed WFP to use the UNHCR registration database in Dadaab, avoiding the need to re-register returnees in Somalia.

83. The evaluation found little evidence of direct coordination with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to build the capacity of ministries responsible for emergency relief. For example, in Puntland while WFP was working to build the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior to assess emergency needs OCHA was working in parallel to build similar capacity in HADMA.

84. There are plans for the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and WFP to work together. WFP is about to collaborate with UNFPA on MCHN and GBV in some areas. WFP aims to provide food, in the form of either vouchers or cash cards, to GBV survivors who, due to food insecurity, are not in a condition to continue counselling and, at the same time, receive food and nutrition training, where available. WFP and UNFPA partners will also work with pregnant women and young girls in 14 maternity homes on nutrition and maternal health, and GBV prevention and mitigation. This will allow WFP to expand its programming further in the South, an area that is difficult to access in Somalia.

---

<sup>101</sup> Subsequently renamed as Joint Resilience Action.

<sup>102</sup> UNICEF/WFP Joint Proposal Strengthening Resilience in South-Central Somalia Submitted to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development through the German Development Bank.

<sup>103</sup> WFP brief, February 2017 - SCOPE in Somalia Cash-based transfer assistance.

### Coherence with donors

85. Differences are apparent in the strategic positions adopted by individual donors, which made it difficult for WFP to identify and align with a consensus donor position. In general, donors appetite for CBTs in Somalia has increased; they have been supportive of the WFP shift to using these during the evaluation period. However, important differences have persisted on the transfer modality (food vouchers as opposed to unrestricted cash), transfer mechanism (mobile money as opposed to SCOPE) and transfer values. For example, the value of transfers was an issue in scaling-up the 2017 response, as the UK Department for International Development (DFID) required partners to fix the transfer value while other donors favoured variable rates calculated by the Cash Working Group (CWG).

86. Since 2012, various donors have expressed support for building resilience in Somalia. However, a common agreement on how the concept translates into a programmatic framework has not emerged. Different donors have funded different NGO consortia, each with their own strategic approach. The evaluation team found that donors expressed differing levels of appetite for continued investment in building resilience in Somalia. One major donor, a global leader in building resilience, suggested a 'wait-and-see' approach.

87. WFP has mainly partnered and aligned with humanitarian donors, for example WFP has worked with the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO), but attempts to partner with the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) have been rebuffed, affecting strategic choices and the portfolio. Other important donors to Somalia, including the Gulf States and other 'non-traditional' donors such as Turkey, have proved highly resistant to participating in donor coordination mechanisms, despite periodic approaches from different agencies, and they have had minimal direct contact with WFP.

### Coherence with civil society

88. WFP has continued to work with very many local and national NGOs to deliver assistance. In 2016, WFP Somalia had over 200 partners, although the number had nearly halved by 2017 (see Annex K). WFP was unable to establish strategic relationships with so many NGOs, each with very different organizational skills and capacities.<sup>104</sup> Consequently, the CO has adopted an innovative approach to partnering with carefully chosen NGOs. Building on umbrella agreements established in 2015, WFP agreed strategic partnerships with three NGOs that leverage expertise to complement and strengthen WFP programmes in 2016. Partners were selected for their capacities in specific areas of interest to WFP: the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) contributing expertise on age, gender, protection and diversity, Save the Children on nutrition, and World Vision on livelihoods and HIV/TB care and treatment.

89. The evaluation found that this approach was starting to yield positive results. The partnerships have created a forum for discussing programmes and solving operational issues. Strategic partners stated that they had participated in monthly planning meetings and mid-term reviews, and had contributed to WFP strategic planning. They have trained other cooperating partners (CPs), for example DRC has provided training on gender and protection. However, the evaluation found it was premature to establish strategic partnerships with national NGOs.

90. A notable feature of the Somali context has been the emergence of NGO consortia: Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS), the Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP) and the Somalia Resilience Action Consortium (STREAM). Each has sought to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable pastoral, agro-pastoral and peri-urban households and communities by introducing multi-sectoral programmes covering livelihood security, social protection, governance

---

<sup>104</sup> The delivery of services by NGOs on behalf of WFP continues to be managed under annual field level agreements (FLAs).

and infrastructure development. At the end of 2017, new forms of partnership had begun to emerge between WFP and NGO consortia. These included agreements to work with BRCiS to deliver nutrition support and with SomReP on a common registration system to link relief and livelihoods (SCOPE). WFP also worked with the SNS on the 2015 Nutrition Causal Analysis.

91. The clusters have provided an important platform for WFP to coordinate with NGOs and other partners in the UN system, for example:

- WFP has aligned its portfolio with the cluster-led Consolidated Appeal (CAP) 2013–2015 and annual HRPs;
- WFP has worked closely with national and local FSC members to move from a focus on food aid to a wider range of transfer modalities;
- WFP leads the Logistics Cluster,<sup>105</sup> which was established to address logistical gaps and help the humanitarian community to build, maintain and seek ways to improve capabilities to efficiently and effectively deliver assistance;
- WFP has seconded a staff member to the position of Deputy Nutrition Cluster Coordinator to support the wider humanitarian community effort; and
- WFP has engaged with the GBV sub-cluster (both as an organization and as co-chair of the FSC) in developing a three-year GBV strategy.<sup>106</sup>

92. However, the evaluation found that the main contribution of clusters has been in operational, rather than strategic, coordination. For example, minutes from Logistics Cluster meetings indicate that most coordination meetings have focused primarily on short-term tactical and operational issues and possibly have not adequately considered longer-term strategic issues, such as support for local markets.<sup>107</sup>

#### 2.1.4 *Did strategic choices maximize relevance?*

93. In Somalia, there are multiple needs spanning emergency and development. It is therefore highly likely that activities in the WFP portfolio are relevant. A more discriminating evaluative question is whether WFP has maximized its contribution through strategic choices based on its comparative advantages.

94. WFP has positioned itself first and foremost to respond to acute food and nutrition emergencies. Throughout the evaluation period the humanitarian situation has fluctuated but has remained serious. Through the provision of GFA and nutrition services, WFP has played a key role in addressing the objectives of the wider humanitarian community as described in CAP 2013–2015 and the strategic response plans 2014–2016.

95. This positioning aligns well with the comparative advantages of WFP and has been broadly supported by national and local government, UN, donor, NGO and community partners. The presence of WFP throughout Somalia has clearly added value. The WFP network of established offices and CPs has played a key role in facilitating broad coverage and reach, as well as community engagement. WFP analytical capacities have complemented FEWSnet and FSNAU. WFP expertise and capacity for supply-chain management has been critical for emergency response. Other agencies, such as UNICEF, UNHCR and many NGOs, have limited logistics and supply-chain

---

<sup>105</sup> Approximately 15 to 20 percent of the time of the head of logistics is dedicated to managing the Logistics Cluster. WFP also co-leads the Food Security Cluster with FAO.

<sup>106</sup> Somalia gender-based violence working group 2014–2016 Strategy.

[http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/\\_assets/files/field\\_protection\\_clusters/Somalia/files/GBV/GBV%20WG%20Strategy%20final%20Jan%2029%202014\\_new.pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Somalia/files/GBV/GBV%20WG%20Strategy%20final%20Jan%2029%202014_new.pdf).

<sup>107</sup> WFP logistics has held meetings with food importers.

management capabilities; and the evaluation team found that there was broad agreement on the unique scale and efficiency of WFP supply-chain operations.

96. WFP has also positioned itself well for building capacity in emergency preparedness. In 2015, WFP made a strategic choice to move from IKTs to CBTs, and subsequently from CBT vouchers to cash transfers.<sup>108</sup> The decision to roll-out the WFP SCOPE platform was a further important investment in preparing to introduce CBTs (see Box 1). In 2015 and 2016, the considerable corporate logistics and food supply-chain management capability was adapted to assess and register up to 1,000 local traders to redeem food vouchers in advance of the crisis. The WFP global strategic agreement with Standard Chartered Bank, which in turn had an agreement with Amal Bank in Somalia to provide cash transfer services, supported the scale-up of cash transfers.

**Box 1: System for cash operations (SCOPE) in Somalia<sup>109</sup>**

WFP Somalia has been using SCOPE, a digital beneficiary and transfer management platform that supports programme intervention cycles from beginning to end, since February 2015. SCOPE is a cloud-based system for biometric registration of beneficiaries, intervention setup, distribution planning, entitlement transfers and distribution reporting.

SCOPE was designed to support all transfer modalities, such as e-vouchers, in-kind food and cash. Biometric signatures to redeem entitlements assure beneficiaries, donors and government partners that WFP assistance reaches the people it is intended for. SCOPE also offers opportunities for multiple interventions through its multi-wallet feature, which enables partner agencies to share the platform and beneficiary data.

97. The evaluation found that how WFP maximized its strategic relevance in recovery and resilience programming outside emergency response was less apparent. In part, this reflected 'competition' from a large number of agencies with the skills, time and resources to support transitional and developmental activities.

98. Stakeholders inside and outside WFP argued that FAO has a strong mandate and capacity for leading support to rural livelihoods in Somalia. Some donors also argued that NGO consortia have a solid advantage in delivering resilience-building strategies (centred on livelihoods and assets) due to their outreach and technical capacities and that there would be little added value in WFP acting as an intermediary. However, WFP has demonstrated its strategic role in coordinating and mobilizing resources for CPs to deliver urban livelihood programmes in the absence of other actors.

#### 2.1.5 *Alignment with WFP corporate strategies and policies*

99. The country office has had to adjust to many WFP policies and guidelines as they have evolved. The evaluation spanned three WFP strategic plans, 2008–2013, 2014–2017 and 2017–2020. In addition, many relevant thematic policies were issued or revised during the period evaluated, including: the Gender Policy (2009,<sup>110</sup> updated 2015<sup>111</sup>); the Humanitarian Protection Policy (2012, updated 2014); School-Feeding Policies (2009, revised 2013); the Nutrition Policy (2012, updated 2017); Cash and Voucher Policies (2008 and 2011); and Safety Nets (2004, updated 2016).<sup>112</sup> New policy themes emerged, including the suite of policies related to WFP IRM issued in 2016,<sup>112</sup>

<sup>108</sup> See Figure 6 showing planned scale-up of CBTs and cash transfers.

<sup>109</sup> See SCOPE in Somalia. Cash-based transfer assistance. WFP February 2017.

<sup>110</sup> WFP. 2009. Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in Addressing Food and Nutrition Challenges.

<sup>111</sup> WFP. 2015. Gender Policy 2015–2020.


<sup>112</sup> Policy on Country Strategic Plans, Financial Framework Review and Corporate Results Framework.

the Policy on Building Resilience introduced in 2015<sup>113</sup> and the Accountability to Affected Populations Strategy 2016–2021.

100. The evaluation found that the country portfolio has aligned well with WFP strategic plans. The EMOPs and PRROs have explicitly aligned activities with SOs in WFP strategic plans. Furthermore, the country office has reacted to the latest strategic policy direction by drafting an interim transitional CSP and initiating a zero-hunger strategic review to actively lay the groundwork for a CSP.

101. The evaluation found strong evidence that the CO has followed evolving corporate thematic policy guidance closely (see Annexes L, M, N and O). For example, the Gender Policy 2015–2020 generated a process of reflection that resulted in a gender baseline study and the CGAP in 2016. The gender baseline provided a quantitative and qualitative analysis of progress made on gender and laid the foundations for the development of CGAP. Furthermore, the country office used this process to align with national, UN and WFP policy frameworks (see **Figure 7**).

**Figure 7: Gender and protection policy frameworks in Somalia**



102. Maintaining humanitarian principles, such as neutrality and impartiality, and ensuring the humanitarian space is preserved and protected – as endorsed by the Executive Board Humanitarian Principles Policy 2004 – has not been easy in Somalia.<sup>114</sup> With the establishment of the political mission in 2013 and its integration with UNCT in 2014, the perception that there were

<sup>113</sup> WFP. 2015. Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security.

<sup>114</sup> See the Somalia Civil-Military Working Group Report 2017.

links between humanitarian agencies and the political and military agendas has strengthened, raising concerns about safe access.

103. In the context of blurred lines, WFP has maintained impartiality by: addressing the needs of IDP, returnees and host communities in a non-discriminatory manner in areas where it could gain access; preserving operational independence in key areas of expertise; and maintaining some degree of neutrality, for example by not flying with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS). Donors have recognized WFP as *“the guardian of humanitarian principles together with UNICEF”*.<sup>115</sup> Despite this, the evaluation found instances of potential risks to beneficiaries from WFP assistance. Examples include risks associated with bags branded United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and supposed Al Shabaab aversion to any form of identification, including possibly WFP SCOPE cards, as *“only government officials tend to hold an ID”*.

104. Two issues have emerged on the degree of alignment with specific areas of thematic corporate policy:

- An analysis of the nutrition and health portfolio has demonstrated broad coherence with WFP policy (see **Table 5**). However, the emphasis on nutrition-sensitive programming in the 2017 Nutrition Policy update has yet to be integrated. Opportunities such as providing health and nutrition education in schools or linking health and nutrition education to FAO farmer field schools, were not taken up during the period evaluated.

**Table 5: WFP nutrition policy objectives and nutrition activities**

WFP Policy Objectives	Activities in the Somalia Country Portfolio
<b>Treating moderate acute malnutrition – wasting</b>	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme targeting children 6–59 months and malnourished PLW
<b>Preventing acute malnutrition – wasting</b>	Seasonal Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme targeting children aged 6–36 months and PLW
<b>Preventing chronic malnutrition – stunting</b>	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition targeting children aged 6–23 months and PLW
<b>Addressing micronutrient deficiencies among vulnerable people, to reduce mortality and improve the health of all groups, through fortification</b>	Supplementary Foods, PlumpySup, PlumpyDoz, SuperCereal
<b>Strengthening the focus on nutrition in programmes without a primary nutrition objective and, where possible, linking vulnerable groups to these programmes</b>	Behavioural Change Communication

Sources: WFP 2012 Nutrition Policy, SPRs.

- In 2012, the WFP Somalia portfolio aligned well with the WFP Policy for HIV and AIDS; nutrition and food assistance support was provided to HIV and TB patients and their households. However, the number of households receiving nutrition support has fallen because of declining donor support, meaning that corporate policy as it currently stands has not been followed. In addition, key informants have suggested that these households were not systematically assessed for vulnerability to determine whether or not they were eligible for inclusion in GFA, potentially putting vulnerable households at risk.

## 2.2. Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making

### 2.2.1 Generating and using analyses

105. WFP has drawn on and has contributed to a strong evidence base on food and nutrition security. As noted above, the seasonal assessments by FAO FSNAU have been the main sources of information on the number of food-insecure people, their location and the severity of food

<sup>115</sup> Meeting with the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group, Nairobi 13 December 2017.

insecurity. Data from these assessments has been combined with other information to produce quarterly IPCs. IPC assessments have been widely regarded as a credible, sound basis for response planning, although there has been growing criticism of aspects of the FSNAU system. For example, significant lags between the availability and communication of information have been noted. Furthermore, FSNAU has not adapted the livelihood-based sampling frame to the needs of government, which are organized around administrative areas.

106. The WFP Somalia VAM unit has collaborated with FSNAU in seasonal and targeted assessments, and in building consensus on needs. In addition, the unit has undertaken complementary emergency food-security assessments, monitored hotspots, monitored and assessed markets, and produced monthly early warning reports. Stakeholders endorsed the separation of the primary responsibility for assessment (in FSNAU) from the responsibility for response (by WFP) as this arrangement safeguards against potential bias in responses.

107. Geographic targeting of WFP food and CBT assistance has linked transparently to the results of FSNAU assessments: WFP has targeted all IPC Phase 3 and 4 localities for GFA in line with FSC guidance, and different IPC benchmarks were used for targeting compared to those in other countries. In 2011, WFP introduced SARPs, which transparently translate FSNAU data on needs into WFP caseloads. SARPs take account of access constraints and fine-tune estimates through dialogue with local authorities. The concurrent introduction of operational plans, which adjust SARPs based on funding forecasts, was important in providing area offices and cooperating partners (CPs) with a realistic basis for planning.

108. However, the evaluation found significant criticism of the underlying population data used to generate estimates. FSNAU – in common with other UN agencies – based its population estimates on the 2014 UNFPA figure of 12.3 million. Given population growth, this may be a significant underestimate<sup>116</sup> and, consequently, plans are in place to update the UN population estimates next season. Accurate estimates of the number of IDP continues to be an outstanding issue. Large discrepancies were noted by the evaluation team between UNHCR/IOM, WFP and government estimates of the number of IDP in specific locations. In addition, there is no clear guidance as to when IDP, some of whom have been 'IDP' for over 20 years, become integrated urban residents.

109. The evaluation found important gaps in WFP understanding of the different circumstances of women, men and youths in rural and urban communities and the differences between recent IDP arrivals and longer-term residents in and around IDP camps and settlements. Insufficient attention has been given to the influence of clan systems and gatekeepers on social exclusion and marginalization, which are known to affect the distribution and redistribution of entitlements.<sup>117</sup> As a result, the evaluation team questioned the assumption that community-based targeting is an effective mechanism for reaching vulnerable and marginalized groups.

110. Several key informants raised the issue of the credibility of FSNAU nutrition data, citing unexplained high levels of malnutrition reported by FSNAU in a particular site.<sup>118</sup> This doubt risked fragmenting a useful, multi-agency approach to assessing nutrition, as some agencies reported that they will be doing their own surveys in future. FSNAU is aware of the concerns but believes that its data is robust; it partners with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention to verify methodological issues and, where deemed necessary, conducts multiple surveys.

---

<sup>116</sup> Recent estimates place the number at 14.3 million [World Bank](#) (2016)

<sup>117</sup> See e.g., Bryld, E., C. Kamau and D. Sinigallia (2013), [Gatekeepers in Somalia](#), Cash Learning Partnership, and; Yarnell, M., and A. Thomas (2017) [On the Edge of Disaster](#), Refugees International.

<sup>118</sup> Dolow, an area that has relatively good security and access and has many NGOs and UN organizations providing services had very high acute malnutrition rates which could not be explained.



111. For internal decision-making, WFP has collected mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) screening data weekly through a network of community nutrition workers and has triangulated this information with FSNAU data. MUAC data, uploaded using the Open Data Kit system on mobile phones, has enabled WFP to monitor the nutrition situation in real time. Although not statistically representative, WFP data has provided a useful analysis of trends in nutrition. FSNAU has expressed interest in collaborating with WFP to make this data available to the wider humanitarian community.

112. To plan livelihood interventions, the country office adopted a three-pronged approach to planning and implementation: integrated context analysis (ICA),<sup>119</sup> seasonal livelihood programming and community-based participatory planning (CBPP). Although the planning process has successfully targeted populations by area, it was based on the questionable assumption that community-based targeting reaches those most in need, meaning that it did not specifically identify the most vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the analysis of livelihoods has concentrated on rural areas and has provided little understanding for underpinning programming in urban areas.

113. The causal analysis of malnutrition in 2015 highlighted the causes of malnutrition in Somalia. Food insecurity is compounded by many factors, such as an unhealthy environment, poor access to health services, and weak social and care practices that render children vulnerable to malnutrition. In 2016, WFP responded to this analysis by incorporating activities, for example, complementary feeding and promoting breast feeding, health and hygiene practices, to tackle the underlying causes of malnutrition in the ongoing SBCC.

114. WFP appears to have missed important opportunities for analysing protection and gender. The Somalia PRRO evaluation concluded that *"there was a lack of proper gender analysis as a basis for proper gender-sensitive planning and implementation"*. The After-Action Review<sup>120</sup> (August 2015) recommended that WFP should undertake a gender and protection assessment of all transfer modalities, but this has not been done. To date there is no evidence that WFP has properly analysed the gender and protection implications of CBTs.<sup>121</sup> Data collected by the VAM and M&E units have generally been disaggregated by the sex of the household head; analysis of age and diversity has been mostly lacking over the years and across programmes.

115. Conversely, positive examples of gender-sensitive analysis include:

- The nutritional causal analysis commissioned by WFP in 2015, which illustrated the links between gender and nutrition;
- Market and supply-chain assessments in 2017,<sup>122</sup> which found that male and female beneficiaries had different purchasing patterns; and
- theThe analysis of underlying causes of food insecurity and nutrition in the JRP, which included gender aspects.

116. WFP has also undertaken many *ad hoc* studies and assessments to support programme design. Examples include:

---

<sup>119</sup> Drawing on the annual assessments, WFP produced a 2007-2014 Trend Analysis, which was updated in 2015. This complements the seasonal analysis and aims to provide an understanding of trends causes of food insecurity and nutrition in Somalia and inform programmes accordingly.

<sup>120</sup> This is a review conducted after the implementation of PRRO 200443 C&V transfers for lessons learning purposes

<sup>121</sup> A 2013 study from Bossaso indicated women's control of food decisions, and that men tend to be a bit more involved in decisions about what to buy with the vouchers (34%). No tension was found in the HH due to the introduction of vouchers.

<sup>122</sup> VAM Market and Supply Chain assessments 2017.

- WFP Omega Value Tool assessments, which help choose transfer modalities (see section 2.3.3).
- Trade logistics capacity assessments for local markets where CBT programmes were to be implemented.<sup>123</sup> These assessments covered market demand, supply sources and delivery routes, challenges and risks such as insecurity and supply disruption, and commodity price and exchange rate fluctuations.
- As co-chair of CWG, WFP participated in and led discussions around the minimum expenditure basket (MEB), particularly when its composition was revised in mid-2017.
  - A geotagging report,<sup>124</sup> led by the Nutrition Cluster, for planning the distribution of nutrition services.

117. WFP used information on the food and nutrition situation to advocate effectively for a response to the 2017 crisis. Key informants reported that WFP was at the forefront of advocacy efforts to raise awareness and funding to respond to the crisis through the Operational Plan for Famine Prevention 2017. A further example of analysis used for advocacy is the “Cost of Hunger Study”, a tool for helping government ministries to understand the need for a multi-pronged strategy (including nutrition-sensitive interventions) to address malnutrition.

118. Under PRRO 200443, in 2013 WFP began strengthening the capacity of state-level government and partner staff to undertake food-security analysis. Area offices (AOs) training invited and supported local authorities and partners to participate in SARP workshops to formulate operational plans, and in national and regional food-security cluster cells to oversee response coordination. While this approach has enabled WFP to consult with federal and state government structures and partners while designing and implementing programmes, it has not supported the emergence of a cadre of staff able to take on these activities in future.

119. In comparison, over the last two years FSNAU has trained 80 government staff in FGS, Puntland and Somaliland line departments in situation analysis and early warning, and has helped establish food-security and nutrition analysis coordination units in MoHADM. However, throughout the evaluation period, WFP has not been clear as to its role vis-a-vis FSNAU and other UN agencies in developing the capacity of national institutions for food and nutrition analysis.

### 2.2.2 Drivers of strategic decision-making

120. The evaluation examined the drivers of the strategic choices made by WFP over the period of the evaluation. The reference point for the evaluation would ideally have been a country strategy. While an initial drafting a country strategy for Somalia began in 2012, it was never completed. The draft strategy addressed the shift from food aid to food assistance and had four pillars: nutrition, relief, livelihoods and safety nets (school meals). The strategy recognized the need to achieve greater impact and to pilot (paper-based) vouchers. In the absence of a formally adopted strategic plan for any part of the evaluation period, WFP Somalia has articulated its priorities in consecutive operational documents.

121. WFP has aligned decision-making clearly with the complex, evolving context. Strategic decisions have been rooted in the WFP mandate and policies,<sup>125</sup> and aligned with national policy frameworks.<sup>126</sup> The establishment of the FGS and gradual improvements in the governance context have been reflected – to an extent – by paying more attention to capacity building.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> The CPE team interviewed logistics staff and reviewed recent examples of Trade LCAs such as for Hobyo District in Mudug.

<sup>124</sup> Forcier Consulting and Somalia Nutrition Cluster. 2017. Somalia Nutrition Cluster Geotagging: Capacity Assessment.

<sup>125</sup> See section 2.1.5.

<sup>126</sup> See 2.1.1.

<sup>127</sup> See 1.2.4.

Section 2.1.4 distheed and confirmed the alignment of operations and activities with the evolving food-security context.

122. The country office has benefited from periodic evaluations.<sup>128</sup> These have been used to adapt programming to experience. This evaluation found that the country office had, in general, responded to recommendations. For example, consolidating nutrition services into MCHN clinics and improving targeting of FFA and FFT activities followed from recommendations made in the evaluation of PRRO and phasing out take-home rations responded to the school-feeding review. However, a notable omission has been the failure of management to act on recommendations to strengthen gender analysis. A review by the evaluation team of the extent to which the recommendations of the previous country portfolio evaluation (CPE) and PRRO evaluation have been followed is given in Annex Q.

123. The difficult experience of WFP before and during the famine of 2011 has been central to shaping decisions during the following evaluation period. The previous Somalia country portfolio evaluation found that serious allegations that food aid had been diverted by WFP staff and partners 2009–2010 had undermined donor confidence in WFP. Taken together with the suspension of activities in Al Shabaab-controlled areas for security reasons in 2010, significantly affected the delivery of food assistance to critical areas in southern and central Somalia, including areas subsequently affected by the 2011 famine. Some commentators have argued that the UN bore a measure of accountability for the subsequent famine.<sup>129</sup>

124. The consequences of this history are seen in several strategic decisions. Firstly, there was a decision to strongly commit to putting in place measures to minimize fraud and corruption, and mitigate reputational risks (see 2.2.3). Secondly, as WFP needed to rebuild trust and confidence in 2012 this may have influenced the decision to focus on core strengths, such as logistics and the delivery of food aid, in the immediate aftermath of the famine. Only later in the evaluation period was WFP in a position to assume a more innovative role. Thirdly, WFP was keenly aware of its role in building preparedness to avert future famines and to be an effective advocate for a timely response to future crises.

125. A further factor referenced by a wide range of stakeholders was the quality of leadership of the WFP country office in setting strategy effectively. Stakeholders commended the quality of the current country office senior management team, which they saw as being able to articulate an innovative vision and to take the necessary risks to deliver it. Given the centrality of good leadership, some WFP staff pointed to the value of WFP investment in future leaders, for example by sponsoring staff to participate in the Harvard management programme. The country office has also benefited from the ability to attract and retain well-qualified, motivated staff, particularly in comparison to WFP offices in other acute emergencies such as in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria. This is partly explained by the operation having an office in Kenya with attractive living conditions for international staff and a strong pool of national officers to draw on.

126. Finally, donors have played a key role in WFP strategic choices<sup>130</sup> and Donor conditionalities have influenced WFP programming choices. For example, donors have provided very little support for school meals as a way to improve the educational outcomes; the lack of support for school meals has shaped WFP strategic choices.

127. Overall resource flows to WFP have been generally stable at around USD150 million a year over the evaluation period but have fluctuated. The fluctuation has required WFP to rapidly scale

---

<sup>128</sup> See 1.3.2.

<sup>129</sup> Maxwell and Majid. 2016. *Famine in Somalia: Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures, 2011–12*.

<sup>130</sup> The role of donors in encouraging WFP to increase the proportion of transfers through CBTs was discussed in 2.1.3.

activities up and down<sup>131</sup> and to make strategic choices among competing priorities. WFP has responded to resource shortfalls by prioritizing life-saving activities over other portfolio activities such as building resilience; for example, in 2016 WFP chose to scale back livelihood activities and focus resources on delivering emergency assistance.

### 2.2.3 *Risk assessment and mitigation*

128. As noted above, unmanaged risks to the reputation of WFP jeopardized the country operation in the lead-up to 2012. Unsurprisingly, risk management has been at the forefront over the current evaluation period. WFP has taken a variety of approaches to assessing and mitigating risks.

129. The risk register has been a core tool to identify and manage risks under the 2015 Enterprise Risk Management Policy.<sup>132</sup> A WFP compliance office maintains the country office risk register to ensure that all programmes operate in accordance with corporate guidelines. Through field interviews, the evaluation team found that regular, wide-ranging staff engagement has made the risk mitigation process more meaningful. The risk register has been updated every six months and has established minimum preparedness actions. While the register has provided a planning framework for action and accountability, the evaluation team found it hard to identify specific actions that had been taken based on the risk register.

130. To minimize the risk of fraud, the country office instituted a strict policy of only operating in areas where it can physically monitor operations and is able to suspend ongoing operations when access is compromised. WFP national staff have adopted a low profile when monitoring operations, for example by using locally hired cars. Third party monitoring contractors have assumed some monitoring responsibilities in high-risk situations where WFP staff could not travel. Additionally, vetting CPs has improved as a result of developing a central UN blacklist of contractors, which provides detailed capacity assessments of partners and indicates potential risks. Furthermore, market-based risk analysis and mitigation measures are managed through the trade trade logistics capacity assessments of retailers used for voucher redemption.

131. Information on cooperating partners and retailers has been triangulated through a hotline set up for feedback from the affected population. A compliance task force established at country office level deals with particularly grave issues, such as fraud, corruption, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and gender-based violence (GBV) reported through the hotline. Two audits over the evaluation period have been satisfied with WFP arrangements for controlling fraud risks. No major diversions of food assistance have been reported over the evaluation period.

132. WFP's low tolerance of reputational risks has strained the humanitarian principle of meeting needs impartially. WFP has not operated in areas controlled by Al Shabaab and has been unable to reach food-insecure populations in these areas. To compensate for this, WFP has coordinated operations with other agencies, notably the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which were able to operate in Al Shabaab-controlled areas. However, despite improvements in access and security, certain areas have remained off-limits to all agencies; in Middle Juba food-insecure populations can only receive assistance by moving out of Al Shabaab-controlled areas. Although ostensibly operating under similar standards, the decisions taken by WFP on coverage have differed from those of cooperating partners and other UN agencies.

---

<sup>131</sup> Donor funding increased dramatically to around \$350m in 2017 and this has created new programming options. Conversely a decline in resources during 2018 appears probable, requiring a down-scaling of activities.

<sup>132</sup> The WFP Risk Appetite Statement identifies a number of risks and mitigation measures in the following areas: Security, Wellness and Safety Risks to Personnel, Well-Being of Beneficiaries, Operations, Demonstrating Results, Staff Capacity, Partnerships, WFP's Reputation and Risk Tolerance Decision Making. (OED2012/015, WFP/EB.1/2016/4-C)

133. During the evaluation period, the security situation has been volatile, particularly in South Central. According to the Aid Worker Security Database<sup>133</sup> about 145 aid workers were killed, wounded or kidnapped between 2012 and 2017. The evaluation team found that the country office has played a critically important and largely successful role in identifying and mitigating security risks by managing essential logistics-related functions and common services (Logistics Cluster and UNHAS) and through the work of its security team (in conjunction with the UN Department of Safety and Security).<sup>134</sup>

134. As well as providing a reliable, scheduled passenger transport service to many places in Somalia, UNHAS has played a critical role in reducing risks to humanitarian staff working in remote locations. By keeping one aircraft on standby at all times UNHAS has provided a prioritized medical and security evacuation service. In 2016, WFP launched a vehicle-tracking project with 50 vehicle tracking devices installed and personnel training facilitated. A total of 200 trucks carrying WFP cargo could be equipped with tracking devices and monitored remotely.

135. Moving forward, the issue of national identity, or at least an interim form of humanitarian identity, will need to be addressed. Somalia has no official identity card<sup>135</sup> so agencies have introduced cards or used biometrics to verify beneficiaries. WFP has decided not to use mobile money transfers, despite evidence that they improve reach and efficiency and that beneficiaries prefer them, because the links between mobile devices and biometric identities have not been secure. Scaling-up use of SCOPE has enabled WFP to more effectively manage risk as biometric identities ensure that services reach the right beneficiaries. Data security and privacy are ensured by uploading all data<sup>136</sup> to the UN Geneva-based central data repository. However, a recent WFP audit has raised serious questions about the protection of sensitive personal data.<sup>137</sup>

## **2.3. Portfolio Performance and Results<sup>138</sup>**

### *2.3.1 Delivery of outputs*

136. This section assesses the performance of WFP in delivering planned outputs. Depending on the activity, output targets set the number of beneficiaries, quantities of food and cash to be distributed, assets to be created and/or the number of institutions to be supported. The main findings are given below. A full analysis of performance against planned outputs is provided in the technical annexes and in the summary tables in Annex P.

---

<sup>133</sup> <https://aidworkersecurity.org/>.

<sup>134</sup> The UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) umbrella sets Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) standards while WFP remains responsible as the agency responsible for implementation of security protocols.


<sup>135</sup> There are ID cards in Somaliland and Puntland, introduced to support elections.

<sup>136</sup> Data uploaded directly through cloud or using an offline version of SCOPE and loaded in a DMS network.

<sup>137</sup> Audit exposes UN food agency's poor data-handling. <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2018/01/18/exclusive-audit-exposes-un-food-agency-s-poor-data-handling>.

<sup>138</sup> Tables of outputs and outcomes are given in Annex P, with further details in Annexes L, M, N and O by thematic area.

**Figure 8: WFP Somalia GFA beneficiaries planned vs actual 2012–2017**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

137. **Figure 8** shows general food assistance (GFA) beneficiaries by year. Planned targets have been exceeded every year except 2013, when targets were overestimated as recovery after the 2011 drought was faster than anticipated.

138. GFA has been delivered through IKTs and CBTs, and as pre-cooked meals. As CBTs have become the predominant transfer modality, IKTs have selectively targeted interior communities which lacked easy access to retailers<sup>139</sup> and areas where non-state armed groups have imposed economic blockades. In 2017, the proportion of cash – as opposed to voucher – transfers increased substantially<sup>140</sup> as cash transfers could be collected from Amal Bank branches either in the form of cash or mobile money.

139. WFP has provided cooked meals to a limited number of returnees, IDP and vulnerable host populations. The cooked meals programme has been useful due to its self-targeting nature,<sup>141</sup> but WFP is considering scaling-down the number of beneficiaries receiving cooked meals and transitioning to CBTs. While reduced, the programme has continued in 20 locations in Mogadishu and, in 2017, supported approximately 103,000 IDP.

140. The number of planned and actual TSFP beneficiaries is shown in **Figure 9**. Targets were exceeded in 2012 and 2017 but fell short in other years. In 2013, planning figures were overestimated. In 2014, the number of beneficiaries reached was low due to the worsening nutrition situation and concomitant focus of WFP on preventive efforts through the blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP). In 2015, admissions to BSFP were low due to the suspension of the programme of a major partner with large coverage in the Bossaso area; in other areas access was intermittent due to insecurity. In 2016 and 2017, WFP met planned targets as nutrition programmes took priority.<sup>142</sup> The nutrition cluster reported that WFP has provided treatment to 93 percent of those reached by partners in the Somalia Nutrition cluster.<sup>143</sup>

<sup>139</sup> WFP experimented with the use of mobile traders but the experiment was not well received. With limited choice this became a de facto in-kind distribution.


<sup>140</sup> Started in 2016 as a pilot in Mogadishu, under the complementary cash for MCHN to enable mothers to buy fresh foods, and expanded in 2017 for relief. Data on the breakdown of transfer modalities for 2017 was not available.

<sup>141</sup> Based on a draft report of the Cook Meals Programme made available by the CO.

<sup>142</sup> See relevant SPRs for further details.

<sup>143</sup> Nutrition Cluster. 2017. Somalia Nutrition Cluster Presentation, November 2017.


**Figure 9: TSFP beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2012–2017**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

141. **Figure 10** shows the number of beneficiaries aged 6–59 months reached by the blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP) over the evaluation period. BSFP has been provided seasonally (during lean periods) and in areas where warranted by malnutrition rates. While performance against targets has fluctuated, BSFP either came close to targets or comfortably exceeded them every year. BSFP reached the fewest actual beneficiaries (6–36 months old) in 2015, only 89 percent of the number planned, because distribution was disrupted by logistical delays in Mogadishu and access to Dolow was constrained because of insecurity.<sup>144</sup>

**Figure 10: BSFP beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2012–2017**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.


142. **Figure 11** Error! Reference source not found. presents the planned and actual distribution of Ready to Use Supplementary Food (RUSF). The distribution mirrors the number of TSFP and BSFP beneficiaries. Underperformance was essentially for the same reasons as for the shortfalls in beneficiary numbers given above. The difficult resourcing and security environment has occasionally caused breaks in the pipeline of food assistance, particularly for supplementary food commodities.<sup>145</sup> In most cases these problems have been fairly minor and the country office has found solutions by moving commodities around and relying on Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) stocks in Berbera.<sup>146</sup>

144 WFP. 2015. Standard Project Report.

145 Based on an analysis of the Pipeline Committee Meeting minutes.

146 WFP pipeline meeting notes from 2012 to October 2017.

**Figure 11: Quantity of RUSF distributed (planned vs actual) 2012–2016**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016.

143. From 2013, planned social and behaviour change communication (SBCC) has related to nutrition activities. WFP has not recorded output data for SBCC consistently during the portfolio period and the only information is in standard project reports (SPRs) from 2014 onwards.<sup>147</sup> **Table 6** details the planned and actual proportions and absolute numbers (depending on how this indicator was reported in the SPRs) that received counselling over the portfolio period. WFP has consistently reached more females than men; the number of men reached has been less than a quarter of the total.

**Table 6: SBCC beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2014–2016**

Year	Male			Female		
	Planned	Actual	Percent A/P	Planned	Actual	Percent A/P
2014*	60	18	30	60	82	137
2015**	40,721	67,869	167	139,866	233,111	167
2016**	207,721	138,435	67	257,164	230,743	90

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. \*Reported as a proportion \*\*Reported as absolute numbers

144. WFP expanded its maternal and child health and nutrition (MCHN) activities in Somaliland, Puntland and parts of South Central as opportunities arose. However, as MCHN is limited in rural areas throughout Somalia WFP has needed to be flexible and retain the capacity to provide mobile nutrition services when required in close coordination and collaboration with UNICEF and CPs. **Table 7** below details the actual number of MCHN centres assisted by WFP compared to planned targets.

**Table 7: MCHN centres assisted (planned vs actual) 2012–2016**

Year	Planned	Actual	Percent A/P
2012	N/A	119	-
2013	150	133	89
2014	130	151	116
2015	160	174	109
2016	173	131	76


<sup>147</sup> Country office data for 2013 showed that 364,386 individuals received counselling or messages through the TSFP.



145. A one-off incentive ration has been provided to women who gave birth under medical supervision in MCHN centres, although it is unclear whether this continued in 2017. Anecdotal evidence from staff at MCHN clinics suggests that the number of women attending health centres for delivery has increased, however, WFP has no reported data to support this. As an alternative to providing incentive rations to mothers, some WFP partners have remunerated traditional birth attendants who have referred pregnant women for delivery at a health facility.

146. The planned and actual number of beneficiaries supported by anti-retroviral therapy (ART) and TB-directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS) are shown in **Figure 12**<sup>148</sup> WFP only reached the planned number of beneficiaries in 2012. Since then there has been a progressive decline in the number of beneficiaries supported, largely due to funding constraints. In 2016, WFP only supported malnourished HIV and TB patients in treatment facilities who adhered to existing protocols.<sup>149</sup> Key informants reported that WFP stopped the programme abruptly without notice, making explaining the situation to beneficiaries difficult. In addition, key informants suggested that households were not systematically assessed for vulnerability to determine whether they were eligible for general food assistance (GFA), potentially putting vulnerable households at risk.

**Figure 12: Support to ART and TB-DOTS (planned vs actual) 2012–2017**




147. Targets for the number of participants in food assistance for assets (FFA) and food assistance for training (FFT) activities were exceeded in 2012 and 2013, the numbers reached were close to target 2015–2016 and fell significantly in 2017 (**Figure 13** and **Figure 14**). The coverage of people classified as IPC level 2 in the WFP trend analysis was extremely limited, ranging from 31 percent in 2013 to 9 percent in 2016. The sharp drop in numbers in 2017 was because of a strategic decision to focus on emergency activities.

148. The proportion of female to male FFA participants has been roughly equal from 2013 onwards; some FFA and FFT sites have provided childcare services for women working or training. While there is some evidence that women were significant participants in management committees there is no data; the proportion of women in leadership roles overseeing FFA and FFT was only reported for 2014 and 2015 when it reached 21 percent, less than half of the 50 percent target.

<sup>148</sup> Data for clients presented in the EMOP 200281 SPR was not disaggregated by sex.


<sup>149</sup> WFP Standard Project Report 2016.

**Figure 13: FFA participants (planned vs actual) 2012–2017<sup>150</sup>**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

**Figure 14: FFT participants (planned vs actual) 2012–2017**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

149. FFA has supported rural communities to adopt a range of environmental recovery and productive activities. Each activity was agreed with target communities through CBPP. Examples of activities have included building rainwater-harvesting structures for crops and pastures, equipping shallow wells with solar pumps, *birkads* and erosion-control measures. Achievement of actual versus planned outputs has been variable (**Table 8**).

**Table 8: FFA assets created and rehabilitated (planned vs actual) 2012–2016<sup>151</sup>**

Output	Unit	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Irrigation structures	Ha	0	5,975	16,622	41,776	10,502
Actual vs planned	(percent)	0	1,707	206	85	75
Soil-water conservation	Ha	232	835	129	1,094	259

<sup>150</sup> The numbers reported in Figure 13 are for FFA participants. There is potential for confusion since SPRs only report on FFA participants for 2012–2014, but participants *and* beneficiaries (that is, participants x six household members) separately for 2015 onwards. As such, *participants* are reported here for comparability across years.

<sup>151</sup> Green boxes indicate targets achieved. Amber, targets not achieved. Grey, no data.

Actual vs planned	(percent)	155	155	182	290	83
Biological land stabilization	Ha				106	70
Actual vs planned	(percent)				707	78
Land clearance	Ha		90	228	6,783	16
Actual vs planned	(percent)		56	104	105	4
Roads rehabilitated	Km	597	1,006	2,108	1,692	604
Actual vs planned	(percent)	149	72	132	94	93
DRR <sup>152</sup> -assisted communities	#	482	341	495		
Actual vs planned	(percent)	241	47	141		
Community ponds >3000m <sup>3</sup>	#	168	109	141	96	119
Actual vs planned	(percent)	280	52	127	82	78
Shallow wells	#	17	92	201	51	191
Actual vs planned	(percent)	17	66	105	25	102
Tree seedlings produced	#		63,500	105,777	85,500	330,500
Actual vs planned	(percent)		113	100	24	99
Flood and gully protection	m <sup>3</sup>		216,176	39,971	36,408	34,355
Actual vs planned	(percent)		676	111	45	93

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016.


150. FFT has mostly concentrated on urban areas. Course options have been tailored to the needs of displaced women and men seeking new skills for employment and developing small businesses, for example traditional weaving and dyeing, information technology, adult literacy, electronics, mobile repairs and plumbing. While FFT course options have positively favoured women's preferences, they were largely pre-identified; the evaluation found little evidence that FFT support was based on an analysis of the needs, opportunities and constraints displaced men and women face in different locations. Similarly, while support for literacy and numeracy, and business skills training may have contributed to women's empowerment, business skills training was only introduced in 2017, indicating a lack of attention to using FFT to help vulnerable groups establish small enterprises.

151. In 2013, WFP began purchasing cereals locally in the Jubaland and South West regions through an agreement made with the MoA; 200 MT were purchased in 2014, 1,500 MT in 2015 and 4,000 MT in 2016.

152. The WFP school meals programme successfully exceeded planned target beneficiary numbers in all years except 2014 and 2017 (**Figure 15**). Schools reported significant breaks in supply in 2017 as WFP took account of donor preferences and prioritized nutrition activities.

<sup>152</sup> Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

**Figure 15: School meals beneficiaries (planned vs actual) 2012–2017**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012-2017.

153. The number of schoolgirls receiving take-home rations was approximately 50,000 a year 2012–2014. The number subsequently declined due to funding shortages and supply-pipeline failures.<sup>153</sup> In view of the findings of the review of the school meals programme, in 2017 WFP took the decision to remove take-home rations from the portfolio and concentrate on school meals for boys and girls.


154. Over the evaluation period, WFP has increased the number of schools it supports year-on-year and has expanded support to reach rural schools in both Somaliland and Puntland. The programme has operated through state ministries of education. Schools have been targeted based on the prevailing level of food insecurity rather than enrolment. Schools have indicated that they prefer vouchers rather than IKTs as the baskets of commodities supplied have not always suited local preferences.

155. Successive SOPs have enabled the Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia (UNHAS) to continue during the evaluation period. UNHAS has met targets for moving personnel (see **Figure 16**), medical and security evacuations, and light cargo such as medical supplies and supplementary food commodities (see Annex P). Between 2012 and 2017, UNHAS recovered approximately 70 percent of its operating costs from passenger and cargo charges. In general, demand for air services has been consistent throughout most of the evaluation period but increased in 2017 as relief activities escalated.<sup>154</sup>

<sup>153</sup> Take-home rations were introduced as an incentive to increase girl's attendance.

<sup>154</sup> 150 agencies are registered with UNHAS; the top 20 agencies account for 78 percent of passenger traffic.

**Figure 16: UNHAS passengers (planned vs actual) 2012–2016**



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016.

156. WFP has engaged in building capacity and strengthening a wide variety of national institutions, through training, secondment of staff and technical assistance, for example:

- Since 2013 WFP has been strengthening the capacity of staff in regional and federal disaster management departments for assessing needs, issuing early warnings, monitoring, targeting and coordinating responses.
- WFP, with the MoH, has delivered five technical training courses on treating acute malnutrition, MCHN and HIV/TB in Puntland, Somaliland, Central Somalia and Mogadishu.
- Training for teachers in managing activities and supporting state-level governments in the formulation of school-feeding policies has strengthened capacity in the education sector.
- Since 2016 WFP has posted an advisor to work on port development, maritime law and legislation, and the organizational structure of marine port authorities.
- WFP has supported the formulation of the national policy framework and programmes, specifically drafting Chapter 2 of the SNDP in 2016.
- In conjunction with UNICEF, in 2017, WFP developed a social protection policy framework and provided capacity strengthening to federal and regional states.

### Transfer modalities

157. In 2012 all transfers were their-kind. The 2007–2011 CPE criticized WFP for the slow uptake of CBTs. WFP has reversed the situation and has progressively increased the use of CBTs; the increase from 2016 onwards has been unprecedented. By October 2016 CBTs comprised an estimated 10 percent of transfers. Cash transfers replacing vouchers were introduced at the very end of 2016.<sup>155</sup>

158. Setting the amount of cash transfers has proved contentious. FSNAU calculated estimates of MEBs in 18 regions as a benchmark for cash transfers. However, the benchmark was cumbersome to calculate and apply; recipients were unclear on their entitlements and several stakeholders felt that the amounts were unrealistically large meaning fewer beneficiaries. Furthermore, transfers did not take account of the number of people in households.

159. SPRs have not reported data on CBT beneficiaries *by activity* consistently, meaning it has been difficult to analyse CBT for the period as a whole.<sup>156</sup> However, the 2016 SPR showed that CBTs

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> For 2012–2014 data for CBT beneficiaries was reported separated from data for other activities but records of the purpose of transfers, e.g. to meet GFA needs or FFA, were not kept. However, from 2015 onwards, data on beneficiaries was broken down within activities according to the transfer modality used.

were the main modality for FFT transfers, two-thirds of GFA and half of FFA. However, nutrition, health and school-feeding transfers have remained almost exclusively in-kind.

### Beneficiary targeting

160. While the evaluation generally found a strong capacity for geographical targeting, there have been concerns regarding community-based targeting of households. The possible exclusion<sup>157</sup> of beneficiaries such as the Bantu in the southern part of the country has been mentioned in the section on GFA. WFP has been aware of the issue<sup>158</sup> and has taken steps to mitigate the risk of exclusion. However, beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluation team had limited ability to seek entitlements as they were unaware of the criteria. Questions about entitlement were the second most frequent issue registered by the call centre in 2017. SPRs have systematically reported community-based targeting as a challenge. Targeting and defining IDP has also been an issue. People displaced during the 1991 war are still classified as IDP and consequently still being assisted by WFP.<sup>159</sup> A mechanism for determining at what point IDP become urban residents is absent.

161. WFP has only partially met food assistance needs due to lack of access, and partner and resource constraints. WFP has progressively expanded coverage in South Central areas as FGS and AMISOM extended their areas of control and Al Shabaab was displaced. However, in late 2017 WFP still could not reach 600,000 people classified as extremely food insecure.

162. WFP targeting criteria have reflected gender considerations. As a result, the majority of recipients of food assistance across all transfer modalities have been women. Beneficiaries of food assistance programmes and activities have comprised 55 percent women and 45 men; of those who purchased food items with SCOPE (both cash and vouchers) 70 have been women and 30 percent men.<sup>160</sup> No major tensions have been reported among men and women regarding the GFA provided by WFP (both cash and vouchers). In general, representation on community committees has been 50 percent female, although the number of women in leadership positions has consistently fallen below the 50 percent target. WFP has done little to empower women to take on leadership roles.

163. However, the needs of adolescent girls across programmes, especially education and nutrition, have not been addressed. This gap is especially important given the link between early marriage and inter-generational malnutrition. As primary schools in Somalia accept children up to the age of 16, school meals are one of the few ways for WFP to reach adolescent girls. Also, although a goal of WFP is to sensitize men on nutrition through social and behaviour change communication (SBCC), the extent to which this has been done is limited.<sup>161</sup>

164. Targeting nutritional activities based on individual and area-level anthropometric targeting criteria has been largely effective. A problem has arisen where screened, referred children have been refused admission to the TSFP because the planning figure in field-level agreements (FLAs) has been insufficient. WFP removed the cap in early 2017. TSFP admission is now on need. WFP has explored providing a buffer stock to each centre but does not yet have the resources to put this in place.

---

<sup>157</sup> WFP relies on a third party (CTG Global) to support targeting and monitoring. Some interviewees expressed concern that some CTG Global staff may be prone to clan-based bias. Most CTG staff do not have a background in humanitarian work.

<sup>158</sup> It is noted as a risk factor in the risk register.

<sup>159</sup> Anecdotal evidence gathered from WFP in Somaliland.

<sup>160</sup> Data provided by WFP Somalia.

<sup>161</sup> See considerations on this in the Technical Annex L.

### 2.3.2 Attainment of objectives

165. Assessing performance against planned outcomes is complicated because there have been changes in how outcomes, and the associated targets and indicators used to measure progress, are defined. Specifications differ among the three main operations, constraining the analysis of trends over the evaluation period. A summary of the main observations relating to outcomes is given in this section, and a detailed analysis is presented in the respective technical annexes.

166. The outcomes associated with general food assistance (GFA) were mainly measured using food consumption scores (FCS) and diet diversity scores (DDS). Reporting in the SPRs was inconsistent for 2012 to 2014 but, from 2015 onwards, DDS and FCS scores have generally exceeded planned targets; the most positive impact has been on female-headed households (**Table 9**). However, the outcomes cannot be specifically attributed to WFP because of other contextual changes.

**Table 9: GFA DDS outcomes (2014–2017)**

Summary of average scores	2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Base value	Follow up	Base value	Follow up	Base value	Follow up	Base value	Follow up
Diet Diversity Score	5.6	5.6	3.2	4.8	3.99	4.46	3.57	4.33
Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	5.1	5.7	2.9	4.7	3.82	4.6	3.60	3.87
Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	4.8	5.8	3.2	4.9	4.07	4.43	3.50	4.47

Source: SPRs 2012–2017. No data for 2012 and 2013.

167. An Omega analysis by WFP in 2016 compared the cost-effectiveness of CBTs and IKTs. However, the calculation made assumptions about the use of vouchers and IKTs rather than using actual data on outcomes. This evaluation received (unquantified) reports of resale of both IKTs and voucher transfers, which would affect their cost-effectiveness. Coupled with limitations in quantifying costs (see section 2.3.4), the Omega analysis was not particularly accurate or helpful.

168. An unintended consequence of GFA, in both 2012 and 2017 crises, was that it triggered large-scale population movements. As WFP assistance could not penetrate areas controlled by Al Shabaab, beneficiaries had to move to places where aid could be delivered. In 2012, the main movements were to Mogadishu and Dadaab camp in Kenya, while in 2017 movement was more localized, typically to district towns under government and AMISOM control. Surveys have indicated that many recent IDP intended to settle in urban areas, despite limited livelihood opportunities.

169. Nutrition outcomes have broadly met targets for coverage, recovery rates, default rates and mortality. The TSFP has met the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response standards for performance on all the key indicators. TSFP mortality rates throughout the period evaluated were 0–1 percent and non-response to treatment was 3 percent, indicating that treatment protocols have been effective.<sup>162</sup> However, the coverage of TSFP was

<sup>162</sup> See Annex L for full details.

lower than the Sphere threshold of >50 percent<sup>163</sup> for rural areas until 2016 when coverage reached 77 percent.<sup>164</sup> Improvements in coverage are attributed to mobilizing and training community nutrition workers. In addition, mobile teams responded to drought in Puntland and Somaliland in early 2016.<sup>165</sup>

170. The coverage and adequacy of blanket supplementary feeding programmes (BSFPs) have improved dramatically since 2014, reaching 83 percent coverage and 100 percent distribution in 2016 because of improved outreach (**Figure 17**Figure 17).

**Figure 17: BSFP outcomes (2012–2017)**

Year	Coverage percent	Adequate number of distributions
2012	N/A	N/A
2013	N/A	N/A
2014	20	26
2015	74	77
2016	83	100
2017	81	69

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

171. Despite inconsistent food supplies, treatment success and nutrition recovery rates for TB-DOTS patients receiving rations have been very good. Nutrition recovery rates were high for ART patients until 2015 when default rates were very high due to the lack of food.<sup>166</sup>

172. A one-off incentive ration has been provided to women who gave birth under medical supervision. Anecdotal evidence from staff at MCHN clinics suggests that the number of women attending health centres for delivery increased because of the incentive. However, WFP has not reported data which supports this anecdotal evidence.

173. Corporate data requirements have changed over the evaluation period. As a result, outcome data for FFA/FFT have been reported consistently from 2016 onwards. It is clear that, across sites and years, WFP did not achieve its targets for DDS, the coping strategy index (CSI) or FCS.<sup>167</sup> Considering the limited scale of FFA/FFT transfers and asset creation/rehabilitation, and the many variables that would have influenced outcomes (e.g. drought, market prices, remittances, insecurity, clan/community-related social support or exclusion) it is questionable as to how appropriate the WFP outcome targets were.

174. The evaluation could make little if any distinction between the WFP livelihood recovery and resilience programmes as they have identical sets of activities. Although the quality of FFA and FFT interventions could not be assessed, the short-term SARP process and field-level agreements (FLAs) with cooperating partners (CPs) used to plan and implement FFA and FFT activities have not been compatible with longer-term livelihood recovery or resilience building.

175. While community asset scores (CAS) associated with food assistance for assets (FFA) indicate targets have been achieved, the scores represent little more than a percentage of target communities that have received FFA support in line with seasonal annual response plans (SARPs)

<sup>163</sup> <http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/management-of-acute-malnutrition-and-micronutrient-deficiencies-standard-1-moderate-acute-malnutrition/>.

<sup>164</sup> Coverage surveys were not done in 2012 and 2013; 77 percent is an aggregate figure for coverage.

<sup>165</sup> WFP. 2016. Standard Project Report.

<sup>166</sup> See Annex L for details.

<sup>167</sup> See Annex N for details.



and operational plans (OPs). The failure to achieve CAS targets at FFA sites in 2014 was because of delays in interventions, which meant that activities were not completed until 2015.

176. The Strategic Review of School Meals Programme in Somalia (February 2017) found little evidence of the impact of school meals on food security – for similar reasons to the lack of impact of FFA and FFT on food security. However, school meals have been effective in keeping girls and boys in school, and in improving overall attendance and education outcomes (**Table 10**). School meals have also attracted strong support from teachers, parents and officials. The cessation of take-home rations in 2017 has not had a significant impact on female attendance.

**Table 10: School meals outcomes (2012–2017)<sup>168</sup>**

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Change in enrolment rate in WFP-assisted primary schools (%)			6.1	13.3	1.3	0.34
Change in enrolment rate among boys (%)			7.2	13.1	0.9	0.34
Change in enrolment rate among girls (%)			4.9	13.5	1.7	0.34
Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools (%)	94.5	95.2	97		99	95.00
Retention rate among boys (%)	94.5	95.2	97		98.5	95.00
Retention rate among girls (%)	94.4	95.5	97		99.7	94.50
Gender ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted schools	0.81	0.8	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.81

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

177. In terms of gender transformative outcomes, 2016 data suggest that there has been a general shift towards joint decision-making among men and women about the use of both food and vouchers.<sup>169</sup> The results of the 2016 livelihood baseline survey corroborate this data.<sup>170</sup> Women reported maintaining control over food-related decisions and resources. Only in Dollow did male beneficiaries mention using some of the cash assistance for business purposes.<sup>171</sup>

178. Outcomes related to capacity building have been poorly monitored and reported. PRRO 200443 introduced reporting on the national capacity index (NCI). Calculating the NCI involved administering a questionnaire to government officials covering policy frameworks, financial capacity, institutional capacity, coordination, design and implementation, and community goals. However, interpretation of the index and the influence of WFP on changes is far from clear.

179. Reporting on common services focuses on outputs rather than outcomes. However, the evaluation confirmed that UNHAS has responded rapidly, efficiently and flexibly to the fast-changing needs of the humanitarian community. The fluid security situation, poor infrastructure, long distances and lack of reliable commercial air transport, have necessitated the continuing presence of UNHAS.

180. Overall feedback from Logistics Cluster users, according to a survey conducted in August 2017, was that 75 percent were generally satisfied with its performance, particularly in coordination. However, several comments pointed to the need for more logistics capacity building.

181. The evaluation did not find many links between emergency, nutrition, livelihood recovery, resilience and school meals interventions:

<sup>168</sup> Green boxes indicate targets achieved. Amber, targets not achieved. Grey, no data.

<sup>169</sup> SPR 200844 2016. This reflects the transformational approach introduced by the WFP gender policy.

<sup>170</sup> Findings from the baseline survey indicate that while women are solely responsible for food, decisions concerning the use of cash and vouchers were taken jointly by men and women. WFP livelihood baseline survey March 2016.

<sup>171</sup> Focus group discussion with male and female beneficiaries, Dollow 4 December 2017.

- While WFP has provided communities with FFA to support the rehabilitation of irrigation canals and schemes, it has not explored integrating any of these interventions with the development of value chains through local purchase, home-grown school meals to support school feeding, or multi-sectoral initiatives to prevent malnutrition – even in more stable regions such as Puntland and Somaliland.
- In some targeted supplementary feeding programmes (TSFPs), for example in the IDP camps in Hargeisa, WFP stopped providing a family ration. This ran counter to the evaluation in 2012, which reported that there was “*evidence that aligning the family ration with TSFP had increased recovery rates*”.

2.3.3 The introduction of SCOPE multi-wallet distribution provided an innovative way of integrating transfers and services at the household level. However, there has been limited operationalization even among WFP activities. For example, nutrition beneficiaere only being registered in SCOPE in late 2017.

### 2.3.3 Monitoring and evaluation

182. Analyses of meaningful longitudinal output-to-outcome analyses in the early part of the evaluation period were constrained by major data gaps and weaknesses in WFP M&E systems.<sup>172</sup> In response, in 2014, the country office drafted an M&E strategy that recognized the need for better outcome monitoring. Post-distribution monitoring has been successfully implemented through third party monitoring and telephone interviews, enabling WFP to track operations in areas staff could not reach.<sup>173</sup> Consequently, outcome reporting in SPRs has improved since 2015, however, the ability to attribute outcomes to WFP remains weak.

183. While the use of remote data collection mechanisms and tools has expanded dramatically over the years, the evaluation found no evidence of any assessment of the repercussions this may have on gender and protection issues. Among them were: possible barriers reaching female beneficiaries due to illiteracy, limited access to technologies such as mobile phones, as compared to males, and female enumerators from working in particularly insecure areas.<sup>174</sup>

184. WFP gave more prominence to protection from 2015 onwards, particularly focusing on accountability to affected populations (AAP) In the context of few opportunities for directly engaging with communities, establishing an effective, easily accessible, robust complaint and feedback mechanism (CFM) provided an important avenue for sharing and receiving information and feedback, and for WFP to triangulate and cross-check data received from third party monitoring partners and other secondary sources.

185. In 2017, monitoring and reporting systems were further enhanced by introducing a digital dashboard that draws together information from SCOPE, Mobile VAM (mVAM) and other WFP data systems. The dashboard periodically replicates various databases thus avoiding slowing down the master databasesthe. Linking the dashboard to the WFP call centre has given staff instant access to data on beneficiaries, enabling problems to be resolved rapidly.

186. WFP has recently reviewed M&E standard operating procedures (SOPs), which now list protection, AAP and GBV as high priority issues; a specific procedure is in place on how to strengthen prioritizing these issues in CO’s M&E. Call centre staff have been sensitized on gender

<sup>172</sup> M&E corporate guidelines became operational with the SRF in 2014. While there are gaps in demonstrating WFP’s impact and measurement on capacity building activities, this is a global issue and not only specific for Somalia.

<sup>173</sup> The use of satellite imagery for monitoring the maintenance and use of infrastructure assets created by FFA programmes was trialled but not found to be effective.

<sup>174</sup> See for example comments on the male-dominated FSNAU enumerator teams in the 2012 FSNAU gender analysis.

While there has been no assessment, 55 percent of the calls received by the call centre were from women, which indicates that women had access to phones. Since the end of 2016, WFP has used voice messages to deal with illiteracy, which affects both men and women.

and protection issues, and informed of referral mechanisms. The SOPs are considered to be good practice in the region and were mentioned in key informant interviews as a model for other country offices to adopt.<sup>175</sup>

2.3.4 Increasing the proportion of female enumerators, both internal and outsourced, has been an ongoing challenge that has undermined WFP capacity to comprehensively reach out to female beneficiaries. However, women are being heard and are contributing opinions, particularly through the CFM.

#### 2.3.4 Efficiency

##### Timeliness

187. Several measures have been taken during the evaluation period to improve the timeliness of WFP responses. Key explanatory factors were the use of the GCMF, pre-registration of beneficiaries in SCOPE and more use of CBTs.

188. In 2011, the Rome-based GCMF was established as a strategic financing platform for prepositioning food in a region or corridor based on anticipated demand. WFP Somalia has increasingly drawn on the GCMF and, since 2015, close to 100 percent of WFP Somalia food requirements have been supplied from GCMF stocks held in Djibouti, Mombasa and Berbera ports. This has reduced delivery lead times. For example, in 2016, the country office received food from the GCMF after an average 46 days as opposed to an average 120 days under the conventional procurement process, a 62 percent reduction in lead-time. The country office also reported modest use of other corporate advance financing tools. Donor conditions for contributions can pose problems in repaying advances.

189. To improve emergency preparedness and reduce response times, the country office embarked on mass registration and distribution of system for cash operations (SCOPE) cards to all potential beneficiaries. By the end of 2015, WFP had registered over 950,000 people in the system and by 2016 1.5 million. The process of contracting, training and equipping retailers with point-of-sale devices also started in 2015. The foresight in undertaking large-scale preparedness proved vital in facilitating a rapid response to the subsequent crisis.

190. Some stakeholders pointed to weaknesses in the SCOPE system, notably failures in fingerprint recognition and the need for a system for replacing lost cards, which left beneficiaries unable to claim their entitlements. Resolving these issues were reportedly slow and has delayed distribution to affected households for several months. Direct transfers to mobile money accounts<sup>176</sup> are more efficient, as they do not require the intermediary step of registration in SCOPE. However, WFP has insisted on the use of SCOPE cards to ensure that beneficiaries are identified correctly.

191. Notable differences between emergency responses in 2011–2012 and 2016–2017 were that in 2016 local markets were better understood than in 2011 and that better systems had been introduced to implement, monitor and manage cash transfers. The increase in the number of beneficiaries from 400,000 in January 2017 to 2,500,000 in April was due to the use of CBTs. The country office conducted an analysis of the time from confirmation of a grant to the date food was dispatched for in-kind distribution to the date that vouchers are valid. In 2016, the average time from confirmation of a grant to food being dispatched was 66 days, compared to 30 days for CBTs.<sup>177</sup> Scaling-down CBT is also more efficient than in-kind distribution as it does not require winding-up complex supply-chain infrastructure.

---

<sup>175</sup> Key informant interview.

<sup>176</sup> A World Bank study found that Somalis in general praise mobile network operators for providing much-needed services in the entire country but WFP has limited trust in these services as they are not regulated.

<sup>177</sup> During food crises in Somalia two months is regarded as the maximum before excess mortality starts.

## Cost efficiency


192. From 2016 onwards, WFP has analysed the cost efficiency of alternative transfer modalities using Alpha. However, the country office has identified weaknesses in the methodology, including the assumption that entire transfers are used by beneficiaries as planned. In cases where households might have resold or exchanged all or part of in-kind or voucher transfers, the analysis might have reached different conclusions.

193. In practice, the choice of transfer modality made by the country office relied heavily on qualitative considerations. Even though Alpha analyses for most planned distributions indicated that in-kind food assistance was more cost efficient, timeliness considerations and the importance of meeting beneficiary preferences increasingly led to a preference for CBT over in-kind. WFP chose not to repeat the Alpha calculations in 2017 concluding that the resource demands of the analysis were disproportionate to the benefits for decision-making.

194. The country office has controlled costs through other initiatives:

- At the beginning of the evaluation period WFP addressed delays and demurrage costs in ports through investments in port infrastructure thehandling capacity. Effective prepositioning has minimized the use of cargo planes and made transportation cheaper. In 2016, an agreement with WFP Yemen and Ethiopia country offices to share the costs of the Berbera logistics hub led to a 90 percent drop in fixed costs for the country office.
- The consolidation of WFP nutrition activities around MCHN centres has yielded efficiencies, for example fewer end-distribution points, shared partner and community worker information avoiding duplication and, in some cases, joint management of facilities with UNICEF. However, to meet needs, particularly in rural areas, WFP has maintained costlier mobile services.
- The establishment of a single registry, as piloted through the system for cash operations (SCOPE), will potentially reduce registration costs and eliminate duplication in cases where multiple agencies target the same households with the same type of aid. However, SCOPE is a work in progress. Many competing registration systems are in use and there are legal and technical constraints to system inter-operability.
- Surveys of UNHAS users have indicated concerns about ticket costs and implied inefficiencies, and the same concerns have been raised directly with the evaluation team. However, according to UNHAS data, the cost per passenger kilometre (\$0.60) has been lower compared to other humanitarian air services provided by WFP (**Figure 18**). High ticket prices reflect the flat cost structure, which means that a UNHAS flight for the popular Nairobi-Mogadishu leg is more expensive than a flight on commercial operators. A move to procuring bulk fuel at global level has helped drive cost efficiency.

**Figure 18: UNHAS efficiency by country (2016)**



Source: Somalia UNHAS/WFP Aviation, data extracted from the WFP Aviation Performance Management tool.

### 2.3.5 Gender and protection

195. Gender inequality and protection have been of significant concern in Somalia but staff capacity and responsibilities for these issues have been limited. Two successive policy programme officers have had marginal responsibility for gender and protection. Recognizing the need to strengthen capacity, the country office has developed terms of reference for a standby partner protection (and gender) advisor but the position has not yet been approved by management.

196. Overall, the operationalization of the latest Gender Policy is lagging. Understanding and capacity among staff on gender is still rather limited and the potential for support from the regional bureau has at times been untapped. This has meant that opportunities for innovations such as CBTs and SCOPE to develop a deeper analysis and understanding of gender dynamics at household and community levels have been missed, and that full engagement with UN initiatives has not happened.<sup>178</sup>

197. The gender baseline requires all staff to undergo mandatory courses on gender from the end of 2016. However, the baseline does not make clear which courses are mandatory. Training relevant to gender has included: basic gender training for M&E officers in both the country office and area offices; training for call centre staff on sensitive issues such as SEA and GBV; and a gender analysis workshop for Kenya and Somalia staff and partners.

198. A strategic partnership with DRC has already yielded results and further benefits are expected to materialize in 2018. DRC-led training courses on gender and protection will be conducted in Hargeisa, Galkayo, Bossaso, Dollow, Mogadishu and Nairobi and will involve a maximum of 25 participants in each location. Training will also cover the basic principles of GBV prevention and the WFP protocol on GBV. Finally, pursuant to its objective of strengthening

<sup>178</sup> See for example the limited engagement of WFP at the UN Gender Theme Group (GTG) level and with the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and the lamented departure of the 2016 gender and protection focal point for UNICEF.

partners' capacities for mainstreaming gender and protection into designing, implementing and monitoring programmes,<sup>179</sup> staff of partner agencies in different locations will also be invited.

199. The evaluation commends the increase in WFP engagement on GBV and protection in general, including at the FSC level, and in preparation for implementing the Centrality of Protection Strategy (CoP). WFP Somalia has recently developed a GBV protocol to guide staff and partners in addressing GBV in the context of food security.<sup>180</sup>

200. Overall, female staff account for 30 percent of the WFP staff in-country. While the percentage of female international staff increased from 26 percent in 2012 to 42 percent in 2017, the percentage among nationals did not change significantly. A human resources (HR) strategy to promote gender and diversity in the workplace was mentioned, but has yet to be approved by the executive management group.<sup>181</sup> Efforts by HR to reach gender parity have included: (i) committing HR to implementing gender-inclusive policies and practices; (ii) increasing the number of female staff by 2 percent annually, with the goal of reaching 30 percent female staff in Somalia-based offices; (iii) considering and integrating gender, age and nationality in country office HR targeting strategies; and (iv) supporting female professional development and distance learning.

201. Despite well-defined WFP data protection and privacy policies, doubts remain about their practical application in the field regarding handling sensitive data (such as biometrics, phone numbers, photos, fingerprints) and informed consent by beneficiaries on the use of such data.<sup>182</sup> A recent internal audit of beneficiary management has raised similar concerns.<sup>183</sup>

202. Gaps in fully analysing and addressing protection risks associated with the system for cash operations (SCOPE) were also evident. For example, during SCOPE registration in 2015, protection incidents seriously affecting the safety of beneficiaries were reported.<sup>184</sup> Concerns about the high-profile of SCOPE and potential difficulties in managing overcrowding at registration and redemption/top-up sites, at least in the initial implementation phase, have led to a recommendation to develop guidance on gender and protection but the recommendation does not appear to have been acted on.<sup>185</sup> A planned protection analysis of SCOPE implementation in 2016 has not been carried out due to competing priorities and security concerns,<sup>186</sup> and is yet to take place.

### *2.3.6 Sustainability and impact*

#### Sustainability of assets

203. The sustainability of assets and capacities created by WFP has varied. During implementation of FFA activities WFP has held structured training courses for both participants and partners on all stages of implementation, including sustainability and maintaining assets. However, the evaluation found little evidence of FFA and FFT activities that have supported women and men to manage and maintain FFA structures. There was also little evidence of FFT activities to help participants find employment or establish small enterprises after training. FFA interventions have suffered from limited support for stand-alone activities. The main tangible benefits appear

---

<sup>179</sup> WFP PRRO 200844.

<sup>180</sup> WFP Gender-Based Violence Survivor Referral and Service Protocol 2017.

<sup>181</sup> The 2016 Gender baseline reported the HR strategy to be in place and to focus primarily on gender parity in staffing.

<sup>182</sup> In the words of one informant, people had no alternative but to register in SCOPE if they wanted to continue receiving assistance. Also, the extent of partners' knowledge and understanding of WFP policies for managing beneficiary identity and information data was also unclear.

<sup>183</sup> Fieldwork was conducted in Malawi, Myanmar and Sudan. WFP Internal Audit of Beneficiary Management 2017.

<sup>184</sup> WFP. 2015. Assessment of security incidents at a WFP registration site in Mogadishu.

<sup>185</sup> A two-page document called SCOPE Protection Guiding Principles developed in 2016 makes no mention of protection concerns.

<sup>186</sup> SPR 200844, 2016.

to have been CBTs and IKTs, which are short-term. The sustainability of WFP contributions to livelihoods recovery could not be substantiated.

204. The main objective of local procurement was to improve post-harvest management and storage to reduce aflatoxin levels. While local procurement has successfully improved quality control and has enabled produce to be sold-on to national markets, its sustainability is not clear.

205. Efforts to integrate WFP and UNICEF services in MCHN centres, coupled with capacity building in ministries of health, point to a more sustainable approach to nutrition services. Progress has been made in building a network of health service providers through MCHN centres. Public-sector financing for MCHN centres has been limited meaning that they have been heavily reliant on donors but they are staffed by dedicated national staff and are moving towards a degree of sustainability through cost recovery.<sup>187</sup>

206. WFP capacity strengthening in the education sector has evolved from training teachers between 2012 and 2014 in the management of activities in Puntland and Somaliland, to helping state governments implement WFP-supported school meals programmes and formulate national school-feeding policies from 2015 onwards. School meals now receive strong government support in both states.

207. WFP has contributed to the development of logistical infrastructure in Somalia by investing in port rehabilitation and strengthening the capacity of port staff. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rehabilitation by WFP of Mogadishu and Bossaso ports has had a positive economic impact, expanding market opportunities in both national and international trade. However, the evaluation team could not confirm this.<sup>188</sup> The significantly increase in the volume of cargo shipped through Berbera port has also probably made a big impact on the local economy of Somaliland, but data for conducting an analysis has been difficult to obtain. With the handover of management of the major ports to private-sector operators, it seems that improvements in port infrastructure will be sustained.

208. WFP has facilitated improvements to minor airstrips<sup>189</sup> around the country. These, combined with contributions from Turkey and Middle Eastern donors<sup>190</sup> – such as from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for upgrading the Bossaso airstrip – have encouraged commercial carriers to begin operating flights in Somalia; some NGOs now fly with East African Express and Juba Air. Ethiopian airlines began scheduled flights from Addis Ababa to Hargeisa, so UNHAS no longer has to operate on that route. If Kenya Airways begins services to Somalia, it may be feasible for UNHAS to cease flying from Nairobi to Mogadishu.

#### Impact of WFP activities

209. The overall objectives of operations in Somalia align with corporate strategic plans and have been broadly consistent over the evaluation period (**Table 11**).

**Table 11: Strategic objectives of WFP Somalia operations**

EMOP 200281	PRRO 200443	PRRO 200844
<b>SO1 Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergency and early recovery situations</b>	SO1 Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies	SO1 Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies
<b>SO2 Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster-preparedness and mitigation measures</b>	SO2 Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster-preparedness and mitigation measures	

<sup>187</sup> Mid-term evaluation of JHNP.

<sup>188</sup> The World Bank is currently undertaking a study of Somalia's ports.

<sup>189</sup> Quansadhere and Afmadow planned for rehabilitation with US funding – Dinsoor completed in 2017 with US funding.

<sup>190</sup> UAE will begin upgrading the airport at Berbera in 2018.

	SO3 Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations	SO2 Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies
	SO4 Strengthen the capacities of governments to reduce hunger	SO3 Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs

210. None of the logical frameworks have set performance indicators for SOs, thus SPRs have not reported on the contribution of WFP to higher-level results.<sup>191</sup> WFP monitoring systems have not been set up to monitor higher-level results, however, some qualitative observations can be made on impacts at this level.

211. All three operations included the common objective of saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies. Evidence of an estimated 258,000 excess deaths in the period October 2010 to April 2012 indicates that there was a major failing in saving lives. This failure has raised major questions not just about WFP operations, but about the entire humanitarian system. The analysis of the response to the 2011 famine falls outside the scope of this evaluation as it was declared over by April 2012. However, the analysis does provide a point of reference and comparison for subsequent performance.

212. In stark contrast to 2011, WFP has been credited with an important contribution to preventing famine in 2017. While the crises in 2011 and 2017 are comparable, there is no evidence of widespread mortality in 2017. However, based on available data it has not been possible to distinguish the impact of WFP actions on changes in malnutrition from the impact of contextual changes or the actions of other actors. Certainly, the context in 2017 was very different, as access in South Central Somalia was much better. Furthermore, diaspora remittances in 2017 appear to have come earlier and on a larger scale.<sup>192</sup>

213. The improvement in emergency response was associated with progress towards the second goal, improved “disaster preparedness and mitigation measures”. Contributions to this goal have included the GCMF, system for cash operations (SCOPE) and cash-based transfers (CBTs), that together have enabled a timelier response. However, these advances have not yet been embedded outside WFP. FGS and state authorities are poorly equipped to take full responsibility for delivering relief and, in the medium term, humanitarian agencies will need to maintain a direct delivery capacity.

214. In the medium term, stakeholders have become increasingly aligned<sup>193</sup> on the potential of a national safety net system aligned with government structures. The main argument for a safety net is that it would sustain and systematize pre-registration of beneficiaries and arrangements for delivering cash transfers, enabling future crises to be managed efficiently and effectively. Debate continues over the detail, including on: balancing chronic, seasonal and acute needs; whether transfers should be conditional or unconditional; whether to include graduation pathways; and who should lead and implement a national safety net. An important contribution of WFP towards systematic assistance has been demonstrating the feasibility of a national biometric identity system and linking this to a single registry of beneficiaries and agency interventions.

215. Currently, parallel coordination bodies are debating the national safety net. Under the social protection sub-working group, WFP and UNICEF have begun to develop a policy framework with the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development and the cooperation of federal and state governments. The process has started to identify strategies to reach the most

<sup>191</sup> M&E corporate guidance did not require the SO to define results framework with longer term results/indicators.

<sup>192</sup> According to CONCERN (pers. comm.) an estimated USD2 billion in remittances in 2017 was an increase of USD1 billion over previous years.

<sup>193</sup> Including ECHO, Sweden, Italy, Germany, USAID and DFID.



vulnerable and to establish a multi-agency, nationwide registration and assistance delivery platform, and has introduced efforts to strengthen the capacity of government partners, including in developing and using social protection indicators linked to SDG targets.<sup>194</sup>

216. A third, broadly common, objective focused on rebuilding post-disaster livelihoods. The evidence collected by WFP has not offered insights on the extent to which participants in WFP livelihood activities have enjoyed sustained benefits but instead has focused on the short-term changes in food security due to food or cash transfers. For example, there has been no follow up on the extent to which FFT participants have been successful in finding employment based on their new skills.

217. A fourth broad objective related to building resilience to future shocks and reducing risk. WFP, along with UNICEF and FAO, has played a prominent role in formulating a strategic approach by introducing the JRS. However, the evaluation found little evidence that JRS has spurred innovative programmatic approaches. JRS has been criticized as a loose affiliation of reformulated activities – for most of the evaluation period the resilience portfolio was effectively confused with FFA activities. While FAO resilience impact measurement and analysis (RIMA) reported positive changes on overall resilience in targeted areas, there are outstanding questions on the scale and sustainability of these changes.

218. JRS was recast in 2017 as a JRP which argues for good nutrition as a basis for resilience. Consequently, it appears that the WFP approach to resilience may be to rebrand integrated approaches to address the root causes of malnutrition. However, government, UN and donor stakeholders consulted by the evaluation team agree that a more systemic resilience approach is needed that combines rebuilding livelihoods with providing basic services, safety nets and early warnings.

---

<sup>194</sup> [WFP and Social Protection: Somalia Case Study](#) 2017.

# 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

## 3.1. Overall Assessment

### 3.1.1 Alignment and strategic positioning

219. WFP has ensured that its approach and activities have broadly cohered with government policies and plans. Given fragmented governance in Somalia, WFP has ensured appropriate strategic alignment with multiple ministries at both federal and state levels. However, the aim has often been to ensure sufficient alignment to enable WFP to deliver its own programmes. Notably, significant progress on nutrition has enabled WFP to help the government to realize its policy objectives and programmes. Achieving this degree of alignment has required strong inter-agency and inter-ministerial collaboration, and sustained WFP policy engagement. Stronger alignment with national institutions responds well to the new strategic directions of the integrated road map (IRM).

220. WFP's strategy and portfolio were judged to be broadly relevant to beneficiaries' needs. The WFP objective of saving lives and livelihoods in emergencies has been particularly relevant to food-insecure Somalis who have been dependent on WFP's ability to organize timely emergency response at scale. The strategic shift from in-kind food assistance to unrestricted cash has clearly met the diverse needs and preferences of beneficiaries. However, the evaluation found that the portfolio has paid limited attention to differentiating needs according to gender, age and ability.

221. Collaboration and alignment with UN agencies has been challenging in the Somalia context. Integrating humanitarian, development and political objectives in one mission has created tensions. WFP – given its mandate – has correctly positioned itself as primarily a humanitarian agency. In difficult circumstances, WFP has maintained overall impartiality and a degree of neutrality. While maintaining its own principled position, WFP has improved collaboration with other UN development agencies and has worked towards stronger partnerships.

222. The evaluation found that there is still much to be done to ensure that short-term emergency activities take longer-term, interconnected problems into account.<sup>195</sup> The joint resilience framework – outlined in the JRS – has not been capitalized on. The JRS has failed to bring together humanitarian and development agencies and, even within the limited ambition of the JRS framework, has failed to catalyse innovative programming. Improvements in integrated programming have been mainly through inter-agency cooperation, most notably with UNICEF. Furthermore, the JRP risks narrowing the operational scope of resilience away from integrated delivery of safety nets, basic services and livelihoods towards a focus on vulnerable households.

223. The evaluation also found limited strategic attention to the post-emergency needs of IDP in urban areas, which are clearly important in Somalia and have been for some time. However, for much of the evaluation period the emphasis has been on supporting rural livelihoods as it was assumed that IDP would return to the pastoral economy. Engaging more with the Durable Solutions Initiative could be a way to bring short- and long-term interventions together in urban settings.

224. WFP has also been adept in maintaining consistency – at least bi-laterally – with donor priorities and policies. In particular, the strategic shift to CBTs and, more specifically, unrestricted cash transfers is consistent with the broad trajectory of donor interests.

---

<sup>195</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP). 2006. Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria.

225. The evaluation found good practices for moving towards better strategic engagement with NGO partners, for example choosing to build strategic partnerships with a select group of NGO partners. While the results are yet to be seen, working with a select group is an opportunity to establish mutually beneficial relationships with the NGO sector. The emergence of NGO consortia offers a channel that WFP should explore in future.

### *3.1.2 Quality of strategic decision-making*

226. The evaluation found that, in general, WFP has made good use of information on food and nutrition in decision-making. WFP has worked well in support of FSNAU and could provide further assistance to ensure the quality of nutrition data and the dissemination of results. Despite some sector-wide criticism of FSNAU, the evaluation strongly supports the continued division of responsibilities for analysing food security as the independence of FSNAU shields WFP from suggestions of bias in assessing needs.

227. A good practice introduced by WFP is the preparation of seasonal analysis response plans (SARPs) and operational plans to provide transparency on the assessment of needs (by FSNAU) and programming decisions. The plans are also useful for engaging government authorities in coordination. WFP drew on its food-security analysis to advocate strongly for a timely response to the 2017 crisis.

228. While geographic targeting has been good, the evaluation could not determine the effectiveness of household targeting. The evaluation team questioned the assumption that community-based targeting effectively reaches vulnerable and marginalized groups. Furthermore, a deeper understanding of gender and protection, and an assessment of the consequences of changing transfer modalities, would have helped decision-makers understand how to better mitigate risks. Similarly, a deeper understanding of the causes of food insecurity and malnutrition is required to strengthen the evidence base for prioritizing programming options.

229. WFP has contributed modestly – but probably appropriately – to building the capacity of various federal and state ministries for analysing food and nutrition issues. However, an overall strategy for capacity building has been lacking and plans have been weakly integrated with other agencies such as FSNAU and OCHA. The impact and sustainability of capacity building has been muted given continued weaknesses in governance structures.

230. The evaluation found that the main drivers of WFP strategic decision-making have been logical and necessary. Strong leadership and staff underpinned effective decision-making in the later part of the evaluation period. An increase in interaction with emerging Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) structures, albeit highly fragile, coincides well with the new WFP Strategic Framework and sets the groundwork for a greater focus on state-building.

231. An important finding was the enduring impact of the 2011 famine on decision-making. Experiences during the famine have led directly to the adoption of strong safeguards against fraud and corruption. While these protocols are considered to have been necessary and effective in the specific context, it will be vital to maintain a degree of flexibility in order to balance risk to WFP's reputation with meeting the needs of vulnerable populations, for example if a food-security situation dramatically worsens.

232. WFP has strategically positioned itself well where it has comparative advantage; the most significant comparative advantages have been in providing emergency responses and common services. Outside periods of crisis the strongest role of WFP has been in building preparedness. However, WFP comparative advantages have not been confined to emergency operations but have also included aspects of nutrition and education.

### *3.1.3 Portfolio performance and results*

233. WFP has performed strongly in delivering outputs. To a large extent, targets for the number of beneficiaries, amounts to be distributed or assets to be created have been met or exceeded. WFP has demonstrated an impressive ability to respond at scale to needs in Somalia. Where WFP has fallen short, it has typically been due to resource constraints, insecurity or changing needs. Pipeline breaks appear to have been relatively minor and adequately managed. Most assistance has been successful in targeting women, but the exclusion of marginalized groups is a concern for the humanitarian system as a whole.

234. The decision to prioritize available resources to life-saving assistance was finely tuned to WFP's mandate, strengths and the imperative of saving lives. At the same time, the decision greatly reduced support for rebuilding livelihoods, providing school meals and supporting ART and TB-DOTS during crises. If WFP aims to consistently deliver its 'dual mandate' then support to non-emergency activities should be predictable and sustained.

235. The effectiveness of WFP outcomes has been harder to assess due to changing objectives and indicators, and limited monitoring data in the first half of the evaluation period. Weaknesses in M&E systems in outcome monitoring were largely rectified from 2015 onwards, and mandatory corporate indicators are almost completely covered. Innovations such as third party monitoring and telephone surveys have been valuable and have contributed to better monitoring; the complaint hotline has provided affected populations with a degree of accountability.

236. Results from 2015 onwards judged against internal goals have generally been good. Some activities have fallen short of targets, for example FFA/FFT and school meals have had little impact on food security but, in the case of school meals, they have improved (female) enrolment. There is little evidence that WFP activities have had a transformative impact on gender relations.

237. Opportunities to capitalize on internal synergies between activities were identified but have been largely unrealized. Overall, few linkages were observed between emergency, nutrition, livelihood recovery, resilience and school meals interventions.

238. One of the most impressive achievements of WFP has been a substantial improvement in timeliness. The introduction and extensive use of the GCMF, the increasing use of CBTs and the decision to pre-register potential beneficiaries in SCOPE underpinned a radically more effective response in 2017, compared to 2011.

239. Several innovations over the evaluation period have been credibly associated with cost savings. However, current WFP systems do not permit quantitative analysis of the scale of savings.

240. Knowledge of higher-level impacts has been constrained as WFP has not monitored SO results. However, the evaluation found that WFP could plausibly be credited with a key contribution to preventing famine during the 2017 drought. However, there is no plan as yet to ensure that the innovations adopted in 2017 will be sustained – ideally with government involvement. The emerging consensus on a national safety net is that it is both desirable and technically feasible. Although government capacities are minimal and fragile, appropriately designed, a safety net could sustain government participation in delivering on its responsibilities to its citizens. Complementary approaches to sustainability – including building private-sector capacity in areas such as nutrition and education – should also be further explored.

### **3.2. Lessons Learned**

241. The Somalia country portfolio evaluation (CPE) identified several important lessons and good practices that deserve wide consideration and dissemination across WFP. Collectively, the lessons learned and good practices contributed to making WFP Somalia dramatically more

effective in responding to the drought in 2017, compared to the 2011/12 crisis. Innovations have been described above and key lessons are listed below:

- The introduction and extensive use of the GCMF has led to a dramatic fall in delivery lead times for in-kind assistance (see para 188).
- The decision to pre-register potential beneficiaries in SCOPE enabled the response in 2017 to be scaled-up rapidly (see para 96).
- Scaling-up the use of cash transfers rather than voucher-based CBTs aligned well with beneficiary preferences and needs, and donor strategies.
- The biometric registry (in this case SCOPE) has the potential to integrate delivery of goods and services at household level (see para 90).
- Building strategic partnerships with a select group of NGO partners is a good practice that could lead to a more nuanced approach to WFP partnerships (see para 88).

### **3.3. Recommendations**

242. The following recommendations take a forward-looking perspective in the framework of the WFP Strategic Plan 2017–2021. Under this framework – and the associated integrated road map (IRM) – WFP will work closely with national institutions towards realizing the SDGs. Unless indicated otherwise, the recommendations are directed to the WFP country office.

*3.3.1 Recommendation 1: WFP should provide technical leadership in developing and piloting a Somali Safety Net Programme (SSNP) to address chronic, seasonal and acute needs.*

243. Rationale:

- *High probability of repeated crises and continuing chronic needs.*
- *Adequate preparedness is essential to delivering timely, life-saving emergency responses.*
- *Despite stakeholder interest no agency has yet taken the lead.*
- *Well aligned to WFP comparative advantages.*

244. It is recommended that WFP should:

- a. Partner with both humanitarian and development donors.
- b. Consult closely with federal and state authorities in the design from the outset.
- c. Draw on the experiences of other regional safety net programmes to inform the design.

245. Based on experience in the ongoing crisis response in Somalia it is specifically recommended that the SSNP should:

- d. Establish a single registry for beneficiaries, based on inter-operability of established systems.
- e. Work to include mobile cash as a delivery modality.
- f. Include referral pathways for protection cases.

*3.3.2 Recommendation 2: WFP should develop a longer-term approach for IDP assistance.*

246. Rationale:

- *The majority of IDP intend to remain and settle in urban areas.*

- *There are insufficient resources to support sustainable urban livelihoods and prevent rising urban poverty.*
- *Humanitarian assistance may also be used for the survival needs of urban poor/IDP.*

247. It is therefore recommended that WFP should develop a longer-term, structured approach to assisting the transition of IDP to settled urban residence. Elements of this should:

- Include IDP as a target group in the SSNP.
- Tighten the definition and targeting of IDP for emergency assistance.
- Expand effective, evidence-based urban livelihood programmes.
- Explore new partnerships to integrate IDP in urban areas.

*3.3.3 Recommendation 3: WFP should change the primary objective of FFA and FFT activities to creating productive assets and livelihoods.*

248. Rationale:

- *Livelihoods are an important pillar of an integrated approach to building resilience.*
- *Evidence of food-security outcomes or sustainability is weak.*
- *Planning and implementing FFA according to annual programming cycles does not ensure sustained community engagement or sustainable outcomes.*

249. It is therefore recommended that WFP should implement future FFA and FFT activities within a strategic framework that:

- Plans and implements FFA and FFT activities according to a three-year cycle and strengthens coherence with national strategies and programmes.
- Ring-fences resources to ensure continuity.
- Develops an M&E framework to assess both the short- and longer-term results of FFA and FFT.

*3.3.4 Recommendation 4: WFP should strengthen integration of gender and protection in programming.*

250. Rationale:

- *Insufficient analysis and understanding of gender and protection issues.*
- *Capacities and skills for assessing gender and protection are limited.*
- *Programming approaches are relatively indifferent to age, gender and ability.*

251. It is therefore recommended that WFP should improve capacities for analysing and programming gender and protection by:

- Reviewing the existing ToR for the policy officer position to integrate responsibilities for gender and protection or establish a dedicated position for gender and protection.
- Proceeding with the request for a standby gender and protection officer and capitalizing on the availability of the Regional Protection and Gender Advisor through regular collaboration and exchange.
- Assessing the impact of transfer modalities on intra-household and community dynamics, including gender and protection, and applying the results to programme design.
- Strengthening the capacity of cooperating partners in gender and protection analysis.

3.3.5 Recommendation 5: WFP should improve targeting of beneficiaries – including IDP.

252. Rationale:

- *Community-based targeting potentially excludes marginalized groups.*
- *Beneficiaries are unaware of the criteria for enrolment and entitlements.*

253. It is therefore recommended that WFP should improve capacity for analysing vulnerability and targeting beneficiaries – including IDP - by:

- a. Promoting community participatory methodologies to ensure women and girls, including IDP, contribute equally and actively to designing targeting criteria and entitlements, .
- b. Improving communication with beneficiaries on targeting criteria and entitlements.
- c. Continuing to closely monitor the distribution of programme benefits.

3.3.6 Recommendation 6: WFP should engage in broader inter-agency dialogue to coordinate approaches to planning and implementing capacity building efforts.

254. Rationale:

- *The context is increasingly conducive to building the capacity of national institutions.*
- *WFP has demonstrated the potential to contribute in well-defined areas. But, capacity building efforts are insufficiently coordinated with other stakeholders.*
- *Results are poorly monitored and reported giving limited visibility to WFP efforts.*

255. It is therefore recommended that WFP Somalia should pay more attention to planning, implementing and reporting capacity building efforts, and should:

- a. Work in partnership with relevant UN agencies to conduct thorough assessments of the capacity of selected partner ministries to identify areas where WFP has a comparative advantage in capacity building, such as analysing food security.
- b. In consultation with the monitoring unit in WFP Rome, strengthen tools and capacity for monitoring and evaluating capacity building activities.

3.3.7 Recommendation 7: WFP should engage with MoH annual strategic planning and support MoH to integrate nutrition monitoring data into the MoH health management information system.

256. Rationale:

- *There is a sound strategy on nutrition and health, rooted in strong collaboration with UNICEF as co-implementing partner. However, there are opportunities to strengthen programme implementation and sustain outcomes.*

257. Therefore, it is recommended that WFP Somalia should:

- a. Work with FSNAU and other Nutrition Cluster partners to deepen analysis of the causes of food and nutrition insecurity.
- b. Ensure that nutrition centres have sufficient contingency resources to treat all malnourished children.
- c. Disaggregate data in order to understand the differences in coverage in urban, rural and IDP settlements, and closely monitor re-admissions to the TSFP to ensure that stopping family rations has not meant that children are re-admitted to TSFP treatment.

- d. Change the incentive for delivering babies in health centres from food to CBT and consider whether or not to continue providing the incentive to mothers or switching to providing the incentive to traditional birth attendants.
- e. Reinvigorate ART and TB-DOTS and provide appropriate support for both clients and their households.
- f. Expand SBCC to community level and the wider public, specifically targeting men and change agents such as community leaders.

*3.3.8 Recommendation 8: WFP should situate and evaluate the contribution of school meals in an inter-agency education strategy.*

258. Rationale:

- *Education is a national priority and has the potential to break inter-generational behaviours.*
- *Education has the potential to address structural causes of food and nutrition insecurity.*
- *WFP school meals are planned and implemented to address food security rather than educational goals.*
- *School meals have a proven positive impact on (female) enrolment and retention but not on food-security indicators.*

259. It is therefore recommended that WFP Somalia should:

- a. Coordinate and report on school meals as part of the education cluster rather than the Food Security Cluster (FSC).
- b. Align operational decision-making with an educational objective, for example in selecting participating schools.
- c. Implement the postponed systems approach for better education results (SABER) with the Ministry of Education (MoE).



# Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ART	Anti-Retroviral Therapy
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia
BSFP	Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CAS	Community Asset Score
CBPP	Community-Based Participatory Planning
CBT	Cash-Based Transfer
CEDAW	UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CFM	Complaint and Feedback Mechanism
CGAP	Country Gender Action Plan
CO	Country Office
CoP	Centrality of Protection Strategy
CP	Cooperating Partner
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CWG	Cash Working Group
DDS	Diet Diversity Scores
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment, Short Course
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
EB	Executive Board
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessment
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
FACA	Food Aid Coordination Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Scores
FEWSnet	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFA	Food Assistance for Assets
FFT	Food Assistance for Training
FFW	Food Assistance for Work
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FLA	Field-Level Agreement
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition

GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCMF	Global Commodity Management Facility
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFA	General Food Assistance
GTG	Gender Theme Group (UN)
HADMA	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HR	Human Resources
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICA	Integrated Context Analysis
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSP	Interim Country Strategic Plan
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ICWG	The Inter-Cluster Working Group
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IKT	In-Kind Transfer
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IRM	Integrated Road Map
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JHNP	Joint Health and Nutrition Programme
JRP	Joint Resilience Programme
JRS	Joint Resilience Strategy
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCHN	Mother and Child Health and Nutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHADM	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
MoWHRD	Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development
MT	Metric Ton
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
mVAM	Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
NCI	National Capacity Index
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEV	Office of Evaluation
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
RBN	Regional Bureau Nairobi
RUSF	Ready to Use Supplementary Food
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SARP	Seasonal Analysis Response Plan
SBCC	Social and Behavioural Change Communication
SCOPE	System for Cash Operations

SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SNDP	Somali National Development Plan
SNS	Strengthening Nutrition Security Consortium Somalia
SO	Strategic Objective
SOp	Special Operation
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SomReP	The Somalia Resilience Programme
SPR	Standard Project Report
SSNP	Somali Safety Net Programme
STREAM	The Somalia Resilience Action Consortium
TB	Tuberculosis
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
UN	United Nations
UNCERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department of Safety and Security
UNFPA	UN Population Fund
UNHAS	Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSAS	UN Somali Assistance Strategy
UNSF	UN Strategic Framework
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	UN Support Office in Somalia
UN WOMEN	UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System

# Photo Credit

Cover Photo: WFP/Karel Prinsloo

**Office of Evaluation**

[www1.wfp.org/independent-evaluation](http://www1.wfp.org/independent-evaluation)

**World Food Programme**

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70

00148 Rome, Italy

T +39 06 65131 [wfp.org](http://wfp.org)