



Evaluation of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey

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Prepared by

Nick Maunder, Team Leader; Karin Seyfert; Meltem Aran; Gökçe Baykal; Marta Marzi; Gabrielle Smith



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Key personnel for the evaluation

World Food Programme

Aysha Twose	Evaluation Manager
Luca Molinas	Office of Evaluation

Evaluation Team

Nick Maunder	Evaluation Team Leader
Dr Karin Seyfert	Project Manager
Dr Meltem Aran	Research Expert
Marta Marzi	Quantitative Analyst
Dr Gökçe Baykal	Qualitative Research Expert
Gabrielle Smith	Social Protection Expert

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Annex 1: Terms of Reference

[Please note that the original paragraph, Table and Figure numbering has been maintained]

Decentralized Evaluation of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey

November 2016-December 2017

WFP Turkey Country Office

1. Introduction

1. These terms of reference are for the evaluation of the ESSN in Turkey. This evaluation is commissioned by the Turkey Country Office, covering the period from November 2016 – December 2017. This will be a mid- term evaluation, as the ESSN is expected to finish in December 2018. The evaluation will cover the ESSN programme, which can be considered a WFP Turkey activity within the scope of these terms of reference. As the evaluation will span multiple missions across the year, it must include analysis of outputs, activities and outcomes.
2. These terms of reference were prepared by the Turkey Country Office, Vulnerability, Analysis and Mapping (VAM) & M&E Unit, based upon an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the terms of reference is twofold. Firstly, it provides key information to the evaluation team and helps guide them throughout the evaluation process; and secondly, it provides key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation. As it is expected that multiple stakeholders will be engaged in the evaluation throughout the year, these terms of reference will serve as the key source of information for any questions about the evaluation, its scope and its purpose.
3. In February 2016, the European Union (EU) announced the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) (2016- 2018), to ensure that the needs of refugees and host communities are addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner. This will be an opportunity to scale up basic needs assistance to refugees in Turkey. The Facility will coordinate assistance of €1.4 billion for humanitarian needs and a further €1.6 billion in longer-term structural assistance. Under this Facility, DG ECHO has partnered with the World Food Program (WFP), the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) and the Ministry of Family and Social Policy, to roll out the ESSN. It is a joint effort to establish one single delivery system of assistance through monthly prepaid debit cards. The ESSN is the subject of this evaluation.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

4. The reasons for the evaluation being commissioned are presented below.

2.1. Rationale

5. The evaluation is being commissioned for the following reasons:
6. The ESSN includes the largest ever EU- supported humanitarian cash transfer programme. It is the culmination of a decade of thinking, piloting and programming of cash in humanitarian contexts and increased consideration to the value of integrated programming. The cash transfer programme is innovative as it brings the use of unrestricted cash transfer to scale, attaches itself to the Turkish social welfare system and provides a system for other cash-based assistance, such as conditional cash transfers for education, through a single national platform. The national outreach to and contact with vulnerable refugees is also an opportunity to increase access to non-cash-

based assistance; registration will ensure that refugees are able to access their entitlements, and the contact with refugees is intended to facilitate referrals to health, education and other specialised programmes.

7. Given the importance of this large, innovative programme, the mid-term evaluation will serve to document and learn from the ESSN, examining its design and outcomes. The ESSN is intended to be a two-year programme, eventually being streamlined into the Turkish national systems. The lessons from the mid-term evaluation will inform changes in programme design and delivery for year two and beyond.
8. The evaluation will have the following uses for the WFP Turkey Office:
9. WFP is a key stakeholder within the ESSN; WFP worked closely with DG ECHO to design the programme, is accountable for all programme finances, and is responsible for overall project monitoring. As such, improving programme effectiveness and efficiency is of interest to WFP. The mid-term evaluation will provide the learning required to make improvements for year two of the programme.

2.2. Objectives

10. Evaluations in WFP serve the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning.
 - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the ESSN programme.
 - **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated, and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.
11. The evaluation is mid-term, in order to inform year two design and delivery. As such, the learning objective is given more weight, to inform key programmatic decision-making. A final evaluation will take place in 2018, which will assess accountability more thoroughly.
12. The results of this evaluation are intended for use within the humanitarian community at large, as the ESSN is the first programme of its kind. This is of particular interest to DG ECHO, as the ESSN is the largest ever single humanitarian aid project funded by DG ECHO. The programme may set precedent for other countries to follow suit, therefore learning and documentation is essential.

2.3. Stakeholders and Users

13. A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and some of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table 1 below provides a preliminary stakeholder analysis, which should be deepened by the evaluation team as part of the Inception phase.
14. Accountability to affected populations, is tied to WFP's commitments to include beneficiaries as key stakeholders in WFP's work. As such, WFP is committed to ensuring gender equality and women's empowerment in the evaluation process, with participation and consultation in the evaluation by women, men, boys and girls from different groups.

Table 1: Preliminary Stakeholders' analysis

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation and likely uses of evaluation report to this stakeholder
INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Country Office (CO) [Turkey]	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries and partners for performance and results of its operation. WFP Turkey's key role in the ESSN is around monitoring and evaluation; this evaluation will provide much needed learning about the programme.
Regional Bureau (RB) [Cairo]	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent/impartial account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices. Within the region, many COs have implemented cash-based programmes and RBC is working to consolidate the learning from these CBTs – the ESSN evaluation will contribute to this body of knowledge.
WFP HQ	WFP has an interest in the lessons that emerge from evaluations, particularly as they relate to WFP strategies, policies, thematic areas, or delivery modality with wider relevance to WFP programming. In addition, as WFP shifts towards more cash-based transfers, learning from the ESSN will be critical to inform better programme design in future. Understanding the benefits and drawbacks to a basic needs approach, rather than the typical WFP focus on food assistance, will also will also feed into WFP strategic planning.
Office of Evaluation (OEV)	OEV has a stake in ensuring that decentralized evaluations deliver quality, credible and useful evaluations respecting provisions for impartiality as well as roles and accountabilities of various decentralised evaluation stakeholders as identified in the evaluation policy.
WFP Executive Board (EB)	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but key findings will be shared, and findings may feed into annual syntheses and into corporate learning processes.
EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS	
Beneficiaries	As the recipients the ESSN cash transfers, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought. Given the restrictions within the cultures of many of the beneficiary populations regarding female roles outside the home, it essential that women and girls are consulted separately about the entire ESSN process and their perceptions.
	Beneficiaries of different nationalities and ethnicities will be consulted to better understand specific barriers to application or biases. Beneficiaries of different ages must also be consulted to understand age-specific difficulties (for example, learning to use an ATM), and age-specific impacts of the assistance (for example, sending children to school). In general, beneficiaries will be consulted to understand their perspectives on the modality, the application process, the targeting criteria, the amount and the impact on their households.

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation and likely uses of evaluation report to this stakeholder
Non-Beneficiaries and Turkish citizens	The evaluation results will be important for non-beneficiaries and Turkish citizens, as they will identify any unintended negative consequences, and shape the design of the programme in year two. Better understanding how the ESSN has impacted non-beneficiaries, including Turkish citizens, with a focus on protection principles and do no harm, is an essential component of the evaluation. Year two programme delivery will seek to minimize any identified negative impacts and improve social cohesion.
Ministry of Family and Social Policies	The Ministry of Family and Social Planning is responsible for accepting and processing all ESSN applications through the local offices. The staff at district level interact with applicants on a daily basis and are the primary point of contact for many concerns and questions. While the ESSN has been designed to align with government systems as much as possible, the key programmatic difference is the multi-purpose assistance, versus Ministry of Family and Social Planning sector specific assistance. Understanding the difference in this design will be of particular interest to the Ministry of Family and Social Planning, with implications for their own national assistance. The sustainability/connectedness questions will also be particularly relevant to Ministry of Family and Social Planning.
Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)	The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) is responsible for emergency response within Turkey, and therefore is also a key stakeholder within the ESSN. AFAD plays a role in overall coordination of the ESSN and is responsible for refugee support in camps. Therefore, AFAD will be interested in understanding the effectiveness of the system as integrated within the government.
Ministry of Interior	Key agencies of the Ministry of Interior implicated within the ESSN include the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) and the Population Department (Nufus). Essential pre-requisites for ESSN applications include registration of all family members with DGMM, and registration of the household address with Nufus. These requirements are placing significant additional burden on these offices, as they seek to register new households and correct existing data. Understanding the ESSN, its relevance and impact, will be critical for the Ministry of Interior to understand the importance of the work they have invested. In addition, these Ministry of Interior investments may be critical links for the sustainability/connectedness evaluation questions.
Other government agencies	The ESSN is as a key component of the EU-Turkey deal. Therefore, in addition to the specific government branches noted above, the Government of Turkey (the Government of Turkey) in general will be interested to understand whether or not the project has achieved its goals, and if these goals are aligned with the Government of Turkey priorities. Particularly of interest will be social cohesion with local populations, capacity development and sustainability. The Government of Turkey is a critical stakeholder within the ESSN mid-term evaluation; the learning will be essential to improve the programme and better understand its sustainability within Turkey.

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation and likely uses of evaluation report to this stakeholder
Turkish Red Crescent	The TRC is WFP’s key implementing partner in the ESSN, and the main liaison with the Turkish Government. As an essential stakeholder in the programme, lessons from the evaluation will be important for TRC, particularly as they will continue to be responsible for implementation in year two.
UNICEF	UNICEF will have a particular interest in the evaluation, as they may be responsible an additional cash transfer conditional on school attendance, implemented by TRC and delivered through the same ESSN platform. Issues related to targeting criteria, transfer values, application processes and accessing assistance will all be of particular interest to UNICEF, in addition to the longer-term vision related to sustainability of the programme.
UNHCR	While UNHCR is not directly involved in the ESSN, it is still a key stakeholder in the evaluation given their refugee mandate. As the ESSN may serve as a blueprint for future refugee assistance programmes, the evaluation results will be essential for future UNHCR strategic and operational planning. In addition, UNHCR has other refugee assistance programming within Turkey, particularly with the non-Syrian populations – understanding these linkages will be important. Finally, during ESSN implementation, UNHCR is working with DGMM on a verification exercise of all refugee data; this is important for the ESSN, as DGMM data is a key component of ESSN registration.
Cash-based Interventions Technical Working Group members	The CBI-TWG is comprised of a number of UN agencies and NGOs who are delivering cash-based interventions in Turkey. With the ESSN and the idea of one delivery platform for all multi-purpose cash, many NGOs are no longer being supported by DG ECHO for e-voucher programming for basic needs or food assistance. Understanding the pros and cons of this scalable model will be extremely valuable for NGOs, as they strive to identify unmet needs and carve out operational space. For the purposes of the evaluation, the team should consider the recently released DG ECHO Guidance note on medium to large-scale cash transfers.
UN Country team	The UNCT’s harmonized action should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. Various agencies are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity level.
Donors [DG ECHO]	DG ECHO developed the concept for the ESSN and is the sole funder of the programme. As this is the largest ever EU- supported humanitarian cash transfer programme, this evaluation is critical for DG ECHO to better understand the ESSN impact and relevance within Turkey. They are interested in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP’s work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.
EU Member States	The ESSN is funded by EU Member States, primarily Germany. This programme is a key component of the broader EU-Turkey deal, which seeks to stem the flow of ‘irregular migrants’ into Europe, while providing Turkey with other diplomatic benefits. The results of this evaluation will be key for EU Member States to understand the impact of their financial contribution.

15. The primary users of this evaluation will be:
- The WFP Turkey Office and its partners in decision-making, notably related to year two ESSN programme implementation and/or design, Country Strategy and partnerships.
 - TRC is the key implementing partner and may use the findings in implementation.
 - DG ECHO is a key user of this evaluation, understanding the impact of the funding and informing future funding decisions. As this is their largest one-time investment, DG ECHO is particularly interested in the learning from the evaluation, how to improve ESSN year two, and how to influence funding decisions globally.
 - NGOs implementing cash-based interventions are expected to use the results of this evaluation to better understand the likely evolution of the humanitarian sector, if the model in future is increasingly similar to the ESSN.
 - Given the core functions of the Regional Bureau (RB), the RB is expected to use the evaluation findings to provide strategic guidance, programme support, and oversight. The RB will also be interested in the results of the evaluation, as the ESSN may serve as a model for other middle-income countries in the region.
 - WFP HQ may use evaluations for wider organizational learning and accountability.
 - OEV may use the evaluation findings, as appropriate, to feed into evaluation syntheses as well as for annual reporting to the Executive Board.

3. Context and subject of the Evaluation

3.1. Context


16. Turkey has the largest refugee population of any country in the world, with some 2.8 million Syrian registered under temporary protection (called refugees within these terms of reference). The latest data from UNHCR (31.12.2106) shows 291,379 individual cases from other countries, mostly Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Somalia. While some 260,000 Syrian refugees live in the 26 camps established by the Government of Turkey, the vast majority live in host communities (DGMM data, 29.12.2016). The provinces with highest concentration of Syrian refugees are Istanbul, Sanliurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep, which is very different from the distribution of non-Syrian refugees (see Figure 2).
17. According to DGMM, of these 2.8 million Syrian refugees, 1.5 million are male and 1.3 million are female. According to WFP off-camp surveys, roughly 65-70% of households are headed by men. Figure 1 below lists the Syrian population by age/gender, and Figure 2 lists the non-Syrians by province, for the 15 provinces with the highest number of non-Syrians.

Figure 1: Age/Gender distribution of Syrians Under Temporary Protection, 29.12.2016, DGMM data

THE DISTRIBUTION OF AGE AND GENDER OF REGISTERED SYRIANS UNDER TEMPORARY PROTECTION AS OF 29.12.2016

AGE	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
TOTAL	1.504.779	1.319.208	2.823.987
0-4	210.027	195.557	405.584
5-9	203.325	191.888	395.213
10-14	154.737	141.057	295.794
15-18	135.394	113.558	248.952
19-24	225.234	177.832	403.066
25-29	150.877	116.890	267.767
30-34	122.530	97.781	220.311
35-39	87.591	74.652	162.243
40-44	60.278	56.830	117.108
45-49	48.656	44.780	93.436
50-54	37.889	36.620	74.509
55-59	25.549	25.640	51.189
60-64	17.780	18.209	35.989
65-69	11.417	11.807	23.224
70-74	6.185	7.175	13.360
75-79	3.797	4.542	8.339
80-84	1.989	2.548	4.537
85-89	1.082	1.255	2.337
90+	442	587	1.029

Figure 2: Non-Syrian populations by province, listed for 15 provinces with highest populations, 31.12.2016 UNHCR data



18. WFP’s pre-assistance baseline (PAB) survey for Syrian refugees conducted in June–December 2015 found that a large proportion have been forced to use negative coping strategies, such as utilising whatever savings and assets they may have brought with them since their arrival. Ongoing data collection through Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) surveys demonstrates that food assistance has supported many families, but many are still forced to engage in negative coping strategies.
19. There have been a significant number of humanitarian organisations operating in Turkey since the start of the Syria crisis, including many local and international NGOs. To coordinate these efforts, a number of Task Forces, working groups and other


coordination structures are in place. The key structures relevant to the ESSN are currently the Cash-Based Interventions Technical Working Group, the Basic Needs Working Group and the ESSN Task Force.

20. As part of the EU-Turkey deal, the EU has committed to provide support to refugees living in Turkey. As part of this support, in June 2016 the European Commission published the Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) for Turkey for a total amount of €505.65 million. Under this HIP, the ESSN project contract was signed in September 2016, with a total value of €348 million.¹
21. The ESSN functions through the Turkish government social welfare system, providing unconditional unrestricted cash transfers to one million refugees. The first applications to the ESSN were received in November 2016, with the first cash transfers in December 2016.
22. As a complementary intervention, it is expected that cash transfers conditional on school attendance will be provided, also implemented by TRC. This will rely on the same delivery mechanism, simply adding top-up amounts to the Kızılaykart (ATM card used for ESSN transfers) contingent on 80% attendance at school. This intervention includes a case management component to facilitate and ensure attendance. The amount provided varies according to the age and gender of the child.

3.2. Subject of the evaluation

23. The ESSN brings the use of unrestricted cash transfers to scale through the Turkish social welfare system, establishing a single national platform for cash-based assistance to refugees. The ESSN covers the entire country – see external Annex 1 for map indicating the number of applications per district as of 2 January 2017.
24. Key stakeholders essential to the ESSN include DG ECHO, the Ministry of Family and Social Planning, WFP, UNICEF and TRC and DGMM and the Population Department/Civil Registry. Through these partners, at least 1 million refugees will receive monthly unconditional unrestricted cash transfers of 100 Turkish Lira (TL) per capita. In addition, some families will receive cash transfers conditional on school attendance, also implemented by TRC. The unconditional cash transfers are intended to allow beneficiaries to meet their basic needs, therefore this programme, unusual for WFP, is not focused on food assistance. Please refer to external Annex 5 for the ESSN Theory of Change. The Theory of Change is accurate to date, though given the early stage of the programme, only the essential components of the ESSN are functioning – such as the cash transfers. It is still expected that other components, such as referral pathways in and out of the ESSN, will be developed as the programme progresses.
25. Applicants must be foreigners residing in Turkey under temporary protection/international protection. This is mostly Syrians (estimated 2.8 million), though non-Syrians (almost 300,000) are also eligible to apply. All applicants must live off-camp; camp residents are not eligible to apply. Applications are submitted at government Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) offices as well as TRC Service Centres.
26. As of 30 January 2017, 153,543 applications had been received by the Ministry of Family and Social Planning, of which 128,974 had been assessed. This includes a total of 44,295 eligible households (all data provided by the Ministry of Family and Social Planning). According to projections by the Boston Consulting Group, the ESSN will have received an estimated 525,000 applications by May 2017, resulting in reaching the target number of individual beneficiaries (one million) by June 2017.

Figure 3: Projected ESN Applications and Beneficiaries, November 2016-June 2017²



27. The ESN officially started accepting applications on 28 November 2016. The programme is expected to last two years, until December 2018, when it will be streamlined into the Turkish social welfare system. The evaluation will be mid-term, covering the first year of the ESN, and informing decisions for year two. The contracted evaluation company is expected to start in January 2017, with multiple missions throughout the year to capture learning from the project as it evolves.
28. The first tranche of ESN funding, intended to cover until May 2017, is €348 million. It is expected that total ESN funding will reach €900 million.

4. Evaluation Approach

4.1. Scope

29. The mid-term evaluation is expected to cover all aspects of the ESN, looking at all aspects of the programme design and implementation across Turkey, and within the broader humanitarian system. As applications are accepted across the country, the evaluation must also cover the entire country. The evaluation should focus on the unconditional unrestricted transfers, and other complementary programming (for example, protection referrals) if and when it is developed. The conditional education transfers should be considered as appropriate. Finally, the governance and appropriateness of the system is a key focus for the evaluation.
30. The scope of the evaluation also includes how the ESN cash programming complements/synergises with other humanitarian and development actions in place. This does not imply evaluating the humanitarian response more broadly, but just understanding how the ESN fits into the larger picture.
31. The ESN target population includes all people under international or temporary protection within Turkey. This includes a variety of nationalities and ethnicities, and it is essential that the evaluation considers the varying needs of these different groups – despite the vast majority of potential applicants being Syrian. The evaluation must

ensure that people under different protection regimes (TP, IP) and different nationalities are included. It must evaluate whether the ESSN has ensured access to impartial assistance without discrimination and has not caused or exacerbated any physical or psychological violence. In addition, the evaluation must consider the different needs of and impacts on girls, boys, men and women separately – including the application process, ATM, use of assistance, decision-making and household dynamics.

32. The evaluation must include multiple missions, to learn from the programme as it evolves. Therefore, the inception mission must take place in February 2017, but the final evaluation report will be due in December 2017. Please refer to section 5 (Phases and Deliverables) for more timeline details.

4.2. Evaluation Criteria and Questions

33. **Evaluation Criteria** The evaluation will apply the international evaluation criteria of [Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability, and Connectedness].³ Gender Equality and protection should be mainstreamed throughout. Please refer to OECD footnote for agreed definitions of each criteria.

34. **Impact:** Changes in outcomes will be included in the mid-term evaluation, rather than impact measurement. However, WFP is working with the World Bank on an impact evaluation, focusing on attribution of cause/ establishing a counterfactual. Initial results will be available at the end of 2017, complementing these terms of reference. If/when a final evaluation is considered for ESSN year two, impact will consider more broadly within the terms of reference.

35. **Evaluation Questions** Allied to the evaluation criteria, the evaluation will address the following key questions, which will be further developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons and performance of the ESSN, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions.

36. Key criteria and questions:

Table 2: Criteria and evaluation questions

Criteria	Evaluation Questions
Relevance/ Appropriateness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Is the ESSN relevant for the refugee situation in the Turkish context; to DG ECHO's Humanitarian Strategy in Turkey and the FriT? Does the ESSN comply with humanitarian principles and standards, the EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid and other EU humanitarian Guidelines? How can it be improved? Is the design of the ESSN, including activities and outputs, relevant to the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? Is the single- platform approach relevant and appropriate? Is working through the government systems appropriate for the ESSN? Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of beneficiaries - considering boys, girls, men and women separately? Are the coordination systems (such as the Governance Board and Joint Management Cell) appropriate and useful?
Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How cost-effective is the model of at-scale, unrestricted, predicTable cash transfers compared with short term, restricted vouchers? Is the transfer value sufficient to meet programme objectives (specifically, meeting household basic needs)? Have the transfers affected household behaviours, such as use of coping strategies, changes in food consumption, changes in education or health practices?

Criteria	Evaluation Questions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the major factors that have slowed meeting programmatic objectives in year one, and may prevent the ESSN meeting programmatic objectives in year two? • How does the transfer value impact cost effectiveness? How does the impact evolve over time? • Is the appeals system effective and cost-effective, and are there alternatives? Have these systems functioned to ensure access to impartial assistance without discrimination for all applicants? • What has been the impact of the ESSN on social cohesion? What programmatic factors have influenced this (design of system, amount of transfer, application process, modality of assistance, etc)? Has the ESSN affected beneficiary integration into Turkish society, economically, socially or otherwise? • To what extent has the ESSN affected household dynamics, female participation and/or inclusiveness in household decisions? Has the ESSN caused any unintended negative consequences within households, or within communities? • How have the targeting strategy and implementation model affected boys, girls, men and women? • Are the targeting strategies (application model including appeals, proxy criteria) effective to ensure coverage consistent with humanitarian principles? • What are the inclusion and exclusion errors linked to programme design? Do selected households meet vulnerability requirements? Are the costs (time/ money/ opportunity costs) of targeting worth it? Are there feasible alternatives? • To what extent has the ESSN delivered results for boys, girls, men and women? • Is the ESSN equally accessible and available to all persons of concern (TP, IP of all nationalities)?
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the implementation model chosen (considering working through existing social protection systems, partnerships chosen, single platform cash transfers) efficient? Is it cost-efficient? How does it compare to government welfare system or smaller scale e-voucher programmes? • How has ESSN cost efficiency evolved over time? • Were ESSN objectives achieved on time? What were key barriers to timeliness?
Sustainability or Connectedness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How have ESSN coordination systems fit into the broader coordination structures in-country? • To what extent can the ESSN serve as a model for other crises in the region, and globally? • How has the ESSN contributed to the refugee response in Turkey as a whole, taking into account coordination mechanisms and other programmes? • How has the ESSN integration and connectedness influenced assistance for boys, girls, men and women? • Under what conditions could the ESSN model be implemented elsewhere?

4.3. Data Availability

37. The evaluation team will have access to all M&E and VAM data, including: baseline surveys, PDM surveys, face-to-face comprehensive household surveys, on-site monitoring reports, focus group discussion reports, and all ESSN monitoring/VAM reports.
38. All household data includes the gender of the household head, so indicators can be disaggregated. However, almost all indicators are at household level, so gender-specific outcomes are not tracked quantitatively. These issues must be explored through focus groups and through other qualitative techniques. Process surveys ask about which household members decide on the use of assistance, to better understand influence on household dynamics. The evaluation team will also have access to anonymized demographic data on eligible and ineligible households, which provides complete information on the gender and age composition of each household.
39. The baseline survey starts in February and will take place on a rolling basis until the sample is met – as such, during the initial missions, there will be limited quantitative data available. However, by the mid-term evaluation report, a year’s worth of data will be available to the evaluation team.
40. The baseline and PDM are conducted by phone, so contain only essential outcome indicators, such as the food consumption score, coping strategies and a limited expenditure module. However, there are ongoing face-to-face surveys with more in-depth modules that will be available to the team. In addition, qualitative data collection will complement all quantitative data, and this will be available to the team.
41. Key government data will be relevant, such as registration information from DGMM, housing data from the Population Department, and application data from the Ministry of Family and Social Planning.
42. Concerning the quality of data and information, the evaluation team should:
 - a. assess data availability and reliability as part of the inception phase expanding on the information provided in section 4.3. This assessment will inform the data collection
 - b. systematically check accuracy, consistency and validity of collected data and information and acknowledge any limitations/caveats in drawing conclusions using the data.

4.4. Methodology

43. the methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:
 - Employ the relevant evaluation criteria above: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability/connectedness.
 - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries etc.) The selection of field visit sites will also need to demonstrate impartiality.
 - Using mixed methods (quantitative, qualitative, participatory etc.) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means.
 - Wherever possible, separate analysis for education conditional cash transfers (CCTs) beneficiaries, as the additional cash transfer may influence ability to meet basic needs, thereby skewing analysis of UNCT impact.
 - Apply an evaluation matrix geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the data availability challenges, the budget and timing constraints.

- Ensure through the use of mixed methods that women, girls, men and boys from different stakeholders' groups participate and that their different voices are heard and used.
 - Ensure that women and girls are consulted separately from men and boys to ensure they present their perceptions honestly and completely; and ensure focus groups with women are led by female members of the evaluation team.
 - Mainstream gender equality, women's empowerment and protection, as above.
 - Methodology must include focus on key protection principles, such as do no harm, access to impartial assistance, and protection from harm.
 - It is expected that the evaluation team will rely on collection of qualitative data (i.e. interviews and focus groups), and examining existing quantitative data. However, if the team feels collection of quantitative data is necessary, this possibility can be explored. Team will work to pre-negotiate access to relevant government data through links with WFP and other stakeholders in country.
 - The evaluation team must ensure interviews are conducted with all key stakeholders, including staff from all essential stakeholders listed in External Stakeholder Table above (e.g. the Ministry of Family and Social Planning, Ministry of Interior, UNHCR, UNICEF, AFAD, DG ECHO, etc).
44. The following mechanisms for independence and impartiality will be employed: an internal evaluation committee to be chaired by the Deputy Country Director, responsible for approval of all evaluation outputs and ensuring the evaluation is not influenced by implementers. In addition, an evaluation reference group will be established including all key ESSN stakeholders. This Reference Group will increase the impartiality of the evaluation, and also increase stakeholder engagement with the process.
45. A key measure to increase impartiality of the evaluation will be the hiring of an evaluation manager. The evaluation manager will be a consultant external to WFP, will have no prior engagement with the ESSN, and will have prior experience serving as an external evaluation manager. This person will serve as a neutral party, responsible for engaging with all stakeholders and serving as the link between the evaluation team and the Turkey Country Office. The evaluation manager will be based at his/her home and will travel to Turkey only for the missions identified in the schedule below.
46. The following potential risks to the methodology have been identified: the Ministry of Family and Social Planning and TRC own the baseline and remote PDM data – there are challenges at present in obtaining this data. In addition, the Ministry of Family and Social Planning owns all personal data (such as addresses) of beneficiaries, therefore it may be difficult to reach beneficiaries for focus groups. Additional data on refugees is held by the Department of Migration Management and the Population Department, which is also not shared publicly in any disaggregated level. However, all beneficiary phone numbers are provided for TRC, so in case addresses cannot be provided, WFP/TRC will have to facilitate organising focus groups for the evaluation team using the phone numbers.
47. It is possible that key stakeholders in the process will be too busy with programme implementation to properly engage with the evaluation. In this case, the evaluation manager will be responsible for ongoing follow-up to ensure meeting dates and times are agreed upon, and if necessary, appeal for support to the governing board to ensure multi-stakeholder engagement.
48. A final risk is that due to the ongoing state of emergency, focus groups and other direct interactions with beneficiaries will be restricted, particularly in the South- East. In case of restrictions, WFP/TRC will need to liaise with the Ministry of Family and Social

Planning and local District Governors to ensure these interactions can take place as scheduled.

4.5. Quality Assurance and Quality Assessment.

49. WFP's Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (DEQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, Templates for evaluation products and checklists for their review. DEQAS is closely aligned to the WFP's evaluation quality assurance system and is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice.
50. DEQAS will be systematically applied to this evaluation. The WFP Evaluation Manager will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation progresses as per the DEQAS Process Guide and for conducting a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their finalization.
51. WFP has developed a set of Quality Assurance Checklists for its decentralized evaluations. This includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products. The relevant Checklist will be applied at each stage, to ensure the quality of the evaluation process and outputs.
52. To enhance the quality and credibility of this evaluation, an outsourced quality support (QS) service directly managed by WFP's Office of Evaluation in Headquarter provides review of the draft inception and evaluation report (in addition to the same provided on draft terms of reference), and provide:
 - a. systematic feedback from an evaluation perspective, on the quality of the draft inception and evaluation report
 - b. recommendations on how to improve the quality of the final inception/evaluation report
53. The evaluation manager will review the feedback and recommendations from QS and share with the team leader, who is expected to use them to finalise the inception/evaluation report. To ensure transparency and credibility of the process in line with the UNEG norms and standards^[1], a rationale should be provided for any recommendations that the team does not take into account when finalising the report.
54. This quality assurance process as outline above does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.
55. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. The evaluation team should be assured of the accessibility of all relevant documentation within the provisions of the directive on disclosure of information. This is available in [WFP's Directive \(#CP2010/001\)](#) on Information Disclosure.
56. As noted above, an external, independent evaluation manager will be hired, which will increase the quality of the final product, in addition to ensuring impartiality.
57. Each mission report will be checked to ensure a gender and protection-lens is applied; all feedback and recommendations must consider gender and protection– particularly recommendations for any changes in year two ESSN design and delivery.
58. All final evaluation reports will be subjected to a post hoc quality assessment by an independent entity through a process that is managed by OEV. The overall rating category of the reports will be made public alongside the evaluation reports.

5. Phases and Deliverables

1. The ESSN evaluation is somewhat different from a typical retrospective evaluation, in that multiple missions with corresponding outputs are requested, so the evaluation team can better understand the ESSN and stakeholder perspectives as they evolve.
2. The deliverables and deadlines for each phase are as follows:
3. Planning: Carried out by WFP Turkey Country Office, focused on discussion with stakeholders and initial draft of terms of reference.

Outputs: Draft terms of reference

Stakeholder Involvement: Final draft terms of reference to be shared with Evaluation Reference

Group (ERG) and WFP RB for comments.

4. Preparation: Led by the WFP Turkey Country Office, and handed over to the Evaluation Manager once hired.

Outputs: Final terms of reference and contract signed with evaluation company

Stakeholder Involvement: All stakeholders informed about selection of evaluation company, and final terms of reference are circulated.

5. March 2017, Inception Mission

Outputs: Debriefing PPT; Word document detailing final terms of reference and Methodology

Stakeholder Involvement: Stakeholders to participate in inception mission as required by Team Leader. ERG invited to comment on detailed methodology. ERG invited for Inception Mission debriefing. Final terms of reference and methodology circulated to ERG.

6. May 2017, Mission 2

Output: Debriefing PPT; Brief report focused on baseline and relevance of ESSN programme design

Stakeholder Involvement: ERG invited for Mission 2 debriefing (videoconferencing for international participants). Brief mission 2 report circulated to all stakeholders.

7. September/October 2017, Mission 3

Outputs: Debriefing PPT; Brief report focused on outputs and outcomes

Stakeholder Involvement: ERG invited for Mission 3 debriefing (videoconferencing for international participants). Brief mission 3 report circulated to all stakeholders.

8. December 2017: Mid-term evaluation report due: Incorporating all evaluation questions listed above. The final report must reflect the gender and age disaggregated analysis incorporated throughout the evaluation, particularly with regard to recommendations for year two.

Stakeholder Involvement: Draft mid-term evaluation report will be circulated for comments to ERG. Comments to be addressed incorporated into final version. Final report circulated to all stakeholders.

9. Dissemination: WFP Turkey Office will lead dissemination and communication efforts, including an in-country workshop.

Stakeholder Involvement: All relevant stakeholders invited to workshop, including those directly and indirectly involved in or affected by the ESSN. Key stakeholders in the ESSN process will be consulted regarding the workshop organisation and planning, and findings must be incorporated into the 2018 workplan.

10. The project is expected to last until December 2018. Once funding is confirmed, a phase 2 of the evaluation will be developed, including a final evaluation. Please refer to evaluation schedule in external Annex 2 for more details.

6. Organization of the Evaluation

6.1. Evaluation Conduct

11. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of its team leader and in close communication with the external evaluation manager and the WFP Turkey M&E/VAM team. The team will be hired following agreement with WFP on its composition.
12. The evaluation manager will be responsible for coordination with all stakeholders and will liaise directly with one key point of contact within the WFP Turkey office whenever necessary. It is expected that the manager and the WFP point of contact will have weekly contact in preparation for missions, and contact in between missions as required.
13. The evaluation team will not have been involved in the design or implementation of the subject of evaluation or have any other conflicts of interest. Further, they will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the evaluation profession](#).
14. Please refer to the evaluation schedule in external Annex 2 for more details on the organisation of the evaluation.

6.2. Team Composition and Competencies

15. The evaluation team is expected to include 3-5 members, including the team leader, and Turkish national evaluators. To the extent possible, the evaluation will be conducted by a gender-balanced, geographically and culturally diverse team with appropriate skills to assess gender and protection dimensions of the subject as specified in the scope, approach and methodology sections of the terms of reference. At least one team member should have WFP experience.
16. The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in the following areas:

Expertise evaluating cash-based programmes

A demonstrated understanding of social safety net programming; preferably with prior evaluation expertise in this domain

Experience working within Turkey, particularly with the Turkish government and/or other Turkish organisations

Gender and protection expertise / good knowledge of gender and protection issues

All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills, evaluation experience and familiarity with the Syria crisis

The team must include members fluent in English, Turkish and Arabic, in order to converse with WFP and other UN agencies, the Turkish government and ESSN

beneficiaries. Other languages of refugees in Turkey will be considered a bonus. All submitted reports must be in English

All documents will be translated into Turkish for consumption/ distribution among Turkish stakeholders

Establishing partnerships or inclusion of Turkish institutions, such as universities or the Turkish Statistical Institute, is strongly encouraged

The team must be gender-balanced, including female members who are capable of leading focus groups and interacting with beneficiaries

17. The Team leader will have technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well:
 - Expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools
 - Demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations
 - Prior experience with the Syria crisis and in-depth knowledge of the context
 - Leadership, analytical and communication skills
 - A track record of excellent English writing and presentation skills.
18. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the Inception Report, the end of field work (i.e. exit) debriefing presentation and evaluation report in line with DEQAS.
19. The team members will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.
20. Team members will: i) contribute to the methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s).
21. The team leader and the evaluation manager will work extremely closely in preparation for, during and post-missions, to ensure all necessary data is available, key stakeholders are consulted and meetings are scheduled. The team leader will be responsible for the direct supervision of other team members.

6.3. Security Considerations

22. Security clearance where required is to be obtained from the WFP Turkey Country Office, with official approval from UN Department of Safety & Security.
 - As an ‘independent supplier’ of evaluation services to WFP, the evaluation company is responsible for ensuring the security of all persons contracted, including adequate arrangements for evacuation for medical or situational reasons. The consultants contracted by the evaluation company do not fall under the UNDSS system for UN personnel.
 - Consultants hired independently are covered by UNDSS system for UN personnel which cover WFP staff and consultants contracted directly by WFP. Independent consultants must obtain UNDSS security clearance for travelling to be obtained from designated duty station and complete the UN system’s Basic and Advance Security in the Field courses in advance, print out their certificates and take them with them.⁴

23. However, to avoid any security incidents, the Evaluation Manager is requested to ensure that:
- The WFP CO registers the team members with the Security Officer on arrival in country and arranges a security briefing for them to gain an understanding of the security situation on the ground.
 - The team members observe applicable UN security rules and regulations – e.g. curfews etc.
24. Additional UNDSS clearance will be required for travel within Turkey, with specific requirements for zones within 10km of the Syrian border. Some areas within the east of the country may be forbidden for travel due to ongoing conflict; the team must develop contingency plans for those areas where primary data collection will not be permitted.

7. Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders

25. The WFP Turkey Office:

a) The WFP Turkey Office Deputy Country Director will take responsibility to:

- Assign an internal point of contact for the evaluation, as the Evaluation Manager will be externally hired: M&E or VAM Officer.
- Compose the internal evaluation committee and the evaluation reference group (see below).
- Approve the final Tor, inception and evaluation reports.
- Ensure the independence and impartiality of the evaluation at all stages, including establishment of an evaluation committee and of a Reference Group (see below and [TN on Independence and Impartiality](#)).
- Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and the evaluation subject, its performance and results with the Evaluation Manager and the evaluation team, supported by relevant WFP staff.
- Organise and participate in two separate debriefings, one internal and one with external stakeholders.
- Oversee dissemination and follow-up processes, including the preparation of a Management Response to the evaluation recommendations.

b) Evaluation Manager (externally hired):

- Manages the evaluation process through all phases including drafting these terms of reference
- Ensure quality assurance mechanisms are operational
- Consolidate and share comments on draft terms of reference, inception and evaluation reports with the evaluation team
- Ensures expected use of quality assurance mechanisms (checklists, QS)
- Ensure that the team has access to all documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team's contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required
- Organise security briefings for the evaluation team and provide any materials as required

c) An internal evaluation committee has been formed as part of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the evaluation, including the Deputy Country Director, the Evaluation Manager, the Head of Programme and the M&E Officer. Please refer to external Annex 3 for a list of members.

26. An evaluation reference group has been formed, as appropriate, with representation from DG ECHO, the Ministry of Family and Social Planning, TRC, AFAD, Ministry of Interior and UNICEF (please refer to external Annex 3 for list of members) and will review the evaluation products as further safeguard against bias and influence. The final report will be endorsed by the ESSN Governing Board.
27. RB management will take responsibility to:
 - Assign a focal point for the evaluation. Anna-Leena Rasanen, Regional M&E Adviser, will be the focal point for this evaluation
 - Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the evaluation subject as relevant
 - Provide comments on the draft terms of reference, Inception and Evaluation reports
 - Support the Management Response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations
28. Relevant WFP Headquarters divisions will take responsibility to:
 - Discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and subject of evaluation.
 - Comment on the evaluation terms of reference and draft report.
29. Other Stakeholders (Government, NGOs, UN agencies) will review all evaluation outputs. DG ECHO will play a key role within the evaluation reference group, as they have particular interest in the outcomes of this evaluation.
30. The Office of Evaluation will advise the Evaluation Manager and provide support to the evaluation process where appropriate. It is responsible to provide access to independent QS mechanisms reviewing draft inception and evaluation reports from an evaluation perspective. It also ensure a help desk function upon request from the RBs.

8. Communication and budget

8.1. Communication

31. To ensure a smooth and efficient process and enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation team should place emphasis on transparent and open communication with key stakeholders. These will be achieved by ensuring a clear agreement on channels and frequency of communication with and between key stakeholders. The Evaluation Manager will be responsible for communication between stakeholders, and ensuring feedback is addressed by the evaluation team. In case of required in-country follow-up, the M&E Officer will serve as the local point of contact to ensure all relevant stakeholders provide required input.
32. As part of the international standards for evaluation, WFP requires that all evaluations are made publicly available. Following the approval of the final evaluation report, including TRC/ Ministry of Family and Social Planning approval, it will be promptly translated into Turkish and disseminated to the Government of Turkey. The evaluation report will be disseminated among another humanitarian organisations working in Turkey and the Syria crisis, including UN agencies, NGOs and donors. Finally, a communications event will be organised specifically to disseminate the findings of this evaluation; a wide variety of humanitarian organisations operating within Turkey will be invited.
33. The final evaluation report will be due in December and circulated immediately once finalised. The communications event will be scheduled for January, shortly after many relevant staff members will return from leave. The WFP communications team will be

responsible for organising this event – planning will start in November/December 2017 to ensure all relevant stakeholders are available on the selected day.

34. Community leaders or organisers may also be invited to the final workshop, to ensure information is disseminated to beneficiary populations. In addition, Accountability to Affected Populations colleagues will be consulted to determine the best way to communicate findings to beneficiaries, including use of the Facebook page and SMS.

8.2. Budget

35. Budget: For the purpose of this evaluation, the budget will:

- Rely on the Long-Term Agreements established by the Office of Evaluation.
- Using the guidance in this terms of reference, the evaluation company is expected to create a realistic budget, including sufficient field time to cover a variety of Turkish provinces. Required areas include, but are not limited to: Istanbul, Ankara, Gaziantep and Sanliurfa. Additional areas must be proposed, including those with smaller refugee populations.
- The budget must also include the costs of an external Evaluation Manager, estimated total LoE 20 days.
- The budget also includes the above-mentioned communications workshop to disseminate findings at the end of the year.

Please send any queries to Aysha Twose, VAM Officer at aysha.twose@wfp.org.

Annex 2: Evaluation Timeline

Table 3: Evaluation timeline

Tasks	Responsible	Dates
Phase 1 – Inception		
Inception mission in Turkey	EM + ET	15-26 May 2017
Submit Draft 1 Inception Report to EM (after company's quality check)	ETL	16-Jun 2017
DEQAS internal quality assurance and feedback	EM	19-23 June 2017
Response to DEQAS comments	ET	26-30 June 2017
Submit Draft 2 Inception Report	ETL	30-Jun 2017
Review of draft IR by External Review Group	EM + ERG	3-14 July 2017
Review of draft IR by government coordination group	EM + ERG	3 July-11 Aug 2017
Revision of report according to ERG comments	ET	11-14 Aug 2017
Translation of IR	ET	14-29 Aug 2017
Submit Draft 3 Inception Report	ETL	5-Sept 2017
Seek ERG approval of final report	EM	5 - 12 Sept 2017
Response to comments		13-15 Sept 2017
Submit Final Draft Inception Report	ET	15-Sep 2017
Circulate final Inception Report to all stakeholders	EM	18-Sep 2017
Phase 2 – Data Collection and Analysis		
Ankara Level Key Informant Interviews (non-government only)	ET	24 - 28 July 2017
Mobilization of field team	ET/TRC	18-22 Sept 2017
Province/district level interviews (5 provinces)	ET	25 Sept – 3 Nov 2017
Phase 3 – Reporting		
Data synthesis and report drafting	ET	5 March 2018
Team meeting (2) to review draft findings and discuss conclusions and recommendations	ET	9 Mach 2018
Initial presentation of results (to WFP, TRC & DG ECHO)	ET	15 March 2018
Internal OPM Quality Assurance (Paul Harvey)	ET	9/10 April 2018
Submit Draft 1 Evaluation Report to outsourced quality assurance - DEQAS	ET	13-April 2018
WFP & DEQAS feedback to OPM	EM	27-April 2018
Response to DEQAS & WFP comments	ET	4-May 2018
Translation of Evaluation Report	ET	25 May 2018
Submit Draft 2 Evaluation Report to Evaluation Manager (circulation to evaluation reference group)	ET	28-May 2018
Review of draft ER by Evaluation Reference Review Group	EM + ERG	18 June 2018
Response to ERG comments	ET	1-June 2018
Submit Final Evaluation Report	ET	30-June 2018
Seek Final Approval. Clarify last points/issues with the team	ET	TBD

Annex 3: ESSN Results Framework, Indicators and Activities

The following Table has been developed by the evaluation team on the basis of the ESSN proposal, interim report and modification requests submitted to DG ECHO. The evaluation team attempted to give a progress value that reflects current status of the programme, beyond what is reported in the modification requests. On some occasions we have used more recent data to update the progress values. This is indicated in footnotes.

Key:

MRI: Modification Request I Feb 2017

MRII: Modification Request II April 2017

MRIII: Modification Request III October 2017

Table 4: ESSN Results framework, indicators and activities

Principle Objective: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies by improving the living conditions of the most vulnerable refugees through predictable and dignified support addressing basic needs			
Specific objective: Stabilise or improve living standards of the most vulnerable out of camp refugee HHs through basic needs support via a nationwide ESSN			
Target indicators	Baseline¹	Target	Progress value²
1. Decrease in HH Coping Strategy Index disaggregated by gender of the head of HH Updated in MRIII to: % decrease in mean Livelihoods Coping Strategies Index (LCSI), disaggregated by gender of the head of household.	24% Updated MRII: LCSI:5.17 Updated MRIII: LCSI 6.36 female head HH: 6.86 male head HH: 6.14	75% of HH have at least a 30% decrease coping Updated MRIII: LCSI 5.36³ (15% decrease)	MRIII: LCSI: 6.04 female head HH: 6.14 male head HH: 5.97
2. % of the target population with acceptable food consumption score, disaggregated by gender of the head of HH	71% Updated MRII: 76.5% Updated MRIII to: female head HH 75% male head HH 78%	87.5 Updated MRIII to: 87.5% female head HH 85% male head HH 88%	86% ⁴ female head HH 85% male head HH 87%

¹ Periodic updates to Baseline data refer to increased availability of PAB data.

² Unless otherwise stated in a footnote, sources of progress values are programme data or CVME and PDM data from MRI-MRIII. Some PDM results are preliminary and require updating.

³ Note that we were unable to reproduce the LCSI. We used the Livelihood Coping Index using WFP methodologies, as described in Annex 12.

⁴ Evaluators calculations using PDM data. Note: this is computed using the WFP PAB threshold of acceptable scores being greater than 42

Target indicators	Baseline ¹	Target	Progress value ²
3. % of HHs not incurring new debt to meet basic needs, disaggregated by gender of the head of HH	57% of households already in debt Updated MRII: 20% Updated MRIII: female head HH: 24.3% male head HH: 24.7%	85-100% MRII: revised to 60% MRIII: revised to 45%	MRIII: female head HH 23.5% male head HH 21.7%
4. % of HHs confirming that their debts are more manageable since they started receiving assistance under the ESSN, disaggregated by gender of the head of HH	n/a	85%	71% ⁵
5. % HHs with per capita expenditure equal to or below the Minimum Expenditure Basket (316TL), disaggregated by gender of the head of HH.	92.6% Updated MRII:64.3% Updated MRIII: 73% female head HH: 76% male head HH: 71.5%	15-40% Updated MRII:30% Updated MRIII: 63% female head HH 66% male head HH 61.5%	61% ⁶ female head HH 64% male head HH 60%
6. New after MRIII: Percentage of individual beneficiaries with per capita expenditure below the World Bank Upper Middle-Income Country poverty line, \$5.5/ day (284 TL), disaggregated by gender of the head of household.	64% female head HH: 69% male head HH: 62%	54% female head HH: 59% male head HH 52%	61% ⁷ female head HH: 62% male head HH: 60%
7. % of surveyed beneficiaries who are informed about key aspects of the programme (awareness of their entitlement & where they can complain)	n/a MRIII: 61%	90%	61% ⁸
8. % of assisted people able to access necessary assistance in a safe & dignified manner, without being subject to associated risks at registration/distribution points etc.	n/a Updated MRIII: 96%	95% Updated MRIII: 99%	95.5% ⁹
9. Added at MRI: % of households receiving transitional assistance using crisis or emergency coping strategies, disaggregated by gender of the head of household	37.5%	30%	

⁵ Evaluators calculations from the PDM.

⁶ Evaluators calculations from the PDM.

⁷ Evaluators calculations from the PDM.

⁸ The value is from CVME May-Aug 2017, this is more logically a progress value, rather than a Baseline.

⁹ Evaluators calculations from CVME May-Aug 2017. It refers to the variable: “% of beneficiaries did not face a problem redeeming cash”

Result 1: Provision of monthly basic needs assistance to vulnerable HHs through multi-purpose cash (Budget EUR 329,027,341)			
Target indicators	Baseline	Target	Progress value
1. Number of service centres established in 6 months.	9	23 Updated MRII: 18	9 ¹⁰ MRIII: 14
2. % of applications received deemed eligible.	0	40% Updated MRII: 50%	60% ¹¹ MRIII: 36.9
3. Number of individuals identified as eligible	0	1 million Updated MRII: 1,300,000 MRIII: 1,192,569,000	1,199,482 ¹² MRIII: 12099
4. % exclusion error (defined as those from the poorest 40% excluded from the ESSN) Dropped at MRII: % inclusion error	n/a Updated MRII: 18%	Exclusion error: 10% Dropped at MRII: incl error 5%	MRIII: 5.33% ¹³
5. MRII Rephrased: % of ESSN cards distributed Original: Number of beneficiary households receiving ESSN cards disaggregated by sex and age of the head of household	0	200,000 Updated MRII: 95%	98% ¹⁴ MRIII: 19.15
6. % of beneficiary HH redeeming min. 75% of ESSN every month MRIII Rephrased: Percentage of beneficiary households redeeming minimum 75% of their ESSN assistance at the time of reporting	0	100% MRIII: 80%	
7. Total value of cash redeemed by beneficiaries MRIII Rephrased: Total value of ESSN assistance redeemed by targeted beneficiaries in % against entitlement at time of reporting	0	75%	90% ¹⁵ MRIII: 0
8. Added MRI: Number of individuals receiving transitional cash assistance. by sex, % of planned	0	100%	

¹⁰ This is from the ESSN website: http://kizilaykart-suy.org/EN/Docs/HM_Liste.pdf. Since the surge capacity is no longer needed, the number of TRC service centres has declined. The target number of 18 is unlikely to be required.

¹¹ This value is from WFP VAM data from February 2018.

¹² This value is from WFP VAM data from February 2018.

¹³ The evaluators would recommend treating this result with scepticism. MRIII reports CVME and PDM as data source. The PDM report puts the exclusion rate at 7% using the *extreme poverty line*, not the *bottom 40% poverty line*. This is higher than the stated target value. The evaluation team's calculations based on a bottom 40% poverty line yield **Baseline values of 49% for inclusion error and 42% for exclusion error**, using the PAB.

Based on PAB, per capita expenditure, and using relative poverty line capturing the poorest 40%.

¹⁴ from Halkbank form Septemeber 2017

¹⁵ August 2017 report from Halkbank

Result 1: Provision of monthly basic needs assistance to vulnerable HHs through multi-purpose cash (Budget EUR 329,027,341)			
Target indicators	Baseline	Target	Progress value
9. Added MRI Value of cash distributed to beneficiaries receiving transitional assistance. % of planned	0	100%	
10. Added MRIII: Total value of cash swept back from dormant accounts/uncollected cards redistributed to beneficiaries	0	100%	It is estimated that as much as 1.5M EUR could be swept back from dormant accounts.

Activities

1. Finalisation of criteria, tools, SOPs
2. Finalise value of transfer
3. Sensitisation
4. Support set up & operations of service centres & SASFs
5. Identification of vulnerable HHs
6. Selection of Financial Service Provider
7. Distribution of ESSN assistance cards
8. Provision of assistance to eligible HHs
9. Contracting of implementing partners
10. Added in MRII: Transitional cash assistance to refugees previously assisted by cash programmes

Result 2: Capacity of national partners developed and augmented (Budget EUR 11,514,733)			
Target indicators	Baseline	Target	Progress value
1. Rephrased MR II: Number of integrations connecting relevant databases for implementation of ESSN. ¹⁶ Original: Relevant databases for implementation of ESSN have ability to communicate directly	0	3 Updated MR II: 5	MR III: 3.5
2. Staff hired to support ESSN (Ministry of Family and Social Planning & TRC) % of planned.	0	100%	MR III: 41%
3. Trainings & workshops conducted, % of planned.	0	100%	MR III: 37.5%
4. People trained disaggregated by sex	0	100%	MR III: 50%
5. Percentage of Service Centres and supported SASFs running in accordance with the rules, regulations and SOPs explained during the training Rephrased MR III: Percentage of visited Service Centres and SASFs with issues recorded by WFP	0	100%	MR III: 82%
6. Exit strategy developed Rephrased MR III: Foundations for potential transition strategy laid out	0	1 MR III: 0.5	MR III: 0.5

Activities

1. Data systems enhancement
2. Map capacity of SASF
3. Enhance capacity to deliver ESSN
4. Enhance call centre
5. Development and provision of capacity building for TRC
6. Development and provision of capacity building for the Ministry of Family and Social Planning
7. Development of exit strategy (continued ESSN after the end of funding)¹⁷

¹⁶ The following 5 connections are expected to be in place: Ministry of Family and Social Planning (Bysbs) - TRC (Gocmen), Nufus (MERNIS) - TRC (Gocmen), Nufus (MERNIS) - Ministry of Family and Social Planning (Bsybs), DGMM (Goenet) - Nufus (MERNIS), DGMM (Goenet) - Ministry of Family and Social Planning (Bsybs)

¹⁷ MR III states that “WFP remains fully committed to developing and planning a sustainable and accountable future for the ESSN and will make its best efforts to ensure options are laid out and a common vision is agreed in a reasonable timeframe. Throughout this Action, emphasis was put on ensuring strong foundations are in place for a possible handover to national actors in due time, essentially focusing on alignment with national systems (indicated in the IR as achieved value 0.5 for this indicator). Recognising that the foundations for a sustainable and accountable future for the ESSN have been laid under the present Action, the target value for this indicator has been revised to 0.5.”

Result 3: Efficient and effective coordination for improved efficiency of humanitarian response (Budget EURO)			
Target indicators	Baseline	Target	Progress value¹⁸
1. ESSN steering committee established Rephrased MRII: ESSN Governing Board established & operational.	0	1	MRIII: 1
2. Joint Management cell established & operational ¹⁹	0	1	MRIII: 1
3. Number of sectoral and thematic coordination mechanisms participated in by WFP. Dropped MRII: Number of ESSN working groups established	0	6	8 ²⁰ MRIII: 2
4. Removed MRIII: Stakeholders who feel coordination & communication within ESSN is appropriate & timely	0	5	
5. Percentage of Service Centres and SASFs who feel coordination and communication with the ESSN coordination are appropriate and timely Rephrased MRIII to: Percentage of surveyed SASF staff who feel coordination and communication within the ESSN are appropriate and timely	0	80%	MRIII: 0

Activities

1. Support ESSN Governing Board & associated working groups
2. Implement joint management cell
3. Participate in other coordination mechanisms

¹⁸ Sources of progress values are programme data or CVME and PDM data. PDM results are preliminary and require updating.

¹⁹ MRII added the words 'joint' and 'operational'

²⁰ MRII October 2017: Coordination mechanisms include: (1) Information Management Working Group, (2) Protection Working Group, (3) Health Working Group, (4) ESSN Task Force, (5) Basic Needs Working Group, (6) Winterization Task Force, (7) Livelihoods Working Group, and (8) Food Security and Agriculture Working Group.

Result 4: Monitoring & Learning (Budget EUR 0)			
Target indicators	Baseline	Target	Progress value²¹
1. Monitoring system developed	0	1	MRIII: 1
2. Original: Monitoring operational (meaning monthly and quarterly monitoring) Rephrased MRII: Monitoring reports produced	0	2 MRII: 1	MRIII: 1
3. Number of comprehensive vulnerability assessments	0	1 MRII: 2	1 ²² MRIII: 0.2
4. Number of studies	0	2	1 ²³ MRIII: 0.4

Activities

1. Preparation of monitoring for ESSN implementation
2. Monitoring of ESSN implementation
3. Conduct Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise
4. Conduct ESSN studies incl. external longitudinal study of the ESSN


²¹ Sources of progress values are programme data or CVME and PDM data. PDM results are preliminary and require updating.

²² To the best of our knowledge one Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise has taken place.

²³ According to MRII documents this includes: (1) the Impact Evaluation with the World Bank and (2) this Decentralised Evaluation. Both are in the last stages before completion.

Annex 4: ESSN Theory of Change

The Figure has been developed by WFP and is reproduced below.



Annex 5: ESSN Application and Assessment Process

Targeting Criteria

It was assumed that 80% of 3 million refugees would apply to ESSN and ESSN should select the 40% most vulnerable.²⁴ Given the unprecedented numbers of refugees and the shift to cover basic needs and not just food security, WFP has taken the decision to select beneficiaries based on their level of vulnerability²⁵ rather than on their refugee status alone²⁶. The pressure to quickly scale up assistance to reach those most in need discouraged the use of time-consuming and costly targeting criteria requiring income or consumption measurement in favour of the use of a restricted number of straightforward criteria, mainly demographics.

In this context a VAM mission from the RB and Headquarters of WFP visited Turkey in March 2016 and based on regression analysis using PAB²⁷ data and internationally commonly used vulnerability criteria proposed a number of easily verifiable vulnerability targeting criteria.²⁸ Following this, a targeting working group composed of WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, and TRC met in April-May 2016 and used the mission’s recommendations to come up with the selected targeting criteria.

In order to achieve a fast scale-up demographic targeting criteria were recommended and the assistance provided by Turkish welfare system to categories of Turkey’s citizens such as widows, disabled people, low-income people were also taken into account. Eventually the targeting criteria that was agreed among all ESSN stakeholders could be seen in Table 5. The criteria were: (1) Families with a dependency ratio higher than 1.5, (2) with two disabled members (with medical report), (3) with four or more children, (4) single females, (5) single parent households, (6) elderly headed households.

Targeting criteria was changed in May 2017 since planned number of beneficiaries was falling behind actual number of beneficiaries.²⁹ In the new targeting criteria families with dependency ratio equal to 1.5 and families with one disabled individual became eligible as well.

Table 5: ESSN targeting criteria

Old Criteria	New Criteria
Dependency ratio >1.5	Dependency ratio >=1.5
At least 2 Disabled members with medical report	At least 1 Disabled members with medical report
	At least 4 Children
	Single female household
	Single parent household
	Household head aged 60+

Source: WFP 2017. ESSN Monitoring Report for Q2 (March-June 2017)

²⁴ WFP 2017. Emergency Social Safety Net Targeting Criteria – Background and Evidence.

²⁵ Vulnerability is defined as “exposure to risk and the lack of ability to cope with its consequences”.

²⁶ WFP Turkey, “Basic Needs Programming in Turkey: Establishing Targeting Criteria and a Minimum Expenditure Basket.,” April 2016.

²⁷ Note that this is not the PAB data that we are using in this report. This initial baseline only includes data from Southeastern Turkey provinces.

²⁸ WFP 2017. Emergency Social Safety Net Targeting Criteria – Background and Evidence


²⁹ WFP 2017. ESSN Monitoring Report for Q2 (March-June 2017).

ESSN Application and Assessment Process

The ESSN application and assessment process is presented in Annex 5 and summarized below:

- **Sensitisation:** Information about the programme was planned to be made available through a range of media outlets including: printed materials (leaflets and posters) distributed through the SASF, DGMM and TRC offices and through local and international NGOs; billboards; an ESSN website and Facebook page; and, national television and local radio.
- **Identification:** Applications for the ESSN are received on a rolling basis and there is currently no closing date for the submission of applications. Given the lack of verifiable socio-economic data on refugees and the need for rapid scale up, eligibility for enrolment to the ESSN is based on six demographic vulnerability criteria³⁰, rather than socio-economic indicators. In line with the emergency and disaster protocols on the Turkish social assistance system, all beneficiary households are to receive a household verification visit by SASF officers – but within one year³¹ of enrolment rather than as a pre-requisite for enrolment.
- **Feedback Mechanism:** A call centre has been set up that provides a free of charge helpline for beneficiaries on the ESSN. It aims to provide information on the ESSN application processes; receive feedback and complaints, and ensure that specific issues are followed up on and resolved.

Figure 4: ESSN Application and Assessment Process



Source: WFP correspondence in 2017

³⁰ Elderly headed households; single headed household; single women; families with +4 children; families with more than 2 disabled members; families with a dependency ratio of 1.5 and above.

³¹ It was originally planned that visits would take place six months after enrolment into the programme. This proved unfeasible and the timeframe was extended to one year. (Correspondence with WFP)

Annex 6: Refugee Crisis Timeline

Year	Month	Key event
2011	29 th April	252 Syrian people crossed the Turkish border fleeing from the civil disruption in their country
2012		The first humanitarian appeals were launched - refugee numbers were still less than 200,000
2012	October	WFP/AFAD/ TRC/ Ministry of Family and Social Planning begin food voucher programme reaching those living in camps with 100 TL per month (50TL from WFP/TRC and 50TL from AFAD)
2013		The funding appeals and response strategies and activities of the government and the humanitarian community in Turkey consolidated and coordinated through the Regional Response and Resilience Plan
2013		Other international actors begin voucher responses
2014		Turkey's first asylum law, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, was established to manage international protection and migration-related matters. It established a new agency, the DGMM under the Ministry of Interior
2014	July	WFP and TRC assist 220,000 Syrians in 21 camps with the e-food card
2014	22 October	Under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the Council of Ministers issued a regulation on temporary protection for Syrian nationals, refugees and stateless persons from Syria seeking international protection in Turkey. Those that register for temporary protection are issued with a TP identification document which grants the right to stay in Turkey and to access to main public services (free access to state health and education (public or TEC) services, and access to social assistance for vulnerable cases)
2015		Turkey became – and has remained - the largest refugee hosting country in the world
2015	July	The first cash assistance to off-camp refugees begins, through WFP and TRC's pilot programme to assist the most vulnerable Syrians living in communities in the South East (through TRC's Kizilaykart)
2015	August	Only 13% of the Syrian refugee population now live in camps, with the vast majority now living in host communities in urban or rural areas
2015	September	Government of Turkey had spent over \$7.6 billion providing for the needs of refugees, including over \$6 billion in camps
2015	25 October	Adoption of the EU-Turkish Joint Action Plan (JAP) at the European Council
2015	29 November	JAP activated, part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda to increase support for Syrian refugees under temporary protection and their host communities in Turkey and prevent irregular migration flows to the EU. It opens the possibility of a source of more long-term, predictable financing for the crisis and for national budget support
2015	1 November	General election is held in Turkey; following the result the peace process between the Government of Turkey and Kurdish representatives broke down. Nationwide protests and clashes followed. Since then the government has restricted data collection activities of aid agencies and has heavily protected access to refugee data collected through DGMM
2015	24 November	Under the JAP, FRiT was established. The EC and the Member States committed to provide an initial €3 billion in 2016 and 2017 with €1.4 billion allocated for humanitarian needs
2015	December	81% of refugees were concentrated in just ten provinces in the South east: Adana, Adiyaman, Gaziantep, Hatay, Kahramanmaras, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, Osmaniye and Şanlıurfa
2015	December	In cooperation with the Turkish authorities comprising the Syria Task Force under the Prime Minister's Office, the European Commission launched a First Stage Needs Assessment for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey
2016	January	Over 2.65 million registered refugees living under temporary protection in Syria including over 2.5 million Syrians
2016	January	Under the TP regime registered and documented Syrian refugees can now apply for work permits to access formal employment within their province of residence, six months after acceptance of his or her temporary protection status
2016	February	UNICEF undertakes feasibility study exploring the potential of linking cash assistance for refugees with the national social assistance system

Year	Month	Key event
2016	4 March	First contracts under the FRiT signed (euro 37 million for education with UNICEF, euro 40m for hum food assistance with WFP)
2016	April	European Commission First Stage Needs Assessment for Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey is completed
2016	April	2100 work permits were issued to Syrians under TP
2016	12 May	Steering committee of FRiT meets to endorse the sectoral and thematic prioritise of the FRiT including hum assistance, infrastructure, health, education, socio-economic support and migration management
2016	3 June	HIP for Turkey is published, which sets out the FRiT's humanitarian strategy, totalling euro 505.6 m. HIP outlines the plans for the ESSN, which was intended to be making the first payments in Sept 2016, reaching 500,000 refugees by December 2016 and achieving the programme objective of supporting 1 million refugees by April 2017
2016	30 June	Steering committee of the FRiT meets to discuss Special Measure of support worth Euro 1.4bn to fast track the mobilisation of funding to support needs of refugees, and present the concept of the ESSN
2016	20 July	A failed military coup in Turkey, following which the President declared a 3 month state of emergency and the government further curtailed freedom of speech and movement
2016	28 July	EC adopts Special Measure worth Euro 1.42 billion to support refugees in Turkey in sectors of health, education, infrastructure and socio-economic support
2016	8 September	EC agrees the biggest ever hum aid programme worth Euro 348m. Contract for ESSN is signed between EC and WFP, to support the needs of up to 1m refugees
2016	October	Government of Turkey had contributed over \$12 billion in support of Syrians in Turkey
2016	October	Pilot of the ESSN is implemented in two districts of Ankara and Sivas provinces
2016	November	WFP's voucher programme reached 142,000 refugees living in camps and 147,000 refugees living off-camp
2016	November	ESSN is launched nationwide
2016	December	3.1million registered refugees living under TP in Turkey, including 2.8 million Syrians
2016	December	First payments are made on the roll-out of the ESSN, which reached 3,913 beneficiaries
2017		The 3RP in Turkey is extended to a two-year timeframe underlining an increased focus on medium and long-term strategies
2017	April	UNHCR estimate that there are 2.9 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey
2017	16 April	A constitutional referendum granted further special powers to the President of Turkey - criticised by human rights organisations
2017	April	Programme had enrolled half the anticipated target (500,000 beneficiaries). The project timeline was revised, with the (increased) target of 1.3M beneficiaries projected to be reached by November. The final transfer under WFP's off-camp programme is made
2017	June	680,000 beneficiaries enrolled
2017	August	1M beneficiaries enrolled
2017	September	Approximately 26,000 work permits to Syrians living under TP had been issued - less than 4% of the population
2017	27 November	380,549 applications to the ESSN had been received, representing more than 1.9 million people. Ninety-nine percent have been processed with 54 percent of assessed applications being eligible. In November, ESSN payments were transferred to 189,589 households (totalling 1,122,246 persons)

Source: Author based on WFP^{32,33} and DG ECHO³⁴.


³² WFP Turkey, "WFP Timeline April," April 2017.

³³ WFP, "Country Brief," June 2017, <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp279438.pdf>.

³⁴ BCG, "DG ECHO Presentation," March 2017.


Annex 7: Geographic Distribution of Refugees by Province

Figure 5: Non-Syrian Refugees and Asylum Seekers by Province



Source: UNHCR as of December 2017 <https://data2.unhcr.org/es/documents/download/62114>

Figure 6: Syrian Refugees and Asylum Seekers by Province



Source: UNHCR as of December 2017 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/61829>

Annex 8: Qualitative Data Analysis of Focus Group Discussions

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List of Abbreviations

ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for education
DGMM	Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
FGD	Focus group discussion
KII	Key informant interview
MoFSP	Ministry of Family and Social Policies
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
SASF	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
SPL	Support-to-Life (<i>Hayata Destek</i>)
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
WFP	World Food Programme

1. Profile of Participants

Throughout the qualitative fieldwork, the team met ESSN beneficiary, non-beneficiary and non-applicant Syrian and non-Syrian male and female groups. Out of 23 FGDs, 8 were conducted with men and 15 were conducted with women (see Table 6). The FGD participants completed a short quantitative survey that enabled the research team to provide a brief profile of the participants.

Table 6: Number of FGDs and number of attendees

	Beneficiary status	Number of FGDs			Number of FGD attendees		
		Gender		Total	Gender		Total
		Men	Women		Men	Women	
Applicant	Beneficiary	6	9	15	53	61	114
	Non-beneficiary (rejected)	1	4	5	9	29	38
Non-applicant	Non-beneficiary (non-applicant)	1	2	3	9	16	25
Total		8	15	23	71	106	177

Household size: The average number of people living in the same household is 5.9, with 3.1 children aged under 18 (see Table 7). While the average household size is about the same across beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, beneficiary households in our sample are likely to have more children. This is probably a function of demographic eligibility criteria.

Educational attainment: The overall education level of the participants is low. One in every five participants at FGDs was illiterate. Half of them had completed either primary school or lower secondary education. There was no difference in education level between female and male participants. Table 7 below displays basic characteristics of FGD participants by their beneficiary status.

Gender and age distribution: By design, there were more women participants at the FGDs: 40 percent of attendees were men and 60 percent were women. On average participants were 38.7 years old. More than half of the participants (60 percent) were younger than 40, and only a few (n=11) of them were 60 years old or over.

Employment status: A large number of FGD participants (55 percent) were not in the labour market. While some of them were looking for work (21 percent), the number of employed participants was very limited (24 percent). The share of participants who were not in the labour market (not employed, not looking for work) was about half the participants in every province. The share of employed participants differed largely across provinces. In Hatay and Istanbul, about 40 percent of participants stated that they were employed. This rate decreased to 7 percent in Afyon.

Table 7: Basic participant characteristics

	Beneficiary	Non-beneficiary (rejected)	Non-applicant	Overall
Average age of the participant	39.8	35.1	34.7	38.7
Average years lived in Turkey	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.2
Average household size	5.9	5.7	6	6.4

	Beneficiary	Non-beneficiary (rejected)	Non-applicant	Overall
Average number of dependent children in HH	3.5	2.3	2.5	3.1
Average number of elderly in HH	0.23	0.27	0.54	0.3

Source: Quantitative survey collected in FGDs

The participant profile in the FGDs for this study is similar to the profile of beneficiaries in the quantitative data sources used for the evaluation. According to PDM, which is representative of the applicant refugee population in Turkey, the average household size is 6 and the average number of children is 3.2 in (applicant) refugee households. These averages are almost the same as the averages of the FGD participants. Information on the educational attainment of refugees is not collected in PAB or PDM, which are representative surveys. Instead, therefore, we compared the FGD participants' education profile with a non-representative data source, CVME (Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise). This comparison shows that FGD participants' education profile is similar to the education profile of the household heads in the CVME dataset.³⁵ According to the CVME dataset, 22.7 percent of household heads are illiterate, another 7 percent know how to read and write but have not graduated from primary school and 49.5 percent have primary or lower secondary education. None of the quantitative datasets provides information about the employment rate of refugees; hence we cannot compare the employment status of participants with the overall refugee population. The qualitative data collected for the ESSN mid-term evaluation, while not being a representative sample, reflects similar profiles and characteristics when compared to the larger sample surveys on refugees in Turkey.

2. Analysis and responses to evaluation questions

This section of the report summarizes the main findings from all FGDs conducted in five selected provinces and assesses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the ESSN programme under the evaluation questions that were set out in the Inception Report.

2.1 Relevance


To address the question of how the ESSN is relevant to refugees' main needs, we first discuss the needs, and challenges of everyday life for Syrian and non-Syrian refugees. This will be followed by a discussion of how the cash transfer programme improves the situation and the relevant or irrelevant role cash transfers play in responding to these challenges.

Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?

How well does it respond to the main identified needs of refugees including protection, disaggregated by a group including an origin of refugees?

³⁵ The datasets PAB and PDM, which are representative of the refugee applicant population, do not report on details such as education profile of the refugees, number of years spent in Turkey or information on employment. The CVME dataset, which is another dataset used in the analysis, reports on these issues. However it is not representative of the refugee population and only used here to give a general idea.

Figure 7: Problem Tree Analysis during FGDs




To better understand the relevance of the ESSN to the needs of refugees, focus groups were started out with the Problem Tree Analysis (see Figure 7 and Annex 12), which entailed a discussion of the needs and problems experienced by refugees since their move to Turkey, including what they found challenging in everyday life. This discussion served both as an icebreaker and to help the team gather information about the challenges refugees face, before analysing how the ESSN responds to these types of problems.

Through the qualitative needs assessment, similar themes and challenges were mentioned in all groups, signalling that the experiences of refugees whether beneficiary or non-beneficiary are similar. When they ranked their problems and needs, shelter – affordable, decent housing – as well as limited access to jobs and income, and to food of good quality and variety, were stated by most groups as being priority concerns. Figure 8 summarizes information on the percentage of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who mentioned specific themes in the FGDs.

Women and men participants have similar concerns and needs. However, we observed that women talked more about issues related to food, whereas men talked more about employment-related problems. There are also provincial differences in ranking the difficulties. In Istanbul, the main problem discussed was inability of accessing public services. Due to population size, they tended to wait more in queues or their applications were processed slowly, etc. In Urfa and Hatay, however, “shelter” and “unemployment” were mentioned as being the main problems. In Afyon, participants talked about the difficulties and discrimination they were experiencing while accessing education, health services and food needs more than any other issue. In Izmir, lack of jobs was the participants’ main concern.

Figure 8: The needs and concerns of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries



Source: Qualitative data from Focus Group Discussions; data compiled and visualized across beneficiaries (n= 110) and non-beneficiaries (n=64)from Problem Tree Analysis. The Figure is represented as a percentage of participants by type of beneficiary status who responded to a question on their primary needs and concerns.

Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries mentioned the most urgent needs as follows:

- (1) Limited access to decent housing, including problems regarding unaffordable rent, high utility bills, substandard housing conditions;
- (2) Limited access to good quality and quantity of food;
- (3) Limited access to decent jobs and decent income;
- (4) Problems with access to public services, especially education and health services. Non-beneficiaries reported accessibility problems, whereas beneficiaries mentioned specific issues with the transportation fee collected at schools, medicine fees that they paid, etc.;
- (5) Adaptation problems, including language barrier, psychological distress.

(i) Limited access to affordable and decent housing

During the discussions, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries mentioned limited access to affordable and adequate housing as their primary concern while living in Turkey. The majority of them complained about high and rising rents for substandard places, such as a house with “a leaking roof”, “full of mould”, with “no sunlight”, or an “insect problem”, in “unsafe neighbourhoods”, or “at basement level with a humidity problem”. As shown in the following quotes, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries complained about high rent prices in all provinces.

“I pay 900 TL per month, and the house is full of cockroaches. If you leave the plates on the table, you find them covered with cockroaches. There are damp patches on the walls. I wipe the walls every day.” (Rejected non-Syrian woman, Afyon)

“I rented a house costing me 300 TL per month, but there was no toilet or kitchen in the house. There is a spare room, which I converted into a toilet and kitchen. The roof of the house is made of old wood and plastic. It is not healthy for my children to live in the house, but this is all I can afford.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

“Water is seeping through the roof. There are damp patches on the walls and I’m still paying 450 TL per month. Can you believe this? You should come and see. If I want to change the

place, I need to pay 750 TL per month, which is impossible, so I decided to remain silent.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay)

“Thank God, we are living under one roof but in cramped conditions. We are living in a badly ventilated apartment that suffers from damp. If the house is in poor condition, then they will rent it to the Syrians. However, if it is in good conditions, they will never rent it to Syrians. Plus, Syrians are facing much higher rents than Turkish.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

An unequal balance between the incomes they receive and the rent they pay is another challenge that the refugees have been facing. Also, the increase in rents is another challenge they face:

“Wages are low, and the rent prices are high. This is the challenge.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay)

“My husband earns around 2000 TL per month right now, and we pay 1200 TL monthly for the rent. Plus, there are utility bills, food expenses and the kids. It is extremely hard to manage.” (Non-Beneficiary Non-Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“We used to rent houses for 250 TL or 350 TL at most. However, nowadays, I pay 500 TL per month, not including utility bills. I mean, the situation is getting more difficult to manage.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

“I have seen houses for 700 TL, 800 TL. How can we afford the rent? Our income is 300 TL, and also think about utility bills, plus if you have children...” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay)

Rental prices varied between metropolitan cities such as Istanbul and Izmir and border cities such as Hatay and Urfa (see Table 8). The common point however is that the refugees choose to live, and can only afford to live, in specific neighbourhoods in urban slums, creating spatially and socially segregated communities in the cities. The problem then extends beyond rent affordability to being obliged to live in unsafe neighbourhoods. Safety concerns are mainly mentioned by non-beneficiary Syrians in Izmir:

“We are staying in an unsafe neighbourhood and our kids are locked up. They cannot go out, either to be afraid of being beaten by other kids or I do not want them to be on streets that the police cannot enter.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir)

Table 8: Range of rents quoted/mentioned during FGDs by province/district

City	District	Rental prices in local currency (TL)	Rental prices in US\$
Istanbul	Sultanbeyli	TL 200–800	54–216
	Fatih	TL 600–1300	162–351
Sanliurfa	Haliliye	TL 300–500	81–135
	Eyyubiye	TL 450–500	122–135
Hatay	Antakya	TL 300–850	81–230
Izmir	Konak	TL 200–650	54–176
	Buca	TL 300–400	81–108
Afyon	Afyon Merkez	TL 300–900	81–243

Source: FGD discussions³⁶; exchange rate for calculations is 1 USD per 3,76 TL as of February 2018.

The participants also reported facing barriers in accessing appropriate housing. There were reports of discrimination towards refugees in the housing market. First, landlords are reluctant to rent an apartment to a large family with children. One participant said:

³⁶ We searched the mentioned rent prices through the FGD transcriptions. Out of 177 FGD participants, 78 refugees talked about the rent prices, while complaining about the high prices. For each district, we noted the maximum and the minimum rent they mentioned. It is also important to note that the rent prices in the Table are excluding utility bills.

“I saw an ad for a rented apartment. I called them, and the first thing they asked was how many children I had. I said I have five. They replied, ‘We do not rent apartments to families with a lot of children.’ I do not get it. What are they afraid of? I came back home and started crying.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay)

Second, besides being reluctant to rent a place to large families, landlords are also unwilling to rent their places to Syrians:

“The problem is the houses, not just the rent. The problem is you can’t find a house because they don’t rent to Syrians. Wherever you go, you see an available place, but they don’t give it to you. If the house is in poor condition, yes, they give it to you to rent. And the rent for Syrians is higher than the rent for Turks.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Landlords routinely ask for several months of rent up front, believing that refugees get a lump sum from the government. One woman shared her experience:

“If you like the house and are about to rent and they find out you are Syrian, then they ask for more, believing that you are getting a Red Crescent card. So you have to pay more.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir.)

For those who cannot afford to rent a house, the other option is to live in a tent. The majority of non-applicant FGD participants residing in Izmir have been living in a tent for a while. This is how they cope with high rent prices.

Box 1: Negative coping strategy: living in a tent

“I came to Turkey one year ago; we were living in Al-Raqa, which was under ISIS control at that time. I lost my 16 and 14-year-old boys in an airstrike. It was tough to overcome. We could not continue living there after this shocking and unfortunate incident. Here in Izmir, we are living in a tent. It is not a refugee camp. One of the landowners is renting out his empty land for Syrian refugees so that they can put up their tents on the land and live there. The rent for the tent is 600 TL per month. If there is some work to do that month, we work for the landowner, and he deducts the equivalent of our work from the rent. He calculates the number of days we work. The situation here is miserable. It is freezing during the winter season; the tent roofs are continually leaking when it rains, and the children are covered with mud to their knees. For heating, we collect pieces of wood, and we light a fire to get warm. We get our blankets, mattresses, carpets and everything we need from the rubbish. We share the toilets with other people, but we take a shower inside the tent; when one of us needs to take a shower, the rest will have to wait outside, even it is cold.”

Non-beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir

The rent is the expenditure item prioritized by most refugee households over other household needs, even food supplies. They either borrow money or make weekly savings out of the income earned so that the money is piled up in instalments week by week, then they can make the payment. One Syrian woman summarized the process:

“My husband is earning 200 TL per week. We put 100 TL or 125 TL aside to pay our rent at the end of the month.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay)

They also emphasised the importance of paying the rent since the common fear stated during the discussions is being evicted by the landlord and becoming homeless. One explained,

“Rent is sacred for us. It comes before food, water, everything you can think of because if you are late, the landlord comes and kicks you out.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay)

(ii) Limited access to decent jobs and income

One of the most significant problems mentioned by both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees in Turkey is their limited access to permanent jobs with decent regular salary, social entitlements, and regular working hours. The majority of the refugees stated that they were getting paid below the net minimum wage³⁷ even though they worked long hours in casual jobs and sometimes in unhealthy and dangerous conditions.

New legislation to grant refugees work permits was adopted in January 2016³⁸. Employers must pay a work permit fee of 537 TL (118 USD) to employ a refugee. However, they are often reluctant to do so. The actual implementation of legislation may also remain irrelevant to the informal labour market, in which the majority of vulnerable refugees can find a job. Without skills or education, it is most likely that a refugee will have to work illegally for low wages, without any entitlements or social benefits. This makes Syrian refugees vulnerable to exploitation:

“He goes to work at 7 am and gets back home at 10 pm. He makes only 200 TL per week. He has been working in a wholesale painting shop as a porter. When he asked for a rise, the boss told him, ‘100 people would kill you to be in your place’. I could not afford to rent a proper house. Rental prices are so high. There is no sunlight and it is very humid. It is an unhealthy place for my children.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay)

The majority of Syrian and non-Syrian refugees tend to be unskilled, which forces them to work under poor conditions, with low wages. Even though the daily wage is not fixed for each province, overall it is much less than the minimum wage that a Turkish worker makes per month (see Table 9).

Table 9: Example of monthly wages earned by refugees (November 2017)

City	Refugee Men	Refugee Women	Refugee Children
Istanbul	TL 1,171 (316) USD	TL 500 (135) USD	TL 600 (162) USD
Sanliurfa	TL 650 (176) USD	N/A	TL 225 (61) USD
Hatay	TL 900 (244) USD	TL 700 (189) USD	N/A
Izmir	TL 1,350 (365) USD	N/A TL	TL 850 (225) USD
Afyonkarahisar	TL 750 (202) USD	TL 240 (65) USD	N/A

Note: FGD³⁹ exchange rate for calculations is 1 USD per 3,76 TL as of February 2018

People with degrees have trouble finding a decent job matching their skills in Turkey, primarily due to the language barrier, lack of an official diploma, etc. One stated,

“A doctor in Iraq migrated to Turkey and the only jobs he found were cleaning toilets and washing dishes. He had been a medical doctor back there.” (Rejected non-Syrian woman, Afyon.)

³⁷ The minimum wage is 1,600 TL= 423 USD as of February 2018.

³⁸ “Regulation on Work Permits of Refugees Under Temporary Protection”, Official Journal No. 2016/8375, 15 January 2016

³⁹ During the FGDs, some of the participants mentioned indicative amounts of daily and/or monthly wages. For each province, we noted the maximum and minimum salary they mentioned, and then converted the daily or weekly wages, multiplying them by 20 (days) or 4 (weeks) to convert them to monthly salaries, and took the average of all salaries mentioned for women, men and children. It is also important to note that we searched the reported wages through the FGD transcriptions and these are only representative of our selected sample, not the entire refugee population.

Another similar story comes up in Hatay:

“I got a maths degree back in Syria, but I could not find a job here. Here they do not hire Syrian teachers any more. I started a job that doesn’t need skills. I found myself working for 12 hours a day.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay.)

In this process, they become subject to a mechanism of de-qualification in the Turkish labour market⁴⁰ and excluded from society, as in the case of the non-beneficiary Syrian man who moved back to the refugee camp (see Box 2).

Box 2: Limited access to decent jobs matching skills

“My wife and I are both university graduates. Both of us used to work as teachers in Syria. We came to Antakya first, and we tried to find teaching jobs in the Syrian schools that were established at the beginning of the Syrian crisis. However, after a while the Turkish Government started to shut down those schools because they wanted to integrate the Syrian students into Turkish schools. When I first came from Syria, I had some savings, but I had to spend it all because I could not find a decent job in Turkey. Eventually, I had to borrow \$12,000 from one of my friends. After five months, I realized that I would not be able to repay my debt or continue living like that. That was six months ago, when I decided to move to a refugee camp along with my wife and my two children, despite the difficult living conditions there. If I received ESSN money, I would rent a place outside the camp and start my life out there. Since there are 4 of us we might receive 480 TL, which would be enough to find a place for 350TL in Sanliurfa, and the rest would be spent on utilities such as water, electricity and gas bills. We might find a job and live a normal life out there.”

Non-applicant Syrian man, Akcakale refugee camp, Urfa

It is also difficult to convince employers to hire people over 40 years old due to the availability of a young Syrian workforce, which is in higher demand in low-skilled sectors. One beneficiary woman complained about it in this way:

“He is a bit heavy, that makes him look older. They prefer to hire younger people, you know.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

The situation is similar in another province:

“Since we came here, my husband has not been able to find a job. He is not that old, but his hair is grey. We have been here for four years, and no one has offered him a job.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

In Afyon, they also suffered from the same problem:

“My husband is 40 years old, and they are not hiring him. They prefer younger people, like 20–25 years old. When you find a job, they offer you 40 TL, which equals nothing.” (Rejected non-Syrian woman, Afyon.)

Besides low salaries, no social entitlements, and insecure working conditions, identity-based discrimination further complicates the already difficult lives of refugees living in Turkey. The discrimination shows itself in various forms. The participants stated that refugees’ earnings are far less than those of Turkish employees in comparable jobs:

“When they Figure out you are a Syrian, then they offer you half of the salary. The Turkish employee earns 100 TL per day, whereas a Syrian gets 40 or 50 TL.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay.)

“There is discrimination between Turkish and Syrian employees. My husband works as a painter, and he is proficient in his job due to his extensive experience in the field. In Turkey, he has to work with another Turkish painter. However, he is not paid as much as his Turkish

⁴⁰ Deniz Senol Sert, 2016. “From skill translation to devaluation: the de-qualification of migrants in Turkey,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*.

colleague, even though he is working longer hours than him and he has more workload. Unequal pay is not an issue, which only comes up in the workplace. Once our landlord hired him to paint a house, and he also offered half of the regular price that a Turkish painter would demand. Our landlord was surprised when my husband asked for equal pay.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

(iii) Limited access to good quality and quantity of food

Good quality, nutritious food is unaffordable for many beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, who have limited livelihood options and are struggling to meet the basic needs of their families. They have access to particular types of food, such as bread, yoghurt and olives – which were the most mentioned. They said that they were unable to provide a good variety of food, including vegetables and meat, and proper meals three times a day. However, the problem is much more extensive for non-applicants:

“We are suffering. Yesterday morning, my kids woke up and asked for breakfast but I didn’t have anything to offer them. I found some leftover bread on the ground, and I told them to eat it with a cup of tea until I could go to Izmir and come with something to eat, thank God.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir.)

Another non-beneficiary woman shared a similar story:

“Sometimes we depend on a bag of bread. There is a market that sells bread to us on credit until my husband finds a job – then he will pay him back.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Urfa.)

They also complained about inflation accompanied by food price increases, with comments such as: “vegetables used to be more affordable”, “the price of rice increased by 50 percent”, “the price of milk used to be 18 TL, now it is 27 TL.” Similar expressions are pretty common in the field.

The most common consumption-related coping mechanism adopted among the refugee population is buying less food, eating fewer meals per day, reducing the quality of food and occasionally substituting chicken for red meat.

(iv) Problems with access to public services (education and health services) and quality of public services

Both beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups discussed in detail their issues with access to education and health services. However, the source of the problems differs between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. While non-applicants mentioned their accessibility problems to health services, the applicants (both beneficiaries and rejected participants) shared their specific and personal problems experienced when accessing these services, primarily the education services.

Since non-applicants mostly lack an ID card, they have restricted access to health services. Throughout the discussion, therefore, non-applicants expressed their concerns especially when their children become ill: “I cannot take my child to the hospital since she does not hold an ID. She is so sill, she cannot defecate but I could not take her to a Turkish hospital.” (Non-applicant non-Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Both beneficiary and rejected applicants have access to both of the services; during the discussion, however, they shared their specific problems. Some complained about school fees, which are variable among provinces and even within a province. In some schools, Syrians are charged a transportation fee; in some others, they are charged for school uniform, but in others again, all of this comes free.

The participants talked about different types of education fees, such as “Class Money” to pay for the print outs necessary for exams, “Cleaning Money” to pay for cleaning the floors and chairs, “Stationary Item list provided by the teacher. One of the attendants in Istanbul said:

“I’m happy that my children are attending school here, but we cannot afford the school expenses. I have two kids and we have to buy everything, from uniform to book, notebooks, etc. It is bit difficult” (Beneficiary Non-Syrian woman, Istanbul).

Another attendant shared similar concerns:

“Currently, if your child is attending a Turkish school, you, as a parent, need to provide uniforms, pens and notebooks. The books come free, however the girl uniforms are far too expensive. The schools are also far from our house. We need to pay 50 TL per month” (Non-Applicant man, Urfa).

However, in Hatay, the transportation fee is mentioned as 100 TL per month, however he mentioned they did not pay any fees except transportation. When they compared Turkish schools with Syrian schools in Turkey that some of the children used to attend, they find attending Turkish schools comes with unaffordable costs:

“We used to send our children to Syrian schools in Turkey for four years and we did not pay a dime. They went to the school with their regular clothes on. We did not force to buy a uniform. However, now, we pay for everything, books, notebooks, uniform, etc. These children should be supported.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Hatay).

Another attendant added:

“Even though free education is provided for Syrian children attending Turkish schools, I cannot destroy my child’s future to send him to a school, in where he cannot communicate. Therefore, I registered him to a private school and he is studying all his lessons in Arabic.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay).

(v) Adaptation problems accompanied by psychological distress

The refugees mentioned that they suffered from certain psychological problems, including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety about the future, stress. Due to the lack of entertainment activities, social events that they used to enjoy back in Syria, and also the lack of communication with the Turkish community—due to the language barrier, they find it hard to adapt themselves into the society.

The language barrier is mentioned by the majority of participants as preventing them from effective communication in hospitals, in schools and in their neighbourhood. The language problem leaves refugees facing struggles to rebuild their lives and contributes to their exclusion. The language problem is experienced both by men and women⁴¹, however, the usefulness of speaking the language differs between men and women. While women mentioned their need to understand the language to communicate with their neighbours and the Turkish community, men mentioned the language barrier as an obstacle to access into the job market and decent jobs.

“Since I cannot speak Turkish, I’m alone, as if I were living in a prison cell.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian woman, Afyon.)

“If you are looking for a job, speaking Turkish would help a lot and make a huge difference. If you speak the language, they will hire you, you will have access to better opportunities” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

Due to the economic conditions of refugees, who suffer extreme cash constraints, there is no place for entertainment in their life in Turkey as they used to have in Syria:

“In Syria, we used to go to ‘Teshreen Garden’ every week because we enjoyed life, we had spare time. In Turkey, my husband comes back at 10:30 pm. In Syria, the working hours are until 3 pm regardless of private or public sector.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

⁴¹ Out of 55 participants who shared their adaptation problems, 30 of them are women and 25 of them are men.

They also suffer from being separated from the community they used to spend time with:

“There is no social atmosphere here. We used to be surrounded by our relatives, but our children suffer from loneliness in Turkey. They have no friends, no relatives.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir.)

Many of them suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, which has an impact on their own and their children’s psychological health:

“I lost my children during an airstrike, and my little boy saw how his elder brothers died. He was traumatized, and now he is not doing well. He is unemployed and mentally depressed.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir.)

Children especially suffer from psychological distress:

“If I tell my daughter that we will go back to Syria, she will start crying. She remembers all the bombings, the war, and she gets scared.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

Participants mentioned that grown-ups have been facing a different type of fear – that of an uncertain future:

“I have four children, and I get scared when I think about their future. They feel insecure, and I have no idea what will happen to them when they grow up.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir.)

“We’re living in a state of uncertainty where many things make us afraid: how to make ends meet at the end of each month, what will happen to our children, if they do something wrong, and how I will help them. In the end, it is Turkey, not our country.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

The following concluding sentences from a focus discussion group accurately and sadly summarize these feelings:

“The main concern is we are waiting for the unknown. We are just numbers on the shelf and under process. However, we have families; we have kids, we have a future. We did not leave our countries to seek luxury. We almost died, they threatened us, we saw dead people there. We had a car, we had a job, and we had a home there. We came here to survive, to find a life.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian man, Afyon.)

The ESSN’s Response and Relevance to the Needs of Refugees–Participants’ Perceptions

Based on participants’ responses, the ESSN responded to the cash-related needs of beneficiary refugees, mainly shelter, food, and educational supplies (see the question on *changes occurred in coping strategies*). For non-cash-related needs, the ESSN also reduces the stress level among the beneficiaries. In other words, the ESSN programme responds to both the basic food/shelter needs of refugees and some of their psychological needs, bringing in some predictability to their lives. Even though refugees remain highly vulnerable and beneficiaries do not find ESSN funds fully sufficient, the cash transfer has reduced their need to resort to negative coping strategies.

(vi) Effects on reducing psychological distress

ESSN beneficiaries also mention that the programme has a positive impact in terms of reducing their stress and improving their mental well-being:

“Without the Red Crescent card support, it is impossible to survive. We have had the cards for six months now and we have started to calm down a little bit for the first time since we came to Turkey. It is not a sufficient amount of money but thank God! All of my children are attending school now.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

“Before having the card, I struggled a lot. I was barely paying the bills and the rent. I have five children; they were asking for allowances and they have several needs. When I got the card, I

felt relief, and now I feel more comfortable about getting my children the things they need.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian woman, Afyon.)

“Having a card has had a positive impact on us. You know how poverty makes people feel and how it affects human psychology. Now, however, we feel more relaxed. We have started to interact with other people. Our neighbours are visiting us; we are paying visits to their home.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian woman, Afyon.)


2.2 Effectiveness

What has been the performance regarding targeting and coverage?

How effective have the ESSN awareness and sensitization activities been?

The main channels of information about the availability of ESSN funds mentioned during FGDs were: (i) word of mouth, or communication within the neighbourhood; (ii) TRC sensitization activities; (iii) social media (exclusively Facebook); (iv) NGO’s dissemination of information (see Figure 9)⁴². It shows that refugees living in Istanbul might not have the same level of community network as the refugees living near to borders (like Hatay and Urfa). Even in Izmir, in a metropolitan city like Istanbul, refugees mentioned that their main source of information is their community since they are living in segregated areas. Both applicants and non-applicants heard about the ESSN programme through similar channels with the same frequency.⁴³

Figure 9: Main channels of information about availability of ESSN (based on number of mentions in FGDs)



Source: Visualization of qualitative data from FGDs⁴⁴

Social networks throughout the neighbourhood play a significant role in notifying the existence of the cash transfer programme to low-income families. Needy members of the community inform one another that they are entitled to the cash transfer by following specific procedures. Word of mouth, therefore, is their first information point before reaching official portals. Most of the Syrians live in the same neighbourhoods; as a woman beneficiary said: “[We heard from] the neighbours, because we live next to each other.” The

⁴² The ranking of the sources is similar in selected provinces, except in Istanbul, where participants mentioned NGO’s sensitization activities as a primary source of information, then TRC, social media, and neighbours.

⁴³ Out of 63 participants (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) who responded to the question, 28 of them mentioned neighbours, 15 mentioned the TRC, 15 others mentioned social media (Facebook) and only 5 of them mentioned NGOs as their main source of sensitization to the Red Crescent card.

⁴⁴ We transcribed the FGD recordings and coded the FGD transcriptions. While coding the data, we built up categories/themes based on frequency of mentions. Throughout sensitization activities discussion, 4 sources come up frequently mentioned by participants and were listed as Neighbours, TRC, Facebook and NGOs. We found the total number of individual mentions and equalised that to 100 percent, then depending on the number of frequency, each source got a percentage value in return.

majority of FGD participants stated that they had heard about the ESSN from their neighbours.

The second source of information mentioned by participants during FGDs was TRC sensitization and awareness activities. Through its social workers, the TRC has disseminated ESSN information in targeted neighbourhoods. One beneficiary mentioned,

“They were visiting our neighbourhood, and they were holding house visits. Then, two years ago, they visited my house as well and informed me about the programme.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa.)

In Hatay, a beneficiary group of men mentioned a TRC committee visiting their houses one by one. One beneficiary man remembered: “Two or three years ago, a committee came to my house and checked our living conditions.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Hatay.) Along with the TRC service centre’s outreach and sensitization activities, the TRC Community Centre is also a focal point where seminars are held, as well as job training and Turkish language courses. One of the participants said, “I was attending a Turkish language course, and the Red Crescent people informed me about the ESSN.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

The third source mentioned by participants is social media, which almost exclusively means Facebook. Most of the Syrians are members of Syrian network groups online. The members inform each other about the ESSN programme. A rejected man in Hatay said, “You cannot hide such news. You hear about it either from people or Facebook.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay.)

Last but not least, NGOs are also conducting awareness activities in the field. One beneficiary mentioned Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM) as follows:

“I went to the ASAM organization. I told them that I was in need of money and I asked for their help. I told them that I have many dependents and couldn’t make a living. My children, especially, are suffering a lot. Then she guided me to the TRC.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Another refugee mentioned the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and added,

“I had a Danish card before and it worked for a couple of months, then they stopped the card. I got a message from the DRC telling me that the DRC card was no longer available, but I needed to visit and register at the Social Security office (SASF) to have a new card.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.)

What has been the performance regarding targeting and coverage?

Is the ESSN equally accessible and available to all vulnerable refugees (including by gender and age)?

The preliminary requirements for application to the ESSN – namely ID and house registration – have prevented some refugees from applying to the programme in the first place. Refugees without an ID card and house registration document are not eligible to make an application and are excluded from the programme. Consequently, non-applicants reported ID and house registration problems as the main reasons for not making an application for a TRC card. On the other hand, rejected applicants reported “failing to fit into the demographic eligibility criteria” as the number one reason for preventing their access to the ESSN programme. Holding an old ID is another reason for rejection reported by rejected applicants.

Reasons for not making an application (non-applicants)

The main target population of the ESSN is the vulnerable families among registered refugees in Turkey. Unregistered refugees are therefore excluded from the programme, due to their lack of either ID or house registration documents. Non-applicants could not register their house if they were living in an undocumented or unregistered house, such as a tent or temporary shack. The main reason for living in an unregistered house is their affordability compared to the regular/decent housing. Those without house registration are therefore likely to be more vulnerable and more in need of humanitarian aid. One of the non-applicants said:

“I’m living in a tent. They told me that I need to live in a house and have utility bills in my name and then they can register my address. If you don’t have a house, you cannot get the card. I cannot afford to live in a house.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir.)

Another problem with house registration is reported as:

“The house that I’m staying in is not registered at the municipalities office. The landlord said that he did not have the money to register the apartment and told us we were free to leave. I cannot leave, however, because it is clean and affordable.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay.)

Non-applicants without ID have also struggled to access the ESSN. However, a few mentioned the lack of ID or transfer of ID across provinces as a problem: “We also want to apply, but they told us we would have to have an ID from Izmir.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir.)

Witnessing other people being rejected or spending time on the application process are also mentioned a few times as factors that discourage refugees from making an application:

“We were sure we would not be able to get the card. The house owner told us that he had applied but got rejected since there were only two people in the house. I did not apply.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay.)

“Some people suggested to us that we make an application. However, my husband works all day long, and I have children. I cannot go around to find the application centres. I cannot go, ask and search.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay.)

Reasons for Refusal of Applications (Rejected Applicants)

The ESSN programme has established demographic eligibility criteria, which may exclude a group of refugees in need. The applicants need to fulfil one of the demographic criteria in order to be eligible for the programme. Most of the rejected or non-applicant refugees in our sample do not meet the ‘having three children’ criterion. They complained that “having one more child does not change the expenses”; one participant said: “I still have rent to pay, I have bills to pay, one more child doesn’t have an impact on expenses. I still need to pay rent, utility bills, and food regardless of the number of children. They assume we can manage but we cannot.” (Rejected non-Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Verification of the ID process is the second most mentioned as a cause of rejection. Every Syrian and non-Syrian national living in Turkey must register with the DGMM. As of late 2016, the DGMM has been carrying out a verification of Syrians residing in Turkey under temporary protection, by updating and completing the information taken during their registration. This verification covers all Syrians who completed their registration on or before 31 December 2016. However, not all Syrians are expected to come forward at the same time. The project has been rolling out in phases. This verification exercise is coordinated by the DGMM and conducted by the local DGMMs known as Provincial Directorates of Migration Management, supported by the UNHCR. Participation in this verification process is not voluntary but a responsibility that refugees must fulfil in order to continue to have

access to services and assistance extended by Turkey. At the end of the process, refugees receive a new temporary protection identity card (*Kimlik*) after verification has been completed.⁴⁵

The ID renewal and verification process begun in December 2016 was still ongoing in the provinces at the time of the fieldwork. The new card also gives access to public services in the provinces in which it is issued. The applicants who made the application with their old IDs were rejected for failing to ‘verify’ their IDs. A rejected woman in Urfa stated, “I have an old ID. They told me to change it for the new one.” Another rejected woman in Urfa reported that she had been asked to renew her ID, then make a new application.

Last but not least, when some of the beneficiaries enjoyed the benefits of the card, they mentioned that their cards were put on hold as they had changed their address:

“I stayed here for a month benefiting from the TRC card. When I moved and changed my address, they rejected me.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay.)

In several other cases, not only rejected participants but also non-applicants and beneficiaries stated that they had either witnessed or heard of these cases: “People are forced to tolerate annoying landlords and rent increases in order not to lose the TRC card.” (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa.)

A beneficiary stated, “My cousins changed their address; once, they were beneficiaries, then their card was put on hold for a while.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian woman, Afyon.)

Another beneficiary also mentioned:

“When people change their address, then their card was put on a hold. I witnessed the case. First they received an approval message from TRC, then after two days they received rejection message, although they changed their address before they received approval message.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir.)

This issue of not being able to change accommodation – in order not to lose ESSN benefits – comes up often in the FGDs as a concern among beneficiaries.

Perceptions on Targeting Performance and Fairness (Beneficiaries)

Out of 63 beneficiaries who attended into the discussion, 52 stated that the transfers need to cover all Syrian refugees regardless of eligibility criteria, however 11 stated that the transfer amount is not enough for beneficiaries and they objected a decrease in the amount for covering all refugees.

The beneficiaries, who agreed on the expansion of coverage while making deductions in the amount of money they receive, stated that being a refugee make all Syrians eligible:

“Regarding the conditions, they cannot distinguish between who is rich and who is poor. But even if he’s rich, it doesn’t mean anything, he is still a refugee and he is still in need.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“The Red Crescent card should cover all Syrian refugees, there isn’t worthy and unworthy because there isn’t anyone that came to Turkey and better off.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)

“All the Syrians are in need. Is there anyone not in need? One percent is not in need but those people were also doing well in Syria and things were always easy for them but 99% of Syrians are in need now. Even those who were well off came to Turkey and spent what they have in one year and have nothing left.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa)

⁴⁵ <http://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-syrians/verification-of-syrian-nationals-under-temporary-protection/> accessed on February 2018.

“When they blocked my transfer, I got so upset and I thought about the people who are not benefiting. Every Syrian refugee is in need of help. I wish that everyone benefits from TRC card.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

Another group of beneficiaries stated that all Syrian refugees are in need of help:

“I would be the first to accept because there are people in need and didn’t get it. I prefer everyone to benefit from the TRC card.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

“I have been in Turkey since 2016. I did not receive any benefit for one and half years. Others were getting it but I was not making me to question myself. Am I better off? So, no problem, you can decrease the amount, and make it 75 TL, or 50 TL but make everyone eligible. There are people with 2 kids and are in need. No problem, I will not be upset.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa)

“There are people who have 2 kids and need money to feed the family. They still need to pay the rent and a lot of other expenses that they need to deal with.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Another group of beneficiaries who supported the idea based their justification on religion:

“It’s good, God never forgets anyone. Even if you reduce the amount, God would open another door for the person in need.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“Okay, we do not want to be selfish. God bless. May God give all his worshippers.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay)

“We are all Muslims. It would be fair. It would be better” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

The beneficiaries, who objected the idea, stated that the current amount is barely enough to cover the rent and utility bills:

“It is good to say let’s cover everyone but if everyone gets a rational amount of money, then it is fine. If it becomes any less than the current amount, we cannot call it “help” anymore.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“All beneficiaries make their monthly budget by considering the cash transfer they will receive in the beginning of the month. Any reduction in the amount of money will put them in trouble when they are paying the rent and utility bills.” (Beneficiary Non-Syrian man, Afyon)

The attendants also discussed whether the allocation of transfers is fairly distributed among the refugee community. Out of 52 refugees who attended to the discussion, 32 of them believed that the ESSN programme failed to include the people who are in need. However, 20 of them stated that the ESSN programme is too generous and includes people who are not in need.⁴⁶

Most of the beneficiaries based their argument on the failure of demographic criteria to exclude families with less than three children:

“I was rejected twice since I have only three kids. Then they changed the criteria and my family was included into the programme. That makes me think ‘don’t people with two kids have a family to support?’. They are still paying their rents. Milk and diapers are still expensive.” (Beneficiary Non-Syrian man, Afyon)

“Some of the refugees cannot benefit from TRC card due to the number of kids in the family. It is not fair. A father who has two kids still needs to buy two cartoons of milk and each carton costs money. How is he supposed to buy them?” (Beneficiary Non-Syrian man, Afyon)

“I don’t think the Kizilaykart is distributed fairly. If there is a justice in the system, everyone should have gotten a card. I witnessed that people got rejections, even though they have a family to support, they have kids. When we asked them, they did not seem to know the reason of their rejection. It is not fair.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa)

⁴⁶ Among the non-beneficiaries, half of them complained about the inclusion error, the other half complained about the exclusion error.

Some beneficiaries mentioned that the programme should take into attention the economic situation of the applicants:

“The TRC offices should make an inquiry about the financial status of the applicants. Checking only medical report and the number of children should not be sufficient to make the applicants eligible. I know some families who have large household size, but all members of the family are working. On the other hand, there are families, who have 2 young children and only the father is working but they are not eligible.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“There is no corruption in the system, but the distribution is not fair. There are families with three kids but all of them are working and making contribution to the income. However, there are families with two kids but both of them are infant and in need of money but excluded.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)

“I know a man, who is healthy, able to work and have four young boys in his house and all of them are working and he gets 1200 TL from TRC card. It is not fair” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Hatay)

Non-beneficiaries have similar concerns as the beneficiaries’ that are stated above. They believed that demographic criteria have led to the misallocation of the benefit. According the non-beneficiaries that attended the discussion, either making the coverage universal or emphasizing socio-economic criteria would have been more meaningful for improved targeting:

“To make the card available to all refugees who are in need, then the distribution will be fair. The criteria about the number of children doesn’t make sense. This woman who is not eligible would get pregnant and have three kids, then become eligible” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir.)

“I know people, who are economically better off but still eligible according to the number of children they have. One of my friend has a car, mini market and also motorcycle but is still eligible” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay)

“My husband cousin does not have a mini market, it would not be nice to call a market but a small mall and he is taking the benefit. When I asked his wife, she said because they have four children.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman. Hatay)

“This is not fair. Some people become eligible due to the demographic criteria. However, I’m not eligible since I have two kids, who are still in need of milk, food and we are still paying rent and utilities. Syrian families with little kids are suffering from the programme’s eligibility criteria. Families with older kids, even though all family members are working, become automatically eligible for the TRC card.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir)

Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?

What other factors promoted or constrained progress towards achieving target coverage rates?

As already stated in the above question, (i) a lack of documentation (ID and house registration) (ii) demographic criteria (iii) ID verification processing time are the main factors limiting the progress towards reaching more refugees and also constraint on achieving target coverage rates, which is explained in details under the question of performance of coverage and targeting above.

The factors that promoted progress in reaching many other refugees were mentioned as Arabic-speaking staff availability at TRC Service Centres (and other institutions such as the DGMM) and a change introduced to the demographic criteria (especially the number of children). They all contributed to the expansion of the programme. A few participants also appreciated the facilitation of translators at TRC Service Centres during the application process: “The best place to make your application is the Red Crescent centre. They speak Arabic and Kurdish. They are very nice and easy-going because they are speaking our language.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir.)

To what extent were the intended services delivered?

Did refugees face any challenges in receiving or accessing their cash transfers (including by gender)?

Two-thirds of the participants reported encountering challenges at the DGMM and Nufus, particularly during the initial stages of the application.⁴⁷ The capacity constraints of the institutions and irregular procedures were the main problems that refugees faced in accessing the cash transfers. The common issues refugees encountered included long waiting times, the ID verification process, especially high number of applicants submit their ID renewal documents in DGMM and the language barrier, especially in Nufus. The frequency of the complaints varied by location, however, as individual DGMM and Nufus offices adopted different procedures. The problems were reported more in Urfa and Hatay than in other provinces.

The FGD participants shared positive feedback about the TRC and SASF officers, and appreciated the way they organized the application process so as to make it more straightforward for refugees. However, the introduction of house visits by SASF offices in some locations, but not all places, created some uncertainties among the applicants and also created irregularities in the implementation process.

Challenges in ID Registration

The procedure refugees have to follow to obtain an ID has involved many uncertainties and sometimes long waiting times. All Syrian refugees can apply to temporary protection identity (TPID) card and also they need to have TPID card before making application to ESN programme. Therefore, when they first arrive in Turkey, they apply to registration centres, where they will be given pre-registration paper. With this pre-registration paper, their access to public services is limited. After the security check is finished, they are provided with a temporary protection ID card that includes an ID number. At first, the ID card started with the number 98. Then, they renewed the IDs adding picture and basic identity information that contained foreigner's ID number starting 99. As of late 2016, DGMM has been carrying out a verification of Syrians residing in Turkey under temporary protection, through updating and completing the information taken during their registration. The verification aims to update the information taken from the refugees during their initial registration. If they are new applicants, they need to verify and renew their IDs, then make a separate application to ESN programme. Then, the renewal of the ID procedure also adds to the backlog and brings new challenges.

All of the applicants go through the ID application procedure before making an application for the ESN card. They are all provided with a temporary protection ID card that includes ID number starts with the number 99 and all applicants need to have that ID card before making an ESN application. They share similar experiences regardless of their beneficiary status. One of the rejected men said,

“You can't apply for a Red Crescent card before you have an ID. It takes a lot of time. It took 4 to 5 months to obtain our IDs. This is the biggest obstacle.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay)

Another beneficiary complained, “I have been living here for two years, and it took me almost one and half years to get my ID. You need to go there [DGMM] and sleep for two days until your turn comes.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa)

⁴⁷ Out of 53 FGD participants who talked about the difficulties they have gone through, 34 mentioned the DGMM as the most challenging institution, then 15 of them noted Nufus and 2 mentioned some difficulties with SASF and 2 with TRC.

Even though some DGMM offices have adopted appointment systems to process applications for a new ID card, applicants have to wait in long queues to get an appointment number. “We had to go there at 4:30 am and wait in rain or sun. It was not organized at all,” a man said, and he “felt disappointment and anger”. (Beneficiary non-Syrian man, Afyon.) Another man complained:

“The situation is too bad. You need to be there so early in the morning, after the Morning Prayer, to find a place in the queue. Even if they give you an appointment after hours of waiting, the earliest available is one and a half months away.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Urfa)

The women also complained about having to queue with their children because they had no one to leave them with. In fact, for the renewal of IDs, the families have to bring their babies with them as well. One woman said:

“The last time, I got my ID and my family’s IDs, and it was not like this. Now, you need to have your babies present at the time of application, even though my baby is two months old.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Both men and women also complained about having to take a day off and that getting permission from the workplace put them in a difficult position. One woman said:

“It is always busy here, and I cannot take a day off here and there to renew my ID; in the end, I may lose my job.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Challenges in Address Registration

The problems in Nufus are less often mentioned than the problems encountered at DGMM offices. However, that does not mean that the address registration procedure has been working smoothly. The participants reported similar problems: (i) long waiting times and lines; (ii) irregularities in processing registrations; and (iii) the language barrier.

Although an appointment system exists in some of the provinces, getting an appointment sometimes takes two to three months. “So people don’t go randomly. That is fine, but this appointment affects us a lot because they told us that the waiting time is two months. They are not booking an appointment within a week.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay.) In Izmir, however, there is no appointment system; applicants are assigned a number, but they do not know when their turn will come. A woman who had left her children at home in order to register her house said: “They assign you a number. I left my daughter in the house, and I got very worried.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir.) Another complained, “In Nufus, you had to wait for long hours until your turn came. It was too crowded.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.)

If the refugees come with a tenancy contract or a landlord, registration of their house goes smoothly but in most of the cases, either the rental agreement does not exist, or the landlord does not agree to come. Most of the refugees rent their houses directly from landlords; they cannot afford to rent a house via a real-estate office: “There are no leases here. You can only get a lease document if you rent your apartment from a real-estate agent. I cannot afford that.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.) Another problem is convincing the landlord to come all the way to the Nufus:

“I went to the Population Department with the water bill receipt. Then they told me to bring the landlord, and we asked the landlord to come but he wouldn’t unless we paid him. He wanted 500 TL or 1,000 TL, and still he wouldn’t come. We went back to them and informed them about the situation. They said, ‘Stay at home, and we will send you the police; we will register you if you are living in the house.’ I agreed. The police did not come. I went back to ask them why they had told me to stay at home and wait; it has been four months now, and I am still waiting.” (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa)

Refugees also face challenges accessing the ESSN benefit when they change their address. The TRC put the transfer payments on hold until the new address has been validated. However, long waiting times become an obstacle for the beneficiaries needing to register their new address. One of the participants shared, angrily:

“If you have the card and you live in this house, but then the landlord throws you out of the house, they will cancel your card! What would I do if the landlord decided to kick me out? Why are you putting my card on hold, my family is still here! My children are here!” (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa)

Even though problems with Nufus were mentioned mostly in Urfa and Hatay, one beneficiary living in Istanbul shared a similar story:

“When you have to move, it is torture. You have to register your address all over again. You have to go to the Governor’s Office and bring the landlord along with you, if he agrees.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)

The language problem is especially prevalent with Nufus. Particularly in Urfa, Syrians complained about the lack of translators in the Nufus office. Both the DGMM and the TRC hire Arabic-speaking staff, and local SASFs get a hand from the TRC most of the time. TRC and SASF offices are in close contact particularly in Hatay and Urfa. However, Nufus and local SASFs were providing a service exclusively to citizens of Turkey up until the ESSN programme was initiated. In Afyon, many reported the language barrier they face in all offices, and the SASF office in particular. One said, “There is a system in the SASF and there are no problems with the processing of the applications. Lack of translators is the main problem.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian man, Afyon.) Another non-Syrian man in Afyon also complained about the lack of translators in any government entities in Afyon: “Neither in hospitals nor governmental institutions are there any translators available.” (Rejected non-Syrian man, Afyon.)

Understanding the Application Process

During the FGDs, the participants (beneficiaries and rejected applicants) were invited to discuss how they applied for the ESSN. Then, the research team went through the FGD recordings and mapped out the application process specific to each FGD. For each province the team drew five different process mapping charts (see Box 3) that detail the application process by province and district.

Box 3: Process mapping charts

The ESSN process mapping graphs (see Figure 10 through Figure 14) show the different scenarios and steps that FGD participants went through during the ESSN application process.

The graphs only show the applicants’ experiences (accepted applicants or rejected applicants) according to their testimony during 18 FGDs in five provinces (Istanbul, Urfa, Hatay, Izmir, and Afyon).

The upper green ribbon represents the application process timeline divided into three sections:

1. From the day of application to 9 weeks (the maximum notification time stated on beneficiary information leaflets)
2. From 9 weeks to 14 weeks days;
3. More than 14 weeks days.

Under the green ribbon, the red horizontal axes represent the application process from the starting point (the application submission date) until the end of the application (receiving a rejection message or withdrawing the money from an ATM).

The grey ribbon represents the different steps that applicants went through in order to obtain all the necessary documents before starting the application, which include issuing IDs for all family members, or changing their ID numbers (from 98 to 99) at the DGMM, or registering their address in the Population Directorate system (Nufus).

The graphs also show the difficulty level of each step according to the applicants' testimony:

- Easy: did not face any problems, the officials were helpful, and the process went smoothly;
- Difficult: experienced discriminatory treatment by the officials, had to pay money, took a long time, waited in a queue, the office was crowded, or had communication problems due to the lack of translators;
- Moderate: had minor problems.

In some cases, applicants were issued with ID and proof of residence for other reasons, irrelevant to the ESSN; in those cases, the participants did not mention how long it took to issue those documents or the level of difficulty, and those steps were placed at the beginning of the application process axis.

The refugees need to follow certain stages to make an application. Before they can receive an ESSN card, they have to follow and complete two essential steps. The first is to obtain a government-issued identity card, which is the documentation of the refugee's legal status. Second, they also need to have an official address and to register that address with Nufus. In the selected provinces where we conducted FGDs, all beneficiaries stated that they completed these steps in order to make an application. However, once they had the necessary documents, they followed different processes.

In Umraniye, Istanbul, when the programme started there was no TRC service centre in Istanbul, so refugees made applications at SASF offices. However, due to the language barrier, the SASF outsourced the process to an NGO called *Multeciler Dernegi* (Refugees' Association) (see Figure 10). The applicants we spoke to told that they visited the NGO and they completed the forms together, then translators submitted the application form and documents to the SASF office. SASF staff entered the applicant's data into the system without seeing the applicants face-to-face and assessed the application documents, then made the decision. Due to the high number of applicants, those applying needed to book an appointment with the NGO, then they were able to submit their documents and have an interview there. However, the process took longer than procedures followed in other districts and some of the participants complained about the length of it:

"I went to *Multeciler Dernegi* and got an appointment date for an interview. However, they scheduled my interview so late that by that time, many people had heard about the ESSN programme. I waited three months to have an interview at the association, to be able to submit my documents." (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Beneficiaries also complained about the long queues, and difficulty in getting an appointment. When they compared their experience to other public institutions, their experience with the local NGO was negative:

"The most difficult stage in the application process was *Multeciler Dernegi*. We kept visiting the place, but nothing happened for four months." (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

"*Multeciler Dernegi* resembled the Population Department in Aleppo. They did not have manners, they did not reply to any questions, they treated us as if we were working for them." (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)

Some applicants also complained about unfair procedures:

"If you know somebody from the NGO, then you don't need to wait that long, you become a VIP." (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)


"We heard that people working for the NGO become the first ESSN card holders, while we were stuck in the queue and waiting for our appointment time. Other than NGO staff, if you were the brother or sister of any municipality's employee, it would be easier to get the card." (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)

However, after the TRC Centre was established in Umraniye district, the application process went a lot more smoothly and the assessment process started to take roughly 60 days once an application was received (see FGD 1 and FGD 3 in Figure 10). It is approximately very close to the expected disbursement timeframe in beneficiary information leaflet provided by

TRC. In the document, it says “if you don’t receive an SMS within 9 weeks, please call TRC Centre on 168,” (TRC Centre Beneficiary Information Leaflet).

Once the TRC service centre was established and became the main point accepting the applications, then refugees’ experiences with the staff got much better compared to NGO interactions. One of the beneficiaries shared his experience: “Everything went so smoothly. I took a number and waited in line for 30 minutes. Then I submitted my documents while having an interview. They told me to go back home and wait for the message. That was it! They treated us well.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Figure 10: Process Mapping in Istanbul



In Urfa and Hatay, the TRC service centre has been receiving the applications and the assessment process takes up to two months once an application is received. Both eligible and non-eligible applicants receive notification via SMS message. In both of these provinces, the notification time doesn't exceed the processing time (up to 9 weeks) set by WFP. It is also relevantly shorter than in any other provinces in our sample (see Figure 11 and Figure 12).

The participants in Urfa and Hatay also provided positive feedback about the TRC's way of processing the applications. They described TRC activities as being "organized", "giving good instructions" and they also mentioned "good manners of staff" and "no language barrier", with "staff speaking Arabic and/or Kurdish":

"Regarding manners towards refugees, the best treatment is at the TRC service centre. We cannot deny this. They treat us well and they are doing their best to help people." (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

"It is all organized. I went to the TRC service centre and submitted my application. They took my documents, noted down my family's name and told me to wait for a message. As they had said, I received the message exactly one month later." (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay)

"At the TRC Centre, we can share our complaints with them, but we did not have any. After a couple of months, I received a message asking about complaints again. I replied: thank God, there is nothing that I can complain about." (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa)

"The difficulties that we have gone through were not in the TRC service centre. They are organized; people waited in queues. It was the Governor's Office (DGMM) instead. It is always crowded and police force people to wait in queues. The TRC Centre is much better." (Rejected Syrian woman, Urfa)

FGD participants also appreciated the precise way the system works, the staff's understanding of the refugees' difficulties and also their good manners:

"The system was very precise. They cut down the allowance I was receiving from the TRC card due to adding my newly wedded wife into our family. I went to follow up the case and I screamed and yelled at them and asked to speak to the manager. They still treated me with utmost respect." (Beneficiary Syrian man, Hatay)

Since the TRC Centre is the only service place to accept ESSN applications and is handling the process very professionally in both provinces, the processing time is relatively shorter and problem-free.

Figure 11: Process Mapping in Hatay





Figure 12: Process Mapping in Urfa



In Izmir SASF offices are the main centres for receiving the applications, and the processing time takes less than nine weeks once an application is received (see Figure 13). Even though the processing time is short, house visits were introduced in the districts the research team conducted FGDs unlike Urfa, Hatay and Istanbul. A couple of beneficiaries stated that a committee from the SASF had visited their house after they submitted their application as a part of verification process. One beneficiary also mentioned that she was rejected after the house visits, then she made a new application. However, it seems that household visits are a recent introduction, since some of the beneficiaries in the same FGDs stated that no committee had paid a visit to their house:

“They visited my house and saw the rooms and got an overall idea about my living conditions. They came for inspection after two weeks.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

“I guess this committee thing is new. Nobody paid a visit to my house for inspection.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

Even though the processing time of the application is short, beneficiaries complained about the difficulty of getting an appointment before submitting the documents to the SASF:


“Before they opened TRC Centre, it was hard to get an appointment from SASF office in Konak since it was always crowded. Now, it is much easy to make your application. They are easy-going people, you give the papers, then they register you. They just opened the TRC Centre five months ago. The application process is faster and easier, now” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

However, they were also satisfied with the SASF staff’s manners towards them:

“They treated us very well. Even they did not ask me to fill the application papers. I only submitted the documents; the woman filled the application form. Otherwise, I could not make it by myself” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

“It was always crowded but we did not suffer much. There was a line and if you waited enough, then they received your documents. The employees were food and kind” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

Figure 13: Process Mapping in Izmir



In Afyon, participants reported that they made their application via SASF offices and, house visits became a part of the application process. It is important to state that the house visits only take place in Izmir and in Afyon and they become the part of the application process unlike everywhere else. Due to the regular house visits process, the assessment takes more time and the process may take more than 9 weeks (see Figure 14). A couple of beneficiaries complained about photos of their home being taken during house visits and they also mentioned that they felt embarrassed when the committee collected evidence of their poverty in the home:

“Everything went smoothly until they took pictures of my house. The stage where they took pictures of my house felt so difficult.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

“They even opened the fridge and took pictures inside.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian man, Afyon)

Based on FGD participants’ comments, there are irregularities about the house inspection part of the application. Some mentioned that they waited more than three months; others seemed satisfied due to shorter waiting periods.

“I waited for only a month, then they came to my house for inspection. However, depending on the waiting list, some people’s inspection was delayed for three to four months.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

“It took only five minutes to submit my application. However, it took three to four months for anyone to come for an inspection.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

Overall impressions about the SASF office in Afyon were good, however. Participants again emphasized that it was very well “organized” and also that hiring a translator in the office removed the language barrier and thereby freed up the process.

“It was all organized when you made your application. You took a number and waited for your turn to come. Then you submitted your documents. Very easy.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian man, Afyon)

“When we went to the SASF, they had a female translator working there and helping us. I’m not sure if she was a volunteer but she helped a lot.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)


Household visits are a routine part of the application process for Turkish citizens, although not required for initial assessment and eligibility for the ESSN. Citizens are registered for social assistance via an integrated database system, where their information is checked against several government databases. Then, social assistance inspection officers perform household visits to verify application information and assess living conditions.⁴⁸ However, the ESSN programme selects based on demographic criteria: large families, the elderly, people with disabilities. There are no financial need assessment criteria attached to the programme. The particular implementation of the application process specific to each province, such as performing household visits in certain locations, creates challenges for refugees in accessing the cash transfer, even though they may be eligible based on demographic criteria. For example, in Izmir, one beneficiary mentioned that he got rejection after SASF officers conducted a household visit but now he is a beneficiary of the ESSN programme:

“I submitted my documents and made ESSN application at SASF office. After 15 days, a committee came to see my house and they rejected my application. So on my first application, I got rejected.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

Within the same FGD group, there were other beneficiaries telling that they never heard about a house visit procedure in their district.

⁴⁸ The SASFs employ 3,923 social assistance inspection officers to perform these household visits, which are completed at least once annually. Source: World Bank(2016) “Turkey’s Integrated Social Assistance System” Pg.10

Figure 14: Process Mapping in Afyon



To what extent were the intended services delivered?

Were special protection cases identified and referred to other providers?

The team heard no mentions of referrals made during FGDs.

Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?

How frequently is the TRC call centre used, for what purposes and with what results?

There is no official appeal mechanism connected to the ESSN. However, TRC call centre is available to answer queries and take a feedback. One in five participants at the FGDs mentioned that they made use of the TRC call centre. They reported that they had used the TRC call centre for the following purposes: (i) to be informed about the programme's eligibility criteria before making an application; (ii) to check their beneficiary status after making an application; (iii) to learn about the reason for their exclusion, after being rejected.

Among the beneficiaries, the main purpose of using the TRC call centre was to check their beneficiary status after making an application. One of the participants said:

“When I made my application, they told me to wait for the submitted documents to be processed, and that the message would be sent right away. Then I called the number 168 and, thank God, it has been 10 months since I got the card.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Refugees who were not eligible for the ESSN benefit also often called the hotline to ask why they had not been selected. One participant said:

“When they sent the rejection message, I rang the TRC call centre. They explained why they had rejected my application. I found out that when my daughter withdrew her name from the card, we got rejected.” (Rejected Syrian man, Hatay)

However, if the rejected person made calls over and over again, then there would be a negative communication between the applicant and the personnel. There was only one case complaining about communication with the call centre. She said:

“They asked me why I was calling them again. They told us there was someone in the family who could work. I told them he was old and ill, so he could not provide for the family. Then they told me to stop calling them.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir)

Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries also mentioned that they used the TRC call centre for getting information about the application process and eligibility criteria. Indeed, refugee households have a right to know the eligibility criteria since 15 July 2017⁴⁹, and participants' experiences with the TRC call centre show that sharing eligibility criteria and necessary steps during the application process eliminated an uncertainty in their life. One mentioned:

“I called them, and they gave me guidance. They told me to get a medical report explaining that my husband was an old, sick man. They told me gently what to do.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.) Another added, “My experience was nice. I asked about my children and about us, and how to get assistance. They told me the necessary steps.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?

How satisfied are beneficiaries with the feedback mechanisms?

The majority of the participants⁵⁰ shared positive feedback about their experience with the TRC call centre; a few complained about a long waiting time or disconnection after waiting on the line. The participants explained their satisfaction especially in being informed about

⁴⁹ ESSN Quarter Three 2017 Monitoring Report, World Food Programme

⁵⁰ Out of the 33 participants who answered the question during FGDs, 29 shared their positive feedback, while only 4 complained about waiting on the line.

the reasons for their rejection. Even when they were rejected, they were far more understanding about their exclusion when the TRC call centre staff took the time to explain the reasons behind it to them and were grateful that if it was fixable, the call centre would guide them through. One of the participants explained:

“I got rejected at first and called 168. They told me that there were not enough people in my house to be eligible. But then they found out that my ID number was wrong, not aligned with my family ID. They guided me to the address that I needed to visit to correct my ID number.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir.)

The waiting time varied according to participants’ experiences. Some mentioned that it was only couple of minutes; a few others complained about long waiting times but because it was “free of charge”, they were fine with waiting until their turn came up.

Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?

Is the appeals system effective?

There is no official appeal system that is part of the ESSN formal application procedure.

However, when participants were asked about the ways that they appealed against the decision when they received a rejection, they shared their means of doing so.

The most common method was making the application all over again from scratch, either based on feedback from SASF or TRC staff or their own decision. One beneficiary said:

“You have to register all over again. The officials rejected my application, and I revisited their office and resubmitted all of my documents. We got the benefit after we had tried five or six times. Thank God!” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

Another beneficiary shared pretty much the same experience with the one in Urfa:

“I just went to check the status of my application. I gave them my ID; they said, your application was not accepted; you have to register again. So I started all over again. I started a new application by visiting the General Directorate of Population and made the house registration.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Making a new application from scratch was the most common strategy of the 15 participants who reported that they had been rejected and had appealed.

Calling the TRC hotline is another way of following up the negative outcome of the application, once they find out that their application has been rejected. One of the participants shared her experience:

“When they sent the rejection message, we called them and talked to them. They explained why they had rejected me. When my daughter withdrew her name from the card, then we got rejected.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Hatay.)

Some of the rejected participants also added that they did not know that they could appeal the decision at all. “I did not know that you could object to the decision.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir.)

What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?

To what extent has the cash transfer helped refugees to meet minimum needs?


Participants’ expenditure before and after the ESSN transfer was analysed using an interactive game called the ‘expenditure mapping’ game (see Figure 15), where each participant was given 50 beans and a board which featured possible spending items.

Figure 15: Expenditure mapping game



According to the analysis of this data, before transfer, the beneficiaries spent more than half of their ‘money’ (beans) to pay rent, utility bills and food expenses (see Figure 16). On average 23 percent of the ‘money’ (beans) was spent on rent (before transfer), followed by 16 percent spent on food and 16 percent spent on utility bills, making a total of 55 percent of their overall budget, on average.

Figure 16: Average share of each budget item in total budget (beans) for beneficiaries before and after transfer



Source: Data collected from expenditure mapping games in FGDs.

Rent came up as the single highest expenditure of both beneficiaries’ and non-beneficiaries’ budgets. One of the beneficiaries stated, “Like my friends, rent is my priority. I reduce food expenses, clothing expenses, anything else you can name, just to pay the rent.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.) Another one stated:


“Paying the rent is our priority. Without a house, we would be homeless people, which is my biggest fear so I pay the rent first each month and then nothing more left for anything else.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“I’m barely covering my rent, which is my priority. I used to pay 600 TL, then they increased the rent to 650 TL. I struggle a lot to pay the rent.” (Beneficiary Non-Syrian woman, Afyon)

On top of rent, they are also responsible for covering utilities such as electricity, water and gas bills. They mentioned that they had been facing enormous economic pressures to meet their needs with the limited income through work and with or without ESSN benefit. Notably, both electricity and gas bills go up during wintertime, which makes refugees more vulnerable.

When the beans were counted after transfer, the share of the items in total expenditure did not change much since a similar share of the transfer money was distributed to each item (see Figure 17). Focusing on beneficiaries, ESSN transfer was reportedly spent mostly on rent – about a third of the additional ‘money’ (beans), on average. This was followed by food and utility bills. Hence for beneficiaries, on average, a total of just over two thirds of the ESSN transfer was spent on these main expenditure items. These items were then followed by clothes and household supplies.

Figure 17: Average share of each budget item in the additional (ESSN) budget (beans) for beneficiaries



Source: Data collected from expenditure mapping games in FGDs.

Even though they received ESSN money, the beneficiaries also stated that basic monthly expenditures were high compared to income, including cash transfers and in-kind benefits given to refugee households.

It is also important to see how budget allocation changed between men and women. Before any transfer occurred, on average men spent most of their budget (beans) on rent, food and then utility bills. For women this order changes to rent, utility bills and then food. But in total the amounts spent on these three main items were similar between men and women.

The additional budget (additional beans) was also spent somewhat differently between men and women participants. On average, men spent more than 70 percent of this additional budget on the three main items: rent, food and utility bills. While women also spent the majority of their budget (60 percent) on these items they also allocated more, compared to men, to other items such as household supplies and healthcare.

What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?

What changes have occurred in coping strategies, food security and debt (differentiated by gender where applicable)?

Coping strategies mentioned by participants were: (i) working long hours with low salary and without any insurance; (ii) reducing both the quality and the quantity of food consumption; (iii) borrowing from relatives and local markets in their neighbourhood; (iv) taking their children out of school; (v) living in substandard housing; (vi) selling their assets. Beneficiaries reported the most dramatic change occurred in meeting their house rent needs, consuming better quality and variety of food, sending their children back to school, and paying back their debts and not borrowing any more.

(i) Effects on paying rent

As regards living costs, rent is the single highest expenditure item for Syrian and non-Syrian refugee households. Out of the 90 beneficiaries who answered the question on whether receiving ESSN makes any difference, 30 said it went straight towards rent and gave significant relief to their budget. One beneficiary stated:

“Without the help of the Red Crescent card, we would not be able to survive. We would already have been kicked out of our house. Before the card, we were not able to pay our rent.”
(Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

Before receiving ESSN, most of them said that they had either borrowed money or delayed payment. The ESSN allowed them to pay the rent on time and without relying on anybody: “Before the card, I would not have been able to pay the rent. I either delayed payment or borrowed money but now, it is much better.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir.)

This result is consistent with the findings from the quantitative analysis on debt levels of beneficiaries in pre and post-transfer periods. Analysis of PAB and PDM datasets show that per capita debt for beneficiary households decreased from 284 TL to 227 TL while it increased for non-beneficiary households from 362 TL to 443 TL.⁵¹

Another impact of ESSN money on beneficiaries is that the cash transfer enabled them to upgrade their accommodation. The majority of the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries complained about housing conditions as stated above. However, some of the recipients reported that ESSN money had helped them to move into a more decent house:

“The month we received the money we moved to a new house, because the old one has mice inside and I have children.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon.)

“My house was like a chicken shed, and the rent was 250 TL. I left that place, and now I’m living in a bigger house for 350 TL.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir.)

“I was living in a dumpster of a house for 350 TL. After I got the card, I moved to another house for 450 TL.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.)

As shown in the above statements, beneficiaries who reported that they had moved to better accommodation had concerns about their children’s health and/or found the living conditions inside the home unbearable. On the other hand, a few of them said that the ESSN had enabled them to move into their own house. Some had previously shared a house with another family; some had stayed with their relatives and had found their own place once they had received the cash transfer:

⁵¹ See Annex 13 for further details.

“We used to live as two families in the same house. Now I have moved to my own house. My Turkish neighbours brought me some stuff, like second-hand furniture. Now I’m saving to buy a washing machine.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon.)

“It helped me a lot. I used to stay with my uncle; now I have moved to a house, and I’m paying my own rent. I have registered my kids for school.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

“My son used to live with us. He couldn’t afford the rent before the Red Crescent card. He has a wife and kids. When he got the Red Crescent card, he moved out.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

This finding is consistent across the genders of respondents and selected provinces.

(ii) Effects on food consumption (quality and quantity)

Reducing food consumption (including quality, quantity, and number of meals) is one of the main coping strategies that both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries adopt. Beneficiaries stated that ESSN money had a positive impact on their food consumption. Out of the 90 beneficiaries who answered the question on whether receiving ESSN relief made any difference, 30 said it increased the variety and quality of the food they consumed.

They stated that they were now able to buy more nutritious food, especially meat:

“If my kids want to eat something special like meat, then I wait until I get the Red Crescent money.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

“In the past, there were many special things that we wouldn’t be able to buy, like meat, but after getting a Red Crescent card, I started to buy. Every first of the month, I’m able to buy meat and a few other things that my children are asking for.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

Beneficiaries also shared their concerns for the well-being of their children. They stated that the ESSN helped them to meet their children’s needs, including nutritious food such as vegetables, fruit and meat, and also other treats such as chocolates, sweets or a sandwich for a packed lunch:

“If they [children] want bananas, we are now able to buy them. The Red Crescent card was very helpful.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir.)

“Before the Red Crescent, it was so hard to meet your children’s food needs. My son asked me to cook for him, but sometimes I could not provide anything. Now I can, thank God.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

“Before the Red Crescent card, my children were craving butter, meat and fish. Once my son took the pan and threw it out of the window, complaining about eating pasta every single day. He wanted to eat red meat. Before the Red Crescent, I could not provide it, but the situation is much better now.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

These results are also in line with the findings from quantitative analysis. According to the results from pre-transfer (PAB) and post-transfer surveys (PDM), percent of beneficiary households with poor or borderline food consumption score (an index constructed to measure food security during the week) decreased from 24 percent to 12 percent in the post-transfer period (pre and post-transfer rates are 23 percent and 18 percent respectively for non-beneficiary households).⁵²

⁵² See Annex 13 for more details.

(iii) Effects on providing educational supplies

Out of the 90 beneficiaries who answered the question on whether receiving ESSN makes any difference, 18 said the ESSN gave them the means to pay transportation fees and buy school supplies:

“I have four children, and all of them are attending school. The TRC card helped me a lot to buy their school supplies since they need notebooks, pens, textbooks. I also top up their transportation cards every month and buy their uniforms once a year.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

“I have three children, and all of them are attending school. I did not buy uniforms last year as the school provided them for free. The TRC card helps me to buy stationery items, textbooks, whatever they need.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

A few shared their stories of how the ESSN helped them send their children back to school:

“My son worked for a while to take care of the family. When I heard about the TRC card, I applied, and they told me to send my children to school. It has been a year since we started to benefit, and my son started to attend the school. There is a big difference. I asked him which one is better, work or study. He replied that school is better.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“I was working, I had to work and my older children (a 15-year-old boy and an 11-year-old girl) took care of my baby (3 years old). The TRC card means I can afford to stay at home and send my children back to school. When I got the payment for the first time, they started attending school.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon.)

Similar results were found in quantitative analysis as well. According to the results from pre-transfer (PAB) and post-transfer surveys (PDM), use of negative livelihood coping strategies about education decreased among beneficiary households in the post-transfer period. Pre-transfer, 17 percent of beneficiary households reported withdrawing children from school while this rate decreased to 10 percent in the post-transfer period. In addition, pre-transfer 39 percent of the beneficiary households reported reducing education expenses while this rate dropped down to 20 percent of in the post-transfer period. Similarly, for non-beneficiary households use of the negative coping strategy of withdrawing children from school decreased in the same time period as well from 12 percent to 7 percent. But in contrast to beneficiary households, use of negative coping strategy “reducing education expenses” stayed at the same rate with 18 percent for non-beneficiary households.

What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?

To what extent have the ESSN transfers improved access to other government services (education and health) and protection outcomes?

All ESSN applicants are required to register with the DGMM and receive an ID card, which is valid only if the refugee remains living in the district where the card was issued. They also need to register their address to apply for the ESSN card. The registration process also gives access to health and education services in Turkey. The ESSN, therefore, has facilitated the registration of refugees, and in an indirect way it has also had a positive impact on the facilitation of access to health services. During the FGD discussions, 60 participants mentioned their experiences with the public hospitals, medical doctors, and generally with the health system in Turkey. Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries appreciated their access to the health services for free, and that they could obtain medicines for free:

“There is a good thing here; you do not need to pay for drugs. That’s a good point.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay)

“Medication is the cheapest thing. You only make symbolic payments. You go to the clinics and get drugs that you would pay 50,000 SYP (100 dollars) for in Syria. However, in Turkey, most

of them come free or you need to pay 10 TL (3 dollars). I mean medication is the cheapest thing. Syrians get drugs for free.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir)

However, others mentioned that certain types of medicine come free but special drugs, such as insulin, allergy medicines, antibiotics etc. have to be paid for. ESSN money helped them to cover these expenses:

“When I have money from the TRC card, I put a certain amount aside to buy medicine for my child, who has an allergy.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa)

“I have an autistic brother and also suffer from epilepsy. I buy specific medicines every month, with money which I put aside from the TRC card, like 150 TL per month.” (Beneficiary non-Syrian man, Afyon)

The main issue raised during the discussions is “lack of translators in the hospitals”, which creates an obstacle to access to the health services.

“The translator at the hospital is the most important thing; if there is a translator then you’ll be able to see the doctor. However, you need to make a payment to the translator, which costs around 40–50 TL so that she can translate for you at the doctor’s office.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir)

“My son had an extra toe on his foot. I took him to the hospital a couple of times and the doctor told me that they could not accept me without a translator. I showed him that he had an extra toe. No help! I was obliged to get a circumciser [a person who does circumcision without being a doctor] and he cut off the extra toe. He was a Syrian circumciser. He took 150 TL for one toe. He gave me medication for it too and took out the stitches after a while.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir)

ESSN transfers also improved access to education services in an indirect way. Participants mentioned that they spent some of the ESSN money on supporting their children in school, by buying them *uniforms*, giving a *daily allowance*, paying their *transportation fee* and buying them *course materials*, including stationery. The ESSN improved access to education services by helping households pay for these additional expenses:

“Before the Red Crescent card, when my children asked for things they needed for school, I was not able to provide them with even a pen or a notebook but now, I’m able to buy school necessities such as books and notebooks and I feel much better.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon)

“I bought a uniform for my daughter. I used the TRC money.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

“I have three children in school and the TRC salary helped me to meet their school needs.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

“Before the TRC card our kids did not use the bus, but now we are able to afford the transportation fee.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Istanbul)

A few also mentioned how the ESSN had helped them send their children back to school:

“It has been a year. The card helped me to put my son into school. He is 14 years old and he is attending primary school. Thank God for helping me but more importantly, helping my son.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

“TRC money helped me to register my daughter at a private kindergarten so that I can work.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

What other effects has the ESSN had?

Has the ESSN affected the social cohesion of beneficiaries within Turkish society (including by gender), and how?

By considering the different dimensions of the integration problem, it becomes possible to consider whether the ESSN programme has had any impact on the integration of refugees into Turkish society. Hence in this section we first introduce a discussion on pathways to integration and the obstacles along the way before discussing how the ESSN might have supported the process.

Pathways to Integration

About half of the participants who attended the discussion commented that they had established good, but limited, relations with their Turkish neighbours.⁵³ The language barrier is mentioned as a significant barrier to social integration in Turkey, and many of them said that they had limited relations like “saluting each other” on the way past or sometimes “paying visits to their houses”. The Turkish community’s contribution and donations in the form of in-kind aid such as second-hand clothes, second-hand furniture, and food packages during Ramadan are often mentioned by the participants with much appreciation and sometimes praise about the “bond between two Muslim societies”.

When participants were asked about their experiences with the Turkish community, “kind but distant” is the main theme which came across among both the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. They stated their gratitude to the Turkish community, since the local community was the first responder to this humanitarian crisis by providing them with in-kind aid: “I have very good neighbours. We had times when we didn’t even have bread to eat, but my neighbours helped me. They used to bring food,” stated one non-beneficiary woman in Istanbul. Regardless of their beneficiary status, most of them shared similar stories. One rejected Syrian woman also said, “My neighbours are good people. From time to time they bring food supplies. In Ramadan, they gave us food packages.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir.) However, this exchange is limited to acts of kindness from the Turkish community and does not necessarily mean ‘integration’ in a comprehensive sense: “They are good people. I have Turkish neighbours; they send or bring stuff. That is it,” one beneficiary stated. (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.)

The majority of Syrian and non-Syrian refugees are living in urban slums and sharing the public space with relatively poor segments of Turkish society. It is important to remember that these Turkish communities are likely to be just as vulnerable and to be experiencing similar everyday struggles such as low wages, long hours of work, etc. One beneficiary mentions: “There is no time left for visits. We say ‘hi’ if we come across each other and we are okay.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.) Another states: “Honestly, it is normal. We exchange hellos with our neighbours, but not visits. Everyone is busy with their work.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Urfa.)

Barriers to Integration

- **Language:** The language barrier constitutes a significant constraint to establishing relations with the Turkish community. One non-beneficiary Syrian woman stated: “My Turkish neighbour is really nice. We visit each other rarely. But we don’t communicate, because of the language barrier.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Urfa.) If they overcome the barrier, as happens in certain cases, then they communicate more: “I speak Kurdish with

⁵³ Out of the 144 participants who answered the question on their experiences of integration into Turkish society, 72 said they had positive but limited relations with the Turkish community and 72 shared negative stories about the integration.

my neighbours, so they understand me. That's why they often come to my house; we visit each other a lot." (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.) Some of the refugees overcome this barrier by getting help from their children: "My children are attending school; therefore they can understand and speak some Turkish. They translate for us." (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Afyon.)

- **Discrimination:** While there have not been any significant tensions or clashes, locals have grown more outspoken about their discomfort regarding the Syrians benefiting from free healthcare and education services and ESSN and other aid programmes. 72 participants in FGDs felt that they faced discrimination of some sort, falling into three areas: (i) renting a house; (ii) in the workplace or while seeking a job; (iii) accessing public services, such as health and education.

- **While renting a house:**

FGD participants', beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, statements show persistent housing discrimination in all provinces. The refugees face widespread discrimination during the housing hunt. In some cases the landlord refused to let families rent a house because they are Syrians:

"The problem is the houses not just the rent. The problem is you can't find a house because they don't give to Syrians. Wherever you go, you find a suitable place but they don't give it to you. If the house is in poor condition, yes they give it to you to rent. And the rent for Syrians is higher than the rents for Turks (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

In other cases, even though they find the house and able to rent, then the price goes up since "Syrians" rent the place:

"There is no heating system in my home and I'm paying 900 TL per month. Whereas my Turkish neighbour living downstairs paying 600 TL per month with a heating system, radiator and every other utility. Why? Syrians are living upstairs but Turkish family living in downstairs" (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Another exploitation mentioned among the participants is landlords' raising the rent based on a belief that Syrian refugees get a lump sum amount from the government—ESSN:

"You want to rent a place, then they tell you that you are a Syrian having the Red Crescent card so they raise the price assuming that you are the beneficiary" (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir).

Another non-applicant raised the same issue in Hatay:

"When my parents rented the house, the landlord asked whether they are beneficiaries of TRC card. My father asked whether it does make any difference. He said the rent is 550 TL without the card, 750 TL with the card" (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay)

- **In the workplace or seeking a job:**

One of the most significant impediments to the social and economic integration of vulnerable refugees in Turkey has been their inability to get work permits. Given the difficulties and costs of obtaining work permits, the only alternative usually continues to be to work informally for low wages, without any insurance or social benefits. This makes Syrian refugees vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination. Discrimination anecdotes in the workplace are one of the most mentioned issues among the refugees, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries:

"We work without an insurance. If I ask for an insurance or raise, then the boss would tell me to leave. I have been working for him for 2 years and making 1600 TL per month,

whereas less experienced Turkish person's salary is 2100 TL" (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa)

Both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries complained about the unequal pay for equal work:

"Excuse me, a Syrian person, for example my son and I are working. The Turkish person I don't know how much they compensate him, the Turk gets more than double of what my son gets even though my son works better than him. I'm certain that my son gets a quarter or a third of what he gets" said one non-applicant Syrian woman in Izmir

In Afyon, where Christian Iraqis are living, they complained about-facing discrimination in the workplace due to their religious identity. Some of them mentioned that they lost their jobs due to being a Christian "I once worked in a restaurant and told them I'm Christian. They shouted at me and fired me" (Rejected Non-Syrian woman, Afyon). In the same focus group, another Iraqi woman agreed, "Same thing happened to my daughter as well. She used to work in a hair saloon and they told her that she is a Christian and it is not right to hire a Christian". This is an issue only comes up in Afyon, where Christian Iraqis have been living for a while.

o **Accessing public services, such as health and education:**

Even though obtaining an ID – which is a necessity for application to the ESSN programme– increases their access to public services, education and health, they mentioned that they feel discriminated against the most while accessing public services.

Even though registered Syrian refugees have been granted access to health services in public hospitals, refugees told that local Turkish community resent the refugees' free treatment:

"Not they they got jealous. They got jealous and envious when we get medicines for free from the hospitals. After that, I told them that they are not the one paying for the medicines, the United Nations is compensating. They think that they are the one paying for the medicines" (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay)

They also mentioned they faced discrimination by local community, when they get together in public areas, such as hospitals:

"This happened to me twice in hospitals. I saw people saying: "that Arabs came, the Arabs came. Why don't they go back to their country? What they are doing here. They say, "those people fled their own country and came here, they are cowards". I reply to them "did you see your wives raped and your children killed in front of your eyes?" we are forced to be here. Then they feel ashamed and keep silent" (Non-Beneficiary Non-Syrian woman, Istanbul)

Limited school places, children attendance into the labour force to take care of their family, poverty, exclusion and gender, they all contributed to reasons of why Syrian/non-Syrian refugee children are unable to go to school. On top of that, refugees' children often face even deeper social and religious discrimination (only in the case of Afyon since they are Christian Arabs):

"My son is a 10th grader in a Turkish school. He dropped out because of the negative and hostile treatment. It is not because of the headmaster. Indeed he is very good person but because Turkish students don't go around Syrian students" (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa)

Some beneficiaries shared their experiences of how they faced more discrimination after becoming a beneficiary of the programme:

“The principal told my daughter, ‘You have an allowance’; he took 100 TL from her for books. He did not ask us. My daughter said, ‘Mum, the teacher told me that I have the allowance from the card, so I can pay 100 TL for books.’ (Beneficiary non-Syrian woman, Afyon)

The same type of story was shared in every province:

“I went to register my kids at school, and the school manager accused me of registering my kids at school to get an allowance from the government. I would like to defend myself, but I cannot speak Turkish.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

In sum, the main obstacles towards the integration of Syrians and non-Syrians in Turkey are far more embedded within economic and social structures and rather difficult for the ESSN to resolve. We have not heard any comments that the ESSN has contributed to their integration *directly*, although by reducing the use of negative coping strategies and enabling them to have a more dignified existence among neighbours in the Turkish community, it may have contributed indirectly to integration. Indeed, whereas beneficiaries expressed that the language barrier is the biggest obstacle to improving their relations with their neighbours, non-beneficiaries reported far more serious problems impeding their integration into the society. One non-beneficiary said:

“I want to let my children live properly, not starving, first, then I will worry about the language issue.” (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa.)

Compared to beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries have a more difficult time adapting themselves to the society they live in:

“I am forced to adapt myself for the sake of my children but life in Turkey is very difficult to handle. Most of my relatives went back to Syria.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir)

“Our brothers left Turkey. We could not make a living here, everything is so expensive: rent, utilities, food, clothes.” (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa)

In this sense, the ESSN may have contributed to integration by enabling refugees to think beyond their ‘survival needs’ and concentrate their efforts on learning the language, looking for a job and socially integrating themselves within the community.

On the other hand, the ESSN may also have contributed to the resentment of poor Turkish communities towards the Syrian community, since Syrians receive more generous amounts in social assistance compared to poor Turkish households.

The net effect of the ESSN on social integration is therefore difficult to judge, as there is evidence to show that it may have had both a positive and negative impact on integration.

What other effects has the ESSN had?

To what extent has the ESSN affected household dynamics, including female participation in household decisions?

Even though the cash transfers are not targeted exclusively at women (contrary to the case of CCTs in Turkey, where the transfer is targeted at women only), based on FGD participants’ responses, women take the lead in making decisions on how to spend the ESSN money.⁵⁴

The difference between men’s and women’s responses is based on their way of justifying the decision-making process. Male participants in particular justified their reply by saying, “I

⁵⁴ Out of the 55 beneficiaries who answered the question on who made the decision on spending ESSN money, 27 said the women decide, 16 said both women and men together make the decision, and 12 said the man decides.

have no idea about household needs,” (beneficiary Syrian man, Hatay) or “She decides how to spend the money. If she says she needs something, it means it is necessary to buy it,” (beneficiary Syrian man, Hatay). Therefore, if a male participant said that it was the woman who decided on spending the ESSN money, the reasoning behind this was that women are responsible for preparing food as well as for childcare and house care.

However, women justified their responses based on different causal mechanisms. First, men spend most of their time outside the house, either working long hours or seeking a job, as one of the participants mentioned: “The men get out of the house at dawn and they come back at dinner time. Then after having dinner, they fall asleep. No time left.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.) Another woman added, “I’m responsible for everything, groceries, because my husband is working from dusk till dawn.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Second, some of the women had lost their husbands in war and these women were forced to become breadwinners and sole caretakers: “I’m a widow, so I’m responsible for how we spend the money,” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa) or “I’m the head of the house, everything’s on me.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul.)

Last but not least, for many women participants displaced by war, this displacement has meant assuming new economic and household responsibilities. One Syrian woman explained, “Women often make the decisions. After we came to Turkey, women took responsibility.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.) Another added, “In our country, our husbands were the ones who worked and spent the money, but in Turkey, it is on us.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Urfa.)

It seems that cash transfer improves the inclusion of women in decision-making and has a positive impact on household decision-making dynamics. Since the women have been taking the lead on choosing which needs to prioritise, cash transfer has a potential role in elevating the women’s status in society. On the one hand, the ESSN seems to increase women’s decision-making power in the household; on the other hand, it increases women’s choices about where to spend the money. Both men and women mentioned that they covered the rent with ESSN money, and following rent, food and utilities; however the majority of women mentioned that they chose to spend money either on food for the children or on the healthcare and clothing needs of children.

What other effects has the ESSN had?

Are there any unintended consequences observed within households, or within communities?

It was mentioned during FGDs that sometimes rental prices were increased for ESSN beneficiaries, which would be an unintended consequence of the ESSN. This was reported as landlords raising the rent based on a belief that Syrian refugees receive a lump sum from the government—ESSN:

“If you want to rent a place, then they tell you that you are a Syrian with the Red Crescent card, so they raise the price assuming that you are a beneficiary.” (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir.) Another non-applicant raised the same issue in Hatay:

“When my parents rented the house, the landlord asked whether they were beneficiaries of the Red Crescent card. My father asked whether it made any difference. He said the rent was 550 TL without the card, 750 TL with the card.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Hatay.)

While this may be true in some circumstances, there is not enough systematic evidence to validate that this was generally the case everywhere.

2.3 Efficiency

Were ESSN objectives achieved on time?

How timely were the monthly transfers?

Cash transfers offered to both Syrian and non-Syrian beneficiaries are reported to have been delivered on time.⁵⁵ Beneficiaries mentioned that they received their money either at the beginning of the month or the last day of the month, depending on the SMS message they received. The TRC Centre sent SMS messages to a certain number of people, assigning each group a different day to prevent queues in the bank. Since these cash transfers are essential in meeting people's needs, the timely delivery of cash transfer is critical. One of the beneficiaries stated, "I receive my money on the first day of the month. There are rent and utility bills waiting; my first thing is to pay the rent and utility bills immediately." (Beneficiary Syrian man, Izmir.) In sum, cash payments were delivered on time and faced no delays.

2.4 Sustainability

How well connected is the ESSN with the refugee response in Turkey as a whole?

What synergies were achieved between the ESSN and other Government of Turkey services and programmes for refugees?

The single platform used by the ESSN has facilitated the use and integration of other social assistance programmes targeting refugees. Beyond the government provided CCTE programme, participants mentioned that some of the agencies met many of the basic needs for them, from providing food, coal and clothing to education materials and psychological support.⁵⁶ However, they were ambiguous about whether the source of the benefit was government led or NGO led.

The Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) programme has been providing bimonthly cash transfers as of May 2017 to vulnerable refugee families whose children regularly attend school. The project has been implemented in partnership with UNICEF and its partner, the TRC, in support of the Government of Turkey. The CCTE programme builds upon the ESSN. Therefore, beneficiaries of the ESSN programme become automatically eligible and received an SMS indicating they would now benefit from the CCTE as a top-up on their card. One of the beneficiaries said that even though she had not registered for the benefit, she received the message (beneficiary Syrian woman, Istanbul). Other participants in the group related that they were also benefiting from the same programme. They confirmed that girls received 40 TL and boys were getting 35 TL. They also knew the condition of the cash transfer, which is stated as not missing school more than four days in a month. Among 13 FGDs only a few of them (23 beneficiaries) mentioned CCTE, due either to its being a fairly new programme, or to hesitancy about sharing the benefit with the community members.

Beyond the CCTE programme, the most mentioned programme among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is known as the PTT card, supported under the UNHCR winter assistance programme. It is a one-time benefit of cash assistance via debit cards issued by the Turkish postal service (PTT). The debit cards can be used in any shop, which is a part of the Mastercard circuit, allowing refugees to buy a variety of goods or services across the

⁵⁵ Out of 30 beneficiaries who answered the question on timeliness of transfers during FGDs, 29 stated the transfers are timely.

⁵⁶ Out of 52 participants who answered the question about the other supporting mechanisms they benefit from, 20 of them mentioned the PTT card, 16 said they were getting a bag of coal, and 12 mentioned food packages.

country.⁵⁷ Even though families are selected according to eligibility criteria, the FGD participants did not seem to know about the vulnerability criteria. They said they had registered for the benefit, then some of them commented that they were lucky to get the benefit:

“We received a PTT card last year. They divided Urfa into three districts, then people got registered, but we knew neither the source nor the eligibility criteria. They did not explicitly define the criteria.” (Non-applicant Syrian man, Urfa)

The FGD participants also did not talk about it as a one-time only transfer: “I received the PTT card last year. However, they did not give me a call this year. Rather, my friends were called and enjoyed the card.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Izmir)

Along with international organizations and NGOs, local governments also provide in-kind aids such as a bag of coal and food packages to support the vulnerable refugee population. Among in-kind benefits, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries mentioned “*bag of coal*” the most. They stated that they received one once or twice a year during the wintertime. It is local government which is distributing the bag of coal in Istanbul. The Social Solidarity Assistance Foundation, however, is the focal point distributing winter benefits in Afyon and Izmir.

NGOs⁵⁸ are also active in the area of in-kind aid provision, and FGD participants mentioned their role in providing aid. The most mentioned NGOs are ASAM, Life Support, Concern, Farah, and IHH. They offer either in-kind (one-time) benefits or psychological support and educational training. Among others, ASAM seems to be active and known throughout refugee communities:

“We applied to ASAM last year, and I registered my daughter to fix her pronunciation. Every Wednesday there’s a doctor who teaches children how to pronounce letters.” (Beneficiary Syrian woman, Hatay.)

“Through ASAM I enrolled my daughter for a language course to learn the language and improve her situation.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir)

The delivery of benefits responds to refugees’ immediate needs: “I registered with the Al Farah organization. They gave me three e-voucher cards. Considering there are 7 of us, every card is worth 300 TL. I went to the mall and bought whatever I wanted. Of course I bought rice, lentils, bulghur, hummus and oil, stuff like that. Thank God, it’s a bit better now.” (Non-applicant Syrian woman, Izmir.) Even though assistance from NGOs is an effective way to address refugees’ concerns, they face a new kind of uncertainty as NGO services end abruptly: “They used to bring milk for my daughter from some NGO – I didn’t remember the name. However, three months ago they stopped providing milk.” (Rejected Syrian woman, Izmir.)

The humanitarian strategies and programmes of other donors, UN agencies, and NGOs emerged as new outlets for refugee populations living in poverty and exposed to social and economic exclusion in society. In an emergency setting, their contribution is significant; however irregular procedures, lack of eligibility criteria (regarding in-kind aids allocated by local NGOs), and misinformation among refugee communities over sources of funding, are the main themes mentioned by the participants that created misinformation about who gets what and how, and feelings of unfair treatment among the refugee communities. In summary, the in-kind aids and other aid programmes are somehow complementary but not coordinated with the ESSN. In addition, there is no coordination mentioned in Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) between ESSN programme stakeholders and NGO project partners.

⁵⁷ UNHCR

⁵⁸ NGOs mentioned through the FGDs are the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), Farah, ASAM, the Danish Refugee Council, Life Support, and Concern Worldwide.

Annex 9: Evaluation Matrix

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
	Relevance				
1	Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?	How well does it respond to the main identified needs of refugees including protection, disaggregated by group including origin of refugees?	Programme design incorporates relevant needs analysis including protection needs. Evidence of differentiation in programme according to different needs of TP and IP refugees	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data, Literature review	Strong
1	Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?	On what basis was the transfer type and amount set (including other services and transfers available to refugees)?	Comparison of transfer amount with minimum expenditure basket. Documentary evidence on basis of calculation of transfer amount.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
1	Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?	What efforts were made to ensure that the ESSN considered beneficiary perspectives?	Evidence of beneficiary consultations on programme design. Evidence of direct impact of consultations on programme design.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Weak
1	Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?	How gender and age sensitive was the design of the ESSN from the perspective of beneficiaries?	Evidence of female beneficiary consultations on programme design. Evidence of differentiation according to different needs (e.g. gender, age)	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Medium
2	To what extent are the ESSN objectives coherent with the national policies and programmes?	To what extent was the ESSN aligned with relevant policies of the Turkish Republic?	Programme design aligned with relevant published documents. Stakeholder agreement on strategic alignment.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
2	To what extent are the ESSN objectives coherent with the national policies and programmes?	To what extent was the ESSN aligned with Turkish social protection programmes (including the CCE)?	Programme design aligned with relevant published documents. Stakeholder agreement on strategic alignment.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Literature review	Strong
2	To what extent are the ESSN objectives coherent with the national policies and programmes?	Did the ESSN offer an appropriate approach to reinforcing the capacity of state institutions?	Capacity assessments conducted in the design phase. Incorporation of capacity assessments in programme design.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Literature review	Medium

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
3	To what extent is the ESSN coherent with EU Policies and Strategies?	To what extent is the ESSN coherent with DG ECHOs humanitarian policies?	Programme design aligned with relevant published documents. Stakeholder agreement on strategic alignment.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
3	To what extent is the ESSN coherent with EU Policies and Strategies?	To what extent is the ESSN coherent with the objectives of the overall EU strategy in Turkey (the FRIT)?	Programme design aligned with relevant published documents. Stakeholder agreement on strategic alignment.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Medium
4	Were appropriate partnership arrangements established to implement the ESSN?	What alternative partnership arrangements for the delivery of the ESSN were considered and were the strategic implications analysed?	Alternative institutional arrangements for implementation considered during design. Stakeholder perceptions of advantages/disadvantages of alternatives.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Weak
4	Were appropriate partnership arrangements established to implement the ESSN?	Are the roles and responsibilities of the different partners well-defined and clear?	Evidence that stakeholder roles were defined (and refined) during implementation.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Literature review	Strong
4	Were appropriate partnership arrangements established to implement the ESSN?	To what extent have WFP, TRC and government been able to capitalize on their comparative advantages in implementing the ESSN?	Stakeholder opinion on the appropriateness of the division of responsibilities. Stakeholder opinion on the appropriateness on alternative division of responsibilities.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Literature review	Strong
4	Were appropriate partnership arrangements established to implement the ESSN?	Were appropriate mechanisms established for accountability and coordination?	Coordination and accountability designed. Stakeholder opinion on adequacy of mechanisms.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Literature review	Strong

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
5	Was the design of the ESSN, including activities and outputs, appropriate and relevant to the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?	Are the outputs and activities logically necessary and sufficient to achieve the stated objectives of the ESSN?	Completeness of Theory of Change, including linking assumptions.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Medium
5	Was the design of the ESSN, including activities and outputs, appropriate and relevant to the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?	Is there clarity between the donor and implementing partners about the objectives and intended outcomes?	Comparison of donor, TRC and Government of Turkey understanding of ESSN objectives and outcomes.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
5	Was the design of the ESSN, including activities and outputs, appropriate and relevant to the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?	Was the analysis of needs and capacities adequate to support the ESSN design?	Comparison of information on needs (pre-published and programme baselines) with main sectors of humanitarian interventions. Capacity assessments undertaken.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Medium
5	Was the design of the ESSN, including activities and outputs, appropriate and relevant to the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?	How were gender and protection issues analysed and incorporated into the design of the ESSN?	Gender and protection assessments conducted. Evidence of impact on programme design.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
5	Was the design of the ESSN, including activities and outputs, appropriate and relevant to the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?	Were appropriate monitoring arrangements incorporated in the design?	Comparison of programme results with monitoring indicators. Reporting arrangements defined. Mechanisms in place to ensure management response to monitoring reports.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
6	Is the single- platform approach relevant and appropriate?	What are the risks and benefits of using a single platform approach?	Stakeholder opinions on risks and benefits.	Structured interviews at HQ level, FGDs, Literature review	Medium
6	Is the single- platform approach relevant and appropriate?	Were appropriate measures put in place to mitigate the risks of adopting a single platform approach?	Stakeholder opinions on mitigation measures.	Structured interviews at HQ level, FGDs, Literature review	Medium

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
	Effectiveness				
7	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	How effective have the ESSN awareness and sensitisation activities been?	Number and type of sensitization activities conducted. Source of information on ESSN among beneficiaries. Awareness of ESSN among non-beneficiaries.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Focus Group Discussions	Strong
7	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	Is the ESSN equally accessible and available to all vulnerable refugees (including by gender and age)?	Disaggregated data on classification of refugees, ESSN applicants and beneficiaries. Reasons for refusal of applications.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
7	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	What inclusion and exclusion errors (including gender) are linked to targeting criteria?	Disaggregated data on refugees, ESSN applicants and beneficiaries.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
7	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	Is the targeting approach consistent with humanitarian principles?	Humanitarian principles for targeting refugees. ESSN Targeting criteria.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Baseline and Monitoring data, Literature review	Strong
7	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	What are the costs of targeting beneficiaries? Are there feasible alternatives?	Data on costs associated with targeting processes. Stakeholder opinion on the feasibility of alternative approaches.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Budget and expenditure data	Weak
7	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	What other factors promoted or constrained progress towards achieving target coverage rates?	Coverage rates by month. Stakeholder opinion on factors influencing coverage rates.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Focus Group Discussions	Medium

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
8	To what extent were the intended services delivered?	Did refugees face any challenges in receiving or accessing their cash transfers (including by gender)?	Data on percentage of transfers withdrawn each month by beneficiaries. Beneficiary opinions on constraints.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Strong
8	To what extent were the intended services delivered?	What scope is there to adjust the level of transfers as circumstances change (e.g. for inflation)?	Existence of mechanism to monitor market prices. Existence of procedure to adjust transfer amount.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
8	To what extent were the intended services delivered?	Were special protection cases identified and referred to other providers?	Protection officers available in SASF offices. Number of protection cases referred by month. Stakeholder perception on effectiveness of referral mechanism.	Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Strong
9	Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?	How frequently is the TRC call centre used, for what purposes and with what results?	Number of calls made to TRC hotline by month. Data on reasons for calls. Data on response to calls.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Strong
9	Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?	How satisfied are beneficiaries with the feedback mechanisms?	Beneficiary opinions on the hotline. Beneficiary awareness of hotline.	FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Strong
9	Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?	Is the appeals system effective?	Existence of appeals mechanism. Awareness of beneficiaries of rights to appeal and appeal mechanism. Beneficiary satisfaction with appeals mechanism.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Focus Group Discussions	Strong

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
10	What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?	To what extent has the cash transfer helped refugees to meet minimum needs?	Beneficiary reports on total household income (including ESSN). Beneficiary reports on use of household income. Data on Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB).	FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
10	What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?	What changes have occurred in coping strategies, food security and debt (differentiated by gender where applicable)?	Beneficiary reports on food consumption. Beneficiary reports on changes in coping strategies. Beneficiary reports on changes in level of indebtedness.	FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
10	What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?	To what extent have the ESSN transfers improved access to other government services (education and health) and protection outcomes?	Use of health and education services by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Changes in use of services. Reasons for change in use.	Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
11	What other effects has the ESSN had?	Has the ESSN affected beneficiary integration into Turkish society (including by gender) and why?	Beneficiary perception of level of integration into Turkish society. Changes in level of integration. Perception of factors leading to changes in integration.	Structured interviews at Provincial level, Focus Group Discussions	Weak
11	What other effects has the ESSN had?	To what extent has the ESSN affected household dynamics, including female participation in household decisions?	Beneficiary reports on responsibility for household decisions. Changes in responsibility for decision-making. Perception of factors leading to changes in decision maker.	Structured interviews at Provincial level, Focus Group Discussions	Medium
11	What other effects has the ESSN had?	Are any unintended consequences observed within households, or within communities?	Beneficiary opinions.	Structured interviews at Provincial level, Focus Group Discussions	Medium
11	What other effects has the ESSN had?	Are any unintended consequences observed within the aid system?	Stakeholder opinions.	Structured interviews at HQ level	Strong

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
12	How effective are the management and governance arrangements?	Are the management arrangements working well and could they be improved?	Stakeholder opinion on extent to which comparative advantages of different actors have been realized. Stakeholder opinion on whether optimal management arrangements have been established.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level	Strong
12	How effective are the management and governance arrangements?	To what extent have national systems and capacities been strengthened?	Capacity-strengthening activities conducted. Stakeholder perception of effectiveness.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level	Medium
12	How effective are the management and governance arrangements?	How effective were the ESSN coordination systems (such as the Governance Board and Joint Management Cell)?	Coordination meetings held. Stakeholder perception of effectiveness.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, Literature review	Strong
12	How effective are the management and governance arrangements?	Is a risk management system in place - including mapping of corruption risks and mitigation measures?	Risk assessment and mitigation plan completed. Extent to which risks during implementation were foreseen. Evidence of use of mitigation measures	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level	Strong
Efficiency					
13	How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	What proportion of the project funding reaches beneficiaries?	Total Cost Transfer Ratio for ESSN	Budget and expenditure data	Strong
13	How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	What were the undocumented financial contributions (Government of Turkey, Halkbank, TRC, other) to the ESSN?	Estimation of unbudgeted time contribution by actors in implementing the ESSN. Estimation of salary costs. Estimation of overhead costs.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level	Weak
13	How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	What are the main drivers of the ESSN administrative costs?	Budget breakdown for ESSN.	Budget and expenditure data	Medium
13	How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	How does the overall cost efficiency compare to other government welfare systems or other humanitarian cash or voucher programmes?	Total Cost Transfer Ratio for comparator projects and programmes.	Budget and expenditure data	Medium

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
13	How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time? How has ESSN cost efficiency evolved over time?	Stakeholder opinion.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Budget and expenditure data	Weak
14	Were ESSN objectives achieved on time?	How timely was the start-up of the ESSN and why?	Enrolment rate by month. Date of completion of capacity building activities. Stakeholder opinion.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Baseline and Monitoring data, Literature review	Strong
14	Were ESSN objectives achieved on time?	How timely were the monthly transfers and why?	Date of crediting transfer to beneficiary within each month.	FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data	Strong
14	Were ESSN objectives achieved on time?	How does the ESSN compare to similar cash and voucher transfer schemes?	Enrolment rates by month for comparator projects.	Baseline and Monitoring data, Literature review	Medium
Sustainability and Connectedness					
15	How well connected is the ESSN with the refugee response in Turkey as a whole?	What synergies were achieved between the ESSN and other Government of Turkey services and programmes for refugees?	Evidence of increased uptake of CCE transfers among ESSN beneficiaries.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Literature review	Medium
15	How well connected is the ESSN with the refugee response in Turkey as a whole?	How well coordinated was the ESSN with the humanitarian strategies and programmes of other donors, UN agencies and NGOs?	Change in number of other cash transfer programmes. Interest in using ESSN platform for other humanitarian aid. Donor interest in co-financing the ESSN.	Structured interviews at HQ level, FGDs, Literature review	Strong
15	How well connected is the ESSN with the refugee response in Turkey as a whole?	How have WFP and TRC operationalised their commitments to humanitarian principles in the implementation of the ESSN?	WFP and TRC interpretation of humanitarian principles. Performance of ESSN against humanitarian criteria.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Strong
15	How well connected is the ESSN with the refugee response in Turkey as a whole?	To what extent were synergies achieved with other FRiT activities?	References to the ESSN in design of other EU aid to Turkey.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Medium

#	EQ	Sub-Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor source in grey)	Anticipated strength of evidence
16	What are the prospects for integrating the ESSN into national systems?	What progress has been made in integrating the ESSN into national systems?	Change in Ministry of Family and Social Planning budget. Official policy statements on integration of ESSN.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
16	What are the prospects for integrating the ESSN into national systems?	What factors promote or inhibit the integration into national systems?	Stakeholder opinion.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Baseline and Monitoring data, Budget and expenditure data	Medium
16	What are the prospects for integrating the ESSN into national systems?	What continued support is required from donors and implementing partners to help institutionalize the ESSN?	Formal requests from Government of Turkey to EU.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Baseline and Monitoring data	Medium
17	To what extent can the ESSN serve as a model for refugee assistance nationally, in the region, and globally?	Has the ESSN influenced the overall strategy of assistance from the TR to refugees, including camp policy?	Changes in Government of Turkey camp policy. Changes in numbers of in-camp refugees.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Literature review	Medium
17	To what extent can the ESSN serve as a model for refugee assistance nationally, in the region, and globally?	Under what conditions could the ESSN model be implemented elsewhere?	Evidence of uptake in other regions.	Structured interviews at HQ level, Structured interviews at Provincial level, FGDs, Baseline and Monitoring data, Budget and expenditure data, Literature review	Medium

Annex 10: Stakeholders Consulted

Name	Organization	Title	Date	Location
Abdullah Vergil	DGMM		23-Feb-18	DGMM Office in Ankara
Abdülsamet Korkut	DGMM	Senior Assistant	23-Feb-18	DGMM Office in Ankara
Ahmet Turan	WFP	Procurement officer	28-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Aladdin Kinik	Nufus	Manager	23-May-17	Antep/Sehit Kamil
Alex Ballinger	DFID	Humanitarian & Migration Lead	27-Feb-18	British Embassy Ankara
Ali Paymanfar	ASAM	Senior social protection officer and ESSN focal point	28/07/2017 and 01/05/2018	ASAM Office in Ankara
Alper Küçük	TRC	Deputy Director General	22-Feb-18	TRC Office in Ankara
Andrea Markham	WFP	Programme Policy Officer	23-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Anjelina Sen	US State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration	Senior Refugee Coordinator	01-Mar-18	US State Department Office in Ankara
Ayda Tekin	Halkbank	Operation Manager	23-May-17	Halkbank/Unaldi
Aysha Twose	World Food Programme	VAM Officer	16/05/2017 and 26/07/2017	WFP Office in Ankara
Azhar Alazzawi	WFP	Head of Sub-Office	22-May-17	
Bayram Selvi	TRC	Immigration and Refugees Services Department Manager	16-May-17	kick-off meeting at WFP
Ben Nicholson	DFID	Country Representative	27-Feb-18	British Embassy Ankara
Bulent Ozturk	TRC/ Kızılay	Deputy Programme Coordinator	22-May-17	DGMM Office-Antep
Calum McLean	DG ECHO	Global Food Security Thematic Coordinator	17-May-17	WFP Office
Celal Yesilçınar	AFAD		22-Feb-18	AFAD office in Ankara
Christina Hobbs	World Food Programme	Head of Programme	17/05/2017 and 27/07/2017	WFP Office
Christoph Laufens	Welt Hunger Hilfe	Expert for Programme Coordination	22-May-17	WHH Office-Antep
Davina Hayles	DG ECHO	Technical Assistant (ESSN)	24-Feb-18	DG ECHO Office in Ankara
Dr. Mehmet Gulluoglu	TRC	Director General	24-May-17	TRC HQ Office in Ankara

Name	Organization	Title	Date	Location
Dr. Ralf Matthias Rausch	German Embassy	Counsellor (Humanitarian Focal Point)	28/07/2017 and 01/05/2018	German Embassy in Ankara
Emma Clua Vandellos	EU Delegation	Head of Section/Facility for Refugees in Turkey	18/05/2017 and 01/03/2018	EU Delegation Office
Eren Demir	AFAD	Assistant Specialist	16/05/2017 and 22/02/2018	kick-off meeting at WFP
Fatma Hasçalık	TRC	Programme Officer	22-Feb-18	TRC Office in Ankara
Friederike Wuenschmann	EU Delegation	International Cooperation Officer/Facility Refugees in Turkey	18-May-17	EU Delegation Office
Gamze Furtun	DGMM	Senior Assistant	23-Feb-18	DGMM Office in Ankara
Giuseppe Simeon	UNHCR	Senior Cash-Based Interventions Officer	24/05/2017 and 25 July 2017	UNHCR Office in Ankara
Hanno Van Gemund	UNHCR	Protection Officer at UNHCR	27-Jul-17	UNHCR Office in Ankara
Homaira	WFP	Programme Policy Officer	02-Mar-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Hüseyin Alp Kaya	AFAD		22-Feb-18	AFAD office in Ankara
Iraz Öykü Soyalp	UNICEF	Chief of Social Protection	24/05/2017 and 25/07/2017	UNICEF Office in Ankara
Jane Lewis	DG ECHO	Head of DG ECHO Office in Ankara	16 May 2017 and 23/02/2018	DG ECHO Office in Ankara
Jean Marie Garelli	UNHCR	Deputy Representative	25/07/2017 and 20/02/2018	UNHCR Office in Ankara
Jean-Yves Lequime	World Food Programme	Director	16-May-17	WFP
Johanna Green	World Food Programme	Government Partnership Officer	16/05/2017, 26/07/2017 and 20/02/2018	WFP Office in Ankara
Jonathan Campbell	World Food Programme	Deputy Country Director	16/05/2017 and 01/03/2018	kick-off meeting at WFP
Kadir Beyaztas	ASAM	Deputy General Coordinator	28-Jul-17	ASAM Office in Ankara
Kahan Ertik	GIZ	Project Coordinator Cash for Work Project	27-Feb-18	GIZ Office in Ankara
Kamil Erdem Güler	TRC	Programme Coordinator	27-Feb-18	TRC Office in Ankara
Leontine Specker	UNDP	Senior Resilience Adviser	21-Feb-18	UNDP Office in Ankara
Livio Mercurio	UNHCR	Cash-based interventions Officer	21-Feb-18	UNHCR Office in Ankara

Name	Organization	Title	Date	Location
Mahmut Ozturk	TRC/ Kızılay	Service Center Admin	23-May-17	TRC Service Center
Malaj Altın	WHO	Programme Coordinator Refugee Health	25/07/2017 and 02/03/2018	WHO Office in Ankara
Maud Biton	World Food Programme	Head of Partnerships and Information Management Unit	16/05/2017, 26/07/2017 and 20/02/2018	WFP Office in Ankara
Mazen Aboulhosn	IOM	Emergency Coordinator	27/07/2017 and 24/02/2018	IOM Office in Ankara
Mehmet Emre Genc	Ministry of Family and Social Planning	Programme Assistant	16/05/2017 and 27/02/2017	kick-off meeting at WFP
Merve Bakırcı	TRC	Graphic designer	27-Feb-18	TRC Office in Ankara
Miray Müge Yucel	WFP	Programme Policy Officer	02-Mar-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Münir Tireli	Ministry of Family and Social Planning	Coordinator	27-Feb-18	Ministry of Family and Social Planning Office
Nabeel Jaradat	WFP	Head of finance	28-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Naomi Watts	Office of Food for Peace/USAID		17-May-17	phone at WFP Office
Neşe Yener	AFAD		22-Feb-18	AFAD office in Ankara
Nils Grede	WFP	Country Director	22-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Nisan Tura	TRC	Program assistant responsible for communication	27-Feb-18	TRC Office in Ankara
Nozomi Hashimoto	WFP	Head of Ankara Sub-office	26/07/2017 and 1/03/2018	WFP Office in Ankara
Obada Kahil	Welt Hunger Hilfe	Project Officer (Kahramanmaras)	22-May-17	WHH Office-Antep
Oğuz Özdemir	Ministry of Family and Social Planning	Head of Department: Assistance for Disabled cases	27-Feb-18	Ministry of Family and Social Planning Office
Oktay Bahceci	DGMM	Manager	22-May-17	DGMM Office-Antep/Sehit Kamil
Omer Faruk Sari	Local Social Assistance Solidarity Foundation	Social Assistance and Screening Officer-Project Officer	22-May-17	SASF Office-Antep/Sehit Kamil
Onyango Makogango	WFP	Gender Specialist	23-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Orhan Hacimehmet	TRC	Kızılaykart Cash Assistance Programmes Coordinator	16/05/2017, 24/05/2017 and 22/02/2018	kick-off meeting at WFP
Ozan Çakmak	UNDP	Syrian Response Programme manager	25-Jul-17	UNDP office in Ankara

Name	Organization	Title	Date	Location
P. Facundo Cuevas	World Bank	Senior Economist, Poverty & Equity	17/05/2017 and 28/02/2018	World Bank Office
Paolo Artini	UNHCR	Deputy Representative	25/07/2017 and 20/02/2018	UNHCR Office in Ankara
Pierre-Yves Bellot	EU Delegation	International Cooperation Office	01-Mar-18	EU Office in Ankara
Qimti Paienjton	UNICEF	Social Protection Specialist	24/05/2017 and 23/02/2018	UNICEF Office in Ankara
Ramazan Ozdag	Ministry of Family and Social Planning	Deputy General Manager	18/05/2017 and 27/02/2018	in-person
Rebecca Blackledge	UNHCR	Programme Officer	27-Jul-17	UNHCR Office in Ankara
Ridvan Gul	TRC/ Kızılay	Team/Operation Leader	23-May-17	TRC Service Center
Sabah Fara	DG ECHO	Technical Assistant (ESSN)	24-Feb-18	DG ECHO Office in Ankara
Sait Simsek	Local Social Assistance Solidarity Foundation	Manager	22-May-17	SASF Office-Antep/Sehit Kamil
Salah Hamwi	Care	Project Manager	22-May-17	WHH Office-Antep
Samet Gunes	MoSFP	Head of Research and Development	18/05/2017 and 27/02/2018	in-person
Sencer Kiremitçi	Ministry of Family and Social Planning	Expert	27-Feb-18	Ministry of Family and Social Planning Office
Serhat Saylan	TRC	Kızılaykart Cash Assistance Deputy Programmes Coordinator	24/05/2017 and 22/02/2018	TRC HQ Office in Ankara
Şerife Aktaş	Nufus	Department Director	26-Feb-18	Ministry of Interior Office in Ankara
Serra Diptaş	AFAD		22-Feb-18	AFAD office in Ankara
Servet Avcı	TRC	M&E Team Leader	27-Feb-18	TRC Office in Ankara
Seval Güzelkılınç	World Food Programme	Program Officer	17-May-17	WFP Office
Silvia Biondi	WFP	Head of Programme	26-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Silvia Mestroni	UNICEF	Chief of Monitoring and Evaluation	24/05/2017, 25/07/2017 and 23/02/2018	UNICEF Office in Ankara
Siobhan Simojoki	WFP	Programme Policy Officer -- Food Sec. & Basic Needs Coordinator	23-May-17	WFP Office at Antep

Name	Organization	Title	Date	Location
Sırma Demir Şeker	The World Bank		28-Feb-18	WB Office in Ankara
Sura Ermistekin	WFP	Programme Associate	22-May-17	DGMM Office-Antep
Suresh Natvarlal	WFP	Head of support services	28-Feb-18	WFP Office in Ankara
Tuğba Evcı	ASAM	Counselling line supervisor assistant, protection focal point	01-Mar-18	ASAM Office in Ankara
Umit Mansız	UNICEF	Social Policy Officer	24-May-17	UNICEF Office in Ankara
Umut Pamuk	DG ECHO	Programme Assistant	16/05/2017 and 24/02/2018	phone at WFP Office
Ximena Del Carpio	The World Bank	Programme leader for social protection	28-Feb-18	WB Office in Ankara
Youri Saadallah	NRC		21-Feb-18	NRC Office in Ankara

Annex 11: Province Level Key Informant Interview Analysis

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List of abbreviations

ASAM	Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
DGMM	Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
KII	Key informant interview
MoFSP	Ministry of Family and Social Policies
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PMT	Proxy Means Test
SASF	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
SPL	Support-to-Life (Hayata Destek)
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
WFP	World Food Programme

1. Relevance

1.1 To What Extent are the ESSN Objectives Coherent with the National Policies and Programmes?

A. To what extent was the ESSN aligned with Turkish social protection programmes (including the CCTE)?

Indicators: Programme design aligned with relevant published documents. Stakeholder agreement on strategic alignment.

The integrated social assistance service system, which is an e-government system that accelerates the management of social assistance in Turkey, provided the necessary infrastructure, including the application, assessment of eligibility requirements and processing of the ESSN. This has provided the IT infrastructure to implement the ESSN, however, using the existing system also had some challenges.

SASFs, by design and law, are the government institutions with responsibility for mobilizing various types of assistance to the poor in Turkey. Social Solidarity and Assistance Promotion Law number 3294 defines that SASFs are entitled to assist poor Turkish citizens and anyone else who is accepted into Turkey or has come to Turkey in need.⁵⁹ They are also expected to take any necessary precautions to reach a more even distribution of income and promote social cooperation and solidarity. Hence SASFs' involvement in the implementation of the ESSN appears to be quite appropriate.

The TRC is an institution with history dating back to the 1890s. It has a long history of providing humanitarian assistance in times of natural disaster in Turkey and abroad. Before the ESSN, the TRC was operating a food voucher programme in the refugee camps in collaboration with the WFP.

When accepting applications for the ESSN, the Turkish Government's integrated system was used. SASFs are the only institutions with the right to use this computerised programme. The computerised integrated system covers the data coming from 17 different state institutions. Once a person's ID is entered into the system, any information recorded under that person's name shows up. In other words, SASF or TRC officers can see information such as property ownership, family size, etc. about the candidate. In order to reach beneficiaries more quickly, TRC Service Centres were given the right to use this programme when receiving ESSN applications. In order to accept applications, the TRC opened service centres in 18 locations across Turkey.⁶⁰ This computerised system was already aligned with the Turkish social protection system, and using the same system was convenient during the ESSN registration phase.

While SASFs are solely responsible for receiving applications for all types of social assistance, for the ESSN, TRC Service Centres were entitled to carry out this duty along with SASFs. The application process for the ESSN is similar to regular Turkish social protection assistance applications, though the eligibility criteria and the process of evaluation differ. Turkish social protection assistance schemes have their own criteria for targeting that merge information collected through the application and use this information in a PMT-style formula that predicts poverty. This formula-based targeting is complemented by community-level selection by the board of trustees, whereby the board can add household names to the list or remove beneficiaries from it, based on their assessment of the

⁵⁹ <http://www.aile.gov.tr/mevzuat/3294-sayili-sosyal-yardimlasma-ve-dayanismayi-tesvik-kanunu>

⁶⁰ As of May 2017, there are 18 TRC service centres in Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Adana, Mersin, Osmaniye, Kilis, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Istanbul, and Izmir.

household's situation. In other words, the targeting method for the current social assistance system is a hybrid between community targeting and an objective points-based system.

The ESSN criteria are objective in design and there is no room for engaging the subjective opinion of the board of trustees to include new beneficiaries. As the director of the SASF in Afyon Merkez stated:

“The strength and main benefit of the integrated system is that it does not let you include any applicant who does not fulfil the demographic eligibility criteria. There is no room for such mistakes.”

Another SASF director in Hatay also confirmed this, saying:

“The [integrated] system has all the power. We cannot proceed with someone, let's say, with two children. Even if they are poor, the system will not allow [them to get the benefit].”

If an applicant does not fulfil the ESSN eligibility criteria, there is no chance of him/her being accepted unless the criteria are changed.

However, some SASFs use discretion, mainly to reduce inclusion errors in the programme. Once the applications are received, they are forwarded to the board of trustees at the related SASF offices, as in the evaluation of the Turkish social protection applications. During our interviews, we observed some variations in decision-making across provinces. The Board of Trustees makes the final decision, as an SASF director in Izmir explained:

“During the board meeting, all the information related to the cases is provided. The board makes the final call as ‘accepted’ or ‘rejected’.”

A TRC service manager in Hatay also said:

“Once we receive the application, after entering all relevant information we have to state whether it is a positive or negative case. We send the files to the board with the decisions – accepted or rejected. Then, they go through each file and make the final decision. Sometimes the board may change an application status. They have the final word.”

When asked about the evaluation of the applications, another TRC service centre manager, in Urfa, confirmed the process by saying:

“We transfer the files to the SASF, and they decide the beneficiary status and let the TRC know about the final decision. Then, the TRC sends a message to approved applicants to go to a Halkbank branch and take their card.”

An SASF director in Izmir also pointed out the responsibility of making this call. He said:

“Even if the financier is not the SASF but another institution, we have the responsibility of fair allocation of this money. We have to be careful while making the final decisions on applications. There will be consequences if the board makes a wrong call.”

Once the decision has been made by the Board of Trustees, social workers carry out visits to the houses of eligible applicants. In the case of Turkish applicants, the decision is made following these house visits. In the case of ESSN applications, however, to reach a broader population quicker, eligible applicants immediately start receiving the assistance once the board of trustees has made the final decision (based on the result from the integrated system), and house visits are expected to take place within a year to confirm eligibility. This came up during our discussions at SASF directorates and TRC Service Centres. An SASF director in Urfa clearly explained:

“Under normal circumstances if someone came to the SASF and submitted their application, we would carry out the house visit in 15 to 20 days. We would write a report of this visit and submit it to the Board of Trustees. After receiving the house visit report, the Board of Trustees would make the final decision. However, this process is not the same for Syrians (ESSN applicants). They start receiving the benefit without the house visits.”

During house visits, if the applicant households are found not to be eligible for the ESSN, e.g. due to undocumented asset ownership, false statement regarding number of people living in the household, etc. they stop receiving the transfer. At the time of field work for this report, in all 5 provinces (and in 10 out of 11 SASF offices) household visits to ESSN beneficiaries were already under way.

In addition to the ESSN, all ESSN applicants are entitled to receive (CCTE) if they have school-age children. The same conditions apply regarding enrolment and attendance at school as in the Turkish case. For Turkish citizens, however, CCTE is only available for households living under a certain poverty threshold. For ESSN applicants, without controlling for the beneficiary status, any family with school-age children can start receiving the CCTE. A TRC service centre manager in Urfa explained this as follows:

“Filling in an application form is a condition for the ESSN programme. However, this requirement does not apply for the CCTE. We automatically process the CCTE through the computerised system. We just need their information to be in the system. Their beneficiary status is not important. The only condition is that the children must be attending school.”

An SASF director in Hatay also stated, “*We were told that we could start providing CCTE benefits irrespective of the households’ level of poverty.*” The amount is the same for both parties. ESSN applicants do not need to make a separate application for the CCTE as Turkish citizens do. They automatically receive an SMS regarding the CCTE if they are ESSN beneficiaries and have children.

The fieldwork revealed that SASF officers sometimes take into consideration both the demographic criteria and the targeting criteria of the Turkish social assistance system when selecting applicants to the ESSN programme. They collect information on the application form that populates the fields normally entered into the Turkish social assistance application form.⁶¹ Even though an applicant fulfils the demographic criteria, they might make a note of asset ownership and this might lead to the rejection of the application. For example, in one SASF in Izmir, the director explained:

“Actually, the committee’s approach to ESSN applicants is the same as Turkish applications. For instance, if an applicant’s file seems to be fitting perfectly into the demographic eligibility criteria, if the family is not in need, the Board of Trustees might reject their application. We sent the files in two batches, one of rejected applications and the other of approved. For the rejected applicants, the Board of Trustees cannot take any initiative. If the system says no, it is a definite no. However, they go over the system-approved files. They closely examine the household monthly income, the number of employed people in the household, how much they pay for rent, how old their children are or whether there are any disabled people in their household. Once they have viewed all these details, they make the final decision on the ESSN. They decide according to the level of destituteness.”

Similar kinds of comments have also been provided by other SASF officers. Even if they state that the Board of Trustees follows the results of the computerised system, they also say that other “details regarding possessions” are also taken into account. In Istanbul, an SASF directorate summarised this as:

“Even though they look as though they meet the demographic eligibility criteria, if they have a recently bought car, the Board of Trustees does not approve their beneficiary status. They also look at whether they have an active tax record. If one has these kind of records, the Board of Trustees may eliminate them due to not being in need.”

⁶¹Out of 11 SASFs, 5 mentioned specifically the role of the committee (the board of trustees) in decision-making. Out of 5 SASF offices mentioned, 3 talked about how they integrate existing Turkish social protection system conditions on top of ESSN demographic eligibility criteria. The decision-making mechanism and criteria system seem to be confusing in different places.

In this way, in the operationalization of the ESSN applications, a two-tiered criteria filter has been created.

On the other hand, other SASF directors stated that the board has no room to make an individual judgement. In Hatay, an SASF director said:

“The final decision is based on the demographic eligibility criteria. We do not make a decision. It is also the same for the house visits. We do that because we are told to. However, we have no right to make any changes if one applicant fulfils the criteria. We only transfer the decision to the centre (HQ).”

This indicates that the evaluation process differs from one province to another. In some provinces, the eligibility criteria are taken as the only criteria for targeting, while in others the SASF employ their own administrative data to see if the applicants should actually be ineligible or excluded from the ESSN⁶². Similarly, some SASFs use house visits as a way of reducing inclusion error, while others do not use information from the visits to inform the targeting decision.

B. Did the ESSN offer an appropriate approach to reinforcing the processes which are managed by state institutions?

Indicators: Capacity assessments conducted in the design phase. Incorporation of capacity assessments in programme design.

The ESSN provided a new space for communication between different state institutions and help them to understand how the other partners work, and strengthened their collaborative capacity.

The state institutions involved in the ESSN process are the DGMM, the Population Directorate (Nufus), and the SASF. To benefit from any services provided by the Turkish Government, one must be registered in the Turkish population directorate system. Foreigners need to register themselves at the DGMM. Once they have their ID, they need to get a residence certification from the Population Directorate. Once they have these papers, they can start their applications for the ESSN at SASF offices or TRC Service Centres.

The ESSN was one of the first initiatives to provide a common working agenda for these state institutions. However, during the interviews, we observed a variation across respondents regarding receiving (or having heard about) a training prior to the ESSN. For example, In an SASF in Hatay, the director said:

“There was no training or workshop provided before the start of implementation. We received a note from the General Directorate and we started with that. There was no training”.

On the contrary, the other SASF director we visited in Hatay said that they received a training on the new module integrated into the online system. SASF directors in Izmir mentioned that they were invited to General Directorate in Ankara for an information workshop where the Ministry officials introduced the programme and the financiers and other stakeholders. They were informed about the programme at this workshop, yet there was no further guidance on implementation of the programme. Some of the SASF directors invited to Ankara and some other received a guidance note at the beginning. If there is any update in the system they also receive it as an online official notice. The other governmental stakeholders, DGMM and Population Directorate, did not mention anything related to a training or preparation regarding the ESSN. The lack of coordination prior to roll out of the

⁶² During the in-depth interviews in 5 provinces, we have observed that the committee has a word in making decisions in the following districts visited: Izmir Konak SASF, Izmir Karabaglar, Istanbul Sultanbeyli. However in the following district SASFs we observed the committee has no say in eligibility and only follows ESSN demographic criteria: Afyon Merkez, Hatay Iskenderun. Other SASF offices visited did not make specific mentions on this topic.

programme created challenges during its implementation. Over time, institutions began to understand and acknowledge their roles better, but ensuring that all stakeholders in the field had gone through prior training and received standard guidelines would have been helpful.

C. To what extent have the WFP, the TRC and the Turkish Government been able to capitalize on their comparative advantages in implementing the ESSN?

Indicators: Stakeholder opinion on the appropriateness of the division of responsibilities.

The ESSN has particular importance as it provides a common ground for international organizations and local NGOs, as well as government institutions, to execute the largest humanitarian cash transfer programme so far in the world. The scope and magnitude of the work requires strong cooperation and capacity from any party involved in the programme. Hence it was crucial to establish the right partnerships and capitalize on the comparative advantages of each organization.

The WFP, as the coordinator of the ESSN, bring their global experience in relief programmes. Before the ESSN, the WFP, in partnership with the TRC, was running a food voucher programme targeting refugees in camps in Turkey. This pre-existing partnership helped when running the operations. Moreover, the WFP's contributions are not limited to coordination of the actions and actors. WFP has monitoring teams to pay regular visits to programme partners such as SASF offices, Population Directorates, Mukhtars etc. In Izmir, the monitoring team was composed of one Turkish speaking and one Arabic-speaking personnel, as described by one of the WFP representatives of the Izmir area office. A similar monitoring process is being followed in other WFP offices, e.g. Istanbul, Hatay, and Urfa. While undertaking the monitoring of the implementation in the field, WFP teams try to detect the issues faced in the field and try to deliver solutions. In our meeting at WFP Istanbul Area Office, the officials said that they are in continuous contact with the partners in the field, particularly SASF offices, and other WFP offices. WFP has an online platform which is accessible to all field offices. They enter the issues that they face in the field to this platform, and other WFP offices can also see their experiences.

Prior to the ESSN, in Hatay and Urfa, WFP was running food voucher programmes in- and off-camps. Throughout these experiences they had the opportunity to better know the needs of the beneficiary population and establish relationships with other actors in the field. WFP has also organized data collection efforts for monitoring and evaluation of the ESSN (starting from the baseline PAB). While the implementation is in progress, as WFP representative in Hatay explained, WFP teams in every region collect quantitative data and report these data quarterly to the central office in Ankara. Other WFP representatives in Izmir and Istanbul, similar to Hatay, also stated that they conduct focus groups discussions to gain insights on particular topics. In this regard, a PAB, Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise (CVME1), and PDM1 data have been collected. These data provide information on beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries as well as non-applicants. The availability of these data and their analyses turns the lessons from this programme into an international learning experience.

The TRC is one of the oldest civil society institutions in Turkey. Its visibility and familiarity facilitated the building of trust among refugees for the programme. We conducted our interviews at TRC Service Centres where they take ESSN applications, and TRC community centres. TRC community centres are established in 2015 to provide psycho-social support to Syrian communities, particularly for children. These centres provide four main services for children, adults and social inclusion. They also provide guidance for access to services, and skill based training.⁶³ In our interviews at TRC service and community centres, we regularly

⁶³ Suriyelilere "Toplum Merkezleri" ile Destek <https://kizilay.org.tr/Haber/KurumsalHaberDetay/2309>

heard about how applicants associate the TRC with confidence. In three provinces, Hatay, Urfa, and Istanbul, TRC service centre officers mentioned the association between the TRC and “credibility”. A TRC service centre manager in Hatay said:

“Once people see the Red Crescent (*hilal-ul ahmer*) they feel confident. They believe in us. We had been part of many relief projects earlier. The TRC’s well-respected brand recognition enabled all these people to trust in our word as well as our work.”

Prior to the ESSN, the TRC was already involved in relief projects for refugees in Turkey. This previous interaction between refugees and the TRC laid the foundations of refugees’ good perceptions of TRC services. In an FGD conducted with Syrian ESSN beneficiaries in Urfa, a woman participant stated that:

“Regarding manners towards refugees, the best treatment is at the TRC service centre. We cannot deny this. They treat us well and they are doing their best to help people.”

Another Syrian ESSN beneficiary man in Hatay put his experience with the TRC as follows:

“The system was very precise. They cut down the allowance I was receiving from the TRC card due to adding my newly wedded wife into our family. I went to follow up the case and I screamed and yelled at them and asked to speak to the manager. They still treated me with utmost respect.”⁶⁴

The TRC service centre manager in Urfa appreciated the relevance of the TRC’s involvement in this programme and added:

“Taking part in this programme makes complete sense for the TRC. Providing aid and running these kinds of relief and assistance programmes are among our missions. With our historical background, vision and mission, I believe our partnership here is perfectly appropriate.”

In addition to its humanitarian approach, providing services in Arabic was among the leading catalysing factors in establishing better communication with ESSN applicants.

The SASFs, as the local institutions to mobilize the aid and social assistance programmes, have brought on their extensive expertise in the receiving and evaluation of aid applications. As an SASF director in Izmir put it:

“By law, SASFs are mandated to assist Turkish citizens as well as any individual accepted into Turkey. We were already used to providing these kinds of services. Moreover, you can find an SASF office in every single district of Turkey. This means that anyone can access the SASF, regardless of the province that they live in.”

The already existing computerised infrastructure of the Turkish social protection assistance programmes systematized the ESSN applications. While enlarging the outreach scope of the SASFs, making use of their integrated system gave international recognition to the SASFs’ capacity. SASF offices are also aware of the importance of their partnership in this programme. In Urfa, an SASF director described their involvement as follows:

“to the integrated system, we can access any data for anyone in the system. This leaves no room for fraud. We ensure social justice here.”

To be able to benefit from any state-provided services in Turkey, an applicant must be registered with the Turkish system. In the case of foreigners, registration starts at the DGMM offices where they receive their IDs. Hence the involvement of the DGMM and Population Directorates in the ESSN programme is necessary from the Turkish government’s point of view. These two state institutions have established new connections with ESSN stakeholders. For example, an officer at Population Directorate in Izmir stated that:

⁶⁴ Please note, these comments from FGD participants are from Annex 8.

“We did not have any close connections with NGOs. Often we are in contact with DGMM which is another public institution. I was surprised when those representatives (meaning TRC and WFP) came and brought brochures. I did not know that we were partners in this programme.”

While formally registering with the Turkish system paves the way to accessing public services in Turkey, it also provides the Turkish Government with an advantage regarding having information on the locations of foreign residents to improve the use and allocation of resources.

D. Are the roles and responsibilities of the different partners well-defined and clear?

Indicators: Evidence that stakeholder roles were defined (and refined) during implementation.

When asked during the KIIs, programme stakeholders were positive and clear about the distribution of the roles and responsibilities. However, we often observe provincial-level variations in operations. As planned, the WFP carries out overall coordination across stakeholders and monitoring activities, the TRC and SASFs receive applications, the SASFs evaluate the applications, forwarding the final decision to the TRC and carrying out the house visits, the TRC notifies the beneficiaries about their status, and Halkbank distributes the Kizilaykart. Apart from the ESSN application, yet as the default condition to be able to start an application, DGMMs were carrying out the ID registrations, and Population Directorates were taking care of the address registrations. An SASF director in Hatay explained: “I think everyone’s role is clear here. The institutions’ services, roles and responsibilities are obvious. We know our job, so does the Population Directorate or the others.” Another SASF director also stated:

“Our roles are well-defined. We know what to expect from whom. Some of the partners pay us regular visits and check whether everything is all right. I am sure they do this for other offices as well.” A TRC service centre manager in Istanbul, for example, said: “Every partner’s role is well-defined. We all support each other, and work in coordination.”

While the distribution of roles appears to be clear, the discussions we carried out during the field mission led us to conclude that there are variations across provinces in the operationalization of the ESSN. We did not observe a standardized operation within and between institutions among project provinces. For example, in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul, one NGO (*Multeciler Dernegi* – Association for Refugees) was the primary institution, which coordinated the applications until a TRC service centre is opened there. We did not come across this situation in any other province. Findings from the FGD discussions also aligned with our insights from the KIIs.⁶⁵

Throughout our interviews with ESSN stakeholders we did not receive any comments regarding a handbook or a structured guideline document where they can revisit from time to time to get guidance on how to respond when they encounter problems. The stakeholders’ lack of information on existence of a guideline for implementation resulted in different combinations of local implementation by programme actors. Had they were more aware of the existence of such operational handbook (including steps for ID and address registration), this process would have been easier and more standard for local implementers. These variations also appeared in FGDs with ESSN beneficiaries or applicants. Their experiences clearly showed a variation across all project provinces. While the duration of completing an application for the ESSN is shorter in Urfa and Hatay, in Istanbul and Izmir this took longer than average (more than nine weeks) for some cases. In Afyon, since the SASF offices approved the applications after visiting the applicants’ houses, all applicants’ receiving the

⁶⁵ Please also see Annex 8 for the Application Process Charts drawn out of FGD discussions.

ESSN card took more than nine weeks. The process maps created out of FGD discussions with the participants who went through the ESSN application process showed that even though the application steps were previously defined, applicants followed different ways. (Also, see process maps provided in Annex 8 for variations in application process by province).

There is some room to optimize the ID and address registration system between DGMM and the Population Directorates. Communication gaps across these institutions at the local level, and also the language barrier between beneficiaries and the Population Directorate offices at times lengthened the registration process. While DGMMs are relatively new, having been established in 2013 as facilities to serve foreigners in Turkey, Population Directorates have been in operation since 1924. Since DGMMs are established to run operations specifically related to foreigners living in Turkey, they have better capacity in providing services in foreign languages. For example in Hatay, all of the recently employed personnel (about 70–80) speaks Arabic, as stated in our interview at DGMM in Hatay. In Urfa, DGMM hired a number of Arabic-speaking interpreters. If they need translation in any other language they seek support from the police. This is not the case for Population Directorates. In one of the southeastern provinces we visited for example, the Population Directorate identifies their conversations with Syrians as *talking in bird's language*. Based on the discussions at the Population Directorate offices in the field, it was clear that signing a protocol between these two institutions and moving address registration of TPs to DGMM would (i) cut some steps in registration, (ii) reduce the burden on Population Directorates and (iii) provide a more convenient ESSN application process. Of six Population Directors that we met during our interviews, five of them mentioned the increased workload after Syrians. They questioned the necessity of Syrians' registration at Population Directorates. Three of these five Population Directors suggested there could be a protocol between DGMM and Population Directorates. For example, a Population Director in Istanbul stated that:

“Even though DGMM has access the settlement document (yerlesim yeri belgesi) they send the applicants to us. When they are registering people at DGMM they also enter these people's location to the system. They can also register their address to the system at that point. Why not?”

Similarly, the other Population Director that we met in Istanbul mentioned similar problems with the address/settlement documents and said that DGMM's registering foreigners' addresses would half their burden.

E. Were appropriate mechanisms established for accountability and coordination?

Indicators: Coordination and accountability designed. Stakeholder opinion on adequacy of mechanisms.

The ESSN, by design, opens a new platform for stakeholders to communicate around issues related to the ESSN and province level coordination has generally worked well, with some differences across provinces in implementation of coordination activities. During the field mission, we noticed that the coordination mechanisms are very much localised. Every province has its provincial-level meeting agenda. These provincial-level meetings are not necessarily being held for the provision of the ESSN. However, in provinces where the caseload is high, the main topic of these meetings became issues and services related to Syrians. In Hatay, and Urfa for instance, a monthly provincial-level security meeting is held. In Afyon, Deputy Governor organised a stakeholder meeting and invited the police, SASF, and DGMM. While not focusing particularly on the ESSN, an SASF director in Afyon talked about this as a good intention which bring an order in handling refugee cases. These sessions are organized under the leadership of AFAD and the governorate of the province. Other state

institutions, UN agencies, local and international NGOs attend these meetings. These provincial-level coordination meetings are also held in Urfa.⁶⁶

In addition to these meetings, the WFP in Urfa, together with the TRC, pays weekly visits to programme stakeholders. This continuous communication enables them to react to problems immediately. In Urfa, for example, a WFP representative stated that they regularly visited the Population Directorates, SASF offices and District Governorates. They particularly follow extreme cases where Syrians are unable to register themselves into the system due to informal housing. Moreover, as they are in close contact with different institutions they can implement solutions quicker than other places. A similar scenario is also observed in Hatay. In Hatay, prior to ESSN, WFP was coordinating a food voucher programme in collaboration with TRC. Since then, WFP has been familiar with the sites where Syrians live. To reach these households, they often in contact with *mukhtars* and SASF offices as the WFP representative that we met in Hatay stated. The SASF director in Defne, Hatay confirmed such visits, stating:

“The roles and responsibilities are defined clearly. On top of this, officials periodically visit us to check whether we have any problems, and if yes, how to resolve them. Representatives from UNICEF, the TRC and the WFP often visit us. I am sure that they pay these kinds of visits in other districts of Hatay.”

Similarly, in Hatay SASF directorates are in close contact with each other, and this reflects in their jobs. SASF Iskenderun’s director put this in words as follows:

“Since the duties and the role of the institutions are obvious, we all know what our responsibilities are. For instance, the Population Directorate’s role is to register the households. They do that. No one asks us to register the houses. I am sure every partner knows what his or her role is. However, I do not know how well prepared they are. Speaking for our institutions here in Hatay, I am sure all SASFs in Hatay work well. I know that they put great effort into providing good services. We often come together and discuss the issues we are faced with; we share the cases with each other and consult with each other.”

As a result, in the provinces where coordination among ESSN stakeholders is stronger, the operationalization of the ESSN works better. When officers and directors in partner institutions are well aware of their roles and responsibilities as well as their partners’, they deliver better and quicker solutions.

In provinces where the case load is less concentrated, these links may be weaker and unexpected problems sometimes occur. In Afyon, a province with lower levels of case load of TPs, for example, the SASF applied the regular Turkish social assistance process to ESSN applications. They took the applications, started carrying out the house visits, and did not confirm the status of eligible applicants until the house visits were completed. However, house visits are not the main condition of being a beneficiary of the ESSN. Their expertise turned into a disadvantage since they acted by rote. Once the low number of evaluated cases was noticed by the WFP in Ankara, a WFP representative paid a visit to Afyon and explained the situation.

⁶⁶ In Izmir, Urfa, Afyon, and Hatay we have heard about provincial-level stakeholder meetings. These are not necessarily organised for the sake of the ESSN, yet it is a much-discussed topic during these meetings. In all five project provinces we also heard about periodical visits paid by the WFP to SASF offices. These visits take place more often in southern-region provinces.

2. Effectiveness

2.1 What has been the Performance Regarding Targeting and Coverage?

F. What other factors promoted or constrained progress towards achieving target coverage rates?

Indicators: Coverage rates by month. Stakeholder opinion on factors influencing coverage rates.

Constraining Factors

Pre-application barriers: An obstacle for the quick roll out of the ESSN application were the ID and address registration processes. Due to a heavy caseload, these registration processes took a long time in some places (particularly Urfa, Izmir and Istanbul).⁶⁷ The longer this registration phase, the worse the situation for potential applicants, because in the absence of ID and a registered address one may not benefit from any public services and cannot start an application for ESSN relief. While registration is necessary, cutting down the repetitive steps between the Population Directorate and the DGMM, e.g. going back and forth between two institutions during the address and ID registration, would very much relieve the whole application process. This issue repeatedly mentioned at Population Directorates (three out of five who mentioned this issue openly) during the field mission. A TRC service centre manager in Hatay said:

“The programme has been running for about one year but there are still some people who can’t get their IDs. This is necessary. DGMM and security officers need to pay more attention when registering people. We are sometimes faced with cases where people belong to the same family but their registered family numbers are different.”

In order to overcome this problem, a special protocol between these two institutions might be signed.⁶⁸ As is recommended during our meetings at various Population Directorates specifically in Istanbul and Urfa, house registration of people under temporary protection status could be completed at the DGMM. With such intervention, people would finalize their registration for ID and house at the same place.

Strict (and double) eligibility criteria: In many of the interviews we carried out throughout the fieldwork, strict ESSN eligibility criteria were mentioned. In 8 out of 11 SASF offices we visited, the demographic eligibility criteria are taken as a constraint against increasing coverage of the benefit – especially for the cases where the family looks very much in need, yet cannot benefit from ESSN due to failing to meet the ESSN criteria. An SASF director in Urfa put this situation in words:

“I find these demographic criteria simplistic and insufficient. I do not believe that these criteria indicate socio-economic hardship. Let’s take the dependency ratio criterion as an example. If there are three children and two adults in the household, they are eligible. What if their children are older than 18 but that they are all girls? They are ineligible. I know a household like that where the mother is a single parent and she has 6 daughters all older than 18. But they do not meet the requirements. I do not think this is right. These conditions need to be revised and improved.”

⁶⁷ Back in November 2016, number of registered Syrians under temporary protection in Urfa, Izmir and Istanbul was, respectively, 399,974; 96,440 and 415,652. As of March 2018, these numbers increased to 477,335; 134,875 and 550,486, respectively. All numbers are coming from the official DGMM statistics published online at www.goc.gov.tr

⁶⁸ This was based on our interviews back in November 2017. As of March 2018, an ongoing work on preparation of such protocol is mentioned during the high level interviews in Ankara.

Adding the Turkish social protection system's requirements on top of the already difficult-to-fulfil ESSN criteria makes it even more difficult for all needy applicants to receive the benefit.⁶⁹ This was revealed during our meetings at SASF offices. At five SASF offices we visited (in Istanbul, Izmir, and Hatay) the respondents stated that, since the integrated system provides any information related to the applicant, they also look at other details beyond the ESSN criteria. These descriptions of how the SASF system is used to identify possible inclusion errors suggest that the integrated system could be used in the future of the programme for identifying who should be excluded from it.

Promoting Factors

Change in the ESSN demographic eligibility criteria: Our KII respondents mentioned, the positive contribution in reaching more people with the help of the ESSN's revised demographic eligibility criteria⁷⁰. An SASF director in Hatay stated

“With the previous criteria where one family needs to have 4 children (meaning the dependency ratio being larger than 1.5) our coverage was about 17 percent. Now this number has been decreased to 3 (meaning the dependency ratio being equal to or larger than 1.5) and our coverage rates have increased to 35–40 percent.” Similar to Hatay, in Izmir an SASF director stated, “With the initial demographic criteria 17.2 percent of the applicants were eligible for the ESSN. After the revision in criteria, this 17.2 percent rate increased to 49 percent. We can say one in every two applicant families are now ESSN beneficiaries.”

The expansion in coverage after the revision of the criteria is also observed in the quantitative analysis carried out for this report.

TRC Service Centre Operations: TRC Service Centres are solely opened for the implementation of the ESSN programme. Most of the managers of these centres were already involved in refugee settlement programmes. In Hatay, a TRC service centre manager stated that he was previously working for the TRC's in-camp food voucher programmes, and a large number of them are now managing these new centres. In order to facilitate the application process, the TRC hired new Arabic-speaking personnel. This enabled easy communication between applicants and officers.

Outreach Activities: Besides this, many outreach activities are performed by the local and international NGOs. With the introduction of the ESSN, NGOs started focusing on beneficiary guidance before the application, or guidance on access to services and protection cases rather than providing financial support. While there are still NGOs providing one-time cash or in-kind transfers, the ones we met during our field mission were working on livelihood activities and protection cases. Their outreach activities and information sessions may lead Syrians to start an application. For example, an NGO named Support-to-Life (*Hayata Destek*) set up mobile teams in Urfa where they reach to people who live far from the centres. Their outreach activities also cover sharing information via information meetings or brochures. Moreover, translation support from the NGOs also plays an essential role for potential applicants in completing their documents for state institutions, e.g. when taking their health report to the hospital. For example, in Urfa, when Support-to-Life's team noticed a household that demographically fit the ESSN criteria yet they miss some papers such as disability certificate they help them go to hospital and receive this report. Similarly, DRC in Hatay, ASAM in Afyon or *MulteciDer* in Izmir provides guidance for refugees regarding their access to services including ESSN and language support at public institutions.

⁶⁹ Please see the discussion on ESSN's alignment with the Turkish social protection system at page 8 above.

⁷⁰ Mentioned more than 20 times by stakeholders during our interviews at the province level.

2.2 To What Extent were the Intended Services Delivered?

G. Were special protection cases identified and referred to other providers?

Indicators: Protection officers available at SASF offices. Number of protection cases referred by month. Stakeholder perception on the effectiveness of the referral mechanism.

During our field visits, we did not observe any protection officers at SASF offices. However, they stated that whenever they notice a protection case, they forward the case to the Ministry of Family and Social Policies Provincial Directorate. Rather than SASF offices, TRC community centres and NGOs were carrying out protection activities. In addition to these, DGGM offices also have responsibilities regarding the referrals of protection cases.

ESSN is not only a cash transfer programme but it also has a protection component which has been initiated in March 2017.⁷¹ In the field, protection cases are being handled by various channels. For example, if a TRC service centre officer notices a protection case they report it to their HQ in Ankara and then they refer the case to relevant TRC Community Centre. TRC community centres are running protection activities since their establishment in 2015, though this activity is not a part of -or funded by- the ESSN. Prior to this, starting in 2013, TRC in collaboration with UNICEF were implementing a child protection programme.⁷² Some NGOs also provide protection and psychological counselling services. In addition to these, by definition,⁷³ the DGMM has a protection function.⁷⁴ In Istanbul and Hatay, the DGMM officers we met mentioned their protection services. In Istanbul, the special desk for protection cases conducted interviews and out of these meetings directed people to relevant institutions. In DGMM Fatih, Istanbul they explained this as follows:

“11 officers are working on protection cases in Kumkapi. We are investigating protection cases such as underage marriages, disability cases, single women, abandoned children. We conducted 15,000 interviews with people who came to update their IDs. Once we detect sensitive cases, we forward them to the Ministry of Family and Social Planning.”

In Hatay, counselling activities are undertaken within a collaboration with UNICEF. The officer we talked to in Hatay DGMM stated:

“We have a protection desk. When people come here to get their IDs, our interviewers talk to them, and if they notice a special case, they direct them to the respective department. We are coordinating these protection screening activities with UNICEF.”

When asked about the protection cases, underage marriages, domestic violence (sexual assault cases) and child labour were the most common problems which appeared in the field. In addition to these cases, health-related needs are also considered as protection cases. Most of the NGOs were addressing these issues by providing necessary health equipment or paving the way to start getting the appropriate treatment. For example, ASAM in Urfa guide the applicants in need to get a wheelchair. The NGO itself is not a provider of such equipment, they rather provide guidance and create links for these people to access their needs. Similarly, TRC Community Centre in Izmir and Urfa gave an example of providing access to health equipment like glasses, prosthesis, wheelchairs etc.

⁷¹ Turkish Red Crescent. 2017. Syria Crisis Humanitarian Relief Operation. Available at https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/74527721_sept-2017-syria-crisis-humanitarian-relief-operation.pdf

⁷² Turkish Red Crescent. 2017. Syria Crisis Humanitarian Relief Operation. Available at https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/74527721_sept-2017-syria-crisis-humanitarian-relief-operation.pdf

⁷³ Law on Foreigners and International Protection: ARTICLE 103 – (1) The Directorate General for Migration Management has been established under the Ministry of Interior with a view to implement policies and strategies related to migration; ensure coordination between the related agencies and organizations in these matters; carry out the tasks and procedures related to foreigners' entry into, stay in, exit and removal from Turkey, international protection, temporary protection and protection of victims of human trafficking.

⁷⁴ This was only mentioned in Istanbul and Hatay. In Izmir, the DGMM mentioned some livelihood projects that they are coordinating with some NGOs, yet there was no mention regarding the protection cases.

2.3 Did the Feedback and Appeal Mechanisms Function Effectively?

H. Is the appeal system effective?

Indicators: Existence of appeal mechanism. Awareness of beneficiaries of right to appeal and appeal mechanism. Beneficiary satisfaction with appeal mechanism.

There is no official appeals system integrated into the whole ESSN process. One of the SASF directors we met talked about this issue and made a recommendation as follows:

“If someone has been rejected, there should be a way for them to appeal. After that, the Board of Trustees would re-examine their case. At that stage, if the applicant is decided to be in need yet rejected due to demographic eligibility criteria, then the Board of Trustees could take an initiative to make them eligible.”

A carefully constructed appeals mechanism could improve the targeting of the programme and reduce exclusion errors.

Although not mentioned frequently during the interviews, some of the KII respondents, especially Halkbank officers (3 out of 6) stated that they direct applicants to 168 (the TRC call centre) when they have questions related to the Kizilaykart. On some occasions, such as in a Halkbank branch in Izmir, the bank personnel uses 168 when they cannot communicate in the same language. The same officer explains: “We do not face any problems regarding language. If we cannot communicate at all, then we call 168 and solve the issue.” However, when it is a banking problem the call centre is not being helpful and redirecting the caller to the bank, as is experienced in Istanbul. Besides bank operations, a TRC service centre manager in Urfa stated that staff forward the applicants to 168 if they face any problems related to their ESSN applications. Although 168 is not commonly used (only mentioned by 6 KII respondents), the officers often forward applicants to 168 to receive information or to make complaints.

2.4 What Outcomes are Associated with the ESSN Transfer?

I. To what extent have the ESSN transfers improved access to other government services (education and health) and protection outcomes?

Indicators: Use of health and education services by beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Changes in use of services. Reasons for change in use.

The ESSN turned into motivation for people to register themselves into the Turkish ID registration system. Once they are officially enrolled in the Turkish system, they are entitled to use public services for free. Hence, even if a household does not meet the ESSN criteria and is rejected, they can still benefit from free health and education services – if they have successfully gone through the registration process. Moreover, once they are in the ESSN system, regardless of their beneficiary status, if there are any school-age children they automatically start receiving CCTE.⁷⁵ An SASF director in Izmir put this situation as:

“A lot of Syrians were reluctant to register themselves into the system and get an ID. They were thinking that they would not need an ID and without that, it would be easier to transfer to a third country. However, as they heard about the financial benefits, they started registering with the system.”

This kind of comment particularly appeared in Izmir, because the province has been a transit point to Europe since the outbreak of the Syrian war. A TRC Community Centre protection officer in Izmir also had the same observation. The fact that registrations have increased as a result of the ESSN is also apparent in the increase in the workload of Population

⁷⁵ Please refer to Annex 8 for number of FGD participants' comments regarding use of public services.

Directorates: As a Population Director in Urfa put it: “Since the beginning of 2017 we have recorded 48,000 houses and 80 percent of these belong to Syrians.” Similar comments on increased workload for registrations were made in Istanbul and Hatay. The increased registration at DGMM offices after the start of ESSN also confirm these findings. (See also Footnote 67).

2.5 What other Effects has the ESSN had?

J. Has the ESSN affected the social cohesion of beneficiaries within Turkish society (including by gender)?

Indicators: Beneficiary perception of the level of integration into Turkish society. Changes in the level of integration. Perception of factors leading to changes in integration.

While no continuous stress between Syrian and Turkish communities is mentioned during the KIIs, the respondents’ perception of Syrians’ integration into Turkish society due to the ESSN indicates a poor association. According to their observations, the ESSN brings the beneficiaries financial relief but is otherwise limited in its impact on integration. This might also be because of their poor command of Turkish, as is mentioned by 20 interview respondents during the fieldwork. KII respondents tend to associate the ESSN’s impact more with improved financial security than with a significant effect on the refugees’ everyday interactions with Turkish society. A WFP representative in Urfa summarised this:

“They start paying off their debts with this money. They feel better; you can see this. They are more comfortable now, more relaxed. Because they know they will receive the same amount of money in the coming month, and this will continue as long as they meet the criteria. They are more self-confident now.”

Some of the KII respondents (4 out of 50) associated the ESSN with a reduction in crime rates. A TRC service centre manager in Istanbul summarised this as, “What would a person do if he or she had no money? Would they live in the streets? What do you expect them to do when they have no money to buy food? They would become involved in crime. However, [the ESSN] helps them adapt to Turkish society. They start their application at the DGMM and they go to the Population Directorate. They get used to Turkish state institutions. They start knowing the country.” As this benefit secures at least some part of their basic needs, the interviewees believe that this helps the refugees live in peace.

The interviewees also mentioned that tensions between Turkish and Syrian communities appear more in places where overall welfare is low, and the resources of the host community are limited. Beyond the financial hurdle, societal behaviours also affect the level of integration. While no constant tension was mentioned, KII respondents talked about the difficulties of integration into society, giving examples of underage marriages, plural marriages, low levels of educational attainment, and highly conservative values. At DGGM Fatih, Istanbul, staff said: “They still act within a tribe mentality. The main problem with their integration is that they live in groups. They need to integrate into society. Integration is our main mission.” An SASF director in Izmir gave an example of how they face difficulties due to cultural differences: “One of the main problems we encounter during our house visits is communication. When I say communication, I mean women’s reluctance to talk to men. Other problems are underage marriages, and not sending their children to school.” KII respondents mentioned positive and negative comments on Syrians’ integration into Turkish society 72 times during the interviews. Nearly 60 percent of these mentions were negative.

K. Are there any unintended consequences observed within households, or within communities?

Indicators: Beneficiary opinions.

At institutions where the Turkish and Syrian communities encounter each other, such as SASF offices, Population Directorates or Halkbanks, interview respondents stated that they observed some tension between the two groups from time to time. As these statements are based on personal experiences we cannot generalise the situation. However, out of 50 KIIs conducted throughout this fieldwork, we did not hear any aggression stories that had caused significant problems within society. Moreover, all the stories we heard were similar. In other words, we did not observe any province-specific Syrian- or ESSN-related problems.

However, in order to avoid potential tension between groups, some stakeholders created their own solutions. In Iskenderun, Hatay, for instance, to prevent any hostility between Turkish and Syrian applicants at SASF offices, separate rooms for ESSN applications have been opened. These two rooms are located in the same area, opposite to each other. The small size of the existing room and availability of another room enabled staff to reach this solution. In Halkbank, for instance, due to the high caseload of Syrians, Turkish customers' waiting time increased and this caused some murmuring among customers. In Reyhanli, Hatay, the representative from Halkbank described this as follows: "All the ESSN transactions are made in the last days of the month. On those days our branch is full of people, and we become swamped. Our regular customers are kept waiting too long, and this damages our customer relations." One of the KII respondents said that they had started hearing people labelling them the 'Syrians' bank'. Our interviews indicate that a lack of knowledge about the programme and its sources of funding is the main reason behind any tension that has arisen between the Turkish and Syrian communities concerning the ESSN.

2.6 How Effective are the Management and Governance Arrangements?

L. Are the management arrangements working well and could they be improved?

Indicators: Stakeholder opinion on the extent to which comparative advantages of different actors have been realized. Stakeholder opinion on whether optimal management arrangements have been established.

1. Difficulties in the pre-application process:

Having a temporary protection ID and a registered house address are the two main conditions for starting an application for ESSN relief. When having these two papers ready takes a long time, the vulnerability of the poor increases.

Our KIIs indicated a need for a revision to the initial registration process. If a common system could be introduced to diminish the duplicated steps between the Population Directorate and the DGMM, Syrians would get their IDs in a shorter period, which would finally enable them to start an application for the ESSN. This would improve the management arrangements. The main recommendation featured during the KIIs, particularly from the Population Directors or officers, was the need for a protocol between the Population Directorate and the DGMM. As mentioned in previous questions, having such a contract would decrease bureaucracy and simplify the whole registration process. While DGMMs are mainly established for foreign citizens, and the Population Directorates' language capacity is limited, having a department at the DGMM offices solely taking care of address registration would be an improvement throughout the registration process.

Another bottleneck mentioned during the interviews was related to the updates in the ID registration system which is among the main pre-conditions before starting an application for the ESSN, though is not directly linked to the ESSN. There have been various updates in

ID registration in the last couple of years. IDs changing from a temporary ID starting with number 98, and later changing that to 99, made people revisit the DGMM offices to obtain a valid and updated ID. Since the ID updating started, DGMM officers' caseloads have increased, and the process for taking new ID records has slowed down. At DGMM Sultanbeyli, Istanbul, our respondent complained about how these ID updates affected their workload:

“After the system update, time allocated per registration increased to 15 minutes. We start from scratch. Before this ID update process, one officer was printing 250 IDs per day. Now it is down to 40.”

2. Lack of information on guidelines and manuals

Implementation of the ESSN programme created an additional need for a new set of management arrangements in partner institutions. The interviews indicate that institutions tend to develop solutions towards the problems faced during the various steps of the programme implementation as required. For example, in our interviews, one of the most frequent problems faced in the field attributed to address registrations at Population Directorates. Since this was a pre-condition to start an application for the ESSN, it is a crucial issue to be solved. In Hatay, an SASF director stated that there were many people who cannot proceed with their applications because their names were miswritten in the system. These people had to update their information, yet due to heavy work load at the Population Directorates getting an appointment was taking a long time. When these kind of specific cases appeared, SASF director made a call to the Population Directorate and solved the problem thanks to their personal relationships. In Urfa, for instance, there was a neighbourhood of 62 households where 362 people were living in offices. Since they were living in informal housing settings, they were unable to start an application for the ESSN. WFP teams contacted with the Municipality officials who are in charge of housing regulations. At the end, they fixed the situation and these offices were registered as houses, and these households were able to start an ESSN application.

Our field interviews and impressions point that there is not one single structured coordination system. For example, communication with applicants appears to be one of the main hurdles in the field. To cope with this issue, some of the programme stakeholders, such as during the pre-ESSN-application process the Population Directorate in Urfa or during the ESSN-application process the SASF in Iskenderun, hired Arabic-speaking personnel or received translation support from other partners. However, not every institution's officers, for example, the Population Directorate in Izmir, were aware that they can ask for language support from the District Governorate, TRC, Municipality or NGOs as some other programme stakeholders do in other provinces.

Our interviews led us to conclude the necessity of raising awareness and information of the stakeholders regarding the guideline documents and mechanisms created at the central level via WFP or SASF General Directorate. This would give all programme partners a reference point to act on particular problems. A pre-set meeting timeline coming along with this guideline would also ease the coordination across programme partners. With the guidance of such a calendar, all institutions would be aware of what other partners were doing, what kind of problems were occurring in the field and how to tackle them.

In the initial phases of the programme, the SASF General Directorate held an online conference for a selected group of SASF directorates. The information was also communicated via online bulletins. An SASF director in Hatay reported: “We first received an official notification from the General Directorate of the SASF through our online portal. Last year [2016], in November, we received an official letter stating that we needed to start getting and processing the applications.” Since these memorandums are the main guidance for the operationalization of the programme when the recipient did not pay attention to the

details or did not understand it well, the risk of failure increased. For example, in Afyon, an SASF director shared their experience with these memorandums as follows:

“We did not attend a training. We started receiving announcements from the Ministry. In our system, there is a tab entitled ‘announcements’. In addition to this, sometimes they also send a separate memorandum stating the beginning of the implementation and the need for our support. Once we receive that document either online or as hard copy, we read through and start off the implementation. In our case, for instance, we somehow skipped some parts in the document and we ended up being the worst performer among all SASF offices.”

The partners in the field were not always aware of the existence of a guideline document. This lack of awareness of a standard guideline (even if there were instructions provided to SASFs at the start of the programme) made the partners find their own solutions for the problems they encountered.

M. To what extent have national systems and capacities been strengthened?

Indicators: Capacity-strengthening activities conducted. Stakeholder perception of effectiveness.

The implementation of the ESSN created a great opportunity for different state institutions to interact with local and international organizations. The implementation of this unique experience has paved the way to strengthen the capacity of partner institutions.

At the end of 50 KIIs conducted in five provinces, three main areas emerged where the programme has contributed to the capacity of institutions:

1. **Language capacity:** One of the main challenges faced in the implementation of the ESSN was the language barrier between applicants and officers. Since TRC Service Centres have been opened specifically for this programme, their staff are capable of communicating in Arabic. However, as a state institution, this situation is not the same at SASF offices. SASF offices that are taking ESSN applications often try to solve this language barrier with their own resources and without any funding/support from the ESSN. In the places where the caseload was high, Arabic-speaking staff were hired. Some only hired a translator, and some of them (Haliliye, Urfa; Konak, Izmir; Iskenderun, Hatay) hired Arabic-speaking personnel to take applications or social workers to carry out house visits. It is worth noting that these new personnel were contract-based. While their employment eased these institutions’ ESSN operations, we do not know about the sustainability of these additional labour force. However, in smaller provinces, as stated in Afyon, SASF offices are not entitled to demand an Arabic-speaking staff member due to the low number of cases. In the cases where SASF offices cannot ask for or receive language support from the SASF Directorate in Ankara, they can either hire new officers out of their budget or outsource them via the resources of district governorship. We also observed that sometimes TRC Service Centres might provide language support for state institutions. In Sultanbeyli, Istanbul, for example, the district municipality and TRC provided translators for the SASF.
2. **TRC Service Centres Capacity:** SASF officers trained TRC service centre officers on how to use the SASF’s computerised system. The TRC service centre manager in Izmir explained: “At the beginning, the service centre manager spent two days at the nearest SASF office to observe how they use the system. Passwords to use the system are provided by the Ministry. If we face any problem in the system we consult the SASF officers.” In addition to these, there are several internal pieces of training mentioned during the interviews that TRC is providing for their employees, as the TRC service centre manager in Hatay says: “We received training by the SASF on the integrated system. We are also getting internal trainings by TRC managers.” TRC has a long history in undertaking projects in humanitarian settings. While they are well experienced in the

field, they were not familiar with the computerised system. These trainings are complementing the TRC's humanitarian approach. The TRC, with all these trainings, has been establishing a strong combination of providing services to refugees in this large-scale, nationwide programme while maintaining its civil society organization characteristics.

3. ***An interaction between international and local NGOs:*** Following the Syrians' relocation in Turkey after 2011, many local and international NGOs started running projects in Turkey particularly in the border provinces where number of Syrians were high. Before the implementation of the ESSN, activities of the NGOs would often overlap with each other. The introduction of the ESSN brought in an order to all the NGO activities in the field. Some of the NGOs in the field, e.g. Support-to-Life, ASAM, were/are funded by the DG ECHO similar to the ESSN. This alignment supported to have a link between the NGOs in the field and ESSN's official partner NGOs TRC and WFP as multilateral organisation. A representative from Support-to-Life in Urfa gave an example as following "We were already working in this field and we were aware of TRC's and WFP's programmes. When the ESSN started, there was a launch event that we were also invited. Since we were providing food vouchers for refugee families in this area, we had the data of these households. We shared this database with TRC." In Urfa and Hatay, WFP mentioned AFAD-coordinated monthly provincial level security meetings where NGOs are also invited to join. These meetings create a basis for communication between local and international programme partners.
4. ***SASF system, adaptation and international learning:*** Before the ESSN, SASF officers already had many years of experience in receiving and processing applications for social assistance for Turkish citizens. The use of the integrated system increased the SASF's collaboration and outreach capacity. While SASFs were already used to running multi-partnered projects, the ESSN opened a new phase of collaboration working with the WFP, the DGMM, the TRC, and the Population Directorate. The application process has been established through the existing Turkish social protection system's computerised 'integrated system'. The system was already appropriate for use in the ESSN programme. A specific ESSN module was installed on the system and SASF officers started using it, similar to their use in other social assistance programme applications. SASF officers also trained TRC service centre officers on how to use the system. While it improved internal capacity both at SASF offices and at TRC Service Centres, it also provided an opportunity for the integrated system to turn into an international learning experience.

3. Efficiency

3.1 How Cost-efficient is the ESSN?

N. What were the undocumented financial contributions (the Turkish Government, Halkbank, the TRC, other) to the ESSN?

Indicators: Estimation of unbudgeted time contribution by actors in implementing the ESSN. Estimation of salary costs. Estimation of overhead expenses.

Implementation of the ESSN programme has brought about new challenges and responsibilities and there were significant unbudgeted contributions to the programme, in particular from local the SASF offices.

The majority of ESSN applications (60.7 percent) were taken by SASF offices in Turkey, from the start of the project until December 2017. This led to a significant amount of additional work at SASF offices. Additionally, the SASF has the responsibility for household visits for

all beneficiary households (including those that applied through the TRC). While SASF offices were given the option of doing the household visits a year after the application, some⁷⁶ have already started conducting them and at the time of field work, in most SASFs visited they were already underway.

During our fieldwork, SASF directors and officers were asked about the time required to take an ESSN application, and the time needed to make a household visit. These estimates are documented in Table 10). According to their answers, we assumed that an application would take 10 minutes on average and a team of 2 staff members would be able to complete about 15 households visits per day.

Table 10: Time spent on taking applications and conducting household visits as reported by SASF officers in KIIs (in minutes)

	Application at the SASF office	Household visit
SASF Afyon	5	15–20
SASF Hatay–İskenderun	5	-
SASF Hatay–Defne	10	-
SASF Istanbul–Bageclar	5	-
SASF Izmir –Karabaglar	30–35	15–20
SASF Izmir–Konak	15–20	-

Based on these figures, and given that a total of 228,684 applications were taken by the SASF up to December 2017⁷⁷, and in addition, given that all the eligible applications (including those made through the TRC) totalled 200,392 as of the end of Dec 2017, we estimate that the SASFs spent a total of about 4764 man days taking applications and will eventually spend 26,719 man days on household visits for the first annual round of household visits to ESSN beneficiaries.⁷⁸ By taking into account the working hours of SASF offices (8 hours a day) and the average number of working days per month (20 days), approximately 1,574 staff months are estimated to have been spent on ESSN-related work by SASF offices (see Table 11). We assume the gross wages of SASF workers to be equivalent to social worker gross wages.

The following equation is then used to calculate the total costs incurred:

$$\text{Total expense of the SASFs} = \text{estimated time spent on ESSN applications (converted to staff months)} * \text{monthly gross wage} + \text{Overhead Costs (50\% of staff costs)}$$

The estimate for unbudgeted contributions of SASFs in terms of staff time is equivalent to 1.5 million TL for receiving applications at SASF offices and 8.2 million TL for household visits for one year. The contribution of using the SASF’s integrated IT system is also highly valuable to the programme, however it is difficult to quantify the value of this contribution with data at hand. In order to account for the contribution of the IT system, we have multiplied staff costs by 1.5 (indicating an overhead of an additional 50% of staff costs) as a lower bound estimate for IT system contribution. The overhead (estimated by this calculation to be around 4.9 million TL) also accounts for the time allocated to database management, archiving, the work of the SASF board during meetings and the coordination costs arising due to the ESSN.

⁷⁶ 10 of 11 SASF offices visited during the fieldwork.

⁷⁷ Calculated by WFP Staff and provided to the evaluation team.

⁷⁸ -This Figure is only for beneficiary households that became eligible until the end of December 2017.

Other government institutions have also made significant contributions to the ESSN programme, including DGMM and the Population Directorates. While the evaluation team acknowledges these contributions, their costs are not accounted for in this exercise as they are not categorized as costs directly linked to the ESSN.

Table 11: Time spent by the SASF on ESSN applications and the monetary valuation of the time (for applications taken by end December 2017)⁷⁹

	Number of applications	Minutes	Hours	Man days (as 8 hours a day)	Man months (As 20 working days)	Using the monthly gross wage of a social worker ⁸⁰
Application at the SASF office	228,684	2,286,840	38,114	4,764	238	₺ 1,468,200
Household visit	200,392			26,719	1,336	₺ 8,233,700
Overhead and Other Contribution (additional 50%)						₺ 4,851,000
Total	-			31,483	1,574	₺ 14,552,900

Note: The household visit number is calculated based on the total number of eligible applications up to December 2017. The number of application at the SASF offices was calculated and provided by WFP.

⁷⁹ Based on the assumption that two SASF officers visit 15 houses per day.

⁸⁰ Estimated at 6163.20 TL gross wages per month, based on TUIK MEDAS. (Converted to 2017 prices using the increase in CPI index from January 2014 to January 2017 as reported in TUIK.)

Annex 12: Methodology and Data Collection Approach

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The evaluation uses a mixed methods methodology employing both quantitative and qualitative data and methods to answer the evaluation questions. Each evaluation question was addressed by a combination of research methods, either qualitative data collection, analysis of primary and secondary quantitative data or a literature review. Given the revised timeline of qualitative data collection for the evaluation, it was possible to have a sequential explanatory mixed methods study, whereby the quantitative data was analysed for preliminary findings and this informed the design/ and any revisions of the qualitative data collection tools before fieldwork started in November 2017.

1. Quantitative Data and Methodology

The quantitative analysis for the mid-term evaluation of the ESSN focuses mainly on the relevance of the programme to refugee needs and on the effectiveness of ESSN.

1.1 Quantitative Data Sources

Three datasets have been used in the quantitative analysis report:

- Pre-Assistance Baseline Survey (PAB);
- Comprehensive Vulnerability Survey (CVME); and
- Post-Distribution Monitoring Survey (PDM).

These datasets were all collected by WFP and TRC for monitoring and evaluation purposes.

Table 12 gives a summary of data collection period and sample size for each survey by type of respondent. PAB and PDM have a panel structure: they are designed to be collected from the same households over time. PAB was collected between February and May 2017 via phone interviews, before the households received ESSN cash assistance. It includes a representative sample of applicants to the ESSN and collects information both from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who are applicants to the programme. PDM, on the other hand, was collected in the period August and October 2017 from the same households, after the ESSN cash transfer. Due to attrition PDM's sample size is smaller than PAB's (6,955 households are common in both datasets, but also note that beneficiary status of some of these common households changed in the meantime).

CVME was conducted in May and August 2017, in the post-transfer period. Three more rounds of CVME are planned to be implemented during the course of the ESSN project. CVME (first round) has a sample size of 600 households from 13 provinces of Turkey.

Table 12: Datasets used in the quantitative analysis

Survey	Sample size (number of households)				Data Collection period
	Non-applicants	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Total	
Pre-Assistance Baseline Survey (PAB)	-	5,297	3,393	8,690	Feb-May 2017 (Pre-transfer)
Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise (CVME)	120	240	240	600	May-August 2017 (Post-transfer)
Post-Distribution Monitoring Survey (PDM)	-	3,716	3,242	6,958	August–October 2017 (Post-transfer)

Source: Authors based on PAB, PDM, and CVME data.

PAB and PDM data are representative of the applicant refugee population.

CVME survey applied a clustered sampling design. 30 clusters were selected from the ESSN beneficiary list using probability proportional to size. Within each cluster 20 households were interviewed.⁸¹ Of these 20 households, eight were beneficiary households selected randomly from the list of ESSN beneficiaries, while ineligible applicant and non-applicant households had to be identified using snowball sampling since there was no sampling frame was available.⁸² The implication of snowball sampling is that CVME data is not representative beyond the sample population.

1.1.1 Surveys structure and content

PAB and PDM were conducted via phone interviews by TRC personnel. Hence the surveys tend to capture only the essential information. PAB has eight sections:

1. General information: Basic information on beneficiary status, province and district of the household
2. Household information: Gender and age of the respondent and household head, number of people living in the household, languages spoken in the household
3. Food consumption and food sources: Food groups consumed by the households during the previous week
4. Consumption based coping strategies: Negative consumption coping strategies employed by the household during the previous week
5. Livelihood based coping strategies: Negative livelihood coping strategies employed by the household during the last month or before
6. Expenditure and income source: Accumulated debt, monthly expenditure on separate items, income sources in the last month
7. Other assistance, suggestion and follow-up: Assistance receiving status of the household (by other organizations), household's assistance type preference
8. Telephone: If the respondent can receive messages on the phone, if anyone in the household has Facebook etc.

The sections and questions in PDM are mostly the same as in the PAB. Instead of the seventh and eighth sections in PAB, PDM has a section called "ESSN Cash Assistance Household Utilisation & Access" that collects information from beneficiary households on their experience with the ESSN so far. In comparison with PAB and PDM, CVME is a more detailed survey with more questions. CVME data was collected via household visits which made it possible to collect a more detailed survey. The sections in CVME are as follows:

1. General information and introduction: Province, district, applicant status etc.
2. Demographics: Information on household composition, including information on members with special needs
3. Arrival profile: The time of arrival of the first and last household member, their origin, DGMM status etc.
4. Household shelter and services: Type of housing, type of occupancy etc.
5. Household assets: Information on different assets that the household owns
6. Education and health: Information on school attendance, sickness, seeking treatment
7. Income and livelihood sources: Income resources of the household
8. Expenditures: Monthly expenditure of the household by different categories

⁸¹ WFP 2017. Refugees in Turkey: Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise (Round 1).

⁸² WFP 2017. Refugees in Turkey: Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise (Round 1).

9. Food sources and consumption: Information on food consumption of different food groups
10. Coping strategies: Negative coping strategies the household uses
11. ESSN Monitoring: Questions particular to ESSN
12. Other Assistance: Receiving of other cash assistance from
13. Personal safety and security: Insecurity issues household experienced

Table 13 gives a comparative overview of information contained in each data source by topic.

Table 13: Topics covered in each survey

Theme	Available information	PAB	PDM	CVME
Demographics	Age and gender of household head	x	x	x
	Nationality of household head			x
	Age and gender of household members	x	x	x
	Number of orphans or children without parents			x
Education	Arabic and Turkish literacy in the household	x	x	
	School attendance for children 6-17	x	x	x
	Reason for not enrolment			x
	Highest education of household head and spouse			x
Health	Number of members with specific needs (disabled, pregnant, chronic ill, elderly, etc.)			x
	Number of children sick in the last month			x
	Number of sick children treated and source of treatment/advice			x
	Number of sick adults treated and source of treatment/advice			x
Food security	Number of days food from the major food groups was consumed during the previous week	x	x	x
	Number of meals consumed by adults/children in the previous day			x
	Ability to cook food at home			x
	Number of day member ate outside home in the last week			x
Coping Strategies	Negative consumption coping strategies during the previous week	x	x	x
	Negative livelihood coping during the last month	x	x	x
Consumption expenditure	Expenditure on food in the previous week;	x	x	x
	Expenditure on non-food items in the previous month or six months	x	x	x

Theme	Available information	PAB	PDM	CVME
Debt and savings	Debt repayment in the last month and total amount of debt	x	x	x
	Borrowing in the last three months	x	x	x
	Reason for borrowing			x
	Type of lender			x
	Savings accumulated in the last three months	x	x	
Income source	Main sources of income in the previous month	x	x	x
	Number of members working in the previous month			x
	Number of income sources and regularity			x
Housing and assets	Housing quality (quality of house, toilet, kitchen, lighting, fuel for cooking, waste disposal; number of rooms)			x
	Ownership of assets			x
Satisfaction of basic needs	Access to water			x
	Access to soap and hygiene items			x
	Access to cooking fuel			x
Assistance received	ESSN	x	x	x
	WFP TRC e-voucher	x		
	UNICEF education grant	x	x	
	Other cash assistance programmes		x	
	Other cash or in-kind programmes	x		x
Satisfaction with design	Preference over assistance type			
	satisfaction with ESSN amount	x	x	
	Sufficiency of ESSN amount		x	
	Satisfaction with targeting of ESSN			x
ESSN implementation	Reason for not receiving ESSN		x	
	Registration with DGMM			x
	Knowledge of ESSN targeting criteria			x
	Knowledge of ESSN amount		x	
	Knowledge of grievances and complaints mechanism			x
	Use and Satisfaction of grievances and complaints mechanisms			x
	Actual amount received		x	
	Safety/Protection problems related to being a beneficiary of ESSN/applying for ESSN			x
	Issues redeeming cash		x	

Theme	Available information	PAB	PDM	CVME
Impact of ESSN	Identity of ESSN cash decision maker		X	
	Disagreement in the household		X	X
	Improved debt management		X	
Migration	Time of arrival			X
	Place of origin			X
	Out-migration plans			X

Source: Authors using PAB, PDM and CVME data.

1.2 Quantitative Analysis Methodology

1.2.1 Methodology for Calculating Welfare Indices

In the quantitative report we make extensive use of three alternative welfare indicators: consumption aggregates, poverty rates, coping indexes, and the food consumption score. In this methodology note, we give an overview of how the welfare indicators were computed.

Consumption Aggregates

We computed consumption expenditure aggregates for CVME and PAB/PDM data using information on food and non-food consumption expenditure. It should be noted that the consumption expenditure modules used to collect expenditure information is quite limited, especially for the PAB/PDM survey. We therefore expect a considerable measurement error.

Monthly consumption expenditure in the PAB/PDM data is computed as the sum of:

- Food expenditure during the last 7 days multiplied by (30/7) to get monthly figures;
- The sum of monthly non-food expenditure on: rent, hygiene items, celebrations, utilities, education, telephone/internet, health, water, transport, other.

Monthly consumption expenditure in the CVME data is computed as the sum of:

- The sum of food expenditure during the last 7 days on each food group multiplied by (30/7) to get monthly figures
- The sum of food consumed from own production during the last 7 days on each food group multiplied by (30/7) to get monthly figures
- The sum of monthly non-food expenditure on: rent, hygiene items, fuel, water, communication, alcohols and tobacco
- The sum of expenditure in the last six months on healthcare, education, clothing and shoes, celebrations divided by six to get monthly value.

Poverty Rate

Throughout the report we make reference to a relative poverty rate and to an absolute poverty rate. The relative poverty rate identifies as poor every individuals whose consumption expenditure is in the lowest 40% of the consumption expenditure distribution.

The absolute poverty rate was calculated based on the MEB calculated by WFP for Syrians living in Turkey⁸³. WFP's conducted a study in August 2016 and estimated the MEB for a households of six refugees in number of provinces in Southeast Turkey.⁸⁴

⁸³ MEB/SMEB Calculation for Syrians living in Turkey

⁸⁴ 1715 TL for a 6 person household and 286 TL per capita, in Southeast Turkey in August 2016 prices.

The absolute poverty rate was computed as follows:

1. Update provincial MEB rates for inflation

We updated for inflation MEB rates for a household of six calculated separately for the provinces of Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Kilis, Hatay, Adana, Mersin, Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara. These provincial rates were inflated to represent February 2017 prices of Turkey using regional CPIs for August 2016 and country CPI for February 2017.

2. Compute national MEB for a household of 6

The average of these province level MEBs were taken as the overall MEB in February 2017 prices for a household of six. This level was estimated at 1964 TL in February 2017 prices.

3. Compute national per adult equivalent and per capita MEB

We computed per adult equivalent level of the MEB making reference to two alternatives per adult equivalent OECD scales (See Table 14)⁸⁵.

Assumption: A household of size six is composed of three adults and three children.

Per adult equivalent MEB poverty lines and per capita MEB poverty line were calculated as follows:

- Per adult equivalent MEB is equal to $1964/2.9=677.3$ TL according to the modified OECD scale
- Per adult equivalent MEB is equal to $1964/3.9=503.6$ TL according to the old OECD scale
- Per capita basket is equal to $= 1964/6 = 327.3$ TL

Throughout the quantitative analysis, the team has carried out sensitivity analyses looking at three different versions of adult equivalence as outlined above. In Annex 13 all results presented are based on the old OECD scale (aes2).

Table 14: Adult equivalence scales

	Modified OECD adult equivalence scale (aes1)	Old OECD adult equivalence scale (aes2)	Per capita rate (pc)
First adult	1	1	1
+ Each additional adult	0.5	0.7	1
+ Each child	0.3	0.5	1
A household of 6 (3 adults, 3 children)	2.9	3.9	6

Coping Indices

All three surveys have questions on negative coping strategies. We constructed coping indices following WFP methodology⁸⁶ to offer a more synthetic way to represent household vulnerability situation. The indices we have constructed include:

- a consumption coping index that captures the extent to which negative consumption coping strategies were used;
- a livelihood coping index that captures the extent to which negative livelihood coping strategies were used; and
- an overall coping index that is a combination of the former two.

⁸⁵ <http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf>

⁸⁶ WFP, The Coping Strategies Index: Field Methods Manual 2nd Edition, January 2008

To compute coping indices each negative coping strategy within a subset is assigned a weight or severity score. The index for a particular household is then given by the sum of the severity scores for all coping strategies employed by that particular household.⁸⁷ A higher score indicates that the household is worse off and resorts to more coping strategies.⁸⁸

Table 15 shows applied severity scores to compute the consumption coping index, and

Table 16 the relevant scores for the livelihood coping index. While the scores for consumption coping strategies are obtained directly from the WFP document on coping strategies, scores for the livelihood coping strategies were decided after discussions among authors of this report.

Table 15: Severity scores for negative consumption coping strategies in PAB, CVME, and PDM data

Consumption Coping Strategy	Severity Score
Relied on less, less expensive food	1
Borrowed food or relied on help from friends or relatives	2
Reduced the number of meals eaten per day	1
Reduced portion size of meals	1
Restrict consumption by adults in order to young-small children to eat?	3

Table 16: Severity scores for negative livelihood coping strategies in PAB, CVME, and PDM data

Livelihood Coping Strategy	Severity Score
Sold household assets/goods (jewellery, refrigerator, television, electronic devices, etc.)	2
Spent savings	1
Bought food on credit	2
Sold productive assets or means of transport (tools, bicycle, car)	3
Withdrew children from school	3
Sent household members to beg	4

PAB and PDM Strategy	Severity Score	CVME Strategy	Severity Score
Reduced expenses on health to cover other basic needs	1	Reduce essential non-food expenditures such as education, health, etc.	1
Reduced expenses on education to cover other basic needs	1		
Reduced expenses on food to cover other basic needs	1		
Borrowed money from non-relatives/friends to cover basic needs (food, education, health, etc.)	2	Borrowed money	2
The entire household had to move to another location or change the type of accommodation in order to reduce rental	3	A household member left/moved elsewhere in	3

⁸⁷ Different from the version of WFP we do not take into account how many days the consumption coping is employed. This is done in order to be able to combine it later with livelihood coping index (for which the number of times it was employed is not asked).

⁸⁸ An example on the calculation of coping indices: A household relied on less expensive food (1), borrowed food from relatives (2) at least once during the last week. It also gathered unusual types of food (4) and sold household assets (2) during the last month or before. Consumption coping index = 1 + 2 = 3 Livelihood coping index = 4 + 2 = 6 Overall coping index = 3 + 6 = 9

PAB and PDM Strategy	Severity Score	CVME Strategy	Severity Score
		Turkey due to lack of resources to maintain them	
Sent children (under the age of 18) to work in order to generate additional income/resources	4	Have children (under 15 years old) involved in income generation	4
Members of the household returned to Syria to provide resources for the household or to reduce household expenditure	4	Sent an adult household member back to Syria to seek work	4
Gather unusual types of food (from the garbage, left-overs from restaurants, immature/rotten food, etc.)	4		
		Marriage of children under 15	4
		Accept high risk, illegal, socially degrading or exploitative temporary jobs? (e.g. theft, prostitution)	4

Calculation of the Food Consumption Score

The food consumption score (FCS) is a composite score based on dietary diversity, food frequency, and relative nutritional importance. It is widely used as an indicator of food security. We computed the FCS following WFP’s document on “Meta data for the Food Consumption Indicator”⁸⁹ and “FCS Technical Guidance Sheet” of WFP.⁹⁰

We used information on reported food consumption in the previous seven day by food group. To construct the score, the number of days in a week each food group was consumed is multiplied by the standard weight of the food group and then they are summed up. Table 17 reports weights for each food group. The higher the score is the more food secure the household is. The formula for FCS is as follows:

$$FCS = (starches*2) + (pulses*3) + vegetables + fruit + (meat*4) + (dairy*4) + (fats*.5) + (sugar*.5)$$

Table 17: Standard weights of food groups

Food group	Weight
Cereals, grains, roots & tubers: rice, bulgur, bread, pasta, potato, etc.	2
Pulses, nuts & seeds: beans, chickpeas, lentils, etc.	3
Vegetables & leaves: spinach, cucumber, eggplant, tomato, etc.	1
Fruits: citrus, apple, banana, dates, etc.	1
Eggs, Meat, fish: beef, lamb, chicken, liver, kidney, fish (incl. canned tuna), eggs, etc.	4
Milk and dairy products: yoghurt, cheese, milk, etc.	4
Oil and fat: vegetable oil, butter, ghee, etc.	0.5
Sugar and sweets: sugar, honey, cakes, sugary drinks, etc.	0.5
Spices and condiments: tea, garlic, tomato sauce, etc.	0

⁸⁹http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/manual_guide_proced/wfp271745.pdf?_ga=2.49019427.429533943.1514364042-2015169499.1514364042

⁹⁰http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/manual_guide_proced/wfp197216.pdf?_ga=2.68244889.90705358.1525242396-242689387.1525242396

1.2.2 Methodology for Baseline Simulation of Non-Applicant Data

Non-applicants constitute a large percentage of refugees in Turkey (estimated at 46.5% of current total number of refugees). It is therefore important for our analysis to be able to understand the main characteristics of the non-applicant population. Specifically we are interested in whether non-applicants are more or less poor than applicant households pre-transfer.

In order to be able to compare expenditure levels and poverty status between applicant and non-applicant households we simulated, under strong assumptions, non-applicant population in the PAB data making use of information from the CVME dataset.

Main Steps in the simulation exercise:

1. **Append CVME and PAB data**
2. **Correct CVME consumption expenditure data to make it comparable with PAB consumption expenditure data**

PAB and CVME survey do not collect consumption expenditure data in the same way. The CVME survey has a more extensive consumption expenditure section, especially with regards to food consumption. To correct for the differences across survey we rely on consumption patterns of non-beneficiary households that should be similar across surveys (since they do not receive the ESSN transfer).

Assumption: Consumption patterns of non-beneficiary households are the same in CVME and PAB data. This might not be the case due to difference in data collection periods across surveys and, most importantly, difference sampling strategy and population representativeness.

We compute the following ratios using non-beneficiaries data only:

- a. $\text{Corrector_food} = \text{Average food expenditure of non-beneficiaries PAB} / \text{Average food expenditure of non-beneficiaries CVME}$;
- b. $\text{Corrector_nonfood} = \text{Average non-food expenditure of non-beneficiaries PAB} / \text{Average non-food expenditure of non-beneficiaries CVME}$.

The ratios are then used to correct consumption expenditure for non-applicants.

3. **Compute weights for non-applicants.**

The sum of population weights for PAB data is 1.6 million. Hence 1.6 million applicants are represented with this dataset. To find out the current number of non-applicants we obtained data from DGMM, UNHCR and WFP. According to the latest DGMM data of December 14, 2017 (as obtained from DGMM's website) it is reported that 3,183,879 Syrian refugees live outside of camps in Turkey. According to UNHCR (as obtained from UNHCR's website) 344,645 non-Syrians are registered with UNHCR in Turkey and under international protection (as of October 31, 2017). Adding these values makes a total of 3.5 million refugees in Turkey. Total number of applicants is 1,886,404 according to WFP's data for December 2017 (obtained from WFP). Hence, roughly the number of non-applicants to be represented are $3,183,879 + 344,645 - 1,886,404$ (applicants in admin data) = 1,642,120

Assumption: CVME data on non-applicants is representative of non-applicant population and population weights are assumed to be equal for every non-applicant household. Note that we know that CVME data is not representative.

Hence, population weight = 1,642,120/574 (number of non-applicant individuals in CVME data)⁹¹.

The rest of the calculations on average monthly expenditures of non-applicant households or their poverty levels are done using these constructed weights and corrected expenditure levels.

Given the nature of the assumptions behind this simulation, especially the one related to representativeness of CVME data, we are aware that the findings can be regarded as merely suggestive. However, given that this is the only source of available data on non-applicants to the programme that can be used, the quantitative analysis team has chosen to include the non-applicant data in order to estimate their situation in the baseline and make some reasonable comparisons between non-applicants and non-beneficiaries / beneficiaries of the programme in the baseline.

1.2.3 Methodology for Poverty and Welfare Simulations in Different Targeting Scenarios

In order to estimate the impact of the programme on poverty rates of the refugees under different cash distribution scenarios we ran a simulation exercise. This simulation exercise uses PAB dataset with non-applicants from CVME appended into it as described in the previous section. Please refer to the previous section for all the limitations behind the use of PAB and CVME appended data.

The targeting scenarios considered are as follows (see Table 18): (baseline) Transfer to all current beneficiaries; (Sc1) Transfer to all applicants; (Sc2) Transfer to all refugees (including non-applicants); (Sc3) Transfer to all individuals living in a household with at least one child (aged 0-17) or elderly (aged 60 or more) or with a single woman⁹². In Sc4, ESSN is distributed per individuals in this kind of households. Sc4 is similar to Sc3 but in Sc4 ESSN is distributed per child/elderly/single female (hence not for all household members). Note that the overall ESSN budget constraint is the same for all targeting scenarios.

Table 18: Alternative targeting scenarios

Scenario	Eligibility criteria	Transfer Value per person (TL)	Estimated number of beneficiaries ('000)
Baseline	Current ESSN criteria	100	742
Scenario 1	Self-selection	46	1,626
Scenario 2	Universal	23	3,269
Scenario 3	Hhs with a child/elderly/single woman	24	3,089
Scenario 4	Per child/elderly/single female	44	1,683

Source: Authors based on appended CVME and PAB data (see Annex 12 for methodology and simulation assumptions).

⁹¹ In the absence of another dataset that includes representative data on non-applicants, we had to make the strong assumption that non-applicants in the CVME data were representative of the non-applicant refugee population in Turkey.

⁹² Note that this corresponds to 94.6 percent of the total refugee population.

Main Steps in the simulation exercise:

1. Compute Transfer value per person under each scenario

Transfer value reported in Table 18 are obtained by dividing up the total ESSN budget by the number of beneficiaries under each scenario. For example, for the second scenario (Sc2), the total amount of transfer is divided by total population of *applicants* (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries).

2. Simulate consumption expenditure post-transfer under each scenario

We added the total ESSN transfer per households to the total monthly household consumption of beneficiary households.

Assumption: The monthly household expenditure of households will increase exactly by the amount of transfer. Hence, the transfer does not crowd out other sources of income and it is not used for other purposes than consumption expenditure (no savings, no debt repayment, etc.).

3. Compute poverty rates for the revised consumption expenditure of beneficiary households

2. Qualitative Data and Methodology

In the context of this research, a qualitative methodology is useful for complementing the quantitative findings as it enables an understanding of the complex experiences of refugees, as well as helping to understand the refugees' experiences with the programme. It will also facilitate an in-depth understanding of how people perceive the changes to their lives brought about by the ESSN cash transfer.

2.1 Qualitative Data Sources

The main qualitative data sources that were used in the evaluation are provided below:

- Key informant interviews at central and provincial level
- Focus Group Discussions with Beneficiaries and Non-Beneficiaries of the Programme
- Collection of life histories

The province level fieldwork in Turkey was carried out over a month and a half, (between November 1st-December 14th, 2017) in five selected provinces, namely Istanbul, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Izmir, and Afyonkarahisar. In order to understand how the programme has functioned in different contexts, the evaluation team selected a total of five provinces to visit, taking into account three selection criteria.

- High refugee caseload and high economic potential. Istanbul and Izmir were selected as provinces with the highest economic development indicators among the high caseload provinces.
- Along the Syrian border, with high refugee caseloads and varying levels of national capacity. Provinces were selected bordering Syria with high refugee numbers and varying levels of government capacity. Hatay and Şanlıurfa were selected in this category.
- Low refugee caseload, non-Syrian applicants and no TRC service centre. Non-Syrian refugees are widely spread over Central and Northern Anatolia. The team included Afyonkarahisar as the fifth province in the sample in order to get insights from non-Syrian groups' ESSN application.

The fieldwork instruments follow the qualitative methodology, composed of Key Informant Interviews, FGDs and a collection of life histories. The guidelines for the data collection instruments were agreed in the inception phase with all stakeholders. During field work, 51 KIIs were conducted with local programme stakeholders, including NGOs as well. A total of 23 FGDs were conducted, 15 FGDs with beneficiaries and 8 with non-beneficiaries (either rejected or non-applicants).⁹³ The FGD participant checklists, which include age, marital status, education level, number of children, the age of each child, spouse' education level, etc. were also provided. In addition, life histories were collected from 30 individuals outlining their process of arrival in Turkey and their application to the ESSN.

2.1.1 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) at central and provincial level

The team also conducted Key Informant Interviews with officials at the local partner institutions as well as NGOs in the selected field provinces in the time period 1 November–15 December 2018. Province level KIIs were conducted in Turkish, except the ones in WFP and DRC offices. A total of 51 in-depth interviews were held with local stakeholders and programme actors in 5 provinces. TRC Service Centres, SASF offices, DGMM offices, Population Directorates (Nufus), WFP offices and local NGOs were visited during the field work in the selected five provinces. During these meetings, the team had discussions with 60 experts/staff, and one-third of these staff were women (21) and the rest were men. Table 19 provides a detailed list of stakeholders interviewed during the field work.

Table 19: Number of KIIs conducted in provinces

	TRC Service Center	SASF	DGMM	Population Directorate (Nufus)	Halkbank	WFP	NGO	Total
Istanbul	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	13
Şanlıurfa	2	2	1	1	1	1	3	11
Hatay	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	10
Izmir	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	10
Afyon	0	3	1	1	1	0	1	7
Total	7	11	6	6	6	4	11	51

The KIIs were conducted in Turkish and English where necessary (two WFP and one DRC interviews were conducted in English). During the KIIs the team took notes and also recorded the discussion if the interviewee gave consent to do so. These voice files were sent to transcribers. The Turkish recordings were transcribed.

Conducting the KIIs proceeded smoothly due to two reasons. First, the team had a permission letter prepared by DGMM, which indicated the field dates and the composition of the team members. Second, TRC team was helpful in arranging the appointment schedule which helped with securing the appointments. Before each interview, the field team shared the permission letter with the province governorates. In some cases, the partner institutions were already notified about the letter by the TRC team in advance.

There were a few occasions where the team had difficulty: During the interview with District Population Directorate in Antakya- where the team was not allowed to either take notes of take a recording of the discussion. This was due to a miscommunication as when we arrived at the office, they were unaware of the study as there was a mix-up in the names of the district and province level director and the letter was sent to the wrong person. After we explained the situation, the director kindly answered our questions, yet did not let us record anything

⁹³ Due to lack of number of attendants in two FGDs (one with ESSN beneficiary non-Syrian women and one with beneficiary Syrian men) in Istanbul, once the fieldwork is completed we repeated these 2 groups. This time, there was only one Iraqi lady attended the discussion. At the end, this FGD turned out to be an in-depth interview. As a result of this failure, we decided to use the data coming from Pilot FGD with beneficiary Syrian women in Istanbul.

since she did not receive a letter from her directorate. Some of the previously visited Population Directorate officials, like the one in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul, also underlined the necessity of a permission letter from their General Directorate. In addition, in two DGMMs, we could not meet the person we were planning to meet. In Hatay, the person on our list was appointed to another centre, and in Urfa, the person was on leave. In both places, we interviewed an assistant expert.

2.1.2 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

FGDs were conducted with three different groups: a) ESSN beneficiaries, b) ESSN non-beneficiaries indicating those who made an application for the Kizilaykart, however, their application was rejected, c) ESSN non-applicants, meaning those, who did not ever fill out an application for Kizilaykart. Table 20 provides the breakdown of the focus groups according to the categories as mentioned above.

Table 20: Number of FGDs by type and province

	Beneficiary				Non-beneficiary					Total
	Syrian women	Syrian men	Non-Syrian women	Non-Syrian men	Syrian women (rejected)	Syrian men (rejected)	Non-Syrian women (rejected)	Syrian women (non-applicant)	Syrian men (non-applicant)	
Istanbul	2 ⁹⁴	2 ⁹⁵	2 ⁹⁶				1			7
Sanliurfa	1	1			1				1	4
Hatay	1	1				1		1		4
Izmir	1	1			1			1		4
Afyon	1		1	1			1			4
Total	6	5	3	1	2	1	2	2	1	23

Throughout this 5-week extended fieldwork, the team met ESSN beneficiary and non-beneficiary Syrian and non-Syrian men and women groups. Out of 23 FGDs, 8 were conducted with men, and 15 were with women (see Table 21). Table 21 presents the breakdown of each FGD regarding the number of men and women attended and also the number of people under each category.

Table 21: Number of FGDs and number of attendants

	Beneficiary status	Number of FGDs			Number of FGD attendants		
		Gender		Total	Gender		Total
		Men	Women		Men	Women	
Applicant	Beneficiary	6	9	15	53	61	114
	Non-beneficiary (rejected)	1	4	5	9	29	38
Non-applicant	Non-beneficiary (non-applicant)	1	2	3	9	16	25
Total		8	15	23	71	106	177

⁹⁴ One of these is the Pilot FGD with ESSN beneficiary Syrian women.

⁹⁵ In our first attempt only 2 Syrian men appeared in the group. Hence, we separately interviewed these two participants. In contrast to the repeated non-Syrian women group, in the second attempt 14 Syrian men participated the meeting.

⁹⁶ In our first attempt, there was 5 non-Syrian attendants, however, not all of them were speaking Arabic. The FGD was conducted with three Arabic speaking ladies, of whom two were living in the same house. The other two attendants were somewhat able to communicate in Turkish, we had a more general conversation with them.

There were on average 7-8 participants in every discussion group. Discussions lasted approximately 115 minutes on average across 23 FGDs. The facilitation of all FGDs was in Arabic and carried out by two Arabic-speaking Syrian nationals. The team first conducted a pilot FGD with ESSN beneficiary Syrian women in Fatih, Istanbul. All team members attended the FGD and provided feedback and made revisions to the FGD questions accordingly. Including the pilot FGD, the team conducted 23 FGDs in total⁹⁷. The field team had a chance to talk to a total of 177 refugees. 106 of them are women (71 Syrian, and 35 non-Syrian women) and 71 of them are men (59 Syrian, and 12 are non-Syrian men).

The FGDs were all audio recorded upon participant consent. The audio recordings were transcribed and translated to English and coded according to the analysis plan.

2.1.2.1 Procedure and discussion format

The team followed the field guidelines when conducting FGDs presented in the Inception Report. The qualitative tools had been previously prepared by the research team and approved by the programme stakeholders. At the beginning of the discussion, the moderator explained the study the ground rules to the participants, emphasizing the importance of their contribution and the uniqueness of each of their experiences. In each group, she stressed that this study was conducted by independent researchers and had no links with either TRC or WFP. There were also no staff present from TRC or WFP during the FGDs.

1. Flow of the FGDs

As an icebreaker activity, the facilitator asked the participants to introduce themselves, their children, spouse and whether or not they are living with their extended family, briefly.

- **Activity 1: Problem Tree Analysis**

Following the instructions and meeting participants, the attendants were first invited to play a “problem tree” game, while discussing their primary needs and concerns and how to cope these difficulties, risks, and shocks in their life in Turkey (see Figure 18 below). Then the facilitator took a note these and of their nature in a flip chart and also noted down quotes, terms, and expressions that participants used to define them.

- **Activity 2: Process Mapping Game**

In the second activity, the participants in the group were invited to play the “process mapping” game, where they were asked to discuss how they applied for the ESSN. After getting few responses, the moderator picked one volunteer and asked her/him to talk about their application phase experiences and wrote their answers on the flip sheet. Then she spoke over the flip chart explaining the application phase while making stops in each level and discussion about the problems specific to each institution. The non-applicants discussed why they did not apply to the card in the first place, and they did not play this game in full as they had not been through the process. The results of the process mapping game were visualized later by the team using Photoshop and are presented in the report in distilled format reflecting the different formats of the application process that were discussed in each FGD. During reporting, the results were sorted by province and by beneficiary status of the participants in the FGD.

⁹⁷ The team initially planned to have 20 FGDs and 1 pilot implementation. However, due to the insufficient number of participants in two Istanbul FGDs, the team contacted the TRC team and re-organized these two groups after completing the 5th province.

ESSN transfer) and were asked to distribute these beans across the categories⁹⁸. The facilitator then let them discuss in more detail their budget and financial needs and where the ESSN has helped them with their consumption. The moderator took a picture of final results of the game and recorded them for further analysis. The number of beads before and after the ESSN transfer were recorded in a Table and analysed by the beneficiary status of the group.

Figure 20: Examples of expenditure mapping game results from the FGDs



In the final part of the FGD, attendants were asked to discuss whether ESSN affected their integration into the Turkish society. Then they debated if any unintended consequences were observed within households, or within their communities.

At the end of the FGDs, participants were asked to fill a short survey on the background of each participant, allowing for the analysis of FGD quotes by participants attributes such as age, educational attainment and the time since arrival in Turkey.

All of the 23 FGDs were audio recorded. Following the completion of the discussion, the audio files were transferred to DropBox and later sent to transcribers along with the notes taken during the discussion. The transcribers listened to the audio recording and translated it into English and transcribed the whole discussion into a Word document before transferring it to NVIVO for coding and analysis.

2. Recruitment of FGD Participants

The beneficiary status is the primary criterion for the recruitment of the focus group participants. To meet the randomness criterion, people whose ID number ending with two were invited to the discussion.⁹⁹ If an applicant, either beneficiary or rejected/non-beneficiary, TRC team was in charge of calling people to participate the study. The phone calls made through TRC call centre 168. They were first called for an invitation to attend and then they received a second call as a reminder and a confirmation of their participation. For recruiting non-applicant participants, the NGO Association for Solidarity with ASAM provided support for the recruitment process. For each group, at least 13 people were invited. Although between 6 to 8 people would be enough for an FGD, we always asked more than ten to make sure we have enough number of participants in the groups.

⁹⁸ In non-beneficiary groups, the question was asked hypothetically: “If you were to receive 10 additional beans where would you place them?”.

⁹⁹ It is important to note that in the districts, where the number of potential participants was limited, the team was more flexible about the ID number criterion. This was especially the case in Istanbul Fatih and Sultanbeyli districts. The distance between districts of Istanbul and the difficulty in transport restricted the team to have to conduct the groups with people who live close to each other in the same neighbourhood. In other provinces there was no such problem and all invited participants had IDs ended with 2. When TRC warned us in advance about the low number of suitable candidates for the meetings, we sometimes included other participants with ID ending with 4. We were also flexible with the recruitment of non-applicants since TRC did not have any record on them and we were assisted by ASAM in gathering these groups.

3. FGD Physical Setting

The field team paid particular attention to the location of the venue for the FGDs with taking TRC team views into account. The location was selected on the basis of it having easy access for participants. The locations selected for the FGDs were (i) TRC community centres, (ii) ASAM offices, (iii) homes of members of the Syrian community or (iv) on one occasion a hotel meeting room (where either of the first three options were not possible). TRC call centre sent an SMS to the participants to let them know about the address of the meeting venue.

Figure 21: FGD with ESSN beneficiary Syrian women at the hotel`s meeting room in Urfa, November 2017



During the FGDs, refreshments were provided for the participants. When the participants brought their children with them, the team offered them some presents such as puzzles, legos, crayons, etc. All the FGD participants received a transportation allowance. The amount of the compensation was adjusted for each province. The transportation allowance was provided in a closed envelop and participants were asked to sign a sheet after they received the envelope (without having to provide their names).

4. Challenges and Solutions

The problems of each field site were unique and in this section we have highlighted some of the problems specific to each location and the direction of bias this may bring the results. In this section below, we will cover challenges of conducting fieldwork in each site separately and describe the ways in which the field team overcame these challenges.

Istanbul

The primary challenge in Istanbul was the recruitment of FGD participants. Given that Istanbul is a metropole, the districts are large in size and even in the same district neighbourhoods may not be close to each other location-wise. This made it difficult to recruit for the FGDs based on the randomness criteria (ID numbers ending in 2) as not enough participants showed up for the sessions. In order to reach a sufficient number of participants in each group the team had to be more flexible about the ID number criteria. Some participants had to be recruited in the same neighbourhood given the difficulties in transport

and in recruiting participants from the random list. In Istanbul, the field team chose to repeat two of the FGDs as the initial number of recruited participants were not sufficient. Hence the total sample was increased to 23 FGDs.

Sanhurfa

Contrary to the difficulty of recruiting FGD participants in Istanbul, the main problem was the attendance of *too many* participants in Urfa. Although TRC team sent invitations and SMSs to only 15 people, we had more people who showed up for the FGDs. There were an additional 15 people at the event venue waiting to attend the discussion during the first FGD. It was difficult to convince people that this was only a discussion meeting and has nothing to do with their ESSN beneficiary status. Based on this experience, the field team took immediate action for the following FGDs and started to check the SMS invitations they should have received from TRC. We do not expect there to be a bias in the sampling in Hatay as the invitations were made randomly by TRC and checked by the field team.

Hatay

Similar to Urfa, the main problem was the attendance of too many participants as in Urfa, although TRC team sent invitations and SMSs to only 15 people. Once people heard that there is a transportation allowance is given, then the word spread quickly. We followed the same strategy as we did in Urfa. We checked their mobile phones whether they got the SMS message from 168. In certain cases the team also consulted with the TRC to check whether their name was on the invite list. We held the FGDs in Hatay at ASAM's office (see Figure 22 below). This choice of location was suitable in that the refugees in Hatay knew the location. We do not expect any sort of bias related to in sampling in Hatay.

Figure 22: FGD with Syrian men at ASAM's Office in Hatay, November 2017



Izmir

The FGDs in Izmir took place at TRC Community Centre as this was the most convenient location in the province. There was no issue of recruitment in İzmir. The only direction of bias in Izmir may be that some of the FGD results may favour TRC – if the location selection had any impact on the participants choice of words about TRC. The field team did not think this was a major issue, especially because TRC staff were not present and it was made clear in the group that the study was carried out independently from TRC and their beneficiary status.

Afyon

The FGD groups were held at the ASAM`s office. There, we conducted one group with Syrians and three FGDs with non-Syrians. The non-Syrian groups were composed of Iraqis, 12 participants for each group. The non-Syrian groups were formed of Arabic-speaking participants, as the research facilitator was speaking Arabic. We therefore recruited Iraqi refugees in the non-Syrian beneficiary and non-beneficiary category and may have missed the experiences of non-Arabci speaking refugees with the ESSN.

2.1.3 Collection of Life Histories

While the Turkish speaking members of the field team were conducting interviews at SASFs and TRC Service Centers, the rest of the team, two Arabic-speaking staff were collecting life stories with the potential Kizilaykart applicants at these centres. These life stories were about 10-15 minutes long description of their story of arrival and life in Turkey and their application to the ESSN. When permission was granted these life stories were also audio recorded and summaries were prepared. Throughout the fieldwork, team members conducted 17 life stories with men and 13 life stories with women.

2.1.4 Ethical Approval

This study received ethical approval.

OPM ethical review procedure adopt internationally recognised principles of the Belmont Report¹⁰⁰. The research approach will go through the ERC approval process (see below) to ensure ethical principles are adhered to. All ERC committee members are [CITI certified](#). The CITI curriculum¹⁰¹ is most widely used ethics certification body. The course curriculum includes training on history and ethical principles, it defines research with human subjects and includes guidance on how to assess risks. Further it includes training on informed consent, privacy and confidentiality as well as how to manage conflicts of interest. The course touches on vulnerable populations requiring additional protections and considerations. It describes different sources of vulnerability. It also includes the impact on autonomy, beneficence, and justice that may arise due to research on or with vulnerable individuals or groups.

The principles of the Belmont report align closely with those specified in the UNEG ethical guidelines¹⁰², touching on principles of avoidance of harm, confidentiality, transparency, utility and credibility. The qualitative research lead has been CITI certified and ethical principles of the Belmont Report as well as UNEG guidelines were taken into consideration in the design of the methodology.

The ethical design of the study has been validated by the ERC board.

¹⁰⁰ The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 'The Belmont Report'. 18 April 1978. <https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/belmont-report/index.html>.

¹⁰¹ CITI. 'Social-Behavioral-Educational (SBE) Basic – CITI Program'. Accessed 28 June 2017. <https://about.citiprogram.org/en/course/human-subjects-research-2/>.

¹⁰² UNEG. 'UNEG Ethical Guidelines', 2008. <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102>.

Annex 13: Quantitative Data Analysis

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List of abbreviations

CGH	Coady-Grosh-Hoddinott
CVME	Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
FCS	Food Consumption Score
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PAB	Pre-Assistance Baseline
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
SASF	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
TRC	Turkish Red Crescent
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

1. Objectives and Scope of the Quantitative Study

The quantitative data collected as part of the mid-term evaluation of the ESSN answers evaluation questions related to relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and connectedness. Our review of the effectiveness of the ESSN covers primarily targeting and coverage performance, while we only discuss preliminary and indicative findings concerning the outcomes of the programme. A robust impact evaluation is outside the scope of the mid-term evaluation and should be carried out as part of the final evaluation.

The main report introduced the ESSN programme, while this annex describes the rationale behind the targeting criteria. It continues with a data and methodology section that describes the data sets used in the report along with some methodology notes (for a detailed description of our methodology, please refer to Annex 12). The main section of this annex presents our findings organized under the four main evaluation criteria.

Table 22 shows the main evaluation questions we have addressed using quantitative data.

Table 22: Evaluation questions

Evaluation criteria	Related research questions
Relevance	Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?
Effectiveness	What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage? To what extent were the intended services delivered? Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively? What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer? What other effects has the ESSN had?
Efficiency	Were ESSN activities timely?
Connectedness	How well connected is the ESSN with the refugee response in Turkey as a whole?

Source: Inception Report

2. Data Sources and Methodology

This annex is based on secondary data analysis of three data sets collected by the WFP and the TRC:

1. The Pre-Assistance Baseline Survey (PAB);
2. The Comprehensive Vulnerability Survey (CVME); and
3. The Post-Distribution Monitoring Survey (PDM).

Table 23 describes the key characteristics of the data sets. One data set was collected before the distribution of the ESSN transfer (the PAB) and two after households had received the ESSN transfer (the CVME and the PDM). PAB data was collected between February and May 2017. PDM data, on the other hand, was collected between August and October 2017. Data for the PAB and the PDM were collected using phone interviews by TRC personnel. The sections and questions in PDM are mostly the same as in the PAB. The same households were called in both surveys, giving it a panel structure. Both are representative of ESSN applicants.

The CVME survey was conducted between May and August 2017 and includes more information compared to the PAB and PDM.¹⁰³ As the name indicates, its main purpose is to measure indicators related to vulnerability. The CVME captures information that can be

¹⁰³ For details on each survey content please refer to Annex 12.

complementary to the PAB and the PDM and data on the non-applicant population that gives information on barriers to application. Three more rounds of the CVME and four more rounds of the PDM are planned to be implemented during the course of the project.

Table 23: Basic information on data sources

Survey	Data collection period	Timing	Modality	Representativeness
PAB	February–May 2017	Pre-transfer	Phone interviews	Representative of applicants
CVME	May–August 2017	Post-transfer	Face-to-face interviews	Not representative, but includes information on applicants as well as non-applicants
PDM	August–October 2017	Post-transfer	Phone interviews	Representative of applicants

Source: Authors based on WFP¹⁰⁴ for PAB, WFP¹⁰⁵ for CVME, and discussions with WFP for PDM.

Table 24 looks at sample size for the three surveys by type of household interviewed. The sampled population for the PAB and the PDM includes beneficiary and non-beneficiary households from 5 strata and is representative of the applicant refugee population of 1.6 million people. Due to attrition, the PDM sample size is smaller than PAB’s¹⁰⁶. CVME has a sample size of 600 households across 13 provinces in Turkey.

CVME data is the only source of data with information on non-applicant refugees and it is therefore extremely important for our analysis because it gives us information on exclusion error. However, while PAB and PDM data are representative of the applicant refugee population, the CVME data is not constructed to be representative of the refugee population. In other words, PAB and PDM data can be used to make statements about all ESSN applicants, with a degree of confidence, while the CVME data can only be used to make statements about those that were interviewed for the survey. Moreover, when we make statements on non-applicants using CVME data we are relying on only 120 respondents.

Table 24: Sample size by survey and household type (no. of households)

Survey	Sample size			
	Non-applicants	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Total
PAB	-	5,297	3,393	8,690
CVME	120	240	240	600
PDM	-	3,242	3,716	6,958

Source: Authors using PAB, PDM and CVME data sets.

2.1 Overview of the Data

In this section we present basic statistics from the three data sets. This illustrates, firstly, how similar or different the three data sets are and, secondly, also gives the reader an overview of the basic population characteristics, such as age and gender composition (see Figure 23). The demographic composition of the refugee population is similar across all three data sets. There is a roughly equal number of women and men in the refugee population. According to PAB data, 51 percent of applicant refugees are male while the same Figure is 50 percent according to PDM data. In CVME, 50 percent of the sample is male.


¹⁰⁴ WFP Turkey, “Pre-Assistance Baseline: Presentation Internal,” July 25, 2017.

¹⁰⁵ WFP Turkey, “Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise (Round 1),” 2017.

¹⁰⁶ 6,955 households are common in both datasets, but also note that beneficiary status of some of these common households changed in the meantime.

Slightly more than half the applicant refugees are children under 18 years old according to both PDM and PAB data. Of the total applicant population represented by PAB data, 19 percent is under 5 years old and 33 percent is between six and 17 years old, 45 percent is of working age (18–59 years old), and only 4 percent is 60 years or older. The distribution of population in PDM data is the same as the one in PAB data¹⁰⁷. The CVME sample age structure mirrors that of the PAB and PDM data; however, the CVME sample has 20 percent of the sample under 5 years old and only 4 percent who are 60 years or older. Figure 23 shows that age distribution by sex is the same across PAB and PDM data that in all three data sources women are more likely to be of working age than men.

Figure 23: Distribution of population by age and gender



Source: Authors using PAB, PDM and CVME data sets. Note: For PDM and PAB data we report 95 percent confidence intervals; CVME data is unweighted.

The distribution of refugees across regions is similar across PAB and PDM data. Southeast Turkey is the region with the highest share of refugees, with nearly half of applicants (43 percent) living there according to the PAB and the PDM. It is followed by Anatolia (22 percent) and Istanbul (15 percent). In comparison, the Aegean and Mediterranean regions have a smaller share of applicants with 11 percent and 9 percent of applicants residing in these regions in the PAB data and 10 percent of applicants in the PDM data. The regional

¹⁰⁷ 95 percent confidence intervals for the two population overlap.

distribution of CVME data is different from the PAB and the PDM distribution, with 51 percent of the sample residing in the Southeast.

Table 25 presents the basic demographic characteristics of households in the three data sets. Applicant households tend to have a male household head, who is between 38 and 40 years old. Female-headed households constitute a significant proportion of applicant households and they increase from 31 percent in the pre-transfer data to 41 percent of all applicant households in the post-transfer data. The difference in the percentage of female-headed households might be due to male household heads leaving. However, since at the time of the PDM survey the targeting criteria of ESSN were known to the households, there might be some misreporting by the respondent in the hope of becoming eligible. The CVME sample is characterized by households with slightly older household heads and they are less likely to be headed by a woman.

PAB, PDM, and CVME households have on average a household size of six, with three children (aged 0–17 years old). Elderly individuals (aged 60 or more) are less common dependents compared to children. On average, the dependency ratio is 1.4 for PAB, 1.5 for PDM, and 1.6 for CVME.¹⁰⁸

It is not uncommon to have someone speaking or reading Turkish in the applicant households. According to the PAB data set, a quarter of households have someone reading and almost half the households having someone speaking Turkish. Turkish literacy increases in the PDM data, with a third of the households having at least one member reading Turkish and 54 percent of them a member speaking Turkish.

Non-attendance of school is an issue among refugee households, with 34 percent of applicant households with children sending none of their children to school according to PAB data. This rate decreases to 30 percent in the post-transfer period, as estimated using PDM data. The rate is lower in CVME data at 18 percent. However, this difference could be due to how the question is asked in different surveys.¹⁰⁹

Table 25: Basic household characteristics¹¹⁰

	PAB		PDM		CVME
Mean age of household head	39	[38.5-39.1]	38	[38.0-38.6]	40
Percentage of households with woman head	31	[29.9-32.2]	41	[39.6-42.3]	22
Mean household size	6	[6.0-6.1]	6	[6.0-6.1]	6
Mean number of children in household	3	[3.1-3.1]	3	[3.1-3.2]	3
Mean number of elderly in household	0	[0.2-0.2]	0	[0.2-0.2]	0

¹⁰⁸ Note that PAB and PDM dataset do not include information on individuals with a disability. Thus, the dependency ratios for the PAB and PDM only include children and the elderly as dependents, making the estimates a lower bound. For CVME, the dependency ratio is calculated taking into account individuals with a disability (with a medical report) as well.

¹⁰⁹ The PAB and PDM surveys ask directly how many school-aged children go to school regularly in the household. The CVME survey asks instead how many school-aged children did not attend school in the last two weeks.

¹¹⁰ It is worth keeping in mind that throughout the report statistics based on PAB and PDM datasets have been computed taking into account the survey design parameters and are therefore representative of the applicant refugees. However, statistics based on CVME data have been computed without reference to survey design and weights and therefore refer to the CVME sample only, unless differently specified.

	PAB		PDM		CVME
Mean dependency ratio	1.4	[1.4-1.4]	1.5	[1.4-1.5]	1.6
Percentage of households with 1+ Turkish speaker	48	[47.1-50.1]	54	[52.6-55.3]	-
Percentage of households with 1+ Turkish reader	25	[23.6-25.7]	33	[31.6-34.1]	-
Percentage of households with no child (6–17) attending school*	34	[32.9-35.6]	30	[28.9-31.8]	18

Source: Authors using PAB, PDM and CVME data sets. CVME data is not weighted. Note: [95 percent confidence interval]

Notes: *The universe is represented by all households with children aged 6–17 years

** The PAB and PDM's questionnaires ask directly how many school-aged children go to school regularly. The CVME questionnaire asks instead how many school-aged children did not attend school in the last two weeks

Overall, then, we can say that the populations represented by the PAB and PDM data are similar, and this is not surprising given the panel design. On the other hand, the CVME sample presents some relevant differences in comparison to the population in the other two data sources: the sample comes disproportionately from the Southeast region, and there is an underrepresentation of female-headed households. This means that caution is necessary when drawing comparisons across PAB/PDM data and CVME data. In the rest of the report we will make use of the three data sources to answer the different evaluation questions.

2.2 A Methodological Note

Some of the key questions this report addresses involve how to identify the poorest and most vulnerable refugees and what the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable refugees are. The first step to answering these questions is defining what we mean by poverty and vulnerability and how we are going to measure them. However, poverty and vulnerability are not necessarily overlapping concepts and there is not a single and agreed-upon measure of either of them. For the sake of this report, we have selected proxy indicators for both concepts and will make use of both or either of them depending on the subject. On the one hand, for poverty we will use monetary poverty, measured as the percentage of individuals/households with consumption expenditure below a given level. We will use per adult equivalent consumption aggregates and make reference to two alternative poverty lines. The first is an absolute poverty line – the MEB as defined by WFP¹; the second is a relative poverty line identifying the poorest 40 percent of the population. We are specifically interested in the poorest 40 percent of the population because the ESSN aimed at covering the most vulnerable 40 percent of refugees. Vulnerability, on the other hand, will be measured by food insecurity and/or by indicators of negative consumption and livelihood coping. Detailed methodological explanations are presented in Annex 12.

3. Relevance

Research questions	Sub-questions	Analysis	Summary of results
1. Is the ESSN relevant to the needs of refugees in Turkey?	How well does it respond to the main identified needs of refugees including protection, disaggregated by group including origin of refugees?	Identify needs of the refugee population Report beneficiaries' view on the adequacy of ESSN amount and on the modality of transfer	The majority of applicant refugees: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are poor in monetary terms; • rely on unskilled labour as their main income source and to borrow money to satisfy basic needs; • make use of negative coping strategies that could potentially damage their well-being in the long run; • have an acceptable level of food security. Monetary poor applicant refugees tend to use negative livelihood coping strategies almost as much as non-poor ones. However, they are more likely to have to use negative consumption coping strategies and to be food insecure. Beneficiaries have mixed view on the ESSN. They are satisfied with the amount provided but 44% of them do not think the amount is sufficient to cover their basic needs. 75% of applicant refugees prefer cash-only benefits.

Source: Authors.

3.1 The Needs of the Applicant Population

In this section we make use of the PAB data to analyse the situation of applicant refugees in terms of poverty and vulnerability prior to the introduction of the ESSN transfer. The analysis covers: monetary poverty and consumption expenditure patterns; income sources; use of negative livelihood coping strategies; use of negative food consumption coping strategies; and food security among applicant refugees. Moreover, we look at the interaction between monetary poverty and the use of negative coping strategies and food insecurity. The aim is to understand whether monetarily poorer households are also more vulnerable along other dimensions, including the use of damaging coping strategies and food insecurity.

3.1.1 Monetary poverty and Consumption Expenditure

Applicant refugees report a very low level of consumption expenditure, of which almost three-quarters is spent on food, rent and utilities. When using the MEB as the poverty line, four out of five applicant refugees are classified as poor.

We used WFP's MEB to define a monetary poverty line for each province. The original MEB was calculated at the household level and we adapted it to individual adult equivalents¹¹¹ and adjusted it for inflation¹¹². We use an MEB of TL 503.6 (€108) per month per adult equivalent as the absolute poverty line throughout the report. We have chosen this measurement since one key objective of the ESSN is to bring beneficiaries up to that basket. Before the transfer, applicants spent on average TL 423 (€91) per adult equivalent per


¹¹¹ Provincial MEBs were calculated by WFP to represent the minimum amount of money that is required to buy the basic goods and services in a number of provinces in Turkey for a family of six. Per capita and adult equivalent rates are calculated from this basket to construct the MEB poverty line used in this report. Please see Annex 12 for details of the calculation.

¹¹² WFP 2016. MEB/SMEB Calculation for Syrians living in Turkey, Sep 2016.

month. Moreover, half of the applicants spend TL390 or less per month, which is below the MEB and the level considered necessary to buy basic goods and services.

Given the low level of consumption expenditure it is not surprising to find in Figure 24 that food represents the biggest share of household consumption expenditure (38 percent), followed by rent (27 percent), and utilities (9 percent). Overall, slightly less than 27 percent of the household budget is left after food, rent and utilities are paid for¹¹³.


Figure 24: Consumption expenditure shares



Source: Authors using PAB data.

The distribution of monthly consumption expenditure is also important. Figure 25 below shows that the distribution of monthly consumption expenditure is very skewed to the right, with the peak of the distribution to the right of the MEB. This means that the monthly amount spent is very similar across households and that most of the households spend less than the minimum basket. Moreover, the shape of the distribution implies that small differences in the value of the poverty line will lead to important changes in the poverty rate.

Figure 25: Distribution of per adult equivalent monthly expenditure¹¹⁴



Source: Pre-assistance Baseline Data

¹¹³ WFP estimates on the share of household expenditure spent on goods and services (see WFP Turkey, “Final Pre-Assistance Baseline Report,” April 2016, 6.) are slightly different from those in this report. The reason is that we did not include debt repayment in consumption expenditure since they are capital account transactions and should not be included in consumption expenditure estimates. See Angus Deaton and Salman Zaidi, “Guidelines for Constructing Consumption Aggregates For Welfare Analysis,” *World Bank*, 2002, 1–107.

¹¹⁴ Per adult equivalent expenditure was calculated using the (old) OECD equivalence scale. For this scale the first adult takes a value of 1 and each additional adult takes a value of 0.7 while each child takes a value of 0.5 (see Annex 12 for details). Throughout the report, for computing per adult equivalent expenditure this scale has been used. Another equivalence scale (the new OECD scale) and per capita rates are also calculated for each analysis for sensitivity checks and can be provided upon request.

To illustrate this point, in Table 26 we estimate poverty rates using various level of the MEB poverty line. Using the MEB poverty line of TL 503.6, 4 out of 5 applicants are poor¹¹⁵. This is consistent with the poverty rate across the refugee population computed using the international comparable poverty line set at TL 360 per month (US\$5/day 2005 PPP) that stands at 83 percent¹¹⁶. Decreasing the poverty line by 10 percent leads to a decrease in the poverty rate of 9 percentage points. This means that a decrease of TL 50 in the value of the poverty line, a negligible amount, moves more than 144,000 applicants from being poor to being non-poor. On the other hand, if we increase the poverty line by TL 50, the poverty rate increases by 6 percentage points, which equals to more than 98,000 applicants. Per capita poverty rates vary in a consistent manner.

Table 26: Sensitivity of poverty rate to changes in the MEB poverty line (percentage of applicants)

	Poverty line (TL)				
	453	478	504	529	554
Per adult equivalent poverty rate	71	76	80	83	86
	295	311	327	344	360
Per capita poverty rate	71	76	79	83	85


Source: Authors using PAB data.

3.1.2 Main income source

Labour income is the main source of income for applicant refugees, with a strong prevalence of unskilled labour. Borrowing is a widespread source of funding to cover basic needs; moreover, the total debt of over a quarter of the applicant refugee households is higher than their monthly income.

Applicant households predominantly rely on labour income as the main source of income for the household (see Figure 26). While for 27 percent of them labour consists of skilled labour, 63 percent of applicant households rely on unskilled labour. Other than labour income, 4 percent of applicant households rely on gifts from family or remittances as their main source of income and another 4 percent on credit or borrowing.

Figure 26: Main source of income (percentage of applicant households)



Source: Authors using PAB data.

¹¹⁵ WFP estimates using a poverty line of TL 284 per month indicate that 82.5 percent of the applicant refugees is poor (“ESSN Baseline Revised Poverty Line English Syria Task Force,” December 7, 2017).


¹¹⁶ WFP Turkey, “Pre-Assistance Baseline: Presentation Internal.”

Although credit and borrowing is reported as the main income source by only 4 percent of applicant households (see Figure 26), being in debt to cover the household’s basic needs is prevalent among applicant households. According to PAB data, nearly three out of every four households borrowed money in the last three months to cover their basic needs (such as food, education, health, rent, etc.).

The ratio of households’ cumulative debt (total amount of debt) to their monthly household expenditure can be used as a measure of the depth of household debt. Figure 27 shows that 47 percent of applicant households have a total debt that is more than half their monthly household expenditure and 11 percent of households have a total debt that is more than twice their monthly household expenditure.

When we analyse borrowing patterns by consumption quintile we find that households in the middle quintiles are more likely to report the use of debt than households in the poorest and richest quintiles. However, the poorest households are more likely to report credit and borrowing as their main income source.

Figure 27: Total debt as a share of household monthly expenditure (percentage of applicant households)



Source: Authors using PAB data.

3.1.3 Use of negative coping strategies and food security

In this section we investigate whether applicant refugees are using negative livelihood and consumption coping strategies. In addition, we further investigate the extent to which households’ food consumption deteriorated by looking at a common food security measure – the FCS. The results show that the use of negative livelihood and consumption coping strategies is widespread among applicant refugees and that one in five applicant households have a poor or borderline FCS.¹¹⁷

Negative livelihood and consumption coping strategies are damaging coping mechanisms adopted by households in emergency situations to cushion the impact of a shock on their livelihood goals and on their consumption goals respectively. While they might be effective in the short run, negative coping strategies tend to be damaging to the household’s well-being in the long term.

We start by looking at the use of negative livelihood strategies. To simplify analysis, negative livelihood strategies were categorized as stress, crisis, and emergency depending on their severity¹¹⁸. Table 27 below gives an overview of how strategies are categorized.

¹¹⁷ Household that have a food consumption score lower than or equal to 28 are categorized as having poor food consumption while households with a score between 28 and 42 are categorized as having borderline food consumption following WFP’s FCS Technical Guidance Sheet since this population is a frequent sugar and oil consumer.

¹¹⁸ Categorization is based on “ESSN Baseline Revised Poverty Line English Syria Task Force.”


Table 27: Negative livelihood coping strategies by severity

Severity	Strategies
Stress	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selling household assets • Spending savings • Buying food on credit • Borrowing money from friends
Crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gathering unusual types of food • Selling productive assets • Withdrawing children from school • Decreasing expenses on food, health or education
Emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moving the entire household to another location • Sending children to work • Sending household members to beg • Sending household members back to Syria

Source: Authors based on WFP¹¹⁹. Note: We reclassified the strategy “Gathering unusual types of food” from stress to crisis level.

Figure 28 shows that almost all applicant households (98 percent) had used at least one negative livelihood coping strategy in the last month. Most applicant households employed “stress” strategies (87 percent) or “crisis” strategies (86 percent) while more than one-third of the households employed “emergency” strategies (36 percent).

Figure 28: Use of negative livelihood coping strategies (percentage of applicant households)




Source: Authors using PAB data.

Next, Figure 29 shows that the use of negative food consumption coping strategies is similarly widespread among applicant households. Most applicant households (88 percent) had used at least one food consumption coping strategy in the last week. These strategies include buying less expensive or less preferred food, reducing the portion size of meals, reducing the number of meals eaten per day, reducing the quantity consumed by adults so that children can eat, and borrowing food or relying on help from friends or relatives. Among these strategies the most commonly employed is buying less expensive food, with 77 percent

¹¹⁹ “ESSN Baseline Revised Poverty Line English Syria Task Force.”

of households employing it at least once a week and 58 percent of households employing it every day of the week.

Figure 29: Use of negative food consumption coping strategies (percentage of applicant households)



Source: Authors using PAB data.

Finally, the FCS is used to assess food security among applicant refugees.¹²⁰ We find that the majority of the applicant households (77 percent) have acceptable FCS pre-transfer and almost no households has a poor FCS (3.1 percent). However, one in every 5 households have a poor or borderline FCS (20 percent).

3.1.4 Interplay between monetary poverty and vulnerability

In this section we investigate whether households that are monetarily poor tend to be the ones that make use of negative coping strategies and are more food insecure. In particular, we focus on the poorest 40 percent of households (i.e. the target group of households for the ESSN programme) to understand whether they are the most vulnerable also in dimensions other than monetary poverty. The results show that the use of negative livelihood coping strategies is only marginally higher among poor households. The difference is greater when looking at consumption coping strategies, with poor households more likely to use them. Consistently poor households are also more likely to be food insecure than non-poor ones.

In Table 28 we assess whether monetary poverty is correlated with the use of negative livelihood coping strategies. The results show that negative coping is common for both poor and non-poor households: 98 percent of households in the poorest 40 percent use at least one negative livelihood coping strategy versus 97 percent of the households in the top 60 percent. However, poor households are significantly more likely to use emergency strategies compared to non-poor households (although the difference is significant only at the 0.5 significance level).

¹²⁰ Food consumption scores of households are calculated using information on consumption of different food groups in the past week and taking into account nutritional importance of each food group. See Annex 12 for details on the construction of the food consumption score.

Table 28: Use of negative livelihood coping strategies by poverty status (percentage of applicant households)


	Non-poor	Poorest 40%	Difference
Stress strategies	87	86	-0.5
Crisis strategies	86	86	0.2
Emergency strategies	35	38	2.8**
At least some livelihood coping	97	98	0.8**

Source: Authors using PAB data. Notes: Poverty is computed using per adult equivalent consumption, with poor households belonging to the poorest 40 percent. Notes: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01

In Figure 30 below we examine which strategies are most used by level of severity. We see that poor and non-poor households alike most commonly rely on buying food on credit and borrowing money as stress coping strategies. Also, reducing food expenditure is the most common crisis strategy for both the poor and non-poor. Finally, moving and sending children to work are the most used emergency coping strategies.

There are, however, some significant differences between poor and non-poor households in terms of strategies used. Poor households are 4 percentage points more likely to buy food on credit, to withdraw children from school and to send them to work. Poor households are also 6 percentage points more likely to gather unusual food than non-poor households and slightly more likely to have to beg. On the other hand, poor households are less likely to spend their savings and to reduce health expenditure, which might mean savings have already been depleted and health expenditure cannot be cut further. Finally, poor households are less likely to move as an emergency strategy.

Figure 30: Use of negative livelihood coping strategies by poverty status (percentage of applicant households)



Source: Authors using PAB data. Notes: Asterisks refer to differences between poorest 40 percent and non-poor for each coping strategy: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01

Next, in Table 29 we look at whether households in the poorest 40 percent of consumption distribution are more or less likely to be food secure and to use negative consumption coping strategies compared to non-poor households. We see that the poorest households are more likely to have a poor and borderline FCS than non-poor households. Additionally, 92 percent of poor applicant households employed negative consumption strategies in the last week as opposed to 86 percent of non-poor households.

Table 29: Use of negative consumption coping strategies and food security by poverty status (percentage of applicant households)

		Non-poor	Poorest 40%	Difference
FCS	Poor	2	5	2.7**
	Borderline	17	25	8.2***
	Acceptable	81	70	-10.9***
Consumption coping strategies	Less expensive food	75	81	6.5***
	Borrowed food	23	28	4.5***
	Reduced number of meals	38	44	6.1***
	Reduced portion size	42	47	4.8***
	Reduced quantity consumed by adults	35	43	8.4***
	Any consumption coping	86	92	6.4***

Source: Authors using PAB data. Notes: Poverty is computed using per adult equivalent consumption, poor households belong to the poorest 40 percent. * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01

3.2 Adequacy of the Amount and Modality of the Transfer

In this section we use PAB and PDM data to report applicant refugees and ESSN beneficiary refugees' views on whether the ESSN amount is adequate to answer their needs. The results are somewhat ambiguous. While the vast majority of beneficiaries state that they are satisfied with the ESSN amount, almost half of them do not think that the transfer is sufficient to cover their basic needs. On the modality of the transfer, three out of four applicant refugees express a preference for cash only.

Beneficiaries' subjective opinion on the adequacy of the transfer differs according to the question asked in PDM survey. Post-transfer, 97 percent of beneficiary households reported that they are satisfied¹²¹ with "the quantity (amount) of ESSN provided" but, at the same time, 44 percent of them think that the amount is not sufficient "to cover their household's basic needs". These different answers to similar questions might be due to how the question is worded exactly and how it was perceived by the respondents. When the respondents say that they are "satisfied" with the amount of ESSN transfer provided, they may instead be saying that they are content that they are receiving a transfer.

Lastly, the payment modality of the ESSN was the preferred method by the majority of the applicant households according to PAB results. Pre-transfer, the majority of ESSN applicant households (76 percent) stated that to best meet their basic needs they would prefer a cash transfer from WFP and TRC. This response was followed by stated preference for a cash and voucher mix (13 percent), followed by voucher only (8 percent), and finally food (4 percent).

¹²¹ 69 percent of households declared themselves to be very satisfied, 28 percent of households are satisfied, and 3 percent are only moderately satisfied (Authors using PDM data).

4. Effectiveness

Research questions	Sub-questions	Analysis	Summary of results
7. What has been the performance in terms of targeting and coverage?	Awareness and sensitization, accessibility, inclusion and exclusion errors, consistency with humanitarian principles, costs, alternative targeting approaches	<p>Estimation of coverage</p> <p>Performance of targeting design, implementation, and overall targeting</p> <p>Descriptive of non-applicant population</p> <p>Simulation of post-transfer poverty impact of alternative targeting mechanisms</p>	<p>Coverage is estimated at 46% of the applicant population and one-third of the overall refugee population.</p> <p>The ESSN targeting criteria generate high exclusion errors and lower inclusion errors. The revised targeting criteria extend coverage without improving the progressivity of the transfer. Overall targeting effectiveness of the ESSN is low, with high exclusion errors. Beneficiary households are more likely to use negative coping strategies, but the use of damaging coping strategies is also widespread among non-beneficiaries.</p> <p>The main reported reasons for not applying are related to lack of registration with DGMM or Nufus. Non-applicant households are smaller, less educated, not registered with DGMM, and arrived in Turkey later than applicant ones. In terms of vulnerability, non-applicants tend to be less poor than beneficiary households and to use negative coping strategies as often as non-beneficiary households.</p> <p>Overall poverty level does not change much with alternative targeting criteria: in particular, universal targeting is only marginally worse than the actual ESSN targeting system in terms of overall welfare improvements.</p>
8. To what extent were the intended services delivered?	Provision of, and access to, cash transfers, review of the transfer amount, referrals	Experience of beneficiaries with ESSN delivery	Only a third of refugees is satisfied with the targeting criteria of the ESSN. Almost all beneficiaries report that they receive the expected amount. Problems redeeming the transfer are reported by 5% of beneficiaries and concern mainly issues with ATMs and ATM cards.
9. Did the feedback and appeals mechanisms function effectively?	Call centres, appeals process, beneficiary satisfaction	Experience of beneficiaries with ESSN assistance	Half of the refugees are aware of how to get assistance on the ESSN.
10. What outcomes are associated with the ESSN transfer?	Minimum needs met, changes in coping strategies and debt, access to education and health services, protection	Estimation of changes in outcomes	Post-transfer beneficiary households catch up with non-beneficiary households in terms of consumption expenditure. Moreover, non-beneficiaries are post-transfer more likely to use negative consumption and livelihood coping strategies, indicating an increase in vulnerability.
11. What other effects has the ESSN had?	Social integration, female participation, unintended consequences	<p>Reported disagreements in the household</p> <p>Safety/protection issues related to ESSN</p>	<p>The ESSN does not seem to create tension within beneficiary households.</p> <p>4% of beneficiary households in CVME data report facing issues at ESSN registration.</p>


4.1 Targeting and Coverage

4.1.1 Coverage

In this section we look at the ESSN's coverage of the applicant and overall refugee populations. The ESSN is reaching 46 percent of applicants and 33 percent of refugees overall. Coverage is mildly progressive across consumption quintiles.

Based on PAB data, 39 percent of households that applied for the ESSN transfer become beneficiary households. This corresponds to 46 percent of the applicant individuals covered (see Figure 31). Female beneficiaries make up 50 percent of overall beneficiaries. Given that PAB data includes only information on households that have applied for the ESSN, coverage estimates based on this data source do not take into account non-applicant refugees. When we estimate coverage using January 2018 official figures obtained from DGMM, WFP and UNHCR, we found 33 percent of refugees were covered by the ESSN.

Figure 31: ESSN coverage (percentage of individuals)



Source: Authors, based on PAB for applicant population and DGMM for overall refugee population. Note: * DGMM estimate was obtained from DGMM website on 31 January 2018 and represents the unsheltered Syrian refugee population as at 14 December 2017. It does not include international protection (hence non-Syrians). For non-Syrians the number is obtained from UNHCR's website on statistics on Turkey as at 31 October 2017 (www.unhcr.org/tr/en/unhcr-turkey-stats), thus representing the total number of non-Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Turkey. Number of beneficiaries is obtained from WFP (presentation on December payment cycle), representing the number as at 25 November 2017.

Figure 32 breaks down the analysis by quintile and shows which percentage of each quintile is benefiting from the ESSN. The red bars show coverage of the ESSN among the applicant refugee population estimated using PAB data. The coverage of the programme is somewhat progressive, with 58 percent of the applicant refugees from the poorest quintile being covered as opposed to 32 percent of the applicant refugees in the richest quintile. In addition, we have blue bars that estimate the percentage of all refugees (i.e. not just applicants) covered in each quintile. Estimates for the overall refugee population are the result of a simulation and subject to serious limitations¹²². When the non-applicant population is simulated into the PAB data set, the coverage rates of all quintiles decrease and the coverage of the poorest quintile drops to 31 percent.


¹²² See Annex 12 for the details regarding the simulation exercise.

Simulation: PAB and CVME data together can shed some light on non-applicants but there are important limitations to the analysis

Non-applicants constitute a large percentage of refugees in Turkey (estimated at 46.5 percent of the current total number of refugees¹²³). We expect that some of the non-applicants are self-selecting themselves out of the ESSN transfer because they do not need it; however, there is a concern that some of the non-applicants would be eligible and in need of the ESSN transfer but are excluded by the application process. We would like to be able to compare the situation of non-applicant households with applicant households in the baseline before the transfer was made, in order to see how their situation compared.

However, the data sets at hand do not allow for this comparison. The PAB data only includes information on applicant households and does not provide information on non-applicant households. The CVME data includes non-representative data on the non-applicant population but it was collected post-transfer and hence does not give us information on the baseline status of non-applicants. To be able to make comparisons in the baseline across non-applicants and applicants (both beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups), the evaluators have simulated observations into the PAB data on non-applicants, using the characteristics of non-applicants in the CVME data. The exercise is useful from a policy perspective; however, it is important to note that the CVME data is not representative of all non-applicant refugees and there are important differences between the PAB and the CVME data in terms of consumption measurement. Thus, the simulation has some limitations. The details of the steps in the simulation methodology are provided in Annex 12.

Figure 32: ESSN coverage of refugees across consumption quintiles (percentage of applicants and simulated percentage of refugees)



Source: Authors based on PAB data and on appended CVME and PAB data (see Annex 12 for methodology and simulation assumption). Note: Quintiles of per adult equivalent consumption expenditure. Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

4.1.2 Targeting effectiveness

Two main factors contribute to determining the overall targeting effectiveness: 1) the targeting design; and 2) the way in which targeting processes are implemented in the field. On the one hand, design issues relate to how well the eligibility criteria succeed in pinpointing poor and vulnerable households. Implementation issues, on the other hand, relate to how successfully the targeting process is carried out in practice.

Targeting effectiveness is measured against an ideal targeting scenario. In the case of the ESSN, the programme objective is to target the 40 percent poorest and most vulnerable refugees and bring them up to the MEB. Inclusion and exclusion errors are indicators of how well the recommended targeting criteria capture (economic) vulnerability among refugee

¹²³ Figure based on administrative data obtained from online sources and WFP. Number of Syrian refugees was obtained from the DGMM website on 31 January 2018 and represents the unsheltered Syrian refugee population as at 14 December 2017. This number does not include International Protection (hence non-Syrians). For non-Syrians the number is obtained from UNHCR's website on statistics on Turkey as at 31 October 2017 (www.unhcr.org/tr/en/unhcr-turkey-stats), representing the total number of non-Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Turkey. Number of applicants is obtained from WFP (presentation on December payment cycle), representing the number as at 25 November 2017.

households. Inclusion errors are an indication that non-vulnerable refugee households are receiving the ESSN transfer, while exclusion errors indicate that vulnerable refugees are excluded from the programme despite being deserving.

Figure 33 shows that while there is a substantial difference between the poorest and the least poor within the population in terms of average per adult equivalent consumption expenditure, only households in the highest quintile are in fact above the MEB calculated as TL 503.6.¹²⁴ Indeed, as already discussed, poverty as defined by the MEB among applicant refugees is extremely high. In terms of targeting effectiveness, high absolute poverty rates are associated with low inclusion errors (since most households are poor) but high exclusion errors (since the programme cannot afford to reach all poor households). Indeed, given the homogeneity of the refugee population in terms of welfare status, it is extremely difficult to come up with targeting criteria that can sufficiently distinguish the poor from the non-poor.

Figure 33: Average per adult equivalent consumption by consumption quintiles



Source: Authors based on PAB data.

4.1.3 Performance of targeting design

We use PAB pre-transfer household data to assess whether ESSN eligibility criteria are successful in identifying the poorest and most vulnerable households.¹²⁵ Given the widespread level of poverty, it is not surprising to find that the ESSN targeting criteria generate high exclusion errors and lower inclusion errors. The revised criteria expand coverage in every quintile and do not improve the progressivity of the transfer, which remains modest. Eligible households are, however, more likely to use negative coping strategies.


Figure 34 shows the relative importance of each eligibility criterion in terms of percentage of eligible households identified. We included in the Figure the dependency ratio criteria before and after the change. Clearly, having a high dependency ratio and being part of a large family (a family with four or more children) are the leading reasons for becoming eligible for the ESSN¹²⁶. Overall, close to 49 percent and 56 percent of applicants satisfy the old and new eligibility criteria respectively.

¹²⁴ Annex 12 contains an explanation of how the MEB was computed.

¹²⁵ It should be noted that in the PAB questionnaire no information is collected on the presence of disabled household members in the household. Therefore, this eligibility criteria could not be replicated. From administrative data we know that the percentage of households eligible via the disabled criteria is well below 1 percent (WFP Turkey, “ESSN Targeting Working Group FINAL,” April 4, 2017).

¹²⁶ Given the lack of information on disability among household members in the PAB data we could not analyse the importance of the disability criterion to determine eligibility.

Figure 34: Compliance with each eligibility criterion (percentage of eligible households that satisfy the criteria)



Source: Authors based on PAB.

Table 30 shows the inclusion and exclusion errors implied by the old and new eligibility criteria¹²⁷. Given the observed widespread (absolute) poverty among the population, it is not surprising to find low inclusion errors and high exclusion errors when we consider the MEB as our poverty line. The new criteria being more inclusive increases inclusion and decreases exclusion errors. However, when we assess whether the eligibility criteria are effectively targeting the poorest 40 percent of the households (i.e. the target population of the ESSN), we see a dramatic increase in the inclusion error. However, the new eligibility criteria are doing a comparatively better job in reducing exclusion error. Even so, with the new eligibility criteria 26 percent of the poorest 40 percent of applicant refugees are still excluded from the transfer, which equals 10 percent of the applicant refugees.¹²⁸

Table 30: Targeting errors by design (percentage of applicants)¹²⁹

	Old eligibility criteria	New eligibility criteria
Poverty line is MEB		
Inclusion error (percent of beneficiaries who do not meet the targeting criteria)	12	15
Exclusion error (percent of non-beneficiaries who meet the targeting criteria)	39	30
Poverty line is poorest 40%		
Inclusion error	51	55
Exclusion error	31	26

Source: Authors based on PAB. Notes: Poverty is computed using per adult equivalent consumption expenditure. Inclusion error is computed as the percentage of eligible applicants who are not poor; exclusion error is computed as the percentage of not eligible applicants who are poor.


¹²⁷ Note that throughout this annex we are presenting inclusion and exclusion errors at population level rather than at household level. Indeed, the ESSN transfer, although targeted at household level, takes into account individual-level needs since its amount changes according to household size. It follows that the target population of the ESSN is constituted by the population of refugee individuals rather than the one of refugee households.

¹²⁸ $10\% = 26\% \times 40\%$

¹²⁹ Exclusion error is defined as percent of non-beneficiaries among those meeting the targeting criteria while inclusion error is percent of beneficiaries who are not meeting the targeting criteria among all beneficiaries.

Figure 35 shows that the new eligibility criteria is expanding the ESSN coverage in every quintile without having a strong impact on the progressivity of the transfer. This means that the new criteria have expanded eligibility to the ESSN in every quintile and are not doing a better job in identifying the poorest applicants.


Figure 35: Coverage of ESSN eligibility by consumption quintile (percentage of applicants)



Source: Authors based on PAB. Note: Per adult equivalent consumption was used. Notes: Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Disaggregating eligibility by specific eligibility mechanism, we see some variation in the ability of the different mechanisms to identify the poor. In terms of consumption poverty, the estimates show that the criteria related to dependency ratio and having large families are the best in identifying poor households (see Figure 36). On the contrary, being a single woman does not seem to be strongly correlated with poverty.

Figure 36: MEB poverty rate by eligibility criteria (percentage of applicants)¹³⁰




Source: Authors based on PAB. Note: MEB poverty is defined as per adult equivalent consumption below MEB. Note: Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

¹³⁰ Households that meet more than one criteria are not excluded from the averages.

A similar conclusion can be drawn by looking at the average negative coping strategies index by eligibility criteria. The only difference we observe is that single parent households seem more likely to have a higher coping strategy index.


Figure 37: Average coping strategy index by eligibility criteria¹³¹



Source: Authors based on PAB. Note: Household-level average is used. Note: Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

To enrich our understanding of vulnerability across eligibility status, we now look at whether eligible households tend to make more use of negative coping strategies and whether they are more food insecure compared to households not eligible for the ESSN. We find that eligible households are more likely to make use of negative food consumption coping strategies, although the prevalence is also very high among non-eligible households (85 percent of non-eligible households used at least one food consumption coping strategy versus 90 percent of eligible ones). In terms of negative livelihood coping strategies, results in Figure 38 show that eligible households are more likely to use any type of negative livelihood coping strategy. Notably they are 8 percentage points more likely than non-eligible households to use emergency coping strategies. This is an indication that eligible households are indeed more vulnerable than non-eligible ones.

Figure 38: Negative livelihood coping strategies by eligibility status (percentage of applicant households)



Source: Authors based on PAB. Notes: Asterisks refer to differences between eligible and not eligible for each category: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01

¹³¹ Coping index used here is the overall coping index that combines both livelihood and consumption coping indices.

4.1.4 Performance of targeting implementation

The assessment of targeting implementation looks at how well the programme has managed to identify and enrol its target group and exclude those who are not part of the target group. We find using PAB data that over a third of eligible households are not benefiting from the ESSN. However, implementation errors observed in the PAB data are partly due to a mismatch between the PAB survey's definition of a household and the ESSN household definition, which itself suggests a possible shortcoming of the ESSN targeting model.

Analysis of PAB data shows that over 92 percent of applicants benefiting from the ESSN are eligible¹³², which translates into an implementation inclusion error of slightly less than 8 percent. On the other hand, implementation exclusion error is close to 36 percent – this means that 36 percent of applicants who are eligible according to the targeting criteria are not receiving the ESSN benefit.

This mismatch between eligibility and beneficiary status we observe in the PAB data is partly due to survey design, in that families registered with different case numbers and living under the same roof might have been captured in the survey as single households. Indeed, in the survey a household is defined as “all people eating from the same pot”¹³³, a definition that does not necessarily coincide with the one of a single case number family¹³⁴. In Table 31 we look at demographic characteristics of households that are eligible but not beneficiaries. We see that they tend to fulfil either the dependency ratio or the large families eligibility criteria. Indeed, they are larger than other households and with more young children. This supports the idea that these households are made up of multiple single case number families that, if considered alone, would not be eligible.

Table 31: Characteristics of households that are eligible but not benefiting from the ESSN

	Overall ^a	Eligible households that are not beneficiaries	Diff
Elderly headed household (%)	0.5	0.2	-0.3
Single parent household (%)	4.2	4.1	-0.1
High dependency ratio (%)	37	81	44***
Single woman household (%)	0.3	0.1	-0.2**
Large family (%)	38	42	4***
Household size	5.9	6.5	0.5***
Number of children (0–18)	3.0	3.6	0.7***
Number of children (0–5)	1.1	1.5	0.4***
Istanbul	14	16	1.9**
Aegean	11	10	-1.1*
Anatolia	23	18	-5.7***
Mediterranean	9.1	9.2	0.1
Southeast	43	48	4.7***

Source: Authors based on PAB. Notes: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01; ^a Estimates refer to non-eligible households and to households eligible and beneficiary.

¹³² Here we define eligibility as satisfying either the old or the new eligibility criteria.

¹³³ See the PAB Questionnaire.

¹³⁴ The mismatch issue observed suggests a reflection on the appropriate definition of household in the context of ESSN targeting. It is common practice in household surveys to identify households as units that “eat from the same pot” because this implies that the various household members are pooling together resources and most likely sharing some of the house facilities and space. If this definition is considered accurate, then the ESSN eligibility criteria should apply to households thus defined and not to single case number families. Otherwise, the ESSN transfer will go to single case number families and then most likely be shared among all the members of the household.

4.1.5 Overall targeting effectiveness

So far we have examined the theoretical performance of the targeting criteria, i.e. whether households theoretically eligible for the ESSN are more vulnerable and poorer. This is important because it helps assess whether the targeting criteria of the ESSN are effective in identifying the proposed ESSN target population. In this section we move on to review the actual performance of the ESSN targeting by looking at whether beneficiary households are among the poorest and among the most vulnerable along dimensions other than monetary poverty.

Targeting can be described as being pro-poor if the poverty rates among beneficiary households are higher than poverty rates among non-beneficiaries, i.e. beneficiary households are more likely to be poor than non-beneficiary households¹³⁵. Table 32 shows that, in the case of the ESSN, beneficiary applicants are more likely to be below the MEB and even more likely to belong to the poorest 40 percent of the population than non-beneficiary applicants.

Table 32: Poverty rates by beneficiary status (percentage of applicants)

Poverty rates	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Difference
Proportion of applicants with per adult equivalent consumption below MEB	75	86	11***
Proportion of applicants in the poorest 40% of per adult equivalent consumption	34	47	13***

Source: Authors using PAB data. Notes: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01. Note:

Figure 39 below shows the distribution of per adult equivalent expenditure for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Although we observe a significant difference in poverty rates by beneficiary status we see that the two distributions are remarkably similar, with both skewed to the right and with centres well below the MEB.


We have seen that beneficiaries tend to be poorer than non-beneficiaries, although the distribution of consumption expenditure is nonetheless very similar across beneficiary statuses. We now turn to a benefit incidence analysis of the ESSN transfer to have a better understanding of how progressive the ESSN is. Figure 40 shows how the ESSN transfer is distributed across the consumption quintiles of applicant refugees (the red bars) and across the quintiles of the simulated overall refugee population (the blue bars)¹³⁶. We see that around a quarter of the total ESSN benefits accrue to the poorest quintile of the applicant refugees. If we consider that quintiles 1 to 4 are all below the MEB, we see that individuals below the MEB receive 86 percent of the benefit – only 6 percent more of the ESSN transfer than they would under universal targeting¹³⁷. If we focus instead on the poorest 40 percent, however, we do get a slightly more progressive result. When we look at the simulated results for the overall refugee population, the share of transfers going to refugees below the MEB rises from 86 percent to 89 percent and the one going to the poorest 40 percent goes from 47 percent to 48 percent.

¹³⁵ The mismatch between ESSN case number and household number mentioned in the previous section is less of a concern for overall targeting effectiveness. Eligible households that are not benefiting are simply considered not beneficiary households. In the case of families that are benefiting and living with other families we are assuming they share resources and act as a single household.

¹³⁶ The simulation is based on a set of restrictive assumptions and has severe limitations; see Annex 12 for a detailed description of the simulation exercise.


¹³⁷ Under universal targeting everyone in the population receives the same amount, i.e. each quintile receives 20 percent of the total benefits.

Figure 39: Distribution of per adult equivalent consumption expenditure by beneficiary status (in the baseline)



Source: Authors using Pre-assistance Baseline Data

Figure 40: Benefit incidence distribution of ESSN transfers across consumption quintiles of applicants and of refugees (simulated)



Source: Authors based on PAB data and on appended CVME and PAB data (see Annex 12 for methodology and simulation assumption). Note: Quintiles of per adult equivalent consumption expenditure. Bars indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

The analysis above suggests that the ESSN is not particularly progressive. This coupled with the fact that the absolute poverty rate among the refugees (over 80 percent) is much higher than programme coverage (46 percent) suggests that the programme is likely to exclude a good number of poor applicants. We find confirmation of this in Table 33, which reports actual targeting errors of the ESSN according to PAB data. We observe high exclusion errors in terms of percentage of applicant refugees below the MEB and percentage of applicant refugees in the poorest 40 percent (51 percent and 46 percent respectively). This means that 51 percent of applicant refugees with consumption below the MEB and 46 percent of applicant refugees in the bottom 2 quintiles are not receiving the ESSN. To reduce exclusion error would require an increase in programme resources to facilitate an expansion in programme coverage.


Table 33: Overall targeting errors (percentage of applicants)

	Beneficiaries
Poverty line is MEB	
Inclusion error	14
Exclusion error	51
Poverty line is poorest 40%	
Inclusion error	53
Exclusion error	46

Source: Authors based on appended PAB data. Note: Poverty is computed using per adult equivalent consumption expenditure. Inclusion error is defined as the proportion of ESSN households that are not poor. Exclusion error is defined as the proportion of poor households that are not covered by the programme.

To understand how the ESSN targeting effectiveness compares to the targeting effectiveness of other cash transfer programmes around the world, the Coady-Grosh-Hoddinott (CGH) index¹³⁸ has been calculated for both our poverty lines. We find that when one considers the relative poverty line, poor applicants are 18 percent more likely to be benefiting from the ESSN than under random or universal targeting (the CGH is 1.18). On the other hand, when one considers the MEB as poverty line poor, applicants are only 7 percent more likely to be beneficiaries (the CGH is 1.07). Coady et al. reviewed the targeting performance in terms of the ratio of the transfer going to the poorest 40 percent of the population for 85 anti-poverty programmes in developing countries.¹³⁹ They found that the median CGH is 1.25 and the median CGH for categorically targeted programmes is 1.32. While this implies that the ESSN is underperforming with respect to categorically targeted programmes, it should be taken into account that the ESSN operates in an emergency humanitarian context and is trying to target a population with an extremely high poverty rate and a very low Gini coefficient.¹⁴⁰

Figure 41: Negative livelihood coping strategies by beneficiary status



Source: Authors using appended PAB. Notes: Asterisks refer to differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries for each category: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01. Stress livelihood coping strategies include: borrow money, buy food on credit, spend savings, sell household assets; Crisis livelihood coping strategies include: reduce education/health/food expenditure, withdraw children from school, sell productive assets, gather unusual types of food; Emergency livelihood coping strategies include: sending member back to Syria, begging, send children to work, entire household moved elsewhere.

¹³⁸ The CGH index is a measure of the effectiveness with which programmes are targeted. It is defined as the ratio of the value of transfers going to the poor to the (relative) size of the poor in the population.¹³⁸ The CGH index compares the actual performance of the targeting of a particular programme to the outcome of a neutral targeting: the higher the CGH index the more progressive the targeting is. A neutral targeting is such that each decile of the population receives 10 percent of the transfer budget. It can be thought of as the result of random targeting across the population or of universal targeting, whereby everyone in the population receives an equal amount of transfer.

¹³⁹ Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott. *Targeting of Transfers in Developing Countries*.

¹⁴⁰ Using PAB, the Gini index is found to be equal to 23.4 for the applicant population. According to the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) among the countries around the world with data between 2012 and 2017 none has a Gini index as low as this. According to the WDI again, Turkey had a Gini index of 41.2 in 2014.

The analysis of targeting effectiveness in terms of monetary poverty suggests that the ESSN is characterized by high exclusion errors, although its beneficiaries are still more likely to be poor than non-poor. We now turn to assess whether ESSN beneficiaries tend to be more vulnerable in dimensions other than monetary poverty. In PAB data, we see that beneficiary households are significantly more likely to use negative consumption coping strategies (91 percent of beneficiaries use at least one food consumption strategy versus 86 percent of non-beneficiaries). Figure 41 shows that beneficiaries also seem more likely to be using negative livelihood coping strategies, in particular they are much more likely to use emergency coping strategies (43 percent of beneficiaries have used emergency coping strategies versus 32 percent of non-beneficiaries). Their livelihood coping index score (8) is consistently higher than that of non-beneficiaries (7).

In Table 34 we analyse whether there are significant differences across beneficiary statuses in terms of income source. We find that beneficiary households are 7 percentage points less likely to rely on skilled work as their primary income source than non-beneficiaries. We also find that beneficiaries consistently tend to rely more than non-beneficiaries on other income sources; in particular, they are more likely to rely on unskilled labour and remittances.

Table 34: Main source of income by beneficiary status (percentage of applicant households)

	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Difference
Skilled labour	30	23	-7.1***
Unskilled labour	61	64	3.0***
Gifts or remittances	3.1	5.3	2.2***
Credit/borrowing	3.6	4.6	1.0***
Other	1.8	2.6	0.8***

Source: Authors using appended PAB. Notes: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01.

4.1.6 Accessibility and consistency with humanitarian principles


Given that the ESSN operates an on-demand application system, it is important to note that, as well as design and implementation exclusion errors, vulnerable households can also be excluded from the programme because they are unable to apply for assistance. The latest available Figure suggests that 47 percent of out of camp refugees in Turkey have not applied to the ESSN.¹⁴¹ We analyse the reported reasons for non-application and compare non-applicant households with beneficiary and ineligible households (i.e. households that have applied for the ESSN but are not benefiting from it) to understand whether non-applicants are less poor and vulnerable than applicants.

The only data source available to understand non-applicants' characteristics is the CVME data. As noted above, CVME data is not representative of the refugee population and findings are only indicative. Analysis of CVME data in Figure 42 shows that the main obstacle to ESSN application is the lack of registration with DGMM (56 percent), followed by non-registration with Nufus (MERNIS) (13 percent). A further 8 percent of non-applicants were not aware of how to apply for the ESSN, while 5 percent did not know about it. Only 4 percent of non-applicants appear to have self-selected out of the transfer.

¹⁴¹ Figure based on data obtained from DGMM and UNHCR's websites and WFP. Data on un-sheltered Syrian refugees was obtained from the DGMM website on 31 January 2018 and represents the population as at 14 December 2017. It does not include refugees under International Protection (hence non-Syrians). For non-Syrians the number is obtained from UNHCR's website on statistics on Turkey as at 31 October 2017 (www.unhcr.org/tr/en/unhcr-turkey-stats), representing the total number of non-Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in Turkey. The number of beneficiaries is obtained from WFP (from the presentation on the December payment cycle) and represents the number as at 25 November 2017.

In Table 35 we look at the main demographic characteristics of applicants and non-applicants to try to understand whether there is self-selection in the ESSN or whether lack of application is due to some specific household characteristics. Non-applicant households tend to be smaller, to have a less educated head, not to be registered with DGMM, and to have arrived in Turkey later than applicant ones.

Figure 42: Reason for not applying to the ESSN (percentage of non-applicants)



Source: Authors using CVME data. Notes: N=120

Table 35: Characteristics of non-applicant households

	Non-applicants	Applicants	Difference
Demographic characteristics			
Household size	4.8	6.2	1.4***
Number of children*	2.2	3.4	1.2***
Dependency ratio**	1.0	1.7	0.7***
Special needs in the household***	40	44	4.0
Female household head	22	23	0.8
Household head education is less than primary	40	27	-13***
Place of origin is rural	56	53	-3
Registration and time of arrival			
Household registered with DGMM	54	98	44***
Household arrived 0–1 years ago	22	4	-17***
Household arrived 1–3 years ago	46	38	-8
Household arrived 3–6 years ago	30	58	28***
Household arrived before the conflict	2.5	0.2	-2.3***


Source: Authors using CVME data. Notes: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01; * Children are household member up to 18 years old; **Dependent members include: individuals above 60+ years old, children below 18, disabled and chronically ill people; *** Special need members include: pregnant and/or lactating women, disabled, chronically ill, elderly people who cannot take care of themselves.

We can thus see that there are some key differences between applicant and non-applicant households. In what follows we seek to ascertain whether households that did not apply for the transfer are significantly more vulnerable and poor than applicant households. However, we do not have a perfect comparison group since the CVME data was collected after the start

of the ESSN¹⁴². We therefore compare non-applicants with both these two categories. When we compare poverty rates across the 3 groups, we find that non-applicants are similar to ineligible refugees; the poverty rates are 61 percent and 59 percent respectively. Non-applicants, however, are 12 percentage points less likely to be poor than beneficiaries (post-transfer). This suggests that non-applicants might be on average better off than beneficiaries and that therefore self-selection into the programme might be working.

In terms of per adult equivalent expenditures, we find that the distribution of non-applicants is quite similar to those of the non-beneficiary group. In Figure 43, we plot the distribution of expenditure per adult equivalent for beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and non-applicant households before the transfer. Non-beneficiary and non-applicant households look remarkably similar except for the right tail of the distribution of non-applicants – this most likely captures better-off households that choose not to apply. The Figure shows that the beneficiary households in the baseline are slightly worse off in terms of per adult equivalent expenditures compared to non-beneficiary and non-applicant households.¹⁴³

Figure 43: Pre-transfer consumption expenditure distribution (simulated distribution for non-applicants in baseline)




Source: Authors based on appended CVME and PAB data (See simulation methodology and assumption). Sample includes household with per adult equivalent expenditure of less than 2000 TL.

Despite being less likely to be poor in monetary terms than beneficiary households, Figure 44 shows that non-applicant households are significantly more likely to use negative consumption coping strategies and have a lower FCS than beneficiaries. This is an indication that they might be more vulnerable than beneficiaries post-transfer. On the other hand, they seem as vulnerable as ineligible households.

¹⁴² Beneficiary households have been receiving the transfer already with implications on their consumption expenditure and poverty level, while ineligible households were not selected for the ESSN, which might be due to the fact that they are less vulnerable.

¹⁴³ To create baseline comparisons of non-applicant, non-beneficiary and beneficiary groups, non-applicant observations were simulated into the PAB data. Estimates for the non-applicant refugee population are the result of this simulation. See Annex 12 for details regarding the simulation exercise.

Figure 44: Negative coping and food security by household type (percentage of households)



Source: Authors based on CVME data (unweighted). Notes: Asterisks refer to differences between beneficiaries and non-applicants and non-beneficiaries and non-applicants for each category: * p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01

4.1.7 Alternative targeting approaches

In this section we use PAB and CVME data to simulate the impact of alternative targeting mechanisms on poverty rates across the whole refugee population.¹⁴⁴ We find that the overall poverty level does not change much with alternative targeting criteria and some scenarios lead to more equitable distribution.

Table 36 summarizes targeting criteria, transfer value per person (in TL), and estimated number of beneficiaries under the six targeting scenarios analysed. The baseline scenario represents the current ESSN targeting scenario, by which ESSN beneficiaries receive TL 100. Under Scenario 1 we distribute the ESSN budget among all households applying for the programme. In Scenario 2, the overall budget is distributed across the whole refugee population (applicants and non-applicants) as a blanket cover refugee grant. Finally, scenarios 3 and 4 represent alternative categorical targeting options that are more narrowly defined: in Scenario 3, the ESSN is given to all households with at least one child, or one elderly person, or a single woman (to each individual in this kind of household); while in Scenario 4 the ESSN is given per child/elderly or single female and thus not given to all members of the household but rather targeted at the individual level. Table 36 summarizes the targeting scenarios simulated in this exercise, summarizing the transfer value and total estimated number of beneficiaries in each case. Note that the budget constraint is held constant for the simulation exercise, with the same amount of funding being allocated to different types of households.

¹⁴⁴ See Annex 12 for simulation assumptions.

Table 36: Alternative targeting scenarios

Scenario	Eligibility criteria	Transfer value per person (TL) ¹⁴⁵	Estimated number of beneficiaries ('000)
Baseline	Current ESSN criteria	100	742
Scenario 1	Universal to all applicants	46	1,626
Scenario 2	Universal to all refugees	23	3,269
Scenario 3	Households with a child/elderly/single woman	24	3,089
Scenario 4	Individuals who are child/elderly/single female	44	1,683

Source: Authors based on appended CVME and PAB data (see Annex 12 for methodology and simulation assumptions).

Table 37 summarizes poverty rates under each of the five scenarios above. Before any transfer we observe that 76 percent of refugees are below the MEB and that beneficiaries are considerably poorer than the rest of the refugees. Below, we report the simulated impact on poverty rates and targeting effectiveness of distributing the current total value of the ESSN under five different targeting scenarios.

Table 37: Simulated poverty impact of alternative targeting scenarios

	Poverty rates			
	Overall	Non-applicants	Non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries
Pre-transfer	76	73	75	86
Post-transfer				
Scenario 0 (Base)	69	73	75	53
Scenario 1	70	73	61	74
Scenario 2	71	68	69	81
Scenario 3	72	69	69	81
Scenario 4	72	70	69	80

Source: Authors based on appended CVME and PAB data (see Annex 12 for methodology and simulation assumptions).

Post-transfer, the simulated overall poverty rates go from 76 percent in the pre-transfer state down to 69 percent in the scenario where the transfer is given only to the current ESSN beneficiaries (Scenario 0), and to 70 percent when the transfer is given to all applicants equally. When the transfer is given to all refugees in Scenario 2 (applicants and non-applicants), the poverty rate is reduced from 76 percent in the pre-transfer baseline to 72 percent. The difference among the various scenarios in terms of overall poverty impact is therefore minimal. In each case, it is also important to observe what happens to the poverty rate of each sub-group. While Scenario 0 (current targeting scenario) helps reduce poverty rates among beneficiaries significantly (from 86 percent down to 53 percent), it leaves the poverty rate among non-applicants and non-beneficiaries at 73 percent and 75 percent respectively. In this sense, the current targeting mechanism helps beneficiaries leapfrog non-beneficiaries and non-applicants in terms of their expenditures.

¹⁴⁵ For the purposes of this exercise the transfer value is taken as TL 100 per person in the base case scenario.

4.1.8 Awareness and sensitization

In this section we explore refugees’ satisfaction with ESSN targeting. Only a third of the refugees think the ESSN is targeting the most vulnerable. Also, less than a third of them are satisfied with the targeting: their biggest concern is the exclusion of vulnerable refugees.

The CVME survey briefly explores perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of ESSN’s targeting, as well as understanding of the targeting criteria. Table 38 shows that only one in five households states that they are aware of the targeting criteria of the ESSN¹⁴⁶. Beneficiary households seem more likely to know the selection criteria than ineligible and non-applicant households¹⁴⁷.


Table 38: Targeting awareness and perceptions

	Non-applicants	Ineligible	Beneficiaries	Total
Know how people are chosen	10	18	25	20
Think that all or most vulnerable people are selected	15	19	52	33
N	48	240	240	528

Source: Authors based on CVME (unweighted).

Figure 45 shows that only around 28 percent of respondents are completely satisfied with the targeting, while equally another 28 percent are completely unsatisfied with the targeting. A further quarter of the sample is concerned that deserving people have been left out of the programme. Beneficiaries are – as one would expect – more satisfied with the programme but nonetheless close to a third (29 percent) of them are still concerned about the exclusion of deserving people.

Figure 45: Satisfaction with ESSN targeting (percentage of households)



Source: Authors based on CVME (unweighted). Note: Sample size for Non-App is 48, while for beneficiary and ineligible is 240 each.
 *Concerned about exclusion error corresponds to the answer “Only somewhat satisfied because deserving members were left out”;
 **Concerned about inclusion error corresponds to the answer “Only somewhat satisfied because undeserving members got included”.

¹⁴⁶ Note that the survey does not check whether the households are aware of the actual targeting criteria.

¹⁴⁷ Selection criteria were made publicly available on Facebook on 15 July 2017 (source: WFP Q3 Monitoring Report), which coincides with the time the CVME data was being collected (May–August 2017).


4.2 Service Delivery

We use the limited available quantitative data to explore issues in service delivery. Almost all beneficiaries report that they receive the expected amount. However, problems redeeming the transfer are reported by 5 percent of beneficiaries and mainly concern issues with ATMs and ATM cards.

The PDM survey collects some information on beneficiaries' experience with the ESSN. According to PDM data, beneficiary households received TL 771 per household and TL 117 per person on average.

Figure 46 shows that over a third of beneficiary households were told what the ESSN amount would be. Of those that were told, almost all report receiving the correct amount. In terms of issues redeeming the ESSN transfer, 5 percent of beneficiary households reported a problem. The most frequent problems redeeming cash include the ATM swallowing the card, lack of understanding of how to withdraw money from the ATM, and lack of money at the ATM.

Figure 46: Delivery of ESSN transfer (percentage of beneficiaries)




Source: Authors using PDM data.

4.3 Grievances and Complaints

Based on the CVME survey, we can briefly explore whether the ESSN's grievances and complaints mechanisms worked. Less than half of the refugees were aware of how to get assistance related to the ESSN and even among beneficiaries knowledge was limited to 61 percent of them.

The CVME survey includes a section on ESSN monitoring, with questions on beneficiaries' awareness and use of ESSN's grievances and complaints mechanisms. Figure 47 shows that slightly less than half of CVME respondents were able to describe how they could get assistance on the ESSN. Even among beneficiary households understanding of how to get assistance was limited, with almost 40 percent of the respondents unable to explain whom to contact. This is in contrast with findings from our qualitative work which indicates that beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries were aware of how to get information on the ESSN.

Figure 47: Awareness of ESSN information and grievances mechanisms (percentage of households)



Source: Authors using CVME data (unweighted).

A total of 44 percent of households that were aware of how to get assistance tried to contact the programme and around 58 percent of them were satisfied with the outcome. Importantly, given that only a fraction of the households have contacted the helpline, the sample size is very small¹⁴⁸. Indicatively we see that ineligible households are more likely to contact the hotline and less likely to be satisfied with the response obtained.

4.4 Outcomes

The focus of this section is on the observed outcomes of the ESSN transfer. We observe that, post-transfer, beneficiary households catch up with non-beneficiary households in terms of consumption expenditure. Moreover, non-beneficiaries are, post-transfer, more likely to use negative consumption and livelihood coping strategies. This indicates an increase in vulnerability for this group compared to beneficiaries, with the latter appearing less vulnerable post-transfer.

We make use of the PAB and the PDM data together as repeated cross-section data to report changes in outcomes over time for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. We are, however, excluding from the sample households that changed beneficiary status between the PAB and PDM data collection because they would bias our results. It is important to highlight that this is not a rigorous impact evaluation that can be used to attribute causality to the ESSN benefits. Our results remain descriptive in nature: we summarize average changes across groups without matching or controlling for other variables.

In Table 39 we compare consumption, monetary poverty, and debt before and after the ESSN transfer for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. On average, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have higher per adult equivalent monthly expenditure post-transfer compared to the pre-transfer period. Consistently, poverty rates decreased for both groups. Despite the decrease in poverty rates, the share of consumption going to food increased for both groups, particularly for beneficiaries; this suggests that they might be spending part of the transfer on food. The increased debt of non-beneficiaries suggests that they might be financing some of their consumption through debt, while beneficiaries have on average a smaller debt owed post-transfer.

¹⁴⁸ The sample size of households requiring assistance is 111.


Table 39: Expenditure, poverty, and debt outcomes

	Non-beneficiaries			Beneficiaries		
	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference
Per adult equivalent consumption expenditure (TL)	460	500	40***	377	421	44***
Proportion of applicants with per adult equivalent consumption below MEB	67	58	-8.5***	83	76	-7.1***
Food share	37	38	0.8*	39	42	2.7***
Per adult equivalent debt (TL)	362	443	81**	284	227	-57***
Total debt as a share of household monthly expenditure	91	94	2.5	84	59	-25***

Source: Authors using appended PAB and PDM data and selecting subsample of households that did not change beneficiary status. Sample size is 5,593 households for each round. Notes: Asterisks refer to comparison between non-applicants and applicants, and non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries (* p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01).

In Figure 48, we can see the distribution of per adult equivalent consumption expenditure pre- and post-transfer by beneficiary status. We see that both post-transfer distributions are to the right of pre-transfer distributions, more so for beneficiary households that are almost catching up with non-beneficiaries post-transfer. A shift to the right implies an improvement in welfare because the core of the distribution is now enjoying a higher consumption level. While non-beneficiaries' post-transfer distribution has a long right tail representing better-off individuals, both post-transfer distributions have their centre below the MEB poverty line.

Figure 48: Distribution of per adult equivalent consumption pre- and post-transfer by beneficiary status



Source: Pre-assistance Baseline (PAB) Data and Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) Survey, panel data with the households that have the same beneficiary status in both rounds. Households with per adult equivalent expenditure of more than 2,000 TL are excluded.

Moving from monetary poverty to food security and consumption coping, we see in Table 40 that beneficiaries are better off in terms of food security as measured by their FCS and less likely to use negative food-related coping strategies. In comparison, in the post-transfer period non-beneficiaries seem worse off than in the pre-transfer period in terms of both food security and use of negative consumption coping mechanisms.

Table 40: Food security and negative food consumption coping outcomes

	Non-beneficiaries			Beneficiaries		
	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference
Percentage of households that used at least one food consumption coping strategy	85.3	88.0	2.8***	91.1	87.1	-3.9***
Food consumption coping index	2.7	3.1	0.4***	3.8	3.2	-0.6***
Percentage of households with poor FCS	3.6	2.5	-1.2	2.8	1.1	-1.7*
Percentage of households with borderline FCS	19.2	15.4	-3.7***	21.1	11.2	-9.9***

Source: Authors using appended PAB and PDM data and selecting subsample of households that did not change beneficiary status. Sample size is 5,593 households for each round. Notes: Asterisks refer to comparison between non-applicants and applicants, and non-beneficiaries and Beneficiaries (* p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01)

Similarly, we find in Table 41 that, post-transfer, beneficiary households are less likely to use stress, crisis, and especially emergency level negative livelihood coping strategies than in the pre-transfer period. They consistently have a lower livelihood coping index post-transfer. However, the opposite is true for non-beneficiary households. While they were less likely to use any type of negative coping mechanisms than beneficiaries pre-transfer, post-transfer they are more likely to use any type of strategy.


Table 41: Negative livelihood coping outcomes

	Non-beneficiaries			Beneficiaries		
	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference
Percentage of households that used at least one stress livelihood coping strategy ^a	86	89	2.9***	88	81	-7.5***
Percentage of households that used at least one crisis livelihood coping strategy ^b	85	90	5.6***	87	83	-4.3***
Percentage of households that used at least one emergency livelihood coping strategy ^c	33	35	2.7*	42	38	-4.7***
Percentage of households that did not use any livelihood coping strategy	2.8	1.5	-1.3***	1.7	4.2	2.5***
Livelihood coping index	6.7	7.2	0.5***	8.0	6.9	-1.2***

Source: Authors using appended PAB and PDM data and selecting subsample of households that did not change beneficiary status. Sample size is 5,593 households for each round. Notes: Asterisks refer to comparison between pre- and post-ESSN transfer for non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries (* p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01); ^a Stress livelihood coping strategies include: borrow money, buy food on credit, spend savings, sell household assets; ^b Crisis livelihood coping strategies include: reduce education/health/food expenditure, withdraw children from school, sell productive assets, gather unusual types of food; ^c Emergency livelihood coping strategies include: sending member back to Syria, begging, send children to work, entire household moved elsewhere.

In Figure 49 we plot the distribution of the coping index by time and beneficiary status. The coping index is a synthetic measure of livelihood and food consumption negative coping: higher values of the index are indicative of greater use of negative coping strategies.¹⁴⁹ The Figure clearly shows that beneficiary households go from being worse than non-beneficiary ones pre-transfer to being better off post-transfer.

Figure 49: Distribution of coping index pre- and post-transfer by beneficiary status



Next, we look at the change in main income source in

Table 42. Non-beneficiary households seem to be less reliant on skilled labour and more on credit and borrowing in the post-transfer period. On the other hand, for beneficiary households we see a shift from relying on unskilled labour, gifts and remittances, and credit and borrowing to relying on the ESSN transfer. At the same time, however, there is also an increase in the share of beneficiary households that report skilled labour as their main income source.

Table 42: Main source of income

	Non-beneficiaries			Beneficiaries		
	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference
Skilled labour	31	28	-3.0**	23	26	2.6**
Unskilled labour	60	62	2.3	64	45	-18.9**
Gifts or remittances	3	2	-1.2**	5	2	-3.8**

¹⁴⁹ For details on how the coping index was constructed please refer to Annex 12.

	Non-beneficiaries			Beneficiaries		
	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference
Credit/borrowing	4	6	2.3***	5	4	-0.6**
ESSN assistance	0	0	0.0	0	23	22.5**
Other	2	1	-0.4	3	1	-1.8**

Source: Authors using appended PAB and PDM data and selecting subsample of households that did not change beneficiary status. Sample size is 5,593 households for each round. Notes: Asterisks refer to comparison between non-applicants and applicants, and non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries (* p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01)

Finally, we investigate the potential effect of the ESSN transfers on health, education, child protection, and access to government services. Table 43 shows that, post-transfer, beneficiary households are more likely to keep children in school, thus preserving them from having to work, and that they are less likely to have to cut education expenses. On the contrary, non-beneficiary households are, post-transfer, more likely to withdraw their children from school and to reduce education expenditure. It should be noted, however, that, despite the differential progress over time, post-transfer beneficiary households are still more likely to have to send children to work and withdraw them from school.

Table 43: Child protection and access to education services

	Non-beneficiaries			Beneficiaries		
	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference	Pre-ESSN	Post-ESSN	Difference
Percentage of households that had to withdraw children from school	12	7	-5.2***	17	10	-6.9***
Percentage of households that had to reduce education expenses	18	18	0.2	39	20	-18.8***
Percentage of households that had to send children to work	12	11	-1.4	23	22	-0.9
Average school attendance rate for children aged 6–17	46	52	5.9***	50	49	-0.8

Source: Authors using appended PAB and PDM data and selecting subsample of households that did not change beneficiary status. Sample size is 5,593 households for each round. Notes: Asterisks refer to comparison between non-applicants and applicants, and non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries (* p-value<0.1, ** p-value<.05, *** p-value<.01)

Questions on health condition and use of health service are only included in the CVME survey. We see in Table 44 that there are no significant differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in terms of health outcomes. Around half of the sampled households had a sick child in the previous 30 days and 40 percent had a sick adult

household member. Close to 90 percent of households with a sick member sought medical treatment and, of those, the overwhelming majority went to a government hospital.

Table 44: Access to health services

	Non- beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Difference between non- beneficiaries and beneficiaries
Percentage of households with a sick child	47	54	7.3
Percentage of households seeking treatment for a sick child	88	90	1.6
Of those, percentage going to a government hospital	85	89	4.1
Percentage of households with a sick adult	43	37	-6.7
Percentage of households seeking treatment for a sick adult	90	90	-0.6
Of those, percentage going to a government adult	82	86	4.2

Source: Authors using CVME data (unweighted).

4.5 Unintended Effects

This section explores whether there are any unintended consequences of the ESSN transfer within the households or within communities. Only a very small percentage of ESSN beneficiaries report intra-household tension caused by the ESSN.

Both the CVME and PDM surveys ask the respondents in beneficiary households whether the ESSN has caused tension in the household. In Table 45 we see that this does not seem to be a common problem. In PDM data, less than 1 percent of the respondents reported that there was tension in the household due to the ESSN.

Table 45: ESSN-related disagreements in the household (percentage of beneficiary households)

	PDM	CVME
Disagreement in the household	0.8	2.5
N	3716	240

Source: Authors using PDM and CVME data (unweighted).

The CVME survey also asked respondents whether there have been any safety/protection problems as a result of applying for or being a beneficiary of the ESSN. Just 4 percent of beneficiaries reported problems. Of these, most cited long waiting times, overcrowding, inappropriate conditions at the service centre/SASF, and lack of priority for vulnerable people.

5. Efficiency


Research questions	Sub-questions	Analysis	Summary of results
13. How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	Portion of funds reaching beneficiaries, partner contributions, cost drivers, comparison with other programmes, changes in efficiency over time	Data not available	
14. Were ESSN activities timely?	Timeliness of start-up and monthly transfers	Enrolment rate by month	According to our data, the ESSN started to enrol beneficiaries in January 2017; the number of enrolled beneficiaries started to decrease in April 2017 and rose again in July with the change in targeting criteria.

5.1 Timeliness

There is limited information on the timeliness of ESSN start-up and monthly transfers in the data at our disposal. In this section, we compare enrolment rate by month based on ESSN administrative data¹⁵⁰ and on PDM data.

In Figure 50 we plot enrolment rate by month according to ESSN administrative data and PDM data. For PDM data, the enrolment rate is constructed using the question on the number of months the household has been a beneficiary and the information on the date of the interview.¹⁵¹

Figure 50: Distribution of beneficiary households by month of enrolment



Source: Authors using PDM data. ESSN administrative data is obtained from WFP.

According to ESSN administrative data, the roll out of the programme started with 25 percent of all beneficiary households becoming eligible in the first 3 months. A peak can be seen in July 2017, with 20 percent of all eligible households becoming eligible in this month. This is most probably due to the change in the demographic targeting criteria that became effective from June 2017 onwards and that consequently enlarged the pool of eligible households.

¹⁵⁰ Data refers to the period from December 2016 to October 2017.

¹⁵¹ For instance, if the survey is collected in August and the household reports being a beneficiary for three months, then the month that the household became a beneficiary is estimated to be May 2017. The PDM data was collected between August 2017 and October 2017.

According to PDM data, only 7 percent of beneficiary households became beneficiaries in the first 3 months, which rises to 22 percent when we include the fourth month (March 2017). The differences in these statistics might be due to the difference between the time when the administrative system “knows” that an applicant is eligible and the time when the applicant knows that he/she is eligible via an SMS message. Indeed, from the time of the application in TRC centres or SASFs it takes about a month for the application to be processed and the beneficiary to receive communication of eligibility via SMS.

April 2017 is the month with the highest percentage of beneficiary households becoming eligible for the ESSN. The peak in July 2017 can also be seen in PDM data, with 18 percent of beneficiary households becoming beneficiaries then.

6. Sustainability and Connectedness

Research questions	Sub-questions	Analysis	Summary of results
15. How cost-efficient is the ESSN?	What synergies were achieved between the ESSN and other government services and programmes for refugees? How well coordinated was the ESSN with the humanitarian strategies and programmes of other donors, United Nations agencies and NGOs?	Percentage of households reporting benefiting from other cash or in-kind programmes	Prior to ESSN, around a fifth of households benefited from cash or in-kind programmes. Post-ESSN, 3% of households report enrolment in another cash transfer programme.

6.1 Connectedness

Due to differences in question design, we cannot compare information on whether households received assistance aside from the ESSN transfer across the PAB and PDM data sets. Pre-transfer, 19 percent of applicant households reported that they received other assistance (in cash or in-kind). A different question is asked in PDM on this issue, asking if the household is enrolled in any other cash transfer programme. Post-transfer, only 3 percent of applicant households reported this. Post-transfer data also show that, among applicant households with children, 22 percent are benefiting from the UNICEF education grant.

Table 46: Other assistance (percentage of applicant households)

	PAB	PDM
Percentage of households receiving other assistance (cash or in-kind) in the last 30 days	19	-
Percentage of households enrolled in other cash assistance programmes in the last three months	-	2.5
Percentage of households receiving UNICEF grant*	-	22

Source: Authors using PAB and PDM data sets. Note: *The universe is represented by all households with children aged 6–17 years.

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Annex 16: Evaluation Reference Group Members

Jonathan Campbell	WFP
Luca Molinas	WFP
Calum McLean	DG ECHO
Joakim Nilsson	DG ECHO
Davina Hayles	DG ECHO
Devrig Velly	DG ECHO
Paul Spiegel	Johns Hopkins University
Lynn Brown	Independent Consultant
Nazlıhan Özgenc	Ministry of Family and Social Planning
Oğuz Özdemir	Ministry of Family and Social Planning
Eren Demir	AFAD
Zuhal Karakoç	AFAD
Orhan Hacımehmet	TRC
Rıfat Karaduman	Ministry of Interior/DGMM

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