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Somalia: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2012-2017)

Evaluation Report: Volume II - Annexes

Prepared by Nick Maunder (Team Leader), George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzarri and Marte Hurlen.

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Evaluation Management

Evaluation Manager

Dawit Habtemariam

Senior Evaluation Advisor

Michael Reynolds

Coordinator of Country Portfolio Evaluations

Sally Burrows

Director of Evaluation

Andrea Cook

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Somalia: An evaluation of FP'S portfolio (2012Mid-2017)

Dated: September 14, 2017

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1. Background

1. The purpose of these TORs is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed Somalia Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) (2012- mid-2017), to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the World Food Programme (WFP) portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation questions (EQs), approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information such as a detailed timeline and map.

Introduction

2. CPEs encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country, strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation. CPEs help WFP country offices (COs) in the preparation of Country Strategic Plans (CSPs) in line with the new WFP's Integrated Road Map (IRM) and Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new interventions.

3. In 2017/2018, the independent Office of Evaluation (OEV) together with an external team will be conducting this CPE. Somalia was selected on the basis of country-related and WFP-specific criteria. It falls in the category of countries where WFP has a relatively important portfolio and the CO would benefit the most from a CPE for ongoing programming and to feed into the design of a new interim CSP for Somalia to be presented to the WFP Executive Board in November 2018.

1.2. Country Context

Political-Economy

4. With an area of 637,657 sq. km, Somalia is strategically located in the Horn of Africa bordering Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and along a coastline of 3,025 km with the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The population is estimated at 12.3 million of which 46% are under the age of 15 years.¹ For more than 25 years, the country has suffered from internal clan-based conflicts, violence and political instability especially across its southern and central parts. Al-Shabaab, a militant Islamic movement, has been controlling some of these areas. Deep cycles of internal conflict have resulted in the fragmentation of the country, widespread vulnerability and piracy undermining the legitimacy of national institutions. In the north, Somaliland is a self-declared autonomous entity and Puntland is a semi-autonomous region. Both regions have established governance and administrative structures that ensure relative peace and security. Following successive transition negotiations, Somalia established the first federal government in August 2012. By 2014, Somalia was no longer at the top of the fragile states index, dropping to second place behind South Sudan.²

5. According to the World Bank, Somalia's gross domestic product (GDP) was projected to reach \$6.2 billion in 2016, with per capita GDP estimated at \$450 and a poverty rate of 51.6%. Somalia's economy is highly dependent on nomadic pastoralism, livestock, farming, fisheries, imports, remittances and international aid. Inequality is highly driven by the difference in poverty incidence in urban settings (60% in Mogadishu and 40% in other urban settings) and rural settings (52.3%).³

¹ <https://web.archive.org/web/20161003235053/http://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/ArabStates/files/pub-pdf/Population-Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PESS-2013-2014.pdf> page 21

² Messner, J. J. (24 June 2014). "Failed States Index 2014: Somalia Displaced as Most-Fragile State".

³ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/somalia/overview>.

The small tax base and weak public financial management continue to cause serious constraints on the government budget, thus leaving the country dependent on foreign assistance.⁴

6. In September 2013, the international community agreed to the Somali Compact with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) based on the principles of the New Deal. The Compact provides a framework for the delivery of assistance to Somalia during 2014-2016 in line with national priorities and increasingly delivered by Somali institutions.⁵ Building on the Compact, the government prepared the Somalia National Development Plan (SNDP) for 2017-2019.

Food and nutrition security

7. Agriculture is the mainstay of Somalia's economy accounting for 65% of GDP and employment. The SNDP envisages ensuring food security for all Somalis. After a gradual recovery from the food insecurity and famine of 2011, Somalia's food security has been under threat since mid-2016 following consecutive seasons of poor rainfall and low river water levels. These have caused crop failures, reduction in rural employment opportunities, and significant shortage of water and pasture – with consequent increases in livestock deaths. As local staple food prices continue to rise sharply, access to food has been affected among poor families. As of January 2017, it is estimated that 6.2 million people – 48% of the population – remain food insecure. Also during the first half of 2017, 2.9 million Somalis are at risk of famine and cannot meet their daily food requirements and require urgent humanitarian assistance, while another 3.3 million need livelihood support to keep from sliding into crisis.⁶

8. The National Health Strategic Plan (2013-2016) aims to realize the vision of “a healthy and productive population contributing to the development of the nation”.⁷ But Somalia currently has one of the worst nutrition and health indicators in the world. Latest nutrition surveys by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) show global acute malnutrition rate in some areas of 15-22% and severe acute malnutrition of 5-7%. National median rates of stunting are above 20%. In November 2016, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that an estimated 363,000 children under age 5 are acutely malnourished, including 71,000 who are severely malnourished and face a high risk of disease and death 1.9 million people may die of preventable diseases due to lack of access to primary health care services. From January to June 18, 2017, a cumulative total of 53,015 suspected cholera cases and 795 deaths have been recorded across Somalia.⁸

Humanitarian access, protection, internally-displaced persons and refugees

9. The lack of peace and security in Somalia has caused massive displacements of people; with 1.1 million in protracted internal displacement and 766,000 people displaced by drought since November 2016.⁹ As of May 2017, the total estimated number of Somalia refugees was estimated at 876,000.¹⁰ From September to December 2015, Asylum seekers and returnees fleeing the Yemen crisis continue to arrive in Somalia with 30,000 people received so far as well as Somali returnees from Kenya. This has significantly exacerbated the humanitarian situation, along with the El Niño phenomenon that intensified extensive flooding and severe drought, affecting an estimated 145,000 people. UNHCR indicates that an estimated 818,000 people were displaced between January and June 2017, including 662,000 people (81%) displaced due to drought and drought-related factors. Humanitarian organizations continue to face challenges in accessing rural areas in central and

⁴ African Development Bank Outlook for Somalia: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/east-africa/somalia>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ <http://www1.wfp.org/countries/somalia>.

⁷ Somalia Health Sector Strategy (2013-2016) pp 8.

⁸ Food Security and Nutrition Brief – June 2017.

⁹ Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia July 2017.

¹⁰ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn> (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Yemen, Uganda).

southern parts of Somalia due to poor road conditions and movement restrictions linked to road blockades, active hostilities and illegal taxation and extortions at checkpoints.¹¹

Education

10. The 2013-2016 Interim Education Sector Strategic Plan envisages provision of equal opportunities and access to quality education for all Somalis.¹² However, Somalia's primary education gross enrolment ratio is arguably the lowest in Africa. The schooling infrastructure and system are inadequate. Nearly 75% of existing schools do not have physical facilities and many existing buildings are too damaged or unsafe for use. A generation of Somali children lost the opportunity for formal education and other benefits of a stable childhood. Somalia has one of the world's lowest enrolment rates for primary school-aged children – only 30% of children are in school and only 40% of these are girls. Further, only 18% of children in rural households are in school.¹³

Gender

11. Gender-based inequalities across Somalia limit access of women and youth to resources and decision making; with the 2012 Gender Inequality Index of 0.776 placing Somalia at the fourth highest globally. Somalia is a traditional and patriarchal society. The conflict has entrenched such discriminatory social structures including the clan system perpetuating gender inequality. Unlike men, Somali women are in a subordinate position and are excluded from the decision making process. In addition, harmful cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and child marriages negatively affect women and girls. Such discriminatory practices deny women and girls access to opportunities in education, employment, health and political participation.¹⁴ In 2016, the Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWHRD) issued a national gender policy to promote gender equality and sustainable human development in Somalia by ensuring that equal value is placed on the contributions of women and men as equals in post conflict reconstruction.¹⁵

International Assistance

12. The United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy (UNSAS 2011-2015) was based on the national reconstruction and development programme.¹⁶ From July 2011 to July 2012, Somalia was declared Level 3 Emergency by the United Nations (UN). Since August 2012, it has been a Level 2 Emergency. Main humanitarian donors have comprised Canada, Germany, European Commission, European Union, Sweden, Norway and Finland, the Global Fund, UK, US, Japan, and Central Emergency Response Fund. During the period 2012-mid-2017, the volume of humanitarian assistance has fluctuated.

13. Somalia continues to face tremendous economic, social and political challenges, despite increasing trend in the volume of development assistance during 2013-2015, and donor presence to address a combination of development needs and low domestic capacity.¹⁷

¹¹ FAO-FSNAU Quarterly Brief 2017.

¹² Interim Education Sector Strategic Plan.

¹³ https://www.unicef.org/somalia/education_56.html.


¹⁴ United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2012).

¹⁵ Federal Republic of Somalia National Gender Policy 2016 pp 10.

¹⁶ 2011–2015 United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy.

¹⁷ Major official development donors have included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Italy, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and USA.

Figure 1: International Assistance to Somalia (2012mid-2017)



2. Reasons for the Evaluation

2.1 Rationale

14. The evaluation is an opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its portfolio of operations from 2012 to mid-2017.¹⁸ The CPE will provide evidence of past and current performance to inform the design of a new WFP Interim Country Strategic Plan for Somalia in line with the WFP IRM and Agenda 2030 SDGs. In the past, OEV commissioned a CPE (2006-2011) and a mid-term operation evaluation of Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200844 in Somalia (mid 2012- 2015).

2.2 Objectives

15. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the CPE will:
- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Somalia **(accountability)**; and
 - determine the reasons for observed success or failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Somalia, form strategic partnerships, and improve interventions, design, and implementation whenever possible **(learning)**.

2.3. Stakeholders and users of the evaluation

16. The evaluation will seek the views of, and be useful to, a broad range of WFP's internal and external stakeholders. The main stakeholder and users of the evaluation are the WFP CO, Bureau in Nairobi (RBN), Headquarters management, and the Executive Board (EB), the beneficiaries, the Government of Federal Republic of Somalia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donors and the UN Country Team. A matrix of stakeholders with their respective interests and roles in the CPE is attached in Annex 4.

17. National government partners comprise ministries and offices such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Human Development and Public Services,

¹⁸ The CO does not have Country Strategy document.

Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development, Ministry of Interior and Office of Statistics. This CPE should enable policy makers to sharpen their view of opportunities for synergies and coordination to support national strategy; and ensure that WFP's future contributions are best attuned to national needs and policy – within any future UNSAS.

18. WFP works closely with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNOCHA, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations AIDS (UNAIDS), UN Country Team, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM).

19. In addition, WFP partners with multilateral and bilateral donors in the design, funding and coordination of delivery of food and technical assistance.

20. In the complex context of Somalia, the CPE will seek the perspectives of all these partners on WFP's role. The CPE should provide useful lessons for enhancing synergy, coordination and collaboration.

21. Cooperating partners are organizations with which WFP has collaborated directly in the implementation of its portfolio. They comprise a number of local authorities, civil society organizations as well as international NGOs such as World Vision International Save the Children and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and national NGOs. The evaluation is expected to enable enhancement for collaboration and synergy between WFP and cooperating partners, clarifying mandates and roles and accelerating progress towards replication and hand-over.

22. WFP beneficiaries are the most important stakeholder group of all: comprising food insecure households, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, children under five, pregnant and lactating women (PLW), farmers, school children and participants in livelihoods activities. Data disaggregation by sex, gender sensitive stakeholder assessment and understanding of differences in gender roles are particularly important for the CPE.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

3.1. WFP's Portfolio in Somalia

23. WFP has been operating in Somalia since 1967 to address basic food needs, strengthen coping mechanisms and support efforts to achieve food security.¹⁹ Since 2012, WFP's portfolio in Somalia has been comprised of two PRROs: PRRO 200844 (2016-2018) - Reducing malnutrition and strengthening resilience shocks food secure in Somalia; PRRO 200443 (2013-2015) - Strengthening food and nutrition security and enhancing-resilience in Somali; one emergency operation (EMOP) 200281 (July 2011-December 2012) life-saving relief assistance – primarily general food assistance (GFA) and nine special operations (SOs).

24. PRRO 200844 aimed to scale up activities started during 2013-2015 under PRRO 200443 and utilize new technologies for biometric registration, cash-based transfers (CBT) management and remote monitoring and evaluation, collecting information rapidly and refining programming according to changing needs. These technologies were expected to increase transparency and accountability while minimizing the security risks for staff in complex environments.

¹⁹ WFP currently operates from the CO in Mogadishu and the Liaison Office in Nairobi. WFP maintains an extensive presence in Somalia through AOs in Mogadishu, Galkayo, Hargeisa, Bossaso and Dolow, and sub-offices in Berbera, Garowe and Beletweyne. WFP also has staff in Kismayo, El Wak and Dhobley in southern Somalia. With WFP having been present since 1967, the CO has been operating from Nairobi from 1995 to 2015. In February 2015, WFP reopened the Somalia office in Mogadishu for the first time in 20 years.

25. Aiming to cover close to 3 million people over three years, PRRO 200443 focused on in-kind and CBTs to: enhance the resilience of communities through Food for Assets and enhanced partnerships; rebuild household food and nutrition security with preventive and therapeutic interventions; relieve hunger and encourage primary school attendance through nutritious cooked meals to school children, particularly on girls via take-home rations to promote gender equality; protect livelihoods during shocks through food assistance for assets and seasonal vulnerability by nutritional support and targeted relief; and enhance capacities to address acute hunger in disasters and will build ministerial capacities with a view to eventual hand-over.

26. SOs for common services were conceived to complement WFP operations. These include: SO 201051 Emergency Rehabilitation Work and Capacity Strengthening at the Port of Kismayo; SOs 200924 and 200507 Provision of Humanitarian Air Services to Somalia and Kenya; and SO 200440 Food Security Cluster Augmentation in Response to the continued Humanitarian Situation in Somalia.

3.2. Scope of the Evaluation


27. Somalia CPE covers a period from 2012 to mid-2017. The evaluation will assess WFP portfolio of operations implemented during 2012-mid-2017 including selected sample geographic areas assisted by the portfolio. The evaluation will review implementation of the management responses to the recommendations of the previously completed CPE for Somalia (2006–2011) and mid-term operation evaluation of PRRO 200844 in Somalia (mid 2012- 2015).

28. In addition to emergency preparedness and response, GFA, school meals, nutrition, vocational training, logistics- including ports infrastructure – warehouse facilities, common services, SCOPE, and UNHAS the evaluation will also examine innovative approaches and tools such as CBTs and how the corporate Food for Assets (FFA) approach has promoted a more integrated and cohesive response to enhancing livelihood development and strengthening community resilience to shocks. The evaluation will assess cross cutting issues including gender inequality and women’s empowerment, coordination, humanitarian principled actions, protection, accountability to affected populations (AAP), and capacity strengthening. The field work will cover a limited number of regions/sites and transparent selection criteria will be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase, taking in to account security considerations.

Table 1: WFP portfolio in Somalia (2012- mid-2017)

Timeline and Funding Levels of WFP Portfolio in Somalia 2012-Mid 2017

LEGEND
>75% FUNDED
50-75% FUNDED
<50% FUNDED



Sources: 1) SPRs 2012-2016. 2017 data not available. 2) Major WFP Emergency Responses (2011-2017) Dashboard

To be evaluated under the CPE

No SPR available

Major Events: The Guardian, CNN, BBC, Relief Web

4 Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology

4.1. Evaluation Questions

29. The CPE will address the three main questions common to the CPE model. The sub-questions focus on issues of particular relevance to the Somalia context, and the ongoing WFP key strategic, operational and technical issues of significance for future positioning and programming. The evaluation team will further develop them in a detailed evaluation matrix during the inception phase. The evaluation will consider the differences in beneficiaries' roles disaggregated by sex and age. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic decisions including the design of the new interim CSP for Somalia under the WFP IRM. Question 3 will constitute the largest part of the inquiry and evaluation report.

- i) **Question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio.** Reflect on the extent to which: i) main objectives and related activities have been relevant with Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities; ii) objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies; iii) objectives have been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with, bilateral partners and NGOs; iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; and v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national needs and strategies and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and gender and protection policies).
- i) **Question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision making.** Reflect on the extent to which WFP has: i) analysed or used existing analysis of the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues in Somalia - including early warning, gender equality, women's empowerment and protection issues; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues; and iii) identified the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organizational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc.) to understand these drivers of strategy, and how they were considered and managed; and
ii) iv) analysed, or used existing analysis of, security-related risks.

Question 3: Performance and Results of the WFP portfolio. Reflect on: i) the level of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities (2012-mid-2017) and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control such as conflict and natural disasters); ii) the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources, and decision-making iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations; iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially RBAs and other UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level. The evaluation will assess the "dynamic" nature of these operations, including the extent to which WFP activities have been developmental in approach in such a conflict-prone context and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures.

4.2. Evaluability Assessment

Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, that is the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.

30. The ongoing volatile and unpredictable political context of Somalia creates major security constraints regarding availability of and access to WFP beneficiaries, cooperating partners as well as regions where WFP operates. OEV will continue close monitoring of the situation and consultation with the CO to assess the practical implications of the instability on the feasibility, scope and timeline of the CPE and take appropriate action. The proposed timeline assumes that the instability will not worsen.

31. Based on a desk review, an initial evaluability assessment has been conducted to determine the level of data availability and quality for assessing processes, results and corresponding indicators stated in portfolio documents. Monitoring data sets, standard performance reports, and qualitative assessment relevant to WFP's work are available for 2012-2016. Due to internal reporting arrangements, some of the data particularly for second half of 2017 will be available later quarter of 2017. The special operations generally aim at being supportive of the outcomes of the EMOPs, PRROs and the objectives of wider humanitarian community in Somalia. They are evaluable at output levels, and, to a certain extent, at outcome levels, as part of their contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of the CO portfolio. However, there is a general lack of reliable and up-to-date data on contextual topics.

32. In Somalia, a systematic longitudinal study can be challenging, especially evaluating portfolio's efficiency, sustainability of WFP services and results, gender inequality and women empowerment, capacity development, resilience, humanitarian principles and protection issues. Complete and consistent trend data on these areas from 2012 to mid-2017 may not be available, as is the case with FFAs including their impact on longer term resilience or CBTs. The evaluation team is required to undertake further assessment of the adequacy and quality of data when developing the evaluation matrix and data collection strategy; identifying alternative approaches for data collection and designing a strong methodology to analyse all data in a rigorous manner.

33. This evaluation will benefit from documentation available in WFP including portfolio documents, monitoring data sets, and relevant evaluation reports including the Somalia CPE (2006-2011); Evaluation of WFP PRRO 200844 in Somalia; the 2012 Nutrition Policy, WFP's emergency preparedness and response (2015), the Global Logistics Cluster (2012), and review of the FFA evaluations and the synthesis report '*On the Impact of Food for Assets*'. The CPE will collect additional information and data on coordination, complementarity and coherence of rapid response mechanisms, risk management, contingency planning, resourcing, human resource capacity, AAP. OEV will establish an e-library with bibliography list which the CPE team is expected to make effective use of it; particularly the data sets as well as the standard performance reports.

4.3 Methodology

This evaluation will examine the extent to which gender and equity dimensions are integrated into WFP's policies, systems and processes.

34. CPEs primarily use a longitudinal design, relying on secondary quantitative data, and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country. The evaluation

will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency²⁰, effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness. Assessing the appropriateness, relevance and coherence of the country portfolio, it will review the extent of alignment with national needs; and internal and external coherence. Assessment of effectiveness of the portfolio will focus on systematic examination of the performance and results at output and outcome levels. The CPE is expected to provide cost and timeliness analysis of delivering food assistance in a country facing access issues. Poor transport infrastructure along with insecurity are associated cost drivers. The evaluation should provide a comparative cost-efficiency²¹ and cost-effectiveness²² analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities e.g. CBT versus in-kind or versus a combination of the two, in the portfolio.

35. Cost efficiency compares in-kind procurement value and logistic costs (transport, storage and handling, quality control and salaries for logistic staff) to transport the different commodities to the respective markets with the CBT local market prices at the same point in time. If sufficient data is available a seasonal analysis should also be presented including the in-kind operational costs (partners, equipment and supplies, travel) with the equivalent CBT operational costs (CBT related delivery and other costs). Attention must be paid to differentiate the start-up costs and the running costs and include depreciation calculations, if necessary. It will compare procuring locally vs procuring internationally (import parity price analysis). Cost Effectiveness focuses on Omega value and/or other cost-effectiveness indicators, e.g. the in-kind vs CBT costs per percent increase in households with adequate food consumption score. The team will develop a plan for assessing sustainability and connectedness.

36. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report, with annexes covering data collection instruments. The evaluation team will deepen the review and critically assess technical feasibility and data and accessibility to inform its choice of evaluation methods, taking in to account the national context. The methodology should:

- Examine the logic of the portfolio based on the common objectives arising across operations;
- Be geared towards addressing the EQs using triangulation of information and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. A model looking at groups of “main activities/sectors” across several operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
- Take into account the limitations to evaluability as well as budget and timing constraints. The evaluation team is required to have strong methodological competencies in designing feasible data capture and analysis plan for this CPE.

37. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries disaggregated by gender (sex and age), existing secondary data, etc.) and using a mixed method (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, and participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of tools. The sampling technique to impartially select sites to be visited and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

4.4 Quality Assurance

²¹ A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

²² Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes. The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the Omega value, a ratio between the in-kind nutrient value score (NVS) divided by the full cost for the in-kind delivery basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the full CBT basket.

38. WFP’s evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The OEV evaluation manager (EM) will conduct the first level quality assurance, and CPE Coordinator will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. 1

39. EQAS calls for carrying out gender responsive evaluations including the identification and disaggregated analyses of gender roles and dynamics, guided by WFP objectives and action plan, inequalities, discriminatory practices and unjust power relations. The CPE methodology will review the extent to which the CS and operations have appropriately analysed and integrated a contextual assessment of gender related gaps addressed the identified gender inequalities. In doing so, the CPE will apply OEV’s Technical Note for Gender Integration in WFP Evaluations and the UN System-Wide Action Plan (UNSWAP) on mainstreaming Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. The evaluation team is expected to assess IASC Gender Marker levels for the CO, and to systematically and appropriately reflect gender in findings, conclusions and recommendations. To enhance the quality and credibility of this evaluation, the selected evaluation firm will provide further quality checks on the draft the evaluation products, such as draft inception and draft evaluation reports, before the team leader (TL) submits them to OEV.

5 Organization of the Evaluation

5.1. Phases and Deliverables

The evaluation is structured in five phases summarized in the table below. The three phases involving the evaluation team are: (i) The Inception phase, with a briefing of the evaluation team in Rome (October 10-12, 2017), followed by an inception mission to Mogadishu (October 16-25, 2017) by TL and EM, producing inception report - a detailed operational plan for conducting the CPE; (ii) The main evaluation mission²³, primary and secondary data collection and preliminary analysis with approximately 3 weeks in the field (Nov. 27 - mid Dec 2017)(iii) the reporting phase concludes with draft CPE report by February 23, 2018, and final evaluation report (a full report and a summary evaluation report) that will be presented for consideration to WFP’s Executive Board November 2018. Annex 2 presents a more detailed timeline. The CO and RB have been consulted on the timeframe to ensure good alignment with the CO planning and decision-making, so that the evidence generated by CPE can be used effectively.

Table 2: Provisional timeline overview

Phases	August-Sep. 2017	Oct 2-Nov 20 2017	November 27—mid December 2017	Jan 29 - mid May 16, 2018	Mid May November 2018	Deliverables
Phase 1 (Preparation) Desk Review Preparation of ToR Stakeholder consultation	X					Concept Note ToR (draft and final) Contracting evaluation firm
Phase 2 (Inception) Briefing team at HQ Document review Inception mission in Mogadishu and Nairobi		X				Inception Report
Phase 3 (Fieldwork) Evaluation, data						Exist Debriefing Aide-memoire/

²³ An internal exit debrief with the CO will be planned on the last day of the fieldwork.

collection/analysis, exit debriefing, HQ Briefing			X			HQ Briefing
Phase 4 (Reporting) Report drafting, comments and revision				X (February 23) March 21-22		Draft evaluation report (D1); Learning workshop
				X May 30		Final report
Phase 5 (Executive Board) EB follow up actions EB.2/November 2018					X	Presentation of SER to EB2/November 2018 Management response, evaluation brief

5.2. Evaluation team composition

40. As presented in Annex 3, this CPE will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant evaluation expertise. The evaluation firm providing the evaluation team is responsible for proposing a mix of evaluators who will effectively cover the areas of evaluation listed in Annex 3. The team should be as few members as possible providing a combination of the expertise and skills required. The team will consist of international, regional and national consultants with gender balance. All team members must be fluent in English. The TL will have the additional responsibility for overall design, implementation, reporting and timely delivery of all evaluation products. The TL should have excellent synthesis and evaluation reporting writing skills in English.

5.3. Roles and responsibilities

41. This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV). Dawit Habtemariam has been appointed as EM. The EM has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. He is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in headquarters (HQ) and the stakeholders learning in-country workshop; assisting in the preparation of the field mission; conducting the 1st level quality assurance of the evaluation products and soliciting WFP stakeholders feedback on the various evaluation products. The EM will be the main interlocutor between the team, represented by the TL, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

42. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Somalia; set up meetings and field visits and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. The nomination of a WFP CO focal point will help communicating with the EM and CPE team. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the inception report. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

43. The contracted firm will be responsible for ensuring the security of the evaluation team, and adequate arrangements for evacuation for medical or insecurity reasons. The evaluation team must observe applicable United Nations Department of Safety and Security rules including taking security training and attending in-country security briefings.

5.4. Communication

It is important that evaluation reports are accessible to a wide audience, as foreseen in the evaluation policy, to ensure the credibility of WFP – through transparent reporting – and the usefulness of evaluations. The dissemination strategy will consider from the stakeholder analysis who to disseminate

to, involve and identify the users of the evaluation, duty bearers, implementers, beneficiaries, including gender perspectives.

44. All evaluation products will be produced in English. Should translators be required for fieldwork, the evaluation firm will make arrangements and include the cost in the budget proposal. A communication plan (see Annex 5) will be refined by the EM in consultation with the evaluation team during the inception phase to include details about the communication strategy.

45. An internal reference group from main WFP's internal stakeholders at Headquarters (HQ), Regional Bureau Nairobi (RBN) and CO, will be established for the evaluation to serve as contact point for communication with WFP stakeholders. They will be invited to provide comments on the main CPE deliverables. While the final evaluation report is the responsibility of the evaluation team, it will be approved by Sally Burrows, OEV CPE Coordinator on satisfactory meeting of OEV's quality standards. OEV will explore the feasibility of a workshop after the field work to discuss the draft preliminary findings and recommendations. The summary evaluation report along with the management response to the evaluation recommendations will be presented to the WFP Executive Board in November 2018. The final evaluation report will be posted on the public WFP website and OEV will ensure dissemination of lessons through its inclusion in the annual evaluation report. The CO and RB are encouraged to circulate the final evaluation report with WFP external stakeholders.

5.5. Budget

46. The evaluation will be financed from OEV's budget which will cover all expenses related to consultant/company rates, international travels, logistics, stakeholder learning workshop and OEV staff.

Annex B: Field Missions Schedule

Date	Time	Organization	Location	People attending	Designation	CPE team
Week 1 Nairobi meetings						
Day 1						
Monday 27 Nov	8.30 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	CPE team set -up (Conference room-Block C)				Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	9.30 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-security	Gilbert Kemboi	Security briefing	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	9.30 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Delphine's office	Delphine Dechaux	Deputy Head of Programme	Nick Maunder
	11.00 a.m. – 12.30 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Laurent's office	Laurent Bukera and Edith Heines	CD and DCD	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	LUNCH					
	2.00 p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP Main conference	All Heads of Units and Area Offices	Pre-briefing	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP -Liljana's office (Block E)	Liljana Jovceva/Delphine	Head of Programme	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
Day 2						
Tuesday 28 Nov	9.00 a.m.– 10.00 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Almu's office (Block E)	Almudena Serrano	M&E/vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM)	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Nick Maunder
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 noon	UNICEF	UNON Complex	Sara Skovgaard	Education Cluster Coordinator	Barnaby Peacocke
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 noon	WFP Somalia	WFP-Enock's Office	Enock Omweri	Compliance Officer	Nick Maunder, George Fenton
	11.30 a.m.– 1.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Pramila and team	Pramila Ghimire	Head of Nutrition Section	Hisham Khogali
	12.00 p.m.– 1.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP -Michele's office	Michelle Pict	Budget and Programming	Nick Maunder, George Fenton
	LUNCH					

	2.00 In-kind– 3.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	Ravza's office (Admin block)	Ravza Salieva	Admin and Procurement	Nick Maunder, George Fenton
	2.00 p.m.– 2.45p.m.	WFP Somalia	Gazebo behind Delphine's office	Pramila Ghimire, Suleha Nuru	School Feeding	Barnaby Peacocke
	3.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	Akberet's office (Admin block)	Akberet Tedla	Head of Finance	George Fenton
	4.00 p.m.– 5.00 p.m.	Food Security Cluster (FSC)	Conference room–Block C	Charles Hopkins, Mulugeta Shibru, Kevin Mackey	FSC	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Nick Maunder
Day 3						
Wed 29 Nov	8.30 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	UNICEF	UNON complex	Surani Abeyesekera	Resilience	Barnaby Peacocke
	9.00 a.m.– 10.00	WFP Somalia	WFP–Block C	Almudena Serrano	M&E/VAM	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Hisham Khogali
	10.00 a.m. – 11.00 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP–Block C	Nynne Warring	Cash Working Group	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke
	11.30 a.m.– 12.30 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP–Block C	Emmanuel Odongo, Bishar Duble/Tue Nilson	Transfer Management/ICT-SCOPE	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 noon	Save the Children	SC office, Lavington	Sarah Baran and Rachel Mose	SNS Nutrition Consortium	Hisham Khogali
	LUNCH					
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	IOM	IOM office, Lavington	Sam Grundy	Development	Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	2.00 p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	WFP Somalia	Liljana's office	Liljana Jovceva	Head of Programme	Nick Maunder
	2.00 p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP–Vlado's office	Vladimir Jovcev	Head of Logistics	George Fenton
	4.30 p.m.– 5.30 p.m.	FAO	WFP–Block C	Rudi Van Aaken	Head of Programme	Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
Day 4						
Thur 30 Nov	8.00 a.m.– 9.00 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP main conference	Caroline Muchai, Ruby Khan	Livelihoods and Resilience	Nicolas Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke

	9.00 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	International non-governmental organizations (INGO)	WFP main conference	WVI, SC, ACTED, DRC, Mercy USA, Adeso	INGO Representatives	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 noon	WFP Regional Bureau	Skype Call-from WFP Somalia	Kathy Derore	FFA	Barnaby Peacocke
	3.30 p.m.– 4.30pm	UNICEF, second floor, meeting room	UNON	Daniele Trotter	Social Protection	Nick Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke
	3.30 p.m.– 4.15p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP Nigel's office (Admin block)	Nigel Sanders	UNHAS	George Fenton
Day 5						
Friday 1 Dec	8.30 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	WFP Somalia	Gazebo behind Delphine's office	Pramila	Nutrition	Hisham Khogali
	10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	WFP Regional Bureau	UNON complex	Allison Oman, Pramila Ghimire	Nutrition	Hisham Khogali
	10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	WFP Regional Bureau	WFP	Tarek Keshavjee	Logistics	George Fenton
	10.30 a.m.– 12.00 noon	WFP Somalia	Block C	Kopano Mhlope	Partnership team (field level agreements [FLAs], etc.)	Nick Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke
	12.00 noon– 1.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Block C	Simoun Scotti	SCOPE dashboard	Nick Maunder and Barnaby Peacocke
	12.00 noon– 1.00 p.m.	IOM	Java, Lavington Arcade, Lavington	Jennifer Pro	Humanitarian response representative	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali
	1.30 p.m.– 2.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	Block C	Delphine, Lilian and Shirin	Review field arrangements	Nick Maunder
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	Block C	Nynne Warring	Cash Working Group (CWG)	Nick Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke
	3.00 p.m.	KBR		KBR		George Fenton
Week 3 Nairobi meetings						
Day 1						
Mon 11 Dec	8.00a.m.– 9.00 a.m.	UNSOM/Gender Theme Group (GTG)	UNON	Shipra Bose	GTG co-chair	Mariangela Bizzari

	8.30 a.m.– 9.15 a.m.	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	WFP–Block C	Anne Shaw	FFP	Nick Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
	9.30 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	Resilience Consortia (SomRep, BRCIS, ACTED)	WFP–Block C	Martijn Goddeeris (BRCIS), Andrew Lanyon and Jochen Schmidt (SomRep), Winnie Mbusya (ACTED)	Resilience consortia	Nick Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
	10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	UNFPA	UNON	Elizabeth Kigen	Gender and Protection	Mariangela Bizzari
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 noon	WFP Regional Bureau	UNON	Faith Awino	School feeding	Barnaby Peacocke
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 p.m.	WFP Regional Bureau	UNON	Josefa Zueco	Programme & Budget	George Fenton
	11.00 a.m.– 12.00 p.m.	UNICEF	UNON complex	Ezatullah Majeed	Chief of Nutrition	Hisham Khogali
	LUNCH					
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	ICRC	ICRC offices (Denis Pritt Road, right across from Total Gas Station)	Dusan Vutokic	ECOSOC team	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali, Barnaby Peacocke
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	WFP CO and Regional	WFP office Gazebo	Annalee Pepper, Ruby Khan	WFP Regional Bureau – Gender and Protection	Mariangela Bizzari
	3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	UNICEF	UNON-Block Q, third floor, UNICEF Somalia office	Jean Lokenga	Chief of Child Protection	Mariangela Bizzari
	4.00 p.m.– 5.00 p.m.	FEWSNET	Ngecha Road	Abdirizak Nur	Head of FEWS NET	Nick Maunder, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
Day 2						
Tues 12 Dec	Team work – at WFP or at Tara Suites					
Day 3						
Wed 13 Dec	7.30 a.m.– 8.30 a.m.	Department for International Development (DFID)	WFP–Block C	Seb Fouquet	Humanitarian and Resilience Team Leader	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali

	9.30 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	All donors/Informal Humanitarian Donor Group (IHDG)	WFP main conference	All donors/IHDG	All donors/IHDG	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzarri
	10.30 a.m.– 11.30 a.m.	European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO)	WFP main conference	Johann Heffinck	Head of Office ECHO Somalia	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	11.30 a.m.– 12.30 p.m.	Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)	NRC offices, Lavington	Karen Peachey	Cash Learning Group	George Fenton
	LUNCH					
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	FSNAU	Ngecha Road	Daniel Molla	Coordinator	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzarri
	4.00 p.m.– 5.00 p.m.	Cash Working Group	Adeso offices (Olunguruone road, Lavington, Kileleshwa)	Deqa Saleh	Cash Working Group	Mariangela Bizzari
Day 4						
Thur 14 Dec	9.30 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Block C	Vlado, Nigel and Delphine	Logistics +UNHAS	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	11.00 a.m.– 12.30 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Block C	Caroline, Ruby and Delphine	Livelihoods and Resilience	Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzarri
	LUNCH					
	4.30 p.m.– 5.30 p.m.	Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA)	Skype call (ID: manizanaqvi)	Maniza Naqvi	DINA-World Bank	Nick Maunder
	3.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	UNHCR	Skype call (ID: Sarah.Khan7)	Sarah Khan	Protection	Mariangela Bizzarri
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	WFP Somalia	WFP-Block C	Pramila, Suleha and Delphine	Nutrition and school meals	Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
Day 5						
Friday 15 Dec	9:30 a.m.– 12:30 p.m.	Debriefing with Management and Heads of Units	WFP main conference	Management, HoU, HoAO		Nick Maunder, George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzarri

Destination	Date	Time	Activity	Location	CPE team
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Week 2 Field mission					
Baidoa	Day 1				
	03 Dec 2017	7.00 a.m.– 10.10 a.m.	Fly to Baidoa with UNHAS via Mogadishu	Travel	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali
		11.00 a.m.– 11.30 a.m.	Security briefing	UNSOA* compound	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali
		11.35 a.m.– 12.30 p.m.	Have brief meeting with WFP staff	UNSOA compound	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali
	Lunch				
	03 Dec 2017	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	Meeting with MoH	Presidential area	Hisham Khogali
		3.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Interior	Presidential area	George Fenton
	Day 2				
	04 Dec 2017	9.00 a.m.– 9.15a.m.	Travel to Idale – IDP (nutrition and relief activities)	Travel	Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
		9.15a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Visit nutrition activities in Idale	Idale IDP	Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
		11.00 a.m.– 11.15a.m.	Travel from Idale to retailers' shops	Idale IDP	Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
		11.15a.m.– 12.15p.m.	Interact with programme beneficiaries and retailers	Baidoa town	Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
	Lunch				
	04 Dec 17	2.00 p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	Meeting with partners in Baidoa	UNSOA compound	Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
		3.30 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with UNICEF	UNSOA compound	Hisham Khogali, George Fenton
05 Dec 2017		Team to fly from Baidoa to Mogadishu		Hisham Khogali, George Fenton	
Dolow	Day 1				
	03 Dec 2017	9.30 a.m.– 11.10 a.m.	Fly to Dolow with UNHAS via Mogadishu	Travel	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		11.00 a.m.– 11.30 a.m.	Security briefing	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari

		11.35a.m.– 12.30 p.m.	Meeting with the District Commissioner	District Commissioner's office	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		12.30 p.m.– 12.35p.m.	Travel back to WFP compound	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
	Lunch				
03 Dec 2017		2.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with Humanitarian Coordinator	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
	Day 2				
04 Dec 2017		9.00a.m.– 9.15a.m.	Travel to Kabasa IDP to see GFA/CBT relief response and gender issues	Kabasa IDP	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		9.15a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Interact with programme beneficiaries	Kabasa IDP	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		11.00 a.m.– 11.15 a.m.	Travel to Qansahaley Camp	Qansahaley Camp	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		11.15 a.m.– 12.15p.m.	Visit to FVT–meet new graduates and WWI	Qansahaley Camp	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		12.15 p.m.– 12.30 p.m.	Travel back to WFP compound	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
	Lunch				
	Day 3				
04 Dec 2017		2.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with partners in two separate discussions (food security)	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke
		2.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with partners in two separate discussions (gender issues)	WFP compound	Mariangela Bizzari
05–Dec–17		8.30 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	Meeting with UNOCHA	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
		11.30 a.m.– 1.10 p.m.	Fly to Mogadishu with UNHA	Mogadishu	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
	Day 1				
03–Dec–17		7.00 a.m.– 10.40 p.m.	Fly from Nairobi to Galkayo	Galkayo	Nick Maunder
	Lunch				
03 Dec 2017		2.30 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	Meet with area office (AO) Management team	WFP compound	Nick Maunder
		3.30 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Visit to the Sahan Research and Development Organization office for CBT top-up and Amal Bank to observe redemption of marginal propensity to consume activity		Nick Maunder

		5.00 p.m.– 5.30 p.m.	Skype call with the DSRSG		Nick Maunder
	Day 2				
	04 Dec 2017	9.30 a.m.– 10.00 a.m.	Visit at Homer MCHN in Galkayo south	Galkayo south	Nick Maunder
		10.15a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Visit Abdullahi Isse school in south Galkayo	Galkayo south	Nick Maunder
		11.15a.m.– 12.30 p.m.	Meet Galmudug local authorities		Nick Maunder
	Lunch				
	04 Dec 2017	3.30 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Debriefing	WFP compound	Nick Maunder
	Day 3				
	05 Dec 2017	10.00 a.m.	Travel back to Garowe	Garowe	Nick Maunder
Garowe	Day 1				
	05 Dec 2017	12.30 p.m.	Arrival in Conoco airport from Nairobi	Conoco airport	Nick Maunder
		1.00 p.m.– 1.45p.m.	Drive to UNCC	UNCC Garowe	Nick Maunder
		1.45p.m.– 2.15p.m.	Security briefing	UNCC Garowe	Nick Maunder
	Lunch				
	05 Dec 2017	3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	Briefing with AO team	WFP compound	Nick Maunder
	Day 2				
	06 Dec 2017	8.30 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Education (MoE)	MoE office, Garowe	Nick Maunder
		9.30 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Visit of school meals progra.m.me	Nawaawi school, Garowe	Nick Maunder
		11.00 a.m.– 1.00 p.m.	Visit to FFA activities	Laacdheere, Garowe	Nick Maunder
	Lunch				
	06 Dec 2017	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	Visit of VFT	SAACOM–Garowe	Nick Maunder
		3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	Meeting with Garowe based partners (INGOs and LNGOs)	UNCC Garowe	Nick Maunder
	Day 3				

	07 Dec 2017	8.30 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	Meeting with MOI (TBD)	MOI office– Garowe	Nick Maunder
		9.30 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	Debriefing	UNCC Garowe	Nick Maunder
		10.30 a.m.	Departure from Conoco to Nairobi	Conoco airport	Nick Maunder
	Day 1				
	05 Dec 2017	1.10 p.m.	Arrival at Mogadishu International Airport (MIA) via UNHAS	Mogadishu	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzari
	Lunch				
	05 Dec 2017	2.00 p.m.– 2.30 p.m.	Security briefing	WFP Office	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzari
		2.45p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	Meeting with UNICEF (Tsedeye)	MIA	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali
		2.45p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	Meeting with UNOCHA (Head)	UNOCHA's office at MIA	Barnaby Peacocke
		2.45p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	Meeting with UNHCR	UNHCR's office at MIA	Mariangela Bizzari
		3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	Meeting with UNFPA	UNFPA Office	Mariangela Bizzari
		3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	Meeting with Nutrition Cluster	Drought Operations Coordination Centre (DOCC)	Hisham Khogali
		3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	Meeting with UNDP/UNOCHA (ACCESS)	UNOCHA's office at MIA	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari
	Day 2				
	06 Dec 2017	9.00 a.m.– 10.00 a.m.	Meeting with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADM)	WFP compound	George Fenton, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzari
		9.00 a.m.– 10.00 a.m.	Meeting with the Ministry of Agriculture	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke
		10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Meeting with the MoH	WFP compound	Hisham Khogali
		10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Education	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke
		10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Ports	WFP compound	George Fenton
		10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Meeting with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Women's Rights	WFP compound	Mariangela Bizzari
		11.30 a.m.– 12.30 a.m.	Meeting with Protection Cluster	MIA	Mariangela Bizzari

	Lunch				
06 Dec 2017	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	Meeting with selected nutrition partners	WFP compound	Hisham Khogali	
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	Meeting with selected cooperating partners (CPs) (GFA, VFT, CBT)	WFP compound	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke,	
	2.00 p.m.– 3.00 p.m.	Meeting with Gender Network	WFP compound	Mariangela Bizzari	
	3.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with WFP Nutrition (Habiba, Abdullahi)	WFP compound	Hisham Khogali	
	3.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with WFP Logistics (Abdulkadir, Pray)	WFP compound	George Fenton	
	3.00 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Meeting with the Deputy Country Director and CO colleagues	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke, Mariangela Bizzari	
	Day 3				
07 Dec 2017	1.30 p.m.– 2.00 p.m.	Transfer from WFP office to the airport	Mogadishu	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzari	
	Lunch				
07 Dec 2017	3.30 p.m.	Departure from MIA to Galkayo	Mogadishu	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali, Mariangela Bizzari	
08 Dec 2017	3.00 p.m.	Arrival from Galkayo	Mogadishu	Nick Maunder	
09 Dec 2017	3.30 p.m.– 4.00 p.m.	Security briefing	WFP compound	Nick Maunder	
	Day 4				
08 Dec 2017	Rest day		Mogadishu	Nick Maunder	
	Day 5				
09 Dec 2017		Meeting with UNDP	MIA	Nick Maunder	
	11.00 a.m.– 11.30 a.m.	Meeting with UNOCHA (Head)	MIA	Nick Maunder	
	11.30 a.m.– 12.30 p.m.	Meeting with Central Emergency Response Fund unit	MIA	Nick Maunder	
	Lunch				
09 Dec 2017	2.45 p.m. to 3.30 p.m.	Meeting with UNHCR (Head)	MIA	Nick Maunder	
	Day 6				
10 Dec 2017	9.00 a.m.– 10.00 a.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Planning	WFP compound	Nick Maunder	
	10.00 a.m.– 11.00 a.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Interior (Commission for Returns, IDPs and Refugees)	WFP compound	Nick Maunder	

	Lunch				
	10 Dec 2017	1.30 p.m.– 2.00 p.m.	Transfer from WFP Office to MIA	Mogadishu	Nick Maunder
		3.30 p.m.	Departure from Mogadishu to NBO	Mogadishu	Nick Maunder
	Day 1				
	07-Dec-17	11.30 a.m.	Arrival Hargeisa plus immigration clearance	WFP compound	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
		11.30 a.m.– 12.00 p.m.	Security briefing	WFP compound	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
		12.30 p.m.– 2.00 p.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Health	MoH	Hisham Khogali
		12.30 p.m.– 2.00 p.m.	Meeting with Ministry of Education	MoE	Barnaby Peacocke
		2.30 p.m.– 3.30 p.m.	Meeting with Food Aid Coordination Agency (FACA) and Ministry of Agriculture	WFP compound	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke
		3.30 p.m.– 4.30 p.m.	Meeting with CBT Relief Partners (Taakulo Somaliland Community (TASCO), Action Aid, SOBA and WVI)	WFP compound	Barnaby Peacocke
	Day 2				
	08 Dec 2017	All day	Rest/discussions with WFP team	WFP office	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali
	09 Dec 2017	8.30 a.m.– 10.00 a.m.	Visit Dami B MCHN/Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme (TSFP) site	Dami B MCHN/TSFP site	Hisham Khogali
		10.30 a.m.– 12.00 p.m.	Visit to Abdi Idan MCHN/TSFP site	Abdi Idan MCHN/TSFP site	Hisham Khogali
		9.00 a.m.– 10.30 a.m.	Visit to Sheikh Nur school	Sheikh Nur school	Barnaby Peacocke
		10.30 a.m.– 3.30 p.m.	Visit to soil bunds project (FFA under CIBT)	Baliahmed village	Barnaby Peacocke
		8.30 a.m.– 5.00 p.m.	Travel to Berbera and visit WFP warehouse and port	Berbera	George Fenton
	Day 3				
	10 Dec 2017	7.00 a.m.– 9.30 a.m.	Travel from Berbera to Hargeisa	Hargeisa	George Fenton
		9.30 a.m.	Departure from Hargeisa to Nairobi	Nairobi	George Fenton, Barnaby Peacocke, Hisham Khogali

* UNSOA – United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (now renamed as UNISOS – United Nations Support Office in Somalia).

Annex C: Evaluation Methodology

The annex presents a summarized version of the Evaluation Methodology section included in the Inception Report.²⁴

Methodological approach

1. The evaluation builds on the methodological approach outlined in the ToR. The CPE will use a longitudinal design, relying on secondary quantitative data, and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country including beneficiaries, disaggregated by gender. The evaluation will address the EQs using triangulation of information and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data.
2. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness. The relationship of the EQs to these criteria is clarified in Table 3.
3. The CPE is a strategic evaluation that examines WFP's entire portfolio rather than the constituent operations. Therefore, the evaluation approach analyses groups of activities that recur across different operations, specifically:
 - (i) logistics, emergency, preparedness and response;
 - (ii) food security, livelihoods and resilience; and
 - (iii) Nutrition and health. Cross-cutting issues will be addressed within each of these thematic areas, namely: analytical work in support of strategic decision-making; partnerships, capacity development; gender; adherence to humanitarian principles; protection; AAP; coordination and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
4. These thematic areas interlock across the portfolio. The evaluation will assess the extent to which these operations reflected an implicit common strategy and constituted a coherent portfolio. Thus, although the thematic areas will guide the allocation of evaluation team (ET) members' tasks, they will not be treated in a compartmentalised way.
5. The WFP portfolio in Somalia was not planned under a comprehensive country strategy. No theory of change (ToC) has been constructed for WFP operations in Somalia. To a large extent, the strategic approach was developed independently within each operation. Furthermore, strategic planning took place in a dynamic context.
6. It would, therefore, be artificial and unrealistic to attempt to reconstruct an overarching implicit ToC against which to assess the portfolio as a whole. Multiple ToCs would be required to reflect the changing contexts at different points in time. Even these would be of limited utility as evaluative benchmarks as there is no evidence that a coherent strategic vision underpinned the approach adopted by WFP CO. Generic ToCs for several activities within WFP do exist and are used to provide a valuable reference point for the CPE.

Gender and protection

7. As noted above, gender will be a cross-cutting line of enquiry. The CPE's assessment of gender issues across the three main EQs will be framed by the four objectives of WFP's Gender Policy. The CPE is cognisant of the critical findings of the gender policy evaluation and will assess the extent to which they are applicable to Somalia. It will be particularly pertinent to assess the

²⁴ See Section 3, page 20 of the Somalia CPE Inception Report.

evaluation's finding that there was little evidence "of WFP contributing to transformative changes in gender relations".

8. A participatory and inclusive evaluation process was used to account for the voices and perspectives of all stakeholders, including men and women of different ages among the beneficiary population. Evaluation questions and sub-questions were revised to ensure capturing a gender and protection perspective across operations and areas of enquiry, and by all team members.

9. All data-collection methods and tools integrated gender and protection dimensions and were tailored to ensure the views and experiences of men and women of various ages targeted by WFP activities in Somalia were adequately captured and used throughout the whole evaluation process. The purpose was to gather information on how WFP activities in the period 2012–2017 affected men, women, boys and girls.

10. Efforts were made to include representative samples of men and women, and the most vulnerable and marginalized in each location, with due considerations of safety, accessibility and cultural issues. Diversity of stakeholders was also given due attention with the inclusion of gender and protection – involving specific actors in individual and group interviews with national and international stakeholders, and WFP staff. Finally, some gender and protection-specific interviews were also held with WFP staff from different units to fully grasp the extent of gender and protection mainstreaming into the office's work and responsibilities.

Efficiency analysis

11. The CPE will provide a cost and timeliness analysis of delivering food assistance. The ToR asks for a comparative cost efficiency²⁵ and cost-effectiveness²⁶ analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities e.g. CBTs versus in-kind transfers. The inception phase examined the availability of data to support the efficiency analysis. It is also noted that efficiency analysis can be time consuming and this element will need to be kept in proportion to the demands of the rest of the CPE.

12. Based on this preliminary analysis it was concluded that the evaluation would be able to examine the extent to which the CO met corporate standards for cost effectiveness and cost-efficiency analyses/reviews validate the alpha and Omega analysis produced and examine how the results of these analyses were applied to strategic or programming decision-making. However, there is insufficient data to conduct additional, retrospective analyses of cost effectiveness and cost-efficiency.

Evaluation matrix

13. Based on the ToR, 16 EQs have been identified for the CPE under the three key areas of assessment. As envisaged in the ToR, the internationally agreed evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, sustainability and connectedness will be employed (see Table 3). However, the scope for assessing impact will be very limited. In the medium-term there is limited potential for sustainability within government. Therefore, the evaluation will be oriented to examining a pragmatic approach towards the sustained delivery of services through national institutions.

Table 3: EQs compared to evaluation criteria

²⁵ A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

²⁶ The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the Omega value, the ratio of the in-kind nutrient value score (NVS) to the full cost for the in-kind delivery basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the full CBT basket.

#	EQs	Evaluation criteria
Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio		
1	What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?	Relevance
2	To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?	Relevance and connectedness
3	To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?	Relevance and coherence
4	To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?	Relevance and coherence
5	To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?	Relevance and effectiveness
6	To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?	Coherence
Question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making		
7	To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?	Relevance
8	To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?	Effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness
9	What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?	Relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness and connectedness
10	How has WFP analysed, or used existing analysis of, contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?	Relevance and efficiency
Key Question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio		
11	How effective have the main WFP programme activities been and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?	Effectiveness
12	How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?	Efficiency

#	EQs	Evaluation criteria
13	What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?	Effectiveness
14	What has been the level of synergy and the multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?	Coherence and effectiveness
15	What has been the level of synergy and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?	Coherence and effectiveness
16	How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?	Sustainability and connectedness

14. Under each of the EQs, several sub-evaluation questions have been developed. These are presented in the full evaluation matrix (Annex D). The technical annexes²⁷ set out a more detailed approach to investigating the EQs that will be applied to their respective thematic areas.

Data-collection methods

15. The main sources of information for the evaluation were identified during the inception phase as follows:

- Published documents. The evaluation will review documents produced by WFP at both corporate level (including policies, strategies and evaluations) and at country level (operational documents), complemented by relevant reports from non-WFP sources.²⁸
- Situation analyses. Food-security analyses produced by FSNAU, WFP and others will be drawn on to develop the contextual understanding of the baseline situation, evolving needs and the causes of food and nutrition insecurity.
- Country level interviews. Drawing on the stakeholder analysis, key national-level stakeholders include; WFP CO and Liaison Office staff, federal and state ministries, United Nations agencies, clusters, donors and international NGOs, and organizations. All interviews will be treated as confidential; they will be systematically written up by team members using a standard template and shared through a confidential section of the e-library.

Sub-national interviews. Interviews will be conducted at the sub-national level with WFP AO/field office staff, regional authorities and CPs.

- Focus group discussions (FGDs). To the extent security considerations allow it, FGDs are planned with the beneficiaries of the different WFP activities. Women-only focus groups will also be organized to ensure that their views are captured.
- Monitoring data. The evaluation will draw systematically on existing WFP monitoring data and reports. These include data from sources including standard project reports (SPRs), the WFP Information Network and Global System (WINGS), VAM, M&E and unit level data. In addition, third-party monitoring is available from the United Kingdom (UK) DFID and USAID.

²⁷ See Annexes J, K, L and M for more details.

²⁸ The bibliography in Annex G presents the e-library of documents gathered by the evaluation.

- Budget and finance data. To support the efficiency analysis, the evaluation will draw on WFP financial data and analyses. These include the comparative analyses of the cost effectiveness of different transfer modalities.

16. Subject to possible security constraints, the evaluation team will carry out field visits to meet operational and direct beneficiaries and inspect or observe the activities and outputs of portfolio operations, e.g. GFA and nutrition interventions, assets created during FFA, Food for Training (FFT) and Food for Education (FFE) activities.

17. Careful consideration was given to criteria for selecting the locations to be visited in Somalia. First, Somali Government representatives will be visited at the federal level in Mogadishu, at the state level (in Somaliland and Puntland) and at regional level (Galguduud and Baidoa). Second, the selected locations allow the evaluation team to visit all major WFP activities and different groups of beneficiaries.

Annex D: Evaluation Matrix

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
	Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio			
1	What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?	What was the political and institutional context of Somalia?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, FGDs, financial reports	Strong
1		What are the economic, social and demographic characteristics and trends (disaggregated by sex and age)?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
1		What were the food security and nutrition situation trends and causes (where possible disaggregated by sex and age)?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
1		What were the key elements and drivers of Somalia's aid relationships (including changes in the international humanitarian aid context)?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
1		What was the WFP corporate policy framework, strategic approaches ²⁹ and programme portfolio?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong

²⁹ As noted in the inception report, WFP Somalia did not have a country strategy for the evaluation period. However, strategic approaches were included in other documents including the operational plans.

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
2	To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?	To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Strong
2		To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Strong
2		Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
2		How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Strong
2		To what extent did the portfolio aim to address gender issues, the differentiated needs of men and women of different ages?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Medium
3	To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?	What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
3		Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
4	To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?	Was the WFP strategy coherent with and integrated into the evolving United Nations strategy for Somalia?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
4		To what extent does WFP harmonize strategic approaches through the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Humanitarian Country Team. (HCT), clusters and working groups (WGs)?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
4		How complementary were the strategies of WFP with other individual United Nations agencies?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
4		How complementary were the strategies of WFP and the main donors?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
4		How complementary were the strategies of WFP and CPs?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
5	To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?	How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its value added?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
5		How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
5		How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners to complement its own comparative advantages?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
6	To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?	What tensions or trade-offs exist between WFP corporate policies and alignment with national strategies and systems?	Literature review, HQ/CO level interviews, area-level interviews	Strong
6		How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict-managed?	Literature review, HQ/CO level interviews, area-level interviews	Strong
	Question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making			
7	To what extent has WFP analysed, or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?	To what extent did WFP analyse – or apply other analyses of – the food and nutrition situation to support decisions over time on the design of interventions?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Strong
7		How did WFP analyse and apply information on gender equality and women's empowerment in support of strategic decision-making?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Strong
7		How did WFP analyse and apply information on protection issues in strategic decision-making?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Strong
7		What efforts did WFP make to ensure that the design of interventions considered beneficiary perspectives?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
7		Were there remaining critical evidence gaps in designing interventions?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews	Medium
8	To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?	What efforts has WFP made, and with what results, to strengthen national capacities for food and nutrition analysis?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
8		What role did the clusters play (with WFP support) in building national capacities?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
8		What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect for humanitarian principles, and with what effect?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
9	What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?	To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?	Literature review, situation analyses, country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, FGDs, financial reports	Medium
9		To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by the performance and results of past interventions?	Literature review, country level interviews, monitoring data	Medium

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
9		To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by considerations of efficiency?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
9		To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by resource availability?	Literature review, country level interviews, financial reports	Strong
9		To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
9		What other factors influenced strategic choices?	Literature review, country level interviews	Medium
10	How has WFP analysed, or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?	To what extent were corporate tools for risk analysis and mitigation applied in Somalia?	Literature review, country level interviews	Strong
10		What are the strengths and weaknesses of these corporate tools in their implementation in the Somali context?	Country level interviews	Medium
10		What additional risk analysis and risk-mitigation measures are implemented by the WFP CO?	Country level interviews	Strong
10		How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?	Country level interviews, monitoring data	Medium
	Key Question 3: Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio			

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
11	How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?	What was the level of inclusion and exclusion errors of food-insecure populations (by activity and over time and space) considering both coverage and targeting?	Situation analyses, country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Strong
11		What outputs were planned and what was achieved?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Strong
11		To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?	Country Level Interviews, Regional Level Interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Strong
11		What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Weak
11		How effective were WFP's internal monitoring and reporting systems?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Strong
11		What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Medium
12	How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?	How timely were the interventions and what explains the timeliness and/or lack of timeliness?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Medium
12		How economic was the provision of logistics services?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, financial reports	Medium
12		What is the comparative cost effectiveness of CBTs and in-kind transfers?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews	Medium

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
12		What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, financial reports	Medium
13	What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?	To what extent did WFP's assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to access to, and control over, food and resources?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Strong
13		To what extent did WFP's assistance contribute to a more equal decision-making responsibility between men and women?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Weak
13		To what extent did WFP's assistance create livelihood opportunities for all genders?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Medium
13		To what extent are the reductions in gender gaps sustainable? Did the approach raise tensions at the household and community levels?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Weak
14		To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Strong
14		What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Strong

	Evaluation question	Sub-questions	Sources of evidence	Evidence
15	What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?	To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?	Literature review, country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Strong
15		What channels and forums were used by WFP to build synergies with partners?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Medium
15		To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Medium
16	How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?	What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Medium
16		What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, focus group discussions	Medium
16		To what extent are the assets created by WFP assistance likely to be sustained?	Country level interviews, regional level interviews, monitoring data, focus group discussions	Medium

Annex E: Interview Checklists

National-level interviews:

- WFP country and liaison offices
- Federal and State Ministries
- United Nations agencies
- Clusters and other coordination bodies
- Other international organizations (INGOs, ICRC)

Local level interviews

- WFP area and field offices
- Regional authorities
- Implementing partners

Focus group discussions with beneficiaries

Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio**1. What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?**

- a. What was the political and institutional context of Somalia?
- b. What are the economic, social and demographic characteristics and trends (disaggregated by sex and age)?
- c. What were the key elements and drivers of Somalia's aid relationships (including changes in the international humanitarian aid context)?
- d. What was the WFP corporate policy framework, country strategy and programme portfolio?

2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

- a. To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?
- b. To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
- c. Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?
- d. How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?
- e. To what extent did the portfolio aim to address the differentiated needs of men and women of different ages?

3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

- a. What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?
- b. Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?

4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

- a. Was the WFP strategy coherent with and integrated into the evolving United Nations strategy for Somalia?
- b. To what extent does WFP harmonize its strategic approaches through the UNCT, HCT, Clusters and WGs?
- c. How complementary were the strategies of WFP with other individual United Nations agencies?
- d. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and the main donors?
- e. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and CPs?

5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

- a. How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its value added?
- b. How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?
- c. How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners to complement its own comparative advantages?

6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?

- a. What tensions or trade-offs exist between WFP corporate policies and alignment and the national strategies and systems?

- b. How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict – managed?

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making

1. To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?

- a. To what extent did WFP analyse – or apply other analyses of – the food and nutrition situation to support decisions over time on the design of interventions?
- b. How did WFP analyse and apply information on gender equality and women's empowerment in support of strategic decision-making?
- c. How did WFP analyse and apply information on protection issues in strategic decision-making?
- d. What efforts did WFP make to ensure that the design of interventions considered beneficiary perspectives?
- e. Were there remaining critical evidence gaps in designing interventions?

2. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

- a. What efforts has WFP made, and with what results, to strengthen national capacities for food and nutrition analysis?
- b. What role did the clusters play (with WFP support) in building national capacities?
- c. What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect for humanitarian principles, and with what effect?

3. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

- a. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?
- b. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by the performance and results of past interventions?
- c. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by considerations of efficiency?
- d. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by resource availability?
- e. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?
- f. What other factors influenced strategic choices?

4. How has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

- a. To what extent were corporate tools for risk analysis and mitigation applied in Somalia?
- b. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these corporate tools in their implementation in the Somali context?
- c. What additional risk analysis and risk-mitigation measures are implemented by the WFP CO?
- d. How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio

1. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

- a. What was the level of inclusion and exclusion errors of food-insecure populations (by activity and over time and space) considering both coverage and targeting?
- b. What outputs were planned and what was achieved?
- c. To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?
- d. What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?
- e. How effective was WFP's internal monitoring and reporting systems?
- f. What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?

2. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?

- a. How timely were the interventions and what explains the timeliness and/or lack of timeliness?
- b. How economic was the provision of logistics services?
- c. What is the comparative cost effectiveness of CBTs and in-kind transfers?
- d. What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?

3. What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

- a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to access to, and control over, food and resources?
- b. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to a more equal decision-making responsibility between men and women?
- c. To what extent did WFP assistance create livelihood opportunities for all genders?
- d. To what extent are the reductions in gender gaps sustainable? Did the approach raise tensions at the household and community levels?

4. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

- a. To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other?
- b. What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio?

5. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

- a. To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?
- b. What channels and forums were used by WFP to build synergies with partners?
- c. To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?

6. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

- a. What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?
- b. What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?
- c. To what extent are the assets created by WFP assistance likely to be sustained?

Looking to the future, how do you see the role of WFP evolving?

- a. Strategically, where does WFP add the most value?
- b. Which activities could be modified (including scale) and which might be dropped? What innovative activities should it consider?
- c. Are changes in corporate policies, procedures or systems required to facilitate these changes?

Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio**1. What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?**

- a. What was the political and institutional context of Somalia?
- b. What are the economic, social and demographic characteristics and trends (disaggregated by sex and age)?
- c. What were the key elements and drivers of Somalia's aid relationships (including changes in the international humanitarian aid context)?

2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

- a. To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?
- b. To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
- c. Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?
- d. How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?
- e. To what extent did the portfolio aim to address the differentiated needs of men and women of different ages?

3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

- a. What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?
- b. Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?

4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

- a. Was the WFP strategy coherent with, and integrated in, the evolving United Nations strategy for Somalia?
- b. To what extent does WFP harmonize strategic approaches through the UNCT, HCT, Clusters and WGs?
- c. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and the main donors?

5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

- a. How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its value added?
- b. How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?

6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?

- a. What tensions or trade-offs exist between WFP corporate policies and alignment with national strategies and systems?

- b. How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict – managed?

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making

7. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

- What efforts has WFP made, and with what results, to strengthen national capacities for food and nutrition analysis?
- What role did the clusters play (with WFP support) in building national capacities?
- What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect of humanitarian principles, and with what effect?

8. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

- To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?
- To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?
- What other factors influenced strategic choices?

9. How has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

- How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio

10. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

- What was the level of inclusion and exclusion errors of food-insecure populations (by activity and over time and space) considering both coverage and targeting?
- To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?
- What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?
- What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?

11. What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

- a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to access to, and control over, food and resources?
- b. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to a more equal decision-making responsibility between men and women?
- c. To what extent did WFP assistance create livelihood opportunities for all genders?
- d. To what extent are the reductions in gender gaps sustainable? Did the approach raise tensions at the household and community levels?

12. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

- a. To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?
- b. What channels and forums were used by WFP to build synergies with partners?
- c. To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?

13. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

- a. What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?
- b. What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?
- c. To what extent are the assets created by WFP assistance likely to be sustained?

Looking to the future, how would you like to see the role of WFP evolving?

- a. Strategically, where does WFP add the most value?
- b. Which activities could be modified (including scale) and which might be dropped? What innovative activities should it consider?

Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio**1. What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?**

- a. What was the political and institutional context of Somalia?
- b. What are the economic, social and demographic characteristics and trends (disaggregated by sex and age)?
- c. What were the key elements and drivers of Somalia's aid relationships (including changes in the international humanitarian aid context)?

2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

- a. To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?
- b. To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
- c. Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?
- d. How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?
- e. To what extent did the portfolio aim to address the differentiated needs of men and women of different ages?

3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

- a. What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?
- b. Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?

4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

- a. Was the WFP strategy coherent with and integrated into the evolving United Nations strategy for Somalia?
- b. To what extent does WFP harmonize strategic approaches through the UNCT, HCT, Clusters and WGs?
- c. How complementary were the strategies of WFP with other individual United Nations agencies?

5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

- a. How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its value added?
- b. How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?
- c. How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners to complement its own comparative advantages?

6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?

- a. What tensions or trade-offs exist between WFP corporate policies and alignment with national strategies and systems?
- b. How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict – managed?

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making

1. To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?

- a. To what extent did WFP analyse – or apply other analyses of – the food and nutrition situation to support decisions over time on the design of interventions?
- b. How did WFP analyse and apply information on gender equality and women's empowerment in support of strategic decision-making?
- c. How did WFP analyse and apply information on protection issues in strategic decision-making?
- d. What efforts did WFP make to ensure that the design of interventions considered beneficiary perspectives?
- e. Were there remaining critical evidence gaps in designing interventions?

2. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

- a. What efforts has WFP made, and with what results, to strengthen national capacities for food and nutrition analysis?
- b. What role did the clusters play (with WFP support) in building national capacities?
- c. What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect of humanitarian principles, and with what effect?

3. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

- a. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?
- b. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by the performance and results of past interventions?
- c. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by resource availability?
- d. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?
- e. What other factors influenced strategic choices?

4. How has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

- a. How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio**1. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?**

- a. **What was the level of inclusion and exclusion errors of food-insecure populations (by activity and over time and space) considering both coverage and targeting?**
- b. What outputs were planned and what was achieved?
- c. To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?
- d. What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?
- e. What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?

2. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?

- a. How economic was the provision of logistics services?

3. What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

- a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to access to, and control over, food and resources?
- b. To what extent WFP assistance contribute to a more equal decision-making responsibility between men and women?
- c. To what extent did WFP assistance create livelihood opportunities for all genders?
- d. To what extent are the reductions in gender gaps sustainable? Did the approach raise tensions at the household and community levels?

4. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

- a. To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?
- b. What channels and forums were used by WFP to build synergies with partners?
- c. To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?

5. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

- a. What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?
- b. What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?
- c. To what extent are the assets created by WFP assistance likely to be sustained?

Looking to the future, how do you see the role of WFP evolving?

- a. Strategically, where does WFP add the most value?
- b. Which activities could be modified (including scale) and which might be dropped? What innovative activities should it consider?
- c. Are changes in corporate policies, procedures or systems required to facilitate these changes?

Key question 1: Alignment and Strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio**1. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?**

- a. To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?
- b. To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
- c. Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?
- d. How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?
- e. To what extent did the portfolio aim to address the differentiated needs of men and women of different ages?

2. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

- a. What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?
- b. Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?

3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

- a. Was the WFP strategy coherent with and integrated into the evolving United Nations strategy for Somalia?
- b. To what extent does WFP harmonize strategic approaches through the UNCT, HCT, Clusters and WGs?
- c. How complementary were the strategies of WFP with other individual United Nations agencies?
- d. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and CPs?

4. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

- a. How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?
- b. How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners to complement its own comparative advantages?

5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?

- a. How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict – managed?

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making**1. To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?**

- a. To what extent did WFP analyse – or apply other analyses of – the food and nutrition situation to support decisions over time on the design of interventions?
- b. How did WFP analyse and apply information on gender equality and women's empowerment in support of strategic decision-making?
- c. How did WFP analyse and apply information on protection issues in strategic decision-making?
- d. What efforts did WFP make to ensure that the design of interventions considered beneficiary perspectives?
- e. Were there remaining critical evidence gaps in designing interventions?

2. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

- a. What efforts has WFP made, and with what results, to strengthen national capacities for food and nutrition analysis?
- b. What role did the clusters play (with WFP support) in building national capacities?
- c. What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect for humanitarian principles, and with what effect?

3. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

- a. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?
- b. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by the performance and results of past interventions?
- c. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by considerations of efficiency?
- d. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by resource availability?
- e. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?
- f. What other factors influenced strategic choices?

4. How has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

- a. How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio**1. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?**

- a. What was the level of inclusion and exclusion errors of food-insecure populations (by activity and over time and space) considering both coverage and targeting?
- a. What outputs were planned and what was achieved?
- b. To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?
- c. What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?
- d. What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?

2. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?

- a. How timely were the interventions and what explains the timeliness and/or lack of timeliness?
- b. How economic was the provision of logistics services?
- c. What is the comparative cost effectiveness of CBTs and in-kind transfers?
- d. What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?

3. What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

- a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to access to, and control over, food and resources?
- b. To what extent WFP assistance contribute to a more equal decision-making responsibility between men and women?
- c. To what extent did WFP assistance create livelihood opportunities for all genders?
- d. To what extent are the reductions in gender gaps sustainable? Did the approach raise tensions at the household and community levels?

4. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

- a. To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other?
- b. What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio?

5. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

- a. To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?
- b. What channels and forums were used by WFP to build synergies with partners?
- c. To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?

6. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

- a. What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?
- b. What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?
- c. To what extent are the assets created by WFP assistance likely to be sustained?

Looking to the future, how do you see the role of WFP evolving?

- a. Strategically, where does WFP add the most value?
- b. Which activities could be modified (including scale) and which might be dropped? What innovative activities should it consider?

Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio

1. What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?

- a. What was the political and institutional context of Somalia?
- b. What were the key elements and drivers of Somalia's aid relationships (including changes in the international humanitarian aid context)?

2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

- a. To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?
- b. To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
- c. Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?
- d. How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?

3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

- a. What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?
- b. Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?

4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

- a. To what extent does WFP harmonize strategic approaches through the UNCT, HCT, Clusters and WGs?
- b. How complementary were the strategies of WFP with other individual United Nations agencies?
- c. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and the main donors?
- d. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and CPs?

5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

- a. How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its value added?
- b. How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?

6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies)?

- a. What tensions or trade-offs exist between WFP corporate policies and alignment with national strategies and systems?
- b. How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict – managed?

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making

1. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

a. What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect of humanitarian principles, and with what effect?

2. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

a. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?

b. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by the performance and results of past interventions?

c. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by resource availability?

d. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?

e. What other factors influenced strategic choices?

3. How has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

a. How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio

1. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

a. To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?

b. What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?

c. How effective was WFP's internal monitoring and reporting systems?

d. What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?

2. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?

a. How economic was the provision of logistics services?

3. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

a. To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?

4. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

- a. What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?
- b. What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?

Looking to the future, how do you see the role of WFP evolving?

- a. Strategically, where does WFP add the most value?
- b. Which activities could be modified (including scale) and which might be dropped? What innovative activities should it consider?
- c. Are changes in corporate policies, procedures or systems required to facilitate these changes?

Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio**1. What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?**

- a. What was the political and institutional context of Somalia?
- b. What were the key elements and drivers of Somalia's aid relationships (including changes in the international humanitarian aid context)?

2. To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

- a. To what extent was the design of the WFP portfolio relevant to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished (over space and time)?
- b. To what extent did the WFP portfolio aim to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?
- c. Did the WFP strategy and portfolio appropriately balance and combine humanitarian and development approaches?
- d. How well did WFP adapt its strategy and portfolio to the evolving context?
- e. To what extent did the portfolio aim to address the differentiated needs of men and women of different ages?

3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

- a. What were the policies, strategies and capacities of Somali authorities for action on food and nutrition security?
- b. Was there an appropriate alignment of WFP strategy and portfolio with national policies and programmes?

4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

- a. To what extent does WFP harmonize strategic approaches through the UNCT, HCT, Clusters and WGs?
- b. How complementary were the strategies of WFP with other individual United Nations agencies?
- c. How complementary were the strategies of WFP and CPs?

5. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

- a. How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its value added?
- b. How realistic was WFP about its comparative disadvantages?
- c. How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners to complement its own comparative advantages?

6. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?

- a. How are tensions between maintaining respect for humanitarian principles and working under the auspices of the Federal Government – as one party to the conflict – managed?

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making**1. To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?**

- a. To what extent did WFP analyse – or apply other analyses of – the food and nutrition situation to support decisions over time on the design of interventions?
- b. How did WFP analyse and apply information on gender equality and women's empowerment in support of strategic decision-making?
- c. How did WFP analyse and apply information on protection issues in strategic decision-making?
- d. What efforts did WFP make to ensure that the design of interventions considered beneficiary perspectives?
- e. Were there remaining critical evidence gaps in designing interventions?

2. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

- a. What efforts has WFP made, and with what results, to strengthen national capacities for food and nutrition analysis?
- b. What role did the clusters play (with WFP support) in building national capacities?
- c. What efforts has WFP made in policy advocacy on hunger, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, gender and the respect of humanitarian principles, and with what effect?

3. What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

- a. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by corporate policies, priorities, HR capacities and perceived comparative advantage?
- b. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by the performance and results of past interventions?
- c. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by considerations of efficiency?
- d. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by resource availability?
- e. To what extent were the choices in the strategy and portfolio influenced by political factors?
- f. What other factors influenced strategic choices?

4. How has WFP analysed, or used existing analyses of, contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

- a. How successful was WFP in mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio**1. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?**

- a. What was the level of inclusion and exclusion errors of food-insecure populations (by activity and over time and space) considering both coverage and targeting?
- b. What outputs were planned and what was achieved?
- c. To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?
- d. What impacts at the sector level are attributable to WFP activities?
- e. How effective was WFP's internal monitoring and reporting systems?
- f. What were the main reasons for observed effectiveness and/or ineffectiveness?

2. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?

- a. How timely were the interventions and what explains the timeliness and/or lack of timeliness?
- b. How economic was the provision of logistics services?
- c. What is the comparative cost effectiveness of CBTs and in-kind transfers?
- d. What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?

3. What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

- a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to access to, and control over, food and resources?
- b. To what extent WFP assistance contribute to a more equal decision-making responsibility between men and women?
- c. To what extent did WFP assistance create livelihood opportunities for all genders?
- d. To what extent are the reductions in gender gaps sustainable? Did the approach raise tensions at the household and community levels?

4. What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

- a. To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other?
- b. What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio?

5. What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

- a. To what extent did WFP operations complement those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?
- b. What channels and forums were used by WFP to build synergies with partners?
- c. To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop between WFP operations and those of multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?

6. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

- a. What progress has been made towards the sustained provision of services through national institutions and capacities?
- b. What progress has been made towards the graduation of emergency beneficiaries to sustained livelihoods?
- c. To what extent are the assets created by WFP assistance likely to be sustained?

Looking to the future, how do you see the role of WFP evolving?

- a. Strategically, where does WFP add the most value?
- b. Which activities could be modified (including scale) and which might be dropped? What innovative activities should it consider?

Key question 1: Alignment and strategic positioning of WFP's country strategy and portfolio = N/A

Key question 2: Factors influencing and quality of strategic decision-making = N/A

Key question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio

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Annex F: Evaluation Timeline

	Somalia country portfolio evaluation	By whom	Key dates (deadlines)
Phase 1-Preparation			
	Desk review. Draft ToRs. OEV/D clearance for circulation in WFP	EM	1-16 August 2017
	Review draft ToR based on WFP feedback	EM	31 August 2017
	Final ToR sent to WFP stakeholders	EM	15 September 2017
	Contracting evaluation team/firm	EM	30 September 2017
Phase 2-Inception			
	Team preparation prior to HQ briefing (reading documents)	Team	2-6 October 2017
	HQ briefing (WFP Rome)	EM & team.	10-12 October 2017
	Inception mission in the country	EM + TL	16-25 October 2017
	Submit draft Inception Report to OEV	TL	8 November 2017
	OEV quality assurance and feedback	EM	15 November 2017
	Submit revised Inception Report	TL	17 November 2017
	Circulate final Inception Report to WFP key stakeholders for their information + post a copy on intranet	EM	20 November 2017
Phase 3-Evaluation phase, including fieldwork			
	Fieldwork and desk review. Field visits to CO(s) and RBN. Internal debriefing with the CO and RB	Team	27 November-15 December 2017
	Exit debrief (PowerPoint) preparation	TL	15 December 2017
	Team meeting in Rome (synthesize findings, concerns and recommendations)	Team	23-24 January 2018
	Debriefing with HQ, RBN and CO staff	EM & Team	25 January 2018
Phase 4-Reporting			
Draft 0	Submit draft evaluation report (ER) to OEV	TL	2 February 2018
	OEV quality feedback sent to the team	EM	9 February 2018
Draft 1	Submit revised draft ER to OEV	TL	16 February 2018
	EM seeks OEV Director's clearance prior to circulating the ER to WFP stakeholders. When cleared, OEV shares draft evaluation report with WFP stakeholders for their feedback	EM	23 February-2 March 2018
	OEV consolidates all WFP's comments (matrix) and shares them with team. Team to consider them before in-country workshop	EM	16 March 2018
	Stakeholders-learning workshop, Mogadishu; share comments with TL	TL/EM	21-22 March 2018
Draft 2	Submit revised draft ER and Draft SER to OEV based on the WFP's comments, and team's responses	TL	30 March 2018
	Review revised draft ER (D2) and draft SER	EM	2-6 April 2018
	Seek OEV Director's clearance to send the summary evaluation report (SER) to Executive Management	EM	9 April 2018
	OEV circulates the draft SER to WFP's Senior management for comments (upon clearance from OEV's Director)	EM	13 April 2018
	OEV sends the comments on the draft SER to the team	EM	30 April 2018
Draft 3	Submit final draft ER (D3) with the revised SER to OEV	TL	9 May 2018
	Seek final approval by OEV. Director. Clarify last points/issues with the team if necessary	EM&TL	16 May 2018
Phase 5-Executive Board (EB) and follow-up			
	Submit SER/recommendations to the Performance Management and Monitoring Division for management response + SER to EB Secretariat for editing and translation	EM	30 May 2018
	Tail-end actions, OEV websites posting, EB round table, etc.	EM	
	Presentation of SER to the EB	D/OEV	November 2018

	Presentation of management response to the EB	D/RMP	November 2018
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Annex G: People Consulted

People consulted, by organization	Designation
ACTED	
Adam Abdow	Field Coordinator
Mohamednur Roble	Area Coordinator
Sarah Marsh	Country Director
Winnie Mbusya	Coordinator, Somalia Resilience Action Consortium
Action Aid	
Abdivizak Mohamed	Field Officer, Somaliland
Ahmed Adan	Head of Policy and Programmes, Somaliland
Susan Otieno	Interim Country Director, Somaliland
ADESO	
Deqa Saleh	CWG
IHDG (Informal Humanitarian Donor Group)	
Donor representatives from ECHO, DFID, Swiss Embassy, Australian Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, Swedish Embassy, Danish Embassy, Norwegian Embassy	
Beneficiary groups	
FFT Women's Group, Qansaxlay, Dolow	
FFT Bee Keepers' Group, Qansaxlay, Dolow	Sheikh Nur school, teachers, Hargeisa Sheikh Nur school, cooks, Hargeisa Sheikh Nur school, Mohamed Hussein, Headmaster, Hargeisa
FFAs Women's Group, Kabasa, Dolow	Bani Hussein village, FFA Women's Group, Hargeisa Bani Hussein village, FFA Men's Group, Hargeisa
FFAs Men's Group, Kabasa, Dolow	
Health Centre, Kabasa, Dolow	
The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)	
Karen Peachey	Cash learning group
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
Daud Hassein Mohamud	ICT-SCOPE officer
Hamdi Mohamed	Finance Manager, Hargeisa
Osman Mohamed Noor	Protection Coordinator, Hargeisa
Simon Nzioka	Country Director
Yussuf Mohammed Keraw	Emergency System Leader (SCOPE)
Zaima Abdullahi	Programme Manager
DFID	
Seb Fouquet	Humanitarian and Resilience Team Leader
DINA	
Maniza Naqvi	Senior Social Protection Adviser, World Bank
Degroor Medical Organization (DMO)	
Abdurahman Issack	Nutrition (including Cluster, Bay and Lower Shebelle) Focal Point
ECHO	
Johann Heffinck	Head of Office ECHO Somalia
FAO	
Rudi Van Aaken	Head of Programme
Federal Government of Somalia	

Abdi Idan	MCHN Centre, Hargeisa
Aburizak Mahmoud	Minister of Interior, South West State
Ahmed Hassen Yussuf	Permanent Secretary, MoE, Mogadishu
Ali Derie Ahmed	Head, Food Aid Coordination Agency (FACA – government agency)
Dr Fatuma Abshir Mohmmed	MoH, South West State
Dr Abdulrahman Ibrahim	Director of Public Health, MoH Mogadishu
Dr Deeq Yusuf	Director General, MoWHRD, Directorate Department in the regional state
Dr Nadifo Abdi Dirshe	MoWHRD, Directorate Department in the regional state
Faisa Shukri	Team Leader MCHN, MoH
Mahomed Hussein Abdi Lafey	Head of Projects and Humanitarian Liaison – Dolow and Jubaland State
Mohamed Moalim	Permanent Secretary, MoHADM
Mohammed Nour Hassan	MoH, Nutrition Coordinator
Nura Yusuf	Team Leader MCHN, MoH
Government of Somaliland	
Ali Bena Abdullahi	Ministry of Agriculture, Hargeisa
Ibrahim Omar	FACA, Liaison Coordinator
Mustaf Ali	School Feeding Coordinator, MoE, Hargeisa
FEWSNET	
Abdirizak Nur	Head of FEWS NET
Food Security Cluster (FSC)	
Charles Hopkins	FSC Coordinator, WFP
Kevin Mackey	Programme Development and Quality Assurance Director, World Vision Somalia
Mulugeta Shibru	FSC Coordinator, FAO
FSNAU	
Daniel Molla	Coordinator
Health Poverty Action	
Mohamed Bulali	
ICRC	
Dusan Vutokic	ECOSOC team
Inchcape Shipping Services (ISS)	
David McLean	General Manager
IOM	
Jennifer Pro	Humanitarian Response Representative
Sam Grundy	Development
Kaashif Development Initiatives	
Abdurahman Hussein	Programme Coordinator, Mogadishu
Mercy USA	
Abdurahman Mohammed	Country Director
Anas Mohamed Yusuf	Field Coordinator

Muslim Handy	
Adbikadir Mohamoud Barre	Programme Coordinator, Mogadishu
NGO Resilience Consortia	
Andrew Lanyon	SomRep Chief of Party
Martijn Goddeeris	BRCiS Coordinator
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	
Abdi Wali Mohamed Dakari	Education Programme Officer
Abukar Haji Aden	Programme Office, Hargeisa
Nutrition Cluster	
Naema Hirad	Deputy Nutrition Cluster Coordinator
Save the Children	
Sarah Baran	SNS Nutrition Consortium Coordinator
Rachel Mose	Technical Specialist – Nutrition
SCI	
Abdu Yusuf Mahdi	Nutrition Programme Manager
SKA Somalia	
John Robinson	Base Operations Manager
Wilfredo Burgos	Director of Transport – Africa
SOBA	
Khadar Ahmed	Member
SomRep	
Andrew Lanyon	SomRep, World Vision (Chief of Party)
Jochen Schmidt	SomRep
Somali Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization (SORRDO)	
Abdullahi Mohamed Ibrahim	Country Coordinator
Mohamed Hassan Abdulle	Nutritionist
TASCO	
Ilyas Hassan Osman	Finance Manager, TASCO
Mohamoud Mohamed Ruale	Programme Manager, TASCO
Oman Jama Farah	Director, TASCO
UNFPA	
Dr Samia Hassan	Humanitarian Response Coordinator
Elizabeth Kigen	National Coordinator for the Gender-based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS) Task Force
UNHCR	
Sarah Khan	Protection
William Ejalu	Head of Sub-office South-Central
UNICEF	
Daniele Trotter	Social Protection
Ezatullah Majeed	Chief of Nutrition
Jane Mbakaya	Programme Manager for Central and South Regions
Jean Lokenga	Chief of Child Protection
Sara Skovgaard	Education Cluster Coordinator
Surani Abeyesekera	Resilience

Tsedeye Girma	Emergency Manager
UNOCHA	
Vincent Lelei	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia
Abdu Riba Mohammed	Humanitarian Affairs Officer for Baidoa, SW State
Mohamoud Mohamed Burale	Humanitarian Coordinator
Thomas Nyambane	Humanitarian Affairs Officer for Baidoa, SW State
UNSOM/GTG	
Shipra Bose	GTG Co-chair
United Nations Women	
Fadumo Dayib	Country Coordinator
USAID	
Anne Shaw	USAID Food for Peace Programme Coordinator
WARDI	
Hussain Moalim Aden	Livelihood Manager
WFP Regional Bureau	
Kathy Derore	Programme Policy Officer, FFA
Allison Oman	Senior Programme Policy Officer, Nutrition
Annalee Pepper	Regional Adviser – Gender, Protection and AAP
Faith Awino	Programme Policy Officer, School Feeding
Josefa Zueco	Senior Budget and Programming Officer
Ruby Khan	Programme Policy Officer, Gender and Protection
Tarek Keshavjee	Senior Logistics Officer
WFP Somalia	
Abdelkhardir Dahir	Logistics Officer
Abdikarim Yusuf	Programme Associate, Livelihoods
Abdulahi Mohamed Ibrahim	Nutrition Focal Point, Mogadishu AO
Abdulkabir Abdi	Programme Officer, M&E, Mogadishu
Abubakar Siddique	Head of Puntland/Garowe
Akberet Tedla	Head of Finance
Almudena Serrano	Head of VAM and M&E
Andreas Deuble	Transfer Management/ICT-SCOPE
Anwar Gul	Head of Kismayo Office, South West State
Bernard de Wouters	UNHAS, Air Transport Officer
Bishar Duble	Head of IT
Caroline Muchai	Head of Livelihoods, Programme
Chana Opaskornkul	Consultant M&E
Corinne	Head of Supply Chain
Delphine Dechaux	Deputy Head of Programme
Edith Heines	Deputy Country Director Somalia
Ekramul Kabir	Head of Programme, Galkayo, Central
Emmanuel Bigenimana	Head of Mogadishu Office
Emmanuel Odongo	Head of CBT team, Programme
Enock Omweri	Compliance Officer
Gabrielle	Social Protection

Habiba Bishar	Nutritionist, Mogadishu
Hammad El Rashid	Head of Hargeisa Office, Somaliland
Happygod John	Head of Programme Hargeisa, Somaliland
Hassan Bilaal	National Programme Policy Officer
Hassan Samai	National Policy Officer, Nutrition, Livelihoods and VAM
Hundubey Ahmed	Programme Policy Officer
Isam Babiker	Head of Baidoa Office, South West State
Jean Damascene Hitayezu	Programme Officer, VAM, Mogadishu
Joshua Mesa	Senior Programme Associate, VAM
Kopano Mhlope	Head of Partnership team, Programme
Laurent Bukera	Country Director Somalia
Lilian Onsongo	OIM and Performance Reports Officer, Head of Reports
Liljana Jovceva	Head of Programme
Michele Pict	Head of Budget and Programming
Mohamed Nuredaiem	Deputy Head of Hargeisa Office, Somaliland
Mohammed Abdu Sheikh	UNHAS
Mokhta Ibrahim	M&E officer, CBT, Mogadishu
Mustafa Ali	Field Monitor Assistance School Feeding
Nigel Sanders	UNHAS, Head/Chief Air Transport Officer
Nynne Warring	Chair Inter-agency CWG
Omar Mohammed Hassan	Programme Assistant
Omar Nur	Logistics Officer, Somaliland
Patrick Joe Segeh Yankuba	Head of Dolow Office
Pramila	Nutrition and School Meals
Pramila Ghimire	Head of Nutrition and Education, Programme
Pray Gwatinyanya	Logistics Officer
Ravza Salieva	Head, Administration and Procurement
Ruby Khan	Programme Policy Officer, Gender and Protection, Livelihoods
Rumbidzai Chitombi	CBT team (Dadaab returnee project)
Shaikh Abubakar Siddique	Head of Garoowe Office
Shirin Jamaludin	Programme Business Support Assistant
Simoun Scotti Ferreira	SCOPE Dashboard
Somane Hassan	Logistics Officer
Suleha Nuru	School Meals, Programme Officer
Tue Nilson	Transfer Management/ICT-SCOPE
Vladimir Jovcev	Head of Logistics
World Vision International	
Abdullahi Abdi Ahmed	Project Coordinator, Hargeisa
Ahmed Ali Hashi	Reporting Officer, Hargeisa
Edward Mulindwa	Commodities Officer, Hargeisa
Mekvanint Zeleke	Programme Coordinator, Hargeisa
Philip Ndekei	Food Assistance Manager
Regina Marete	Commodities Officer

Simon Nyabwengi	Country Director
Yassin Abdibrahim	Project Coordinator

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³⁰ Viewed as relevant for this CPE.

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Annex I: Somalia Core Development Indicators

	Indicator	Year	Value		Source	
General	Population (total, millions)	2016	14,317,996		World Bank, WDI.	
		2015	13,908,129			
	Average annual growth (%)	2000/2005	2.7		UNDP/HDR 2016	
		2010/2015	2.4			
Urban Population (% of total)	2016	40.0%		World Bank, WDI.		
Human Development Index	2015	NA		UNDP/HDR 2016		
Gender	Social Institutions and Gender Index	Value	0.4594		SIGI 2014	
		Rank	102/107			
	Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births)	2015	732		UNDP/HDR 2016	
	Seats in National Parliament (% female)	2016	13.8			
	Population with at least some secondary education, female, male (% aged 25 and above)	2005-2015	M	F		UNDP/HDR 2016
			NA	NA		
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (% of total)	2006	9.4		World Bank, WDI.	
	Labour force participation rate (%)	2015	M	F		UNDP/HDR 2016
75.9			33.2			
Employees, agriculture, female (% of female employment)	NA	NA		World Bank, WDI.		
School enrolment, primary (% gross)	2007	29.2		World Bank, WDI.		
Economic	Income Gini Coefficient	2010-2015	NA		UNDP/HDR 2016	
		2016	434			
	GDP per capita (current US\$)	2015	426		World Bank, WDI.	
		2016	426			
	Foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP)	2015	8.7		World Bank, WDI.	
2014		7.7				
Net official development assistance received (current US\$)	2015	1,253,550,000		World Bank, WDI.		
Poverty	Population living below \$1.90/day (%)	2015-2014	NA		UNDP/HDR 2016	
	Population near multidimensional poverty (%)	2006	8.3		UNDP/HDR 2016	
	Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%)	2006	63.6		UNDP/HDR 2016	
Nutrition	Wasting (% (Moderate and Severe))	2010-2015	Mod & Sev		UNICEF/SOWC 2016	
			15			
	Stunting (% (Moderate and Severe))	2010-2015	Mod & Sev		UNICEF/SOWC 2016	
			26			
	Underweight (% (Moderate and Severe))	2010-2015	Mod & Sev		UNICEF/SOWC 2016	
			23			
	<5 mortality rate	2000	174		UNICEF/SOWC 2016	
2015		137				
Exclusive Breast-Feeding (6 months) (%)	2010-2015	5		UNICEF/SOWC 2016		
Minimum Acceptable Diet (6-23 months) (%)	2010-2015	NA		UNICEF/SOWC 2016		
Minimum Dietary Diversity for Women	New indicator, NA	New indicator, NA		New indicator, NA		
Health	Maternal Mortality Ratio (Lifetime risk of maternal death (1 in:))	2015	22		UNICEF/SOWC 2016	
	Life expectancy at birth	2013	58			
	Estimated HIV Prevalence Rate (Adults)	2016	0.4		UNAIDS 2016	
		2015	0.4			
	Public expenditures on health (% of GDP)	2014	NA		UNDP/HDR 2016	
	Youth literacy rate (15-24y) (%)	2009-2014	M	F		UNICEF/SOWC 2016
			NA	NA		
Use of improved drinking water sources (%)	2015	NA		UNICEF/SOWC 2016		
Use of improved sanitation facilities (%)	2015	NA		UNICEF/SOWC 2016		
Education	Population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older)	2005-2015	NA		UNDP/HDR 2016	
	Government expenditures on education (% of GDP)	2010-2014	NA		UNDP/HDR 2016	
	School enrolment, primary (% gross)	2010-2014	M	F		UNICEF/SOWC 2016
			NA	NA		
	Net attendance ratio, primary school (%)	2007	29.2		World Bank, WDI.	
		2009-2014	M	F		UNICEF/SOWC 2016
24			19			
Net attendance ratio, secondary school (%)	2006	M	F		MICS 2010	
	25.1	20.8				
Net attendance ratio, secondary school (%)	2009-2014	M	F		UNICEF/SOWC 2016	
		7	4			

Annex J: WFP Portfolio in Somalia and Donor Funding

Operation	Title	Time frame	USD required	USD received	Proportion funded (%)	Project objectives
EMOP 200281	Tackling hunger and food insecurity in Somalia	01 July 2011–31 Dec 2012	427,681,847	311,308,763	73	The main pillars of both the former EMOP 108120, which ended in June 2011, and EMOP 200281, which started in July 2011, are GFA and nutrition programmes providing support to families living in emergencies and ensuring their adequate food consumption. An emergency school meals programme provides a daily meal, while increasing access to education of vulnerable children. Early recovery activities, including institutional feeding, FFAs and FFT, support the re-establishment of basic livelihoods of targeted households.
PRRO 200443	Strengthening food and nutrition security and enhancing resilience	01 Jan 2013–31 Dec 2015	788,990,181	422,895,937	54	<p>The operation has the following strategic objectives:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. protect livelihoods during shocks and seasonal vulnerability through nutritional support and targeted relief, as appropriate; 2. enhance the resilience of communities through FFAs and enhanced partnerships; and 3. rebuild household food and nutrition security with preventive and therapeutic interventions, school meals and FFAs. <p>It will also enhance capacities to address acute hunger in disasters and will build ministerial capacities with a view to eventual handover (addressing Strategic Objective 5). The PRRO continues a shift begun under EMOP 200281 from live-saving relief assistance – primarily GFA – towards recovery assistance that enables communities to cope more effectively with hardships. Through EMOP 200281, WFP introduced voucher transfers in Somaliland. The evaluation showed that beneficiaries accessed a more diverse food basket and consumed more calories using vouchers as compared with in-kind assistance. Greater beneficiary satisfaction was reflected in the fact that households consumed nearly the entire value of the transfer, whereas with in-kind transfers some food was sold to pay for other priorities. While not feasible countrywide, the success of the project</p>

						indicates that market-based approaches are appropriate and could be scaled up.
PRRO 200844	Reducing malnutrition and strengthening resilience to shocks for a food-secure Somalia	01 Jan 2016–31 Dec 2018	731,555,923	592,934,553	81	<p>Protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 200844 will build on the existing PRRO by employing flexible and scalable programmes for strengthening nutrition and food security through early warning, safety nets and conditional seasonal transfers. This PRRO has three main objectives:</p> <p>1) Stabilize and reduce the prevalence of global acute malnutrition and disparities between boys and girls under 5; provide life-saving assistance to people in the IPC, “crisis” and “emergency” phases, and protect populations at risk of acute food insecurity resulting from shocks, through predictable and reliable safety-net programmes (Strategic Objective 1).</p> <p>2) Address the causes of acute malnutrition with integrated preventive programmes for children under two and PLW – contributing to the Zero Hunger Challenge Objective 1 – and stabilize seasonally vulnerable households by focusing on resilience (Strategic Objective 2) – contributing to Zero Hunger Challenge Objective 2.</p> <p>3) Enhance the food security and productivity of households in the IPC “stressed” phase, through investments in food production and sustainable income generation (Strategic Objective 3) – contributing to Zero Hunger Challenge Objective 4.</p>
SOp 105780	Emergency rehabilitation works for logistics infrastructure in Somalia	15 Feb 2007–31 Mar 2013	43,070,684	18,096,275	42	<p>The Special Operation (SO) 105780 was launched in February 2007 to facilitate the efficient delivery of humanitarian food supplies in southern Somalia through targeted rehabilitation works at Mogadishu and Kismayo ports and at key bottlenecks in the road and bridge network in the region. This operation contributed to WFP Strategic Objective 1 and was extended several times through budget revisions. Because of the temporary suspension of operations in southern Somalia in 2010 and the additional logistical workload this placed on the northern ports of Berbera and Bossaso, this operation was extended in February 2010 to include rehabilitation work to improve the logistics infrastructure in Somaliland,</p>

						Puntland and the central regions. Following delays caused by the volatile security situation and challenging operating environment, and an extension in geographical area of the operation, this operation was closed on 31 March 2013 and replaced by SOp 200475.
SOp 106810	Humanitarian air service in support of relief operations in Somalia and Kenya	01 Aug 2007–31 Dec 2012	95,772,987	77,581,693	81	The core objective of this SOp is to facilitate the delivery of life-saving humanitarian and movement of humanitarian workers in Somalia, through the provision of critical and safe passenger air services at a subsidized cost, in support of WFP Strategic Objective 1. The operation is complying with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recommendations regarding the management and maintenance of WFP air transport services, by ensuring adequate levels of safety and security. Specific services provided by the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) include air transport of humanitarian staff within Somalia, medical and security evacuation permanently available for relocations of staff, airlift of essential relief cargos – such as medical supplies to locations inaccessible by road. In summary, UNHAS aims to respond in a fast, efficient and flexible manner to the needs of the humanitarian community.
SOp 200344	Logistics and emergency telecommunications cluster augmentation in response to the humanitarian situation in Somalia	25 Aug 2011–31 Dec 2012	7,081,191	2,257,951	32	SO 200344, was launched to provide the humanitarian community with adequate logistics and information and communications technology capabilities, as well as coordination mechanisms to enable the delivery of assistance.

SOp 200440	Food Security Cluster augmentation in response to the continued humanitarian situation in Somalia	01 Sep 2012–30 Jun 2016	7,353,169	3,262,307	44	<p>This SOP will provide the resources to allow the FSC to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assume the leadership around the coordination and information management of food-security related activities; 2. Provide guidance and strategic vision to its membership to respond to the acute needs, and; 3. Lay the foundations of recovery through strategic coordination guidance on livelihood planning that strengthens resilience to address the underlying causes of the year-on-year crisis in Somalia. SOP 200440 "Food Security Cluster Augmentation in Response to the continued humanitarian situation in Somalia" enabled the FSC, which is co-led by WFP and FAO, to assume humanitarian leadership around coordination and information management of emergency food-security responses. The SOP ended in June 2016 after which the FSC activities were integrated into WFP's PRRO and the ongoing FAO programme.
SOp 200475	Development of logistical infrastructure for Somalia and the Horn of Africa Corridor	01 Apr 2013–30 Nov 2014	15,939,383	14,828	0	<p>Building on past achievements lunched under SOP 105780, WFP proposes to continue its rehabilitation work in Somalia and to focus its attention on areas which will have the most impact for humanitarian assistance in Somalia. In addition to the relocation of warehouse facilities, the SOP provides for a further programme of rehabilitation to the ports of Berbera, Bossaso and Mogadishu as well as WFP warehouse facilities according to funding received.</p>

SOp 200507	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and in Kenya	01 Jan 2013–31 Dec 2015	100,459,414	78,275,716	78	<p>SOp 200507 has been prepared to ensure continued provision of safe and reliable air transport services to the humanitarian community in Somalia and Kenya for the period 2013–2014. The objectives of the SOP are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To provide safe, efficient and cost-effective inter-agency air transport service for over 100 United Nations agencies, NGOs and donor organizations operating in both Somalia and Kenya; 2. To transport light cargo such as medical supplies, specialized emergency food stuff and high value equipment (ICT); and 3. To provide timely medical and security evacuations for the humanitarian community in the region. <p>The objectives above are linked to WFP's Strategic Results Framework and are examples of Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.</p>
SOp 200546	No SPR					
SOp 200637	Security augmentation in support of WFP operations in Somalia	01 Jun 2014–31 Dec 2014	7,482,753	3,366,331	45	<p>The aim of the proposed SOP is to ensure uninterrupted funding for WFP Somalia's security-related functions. The Sop will delink security-related funding from in-kind and cash contributions to the PRRO 200443 budget and ensure that any gaps in programme funding will not jeopardize WFP's ability to ensure the safety of its staff in Somalia's highly complex security environment. The proposed SOP will allow WFP to maintain a flexible and safe presence in Somalia regardless of the size or current funding levels operation.</p>
SOp 200924	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and in Kenya	01 Jan 2016–31 Dec 2017	60,850,071	21,326,754	35	<p>In 2016, WFP also implemented two SO to support the provision of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. SO 200924 "Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Somalia and Kenya" continued to facilitate the provision of safe and reliable air transport services to the humanitarian community in Somalia and Kenya including medical and security evacuations. The SO, set to end in December 2017, is linked to Strategic Objective 1 (Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies) of WFP's Strategic Plan (2014–2017), and to SDGs 2 (Zero Hunger) and 17 (Partnerships).</p>

WFP funding in Somalia by donor, by year

Donor	Contributions (USD)					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
African Development Bank				1,000,000		
Angola	1,566,280					
Australia						6,809,220
Austria		264,901				
Belgium	1,028,944	325,945				1,119,821
Brazil	4,070,991					
Canada	1,478,067	10,029,211	9,874,327	7,396,236	9,445,793	8,205,107
China					2,000,000	10,000,000
Colombia	74,569	100,000				
Czech Republic						100,523
Denmark			2,928,870		2,140,411	3,176,437
Estonia	92,715					
European Commission				1,092,896	3,968,254	23,218,496
Finland			2,478,315	2,120,891	2,645,503	2,134,472
France						1,679,731
Germany		2,633,404	16,017,685	1,122,334	10,893,409	53,805,235
Hungary						179,295
Intl Committee of The Red Cross		220,000				
Italy			612,245		1,106,195	3,937,621
Japan		6,573,219	4,200,000	4,200,000	4,500,000	7,432,000
Kuwait			150,000			
Liechtenstein						99,305
Lithuania						10,858
Luxembourg						530,786

Mozambique	105,944					
Multilateral	-129,939	19,343,955	2,715,583	25,330,567	17,333,749	20,372,800
New Zealand						1,060,307
Norway	386,187	602,825			876,168	3,348,835
OPEC Fund for International Development						300,000
Private Donors	383,704	219,817	14,828			3,111,002
Republic of Korea		1,050,000	500,000		500,000	200,000
Russian Federation	2,000,000	1,000,000	973,250	1,026,750	1,000,000	1,000,000
Saudi Arabia		553,740	160,302			
Slovenia					32,609	33,595
South Africa	1,982,118					
Spain	200,000					
Sweden					2,329,197	4,380,922
Switzerland		1,604,369	554,324	1,028,807	4,160,802	1,232,278
Tanzania	233,082					
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund		5,499,126	4,054,679	6,242,758	5,383,844	9,586,556
United Nations Common Humanitarian Fund	2,796,098	7,034,074	6,451,299	6,247,066	2,300,001	
United Nations Country Based Pooled Funds						811,293
United Nations Other Funds and Agencies (excluding Central Emergency Response Fund)	552,433		1,308,597		500,001	
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund					350,000	
UK	7,824,841	8,593,497	7,563,282	6,904,135	13,310,811	53,399,777
USA	58,243,769	96,091,472	88,224,456	65,146,220	64,435,529	187,674,541

Source: WFP's corporate system for contribution statistics 'FACTory'/WINGS. Extracted on 10 April 2018.

Annex K: List of Cooperating Partners

Year	Partner name	Project
2013	Access Aid and Development	200443
	Action Relief Somalia	200443
	Afgoye Alifow Women Development Organization	200443
	Agro-Pastoral Charity Centre	200443
	Doyale Relief and Development Organization	200443
	Hiran Community and Development Organization	200443
	Horn of Africa Organization for Protection of Environment and Improvement of Livelihoods	200443
	Liban Welfare Organization	200443
	Mercy USA for Aid and Development	200443
	Ministry of Education and Higher Education–Somaliland	200443
	Ministry of Education of Puntland	200443
	Ministry of Health – Puntland	200443
	Ministry of Health – Somaliland	200443
	Nomadic Assistant for Peace and Development	200443
	Norwegian Church Aid	200443
	Physicians for Social Responsibility–Finland	200443
	Relief Action Organization	200443
	Saacid	200443
	Shabelle Relief & Development Organization	200443
	Somali Society Development Association	200443
	Swisso Kalmo	200443
	Wamo Relief and Rehabilitation Services	200443
	World Assembly of Muslim Youth	200443
	WVI–World Vision International	200443
	Zamzam Foundation	200443
Total number of partners in 2013	25	
2014	Access Aid and Development	200443
	Action Relief Somalia	200443
	Afgoye Alifow Women Development Organization	200443
	Agro Pastoral Charity Centre	200443
	Doyale Relief and Development Organization	200443
	Health, Education and Agro-pastoral Liaison	200443
	Hiran Community and Development Organization	200443
	Horn of Africa Organization for Protection of Environment and Improvement of Livelihoods	200443
	Intersos Humanitarian Aid Organization	200443
	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	200443
	Liban Welfare Organization	200443
	Mercy Corps	200443
	Mercy USA for Aid and Development	200443
	Ministry of Education and Higher Education – Somaliland	200443
	Ministry of Education of Puntland	200443

	Ministry of Health – Puntland	200443
	Ministry of Health – Somaliland	200443
	Nomadic Assistant for Peace and Development	200443
	Norwegian Church Aid	200443
	Physicians for Social Responsibility – Finland	200443
	Relief Action Organization	200443
	Saacid	200443
	Shabelle Relief & Development Organization	200443
	Somali Society Development Association	200443
	Swisso Kalmo	200443
	Wamo Relief and Rehabilitation Services	200443
	World Assembly of Muslim Youth	200443
	World Vision International (WVI)	200443
	Zamzam Foundation	200443
	Total number of partners in 2014	29
2015	Access Aid and Development	200443
	Action in Semi-arid Lands	200443
	Action Relief Somalia	200443
	Active in Development Aid	200443
	Afgoye Alifow Women Development Organization	200443
	African Community Development Concern	200443
	African Youth Development Association	200443
	Agency for Peace & Development	200443
	Agro Pastoral Charity Centre	200443
	Al Ta'awun Social Services	200443
	Alliance Organization Aid	200443
	American Refugee Committee (ARC)	200443
	Bossaso Municipality	200443
	Brothers Relief & Development Organization	200443
	Committee of concerned group	200443
	Community Concern Somalia	200443
	Community Development Initiative	200443
	Danish Refugee Council	200443
	DANKAABA Social Development Organization	200443
	Daryel Poverty Alleviation	200443
	Deegan Relief and Development Organization	200443
	DEH Relief – Somalia	200443
	Dhalmado Mother and Child Development Concern	200443
	Doha Action Group	200443
	Doyale Relief and Development Organization	200443
	DRC–Danish Refugee Council	200443
	El-Berde Primary Health Care Organization	200443
	Finn Church Aid	200443
	Galkayo Vocational Training Centre	200443
	Gardo Women Organizations Network	200443
Gedo Women Development Organization	200443	
General Assistance Volunteers Organization	200443	

Girls Development Association	200443
Hapo Child Organization	200443
Health Poverty Action	200443
Health, Education and Agro-pastoral Liaison	200443
Hidig Relief & Development Organization	200443
Himilo Foundation	200443
Himilo Relief and Development Association	200443
Hiran Community and Development Organization	200443
Hiran Humanitarian Aid & Development Organization	200443
Horn International Relief and Development Organization	200443
Horn of Africa Aid and Development Organization	200443
Horn of Africa Organization for Protection of Environment and Improvement of Livelihoods	200443
Horsed Relief and Development Organization	200443
Humanitarian Action for Relief and Development Organization	200443
Humanitarian Africa Relief Development Organization	200443
Iimaan Relief and Development Organization	200443
Ilsan Women Coalition	200443
Integrated Services for Displaced Population	200443
Intersom Relief & Development Organization	200443
Intersos Humanitarian Aid Organization	200443
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	200443
Isse Voluntary Development Organization	200443
Jumbo Peace & Development Organization	200443
KA AH Relief and Development Organization	200443
Kaashif Development Initiatives	200443
Kaashif Voluntary Organization	200443
Kulmiye Development Organization	200443
Liban Welfare Organization	200443
Mandher Relief and Development Organization	200443
Mercy Corps	200443
Mercy Corps	200443
Mercy USA for Aid and Development	200443
Ministry of Education and Higher Education – Somaliland	200443
Ministry of Education of Puntland	200443
Ministry of Environment, Wild and Tourism – Puntland	200443
Ministry of Health – Puntland	200443
Ministry of Health – Somaliland	200443
Ministry of Interior, Local Government and Rural Development	200443
Muslim Hands	200443
National Organization for Women and Children Development	200443
New Ways Organization	200443
Nomadic Assistant for Peace and Development	200443
Norwegian Church Aid	200443
Norwegian Church Aid	200443
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	200443
Ocean Training and Promotion	200443

Onkod Relief and Development Organization	200443
Organization for Somalis Protection & Development	200443
Physicians for Social Responsibility – Finland	200443
Puntland Development Organization	200443
Puntland Girls' Association	200443
Puntland Highway Authority	200443
Puntland Relief and Development Organization	200443
Puntland Youth and Social Development	200443
Rainwater Association of Somalia	200443
Ras Awad Welfare Association	200443
Relief Action Organization	200443
Relief and Development Committee	200443
Saacid	200443
Sahil Internal Organization	200443
Sanaag Concern Development Organization	200443
Sanaag Development Foundation	200443
Save the Children	200443
Shabelle Relief & Development Organization	200443
Shadeedley Development Organization	200443
Shilaale Rehabilitation and Ecological Concern	200443
Social and Environmental Development Organization	200443
Social Development and Research Association	200443
Social Empowerment Rehabilitation and Development Organization	200443
Social Empowerment Relief and Development Organization	200443
Somali Agro Action Community	200443
Somali Development and Rehabilitation Organization	200443
Somali Humanitarian and Development Organization	200443
Somali Red Crescent Society	200443
Somali Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization	200443
Somali Rural Relief and Development Organization	200443
Somali Society Development Association	200443
Somali Women Association	200443
Somaliland Community Action Network	200443
Somaliland Community Development Organization	200443
Somaliland Youth Salvation Association	200443
SOS-Kinderdorf	200443
Sustainable Livelihoods Development Organization	200443
Swisso Kalmo	200443
Towfiq Umbrella Organizations	200443
Ugbaad Women Association	200443
Wamo Relief and Rehabilitation Services	200443
Wardi Relief and Development Initiatives	200443
Women and Child Care Organization	200443
Women Relief and Development Forum	200443
World Assembly of Muslim Youth	200443
World Vision International (WVI)	200443
Young African Development Action	200443

	Zamzam Foundation	200443
	Total number of partners in 2015	126
2016	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED)	200844
	Action Against Poverty	200844
	Action in Semi-arid Lands	200844
	Action Relief Somalia	200844
	Afgoye Alifow Women Development Organization	200844
	African Community Development Concern	200844
	African Youth Development Association	200844
	Agency for Peace & Development	200844
	Agro Pastoral Charity Centre	200844
	Al Ta'awun Social Services	200844
	Alliance Organization Aid	200844
	Brothers Relief & Development Organization	200844
	Community Concern Somalia	200844
	Community Development Initiative	200844
	Danish Refugee Council	200844
	Deegan Relief and Development Organization	200844
	Deggara Humanitarian Organization	200844
	DEH Relief – Somalia	200844
	Doyale Relief and Development Organization	200844
	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	200844
	El-Berde Primary Health Care Organization	200844
	Food Aid Coordination Agency (FACA)	200844
	Galkayo Vocational Training Centre	200844
	Gedo Women Development Organization	200844
	General Assistance Volunteers Organization	200844
	Hapo Child Organization	200844
	Health Poverty Action	200844
	Health, Education and Agro-pastoral Liaison	200844
	Hidig Relief & Development Organization	200844
	Himilo Foundation	200844
	Himilo Relief and Development Association	200844
	Hiran Community and Development Organization	200844
	Hiran Humanitarian Aid & Development Organization	200844
	Horn International Relief and Development Organization	200844
	Horn of Africa Aid and Development Organization	200844
	Horn of Africa Organization for Protection of Environment and Improvement of Livelihoods	200844
	Horsed Relief and Development Organization	200844
	Integrated Services for Displaced Population	200844
	Intersom Relief & Development Organization	200844
	Intersos Humanitarian Aid Organization	200844
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	200844	
Isse Voluntary Development Organization	200844	
Jumbo Peace & Development Organization	200844	
KAAH Relief and Development Organization	200844	

Kaashif Development Initiatives	200844
Kulmiye Development Organization	200844
Liban Welfare Organization	200844
Mandher Relief and Development Organization	200844
Mercy Corps	200844
Mercy USA for Aid and Development	200844
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Puntland	200844
Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Somaliland	200844
Ministry of Education, Puntland	200844
Ministry of Health, Puntland	200844
Ministry of Health, Somaliland	200844
Ministry of Health, Mogadishu	200844
Muslim Hands	200844
New Ways Organization	200844
Nomadic Assistant for Peace and Development	200844
Norwegian Church Aid	200844
Norwegian Church Aid	200844
Ocean Training and Promotion	200844
Onkod Relief and Development Organization	200844
Organization for Somalis Protection & Development	200844
Puntland Development Organization	200844
Puntland Relief and Development Organization	200844
Puntland Youth and Social Development	200844
Rainwater Association of Somalia	200844
Ras Awad Welfare Association	200844
Relief and Development Committee	200844
Sahil Internal Humanitarian Organization	200844
Sanaag Concern Development Organization	200844
Sanaag Development Foundation	200844
Sanaag Urban and Rural Development Organization	200844
Save the Children	200844
Shabelle Relief & Development Organization	200844
Shadeedley Development Organization	200844
Shilaale Rehabilitation and Ecological Concern	200844
Social and Environmental Development Organization	200844
Social Development and Research Association	200844
Social Empowerment Rehabilitation and Development Organization	200844
Social Empowerment Relief and Development Organization	200844
Somali Agro Action Community	200844
Somali Development and Rehabilitation Organization	200844
Somali Humanitarian and Development Organization	200844
Somali Red Crescent Society	200844
Somali Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization	200844
Somali Rural Relief and Development Organization	200844
Somali Society Development Association	200844
Somali Volunteer for Development and Environmental Care (SVDEC)	200844
Somali Women Association	200844

	Somaliland Association for Youth Salvation	200844
	Somaliland Berde Association	200844
	Somaliland Community Development Organization	200844
	Somaliland Development Trust Organization (SDTO)	200844
	Somaliland People's Development Organization	200844
	Somaliland Social Welfare Community Service Organization (SSWCO)	200844
	Somaliland Youth Salvation Association	200844
	SOS - Kinderdorf	200844
	Swisso Kalmo	200844
	Taakulo Somaliland Community (TASCO)	200844
	Towfiq Umbrella Organizations	200844
	Ugbaad Women Association	200844
	Wamo Relief and Rehabilitation Services	200844
	Wardi Relief and Development Initiatives	200844
	Welfare and Development Organization	200844
	Women and Child Care Organization	200844
	WVI-World Vision International	200844
	Young African Development Action	200844
	Zamzam Foundation	200844
	Total number of partners in 2016	210
2017	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED)	200844
	Action Against Poverty	200844
	Action in Semi-arid Lands	200844
	Action Relief Somalia	200844
	ActionAid International	200844
	Afgoye Alifow Women Development Organization	200844
	African Community Development Concern	200844
	Agency for Peace & Development	200844
	Agro Pastoral Charity Centre	200844
	Al Ta'awun Social Services	200844
	Alliance Organization Aid	200844
	Ayuub NGO	200844
	Brothers Relief & Development Organization	200844
	Community Activity for Development and Relief Organization	200844
	Community Concern Somalia	200844
	Danish Refugee Council	200844
	Daryel Poverty Alleviation	200844
	Deegan Relief and Development Organization	200844
	Deggarras Humanitarian Organization	200844
	DEH Relief - Somalia	200844
	Doyale Relief and Development Organization	200844
	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	200844
	El-Berde Primary Health Care Organization	200844
	Food Aid Coordination Agency (FACA)	200844
	Galkayo Medical Foundation (GMF)	200844
	Galkayo Vocational Training Centre	200844
Gedo Women Development Organization	200844	

General Assistance Volunteers Organization	200844
Health Poverty Action	200844
Health, Education and Agro-pastoral Liaison	200844
Hidig Relief & Development Organization	200844
Himilo Foundation	200844
Himilo Organization for Development	200844
Himilo Relief and Development Association	200844
Hiran Community and Development Organization	200844
Hiran Humanitarian Aid & Development Organization	200844
Horn International Relief and Development Organization	200844
Horn of Africa Aid and Development Organization	200844
Horn of Africa Organization for Protection of Environment and Improvement of Livelihoods	200844
Horsed Relief and Development Organization	200844
Integrated Development Focus	200844
Integrated Services for Displaced Population	200844
Intersom Relief & Development Organization	200844
INTERSOS	200844
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	200844
Isse Voluntary Development Organization	200844
Jumbo Peace & Development Organization	200844
KA AH Relief and Development Organization	200844
Kaashif Development Initiatives	200844
Kulmiye Development Organization	200844
Liban Welfare Organization	200844
Mandher Relief and Development Organization	200844
MEDAIR	200844
Mercy Corps	200844
Mercy USA for Aid and Development	200844
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Puntland	200844
Ministry of Education and Higher Education, Somaliland	200844
Ministry of Education, Puntland	200844
Ministry of Health, Puntland	200844
Ministry of Health, Somaliland	200844
Ministry of Health, Mogadishu	200844
Muslim Hands	200844
New Ways Organization	200844
Nomadic Assistant for Peace and Development	200844
Norwegian Church Aid	200844
Norwegian Church Aid	200844
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	200844
Ocean Training and Promotion	200844
Onkod Relief and Development Organization	200844
Organization for Somalis Protection & Development	200844
Physicians Across Continents	200844
Puntland Development Organization	200844
Puntland Relief and Development Organization	200844

Puntland Youth and Social Development	200844
Rainwater Association of Somalia	200844
Ras Awad Welfare Association	200844
Relief and Development Committee	200844
Sahil Internal Humanitarian Organization	200844
Sanaag Concern Development Organization	200844
Sanaag Development Foundation	200844
Save the Children	200844
Shabelle Relief & Development Organization	200844
Shadeedley Development Organization	200844
Shilaale Rehabilitation and Ecological Concern	200844
Social and Environmental Development Organization	200844
Social Development and Research Association	200844
Social Empowerment Rehabilitation and Development Organization	200844
Social Empowerment Relief and Development Organization	200844
Solidarity Community Development Organization	200844
Somali Advocacy Against Hunger	200844
Somali Agro Action Community	200844
Somali Development and Rehabilitation Organization	200844
Somali Humanitarian and Development Organization	200844
Somali Red Crescent Society	200844
Somali Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization	200844
Somali Rural Relief and Development Organization	200844
Somali Society Development Association	200844
Somali Volunteer for Development and Environmental Care (SVDEC)	200844
Somali Women Association	200844
Somaliland Association for Youth Salvation	200844
Somaliland Berde Association	200844
Somaliland Community Development Organization	200844
Somaliland Development Trust Organization (SDTO)	200844
Somaliland Social Welfare Community Service Organisation (SSWCO)	200844
SOS – Kinderdorf	200844
Swisso Kalmo	200844
Taakulo Somaliland Community (TASCO)	200844
Towfiq Umbrella Organizations	200844
Ugbaad Women Association	200844
Wamo Relief and Rehabilitation Services	200844
Wardi Relief and Development Initiatives	200844
Welfare and Development Organization	200844
Women and Child Care Organization	200844
World Vision International (WVI)	200844
Young African Development Action	200844
Total 2017	115

Annex L: Findings on Nutrition and Health

1. Introduction


1.1 Nutrition and health context in Somalia

1. Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI), 2012 value was very low at 0.285. If internationally comparable data were available, Somalia would probably rank among the lowest in the world, at 165 out of the 170 countries in the 2010 global Human Development Report. Gender inequality is also high at 0.776 out of a value of 1 (which signifies complete inequality).³¹

2. Years of war and armed conflict in Somalia have led to the destruction of social services, especially health facilities. This, coupled with a high level of insecurity and drought, has resulted in population displacements. The poor level of health coverage in most parts, the high cost of providing health care delivery services in insecure areas, and the weak capacity of local authorities have led to unprecedented levels of morbidity and mortality.

3. World Bank data suggest that in 2015, 68.4 percent of all deaths in Somalia were due to communicable diseases and maternal pre-natal and nutrition conditions. In addition, the under 5 mortality rate in 2015 was 136.8 deaths per 1000 live births, with male children having a higher mortality rate than female children.³²

Figure 2: Global acute malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) prevalence in Somalia 2013–2017



Source: FSNAU nutrition data 2013–2017.


4. Figure 2 shows the deteriorating nutrition situation through to the 2017 *Gu* season, with GAM and SAM rates above the emergency threshold. The improvements in GAM following the famine in 2011 in parts of Somalia were quickly reversed when severe drought exacerbated by El Niño conditions hit parts of Puntland and Somaliland in 2016, affecting hundreds of thousands of people.

³¹ UNDP, 2012, Somalia Human Development Report

³² <https://data.worldbank.org/>

5. The rate of GAM and SAM are consistently higher in the south-central area of the country with the north-west regularly having the lowest GAM rates when compared to the other areas. The median rates of acute malnutrition are consistently classified as critical in the south-west (> 15 percent), serious (10– 14 percent) in the north-east and poor (5–9 percent) in the north-west.³³ Similarly, GAM rates among the IDP populations in Somalia were above the emergency threshold in many caseloads as can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Trends in GAM rates among IDP populations in Somalia 2013–2017



Source: FSNAU nutrition data 2013–2017.

6. However, Figure 3 also demonstrates that by the 2017/2018 *Deyr* season, malnutrition rates had declined significantly among the IDP population. WFP mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) screening data also suggests a decline in the number of malnourished children under 5 years of age since the *Gu* season survey, as demonstrated in Figure 4. However, food security needs are nearly double the five-year average in Somalia, with an estimated 2,444,000 people currently in crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 866,000 in emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁴ This coupled with projections of a poor *Gu* season³⁵ in April/May 2018 suggests that the situation remains precarious into 2018 despite the improved malnutrition rates.

7. In general, Somalia is characterized by low levels of chronic malnutrition, with most population groups having reported low (< 20 percent) prevalence of stunting. Thus, stunting is not a public health problem in Somalia.³⁶ However, there are exceptions, such as in 2016 when it was reported that Baidoa and Kismayo IDP camps and Bay Agro-pastoral rural livelihood zone in southern Somalia reported a high (> 30–39 percent) prevalence of stunting.³⁷

³³ WHO, 2003, The Management of Nutrition in Major Emergencies.

³⁴ <http://www.fsnau.org/downloads/FSNAU-FEWSNET-SOMALIA-Food-Security-Outlook-October-2017.pdf>.


³⁵ FSNAU, FewsNet, 2017, Somalia Food Security Outlook October 2017-May 2018.

³⁶ WHO has the following classification for the severity of stunting < 20 percent H/A Z-score < -2 is low severity, 20-29 percent H/A Z-score < -2 is medium severity, 30-39 percent H/A Z-score < -2 is High severity, ≥40 percent H/A Z-score < -2 is very high severity.

³⁷ FSNAU, 2016, Technical Series Report No. VII 70 Issued 21 December 21.

8. The causes of malnutrition in Somalia are complex. A trend analysis suggested that while at the macro level (that is at country level) food insecurity and GAM rates are aligned, the epicentre of the food-security crisis and that of nutrition do not match.³⁸ This suggest that food insecurity alone may not be the cause of high GAM rates.

Figure 4: GAM rates of children 6–59 months screened using MUAC 2017



Source: WFP CO MUAC screening data.

9. Both acute and chronic malnutrition are observed more frequently for boys than for girls. A survey conducted in 2016 by the FSNAU reported that both the youngest (6–17 months) and oldest (54–59 months) children in the survey sample were more malnourished than the rest of the children in the remaining age groups. This was also found for moderate acute malnutrition prevalence where malnutrition was disproportionately higher for those two groups than the other age bands analysed.³⁹

10. Recent nutrition causal analysis has confirmed that “as well as insecurity, climatic and seasonal factors and notable poverty, dominant child care practices and select socio-cultural beliefs remain core drivers of malnutrition in south-central Somalia.”⁴⁰ In addition, in all communities studied, weak infant and child feeding care practices combined with poor hygiene, lack of basic health and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities and women’s excessive workloads had a major impact on nutrition status.⁴¹

11. The research also found that “dominant socio-cultural beliefs and related social norms including dietary taboos and, in some communities, young marriage and child bearing ages for girls, FGM and the growing phenomenon of female-headed households in many areas widely impact adversely on the health, well-being and nutritional status of the communities studied.”

12. The prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies in Somalia is high. A 2009 survey⁴² found that:

- The average prevalence of anaemia was 59.3 percent (54.8–63.6) and a serious public health concern.
- Overall, vitamin A deficiency in the 6–50 months age group was 33.3 percent, with all strata showing values exceeding the World Health Organization (WHO) threshold of above 20 percent which classifies the prevalence of vitamin A deficiency as severe.

13. Higher morbidity patterns are noticed in central and southern zones when compared to the north-eastern zone of Somalia. In addition, IDP settlements in the north-east and south-central

³⁸ WFP, 2012 Trend Analysis of Food and Nutrition Insecurity in Somalia (2007–2012).

³⁹ FSNAU, 2016, Technical Series Report No. VII 70 Issued 21 December 2016.

⁴⁰ SNS, 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis, South and Central Somalia.

⁴¹ SNS, 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis, South and Central Somalia.

⁴² FSNAU, 2009, National Micronutrient and Anthropometric Nutrition Survey, Somalia.

zones have significant morbidity incidence when compared to IDP settlements located in the north-west zone.⁴³

14. According to the Gu 2016 survey results, all rural livelihood zones and IDP settlements in Somalia reported low measles vaccination below the recommended Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response standards of 90 percent. Similarly, coverage for vitamin A supplementation was below the sphere standards recommendation (> 95 percent), in all surveyed livelihoods⁴⁴

15. Somalia is also one of the acute watery diarrhoea/cholera-endemic countries in the world. Recently, during the period when the Gu 2016 assessment was carried out, outbreaks of acute watery diarrhoea, cholera and measles affected most parts of southern Somalia.⁴⁵

16. In 2007, a HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections sero-surveillance survey was conducted by WHO in Somalia and showed an HIV prevalence rate of 0.9 percent among antenatal care attendants. More recent World Bank data suggests a decline in prevalence to 0.4 percent in 2016. HIV and AIDS are considered as a low concentration epidemic in north-east and south-central Somalia.⁴⁶ The women's share of the population living with HIV was reported as 51.39 percent in 2016.⁴⁷ Pervasive HIV-related stigma deters many Somali women from being tested for HIV.⁴⁸

17. The coverage of anti-retroviral therapy (ART) in Somalia is estimated at 11 percent by the World Bank.⁴⁹ The 2007 WHO survey also confirmed a prevalence rate of HIV/tuberculosis (TB) co-infection of 4.5 percent among newly confirmed tuberculosis patients. The incidence of tuberculosis in Somalia is 270 per 100,000 people.⁵⁰

18. Somalia has a complex political, security and development environment, and much of its recent history has been marked by poverty, famine and recurring violence. In 2012 permanent political institutions were established. After decades of conflict and instability, a federal government was established, built through national dialogue and consensus. These efforts were supported by the international community through the Somali Compact.⁵¹

19. Somaliland, having declared independence in 1991 and set up its own institutions, developed a Somaliland National Development Plan 2012–2016. The plan had as one of its strategic objectives under the Social Pillar “the improvement of maternal health and child nutrition.”⁵²

20. The Somaliland Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013–2016 promoted access to the essential package of health services (EPHS)⁵³ and, where these are not available, to implement basic health and nutrition interventions. In addition, the health sector plan specifies an objective to improve health and nutrition for women children and adolescents by 2016.⁵⁴

⁴³ FSNAU, 2016, Technical Series Report No. VII 70 Issued 21 December 2016.

⁴⁴ FSNAU, 2016, Technical Series Report No. VII 70 Issued 21 December 2016.

⁴⁵ FSNAU, 2016, Technical Series Report No. VII 70 Issued 21 December 2016.

⁴⁶ WHO, 2010, Country Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014.

⁴⁷ <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

⁴⁸ SOLNAC, SCC and PC, 2013, Somali HIV Epidemic and Response.

⁴⁹ <https://data.worldbank.org/>.

⁵⁰ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD?locations=SO>.

⁵¹ Federal Somali Government, 2013, The Somali Compact.

⁵² Republic of Somaliland, 2011, Somaliland National Development Plan 2012-2016.

⁵³ Main aim is to improve maternal, reproductive, and neonatal and child health; combat communicable disease; improve surveillance and control, including water and sanitation promotion; provide first-aid and care of critically ill and injured; treatment of common illnesses and HIV, sexually transmitted infections, and tuberculosis.

⁵⁴ Republic of Somaliland, 2012, Somaliland Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013-2016.

21. Puntland's second five-year development plan⁵⁵ recognized the importance of health, and states, "A healthy population contributes to economic development through increased productivity and lengthened working life." The plan also addressed HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue. The plan identified several key strategies to reach its goals among them the Puntland infant and young child feeding (IYCF) strategy 2012–2016.

22. The Puntland IYCF Strategy promoted i) early initiation and exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months to achieve optimum growth, development and good health ii) age-appropriate complementary feeding, with safe and nutritionally adequate foods, starting at six months while continuing to breastfeed up to two years and beyond iii) appropriate feeding of a sick child.⁵⁶

23. More recently the FGS produced a National Development Plan 2017–2019⁵⁷ which specifically aims to:

- reduce maternal, neonatal and child mortalities and improve quality of life through improved access to essential health services of acceptable quality and through prevention and control of communicable and non-communicable diseases; and
- improve the nutritional status and increase access to and utilization of quality and integrated essential nutrition services for improved survival and development of Somali people with a focus of women, children and other vulnerable communities, among other objectives.

24. In 2014 the three health authorities (FGS, Somaliland and Puntland) agreed the harmonization of their collaboration with development partners through the Somali Health Policy: Prioritization of Health Policy Actions in the Somali Health Sector, 2014. One of priorities agreed upon was "improving access to essential health services of acceptable quality through implementation of EPHS, producing the desired health outcomes in terms of reducing maternal, neonatal and child mortalities, decreasing the rates of undernutrition, controlling prevalent communicable and non-communicable diseases and improving the quality of life."⁵⁸

25. In 2014, the Government of Somalia joined SUN. SUN is a global movement which unites government, civil society, businesses and citizens in a worldwide effort to end undernutrition.

26. The United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011–2015 had three objectives, these were:

- social services: Somali people have equitable access to basic services;
- poverty reduction and livelihoods: Somali people benefit from poverty reduction through improved livelihoods, decent work, equitable and sustainable economic development;
- good governance and human security: Somali people live in a stable environment where the rule of law is respected and rights-based development for everyone is pursued.

27. Objective one explicitly refers to nutrition and includes a reference to vulnerable people, including women and children, receiving humanitarian assistance. WFP is given the responsibility to address child malnutrition, specifically supplementary feeding and food security alongside UNICEF which addresses the treatment of SAM.

28. In 2011, WHO, WFP, UNICEF and FSNAU/FAO developed the Somali Nutrition Strategy 2011–2013, towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The strategy aimed to improve nutritional status in Somalia resulting in improved health, growth and development.

⁵⁵ Puntland State of Somalia, 2013, Puntland Second Five Year Development Plan 2014–2018.

⁵⁶ Puntland MoH, 2012, Puntland Infant and Young Child Feeding Strategy 2012–2016.

⁵⁷ FGS, 2016, National Development Plan for Somalia 2017–2019.

⁵⁸ FGS, 2014, Somali Health Policy: Prioritisation of Health Policy Actions in the Somali Health Sector.

29. From 2010 to 2013 the EPHS was rolled out in Somaliland, Puntland and south-central Somalia by a consortium of partners, Health Consortium for the Somali People, supporting the Ministries of Health (MoHs) with DFID funding.

30. The Somali Joint Health and Nutrition Programme is a United Nations-led (WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA) programme overseen by the MoH of the governments of Somaliland, Puntland and the Somali Federal Government together with a steering committee chaired by the United Nations Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator.

31. The Joint Resilience Strategy (JRS) and JRP between FAO, UNICEF and WFP recognized that nutrition was integral to resilience in Somalia, both as necessary to achieve resilience, and as an excellent measurement of resilience levels achieved and maintained.⁵⁹

32. Somalia emerged from a declared famine⁶⁰ in February 2012. However, over the portfolio period many consolidated appeals (CAP) and humanitarian response plans (HRP) were released incorporating the work of the sectoral clusters including the Food Security, Nutrition and Health Clusters.

33. The UNOCHA, launched the CAP 2013–2015, which had the following four-pronged strategy:

- ensure equal and integrated life-saving assistance to malnourished children and people living in humanitarian emergency and crisis to reduce mortality and destitution;
- contribute to improving the quality, reliability, responsiveness, and accessibility of basic services, and promote predictable safety-net programming, thereby meeting the humanitarian needs of vulnerable people and strengthening their resilience to shocks;
- invest in household and community resilience through increased access to durable solutions that address livelihood vulnerability, including displacement and climate change – and result in a return to stable and sustainable livelihoods; and
- strengthen the capacity and coordination of NGOs, affected communities, and local, regional and national-level authorities to prevent and mitigate risks and implement effective emergency preparedness and response.

34. The 2014 Strategic Response Plan produced by UNOCHA also in support of clusters had four priorities including i) acute and chronic food insecurity and high levels of acute malnutrition; ii) inadequate and poor quality basic services. Among the key actions to be undertaken was preventive, curative and promotive nutritional support services to acutely malnourished children (0–59 months) and PLW, women of reproductive age through quality access to a basic nutrition services package (BNSP).

35. In 2015, the HRP identified key humanitarian needs as i) acute food and livelihood insecurity; ii) GAM levels are above the emergency threshold, particularly among IDPs. lii) critical lack of health, water, sanitation and hygiene services are contributing to high levels of morbidity and mortality; iv) lack of access to schools; and v) lack of protection of civilians, particularly for over 1.1 million protracted IDPs who continue to face violations and forced evictions, and need durable solutions.⁶¹

36. By 2017, the Operational Plan for Pre-famine Scale up was stating that famine was a “strong possibility” for 2017 if no action was taken. Nutrition Cluster partners planned to provide life-saving nutrition interventions by establishing additional mobile clinics, fixed nutrition sites and

⁵⁹ Unauthored, From Somalia Joint Resilience Strategy 2013–2015 to the Joint Resilience Programme 2017–2021.

⁶⁰ Famine was declared in July 2011 in parts of Somalia.

⁶¹ UNOCHA, 2015, Humanitarian Response Plan 2015.

outreach clinics to treat and prevent severe and moderate acute malnutrition in children age 6–59 months and PLW. Partners also planned to provide preventive interventions, such as blanket supplementary feeding, mother and child health and nutrition (MCHN), a basic nutrition service package and micronutrient supplementation, all targeting PLW and children under 6–59 months of age.⁶²

1.2. WFP's nutrition and health portfolio in Somalia

37. The evaluation covers the period 2012 to mid-2017. During this period WFP implemented three projects, EMOP 200281 (July 2011–Dec. 2012), PRRO 200443 (January 2013–December 2015) and PRRO 200801 (Jan. 2106–Dec. 2018). Eight SOPs were also implemented in support of the projects and the wider humanitarian community in Somalia.

38. Over the portfolio period, WFP has been the co-lead of the FSC and lead of the Logistics Cluster. It is an active member of the Nutrition Cluster providing the deputy cluster lead. In addition, WFP is a representative of the United Nations on the Health Sector Committee and is a member of the Joint United Nations Team on AIDS.⁶³

39. EMOP 200281 started in July of 2011 in response to the declaration of famine in parts of Somalia.⁶⁴ The main pillars of the EMOP were GFA and nutrition programmes providing support to households living in emergencies.⁶⁵ Following a large-scale humanitarian response the FSNAU and the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSnet) declared an end to the famine in February 2012. EMOP 200281 continued to be implemented throughout 2012.

40. Through EMOP 200281, WFP implemented a TSFP and a BSFP in areas of lower food and nutrition vulnerability (Somaliland and Puntland) as well as support to institutions treating HIV and TB through ART and directly observed treatment, short course (DOTS), respectively, among other interventions.

41. EMOP 200281 proposed a strategic shift from the previous operation. TSFP family rations and food for work (FFW) schemes were prioritized to meet relief needs. That is TSFP was used by WFP to target its relief interventions. GFA would continue to be used during acute emergencies when other options are not possible due to time or access constraints.

42. PRRO 200443 activities built on WFP's existing nutrition programmes in EMOP 200281. Again, the aim was "to treat and prevent moderate malnutrition, to address micronutrient deficiencies in target groups and ensure that other activities are sensitive to nutrition issues."⁶⁶

43. Through PRRO 200443, WFP planned, in a strategic shift, to use static and mobile sites and outreach workers to extend coverage of the TSFP. The programme was implemented in all operational areas with a focus on the south and central regions.⁶⁷ TSFP targeted moderately malnourished children under the age of five years and PLW for treatment.

44. WFP's approach to the prevention of moderate acute malnutrition was area specific and flexible, taking greater account of seasonality. It consisted of:

- seasonal⁶⁸ BSFP implemented where there were seasonal variations in GAM (GAM) and little access to health services. These efforts focused on IDP settlements and vulnerable rural

⁶² UNOCHA, 2017, Operational Plan for famine Prevention.

⁶³ WFP, 2012, Project Document Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200443.

⁶⁴ WFP, 2012, Project Document Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200443.

⁶⁵ WFP, 2012, Standard Project Report EMOP 200281.

⁶⁶ WFP, 2012, Project Document Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200443.

⁶⁷ WFP, 2012, Project Document Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200443.

⁶⁸ Somalia has 2 rainy seasons (Gu and Deyr) and 2 lean seasons where malnutrition rates tend to fluctuate.

areas to prevent deterioration of nutrition status; and

- the integration of preventive food-based nutrition services into antenatal and postnatal care to prevent malnutrition and increase the use of health services during the first 1,000 days of life. These efforts were focused in Somaliland and Puntland where MCHN clinics are functioning and GAM prevalence is stable, though requiring intervention.⁶⁹

45. In addition, a one-off incentive ration was to be given to mothers for giving birth under medical supervision to promote healthy pregnancies and deliveries.

46. MCHN was also launched in Mogadishu in the last quarter of 2015. WFP targeted the clinics that are rolling out the EPHS, which is the government platform for offering integrated health and nutrition services. WFP also introduced a restricted cash-based transfer (e-voucher) component for PLW in Mogadishu, complementary to the regular entitlement in the MCHN programme, with the aim of diversifying their households' diets.

47. Through PRRO 200443 there were three categories of beneficiaries for institutional feeding. These were:

- malnourished clients receiving ART or TB-DOTS treatment;
- clients receiving ART or TB-DOTS treatment; and
- households that had members in the treatment ART or TB-DOTS programme.

48. Following the end of PRRO 200443, WFP began implementation of PRRO 200844 in 2016 for a period of 3 years. The stated objectives of PRRO 200844 are to:

- "stabilize and reduce the prevalence of global acute malnutrition and disparities between boys and girls under 5; provide life-saving assistance to people in the IPC "crisis" and "emergency" phases; and protect populations at risk of acute food insecurity resulting from shocks, through predictable and reliable safety-net programmes (Strategic Objective 1)⁷⁰;
- "address the causes of acute malnutrition with integrated preventive programmes for children under two and PLW – contributing to Zero Hunger Challenge Objective 1 – and stabilize seasonally vulnerable households by focusing on resilience (Strategic Objective 2)"; and
- "enhance the food security and productivity of households in the IPC "stressed" phase, through investments in food production and sustainable income generation (Strategic Objective 3)⁷¹.

49. WFP also expanded its clinic-based approach to MCHN wherever access and infrastructure allowed, aiming to prevent chronic and acute malnutrition through the first 1,000 days of life. In addition, WFP continued to provide incentives for pregnant women to give birth to their babies in health centres.⁷²

50. WFP flexible approach to providing nutrition services meant that where access, livelihood systems, insecurity or partner capacity limit MCHN services then WFP would treat moderately acutely malnourished children through:

- Curative TSFP for children aged 6–59 months and PLW
- Seasonal preventive BSFP to reduce the risk of children under 3 and PLW becoming acutely

⁶⁹ WFP, 2012, Project Document Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200443.

⁷⁰ Strategic objectives here refer to the 2014-2017 Corporate Strategy of WFP).

⁷¹ WFP, 2016, PRRO 200844 Project Document.

⁷² WFP, 2016, PRRO 200844 Project Document.

malnourished

51. Through BR 1 of PRRO 200844, WFP planned to introduce cash-based supplementary transfers to PLW through an e-voucher to be redeemed with local traders for food commodities. WFP planned to provide 18,650 PLW with a cash transfer and actually provided 33,726 with a cash transfer⁷³. WFP expanded the e-vegetable programme, which has been providing complementary CBTs to PLWs attending maternal and child health clinics in Mogadishu since 2015, to Puntland. Value vouchers enabled PLWs to access fresh vegetables and fruits from local markets.

52. Through PRRO 200844, WFP also intended to work with partners to address the underlying causes of malnutrition based on the nutrition causal analysis undertaken in 2015.⁷⁴ It tackled the livelihood-related causes of malnutrition in girls and boys with targeted communications on behaviour change for men and women on childcare.

53. WFP reduced its focus on institutional feeding in PRRO200844. However, it continued to support malnourished HIV and TB patients in treatment facilities, while they adhered to existing protocols.

2. Evaluation findings

2.1. Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning

2.1.1 What has been the context for aid delivery

54. The portfolio period under evaluation (2012 to mid-2017) is covered by three WFP corporate strategic plans, the 2008–2013, 2014–2017 and the 2017–2021 strategic plans. All three of which emphasize WFP's mandate in addressing malnutrition.

55. WFP Somalia's activities in nutrition are aligned with strategic objectives 1 to 4 of WFP's corporate strategic plans for 2008–2013 and 2014–2017, by addressing nutrition needs in emergencies, preventing malnutrition and chronic malnutrition as well as addressing nutritional needs in fragile or conflict settings.

56. WFP's Strategic Plan 2017–2021 considers the transition from the MDGs⁷⁵ to the 2030 agenda as described in the SDGs.⁷⁶ WFP's portfolio in Somalia addressed strategic objectives 1 to 5 of the 2017–2021 Strategic Plan, with the latter part of the portfolio focusing more on capacity building and knowledge sharing.

57. The portfolio period under evaluation was also covered by two WFP nutrition policies. The 2012 nutrition policy⁷⁷ covers most of the period under evaluation. It was replaced by the 2017 nutrition policy⁷⁸ in February of that year.

Table 4: Comparison of WFP 2012 nutrition policy with WFP Somalia's nutrition activities 2012–2017

Policy objective	Activities in the Somalia country portfolio
Treating moderate acute malnutrition – wasting;	TSFP targeting children 6–59 months and malnourished PLW, including social and behavioural change communication (SBCC)
Preventing acute malnutrition – wasting	Seasonal BSFP targeting children aged 6–36 months and PLW, including SBCC

⁷³ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report PRRO 200844.

⁷⁴ SNS, 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis.

⁷⁵ UNDP, 2015, The Millennium Development Goals.

⁷⁶ <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html>.

⁷⁷ WFP, 2012, Nutrition Policy.

⁷⁸ WFP, 2017, Nutrition Policy.

Preventing chronic malnutrition – stunting	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition targeting children aged 6–23 months and PLW
Addressing micronutrient deficiencies among vulnerable people, to reduce mortality and improve the health of all groups, through fortification	Supplementary foods, Plumpy'Sup, Plumpy'Doz, Superereal have required daily micronutrients, including SBCC
Strengthening the focus on nutrition in programmes without a primary nutrition objective and, where possible, linking vulnerable groups to these programmes	Examples of behavioural change communication linked to school feeding with ADRA and plans to link SBCC with farmer field schools run by FAO

Sources: WFP, 2012 Nutrition Policy, WFP, 2012–2016, Standard Project Reports EMOP 200281, PRRO 200443, PRRO 200844

58. Table 4 describes the objectives of WFP's 2012 nutrition policy and the activities undertaken by the CO to address them and demonstrates a good alignment between the CO Nutrition activities and the 2012 nutrition policy.

59. The nutrition policy 2017 is an extension of the 2012 nutrition policy, with a continued focus on treatment of acute malnutrition and prevention of malnutrition and a greater emphasis on nutrition-sensitive approaches. It continues to recognize that good nutrition is important throughout the life cycle and particularly in the first 1,000 days from conception to 2 years of age⁷⁹ and builds on the evidence base for nutrition-specific interventions⁸⁰ particularly those that prevent malnutrition. WFP's nutrition activities in Somalia are in line with these, however greater emphasis on nutrition-sensitive programming is required.

60. The JRP, supporting livelihood interventions, planned to include nutrition-sensitive activities, however the lack of progress due to the focus on emergency interventions meant this opportunity was not taken up. Key informants provided examples of ongoing efforts to undertake nutrition-sensitive activities. These included the provision of health and nutrition education in schools by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) as well as WFP and FAO efforts to link health and nutrition education to farmer field schools. However, while the potential for expanding nutrition-sensitive activities exists, these opportunities were not taken up during the portfolio period because of the need to prioritize the emergency response in 2017.

61. WFP's HIV and AIDS policy, 2010, has two main objectives:

- ensuring nutritional recovery and treatment success through the provision of nutrition and/or food support; and
- mitigating the effects of AIDS on individuals and households through sustainable safety nets.

62. At the start of the portfolio, WFP Somalia addressed both these objectives by providing nutrition and food assistance support to HIV and TB patients and their households. Continued financial constraints have gradually resulted in a decline in the number of patients receiving nutrition support and more recently the stopping of rations to households with ART and TB-DOTS patients. The evaluation team is unclear on what basis the discontinuation of support to households was made, but this does not follow corporate policy as it currently stands.

⁷⁹ WFP, 2017, Nutrition Policy.

⁸⁰ Bhutta Z, et al 2013. Evidence-based interventions for improvement of maternal and child nutrition: what can be done and at what cost? The Lancet, 382: 452–477.

2.1.2 To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

63. Given the high rates of GAM throughout the portfolio period and the chronic nature of the humanitarian situation WFP's objectives have appropriately tried to address the humanitarian situation through TSFP and BSFP while targeting PLW and children aged 6–23 months through MCHN to break the intergenerational cycle of malnutrition to address chronic malnutrition. However, in locations where WFP no longer provides an incentive for pregnant women to attend health centres for safe delivery e.g. urban areas of Somaliland, an opportunity to include adolescent girls⁸¹, given their importance as a target group in breaking the intergenerational cycle in Somalia, may be lost.

64. Efforts to integrate services with UNICEF and consolidate WFP services in MCHN structures where available, coupled with capacity-building efforts with the different MoH's, point to a change in strategy that enables a more sustainable approach to nutrition service provision.

65. WFP recognizes that the causes of malnutrition in Somalia are not only food insecurity but compounded by several factors, such as a poor health environment (including access to health services) and weak social and care practices (rendering children vulnerable to malnutrition). WFP's activities in SBCC, addressing subjects such as complementary feeding, breast feeding, health and hygiene promotion, aim to tackle the underlying causes of malnutrition. However, as noted later in the report, WFP continues to mainly reach women with these messages.

66. WFP was able to adapt flexibly to the changing context. Following improvements in the GAM rates in Somalia, after the 2011 famine, the situation started to deteriorate again in 2016. Severe drought, exacerbated by El Niño conditions, hit parts of Puntland and Somaliland, affecting hundreds of thousands of people and may have been the drivers behind increases in GAM rates. The most urgent needs reported at the time included access to water, food, cash relief, emergency livelihood support, nutrition and health services to reduce morbidity and mortality. Key informants reported that WFP was at the forefront of advocacy efforts to raise awareness and funding to respond to the crisis through the operational plan for famine prevention, 2017.

67. A further example of WFP's ability to respond to the changing environment was the cholera outbreak in 2017. At the height of the food crisis there was a cholera outbreak in Somalia. By June 2017, 21 regions in Somalia reported cases with 13 of those reporting a case-fatality rate above 1 percent. Cholera patients in the areas of the outbreak, in Dolow, Luuq, Kismayo and Baidoa, totalling 1773, received a three-month entitlement from WFP. The entitlement was based on the minimum expenditure basket (MEB), between USD 57 and 86 per month per household, depending on the location. In total USD 378,000 was transferred to cholera patients.⁸²

2.1.3 To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

68. The political environment in Somalia is complex. WFP like other humanitarian organizations relates to three authorities, the FGS, Somaliland and Puntland Governments. Despite this, WFP's objectives were coherent with the governments' stated policies and plans.

69. For example, in 2011 Somaliland, having declared independence in 1991 and set up its' own institutions, developed a Somaliland National Development Plan 2012–2016. The plan has as one of its strategic objectives under the Social Pillar "the improvement of maternal health and child nutrition."⁸³ The plan also goes on to declare a need to combat infectious diseases such as malaria,

⁸¹ Given the relatively common practice of early marriages the safe delivery incentive gives an opportunity for WFP to address the needs of adolescent girls, particularly as the take-home ration from schools is no longer being provided.

⁸² CO data.

⁸³ Republic of Somaliland, 2011, Somaliland National Development Plan 2012–2016.

TB and HIV.”⁸⁴ WFP’s activities throughout the portfolio targeted maternal and child health and nutrition through BSFP, TSFP and MCHN with rations provided to PLW and children under 5 years of age.

70. WFP’s nutrition treatment and prevention interventions are also well aligned with the Joint Health and Nutrition Programme EPHS.⁸⁵ It addressed the key determinants of acute malnutrition and stunting promoting community-based behavioural change through an effective package of health- and nutrition-specific preventive actions that were in line with the EPHS and the National IYCF strategy.⁸⁶ Key informants from government authorities also suggested that nutrition without WFP inputs would be weak in Somalia.

71. The Somaliland Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013–2016 promoted access to the EPHS and, where these are not available, to implement basic health and nutrition interventions. In addition, the health sector plan specified an objective to improve health and nutrition for women, children and adolescents by 2016.⁸⁷

72. Over the portfolio period, WFP increased programme coverage through a combination of teams operating in government health facilities to treat cases of malnutrition, and mobile teams delivering nutrition services at the community level. This approach was further strengthened by aligning WFP interventions with the BNSP – a government strategy that integrates nutrition with hygiene promotion and soap distribution, micronutrient supplementation, home-based treatment of diarrhoea and de-worming.

73. Therefore, WFP’s activities in nutrition that target malnourished children and PLW, as well as its preventive actions through BSFP and MCHN, were well aligned with the Somaliland National Development Plan 2012–2016 and the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013–2016, and follow the approach detailed in the Somali Management of Acute Malnutrition Guidelines of 2010. WFP’s activities in institutional feeding for ART and TB-DOTS are also well aligned with Somaliland policies.

74. Puntland’s second five-year development plan⁸⁸ recognized the importance of health and addressed HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue. The plan identifies several key strategies to reach its goals, among them the Puntland IYCF Strategy 2012–2016. Once again WFP’s objectives and activities were well aligned with the Government of Puntland’s plans and strategies as Table 5 demonstrates.

Table 5: Puntland IYCF Strategy and WFP complementary activities 2012–2017

IYCF area	WFP activity
Early initiation and exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months to achieve optimum growth, development and good health	Behavioural change communication – promoting exclusive breastfeeding
Age-appropriate complementary feeding, with safe and nutritionally adequate foods, starting at six months while continuing to breastfeed up to two years and beyond	Behavioural change communication – promoting complimentary feeding. Blanket supplementary feeding and maternal and child health and nutrition
Appropriate feeding of the sick child	TSFP

⁸⁴ Republic of Somaliland, 2011, Somaliland National Development Plan 2012–2016.

⁸⁵ WFP, 2015, Operational Evaluation of PRRO 200443.

⁸⁶ WFP, 2015, Operational Evaluation of PRRO 200443.

⁸⁷ Republic of Somaliland, 2012, Somaliland Health Sector Strategic Plan 2013–2016.

⁸⁸ Puntland State of Somalia, 2013, Puntland Second Five Year Development Plan 2014–2018.

75. WFP's support to PLW through TSFP and preventive actions through BSFP and MCHN as well as the targeting of children aged 6–59 months with nutrition activities shows that its efforts are well aligned with the specific aims of FGS National Development Plan 2017–2019.⁸⁹ These include reducing maternal, neonatal and child mortalities, improving the nutritional status and increasing access to and use of quality and integrated essential nutrition services for improved survival and development of Somali people.

76. Key informants noted that government capacity was weak and that many of the plans and policies developed, while owned by the government, were done through the support of United Nations and other partners including WFP, hence alignment was always highly likely.

77. The Government of Somalia was supported in SUN by WFP and UNICEF, who led the United Nations SUN network in Somalia. WFP participated in the SUN global movement, in coordination with the government's SUN focal point. This, coupled with WFP's regular participation in the quarterly sub-national cluster coordination and information sharing meetings, provided a good advocacy platform and enabled the alignment of WFP programmes through shared goals such as stunting reduction.⁹⁰

2.1.3 To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

78. The United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011–2015 had three objectives. The first objective explicitly refers to nutrition and includes a reference to vulnerable people, including women and children, receiving humanitarian assistance. WFP is given the responsibility to address child malnutrition, specifically supplementary feeding and food security, alongside UNICEF, which addresses the treatment of SAM.⁹¹

79. WFP and UNICEF articulate their distinct roles in addressing malnutrition in the document, Areas of Technical Cooperation between the World Food Programme and UNICEF, 2011. WFP has the responsibility for supplementary feeding and UNICEF has the responsibility for addressing SAM. The respective roles of WFP and UNICEF require a close working relationship to have a coordinated concerted effort for the management of acute malnutrition (including appropriate geographical coverage of services, a screening and referral system, and tracing of defaulters). Key informants have stated that while in the past there was not a very good working relationship, now there is a very good working relationship between UNICEF and WFP, which emanates from the senior management at the country level of both organizations.

80. Evidence of a close working relationship and complementarity includes collaboration on the newly revised National Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition Guidelines, post the 2017 crisis work to rationalize outpatient therapeutic programme (OTP) and moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) services, as well as efforts to harmonize the curricula of the respective organizations' community workers.

81. The JRS and JRP between FAO, UNICEF and WFP recognized that nutrition was integral to resilience in Somalia; it was necessary both to achieve resilience and as an excellent measurement of resilience levels achieved and maintained.⁹² This effort at complementarity was less successful because of the need to focus on the emergency in 2016/2017, which meant that the programme was not implemented at scale. The JRP highlights nutrition activities, such as TSFP and BSFP, as a

⁸⁹ FGS, 2016, National Development Plan for Somalia 2017–2019.

⁹⁰ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

⁹¹ United Nations, 2010, The United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy 2011–2015.

⁹² Unauthored, From Somalia Joint Resilience Strategy 2013–15 to the Joint Resilience Programme 2017–2021.

safety net. While this is understandable for BSFP, a preventive activity, it is less so for TSFP, which treats already malnourished children.

82. More recently WFP and UNICEF have submitted a joint proposal for funding to the Government of Germany. The proposed Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Development Bank) and German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) funded collaboration between UNICEF and WFP. This was embedded within the JRP and ensures a multisectoral approach to addressing malnutrition through health, nutrition and WASH interventions, to strengthen community resilience in overcoming recurrent shocks and crises.⁹³

83. Throughout the portfolio period the humanitarian situation fluctuated but remained serious and WFP played a key role in addressing the objectives of the wider humanitarian community as described in CAP 2013–2015, the strategic response plans of 2014–2016 and through the provision of GFA and nutrition services.

2.1.4 To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

84. WFP's clear added value is its widespread presence throughout Somalia. This coupled with its expertise in supply-chain management places it at the centre of MAM treatment and prevention efforts in Somalia. WFP's network of CP's plays a key role in WFP's reach.

85. WFP expanded on an umbrella agreement entered into with World Vision to further streamline the operation and by the end of 2015 signed Letters of Intent with three main international partners (World Vision International, DRC and Save the Children) covering different aspects of implementation, such as nutrition, livelihoods, returnees and capacity development for local partners.⁹⁴

86. Also in 2015, WFP changed its partnership approach for the HIV/TB care and treatment activities. Instead of dealing directly with smaller partners, WFP entered into a partnership with World Vision International, which has a large coverage of health facilities. Despite this, the lack of resources has limited the impact of the partnership.

87. WFP continued to pursue innovative partnerships. For example, in 2015 WFP and World Vision International partnered to pilot a community nutrition workers (CNW) mobile data project to monitor the nutrition status of children less than 5 years of age in selected World Vision TSFP centres in Hargeisa. The CNWs screened children and used mobile phones as data-collection tools to transmit the data for analysis.⁹⁵ More recently WFP is considering the piloting of mother-led MUAC screening.

88. WFP also worked closely with the authorities in Somalia. Its focus was on strengthening coordination with the MoH based on a Letters of Understanding (LoU) that came into effect in 2015 and 2016. This provided a basis for joint programming, supportive supervision, monitoring, capacity building and data management.

89. For example, in 2016, WFP supported the government and local administration to review the nutrition strategy, policy formulation and coordination, training on planning and development of nutrition interventions. WFP also provided programme-implementation related training including

⁹³ UNICEF/WFP Joint Proposal Strengthening Resilience in south-central Somalia submitted to the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development through the German Development Bank.

⁹⁴ WFP, 2014, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

⁹⁵ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

warehouse training and training in fuel-efficient stoves as some government authorities are implementing activities directly.⁹⁶

2.2. Factors and quality of strategic decision-making

2.2.1 To what extent has WFP analysed, or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?

90. WFP, like other organizations working in Somalia, relies on data and analysis from the FSNAU. The FSNAU works in collaboration with partners to produce statistically representative GAM and SAM data over the two main rainy seasons of *Gu* and *Deyr* as well as food-security analyses based on the integrated phase classification.

91. Key informants reported that WFP along with other partners supported these efforts by contributing to the Assessment and Information Management Working Group, which discusses and agrees the sampling protocol, methodology for the surveys and vetting of the nutrition results. WFP also provides staff for regional meetings where the planning and logistics of surveys is discussed and an initial analysis of results takes place. However, key informants suggested that WFP can be slow to provide information when requested, for example the relatively recent decision to incorporate MAM and SAM admission data in the FSNAU dashboard was delayed because of this.

92. Several key informants, while still using the data produced by FSNAU, raised the issue of its credibility, many citing unexplained high levels of malnutrition reported by FSNAU in a certain site.⁹⁷ The doubts in credibility of the results meant that, in this case, an inter-agency mission was sent to verify the results, which it could not do. The issue of the credibility of FSNAU data risks fragmenting a useful multi-agency approach to nutrition assessment in Somalia, with some agencies reporting that they will be doing their own surveys.

93. FSNAU is aware of concerns, but believes that its data is robust given the context in Somalia. It has a partnership with CDC to verify methodological issues and, where deemed necessary, makes efforts to do multiple surveys where it feels that partners may be biasing results for operational interests.

94. With the formation of the FGS, Somaliland and Puntland authorities and the establishment of state and district-level authorities many stakeholders reported the need to shift the focus away from the current livelihood-based sampling frame used by FSNAU for nutrition surveys to a district-level sampling frame.

95. WFP also collects MUAC screening data on a weekly basis through a network of CNW. The data enables WFP to monitor the nutrition situation in real time as the CNW upload data using the open data kit (ODK) system on mobile phones. While not statistically representative, the data provide a useful trend analysis on how the nutrition situation is evolving. FSNAU noted an interest in collaborating with WFP to present this data to the wider humanitarian community.

96. During the portfolio, WFP invested in the SNS led nutrition causal analysis⁹⁸, which donors and CP key informants found useful. In addition, work through the SUN movement on the Cost of Hunger report should prove a useful advocacy tool to engage government authorities and donors.

⁹⁶ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report PRRO 200844.

⁹⁷ Dolow, an area that has relatively good security and access and has many NGOs and United Nations organizations providing services had very high acute malnutrition rates which could not be explained.

⁹⁸ SNS, 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis, south and central Somalia.

97. WFP continued to build on previous work on AAP by engaging beneficiaries to understand their perspectives in two ways:

- through the complaints phone line WFP details on the back of beneficiary registration cards the number to call to make complaints; and
- face-to-face engagement at TSFP, MCHN and BSFP sites during monitoring visits where SBCC activities and the weighing and measuring children take place. Beneficiaries have access to government staff and CP staff as well as WFP staff on monitoring visits.

98. FGDs held at MCHN centres with mothers and pregnant women suggested that the preferred method of providing feedback is to talk to staff at the nutrition sites as they are easily available and they are seen regularly by the beneficiaries.

99. The high GAM and concomitant MAM rates throughout the portfolio period support the need for TSFP. However, the evaluation team noted that in some places where TSFP is operating, WFP no longer provides a family ration, for example in the IDP camps in Hargeisa. While it is recognized⁹⁹ that there are multiple factors causing malnutrition in Somalia, not only food insecurity, it is not clear on what basis this decision was made. Particularly since the CPE evaluation of 2012 reported that there was “evidence that aligning the family ration with TSFP had increased recovery rates.” Despite collecting the data, WFP does not systematically report on re-admissions to the TSFP programme, which may be a good indicator to monitor to determine the impact that de-linking the family ration from TSFP is having.

2.2.2 To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed appropriate response strategies, including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

100. WFP, in close collaboration with UNICEF, supported the SUN movement in Somalia. The development of the “Cost of Hunger Study” will provide an appropriate advocacy tool to build the understanding of government ministries about the need for a multi-pronged strategy to address malnutrition, including nutrition-sensitive interventions when completed.

101. In addition, the support to SNS on the nutrition causal analysis research enabled it to be completed. While the analysis presented is relatively basic, it does highlight the need to address the socio-cultural and health factors causing the high rates of malnutrition in Somalia.

2.2.3 What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

102. Several factors contributed to the strategic choices WFP made throughout the portfolio period. In terms of humanitarian response, there was a determination not to repeat the experience of the 2011 famine where WFP was criticized for its response. This specifically meant that WFP-led in raising the alarm in 2017 when the food security and nutrition situation was deteriorating.

103. WFP needed to ensure that it was able to oversee the interventions it was undertaking through CP's. This resulted in the use of third-party monitors in areas to which WFP could not travel and this resulted in a more careful selection of CP's, and the triangulation of information through the hotline set up for feedback from the affected population. WFP also adjusted its nutrition programme based on learning from previous evaluations. An example of this is the consolidation of nutrition services into MCHN clinics because of the recommendations made in the Operational Evaluation of PRRO 200443. Lastly, resource constraints throughout the portfolio period meant that WFP had to prioritize nutrition activities on an ongoing basis depending on how the volatile situation in Somalia was developing.

⁹⁹ SNS, 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis, south and central Somalia.

2.3. Portfolio performance and results

2.3.1 How effective have the main WFP programme activities been and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

104. Targeting of health and nutrition activities changed based on the changes in the context. EMOP 200281 took place in response to a declaration of famine. TSFP was implemented in all areas of high vulnerability of food and nutrition, whereas MCHN programmes were implemented in areas with lower food and nutrition vulnerability. Areas with GAM < 10 percent would have MCHN programmes, areas with GAM > 15 percent had TSFP and areas between 10 and 15 percent GAM would have MCHN or TSFP depending on the operational context, such as partner capacity.¹⁰⁰

105. Children were screened and referred to TSFP using mid-upper arm circumference measurements (MUAC) between 115 and 125 mm and weight-for-height =>-3 <-2 Z-scores. PLW are referred to TSFP using MUAC. The average duration of treatment varied between three and four months. Beneficiary figures were determined based on the prevalence of malnutrition. PLW were admitted to the programme with MUAC of 21 cm.¹⁰¹

106. All children 6–23 months and PLW (pregnant women from the second trimester and lactating women for the first six months) were targeted through MCHN with a blanket supplementary ration. All pregnant women registered at WFP-supported MCHN clinics received a one-off incentive ration (MCHN incentive) when they delivered under medical attention to promote healthier pregnancies and safer deliveries. WFP continues to target all TB-DOTS clients and pre-ART and ART clients.¹⁰²

107. Because of high GAM prevalence, targeting under PRRO 200443 was adjusted and treatment of MAM through TSFP was implemented in all areas. Moderately malnourished children aged 6–59 months and acutely malnourished PLW were eligible, using the same anthropometric criteria as in EMOP 200281 and a maximum stay in the programme of four months.¹⁰³

108. Seasonal blanket supplementary feeding to prevent acute malnutrition in children aged 6–36 months was implemented during the *jilaal* and *hagaa* dry seasons in areas vulnerable to malnutrition with a GAM of greater than 15 percent.¹⁰⁴

109. Prevention of acute malnutrition in children aged 6–23 months and PLW was implemented at MCHN clinics, with a focus on towns and surrounding areas. Women giving birth under medical supervision received a one-off household ration to promote healthy pregnancies and safe deliveries. Malnourished ART and TB clients were eligible for nutritional rehabilitation when their body mass index was below 18.5. Chronically ill PLW were eligible for rehabilitation when their MUAC was less than 21 cm. Discharge was based on the same indicators, with a maximum length of stay in the programme of six months for ART clients and eight months for TB clients. ART clients' households were targeted for support for six months, while TB clients' households were targeted for eight months.¹⁰⁵ Through PRRO 200844 WFP maintained the same anthropometric criteria for entrance but consolidated activities into MCHN clinics whenever possible, depending on government and partner capacity as well as access constraints.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁰ WFP, 2012, EMOP 200281 Project Document.

¹⁰¹ WFP, 2012, EMOP 200281 Project Document.

¹⁰² WFP, 2012, EMOP 200281 Project Document.

¹⁰³ WFP, 2013, PRRO 200443 Project Document.

¹⁰⁴ WFP, 2013, PRRO 200443 Project Document.

¹⁰⁵ WFP, 2013, PRRO 200443 Project Document.

¹⁰⁶ WFP, 2016, PRRO 200844 Project Document.

110. In terms of planned versus actual commodities distributed. WFP SPRs throughout the portfolio period did not disaggregate by activity. Therefore, the only commodity presented in Table 6 is ready-to use supplementary food (RUSF), which was only used in the nutrition activities. No data was available for 2017. In 2012, nutrition interventions were negatively impacted because of the global suspension of Plumpy'Sup and Plumpy'Doz distributions, which exacerbated Supercereal shortfalls as well.¹⁰⁷ In 2013, lower than expected admissions and overestimates of PLW resulted in lower than expected distributions. In 2014, there was an overall decrease in the number of nutrition beneficiaries reached due to the focus on BSFP as a preventive measure against the deteriorating malnutrition situation.¹⁰⁸ In 2015, enrolments in the TSFP were lower than expected and the suspension of a major partner in Bossaso as well as reductions in access to districts in the lower Shebelle and Hiran regions meant distributions were lower than planned. While BSFP distributions were disrupted due to logistical delays in Mogadishu and insecurity in Dolow¹⁰⁹, no explanation was given for the lower than planned distributions of RUSF in 2016. However, regular pipeline breaks were a likely cause.

Table 6: Planned and actual metric tons (mt) of RUSF distributed

Year	Planned (mt)	Actual (mt)	Actual/Planned (%0)
2012	1,085	1,688	156
2013	6,394	3,576	56
2104	5,520	4,245	77
2015	7,053	4,502	64
2016	7,202	4,048	56
Total¹¹⁰	27,254	18,059	66

Source: WFP, EMOP 200281 SPR, PRRO 200443 and PRRO 200844 SPR 2012–2016.

111. Figure 5 details the number of planned and actual beneficiaries 6–59 months old of TSFP and Table 7 details the number of planned and actual PLW in the TSFP throughout the portfolio period.


Figure 5: Number of planned and actual TSFP beneficiaries aged 6–59 months

¹⁰⁷ WFP, 2012, Standard Project Report EMOP 200281.

¹⁰⁸ WFP, 2014, Standard Project Report EMOP 200443.

¹⁰⁹ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

¹¹⁰ Excluding 2017.



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017. 2017 data reported for 6–59 months only.

Table 7: Number of planned and actual PLW in TSFP 2012–2016

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
2012	96,000	208,720	217
2013	323,300	233,373	72
2014	175,000	77,383	44
2015	130,000	86,734	67
2016	91,000	86,743	95
2017	230,000	247,871	108
Total	1,045,300	940,824	90

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

112. Despite the global suspension of Plumpy'Sup and Plumpy'Doz distributions for two months in 2012, which exacerbated Supercereal shortfalls, WFP was able to provide supplementary treatment for a greater number of beneficiaries than planned.¹¹¹

113. The beneficiary achievement rates for TSFP in 2013 were lower than expected due to the lower than expected number of admissions of children aged 6–23 months when compared with children aged 24–59 months. However, the Post Gu 2013, FSNAU Nutrition Analysis Technical report showed that children aged 24–59 months were more prone to acute malnutrition.

114. In addition, an analysis of 2012 monitoring data indicated that there was a disparity in the use of WFP nutrition services between boys and girls, with a larger number of girls using the service than boys. This disparity was reduced in 2013 with the girls to boys ratio of new admissions to TSFP recorded as 1:0.86.¹¹² The underachievement for PLW in 2013 was attributed to high planning figures in the 2013 SPR.

¹¹¹ WFP, 2012, Standard Project Report EMOP 200281.

¹¹² WFP, 2013, Standard Project Report PRRO200443.

115. In 2014, despite accessing newly-accessible districts such as Wajid, Hudur and Baidoa, which resulted in the expansion of the TSFP programme, the numbers reached were low because of the worsening nutrition situation and concomitant focus of WFP on preventive efforts through BSFP. In 2015 admissions were low due to the suspension of a major partner with large coverage in the Bossaso area. In some areas, access was intermittent because of insecurity. In 2016 and 2017, WFP was able to meet almost all the beneficiaries aged 6–59 months old planned for because nutrition programmes were prioritized given the worsening food-security situation.

116. Key informants from WFP partners reported that prior to 2017 a cap on the number of new admissions to TSFP was in place based on the agreed number of beneficiaries in the signed field level agreements (FLA) between WFP and partners. This resulted in screened and referred children being refused admission to TSFP because of the planning figure in the FLAs. WFP removed this cap in early 2017 and no longer applies it, accepting that any child meeting the entrance criteria to TSFP should be admitted based on need.

117. Key informants from partners also suggested that in some cases the supplies of commodities were not enough to cope with a greater number of admissions than planned for. This was particularly so, for example, in areas where new IDP's were arriving and being referred to TSFP; these new admissions would not receive a ration. The ET notes that WFP has explored the potential for a buffer stock of supplies for two months to be provided to each centre, but does not, as yet, have the resources to put this in place and, instead, is exploring the potential for an additional 10 percent contingency to be provided to each centre.

118. During EMOP 200281, individuals under the TSFP received either 92 g/person/day of RUSF (500 Kcal) or a ration consisting of 250 g CSB, 20 g vegetable oil and 17 g of sugar/person/day (1,245 Kcal). The ration received depended on “operational and logistical factors, including security and partner capacity.”¹¹³ This ration was simplified during PRRO 200443 with a ration of 92 g of Plumpy'Sup per person per day, providing 500 kcal/person/day being provided to malnourished children and PLW. A family ration was also given to families of individuals enrolled in the TSFP. This consisted of 278 g cereal, 122 g pulse and 29 g of vegetable oil/person/day.

119. The planned ration for TSFP changed again in PRRO 200844. Children under 5 years of age were to receive 92 g of Plumpy'Sup/person/day (500 Kcal), while PLW would receive 250 g of Supercereal and 25 g of vegetable oil/person/day (1161 Kcal).

120. In 2017, the 92 g sachet of Plumpy'Supplement was replaced by a 100 g sachet. Adjustments were made to the number of sachets provided monthly to beneficiaries. This change seems to have been accepted without any major problems. The rations provided throughout the portfolio period are appropriate, however focus group discussion did suggest that despite efforts, commodities were being shared among siblings. In addition, WFP staff, partners and beneficiaries reported that commodities distributed for TSFP were available in some markets, suggesting they were being sold.

121. Table 8 details the number of centres supported with TSFP activities during the portfolio period. WFP was able to support more than the planned number of TSFP sites. The exception is 2014, when, as noted above, WFP focused efforts on BSFP because of the deteriorating nutrition situation.

Table 8: Number of planned and actual centres supported with TSFP

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
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¹¹³ WFP, 2011, Project Document EMOP 200281.

2012	400	781	195.3
2013	600	972	162
2014	900	741	82.3
2015	635	694	109.3
2016	650	697	107.2
2017 ¹¹⁴	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

122. In 2013 WFP undertook to provide SBCC links to its nutrition activities. WFP output data for SBCC was recorded inconsistently throughout the portfolio period and was only available in the SPR's from 2014 onwards. CO data for 2013 recorded that 364,386 individuals received counselling or messages through the TSFP.

123. Table 9 details the planned and actual proportions and absolute numbers (depending on how this indicator was reported in the SPR's) that received counselling over the portfolio period. WFP consistently reached more females through SBCC because caregivers are traditionally female in Somali society.

Table 9: Number of planned and actual beneficiaries of SBCC

Year	Male			Female		
	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
	Proportion					
2014	60	18	30	60	82	136.7
	Absolute numbers					
2015	40721	67869	166.7	139,866	233111	166.7
2016	207721	138435	66.6	257164	230743	89.7
2017 ¹¹⁵	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

124. WFP met almost all the outcome indicators for TSFP as defined in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. The TSFP activity met sphere standards for performance in all the key indicators including recovery rates, default rates and mortality. Table 10 shows the recovery rates of TSFP beneficiaries throughout the portfolio period. These are consistently above the > 75 percent sphere¹¹⁶ threshold indicating that the treatment protocols in place are effective.

Table 10: Proportion of TSFP beneficiaries who recovered after treatment

Year	Recovery rate (%)				
	Male 6–59 months	Female 6–59 months	Combined 6–59 months	PLW	Total combined
2012	92.6	92.3	93	94	
2013	89.3	88.5	88	90	
2014	91	91		92.8	92
2015	92.8	92.7		92.8	92

¹¹⁴ Data not available.

¹¹⁵ Data not available.

¹¹⁶ <http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/management-of-acute-malnutrition-and-micronutrient-deficiencies-standard-1-moderate-acute-malnutrition/>.

2016	94.6	94.3		94.9	94
2017			83		

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

125. WFP attributed the increase in success of the treatment in 2014 when compared to 2013 to the follow-up of beneficiaries by the CNW.

126. Table 11 details the default rate in TSFP. This again meets the sphere threshold of < 15 percent. CP staff and mothers reported that the main reasons for default were:

- distance to the centre;
- time required to attend the centre; long queues mean carers are away from their other children for long periods of time; and
- mobility of the target population, with many displaced because of drought returning to areas of origin when rains return.

127. TSFP mortality rates throughout the portfolio period were 0–1 percent and non-response to treatment was 3 percent¹¹⁷ except for 2017 where it was 12 percent, but below the target of < 15 percent. This suggests that treatment in TSFP was effective. However, the coverage (Table 12) of the TSFP was lower than the sphere threshold of > 50 percent¹¹⁸ for rural areas until 2016 when coverage of 77 percent¹¹⁹ was achieved. Improvements in coverage are attributed to increased mobilization and training of CNW and the provision of tools, such as mobile phones, for remuneration. In addition, mobile teams were used in early 2016 in response to droughts in Puntland and Somaliland.¹²⁰ The increased coverage of TSFP was maintained in 2017 at 75 percent.

Table 11: Proportion of TSFP beneficiaries that defaulted during treatment

Year	Default rate (%)				
	Male 6–59 month	Female 6–59 months	Combined 6–59 months	PLW	Total combined
2012			3	1	
2013			8	7	
2014	3	3.2		3.6	4
2015	2.8	2.8		3.3	3
2016	2	2		2.4	2
2017			3		

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

128. Seventy-seven percent is an aggregate figure for coverage across all settings, urban, rural and camp, that WFP works in. The sphere thresholds for coverage vary according to these settings (that is > 50 percent for rural, > 75 percent for urban and > 90 percent for camp settings). It would be useful for WFP to disaggregate coverage data based on this to determine where coverage is greatest and what the true coverage levels are in the rural areas that are assumed to be the hardest to reach.

Table 12: Coverage of the TSFP

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Coverage	N/A	N/A	48.4	44.9	77.1	75.2

¹¹⁷ WFP, 2012–2016, Standard Project Reports.

¹¹⁸ <http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/management-of-acute-malnutrition-and-micronutrient-deficiencies-standard-1-moderate-acute-malnutrition/>.

¹¹⁹ Coverage surveys were not done in 2012 and 2013. 77 percent is an aggregate figure for coverage.

¹²⁰ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report.

129. Having said this, WFP continues to be the largest provider of TSFP in Somalia. The Nutrition Cluster reported that WFP provided treatment to 355,948 MAM cases out of 383,286 by August 2017, making up 92.8 percent of the total reached by partners in the Somalia Nutrition Cluster.¹²¹

130. Despite WFP's efforts when compared to the numbers being treated for SAM, the ratio of MAM to SAM cases admitted for treatment is low at 1.4 to 1.¹²² Given the rates of malnutrition in Somalia this ratio should be closer to 4–5 to 1. This is likely to be a direct result of WFP's low risk appetite, which requires WFP activities to take place only in areas where WFP or third-party monitors can have access to monitor activities.


131. WFP is currently working with UNICEF and CPs to rationalize and integrate services more closely with UNICEF to improve the efficiency of the nutrition services provided. Criteria for rationalization will include factors such as less than 3 km distance between TSFP and OTP centres, common training curricula for community workers and screening for both SAM and MAM cases by community workers.

132. The rationalization exercise will also have to consider the limited number of fixed sites and the need to continue to use mobile services to increase coverage. This is particularly true since a recent geotagging report (see Figure 6) published by the Nutrition Cluster identified that in Somaliland, "many of the fixed nutrition sites are located in the capital, Hargeisa, while the eastern regions remain vastly underserved by nutrition services." In particular, Sool emerges as the region most lacking basic services, supplies and infrastructure at fixed nutrition sites. Similarly, in Puntland, the majority of fixed nutrition facilities are found in Garowe, while the rest of Nugaal and districts in Bari have a concerning lower concentration of fixed nutrition sites. In south-central Somalia, Banadir has the highest concentration of fixed nutrition sites and implementing partners, while insecurity impedes humanitarian access to other regions.

¹²¹ Nutrition Cluster, 2017. Somalia Nutrition Cluster Presentation, November 2017.

¹²² The total number of cases treated for SAM from January to August 2017 was 276,942 with the equivalent figure for MAM being 383,286.

Figure 6: Distribution of fixed sites in different regions of Somalia



Source: Forcier, 2017, Nutrition Cluster geotagging capacity assessment.

133. However, even the use of mobile teams has limitations because, while mobile teams play a key role in delivering nutrition services in remote and isolated areas, limited numbers of personnel and resources result in a low frequency of visits, which cannot guarantee adequate service provision to affected communities.¹²³

134. WFP also implemented preventive nutrition activities throughout the portfolio period. Table 13 details the number of beneficiaries aged 6–36 months of the BSFP over the evaluation period.

135. Table 14 details the number of PLW receiving a ration under the BSFP. BSFP was provided on a seasonal basis (that is during lean periods) and in areas where malnutrition rates warranted it.

Table 13: Planned and actual BSFP beneficiaries aged 6–36 months

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual/Planned (%)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2012	113,700	113,700	227,400	145,594	187,960	333,554	128	165	146
2013	86,480	97,520	184,000	82,968	95,998	178,966	96	98	97
2014	86,480	97,520	184,000	163,004	174,090	337,094	188	179	183
2015	140,900	150,610	291,510	124,108	134,450	258,558	88	89	89
2016	64,800	70,200	135,000	62,029	67,199	129,228	96	96	96
2017	238,144	231,856	470,000	268,860	315,618	584,478	113	136	124
Total	730,504	761,406	1,491,910	846,563	975,315	1,821,878	116	128	122

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

¹²³ Forcier, 2017, Nutrition Cluster geo-tagging capacity assessment.

Table 14: Planned and actual PLW beneficiaries of BSFP

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
2012	N/A ¹²⁴	N/A	
2013	N/A	N/A	
2014	64,000	116,391	182
2015	101,490	106,381	105
2016	92,500	167,727	181
2017	453,100	95,750	21
Total	711,090	486,249	68

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

136. The lowest number of actual beneficiaries (6–36 months old) reached against the number planned was lowest in 2015 at 89 percent. This was a consequence of disruption to distributions because of logistical delays in Mogadishu and access constraints to Dolow because of insecurity.¹²⁵

137. Table 14 highlights that WFP continuously exceeded the number of planned PLW beneficiaries of BSFP until 2017, when Budget Revision 3 did not include PLW as a target. Ultimately, they were included because of the high GAM prevalence in 2017.

138. Table 15 details the number of planned and actual health centres assisted with BSFP. The table shows that only in 2012 did WFP not exceed the number of planned health centres to be assisted. This was a result of the global suspension of Plumpy'Sup and Plumpy'Doz distributions and the concomitant Supercereal shortfalls. The result was a reduction in preventive food rations and the premature shift from blanket to targeted interventions in border areas.¹²⁶

Table 15: Planned and actual sites of BSFP

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
2012	300	135	45
2013	50	195	390
2014	190	374	196.8
2015	60	72	120
2016	N/A	199	
2017			

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

139. Key informants from partners suggested that they were not always clear how decisions were made about where BSFP would take place or the criteria WFP was using to decide where to implement the seasonal BSFP. WFP also provided SBCC at the sites where BSFP took place. Table 16 details the planned and actual number of male and female recipients of SBCC.

Table 16: Planned and actual beneficiaries of SBCC through the BSFP

¹²⁴ In 2012 and 2013 PLW were not included in BSFP.

¹²⁵ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report.

¹²⁶ WFP, 2012, Standard Project Report.

Year	Male			Female		
	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
	Proportion					
2014	60	15	25	60	85	141.7
	Absolute numbers					
2015	2,676	4,460	166.7	14,847	24,746	166.7
2016	N/A	7,063			26,220	
2017						
Total						

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

140. WFP once again inconsistently reported the outputs of the SBCC, initially using proportions and then absolute figures for recipients of the communications. More recently, planning figures were not reported in the 2016 SPR making it difficult to analyse achievements. The 2015 figures however suggest that WFP exceeded its planning numbers and provided SBCC to more men and women than planned for. However, it is also notable that the number of men reached (in a context of large gender disparity) is less than 20 percent of the females reached. This is likely the result of the main caregivers in Somali society being women who would accompany children to the BSFP.

141. Table 17 details the coverage and adequate number of distributions of the BSFP. Coverage surveys were not undertaken in 2012 and 2013. The coverage of the BSFP has dramatically improved since 2014, reaching 83.4 percent in 2016. This is coupled with increased number of beneficiaries receiving adequate distributions because of improved outreach.

Table 17: Coverage of the BSFP and the proportion of beneficiaries that received an adequate number of distributions

Year	Coverage (%)	Adequate number of distributions
2012	N/A	N/A
2013	N/A	N/A
2014	20	25.7
2015	73.7	77.2
2016	83.4	100
2017	81.3	68.90

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

142. Initially (August 2011 to September 2012) the BSFP ration provided was 250 g of cereal, 20 g of vegetable oil and 17 g of sugar/person/day (1,245 Kcal). This was an adequate ration in terms of calorific value and in terms of the potential for sharing the ration with other family members, however micronutrient deficiencies were not addressed through this ration.

143. In addition, a one-off incentive ration was provided to women who gave birth under medical supervision. This consisted of 278 g cereal, 122 g pulse, 29 g vegetable oil (1,690 Kcal). Anecdotal evidence from staff at MCHN clinics suggests that the number of women attending health centres for delivery increased because of this incentive, however WFP has not reported data to support this anecdotal evidence. Two centres visited in Hargeisa reported that they no longer provide the incentive for delivery, in one example it was reported that the centre had stopped the ration for two years. Key informants reported that the incentive ration is only provided to PLW in rural areas.

144. Under PRRO 200443 the BSFP ration changed. The ration for seasonal BSFP was /planned at 50 g (272 Kcal) of Plumpy'Doz/person/day for 90 days and targeted children aged 6–36 months, which meets the recommended nutrient intake for vitamins and minerals. Children aged 6–23 months who were targeted for BSFP through MCHN clinics were provided with the same ration for 365 days while PLW were provided a ration of 25 g of vegetable oil and 250 g of Supercereal (1161 Kcal/person/day) for 180 days.

145. PRRO 200844 heralded two notable changes: i) the use of cash as part of the incentive for delivery in a health facility; and ii) WFP started to refer to the MCHN programme as preventing stunting or chronic malnutrition for the first time in its reporting.¹²⁷

146. The planned ration for the seasonal BSFP under PRRO 200844 remained the same at 50g of Plumpy'Doz/person/day (272 Kcal). Children 6–23 months received the same ration under MCHN and PLW in the MCHN programme were planned to receive 250g of Supercereal and 25g of vegetable oil/person/day (1161 Kcal). Women who delivered in a medical facility would receive a one-off one month incentive of 139g cereal, 56g pulse, 29g Vegetable oil, 56g Supercereal and USD 0.27 /person/day (1167 Kcal).

147. While WFP is providing a demand-based incentive for women to attend a health facility for delivery, some of WFP's partners are providing a supply-based incentive by providing remuneration for traditional birth attendants (TBAs) that refer pregnant women for delivery at a health facility.

148. Table 18 and Table 19 detail the number of 6–23 months old and PLW beneficiaries of the prevention of stunting programme. For both beneficiary groups, WFP was able to exceed the number of beneficiaries planned for in 2016. This was achieved as a result of the expansion of MCHN in south-central Somalia and Mogadishu.

Table 18: Number of planned and actual children 6–23 months in the prevention of stunting (MCHN) programme

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual/Planned (%)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2016	28,175	29,325	57,500	73,923	76,941	150,864	262.4	262.4	262.4
2017	236,400	295,500	531,900	94,611	106,690	201,301	40	36	38
Total	264,575	324,825	589,400	168,534	183,631	352,165	64	57	60

Source: WFP, 2016 SPR PRRO 200844. CO data for 2017.

¹²⁷ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report PRRO 200844.

Table 19: Number of planned and actual PLW in the MCHN programme

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
2016	92,500	167,727	181.3
2017	453,100	95,750	21
Total	545,600	263,477	48

Source: WFP, 2016 SPR PRRO 200844.

149. Table 20 details the number of MCHN centres planned and actually assisted by WFP.

Table 20: Number of MCHN Centres planned and actually assisted

Year	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
2012	N/A	119	
2013	150	133	88.7
2014	130	151	116.2
2015	160	174	108.8
2016	173	131	75.7
2017			

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

150. WFP has made efforts to implement the findings of the mid-term evaluation of PRRO 200443¹²⁸ which, among others, recommended the consolidation of nutrition activities into MCHN centres to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities. There is evidence of WFP expanding its presence in MCHN in Somaliland and Puntland as well as in the south-central region as opportunities arise. However, as previously noted, the availability of these services in rural areas is limited throughout Somalia, therefore it is likely that WFP will need to retain the flexibility and capacity to provide mobile nutrition services when required in close coordination and collaboration with UNICEF and CPs.

151. Table 21 details WFP's efforts in SBCC through the BSFP. Once again WFP used different indicators during the portfolio period and had incomplete data.

Table 21: Number of planned and actual beneficiaries of counselling in the MCHN programme

Year	Male			Female		
	Planned	Actual	A/P (%)	Planned	Actual	A/P (%)
2013	N/A	N/A		N/A	N/A	
2014	60	8	13.3	60	92	153.3
	Absolute numbers					
2015	25422	42371	166.7	120,802	201337	166.7
2016	14453	10387	71.9	121586	110822	91.1
2017						

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

152. In addition to counselling WFP provided SBCC messages through the MCHN programme. Table 22 details the number of males and females that received messages in 2016. Similarly, to

¹²⁸ WFP, 2015, Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience June 2012–December 2015, mid-term evaluation.

SBCC in TSFP and BSFP the proportion of men to women reached through messaging is low due to most caregivers being women.

Table 22: Number of Planned and Actual recipients of SBCC messages under the MCHN programme

Year	Male			Female		
	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)	Planned	Actual	Actual/Planned (%)
2016	26789	25204	94.1	216789	183433	84.6
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP, 2016 SPR PRRO 200844. CO data for 2017.

153. The coverage¹²⁹ of MCHN services (Table 23) was low and consistently below WFP's own target of > 70 percent. WFP's continued and appropriate prioritization of TSFP when resources are low (note the low proportion of the target population that participate in adequate number of distributions), the mobile and scattered nature of the population and the inaccessible areas are likely contributing factors to this low coverage.

Table 23: Coverage of MCHN and the proportion of beneficiaries that received an adequate number of distributions

Year	Coverage	Adequate number of distributions
2012	N/A	N/A
2013	N/A	N/A
2014	49.9	
2015	62.1	61.3
2016	45.1 ¹³⁰	75
2017	54	91.90

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

154. Table 24 details the beneficiaries of WFP's institutional feeding under care and treatment as well as mitigation and safety-net interventions.

Table 24: Planned and actual beneficiaries of HIV/TB care and treatment and mitigation and safety net

Year	Planned			Actual			Actual/Planned (%)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
2012	19,500	19,500	39,000	39,926	41,560	81,486	204.7	213.1	209
2013	50,000	50,000	100,000	50,360	34,997	85,357	100.72	70	85.4
2014	50,000	50,000	100,000	27,817	19,331	47,148	55.6	38.67	47.1
2015	59,000	41,000	100,000	23,489	18,223	41,712	39.8	44.4	41.7
2016	3,060	2,940	6,000	491	341	832	16	11.6	13.9
2017	2,040	1,960	4,000	2,883	2,455	5,338	141	125	133
Total	183,600	165,400	349,000	144,966	116,907	261,873	80	71	75

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

155. WFP only achieved its planned number of beneficiaries in 2012. This was mainly due to the addition of four new TB clinics in newly-accessible areas of Mogadishu and Hiran. The number of actual clients of ART and TB-DOTS in 2012 was 2,636 and 10,650, respectively. Data for clients presented in the EMOP 200281 SPR was not disaggregated by sex. These figures include

¹²⁹ Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme.

¹³⁰ Due to limited resources WFP only carried out the coverage survey at a limited number of MCHN sites.

beneficiaries of a household ration provided to supported households that have a member suffering with HIV or TB.

156. Since 2012 there has been a progressive decline in the number of beneficiaries supported under institutional feeding. In 2013 a prolonged suspension of the provision of food assistance to the HIV and TB clients in 20 clinics in Somaliland reduced the total number of beneficiaries reached.¹³¹ In 2014 the total number of beneficiaries planned for was overestimated which resulted in the low achievement figures.¹³² In 2015, due to funding constraints the programme only ran for the first six months in central Somalia and for only the last quarter in Somaliland, thus reducing the number of beneficiaries of the care and treatment and the mitigation and safety-net activities.¹³³ In 2016, WFP significantly reduced efforts in the care, treatment, mitigation and safety-net interventions for HIV/TB clients. WFP only supported malnourished HIV and TB patients in treatment facilities, while they adhered to existing protocols.¹³⁴ Key informants reported that WFP abruptly stopped the programme without notice making explaining the situation to beneficiaries difficult. In addition, key informants suggest that these households were not assessed for vulnerability systematically to determine whether they would be eligible for inclusion in GFA, potentially putting vulnerable households at risk.

157. The planned rations through PRRO 200443 were appropriate and adequate, however the funding constraints meant that WFP rarely achieved its planned beneficiary target. Despite efforts in 2015 to introduce a cash transfer to the programme, funding constraints did not allow this either.¹³⁵

158. Table 25 and

¹³¹ WFP, 2013, Standard Project Report.

¹³² WFP, 2014, Standard Project Report.

¹³³ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report.

¹³⁴ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report.

¹³⁵ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

159. Table 26 detail the outcome data collected by WFP for TB-DOTS and ART. The data is incomplete for the portfolio period. After 2013 rather than using a treatment success rate WFP used nutrition recovery as an outcome indicator as recommended by the Operational Evaluation of PRRO 200443.

Table 25: Outcome data for TB-DOTS

Year	Success rate (%)	Default rate (%)	Nutrition recovery rate (%)
2012	92	1	
2013	90	2	79
2014		N/A	90
2015		N/A	94
2016		0	99
2017	N/A	1	73.00

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

Table 26: Outcome data for ART

Year	Nutrition recovery rate			Default rate
	Male	Female	Combined	
2012	N/A	N/A		N/A
2013	N/A	N/A	97	N/A
2014	N/A	91		N/A
2015	N/A		56	35.7 ¹³⁶
2016	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

160. Despite the inconsistent food supplies TB-DOTS patients receiving a ration had a very good treatment success rate and nutrition recovery rate. Similarly, for ART, nutrition recovery rates were high until 2015 when default rates were very high because of the lack of food.

161. While acute malnutrition rates, which were on the rise in 2017, showed a decline and a potential famine situation was averted it is difficult to attribute this impact to WFP's efforts alone, given the multiple factors causing malnutrition. In addition, only in 2016 did WFP explicitly attempt to tackle chronic malnutrition and, therefore, it is unlikely that there would be a great deal of impact to note and more regular monitoring and reporting of height-for-age as a measure of chronic malnutrition will need to be undertaken.

162. WFP regularly collects monitoring data from partners responsible for TSFP, BSFP and MCHN sites. This data provides output and outcome results as reported in the SPRs. As already noted, the collection and reporting of data in SPRs throughout the portfolio was not always consistent and, in some cases, data were not collected, specifically for output and outcome reporting.

163. For example, coverage data, a key performance indicator, was often either not collected for programmes in 2012 and 2013¹³⁷ or, when collected, collected only for a limited number of sites rendering the data unrepresentative. There have been noted improvements in output and outcome reporting from 2015 onwards with data more consistently reported.

164. The evaluation team also observed WFP efforts to register nutrition beneficiaries using the SCOPE biometric mechanism. This is a positive development in reducing the risk of duplication. This coupled with the use of mobile technology through the CNW to collect screening data are useful monitoring developments undertaken by the CO.

165. There have been two recent evaluations of WFP Somalia prior to the current CPE. These included a CPE in 2012 covering the period 2006–2011 and an Operational Evaluation of PRRO 200443 which took place in 2015.

166. The nutrition component of WFP's portfolio was scaled up from 2010. The CPE evaluation reported that, "stakeholders, including state authorities, saw this as an appropriate response in preventing malnutrition and promoting MCHN care"¹³⁸ while being flexible and responsive to

¹³⁶ This figure is sourced from CO data and is for male defaulters only, no records for female defaulters were made available to the ET.

¹³⁷ WFP, 2012 and 2013, Standard Project Report EMOP 200281 and Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

¹³⁸ WFP, 2012, Country Portfolio Evaluation Somalia: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio.

needs and seasons. This was reinforced by government authorities during this evaluation when they noted that, “nutrition would be weak in Somalia without WFP.”

167. The CPE 2012 evaluation reported that attendance at MCHN had increased significantly, however concerns over coverage and outreach resulting from the dependence on static centres. This led to the conclusion that there was a need for WFP to scale up a mobile programme to reach potentially excluded children in remote areas and that this should be done in collaboration with UNICEF’s OTP.¹³⁹ This evaluation team concluded that while coverage remains low there will continue to be a need for mobile clinics, but that the costs could ultimately be prohibitive.

168. The evaluation went on to say that there was, “evidence that aligning the family ration with TSFP has increased recovery rates, but also that in some cases beneficiaries might maintain a child’s low weight to ensure continuation of the ration” and that, “There is also potential for overlap between TSFP and MCHN.” In contrast, an Operational Evaluation¹⁴⁰ in 2015 suggested that the TSFP family ration can be discontinued in Somaliland and part of Puntland. Other options to address key causal factors for SAM and MAM should be considered, including reducing the mothers’ time and workload, and lack of household income. Using cash-based modalities and linking this group to livelihood activities should be considered.” Currently WFP has de-linked the general food distribution ration from TSFP, however careful consideration and analysis should be undertaken to see what impact this de-linking has had on efficiency of TSFP through analysis of readmissions.

169. The Operational Evaluation, 2015 made a number of recommendations with respect to WFP’s nutrition interventions, one of which stated, “WFP Somalia should prioritize, revise and streamline nutrition and health programming for maximum effectiveness and efficiency according to the context and limited resources. Specifically, this evaluation has identified several nutrition and health activities that need to be discontinued, or modified.”¹⁴¹

170. WFP’s Management Response¹⁴² to the evaluation partially agreed with this recommendation, but emphasized the need for WFP to maintain capacity to be able to respond to humanitarian crises, even in relatively more stable nutrition environments in Somalia, such as Somaliland. It also highlighted that in some of the areas where, for example, BSFP was recommended to be stopped overall, GAM rates were critical (parts of Puntland), and that replacing the programme with MCHN would depend on the availability of these services in the region as well as capacities of partners.¹⁴³ The CPE evaluation 2012 had also highlighted that blanket supplementary feeding was not a long-term solution as it did not address the underlying causes of food insecurity. Key informants reported that BSFP was no longer taking place in Somaliland and that 50 percent of BSFP in Puntland had been integrated into MCHN. However, WFP retains the flexibility to implement BSFP should GAM rates increase above 15 percent and access is possible.

¹³⁹ WFP, 2012, Country Portfolio Evaluation Somalia: An evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio.

¹⁴⁰ WFP, 2015, Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience June 2012–December 2015, Mid-Term Evaluation.

¹⁴¹ WFP, 2015, Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience June 2012–December 2015, Mid-Term Evaluation.

¹⁴² WFP, 2015, Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience June 2012–December 2015, Management Response.

¹⁴³ WFP, 2015, Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) Strengthening Food and Nutrition Security and Enhancing Resilience June 2012–December 2015, Management Response.

171. The CPE 2012 evaluation noted that food support to TB and HIV patients had proved to be effective in attracting people for screening and ensuring compliance with treatment regimes, leading to a high cure rate for TB despite, as in several nutrition interventions, the supply of food was not always consistent. The Operational Evaluation in 2015 suggested the need for clarity on the objectives of the programme and that an appropriate RUSF should be used that is consistent with national guidelines and the global guidance on Nutrition Assessment Counselling and Support (NACS)¹⁴⁴ programming for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV) and TB.¹⁴⁵ The evaluation suggested that the household ration be replaced by a cash modality, however the management response indicated that the ration may be stopped based on needs assessment. The evaluation team found that while there is clarity on the nutrition outcome of the institutional feeding programmes RUSF alone is not provided and that support to households has been withdrawn, contrary to WFP's HIV policy.

172. The Operational Evaluation also recommended further emphasis on SBCC and consideration of alternative modalities for helping through MCHN for PLW, which WFP accepted and pointed to work the evaluation had not acknowledged in basic health, nutrition and hygiene promotion. The evaluation team noted the expansion of SBCC activities. However, it was also noted that women remain the main recipients of messaging and that more men will need to be reached for practices to change.

2.3.2 How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been and what are the drivers of efficiency?

173. Nutrition interventions were ongoing throughout the portfolio and timely with seasonal BSFP in place to prevent MAM among children aged 6–36 months and PLW. However, lack of resources meant that WFP was often having to prioritize activities and, in some cases, suspending activities for periods of time due to lack of resources.

174. In 2012, nutrition interventions were negatively impacted because of the global suspension of Plumpy'Sup and Plumpy'Doz distributions, which exacerbated Supercereal shortfalls as well. As a result, the preventive programmes' food rations were revised downwards and a premature shift from blanket to targeted interventions in the border areas took place, despite the high levels of malnutrition, to focus on identified cases. Moreover, given the Plumpy'Doz suspension, the seasonal BSFP for IDP groups in the north was cancelled during the dry season from July to September.¹⁴⁶

175. In 2014, despite moving into newly-accessible districts, such as Wajid, Hudur and Baidoa, which resulted in the expansion of the TSFP programme, the numbers reached were low because of the worsening nutrition situation and concomitant focus of WFP on preventive efforts through BSFP.¹⁴⁷ In 2015, admissions were low because of the suspension of a major partner with large coverage in the Bossaso area. In some areas access was intermittent because of insecurity. In 2016, WFP was able to meet almost all the beneficiaries aged 6–59 months old planned that had been planned for.

176. The consolidation of WFP nutrition activities around MCHN sites following the recommendations of the PRRO 200443 Operational Evaluation in 2015 has yielded efficiencies.

¹⁴⁴ Fanta, 2012, Defining Nutrition Assessment Counselling and Support.

¹⁴⁵ At the time of the evaluation National Nutrition, Assessment, Education, Counselling and Support (NAECS) guidelines specific for Somalia had been developed and were undergoing endorsement by the various Somalia MoHs.

¹⁴⁶ WFP, 2012, Standard Project Report EMOP 200281.

¹⁴⁷ WFP, 2014, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

These included fewer end distribution points, sharing of partner and community worker information to avoid duplication and, in some cases, complete joint management of facilities with UNICEF. However, to meet needs, particularly in rural areas, WFP maintains mobile services alongside UNICEF. Mobile services are costlier, but with the existing low coverage of activities and the concentration of MCHN structures in urban settings it is likely that WFP will have to continue to maintain this capacity.¹⁴⁸

177. In 2013 a prolonged suspension of the provision of food assistance to the HIV and TB clients in 20 clinics in Somaliland reduced the total number of beneficiaries reached.¹⁴⁹ In 2014 the total number of beneficiaries planned for was overestimated, which resulted in the low achievement figures.¹⁵⁰ The ART and TB-DOTS programmes regularly suffered because of lack of resources. In 2015, funding constraints meant the programme only ran for the first six months in central Somalia and for only the last quarter in Somaliland, thus reducing beneficiaries of the care and treatment and the mitigation and safety-net activities.¹⁵¹

178. Key informants reported the potential for further efficiencies through the rationalization and scale up efforts under way between WFP and UNICEF. These efforts aim to ensure that UNICEF and WFP efforts are better coordinated to meet needs as they relate to malnutrition and address issues such as the ratio of OTP to TSFP and the location of TSFP and OTP within appropriate referral distances. This coupled with efforts to harmonize community worker curricula, tasks and training across the nutrition sector with UNICEF and MoH should yield efficiencies in the identification and referral of malnourished children and PLW as well as in access to nutrition services.

2.3.3 What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of the gender inequality gap in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

179. Through SBCC WFP has made efforts to address the underlying causes of malnutrition, specifically in the transfer of key messages related to nutrition to both men and women attending the different nutrition activities.

180. A WFP-commissioned nutrition causal analysis undertaken in 2015¹⁵² emphasized the role of SBCC in addressing the cultural issues of child care (including the impact of early marriage) health, food preparation, hygiene and immunization. It recommended the need to explore ways of effectively engaging community and religious leaders and opinion leaders to change practices in Somalia.

181. However, Figure 7 demonstrates that the number of men reached with messages is considerably lower than the number of women because the main caregivers in Somali society are women and these are the main attendees at nutrition centres where SBCC activities are centred.

Figure 7: Number of men and women receiving SBCC messages through different WFP nutrition activities 2015–2016


¹⁴⁸ Forcier, 2017, Nutrition Cluster Geo-Tagging Capacity Assessment.

¹⁴⁹ WFP, 2013, Standard Project Report.

¹⁵⁰ WFP, 2014, Standard Project Report.

¹⁵¹ WFP, 2015, Standard Project Report.

¹⁵² SNS Consortium, 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis Study South Central Somalia.



Source: WFP, 2015–2016 Standard Project Reports PRRO 200433 and PRRO 200844.

182. There have been fewer efforts to undertake SBCC at community level¹⁵³ or through mass media. Efforts to reach community influencers, such as religious leaders and elders, are not evident despite reference to them as key to behavioural change in WFP Somalia’s Communication for Behaviour Change Strategy for WFP Interventions under PRRO 200443.

2.3.4 What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, and with bilateral partners and NGO partners at an operational level?

183. WFP’s efforts in TSFP and BSFP complemented directly the work of UNICEF in OTP with WFP, addressing the treatment of MAM and the prevention of malnutrition while UNICEF addresses the treatment of SAM. As noted above, synergy between WFP and UNICEF was hampered by the lower risk appetite of WFP when compared with UNICEF, which resulted in UNICEF providing services in areas where WFP did not work.

184. Operationally, the Joint Health and Nutrition Programme (JHNP) was started in 2012 and is overseen by the MoHs of the Somaliland, Puntland and the FGS as well as the United Nations Resident Coordinator. The programme targeted nine regions in Somalia with service delivery.

185. A mid-term evaluation of the JHNP found that public sector financing was limited and implementation of policies and plans remained largely dependent on the donors’ financing. The implementation was, to a large extent, carried out by international agencies – procurement and distribution of medicines by UNICEF or NGOs as implementing partners for service delivery.¹⁵⁴

186. However, the mid-term evaluation also stated that health facilities were staffed by dedicated staff who, despite not operating in ideal conditions, were determined to serve their patients in the best way possible despite many challenges, including; delays in salary payments, availability of medicines, some equipment and instruments, and the infrastructure not being appropriate to the needs in many places. This hampered the provision of services, but the level of service provided is still high and on track to meet most targets for the JHNP.

¹⁵³ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report PRRO 200844.

¹⁵⁴ Bernt, A. et al., 2015, Mid-term Review of the Somali Joint Health and Nutrition Programme.

187. In addition to WFP's ongoing partnership with UNICEF and because of the deteriorating food security and malnutrition situation in the drought-affected areas in northern Somalia in the first half of 2016, UNICEF and WFP teamed up to deliver an integrated package of life-saving humanitarian assistance to people affected by the drought in northern Somalia. The augmented response package included unconditional food assistance, preventive and curative nutrition programmes, livelihoods activities, health services and support to communities to enable them access safe water and improve sanitation and hygiene conditions. Assistance was delivered through the SCOPE multi-wallet function.

188. By 2017 the Operational Plan for Pre-famine Scale up was stating that famine was a "strong possibility" if no action was taken. Key informants reported that WFP was at the forefront of advocacy to raise awareness and the necessary funds to mount a response.

189. Nutrition Cluster partners planned to provide life-saving nutrition interventions by establishing additional mobile clinics, fixed nutrition sites and outreach clinics to treat and prevent severe and MAM in children age 6–59 months and PLW. Partners also planned to provide preventive interventions such as blanket supplementary feeding, MCHN, basic nutrition service package and micronutrient supplementation all targeting PLW and children under 6–59 months old.¹⁵⁵ WFP was an important contributor to this effort reaching 92.8 percent of all the MAM cases treated.

190. WFP also seconded a staff member to the position of Deputy Nutrition Cluster Coordinator to support the wider humanitarian community efforts in nutrition. Examples of collaboration and complementarity with NGO's includes work with the Somalia Nutrition Consortium (SNS) on the 2015, Nutrition Causal Analysis.

191. In general, key informants were happy with the collaboration with WFP. However, the SNS consortium was unhappy with the fact that WFP did not provide complementary TSFP services to the OTP services the consortium was providing in the south, forcing them to increase the length of time SAM cases stayed in OTP to ensure full recovery.

192. It is evident however that the SNS consortium had not consulted enough with WFP to determine WFP's position. WFP could not operate in areas where it could not undertake monitoring. However, the SNS consortium and DFID (the funder) could send their third-party monitors to the locations the consortium was working in, suggesting that WFP's risk appetite was lower than some of its partners.

193. In terms of resilience programming, the JRP between FAO, UNICEF and WFP recognized that nutrition was integral to resilience in Somalia. It was necessary both to achieve resilience and as an excellent measurement of resilience levels achieved and maintained.¹⁵⁶ However, with WFP focusing on the emergency at the end of 2016 and throughout 2017, little was achieved regarding the programme.

194. More recently WFP provided support to the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia Consortium (BRCiS) of NGO's by providing commodities for nutrition programming, making the BRCiS approach more holistic. The BRCiS consortium takes a holistic approach to support communities to develop their capacity to withstand minor shocks.

195. WFP has demonstrated that it is taking an opportunistic approach to programming. For example, there are plans for UNFPA and WFP to work together through their partners in 14 maternity homes on both nutrition and maternal health. The idea is to work both with pregnant

¹⁵⁵ UNOCHA, 2017, Operational Plan for famine Prevention.

¹⁵⁶ Unauthored, From Somalia Joint Resilience Strategy 2013–2015 to the Joint Resilience Programme 2017-2021.

women and young girls and on gender-based violence (GBV) prevention and mitigation. Some of the clinics are, in fact, already working as GBV one-stop centres. This will allow WFP to expand its programming further in the south, an area that is difficult to access in Somalia.

196. Key informants reported that progress on SUN has been slow. Partially because of the complexity of dealing with three government authorities, but also because there is still a need to sensitize the different ministries about their role in nutrition.

197. Several recommendations were made following the self-assessment¹⁵⁷ that took place in 2016, including:

- more commitment from government and relevant stakeholders was needed in SUN in Somalia;
- since the business network was missing from this workshop, sincere effort needs to be made to get them more involved and strengthen their capacity to SUN;
- Somalia Chamber of Commerce, food companies that deal with importing food and other relevant businesses that the Ministry of Commerce and Industries identifies, which can help SUN, should all be implored to join in the SUN movement;
- government, through the Ministry of Planning, should ensure integration of nutrition into the SNDP and develop a common results framework; and
- speed up the remaining activities (that is the financial and expenditure tracking systems, the common results framework, a costed multisectoral nutrition action plan, and advocacy, communication and social mobilization strategies).

2.3.4 How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

198. WFP's efforts at consolidating its nutrition activities in MCHN structures provides the potential for sustainability. However, none of the MoH in FGS, Somaliland or Puntland have the capacity, financially or practically (human resources, logistical or materials) to take over the management of the nutrition activities undertaken by WFP. In addition, as noted earlier in the report, the geographical coverage of MCHN centres is limited.

199. WFP has undertaken capacity-building activities throughout the portfolio period. In 2013, WFP worked with close to 200 CPs, including international and national NGOs. WFP held 52 separate trainings for CPs, focusing on the proper implementation of WFP programmes and correct administrative procedures for invoicing and other activities.¹⁵⁸ WFP's 2013 SPR noted, "It has been widely noted that investments made in capacity building of our partners have been reflected in improved quality programming – particularly in the areas of nutrition."

200. In 2014, WFP conducted nutrition-related training workshops for the staff of partners cooperating with WFP. WFP also entered into an umbrella agreement with World Vision International in 2014, where the INGO provided assistance to more than one activity in several operational areas. This agreement allowed for greater flexibility in project implementation and facilitated increased capacity building of NGOs in Somalia.¹⁵⁹

201. In 2015 WFP focused on strengthening coordination with the MoH of Somaliland based on an LoU that came into effect in 2015. This provided a basis for joint programming, supportive supervision, monitoring, capacity building and data management.

¹⁵⁷ SUN, 2016, SUN Movement Reporting, Somalia Joint Assessment by Multi-Stakeholder Platform.

¹⁵⁸ WFP, 2013, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

¹⁵⁹ WFP, 2014, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

202. Enhanced capacity development activities aimed at improving the quality of programmes were provided to MoH and cooperating-partner staff. Five technical training sessions on the treatment of acute malnutrition, MCHN and HIV/TB were conducted in Puntland, Somaliland, central Somalia and Mogadishu.

203. In 2016, following on from previous agreements signed with the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland, WFP signed an LoU with the MoH in Mogadishu to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry in terms of planning, coordination, monitoring and overall supervision of WFP-supported nutrition activities in Somalia. For example, in 2016, WFP supported the government and local administration to review the nutrition strategy, policy formulation and coordination, by providing training on planning and development of nutrition interventions. WFP also provided programme-implementation related training, including warehouse training, and provided training in fuel-efficient stoves as some government authorities are implementing activities directly.¹⁶⁰ One area for further capacity support requested by government was in data management. The MoH in Puntland, Somaliland and FGS have a health data base that they currently use and have requested support to incorporate the nutrition data available into this system.

204. In addition, FSNAU has been working over the last few years to transfer much of its capacity into offices in Somalia and has started to work closely with the government on capacity development for data collection and analysis. This may be an opportunity for WFP VAM to engage both with FSNAU and the government authorities in a systematic effort to build data collection, management and analysis capacity.

205. WFP also continued the umbrella agreement previously established in 2015 with WFP's strategic partners (DRC, Save the Children and World Vision International). The partnership has created a forum for programmatic discussions and solving of operational issues. CPs also stated that they participate in monthly planning meetings with WFP and mid-term reviews as well as contributing to WFP strategic planning.

206. As part of a wider contribution to the humanitarian system in Somalia, WFP contributed a Deputy Cluster Coordinator for the Nutrition Cluster in Somalia. The Nutrition Cluster has been operational in Somalia since 2006, following the HCT recommendations to activate the cluster system to effectively coordinate the humanitarian crisis in the country and its aim is to ensure that cluster stakeholders have the necessary capacity to achieve appropriate, timely and quality nutrition response to emergencies.

207. Government and WFP key informants highlighted the contribution to salaries of staff that WFP makes to nutrition departments/units within the ministries and the support they get from undertaking supervision activities. Key informants also noted that there are often delays in the payments including the daily subsistence allowance provided by WFP, which affects the staff motivation.

208. However, key informants from MoH also noted that they are not involved in strategic discussions with WFP. Key informants cited the example of engaging with UNICEF and WHO on an annual work plan process where responsibilities and roles are detailed and agreed. WFP does not engage with the MoH in this way. In addition, all UNICEF partners are endorsed by the MoH, whereas this is not the case for WFP partners, raising concerns that some of the partners may not be certified or have a Memorandum of Understanding with the government. In addition, the MoH would like to receive the reports that WFP receives from its partners to be able to better supervise activities.

¹⁶⁰ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report PRRO 200844.

Annex M: Findings on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Logistics

1. Introduction

1. Flooding and drought are part of everyday life in Somalia and because of high levels of vulnerability, such hazards often turn into emergencies. Most of the Somali population is dependent on pastoralism and rainfed agricultural activities for their survival. Climate change and deforestation arising from the long-term use of charcoal has contributed to an environment that is extremely sensitive to shocks. Droughts and floods are common.

2. In 2011, a severe drought hit the Horn of Africa and famine was declared in parts of Somalia for the first time since 1991. In 2014, the food-security situation in Somalia again deteriorated significantly with 1.1 million people in crisis and emergency (IPC Phase 3 and 4).¹⁶¹ In late 2015, the cyclical weather phenomenon, El Niño, hit the region, exacerbating the existing drought in Somaliland. This was followed by heavy rains and flooding causing further displacement and outbreaks of water-borne diseases.


3. Because of the poor Gu (long) rains in 2016 and two failed back-to-back growing seasons across much of central, north-eastern and northern Somalia, over five million people (more than 40 percent of the population) were assessed to be food insecure. The continued failure of the rains in 2016 through 2017 led to the loss of livelihoods, scarcity of water and pasture, and the displacement of 766,000 people.¹⁶² Almost 60 percent of acutely food-insecure people among the most vulnerable groups were internally displaced.

4. IPC analysis for Phases 2 to 4 (Figure 8) indicates the growing trend in food insecurity since the food crisis of 2012. The chart also shows the increasing level of access to vulnerable populations resulting from the improving security situation.

Figure 8: IPC phases - trend analysis by population (2012-2017)

¹⁶¹ WFP Executive Brief, October 2014.

¹⁶² adesoafrika.org/what-we-do/blogs/the-formation-of-the-somali-national-disaster-management-policy.



Source: WFP VAM (FSNAU Data).

5. By mid-2017, 2.9 million people (25 percent of the population) were classified as being in IPC Phase 3, crisis, or Phase 4, emergency, conditions across the country.¹⁶³ This was double the number in need in August 2016. Over 3 million were in Phase 2, stressed. Despite falls in the number of people classed as in Phases 2 and 3, the number of people classified as IPC Phase 4, estimated at 22,000 in February 2016, increased dramatically in 2017.

6. Drought has been a major driver of food insecurity. Consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, near total crop failures and loss of livestock have undermined food security. Many areas of the eastern Horn of Africa experienced very poor rainfall between 2015 and 2017.¹⁶⁴ An analysis of agricultural production data shows that the frequency of poor agricultural production (that is, cereal harvests less than 70 percent of average) rose from 27 percent during the 1995–2016 period to 67 percent in years when the season started poorly. Consequently, the intervals between humanitarian crises have significantly shortened in recent years.

7. The humanitarian situation in Somalia has been complex and protracted, including conflict as well as cyclical natural disasters, the impact of which was aggravated because of the difficult access for humanitarian actors. The country suffers from chronic fragility of state institutions as a result of two decades of civil war and the Islamist Al-Shabaab group controls large parts of the south-central areas, which further complicates humanitarian access. The African Union peace-support force (AMISOM)¹⁶⁵ was deployed to provide security, but also takes offensive action against Al-Shabaab.

8. While much of the south of the country remains under the control of Al-Shabaab, in the north, Somaliland is a self-declared independent entity and Puntland a semi-autonomous region. Both regions have established governance and administrative structures that ensure relative peace and security, although border areas between the two remain contested.

9. Population displacement, trade disruption due to insecurity and a scarcity of employment opportunities and income has combined with high food prices to erode purchasing power,

¹⁶³ Food Security Information Network: Global Report of Food Crisis 2017.

¹⁶⁴ <http://www.fews.net/east-africa/alert/september-29-2017>.

¹⁶⁵ AMISOM includes over 22,000 troops and police) and is presently fighting Al-Shabaab together with the National Security Forces of Somalia. It operates under a mandate (UNSC resolution 2182/2014) to protect the Somali Federal Government.

especially among unskilled wage labourers.¹⁶⁶ During the evaluation period, over one million people have continuously been displaced and gathered in informal settlements mainly in the urban areas. Another one million fled to other countries, mainly to Kenya (420,000), Ethiopia (250,000) and Yemen (250,000).¹⁶⁷ The conflict in Yemen further complicated the situation with returning Somalis and Yemeni refugees entering Somalia from the north.

10. With the longest coastline (3,333 km) in Africa, and about 55 percent of the population living along it, Somali ports are an important element of the supply chain for effective humanitarian response. The 21,933 km long road network in Somalia is in poor condition. Ninety percent of the primary roads have deteriorated and are past their designed life span. Within the country, only 2,860 km (13 percent) of roads are paved, the rest of the network being earth or gravel. There are approximately 60 airstrips, airfields and airports spread across the country with 7 major feeder airports, and 23 other important airstrips, several of which are used by the UNHAS. The six main airports include Mogadishu, Berbera, Hargeisa, Bossaso, Garowe and Kismayo. Almost all other major urban centres also maintain at least one airstrip that can handle a small aircraft. Additionally, WFP Somalia logistics maintains an operational presence at the four main seaports¹⁶⁸ of Mogadishu, Bossaso, Berbera and Kismayo.

11. The thematic scope of this annex to the WFP Somalia CPE considers the CO's programme from the perspective of emergency preparedness and response (EPR). It sees the role played by the logistics department as a strategically and operationally important function that underpins programme delivery under EMOP 200281, PRRO 200443 and PRRO 200844. The annex also focuses on two inter-agency common services¹⁶⁹ hosted by WFP Somalia – UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster. The following SOPs (Table 27) were also reviewed:

Table 27: Special operations reviewed

SOp no.	Date	Operation
105780	07 Feb–13 Mar	Emergency rehabilitation works for logistics infrastructure in Somalia
106810	07 Aug–12 Dec	Humanitarian air service in support of relief operations in Somalia and Kenya
200344	Jan–12 Dec	Logistics and emergency telecommunications cluster augmentation in response to the humanitarian situation in Somalia
200475	13 Apr–14 Nov	Development of logistical infrastructure for Somalia and the Horn of Africa corridor
200507	13 Jan–15 Dec	Provision of humanitarian air services in Somalia and Kenya
200637	14 Jan–14 Dec	Security augmentation in support of WFP operations in Somalia
200924	16 Jan–17 Dec	Provision of humanitarian air services in Somalia and in Kenya
201051	17 Jun–18 May	Emergency rehabilitation work and capacity strengthening at the Port of Kismayo

Source: SPRs.

¹⁶⁶ Food Security Information Network: Global Report of Food Crisis 2017.

¹⁶⁷ Regional Humanitarian Crises Analysis – SIDA 2016.

¹⁶⁸ Other smaller ports include Aluula, Maydh, Lughaya, Eyl, Qandala, Hafun, Hobyo, Garacad and El-Maan, although not all are accessible for security reasons.

¹⁶⁹ WFP also co-hosts (with FAO) the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, which is not evaluated in this annex.

12. In the aftermath of the 2011 famine, WFP supported 3.6 million vulnerable Somalis during 2012 through an EMOP (200281)¹⁷⁰, which was further supported by four SOps (105780, 106810, 200344 & 200440). Since 2012, WFP Somalia's EMOPs have been managed and funded through the GFA elements of PRRO 200443 and, currently, 200844, as well as the SOps noted above.

13. During the evaluation period, WFP's focus was primarily on addressing humanitarian needs. Ongoing insecurity in conjunction with the poor transport infrastructure left the humanitarian sector with limited options for delivering life-saving cargo to people scattered across the country. Although in this complex context the CO tackles one of the most challenging humanitarian operations in the world, the Somali private sector has responded positively – through local markets – to the availability of cash-based transfers (CBTs) to beneficiaries, which enabled an alternative and innovative means of preparing for and responding to crises.

14. The CPE looked at the range of emergency preparedness, response and logistics interventions that have been implemented in Somalia over the period 2012 to 2017 and considered individual projects only as they relate strategically to SOps. Cross-cutting cash-based transfer activities were reviewed strategically from a technical perspective, with an emphasis on the use of the SCOPE platform.

15. Given the turnover of staff and other key informants, and the dynamic nature of operations caused by fluctuations in the security situation, the evaluation team faced limitations in obtaining some information. Therefore, findings mainly relate to the period 2014 to 2017 and consider EQs that are most relevant to WFP Somalia EPR, logistics and common services.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning

2.1.1 Context for aid delivery in Somalia (2012–2017)

16. The humanitarian situation in Somalia has been complex and protracted, with difficult access for humanitarian actors, such as WFP. The Islamist Al-Shabaab group controls large parts of the south-central areas. Road access is constrained by illegal checkpoints, poor infrastructure, clashes along major routes and direct threats on humanitarian and commercial goods during transit. The African Union Mission in Somalia peace-support force¹⁷¹ was deployed to provide security, but also took offensive action against Al-Shabaab. As of 2016, Somalia has been officially divided into six regional states – Puntland, Galmudug, Jubaland, South West State, Somaliland and Khaatumo. Somaliland is a self-declared independent entity and Puntland a semi-autonomous region. Both have established governance and administrative structures that ensure relative peace and security, although border areas between the two remain contested.

17. The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (MoHADM)¹⁷² in Mogadishu, the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) in Puntland and the Food

¹⁷⁰ The EMOP objectives were to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergency and early recovery situations (WFP Strategic Objective 1) and to prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (WFP Strategic Objective 2).

¹⁷¹ AMISOM includes over 22,000 troops and police) and is presently fighting Al-Shabaab together with the National Security Forces of Somalia. It operates under a mandate (UNSC resolution 2182/2014) to protect the Somali Federal Government.

¹⁷² In 2016 a national disaster management policy was drafted. The CPE team discussed this with the permanent secretary of MoHADM, Mohamed Moalim.

Aid Coordination Agency (FACA), hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture in Somaliland, are the primary official interlocutors for WFP (for relief interventions) and its partners. The Federal Government's aim is to establish disaster management centres in districts and regions nationwide for data collection, early warning, information management, capacity building and disaster preparedness. While the governments at both federal and state levels currently have limited human resources and institutional capacity, they have gained traction and been proactive in announcing that humanitarian aid was expected to experience a significant spike in 2017 similar to the response to the 2011 famine, during which humanitarian aid surged to nearly USD 800 million.¹⁷³

18. Somalia is emerging from 25 years of political instability and economic challenges. Conflict that began in 1991 has fragmented the country, undermined political institutions and, combined with periods of flooding and severe drought, created widespread vulnerability. According to the World Bank¹⁷⁴, a lack of reliable data has left policymakers and donors to operate in a statistical vacuum, which poses a threat to the design and implementation of programmes needed to support resilience, development and humanitarian assistance.

19. Half of the population of about 12 million lives below the international poverty line (USD 1.90 a day). Inequality has been driven by the difference in the incidence of poverty in different locations: 60 percent in Mogadishu, more than 40 percent in other urban settings, over 50 percent in rural areas and in IDP settlements about 70 percent.¹⁷⁵ During the evaluation period, over one million people have been continuously internally displaced¹⁷⁶, gathering in informal settlements mainly in urban areas. Another one million have fled to other countries, such as Kenya (420,000), Ethiopia (250,000) and Yemen (250,000).¹⁷⁷ The conflict in Yemen further complicated the situation with returning Somalis and Yemeni refugees entering Somalia from the north.

20. Remittance services are a large industry, with the Somali diaspora contributing approximately USD 1.4 billion annually to the economy.¹⁷⁸ Mobile telecommunications service providers¹⁷⁹ have grown significantly. According to a World Bank report¹⁸⁰, 73 percent of the population¹⁸¹ above the age of 16 use mobile money services. Puntland has the highest mobile money penetration rate, closely followed by Somaliland, with south-central having a broad use of mobile money and cash-transfer services. Of those who receive a salary or allowance, more than half receive this directly on their mobile money account, and of these 63 percent keep their funds digitally within the system (do not cash out). This prompts more active and varied use of other mobile money services, including utility and merchant payments.

¹⁷³ Aid Coordination Unit, Office of Prime Minister Federal Republic of Somalia, April 2017.

¹⁷⁴ Somali Poverty Profile, World Bank, June 2017.

¹⁷⁵ Somali Poverty Profile 2017 W-Bank.

¹⁷⁶ Approximately 9 percent of the population are internally displaced. Poverty incidence is highest in IDP settlements where seven out of ten people are poor. WFP regards people as IDPs even though they may have been displaced in 1991, during the civil war.

¹⁷⁷ Regional Humanitarian Crises Analysis – SIDA 2016.

¹⁷⁸ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/06/10/world-bank-makes-progress-to-support-remittance-flows-to-somalia>.

¹⁷⁹ ICT is one of the fastest growing sectors and the third largest employer in the country, employing around 25,000 Somalis. The penetration rate of mobile money in each zone is dominated by one mobile money service (Hormuud's EVC Plus in south-central, Golis' Sahal in Puntland and Telesom's Zaad in Somaliland). Banking services nationally remain very low, at 15.5 percent.

¹⁸⁰ Mobile Money in Somalia, Household Survey and Market Analysis, World Bank, March 2017.

¹⁸¹ Eighty-three percent of population in urban areas and between 55 percent and 72 percent in rural areas.

21. For international transfers, Hawala is commonly used, though remittance companies are increasingly partnering with mobile network operators to transfer international money directly to the mobile money accounts. Mobile money is regularly transferred across different states in south-central, but Somaliland remains a largely autonomous zone. The services are deemed to be fast and convenient, but the system remains unregulated.¹⁸²

22. Markets in Somalia are growing rapidly. The CO procurement office has noted that even stationery has, since 2016/2017, been available in many locations and the percentage of product availability is increasing annually. WFP, donors and many aid organizations took the opportunity to invest in cash and market-based programming as an effective means to provide humanitarian assistance, which in turn further stimulated market growth. However according to the World Bank, Somalia remains highly dependent on imports.¹⁸³ The economic structure is profoundly affected by conflict and aid, making the economy relatively urbanized¹⁸⁴ and unevenly integrated with the global economy.

23. The expansion of CBT programming in Somalia became a key element of WFP's EPR approach to GFA and builds on work begun in 2011. As a result, the role of the logistics department changed significantly to adapt to the strengthening local markets and the ability to use retailers to supply food commodities as part of CBT services used by implementing partners.

24. The WFP portfolio largely remained the same over the evaluation period: GFA (relief), resilience, school meals and nutrition. WFP's corporate strategic plans guide all interventions for EPR. Under the 2014–2017 Plan the most relevant section is Strategic Objective 1 (SO1) – to Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies.

25. The head of WFP logistics also led the Logistics Cluster¹⁸⁵, which was established to address logistical gaps and help the humanitarian community to build, maintain and seek ways to improve capabilities to efficiently and effectively deliver assistance. Additionally, WFP Somalia hosted the UNHAS, which provides passenger and cargo transport services from Kenya to and within Somalia. UNHAS also provided flight services to the refugee camps of Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya.

26. Since 2015, For the supply of food commodities, since 2015 WFP Somalia has relied primarily on the service offered by the Rome-based Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) for the supply of food commodities. This is a strategic financing platform for pre-positioning food in a region or corridor based on anticipated CO demand. The majority of WFP Somalia's requirements were supplied from GCMF stocks.¹⁸⁶

2.1.2 *Relevance to humanitarian needs, priorities and capacities*

27. The United Nations HRP for Somalia targeted an average of 1.1 million people in crisis and 1.1 million IDPs per year during the evaluation period. See Table 28

¹⁸² Mobile services can be prone to technical issues and mistakes, including problems with cash out processes and the lack of interconnectivity between different mobile money providers. The US dollar is commonly used for all types of transactions, particularly to pay for durable goods, to send/receive money and to cash out digital money.

¹⁸³ Somalia Economic Update, July 2017, World Bank.

¹⁸⁴ In 2016, 40.03 percent of Somalia's total population lived in urban areas and cities.
www.statista.com/statistics/455928/urbanization-in-somalia/

¹⁸⁵ Approximately 15 to 20 percent of the time of the Head of logistics is dedicated to managing the logistics cluster. (WFP also co-leads the Food Security Cluster together with FAO).

¹⁸⁶ Information based on interview with WFP Somalia logistics. Stocks held at the port of Berbera provide most supplies.

28. Of the resources requested by UNOCHA, approximately 53 percent of projected need was unmet, although there was little variation in appeal figures despite the changing context. While WFP's main objectives have been aligned to the HRPs and the CO played a major role in saving lives and protecting livelihoods in emergencies, the difficult resourcing environment occasionally caused breaks in the supply of food assistance pipeline (particularly for supplementary food commodities).¹⁸⁷ Between 2012 and 2016, 47 percent of WFP resource requirements were met. See Table 29.

29. Given the highly dynamic and primarily emergency context, WFP Somalia is regarded as having been able to adapt and expand its activities quickly to respond to emergency needs, which were well anticipated.

Table 28: Consolidated appeal/humanitarian response plan

Population (millions) (IPC Phase)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Stressed	1.3	1.7	2.3	2.1	3.5	3.9
Crisis	2.5	2.1	0.8		0.3	1.1
IDPs	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Appeal USD (millions)	1,100	1,300	933	863	885	864
Met (%)	49	57	41	38	50	65.7
Unmet (%)	51	43	59	62	50	34.3

Source: UNOCHA HRPs/UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service.

Table 29: WFP Somalia CO funding

Type of operation	Required (USD)	Received (USD)	Received as a fraction of required (%)
Emergency operation (EMOP 200281)	427,681,847	311,308,763	73
PRRO (PRRO 200443)	788,990,181	422,895,937	54
PRRO (PRRO 200844)	729,313,108	138,725,636	19
8 x Special operations (SOp)	338,009,652	204,181,855	60
Total	2,283,994,788	1,077,112,191	47

Source: SPRs 2012–2016.

Coherence with stated national agenda and policies

30. Endorsed in September 2013, the New Deal Somali Compact (Somali Compact) set out a partnership framework covering the period from 2014 to 2016. It was based on mutual accountability and shared risk between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Parliament, regions, civil society, the international community and the people of Somalia. Its aim was to provide an overarching Strategic Framework for coordinating political, security and development efforts for peace and state-building activities. The key priorities set out by the Somali Compact continue under the 2017 to 2019 Somali National Development Plan (SNDP). UNICEF is co-leading the sub-working groups on Disaster Management, Social Protection and Food Security and Nutrition, with technical support from WFP.

¹⁸⁷ Based on an analysis of Pipeline Committee Meeting minutes.

31. Linked to the SNDP, a draft national disaster management policy was approved by the Federal MoHADM.¹⁸⁸ Regional and federal authorities supported the draft and experts from the United Nations, NGOs, private sector and civil society in Mogadishu provided input. As the first such national disaster management initiative, this policy aims to improve community resilience and emergency preparedness to significantly reduce the loss of lives and property.¹⁸⁹ It also provides the legislative framework for disaster management within relevant government institutions by improving disaster risk governance at the federal and regional levels and incorporating disaster risk reduction into the National Development Plan.

32. Through interviews with the Ministry of Interior in Baidoa (South West State) the CPE team learned that the government provides a platform for humanitarian and development activities and worked closely with the federal authorities to develop a road map with partners (including WFP) to address security and stabilization issues. Social impact projects have been regarded as a priority, with WFP's operations aligned to the policy and necessarily focused on humanitarian needs during the evaluation period.

33. Overall, increasing cooperation enabled better response capabilities. For example, the federal authorities advised¹⁹⁰ that the diaspora and business community were among the first responders to the 2016/2017 crisis. Remittance companies were able to reach out to communities faster than the aid community through money transfers because of their national footprint (even in areas where the government cannot function). Coordination on this occasion was key and WFP's approach to scaling up the use of CBTs through the implementation of SCOPE, as a platform for the biometric registration of beneficiaries, played an important part.

34. The government supported CBT as a key priority for WFP and regards it as being better than 'traditional aid' because it helps to boost the local economy. WFP can, therefore, play a strong role in stabilization and social protection. The South West State authorities advised that they intend to register people for security, economic and stabilization purposes, but lack the means to achieve this and are looking for a good biometric system to use.

2.1.3 *Coherent and harmonized with partners*

35. Over the portfolio period several consolidated appeals (CAP) and HRPs were released incorporating the work of the sectoral clusters. A review of the CAP 2013–2015 suggested that because of the lack of funding much of the efforts should have been focused on the life-saving elements of the plan rather than the resilience and safety-net efforts. This recommendation aligned with WFP's Strategic Objective 1.

36. The 2017 HRP for Somalia was a reprioritized plan seeking USD 864 million to target 3.9 million people. The plan aimed to provide life-saving assistance, while at the same time strengthen linkages between the humanitarian action and the durable solutions to end need. The HRP included key strategic priorities that ensure humanitarian assistance reduces human suffering caused by conflict and natural disasters. Under UNOCHA's leadership, sector clusters were active

¹⁸⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Somali_Disaster_Management_Agency (Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Mohamed Moalim).

¹⁸⁹ FGS National Development Plan 2017–2019, section 9.9.3 (vision statement) states that 'Effective disaster preparedness and response will be mainstreamed in public and private sector work and by individuals, significantly reducing deaths, damage, economic loss and people affected by disasters'.

¹⁹⁰ Based on interview in Mogadishu with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management.

in coordinating each of the main areas of humanitarian response. The Strategic Response Plan (SRP)¹⁹¹ consolidates the collective annual HRP.

37. WFP's strategy was driven by the SRPs and plans under PRROs 200443 and 200844. From a preparedness and response perspective, the CO has helped to address challenges faced by the humanitarian community in institutionalising CBT coordination. For example, there was limited cash preparedness prior to 2016 mainly because of difficulties in providing consistent coordination between major emergencies. As there had been an active Cash Working Group (CWG) in the past, WFP and the CaLP re-formed the group in February 2017. Interviewees suggested that had an effective CWG been in place in 2016 it is possible that several important technical and strategic decisions about cash programming could have been made much earlier, which may have led to a more coherent cash-based response. Nevertheless, WFP's support to the CWG was well regarded. However, despite developing links with the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG) and efforts to brief senior leaders on the use of cash transfers, the HCT still sought evidence from the CWG to support the use of cash at scale.¹⁹² Efforts were needed to ensure that 'cash' is understood and integrated into programmes.

38. Building on synergies between both organizations, WFP and UNICEF engaged in a strategic partnership to jointly implement an augmented humanitarian response using SCOPE. The joint response targeted IDPs with critical levels of malnutrition, as well as Somali refugees returning from Kenya. The use of SCOPE for both in-kind and cash-based programmes served as an important form of digital identity.¹⁹³ The platform was used for registration, food assistance and nutrition, as well as to ensure that value transfers were performed securely and that only targeted beneficiaries received assistance.

39. WFP was an active partner of the Return Consortium facilitating the voluntary return of Somali refugees from Kenya. Contributing to the tripartite agreement between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR, WFP supported the voluntary return of refugees and their reintegration.

40. WFP Somalia led the Logistics Cluster and played an important role as the humanitarian logistics focal point with the national authorities. In 2016, WFP mobilized up to 200 contracted trucks and a time-charter vessel to support the delivery of food assistance to various locations in Somalia on behalf of the humanitarian community.

41. A significant coordination challenge faced by the Logistics Cluster related to the limited ability of user organizations to provide advanced (non-food) pipeline plans. Such plans are essential to enable the efficient matching of logistical assets to existing needs. A lack of forward planning further limited the ability of the cluster to help partners advocate for funding. Through regular coordination meetings and other communication channels, the Logistics Cluster staff were able to mitigate some of the planning challenges, but this was time consuming and required additional capacity to be effective¹⁹⁴ – particularly in supporting smaller international and national organizations.

¹⁹¹ The SRP replaced the Consolidated Annual Appeal (CAP) process.

¹⁹² CWG meeting minutes. The cautious approach to risk may have slowed the move to cash and level of coverage in earlier humanitarian operations.

¹⁹³ Many of the population do not have an official identity card.

¹⁹⁴ WFP logistics staff, including the head of logistics, provide part time inputs to the logistics cluster .

42. The Logistics Cluster was not backed by a strategic vision (for logistics and supply-chain management) in the HCT or among donors, which could have led to costly inefficiencies. Minutes from user group meetings available online indicated that most coordination meetings were focused primarily on short-term tactical and operational issues and possibly inadequately considered longer-term strategic requirements that could reflect issues such as: support to local market¹⁹⁵ (as well as regional or international) supply chains to sustain long-term cash-based programming, joint food and non-food pipeline¹⁹⁶ management and the related contracting of transport services, cost-sharing of common logistics services, fuel supply, vehicle maintenance and potential infrastructure improvements.

43. Donors have been supportive of WFP's efforts regarding in-kind food deliveries and CBT scale up, and using the CO's capacity and scale helped to reduce their grant management burden. They recognized that while the drought conditions in 2017 were as bad as those in 2011, aid efforts helped to significantly reduce mortality.¹⁹⁷

44. Cash-based programming was the biggest transformation for the CO during the evaluation period and stakeholders recognized that the private sector is better placed (technically) to deliver money transfers, which in turn stimulates market-based activities that can be monitored. Using mobile money may become a cheaper means for WFP to help, working primarily through its intellectual capacity. Donors and the FGS (based on the National Development Plan) encourage programmes that support the development of a unified approach to social protection and safety nets.¹⁹⁸

45. Donors are increasingly aligned about how CBT should be implemented.¹⁹⁹ The European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) may advocate for cash transfers to be channelled through a single agency, with other agencies then needing to specialize in programme delivery. Overall, there is a need for a common CBT system or architecture for cash programming. However, as of the end of 2017, it was unclear how the 'cash pipeline' would be sustained, with benefits maintained and further developed.

46. Under Strategic Objective 1, in 2016 the CO signed two-year FLAs²⁰⁰ with World Vision International, Save the Children International and the DRC. Among various activities, the CPs undertook to contribute to providing life-saving relief assistance to populations in crisis and emergency. To assist returning refugees and IDPs, DRC further agreed to support the registration and transfer management of all returnees to Somalia by building on the collaboration developed with WFP in Mogadishu and Berbera. DRC also undertook to develop a data sharing protocol to be supported through the SCOPE beneficiary management system.

2.1.4 *Extent that WFP was strategic in alignments and positioned where it can make the biggest difference*

47. WFP's operational base depended on working through international and local NGOs. At the beginning of the evaluation period, WFP worked with almost 200 CPs and held stakeholder

¹⁹⁵ WFP Logistics has held meetings with food importers.

¹⁹⁶ Interviews with members of the HCT indicated that WFP and the Logistics Cluster could have played usefully a stronger coordination role.

¹⁹⁷ ECHO advised that actual mortality in 2017 was less than 10 percent of that which occurred in 2011.

¹⁹⁸ A humanitarian safety net model could be similar to the HSNP in Kenya.

¹⁹⁹ There was an agreement with between DFID and ECHO on a standardised transfer amount, which was set at 65 percent of the minimum expenditure basket or USD 70. USAID also provide USD 70 calculated as 80 percent of the food basket.

²⁰⁰ Based on copies of FLAs 2016 to 2018 for DRC, WVI and SCI.

meetings to refine GFA (and other) programme planning and implementation.²⁰¹ For example, WFP organized 52 separate training sessions for CPs in 2013, focusing on the implementation of programmes and administrative procedures for invoicing and other activities.²⁰² The scale of the interventions and scope of collaboration with partners has positioned WFP as a principal humanitarian agency for the implementation of emergency response activities and has improved the engagement of partners and the government in its operations. In general, the CO's consultations and communications with CPs regarding programme planning and operational decisions were found to have been positive, in particular since the establishment of WFP AOs, although the low level of capacity among local NGOs limited their operational capability.

48. Having operated within the country for many years, the CO's GFA programming is supported by a considerable corporate logistics and food supply-chain management capability that provided significant resources to quickly adapt and scale up crucial activities. These included the registration and monitoring of up to 895 local traders aligned to the SCOPE platform, who, during the latter part of the evaluation period, played a significant role in enabling the scale up of CBT. This scale up was also supported through WFP's global strategic agreement with Standard Chartered Bank, which, in turn, has an agreement with Amal Bank²⁰³ in Somalia to provide essential cash-transfer services. In terms of analytical capacity, WFP Somalia's comparative advantage was its on the ground presence (at AOs) that complemented the likes of FEWSnet and FSNAU.

49. Other agencies, such as UNICEF, UNHCR and many NGOs, necessarily maintain logistics and supply-chain management capabilities. To some extent, such agencies also contract air transport operators to move passengers and cargo to meet programme needs that are outside of the scope of WFP or where capacity is not available through common services provided through UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster. In such instances, it was found that there is generally good coordination around the use of assets and services via the Logistics Cluster, Inter-cluster working Group and other coordination mechanisms.

50. The Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport has overall responsibility for port management, development, rehabilitation and maintenance. However, the country lacks the required institutional framework to be effective and further lacks capacity to manage and maintain any infrastructure. The country's seaports play a crucial role in local trade and development. As Somalia is positioned on one of the most important world sea trade routes, the maritime sector represents a major potential to the economy. By supporting the government in the rehabilitation of maritime infrastructure (under SOp 105780 Logistics Augmentation, Feeder Roads, Ports Projects) in Mogadishu and Bossaso at a time of crucial need and political transition, WFP aimed to improve food import capacity and speed and at the same time help to encourage commercial opportunities.²⁰⁴

51. Supported by the logistics and procurement departments, the local purchase of cereals in the Jubaland and south-west regions began in 2013 through an agreement made with the Ministry of Agriculture. In 2014, 200 metric ton was purchased at a price just below import parity (WFP

²⁰¹ To lower operational costs and to build more strategic partnerships, from 2014 WFP worked with approximately 30 percent fewer cooperating partners than in 2013.

²⁰² WFP, 2013, Standard Project Report PRRO 200443.

²⁰³ <https://amalbankso.so/about-us/about-amal-bank/>.

²⁰⁴ The level of success of WFP's infrastructure rehabilitation investments is difficult to determine and could be the subject of a more detailed study.

paying between a 5 percent and 8 percent premium for good quality). Although the agreement ended after two years, potentially valuable connections were made with small farmers enabling them to improve production quality. In 2015 a further 4,000 mt were purchased²⁰⁵ and in 2016, 1,500 mt.

2.1.5 Extent to which there have been trade-offs in alignment with national strategies and WFP mission, plans and corporate policies

Beneficiary targeting

52. Under the GFA and CBT elements of the portfolio, targeting of the most vulnerable communities has been challenging, and there were concerns regarding the possible exclusion²⁰⁶ of beneficiaries, such as the Bantu in the southern part of the country. There was a reliance on critical data analysis conducted by WFP VAM, FSNAU (IPC) and FEWSnet and, given the rapid urbanization of the country, the government²⁰⁷ has been concerned that a more up to date means of targeting the most vulnerable people be adopted in the future. They saw a need for organizations, such as WFP, to maintain a strong field presence through increased engagement with local authorities to hold them accountable. There has been a perception that the international community was not particularly receptive to the government's call for strengthened and more strategic collaboration and engagement of local actors.

53. Further frustration with the international community was also evident regarding differing views or approaches to data management. WFP's role in data and information provision through SCOPE was acknowledged as the single biggest database in the country. The government also has a database with 1.5 million records, while the World Bank collects poverty profile data. There is no official identity card in Somalia, so agencies provide cards or use biometrics to verify beneficiaries. There are at least three currencies in Somalia with significant fluctuation in the exchange rates, but the US dollar is the preferred currency. Cash transfers are not always feasible in some areas when non-state armed groups impose economic blockades – such as in Wajid (Bakool region) and Dinsoor (Bay region) towns.²⁰⁸ Local markets are reliant on the transport routes that supply them.

54. The classification of IDPs was also seen as an issue. For example, people displaced during the war in 1991 were still being assisted as IDPs by WFP.²⁰⁹ Protracted displacement has resulted in settlements on the outskirts of Mogadishu and other large towns where people who lost all their rural assets have become 'urbanized' in an unplanned manner. The government attempted to create a more structured response to this problem and has allocated land specifically to support returnees from Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia.

2.2 Factors and quality of strategic decision-making

2.2.1 Extent to which WFP has analysed food security and nutrition-related issues

55. Multi-agency seasonal assessments, facilitated and reported by the FSNAU Somalia, provided the principal reference point for aligning WFP's operations with the humanitarian and

²⁰⁵ Payments were made upon delivery to the WFP warehouse in Mogadishu port.

²⁰⁶ There is a strong reliance on the services of third party monitors (CTG Global) to support targeting and monitoring. Some interviewees expressed concern that some of their staff may be prone to clan-based bias. Most CTG Global staff do not have a background in humanitarian work.

²⁰⁷ Based on interview with MoHADM.

²⁰⁸ Cash Working Group for Somalia Monthly Dashboard Report April 2017.

²⁰⁹ Anecdotal evidence gathered from WFP in Somaliland.

development needs of Somalia. (The IPC²¹⁰ is an integral tool of the assessment and identifies the different phases of food insecurity and crisis across the country).

56. The CO VAM unit has been responsible for analysing national hunger, food security and nutrition issues in conjunction with FSNAU. The VAM unit participates in fieldwork and analysis for FSNAU's biannual assessments and undertakes its own mapping, assessments, analysis and allocation planning. Food security and vulnerability assessments allow a more accurate understanding of the underlying causes of food insecurity. Over the evaluation period, WFP responded effectively to the FSNAU phase classification, targeting areas of food insecurity and crisis with food assistance, mainly through GFA, with a more nutrition-focused approach through TSFP.

57. The CO transfer management team planned CBT interventions using various sets of information, including VAM and FSNAU data, as well as data generated through the WFP Omega value tool, to choose one or a combination of the three main transfer modalities – in-kind food, cash or vouchers. Decisions were also based on overall food security needs and financial service provider availability, information and communications technology (ICT), and implementing/cooperating partners' (CP) capacities.

58. For the team to develop confidence that beneficiaries could buy food that they needed using cash, or by redeeming their CBT vouchers (initially paper and, since 2015, SCOPE card e-vouchers) for the (19 to 25) predetermined food items to be delivered through local market traders, the CO logistics department developed the capability to assess local market capacity and performance. For each local market where a CBT programme was implemented a 'Trade Logistics Capacity Assessment' was undertaken.²¹¹ This included a political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, legal and environmental (PESTLE) analysis and considerations of market demand, supply sources and delivery routes, challenges and risks, such as insecurity and supply disruption, commodity price and exchange rate fluctuations. As necessary, traders were then identified and vetted by CO procurement against United Nations sanctions lists. Those selected were then contracted. Once the MEB had been calculated and agreed, contracts were managed by logistics.

59. While most agencies interviewed felt that operational coordination improved over time, they felt that coordination among donors was lacking and this affected, for example, discussions about the MEB and transfer values. Participants in a workshop to consider progress in the Somalia response noted that, to some degree, these issues reflected weaknesses in coordination at a strategic level. This was, for example, an issue in the scale up of the 2017 response, where DFID required its partners to use a fixed transfer value on the basis that it would help increase the speed of the roll-out. Some partners were concerned, however, that this would not fairly reflect actual variations in MEBs across regions while work was ongoing simultaneously on cross-sector review and updating MEB values for different areas. In contrast, other donors supported transfer rates linked to guidance developed by the CWG.

60. The logistics department developed a strategic supply chain and supply corridor alert mechanism that monitored commodity prices and other factors affecting local markets. If problems were detected, logistics was able to determine an appropriate intervention, whether

²¹⁰ The IPC is not a response analysis, but remains the principal reference for planning humanitarian interventions.

²¹¹ The CPE team interviewed logistics staff and reviewed recent examples of Trade LCAs such as for Hobyo District in Mudug Region.

operational or through official channels, to mitigate the situation. Through stakeholder interviews the CPE team determined that this process successfully tackled several issues. For example, when the local market in Baidoa was not receiving commodities from Mogadishu for more than four days, the alert system determined that trucks were being held at a government checkpoint and were able to have them released. This has proved to be a critical CBT support service because Baidoa market (and similarly in other large towns) feeds more than 500,000 people (250,000 IDPs and almost 300,000 host population).

61. While local market monitoring was relatively successful, given the heavy reliance on imports, market supplies are potentially fragile. The extent to which WFP or other aid organizations monitored upstream supply chains is not clear, but a more strategic common services approach led by WFP may later be required to ensure that the (market-based) food assistance pipeline is not impacted.

62. WFP developed a feedback and complaints system in 2014 to enhance its accountability and interaction with beneficiaries by regularly communicating with them as well as allowing them to make calls directly to a call centre. At the start of the call centre service that was developed, the major challenge was the low number of calls from beneficiaries. In 2015, the beneficiary call centre received an increased number of calls because of active and sustained communication and sensitization campaigns. The number of calls received increased from a few calls a week to as many as 40 a day by the end of that year.

63. The CPE team noted that WFP took beneficiaries' perspectives into consideration. For example, when concerns were raised regarding the use of e-vouchers that affected the flexibility of people to move as they needed to stay close to where the CBT participating retailers were located in order to continue to receive support, WFP acted to help address this. It expanded the retailer network (to 895 across Somalia) and removed limits on the use of SCOPE to areas where the cards were issued. This allowed beneficiaries, including returning IDPs, to move without the risk of losing support. However, the use of SCOPE cards as a form of identity may require further consideration as the CPE team learned (in Baidoa) that beneficiaries found by Al-Shabaab to be carrying such a card faced serious protection issues and have been 'fined'.²¹²

64. A World Bank study found that Somalis, in general praise mobile network operators for providing much-needed services across the entire country, but there is limited trust among the population as the system remains unregulated. Somalis deem mobile money to be fast and convenient, with a 92 percent satisfaction rate. SCOPE appears to have been widely accepted by beneficiaries, but the CPE team did not have access to data to confirm this. There has been a strong focus on biometric identity/registration rather than a more flexible and perhaps more timely CBT approach using mobile money. NGOs prefer mobile²¹³ because it gives more flexibility and can reach more people; they rely on call back systems to verify identities (but there may be challenges when using this mechanism at scale).

²¹² SCOPE cards are a form of 'enemy' identity. Beneficiaries in Baidoa have reportedly been fined 'four Kalashnikov rifles' for possessing a SCOPE card.

²¹³ Based on feedback provided to the cash working group.

2.2.2 *Extent to which WFP has contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda and analysed response strategies, including developing partner capacity*

65. In 2017, WFP Somalia began a joint programme to assist the government in developing a national social protection policy and strategies to reach the most vulnerable. WFP, in partnership with UNICEF, also helped develop social protection goals for the resilience chapter of the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development.²¹⁴ The CO also worked with the FGS and state-level authorities' disaster management departments to strengthen capacity in monitoring, needs assessments, early warning, triggers for early response, targeting and response coordination.

66. The CPE team learned that the participation of local NGOs in cash coordination was limited and that the CWG (co-led by WFP) did not regularly engage with nationally-led coordination groups.²¹⁵ In some areas, communication between national and international actors has been poor and work was needed to analyse requirements at the district level. More could also have been done to increase engagement with the government at federal and state levels.

67. Moving forward, the issue of national identity, or at least an interim form of humanitarian identity, will need to be addressed. From just a CBT perspective, this would enable the implementation of international financial standards, such as 'know your customer' and 'anti-money laundering', that are key to raising the levels of financial inclusion. WFP will need to address the issue of access to SCOPE data. The government has asked for support from WFP and other organizations to establish a framework to record identities at the state and national levels. Information sharing is key to addressing the situation, but there may be a risk that organizations are being overprotective and territorial.

68. WFP provided support to link the CWG with UNOCHA's Drought Operations Coordination Centre (DOCC) and the ICCG in Mogadishu, which included representatives of all the clusters. However, cash coordination also needed to include stronger interaction with the Logistics Cluster, which could have played a more strategic role in monitoring market supply and value chains (see above), and build stronger links with new and evolving structures, including the National Humanitarian Forum. The CO also worked to strengthen coordination with regional and federal disaster management departments by investing in capacity strengthening of staff for monitoring, needs assessments, early warning, triggers for early response, targeting and response coordination.

69. Through its SOs, WFP contributed to the development of logistical infrastructure in Somalia by investing in port rehabilitation and capacity strengthening of port staff. Since 2016 WFP has supported the government by posting an adviser to work on port development, maritime law and legislation, and the organizational structure of marine port authorities. Maritime policy formulation, conditions for ship registration, the need to follow-up on the ratification of conventions and the country's global relations are identified as key areas for attention.

2.2.2 *Factors that determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed*

70. The availability and technical scalability of the SCOPE platform was a strong influence in WFP Somalia's decision to ramp-up CBT activities. Further, the operational capacities of implementing

²¹⁴ WFP Social Protection Case Study September 2017.

<https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/d60073e61064416a9f9a78ed5a3d7649/download>

²¹⁵ Based on field interviews.

partners also encouraged the use of new ways to provide assistance at scale in an environment where humanitarian access was also an issue. While strategically the choice to scale up CBT proved to have been successful, as the approach was not accompanied by a ToC it has been difficult to determine the impact this had on private-sector capacity.

71. During 2012, approximately 90 percent of WFP’s humanitarian relief cargo to Somalia arrived by sea through the regional ports of Mombasa and Djibouti with some food being delivered to distribution points directly from Dolo Ado, Ethiopia. Five extended delivery points – Bossaso, Gaalkayo, Hargeisa, Mogadishu and Dolo – were also used and 40 commercial Somali transport companies contracted.

72. In 2015, WFP Somalia began sourcing in-kind and locally-purchased food contributions from the GCMF. The GCMF stocks in Djibouti were used to supply Somaliland, Puntland and central Somalia, while the stocks in Mombasa supplied the south and Mogadishu. The opening of the Berbera corridor for shipments to Ethiopia and Yemen, the same year, led to a considerable increase in activities at Berbera Port in Somaliland²¹⁶, which also became a GCMF hub that has since been of strategic importance to the CO. See Table 30.

Table 30: WFP Somalia food purchases (USD) from GCMF

Commodity	2016	2017	Total
Maize	3,509.6	490.4	4,000.0
Sorghum		9,593.7	9,643.7
Wheat	7,508.3		7,508.3
CSB	3,237.2	7,861.1	11,501.3
RSF	961.0	6,805.4	8,043.6
Olive Oil	951.9	480.5	1,432.4
Pulses	1,459.3	150.0	1,609.3
Totals	17,627.2	25,381.0	43,738.5

Source: WFP Somalia Logistics.

2.2.3 Analysis of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks

73. The WFP Enterprise Risk Management Policy²¹⁷ (2015) and Risk Registers are key tools used to manage risks in WFP. The compliance office (based in Nairobi) maintained the CO central risk register to ensure that all programmes were operated in accordance with corporate guidelines. Support was provided to AOs through the compliance task force. An annual risk register, updated every six months, established minimum preparedness actions. Through field interviews, the CPE team found that the risk-mitigation process became more meaningful through greater levels of staff engagement. However, the usefulness of the risk register is difficult to quantify. While it provided a framework for action and accountability, follow-up reports regarding risk-mitigation action were not available for review.

²¹⁶ SPR 200844.

²¹⁷ The WFP Risk Appetite Statement identifies several risks and mitigation measures in the following areas: Security, Wellness and Safety Risks to Personnel, Well-Being of Beneficiaries, Operations, Demonstrating Results, Staff Capacity, Partnerships, WFP’s Reputation and Risk Tolerance Decision Making. (OED2012/015, WFP/EB.1/2016/4-C).

74. Since the 2011 famine, WFP and partners have invested heavily in humanitarian assistance where possible given the security context. Between 2014 and 2016, a Special Operation (200637 for 'Security Augmentation') was established (in compliance with UNDSS standards) to help cover the high security costs related to programme implementation. The aim was to ensure uninterrupted funding for WFP Somalia's security-related functions by de-linking funding for security from in-kind and CBT contributions under the PRRO 200443 budget. This change was made to ensure that any gaps in programme funding would not jeopardize WFP's ability to ensure the safety and security of its staff.²¹⁸

75. The strong move to scaling up the use of SCOPE as a digital platform to enable both cash/voucher and in-kind transfers enabled WFP to more effectively manage risk. This was achieved through increased transaction reporting and monitoring capabilities, and by using biometric identity to ensure that services went to the right beneficiaries. Data security and privacy is assured with all data being uploaded²¹⁹ to the United Nations' Geneva-based central data repository. Further market-based risk analysis and mitigation measures were managed through the Trade Logistics Capacity Assessment process and supported by the CWG.

76. Somalia has one of the most logistically demanding operating environments in the world, where safe access to the majority of key humanitarian programme locations has been a major challenge. During the evaluation period, the security situation in many areas remained volatile, particularly in south-central region. According to the Aid Worker Security Database,²²⁰ 145 aid workers have been killed, wounded or kidnapped between 2012 and 2017. The evaluation team found that through the management of essential logistics-related functions and common services (the Logistics Cluster and UNHAS) as well as through its security team (in conjunction with UNDSS), the CO played a critically important, and largely successful, role in identifying and mitigating contextual, institutional and programmatic risks.

77. As well as providing a reliable scheduled passenger transport service to multiple locations in Somalia, UNHAS plays a critical role in reducing risks to humanitarian staff working in remote locations by providing a prioritized medical and security evacuation service – achieved by keeping one aircraft always on standby.

78. UNHAS has been the only approved air carrier for United Nations staff travelling within Somalia and from Kenya. Its policies and procedures, staff qualification criteria and aircraft chartering agreements are based on the United Nations Common Aviation Safety Standards (UNAVSTADS); jointly agreed between WFP and the Department of Field Support (DFS) under the ICAO. In addition, UNHAS operates under many other legal, contractual, and safety obligations.

79. There was close coordination between UNHAS and UNDSS to ensure the timely sharing of security situation information at all destinations, resulting in well-informed adjustments to operations. Through the WFP Aviation Safety Office²²¹, operational hazard identification has constantly been implemented, relevant risk analyses carried out and mitigation actions

²¹⁸ During the CPE Team's field visit it was not feasible to evaluate special operation 200637 due to time constraints and staff access.

²¹⁹ Data uploaded directly through cloud or using an offline version of SCOPE and loaded within a DMS network.

²²⁰ <https://aidworkersecurity.org/>.

²²¹ Key personnel are based at HQ, United Arab Emirates and in Kenya.

adopted.²²² UNHAS confirmed that it regularly conducted airstrip assessments to ensure that locations served meet safety and security standards.

80. In 2016, WFP launched a vehicle-tracking project with 50 vehicle-tracking devices installed and personnel training facilitated. The system allowed for accurate monitoring of the actual locations of assets and the routes and distances travelled. A total of 200 trucks carrying WFP cargo could be equipped with tracking devices and monitored remotely.

2.3 Portfolio performance and results

2.3.1 Effectiveness of programme activities

Beneficiary targeting and monitoring

81. The portfolio largely focused on humanitarian programming that supported Strategic Objective 1 to 'Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies'. This entailed emergency relief response activities that were complemented by resilience, livelihoods and nutrition activities. (These are discussed in separate annexes.) Based in IPC analysis, Table 31, Table 32 and Table 33 indicate the number of people that required humanitarian assistance during the evaluation period and their broad geographic location.

Table 31: Population classified at IPC Phase 4 'Emergency'

Country area	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Border areas	3,000		22,187	-	121,141	87,074
Central	124,164	51,303	10,338	-	17,745	137,765
Mogadishu			15,924	9,000	29,202	136,637
Not accessible	143,683	56,761	34,023	4,300	125,271	110,113
Puntland	54,098	14,766	11,832	3,700	110,160	161,655
Somaliland	16,783	2,475	3,127	6,400	64,410	169,741
Total	341,728	125,305	97,430	23,400	467,928	802,985

Table 32: Population classified at IPC Phase 3 'Crisis'

Country area	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Border areas	49,854	4,723	103,899	28,800	310,955	264,911
Central	126,792	94,564	127,071	24,700	432,696	410,042
Mogadishu	76,000	-	365,243	18,000	652,098	306,852
Not accessible	814,962	122,485	300,715	120,700	784,116	534,769
Puntland	152,228	77,940	91,998	115,100	658,994	395,323
Somaliland	166,832	11,116	70,900	249,600	579,283	427,691
Total	1,386,668	310,828	1,059,825	556,900	3,418,141	2,339,588

Table 33: Population classified at IPC Phase 2 'Stressed'

Country area	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Border areas	170,003	315,650	452,052	283,700	489,944	198,787
Central	324,676	401,034	492,701	357,950	562,093	242,464
Mogadishu	261,000	396,260	789,074	1,820,200	1,390,448	357,395
Not accessible	1,583,730	1,895,055	1,651,152	1,329,700	1,744,084	921,311

²²² There have reportedly been several 'near misses' with US drones, so the US military now tracks UNHAS flights. ICAO was involved negotiating safer operating conditions.

Puntland	278,609	424,716	451,714	774,850	1,196,461	502,424
Somaliland	770,599	880,642	570,130	1,050,700	1,545,567	861,152
Total	3,388,617	4,313,357	4,406,823	5,617,100	6,928,596	3,083,533

Source: WFP SPR data for EMOP 200281, PRRO 200443 and PRRO 200844.

82. During the evaluation period, WFP provided GFA, through in-kind and CBTs to IDPs, Somali returnees, refugees from Yemen and food-insecure local communities throughout the country. At the end of 2012, in the transition from EMOP 200281 to PRRO 200443, the level of food insecurity was still very high and there was a need for the continuation of humanitarian relief activities. Although these were scaled down in the planning for 2014, relief activities continued and were rapidly scaled up again in 2016 in response to the drought emergency, which saw a significant and rapid scale up of CBT in 2017.²²³

83. Apart from Somali returnees, Yemeni refugees and El Niño-affected populations, WFP's relief assistance under EMOP 200281, PRRO 200443 and, subsequently, PRRO 200844 targeted IDPs and other households in locations facing severe food insecurity (IPC crisis and emergency phases) with cooked meals and dry food rations. While having been phased out in Kismayo, Baidoba and Luuq districts, the programme has continued through 2017 to deliver cooked meals in Mogadishu in 20 locations to support IDPs and vulnerable host populations. The beneficiaries were self-selected based on the assumption that only those in dire need would spend time to travel to the food distributions and line up for their daily ration.²²⁴ As of the end of the evaluation period, the programme supported approximately 103,000 vulnerable people. See Table 34.

Table 34: Total beneficiaries – cooked meals

Year	January to June	July to December
2012	74,000	74,000
2013	74,000	74,000
2014	74,000	85,000
2015	85,000	85,000
2016	85,000	85,000
2017	85,000	103,000

Source: WFP Somalia.

84. For the returnee programme (refugees returning from Kenya to Somalia), WFP provided, 'as needed', cook meals at the border crossing between Kenya and Somalia and upon arrival at their final destinations in Kismayo, Baidoa or Luuq districts. In 2016 62,000 returnees were supported and 60,000 in 2017.²²⁵ The CPE team learned that while the cooked meals programme had been a useful intervention²²⁶ (supporting Strategic Objective 1) that saved the lives of extremely vulnerable people, it is questionable whether the intervention remained justifiable in the

²²³ Source: UNOCHA monthly cash 3W exercise presentations. Approximately 60 percent of all cash and vouchers were disbursed mainly by WFP and FAO. The overall number of beneficiaries supported [by the humanitarian community] increased from 1.42 million people in March 2017, to a peak of 3.36 million people in May 2017 with an average of \$44M disbursed each month via CBT from May to August 2017.

²²⁴ "Final Evaluation Report of the Wet Feeding and Cash Transfer Project in Southern Somalia"
<http://www.alnap.org/resource/7771.aspx>.

²²⁵ Source: Country programme office.

²²⁶ Based on a draft report of the Cook Meals Programme made available by the CO.

prevailing context as a viable way to deliver food assistance. This was largely because the original objective was designed around the very volatile security situation in Mogadishu, but as the situation improved this reasoning declined. Additionally, the delivery of the cooked meals programme had resource implications and was regarded (by Somalis) as an undignified means of assistance compared to dry ration distribution or CBTs.

85. WFP may, therefore, need to complement or transition from this modality to another form of support. Alternative approaches include scaling down the programme with respect to beneficiary numbers and location of IDP centres; reducing the provision of meals while complementing them with CBTs; establishing a catchment point for newly-arrived and returning IDPs in the Daynile and Gaheyr areas of Mogadishu; providing cooking utensils, stoves and fuel; transitioning fully to CBT; and linking the cooked meals programme with school feeding activities.

86. Targeting the most vulnerable populations has been challenging because of access constraints and there have been concerns regarding the possible exclusion²²⁷ of beneficiaries, such as the Bantu in the southern part of the country. There is a strong reliance on the services of third-party monitors (CTG Global) to support targeting and monitoring. Some interviewees expressed concern that some of their staff may be prone to clan-based bias.

87. The difficult resourcing and security environment has occasionally caused pipeline breakdowns in the supply of food assistance (particularly for supplementary food commodities).²²⁸ Emergency CBT was initially not part of the PRRO 200443 Plan, but, in line with WFP's corporate commitment to expand the use of CBTs, the CO began rolling out its corporate SCOPE²²⁹ system at the end of 2014. This helped to reduce the reliance on in-kind food assistance and mitigate the impact of pipeline breakdowns. By the end of 2015, WFP had registered over 950,000 people on the system. The process to contract, train and equip retailers with point-of-sale devices also started. To improve EPR, the CO embarked on a mass registration and distribution of cards to all potential beneficiaries. Initially, problems were encountered with early expiry of e-vouchers. To address this, WFP sent text messages to beneficiaries' phones to advise on the top-up location and expiry date of vouchers.

88. A notable difference between the 2011–2012 and 2016–2017 emergency responses was that by 2017 the case for cash transfers in Somalia had already been made and local markets were better understood. There was also better access to vulnerable populations and better systems, such as SCOPE and WFP's call centre, to implement, monitor and manage cash transfers. WFP had registered almost 1.5 million people on SCOPE by the end of 2016, allowing for an immediate response when funds were released, while continuing to register new beneficiaries (over 2.5 million by the end of 2017).

89. By April 2017 over 1 million beneficiaries per month received e-vouchers through SCOPE and the use of unrestricted cash was increased in the latter half of the year, influenced by work with Standard Chartered Bank regarding agreements for secure transfers and donor pressure (from ECHO) to increase the use of unrestricted cash.


²²⁷ Most CTG staff do not have a background in humanitarian work.

²²⁸ Based on an analysis of Pipeline Committee Meeting minutes.

²²⁹ WFP's beneficiary and transfer management platform that supports the programme intervention cycle from beginning to end.


90. Between 2012 and 2016 the quantity of in-kind food assistance distributed by WFP declined by approximately 70 percent. See Figure 9 and Figure 10.

Figure 9: Tonnage delivered – planned versus actual



Source: SPRs 2012–2016.

Figure 10: Portfolio tonnage, planned versus actual by operation (2012 to mid-2017)



Source: SPRs 2012–2017.

Table 35: GFA beneficiaries, planned versus actual by operation (2012–2016)

Operation	Gender	Beneficiaries	
		Planned	Actual
EMOP 200281	Female	N/A	1,727,190
	Male	760,970	1,659,453
PRRO 200443	Female	645,660	601,970
	Male	620,340	578,363
PRRO 200844	Female	1,186,190	1,249,269
	Male	1,144,810	1,300,258

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2017.

91. The two tables (Table 36 and Table 37) show a dramatic increase in the use of CBTs between 2012 and 2016 as compared to in-kind food assistance.²³⁰

Table 36: CBT planned versus actual

Operation	Year	Type	Planned distribution (USD)	Actual distribution (USD)
200281	2012	Cash	NA	NA
		Voucher	833,333	920,961
200443	2013	Cash	1,944,000	0
		Vouchers	7,204,791	1,603,062
	2014	Cash	2,644,500	0
		Vouchers	11,393,924	3,762,601
	2015	Cash	5,005,044	0
		Vouchers	7,484,400	9,995,062
200844	2016	Cash	NA	34,966
		Vouchers	56,347,596	26,359,663
	2017	Cash	NA	19,569,947
		Vouchers	NA	114,626,776

Source: SPRs 2012–2017.

Table 37: Overview of CBT versus food distributed

Year	Number of beneficiaries reached			Total food distributed (mt)	Total CBT distributed (USD)
	Total actual	Total women	Proportion of women (%)		
2017	2,949,989	1,563,494	53	N/A	134,196,723
2016	1,888,984	1,062,132	56	51,403	26,394,629
2015	2,190,218	1,200,994	55	76,924	9,995,062
2014	1,542,642	906,997	59	87,910	3,762,601
2013	1,750,972	985,879	56	75,633	1,603,062
2012	3,622,753	1,886,983	52	169,328	920,961
Total	10,995,569	6,042,985	56	291,870	41,755,354

Source: SPRs 2013–2017.

92. Although planning for cash distributions (as distinct from vouchers) began in 2013, actual deliveries only started in late 2016. This was primarily because of the time required to establish and test a reliable and accountable delivery model and to mobilize resources for cash transfers.

93. Programme activities resulted in diet diversity²³¹ scores generally greater than the planned project targets.²³² See Table 38.

²³⁰ It is difficult to compare CBT with in-kind food distributions outcomes, as data on food consumption scores is not available, missing or hard to obtain. Further work is needed to look at the decision-making processes on modality choice.

²³¹ Dietary diversity is defined (by WFP VAM) as the number of different foods or food groups eaten over a reference time period, not regarding the frequency of consumption.

²³² Data available for food consumption scores was found to be patchy and inconsistent (FCS).

Table 38: Average diet diversity scores under SO 1

Summary of averages scores	2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up	Base value	Follow-up
Diet diversity score	5.6	5.6	3.2	4.8	3.99	4.46	3.57	4.33
Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	5.1	5.7	2.9	4.7	3.82	4.6	3.60	3.87
Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	4.8	5.8	3.2	4.9	4.07	4.43	3.50	4.47

Source: SPRs 2012–2017. No data for 2012 and 2013.

94. Positive outcomes were mainly the result of prioritizing relief assistance in central and south Somalia, especially in the newly-liberated towns. Under PRRO 200844, diet diversity scores in IDP settlements were below targets at the end of 2016, although the percentage of households with poor food consumption scores later decreased by nearly two-thirds, with the most positive impact being reported for female-headed households.²³³

95. To match the expansion of CBT and SCOPE registration, WFP significantly increased its nationwide network of retailers and equipped them with global positioning systems-enabled point-of-sale technology. During 2016, WFP conducted on-site market assessments and inspection of potential retailers, registering over 500 throughout the country. As the number of retailers continued to grow, a retailer management system was established by WFP logistics to strengthen working relationships. By the end of 2017, WFP had agreements with 895 retailers, enabling beneficiaries to use e-vouchers on their SCOPE card to buy food from local shops. This shift has been the driver of significant change within the WFP logistics department which previously had to rely strongly on private-sector/market performance to operationally deliver food assistance.

96. The MEB for market-based interventions was a key topic of discussion between agencies (and donors) delivering CBT programmes. It was revised in mid-2017 and endorsed by the CWG to use as a basis for transfer value recommendations. The revised MEB data was provided monthly by FSNAU for each region of the country, for rural and urban areas. The transfer value recommendations were agreed by the CWG to be set at 80 percent of the full MEB rate for multi-purpose cash transfers and 100 percent of the food MEB rate for food-security cash transfers. For each region, the rural and urban MEB rates were used to establish rural and urban transfer values.²³⁴

97. In 2015, WFP moved from paper-based checklists to mobile data collection through an ODK platform.²³⁵ The use of mobile technologies allowed the CO to quickly collect data from the field in a standardized way, and to analyse and share it securely. The increased use of technology complemented physical monitoring by WFP food monitors and third-party monitors (CTG Global), especially in areas where access was a challenge. The widespread use of mobile phones in Somalia provided an opportunity to collect direct feedback from beneficiaries. The mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping (mVAM) project was piloted in Somalia from May 2014 to April 2015, collecting food-security data from households through short mobile phone surveys, text

²³³ SPR 200844.

²³⁴ <http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/cwg---recommended-transfer-values--24.11.17-final.pdf>.

²³⁵ A platform for the collection (and submission to an online server) of monitoring data using Android mobile devices.

messages, live telephone interviews and automated phone calls (interactive voice response), enabling quick responses to emerging issues.

98. In 2017, the CPE noted that monitoring and reporting systems were enhanced through the introduction of a digital dashboard that drew together information from SCOPE, mVAM and other WFP data systems. This essentially created a data warehouse producing a periodic replication of various databases (avoiding slowing down the master databases, which were refreshed regularly within the dashboard). SCOPE has been the front-end of the system and the dashboard provided management with an overview of data, which otherwise would be difficult to access. The dashboard was linked to the WFP call centre, allowing representatives instant access to data on beneficiaries, enabling problems to be resolved rapidly.

UNHAS

99. Travel by road has generally been unsafe for relief workers so the availability of air services through UNHAS Somalia was crucial to support humanitarian activities. Special Operation 106810 (2007–2012) 'Humanitarian Air Service in Support of Relief Operations in Somalia' facilitated the movement of personnel, medical and security evacuations, and light cargo, such as medical supplies and supplementary food commodities. SO 200507 (2013–2015) ensured the continued provision of UNHAS services in Somalia and Kenya and played an important role in support of PRRO 200443 (and PRROs 200174 and 200294 in Kenya²³⁶). See Table 39 for UNHAS aircraft operated by year.

Table 39: UNHAS aircraft operated

2012	1 Cessna 208	2 Dash 8	1 Dornier 328J		
2013	1 Beech 1900	1 Cessna 208	2 Dash 8	1 Dornier 328J	
2014	1 Beech 1900	1 Cessna 208	2 Dash 8	1 CRJ 200	1 EMB 135
2015	1 Beech 1900	1 Cessna 208	2 Dash 8	1 Dornier 228	1 Dash 8–Q400
2016	1 Beech 1900	1 Cessna 208	2 Dash 8	1 Dornier 228	1 Dash 8–Q400
2017	1 Beech 1900	1 Cessna 208	2 Dash 8	2 Dornier 228	1 Dash 8–Q400

Source: UNHAS Somalia.

100. The fluid security situation, poor infrastructure, long distances and lack of reliable commercial air transport necessitated the continuing presence of UNHAS under SO 200924, which was launched in January 2016 for two years, supporting PRRO 200844 and the wider aid community.²³⁷

101. CPE team interviews confirmed that UNHAS frequently responded in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to the fast-changing needs of the humanitarian community. Maintaining its management centre in Kenya facilitated activities because of its proximity to aircraft operators, which were also largely based in Kenya. During the evaluation period, UNHAS transported an average 34,500 passengers and 241 metric ton of miscellaneous cargo per year (Table 40). In general, it is observed that demand²³⁸ for air services has been consistent throughout most of the evaluation with an increase in 2017 because of the escalation of relief activities.

²³⁶ The WFP Kenya office was responsible for financing their own component of the operation and chairing their own user group meetings.

²³⁷ The special operation also supports PRROs 200737 (WFP refugee operations) and 200736 (relief and recovery) in Kenya.

²³⁸ 150 agencies are registered with UNHAS with the top 20 agencies accounting for 78 percent of passenger traffic.

Table 40: UNHAS passenger (Pax) and cargo transport (mt) 2012 to 2017

	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016		2017	
	Pax	mt	Pax	mt	Pax	mt	Pax	mt	Pax	mt	Pax	mt
Jan	3,238	25.2	2,700	17.09	1,838	12.00	2,590	27.55	2,376	12.38	2,514	19.80
Feb	4,307	28.8	3,206	14.9	2,338	11.4	3,450	19.3	3,627	18.3	2,964	36.1
Mar	2,270	15.8	2,638	17.0	3,524	18.5	4,156	25.9	3,378	19.7	4,394	39.5
Apr	2,069	24.7	2,281	18.4	2,934	24.6	2,922	15.4	3,443	19.9	3,451	31.2
May	2,190	15.1	1,858	10.9	3,379	29.3	3,003	17.2	3,836	20.2	3,917	27.8
Jun	2,092	12.8	1,491	9	3,761	38	3,177	22	2,566	20	3,073	37
Jul	2,231	23.0	1,572	13.8	2,616	32.0	2,310	18.3	3,385	23.6	4,863	28.2
Aug	2,161	15.0	2,038	15	3,582	23	3,581	21	3,353	28	4,340	26
Sept	2,399	16.4	1,962	14	3,498	15	3,278	16	3,373	20	4,524	24
Oct	2,275	18.7	2,161	12.2	3,528	19.3	3,509	24.5	3,226	50.8		
Nov	3,078	13.9	2,643	18.4	4,133	24.1	4,072	25.7	3,487	21.5		
Dec	2,123		2,164	17.7	2,893	20.1	2,965	14.4	2,745	18.9		
Tot.	30,433	209.5	26,714	178.4	38,024	268.4	39,013	247.0	38,795	274.1	34,040	269.9

Source: UNHAS Somalia.

Logistics Cluster

Special Operation 200344, 'Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster Augmentation in Response to the Humanitarian Situation in Somalia', in 2011 supported the activation of the Somalia Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, set up in response to the famine crisis. To support the overall emergency response, the humanitarian community required more reliable, predictable and cost-effective supply-chain solutions. Under this SO the Logistics Cluster provided common services capacity in the form of sea and air cargo transport, storage solutions, enhanced logistics coordination and information management. (The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster elements under this project were completed in 2011).

102. With the end of the famine response in February 2012, overall logistics requirements for Somalia decreased, but Logistics Cluster participants agreed to extend the (free) common shipping service until 1 July 2012, which subsequently transitioned to a WFP bilateral cost recovery service.²³⁹ During the evaluation period the Logistics Cluster (through WFP Somalia) supported the humanitarian community via the operational coordination of logistics and information management activities and acted as a linkage to WFP capacity for requirements to fill any logistics gaps, such as occurred in locations where Al-Shabaab restricted road access. For example, storage was set up at key air operations hubs to support both WFP and partners to better pre-position emergency items.

103. At the end of 2016, the Logistics Cluster scaled up logistics support on behalf of the humanitarian community and the FGS to ensure the uninterrupted transport and delivery of relief items. A time-charter vessel, MV Esbjerg, with 4,800 mt capacity, provided a regular delivery service

²³⁹ Twenty organizations in 2012, including 16 NGOs and 4 United Nations agencies, transported cargo through the cluster's common shipping services. Ninety percent of the estimated target was transported in 2012, with most of the relief cargo transported to Somalia consisting of non-food items (NFIs).

of supplies between the northern ports of Berbera and Bossaso²⁴⁰ and from Mombasa to Mogadishu and Kismayo; local coastal transshipment services were also used. For the transport of cargo by air, the Logistics Cluster (WFP) operated two cargo aircraft of 5.5 mt capacity each. UNHAS also operated two cargo/passenger planes with a payload load of 1.5 mt each in support of Logistics Cluster activities.

104. Overall feedback from Logistics Cluster users (according to a survey conducted in August 2017) was that 75 percent were generally satisfied with its performance – particularly for the level of coordination. However, several comments related to the need for more focus on logistics capacity building.

2.3.2 *Efficiency of programme activities and drivers of efficiency*

105. WFP's emergency response in 2016/2017 started earlier and scaled up faster than in 2011 because the CO was able²⁴¹ to take some level of risk based on funding commitments, using internal funds to cover initial spending requirements and by undertaking preregistrations on SCOPE to speed up implementation. This meant that cash transfers could begin as soon as donor funds were received. WFP had registered almost 1.5 million people on SCOPE by the end of 2016, allowing for an immediate response to relief needs.

106. The use of SCOPE was expanded from only delivering value vouchers to also enabling in-kind food assistance and unrestricted cash to beneficiaries. The logistics team moved retailer invoice processing from the AO level and centralized it at the CO, speeding up the payment process by one-third.²⁴² By scaling up SCOPE operations, overheads for CBT activities were reduced. For example, agreements were signed directly with food retailers (rather than Amal Bank) for value voucher redemption, leading to a reduction in transaction costs. The associated overhead cost of CBTs further reduced from 16 percent to 10 percent because of the combined effect of a reduced partnership cost per dollar and the economy of scale through delivering a higher transfer value.

²⁴⁰ Due to the disputed border between Somaliland and Puntland, cargo has to be trans-shipped from Berbera to Bossaso so that it can be transported in-land to distribution sites.

²⁴¹ Observations gathered through field level interviews.

²⁴² Information based on interviews with procurement and finance departments.

Table 41: Timeliness comparison

	IK	CBT
Contributions		
Number of contributions programmed since Jan 2017	20	12
<i>Pct. delivered (June 20 2017)</i>	50%	92%
Lead times: Number of days		
Grant confirmation to PO release		
<i>average</i>	13.1	10.9
<i>minimum</i>	2	-26 *
<i>maximum</i>	34	57
Grant confirmation to dispatch or first voucher valid		
<i>average</i>	66.0	30.2
<i>minimum</i>	29	7
<i>maximum</i>	120	98
* minimum is negative as the contribution was using advanced financing		
Where contributions have not yet been delivered, the date of analysis (June 20 2017) was used as proxy delivery date in order to be able to include the contributions in the calculations		
For a few CBT contributions, several POs were programmed against the contribution, in which case the voucher validity date closest to the PO release date has been used as the basis for the calculations		

107. In 2017, the CO conducted an analysis of the time taken from the confirmation of a grant to the date food was dispatched for in-kind distribution or the date that vouchers were valid for CBT. See the findings in Table 41.

108. The comparison shows that it took an average of 66 days from confirmation of a grant to food being dispatched and for CBT it was one month approximately.²⁴³ It was also noted that to scale-down a CBT intervention was more efficient as it did not require the closure of a complex supply-chain infrastructure, so WFP was able to raise or lower beneficiary numbers in line with shifts in context more efficiently.

109. In 2016 the CO reported, "generally, the cost of delivering assistance through [CBTs] to a single household per month is up to six times lower than for in-kind assistance".²⁴⁴ The transfer value for relief beneficiaries ranged between USD 28 and USD 41 depending on the geographical area as the programme was implemented in different regions of Somalia. However, in contradiction to this analysis, in 2017 the CO Transfer Management Team conducted a cost comparison²⁴⁵ of in-kind food assistance versus CBT in Somalia. Findings showed a total cost to deliver the in-kind basket was USD 13.43 per person and that for CBT was USD 15.88. The analysis did not consider differences in household food access, preferences, protection risks or impact on the wider local economy.²⁴⁶

110. Direct comparisons between in-kind and cash transfers are difficult to make. In locations where nutrition products were delivered via airlifts, in-kind costs could be much higher. Cash transfers also helped to sustain local market systems in locations like Baidoa, which are not accessible by road, but can be supplied by the private sector.²⁴⁷ Delivering assistance through cash

²⁴³ During food crises in Somalia two-months is regarded as the maximum time before excess mortality starts.

²⁴⁴ SPR 200844 (Page 14).

²⁴⁵ In-kind versus CBT: Cost and timeliness analysis, WFP Somalia.

²⁴⁶ For CBT, food access may allow a more diverse diet as the e-voucher system requires the retailers to stock 20-25 different food items; the in-kind food basket provides only 4 items.

²⁴⁷ Traders typically must pay up to USD 2,000 per truck to Al-Shabaab at checkpoints to access towns like Baidoa (visited by the CPE team).

has fewer security risks both for WFP and beneficiaries, and when using unrestricted transfers could be more cost effective.²⁴⁸

111. While the setup costs for CBT in terms of hardware (for SCOPE) and retailer contracts are significant, economies of scale and backup through WFP's global agreement with Standard Chartered Bank for CBT likely make such activities more viable in the longer term. WFP can monitor the direct operating costs of managing SCOPE, but indirect costs, such as for CO personnel or for costs incurred by implementing partners, are difficult to determine. Further study on this topic will be required.

Logistics – port infrastructure improvements

112. For several years (prior to the beginning of the evaluation period), the logistics department faced delays (and demurrage costs) with discharging vessels because of the poor port infrastructure and limited handling capacities. The Federal Government sought support to improve port operations and had interest from donors, such as the Italian Government, to invest in improvements (in support of EMOPs). Through Special Operation 105780 (2007–2013) 'Emergency Rehabilitation Works for Logistics Infrastructure in Somalia', WFP rehabilitated the ports of Mogadishu (with the main works being performed between 2008 and 2009) and Bossaso by dredging the port basins and installing navigation systems, communications and cargo-handling equipment, which helped to increase port traffic capacity and facilitated the efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, the dredging of the inner port of Bosasso in 2012 increased the capacity of arriving dhows by up to 20 percent.²⁴⁹ Storage facilities at Berbera Port were also rehabilitated and expanded. WFP was granted access to additional land on which to erect temporary warehouses to accommodate the increased volumes of (GCMF) cargo being imported for Ethiopia and Yemen.

113. Under Special Operation 200475 (2013–2014), designed to follow on from SO 105780 to increase operational capacity and flexibility in the delivery of humanitarian supplies, further training of port workers was conducted to improve cargo superintendence and management. As a consequence of resource constraints²⁵⁰ the operation was closed in November 2014, before its planned end date. Originally all four main ports were included in the SO. However, Kismayo was very insecure and only became accessible in 2015 and then used to import small volumes of food commodities (approximately 50 to 60 mt per month). In 2017, WFP decided to support the rehabilitation of the port through a new Special Operation 201051. This was aimed at the removal of a shipwreck, which has been a constraining factor for port efficiency.

114. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rehabilitation by WFP of Mogadishu and Bossaso ports has had a positive economic impact, expanding market opportunities in both national and international trade. However, this was not possible to confirm.²⁵¹ The significantly increased volumes of cargo being shipped through Berbera Port have also likely had a large impact on the local economy of Somaliland, but data has been difficult to obtain to conduct an appropriate analysis.

²⁴⁸ Cash through banks (WFP model) has a 1.4 percent bank overhead, which is lower than mobile money or *Hawala*.

²⁴⁹ SPR 105780.

²⁵⁰ According to SPR 200475, only USD 14,828 was expended in 2014.

²⁵¹ The World Bank is currently undertaking a study of Somalia's ports.

115. In October 2013, the FGS endorsed an agreement with the Turkish company Albayrak to manage the Port of Mogadishu for a 20-year period.²⁵² According to the Prime Minister's Office, the agreement was secured by the Ministry of Ports, which assigned Albayrak responsibility for rebuilding and modernising the port. In September 2014, the FGS officially delegated management of the Mogadishu Port to Albayrak. Similarly, the authorities in Somaliland and Puntland have handed over the operation of the ports of Berbera and Bossaso to international port management companies.²⁵³ It would, therefore, seem that WFP Somalia's engagement in port infrastructure improvements is no longer needed.

116. The opening of the Berbera corridor for shipments to Ethiopia and Yemen in 2015 led to a considerable increase in activities at Berbera Port²⁵⁴ in Somaliland. In 2016, the volumes²⁵⁵ handled rose by over 250 percent. Consequently, a cost-sharing agreement was made with WFP Yemen and Ethiopia COs, which led to a 90 percent drop in fixed costs for WFP Somalia as expenses were absorbed by operations for three countries.²⁵⁶ The port has also been used by the GCMF as a hub for Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen, offering lower costs and shorter transit times compared to Djibouti and Mombasa. The GCMF subsequently reduced delivery lead times²⁵⁷ especially during emergencies. The model²⁵⁸ was established in 2011 and has served as a vital resource for WFP Somalia.²⁵⁹

117. The opening of the direct road corridor from Tanzania to the border areas of southern Somalia enhanced WFP's ability to deliver humanitarian assistance on time and at a reduced cost.²⁶⁰ As part of El Niño preparedness, WFP prepositioned logistics assets in flood prone areas, which enabled a quick response when needs arose.

Logistics Cluster

118. The Logistics Cluster amended its shipping SOPs, and included a dead freight²⁶¹ charge as a financial penalty for organizations that failed to bring their cargo on time for loading, which improved efficiency for voyages between Somali ports. Other cost recovery measures have also reportedly had a positive effect on Logistics Cluster operations.²⁶²

UNHAS

119. In areas not accessible by road, such as trading centres in south and central Somalia, including Wajid, Baidoa, Bulo Burte and Dinsoor, WFP used cargo planes to deliver essential

²⁵² www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-ports/somali-port-poised-for-facelift-with-turkish-help-idUSKCN0IC1DW20141023.

²⁵³ Berbera is being managed by DP World (Dubai) and Bossaso by P&O Ports.

²⁵⁴ The CPE team was not able to collect sufficient data to be able to determine the level of impact that WFP operations have had on the Somaliland economy.

²⁵⁵ SPR 200844.

²⁵⁶ Storage costs were further reduced by providing space to other United Nations agencies such as UNICEF in Bossaso and IOM in Kismayo.

²⁵⁷ In 2016, COs purchasing from GCMF received food after an average 46 days as opposed to the 120 days average under the conventional procurement process – representing a 62 percent reduction in lead-time.

²⁵⁸ The GCMF has grown to USD 350 million, enabling the forward positioning of more than 1 million mt of food in 2016. Approximately 70 percent of GCMF commodities are procured for country operations in East Africa.

²⁵⁹ Once the CO has confirmed funding they can source food from GCMF stocks.

²⁶⁰ SPR 200443.

²⁶¹ Logistics operations overview reports.

²⁶² The CPE did not have sufficient access to financial data to make an accurate determination of logistics cluster cost efficiencies.

nutrition products.²⁶³ To enable faster responses during emergencies, over 10,000 mt of food was strategically prepositioned in 13 WFP warehouses across the country, which optimized the use of logistics/UNHAS aircraft.

120. Following the principle of higher cost recovery when feasible to reduce the reliance on donor funding²⁶⁴, between 2012 and 2017 UNHAS recovered approximately 70 percent of its operating costs through passenger seat and cargo charges. See Table 42.


Table 42: UNHAS operating costs

Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017*
Budget – SO (USD)	30,342,679	35,480,702	35,480,702	29,353,038	30,408,249	26,063,245
Actual expenditure (USD)	27,279,280	24,777,851	27,722,262	26,947,246	26,223,849	23,104,832
Income (USD)	16,756,861	17,252,708	18,826,794	18,316,403	17,902,798	19,226,772
Proportion recovered (%)	61	70	68	68	68	83

Source: UNHAS Somalia (*To Nov 2017).

121. Although users raised concerns via UNHAS surveys (and directly with the CPE team) about ticket costs²⁶⁵, mainly on the route between Nairobi and Mogadishu, according to UNHAS data, the cost per passenger kilometre is comparatively low at USD 0.60. See Figure 11.

Figure 11: UNHAS global effectiveness versus efficiency



Source: UNHAS.

²⁶³ SPRs 106810, 200507 and 200924.

²⁶⁴ ECHO does not fund UNHAS Somalia because the EU flight also operates to and within Somalia and in East/Central Africa.

²⁶⁵ USD 500 seat price cap, from Kenya to Somalia, was established to enhance access for organizations to all locations in Somalia for one flat rate. Security stops have to be made in Wajiir, Kenya on the return leg (this increases operating costs).

122. By 2016, all eight main airstrips were operational and UNHAS added 17 new locations²⁶⁶ in 2017 to its service. WFP has facilitated improvements to minor airstrips²⁶⁷ around the country. This, combined with contributions from Turkey and Middle Eastern donors²⁶⁸ – such as for upgrading the Bossaso airstrip funded by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – has encouraged commercial carriers to begin flight operations within Somalia. Some NGOs now use flights by East African Express and Juba Air. Ethiopian airlines began scheduled flights from Addis Ababa to Hargeisa, so UNHAS no longer operates on that route. If Kenya Airways begins services to Somalia, it may be feasible for UNHAS to cease operations from Nairobi to Mogadishu.

123. The UNHAS fleet includes three short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft that can operate both long haul (Kenya to Somalia and within Somalia) and shorter routes, making them cost efficient options. Once the airstrip at Garowe has been upgraded it can be used as an operating hub, enabling the operation of a jet aircraft (having a lower operating cost per hour) and a reduction in the number of relatively high cost STOL aircraft.²⁶⁹

2.3.3 *Level of synergy and multiplying effect between portfolio activities*

124. The use of CBT demonstrated an important means to draw interventions together. Beneficiary registration, which created a new form of digital identity through SCOPE, has further provided significant linkages between the different portfolio elements. This approach enabled a new means of providing various types of assistance at scale and has shown that the private sector, through local markets, could deliver food assistance to large numbers of beneficiaries. WFP Somalia has acted as a lead agency in this area and has an opportunity to further build its thought leadership capabilities.

Local purchase

125. In 2016, the logistics (and procurement) department supported resilience and livelihoods programming through activities to strengthen the capacity of smallholder farmers to access reliable markets. WFP procured 4,000 mt of high quality maize from 500 small-scale farmers in Lower Shabelle – an increase from 200 mt from 100 farmers in 2015. Farmers' cooperatives were supported with training on modern warehouse management techniques to reduce post-harvest losses and facilitate market linkages. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the activity was more about establishing partnerships and capacity building and while WFP's approach to support local farmer cooperatives could have had a developmental impact, it is unclear how realistic the strategy was given that most of the cereals available for purchase at that time were grown in Al-Shabaab areas. Further, with the 2016/2017 drought emergency, the availability of cereals for local purchase was very limited.

2.3.4 *Level of synergy and multiplying operational opportunities with partners – United Nations, bilateral and NGO*

126. WFP and UNICEF engaged in a strategic partnership to jointly implement an augmented humanitarian response. The use of SCOPE for both in-kind and cash-based programmes played an important role in a country where most of the population does not have an official identity

²⁶⁶ In 2013 a total of only eight locations could be accessed because of insecurity caused by Al-Shabaab.

²⁶⁷ Quansadhere and Afmadow planned for rehabilitation with US funding – Dinsor completed in 2017 with US funding.

²⁶⁸ UAE will begin upgrading the airport at Berbera in 2018.

²⁶⁹ Dash 8-Q400 cost is USD 4,300 per hour whereas an Embraer (jet) of similar size is USD 2,500 per hour (source WFP Aviation).

card. In Puntland, WFP provided food vouchers while UNICEF provided water vouchers.²⁷⁰ Both agencies also delivered a joint response in the south, with WFP providing food vouchers and UNICEF providing cash, which beneficiaries could withdraw at Amal Bank branches. The partnership was extended in 2016/2017 to support the reintegration of Somali returnees from Kenya by providing emergency cash transfers to help them resettle (assistance implemented using the SCOPE platform).

127. There are differing approaches between aid organizations to the use of digital registration, cash transfer and tracking systems. For example, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is used to register all household members, whereas SCOPE is used only to register the head of household. This can cause reregistration challenges when family members need to separate. Further, there have been technical issues related to system interoperability, such as different file formats and DTM being more accurate at detecting duplicate entries. With other agencies, such as UNHCR, also using their own registration systems there was a need for improvements in how such systems are implemented²⁷¹ to ensure better levels of interoperability. See Table 43 for a summary of humanitarian beneficiary registration (and cash-transfer) systems used in Somalia.

Table 43: Beneficiary registration systems

Organization	System	Function
WFP ²⁷²	SCOPE	Biometric registration, digital voucher and cash transfer plus commodity tracking
UNHCR	ProGReS (profile global registration system)	Biometric (refugee) registration/identity platform ²⁷³
IOM	DTM	Registration (usually biometric) and mobility tracking
World Vision	LMMS (last mile mobile solutions)	Registration (can be biometric), commodity tracking and CBT support
RedRose ²⁷⁴	ONESystem	Registration (biometric) and cash transfers across digital channels
Save the Children	sQuid (Kenya)	Delivers digital financial services, and digital learning tools that improve education outcomes ²⁷⁵

Source: Interviews and online information.

128. Despite the efforts of the CWG, transfer values and ways of working across agencies have not been harmonized. The use of different digital systems has led to the existence of separate beneficiary lists, which were not shared. This makes effective coordination challenging and leads to delays in the disbursement of resources in some cases. Some donors advocate for a single beneficiary list to facilitate a scale up in CBT and eventual link to social protection systems. The governments²⁷⁶ at federal and state levels also supported this approach.

129. There are many important humanitarian coordination mechanisms used by WFP, UNHAS and the Logistics Cluster that were used to build synergies with partners:

- the Inter Cluster Working Group (ICWG);
- HCT and Operational Working Group (OWG) meetings;

²⁷⁰ WFP brief, February 2017 – SCOPE in Somalia cash-based transfer assistance.

²⁷¹ This issue is related to global humanitarian operations and is being addressed at HQ level.

²⁷² UNICEF also uses SCOPE.

²⁷³ UNHCR also tested newer registration technology, BIMS (Biometric Identity Management System), in Thailand in 2015.

²⁷⁴ RedRose is an international company specialized in supporting CBT programmes for various aid organizations.

²⁷⁵ Regulated by financial bodies in the UK and Kenya.

²⁷⁶ Information gathered through interviews with authorities in Mogadishu and Baidoa.

- NGO Forum;
- military and civil defence assets meetings;
- separate UNHAS and Logistics Cluster User Group meetings;
- sector cluster meetings (that is Food Security and Livelihood Cluster – also managed by WFP with FAO);
- access Working Group meetings UNDP and UNOCHA;
- coordination meetings in key operational locations; and
- UNOCHA – Drought Operations Coordination Centre (DOCC).

130. WFP has been regarded by the FGS as having engaged well with local non-state actors such as NGOs and communities. WFP²⁷⁷ participated in the Country Humanitarian Forum and sector discussions, which were organized by the MoHADM.

131. WFP worked with nearly 200 NGO partners in Somalia.²⁷⁸ Key partners included World Vision, Save the Children and DRC. Informal WFP partners included the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC), which operated in areas where WFP has not been able to work – principally Al-Shabaab areas. Several Islamic NGOs also provided important humanitarian assistance in areas that WFP did not access.

132. UNICEF outsourced several logistics functions²⁷⁹ to the WFP Somalia logistics department to take advantage of their network, such as transport contracts and warehousing requirements in locations such as Berbera and Bossaso.

WFP has been a partner of the Return Consortium, facilitating the voluntary return of Somali refugees from Kenya. The CO contributed to the tripartite agreement between Kenya, Somalia and UNHCR by providing air transport for returnees and supporting their reintegration through food security and nutrition programmes. See

²⁷⁷ The MoHADM confirmed (and highly appreciated) that WFP was among the first responders to the devastating truck bomb attack in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017 that killed over 500 people.

²⁷⁸ WFP's operational relationship with NGOs and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Annual Report 2011.

²⁷⁹ Information gathered based on field interviews.

Table 44.

Table 44: UNHAS returnee flights from Kenya to Somalia

		2016		2017 (to Nov)		
From	To	Pax	Flights	Pax	Flights	Proportional increase in Pax (%)
Kakuma	Baidoa	34	1	63	2	85
	Mogadishu	468	15	698	20	49
	Kismayo	0	0	974	27	100
	Total	502	16	1,735	49	246
Dadaab	Baidoa	229	7	0	0	-100
	Mogadishu	1,350	38	507	14	-62
	Kismayo	64	2	3,959	108	6086
	Total	1,643	47	4,466	122	172

Source: UNHAS Somalia.

2.3.5 Sustainability of WFP programme activities

133. Efforts to assure WFP's sustained assistance to Somali communities included, in 2015, the reopening of the WFP Somalia Office in Mogadishu to establish in-country representation for the first time in 20 years. The proximity of WFP to different stakeholders in Mogadishu has helped to reinforce coordination with local authorities.

134. Overall, local markets responded strongly to WFP's CBT interventions and have met demands nationally (under the GFA elements of the portfolio). This approach to supporting the role of the private sector will undoubtedly have a sustainable effect.

135. Some private-sector capacity building has been undertaken by WFP, for example the procurement department reported conducting training in the use of WFP's internal electronic tender system for online tendering. The system works well for local traders, but only those that have internet access. Training for traders has also been conducted as part of SCOPE implementation and CBT activities. Anecdotal evidence indicated that some retailers have expanded their businesses and become wholesalers.

136. The logistics department has provided training for port management staff in Mogadishu, Bossaso and Berbera, and invested in infrastructure improvements under SOs 105780 and 200475. The Somali authorities have since handed over the operation of the main ports to international port management companies.²⁸⁰ Therefore, it is likely that WFP's inputs in Berbera and Bossaso will be sustained. (Further port infrastructure work is planned in Kismayo under SO 201051).

²⁸⁰ Mogadishu port is managed by Turkey's Albayrak Group; Berbera by DP World (Dubai) and Bossaso by P&O Ports.

Annex N: Findings on Livelihoods, Food Security and Resilience

1. Introduction

1.1 Food-security context in Somalia

1.1.1 Background

1. Somalia is a low-income country with a total estimated population of 14.3 million and changing demographics.²⁸¹ Rates of urbanization are high, with the proportion of the population living in urban areas and cities rising from 35 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2017.²⁸² Nine percent of Somalis are IDPs. Rural populations include pastoralist nomads living in arid and semi-arid bush and savannah areas (26 percent of the population) and agro-pastoralists (23 percent) who depend on rainfed agriculture and locally-irrigated agriculture in riverine areas.²⁸³ A further one million are estimated to live as refugees in neighbouring countries, including 260,000 concentrated in Dadaab camp in Kenya.²⁸⁴

2. Somalia's rural populations are divided into four major clans and several minority groups. The geographical coverage of the larger clans spans a range of agroecological zones, where livelihoods and socio-economic structures are adapted to the use of locally available natural resources (Figure 12). Each clan uses customary law to govern member communities independently of modern state structures. In situations where the clans are divided, this has created a mismatch between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions. Unstable alliances, the diffusion of power and communal tensions over scarce resources have led to clan-based conflicts, violence and political instability for more than 25 years, particularly affecting south and central areas.²⁸⁵

3. In addition, while the social capital, kinship networks and support provided by intraclan structures afford a level of physical and social security to communities that may help many rural households address food gaps, these capacities are weaker in urban areas and among displaced groups. Urbanization and displacement have also led to changes in gender roles and responsibilities. Historically, men-controlled household incomes and assets while women managed household budgets and expenditures. However, in recent years the proportion of women-headed households has grown significantly, especially among urban and displaced groups, and women have increasingly engaged in income-earning activities to meet their families' household food and economic needs.²⁸⁶ The recent Somalia Economic Update estimated 70 percent of Somalia's GDP is urban based, consumption driven and fuelled by remittances and donor support. It concluded that resilience to recurring natural hazards will require considerable, longer-term investment in urban livelihoods, services and infrastructure.²⁸⁷

²⁸¹ [World Bank](#) (2016).

²⁸² [Statista](#) (2016).

²⁸³ A subset of the pastoralists, the *Barlawe*, have suffered asset losses to levels where they are unable to sustain viable pastoral livelihoods and rely instead on petty trade, small-scale agriculture and labour.


²⁸⁴ [CIA World Factbook](#) (2017).

²⁸⁵ Fragile states (2012) [Somalia's complex clan dynamics](#).

²⁸⁶ Smith, G. (2014) [Designing social protection frameworks for three zones of Somalia](#). UNICEF.

²⁸⁷ [Somalia Economic Update](#) World Bank (2017).

Figure 12: Map of Somalia livelihood zones



Source: FSNAU.

1.1.2 Food security


4. Structurally, Somalia faces a chronic ongoing food deficit. Even in a good year, total crop production meets only 40 to 50 percent of national cereal requirements. Total expenditure on food represents the largest proportion of the financial burden faced by poor households and ranges from 60 to 95 percent.²⁸⁸ This makes the food security of rural and urban households sensitive to fluctuations in crop production and livestock prices, with the terms of trade between casual labour and cereals (a proxy indicator for a household's ability to pay for food) correlating strongly with local and national levels of food insecurity.²⁸⁹

5. Over the period 2005 to 2017, Somalia has been hit by four major food crises with the number of Somalis facing food insecurity ranging from 3.4 to 6.7 million. These periods correlate closely with the periods of low national annual cereal output (Figure 13) including in 2005/2006, 2008/2009, 2011/2012 and 2016/2017.

²⁸⁸ Sneyers, A. (2017) [Food, Drought and Conflict: Evidence from a Case Study on Somalia](#). Working Paper 252, Household in Crisis Network: Institute of Development Studies.

²⁸⁹ FSNAU [Food Security Analysis System](#) (FSNAS).

Figure 13: Annual cereal production in Somalia (mt) (1995–2016)



Source: FSNAU.

Figure 13 also shows how, after the failure of consecutive rainy seasons in late 2010 (October to December, *Deyr* season) and early 2011 (April to June, *Gu* season) and the collapse in livestock prices in 2011 (Figure 14), the crisis led to the declaration of a famine in the Middle and Lower Shabelle and Bakool areas of southern Somalia; 2.4 million people (32 percent of the regional population in 2012) were classified as being in crisis or emergency status and rural areas particularly badly affected.²⁹⁰ Additionally, 258,000 lives were lost between October 2010 and April 2012 in southern and central Somalia, including 10 percent of children under 5.²⁹¹

6. After the end of the famine in 2012, the severity of food insecurity gradually improved. This can be attributed to stable *Gu* and *Deyr* rains over the next four years supported by investments in humanitarian relief and recovery. However, a combination of the El Niño-related failure of four consecutive rainy seasons in 2016–2017, coupled with conflict-related population displacements and trade disruptions has led to a significant deterioration in the food-security situation in recent months, with an estimated 3.4 million people facing crisis or emergency IPC status in mid-2017 (26 percent of the population).²⁹² Over 680,000 people were displaced in the first half of 2017, most of whom moved from rural to urban areas and the vulnerability of the urban poor escalated.²⁹³


²⁹⁰ <http://www.fsnau.org/products/quarterly-briefs>. See also Sneyers (2017) (footnote 5).

²⁹¹ London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health (2013) [Mortality among populations of southern and central Somalia affected by severe food insecurity and famine during 2010-2012](#). Also, [FSNAU Technical Release 2 May 2013](#).

²⁹² FSNAU August 2017. See the overview of IPC rankings at [FSNAU user brochure](#) and paragraph 21.

²⁹³ [Somalia Urban Investment Project](#), World Bank (2017).

Figure 14: Regional trends in medium-quality goat prices, Juba Valley (SoSH)



Source: FSNAU.

7. Agricultural productivity in Somalia is low with average cereal yields of below 0.5 mt/ha. While challenges to smallholder agriculture and national food security are recognized in policy, little progress has been made in boosting productivity because of the complexity of the contributing factors. These include the small size of farms, low levels of mechanization, high labour demands of manual cultivation, limited use of inputs or application of improved husbandry methods, absence of soil and water conservation strategies and vulnerability to climate events, which collectively make the sustainability of local food production systems fragile.²⁹⁴

8. Low productivity is compounded by land disputes, exacerbated by the outmigration of many rural families during periods of protracted drought and insecurity that have led to land grabs. Farmers wishing to access land depend on customary rights, which may be withheld, especially for women, such that returnees looking to resettle and access lands based on previous entitlements may no longer be recognized by local gatekeepers.²⁹⁵ Pastoralists have also suffered significant losses in recent years. Drought, insecurity and cross-border epidemics have disrupted livestock movements and interrupted trade routes causing significant income loss.²⁹⁶

9. Agriculture is Somalia's most important export sector with more than 50 percent of national earnings derived from the country's USD 200 million livestock export markets.²⁹⁷ However, exports account for just 14.5 percent of GDP, creating a large trade deficit (47 percent of GDP in 2015). While in the past security disruptions have led to restrictions to market access, and livestock exports have been disrupted by rift valley fever, during the CPE period, most Somali national and export markets continued to function effectively and remain linked to the Gulf States through ports and overland to Kenya.

10. Somalia's agricultural institutions lack research, extension and outreach capacity to support improvements in food production or monitor and address pest and disease outbreaks that affect the country's agricultural exports. The quality of inputs sold to farmers by private agri-dealers is often poor. Inputs are often past their shelf life or mislabelled, and veterinary products may be counterfeit. Only limited quantities of modern variety seeds are available nationally. There is also an absence of enabling infrastructure for agriculture. The virtual absence of post-harvest processing and transport mean that unsold produce is often lost, as are opportunities to increase

²⁹⁴ European Union (2010) [Review and Identification of The Agriculture Programme for Somalia](#).

²⁹⁵ Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (2013) [Patterns of Violence in Somalia](#). WFP Seminar Series.

²⁹⁶ FAO (2017) Somalia: Preventing famine, building resilience, promoting recovery.

²⁹⁷ [Somalia Economic Update](#), World Bank (2017).

incomes through value addition processing, packaging and engagement in key markets. Credit, including supplier credit, is rare or absent except through remittances. There are no leasing companies supplying machine inputs, such as cultivators, trucks or pumps. While most vendors of fruits and vegetables in markets in Somalia are women, the limited number of produce markets and lack of sanitary or childcare facilities can mean many women are forced to stay at home.²⁹⁸

1.1.3 Access to education

11. Somalia has one of the lowest primary school enrolment rates in Africa with only 30 percent of children in school and just 40 percent of these are girls. The situation is worst in rural areas where only 18 percent of children are enrolled. Nearly 75 percent of schools have inadequate facilities and many buildings are too damaged or unsafe for use. Gender inequality is common in the education system.²⁹⁹ In a 2017 review by WFP, attendance rates in schools, especially for girls, were found to be highly dependent on a combination of the children's households' ability to pay school fees, the local security and protection environment surrounding access, the status of the school infrastructure and presence of salaried teachers.³⁰⁰

1.1.4 National policies

12. Following the election of the FGS in 2012, the country launched a New Deal Compact with five Peacebuilding and State-building Goals (PSGs) covering legitimate and inclusive politics (PSG1), security (PSG2), justice (PSG3), economic foundations (PSG4), and revenue and services (PSG5).³⁰¹ National food systems were covered under PSG 4, which focused on strengthening the management of Somalia's natural, productive and human resources. These national priorities reflected state-level plans in Somaliland and Puntland. Emphasis was given to livestock exports, market and road infrastructure, opportunities for youth employment, and the provision of financial services supported by improved regulatory frameworks and stronger federal and state-level institutions.

13. In 2016 the New Deal Compact was updated as the SNDP 2017–2019, which sets out the its development goals and a roadmap towards identifying and realizing its SDG targets by 2030. The SNDP identifies 10 national challenges for agriculture (Box 1) and consolidates the Ministry of Agriculture Strategic Plan (2016–2020)³⁰² in a national strategy with four goals that include:

- strengthening the institutional capacities of national and federal ministries and departments of agriculture;
- improving and rehabilitating productive agricultural infrastructure;
- increasing agricultural production; and
- developing and supporting effective agricultural commodity marketing systems across Somalia.

14. For a first time, the SNDP also introduces a cross-cutting resilience approach in Somalia. This includes systemic efforts to support the reintegration of IDPs and returnees, while providing conditions for safe migration and returns, and tap into the financial (remittance), knowledge, and investment support of the Somali diaspora. This approach recognizes the need to introduce national targets for employment, food and nutritional security (availability, accessibility and

²⁹⁸ Hadley, S. and Farah, S. (2014) [Somalia Economic Growth Strategic Assessment](#). USAID: IBTCI.

²⁹⁹ UNICEF and Somalia Federal Republic [Go-2-School Initiative: Educating for Resilience](#) (2013–2016).

³⁰⁰ WFP (2017) Strategic review of WFP's School Meals Programme in Somalia. WFP PMMD: IMPACT.

³⁰¹ Hearn, S. and T. Zimmerman, (2014). [A New Deal for Somalia? The Somali Compact and its Implications for Peacebuilding](#). New York: Centre on International Cooperation.

³⁰² Ministry of Agriculture [Strategic Plan 2016–2020](#).

prices), and disaster preparedness and response, alongside strategies to support national resilience building, including the introduction of a social protection framework.

15. To this end, five social protection goals have been introduced including increased access to education; (i) improved water and health services; (ii) provision of a package of dependable assistance for vulnerable people; (iii) the creation sustainable employment for the urban or peri-urban poor; (iv) particularly for the youth (v) at high risk of *Tahriib* (outmigration). Ministry of National Planning and International Cooperation coordination committees are charged with facilitating these initiatives with relevant line departments at the federal and state levels.

16. The 2013–2016 Interim Education Sector Strategic Plan targeted equal access to quality education for all Somalis. This ambition was reiterated in the 2017–2019 SNDP in which the government sees its overall ambition for education as, “ensuring the provision of accessible, equitable, affordable and quality education services to all people in Somalia”.³⁰³ Its goals include strengthening the MoE’s governance, management and partnerships to deliver education programmes and services by 2019 and creating a sustainable education financing system that increasingly relies on national revenues and resources. While school feeding is identified as part of the current programmes, neither the Sector Strategic Plan nor the SNDP reference the use of school meals to support future education outcomes.

1.1.5 International assistance

17. Introduced in 2014, the strategic objectives of the United Nations Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) 2014–2016 mirrored the five PSGs of the Compact. This reflected a desire to articulate a common vision for Somalia with integrated priorities and responsibilities for United Nations agencies. When the Compact was replaced by the SNDP in 2016, the ISF was replaced by the United Nations Humanitarian Strategy (2016–2018) and new a strategic framework (United Nations Strategic Framework [UNSF], 2017–2021) to guide the collective work of United Nations agencies. By aiming to address the root causes of fragility, development obstacles, chronic dependencies on international support and humanitarian crises, the UNSF continues the themes of the ISF and responds directly to the cross-cutting resilience priorities of the SNDP.

18. Many aspects of the United Nations’ joint approach build on the JRS, a strategic partnership formed by WFP, FAO and UNICEF in 2012. Drawing on lessons from the 2011 drought response and understanding of household livelihoods and disaster risk reduction, the JRS proposed the introduction of three complementary building blocks to support Somali households and communities exposed to the protracted crisis. They included:

- strengthening productive sectors – increasing household incomes by diversifying livelihood strategies, intensifying production at household level and enhancing access to markets and market information;
- improving basic social services – strengthening the human capital of vulnerable households by improving systems and services that track and respond to household demands for support to sustain good health, nutrition and education, safety and adequate skills; and
- establishing predictable safety nets – addressing the most vulnerable people’s basic needs through the predictable and sustainable transfer of food or cash for the destitute or seasonally at-risk populations.

19. Since 2012 donors have begun to support resilience approaches led by NGO consortia including BRCiS,³⁰⁴ the Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP),³⁰⁵ and the Somalia Resilience

³⁰³ Government of Somalia (2016). [National Development Plan, p. 162.](#)

³⁰⁴ [https://www.nrc.no/what-we-do/brcis-consortium---building-resilient-communities-in-somalia/.](https://www.nrc.no/what-we-do/brcis-consortium---building-resilient-communities-in-somalia/)

³⁰⁵ [http://www.somrep.org/#.](http://www.somrep.org/#)

Action Consortium (STREAM).³⁰⁶ Each has sought to increase the resilience of vulnerable pastoral, agro-pastoral and peri-urban households and communities by introducing multisectoral programmes covering livelihood security, social protection, governance and infrastructure development. Modalities include: delivery of predictable and regular, unconditional and conditional CBTs to vulnerable households; technical support for livelihood diversification; support for community savings and credit; access to markets and financial services; and the development of community-led preparedness, early warning and response systems.

20. United Nations and NGO-led emergency response strategies are guided using integrated food security and nutrition analyses, the findings of which are consolidated under the IPC to guide decision-making.³⁰⁷ First developed in 2006, the IPC draws together all available food-security information ranging from production figures to livestock prices to civil insecurity and malnutrition rates. From these data the IPC makes a phase classification which informs the prioritization of agency interventions across Somalia's main livelihood zones.³⁰⁸ While a chronic IPC scale has been developed to support resilience programming, it has yet to be operationalized in Somalia, and WFP has, instead, applied long-term trend analyses based on historical IPC data for this purpose.³⁰⁹

1.2. WFP's food security, livelihoods and resilience portfolio in Somalia

1.2.1 Operations

21. In the absence of a strategic plan for any part of the 2012–2017 CPE period, WFP Somalia's priorities have been driven by consecutive operational frameworks. In 2012, the CO's planning centred on the EMOP *"Tackling Hunger and Food Insecurity in Somalia"* (200281, 2011–2012). The EMOP's objectives aligned with WFP's corporate Strategic Plan (2008–2013) and aimed to improve food consumption for IDPs and other vulnerable groups affected by conflict and drought while introducing plans to reduce unconditional food transfers by reinforcing the self-reliance of households and communities through asset creation.³¹⁰

22. In 2013, the EMOP was replaced with a PRRO (200443) which sought to accelerate this shift from life-saving relief assistance towards support for early recovery and rehabilitation. Household food and nutritional security would be boosted by preventive and therapeutic nutrition interventions, school meals and FFAs, while WFP would expand its engagement in the JRS partnership and introduce efforts to strengthen the capacities of government institutions.

23. PRRO 200844 was launched in January 2016 as a follow on to PRRO 200443 and aimed to continue the shift from relief to recovery and resilience building. Its ongoing objectives include: providing life-saving assistance to people in the IPC 3 (crisis) and IPC 4 (emergency) phases while protecting populations at risk of acute food insecurity using predictable and reliable safety-net programmes (SO 1); addressing the causes of acute malnutrition while stabilizing seasonally vulnerable households by focusing on resilience (SO 2); and enhancing the livelihood food security and productivity of IPC 2 (stressed) households by investing in food production and income generation (SO 3).

³⁰⁶ <http://www.acted.org/en/eu-and-stream-consortium-supporting-resilience-building-jubaland-through-efficient-livelihoods-inter>.

³⁰⁷ The IPC encourages the use of multiple data sources and methods to arrive at a meta-analysis of the food security situation faced by resident and displaced populations. Examples include seasonal assessments, the Somalia Water and Land Information Management programme (SWALIM), WFP Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM), and Nutrition assessments by different agencies.

³⁰⁸ See FSNAU [Integrated Phase Classification](#) (IPC) for more details.

³⁰⁹ Food and Nutrition Security in Somalia, WFP (2007–12 and 2007–2014).

³¹⁰ Wider confirmation of this approach include DFID (1999), [Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets](#), and Elluard, C. (2015) [Guidance notes: cash transfer in livelihood programming](#). CaLP.

24. In addition, nine SOs for common services complemented WFP operations. These included, SO 200440 which was active over the entire CPE period and focused on FSC augmentation.

1.2.2 Activities

25. Across these three operations, WFP Somalia have adopted a range of activities in line with WFP's corporate policies and guidelines to support its food security, livelihoods and resilience programming (Table 45). GFA provided food, cash or vouchers to households in areas facing IPC 3 and IPC 4 phases to help them access food and avoid distress strategies that deplete assets and impact on their livelihoods.

26. School meals were introduced to improve the nutrition of primary school-aged children through the provision of micronutrient-fortified meals and snacks. By supporting higher rates of enrolment, attendance and retention of pupils and improved concentration in class, school meals would also support educational outcomes. Increased gender equality in education would be achieved by the deliberate targeting of girls with take-home rations to improve school attendance ratios. Value transfer to households would also be realized by reducing household food expenditures and improving overall food consumption.

27. Food for Assets (FFA) activities and approaches were used in stressed areas (IPC 2) to help households and communities build assets that reduce their risk exposures to disasters, strengthen livelihoods and build resilience over time, while helping households meet short-term seasonal gaps in their access to food. FFA was used in rural areas to support field level rainwater-harvesting structures for crops and pasture, shallow wells and solar pumps, *birkads* (water catchments) and erosion-control structures. Conversely, in urban areas, FFT was provided to help build the skills, knowledge and economic opportunities available to women and men in areas such as plumbing, weaving and dying, ICT literacy, electronics and mobile repairs.

Table 45: Summary of food security, livelihoods and resilience operations and activities

Operation	GFA	FFA/FFT	School meals	FSC	Period
EMOP 200281	◊	◊	◊		2012–2013
PRRO 200443	◊	◊	◊		2013–2015
PRRO 200844	◊	◊	◊		2016–2017
SO 200440				◊	2012–2017

1.2.3 Implementation arrangements

28. Underpinning the resilience approach in more stable IPC 2 phase localities, was the CO's adoption of the three-pronged approach (3 PA), which employed three interrelated processes to support resilience planning and implementation. In a process aligned with the IPC, integrated context analysis (ICA) combined national assessments of food security and nutrition risk exposures across Somalia with analyses of historical trends. Seasonal livelihood programming (SLP) aimed to support close sub-national coordination and support the joint implementation of agreed interventions and partnership. Community-based participatory planning (CBPP) sought to help targeted communities and vulnerable groups to build their ownership of interventions by prioritizing their needs and identifying strategies to help them adapt to ongoing changes in the local context.

29. Each of WFP's activities involved modalities, including in-kind, cash-based and voucher transfers. In line with WFP's corporate policies and the global expansion of its CBT programming, the Somalia CO looked to expand CBT, including use of combined direct in-kind and cash-based interventions in places where food transfers were difficult, or there were opportunities to bolster livelihoods and/or support food and agriculture markets. To ensure timeliness, scale capacity and accountability of transfers, WFP introduced SCOPE as a biometric registration platform.

Opportunities to explore the use of cash and voucher programmes as part of future national social protection and safety-net systems were also recognized.

30. In partnership with the FSNAU IPC, the CO's VAM undertook seasonal assessments of economic, geospatial and household vulnerability data to identify food-insecure populations and establish the underlying causes of food insecurity as the basis for the design of WFP operations. In places that were too remote or dangerous for face-to-face assessments, or when high-frequency data is needed, WFP adopted mVAM using short message system (SMS), interactive voice response, live calls and beneficiary feedback to reach vulnerable populations. Third-party monitoring contracted private companies to assume some of the monitoring responsibilities in at-risk situations. WFP SOPs for M&E were to be followed with timelines and responsibilities adjusted by the CO.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning

2.1.1 Relevance and connectedness of the WFP objectives and activities of the strategic context for aid delivery in Somalia and the differentiated humanitarian and developmental needs of vulnerable groups

32. Somalia is a dynamic context where the population has faced violence and insecurity coupled with environmental and economic shocks for more than 20 years triggering widespread displacement and vulnerability. The CPE period began and ended with two emergencies. In 2012, famine was declared in the Middle and Lower Shabelle and Bakool areas of southern Somalia. There, 2.4 million people (32 percent of the population) were classified as being in crisis or emergency status.³¹¹ In 2016–2017 a significant risk of famine was reported with 2.9 million Somalis classified as at risk of famine in the first half of 2017 and 3.3 million needing livelihood support.³¹² Each crisis was precipitated by the failure of consecutive seasonal rains.

33. High levels of food and nutritional insecurity led WFP to prioritize an emergency response that came to dominate the CPE portfolio. While this was initially based on GFA, from 2015 the delivery modality evolved from in-kind to CBTs, and within CBTs from vouchers to cash. Given the repetitive and historical nature of crises in Somalia, the overall strategy to extend WFP's capacity to provide humanitarian support to more of the population over the CPE period was appropriate to the evolving context and was supported by WFP's national and local government, United Nations, donors, NGOs and community stakeholders and partners.

34. WFP's leading contribution to humanitarian aid coordination was supported by a close engagement with the IPC process which guided WFP's positioning alongside that of its partners and donors. WFP VAM was closely involved with the FSNAU supporting seasonal analyses, IPC classifications and response strategies. Likewise, food-security decision-making was underpinned by the FSC with significant WFP support through SO 200440. However, while the humanitarian alignment of WFP's portfolio and rapid scaling up of its emergency response in 2016 is to be commended, the focus on emergency response at scale dominated its programming while its ability to address the underlying causes of vulnerability and the changing needs of men and women remained weak.

2.1.2 Coherence of WFP's objectives with national and sub-national government strategies, policies and capacities

35. After successful elections in 2012, the new government created the framework of a provisional constitution. In 2013, the New Somalia Compact was agreed with members of the

³¹¹ WFP [Somalia Country Profile](#).

³¹² FSNAU-FEWSNET [Somalia Food Security Outlook, October 2017-May 2018](#) (2017).

international community, including a two-year period of support to restore Somalia's institutions. In 2017, following a peaceful transition of political power, the Compact was replaced by the SNDP, which mirrors the earlier state-level plans of Puntland and Somaliland and sets out the priorities and strategic focus of the country's line ministries. Consequently, in the latter part of the CPE, WFP has faced the challenge of rising expectations among a fresh and ambitious leadership in Mogadishu's line ministries looking to overcome limited resources and weak sub-national capacities in states outside of Puntland and Somaliland.

36. To navigate this setting, WFP aligned its strategic operations with the Compact and SNDP under the EMOP and both PRROs and targeted institutional support to crisis preparedness and emergency response. The primary FGS body for this work was the MoHADM of FGS and equivalent bodies in Somaliland and Puntland. WFP worked with national coordination bodies, such as the Somaliland FACA, and expanded and supported regional FSCs alongside United Nations UNOCHA counterparts; it operated its school meals programme through the Ministries of Education in Somaliland and Puntland.

37. However, WFP's food security, livelihoods, and resilience operations were hampered by the absence of a clear strategy to support and strengthen the capacities of government institutions despite their growing interest in developing a recovery agenda that bridges the humanitarian-development nexus. For example, WFP's engagement with FGS on resilience building and longer-term programming under the Drought Impact Needs Assessment and Recovery and Resilience Framework processes in 2017 has so far been limited.³¹³ There is also little evidence of any integration of WFP's strategy or capacity support for government-owned agriculture (crop production, livestock and fisheries), environment (clean energy and natural resource management), food security, or livelihoods and employment sector ministries at the national or state levels.

38. Even in stable contexts, such as Somaliland where FFA sites were agreed through local coordination bodies under the Seasonal Analysis Response Plans (SARPs), no attempt was made by either WFP or FACA to integrate activities with the catchment regeneration plan of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Somaliland Development Fund. As a result, the fit between state-level resilience-building strategies, as described under the SNDP and WFP interventions, was limited. Only in the education sector did WFP commit to implementing school meals interventions directly through government structures in Somaliland and Puntland. However, even here, because of the pressing needs of the emergency, the use of a SABER diagnostic – planned for 2016–2017 to support government in developing strategies to strengthen universal access to education – has been postponed twice.

2.1.3 Effectiveness of WFP's positioning and strategic alignments to make the biggest difference

39. By positioning its PRRO operations in line with the United Nations' priorities in the Interim Strategic Framework (2014–2016), Humanitarian Strategy (2016–2018) and new Strategic Framework (UNSF, 2017–2021), WFP positioned its overarching food-security portfolio broadly in line with the national policies and strategies of United Nations agencies. This approach was reinforced by WFP's collaboration with the UNCT and United Nations agencies. Whereas WFP was criticized for insufficient leadership and commitment to joint planning and decision-making with partners during the 2011–2012 drought response, during the CPE period it worked closely with national and local FSC members and moved from a focus on food aid to embrace an expanding range of humanitarian response options.

³¹³ See [Toward Drought Recovery and Resilience: the Somalia Drought Impact & Needs Assessment and Recovery & Resilience Framework](#), UNDP (2017), and the [Findings of the Drought Impact Needs Assessment](#), ReliefWeb (2017).

40. This shift was strongly supported by United Nations, donors, NGOs and regional Ministry of Home Affairs partners, as was WFP's engagement in geographical targeting with FSNAU, support to the FSC and expansion of market-led GFA approaches involving the use of CBT cash and vouchers. CBTs have led to the beginnings of a new alignment for WFP in Somalia by which it has expanded its private-sector engagement through the training of vendors, provision of equipment, and injections of CBT cash that have stimulated national food systems. However, in approaching vendors on a one-to-one basis, and in the absence of any support to a trade body to help manage relationships, WFP's commitment to private-sector support was, apparently, limited.

41. Similarly, WFP maintained a level of market engagement by purchasing 5,700 mt of cereals locally between 2014 and 2016. One of the main drivers of this approach was to improve post-harvest management and storage by 10 FAO-supported producer cooperatives to reduce aflatoxin levels, improve quality and sell-on produce into national markets. However, here again, WFP largely failed to see this as an opportunity to build cross-cutting synergies between its food-security programming and support to national food systems as part of a deliberate strategy for private-sector engagement.

2.2. Factors and quality of strategic decision-making

2.2.1 WFP and partner analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues and their use in decision-making

Situation analysis

42. While WFP Somalia's VAM unit is small relative to the scale and complexity of WFP operations in Somalia, this is compensated for by collaborating with the FSNAU in seasonal and targeted assessments, joint analyses, and in building consensus on needs. Through this collaboration the VAM unit have developed a sophisticated approach to data collection and analysis using food and nutrition trends analysis, hotspot monitoring, market monitoring and market assessments, emergency food-security assessments (EFSA), monthly early warning reports and seasonal assessments. The evaluation also found that over the CPE period, WFP supported a growing analysis of commodity markets. This underpinned its decision to expand the use of CBTs to vulnerable households, track impacts on the costs and availability of staple foods in local markets and estimate MEBs.

43. Based on the IPC, WFP's collaboration with the FSNAU drove the geographical targeting of its in-kind and CBT transfers as well as those of its United Nations and NGO partners. IPC level 3 and 4 localities were targeted with GFA on the basis that households would be unable to meet basic food needs and absorb the demands of conditional transfers. IPC 2 localities were provided recovery and resilience support involving FFA and FFT.

44. Across each of its AOs, WFP VAM ensured that IPC analyses were linked to decision-making and translated into local response planning. This was a robust system that mirrored the 3 PA. While IPC analyses correlated with a national ICA, the SARPs of sub-offices, including their constituent operational plans, corresponded to SLP. The formulation of FLAs by CPs was based on CBPP. This was a significant improvement over the 2013 evaluation of PRRO 200443, which found no standardized approach to beneficiary selection or evidence that the 3 PA was adopted at national or community levels.

Monitoring and evaluation

45. As with the 2011 CPE and 2013 PRRO evaluations, the evaluation team found that in 2017, WFP's M&E systems continued to follow a compliance-oriented M&E plan with SOPs operating in line with WFP policy. This included process monitoring and the monitoring of corporate outcomes. Post-distribution monitoring was successfully implemented by WFP M&E staff in accessible

localities and through third-party monitoring in areas WFP could not reach itself. This enabled WFP to track its operations in areas where its own staff could not go. Beneficiary feedback and AAP introduced before the CPE period has improved significantly with the introduction of SCOPE, with beneficiaries at all field sites visited aware of feedback mechanisms and reporting they had both used them and received follow-up support.

46. However, while WFP's current collection of M&E data and follow-up is good and meaningful, longitudinal output-to-outcome analyses were prevented by major data gaps and weaknesses in WFP's M&E systems. Data management in 2012–2013 used Microsoft Excel spreadsheets that were lost during M&E staff handovers; data requirements and reporting in the SPRs shifted between EMOP 200281 and PRRO 200443 and, again, in 2015, with the introduction of WFP's new corporate results framework. The geographical targeting of WFP FFA/FFT interventions shifted over the CPE period in line with changing IPC classifications. In effect, FFA/FFT sites were targeted on an annual basis under local SARP agreements forcing WFP to focus its M&E efforts on seasonal activity-to-output monitoring. High levels of socio-economic, infrastructural and environmental variability resulted from the selection of sites for short-term assistance on an annual basis and affected WFP's ability to collect and interpret corporate outcome data in relation to its FFA and FFT contributions.

2.2.2 WFP's contributions to strengthening national and partner capacities for context analysis and the development of appropriate response strategies

47. With the introduction of PRRO200443, WFP began to implement the capacity strengthening of state-level government and partner staff in FFA and FFT. However, this programme was ad hoc and only a minor part of WFP's intervention in these areas. Training operated through AOs, which also offered invitations and support to local authorities and partners to participate in SARP workshops towards the formulation of operational plans, and to participate in national and regional FSC cells to oversee response coordination. While this approach enabled WFP to consult with federal and state government structures and partners during the design and implementation of its programmes, it did not support a handover process or the emergence of a cadre of staff able to take on these activities in future. While national capacity indices were introduced for school feeding and nutrition, no analyses were made of national or state-level capacities in the Ministries of Agriculture, Livestock or Environment or of the coordinating bodies relevant to WFP to inform WFP capacity strengthening in livelihood recovery or resilience building.

48. In comparison, over the last two years the FSNAU have trained 80 government staff from FGS, Puntland and Somaliland line departments in situation analysis and early warning and helped establish food security and nutrition analysis coordination units within the MoHADM. However, while the FSNAU have succeeded in signing a capacity agreement with FGS MoH, it was less successful in establishing an IPC technical working group with the government and resource constraints have led the Disaster Management Authority in Puntland and the FGS Ministry of Planning to delay signing capacity-strengthening agreements with the FSNAU. Throughout the CPE period, WFP was unclear as to its role in supporting government structures or the FSNAU in taking forward these initiatives, and the comparative roles of WFP and FSNAU in providing capacity-strengthening leadership needs to be clarified.

49. Although WFP implemented its livelihood recovery and resilience activities through CPs, the provision of M&E capacity strengthening was limited. As a result, the monitoring of WFP's livelihood interventions and quality of vulnerability analysis was highly dependent on the existing capacities of CPs. In some cases, this gap led to CPs having difficulties integrating their own community monitoring within WFP's internal M&E systems with differences in data selection. With WFP's reliance on operational management through CPs, introduction of the partner capacity assessment tool and follow-up capacity strengthening will need to focus in this area.

2.2.3 Factors determining WFP's strategic choices and management of risks

50. Three phases of WFP's CPE interventions broadly corresponded to its three operations. In 2012 WFP's response was led by EMOP 200281 where the primary aim was to improve food consumption for IDPs and other vulnerable groups affected by conflict and drought. Prior to the start of the CPE period, WFP was criticized by national stakeholders, donors and partners for its lack of engagement and insular management of the emergency response. As national conditions shifted with the emergence of new government structures in 2012 and IPC ratings began to improve, WFP began to address these institutional risks by rebuilding staff capacities, collaboration and trust with stakeholders and partners.

51. In 2013, WFP agreed PRRO 200443, which introduced a resilience component into WFP operations as part of a shift in focus towards early recovery and rehabilitation involving close cooperation with FAO, UNICEF and others in taking forward resilience thinking under the JRS. However, although the 2013–2015 period was characterized by meteorological and security conditions that may have favoured the deepening of WFP's longer-term recovery and resilience interventions, there was no expansion in associated livelihoods programming. In 2015, WFP introduced a roadmap which prioritized the need to improve the timeliness and scale for any future emergency response by introducing the beneficiary registration and transfer management platform, SCOPE, and expanding the use of CBTs and cash.

52. WFP's de-prioritization of livelihood, resilience and education initiatives, in relation to its strategy to build its humanitarian support capacity to reach more of the population, was justified by its ability to make the biggest difference to food security using available human, financial and physical resources. It was driven by assessments of risks and mitigation options, supported by long-term food security trends analyses,³¹⁴ and endorsed by government, United Nations, NGOs and community stakeholders in Somalia at the time. The strategy of pre-registering beneficiaries and shifting to CBTs as a springboard for WFP's emergency response capability is also confirmed by the largely successful response to the 2016–2017 drought. The trade-offs made in setting these priorities over and above recovery and resilience programming also reflected donor positioning, which saw WFP's leadership and value addition to be strongest in the areas of EPR. From the donor perspective, resilience-building strategies could be sustained by a NGO consortia through their outreach and technical capacities, and local networks.

2.3. Performance and results of the WFP portfolio

2.3.1 Effectiveness of WFP's programme activities and the main drivers

Targeting

53. While the IPC-SARP-FLA planning process led to successful area-based targeting of populations, it did not provide WFP with an understanding of the underlying causes of food insecurity and vulnerability within targeted geographical areas. This was the result of a gap in the vulnerability analysis within the IPC approach, in which the analysis focused on livelihood categories and geographical zones. VAM systems did not compensate for this gap. As a result, WFP's targeting and understanding of the appropriateness of different modalities was lacking and there was little evidence that analyses of the underlying causes of food insecurity informed WFP targeting.

54. Gaps in WFP's vulnerability analyses included the comparative positions of women, men and youths in rural and urban communities and differences between recent IDP arrivals and longer-term residents in and around IDP camps and settlements. Insufficient attention was given to the influence of clan systems and gatekeepers on social exclusion and marginalization that are known

³¹⁴ Food Security and Nutrition in Somalia 2007–2014 (2015).

to affect the distribution and redistribution of entitlements in Somalia.³¹⁵ As a result, the assumption that community-based targeting could provide an effective mechanism to reach vulnerable and marginalized groups has to be questioned. The evaluation team does not believe WFP addressed this question adequately. Thus, it was unable to understand the risks and benefits of its different assistance activities on the agricultural, pastoralist and IDP households it targeted, their relationship to rural and urban contexts and gatekeepers, the length of stay of IDP households in displacement camps and settlements, or the underlying influence of each households' gender, age and wealth structure.


Food for Assets and Food for Training

Activities under WFP's livelihood recovery and resilience-building programmes began with FFW under the EMOP in 2012. FFW represented less than 1 percent of the EMOP portfolio, and the 2011 CPE evaluation found a lack of commitment to longer-term livelihoods approaches. From 2012 onwards, WFP's livelihoods interventions shifted to FFA and FFT activities, which, until 2017, largely reached or exceeded planned beneficiary numbers (Figure 15 and

³¹⁵ See e.g., Bryld, E., C. Kamau and D. Sinigallia (2013), [Gatekeepers in Somalia](#), Cash Learning Partnership, and; Yarnell, M., and A. Thomas (2017) [On the Edge of Disaster](#), Refugees International.

Figure 16).³¹⁶


Figure 15: Participants in Food for Assets activities



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

³¹⁶ Note, the 2012 FFA figure presented was in fact food for work (FFW).

Figure 16: Participants in Food for Training activities



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

55. However, when set against the estimated number of people classified as stressed (IPC level 2),³¹⁷ the coverage of these programmes ranged from a high of 31 percent in 2013 to a low of 9 percent in 2016 which, while significant in some years, was limited relative to the levels of identifiable need. Among the beneficiaries, the proportion of female to male FFA participants was roughly equal from 2013 onwards. Following their introduction under the 2013 PRRO, some FFA and FFT sites also provided childcare services for women engaged in work or training. While there is evidence that women were significant participants in management committees, the proportion of women in leadership roles overseeing FFA/FFT was only reported for 2014 and 2015 when it reached 21 percent, less than half of the 50 percent target. WFP’s ability to target limited FFA resources to support women from 2014 onwards as it planned was not evidenced from beneficiary ratios. While a higher than expected proportion of male FFT beneficiaries was reported in most years, this was due to an appropriate engagement of male youths in training, but from 2015, FFT dropped significantly which runs counter to the needs of Somalia’s growing urban IDP populations.

56. From 2013 onwards, the FFA activities used to support rural communities adopted a range of proven environmental recovery and productive activities. Each was agreed with target communities through CBPP. Examples included rainwater-harvesting structures for crops and pasture, shallow wells with solar pumps, *birkads*, and erosion-control measures (Table 46). FFT was used to support courses in urban areas, including plumbing, weaving and dying, ICT literacy, electronics and mobile repairs with course selection positively biased to match women’s preferences.

WFP’s ability to achieve actual versus planned outputs was variable. This was despite activities being agreed under the SARP and OP planning process based on available resources. While FFT activities supported trainees through targeted literacy centres throughout the CPE (Table 47), only in 2014 did WFP FFA activities achieve planned outputs. Interestingly, 2014 was a year when WFP faced significant resource limitations and had to reduce food distributions for FFA and FFT, resulting in beneficiary numbers being below target. This suggests that in 2012–2013 when WFP exceeded planned beneficiary numbers by a significant margin, performance may have been

driven more by a focus on resource transfer than a close engagement of communities in longer-term planning for livelihood recovery and resilience building.

57. Beneficiaries reported both FFA and FFT were relevant to their needs. Longer-term IDPs (more than six months) receiving GFA in IPC category 3 and 4 areas indicated their preference for conditional FFT over unconditional transfers to improve their skills and employability. However, although WFP Somalia recognized in its 2013 SPR that there is a positive relationship between the targeting of appropriate FFA water assets and the ability of girls to attend school. The limited range of FFA activities that WFP offered women and girls to help them lighten their domestic workloads may in part explain why WFP did not significantly increase the proportion of female FFA participants.³¹⁸

Table 46: FFA outputs: assets created and rehabilitated, actual versus planned³¹⁹

Output	Unit	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Irrigation structures	ha	0	5,975	16,622	41,776	10,502	
Proportion of actual to planned	%	0	1,707	206	85	75	
Soil-water conservation	ha	232	835	129	1,094	259	
Proportion of actual to planned	%	155	155	182	290	83	
Biological land stabilization	ha				106	70	
Proportion of actual to planned	%				707	78	
Proportion of actual to planned	ha		90	228	6,783	16	
Proportion of actual to planned	%		56	104	105	4	
Rangeland reseeded	Ha				12,459	5,142	
Proportion of actual to planned	%				43	100	
Roads rehabilitated	km	597	1,006	2,108	1,692	604	
Proportion of actual to planned	%	149	72	132	94	93	
DRR assisted communities	#	482	341	495			
Proportion of actual to planned	%	241	47	141			
Community ponds > 3000 m ³	#	168	109	141	96	119	
Proportion of actual to planned	%	280	52	127	82	78	
Shallow wells	#	17	92	201	51	191	
Proportion of actual to planned	%	17	66	105	25	102	
Tree seedlings	#		63,500	105,777	85,500	339,500	
Proportion of actual to planned	%		113	100	24	99	
Flood and gully protection	m ³		216,176	39,971	36,408	34,355	
Proportion of actual to planned	%		676	111	45	93	

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

Table 47: Food for Training outputs: literacy centres supported

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
FFT literacy centres	#	99	175	129	78		
Proportion of actual to planned	%	165	292	211	100		

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

³¹⁸ Activities benefiting women listed in Table 47 include community ponds, shallow wells and seedlings.

³¹⁹ Due to data gaps, FFA/FFT output classes are aggregated across resilience and recovery Objectives. For all tables, Green boxes indicate targets achieved. Amber, targets not achieved. Grey, no data.

58. Furthermore, while beneficiaries were broadly supportive of WFP’s FFA and FFT activities, they voiced concerns that these were temporary interventions involving little support to help women and men establish institutional arrangements to manage and maintain FFA structures or find employment after the FFT training period was over. This beneficiary perspective confirms the opinion of the evaluation team that both FFA and FFT largely operated as short-term, stand-alone activities supporting beneficiaries more through short-term cash and in-kind transfers than longer-term livelihood recovery or resilience-building contributions. Although the quality of FFA and FFT interventions could not be assessed, the short-term basis of the SARP process and FLAs with CPs to plan and implement FFA and FFT activities was not compatible with contextual needs of livelihood recovery or resilience building in Somalia, or the sustainability of WFP-supported outputs. In the face of limited resources, it is disappointing that WFP failed to explore alternative ways to operationalize its livelihood recovery and resilience programmes, such as by focusing resources in target catchment areas or strengthening year-on-year engagements with the same communities. Many of these findings are not new in the Somalia context (see Box 1).

59. WFP outcomes data is presented in Table 48, Table 49, Table 50 and Table 51 for both livelihood recovery (Strategic Objective 2) and resilience sites (SO 3). While this data was only

Box 1: FAO country evaluation (2012–2013)

This evaluation included an in-depth study of FAO’s cash for work [assets] programme to test its main underlying assumption that by disbursing cash to targeted poor and vulnerable individuals and rehabilitating communal productive assets, households and communities would experience short- and long-term gains in food security. Among the most significant lessons emerging from the evaluation were the need to:

- better coordinate with other agencies;
- acknowledge informal community redistribution mechanisms and local concepts of justice in planning;
- undertake a more careful assessment to understand the [gendered] implications of choosing to rehabilitate one type of infrastructure over another;
- ensure the inclusion of those who are vulnerable and marginalized;
- implement programmes over a longer timeframe, and with more workers; and
- deliver CFW as part of a package of interventions, targeted according to categories and needs.

reported consistently from 2016 onwards, it is evident that across sites and years WFP did not achieve its targets for diet diversity, coping strategy or food consumption scores. When considering the limited scale of WFP’s FFA/FFT transfers and asset creation/rehabilitation, alongside patchy data, and multiple wider variables that would have influenced WFP’s outcome measures (e.g. drought, market prices, remittances, insecurity, and clan/community-related social support or exclusion) it is questionable as to how appropriate WFP’s outcome targets were within the context. Therefore, no relationship could be drawn between them and WFP’s FFA/FFT activities. While community asset scores (CAS) indicate targets were achieved, they represent little more than a percentage of target communities that received FFA support in line with SARP and OP planning. The failure to achieve CAS targets at FFA sites in 2014 was due to the timing of interventions, which meant that activities did not reach completion until 2015. Nevertheless, in the same year all 453 target villages in the recovery programme were reached successfully.

Table 48: Average diet diversity scores at recovery and resilience FFA/FFT sites

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Recovery programme						
DDS: diet diversity score (recovery programme)					4.6	4.8
DDS: diet diversity score (female-headed households)					4.2	4.4
DDS: diet diversity score (male-headed households)					4.7	4.9
Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)						
DDS: diet diversity score (resilience programme)				4.2	4.2	
DDS: diet diversity score (female-headed households)			5.72	3.9	4.9	
DDS: diet diversity score (male-headed households)			6	4.3	4.1	

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

Table 49: Average annual food consumption scores at FFA/FFT sites

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Recovery programme ('Other' districts)						
FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score					26.4	14.5
FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)					27.3	13.1
FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)					24	18.5
Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)						
FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score					22.2	34.8
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (female-headed)					30.8	49.7
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (male-headed)					18.6	30.9
Recovery programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)						
FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score				26.6	30.3	
FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)			35.6	17.6	31.2	
FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)			29.8	30	24	
Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)						
FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score				34	24.2	
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (female-headed)			0	49.5	8	
FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (male-headed)			12.53	28.1	26.6	

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

Table 50: Average annual coping strategy index at FFA/FFT sites

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)						

Percentage of households with reduced/stabilized Coping Strategy Index				35.5	56.6	
Percentage of households with reduced/stabilized Coping Strategy Index			43.7	13.2	19.6	

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

Table 51: Average annual community asset scores at FFA/FFT sites


	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Recovery programme						
CAS: percentage of communities with an increased Community Asset Score	100	100	100	100		
Resilience programme (Gedo, Toghdeer, Bari)						
CAS: percentage of communities with an increased Community Asset Score			75	93.3		

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

School meals

As of April 2017, education had received less than 1 percent of the funding for the Somalia’s 2016–2017 drought response.³²⁰ This is despite estimates that in drought-affected areas, nearly 30 percent of these children are at significant risk of dropping out of school. Against this backdrop, WFP’s school meals programme successfully reached more than the planned target beneficiary numbers in all years except 2014 and 2017 (Figure 17). The ratio of actual versus planned girls receiving take-home rations declined over consecutive years of the CPE period (Figure 18) because of funding shortages and pipeline failures.³²¹ This has not had a significant impact on girls’ attendance and a decision to remove them from the portfolio to concentrate on school meals for boys and girls is supported by the Ministries of Education in Somaliland and Puntland.

Figure 17: Actual versus planned girls and boys benefiting from school meals in primary schools




Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

Figure 18: Actual versus planned take-home rations beneficiaries (girls)

³²⁰ This figure excludes school meals which are categorized as food security interventions.

³²¹ Take-home rations were introduced as an incentive to increase girls’ attendance.



Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

60. In the period before 2012, the number of primary schools assisted by WFP through emergency school meals increased from 118 in 2006 to a peak of 319 in 2009 before declining following WFP’s withdrawal from south-central Somalia. Higher levels continue to represent about 10 percent of active schools in areas where WFP had access. While over the CPE period WFP only reached its target number of schools in 2015, it has managed to increase the number of schools it supports across consecutive years (Table 52) and extended coverage of its school meals programme to rural schools in Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug States, where the programme operated through the relevant state-level ministries of education.

Table 52: Primary schools assisted by WFP school meals

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Primary schools assisted by WFP	316	380	444	496	490	

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

61. Multiple outcomes were observed from WFP’s school meals programme across schools, geographic locations and years, confirming the positive reception from teachers, parents and officials. While the rates of increase in school enrolment slowed in 2016, this may have been a combination of successful growth in school attendance in 2015 and the failure of rains in 2016 leading to disruptions in household incomes. School meals were particularly effective at supporting the retention of girls and boys, supporting overall attendance and education outcomes. The only negative feedback received for the programme was the tendency for the food basket to be based on the available pipeline rather than local food preferences. See Table 53).

62. A review commissioned by WFP in 2016–2017 found that the school meals programme had achieved a greater impact on education than on food-security outcomes. While this may in part be explained by the exclusion of school meals data from the household food consumption analysis, the review found clear evidence for the use of school meals to achieve education outcomes. The review advocated stronger collaboration with government, UNICEF, and NGO partners on WASH provision, nutrition and health communication, and child protection support to ensure a closer integration of partner programmes for children and schools. Where the programme was less successful was in raising gender ratios in favour of girls’ enrolments. This remains stubbornly at 8 girls for every 10 boys. In future, WFP should also promote a closer

integration of the school meals and livelihoods programming to free-up demands for girls' labour and time, while working with government to address wider cultural barriers to school enrolment, retention and completion for girls.

Table 53: School meals outcomes for WFP-assisted primary schools


	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Enrolment rate of change in WFP-assisted primary schools			6.1	13.3	1.3	0.34
Enrolment rate of change (boys)			7.2	13.1	0.9	0.34
Enrolment rate of change (girls)			4.9	13.5	1.7	0.34
Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	94.5	95.2	97		99	95.00
Retention rate (boys)	94.5	95.2	97		98.5	95.00
Retention rate (girls)	94.4	95.5	97		99.7	94.50
Gender ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted schools	0.81	0.8	1.1	0.8	0.8	

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

2.3.2 Efficiency of WFP's programme activities and the main drivers

63. Over the CPE period, WFP Somalia led a successful shift from in-kind to CBT programming for FFA and FFT, which has grown significantly in consecutive years since 2013 (Figure 19). While the growth in CBT use has been behind planned levels, the shift has been supported by WFP learning. It was promoted by the 2013 PRRO evaluation that found WFP voucher activities had enabled beneficiaries to purchase food items and negotiate lower prices, a perspective confirmed by beneficiaries (women and men) during the current CPE field visits. A high demand for unrestricted cash, which allowed beneficiaries to cover food needs and reinvest in petty-trade and income generation activities was also reported. Issues to be resolved in 2013 included the need to strengthen the capacity of traders in more localities to provide food for the large numbers of beneficiaries and raise beneficiary awareness of CBT entitlements. The introduction of electronic registrations and smartcards was recommended to improve efficiency and simplify administrative procedures, with the capacity strengthening of WFP staff and partners to expand use of the CBT modality. The evaluation team also found incidences where District officials were seeking to fix in-kind transfer prices with local traders, a factor local AO staff were aware of.

Figure 19: Actual versus planned FFA and FFT participants collecting CBT



64. In response, WFP introduced SCOPE in 2015. It began the pre-registration of vulnerable beneficiaries, increased the number of WFP AOs, trained partners in using SCOPE and expanded the use of cash-based CBTs. Registered women are now 80 percent of the principal SCOPE users. The majority of these are IDP beneficiaries of GFA who are currently able to use cash and vouchers to buy food from a network of almost 800 retailers. These numbers have expanded rapidly from under 500 in December 2016, with the majority concentrated in more stable areas including Somaliland, Puntland and urban centres.

65. Despite the up-front costs involved in establishing the system and pre-registering users, the strategy has delivered significant efficiency gains. Costs are projected to fall as the requirement for new registrations diminishes and WFP achieves economies of scale. Multiple ‘wallets’ on a single SCOPE card have begun to allow WFP and CPs to provide a range of different interventions to single households, enhancing beneficiary data management and information sharing. This has supported beneficiary tracking and may in future allow WFP to modify its support to individual households as they move between emergency needs and livelihood recovery. While CPs report problems, such as failures in fingerprint recognition and the need for some beneficiaries to reregister after displacements, SCOPE has largely been positively received as a biometric platform with the potential to support the management of an integrated a package of cross-sectoral and cross-agency support.

66. WFP’s cost-effectiveness measurement tool, the Omega analysis, explores the ratio between the in-kind nutrient value score (NVS) of a food basket divided by the full cost for the in-kind delivery of the basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the CBT basket. Contextual weaknesses in the methodology are recognized by the CO. For example, the Omega analysis focuses on a supply-side assessment that assumes the entire transfer is used by the beneficiary as planned. This may not be the case. Where households may resell or exchange all or part of the in-kind transfer, a more realistic analysis might compare the cash-use value of the transfer against CBT alternatives.

67. Despite these shortcomings, the evaluation team found the CO was incorporating the Omega analysis as an integral part of a decision tool in which the cost-effectiveness analysis of NVS transfer costs was supported by wider considerations based on a robust understanding of the context. As a result, even though Omega analyses for most of planned distributions indicated greater cost effectiveness for in-kind transfers and timeliness calculations. The importance of meeting beneficiary preferences has increasingly led to a preference for CBT to be used over in-kind.

68. Where WFP has been less successful has been in driving down costs and improving efficiencies by exploring the role of FFA and FFT to support WFP exiting food assistance support and/or a shift towards a greater urban livelihoods focus. Over 9 percent of the population (1.1 million) are currently IDPs. A third of these live in the Mogadishu area³²², and displacement has been characterized by a rapid rise in densely populated informal settlements and IDP camps with a high proportion of female-headed households and youths³²³ surrounding urban areas.³²⁴ Women are increasingly involved in income-earning activities to meet their families’ household food and economic needs, and with more than 70 percent of the population under 30, the government is prioritizing urban resilience³²⁵, and calling for agencies to tackle women and youth

³²² Poverty rates (< USD 1.9/day) vary from close to 70 percent in IDP settlements, 60 percent in Mogadishu, 50 percent in rural areas, and 40 percent in other urban settings. [World Bank](#) (2017).

³²³ Smith, G. (2014) [Designing social protection frameworks for three zones of Somalia](#). UNICEF.

³²⁴ See e.g. [UNHCR Somalia Durable Solutions](#) (2017).

³²⁵ [World Bank](#) (2017).

employment.³²⁶ Surveys also indicate that a large proportion of IDPs are likely to stay in urban areas.³²⁷ Reaching them is more cost effective than reaching rural populations. Yet, while IDPs have correctly been targeted by WFP, unconditional GFA has been used for both recent and long-term IDPs despite very different needs³²⁸, and the use of FFT to improve the employability of IDP women and youths has been a low priority. WFP should reconsider its role in urban livelihoods and resilience building by working with Durable Solutions partners with whom it currently has only limited relationships.³²⁹

69. WFP's potential to build efficiency by creating linkages between its emergency, nutrition, livelihood recovery, resilience and school meals interventions has also been weak. Given WFP has supported communities with FFA for the rehabilitation of irrigation canals and schemes it has not explored the integration of any of these interventions with value chain development through local purchases, the role of home-grown school meals to support school feeding or adoption of multisectoral initiatives for the prevention of malnutrition. While this can to some extent be explained by WFP's national focus on building up its emergency response capacity, it has nevertheless been operational in stable regions, such as Puntland and Somaliland throughout the CPE period. In these regions, synergies should have been better explored.

2.3.3 Synergies and multiplying effects of WFP's activities and those of its United Nations, government and NGO partners

Resilience

70. To establish and promote a resilience agenda in Somalia, WFP introduced the JRS in 2013 in partnership with FAO and UNICEF across five districts in the Gedo, Bari and Togdheer regions.³³⁰ JRS activities were implemented by the partners until 2015 when the JRS received mixed reviews across consecutive evaluations. The use of FAO's resilience impact measurement and analysis tool, RIMA, showed positive impacts on agricultural production, livestock incomes, income diversification and beneficiary transfers.³³¹ However, many of these changes were dependent on ongoing support and the JRS was criticized for being a loose affiliation of reformulated activities operated across the registration and transfer management systems of each agency rather than a genuine partnership.³³²

71. Although WFP continued to distinguish and report on JRS activities in the SPRs, the CPE found little evidence of practical differences between WFP's resilience and livelihood recovery operations. From 2014–2015 onwards, the selection of both SO 2 and SO 3 sites was based on the 3 PA and involved multi-stakeholder engagements, including CBPP, joint planning with United Nations and NGOs, and local government engagement.³³³ Activity sets were indistinguishable across the strategic objectives. FAO's 2015 JRS evaluation found no clear sense of value added across the cooperating agencies because of significant overlaps, such as the provision of FAO cash and WFP in-kind interventions to support asset building in the same localities.⁵³

³²⁶ The [Somalia National Development Plan](#) (2017–2019) estimates women's labour force participation at 40 percent to be half that of men's, and stresses the need to accelerate development through the economic and social integration of women, youth and displaced, returnees through greater employment.

³²⁷ See e.g. Global Programme on Forced Displacement, [Analysis of Displacement in Somalia](#) (2014).

³²⁸ See [WFP Resources on Refugees, IDPs, and Urban Programming](#) (WFP Go) including the [Urban Programming Overview](#), and [Urban Food Insecurity: Strategies for WFP](#).

³²⁹ See [Synthesis report of joint UNHCR-WFP evaluations of Durable Solutions](#).

³³⁰ For background documentation and updates, see the [Resilience in Somalia website](#).

³³¹ FAO [resilience evaluation a-bd443e](#) (2015).

³³² JRS [Mid-term review](#) (2016).

³³³ See for instance, [Strengthening resilience for food security and nutrition: a conceptual framework for collaboration and partnership among the Rome-Based Agencies](#). WFP (2015).

72. WFP, FAO and UNICEF, have taken on board the findings to develop a new JRP that includes a common causal analysis and results framework, and aims to double the number of target districts. However, progress has been slow. The integration of beneficiary management platforms is incomplete, and the JRP is yet to be released to donors. Though this can, to some extent, be explained by the prioritization of emergency response by FAO and WFP in 2016, the resilience agenda continues to be held back by an absence of dedicated staff and active leadership across the agencies. Furthermore, the view of the evaluation team is that the JRP better describes a comprehensive programme for the prevention of malnutrition through nutrition-sensitive programming than it does a wider resilience agenda.

73. Where the JRP is looking ahead is in envisaging the need for WFP and its partners to review their comparative advantages in supporting a national resilience agenda that is in line with the SNRP. Government, United Nations and donor stakeholders agree that a more systemic resilience approach is needed which integrates the local household and community support promoted by the JRP with enhanced efforts to lay the foundations for a complementary range of national services. These services need to provide a combination of productive input support, basic services and cash injections (safety nets) to catalyse the livelihood investments of Somalia's rural and urban populations.

Social protection

74. WFP's ability to help government establish a national safety-net system for food security relies on the establishment of an effective platform across which national beneficiary registration, management and transfers can operate at scale within the framework of a robust social protection policy portfolio. To this end, WFP's introduction of SCOPE in 2015 and the expanded use of cash-based CBTs have provided a proof of concept for a national safety-net platform. More recently, under the social protection sub-working group, WFP and UNICEF have also begun to work with the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development to develop a policy framework with the cooperation of federal and regional member states. The process has started to identify strategies to reach the most vulnerable, establish a multi-agency nationwide registration and assistance delivery platform, and introduced efforts to strengthen the capacity of government partners including in the development and use of social protection indicators linked to SDG targets.³³⁴

NGO partnerships

75. In 2011, the CPE evaluation highlighted the limited reach and technical competence of local NGO partners as a major challenge to WFP's livelihood recovery and resilience programmes. This was corroborated by the 2013 PRRO evaluation that concluded that more strategic partnerships were needed for FFA to be implemented on a larger scale and over the longer term. This situation continues. NGO partnerships remain dominated by local, short-term FLAs, designed around activities managed by individual AOs rather than through longer-term strategic agreements. As a direct consequence, the capacity strengthening of CPs has been focused on supporting the technical delivery of short-term projects (e.g. FFA/FFT training, introduction of SCOPE and field monitoring). WFP needs to start exploring longer-term two-way agreements based on the common strategic interests of both parties and a comprehensive assessment of CP capacity needs.

76. Even where the ambitions of WFP's Framework Agreements with World Vision and the DRC have included longer-term livelihood recovery and resilience strategies, delivery on the ground has been managed through FLAs. Only at the end of the CPE period in 2017 did new forms of WFP partnership begin to emerge with NGO Resilience Consortia. Throughout the CPE period, WFP has

³³⁴ [WFP and Social Protection: Somalia Case Study](#) (2017).

shared the same broad resilience agenda as SomRep, BRCiS and STREAM.³³⁵ These new kinds of relationships with NGO consortia rather than individual entities are to be encouraged. WFP needs to recognize that the comparative advantage of international NGOs lies in their remote access, community engagement, support to national NGOs and technical capacities. WFP's own value added is in its ability to coordinate this work while helping Somalia's federal and state governments to establish national safety nets, social protection strategies and the provision of basic services.

Food Security Cluster

77. WFP's ability to collaborate with United Nations agencies and NGOs through its leadership and coordination support to the FSC has been a major factor supporting its EPR capacity, alongside its livelihood recovery and resilience work. The basis for its current engagement began in 2011 when WFP and FAO agreed to the merger of the Agricultural Cluster with the Livelihoods and Food Cluster into the FSC, co-led by the two agencies. Support to the FSC helped it establish local chapters in decentralized locations with the support of WFP AOs. WFP collaborated with cluster members to explore the comparative advantages of different humanitarian response options, including the use of food aid, vouchers, cash transfers and other interventions. The FSC now has 300 members on its books, with 29 active partners who oversee the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and HRP. One of the emerging roles of the FSC is to support the layering and sequencing of interventions by multiple agencies in both rural and urban areas to support resilience building and social protection across agencies. This will be an essential part of future national resilience strategies. Active groups under the FSC include the Livestock Working Group. A CWG, which was relaunched in 2017 to support the current emergency response, is currently working on harmonized transfer values, market monitoring and the local coordination of cash transfers.

School meals

78. Over the CPE period, WFP capacity strengthening in the education sector evolved from training teachers between 2012 and 2014 in the management of activities in Puntland and Somaliland to helping state-level governments implement WFP-supported school meals programmes and formulate national school feeding policies from 2015 onwards. School meals now receive strong government support in both states. This was a significant improvement on the 2011 CPE evaluation that found little interest among ministries to assume partial responsibility for leading and monitoring school feeding programmes. It is also coherent with the GO2School campaign of the Ministry of Education (MoE) and UNICEF, and the FGS Ministry of Education is now also strongly requesting future collaboration.

79. WFP's analysis of its capacity-strengthening support used the NCI to support education officials in assessing the management of school feeding programmes. NCI self-assessments increased from a baseline of 0.3 in 2012 to 1.5 in Puntland in 2016 and 1.1 in Somaliland (

³³⁵ Albeit, WFP's resilience programming has some significant comparative limitations such as an absence of support for local savings and credit schemes or a comprehensive approach to secure community access to safe water. See also paragraph 20.

80. Table 54). This limited, but positive contribution, will be informed in future by the introduction of SABER. Unfortunately, the SABER diagnostic planned for 2016 has yet to be undertaken to inform future policy and programme and capacity objectives. When undertaking this analysis, it will be important for WFP and government to examine the role of community-managed schools in urban areas where there are significant inward investments from Somalia's diaspora offering an enhanced ability to expand education services to growing urban populations.

Table 54: National capacity index for Somalia primary schools

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
School feeding NCI Puntland		2.6	0.3	1.5		
School feeding NCI Somaliland		1.8	0.5	1.1		

Source: WFP SPRs 2012–2016. CO data for 2017.

2.3.4 Sustainability of WFP's programme activities and the main drivers

81. While beneficiaries were broadly supportive of WFP's FFA and FFT activities, they voiced significant concerns that these were temporary interventions. Confirming this position, the evaluation team found little evidence that activities included wider sustainability support to help women and men establish institutional arrangements to manage and maintain FFA structures, or of business support being included in FFT to help participants find employment or establish small enterprises after their training period finished. In effect, while their relevance to geographical areas selected on the basis of the IPC made logical sense, FFA interventions suffered from a limited coverage of stand-alone activities that beneficiaries welcomed more through their short-term CBT and in-kind transfers than longer-term contributions. As a result, the sustainability of WFP's contributions to livelihoods recovery could not be substantiated.

82. Nevertheless, communities were consistent in their desire for further FFA/FFT support. To improve future sustainability and help government establish a national resilience system for Somalia, WFP should consider concentrating limited FFA and FFT resources to a shortlist of target areas where it can link with state-level institutions to build resilience over the longer term in line with the SNDP. Sustainability and efficiency in both rural and urban areas can then be achieved by transferring the implementation of rural household and community-resilience portfolios to NGO consortia and FAO. Simultaneously, WFP continues to work with government to maintain a focus on coordination and establish and strengthen capacities for the introduction and provision of a national Somali Safety Net Programme to address chronic caseloads with a scaling up capability for acute and seasonal needs.

83. Despite the limited scale of WFP school meals provision in Somalia, it received positive support from teachers, parents and officials. Strategically, both national and state-level governments see primary education as a core part of state building and the establishment of the social contract under the SNDP. With school meals recognized as an essential draw factor for poor and vulnerable households, it was disappointing to find very limited attention was given to building a link between school meal provision and local livelihood support programmes to improve overall enrolment and gender ratios in favour of girls. WFP should see this as an essential part of its contribution to the Education Cluster and partnership with UNICEF. To build stronger community linkages and ensure appropriate food baskets, home-grown school meals and local purchases are options that could be explored with school vouchers offering an alternative to WFP/MoE-managed arrangements and associated pipeline risks. Introduction of the delayed SABER diagnostic should be made a priority to support national and state governments to develop integrated strategies to strengthen universal access to primary school education.

Annex O: Findings on Gender and Protection

1. Introduction

1.1 Gender and protection context in Somalia

1. Somalia is the sixth lowest country globally for gender equality.³³⁶ It is also the only country in the region that has not signed the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

2. Culturally the Somali society is organized into clans, which are divided into pastoralist, agriculturalist, and mixed origin agro-pastoralist, and an estimated 29 percent of the population is nomadic.³³⁷ According to the nomadic division of labour, women are responsible for small stock, milking, processing and marketing dairy products, cleaning and cooking, and water and firewood collection. This latter can be particularly burdensome during the Hagee and Jilaal dry seasons and may expose women to the risk of sexual assault.³³⁸ Men, on the other side, are responsible for the livestock. During dry periods, men and older boys from pastoral households migrate with their livestock in search of water and fodder, increasing their exposure to conflict and early death. Women, girls, elderly people and young boys are often left behind, with limited access to food and protection. At times it is the women and children who move to escape the consequences of consecutive droughts, while men remain in livestock-herding areas with the animals searching for pasture.

3. Somalia is also traditionally polygamous, with each wife and children forming a separate socio-economic unit, with their own dwelling, and resources, such as small stocks. In general, discriminatory customary and Sharia laws limit women's access to land in Somalia, while rights over the family income, harvest and inheritance are dependent on the seniority of the wife.³³⁹

4. Gender inequality, power imbalances, prevailing insecurity and absence of an adequate protection system, natural disasters and displacement all contribute to make women and girls particularly vulnerable. Somalia is one of the worst performing countries for maternal and child mortality. While the average fertility rate is 6.6 children per woman, one out of seven children die before turning 5, and 1 in every 22 women die of pregnancy-related causes.³⁴⁰ According to latest estimates, more than 1.5 million women of childbearing age and 130,000 PLW need urgent care.³⁴¹ Most of this is a consequence of the poor availability of maternal health facilities and lack of access to community health workers.³⁴² Literacy levels are generally low for both men and women. Somalia has one of the lowest enrolment rates for primary school-aged children with only 42

³³⁶ OECD Social Institution and Gender Index 2014.

³³⁷ UNFPA Somalia Newsletter, August 2017. <http://somalia.unfpa.org/en/publications/unfpa-somalia-newsletter-august-2017>.

³³⁸ UNOCHA 2016 Consequences of Drought in Somalia.

³³⁹ WFP Trend Analysis of Food and Nutrition Insecurity in Somalia 2007–2012.

³⁴⁰ Some important discrepancies are observed between UNFPA and UNICEF data on maternal mortality with the latter reporting 1 out of 12 women dying due to pregnancy-related causes in 2016 instead of the 1 out of 22 reported by UNFPA in 2017. UNICEF Situation Analysis of Children in Somalia 2016 https://www.unicef.org/somalia/SOM_resources_situationalanalysissummary.pdf; and UNFPA Somalia Newsletter, August 2017.

³⁴¹ UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan Revision May 2017.

³⁴² Access to maternal health services is low with 44 percent and 38 percent of births in Somaliland and Puntland being attended by skilled birth attendants. UNFPA Somalia Newsletter, August 2017.

percent of the children aged 6–12 attending primary schools; of these only 36 percent are girls.³⁴³ Girls continue to be the most disadvantaged as families tend to prioritize boys and studies indicate that even when enrolled, girls leave schools before they reach grade five.³⁴⁴

5. Of the estimated 1.5 million Somali IDPs,³⁴⁵ about 80 percent are women, children and elderly.³⁴⁶ The changing gender roles resulting from the ongoing conflict is manifest in 66 percent of households headed by women³⁴⁷, while men increasingly face difficulties in fulfilling their role as family provider.³⁴⁸

6. Protection concerns in Somalia stemming from the extended drought and insecurity include: abuses against civilians, extrajudicial killings, forced evictions, arbitrary arrests, abductions and child recruitment by armed groups.³⁴⁹ Forced evictions are the second main cause – after conflict – of internal displacement, particularly in urban areas. Between January and July 2017, 90,000 people were evicted.³⁵⁰ Displaced people are the primary victims of evictions and women and children are disproportionately affected by them.³⁵¹

7. GBV in Somalia affects mostly women and girls (99 percent),³⁵² and it is particularly high in displacement settings, with an estimated 76 percent of GBV survivors coming from the IDP population.³⁵³ Of all the cases, physical assault is the most reported form of GBV at 52.5 percent, followed by rape at 16.8 percent, sexual assault at 13.9 percent, denial of resources opportunities and services (6.9 percent) and psychological abuse at 6.7 percent, while early and forced marriage is at 3.3 percent.³⁵⁴ FGM affects 98 percent of women and girls aged 15–49, and it has the highest prevalence in the world.³⁵⁵ Overall, underreporting is high and it is mostly a result of stigma and general impunity. Domestic violence, spousal rape or sexual harassment are not prohibited under any law.³⁵⁶ The general paucity of data makes estimates and interventions on GBV very difficult.³⁵⁷

1.1.1 National gender and protection framework

8. The New Deal Compact for Somalia provided the overarching framework for coordinating the political, security and development efforts for peace and state-building activities as defined by the FGS with the support of the international community for the period 2014–2016. Recognizing

³⁴³ Data UNDP Somalia Human Development Index 2012 in Somalia Federal Republic, Ministry of Human Development and Public Services, *Go2School Initiative 2013–2016: Educating for Resilience*.

³⁴⁴ UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017.

³⁴⁵ UNHCR Somalia Situation 2017, May 2017.

³⁴⁶ UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017.

³⁴⁷ UNFPA Somalia 'Population Estimation Survey 2014', Analytical Report Vol. 2.

³⁴⁸ LOGICA 2015, The impact of war on Somalia men: An inception study. Washington DC. J. Gardner and J. El-Bushra 2016, The impact of war on Somali men and its effects on the family, women, and children. Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper.

³⁴⁹ UNICEF estimated that there are up to 5,000 child soldiers in Somalia, mostly recruited by al-Shabaab and clan militias. Amnesty International, *The State of the World's Human Rights 2016–2017*.

³⁵⁰ UNOCHA Humanitarian Bulletin August 2017. Forced evictions result from the conflict over urban space emanating from urbanization due to insecurity of land tenure, limited possibilities to verify title, and occupation of private and public buildings.

³⁵¹ NRC Housing, Land and Property Rights for Somalia's Displaced Women, 2016.

³⁵² GBVIMS 2016.

³⁵³ UNOCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017.

³⁵⁴ Legally the minimum age for marriage in Somalia is 18 years for both boys and girls. WFP 2017. *Gender-Based Violence Survivor Referral and Service Protocol*. Rome.

³⁵⁵ <http://www.un.org/en/events/femalegenitalmutilationday/>.

³⁵⁶ OECD Social Institution and Gender Index data, (accessed 9.10.2017).

³⁵⁷ WFP Regional Implementation Strategy of the Gender Policy 2016–2020. East & Central Africa Regional Bureau (RBN). http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Somalia/files/GBV/Somaliapercent20GBVpercent20WGpercent20STRATEGYpercent202014-16percent20-percent20Finalpercent20summary.pdf; and Somalia Humanitarian Strategy: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2016_2018_humanitarian_strategy.pdf.

the role of women in community mobilization and peace building in Somali society, the following priorities were identified in relation to gender and protection:

- expansion of gender-responsive health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene;
- access to justice and protection from sexual and GBV; and
- economic empowerment.

The Compact also incorporated the commitment of Somaliland to gender mainstreaming.

9. Most recently, the SNDP 2017–2019³⁵⁸ guides the engagement of all development partners until 2020, including on gender issues. For the first time in Somalia’s history, the plan includes a specific section outlining primary gender-relevant goals under the Social and Development Pillar. These are: 1). Create an enabling legal, policy and institutional environment to achieve gender equality and equal opportunities; 2). Improve safety and security for women; and 3). Make available quality gender statistics and information to address gender disparities.³⁵⁹

10. Somalia’s National Gender Policy dates to 2016.³⁶⁰ The purpose is to guide the process of developing legislation, policy, implementation mechanisms and programmes for the promotion of equal rights and opportunities for men and women. Priority interventions areas are economic empowerment, health, education, political participation and access to justice. Implementation of the policy lies with the FGS and the MoWHRD, more specifically. In addition to the National Gender Policy all national food security and nutrition policies integrate references to the needs of women and children.

11. The 2014 Plan on Ending Sexual Violence, the 2017 National GBV Strategy and the 2015/2016 Action Plan on the Human Rights Roadmap provide the framework for protection and human rights at the national level, while a Puntland Rape Act was passed in 2016.

12. A national platform on women, peace and security was established in 2016 under the Federal MoWHRD to enhance women’s participation, including in leadership position and in peace and reconciliation processes. During the electoral process in the same year, 67 women were elected Members of Parliament in the lower and 13 in the upper Federal Parliament houses. These numbers constitute 25 percent of the representation in each chamber and a 10 percent increase compared to the previous legislature in 2012.³⁶¹

1.1.2 The United Nations Gender and Protection Framework

13. The United Nations in Somalia is represented by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), established in 2013, and the UNCT, and were formally integrated with the appointment of a DSRSG/RC/HC from January 2014.³⁶² Within this framework, The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (United Nations Women) is the overall coordinator and technical adviser on gender equality and women’s empowerment. This role is performed through the Gender Theme Group³⁶³, and the commitments outlined in the United

³⁵⁸ FGS National Development Plan 2017–2019. <http://mopic.gov.so/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/SOMALIA-NATIONAL-DEVELOPMENT-PLAN-2017-2019.pdf>.

³⁵⁹ More information on the gender goals and related targets can be found in 7.8 of the NDP.

³⁶⁰ The Policy has been informed by Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. At the time this annex was developed the policy was still in a draft form.

³⁶¹ Briefing on United Nations Women’s Operational Response in Somalia 2017. <http://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/executivepercent20board/2017/annualpercent20sessionpercent202017/bnpercent20finalpercent20cpercent20draftpercent20somalia.pdf?la=en&vs=5325>.

³⁶² The Deputy Special Representative for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia also serves as the United Nations Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian Coordinator.

³⁶³ The Group is chaired by United Nations Women and co-chair by UNSOM. According to United Nations Women, while the GTG has been there for some time, it has been dysfunctional and dormant until very recently (May 2017) when it started being active again.

Nations ISF, the UNSF Somalia later³⁶⁴ and the Joint Programmes.³⁶⁵ The United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) has been specifically established to channel the financial and programmatic support of the United Nations to the SNDP alongside funds provided directly to national entities under the National Funding Stream. Women's Political Leadership and Empowerment is among the 15 joint programmes currently being implemented through the MPTF.³⁶⁶ Ongoing efforts include the development of a United Nations Gender Accountability Framework; the Women, Peace and Security joint programme development document and a United Nations-wide Gender Strategy for Somalia. United Nations Women is also supporting the Food Studies Group in the implementation of the human rights and gender equality pillar of the SNDP.

14. UNHCR is the Protection Cluster coordinating agency in Somalia. The cluster is responsible for providing analysis and sharing protection-related information. It consists of a Secretariat and the following four areas of responsibility or sub-clusters³⁶⁷: protection of housing, land and property rights; protection against explosive hazards; GBV; and child protection.³⁶⁸ There is now a growing momentum for protection in Somalia as manifested by the Centrality of Protection (CoP) Strategy 2018–2019 developed by the Protection Cluster in consultation with the HCT and the ICCG.³⁶⁹ Protection is one of the four core strategic objectives for humanitarian action in Somalia alongside life-saving, nutrition and resilience.³⁷⁰

15. The GBV area of responsibility/sub-cluster is the main humanitarian body coordinating GBV interventions for the United Nations in Somalia. Chaired by UNFPA and Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) at the national level, the GBV sub-cluster spearheaded the development of a three-year GBV strategy (2014–2016)³⁷¹, which was approved by the UNCT in February 2014. The goal is to reduce GBV through: 1). prevention; 2). response; 3). access to justice and rule of law; and 4). coordination. The strategy is in line with the New Deal Compact and is anchored in the CAP Process. Other GBV tools in place in Somalia include the Somali Clinical Management of Rape Protocol, referral pathways, the Gender-based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS) included in the drought response guide, service mapping and common national response plans.

16. Operationally, 17 one-stop centres, 3 family centres and 4 safe houses/temporary protection shelters provide a comprehensive set of GBV-related services, including medical support, psychosocial counselling and legal support. In addition, some police women desks are being piloted to provide a friendly space for survivors. A clearly defined referral pathway exists for

³⁶⁴ United Nations Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework 2014-2016. United Nations Strategic Framework Somalia 2017-2020.

³⁶⁵ United Nations Women operational support is channeled through three joint programmes focusing on: strategic coordination and technical advice to promote gender equality, rule of law, and women's political empowerment. A fourth joint programme on human rights, women, peace and security with UNDP, UNICEF, and UNSOM was under development at the time this evaluation was conducted.

³⁶⁶ <https://www.uninsomalia.org/programmes-under-the-mptf/>.

³⁶⁷ Depending on the context, area of responsibility, sub-cluster or working group are used interchangeably to refer the thematic focus under the protection cluster.

³⁶⁸ The first two were only established in 2015.

³⁶⁹ Somalia Humanitarian Country Team – Centrality of Protection (CoP) Strategy 2018-2019. At the time of writing, the strategy was awaiting endorsement by the HCT.

³⁷⁰ UNOCHA Humanitarian Response Plan Revised May 2017.

³⁷¹ Somalia gender-based violence working group 2014–2016 Strategy.

http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Somalia/files/GBV/GBV%20WG%20Strategy%20final%20Jan%2029%202014_new.pdf.

Mogadishu and Baidoa, while GBV coordination mechanisms are in place in all regions. Among the key GBV actors in Somalia are NRC, DRC, IRC, ARC, CESVI, and Intersos.³⁷²

1.2. WFP's gender and protection portfolio in Somalia

1.2.1 Gender and protection policy framework

17. The evaluation period was characterized by three WFP Strategic Plans, 2008–2013; 2014–2017 and 2017–2021. While reference to gender and protection is present in all three, from 2014 onwards, there is evidence of a higher level of reflection and articulation of gender equality and women's empowerment and the need to strengthen WFP's capacity to protect the people it assists. It can achieve this through, among other actions, enhanced gender and protection analysis, and measures to minimize possible risks in the context of food assistance.³⁷³ The 2017–2021 Plan also contains explicit references to gender-transformative programmes and policies, and decision-making by women and girls.³⁷⁴

18. Two policies on gender were also adopted – the 2009 'Promoting Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women in Addressing Food and Nutrition Challenges'³⁷⁵; and the WFP Gender Policy 2015–2020. The latter specifically commits WFP to a "gender-transformative approach to food assistance programmes and policies" through four key objectives: 1). food assistance adapted to different needs; 2). equal participation of women and men, girls and boys; 3). decision-making by women and girls; and 4). gender and protection.³⁷⁶ Together with the WFP Gender Action Plan (GAP)³⁷⁷, the policy provides normative and accountability frameworks for the development of regional and country-specific strategies and plans.

19. The gender strategy for East and Central Africa identifies three inter-linked gender-transformative priorities for the period 2016–2020: 1). Improving the depth and quality of gender analysis for evidence-based programming; 2). Increased meaningful participation of affected population; and 3). Fostering gender- and nutrition-sensitive programming across all interventions.³⁷⁸ Building on the GAP, the priorities laid out in the Regional Gender Strategy, and the Somalia Gender Baseline, a Country Gender Action Plan (CGAP) was finalized in December 2016 to illustrate CO priorities and needs until 2020 with regards to gender. It was also designed to provide protection, as reflected by the two objectives with specific protection components.³⁷⁹

20. The 2012 Humanitarian Protection Policy³⁸⁰, and its update in 2014, represent important milestones in the organization's engagement in protection, which initiated in 2004 with the EB's endorsement of the Humanitarian Principles Policy. The protection policy outlines the linkages between protection and food security and stipulates that WFP should be "designing and carrying

³⁷² Who does What Where Matrix, August 2017.

<https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/somalia/document/somalia-3w-who-does-what-where-matrix-august-2017>.

³⁷³ WFP Strategic Plan 2014–2017. An analysis of the references to gender and protection contained in WFP's strategic plans can be found in the Inception Report.

³⁷⁴ WFP Strategic Plan 2017–2021.

³⁷⁵ In the absence of a policy on protection, this policy underscores WFP's commitment to the protection of women, making prevention of gender-based violence a programme priority.

³⁷⁶ WFP Gender Policy 2015–2020.

³⁷⁷ The GAP is the accountability framework for the implementation of the Gender Policy. It lists actions, responsibilities and indicators across nine operational outcomes to be achieved by 2020. Following the practice observed at the country level, and to avoid confusion, the term Country Gender Action Plan (CGAP) is hereafter used with reference to Somalia.

³⁷⁸ Regional Implementation Strategy of the Gender Policy 2016–2020.

³⁷⁹ Objective I, output 1.1 Gender (and Protection) is integrated throughout M&E and VAM office framework; and Objective IV Mainstream gender and protection considerations into existing modalities and innovations. For more details on this refer to the Annex: Implementation Action Plan of the Somalia Gender Action Plan.

³⁸⁰ WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy 2012. An evaluation of this policy is currently under way, and Somalia was one of the six desk-based case study countries reviewed.

out food and livelihood assistance activities that do not increase the protection risks faced by the crisis-affected populations receiving assistance. Rather, food assistance should contribute to the safety, dignity and integrity of vulnerable people".³⁸¹ Since its approval in 2012, more than 30 Cos³⁸² have worked on the systematic integration of protection into their programming and operations. Somalia is one of them. Other protection-related tools include: the 2015 Integrating Protection and AAP³⁸³; the AAP Strategy 2016–2021; the Protection Guidance and GBV Manuals; and the WFP Guide to Personal Data Protection and Privacy, all from 2016.

21. WFP Protection Policy provides a framework for a principled use of personal data by requesting the establishment of guidance and systems for managing protection-related information. Moreover, the more recent guide on data protection and privacy outlines the following five principles as underpinning WFP's data management: 1). Lawful and fair collection and processing; 2). Specified and legitimate purpose; 3). Data quality; 4). Participation and accountability; and 5). Data security. Informed consent by the beneficiary is central to all.³⁸⁴

22. While there is no protection action plan in Somalia, reference to protection can be variously found in the CGAP, particularly in relation to VAM and M&E; and the same person in charge of gender is also responsible for the protection portfolio. Protection mainstreaming is ensured through an operational focus on accountability to affected populations (AAP)³⁸⁵ that includes: 1). Information provision; 2). Participation; and 3). Complaints and feedback mechanisms. This reflects WFP's tendency to associate protection with the "Do no harm" approach, which is also evident in the significant focus on GBV and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) issues.

23. A GBV protocol has been recently developed by WFP Somalia to guide staff and partners on addressing GBV in the context of food security.³⁸⁶ The protocol states WFP responsibility to: 1. Assume that GBV is taking place in Somalia; 2. Treat it as a serious life-threatening protection issue; and 3. Take actions to minimize risks in the context of its intervention. The protocol clearly outlines what is in WFP's capacity when it comes to GBV, and the standards for referring GBV cases to the relevant service providers for specific and qualified support.

24. The official annual reporting exercise (SPRs) reflects all the above, and saw the alternation of two different set of gender indicators for the period 2012–2013, and from 2014 onwards. With the adoption of the Strategic Plan 2014–2017, a new 'cross-cutting issues' category for results on gender equality, partnerships and protection was introduced, which for the first time features a gender-transformative indicator alongside more traditional ones to capture transformation on decision-making in relation to WFP assistance.³⁸⁷ Within this category, the protection and AAP result reads as follows: 'WFP assistance delivered and utilized in safe, accountable and dignified conditions'.

³⁸¹ Unlike other non-protection-mandated United Nations organizations, WFP has developed its own definition of protection, which is narrower than the IASC consensus on protection: "All activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, namely human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law."

³⁸² WFP update on Implementation of the Protection Policy, 2014.

³⁸³ OZPSZH integrating protection and AAP strategy 2015.

³⁸⁴ Other WFP documents referencing data protection issues include WFP Corporate Information Security Policy; WFP Directive on Information Disclosure; and WFP Records Retention Policy.

³⁸⁵ In line with the Protection Policy, in 2012 WFP endorsed the five IASC commitments to ensuring AAP, with a view to reinforce dignified programming and provide a framework for people's voices to be captured and listened to.

³⁸⁶ WFP Gender-Based Violence Survivor Referral and Service Protocol 2017.


³⁸⁷ The indicator reflects WFP's commitments to working for gender-transformative results with its beneficiaries and reads as follows: "Proportion of households where females and males together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food."

1.2.2 Gender and protection in WFP operations in Somalia

25. Gender does not feature prominently in any of the two evaluations for Somalia that took place in the period under consideration.³⁸⁸ The Somalia CPE 2006–2011 also contains very limited to no mention of protection-related issues, except for GBV, child labour and recruitment by armed groups. These, however, are only cited in the context analysis and with no specific reference to WFP operations.³⁸⁹

26. A slightly greater attention to protection and gender can be found in the evaluation of PRRO 200443 in 2014.³⁹⁰ Alignment of the PRRO with the new Strategic Plan 2014–2017 and the introduction of the ‘cross-cutting issues’ category for results on gender equality, partnerships and protection is said to have brought about more attention to gender-sensitive approaches and sex-disaggregated data in the strategic results framework. See more in Figure 20.

Figure 20: Summary overview of gender and protection policy framework in Somalia



27. During the period 2012–2017, WFP country portfolio in Somalia has comprised two PRROs, 200443 (2013–2015) and 200844 (2016–2018); one EMOP 200281 (July 2011–December 2012); and eight SOs.³⁹¹ All, but the EMOP, were awarded with a gender marker of 2, with the PRRO 200844 scoring an exceptional 2a and receiving praises from HQ for the “solid gender analysis and

³⁸⁸ Somalia CPE that covered 2006–2011, and evaluation of PRRO 200443 for 2102–2014.

³⁸⁹ While WFP initiated its work on protection in 2005, the Policy was only approved in 2012, thus it may be that protection was not yet fully captured and reflected in evaluations.

³⁹⁰ There reference has been made to protection threats confronting displaced Somalis, including by self-appointed gatekeepers who charge fees for the right to live in IDP settlements and receive relief distributions; and gender-based violence, which remains one of the greatest protection concerns particularly for IDP girls, adolescents and women.

³⁹¹ For more details on special operations refer to WFP Operations Database.

content”.³⁹² Despite this, reference to gender is only found in relation to enrolment and retention of girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools, and to nutrition interventions targeted to pregnant and lactating mothers, in all but PRRO 200844. The latter, in fact, recognizes the importance of consulting with men, women, boys and girls in the planning, selection and implementation of activities; female participation in project management and community committees; measures to mitigate protection concerns and ensure beneficiaries’ safety and dignity; and behaviour-change communication specifically targeted to women, men, boys and girls to improve household nutrition, health and hygiene practices.

28. Since the adoption of the new Gender Policy in 2015 and the development of the CGAP in 2016, capacity development of staff, partners and the government on gender and protection mainstreaming is indicated as a priority.³⁹³

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning

2.1.1 What has been the context for aid delivery in Somalia?

29. WFP’s assistance in Somalia is provided in a context of continuous fragility characterized by frequent shocks and protracted insecurity, coupled with undergoing state and peacebuilding processes. The capacity and authority of the FGS, established in 2012, remain limited, clan leaders continue to govern different areas of the country and Al-Shabaab has been increasingly resorting to terrorist attacks to overthrow the FGS and gain full control of the country.

30. The past few years has seen some important transitions and transformations in Somalia, including progress on gender. Among them, the 2016 election of a new parliament and president, with double the number of the women representatives as compared to the previous one; the integration of specific gender objectives in the SNDP; and the drafting of the National Gender Policy. A renewed commitment to gender mainstreaming and the Women, Peace and Security agenda also emerged from the London Conference on Somalia in May 2017. Despite these advances, progress on state building has been limited at all levels, and particularly so on rule of law, and delivery on Human Rights and Protection.³⁹⁴ Participation of women in leadership and decision-making remains low and further hampers capacity to address gender disparities and protection concerns that are among the most pronounced in the world.

31. Within this context, the MoWHRD is mandated to ensure coordination, collaboration and implementation of human rights and gender priorities, including those set forward in the SNDP. To execute the Ministry’s mandate to lead, support, coordinate and monitor the realization of these priorities, the government established the Pillar Working Group 9 (PWG 9). Since its establishment, however, the MoWHRD underwent several leadership changes, which, coupled with shifting priorities towards the elections in 2016, has resulted in limited results and in a still-poorly capacitated state entity on gender and human rights.³⁹⁵

32. Other challenges include protracted and increased displacement resulting from recurrent droughts and insecurity and rapid urban growth, which are putting further strain on the already

³⁹² EMOP 200281 scored 1. The Gender Marker was introduced in WFP in 2012, and applied retroactively to all projects before 2012, to assess the likelihood of projects to meet the different needs of men, women, boys, and girls. It has been since used for all projects except for the Inception Report-EMOPs as COs need more time to collect information and provide a gender analysis. The marker is also “not applicable” to SOs as they mostly focus on acquisition and deployment of material, equipment, services and logistics infrastructures. For a project to obtain a 2a gender analysis should be made per each activity and transfer modality, and responses identified accordingly; moreover, gender considerations should be reflected in the Logical Framework. Interestingly, all newly approved projects in 2016 scored 2a.

³⁹³ PRRO 200844.

³⁹⁴ United Nations Strategic Framework 2017–2020.

³⁹⁵ UNDP Somalia Gender Equality Progress Report 2016.

limited basic services and livelihood opportunities. This is having negative consequences, particularly for women who represent the majority of the heads of households, including in displacement settings.³⁹⁶ Family separation and disruption of traditional protection mechanisms have left women and girls particularly at risk of GBV.

33. Despite the above, gender analysis is generally limited and data scarcity continues to be the norm in Somalia, particularly on social dimensions such as gender and protection. At the time the Drought Impact and Needs Assessment (DINA) was launched at the end of the summer 2017, for example, data on gender were reportedly still lacking, and disaggregation by sex and age was still not there.³⁹⁷ To address the sore lack of reliable data and analysis on gender issues, United Nations Women is planning to conduct a baseline survey on the State of Women and Men in Somalia in cooperation with the World Bank. This will serve as the foundation for quality statistical data on gender in Somalia.³⁹⁸

2.1.2 To what extent are the main objectives and related activities of WFP relevant to Somalia's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

34. In the period covered by the present evaluation, WFP has been supporting the people in Somalia to address their food insecurity and malnutrition through both relief and developmental efforts. Over the years, WFP's focus has been shifting from relief to more long-term investment in people's and communities' capacities and assets. This was being undertaken through livelihood interventions (FFA and FFT), safety nets and interventions on nutrition and education in 2013–2014. It has changed to a much more prominent investment on the provision of emergency relief assistance since 2016.³⁹⁹ This is largely to address the consequences of the drought and the deteriorating food-security situation. The shift resulted from a combination of donors' push, call for support by the government, and WFP's internal decision-making. The new 2013 PRRO 200844 continued the shift from relief to recovery and resilience-building activities.

35. Until recently⁴⁰⁰, attention to gender has been limited to traditional activities, such as enrolment and retention of girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools, nutrition interventions targeted to PLW and FFT activities targeted to both men and women.⁴⁰¹ It was only in 2016, however, that a more nuanced analysis of the differential needs, concerns, opportunities and constraints of men and women was conducted, and resulted in a more targeted set of activities.⁴⁰²

36. Gender-sensitive data collection and analysis has admittedly been a challenge for the WFP Somalia CO, largely because of security and access constraints. This has negatively affected WFP's capacity to fully account for the gender inequalities and exclusion of marginalized groups in relation to clan divisions that have underpinned and exacerbated food insecurity and malnutrition.

37. To overcome insecurity and lack of direct access in many parts of the country, remote data-collection technologies, such as call centres, hotlines, mobile data collection and third-party monitoring expanded significantly over the years. Yet, field access continues to be highly constrained in most areas, also for the same organizations contracted specifically for it, thus reliance on third-party monitoring (TPM) is high. This however does not come without concerns,

³⁹⁶ WFP 2016 Livelihood baseline survey reveals that there are more female headed households with borderline and poor food consumption; and that on average female headed households have higher amount of outstanding debts (USD 22) than male headed households (USD 15).

³⁹⁷ Key informant interview, Nairobi, December 2017.

³⁹⁸ United Nations Women Briefing on the operational response of United Nations Women at the country level: Somalia.

³⁹⁹ Other activities were targeted supplementary feeding programmes for children 6–59 months, and PLW.

⁴⁰⁰ The turning point on this was represented by the approval of PRRO 200844 2016-2018. See considerations on this in the section 1.2.2 above.

⁴⁰¹ These include literacy, tailoring, and vocational skills on one side, and phone repair, carpentry and masonry on the other, among others.

⁴⁰² See considerations on this in the 1.2.2 section above.

especially in relation to quality of data collection and reporting; limited knowledge and understanding of humanitarian principles by TPM providers; and poor knowledge of commissioning agencies' mandates and policies. Moreover, the greater the integration and level of access to a given area, the lower the chances that TPM will report on critical issues and wrongdoing.⁴⁰³ The lack of female enumerators, even among outsourced monitors, is admittedly another important challenge in the Somali context.

38. The use of CBTs by WFP has progressively increased since 2012, with an unprecedented growth from 2016 onwards, reaching a total of 1.1 million beneficiaries in the drought response in 2017, with an average of 127,000 beneficiaries/month. WFP Somalia was the first country in the region to undertake SCOPE registration on a significant scale and across all programmes. Biometric registration started in February 2015 with a total of 2.4 million people registered by 2017. In a context of general data scarcity, SCOPE allowed for increased transparency, accurate data collection and better reporting. Also, in the general documentation vacuum that characterized Somalia⁴⁰⁴, SCOPE has soon been recognized as a robust system for registration and, as such, has attracted the attention of many actors, including the government. Attention to gender is ensured by the fact that at least one of the three beneficiaries registered and authorized to use the SCOPE card must be a woman. As for child-headed households, child heads over 16 years old – or at a minimum 14 – can be registered as primary card user.⁴⁰⁵ These measures are particularly relevant in the context of Somalia given the high number of both female and child-headed households.

39. Besides the above, the evaluation found just a few considerations by WFP for other diversity issues, such as age and disability.⁴⁰⁶ There was limited evidence of a differentiated approach across age, gender and diversity in all the activities implemented, beyond the traditional efforts on nutrition and education. This reflects a general reality in Somalia whereby the needs and concerns of adolescents and youth, as well as those of other marginalized groups, such as the elders and persons with disability, have been largely ignored, until very recently. Attention to adolescents and youth for example is now evident in the new UNSF, while the SNDP contains reference to all.

40. Finally, another emerging trend is protection, and GBV been granted increasing visibility and priority across all humanitarian and development plans and strategies, by both the government and the international community, including WFP.⁴⁰⁷

2.1.3 To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

41. Overall, coherence between WFP's objectives and implemented activities and Somalia's priorities for 2014–2016 is ensured through the 2013 Somali Compact and the National Development Plan from 2016 onwards. First United Nations Somalia ISF and later the Strategic Framework set out the United Nations' role in implementing the Compact and the SNDP. The Somali Compact articulates five PSGs⁴⁰⁸ and includes gender and respect for human rights as

⁴⁰³ Secure Access in Volatile Environments (SAVE) 2017. *The use of third-party monitoring in insecure contexts – Lessons from Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria*. Resource Paper. <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/save-2016-the-use-of-third-party-monitoring-in-insecure-contexts.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁴ According to SPR 200844, nearly half the population does not have an identity card in Somalia.

⁴⁰⁵ WFP SCOPE Protection Guiding Principles 2016.

⁴⁰⁶ Limited reference to the elderly can be found in PRRO 200443, in PRRO 200844, and in the 2016 CGAP. Adolescent girls are mentioned among the target groups for Supercereal together with children and women of reproductive age in PRRO 200443. Disabled are mentioned only in PRRO 200443.

⁴⁰⁷ See for example WFP assistance for GBV survivors piloted by WFP in Baidoa and Mogadishu, and the GBV Survivor Referral and Service Protocol. Finally, the 2016 Livelihood baseline provides a good example of age, sex and diversity analysis.

⁴⁰⁸ The five goals are Inclusive Politics (PSG1); Security (PSG2); Justice (PSG3); Economic Foundations (PSG4); and Revenues and Services (PSG5).

cross-cutting issues. Interestingly, the only gender-related key deliverables in the ISF, where WFP is specifically mentioned alongside other United Nations agencies, is under PSG 5. This is in relation to: 1. the “Go to School” flagship programme and reduction of the gender gap in education; and 2. HIV and AIDS sensitization on gender equality and GBV.⁴⁰⁹ While positive results were visible in relation to boys’ and girls’ retention, and in support to overall attendance and education outcomes, very little is happening on HIV and AIDS.⁴¹⁰

42. In the new UNSF 2017–2020, WFP features more prominently also in relation to gender-sensitive activities.⁴¹¹ Examples include the integration of age and gender-sensitive early recovery and resilience elements under Strategic Priority 4 on Resilience; and support to gender-responsive institutional frameworks on social protection; and primary education enrolment ratio by sex.⁴¹²

43. WFP is one of 16 United Nations entities participating in the MPTF Joint Programme initiatives. Specifically, WFP has contributed to the JHNP, which ensures alignment of WFP nutrition programmes with the MoH, local authorities, and United Nations agencies, including on gender-sensitive nutrition. The recently established Joint Programme on Human Rights, Women, Peace and Security does not list WFP among the contributing agencies.⁴¹³ Finally, alignment is realized also through participation in relevant coordinating groups at the national level. See Table 55 for a summary of WFP’s alignment with the National Gender Policy.

⁴⁰⁹ United Nations Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework 2014-2016.

⁴¹⁰ According to the 2015 SPR, THR were only given to girls in central and south Somalia, where schools are very few. Similarly, in 2016. In the words of a WFP staff there is no single donor interested in funding THR, and school feeding more in general. The number of HIV/TB Care and Treatment beneficiaries progressively reduced from 39,926 males and 41,560 females in 2012, to an actual 491 males and 341 females in 2016, where HIV/TB activities were only implemented in Mogadishu. See the technical annex on Nutrition for more information on WFP’s activities on HIV and AIDS.

⁴¹¹ Examples include the integration of age and gender-sensitive early recovery and resilience elements under Strategic Priority 4 on Resilience; support to gender-responsive institutional frameworks on social protection; and primary education enrolment ratio by sex.

⁴¹² United Nations Strategic Framework 2017–2020.

⁴¹³ These are United Nations Women, UNDP, UNSOM, and UNICEF.

Table 55: Summary of WFP's alignment with the National Gender Policy

National Gender Policy		WFP Activities		
Access to Justice	<i>Promoting and facilitating multi-sectorial cooperation to address gender-based violence and harmful traditional practices</i>	Strengthening partners' capacities for mainstreaming gender and protection into programme design, implementation, & monitoring	Women and men will be informed about providing feedback on WFP's assistance	WFP evaluate protection risks of beneficiaries
				Identifying and mitigating protection issues and maximizing beneficiaries' safety and dignity
Education	<i>Designing and implementing programs to improve girls and boys access to primary education, laying emphasis on enrolment and retention of girls in school</i>			WFP provides daily school meals to primary school boys and girls
				Monthly take-home rations will be provided to households with girls who attend at least 80 percent of schooldays per month
Economic Empowerment	<i>Creating opportunities in rural areas to improve the economic status of rural women and men</i> <i>Establishing vocational, entrepreneurs and skills enhancement programs and training for women and men</i>			Ensuring that gender roles were considered when selecting food assistance for assets (FFA) activities
				WFP included men, women and young people in the planning, selection and implementation of activities
Health	<i>Promoting reduction of maternal child mortality rate country wide by expanding maternal and child healthcare services</i> <i>Improving equal access to HIV/AIDS information for prevention, treatment and care for women and men living with HIV/AIDS</i>			Expanding its clinic-based approach to mother-and-child health (MCH) where access and infrastructure permit
				Giving incentives for pregnant women to deliver their babies at clinics staffed by skilled health workers
				Household rations include SuperCereal to address micronutrient deficiencies in women of reproductive age, adolescents, elderly people and older children
				Treating moderately acute malnutrition in children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women will be managed through MCH clinics by targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) programmes
		Seasonal preventive blanket supplementary feeding (BSF) to reduce the risk of children under 3 and pregnant and lactating women becoming acutely malnourished during the lean season		
		Piloting a new ready-to-use supplementary food that is based on pregnant and lactating women's daily requirements, does not require preparation and reduces the risk of intra-household sharing		
		Stabilizing and reducing the prevalence of global acute malnutrition and disparities between boys and girls under 5		
		Considering seasonality, geography and access in its assistance to children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women to reduce under nutrition		
		Engaging in curative and preventive nutrition activities, protecting the food security of vulnerable households and strengthening partnerships with humanitarian and development actors		
		Targeted communications on behaviour change for men and women on childcare, health, food preparation and storage, immunization, and water and sanitation		

44. Coherence between WFP's activities and the 2016 National Gender Policy is evident in all the policy's priority intervention areas⁴¹⁴ except for political participation. More specifically, WFP's activities contribute to the following strategies for implementation set forth by the policy:

⁴¹⁴ Priority interventions areas are arranged into five thematic areas: economic empowerment, health, education, political participation and access to justice.

- creating opportunities in rural areas to improve the economic status of rural women and men, and establishing vocational, entrepreneurial and skills enhancement programmes and training for women and men (Gender and Economic Empowerment);
- promoting reduction of maternal and child mortality rates country wide by expanding maternal and child healthcare services, and improving equal access to HIV/AIDS information for the prevention, treatment and care for women and men living with HIV/AIDS (Gender and Health);
- designing and implementing programmes to improve girls' and boys' access to primary education, laying emphasis on enrolment and retention of girls in school (Gender and Education);
- and (most recently) promoting and facilitating multi-sectoral cooperation to address GBV and harmful traditional practices (Gender and Access to Justice).

Questions remain on the extent to which such an alignment is the result of a conscious effort on the side of WFP, as nothing on this was found by the evaluation.

45. WFP is also mentioned as a partner to the government in the national 2015/2016 Action Plan on the Human Rights Roadmap in relation to Theme IV: The Human Rights of Children, Women and Gender Equality; and Theme V: Economic and Social Rights. Interestingly however, while WFP has been participating in the United Nations Gender Theme Group (GTG), the evaluation found no evidence of any significant contribution to the Human Rights Results Group.

2.1.4 To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonized with those of partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

46. Overall, coherence and harmonization among different United Nations agencies' objectives and activities is ensured through the United Nations Somalia ISF and subsequent UNSF – the United Nations MPTF and Joint Programmes. Clusters, sub-clusters and working groups also provide important avenues for coordination and harmonization among the different actors operating in Somalia. Among them, WFP's highest engagement is perhaps with the GBV sub-cluster both as an organization and as co-chair of the FSC.⁴¹⁵ WFP is also participating in the Protection Cluster, mostly at Nairobi level, and has reportedly attended some meetings of the GTG and contributed to the development of the United Nations-wide Strategy for Gender.⁴¹⁶

47. WFP is working closely with UNHCR to facilitate the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees, primarily from Kenya and Yemen, through integration into food security and nutrition-assistance programmes. Other than duration of assistance, which is the same for both, approaches by the two agencies differ significantly, as outlined in Table 56.

48. The aim of UNHCR's multi-purpose cash interventions in Somalia is to enable returnees to reintegrate locally and to support themselves to become self-reliant by helping them cover their basic needs.⁴¹⁷ Assistance is meant to complement provision by other agencies, particularly WFP food assistance. UNHCR expressed some concerns regarding WFP's assistance modality, particularly in relation to the voucher system and its value. According to some analysis done by






⁴¹⁵ WFP has been commended by the GBV sub-cluster lead for spearheading the efforts to develop a GBV protocol and checklist for GBV mainstreaming for the food security cluster, which at the time the evaluation was conducted was the only one in place at the cluster level; and the comments provided to the GBV strategy 2017–2019. Key informant interview, Hargeisa December 2017.

⁴¹⁶ Key informant interview with United Nations Women, Nairobi 13.12.2017.

⁴¹⁷ More specifically, this consists of a subsistence allowance of USD 200 per household per month to cover basic needs; a one-off reinstallation grant of USD 200 per person paid upon arrival to re-establish their lives in Somalia; cash grants to cover core relief items; and conditional grants for education and shelter.

UNHCR, about 23 percent of the cash assistance provided to returnees is used for food.⁴¹⁸ The feeling is that WFP assistance is not enough to cover all the food needs and the voucher system is not helping returnees to meet all their food preferences. The potential for abuse and corruption associated with the use of retailers was also mentioned. Possible risks include harassment, cartels and abuse of power by vendors, cashing-in the voucher for a lower value and providing items for less than the actual value of the voucher. Other informants, including WFP staff, expressed similar concerns. Other challenges experienced in relation to this collaboration are lack of interoperability between the systems used for registration by WFP and UNHCR⁴¹⁹, differences in the sizes of households (and related assistance) between the two agencies and problems with the functioning of the SCOPE cards issued in refugee camps in Kenya.⁴²⁰

Table 56: Summary of UNHCR and WFP approaches to returnees

	UNHCR	WFP
<p><i>purpose</i></p> 	to cover for basic needs and facilitate reintegration	to cover for basic food needs
<p><i>duration</i></p> 	6 months	6 months
<p><i>amount</i></p> 	200 USD/person upon arrival + 200 USD/HH	15 USD/person
<p><i>transfer modality</i></p> 	direct cash provision through Amal Bank	cash-based voucher to be redeemed at specific retailers
<p><i>target group</i></p> 	individuals & households	households

49. Since 2012, WFP, FAO and UNICEF have partnered under the JRS, later developed into the JRP. Alignment and collaboration is particularly close with UNICEF and to a lesser extent with FAO, while WFP is also playing a catalyst role between the two.⁴²¹ The evaluation appreciates the efforts made to include gender in the analysis of the underlying causes of food insecurity and nutrition,

⁴¹⁸ UNHCR Somalia Newsletter, “Sustainable reintegration through cash-based interventions”, Issue No. 3, October 2017.

⁴¹⁹ The systems the agencies are using for registration and management of returnees are different and not compatible, thus, now, some problems were encountered for example in relation to household size, which was at times different between the two agencies, and problems with the functioning of the SCOPE cards issued in Kenya, returnees had to undergo a further registration process upon arrival in Somalia.

⁴²⁰ According to UNHCR, during SCOPE registration in Dadaab and Kakuma biometrics were not collected, at least initially, and this required refugees to go through a further verification and registration process upon arrival in Somalia. Moreover, other informants point to the fact that initially the SCOPE card was only meant to work in the location where it was issued without consideration for mobility.

⁴²¹ Key informant interviews Nairobi, December 2017.

which resulted in the integration of a specific gender dimension into the programme's framework. This is evident in the communities' "improved knowledge and attitudes on issues affecting women's access to protection, education, and health service and livelihood opportunities"; and women's "increased control over their time to access services and pursue livelihood opportunities" outputs.⁴²²

50. Despite its work on IDPs and returnees and the leadership on resilience, the evaluation found limited engagement and visibility of WFP in the durable solution initiative and working group at UNCT level.⁴²³ This probably speaks to the fact that the shift from pure humanitarian mode towards the provision of a more realistic set of opportunities for integration and living, especially in urban environment, has yet to materialize, as well as the limitations of the work done so far on this at the UNCT level.

51. At the time the evaluation was conducted WFP was about to start collaboration with UNFPA on MCHN and GBV in some areas of the country. WFP will provide food support in the form of either vouchers or cash cards to those GBV survivors who because of food insecurity are not in condition to continue counselling, while at the same time receiving food and nutrition training, where available.⁴²⁴ As for NGO partners, synergies and key areas of collaboration are spelled out in the three strategic partnership agreements WFP holds with the DRC, World Vision, and Save the Children. The former was specifically chosen for its expertise on gender and protection, and to support WFP's capacity to "enhance the protection of affected populations" through a focus on reducing violations of rights and GBV.⁴²⁵

2.1.5 To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

52. WFP Gender Policy 2015–2020 advocates a twin-track strategy of gender mainstreaming and targeted actions towards gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE). This has been the practice also in WFP's previous history on gender. The Somalia CGAP objectives include work at both the programmatic and structural/policy level in support of government capacities on gender. While the evaluation sees a direct responsibility and capacity of WFP for the first, capacity to be directly influential at the structural and policy level appears lower. Hence the importance of leveraging partnerships with other United Nations entities for a coordinated engagement on gender and protection. This seems in line with the approach outline in the CGAP.

53. As mentioned, in early 2016 WFP established framework agreements with three strategic partners: the DRC, Save the Children, and World Vision International. Partners were selected for their capacities in specific areas of interest for WFP, with DRC contributing expertise on age, gender and diversity. The stated intention was to leverage partners' specific capacities and expertise to fill existing gaps, and to complement and strengthen WFP's capacity and impact in those areas. More on the efforts currently ongoing in gender and protection can be found in section 2.2.3.

⁴²² JRP Problem Tree Theory of Change, and United Nations JRP Results Framework.

⁴²³ WFP is not mentioned in the NDP among the stakeholders providing contributions to support durable solutions for the assisted population in Somalia. Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019.

⁴²⁴ No formal partnership has yet been established with UNFPA. The opportunity to work on GBV survivors originated when UNFPA supported the FSC for the development of the GBV guidelines and checklist, and WFP agreed to support GBV cases through inclusion in SCOPE caseload (where not already there) with a focus on Mogadishu and Baidoa. Food insecure GBV survivors will be referred to WFP by UNFPA and relevant GBV service provider in the area, which in the case of WFP will likely to be DRC. Survivors will receive 6-months' worth of assistance through cash. Depending on the location, light conditionality such as attendance of psychosocial counselling, and nutrition training may also apply. WFP Assistance for GBV Survivors in Baidoa and Mogadishu, Brief on Pilot, August 2017.

⁴²⁵ Letter of Intent DRC, February 2017.

54. On protection, the choice of investing in AAP through the establishment of an effective, easily accessible and robust complaint and feedback mechanism (CFM), and communication around it, was also strategic and well reflects WFP's outreach capacity, as well as its monitoring strength. In a context of reduced opportunities for direct engagement with communities, WFP's CFM provides an important avenue for community members to share and receive information and feedback and for the organization to triangulate and cross-check data received by TPM partners and other secondary sources. The evaluation also commends WFP's increased engagement on GBV and protection more in general, including at the FSC level, and in preparation for the implementation of the CoP Strategy.

55. Perhaps the most worrisome findings concern gender. Though recognizing that the CGAP was only finalized in early 2017, it is also important to remember that WFP has a long corporate history on gender, with some important and recognized successes.⁴²⁶ Hence, it is unfortunate to see that this has not resulted in a more robust capacity at the country level. While the origin of this can be found in the different momentum and priority granted to gender within the organization at large, some responsibilities at country level are also evident. Among them, the potential support by the Regional Bureau in this area left at times untapped; the missed opportunities of big revolutions, such as CBTs and SCOPE, to develop a more profound analysis and understanding of gender dynamics at household and community levels; and the incapacity to fully harness existing gender expertise, both internally and externally.⁴²⁷ Finally, while the latest Gender Policy 2015–2020 has certainly contributed to put gender at the forefront, as it is often the case, implementation is still lagging behind and reflects the typical time lag between corporate understanding and conceptualization and operationalization.

2.1.6 To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on the one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including humanitarian principles and protection policies) on the other?

56. Since 2012, WFP has re-established its operations in some areas previously banned by Al-Shabaab for alleged lack of neutrality on the side of the United Nations and NGOs. In 2015, WFP reopened the Somalia office in Mogadishu for the first time in twenty years. With the establishment of the political mission in 2013 and its integration with the UNCT in 2014, the perception of linkages between humanitarian actors and the political and military agendas have increased, further jeopardizing the capacity of aid agencies to safely assist people in need.⁴²⁸ At the same time, the Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines were endorsed in November 2014 and have been active since. Yet, ensuring the humanitarian space is continuously preserved and protected has not been an easy task.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁶ WFP Gender Policy 2015-2020 is the fourth of a series of policy efforts WFP made since the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. Among them, the Enhanced Commitment to Women to Ensure Food Security (2003-2007) was highly commended for "moving beyond vague rhetoric to identify targeted actions". In the words of evaluators, the "Policy was strategic in addressing women's needs, pragmatic in identifying discrete actions, and relevant as it connected with WFP's food aid modalities". End-of-Term Evaluation of WFP's Gender Policy (2003–2007).

⁴²⁷ See for example the limited engagement of WFP at the GTG level and with United Nations Women, and the lamented departure of the 2016 gender and protection focal point for UNICEF.

⁴²⁸ Such a blurring of lines has been there in Somalia since at least 2008 when Al-Shabaab started expelling some international NGOs from areas under its control for alleged intelligence activities and culminated in 2011 with the closure of all United Nations agencies and NGOs offices, except for ICRC and MSF. Among the accusations was the lack of "complete political detachment and neutrality with regard to the conflicting parties in Somalia". Analysts believed the United Nations integration process, stabilization efforts, the counter-terrorism legislation, and the military involvement in relief effort are among the drivers of this blurring of lines. Ferreiro, M. "Blurring of Lines in Complex Emergencies: Consequences for the Humanitarian Community", *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*.

⁴²⁹ See the Somalia Civil-Military Working Group Report 2017.

57. In a context of prolonged blurring of lines, somehow WFP has been able to maintain overall impartiality by addressing the prevailing needs of IDPs, returnees and host communities in different areas of the country in a non-discriminatory manner. But this has only been possible where it had access⁴³⁰ to preserve its operational independence in its key areas of expertise; and to hold to some degree of neutrality, for example by not flying with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia.⁴³¹ All the above granted WFP recognition by the donors as “the guardian of humanitarian principles together with UNICEF”.⁴³²

58. Despite the above, the evaluation recorded instances of potential risks to beneficiaries in relation to WFP’s assistance. Examples include risks associated with the use of USAID branded bags;⁴³³ and Al-Shabaab supposed aversion for any form of identity, including possibly WFP SCOPE cards, as “only government officials tend to hold an ID”.⁴³⁴

2.2. Factors and quality of strategic decision-making

2.2.1 To what extent has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of food security and nutrition-related issues?

59. The main sources of food insecurity analysis in the country are the seasonal assessments carried out by the FSNAU and the IPC Map, none of which provides a breakdown by sex and age.⁴³⁵ The latest gender analysis by FSNAU dates to 2012.⁴³⁶ While the report recommended a comprehensive, stand-alone gender assessment to supplement ongoing data collection and analysis, not much has happened on this since.

60. Following a tradition established by the previous management, in 2015 WFP conducted the 2007–2014 Trend Analysis by compiling data from existing food security and nutrition data⁴³⁷ to provide an understanding of the trends and of the underlying causes of food insecurity and nutrition in Somalia and inform programmes accordingly. The section on Clan and Gender Dynamics contained there, is the same as that in the 2012 version, which in turn was largely drawn from a 2008 analysis of Somali socio-political organization and gender, with no specific analysis or additional contribution made by WFP. In the draft 2017 update, the section on gender is absent altogether. However, seasonal livelihood calendars with indication of the differential roles, responsibilities and constraints of men and women in any given season are present in all.

61. Data collected by VAM and M&E are generally disaggregated by the sex of the household head, while age and diversity analysis has been mostly lacking over the years and across programmes. The only exception to this that the evaluation could find is the 2016 livelihood baseline survey. Moreover, even when sex-disaggregated data are available, the real gap is at the level of the analysis, as demonstrated by the lack of a truly differential approach between men and women, beyond nutrition and education. Gender and protection-relevant data are collected on a regular basis for monitoring and reporting, for example in relation to the annual reporting

⁴³⁰ Either directly or through CPs and TPMs.

⁴³¹ Another example of this was WFP’s policy not to use UNSOS flights.

⁴³² Meeting with the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group, Nairobi 13.12.2017.

⁴³³ This came out during discussions with NGOs partners in Mogadishu, with DRC clearly referring to the risk of carrying USAID logo. Similarly, UNICEF is reportedly not accepting USAID-branded commodities. No similar risks were reported in Somaliland.

⁴³⁴ According to informants, similar problems are experienced by other organizations, which however tend to be less operational, and their interventions less massive, thus they are often less visible. In general, however, in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas the policy of most is one of “no visibility”.

⁴³⁵ According to WFP staff, most of the data contributed to the FSNAU exercise are sex-disaggregated, while overall FSNAU is not.

⁴³⁶ FSNAU Gender in Emergency Food Security, Livelihoods and Nutrition in Somalia 2012.

⁴³⁷ FSNAU, FEWS NET, etc.

exercise. The extent of their use for programmatic decisions, however, has been limited.⁴³⁸ Qualitative gender analysis is also largely absent. This is mostly a consequence of the limited understanding and capacity of gender by staff and partners alike. Recent efforts to enhance WFP's capacity on gender analysis, though important, occurred in late 2017.⁴³⁹

62. The SLP, coupled with CBPP exercises, ensure that men and women across different population groups are involved in the planning, design and implementation of food security and nutrition programmes in accordance with their differential seasonal constraints and priorities.⁴⁴⁰ These processes are by far the best examples of gender-sensitive analysis that currently exist at WFP Somalia level. Other examples include, the nutritional causal analysis commissioned by WFP in 2015, which illustrates the links between gender and nutrition, while reference to differential purchasing patterns of male and female beneficiaries have been found in 2017 market and supply-chain assessments.⁴⁴¹

63. AAP is at the core of WFP's M&E activities and takes the forms of: 1). a CFM in place since 2015; 2). monitoring visits by WFP staff wherever possible; 3). sensitization of partners and projects participants; and 4). TPM. A significant increase in the use of the CFM was recorded in 2016 with 250 calls a week against the 150/week registered in 2015. Calls are recorded on an open source platform for data collection called SugarCRM. This allows referral to the most appropriate staff for resolution while maintaining the privacy of the caller.⁴⁴² WFP recently reviewed its M&E SOPs, which now list protection, AAP and GBV among the high priority issues and a specific procedure is in place on how to escalate internally. Call centre staff are duly sensitized on relevant gender and protection issues and informed about existing referral mechanisms. SOPs are considered as a good practice in the region and are referred to as a model for other COs.⁴⁴³ Since the same operators also work on mVAM, it is assumed cross-fertilization is occurring.

64. While the use of remote data-collection mechanisms and tools expanded dramatically over the years, the evaluation found no evidence of any assessment of the repercussions this may have on gender and protection issues. Among them, possible barriers in reaching out to female beneficiaries because of illiteracy, limited access to and use of technologies, including mobile phones, as compared to males and lack of female enumerators in particularly insecure areas.⁴⁴⁴ Similarly, despite WFP's well-defined humanitarian and data protection and privacy policies, doubts remain about their actual application in the field in handling sensitive data, such as biometrics (phone numbers, photos, and fingerprints) and in relation to the issue of informed consent by beneficiaries on the use of such data.⁴⁴⁵ Of relevance to this evaluation, a recent internal audit of beneficiary management raises similar concerns.⁴⁴⁶

65. Gaps in fully analysing and addressing protection risks in relation to SCOPE are also evident. For example, during SCOPE registration in 2015, some protection incidents seriously affecting the

⁴³⁸ Key informant interviews with WFP staff, Nairobi December 2017; and Somalia Gender Baseline study report 2016.

⁴³⁹ A training on gender analysis for staff from Somalia and Kenya COs was held in Nairobi in October 2017.

⁴⁴⁰ SLP and CBPP are two of Three-Pronged Approach (3 PA) to strengthen planning and design of resilience building, productive safety nets, disaster risk reduction and preparedness programmes. By bringing people, government and partners together through participatory approaches, it is a good example of accountability and provides a forum for women's and men's participation and empowerment.

⁴⁴¹ VAM Market and Supply Chain assessments 2017.

⁴⁴² SPR 200844 2016.

⁴⁴³ Key informant interview.

⁴⁴⁴ See for example comments on the male-dominated FSNAU's enumerator teams in the 2012 FSNAU gender analysis.

⁴⁴⁵ In the words of one informant, people had no alternative but registering into SCOPE should they wanted to continue receiving assistance. Also, the extent of partners' knowledge and understanding of WFP policies for beneficiary identity and information management is also unclear.

⁴⁴⁶ Fieldwork was conducted in Malawi, Myanmar, and Sudan. WFP Internal Audit of Beneficiary Management 2017.

safety of beneficiaries were reported.⁴⁴⁷ Concerns about the high-profile nature of SCOPE and potential difficulties in managing overcrowding at registration and redemption/top-up sites, at least in the initial implementation phase, resulted in the recommendation to develop some guidance on gender and protection in relation to it. On this, the evaluation found a two-page document called SCOPE Protection Guiding Principles developed in 2016 and detailing the “how to” of registration of: women; 16 years old and older-aged household member; polygamous families; and complex cases such as child-headed households and others.⁴⁴⁸ Nothing is mentioned there in relation to safety of beneficiaries, and other protection concerns in relation to registration and redemption. A planned protection analysis of SCOPE implementation in 2016 was not carried out because of competing priorities and security concerns⁴⁴⁹ and it is yet to take place.

66. A document called Communication Strategy for SCOPE was also developed by WFP in 2015 in response to the need for information and sensitization around the new system. The strategy contains a developed analysis of risks associated with the roll-out of SCOPE and identifies communication-based mitigating measures. As such, the strategy is probably the closest to a protection analysis that could be found among WFP documents in relation to SCOPE. The extent of its use and dissemination, however, is unclear.⁴⁵⁰

67. Vouchers have been the predominant form of CBTs by WFP in Somalia. Cash was only introduced in August 2017 in Dollow, Mogadishu and Baidoa. In principle, the choice between which transfer modality to use is based on the preferences of women and men and protection risks to beneficiaries, among other factors.⁴⁵¹ In 2015, WFP Somalia conducted an internal reflection on the performance of cash and voucher that included a specific recommendation on a gender and protection assessment to identify potential risks of different transfer modalities on various population groups and related mitigating measures. To date, however, there is no evidence of a proper analysis by WFP of the gender and protection implications of CBTs.⁴⁵² The most recent cash-related assessment solely refers to the risk of tension at the household level arising from possible different priorities by men and women, and issues of control over resources.⁴⁵³ Monitoring is done separately for each transfer modality and questions about possible tension at the household level are included in cash assistance monitoring. Evidence from FGDs, in general, points to women’s continued control over food even when receiving cash, though some male beneficiaries in Dollow indicated a greater involvement in decision-making in relation to cash. Not much reflection on gender and protection is evident at the Cash-working Group level in any of the four streams of work.⁴⁵⁴

68. Very recently, WFP’s responsibility for preventing and mitigating GBV risks, which occur in the context of food insecurity or may be influenced by the way food assistance interventions are

⁴⁴⁷ WFP 2015. Assessment of security incidents at a WFP registration site in Mogadishu.

⁴⁴⁸ These include single headed households without other adult members or children 16 and above, and HHS headed by persons with disability and without other adult members or children 16 and above. WFP SCOPE Protection Guiding Principles 2016.

⁴⁴⁹ SPR 200844 2016.

⁴⁵⁰ The document was shared in a draft format, many WFP staff did not know about its existence, and it was difficult to locate it. In addition, the Gender baselines study reported its application has not been consistent.

⁴⁵¹ In 2012 for example, women indicated a preference for vouchers over cash transfers to ensure meeting food needs. WFP Trend Analysis of Food and Nutrition Insecurity 2012.

⁴⁵² A 2013 study from Bossaso indicated women’s control of food decisions, and that men tend to be a bit more involved in decisions about what to buy with the vouchers (34 percent). No tensions in the HH due to the introduction of vouchers.

⁴⁵³ WFP 2017. Macro Financial Assessment Cash-based Transfer Interventions.

⁴⁵⁴ These are: 1. mobile technology; 2. M&E; 3. risks; and 4. market. key informant interview, Nairobi 13.12.2017.

implemented, while referring survivors to available services in coordination with protection actors for more direct assistance.⁴⁵⁵

2.2.2 To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, analysing appropriate response strategies and including developing national or partner capacity on these issues?

69. The evaluation did not identify any particular role for WFP on policy and advocacy on gender and protection at the national level. For example, there is no evidence of WFP's direct engagement with state institutions mandated to advance gender equality, besides the contribution to the development of the 2016 National Gender Policy. Similarly, on Human Rights and Protection and the priorities and commitments of the Food Studies Group in this area.⁴⁵⁶

70. At the partners' level, positive achievements include participation in the GTG; contribution to the development of the United Nations Gender Strategy for Somalia; the strategic partnership with DRC, with its emphasis on gender and protection; and the revision of the field level agreement with the inclusion of a specific annex on gender and protection (Annex 6). Of relevance, training activities developed by DRC planned for early 2018 will also target partner staff.

2.2.3 What factors determined strategic choices and how they were considered and managed?

71. The Gender Policy 2015–2020 generated a process of reflection, stock-taking and planning on GEWE that, in the case of Somalia, resulted in a baseline study and the CGAP, both in 2016. The gender baseline study provides a comprehensive assessment of the state of the art in Somalia with regards to GEWE. The study comprises a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the progress made on gender and sets the basis for the development of the CGAP. Other important influencers are the 2012 Humanitarian Protection Policy and the momentum gained by protection in Somalia in recent years; and capacity and emphasis on gender and protection at the regional level.

72. Despite gender inequality and protection having always been significant concerns in Somalia, staff capacity and responsibility on these issues, is admittedly limited. Two policy programme officers followed one another in the period 2012–2017 at the CO level, both with a formal marginal responsibility for gender and protection, which remained practically unchanged over time. According to the existing ToR, the primary responsibility of the assignment is to "support the JRP with UNICEF and FAO, as well as capacity building of the Government of Somalia in the area of Social Protection". Additionally, leadership on the Country Strategic Plan is also mentioned, while responsibility on gender and protection is the last of a list of nine tasks.⁴⁵⁷ Capacity in Somalia is less than in the rest of the countries in the region where at least 40 percent of the person's time is dedicated to gender and protection.⁴⁵⁸ Recognizing the need to strengthen existing capacity, the CO developed the ToR for a Standby Partner "Protection (and Gender) Adviser". The request however has not been approved yet by the management.

73. On a different note, a certain level of confusion between gender and protection is manifest in the dual responsibility assigned to the in-country focal point, further reflected in the request for a Standby Partner "Protection (and Gender) Adviser"; as well as in the continued references to both in the regional strategy and CGAP. At times these are dizzily combined in expressions such as "gender-transformative protection mainstreaming" or "gender-responsive protection".⁴⁵⁹ Notably,

⁴⁵⁵ GBV Survivor Referral and Service Protocol and Checklist 2017.

⁴⁵⁶ The only capacity development initiative mentioned in SPR 2016 for PRRO 200844 is the posting of a consultant in the government to work on post development, maritime law and legislation, and the organizational structure of marine port authorities.

⁴⁵⁷ ToR for Programme Policy Officer, last revision January 2016.

⁴⁵⁸ South Sudan is an exception with 3 people working full time on gender, one international and two nationals, one international Protection Advisor, and two national CFM hotline staff.

⁴⁵⁹ See for example references to them in the CGAP.

this “dual hat” position is standard practice in five of the eight countries in the region, as well as in other regions where WFP operates.⁴⁶⁰ It is the opinion of the evaluation that there are important synergies and overlaps in the work on gender and protection that it is worth harnessing and combining responsibilities in one focal person may be an effective way to do so, as long as understanding is there and issues are not mixed together meaninglessly.

74. Partnership with DRC has created a forum for programmatic discussions, as well as opportunities for furthering the capacity of WFP staff on gender through the development of training activities targeted to WFP staff and partners, which will be held in early 2018.⁴⁶¹ Along with the new Gender Policy and the focus on a gender-transformative policies and programmes, some measures have certainly facilitated attention to gender issues in the past years. These include requirement for 15 percent of the CO annual expenditures to be on gender-related initiatives, a percentage that Somalia CO is said to have consistently exceeded in the previous years.⁴⁶² However, questions were raised about the real value of the gender budgeting exercise and its impact on decision-making.

75. In accordance with the 2016 Guide on data protection and privacy, SCOPE is hosted on WFP's private cloud, data management is in accordance with the United Nations information security standards and access is limited by appropriate controls. However, some data protection and privacy faults were recently highlighted by a WFP audit, and it is reasonable to expect that they would apply to Somalia as well.⁴⁶³ The evaluation appreciates WFP's efforts to uphold ethical and safety considerations in processing beneficiary data despite the pressure for information sharing and access by the government (and others).⁴⁶⁴ In the words of an informant, “Capacity development [of the government] is generally lacking, and information sharing is key to this, while [international] organizations tend to be overprotective and territorial”. Moreover, various informants commented on the fact that SCOPE could easily act as a de facto common platform registration database for Somali beneficiaries, but this also has not yet materialized given the sensitivity of biometrics.⁴⁶⁵

2.2.4 How has WFP analysed or used existing analyses of contextual, institutional and programmatic risks?

76. WFP's multiple monitoring procedures and tools provide a robust system for detecting and addressing issues affecting the dignity, safety and integrity of beneficiaries, as well as cross checking data originated from TPM. Women are also said to contribute their voices and opinions, particularly through the CFM. The low proportion of female enumerators, both internally and in outsourced monitors, however, remains a challenge and continuously undermines WFP's capacity to comprehensively reach out to female beneficiaries.

77. Another important mechanism for monitoring and addressing issues of concern to WFP's beneficiaries is the compliance task force established at the CO level to deal with particularly grave issues such as fraud, corruption, PSEA, and GBV. At the time the evaluation was conducted, the task force was meeting every other week. It was chaired by the WFP Deputy Director and

⁴⁶⁰ Evaluation of WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy 2018 (upcoming).

⁴⁶¹ Initially the plan was to train all AOs by the end of 2017, but then activities got delayed. CGAP 2016.

⁴⁶² Somalia CO Gender Action Plan 2016.

⁴⁶³ See for example the findings of a recent WFP audit on this, WFP Internal Audit of Beneficiary Management 2017.

⁴⁶⁴ According to government informants, sharing of beneficiaries' data is an area where collaboration between the international community and the FGS has been clearly lacking.

⁴⁶⁵ Management of personal data carries risks that are often unrecognized. The loss, theft or misuse of personal data can cause harm to the people WFP seeks to assist, as well as to WFP personnel. This is particularly true in conflict settings, and in situation of volatile and fragmented socio-political institutions. WFP Guide to Data Protection and Privacy Policy 2016.

comprised the compliance officer and the head of programme. There was a plan to integrate M&E given its role in relation to the CFM.

78. Neither protection nor gender is explicitly mentioned in the 2017 Somalia CO risk register. However, among the issues of relevance mentioned there are: exclusion and inclusion errors in the targeting of beneficiaries⁴⁶⁶ because of clan dynamics; the risk of diversion and misappropriation by CPs resulting from collusion; and security constraints affecting WFP's targeting and data collection and analysis capacity. These, together with cashing-in by retailers, mirror the anecdotal evidence gathered by the evaluation. Among the mitigating measures: strengthening sensitization of beneficiaries is mentioned in relation to the risk of "misunderstanding among humanitarian actors during the use of SCOPE"; and the use of SCOPE is clearly indicated as a mitigating measure against the risk of diversion and misappropriation by CPs.⁴⁶⁷ Some risk analysis in relation to the introduction of SCOPE is evident in the Communication Strategy for SCOPE, with specific communication measures to mitigate identified risks.⁴⁶⁸ There is no evidence, however, of these risks being reflected in other tools. Finally, while protection and privacy of personal data are said to be extremely important when managing beneficiary information⁴⁶⁹, risks of processing personal data are not included in the 2017 risk register.

2.3. Portfolio performance and results

2.3.1 How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

79. Achievements on gender and protection have been mixed, and progress on them not necessarily consistent over time. Since 2015 there was increased attention given to both, with some concrete results becoming visible from 2016 onwards. In accordance with WFP Gender Policy, results can be grouped in the two areas of Gender Equality Programming and organizational change. Here is an illustration of achievements and challenges from an organizational change perspective, while programming is discussed in the section that follows.

80. According to the analysis conducted for the development of the gender baseline study, as of 2016, improvements were needed across the whole of Layer 2: Organizational change, in relation to the gender budget.⁴⁷⁰

81. Gender parity remains a significant challenge in Somalia, particularly for national staff. While the percentage of female international staff increased from 25.56 percent in 2012 to 42.25 percent in 2017, the percentage among nationals did not change significantly. Overall, females represent 30 percent of the overall staff in country (see Figure 21). An HR strategy to promote gender and diversity in the workplace was variously mentioned, however, the evaluation was not able to locate it.⁴⁷¹

Figure 21: Overview of gender parity among national and international staff in the period 2012-2017

⁴⁶⁶ Addressing exclusion is one of three priorities identified in the CoP Strategy 2018-2019, the others are addressing protection concerns of IDPs, and enhancing protection of communities in conflict zones.


⁴⁶⁷ 2017 SOMCO Risk Register Mid-Year Review.

⁴⁶⁸ See 1.6 Risk Mitigation Through Communication, (Draft) Communication Strategy for SCOPE 2015.

⁴⁶⁹ See Scope in Somalia Cash-based transfer assistance February 2017; and more generally, WFP Guide to Data Protection and Privacy Policy.

⁴⁷⁰ The baseline measured progress against the indicators outlined in the GAP for each layer, programmatic and organizational change. Gender Baseline Study Report 2016.

⁴⁷¹ The 2016 gender baseline reported the HR strategy to be in place and to focus primarily on gender parity in staffing.



Source: WFP CO HR data.

82. On capacity strengthening of staff, the gender baseline referred to the requirement for all staff to undergo mandatory courses on gender, beginning at the end of 2016, though it is not clear from the document which courses the baseline refers to.⁴⁷² Some relevant training activities that happened during the evaluation timeframe are basic gender training with M&E officers from both CO and AOs and call centre staff, including referral on sensitive issues such as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and GBV; the gender analysis workshop for Kenyan and Somali staff and partners; and GBV service providers in Mogadishu and Baidoa trained on the use of SCOPE.

83. Partnership with DRC has also been yielding results, though some will only materialize in 2018. More specifically, training is planned to be conducted in Hargeisa, Galkayo, Bossaso, Dolow, Mogadishu and Nairobi and will involve a maximum of 25 participants in each location. In line with growing interest in GBV and the leveraging of DRC expertise in the area, the training will include some basics on GBV prevention and the WFP protocol on GBV. Finally, pursuant to its objective to continue strengthening partners' capacities for mainstreaming gender and protection into programme design, implementation and monitoring⁴⁷³, staff of partner agencies in different locations will also be invited.

84. The reported progress following the adoption of the CGAP includes:

- the WFP Somalia Gender Results Network, which replaced the previous gender focal point network, has been activated and was expanded in 2017 to include representatives from AOs. At the time the evaluation was conducted, however, only a few meetings had been held (Output 6.2);
- contribution to the development of a national gender strategy and participation in the GTG, protection and GBV (sub-) cluster (Output 2.1);
- proposals regularly reviewed for gender and protection considerations (Output 4.1.);
- ongoing revision of M&E tools to include a gender and protection dimension (Output 1.2);
- 16 days on violence against women commemorated (Output 7.2);

⁴⁷² A mandatory course on gender that exists at the United Nations level is the so-called "I know gender", which however is not listed under WFP mandatory courses, which include Prevention from Sexual Harassment and Prevention from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

⁴⁷³ WFP PRRO 200844.

- the tracked expenditures on GEWE for the PRRO 200844 in 2016 was 24 percent of the total⁴⁷⁴;
- of relevant staff (Output 10.1).⁴⁷⁵

2.3.2 Targeting

85. WFP Somalia follows a two-phased approach to targeting its beneficiaries – geographic targeting to identify the areas of concern and individual/household targeting for the most vulnerable individuals/households. The basis of the geographical targeting is the FSNAU, the results of which, however, are not disaggregated by sex.⁴⁷⁶ For livelihood support, the integration of a gender dimension is ensured using the 3 PA approach, and particularly the SLP and the CBPP pillars. CBPP is also used for household targeting. Gender considerations included in WFP targeting criteria include priority to female-headed households and an emphasis given to participatory approaches to identify needs and tailor programme responses. However, there is no mention in WFP targeting criteria of any differential targeting for boys and girls in WFP-assisted schools, despite the reported different enrolment rates.⁴⁷⁷

86. Community consultations with both men and women for the design of livelihoods and other projects implemented by WFP are consistently cited across SPRs as ways to ensure the needs, priorities, and constraints of men and women across various seasons are captured and reflected in project design and implementation.⁴⁷⁸ In general, the evaluation found women were the primary recipients of food assistance across all transfer modalities, with a 52 percent female registration as the primary cardholders in SCOPE, and a 66 percent female redemption.⁴⁷⁹ In relation to Gender Policy Objective 1 in 2017, WFP targeted 55 percent women, and 45 percent men in food assistance programmes and activities; and 70 percent of those purchasing food items with SCOPE (both cash and vouchers) are women and 30 percent are men.⁴⁸⁰

87. Participatory and inclusive approaches with women and other vulnerable groups, as well as CFM and safe and flexible transfer modalities, have also been effectively used to mitigate protection risks and ensure the safety and dignity in relation to cash assistance.⁴⁸¹ According to the 2017 WFP data, however, lack of awareness of, “selection and targeting criteria, rations or entitlements, processes, distribution site, distribution date or complaints and feedback mechanisms in place is the second most frequent complaint received through the CFM, after ‘beneficiaries not receiving top-ups’”.⁴⁸² This does not come as a surprise to WFP,⁴⁸³ and efforts are there to improve communication with beneficiaries, including through improved direct access by WFP staff, enhanced monitoring of CPs’ and TPMs’ capacities and practices, and open dialogue with beneficiaries through available technologies. Yet, issues related to targeting were also recorded during the evaluation. Among them, exclusion and marginalization of vulnerable groups, also in relation to clan affiliation; and collusion between CPs, local authorities and retailers.

⁴⁷⁴ Calculation is made using the Gender Expenditure Analysis (GEA) tool. Capacity to report and track gender expenditures in line with the new Gender Policy was supposedly under development at the time of the gender baseline in 2016.

⁴⁷⁵ Reference is to relevant outputs of the CGAP 2016.

⁴⁷⁶ As previously mentioned, there is a general lack of gender analysis in the FSNAU, and efforts to address this as suggested by the 2012 gender analysis were not followed through.

⁴⁷⁷ 38 for boy and 21 percent for girls, WFP Somalia Targeting Criteria final PRRO 200844.

⁴⁷⁸ SPRs 2013, 2014, 2015.

⁴⁷⁹ WFP SCOPE Management Dashboard, December 2017.

⁴⁸⁰ 2017 Somalia Dashboard, last accessed January 2018.

⁴⁸¹ WFP PRRO 200844.

⁴⁸² Cases January – September 2017, M&E.

⁴⁸³ Reports on this are included in SPRs since 2014.

Gender-sensitive targeting for V/FFT on the other side is not an issue, as most of the activities are specifically targeted to women.

2.3.3 What is the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender inequality gaps in relation to and control over food, resources and decision-making?

88. According to the gender baseline, progress on Layer 1: Gender Equality Programming has been acceptable in four out of ten indicators. These relate to the CFM; the gender marker coding 2a and 2b of project documents; meaningful participation of affected populations; and adequate sample sizes from which to draw conclusions at sex- and age- disaggregated levels.⁴⁸⁴

89. Community committees reported a general 50 percent representation by women, while the number of women in leadership positions in relief management committees is consistently below the 50 percent target.⁴⁸⁵ As for gender-transformative results, 2016 data suggest a general shift towards joint decision-making between men and women over the use of both in-kind and vouchers.⁴⁸⁶ This is corroborated by the results of the 2016 livelihood baseline survey and is in line with the gender-transformative approach promoted by the new Gender Policy.⁴⁸⁷ However, no explanation is given in the SPR on whether this may have resulted from specific efforts on this by WFP. Also, no major tensions were registered during FGD over the assistance provided by WFP (both cash and voucher). Women reported maintaining control over food-related decisions and resources, while only in Dolow did male beneficiaries mention using part of the cash assistance for business.⁴⁸⁸

90. While vouchers/FFT programmes are specifically designed for women⁴⁸⁹, the evaluation found no evidence of any specific analysis of the differential needs, opportunities and constraints of men and women in different locations, or of innovative approaches being attempted by WFP and CPs. Rather, the existing offer rests on the conservative side of the interventions spectrum, with literacy and numeracy as the only option for women's empowerment in some areas; this reflects no real transformational intent. Interestingly, at times women themselves have been innovative in their choice of activity to enrol in. In Dolow for example, four women decided to attend the bee keeping training, which is traditionally meant for men.⁴⁹⁰ Since WFP is said to rely heavily on partners for the definition and implementation of proposed activities, this is a sign of a general lack of capacity in this by partners, as much as of lack of encouragement by WFP.

91. Among the issues of concern that emerged during the evaluation is a general gap in addressing the needs of adolescent girls across programmes, especially in relation to education and nutrition. For example, while take-home rations for girls have been successful in encouraging girls' enrolment and attendance at primary level, enrolment and retention of girls at secondary level remains challenging.⁴⁹¹ This raises question about the sustainability of WFP intervention in this area, including in relation to sensitization of parents to the importance of girls' education. Culturally, women continue to be the primary caregivers and responsible for childcare and feeding. While recognizing WFP's intent to sensitize and engage men on nutrition-sensitive

⁴⁸⁴ See the 2016 gender baseline for more details on this.

⁴⁸⁵ The only exception to this was the number of women in leadership positions of FFT/A in EMOP 200281 which exceeded that of men. EMOP 200281, SPR 2012. The 2013 SPR for the PRRO 200443 also reported mixed results on this. Finally, no data on this were available for 2016.

⁴⁸⁶ SPR 200844 2016. This reflects the transformational approach introduced by WFP gender policy.

⁴⁸⁷ Findings from the baseline indicate that while women are the sole responsible for food, decisions concerning the use of cash and voucher were taken jointly by men and women. WFP Livelihood baseline survey March 2016.

⁴⁸⁸ FGD with male and female beneficiaries, Dolow 04.12.2017.

⁴⁸⁹ Examples include poultry, tie and dye, beauty, tailoring, and hair dressing, while masonry, carpentry, bee keeping, mobile repairs, and others were offered to men.

⁴⁹⁰ When asked for the reasons behind it, all mentioned interest in something different than the typical female activity, and having been supported by their family in their choice.

⁴⁹¹ See data on this in the relevant Technical Annex on Food Security, Livelihoods, and Education.

programming and practices through SBCC, available data indicate that the proportion of men to women reached with the SBCC messages is consistently low.⁴⁹²

92. Protection became more prominent in WFP from 2015 onwards, with a particular focus on AAP. There are no safety concerns reported in the SPRs in 2012–2017, though it is recognized that there may be a high level of underreporting.

93. To overcome mobility constraints and security issues, WFP Logistics encourages contracted retailers to reach out to remote villages for beneficiaries to buy food items. This was very much appreciated by women in the Bali Ahmed village in Somaliland, who lamented the distance to town and the cost of transport should they had to go at their own expenses.⁴⁹³ While there is no indication of any specific gender analysis underpinning this, it is yielding benefits for women and men alike. At the time the evaluation was conducted, there were a total of 71 female retailers contracted by WFP, which represented 8 percent of the total retailer base. Many more are believed to own shops, but prefer to have their business under their husband's or son's name. This, however, is simply a reflection of the reality of business in Somalia, with no specific analysis or efforts having been made by WFP on this.⁴⁹⁴

2.3.4 What has been the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities in the portfolio, regardless of the operations?

94. Some level of synergy between gender and protection-related activities is only visible from 2015–2016 onwards, with specific activities being undertaken on both, and the analysis of achievements, opportunities and challenges done in the context of the gender-baseline survey. The decision tree and ToC for the JRP provides the best analysis of synergies between the various activities of the portfolio from a gender perspective. In general, however, more could be done to better link all activities, and use multiple opportunities for the advancement of GEWE.

2.3.5 What has been the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners, especially United Nations partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs at operational level?

95. For a discussion of synergies and opportunities of collaboration with partners refer to section 2.1.4.

⁴⁹² See considerations on this in the Technical Annex on Nutrition.

⁴⁹³ The village is located 58 km east of Hargeisa in a mostly pastoralist area. The village was badly affected by the drought in 2016 and almost 90 percent of the community have been affected by food insecurity and malnutrition problems.

⁴⁹⁴ As stated by one informant, "Contracting is based on set criteria, and any retailer (male or female) who meets the criteria is qualified. SOP for Selection and Administration of Retailers, April 2016. Reference to female employees and its impact on female access to shops was found in the WFP Central Market Assessment, July 2017.

Annex P: Output and Outcome Performance by Operation 2012–2017

This annex presents output and outcome indicators and performance by operation across the entire evaluation. While all the operations reported on outputs, some did not report on outcomes. No outputs or outcomes were listed for SOs 200475 and 200637.

EMOP 200281

Output	2012		Total		Ratio
	P*	A*	P	A	Total A/P (%)
Cash and vouchers (C&V): no. of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	12,000	22,806	12,000	22,806	190
C&V: no. of men collecting cash or vouchers	40	76	40	76	190
C&V: no. of women collecting cash or vouchers	1,960	3,725	1,960	3,725	190
Area of agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes (including irrigation canal repair, specific protection measures, embankments, etc.) (ha)	100	0	100	0	0
Area of cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures only (ha)	150	232	150	232	155
Extent of feeder roads rehabilitated (FFA) and maintained (self-help) (km)	400	597	400	597	149
No. of assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks in place because of project assistance	200	482	200	482	241
No. of beneficiaries of household food assistance for TB treatment	23166	63900	23166	63900	276
No. of beneficiaries of household food assistance for ART	11934	12653	11934	12653	106
No. of clients who received household food assistance for ART	1989	2636	1989	2636	133
No. of clients who received household food assistance for TB treatment	3861	10650	3861	10650	276
No. of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3,000–15,000 mt ³)	60	168	60	168	280

No. of health centres/sites assisted	700	916	700	916	131
No. of literacy centres assisted	60	99	60	99	165
No. of primary schools assisted by WFP	338	316	338	316	93
No. of shallow wells constructed	100	17	100	17	17
Average A/P					162

* P – planned, A - actual

PRRO 200443

Output	2013		2014		2015		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P (%)
C&V: no. of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	85,375	43,382	47,202	60,108			132,577	103,490	78
C&V: no. of men collecting cash or vouchers	7,762	3,577	1,405	4,081			9,167	7,658	84
C&V: no. of women collecting cash or vouchers	10,998	3,958	1,405	5,937			12,403	9,895	80
C&V: Total cash equivalent of food redeemed through cash vouchers	9,148,792	2,460,417	997,908	2,619,408			10,146,700	5,079,825	50
C&V: Total monetary value of cash vouchers distributed	9,148,792	2,603,558	997,908	2,619,408			10,146,700	5,222,966	51
Area of agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes (including irrigation canal construction, specific protection measures, embankments, etc.) (ha)	80	91			0	5,310	80	5,401	6,751
Area of agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes (including irrigation canal repair, specific protection measures, embankments, etc.) (ha)	270	5,884	8,070	16,622	49,383	36,466	57,723	58,972	1,02

Area of cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures only (ha)	540	835	71	129	377	1,094	988	2,058	208
Area of cultivated land treated with biological stabilization or agro forestry techniques only (including multi-storey gardening, green fences, and various tree belts) (ha)					15	106	15	106	707
Area of land cleared (ha)	160	90	219	228	347	127	726	445	61
Area of land cleared of garbage (ha)					6,110	6,656	6,110	6,656	109
Area of land spread with forage seeds (ha)					29,167	12,459	29,167	12,459	43
Extent of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help) (km)	300	115	190	271	0	164	490	550	112
Extent of feeder roads rehabilitated (FFA) and maintained (self-help) (km)	1,100	891	1,212	1,566	1,803	1,528	4,115	3,985	97
No. of ART clients who received both individual nutritional food supplements and household food assistance	1,830	1,466	1,466	1,980			3,296	3,446	105
No. of assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place because of project assistance	590	331	352	495	104	0	1,046	826	79
No. of beneficiaries of household food assistance for TB treatment	78,125	61,082	61,082	37,902			139,207	98,984	71
No. of beneficiaries of household food assistance for ART	21,875	17,218	17,218	9,246			39,093	26,464	68
No. of excavated community water ponds (3000–15,000 m ³) for domestic uses constructed	210	109	111	141	0	11	321	261	81
Number of excavated community water ponds for livestock uses constructed (3000–15,000 m ³)					117	85	117	85	73

No. of food monitors – men	57	72					57	72	126
No. of food monitors – women	22	30					22	30	136
No. of health centres/sites assisted	800	1,300	1,220	1,266	891	981	2,911	3,547	122
No. of homestead level micro-ponds (usually 60–250 mt ³) constructed					40	39	40	39	98
No. of households who received fuel-efficient stoves					5,991	2,200	5,991	2,200	37
No. of literacy centres assisted	60	175	61	129	78	78	199	382	192
No. of members of food management committees (female) trained on modalities of food distribution	1,777	1,683					1,777	1,683	95
No. of members of food management committees (male) trained on modalities of food distribution	2,666	2,760					2,666	2,760	104
No of men in leadership positions on food, cash and voucher management committees	3,772	3,806					3,772	3,806	101
No. of men receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP					68,819	114,700	68,819	114,700	167
No. of people trained (skills: livelihood technologies)					14,211	11,950	14,211	11,950	84
No. of primary schools assisted by WFP	444	380					444	380	86
No. of Prosopis trees cleared					222,016	222,004	222,016	222,004	100
No. of schools assisted by WFP					496	496	496	496	100
No. of shallow wells constructed	350	140	191	201	202	51	743	392	53
No. of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution	650	539					650	539	83
No. of TB treatment clients who received both individual nutritional food	6,490	5,591	5,591	4,996			12,081	10,587	88

supplement and household food assistance									
No. of tree seedlings produced	56,000	63,500	105,647	105,777	356,655	85,500	518,302	254,777	49
No. of women in leadership positions on food, cash and voucher management committees	2,515	2,481					2,515	2,481	99
No. of women receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP					275,515	459,194	275,515	459,194	167
Nutrition: no. of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			236	0			236	0	0
Nutrition: no. of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			590	0			590	0	0
Nutrition: no. of male government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			354	0			354	0	0
Proportion of men receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP against proportion planned (%)			180	41					23
Proportion of women receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP against proportion planned (%)			180	259					144
School feeding: number of male government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	11	10	640	148			651	158	24
School feeding: number of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	4	3	160	24			164	27	16
School feeding: number of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	15	13	800	258			815	271	33

The project has activities to raise awareness of how gender equality goals can increase effectiveness of WFP interventions	1	1					1	1	100
The project has initiatives to reduce risk of sexual and GBV	1	1					1	1	100
Training on food distribution includes a solid explanation for gender-sensitive provision of food	1	1					1	1	100
Volume of check dams and gully rehabilitation structures (e.g. soil sedimentation dams) constructed (m ³)	32,000	216,176	36,012	39,971	58,280	23,733	126,292	279,880	222
Volume of earth dams and flood-protection dikes constructed V					22,167	12,675	22,167	12,675	57
Average A/P									225

* P – planned, A - actual

SO 105780

Output	2012		2013		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P (%)
Completion of warehouse, Port of Mogadishu							
Dredging Bossaso, amount removed (m ³)							
Drifts rehabilitated							
Extent of roads repaired (km)							
No. of assessments/surveys conducted							
No. of bridges built/rehabilitated							
No. of bulletins, maps and other logistics information produced and shared							
No. of ports rehabilitated							
Number of bridges built/rehabilitated							
Number of ports rehabilitated	2	2			2	2	100
Number of staff trained	34	34			34	34	100
Number of training sessions/workshops organized	4	4			4	4	100
Ports rehabilitated							
Power generating sets purchased for the ports							
Removal of wreck, full wreck							
Roads rehabilitated							
Safe havens built within the ports' premises for staff security							
Average A/P							100

SO 106810

Output	2012		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P (%)
Fraction of requests for medical and security evacuations fulfilled					
Average flying time per month (hours)					
Average amount of food or non-food items transported monthly (mt)	16	21	16	21	131
Average no. of passengers transported monthly	1,600	2,500	1,600	2,500	156
Average flying time per month (hour)					
Average amount of food or non-food items transported monthly by air (mt)					
Average number of passengers transported monthly by air					
No. of destinations covered					
No. of flights conducted for security evacuations					
Flying time (hour)					
No. of humanitarian organizations benefiting from the service					
No. of medical evacuation of staff undertaken					
No. of agencies and organizations using air service					
No. of aircrafts leased for security assessment/evacuation					
No. of delivery points reached					
Amount of non-food cargo transported (mt)					
No. of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	102	82	1600	2500	156
No. passengers transported					
No. of special flights conducted for medical evacuations					
No. of staff evacuated/relocated because of insecurity					
No. of staff medically evacuated					
Average A/P					148

SO 200344

Output	2012		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P (%)
No. of agencies and organizations using logistics coordination services	20	20	20	20	100
No. of bulletins, maps and other logistics information products produced and shared					
No. of bulletins, maps and other logistics information produced and shared	60	58	60	58	97
No. of operational areas covered by data communications facilities					
No. of organizations utilizing logistics common services					
Amount of humanitarian cargo moved through logistics common services (mt)	1500	1342	1500	1342	89
Quantity of humanitarian cargo moved through logistics common services					
Average A/Pe					95

SO 200440

Output	2012		2013	2014		2015		2016		Total		Ratio	
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	A	Total A/P (%)	
No. of bulletins, maps and other information products compiled and shared							180	168	240	201	420	369	88
No. of bulletins, maps and other logistics information produced and shared	8	9	171	173	60	52					239	234	98
No. of guidance documents developed and circulated to the cluster							2	2	2	1	4	3	75

No. of humanitarian partners/cluster participants trained	450	600	320	208	270	195					1040	1,003	96
No. of partner organizations participating in the cluster system nationally							250	266	250	224	500	490	98
No. of regional cluster coordination cells created							13	13	13	14	26	27	104
No. of technical reports shared with cluster partners							3	2	1	1	4	3	75
No. of training sessions / workshops organized							32	28	8	6	40	34	85
No. of United Nations agency and NGO staff trained							605	461			605	461	76
Average A/P												88	

SO 200507

Output	2013		2014		2015		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	Total A/P (%)
Amount of food or non-food items transported monthly (mt)	20	30	20	35			40	65	163
Average no. of passengers transported monthly by air	3,000	5,038	3,000	3,358			6,000	8,396	140
Frequency of the users' groups meetings	6	7	2	3			8	10	125
No. of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	100	133	100	155	100	150	300	438	146
No. of aircrafts made available			7	7	6	6	13	13	100
No. of assessments/surveys conducted					4	4	4	4	100
No. of flights conducted for medical and security evacuations			0	26	0	27	0	53	
No. of locations served					30	34	30	34	113
No. of passengers transported monthly against planned (passenger segments)					5000	5190	5000	5190	104
No. of passengers transported monthly against planned (passengers transported)					3000	3250	3000	3250	108
No. of serious incidents (air safety related)			0	0			0	0	
Proportion of requests for medical and security evacuations fulfilled (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	300	300	100
Proportion of use of the contracted hours of aircraft (%)	100	138	100	112			200	250	125
Quantity of cargo transported (mt)					240	288	240	288	120
Utilization of available aircraft capacity	1	1	1	1			2	2	100
Use of the contracted hours of aircraft					100	150	100	150	150
Average A/P									121

SO 200924

Output	2016		Total		Ratio
	P	A	P	A	Total A/P (%)
No. of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	130	146	130	146	112
No. of assessments/surveys conducted	4	4	4	4	100
No. of locations served	30	34	30	34	113
No. of passengers transported monthly against planned (passengers transported)	3,000	3,176	3,000	3,176	106
Proportion of passenger bookings served (%)	95	98	95	98	103
Proportion of response to medical and security evacuations (%)	100	100	100	100	100
Quantity (mt) of cargo transported	240	434	240	434	181
A/P					116

EMOP 200281
Outcomes

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base value	2012
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score		8	9
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable food consumption score		56	69
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score		36	22
1	Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools		0.73	0.81
1	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as percent)		27.3	16
1	Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools (percent)			94.5
	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools (percent)			94.4
1	Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools (percent)			94.5
1	Supplementary feeding death rate (percent) children under 5		0.3	0
1	Supplementary feeding death rate (percent) PLW		0.3	0

1	Supplementary feeding default rate (percent) children under 5		3.3	3
1	Supplementary feeding default rate (percent) PLW		3.3	1
1	Supplementary feeding recovery rate (percent) PLW		89.2	94
1	Supplementary feeding recovery rate (percent) children under 5		89.	93
2	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score			100
2	Disaster preparedness index			4
2	TB treatment default rate (percent)		1.1	1
2	TB treatment success rate (percent)		92.8	92
5	NCI: nutrition programmes national capacity index			9
5	NCI: school feeding national capacity index			8.25

PRRO 200443 Outcomes

SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base value	2013	2014	2015
1	Diet diversity score		5.6		5.6	
1	Diet diversity score	2.9	2.9			5.4
1	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	2.2	2.2			5.4
1	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)		5.7		5.7	
1	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	3.0	3.0			5.4
1	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)		5.6		5.6	
1	FCS: percentage of households with acceptable food consumption score			76.0		
1	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score			14.0		
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score	17.5	87.5			13.8
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score			10.0		
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	20.0	100.0			26.7
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	0.3	1.6		1.6	
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	17.1	85.3			10.9
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	1.9	9.4		5.4	
1	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as percent)		16.0	15.1		
1	Prevalence of low mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) among children under 5		1.0	0.0		
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70.0	0.0			73.7
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70.0	0.0		20.0	

1	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66.0	0.0			77.2
1	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66.0	0.0		25.7	
2	ART nutritional recovery rate (percent)	75.0	97.0			56.0
2	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score	80.0				100.0
2	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score			100.0		
2	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score	80.0	100.0		100.0	
2	Disaster preparedness index		4.0			
2	Enrolment (boys): average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6.0	7.2			13.1
2	Enrolment (boys): average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6.0			7.2	
2	Enrolment (girls): average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6.0	4.9			13.5
2	Enrolment (girls): average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6.0			4.9	
2	Enrolment: Average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	6.0			6.1	
2	Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	1.0	0.8			0.8
2	Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	1.1	0.8		1.0	
2	MAM treatment default rate (percent)	15.0	8.0			3.0
2	MAM treatment default rate (percent)	15.0	8.0		4.0	
2	MAM treatment mortality rate (percent)	3.0	0.0			0.0
2	MAM treatment mortality rate (percent)	3.0	0.0		0.0	
2	MAM treatment non-response rate (percent)	15.0	3.0			3.0
2	MAM treatment non-response rate (percent)	15.0	3.0		3.0	
2	MAM treatment recovery rate (percent)	75.0	92.0			92.0
2	MAM treatment recovery rate (percent)	75.0	92.0		92.0	

2	NCI: school feeding national capacity index (Puntland)	1.6	0.3			1.5
2	NCI: school feeding national capacity index (Puntland)	1.6	0.0		0.3	
2	NCI: school feeding national capacity index (Somaliland)	1.6	0.5			1.1
2	NCI: school feeding national capacity index (Somaliland)	1.6	0.0		0.5	
2	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as percent)	14.4	15.1			13.6
2	Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as percent)	14.4	15.1		14.9	
2	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70.0	0.0			62.1
2	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	50.0	0.0			44.9
2	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) MCHN	70.0			49.9	
2	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) TSFP	50.0			48.4	
2	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66.0	0.0			61.3
2	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66.0			63.0	
2	Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	85.0	95.5		97.0	
2	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	85.0	95.2		97.0	
2	Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	85.0	95.2		97.0	
2	TB treatment nutritional recovery rate (percent)	75.0	79.0			94.0
2	TB treatment nutritional recovery rate (percent)	75.0	79.0		90.0	
3	ART nutritional recovery rate (percent)				97.0	
3	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score	80.0				93.3
3	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score				100.0	
3	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score	80.0	80.0		75.0	
3	CSI (asset depletion): percentage of households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies	19.2	19.2			35.5
3	CSI (food): coping strategy index (average)	12.3	12.3			7.3

3	CSI (food): coping strategy index (average)					13.2
3	CSI (food): percentage of households with reduced/stabilized coping strategy index	100.0	48.4		43.7	
3	Diet diversity score	4.5	3.4			4.2
3	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	4.5	3.6			3.9
3	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	4.4	4.4		5.7	
3	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	4.5	3.3			4.3
3	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	4.0	4.0		6.0	
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score	4.9	24.5			26.6
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score (female-headed)	9.0	44.8			17.6
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score (male-headed)	4.3	21.7			30.0
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score	6.1	30.3			34.0
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	2.8	13.8			49.5
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	0.6	3.2		0.0	
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	6.5	32.5			28.1
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	2.7	13.3		12.5	
3	Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools		0.8	0.8		
3	Prevalence of low MUAC among children under 5		11.0	12.0		
3	Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools		94.5	95.5		
3	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools		94.4	95.2		
3	Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools		94.5	95.2		
3	Supplementary feeding death rate (percent)		0.0	0.0		
3	Supplementary feeding default rate (percent) children under 5		3.0	8.0		

3	Supplementary feeding default rate (pe cent) PLW		1.0	7.0		
3	Supplementary feeding non-response rate (percent) children under 5		3.0	3.0		
3	Supplementary feeding non-response rate (percent) PLW		3.0	3.0		
3	Supplementary feeding recovery rate (percent) children under 5		93.0	88.0		
3	Supplementary feeding recovery rate (percent) PLW		94.0	90.0		
3	TB treatment default rate (percent)		1.0	2.0		
3	TB Treatment nutritional recovery rate (percent)			79.0		
3	TB treatment success rate (percent)		92.0	90.0		
5	NCI: nutrition programmes national capacity index (Puntland)		1.6			
5	NCI: nutrition programmes national capacity index (Somaliland)		2.0			
5	NCI: school feeding national capacity index (Puntland)		1.7	2.6		
5	NCI: school feeding national capacity index (Somaliland)		1.6	1.8		

PRRO 200844

Outcomes					
SO	Outcome	Project end target	Base value	2016	2017
1	Diet diversity score	4.77	4.77	4.67	4.50
1	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	4.75	4.75	4.72	4.29
1	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	4.86	4.86	4.51	4.49
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score	5.80	29.00	11.30	37.50
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	5.40	27.00	6.80	51.10
1	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	7.20	36.00	23.80	33.35
1	MAM treatment default rate (percent)	15.00	3.00	2.00	3.00
1	MAM treatment mortality rate (percent)	3.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
1	MAM treatment non-response rate (percent)	15.00	3.00	3.00	12.00
1	MAM treatment recovery rate (percent)	75.00	92.00	94.00	83.00
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	50.00	44.90	77.10	81.30
1	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70.00	0.00	83.40	75.20
1	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66.00	0.00	100.00	68.90
2	ART default rate (percent)	15.00	0.00	0.00	
2	ART nutritional recovery rate (pe cent)	75.00	0.00		
2	Average number of schooldays per month on which multi-fortified foods or at least four food groups were provided	16.00	0.00	26.00	23.00
2	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score	80.00	0.00		
2	Diet diversity score	3.90	3.90	4.55	4.78
2	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	3.90	3.90	4.19	4.38
2	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	3.90	3.90	4.70	4.88
2	Enrolment (boys): average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	2.00	0.55	0.88	0.34
2	Enrolment (girls): average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	2.00	1.32	1.70	0.34

2	Enrolment: average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	2.00	0.89	1.25	0.34
2	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score	9.00	18.00	26.35	14.50
2	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score (female-headed)	11.00	22.00	23.97	18.45
2	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score (male-headed)	8.50	17.00	27.32	13.05
2	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score	20.15	40.30	22.16	34.80
2	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	22.90	45.90	30.82	49.70
2	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	19.25	38.50	18.59	30.90
2	Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	1.00	0.80	0.80	1.24
2	NCI: school feeding national capacity index	1.50	1.50		
2	NCI: school feeding national capacity index	1.10	1.10		
2	Percentage of communities with an increase community asset score	80.00	68.80		75.00
2	Proportion of children who consume a minimum acceptable diet	70.00	0.00	6.00	10.00
2	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	70.00	0.00	45.10	54.00
2	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66.00	0.00	75.00	91.90
2	Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	80.00	97.56	98.48	95.00
2	Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	80.00	99.06	99.67	94.50
2	Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	80.00	98.23	99.01	95.00
2	TB treatment default rate (percent)	15.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
2	TB treatment nutritional recovery rate (percent)	75.00	0.00	99.00	73.00
3	CAS: percentage of communities with an increased asset score	80.00	0.00		
3	CSI (asset depletion): percentage of households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies	48.00	48.00	56.57	
3	CSI (food): coping strategy index (average)	12.70	12.70	19.62	
3	Diet diversity score	3.30	3.30	4.17	
3	Diet diversity score (female-headed households)	2.80	2.82	4.88	

3	Diet diversity score (male-headed households)	3.45	3.45	4.07	
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score	10.20	20.40	30.30	
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score (female-headed)	10.80	21.70	31.21	
3	FCS: percentage of households with borderline food consumption score (male-headed)	10.05	20.20	24.00	
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score	24.05	48.10	24.24	
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (female-headed)	30.00	59.90	8.00	
3	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (male-headed)	22.90	45.70	26.59	

Annex Q: Response to Previous Evaluation Findings

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
Somalia country portfolio evaluation (2006–2011)		
<p>Recommendation 1: The VAM Unit in the Somalia country office should be strengthened to provide food and nutrition-security information that complements the assessments and analysis undertaken by the FSNAU, Somalia, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) and other contributors. The information should mainly support WFP’s capacity to make relevant and decisive strategic programme decisions, but should also contribute to improving the knowledge of both state actors and other humanitarian partners in planning and responding effectively. Specifically:</p>	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>For several years the country office has been working to strengthen VAM. It conducted food security and vulnerability assessments for the regions covered by WFP AOs in Somaliland in October 2008; in Puntland in April 2007; in Galkayo in January 2011; in Mogadishu in August 2011; and in border areas in April 2012. WFP and the FSNAU also carried out joint assessments in Mogadishu in December 2011, April 2012 and July 2012. The VAM assessments in Mogadishu and border areas included a focus on nutrition. In 2011/2012 several rapid assessments on food security and nutrition were conducted, inclusive of clan-related issues.</p> <p>After the evaluation period a second international VAM officer joined the unit, focusing on assessments.</p> <p>A market analyst post was advertised internally and then externally, but no qualified candidate was found. The post is to be re-advertised if funding allows.</p>	<p>WFP currently undertakes nutrition surveillance with weekly reporting, providing a good complement to data gathered around the <i>Gu</i> and <i>Deyr</i> seasonal assessments undertaken by FSNAU. This data is not currently widely shared.</p>
<p>1a) Carry out independent studies with technical support from the Regional Bureau and headquarters, to determine: i) the benefits that households of different compositions, wealth groups</p>	<p><i>Partially agreed</i></p> <p>Under PRRO 200443, evaluations and impact studies – some internal and some external – will be conducted on: education activities (2012); the BSFP (seasonally beginning in 2013); targeted</p>	<p>The evaluation team does not find any evidence of gender analysis of this kind being done in the past years. Interesting to note, the management response only addressed clan affiliation, while gender appears to have been disregarded.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>and livelihood zones derive from food assistance; ii) the impacts of food assistance on local agricultural and pastoralist economies, including the effect on labour markets within Somalia; and iii) the situation of the urban poor, as opposed to traditional IDP communities, with particular reference to gender and clan affiliation, to inform WFP's future targeting strategy. (by mid-2013)</p>	<p>supplementary feeding family rations (2014); coping capacities (2014); and the mother and child nutrition activity (2015). Regular market analysis, a Somalia pastoral study (2013) and additional rapid assessments will be conducted as needed.</p> <p>Clan affiliation has recently been included as one aspect of assessments.</p> <p>The country office does not agree fully with the recommendations concerning different economies.</p> <p>Together with local food-security experts it monitors variables such as market prices, terms of trade and labour rates that could be affected by humanitarian responses. This allows the country office to adjust its programming to minimize undesirable impacts; existing analyses are sufficient to monitor the potential impact of assistance. In addition, Version 2 of the IPC system – used by the FSNAU and other partners for seasonal assessments – incorporates humanitarian assistance and its impact as a factor for classifying the food-security situation. Full functioning of IPC Version 2 will allow deeper understanding of the effects of humanitarian assistance on local economies.</p>	<p>The CO has not carried out analyses to understand the comparative benefits of FFA or FFT among households of different gender compositions, wealth groups or livelihood strategies. Although monitoring data including TPM is gender disaggregated it is not part of any clear approach to analyse or address vulnerability.</p> <p>There is limited understanding of the impacts of food assistance on local agricultural and pastoralist economies, including labour markets.</p> <p>There is no real evidence of the situation of the urban poor, such as the differentiation of recently arrived or longer-term IDPs.</p> <p>While gender responsiveness is part of targeting, especially CBTs (80 percent recipient women) there is little evidence that assessments of clan affiliation and associated inclusion/exclusion have been used to inform WFP's targeting.</p>
<p>1b) Improve the collection and analysis of data on food market economics in Somalia with technical support from the Regional Bureau and headquarters,</p>	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>Price analysis tools are being reviewed and improved in the context of emergency operation (EMOP) 200281. The Regional Bureau, the Food</p>	<p>The roll-out of IPC v2 has provided better analysis and information on markets. Price analysis tools were reviewed and improved with market assessments used to determine how well markets</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>focusing on markets' capacity to respond to changes in demand through market-based responses, such as cash and vouchers, and the implications of cross-border trade flows on household access to essential food commodities, in collaboration with FEWS NET and FSNAU. (by end 2013)</p>	<p>and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and FEWS NET are tracking cross-border trade flows; data will continue to be collected if funding and regional capacities are available.</p> <p>WFP conducted market assessments to inform the use of vouchers under EMOP 200281 and uses assessments to review the cost effectiveness and efficiency of different transfer modalities and to determine how well markets function.</p> <p>As with recommendation 1a), the full roll-out of IPC Version 2 will provide better information on markets.</p>	<p>function and inform the use of CBTs versus in-kind transfers.</p> <p>The tracking of cross-border trade flows and how market systems and supply chains have been impacted by in-kind and CBTs is less evident. While the tracking of markets data suggests Somalia's market systems have been able to absorb the expansion of CBTs as part of the scale up of the 2017 emergency response, WFP has not yet begun to explore how it might use this analytical capability as part of a strategy for building market systems and private-sector capacities to absorb future shocks as part of a national resilience system.</p> <p>The logistics department developed a strategic supply chain and supply corridor alert mechanism that monitored commodity prices and other factors affecting local markets. If problems were detected, logistics could determine an appropriate intervention, whether operational or through official channels, to mitigate the situation. Through stakeholder interviews the CPE team determined that this process successfully tackled several issues. For example, when the local market in Baidoa was not receiving commodities from Mogadishu for over four days, the alert system determined that trucks were being held at a government checkpoint and were able to have them released. This has proven to be a critical CBT support service because Baidoa market (and similarly in other large towns) feeds over 500,000</p>

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		<p>people (250,000 IDPs and almost 300,000 host population).</p> <p>While local market monitoring was relatively successful, given the heavy reliance on imports, market supplies are potentially fragile. The extent to which WFP or other aid organizations monitored upstream supply chains is not clear, but a more strategic common services approach led by WFP may later be required to ensure that the (market-based) food assistance pipeline is not impacted.</p>
<p>Recommendation 2: WFP should base the country strategy – developed within the framework of the overarching United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy (UNSAS) – on area-level strategies that take into account: i) the different political and security contexts of each area; ii) the diversity of livelihood zones; iii) the different emphases across the relief-development continuum, including contingency planning, EPR, recovery and transition; iv) alternative transfer modalities for food assistance – food-based, voucher-based and cash -based – that can be applied in different rural and urban situations; and v) the variable capacities of state authorities, institutions and humanitarian partners. Specifically:</p>	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>EMOP 200281 was based on analysis conducted with local authorities through a series of area-level strategy development sessions in February 2011 to determine the relevant policies, strategies and objectives of each authority. Analysis at the AO level was also conducted to determine the underlying causes of food insecurity in different livelihood zones and understand local capacities and social/political contexts.</p>	

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>2a) Where feasible, WFP area-level strategies should concentrate more on addressing the underlying causes of malnutrition through collaboration with principal partners – FAO, the IFAD, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and UNICEF – that offer different and complementary expertise and competencies, thus ensuring: i) a concerted approach to building household and community resilience to shocks in the most vulnerable areas of Somalia; ii) better programming synergies and more effective use of resources, such as by integrating FFA into broader agricultural and pastoral development projects, and integrating targeted supplementary feeding (TSF) into the outpatient therapeutic programme (OTP); and iii) prioritizing interventions such as school feeding in areas of higher food and nutrition insecurity where coverage is low. (by end 2013)</p>	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>Each year in February reviews are conducted with government/local authorities, other United Nations agencies and NGOs in each area to identify synergies; seasonal response analysis and internal reviews are also conducted. In August 2012, greater attention was paid to transfer modalities in the seasonal response analysis.</p> <p>For the development of PRRO 200443, a trend analysis of the food and nutrition security was conducted that considered political and security contexts, livelihood zones and shocks. It was discussed with FAO, Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM), FSNAU and FEWS NET and informed decision-making on the appropriate types of responses for different areas.</p> <p>From March to May 2012, a joint strategy for enhancing resilience was developed with FAO and UNICEF. An operational plan was developed in July to August 2012 and presented to donors.</p> <p>WFP conducted an evaluation of its school feeding programme, which included household surveys that the country office will review, along with education school feeding indicators, to determine potential handover strategies over the course of 2013, possibly phasing out some schools. While the country office is shifting to a PRRO – and recognizing that school feeding is</p>	<p>The ongoing rationalization exercise between WFP and UNICEF should ensure a more consistent, coordinated and efficient approach to the treatment acute malnutrition. Also, efforts to work alongside BRCiS in providing a holistic resilience approach although recent are potentially positive.</p> <p>WFP updated its food and nutrition-security trend analysis in 2014, which explored political, security, livelihoods and risk of shocks in its assessment. It engaged with FAO, SWALIM, FSNAU and FEWS NET to inform decision-making on appropriate responses in different livelihood areas and its FFA/FFT interventions are broadly compatible with the needs and expectations of communities in line with WFP guidelines.</p> <p>While the JRS has provided a framework for collaboration on resilience building with UNICEF and FAO, only in 2016–2017 has this begun to evolve as a comprehensive approach to address the underlying causes of malnutrition under the JRP. However, at the end of 2017, no fundraising for the JRP had yet started.</p> <p>While WFP differentiated the geographical targeting of its livelihood recovery and resilience portfolios in line with the IPC, area-level (AO) strategies have been hard to differentiate. All have followed the same broad approach in line with the 3 PA. IPC analyses correlated with a national ICA,</p>

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	<p>WFP's priority in highly food-insecure areas – it is important to continue to do rigorous food-security assessments. However, these trend analyses are a contribution to better understanding food-security contexts for programme design, and as an entry point for partner discussions and consensus building.</p>	<p>the SARPs of AOs and their constituent operational plans with SLP, and the formulation of FLAs by CPs was based on CBPP. Area-based planning were short-term and the interventions of the different agencies were largely implemented with little attention to those of others. As a result, although the complementary expertise and competencies can be recognized, it was hard to ascertain any concerted inter-agency approach to building household and community resilience to shocks or evidence that FFA was integrated into wider national or state-level agricultural and pastoral development strategies such as under the Somaliland catchment development programme.</p>
<p>Recommendation 3: There should be a paradigm shift within WFP, increasing the emphasis on and incentives for measuring results. Information and analysis generated by the M&E unit should be more than a compliance tool; it should more effectively inform and support WFP programming by providing first-hand information on the relevance and impacts of different interventions on different socio-economic groups, and should rely less on relatively weak secondary data. Specifically:</p>	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>This shift is already well under way. As pointed out in the evaluation report, the M&E unit and systems in the country office have undergone several changes during the evaluation period. The compliance-oriented systems were enhanced from late 2010 to 2012, and processes have been put in place to ensure the M&E system informs programming effectively. The country office does not agree with the evaluation's general conclusion that secondary data is "weak", but does agree that this data should be improved and supplemented by primary data to the extent possible. Under the PRRO, WFP will continue to work with ministries and partners in education, health and other</p>	

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	sectors to strengthen national capacities in assessments, implementation and reporting as an integral part of the activities in the EMOP 200281 and PRRO 200443 (see Recommendation 4). WFP and partners will continue to focus on national authorities' capacities to report on outcome-level data.	
3a) Realistic and measurable outcome indicators should be developed with technical support from the Regional Bureau and headquarters. The indicators should be directly attributable to different WFP programme interventions – especially innovative approaches such as TSF – incorporated into the M&E system and reported in standardized project reports (SPRs) in addition to output data. (for incorporation into the SPR 2013)	<i>Partially agreed</i> The country office uses the corporate strategic results framework, which includes output and outcome indicators, and agrees that outcome reporting against realistic indicators needs to be improved. For the development of PRRO 200443 and EMOP 200281, the M&E and VAM units are reviewing the collection of outcome indicators, such as the food consumption score, and are exploring how to perform more regular data collection and improve analysis to provide better information on the country office's impact. This is currently being done with an evaluation of the school feeding programme, using monitoring data, household surveys and data on schools. WFP is implementing a targeted outcome measurement and reporting strategy on selected projects using additional corporate M&E analysis, support and guidance, and reviewing assessments and systems to improve indicator reporting against the strategic results framework. Somalia operations benefit from corporate-wide activities designed to improve	As with the 2011 CPE and 2013 PRRO evaluations, the evaluation team found that in 2017, WFP's M&E systems continue to follow a compliance-oriented M&E plan with standard operating procedures operating in line with WFP policy. This included process monitoring and the monitoring of corporate outcomes. Post-distribution monitoring was successfully implemented by WFP M&E staff in accessible localities and through TPM in areas WFP could not reach itself, which enabled WFP to track its operations in areas its own staff could not reach. However, while WFP's current collection of M&E data and follow-up is good and meaningful, longitudinal output-to-outcome analyses were prevented by major data gaps and weaknesses in WFP's M&E systems: data management in 2012–2013 used Excel spreadsheets that were lost during M&E staff handovers; data requirements and reporting in the SPRs shifted between EMOP 200281 and PRRO 200443 and again in 2015 with the introduction of WFP's new corporate results

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	outcome reporting on food security, nutrition, education, resilience building and capacity development.	<p>framework; and the geographical targeting of WFP FFA/FFT interventions shifted over the CPE period in line with changing IPC classifications.</p> <p>Outcome data for nutrition activities are in place. These coupled with GAM rates provide a good understanding of WFP's contribution to impact. However, they have not always been collected consistently, for example coverage data.</p>
3b) An outreach strategy must be developed that articulates how issues and concerns raised by beneficiaries and their communities, through field monitoring, will be considered and inform programme planning and design. (by mid-2013)	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>The country office has developed systems to identify and address beneficiary concerns through monitoring systems and a hotline for beneficiaries and communities to communicate directly to the country office. While technological issues have limited the effectiveness of the hotline, the country office will ensure beneficiaries are better informed about channels of communication, and if technically feasible will provide local contact numbers.</p>	<p>Significant progress was made on this with CFM. However, improvements still needed on information sharing and communication with beneficiaries re assistance.</p> <p>Beneficiary feedback and AAP introduced before the CPE period has improved significantly with the introduction of SCOPE with beneficiaries at all field sites visited aware of feedback mechanisms and reporting they had both used them and received follow-up support.</p>
<p>Recommendation 4: WFP must have the requisite skills and resources for enhanced field monitoring and more effective capacity development of state authorities and CPs in supporting assessments and implementing and reporting on WFP programme interventions, with close reference to other capacity development efforts of the United Nations system. Specifically:</p>	<p><i>Agreed.</i></p> <p>The country office has worked with line ministries in Somaliland and Puntland to expand the ministries' role in assessments, implementation and reporting on health, nutrition and education activities. It coordinates with UNICEF and others to develop the capacity of the health ministries. The country office has led facilitation of the development of a national nutritional strategy with the involvement of</p>	

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
	UNICEF, WHO and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.	
4a) WFP should develop AOs' capacity to generate and analyse output and outcome information within their zones, supported by more trained field monitors with better understanding of the nutrition and food-security objectives incorporated in WFP programming. (by mid-2013)	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>In the context of EMOP 200281 food aid monitors are trained to analyse food-security information and programme activities. The PRRO 200443 budget provides for additional national officers to work on nutrition and livelihoods, school feeding, cash/vouchers, M&E, VAM and other areas.</p> <p>WFP is committed to developing staff capacity and technical expertise in the areas of market analysis and nutrition, especially in challenging situations.</p>	<p>While there is some evidence of improved M&E capacities at national and AO levels, FFA/FFT sites were targeted on an annual basis under local SARP agreements forcing WFP to focus its M&E efforts on seasonal activity-to-output monitoring. High levels of socio-economic, infrastructural and environmental variability resulted from the selection of sites for short-term assistance on an annual basis and impacted on WFP's ability to collect and interpret corporate outcome data in relation to the CO and AO FFA and FFT contributions.</p>
4b) WFP should support capacity development objectives in the area-level strategies more effectively, focusing on the requisite capacity of government institutions mandated to fulfil emergency preparedness and disaster risk management – such as the National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority in Somaliland and the HADMA in Puntland – and on planning departments in the education and health sectors. Capacity development should allow government offices to assume increased responsibility for information collection, monitoring and technical	<p><i>Agreed.</i></p> <p>Support for capacity development of the National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority and the Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA) has been incorporated into PRRO 200443. WFP offices in Somaliland and Puntland are increasingly involving both entities in WFP-led assessments and both participated in recent response analyses.</p> <p>Since 2010, as part of a joint strategy with UNICEF, WFP has provided capacity development assistance to education and health authorities in Somaliland and Puntland. Capacity development</p>	<p>With the introduction of PRRO 200443 WFP began to implement the capacity strengthening of state-level government and partner staff in FFA and FFT. However, this programme was ad hoc and only a minor part of WFP's intervention in these areas. Training operated through AOs which also offered invitations and support to local authorities and partners to participate in SARP workshops towards the formulation of operational plans, and to participate in national and regional FSC cells to oversee response coordination. While this approach enabled WFP to consult with federal and state government structures and partners during the design and implementation of its programmes, it did not support a handover process or the emergence of a cadre of staff able to take on these</p>

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support to training, school feeding and nutrition interventions. (by end-2013)	of school feeding units focuses on monitoring and ensuring objectives are achieved.	activities in future. While national capacity indices were introduced for school feeding and nutrition, no analysis was made of the national or state-level capacities in the Ministries of Agriculture, livestock and environment, and coordinating bodies relevant to WFP to inform WFP capacity strengthening in livelihood recovery or resilience building.
Recommendation 5: WFP must considerably improve its external consultations on and communication of analysis, programme planning and decision-making to ensure better transparency and greater accountability to its principal stakeholders. Specifically:	<i>Partially agreed</i> WFP agrees that improvements in communication can still be made, but regrets that this recommendation fails to take into full account significant steps taken by the country office to improve consultations with partners. These include:	
5a) WFP should build on recent initiatives in liaising regularly with donors and CPs, at the country and AO levels respectively, by defining a communications and partnership strategy that identifies activities through which partners are regularly informed of programme developments and related issues, with technical support from the Regional Bureau and headquarters. (by mid-2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strategy development and review sessions with local authorities, United Nations agencies and NGOs (see Recommendations 2 and 2a) above); - quarterly cooperating-partner meetings; - regular meetings with the education and health ministries in Somaliland and Puntland; - monthly donor meetings; - development of the joint FAO-WFP-UNICEF strategy for enhancing resilience including consultation among the three agencies and with the UNCT, donors and clusters; - involvement of other agencies, organizations and authorities in WFP-led assessments; - post-assessment briefings for technical stakeholders at AO level and in Nairobi; 	<p>WFP liaison and collaboration has improved significantly e.g. UNICEF and FSC. Opportunities include the NGO consortia.</p> <p>Multiple stakeholders noted the improved collaborative behaviour of WFP.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
	<p>– community consultations contributing to the development of PRRO 200443 (May 2012); and</p> <p>– consultations with donors and United Nations agencies on the development of PRRO 200443 (May 2012).</p> <p>WFP is committed to continued dialogue with partners to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of its programmes.</p>	
<p>5b) As co-lead – with FAO – of the newly established FSC in Nairobi and at the field level, WFP should: i) facilitate consideration of a range of short- to long-term response options based on the food and nutrition-security analysis available from FSNAU, FEWS NET and WFP; ii) define the roles that WFP, FAO and other partners can play in these responses; iii) share analysis, implementation plans, progress reports and M&E related to its food assistance programme with other principal actors; and iv) use the cluster as a forum for advocacy on alternative strategies in the event that a principal actor such as WFP cannot gain access to specific areas. (by mid-2013)</p>	<p><i>Agreed</i></p> <p>In February 2012, the former food assistance cluster and the former agriculture and livelihoods cluster merged to form the FSC, which adapted its members’ advisory and reporting roles to the modalities of current programmes. The 2012 Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) document reported that FSC member activities included improving access to food, investing in livelihoods, supporting safety-net programmes and providing access to cash, food, vouchers, livestock vaccinations, seeds, tools, fertilizer and others. The FSC seasonal and multi-year activities allow for assessment beyond the immediate and seasonal requirements of populations in crisis: FSC members can share strategies for enhancing resilience capacity in stressed communities. The joint FAO-UNICEF-WFP resilience strategy and the NGO consortium resiliency strategy suggest that the FSC will work with its members through 2013 to reassess approaches to building resilience. Analysis undertaken by FEWS NET,</p>	<p>WFP’s ability to collaborate with United Nations agencies and NGOs through its leadership and coordination support to the Food Security Cluster has been a major factor supporting its EPR capacity, alongside its livelihood recovery and resilience work. The basis for its current engagement began in 2011 when WFP and FAO agreed to the merger of the Agricultural Cluster with the Livelihoods and Food Cluster into the FSC, co-led by the two agencies. Support to the FSC helped it establish local chapters in decentralized locations with the support of WFP AOs, and WFP collaborated with cluster members to explore the comparative advantages of different humanitarian response options including the use of food aid, vouchers, cash transfers and other interventions. The FSC now has 300 members on its books, with 29 active partners who oversee the annual Humanitarian Needs Overview and HRP. One of the emerging roles of the FSC is to support the layering and sequencing of interventions by multiple agencies in both rural and urban areas to support</p>

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	<p>FSNAU and WFP's VAM unit are shared with the FSC membership to enhance understanding of the IPC and how to prioritize responses, including contingency planning and preparedness. In the new three-year CAP, the FSC will facilitate discussion on response options and strategies. It will also review coverage of regions to ensure food-security activity coverage despite access constraints.</p> <p>WFP increasingly incorporates discussion of transfer modalities in its seasonal response analysis, which includes external partners. The FAO-UNICEF-WFP strategy will complement this collaboration through coordination on transfer modalities.</p> <p>WFP has scaled up its planned cash and voucher interventions under EMOP 200281 and has planned a continuation under PRRO 200443, although implementation levels will depend on funding availability. The operations include interventions designed to address short-term requirements along with recovery and resilience-building activities.</p>	<p>resilience building and social protection across agencies. This will be an essential part of future national resilience strategies. Active groups under the FSC include the Livestock Working Group and CWG which was relaunched in 2017 to support the current emergency response and is currently working on harmonized transfer values, market monitoring, and the local coordination of cash transfers.</p>
<p>Operation evaluation: Somalia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (200443) strengthening food and nutrition security and enhancing resilience June 2012–December 2015</p>		
<p>Recommendation 1: WFP Somalia should prioritize, revise and streamline their nutrition and health programming for maximum effectiveness and efficiency according to the context and limited</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p>	<p>Evidence of this as an ongoing activity. Decisions on when to start BSFP are context dependent with a GAM of 15 percent used as the threshold to start BSFP coupled with IPC phase in accessible areas on a seasonal basis. Also, rationalization exercise with</p>

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resources. Specifically, this evaluation has identified several nutrition and health activities that need to be discontinued, or modified.		UNICEF to ensure a more coordinated approach between OTP and TSFP as well as consolidation of various community workers profiles and tasks.
1a) BSFP can be discontinued in Somaliland and Puntland.	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p> <p>BSFP is determined by the prevailing acute malnutrition rates and the probability of seasonal deteriorations in the region. In Somaliland where GAM rates (GAM) are below 15 percent, which is the global emergency threshold, WFP could explore opportunities for phasing out BSFP and increasing MCHN coverage.</p> <p>In Puntland however, there are areas where malnutrition rates are critical: pockets with high GAM rates and where seasonal BSFP interventions happen alongside TSFP. In addition, MCH programme coverage is not as extensive as Somaliland. However, with MCHN expansion, BSFP could be phased out gradually.</p>	No BSFP currently ongoing in Somaliland, however WFP holds with the need to respond when required given changes in context. Puntland has 50 percent of BSFP integrated into MCHN. MCHN coverage in Puntland also focused on urban areas (geotagging report). No BSFP for PLW currently implemented in south-central Somalia
1b) TSFP for acutely malnourished PLW can be discontinued in Somaliland and much of Puntland as MCHN often covers the same target group and the caseload is small. Malnourished PLW can be effectively screened, managed and monitored in the context of MCHN.	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p> <p>While this is something WFP could consider, it is important to highlight that the objectives of the two interventions are not the same; while TSFP is primarily curative, MCHN focuses on the promotion of growth and the prevention of acute malnutrition among infants and young children < 24 months of age through nutritional support (including lactating mothers) and increased postnatal care attendance. It is however unclear</p>	TSFP was implemented in Somaliland because of recurrent drought in Somaliland. Also, this evaluation finds that while MCHN can take on the caseload of malnourished PLW there is evidence to suggest that MCHN coverage is limited to urban areas of Somaliland (See geotagging report)

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	<p>if MCHN intervention could address high GAM rates in disaster prone settings; WFP however agrees that in the context of Somaliland (with relatively lower GAM rates) TSFP programmes can be replaced, with malnourished PLW screened and monitored under MCHN programmes. However, the CO will maintain the capacity to reimplement TSFP should there be an increase in the under 5/PLW MAM prevalence. For Puntland WFP would be more cautious in replacing TSFP programmes with MCHN, considering that the region is more vulnerable to food insecurity, with high GAM rates in some districts. There are also less fully functional health facilities to effectively accommodate MCHN programmes.</p>	
<p>1c) The TSFP family ration can be discontinued in Somaliland and part of Puntland. Other options to address key causal factors for SAM and MAM should be considered, including reducing mothers' time and workload, and lack of household income. Using cash-based modalities and linking this target group to livelihood activities should be considered based on local capacity and access.</p>	<p>In considering where and when to discontinue TSFP programmes, WFP will explore at the same time the possibility of introducing diversified transfer modalities such as cash and voucher, especially for the household relief response of the TSFP family ration. Additionally, linkages and integration into existing livelihood activities will be considered.</p>	<p>Family ration was discontinued for TSFP beneficiaries in Somaliland and WFP no longer targets general food distribution to TSFP beneficiaries. This needs to be carefully monitored and checks on number of readmissions to TSFP need to be made since this could reduce the impact of the nutrition intervention. WFP has implemented a cash-based response and expanded SBCC on child care practices, health and hygiene among others.</p>
<p>1d) The purpose of the PLHIV and TB intervention should be clearly defined as nutritional treatment and, as such,</p>	<p><i>Partially Accepted</i> National nutrition, assessment, education, counselling and support guidelines specific for</p>	<p>The purpose of PLHIV and TB interventions is clear with nutrition outcomes used. However, an appropriate RUSF is not being used and the low</p>

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<p>standard entry and exit criteria must be used. An appropriate ready to use food (RUF) as an individual ration is highly preferable and consistent with national guidelines and the global guidance on NACS programming for PLHIV and TB.1 The food-based household ration for this target group should be replaced with a cash-based transfer modality when access and local capacity will allow and is sufficient or can be properly developed.</p>	<p>Somalia have been developed and are undergoing endorsement by the various Somalia MoHs. The guideline defines standard entry and exit criteria and is consistent with WFP HIV policy as well as other global guidelines on NACS programming for PLHIV and TB. WFP will explore appropriate RUF. For the household ration, based on the results of the needs assessment, WFP could discontinue the family ration.</p>	<p>funding makes this less likely to happen. No needs assessment was carried out prior to stopping the ration in support of affected households and the recommendation made was for a change from in-kind to CBT.</p>
<p>1e) As other agencies such as UNICEF seek to pilot test non-food approaches to managing MAM, it is incumbent upon WFP to collaborate effectively to assess innovative and cost-effective approaches in contexts where the GAM rate is relatively low.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i> WFP to explore UNICEF's approach and work towards an effective collaboration plan to assess innovative and cost-effective approaches.</p>	<p>ET has not come across UNICEF using non-food approaches to managing MAM.</p>
<p>Recommendation 2: WFP Somalia should collaborate with MoH, local health authorities and United Nations partners under the joint mandate and JHNP to consolidate and scale up integrated programming at the MCHN. Specifically, WFP should revise the following aspects of their programme to ensure that it is coherent with other agencies, and global best practice.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p>	<p>Rationalization exercise taking place currently and should be complete in March.</p> <p>WFP's operational base depended on working through international and local NGOs. At the beginning of the evaluation period WFP worked with almost 200 CPs and held stakeholder meetings to refine GFA (and other) programme planning and implementation. For example, WFP organized 52 separate training sessions for CPs in 2013, focusing on the implementation of programmes and administrative procedures for</p>

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		<p>invoicing and other activities. The scale of interventions and scope of collaboration with partners has positioned WFP as a principal humanitarian agency for the implementation of emergency response activities and has improved the engagement of partners and the government in its operations. In general, the CO's consultation and communication with CPs regarding programme planning and operational decisions was found to have been positive, in particular since the establishment of WFP AOs, although the low level of capacity among local NGOs limited their operational capability.</p>
<p>2a) Adopt the one common approach to programming and align treatment programmes (OTP and TSFP) and prevention programmes at static and outreach/satellite sites.</p>	<p>Rationalization plans are underway and WFP is actively engaged in the process. It is expected that the plan will provide a platform for WFP to align and integrate TSFP interventions with those of OTP and other services; WFP is also an active member of the Nutrition Cluster as well as a member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the Nutrition Cluster. Through these different avenues WFP will ensure its nutrition programmes are well aligned for an effective collaboration with MoH, local authorities and United Nations agencies under the JHNP.</p>	<p>Rationalization exercise should contribute to this and includes integration and improved coordination of OTP and TSFP interventions.</p>
<p>2b) Streamline and revise FLAs in the second quarter of 2015 to ensure one partner operating in one site, where feasible.</p>	<p>WFP will continue to streamline and revise FLAs, to ensure that where feasible a single CP is implementing nutrition programmes at one site.</p>	<p>Wherever possible this is being considered and discussions are ongoing with UNICEF to determine whether the same partner can be used for TSFP and OTP - this is highly dependent on capacity.</p>

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2c) Ensure provision of essential drugs and supplies concurrent with the significant increase in use of maternal and child health services.	WFP will continue to ensure the provision of food supplies, using its logistical capabilities. Essential drugs are not part of WFP's mandate, and, therefore, WFP will expect that other partners will address this adequately.	Not a role of WFP – evidence from MCHN visits suggests essential drugs are available.
2d) Simplify and streamline recording and monitoring systems.	<i>Accepted</i> As per action identified for Recommendation 9, adjustments will be identified to lead to more efficient M&E system/process.	Use of SCOPE should enable the digitization of monitoring and reporting.
2e) Strengthen and consolidate community-based behavioural change interventions aimed to address the key determinants of acute malnutrition and increase resilience.	<i>Accepted</i> WFP will continue to strengthen and consolidate behaviour-change communication (BCC) interventions. A BCC strategy has been developed and piloted in Somaliland and based on the feedback the first phase worked well. WFP together with UNICEF currently trains community nutrition workers (CNW) on BCC especially in areas where Integrated management of acute malnutrition and resilience programmes are running. CNW are trained on BCC as part of strengthening provision of community-based basic nutrition services. WFP also does considerable work on basic health, nutrition and hygiene promotion that has not been well acknowledged.	BCC expansion noted, but at centres; more effort required at community level specifically targeting men and community influencers, religious leaders, etc.
2f) Scale up MCHN in the south-central zone following a thorough quarterly review to address issues in the pilot phase.	<i>Partially accepted</i> Subject to availability of resources, partner capacity, United Nations and Federal	Evidence of expansion for example the new partnership with UNFPA to work in south-central region, however clearly dependent on availability of

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
	Government roll-out of complementary inputs and availability of appropriate facilities	functional MCHN of which the south-central zone has the fewest in the country.
2g) Clearly determine impact of the MCHN programme through the planned impact assessment in 2015. This assessment should also identify barriers to access and integrated programming including unreported results. Sufficient budget for technical expertise should be allocated for this and the findings documented to contribute to the global evidence base.	<i>Partially accepted</i> While the process is starting in 2015, the assessment will not be completed until 2016.	No evidence of this and the evaluation team has not had access to this impact assessment.
Recommendation 3: WFP Somalia should continue to provide food assistance to the most food-insecure population groups based on food-security assessments, but a greater emphasis should be placed on the use of alternative transfer modalities. general food distribution should continue as an option under the 'contingency activities', but defined with clear exit strategies. Wet feeding should continue in urban centres in the south, but exit strategies should be developed.	<i>Partially accepted</i> The CO will continue to implement, based on assessed needs, the relief responses using the different modalities available to WFP. The current approach employed by the CO includes a mechanism to transition beneficiaries from relief to FFA SO1 and SO2 in rural areas. However, the CO agrees that a specific and nuanced transition strategy for urban beneficiaries assisted through the current wet feeding programme could be further elaborated. Given the current fragility, systemic vulnerability and dynamic environment in Somalia, relief will continue to play a critical role in the CO's response basket for providing life-saving assistance to highly food-insecure populations and, as such, requires consistent resource mobilization to ensure a timely response.	The CO has adopted a large-scale strategic shift to CBTs.

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
	Consequently, relief responses, will continue to be included in the planning response caseload based on the ICA, early warning and early action guidance and food-security assessments.	
<p>Recommendation 4: In collaboration with FAO and UNICEF, WFP Somalia should continue to develop and implement appropriate community-resilience approaches. The approach should not only focus on protecting livelihoods, but on improving livelihood opportunities, increasing community capacity and building resilience at all levels. This should be coordinated with other resilience initiatives in Somalia, including SomRep and the Informal Humanitarian Donor Group (IHDG) working on resilience.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i> in terms of collaboration with FAO and UNICEF. Key lesson learned – currently defined during the JRS Phase (2013–2015) – will be taken into account for future programming. Future resilience programming will focus on; 1) enhanced productive sectors; 2) access to basic services; and 3) safety nets for social protection. However, it is important to note that activities for improving livelihood opportunities are identified and prioritized by the community through SLP and CBPP.</p>	<p>Little evidence of practical differences between WFP’s resilience and livelihood recovery operations was found. From 2014–2015 onwards, the selection of both SO 2 and SO 3 sites were based on the 3 PA and involved multi-stakeholder engagements including CBPP, joint planning with United Nations and NGOs, and local government engagement, but activity sets were indistinguishable across the strategic objectives. While WFP, FAO and UNICEF have taken on board the PRRO recommendation to develop a new JRP, including a common causal analysis and results framework, progress has been slow. The integration of beneficiary management platforms is incomplete, and the JRP is yet to be released to donors. Though this can to some extent be explained by the prioritization of emergency responses by FAO and WFP in 2016, the resilience agenda continues to be held back by an absence of dedicated staff and active leadership across the agencies.</p> <p>NGO partnerships remain dominated by local, short-term FLAs, designed around activities managed by individual AOs rather than through longer-term strategic agreements. The capacity strengthening of CPs has been focused on</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
		<p>supporting the technical delivery of short-term projects (e.g. FFA/FFT training, introduction of SCOPE and field monitoring). Even where the ambitions of WFP's Framework Agreements with World Vision and the DRC have included longer-term livelihood recovery and resilience strategies, delivery on the ground has been managed through FLAs. Only at the end of the CPE period in 2017 did new forms of WFP partnership begin to emerge with NGO Resilience Consortia. Throughout the CPE period, WFP has shared the same broad resilience agenda as SomRep, BRCiS and STREAM. These new kinds of relationship with NGO consortia rather than individual entities are to be encouraged because of their comparative advantages in remote access, community engagement, support to national NGOs and technical capacities.</p> <p>WFP's own value added is in its ability to coordinate this work while helping Somalia's federal and state governments to establish national safety nets, social protection strategies, and the provision of basic services. However, the view of the evaluation team is that the JRP better describes a comprehensive programme for the prevention of malnutrition through nutrition-sensitive programming than it does a wider resilience agenda.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
		<p>Where the JRP is beginning to look ahead is in envisaging the need for WFP and its partners to review their comparative advantages in supporting a national resilience agenda that is in line with the SNDP. Government and United Nations and donor stakeholders agree that a more systemic resilience approach is needed which integrates the local household and community support promoted by the JRP with enhanced efforts to lay the foundations for a complementary range of national services that can provide a combination of productive input support, basic services and cash injections (safety nets) to catalyse the livelihood investments of Somalia's rural and urban populations.</p>
<p>Recommendation 5: WFP Somalia should collaborate with UNICEF to ensure that school feeding contributes to educational outcomes. This includes assessments of enrolment, attendance and any other impact the activity makes to education in Somalia. The comparative advantage of the current take-home rations compared to alternative measures for promoting girls' enrolment should form the basis for the school feeding activities in the next PRRO. Moreover, the school feeding component should include mechanisms to ensure</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p> <p>The CO will undertake an evaluation of the school meals programme to assess the achievement of objectives and quality of implementation. The evaluation is expected to generate recommendations for enhancing programme implementation and identifying potential 'barriers' that could potentially restrict highly food-insecure households from participating</p> <p>The CO will collaborate with UNICEF to obtain data on complementary assistance offered by UNICEF in WFP-supported schools. WFP will also closely work with the MoE in obtaining data. To ensure that the most destitute households will</p>	<p>WFP's capacity strengthening in the education sector evolved from training teachers in the management of activities in Puntland and Somaliland between 2012 and 2014, to helping state-level governments implement WFP-supported school meals programmes and formulate national school feeding policies from 2015 onwards. School meals now receive strong government support in both states. They proved particularly effective at supporting the retention of girls and boys, supporting overall attendance and education outcomes. Where the programme was less successful was in raising gender ratios in favour of girls' enrolments. WFP should promote a closer integration between school meals and livelihoods</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>that children from the most destitute households will be able to attend school.</p>	<p>be able to attend, priority will be given to schools included in the national 'Go2School' initiative supported by UNICEF.</p>	<p>programming to free-up girls' labour demands and time, while working with government to address wider cultural barriers to school enrolment, retention and completion for girls. The only negative feedback was the tendency for the food basket to be based on the available pipeline rather than local food preferences.</p> <p>A review commissioned by WFP in 2016–2017 found that the school meals programme had achieved a greater impact on education than on food-security outcomes. While this may in part be explained by the exclusion of school meals data from the household food consumption analysis, the review found a clear evidence base for the use of school meals to achieve education outcomes, and advocated for stronger collaboration with government, UNICEF and NGO partners on WASH provision, nutrition and health communication, and child protection support to ensure a closer integration of partner programmes for children and schools. However, WFP disengaged with the Education Cluster because of the way the resourcing of school feeding was leading donors to believe the education sector was well funded. This should not have led to a disengagement at the cluster level and WFP needs to boost its collaboration with UNICEF with examples of coordinated planning at the local, state and national strategic levels.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>Recommendation 6: WFP Somalia should address identified capacity gaps in several sectors, including nutrition and health, the use of cash-based modalities and gender analysis. The evaluation team therefore recommends that WFP Somalia develop a comprehensive capacity development strategy. This strategy should be based on capacity needs assessments and with monitoring indicators showing the specific capacity aspects to be increased. The capacity development strategy should not only address government counterparts, but increase identification and integration of alternative community governance structures. Furthermore, the capacity development strategy should address WFP Somalia's internal capacity needs.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p> <p>The CO agrees that a capacity evaluation related to WFP's ongoing activities with federal and regional authorities would be beneficial, however, this should only complement the ongoing work lead by UNSOA and the PSGs and not be an independent work on its own. The CO agrees that in the new PRRO greater investment is required in federal and regional authorities. However, given the current context caution needs to be exercised because of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) the young nature of the current federal government and regional administrations; and 2) there still remain significant sub-national divisions between regional administrations and the federal government around the responsibilities and funding of service provision. 	<p>While a capacity development strategy for nutrition was not available, WFP has consistently invested in the development of the capacity of MoH in Somaliland, Puntland and FGS.</p> <p>No evidence of a national or state-level capacity-strengthening strategy for FSLR. Some AO-level examples of education capacity support were oriented to programme delivery rather than sustainability. The CO worked to strengthen coordination with regional and federal disaster management departments by investing in capacity strengthening of staff for monitoring, needs assessments, early warning, triggers for early response, targeting and response coordination.</p> <p>Through its SOs, WFP contributed to the development of logistical infrastructure in Somalia by investing in port rehabilitation and capacity strengthening of port staff. Since 2016 WFP has supported the government by posting an adviser to work on port development, maritime law and legislation, and the organizational structure of marine port authorities. Maritime policy formulation, conditions for ship registration, the need to follow-up on the ratification of conventions and the country's global relations are identified as key areas for attention.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
		<p>Overall feedback from Logistics Cluster users (according to a survey conducted in August 2017) was that 75 percent were generally satisfied with its performance – particularly for the level of coordination. However, several comments related to the need for more focus on logistics capacity building.</p> <p>Some private-sector capacity building has been undertaken by WFP, for example the procurement department reported conducting training in the use of WFP's internal electronic tender system for online tendering. The system works well for local traders, but only those who have internet access. Training for traders has also been conducted as part of SCOPE implementation and CBT activities. Anecdotal evidence indicated that some retailers have expanded their businesses and become wholesalers.</p>
<p>6a) Nutrition and health: It is essential that WFP invest in its own technical capacity in the health and nutrition sector to fully engage and provide leadership on policy, strategy and coordination in Somalia and to ensure effective programme implementation. Specifically, this will require investing in long-term technical capacity at senior management level as well as at AO level. This technical leadership will also enable WFP to</p>	<p><i>Nutrition and health accepted</i></p> <p>The CO has already recruited a Nutritionist, based in Mogadishu, to strengthen the dialogue and relationship with the MoH as well as provide support to AO on a roaming basis. The CO Nutrition team is currently being strengthened by recruiting more senior nutrition staff. Through WFP's role as the United Nations co-lead of PSG5, more appropriate sector-wide health/nutrition handover strategies can be developed.</p>	<p>WFP has invested in nutrition staff as noted in the management response and has trained focal points in the AO on nutrition.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>address persistent issues with LoUs, FLA contracts, the development of a phased handover strategy with government and leveraging funding for nutrition programming with major donors. Good technical leadership will also address programmatic issues currently hampered by policy constraints including the need for revision of national guidelines for the Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition.</p>		
<p>6b) The use of cash-based transfer modalities: The CO should work with the Regional Bureau and/or WFP HQ to strengthen the capacity of WFP and CPs in cash-based transfer modalities.</p>	<p><i>Accepted</i> The CO organized PRRO 200443 C&V transfers after action review last April for lessons learning purposes – facilitated by the Regional Bureau. At the end of May, the CO will host one week of C&V training for AO and CO staff</p>	<p>Strong capacities have built in the CO, drawing partially on other WFP resources.</p>
<p>6c) Gender analysis: the CO should strengthen its gender analysis capacity, including through recruitment of a gender consultant and a full-time gender expert. This will maximize gender impacts during the last months of implementation of the current PRRO while ensuring the next PRRO will be based on sound gender analysis and with additional specific indicators to monitor gender impact at community level.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i> The CO has recently recruited a consultant to boost capacity in gender and protection mainstreaming throughout current and future programming. Working closely with the Regional Bureau, CO technical teams and AO/SO staff, the consultant will undertake a needs and opportunities context analysis. This will assist the CO in both identifying immediate actions that may be taken in current programming, and those that may be integrated into the new PRRO. This will include gender- and protection-specific objectives and indicators. Research into the</p>	<p>Consultant(s) recruited, but with a marginal responsibility on gender and protection. Gender analysis further recognized as a gap and a priority area in the Regional Gender Strategy (2016–2020). Qualitative gender and protection analysis still largely absent. Even when sex-disaggregated data are collected, the gap is at the level of the analysis. There is no analysis of gender and protection implications of different transfer modalities. More dedicated capacity and efforts on gender and protection still to materialize (see standby capacity request). Recent efforts (Oct 2017) on the development of staff capacity for gender analysis</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
	<p>relationship between WFPs work and gender and protection will be ongoing.</p> <p>The consultant will build awareness of and capacity in gender and protection mainstreaming among technical teams in the CO, staff at area and sub-offices, and, where possible, with key CPs. The consultant will also identify and build relationships with other agencies and organizations active in gender and protection programming in Somalia to enable ongoing lessons sharing and coordination.</p>	<p>through specific training on this held by the Regional Bureau, and capacity-building activities planned for early 2018 across areas offices.</p>
<p>Recommendation 7: WFP Somalia, together with HQ, should develop a fundraising strategy to enable programming to be implemented as planned. The strategy should include focus on funds available for cash-based approaches to be more effectively utilized across multiple sectors.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i></p> <p>The CO will continue to engage with HQ to further develop its fundraising strategies and continue to advocate for funding for WFP to be used in Somalia.</p> <p>It should be noted however that resources mobilization is not the sole responsibility of the CO.</p> <p>It should also be noted that as a voluntarily funded organization, WFP's operations are never fully funded. Efforts to raise funds will, therefore, be accompanied by a resource management strategy to prioritize resources for the most vulnerable and food-insecure people in Somalia.</p> <p>The CO will continue to advocate for cash resources to further strengthen its market-based interventions.</p>	<p>No evidence found of this strategy.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>Recommendation 8: WFP Somalia should continue using a flexible approach that links relief and recovery, while strengthening community resilience in the next PRRO. The overall country strategy should also be aligned with the New Deal Compact and the strategies of other humanitarian and development agencies working in Somalia.</p>	<p><i>Partially accepted</i> Upcoming PRRO document will consider New Deal Compact and other strategies. However, it should be noted that New Deal Compact PSG4 and PSG5 leans more towards a developmental approach. Nevertheless, WFP Somalia will align with these strategies without compromising its neutrality and beneficiaries focus in our existing and upcoming programming.</p>	<p>FFA interventions suffered from a limited coverage of stand-alone activities that beneficiaries welcomed more through their short-term CBT and in-kind transfers than longer-term contributions. WFP's food security, livelihoods and resilience operations were also hampered by the absence of a clear strategy to support and strengthen the capacities of government institutions despite their growing interest in developing a recovery agenda that bridges the humanitarian-development nexus.</p> <p>For example, WFP's engagement with FGS on resilience building and longer-term programming under the Drought Impact Needs Assessment and Recovery and Resilience Framework processes in 2017 has so far been limited. Even in stable contexts, such as Somaliland, where FFA sites were agreed through local coordination bodies under the Seasonal Analysis Response Plans (SARPs), the resilience agenda continues to be held back by an absence of dedicated staff and active leadership across the agencies. No attempt was made to integrate activities with the catchment regeneration plan of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Somaliland Development Fund. As a result, the fit between state-level resilience-building strategies as described under the SNDP and WFP interventions was limited.</p>
<p>Recommendation 9: WFP Somalia should ensure further development of</p>	<p><i>Accepted</i></p>	<p>See response to CPE Evaluation 3a) M&E.</p>

Evaluation recommendation	Management response	View of the evaluation team on the degree of follow-up
<p>the M&E system to ensure greater attention to its usefulness for planning and management purposes. Indicators should be developed to support the strengthening of an integrated approach, as well as indicators allowing for the assessment of impacts of different implementation modalities, such as livelihood activities implemented under the JRS. Moreover, the M&E system should develop compatible and easily accessible databases to promote optimal use of monitoring and evaluation for planning and management purposes.</p>	<p>The Logical Framework of the upcoming PRRO document (2016–2018) will include new outcome indicators for assessment of the different WFP implementation modalities.</p> <p>The CO will undertake development of a comprehensive M&E data base to promote optimal use of M&E information. Adjustments will be identified to lead to more efficient M&E systems/processes.</p>	

Annex R: Mapping of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>1.2.1 Economy and poverty</p> <p>1.2.2 Food and nutrition security</p> <p>1.2.5 Access to social services</p> <p>1.2.6 International assistance</p> <p>1.3.4 External events impacting on the portfolio</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p> <p>2.1.3 Coherence with policies, strategies and programmes of other actors</p>	<p>There is a high probability of repeated, major, acute food crises in Somalia. These acute crises have overlaid the ongoing chronic emergency with continuing conflict-related crises (para 11, 14–20, 56).</p> <p>The United Nations HRP for Somalia aimed to target an average of 1.1 million people in crisis and 1.1 million IDPs per year during the evaluation period (para 41).</p> <p>In the medium-term the government is dependent on foreign assistance for service delivery (para 32).</p> <p>WFP's comparative advantages are aligned with a strategic role in responding to acute food and nutrition emergencies and building capacity for emergency preparedness (para 95–98).</p> <p>Based on the experience of the 2010 famine, WFP was keenly aware of its role in building preparedness to avert future famines and to</p>	<p>WFP could plausibly be credited with a key contribution to preventing famine in 2017. However, no plan is yet in place to ensure that the innovations adopted in 2017 are sustained – ideally with a measure of government involvement.</p> <p>WFP has strategically positioned itself well to respond in areas of its comparative advantage. Outside of crisis periods, the strongest role for WFP has been in building preparedness. WFP's comparative advantages are well aligned with developing and piloting a national safety-net programme.</p>	<p>Rec 1: WFP should provide technical leadership in developing and piloting a national safety-net programme Somali Safety Net Programme (SSNP) to address chronic, seasonal and acute needs.</p> <p>1a. WFP should partner with both humanitarian and development donors.</p> <p>1b. Consult closely with federal and state authorities in the design from the outset.</p> <p>1c. Draw on experiences from other regional safety-net programmes to inform the design.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.1.4 Did strategic choices maximize relevance?</p> <p>2.2.2 Drivers of strategic decision-making</p> <p>2.3.3 Sustainability and impact – impact of WFP activities</p>	<p>be an effective advocate for a timely response to future crises (para 124–125).</p> <p>WFP has been plausibly credited with an important contribution to preventing famine in 2017 (para 216). This effectiveness in emergency response was associated with progress with improved disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (para 217).</p> <p>In the medium-term stakeholders are increasingly aligned on the potential of a national safety-net system aligned with government structures. The principal argument is that this would sustain and systematise the pre-registration of beneficiaries and arrangements for delivering cash transfers, so that future crises could be managed efficiently and effectively (para 218).</p> <p>Government, United Nations and donor stakeholders consulted agree that a more systemic resilience approach is needed that goes beyond addressing the root causes of malnutrition, to combining livelihoods with the provision of basic services and safety nets (para 222).</p>	<p>A social safety net is an important pillar of an integrated approach to building resilience to food insecurity and adequate preparedness is essential to delivering a timely, life-saving emergency response.</p> <p>The emerging consensus for a national safety net appears both desirable and technically feasible. Although government capacities remain minimal and fragile, appropriately designed, this can provide a channel for sustained government participation in delivering on its responsibilities to its citizens.</p> <p>Increased alignment with national institutions responds well to the new strategic directions included in the IRM.</p> <p>While there is an evident interest among multiple stakeholders in establishing a</p>	

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>Significant fault lines continued which inhibited the delivery of a coordinated United Nations response spanning the humanitarian-development nexus (para 80).</p> <p>WFP has so far partnered and aligned with principally humanitarian donors (para 88).</p>	<p>social safety net in conjunction with the government, no agency has yet taken the lead in developing it.</p>	
<p>1.2.1 Economy and poverty</p> <p>1.2.2 Food and nutrition security</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p> <p>2.1.3 Coherence with policies, strategies and programmes of other actors</p> <p>2.2.3 Risk assessment and mitigation</p> <p>2.3.4 Efficiency-timeliness</p>	<p>The distribution of CBTs to (biometrically) pre-identified beneficiaries offers a proved, effective and efficient mechanism of crisis response (para 191, 193, 195, 217, 242).</p> <p>Interviews with knowledgeable key informants uniformly confirmed a strong beneficiary preference for CBTs, specifically unconditional cash delivered through mobile money (para 72).</p> <p>Donors have shown an increasing appetite for the use of CBTs in Somalia and have been supportive of WFP's shift to using this modality over the course of the evaluation period (para 86).</p> <p>WFP remains unwilling to use mobile money transfers, despite evidence on improved reach, efficiency and beneficiary preferences, because of a lack of secure link between the</p>	<p>Given the range of needs, the strategic shift from in-kind transfers to unrestricted cash is clearly in line with beneficiary needs and preferences.</p> <p>One of the most impressive achievements of WFP has been a substantial improvement in timeliness. The increasing use of CBTs and the decision to pre-register potential beneficiaries in SCOPE both facilitated a rapid scale up of the response in 2017. This underpinned a radically more effective response in 2017, compared to 2011.</p>	<p>Rec 1 continued:</p> <p>1d. Establish a single registry for beneficiaries, based on interoperability of established systems.</p> <p>1e. Work to include mobile cash as a delivery modality.</p> <p>1f. Include referral pathways for protection cases.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.3.3 Sustainability and impact – impact of WFP activities</p> <p>3.1.3. Portfolio performance and results</p>	<p>mobile device and a biometric identity (para 136).</p> <p>Gender inequality and protection have been significant concerns in Somalia (para 199).</p> <p>As a non-gender and protection mandated agency, WFP’s responsibilities were to mainstream programme gender and protection within its portfolio and activities (para 70).</p>	<p>The strategic shift to an increasing reliance on CBTs, and, more specifically, the use of unrestricted cash transfers in the portfolio is clearly in line with the broad trajectory of donor priorities.</p> <p>As the post-emergency response is scaled-back, elements of the capacities and systems for delivering CBTs in Somalia may be lost.</p> <p>The exclusion of marginalized groups remained a concern for the humanitarian system.</p>	
<p>1.2.1 Economy and poverty</p> <p>1.2.2 Food and nutrition security</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p> <p>2.1.3 Coherence with policies, strategies and</p>	<p>Based on provisional figures from UNHCR more than 1.13 million individuals have been newly displaced during 2017. GAM rates among the IDP populations are generally higher than for host populations (para 17, 18).</p> <p>There is an on-going process of rapid urbanization within Somalia that is being accelerated by the periodic crisis-driven inflows of IDPs (para 1).</p>	<p>The evaluation found limited strategic attention to the post-emergency needs of IDPs in urban areas. This is clearly an important dynamic in Somalia, which has been in place for some time. However, for much of the evaluation to emphasis remained on rural livelihoods an assumption that IDPs</p>	<p>Rec 2: WFP should develop a longer-term approach for IDP assistance</p> <p>2a. Include IDPs as a target group within the SSNP.</p> <p>2b. Tighten the definition and targeting of IDPs for emergency assistance.</p> <p>2c. Expand urban livelihood programmes, based on evidence of effectiveness.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>programmes of other actors</p> <p>2.2.1 Generating and using analytical information</p> <p>2.3.1 Delivery of outputs</p> <p>2.3.2 Attainment of Objectives</p> <p>3.1.1 Alignment and strategic positioning</p>	<p>The majority of IDPs intend to remain and settle in urban areas rather than return to rural livelihoods. Many of these IDPs have – or will – become long-term urban poor experiencing extreme poverty. The government is prioritizing urban resilience and calling for agencies to tackle women’s and youth employment (para 9, 77, 170, 227).</p> <p>The importance of needs related to the process of urbanization and IDP settlement has become increasingly apparent. Important gaps were identified in understanding the comparative positions of women, men and youths in rural and urban communities and the differences between recent IDP arrivals and longer-term residents in and around IDP camps and settlements (para 77, 109, 110, 227).</p> <p>The analysis of livelihoods concentrates on rural livelihoods with little understanding to underpin programming in urban areas (para 113).</p> <p>People displaced during the war in 1991 were still classified as IDPs and consequently being assisted by WFP and a mechanism for</p>	<p>would return to the pastoral economy.</p> <p>Greater engagement with the Durable Solutions Initiative could have provided a platform for bringing together short- and long-term interventions.</p> <p>There are insufficient resources being directed to support the integration of IDPs and development of sustainable urban livelihoods.</p> <p>The evaluation found limited strategic attention to the post-emergency needs of IDPs in urban areas. This is clearly an important dynamic in Somalia, which has been in place for some time. However, for much of the evaluation period the emphasis remained supporting rural livelihoods, with an assumption that IDPs will return to the pastoral economy.</p>	<p>2d. Explore new partnerships to promote the integration of IDPs in urban areas.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>determining at what point IDPs become urban residents is absent. (para 109, 110, 162).</p> <p>While IDPs have been appropriately targeted by WFP, unconditional GFA has been used for both recent and long-term IDPs despite very different needs (para 77).</p> <p>Despite its work on IDPs and returnees, and the leadership on resilience, the evaluation found limited engagement with and visibility of WFP in the Durable Solutions Initiative and working group at UNCT level (para 80).</p>	<p>Consequently, humanitarian resources will be continually required to address the survival needs of the urban poor/IDPs.</p>	
<p>2.1.1 Alignment with national strategies, policies and programmes</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p> <p>2.3.3 Sustainability and impact</p>	<p>There is little evidence of integration of WFP's strategy or capacity to support government-owned agriculture (crop production, livestock and fisheries), environment, food security, or livelihoods and employment sector ministries at the national or state levels. As a result, the fit between state-level resilience-building strategies and WFP interventions was limited (para 68).</p> <p>WFP did not provide continued and predictable funding to address the chronic needs which continued in 2017 alongside the surge in emergency needs (para 74).</p>	<p>The JRS failed to provide a platform to bring together humanitarian and development agencies, and even within the limited ambitions of the JRS framework it failed to catalyse innovative programming.</p> <p>The evaluation found there was still much to be done in improving connectedness and ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context</p>	<p>Rec 3: WFP should shift the primary objective of FFA and FFT activities to creating productive assets and livelihoods.</p> <p>3a. Plan and implement FFA and FFT activities within a three-year planning cycle and strengthen coherence with national strategies and programmes.</p> <p>3b. Ring-fence resources to ensure continuity.</p> <p>3c. Develop an M&E framework to assess both the short- and longer-term results of FFA and FFT.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>FFA interventions suffered from limited support to stand-alone activities. The main tangible benefits to beneficiaries appear to have been short-term transfers of CBTs and IKTs and the sustainability of WFP contributions to livelihoods recovery could not be substantiated (para 207).</p> <p>The evidence on results collected by WFP does not offer insights into the extent to which participants in WFP livelihood activities enjoyed sustained benefits, and instead focuses on the short-term benefits on food security of the food or cash transfers (para 220).</p> <p>Government, United Nations and donor stakeholders consulted agree that a more systemic resilience approach is needed that goes beyond this to combine livelihoods with the provision of basic services, safety nets and early warning (para 222).</p>	<p>that takes longer term and interconnected problems into account.</p> <p>The decision to prioritize available resources to life-saving assistance played towards WFP’s mandate, strengths and the imperative of saving lives, but resulted in greatly reduced coverage for livelihoods.</p> <p>If WFP aims to consistently deliver on its ‘dual mandate’ then support to non-emergency activities should be predictable and sustained.</p> <p>FFA has been planned and implemented within annual programming cycles rather than as part of a longer-term strategy of community engagement for building resilience.</p>	
1.2.3 Gender and protection	Gender disparities in Somalia are among the most pronounced in the world. Early marriage	The evaluation found that the portfolio was relatively	Rec 4: WFP should strengthen integration of gender and protection in programming:

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>1.3.2 WFP country office assessment and analysis</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p> <p>2.1.5 Alignment with WFP corporate strategies and policies</p> <p>2.2.1 Generating and using analytical information</p> <p>2.2.2 Drivers of strategic decision-making</p> <p>2.3.1 Delivery of outputs</p>	<p>and lack of education are key contributors to malnutrition (para 21).</p> <p>Missed opportunities to analyse the gender and protection implications of big innovations such as CBTs and SCOPE (para 115, 200, 206).</p> <p>There were no stand-alone assessments of gender or protection issues – despite dedicated capacity being available in both the CO and RBN – and these issues were addressed to various degrees within the context of other assessment processes (para 61).</p> <p>The evaluation found few considerations of diversity issues such as age, and disability⁴⁹⁵, and limited evidence of a differentiated approach across age, gender, and diversity in all the activities implemented, beyond the traditional efforts on nutrition and education (para 75).</p> <p>A general gap exists in addressing the needs of adolescent girls across programmes, especially in relation to education and nutrition. This is especially important given</p>	<p>undifferentiated and paid limited attention to needs according to gender, age and ability.</p> <p>Decision-makers would have benefited from a deeper understanding of gender and protection to understand how to better mitigate risks, including an assessment of the consequences of the shift in transfer modalities.</p> <p>There is insufficient understanding of social systems in general, and gender and protection issues in particular</p> <p>The CO has not taken opportunities to strengthen capacities and skills for gender and protection assessment</p> <p>The 2015 WFP Gender Policy recommends resourcing</p>	<p>4a. Review the existing ToR for the policy officer position to ensure a more equal and visible integration of responsibilities on gender and protection or establish a dedicated position on gender and protection.</p> <p>4b. Proceed with the request for a standby gender and protection officer and capitalize on the Regional Protection and Gender Adviser through more regular collaboration and exchange.</p> <p>4c. Assess the effects of various transfer modalities on intra-household and community dynamics, including gender and protection, and apply the results to programme design.</p> <p>4d. Strengthen capacities of CPs in gender and protection analysis.</p>

⁴⁹⁵ Limited reference to the elderly can be found in PRRO 200443, in PRRO 200844, and in the 2016 CGAP. Adolescent girls are mentioned among the target groups for Supercereal together with children and women of reproductive age in PRRO 200443. Disabled are mentioned only in PRRO 200443.

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.3.2 Gender and protection</p> <p>3.1.2 Quality of strategic decision-making</p>	<p>the link between early marriage and intergenerational malnutrition (para 165).</p> <p>Gender inequality and protection have been significant concerns in Somalia, but staff understanding, capacity and responsibility on these issues is still rather limited and the potential support by the Regional Bureau in this area is, at times, left untapped (para 200).</p>	<p>gender advisers in each large country office</p> <p>Consequently, programming approaches are relatively undifferentiated across age, gender and ability</p>	
<p>2.2.1 Generating and using analytical information</p> <p>2.3.1 Delivery of outputs</p> <p>3.1.2 Quality of strategic decision--making</p>	<p>Important gaps were identified in understanding the comparative positions of women, men and youths in rural and urban communities and the differences between recent IDP arrivals and longer-term residents in and around IDP camps and settlements. The assumption that community-based targeting provides an effective mechanism to reach vulnerable and marginalized groups was questioned (para 110, 161, 232).</p> <p>While the planning process led to successful area-based targeting of populations for livelihoods, they did not enable targeting of the most vulnerable groups which instead relied on the questionable assumption that community-based targeting reached those most in need (para 113)</p>	<p>The evaluation found that the portfolio was relatively undifferentiated and paid limited attention to needs according to gender, age and ability.</p> <p>While geographic targeting was strong, the effectiveness of household level targeting was uncertain. The assumption that community-based targeting provides an effective mechanism to reach vulnerable and marginalized groups was questioned by the evaluation.</p>	<p>Rec 5: WFP should improve targeting of beneficiaries – including IDPs:</p> <p>5a. Promote the equal and active participation of women and girls using participatory methodologies to ensure the community participation in the design of targeting criteria and entitlements, including IDPs.</p> <p>5b. Improve communication with beneficiaries on targeting criteria and entitlements.</p> <p>5c. Continue to closely monitor the distribution of benefits of programming.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>Targeting of nutritional activities was largely effective, based on individual and area-level anthropometric targeting criteria (para 166)</p> <p>Beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluation were unaware of the criteria for enrolment and entitlements, limiting the ability to seek their entitlements (para 161)</p> <p>Under the GFA elements of the portfolio, the possible exclusion of beneficiaries such as the Bantu in the southern part of the country has been highlighted (para 161).</p>	<p>The exclusion of marginalized groups remained a concern for the humanitarian system.</p>	
<p>1.2.4 Government strategy, policies and programmes</p> <p>1.3.4 External events affecting the portfolio</p> <p>2.1.1 Alignment with national strategies, policies and programmes</p> <p>2.1.3 Coherence with policies,</p>	<p>The context – both in Somalia and within WFP corporate strategies – is conducive to increased alignment with national policies and WFP strengthening national capacities (para 24, 29, 57, 64–70, 100–105).</p> <p>Overall strong coherence was found between WFP’s objectives and activities and national strategies, policies and programmes (para 64–66, 122).</p> <p>However, the depth of the collaboration varies considerably, with nutrition providing a best-practice example of structured engagement with government policies and programmes, with much less achieved in</p>	<p>Given the fragmented governance arrangements in Somalia, WFP has appropriately ensured strategic alignment with multiple ministries at both FGS and state levels.</p> <p>WFP contributed modestly – but probably appropriately – to capacity building of various FGS and state ministries in food and nutrition analysis.</p> <p>An overall strategy for capacity building was lacking and plans</p>	<p>Rec 6: WFP should engage in broader inter-agency dialogue to coordinate approaches to planning and implementing capacity-building efforts.</p> <p>6a. Work in partnership with relevant United Nations agencies to conduct thorough capacity assessments of selected partner ministries as a basis for identifying specific areas where WFP has a comparative advantage in capacity building, such as food-security analysis.</p> <p>6b. In consultation with the monitoring unit in WFP Rome, strengthen tools and capacities for monitoring and evaluating capacity-building activities.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>strategies and programmes of other actors</p> <p>2.1.5 Alignment with WFP corporate strategies and policies</p> <p>2.2.1 Generating and using analytical information</p> <p>2.2.2 Drivers of strategic decision-making</p> <p>2.3.1 Delivery of outputs</p> <p>3.1.2 Quality of strategic decision-making</p>	<p>emergency response, agriculture and education (para 67-70).</p> <p>Except for UNICEF, there was little coordination with other United Nations agencies on capacity building of national institutions, including the UNOCHA and FAO (para 81-85, 120).</p> <p>WFP capacity strengthening of state-level government and partner staff in food-security analysis did not support the emergence of a cadre of staff able to take on these activities in future (para 119).</p> <p>The results of capacity-building efforts are poorly monitored and reported and consequently there is limited visibility of WFP's efforts (para 180).</p>	<p>were weakly integrated with other agencies including FSNAU and OCHA.</p> <p>The impact and sustainability of these efforts is muted given continued weaknesses in governance structures.</p> <p>Greater movement in this direction seems to be called for by the latest WFP directives in the IRM.</p> <p>Increased alignment with national institutions responds well to the new strategic directions included in the IRM.</p>	
<p>1.2.2 Food and nutrition security</p> <p>1.3.1 Overview of the portfolio</p>	<p>Overall, WFP's nutrition approach enables a more sustainable approach to nutrition service provision (para 209).</p>	<p>WFP comparative advantages, these are not confined to the sphere of EMOPs and include</p>	<p>Rec 7: WFP should engage with the MoH on annual strategic planning, support to integration of nutrition monitoring data into the existing MoH Health Management Information System.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.1.1 Alignment with national strategies, policies and programmes</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p> <p>2.1.3 Coherence with policies, strategies and programmes of other actors</p> <p>2.1.5 Alignment with WFP corporate strategies and policies</p> <p>2.2.1 Generating and using analytical information</p> <p>2.3.1 Delivery of outputs</p>	<p>WFP's nutrition activities are well aligned to meeting the large-scale chronic needs (para 73).</p> <p>There is currently a very good working relationship between UNICEF and WFP. Key areas of strategic collaboration are: child malnutrition; the JRS/JRP; delivery of transfers and services through SCOPE; and schools (para 81).</p> <p>WFP has worked on strengthening co-ordination with the MoH to provide a basis for joint programming, supportive supervision, monitoring, capacity building and data management (para 66).</p> <p>The emphasis on nutrition-sensitive programming in the 2017 Nutrition Policy update has yet to be integrated in the nutrition and health portfolio (para 105, 183).</p> <p>In some places where TSFP was operating, WFP no longer provides a family ration, for example in the IDP camps in Hargeisa. This ran counter to the CPE evaluation of 2012 that reported that there was "evidence that aligning the family ration with TSFP had increased recovery rates" (para 183).</p>	<p>aspects of nutrition and education.</p> <p>There is a sound strategy towards nutrition and health programmes, rooted in strong collaboration with UNICEF as co-implementing partner. However, opportunities were identified to strengthen implementation and sustain outcomes.</p> <p>In the case of nutrition WFP is well aligned to helping the government to realize its own policy objectives and programmes.</p> <p>Opportunities to build connectedness by capitalizing on internal synergies between activities were identified but largely remained unrealized. Overall, few linkages were observed between emergency, nutrition, livelihood recovery, resilience and school meals interventions.</p>	<p>7a. Work with FSNAU and other Nutrition Cluster partners, to deepen the analysis of the causes of food and nutrition insecurity.</p> <p>7b. Ensure that nutrition centres have a contingency to treat all malnourished children.</p> <p>7c. Disaggregate the coverage figures to understand the differences in coverage between urban, rural and IDP settlements and closely monitor readmissions to TSFP to ensure that stopping the family rations has not meant that children are re-admitted to TSFP treatment.</p> <p>7d. Change the delivery incentive from food to CBT and consider whether to continue providing it to mothers or switch to providing the incentive to TBAs.</p> <p>7e. Reinvigorate ART and TB-DOTS with appropriate support both for clients and their households.</p> <p>7f. Expand SBCC to community level and the wider public, targeting men specifically and change agents, such as community leaders.</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
<p>2.3.2 Attainment of objectives</p> <p>2.3.3 Sustainability and impact</p>	<p>Anecdotal evidence from staff at MCHN clinics suggests that the number of women attending health centres for delivery increased because of the incentive ration. Some of WFP's partners provided remuneration for TBAs who refer pregnant women for delivery at a health facility, rather than directly to the mothers (para 146).</p> <p>Institutional feeding has been used to support ART and DOTS treatment. WFP reduced its focus on institutional feeding in PRRO 200844 (para 46).</p> <p>Households of HIV and TB patients were not assessed systematically for vulnerability to determine whether they would be eligible for inclusion in GFA, potentially putting vulnerable households at risk (para 105, 147).</p> <p>Despite the inconsistent food supplies, TB-DOTS patients receiving a ration had a very good treatment success rate and nutrition recovery rate. Similarly, for ART, nutrition recovery rates were high until 2015, when default rates were very high because of the lack of food (para 173).</p> <p>WFP promoted SBCC to address subjects such as complementary feeding and breast</p>		

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
	<p>feeding, and health and hygiene promotions to tackle the underlying causes of malnutrition (para 114, 115).</p> <p>WFP consistently reached more females through social and BCC and the number of men was less than a quarter of the total (para 144).</p>		
<p>1.1.1 Rationale, objectives and users</p> <p>1.2.4 Government strategy, policies and programmes</p> <p>1.2.5 Access to social services</p> <p>2.1.1 Alignment with national strategies, policies and programmes</p> <p>2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiary needs</p>	<p>Education is a strong national priority given its potential to break intergenerational behaviours that perpetuate the Somali crisis (para 10, 73, 165).</p> <p>Somalia has one of the world's lowest primary school enrolment rates in Africa with only 30 percent of children in school and just 40 percent of these are girls (para 34).</p> <p>The various Ministries of Education perceive a strategic alignment between WFP school meals and their respective education plans. However, WFP school meals are planned and implemented to address food security, rather than educational goals (para 69, 210).</p> <p>Schools were targeted based on the prevailing rates of food insecurity in the locality, rather than the enrolment rates (para 155).</p>	<p>WFP's comparative advantages; these are not confined to the sphere of EMOPs and include aspects of nutrition and education.</p> <p>If WFP aims to consistently deliver on its 'dual mandate', then support to non-emergency activities should be sustained.</p> <p>International evidence confirms the specific importance of education in addressing structural food and nutrition insecurity.</p>	<p>Rec 8: WFP should situate and evaluate the contribution of school meals within an inter-agency education strategy.</p> <p>8a. Coordinate and report on school meals as part of the Education Cluster, rather than the FSC.</p> <p>8b. Align operational decision-making to an educational objective, for example the selection of participating schools.</p> <p>8c. Implement the postponed SABER diagnostic with the Ministry of Education (MoE).</p>

Report section	Key findings plus additional paragraph numbers	Conclusions	Recommendations
2.2.2 Drivers of strategic decision-making 2.3.1 Delivery of outputs 2.3.2 Attainment of objectives 2.3.3 Sustainability and impact	<p>School meals have been proved to have a positive impact on (female) enrolment and retention, rather than food-security indicators (para 178).</p> <p>Donors have exhibited a very low level of support for school meals, especially around an educational outcome, which shaped WFP's strategic placement of the programme, but education is a strategic priority for Somali authorities (para 30, 127, 178).</p>		

Annex S: Acronyms and Abbreviations

3 PA	Three-pronged approach
AAP	Accountability to affected populations
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AIDS	Acquired immune deficiency syndrome
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AO	Area office (WFP)
ART	Anti-retroviral therapy
BMZ	Germany Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development
BRCiS	Building resilient communities in Somalia
BNSP	Basic nutrition services package
BSFP	Blanket supplementary feeding programme
CAS	Community asset scores
CAP	Consolidated appeal process
CBPP	Community-based participatory planning
CBT	Cash-based transfers
CDC	Center for Disease Control and Prevention
CEDAW	United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CFM	Complaint and feedback mechanism
CGAP	Country gender action plan
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
CO	Country office
CoP	Centrality of protection strategy
CP	Cooperating partner (WFP)
CPE	Country portfolio evaluation
CSI	Coping strategy index
CSP	Country strategic plan
CNW	Community Nutrition Workers
CWG	Cash Working Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DDS	Diet Diversity Scores
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DFS	Department of Field Support
DOTS	Directly observed treatment, short course
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
EB	Executive Board
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office

EFSA	Emergency food-security assessment
EMOP	Emergency operation
EPHS	Essential package of health services
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FACA	Food Aid Coordination Agency
FCS	Food consumption scores
FEWSnet	Famine early warning systems network
FFA	Food for Assets
FFE	Food for Education
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGM	Female genital mutilation
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FLA	Field level agreement
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FSLC	Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
GBV	Gender-based violence
GBVIMS	Gender-based information management system
GCMF	Global Commodity Management Facility
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GFA	General food assistance
GTG	United Nations Gender Theme Group
HADMA	Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human resources
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICA	Integrated context analysis
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSP	Interim Country Strategic Plan
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
ICWG	The Inter Cluster Working Group
IDP	Internally displaced people
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated food-security phase classification
IRM	Integrated road map

ISF	Integrated strategic framework
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JHNP	Joint Health and Nutrition Programme
JRP	Joint Resilience Programme
JRS	Joint Resilience Strategy
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Development Bank)
LC	Logistics cluster
LoU	Letter of Understanding
MAM	Moderate acute malnutrition
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MCHM	Mother and child health and nutrition
MEB	Minimum expenditure basket
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHADM	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management
MoWHRD	Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development
mt	metric ton
MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference
mVAM	Mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping
NACS	Nutrition assessment counselling and support
NC	Nutrition Cluster
NCI	National capacity index
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NVS	Nutrient value score
ODK	Open data kit
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEV	Office of Evaluation
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control (US Government)
OTP	Outpatient therapeutic programme
OWG	Operational working group
PDM	Post-distribution monitoring
PESTLE	Political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, legal and environmental
PLHIV	People living with HIV/AIDS
PLW	Pregnant and lactating women
PRRO	Protracted relief and recovery operation
PSGs	Peacebuilding and state-building goals
RBN	Regional Bureau Nairobi
RIMA	Resilience impact measurement and analysis tool (FAO)
RUSF	Ready to use supplementary food
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SAM	Severe acute malnutrition
SARP	Seasonal analysis response plan
SBCC	Social and behavioural change communication
SCOPE	System for cash operations

SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SLP	Seasonal livelihood programming
SMS	Short message system
SNDP	Somali National Development Plan
SNS	Strengthening Nutrition Security Consortium Somalia
SO	Strategic objective
SOp	Special operation
SOP	Standard operating procedure
SomReP	Somalia Resilience Programme
SP	Strategic plan
SPR	Standard project report
SSNP	Somali Safety Net Programme
SSWC	Save Somali Women and Children
STREAM	Somalia Resilience Action Consortium
TB	Tuberculosis
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ToC	Theory of change
ToR	Terms of reference
TPM	Third-party monitoring
TSFP	Targeted supplementary feeding programme
UNAIDS	United Nations AIDS
UNAVSTADS	United Nations Common Aviation Safety Standards
UNCERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS	Humanitarian Air Services
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISF	United Nations Somalia Integrated Strategic Framework
UNMPTF	United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSAS	United Nations Somali Assistance Strategy
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSWAP	United Nations System-Wide Action Plan
United Nations	
Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability assessment mapping
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WB	World Bank

WFP	World Food Programme
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System
WG	Working group
WHO	World Health Organization

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Office of Evaluation

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World Food Programme

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70

00148 Rome, Italy

T +39 06 65131 wfp.org