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Ethiopia: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2012-2017)

Evaluation Report

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All opinions expressed are those of the evaluation team.

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
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
Factsheet: the WFP portfolio in Ethiopia¹

Operation	Timeframe	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
PRRO 101273	January 2009 - December 2011 (extended to March 2012)	Req: 131,946,240; Rec: 89,804,583; Funded: 68%					
CP 200253	2012 - 2015 (extended to end 2017)			Req: 339,459,465 Rec: 137,280,395; Funded: 40%			
PRRO 200290	January 2012 - December 2013 (extended to mid-2015)		Req: 1,496,167,505; Rec: 800,797,866; Funded: 54%				
SO 200358	January 2012 - August 2013 (extended to September 2017)			Req: 31,439,779; Rec: 27,726,065; Funded: 88%			
SO 200364	January 2012 - December 2012 (extended to end of 2015)		Req: 22,627,815; Rec: 20,040,055; Funded: 89%				
PRRO 200365	April 2012 - March 2015		Req: 356,769,969; Rec: 247,940,217; Funded: 69%				
EMOP 200656	January - March 2014			Req: 1,499,997; Rec: 1,260,506; Funded: 84%			
SO 200752	September 2014 - October 2015 (extended to December 2016)				Req: 6,281,982; Rec: 6,285,391; Funded: 100%		
SO 200711	January 2015 - December 2015 (extended to end of 2018)	LEVEL OF FUNDING KEY				Req: 16,324,590; Rec: 12,959,196; Funded: 79%	
PRRO 200700	April 2015 - March 2018 (extended to June 2018)	LESS THAN 50% FUNDING				Req: 493,559,948; Rec: 296,352,859; Funded: 60%	
PRRO 200712	July 2015 - June 2016	BETWEEN 50 - 75% FUNDING				Req: 1,354,263,236; Rec: 755,135,544; Funded: 56%	
SO 200977	May 2016 - November 2016 (extended to December 2017)	OVER 75% FUNDING				Req: 12,685,861; Rec: 11,304,412; Funded: 89%	
Total Beneficiaries (planned)		7,239,720	6,064,628	6,052,208	9,132,258	12,063,318	8,014,492
Total Beneficiaries (actual)		6,209,900	5,004,038	5,272,030	6,196,996	9,236,347	6,870,809
% female beneficiaries		51%	52%	51%	50%	50%	50%
Total resource requirement (million \$)		466	313	293	389	468	316
Total received (million \$)		211	336	269	249	394	254
Food Distributed (MT)		502,069	390,759	357,241	444,058	491,558	407,682

Funding levels and beneficiaries reached 2012-2017



% of beneficiaries by activity 2012-2017



Note: there is an element of double-counting, since some individuals benefit from more than one modality.

	School feeding	Nutrition	General food ass.	FFA
CP-200253	X	X		X
PRRO200290		X	X	X
PRRO200712		X	X	X
PRRO200365	X	X	X	
PRRO200700	X	X	X	
IR-EMOP 200656			X	
Planned % of beneficiaries	9%	18%	52%	21%
Actual % of beneficiaries	9%	19%	54%	18%
Planned v actual beneficiaries	85%	87%	80%	71%

Top donors to WFP Portfolio in Ethiopia 2012-2017:

USA (33%), UK (13%), Canada (10%), EC (9%), Germany (6%).

¹ For a more comprehensive summary (including all trust funds), see Annex H.

Executive Summary

Evaluation features

1. The country portfolio evaluation covered all WFP operations in Ethiopia from 2012 to 2017. It assessed WFP's alignment and strategic positioning, the quality of its strategic decision making and the performance and results of its portfolio of activities. Fieldwork in April 2018 and interviews with more than 200 stakeholders supplemented data and document reviews. The evaluation took place in parallel with preparation of an interim country strategic plan (ICSP) for 2019–2020 and its findings will support preparation of a full country strategic plan (CSP).

Context

2. Ethiopia's population exceeds 100 million people. Its system of ethnic federalism² comprises two city administrations and nine regions of varying sizes and levels of development. The pastoral Afar and Somali regions tend to have the worst socio-economic indicators. Ethiopia hosts more than 900,000³ refugees, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudan, in 26 camps across the country. Recent conflict between Somali and Oromo communities resulted in the internal displacement of more than 1 million conflict-affected people, bringing the national total of internally displaced persons to about 1.3 million at the time of the evaluation.

3. Economic growth averaged 11 percent over the past seven years. The proportion of the population living in poverty declined from 38.7 percent in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2010/11 and to an estimated 23.5 percent in 2016. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains one of Africa's poorest countries, with a per capita income of USD 1,530 per year. Rapid population growth results in very high absolute numbers of people in poverty: 25 million Ethiopians live below or just above the poverty line, making them vulnerable to climate shocks and seasonal food insecurity. Despite recent improvements, an estimated 38 percent of children aged under 5 are stunted because of chronic malnutrition and 10 percent are wasted because of acute malnutrition. One fifth of women and girls of reproductive age are undernourished.⁴ Women's rights are constitutionally guaranteed, but Ethiopia still ranks 115th of 144 countries on the Gender Parity Index.⁵

4. Ethiopia's mountainous landscape and location in the Horn of Africa result in enormous variations in agro-ecology and livelihoods. Most people depend on rainfed agriculture or pastoralism, making the country highly vulnerable to rainfall shocks.


² Ethnic federalism is a federal system of national government in which the federated units are defined according to ethnicity.

³ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) figures for January 2018.

⁴ 22.4 percent according to the Central Statistical Agency and the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program. 2017, *Ethiopia – Demographic and Health Survey 2016*. <https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR328/FR328.pdf>.

⁵ World Economic Forum, 2017. The Global Gender Gap Report 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2017>.

Figure 1: Chronological overview of the portfolio



IR-EMOP: immediate-response emergency operation
 PRRO: protracted relief and recovery operation
 SO: special operation

5. From 2012 to 2017 between 5 and 8 million people received support through the Government’s rural safety net – the productive safety net programme (PSNP)⁶ – and between 2 and 10 million received humanitarian food assistance. Recent years have seen severe crises. Rain failure in 2015 led to almost 19 million people receiving food assistance in the form of safety net transfers or general food distributions in 2016, and poor lowland rains in 2016/17 caused severe food crises for pastoralists.

6. Although heavily dependent on official development assistance,⁷ the Government exerts strong leadership in food security and humanitarian response. It is WFP’s main implementing partner, although WFP also partners with non-governmental organizations, particularly on nutrition programmes.


WFP strategy

7. A formal WFP strategy covered the period from 2012 to 2015. There was no formal strategy for later years.

8. The main drivers of humanitarian need were successive arrivals of large numbers of refugees, especially from South Sudan, and major droughts in recent years (see figure 1).

9. Although WFP delivers and supports the delivery of humanitarian assistance in virtually all of Ethiopia, changes in the division of labour among humanitarian actors have led to an increasing focus on Somali region, whose share of WFP in-kind food assistance rose from about 60 percent in 2015 to more than 90 percent in 2017.

Figure 2: Humanitarian response delivery channels (USD million) and WFP share (%), 2012–2017



Source: Evaluation team’s calculations from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs data. Covers only the humanitarian response for Ethiopian nationals. JEOP: Joint Emergency Operations Plan

10. This partly explains why, although the value in United States dollars of WFP’s response for Ethiopian nationals rose dramatically during the crises of 2015/16 and 2016/17, WFP’s share of the total response fell

⁶ Launched in 2005 and jointly funded by the Government and development partners, Ethiopia’s PSNP is the largest social safety net programme in Africa. It provides food and/or cash transfers to food-insecure households in chronically food-insecure districts (*woredas*). Most households earn their safety net transfers through participation in labour-intensive public works, but unconditional transfers are provided to households without able-bodied adult labour.


⁷ Official development assistance of more than USD 4 billion in 2016 represented 5.6 percent of gross national income (according to data provided by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Official development assistance funded more than a third of the annual budget.

sharply (figure 2). WFP managed about 70 percent of distributions in 2012–2013, but only 40–45 percent in the last three years of the period evaluated.

WFP portfolio

11. Ethiopia is one of WFP’s largest operations. Expenditure during 2012–2017 totalled just over USD 2 billion; receipts were nearly 70 percent of requests in 2011/12 but only 57 percent over the whole period (figure 3). Ethiopia’s share of WFP global funding declined from 10 to 5 percent between 2011 and 2017. WFP’s largest donors to the Ethiopia portfolio were the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Commission.

Figure 3: WFP Ethiopia funding: requests versus receipts, 2011–2017



Source: Evaluation team’s analysis of data from the WFP donor information hub.

12. Total staff in Addis Ababa and 17 sub-offices and area offices rose from 660 in 2011 to almost 850 in 2017. Major efforts to reduce staff numbers began in 2016 and by 2018 were in their final stages. However, the effects do not yet show clearly in staffing data because the structure and staffing review coincided with successive emergencies, which required additional staff, and the process of separating from “retrenched” staff members is slow. The proportion of international staff fell steadily from 10 percent in 2012 to 7 percent in April 2018. There is a major gender imbalance, especially among national and field office staff; sub-offices in Somali and Afar regions have the fewest women staff members.

13. Figure 1 shows the WFP operations implemented during the period evaluated: a country programme⁸ and five protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs). Two successive PRROs addressed humanitarian crisis and supported resilience to food insecurity.⁹ Three others ran consecutively for assisting refugees.¹⁰ Five special operations supported humanitarian logistics; the two largest were for the construction of a humanitarian logistics base in Djibouti and a road bridge in Somali region.

⁸ Country Programme Ethiopia 200253 (2012–2015) (WFP/EB.2/2011/8/2).

⁹ PRRO – Ethiopia 200290 (2012–2015) (WFP/EB.2/2011/9-C/2) and PRRO – Ethiopia 200712 (2015–2018) (WFP/EB.A/2015/9-B/2).

¹⁰ PRRO 10127.3 (2009–2012) (WFP/EB.2/2008/8-B/3); PRRO – Ethiopia 200365 (2012–2015) (WFP/EB.1/2012/8/3) and PRRO – Ethiopia 200700 (2015–2018) (WFP/EB.2/2014/8-B/6). In addition, IR-EMOP 200656 from January to March 2014 provided assistance to people affected by fighting in South Sudan.

14. WFP programmes for Ethiopian nationals, which accounted for more than 70 percent of expenditures, included humanitarian assistance and safety net support for vulnerable households, targeted nutrition support, school feeding and various pilot projects related to livelihoods. Capacity building was an important element of logistics and other programmes. In programmes for refugees, which accounted for nearly a quarter of expenditures, WFP took the lead in providing basic food assistance and supporting supplementary feeding and school feeding programmes.

15. WFP made increasing use of cash-based transfers, but they continued to account for only a small proportion of total expenditures, accounting for about 12 percent by value of WFP operations for Ethiopian nationals and less than 10 percent of operations for refugees in 2017.

Evaluation findings

WFP's strategic alignment and positioning

16. All the main elements of the WFP portfolio were relevant to Ethiopia's humanitarian and development needs and WFP remained relevant by responding well to emerging needs. However, at the time of the evaluation, WFP and other humanitarian actors were not yet meeting the needs of conflict-affected internally displaced persons as systematically as those of other distressed people. The scale of humanitarian needs restricted WFP's scope for development work, but WFP has been active among agencies seeking to strengthen work at the humanitarian–development nexus. WFP's strong focus on pastoral lowlands, particularly in Somali region, was also relevant. The Government and other partners recognize the challenges of working effectively in these difficult settings and value WFP's willingness and ability to do so.

17. The Government is WFP's main partner. This ensures that WFP's programmes are strongly coherent with national policies and strategies, and there are close working relationships between WFP and core government agencies. WFP activities are generally integrated with national systems for targeting and delivery. Using government systems is beneficial in providing opportunities for dialogue and influence and pathways for sustainability, but there are trade-offs between working within government-led systems and fully adhering to WFP guidelines. WFP is not autonomous in targeting and sometimes accepts standards of service that are lower than its norms, when doing so allows wider coverage.

18. Government-led coalitions are the main framework for ensuring WFP's coherence with other United Nations agencies and development partners. The United Nations development assistance framework plays a secondary role in ensuring coherence among United Nations agencies. Throughout the period covered by the evaluation, WFP had particularly strong working relationships with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and strengthened its relationship with the World Bank.

19. WFP's orientation and activities in Ethiopia have been consistent with its evolving global strategies and policies. It will take time to adapt fully to the gender policy of 2015; new policies on the environment, climate change and emergency preparedness, all adopted in 2017, are too recent to have been reflected in the portfolio. Country office staff and management recognize the importance of the approaches to and concepts of resilience in WFP's 2015 policy, but are still absorbing their implications. They have tended to focus on resilience at the household and individual levels, while WFP's support for national logistics and emergency-preparedness systems also contributes to national resilience.

20. WFP's partners were strategically appropriate. However, WFP's strategic positioning continued patterns set before 2012; the main changes were matters of adaptation to changing circumstances rather than choice. For example, Somali region became more prominent mainly because of WFP's reduced share in the delivery of humanitarian assistance elsewhere in Ethiopia; this in turn accentuated WFP's role in technical support and capacity development for national systems. External stakeholders and recent leadership in the country office agree that WFP in Ethiopia has lacked a sufficiently well-articulated strategy. Several initiatives linked to livelihoods had the aim of complementing emergency work, but some donor representatives have perceived them as detracting from WFP's core emergency-related business.

Factors influencing WFP's decision making

21. Space for strategic decision making was limited by the inherited patterns already noted and by the government-led frameworks within which WFP works. The Government leads the biannual humanitarian needs assessments, and WFP's role in meeting needs is largely determined by the preferences of the Government and donors. As shown in figure 2, the role of the Government and non-governmental organizations increased while the share and geographical scope of WFP deliveries decreased.


22. WFP's ability to innovate has been limited by difficulty in obtaining funding in an increasingly difficult environment for international aid. There were also internal constraints: discontinuities in the country office's leadership were detrimental, and the office's work in recent years was dominated by a structure and staffing review, which was necessary but morale-sapping and added to the burden of senior staff who were already stretched, not least by the demands of concurrent emergencies. There are strong external perceptions that WFP has not been as effective as it needs to be in joint planning and coordination forums at all levels. However, there is also appreciation of the calibre of certain WFP staff members and the value of WFP's contribution in responding to major crises.

23. There are several examples of successful advocacy and of the Government seeking to learn from WFP approaches. However, WFP's own learning from experience was hampered by serious deficiencies in monitoring and reporting and by weaknesses in managing and responding to evaluations. Beyond obligatory corporate reporting, the use and analysis of data were weak; the evaluation team found that available outcome indicators had little explanatory power, and WFP paid too little attention to the wider monitoring and evaluation frameworks of the national programmes to which it contributed. The quality, timeliness and transparency of reporting were regarded as weak by major donors, although the difficulties of operating through government systems, particularly in Somali region, were acknowledged, as were some recent improvements. The absence of an operational country strategy since 2015 resulted in corporate learning being less systematic than it could have been.

Portfolio performance and results

24. Figure 4 shows that during the period evaluated there were nearly 5 million WFP beneficiaries as a minimum (in 2013–2014) rising towards 9 million during the response to *El Niño* in 2016, but actual total beneficiaries were fewer than planned for every year. The shortfall in beneficiaries was far less than the shortfall in funding noted in figure 2, meaning that assistance was spread more thinly than planned.


Figure 4: Total planned versus actual beneficiaries, 2012–2017



Sources: Standard project reports for 2012–2017.

25. Figure 5 shows the changes in beneficiary numbers by activity. Increasing shares of beneficiaries of general food assistance and nutrition support reflect emergency feeding during recent droughts, while the declining proportion of food assistance for assets beneficiaries reflects reductions in funding for such work and the reduced geographical scope of WFP support for the PSNP.

Figure 5: Beneficiaries by activity, 2012–2017




Sources: Standard project reports for 2012–2017.

Totals exceed those in the figure 4 because figures include double counting of beneficiaries receiving assistance through more than one modality.

26. The evaluation found that WFP’s main programmes were all broadly effective. The integration of WFP’s work with wider programmes led by the Government and supported by a range of partners means that it is rarely possible to attribute outcomes specifically to WFP inputs; the challenge is to assess WFP’s contributions to overall efforts. The biggest humanitarian achievement was the successful emergency response to large-scale droughts from 2015/16 onwards. Non-WFP stakeholders all credit WFP with a major contribution to the national logistics response, in addition to its own direct deliveries.

Figure 6: WFP support for Ethiopian nationals, 2012–2017



Sources: Standard project reports.

27. Figure 6 shows the main elements of WFP support for Ethiopian nationals; all the charts in the figure show a surge resulting from responses to droughts in 2015/16 and 2016/17. However, assistance for the


PSNP declined over the period evaluated because of WFP's declining role in the PSNP outside Afar and Somali regions. WFP's work on vulnerability analysis made a useful contribution to needs assessments carried out by the Government and its partners and WFP continued to play an effective role in support for food security through the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance, particularly in Afar and Somali regions. The programmes to which WFP contributed made a big difference to beneficiaries' ability to survive a major drought. WFP's livelihoods and climate-related projects, although small in scale, were useful pilots for testing various approaches to resilience.

28. In the last two years, numbers of supplementary feeding beneficiaries exceeded initial targets because of rapid escalation in needs. The scaling up of WFP's humanitarian nutrition programming undoubtedly helped to save lives. Improved ("second generation") targeted supplementary feeding and the targeted supplementary feeding programme for refugees were effective in treating moderate acute malnutrition.

29. As a result of reduced funding, the scale of school feeding declined from about 640,000 beneficiaries per year between 2012 and 2014 to about 450,000 between 2015 and 2017. A recent evaluation¹¹ provided rigorous evidence of the effectiveness of the school feeding programme in Afar and Somali regions in strengthening pupils' enrolment and performance, especially for girls.

30. Figure 7 shows the growing gap between requirements and expenditures for refugees. In the last three years actual expenditures declined from 69 percent to 44 percent of requirements. Nevertheless, WFP and core partners (the Government and UNHCR) responded to very substantial and, at times, rapid increases in refugee numbers during the period.

Figure 7: Refugee operations, beneficiary numbers and budgets, 2012 –2017



WFP financial database

Source:

31. The main challenges to effectiveness came from resource constraints – especially for refugee programmes, in which ration cuts became unavoidable – and from weaknesses in targeting for programmes to which WFP contributes. WFP piloted improved supplementary feeding approaches, which should strengthen the future effectiveness of all nutrition programmes. Infrastructure investments intended to reduce transport costs have not yet achieved this objective. The Djibouti logistics hub was completed late and at higher cost than planned; it was not significantly used during the evaluation period – WFP found other ways of expediting humanitarian deliveries. The Geeldoh bridge in Somali region already provides an effective link among communities, but will not be useful for heavy lorries until access roads are upgraded.

¹¹ Final Evaluation of WFP's United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Programme's Support in Afar and Somali Regions in Ethiopia 2013–2017 (June 2018).

32. Ethiopia's ability to cope with major crises was greatly assisted by efficiency gains in WFP's supply chain; advance procurement through the Global Commodity Management Facility reduced lead times and lowered costs, while volumes increased. Reopening of the Berbera corridor, although it involved high insurance costs, made it possible to bypass the bottleneck of Djibouti and enabled supplies to be transported directly to Somali region. WFP also deserves credit for efficiency gains associated with biometric identification of refugees, which allows the use of fingerprints for verifying the identities of registered beneficiaries and led to a substantial reduction in the number of claimants. The share of cash-based transfers increased from 6 to 12 percent of the portfolio, helping to enhance both efficiency and effectiveness. However, the Government was reluctant to allow the use of cash-based transfers in some refugee settings, and WFP has not shaken off perceptions that it is a self-interested advocate for in-kind food transfers.

33. Despite systematic efforts to strengthen WFP's approach to gender issues in line with the 2015 corporate gender policy, changes are gradual and the country gender action plan has yet to be fully implemented. Women remain severely under-represented among country office staff. The Ethiopia country office has the worst staff gender ratios in the East Africa region and the staffing review has made little difference. There has been no systematic engagement with the Government on addressing gender issues, and stakeholders do not see WFP as having particular strengths in this area.

34. Most activities had broadly equal numbers of female and male beneficiaries, but pregnant and lactating women and girls were special targets for supplementary feeding, and take-home rations boosted girls' school attendance. Projects with a special focus on women included Purchase for Progress, the Rural Resilience Initiative and the Rural Women's Economic Empowerment programme, which is a joint programme of the Rome-based agencies. The PSNP fostered women's participation in community decision making and provided social protection support aimed at helping women to participate in public works, but these provisions were weaker in the regions where WFP is most active (Somali and Afar).

35. As regards internal synergies, WFP's support for logistics and supply chain systems underpinned the rest of the portfolio, home-grown school feeding approaches and the Rural Women's Economic Empowerment programme drew on experience from the Purchase for Progress pilot, and WFP brought a common nutrition perspective to programmes for refugees and Ethiopian nationals. However, the absence of an agreed country strategy impeded more systematic exploitation of internal synergies. The thoroughgoing coherence of WFP's portfolio with national policies and systems fostered external synergies, notably WFP's leveraging of its logistics and supply chain expertise in support of national systems, although the country office could have done more to influence the programmes in which it participated.

36. WFP's support for the capacity development of the National Disaster Risk Management Commission and the national logistics system made a significant contribution to sustainability. The use of government systems to deliver the programmes in WFP's portfolio enhanced the prospects for sustainability, but Ethiopia's needs for humanitarian support (both financial and technical) are likely to continue in a context of increasing attention directed to better integration of humanitarian and development efforts.

37. Integrated humanitarian response frameworks in Ethiopia mean that key successes cannot be attributed to WFP alone and weaknesses need to be addressed jointly by WFP and its implementing partners. Given the strong alignment between the humanitarian and development objectives of the Government and its development partners, operational collaboration supports effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, but makes attention to the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality all the more important. For example, the Government's preferential treatment of Eritrean refugees in relation to ration cuts was a clear infraction of the impartiality principle. Although neutrality in situations of conflict has not emerged as a major issue in Ethiopia, the nature of WFP's working relationship with the Government requires vigilance, particularly as regards WFP's close identification with the Government of Somali region. Humanitarian access was good except for reaching some groups of internally displaced persons. WFP sought to strengthen feedback mechanisms in accordance with its commitments to ensuring accountability to affected populations.

Conclusions

Overall assessment

38. During 2012–2017, WFP played a substantial role in responding to emergencies in Ethiopia, providing support for national systems and logistics as well as its own deliveries of assistance. It continued to lead in the provision of food assistance to refugees, although funding constraints made it increasingly difficult to provide adequate rations. Its school feeding programmes were demonstrably effective and influenced the Government's emergency school feeding responses. WFP helped strengthen national approaches to targeted supplementary feeding, although this proceeded more slowly than intended. Of most significance, WFP played a major role in preventing the 2015/16 *El Niño* crisis from becoming a catastrophe and subsequently in averting famine in Ethiopia's pastoral lowlands.

39. However, WFP saw its overall role in humanitarian response change and become increasingly focused on the more challenging Somali and Afar regions. The country office suffered, in practical and reputational terms, from lack of leadership continuity and a perceived lack of strategic focus. Trying to match staffing to income levels while simultaneously dealing with major humanitarian crises put the country office under unprecedented strain. Acknowledged weaknesses in monitoring and reporting hampered strategic reflection and affected donor confidence.

40. In the coming period, with the staffing review nearing completion, significant improvements to monitoring and evaluation initiated, new leadership in place and the development of a CSP under way, WFP has an unmissable opportunity to address past shortcomings and define and strengthen its future role in Ethiopia.

Major conclusions

41. During the period evaluated, WFP's effectiveness in Ethiopia was jeopardized and WFP incurred reputational damage on account of discontinuities in senior leadership. With its structure and staffing review now complete, there is a need to restore morale in the country office and to strengthen the office's efficiency and effectiveness. Ethiopia is a complex country that requires sustained attention from senior staff with experience of working in the country.

42. The absence of an explicit country strategy since 2015 has been another weakness. Preparation of a CSP provides a major opportunity, aided by the portfolio-wide rigour of analysis required for the CSP framework. WFP staff must align with a common vision that is credible to external stakeholders. The ability to take full advantage of WFP's new approach to planning and budgeting depends on donors reducing the earmarking of their contributions and providing more multi-year funding, which in turn requires donor trust in WFP's country office and headquarters. Implementation of the CSP will require continued partnerships with core government agencies, which must be willing partners in any proposed capacity building. WFP needs to convince all major stakeholders that activities such as building of livelihood resilience or stunting prevention will reflect WFP's comparative advantages without undermining what they see as WFP's core emergency functions.

43. This last point is important as there is an opportunity for WFP to use resilience as a conceptual framework for linking humanitarian and development objectives. WFP's portfolio includes several resilience-related programmes but more thinking is needed about how to operationalize approaches to resilience and to go beyond household and individual resilience to look at institutional resilience as well. The PSNP and humanitarian food assistance programmes provide opportunities to be considered from a resilience building perspective.

44. The quality of monitoring, reporting and analysis has been inadequate, which has hampered learning. High-level indicators reported in standard project reports are insufficiently detailed to allow the gauging of performance, especially because WFP usually works jointly with other actors. The country office needs to consider how WFP can both use and complement the monitoring and reporting systems of the wider programmes within which it operates (such as the PSNP and programmes for refugees), ensure adequate staffing of its monitoring and evaluation function, factor in the (reasonable) reporting requirements of donors and ensure timely implementation and adequate supervision of a prioritized

programme of evaluations. A clear and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan could also support requests for donor funding specifically for monitoring and evaluation.

45. With the head of nutrition position vacant for more than two years, staffing constraints limited the attention that the nutrition team was able to direct to persistent advocacy, particularly for the scale-up of "second-generation" targeted supplementary feeding; capacity building and the holding of partners to account for the quality of programme delivery; and overseeing evaluations and ensuring adequate generation of evidence. There was also insufficient attention to nutrition activities for refugees and WFP did not receive funding for activities for the prevention of stunting. To guide advocacy and staffing decisions, WFP needs a clear strategy for nutrition that shows how it complements other actors in Ethiopia.

46. The Government's road map for supporting refugees in line with UNHCR's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is promising and should be supported, but it will take time to change the magnitude of humanitarian resource requirements. Meanwhile, the achievement of consistent and predictable funding for more efficient delivery of essential assistance continues to be a challenge. Greater collaboration with other agencies and partners on viable livelihood strategies for refugees should also be pursued. Discrimination in the treatment of different groups of refugees is inconsistent with humanitarian principles and should continue to be actively resisted.

47. Much more attention to gender dynamics is needed in all elements of the portfolio. This will require ensuring that all the work that the country office does, and the way in which it does it, contributes to gender equality and transformation of the balance of power between women and men. It is essential that the links between gender inequality and poverty and the different implications that interventions have for women and men are recognized and that WFP's strategy and operations are tailored accordingly. The country office's internal practices, including its staffing, need to be consistent with these needs. More broadly, protection and accountability to affected populations are vital elements of all WFP's work and should continue to receive attention in the new CSP.

Recommendations

48. The following recommendations stem from the evaluation findings and respond to the main conclusions outlined in the previous section. They are pitched at the strategic level and linked to CSP preparation, but many of them imply the implementation of operational recommendations as shown in the table below.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
1	WFP staffing and continuity	Discontinuities in senior leadership impaired performance and caused reputational damage.	Ensure that the discontinuities in senior staffing that were experienced during the 2012–2017 period do not recur and prioritize recruitment for core senior posts, including heads of nutrition and the monitoring and evaluation function, in the country office.	Human Resources Division and country office supported by the Nutrition Division, Performance Management and Monitoring Division, Office of Evaluation and Regional Bureau. June 2019.
2	Strategic focus and preparation of the country strategic plan	Absence of an explicit country strategy since 2015 has been a weakness.	<p>Ensure that the CSP preparation process is outward-looking so that the CSP is credible with the Government and donors, who must share WFP's perspective on WFP's future role.</p> <p>Among issues to be addressed with Government and other development partners are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP's dual mandate, areas of comparative advantage and appropriate long-term role in Ethiopia; • an appropriate geographical focus for WFP activities and roles; • ways of mitigating governance and accountability risks in the delivery of food and nutrition assistance in Ethiopia, with particular focus on Somali region; and • evidence-based discussions of cash-based versus food transfers and appropriate levels of benefits. 	Country office. November 2019.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
3	Focus on resilience	More thinking is needed about how to operationalize approaches to resilience building.	<p>Use work on resilience as a conceptual framework for linking humanitarian and development objectives, addressing the resilience of national institutions as well as that of households and individuals.</p> <p>This should include providing support for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • emergency planning and response and national capacities in supply chains and logistics; • strengthening of humanitarian needs analysis and the targeting of responses; • integration of humanitarian support, safety nets and development; and • initiatives that focus on capacity strengthening and building household resilience. <p>The PSNP and humanitarian food assistance programmes should be considered in terms of resilience building. In particular, WFP should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • work more closely with the Government and other stakeholders in order to strengthen integration between the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance and develop relevant capacities within the Government; • contribute to better adaptation of the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance programmes to pastoral regions; and • continue to support government capacities to 	<p>Country office supported by the Regional Bureau and Policy and Programme Division.</p> <p>November 2019.</p>

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<p>manage in-kind food assistance programmes, with a view to achieving full implementation by the Government.</p>	
4	Monitoring, evaluation and learning	The quality of monitoring, reporting and analysis has been inadequate.	<p>Ensure adequate staffing and leadership in the country office's monitoring and evaluation function. Rethink the priorities for monitoring and evaluation in order to better reflect the reality that WFP is predominantly a contributor to joint programmes. Ensure that each main activity has a monitoring and evaluation plan that explicitly considers what WFP can draw on and contributes to the monitoring and evaluation of WFP's overall efforts in Ethiopia.</p> <p>Areas where more evidence-based learning is required include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • effective use of cash-based transfers, with attention to the full spectrum of transfer options, from solely cash-based transfers to solely in-kind food distributions; • strengthening of cost analysis generally, during the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes; • stronger nutrition analysis (see recommendation 5); and • stronger gender analysis (see recommendation 7). 	<p>Country office supported by the Regional Bureau, the Performance Management and Monitoring Division and Office of Evaluation.</p> <p>November 2019.</p>

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
5	Nutrition programming	WFP needs a clear nutrition strategy, showing how its work complements that of other actors in Ethiopia.	<p>The country office should conduct a situation analysis and develop a nutrition plan for the next CSP period, working with the Government and other actors in order to identify where WFP has the most added value; it should prioritize recruitment of the staff required to deliver this plan.</p> <p>Priorities for the WFP nutrition strategy should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • humanitarian nutrition, with advocacy and support for measures that address stunting; • support for a more rapid roll-out of the “second-generation” approach to targeted supplementary feeding; • strengthening of technical support for the refugee programme; • increased analysis, with partners, of nutrition trends among refugees and the effects of ration cuts on nutrition; and <p>ensuring a nutrition-sensitive approach in all WFP activities.</p>	Country office with support from the Regional Bureau. November 2019.
6	Refugee assistance	More consistent and predictable funding is needed for more efficient delivery of essential assistance to refugees.	<p>Work with partners with a view to ensuring adequate and timely funding that meets humanitarian needs while also supporting evolution towards more sustainable approaches. Join other United Nations agencies on insisting that humanitarian principles are observed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocate for and support greater use of cash-based transfers in refugee assistance. 	Country office. November 2019.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support stronger analysis of the effects of ration cuts on nutrition (see recommendation 5). • Support reconciliation of refugee numbers and continued strengthening of registration systems. • Support moves towards responses that are better tailored to the different needs and capacities of different groups of refugees. • Promote realization of the objectives of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. 	
7	Gender	Much more attention is required to gender dynamics in all elements of the programme.	Gender issues should (continue to) be addressed in an integrated way, building on the country gender action plan. Actions should include proactive measures for boosting recruitment of women national staff and more attention should be directed to context-specific gender issues throughout the portfolio including appropriate mainstreaming of gender equality and the empowerment of women in all components.	Country office with support from the Regional Bureau. November 2019.
8	Protection and accountability to affected populations	Protection and accountability are vital elements in all WFP's work.	Strengthening protection and accountability to affected populations should continue to be a priority, but WFP should work on strengthening national systems wherever doing so is consistent with the needs of beneficiaries.	Country office. November 2019.

Introduction

1.1 Evaluation Features

Rationale

1. Country portfolio evaluations (CPEs) focus on WFP operations at country level. They address the performance and results of the full set of WFP activities during a specific period and their insights guide future strategic and operational decision making. They answer three key evaluation questions:

Question 1: What were the alignment and strategic positioning of the WFP portfolio of activities?

Question 2: What factors affected the quality of strategic decision making?

Question 3: What were the performance and results of the WFP portfolio?

2. Ethiopia was selected for an independent evaluation managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) as part of its ongoing series of country portfolio evaluations, which seeks to provide systematic coverage of WFP country presence. The country portfolio evaluation covers 2012–2017, and is timed to provide evidence of past and current performance that can assist the design of the country office's new interim country strategic plan (I-CSP) for 2019–2020, scheduled for Executive Board approval in February 2019.

Objectives and Intended Users

3. The terms of reference (ToR) are reproduced in full at Annex A. In order to serve the objectives of accountability and learning, the evaluation will:

- Assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development needs in Ethiopia (accountability).
- Determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the country office to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Ethiopia, forming strategic partnerships, and improving operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

4. The principal intended users of the evaluation are the WFP country office, the Government of Ethiopia, the WFP regional bureau in Nairobi (RBN), WFP senior management, the United Nations country team, NGOs, donors and the WFP Executive Board.

Methodology and limitations

5. The evaluation was undertaken by an independent team. Its work involved inception visits to Rome, Addis Ababa and Nairobi in February 2018 which informed the inception report (Mokoro, 2018a). The main evaluation visit to Ethiopia took place over three weeks in April 2018. It incorporated a week of field visits to regions and sites where WFP has been operational,¹² and included introductory and closing sessions with country office staff; a feedback session in May included staff from headquarters and the regional bureau.

¹² Members of the evaluation team visited various sites in Shire and Mekele (Tigray region), refugee camps in Gambella, and a range of WFP operations in Somali region (around Jijjiga and in Melkadida), as well as logistics facilities in Adama (Nazareth) and Djibouti.

6. CPEs draw on analysis of secondary data and document review, supplemented by extensive interviews and a programme of field visits. The methodology for the evaluation is fully described in the inception report and summarised in Annex B; the evaluation matrix is presented as Annex C. The evaluation process is described in Annex D, with interviewees listed in Annex E. Annex V is an extensive bibliography. The Office of Evaluation provided support on quality assurance and management of the evaluation.

7. The evaluation followed the formats and quality assurance procedures set out in the Office of Evaluation's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) for centralised evaluations. Drafts also responded to Mokoro's internal quality support reviews. The main limitations experienced were: delays and high transaction costs in arranging the team's programmes of meetings and site visits in Ethiopia; the unavailability of some data and delays in obtaining much of the data on which this report relies (Annex J); the limited value of recorded outcome data (Annex I);¹³ and a bias, in both interviews and data, towards the more recent years of the evaluation period. Annex B explains the team's efforts to mitigate these limitations by seeking out early-period informants for telephone interviews, persevering in data quests, and triangulating different sources of evidence. As appropriate, this report comments on the strength of the evidence that underpins its main findings and conclusions.

8. As described in the inception report (Mokoro, 2018a, Annex M), Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) perspectives were mainstreamed in the evaluation approach. Annex T of the present report summarises gender issues and findings.

9. A strategic evaluation of WFP support for enhanced resilience has been taking place in parallel with the CPE (Bene et al, 2018). The WFP portfolio in Ethiopia included numerous activities relevant to its resilience programming, but Ethiopia was omitted from the list of countries to be visited by the resilience evaluation, so as not to overlap with the CPE work programme and risk overburdening the country office. However, it was arranged for the CPE evaluation team to undertake some additional analysis and interviews to feed into the resilience evaluation as well as the CPE itself (for details see Annex M).

¹³ Including discontinuities in the outcome data reported, patchy coverage of WFP operations, high levels of aggregation, and limited explanatory power of outcome indicators selected. Full discussion in Annex I.

1.2 Country Context

Overview

10. This section notes significant economic and social factors that affected the Ethiopia country portfolio and are relevant to the evaluation. Annex F is a chronology of relevant developments and Annex G provides contextual data on socio-economic indicators, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and aid to Ethiopia.

11. Several distinctive features recur frequently in the analysis of the WFP portfolio in Ethiopia and set parameters for the country strategy of WFP:

- a) Ethiopia's scale and complexity: The size of the country means that crises that affect only a small percentage of the population may nevertheless affect millions of people; its diversity means that the timing and incidence of crises may be very varied, and puts a premium on detailed systems for early warning, needs analysis and targeting.
- b) Government leadership and decentralisation: Government exerts strong ownership and leadership over policies and programmes. At the same time there is a high degree of decentralisation to regional states and woredas (districts), which are politically, socially and economically diverse, and differ in administrative capacity; these factors need to be taken into account in delivering programmes to different regions.
- c) Safety nets and humanitarian assistance: These are linked through common planning and coordination systems, and there are moves to strengthen such integration.
- d) Refugees are a major long-term driver of humanitarian needs, and, more recently, there are large numbers of conflict-affected IDPs.
- e) Evolving context: Population growth, urbanisation, rapid economic development, climate change and the geo-political context all mean that Ethiopia's humanitarian and development needs are likely to change in ways that are not always predictable.

Political Framework

12. Ethiopia is a landlocked country bordered by Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan and Sudan. Ethiopia's population is now over 100 million and it is the second most populous nation in Africa (after Nigeria).

13. Under a constitution adopted in 1995, Ethiopia has a system of ethnic federalism, comprising nine regional states and two city administrations (see Map 1 below). Regions are ethnically defined and vary in size and level of development. Four regions – Amhara, Oromia, the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) and Tigray, which account for the large majority of Ethiopia's population, are considered the more advanced regions; four further regions – Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali – are considered as developing regions, with generally lower levels of administrative capacity. The pastoral Afar and Somali regions tend to have the worst socio-economic indicators.


14. Ethiopia hosts the second largest refugee population within east and central Africa (after Uganda): 900,000¹⁴ refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, are in 26 camps across the country (see Map 8 in Annex N).

15. Government in Ethiopia has been stable under the present constitution, with Parliament dominated by the parties of the ruling coalition – the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), but there have been times of tension and conflict. In February 2018 the Prime Minister who had served through

¹⁴ In January 2018, UNHCR figures.

most of the evaluation period resigned and there was a State of Emergency during the transition to his successor.

Map 1 Ethiopia regional states



Ethiopia's federal system comprises nine regional states:

1. Tigray
2. Afar
3. Amhara
4. Oromia
5. Somali
6. Harari
7. Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
8. Benishangul-Gumuz
9. Gambella

and two city administrations:


10. Addis Ababa City
11. Dire Dawa City

The counterparts of Federal *Ministries* are Regional *Bureaus* and *Woreda* (district) *Offices*.

:Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/05/Ethiopia_regions_english.png

16. Recent conflict between ethnic Somali and Oromo communities has resulted in more than 1 million conflict-affected internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNOCHA, 2018a & UNOCHA, 2018b). Altogether there are around 1.3 million conflict-affected IDPs in Ethiopia, but the majority are found near the border between Oromia and Somali regions. These recent displacements began to be identified in December 2016 and have grown consistently since then, with new displacements still being reported (Figure 1 below). The majority of these sites can be accessed by humanitarian agencies, but this is not true for all sites (UNOCHA, 2018b).

Figure 1 Conflict displacement since December 2016 (total people displaced)



Source: UNOCHA, 2018b.

Government Policies and Priorities

17. Ethiopia has implemented successive national plans focused on poverty reduction and the acceleration of economic growth. The Government is currently implementing the second phase of its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), which will run to 2019/20. The plan envisages Ethiopia achieving lower-middle income status by 2025 by modernising the agricultural sector, expanding industrial development with primary focus on light manufacturing, and making a significant shift to export development, while implementing the Climate Resilient Green Economy strategy in all sectors to ensure sustainability. The

industrial sector is expected to grow by an average of 20 percent a year, transforming the country into a manufacturing hub and creating jobs. Modernising the agricultural sector is deemed critical to the development of the manufacturing sector, but also in enhancing food and nutrition security and reducing rural unemployment (Government of Ethiopia, 2016a).

Economy and Poverty¹⁵

18. Over the past seven years, Ethiopia has achieved high economic growth averaging 11 percent per annum. The poverty headcount declined from 38.7 percent in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2010/2011 and is estimated to have declined further to 23.5 percent in 2016. Between 2000 and 2014, the Human Development Index (HDI) for Ethiopia improved by an annual average of 3.2 percent, from 0.284 in 2000 to 0.4442 in 2014.

19. Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in Africa, with a per capita income of USD 1,530 and ranking 174th out of 188 countries in the 2016 UNDP Human Development Report. Many rural households depend on seasonal wage employment or assistance from national social protection programmes. Although percentage poverty rates have declined (as noted above), rapid population growth means that absolute numbers in poverty are still very high: 25 million Ethiopians remain in poverty or live just above the poverty line, making them vulnerable to climatic shocks and seasonal food insecurity.

Food and Nutrition Security

Vulnerabilities


20. Ethiopia's mountainous landscape and its location in the Horn of Africa result in enormous variations in agro-ecology and livelihoods. The interaction of weather systems with Ethiopia's highlands leads to significant differences in the timing, duration and quantity of rainfall from place to place. In turn, this leads to differences in the livelihood strategies followed (pastoral, agro-pastoral and crop dependent), the livestock reared, the crops grown, the timing of planting and harvesting, and the vulnerability of households. Most rural households rely on subsistence agriculture and livestock despite declining farm sizes and the impacts of environmental degradation. With most of its population dependent on rain-fed agriculture or pastoralism, Ethiopia remains highly vulnerable to rainfall shocks.

21. During the period covered by this evaluation between 5 and 8 million people received support through a rural safety net programme (the Productive Safety Nets Programme – PSNP); in addition, between 2 and 10 million people received humanitarian food assistance (Figure 2 below). The last two years of the evaluation period both saw severe crises. A *krempt*¹⁶ rain failure in 2015 led to 19 million people receiving some form of food assistance (either safety net transfers or general food distributions) in 2016; while in late 2016/early 2017 poor rains in predominantly pastoral areas led to severe food crises for affected populations.

¹⁵ See summary indicators in Annex G, Table 5.

¹⁶ The 'long rains' for many of Ethiopia's crop dependent population falling between June and September.

Figure 2 Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) and humanitarian caseloads 1992–2017, in millions of people



Source: World Bank, 2017.

22. Early analysis of potential climate change trends indicates that the March-May rains (commonly known as the *belg* in agricultural areas or the *gu* in Somali region) are reducing in volume and becoming increasingly erratic (WFP, 2013g). These trends particularly affect the pastoral southern and south-eastern areas of Ethiopia, but also have implications for a significant proportion of agricultural areas.

Government leadership

23. The Government exerts strong leadership on food security and humanitarian response (see Box 1 below). Despite its dependence on Official Development Assistance (ODA) for more than a third of its annual budget, the extent of the Government's dominance in policy discussions, programming and implementation in the development and humanitarian domains is heavily emphasised in discussions with WFP staff, NGOs and donor agencies.

Box 1 Government leadership on food security and humanitarian response

External trends and internal consequences

Since 2000, the Government of Ethiopia has progressively taken a greater leadership role in shaping how the country combats food insecurity, malnutrition and the negative effects of climate change. The outcome has been a series of Government Flagship Programmes (GFPs), against which all international actors must align their financial and technical support. The most prominent of these GFPs include: the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), the Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD), the National Nutrition Programme (NNP), the Seqota Declaration, the Home Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSFP), and the Sustainable Land Management Programme (SLM)—and its sister flagship, the Sustainable Land Management Programme for Food Insecure and Pastoral Areas (SLM-FIPA).

Each of these GFPs is intended to address a specific aspect of food insecurity, malnutrition and /or climate change. Each is led by a government entity, responsible for the implementation of its respective flagship at federal, regional and woreda level. Funding for these programmes comes from national budgets, but a significant portion is provided through development assistance and loans, under the broad umbrella of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

During the 1980s and 1990s, emergency humanitarian assistance (including food aid) was the principal means for addressing the food insecurity and malnutrition caused by recurring climate and economic shocks. UN system agencies—notably WFP—and NGOs were the main implementing actors. Starting in 2000, however, this pattern began to change, and by 2004/2005, the [Government of Ethiopia] took a stronger stance in addressing structural poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition through government-led programmes that aimed to address the root causes of vulnerability. Moreover, in handling emergencies, the Government has taken the firm position of lead responder. The role of international agencies has evolved to primarily ensuring alignment and coordination with government emergency protocols and systems.

Source: Quoted from *Repositioning WFP in Ethiopia, September 2016* (WFP, 2016u).

24. Four relevant Government policies guide food security interventions:
- The National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (Government of Ethiopia, 2013).
 - The National Social Protection Policy (Government of Ethiopia, 2014).
 - The Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (Government of Ethiopia, 2010a).
 - The Ethiopia Strategic Investment Framework for Sustainable Land Management (Government of Ethiopia, 2008).
25. These policies are implemented through a number of government programmes and services:
- a) Early warning and needs assessment: The Government has a decentralized system of early warning; staff at woreda level collect monthly data on a range of indicators including rainfall, production, livestock and market prices. In addition the Government leads periodic multi-stakeholder needs assessments, which take place at least twice a year, but may be more often in crisis years.
 - b) Humanitarian food assistance (HFA): This is provided to rural households that are food-insecure because of a shock, most often drought. The number of people supported (and duration of this support) is determined through a twice yearly needs assessment. Humanitarian food assistance is largely provided in the form of food, but can also be provided in cash. Households are selected through a community-based targeting process. (HRD & PSNP DPs, 2017)
 - c) The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP): Launched in 2005 and funded by the Government and development partners (DPs), the PSNP provides food and/or cash transfers to food insecure households in chronically food insecure woredas. Households that have labour (the majority of PSNP beneficiaries) earn their safety net transfers by participating in labour-intensive public works. Unconditional, direct transfers are provided to households without adult able-bodied labour.
 - d) The Sustainable Land Management Programme: This programme involves the rehabilitation of degraded lands using an integrated watershed approach. (World Bank, 2013)
 - e) Integration of PSNP and humanitarian food assistance: The 2016 drought response highlighted challenges created by the artificial divide between support provided through the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance. Work towards better integration of these responses is under way. (HRD & PSNP DPs, 2017)

Nutrition challenges

26. Despite recent improvements, child mortality and malnutrition remain critical issues in Ethiopia. One in 14 children die before their fifth birthday (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017) with undernutrition believed to be an underlying cause of more than half of these deaths (The Lancet, 2008). An estimated 38 percent of children under 5 are stunted (chronic malnutrition) and 10 percent wasted (acute malnutrition). One fifth of women (22.4 percent) of reproductive age are undernourished with a body mass index (BMI) of less than 18.5 (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017).

27. Moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), which WFP is mandated to address, poses a lower risk of death than severe acute malnutrition (SAM), but contributes more to the overall disease burden, as it affects many more children. MAM in Ethiopia stands at 7 percent (compared to 2.9 percent prevalence of SAM), and is estimated to affect more than 600,000 children (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017).

28. Multiple factors contribute to malnutrition in Ethiopia. Poverty, insufficient availability of food, and inadequate child care and feeding practices are compounded by low access to basic services and by recurring humanitarian crises. As noted above, 25 million Ethiopians live below the poverty line, and there is an estimated per capita food deficit of 236 kcal per day (FAO, 2015b). Even where households are able to meet their calorie requirements, on average, 76 percent of energy is derived from staples, indicating that the diet is lacking in diversity and adequate nutrition. Infant and young child feeding practices across the country are poor, with just 57 percent of infants exclusively breastfed to 6 months as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017).

29. More detailed analyses of food security and of nutrition issues in Ethiopia are provided in Annex L and Annex P respectively (including fuller descriptions of government policies and programmes).

Gender Dimensions

30. The Ethiopian Constitution and its National Policy on Women guarantee gender equality and the protection of women's human rights in various spheres of life. The constitution stipulates the right to affirmative action for women in order to fight prevailing inequalities and level the field for equal participation of women in all sectors, including political and socio-economic life.


31. In Ethiopia 80 percent of the population is rural and predominantly reliant on agriculture and subsistence living. As the ones responsible for food selection and preparation as well as the care and feeding of children, women have a key role to play in the food and nutritional security of their households and also provide a significant amount of agricultural labour in Ethiopia (USAID, 2017). In spite of the importance of their contribution to the sector and the economy, women are often disadvantaged and their contribution is less valued. Women, for instance, contribute as much as 70 percent of on-farm labour in post-harvest activities, for cereals, and take 60 percent of labour marketing share. Gender roles in agriculture and socio-cultural norms often restrict women's access to credit and extension services, productive farm inputs, and land ownership. The Agricultural Sample Survey of 2006/2007 indicated that male landowners (land certified) outnumbered female landowners (land certified), by almost five times. As a result, women farmers tend to produce less per hectare than men (UNWOMEN, 2014). Ethiopia's standing in the Global Gender Gap Index (115 out of 144 countries and an overall score of 0.656) shows that women's participation in key sectors and their role in decision-making are still behind men's (WEF, 2017). Annex T provides a more detailed review of the gender context and of relevant government policies.

International Aid

32. In the period 2014–2015, Ethiopia was the fourth largest recipient of gross Official Development Assistance (ODA). Yet the proportion of ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) is decreasing; ODA accounted for 5.3 percent of GNI in 2015 compared to 8.2 percent in 2013. On ODA per capita, Ethiopia in 2015 ranked 87th out of 156 aid-recipient countries.¹⁷

¹⁷ OECD DAC data at <https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS/rankings>

Figure 3 Official aid and humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia 2008–2016



Sources: Humanitarian funding data: the Financial Tracking Service <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/71/summary/2017> accessed 12-mar-18; Official Development Assistance data: The World Bank <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=ET> accessed 12-mar-18.

33. The top three donors are the World Bank, the United States and the United Kingdom, followed by the European Union and the African Development Bank. An increasing share of assistance is being channelled directly through the Government. Figure 3 above provides a summary of humanitarian assistance and ODA received since 2008, and Annex G provides some additional summary charts. Figure 38 in Annex L provides an overview of the joint government/development partner humanitarian coordination structure. As regards coordination amongst UN agencies, Ethiopia is a pilot for "Delivering as One", and joint United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) were prepared for the periods 2012–2016 and 2016–2020 (UN, 2011, UN, 2015).

1.3 The WFP Portfolio in Ethiopia

WFP Context

34. WFP has been working in Ethiopia since 1965. Its portfolio is shaped by evolving global strategies and approaches. Significant WFP policy and strategy developments are included in the chronology at Annex F, and each of this report's thematic annexes notes relevant WFP policy and guidance.

35. Over the evaluation period, WFP continued its efforts to shift from food aid to food assistance and to build its capacity to support economic and social development, in addition to its traditional emergency relief mandate. The review period straddles three strategic plans (2008–2013, 2014–2017 and 2017–2021).¹⁸ WFP approaches are marked by the use of a broader toolbox, including more use of cash and vouchers, and by moves towards greater financial and administrative flexibility, more emphasis on alignment with, and capacity development of, partner governments, and a more strategic approach to country portfolios. There has been greater decentralisation of responsibility to regional bureaus and country offices.

36. From 2016 WFP has been pursuing radical reforms described in its Integrated Road Map (WFP, 2016a). Country strategic plans (CSPs) are becoming mandatory, linked to integrated country-level budgets, within which the previous programme categories are replaced by budget components linked to specific WFP strategic results and focus areas (crisis response, resilience building, root causes). This has implications for WFP planning and budgeting processes, but also for the underlying organisational culture and behaviours

¹⁸ Their evolving strategic objectives are compared in Annex K, Table 21.

of WFP and for its relationships with its donors, with country governments and with other partners at country level. Ethiopia will be in the last wave of CSP preparation, with its first CSP due to be presented to the Executive Board in February 2019. As an input to the CSP, a country-led Zero Poverty and Hunger Strategic Review has been launched (WFP, 2017k), but, because this exercise is incomplete, Ethiopia will begin with an interim CSP for 2019–2020.

37. Among aid agencies generally, the evaluation period has seen renewed advocacy for better articulation between humanitarian and development assistance and for more effective approaches to humanitarian aid, including longer planning horizons and more responsibilities for local actors. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) and the associated "Grand Bargain" sought to generate momentum on these issues (WHS, 2016).

WFP Country Strategy

38. There has been only one formal strategy document for WFP in Ethiopia during the evaluation period, from 2012–2015 (WFP, 2011e). The country strategy identified the WFP comparative advantages in Ethiopia to include being "a leading partner in humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management; staff capacity and knowledge on community-based natural resource management; a partner in supporting access to basic social services;" and having "extensive field presence and relationship with local governments and communities; and a proven ability to innovate in partnership with government". In addition, WFP logistics capacity was recognised as a vital contribution and WFP procurement was seen to play an important function in supporting food markets, local food processing and food market analysis in Ethiopia. To reflect these comparative advantages and also support the Government's own agenda, the strategy had three objectives: (i) to enhance capacities to reduce disaster risks; (ii) to prevent food poverty and nutrition inadequacy from diminishing food-insecure households' nutrition, education and health outcomes; and (iii) to promote livelihood diversification and improved access to food markets. The strategy's results framework was linked to the United Nations Development Assistance Framework.

39. Although there was no formal successor to the 2012–2015 strategy, various other strategic documents were prepared (see Annex K). Some were linked to a Structure and Staffing Review (SSR) for which preparations began in September 2015; it was launched in August 2016 and was nearing completion in the first quarter of 2018. The SSR was of immense strategic importance; it aimed for a large reduction in staff as well as reorganisation of the country office.

Portfolio overview

40. The evaluation period included 12 operations and 8 trust funds.¹⁹ The major operations were one country programme (CP 200253), which ran throughout the evaluation period, and five protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs). Two PRROs were successive operations responding to humanitarian crisis and enhancing resilience to food insecurity (PRRO 200290, 2012–2015, and PRRO 200712, 2015–2018). Three other PRROs ran consecutively to provide food assistance to refugees (PRRO 121273, 2009–2012, PRRO 200365, 2012–2015, and PRRO 200700, 2015–2018). There was also an emergency operation (EMOP 200656) which ran from January to March 2014 to assist people affected by fighting in South Sudan. Five special operations (SOs) supported humanitarian logistics.

¹⁹ A detailed list is provided in Annex H, Table 10.


41. Total expenditure was just over USD 2 billion. Expenditures were dominated by programmes for Ethiopian nationals (over 70 percent of expenditures); refugees accounted for just under one quarter of the total, with the balance going to special operations and trust funds (see Table 11 and Table 12 in Annex H).

Development of the Portfolio

Chronological overview

42. Figure 4 below provides an overview. At the beginning of the evaluation period, WFP was preoccupied with a Level 3 emergency declared in response to drought in the Horn of Africa. Later, WFP operations had to adapt to three other major crises: the influx of refugees from South Sudan after civil war broke out in that country, and successive droughts: the El Niño crisis of 2015/2016, and the drought which affected pastoral lowlands in 2016/2017.

Figure 4 Chronological Overview of the Portfolio



Country Programme

43. CP 200253 started in 2012.²⁰ It had five components: disaster risk management capacity; natural resource management capacity, including community-based watershed development under the Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions (MERET) programme; food for education in primary schools; urban HIV care, treatment and support; and promoting food marketing and rural livelihoods, especially for women.

44. In the first year of the country programme there was a shift from food to vouchers in the HIV and AIDS project, which enabled beneficiaries to receive locally familiar foods including fresh vegetables and animal protein sources. Cash transfers were introduced in remote project areas in 2013 where formal agreements could not be entered to start vouchers. All country programme components faced resource shortfalls at some time. MERET particularly saw a decline in beneficiaries, due to critical funding shortfalls; in 2016 the MERET programme closed.

Protracted relief and recovery operations for Ethiopian nationals

45. PRRO 200290, starting in 2012, aimed primarily to help emergency-affected households to reduce the impact of shocks by addressing their food needs. It also aimed to support the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) households and communities in improving food security, resilience and recovery from disaster, and to support the most vulnerable and food-insecure households in reducing or stabilizing moderate acute malnutrition among children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women. The PRRO included capacity-development measures related to disaster preparedness and response.

46. PRRO 200712, from 2015, had similar components but additionally aimed to prevent chronic malnutrition and stunting among children under 2 and pregnant and lactating women. The focus of PRRO 200290 and PRRO 200712 was affected by sharp increases in the needs for emergency relief and nutrition as a result of successive droughts.

Refugees

47. WFP has provided food assistance for refugees in Ethiopia since 1988. Through PRROs 101273, 200365 and 200700, WFP Ethiopia provided food assistance for refugees, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, throughout the evaluation period. These operations aimed to treat and reduce acute malnutrition in children, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable refugees with special nutrition needs. The operations also aimed to stabilise school enrolment of refugee girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools and enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security. PRROs 200365 and 200700 added the objective of increasing livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile transition situations.

48. In 2012 the refugees were hosted in 17 camps. In 2013 refugee camps were established in Tigray, for Eritrean refugees, and in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella to accommodate new arrivals from Sudan and South Sudan. In 2014 and 2015 the number of refugees requiring food assistance increased further because of the large influx of South Sudanese refugees fleeing fighting in their home country. By September 2017, Ethiopia was hosting 900,000 refugees in 26 camps across the country; 43 percent of the refugees were in the Gambella region (Western Ethiopia) and 25 percent were in the Melkadida region (near Somalia and Kenya).

²⁰ Following on from CP 104300.

49. During the evaluation period, WFP made more extensive use of cash in combination with food rations (for details see ¶170 below). The introduction of fingerprint-based biometrics was another key activity from 2016, which aimed to strengthen the targeting and delivery of assistance to refugees.

Special operations

50. WFP Ethiopia operated United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) over the evaluation period. SO 200364 and SO 200711 aimed: to provide safe, effective and efficient access to beneficiaries and project sites for NGOs, UN agencies, donor organisations and diplomatic missions; to respond in a fast, efficient and flexible manner to the needs of the humanitarian community, including timely medical and security evacuations; and to transport light cargo, such as medical supplies, high energy foods, and information and communication technology (ICT) equipment. UNHAS also delivered humanitarian assistance in the form of food and non-food items to refugee camps and air-drop sites in South Sudan.

51. Three other special operations were:

- Djibouti logistics hub: SO 200358, which ran from 2013–2017, focused on construction of a humanitarian logistics base in Djibouti, where WFP and other humanitarian agencies could store supplies intended for operations across East Africa.
- Geeldoh bridge: SO 200752 was launched in 2014 to build a bridge in the Somali region to facilitate access to isolated districts and villages that were cut off from basic services and humanitarian assistance during rainy seasons.
- Logistics cluster / capacity support: SO 200977 looked to address the logistics capacity constraints that were exacerbated by increased humanitarian needs. It aimed to: enhance coordination and information sharing, predictability, timeliness and efficiency of the emergency logistics response under the Cluster approach, which is under the overall leadership of the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC); support the delivery of humanitarian relief to affected populations by augmenting logistics capacity; provide capacity development for government entities and staff, specifically to support the NDRMC to fully implement the WFP-supported Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP) and associated reporting tools.

Thematic Components of the Portfolio

Classification by beneficiary

52. As noted above, several operations were oriented towards refugees, while others supported Ethiopian nationals. This distinction is relevant because drivers of refugee assistance are different, and the administrative channels for delivering assistance to refugees are also different, as are some of the partners with whom WFP works (notably UNHCR). However, there are also components in common (school feeding and nutrition, for example) and there is increasing interest in the potential for the needs of refugees and host communities to be addressed jointly.

53. A number of WFP activities/operations did not have direct individual beneficiaries but were oriented towards general analysis, capacity development and delivery systems shared by multiple partners. This applies for example to vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) work, and to several special operations that were linked to logistics and the supply chain; the food management improvement programme also falls in this category. Moreover, because of Ethiopia's strategic location, several logistics elements, including UNHAS and the logistics hub at Djibouti, were intended also to have cross-border benefits.

Activity-wise analysis

54. As a portfolio analysis, this evaluation focuses on activities that are often supported by more than one operation. As proposed in the inception report the evaluation has focused on the following sets of activities, with each set described and analysed more fully in an annex to this report:

- a) Emergency response, logistics and supply chain (Annex R): This covers logistics and supply chain for WFP deliveries, but also national-level support to emergency responses and related capacity development, and the infrastructure projects and other special operations which supported logistics.
- b) Vulnerability analysis, food security and livelihoods support (Annex L): This covers WFP data collection and analysis and its support to government needs assessments and food security monitoring; general food and cash distributions to relief beneficiaries and support to the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP); and support to separate livelihoods initiatives. WFP supported asset creation both through the PSNP and, until its termination, the MERET programme. (Related findings from additional work on resilience issues are in Annex M.)
- c) Food assistance to refugees (Annex N): This covers all aspects of WFP support to refugees, including general food assistance, nutrition,²¹ school feeding and livelihoods activities.
- d) Nutrition (Annex P): This covers supplementary feeding programmes for Ethiopian nationals and for refugees, the urban HIV and food security project, local production of ready-to-use supplementary food and (the preparatory stages of) a fresh food voucher project.
- e) School feeding (Annex Q): The major programme was support to school feeding in Afar and Somali regions (funded by the McGovern-Dole programme of the United States Department of Agriculture), but there was also continuing support to home-grown school feeding in Southern and Oromia regions, national capacity development, and technical support to an emergency school feeding programme introduced by the Government as a drought response.

55. Some of these thematic topics include cross-cutting elements (for example, vulnerability analysis has relevance across the portfolio). Capacity development is considered in all components, with particular reference to the development of sustainable institutional capacity. Additional cross-cutting topics are:

- a) Gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE – Annex T): gender analysis is mainstreamed in the activity reviews which also feed into an overview of the evolving WFP approach to gender.
- b) Humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations (Annex O).
- c) Cost analysis and efficiency: As well as being considered for each activity, a number of key topics were selected for more detailed analysis (Annex S).
- d) Strategic analysis and learning – drawing on monitoring, evaluation and learning as manifested in all components, but also drawing on overall analysis of the M&E system of WFP (Annex J) and strategic planning at country level (Annex K).

Financial and Beneficiary Breakdown of the Portfolio

56. Budgeted and actual expenditures, planned and actual beneficiary numbers, food deliveries and other indicators of performance are considered activity-wise in Section 1 of this report. The present subsection describes the aggregate portfolio and its composition.

²¹ Analysed in more detail in Annex P.

Trust funds


57. WFP Ethiopia also set up eight trust funds over the evaluation period.²² Three supported special projects: support to community HIV response; the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme (part of a multi-country programme by the Rome-based agencies); and a project to support local production of a chick-pea based supplementary food. A fourth trust fund was used to facilitate treating insurance-for-work under the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) programme as a cash-based transfer, and the others were vehicles for support to logistics/procurement on behalf of the Government. It appears that most of the trust funds were created for pragmatic administrative reasons: the community HIV trust fund was a mechanism to ring-fence HIV funding as the country programme was coming to an end, and all but two of the others were means to simplify procurement or the payment of insurance premiums for work.

Beneficiaries – total and by activity

58. Figure 5 below shows that actual total beneficiaries were fewer than planned for every year. There were close to 5 million WFP beneficiaries as a minimum, (2013 and 2014) rising towards 9 million during the El Niño response in 2016.

59. However (Figure 6 below), the distribution of beneficiaries by activity from 2012–2017 was very close to the planned distribution. General food assistance accounts for more than half of all beneficiaries; food assistance for assets (18 percent) and nutrition (18 percent) are the next largest groups, with school feeding beneficiaries fewer than 10 percent of the total.


Figure 5 Total planned and actual beneficiaries 2012–2017



Source: SPRs 2012-2017

²² For details, see Table 10 in Annex H.


Figure 6 Planned and actual beneficiaries by activity 2012–2017 (%)



Source: SPRs 2012–2017. See also Table 13 in Annex H.

Note: There is an element of double-counting, since beneficiaries receiving support under more than one activity type are included under each activity (e.g beneficiaries of take-home rations will also receive meals in school).

Figure 7 Beneficiaries by activity 2012–2017




Source: SPRs 2012–2017. Totals exceed those in Figure 5 above because figures include double counting of beneficiaries receiving assistance through more than one modality.

60. Figure 7 above shows changes in beneficiary focus of the portfolio. Increased shares for general food assistance and nutrition reflect emergency feeding during recent droughts, while the smaller proportion of food assistance for assets beneficiaries reflects reductions in funding for such work and the reduced geographical scope of WFP support to the PSNP.

Funding of the portfolio

61. Figure 8 below shows that percentage funding has been well below requests, especially after 2012. Ethiopia represented only 6 percent of the WFP global budget in 2017, down from a high of 11 percent in 2012. The shortfall between funding requested and funding received (Figure 8), is larger than the gap between planned and actual beneficiaries (Figure 5 above), showing that available resources were spread more thinly than originally intended: the ramifications for each main set of activities are explored in the activity-wise analyses.

Figure 8 WFP Ethiopia funding: requests and receipts compared (2011–2017)




Source: Evaluation team analysis of data from “WFP Donor Information Hub”.

62. The top bilateral donors to WFP in Ethiopia over the evaluation period have been the USA (34 percent of total funding), the UK (13 percent), Canada (10 percent), the European Commission (9 percent) and Germany (5 percent). More details of funding per operation and per donor are provided in Annex H.

Food tonnage and beneficiary coverage


63. Figure 9 below shows planned and actual food distributions over the evaluation period. Distributions fell well short of what was planned even in crisis years. Data on planned and actual beneficiary numbers (Figure 10 below) show a similar pattern of shortfall, while also highlighting the rise in beneficiary numbers in the crisis years of 2015 and 2016. As with financing (see ¶61 above), the shortfall in tonnage was greater than the shortfall in beneficiaries, implying less assistance per beneficiary than originally intended. The balance between male and female beneficiaries was close to 50:50 throughout.

Figure 9 Portfolio food distribution (mt) planned and actual 2012–2017



Source: SPRs 2012–2017. Percentages show percentage of planned distribution actually reached.

Figure 10 Average number of beneficiaries, planned and actual, 2012–2017




Source: SPRs 2012–2016 for CP200253; PRRO 200290; PRRO 200365; EMOP 200656; PRRO 200700; PRRO 200712. Total beneficiaries calculated between all CP, PRRO and EMOP operations. P = planned. A = actual.

The WFP share in Food Assistance Delivery

64. There has been a significant decline in the proportion of humanitarian food assistance channelled through WFP. Although the USD value of the WFP response rose dramatically during the crises of 2015/2016 and 2016/17, the WFP share of the total response decreased sharply. Analysis of data held by OCHA indicates that the distributions managed by WFP made up 67 percent and 73 percent of the total value of the response in 2012 and 2013 respectively. More recently the WFP share was significantly less, typically between 40–45 percent in the last three years. Figure 11 below illustrates the data.

Figure 11 Humanitarian response 2012–2017: delivery channels (USD m) and WFP share (%)




Source: Evaluation team calculations from OCHA data. Covers only the humanitarian response for Ethiopian nationals.

Geographical Distribution and Implementing Partners

65. The Government is the implementing partner for most of the assistance provided through WFP, although NGOs feature as implementing partners for nutrition programmes in particular.


66. WFP delivers, and supports delivery, across virtually the whole of Ethiopia, as illustrated by Map 2 below. However, there has been an increasing geographic focus on Somali region; as illustrated in Figure 12 below, the Somali region's share of WFP in-kind food assistance was around 60 percent up to 2015, but rose to more than 90 percent in 2017.

Map 2 Geographical distribution of WFP operations/activities in 2016



Source: WFP/VAM Ethiopia, produced October 28, 2016.


Figure 12 The geographic footprint of WFP for in-kind food assistance: Somali region vs. others



Source: Data sources for this graph vary from year to year. 2012-14 and 2015 data are derived from budget revisions (WFP, 2014zb and WFP, 2015za); data for 2016 and 2017 have been extracted from COMET (but excluding data not linked to any given region).

67. Figure 13 illustrates that the dominance of the Somali region in the WFP portfolio is not because total needs are less in the rest of Ethiopia, but because WFP is playing a much smaller role in the response elsewhere.

Figure 13 Total food assistance effort, by region, WFP and other, 2016 (millions of person months)




Source: Evaluation team estimates, based on COMET data for 2016 only (refugees not included).

Note: This is just a rough illustration. Hard data are not available (and no data on the regional breakdown of WFP's cash-based food assistance). This illustrative calculation assumes: (a) that all woredas received 10 months of support, of which 5 months were provided according to the original Humanitarian Requirements Document, and 5 months according to the mid-year update; (b) that WFP always provided a full ration. The country office has noted that the absence of recorded WFP food assistance in Tigray is an apparent error (but any WFP share of assistance in Tigray would also have been very small).

68. The present concentration of WFP activity in Afar and Somali regions is further illustrated by the distribution of beneficiaries according to WFP sub-office (Figure 14 below), and indeed by the number of sub-offices in Somali region.

Figure 14 Breakdown of total beneficiaries by sub office 2017




Source: Sub office summary data provided by the EthiopiaCO.

Cash-Based Transfers

69. In the period since 2012, WFP has made increasing use of cash-based transfers. WFP has used cash and vouchers under its HIV programming since the beginning of the evaluation period and undertook its first cash-for-relief programming in Ethiopia in 2013. Figure 15 below shows the planned and actual scale of WFP cash programming for humanitarian food assistance and PSNP. It should be noted that the low level of actual cash distributions in 2017 reflected initial delays in a pilot project to use cash for PSNP beneficiaries in Somali region, with sizeable transfers delayed to the first quarter of 2018.²³

Figure 15 Planned and actual use of cash-based transfers by WFP (for Ethiopian nationals, USD millions)




Source: PRRO SPRs. Includes CBT data from relief operations PRRO 200290 and 200712.

70. Figure 16 below shows the growing use of cash in refugee distributions. Combined cash and food assistance was introduced for refugees in 2013 in two refugee camps. Over the period assessments and consultations indicated that combined cash and food assistance had several advantages: it enabled refugees to diversify their diet, minimised sales of cereals and was appreciated by beneficiaries. The over-achievement of these transfers was as a result of these positive effects and increased resources received

²³ The Somali pilot was the main cash transfer planned for 2017. This cash transfer work has been emergency financed and therefore short-term.

for cash-based transfers. In 2016 the cash-food modality had expanded to ten camps. In 2017, resource shortfalls meant that actual cash transfers were 52 percent of the planned total for the year. However, WFP still extended the cash-plus-food assistance to three more camps in 2017, making a total of 13 camps.

Figure 16 Planned and actual refugee cash distribution 2012-2017 (USD)




Source: WFP SPRs PRRO 200700 and PRRO 200365.

Country Office Staffing

71. Ethiopia has one of the larger WFP country offices. Total staff – based in Addis Ababa and in 17 sub-offices and area offices – rose from 660 in 2011 to a peak of almost 850 in 2017 (see Table 14 in Annex H). Figure 17 below shows the balance between international and national staff from year to year. The international staff proportion has fallen consistently, from 10 percent of all staff in 2012 to 7 percent in April 2018.

Figure 17 Country office staff (international and national) by year 2011-2018




Source: Table 14 in Annex H.

72. As noted earlier, a major process of retrenchment began in 2016 and was in its final stages in early 2018. However, its effects do not yet show clearly in the total staffing data, for two reasons: (i) the structure and staffing review coincided with successive drought emergencies which required additional staffing; and (ii) the process of separating from retrenched staff is slow, as the staff have the opportunity to apply for re-designated posts, and final separation only takes place as and when it becomes clear that a staff member will not be selected for an available post.

73. One-third of the country office staff are based in Addis Ababa. Figure 18 below shows the average distribution of staff across sub-offices. The largest is Nazareth (Adama), which is a major logistics base, with

the rest of the distribution reflecting the geographic focus of WFP activities, as discussed from ¶165 above. Figure 18 also highlights the gender imbalance in country office staffing, which is especially pronounced for national staff; sub-offices in Somali and Afar regions have the fewest women. Additional data on staffing are provided in Annex H, and gender dimensions are explored in Annex T.

Figure 18 Average number of staff 2016–2018, by duty station, by sex



Source: WFP CO data April 2018. Percentage of women shown for each duty station.

Evaluation Findings

74. Evaluation findings are presented according to the three main areas of enquiry specified by the terms of reference (Annex A). In each section, evidence is organised under sub-headings that reflect the evaluation questions agreed for the evaluation matrix (Annex C).

2.1 Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

Relevance to Ethiopia's humanitarian and developmental needs²⁴

75. All the main elements of the WFP portfolio in Ethiopia were clearly relevant to humanitarian and developmental needs. Moreover, WFP remained relevant by responding well to emerging needs, most notably the droughts of 2015/16 and 2016/17, but also to increasing numbers of refugees. Recently, the needs of conflict-affected internally displaced persons have grown exponentially (¶16 and Figure 1 above); WFP is among the responders, but these needs are not yet being addressed by the humanitarian community as systematically as the needs of other distressed people (see Box 2 below).

Box 2 Addressing the needs of conflict-affected IDPs

WFP humanitarian support is guided by government-led seasonal assessments. Although imperfect, these are the main evidence available for identifying and prioritising need. The needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) are not routinely covered by these needs assessments, which affects the ability of WFP to respond to IDP needs. While WFP has managed to provide some support to IDP populations, (i) there have been some problems of access in southern Somali region and (ii) the amount of support provided to IDPs tends to be similar or less than is provided for a drought-related response, although experience suggests that conflict-related needs are typically much higher. Furthermore, IDPs in Somali region – where WFP is operational – are reportedly receiving higher levels of support than just across the regional border in Oromia. Overall much more attention is being paid to IDPs in Somali region (because of the greater presence of WFP and other UN and NGO actors) but the needs will be similar both sides of the border between Somali and Oromia regions and the response should reflect this.

76. The scale and urgency of humanitarian needs, set against resource constraints for addressing them, left comparatively little room for developmental work within WFP operations.²⁵ WFP programmes have included activities and objectives oriented towards building resilience, for example through work on livelihoods, but these have been a small part of its portfolio, and often the hardest to finance.²⁶ However, WFP and the coalitions within which it works in Ethiopia²⁷ have sought to strengthen links between humanitarian and development work.

77. There are some favourable trends in policies and approaches in Ethiopia that may help future humanitarian work, by WFP and others, to become more broadly relevant. For example: there are serious efforts to integrate systems for providing humanitarian responses to climate shocks with underlying social

²⁴ cf. EQ2. To what extent have the portfolio's main objectives and related activities been relevant to Ethiopia's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups and vulnerable people), priorities and capacities?

²⁵ External stakeholders consulted about WFP's engagement with resilience issues observed that the scale of humanitarian programming in Ethiopia made it difficult for WFP to give prolonged attention to topics outside the humanitarian sphere. (see Annex M, ¶18).

²⁶ A similar point applies to stunting prevention.

²⁷ See the discussion of coherence, ¶79ff below.

protection programmes; and, as the Government rolls out its commitments to the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) it should become more practical to address the needs of host communities and refugees simultaneously; school feeding addresses developmental as well as humanitarian objectives.

78. The strong (and growing) focus of WFP on pastoral lowlands, and especially Somali region (as noted in ¶65 above), was also relevant. It meant addressing needs that were exceptionally high in areas where delivery is particularly difficult and national capacity relatively low. Some programmes included significant design features to serve gender objectives (notably the take-home rations component of school feeding in Afar and Somali regions, and the rural women's empowerment project – RWEE) but, as discussed later (from ¶197 onwards), there is much scope to strengthen gender approaches.

Coherence with national agenda and policies²⁸

79. The WFP portfolio has been strongly coherent, both in objectives and in approaches, with the Ethiopian national agenda and policies. The Government exerts strong leadership (see ¶23 and Box 1 above) and is the main partner in almost all areas of WFP work. The national Growth and Transformation Plan provides a clear overarching framework, and any differences between the Government and partners are more often about details of implementation and targeting than about underlying objectives or overall priorities.

80. In practice, WFP activities are not only aligned with national policies but integrated with national systems for targeting and delivery, and coordinated with other development partners under government leadership. Alignment is ensured not only at the level of policy and strategy documents, but also in the working relationships between WFP and key government agencies, including the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Health, and the corresponding bureaus at regional level. A particularly important relationship is with the Somali Regional Government.

81. These close relationships are very positive overall; they promote efficiency and sustainability, and provide opportunities for systemic capacity development. They also entail some constraints: joint targeting systems do not necessarily follow WFP-preferred approaches (e.g. the identification of hotspot woredas to be prioritised for supplementary feeding is not directly based on nutrition surveys); the government standards used for implementation are not always in line with international norms (e.g. the government criteria of eligibility for supplementary feeding are more restrictive); using government systems for disbursement is not always straightforward (hence delays in rolling out the cash pilot in Somali region); and government delivery complicates WFP monitoring and reporting.

82. Overall, WFP has proved adept at working with government systems, and its programme instruments have been adaptable. The necessary scaling up to address the droughts of 2015/16 and 2016/17 was accomplished using existing Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (without resort to EMOPs). WFP took over management of the IFAD component of the Rome-based agencies' joint Rural Women Economic Empowerment project because IFAD could not match the ability of WFP to work within government systems.

²⁸ cf. EQ3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

Coherence with United Nations and other Partners²⁹

83. Ethiopia is a "One UN" country, and the 2012–2015 strategy was explicitly aligned with the UNDAF as well as the national Growth and Transformation Plan (see Annex K). Although WFP did not produce a strategy to coincide with the 2016–2020 UNDAF (UN, 2015), it participated in its preparation, and WFP contributions are listed against its pillars and outcomes; for various components WFP budgets, funds available and gap are listed, but there is no obvious way of linking these figures to subsequent WFP budgets and expenditure reports. The 2016–2020 UNDAF itself is explicitly aligned with GTP II, but, in reviewing experience with the previous UNDAF, it acknowledges significant limitations: its monitoring framework was handicapped by lack of clear baselines and targets for indicators, and by the difficulty of tracking UNDAF budgets and disbursements.³⁰ The UNDAF preparation process promotes coherence and coordination among UN agencies, and their alignment with government policies and programmes, but it does not result in a very operational document; it has not served as a programming framework for UN agencies, and given the strong government-led frameworks already in place it is not clear how much value a UN programming framework per se would add.

84. Thus, for WFP, its direct relationships with Government also provide the framework for its collaboration with other partners. The thematic annexes to this report provide details of the coordination arrangements in each sector; these shape WFP working relationships with other UN agencies as well as with the Government and other partners. Within this context, WFP has particularly close working relationships with OCHA (all aspects of emergency response), UNHCR (refugees), UNICEF (notably treatment of malnutrition – including joint work towards integrated approaches, but also collaboration on school health and nutrition strategies).

85. The relationship with the World Bank has become increasingly important, because of the Bank's role in PSNP³¹ and the fact that the PSNP is increasingly being used as a vehicle for humanitarian response. It is also important because of the Bank's increasing involvement in initiatives to address the long-term needs of displaced people.

86. The rural women's empowerment project (RWEE) is a multi-country collaboration among the Rome-based agencies (FAO, WFP and IFAD). Discussions amongst these agencies before and after a visit by their Executive Directors in 2017, have encouraged a concept of joint resilience work in Somali region. The vision is not a traditional joint programme, but rather to recognise that the three agencies have interventions in the same geographic areas; that these interventions are complementary and impact could be increased if linkages are made during the planning process; and that agencies should therefore seek to coordinate at the woreda level in their engagement with government implementing agencies (Annex M, ¶13).

87. Partnerships linked to resilience work illustrate the centrality of relationships with the Government. The strongest relationship is with the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), but important partnerships have been established with the Ministry of Education (school feeding), Ministry of

²⁹ cf. EQ4 To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

³⁰ The recent evaluation of WFP's school feeding programme in Afar and Somali regions, noted that an overall evaluation of the UNDAF was meant to discourage separate evaluations by individual UN agencies, but that the UNDAF evaluation (not surprisingly) paid no attention to school feeding (Mokoro, 2018b).

³¹ The World Bank is itself the largest PSNP donor; it is also a conduit of some other donors' funds; it hosts the multi-donor trust fund which finances the majority of technical support to the PSNP; it hosts the PSNP secretariat; and the nature of the World Bank means that it has particular access to government as well as a major voice in inter-donor forums.

Health (nutrition), and the Ministry of Agriculture (the Productive Safety Net Programme). With NDRMC, the partnership is heavily focused on emergency response and engagement around anticipating or predicting shocks through investments in early warning systems and woreda disaster risk profiles. The Government itself is increasingly highlighting resilience, with the Humanitarian Requirements Document recently renamed as the "Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan". WFP is actively engaged in the various working groups which make up the institutional architecture of key programmes/interventions, and works alongside other international agencies in these forums.³²

88. The emphasis on government-led implementation in Ethiopia means that there is less use of NGOs as implementing partners for WFP, but NGOs do play a significant role in providing field-level technical support to government nutrition programmes. NGO support is most relied upon where health and logistics systems are weak, such as in the pastoral regions. In refugee camps NGOs are often the service providers. WFP collaborates with other NGOs (most notably the Joint Emergency Operation (JEOP) consortium) within the overall humanitarian response.

89. The key relationships of WFP with aid agencies are with its main donors (see above, ¶41 onwards); principal donors such as USAID, DFID and the EC are also participants, alongside WFP, in the humanitarian and development coordination structures, and financiers of projects and programmes that take place in parallel with those of WFP.

Alignment with WFP Policies, Strategies And Humanitarian Principles³³

Alignment with WFP policies and strategies

90. Strategic directions set out in the 2012–2015 country strategy were clearly consistent with WFP policies and strategies at the time, and the current WFP portfolio remains consistent with the objectives of the WFP strategic plan for 2017–2021 (cf. Annex K, Table 21). The thematic annexes to this report confirm that various WFP activities in Ethiopia have been consistent with the main global policies adopted by WFP. This has included taking account of revisions to policies such as those for nutrition, for school feeding and for gender.

91. The annexes also document several cases of trade-offs between working within government-led systems and fully adhering to WFP guidelines. As noted above (¶81), WFP does not have autonomy in targeting and sometimes accepts service standards that are lower than WFP norms (but which allow wider coverage) – for example, the Government has not yet adopted the WHO 2006 guidelines on thresholds for admission to supplementary feeding.

92. In 2015, WFP adopted a new *Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition* (WFP, 2015e). The evaluation team's review of resilience issues found that the country office is still familiarising itself with the concepts and methods the policy advocates; more work is required to ensure that staff are adequately aware of resilience concepts and approaches and how these concepts could and should influence the design and implementation of WFP activities. (See Annex M, ¶15–20.)

93. As discussed below (¶177 onwards), full adaptation to the revised gender policy will take time. Policies on environment (WFP, 2017t), climate change (WFP, 2017u) and emergency preparedness (WFP, 2017r) were adopted in 2017 and so are more relevant to future work.

³² For more detail on resilience partnerships, see Annex M, ¶9–14.

³³ cf. EQ5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including protection and the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand? Has WFP dealt appropriately with such trade-offs?

Humanitarian principles

94. A full assessment of the portfolio's conformity with the humanitarian principles and WFP policies on protection and accountability to affected populations (AAP) is provided in Annex O. A consistent theme is that, given the integrated humanitarian response frameworks in Ethiopia, key successes and weaknesses cannot solely be attributed to WFP, but rather a combination of agencies including the Government. Concerning the main principles:

- a) The main challenges to the principle of **humanity** (seeking to address "human suffering wherever it is found") come from resource constraints which require prioritisation even amongst those in need. The most acute concerns have been related to conflict IDPs (Box 2 above) and refugees, where there has been an increasing gap between basic humanitarian requirements and the resources provided by the international community.
- b) The principle of **operational independence** requires that WFP assistance is not distorted by non-humanitarian objectives of the government or any other actor. So long as there is strong alignment between the humanitarian and developmental objectives of the government and its development partners, operational collaboration serves the interests of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. However, such collaboration makes conscious attention to the principles of neutrality and impartiality all the more important.
- c) As regards **impartiality**, the issue of ensuring due attention to conflict IDPs has already been mentioned. In the context of ration cuts, the Government has treated Eritrean refugees more favourably than other groups. This is a clear breach of humanitarian principles; WFP and other humanitarian agencies should continue to make clear that this is unacceptable.
- d) **Neutrality** vis-à-vis conflict has not emerged as a key issue in Ethiopia, but the nature of the working relationship between WFP and the Government does require vigilance, particularly as regards the close identification of WFP with the Somali Regional Government.³⁴

Strategic Positioning³⁵

95. For all main components of the portfolio, the choice of partners by WFP was strategically appropriate (as noted above in the discussions of coherence with national systems and with non-Government partners). However, the present configuration of the portfolio does not represent the implementation of a proactive overall strategy so much as a series of particular decisions, often ad hoc, against the background of patterns that were mostly set before the evaluation period. Many key determinants of the present configuration pre-date the evaluation period, and the main changes in the portfolio were matters of adaptation rather than choice. Thus:

- a) Refugees: the WFP strategic position as leading on the provision of food assistance to refugees is long-established; during 2012–2017 the task was to adapt to changing demands (Annex N).
- b) The special role of WFP in Somali region was also well established before 2012 (see Box 3 below). The increasing relative importance of Somali (dramatically illustrated in Figure 12 and ¶67 above) was a result of choices by Government and major donors surrounding the El Niño response in particular. As noted in ¶64 and Figure 11 above, there has been a significant decline in the proportion of humanitarian

³⁴ This could become an issue in relation to factional rivalries within Somali region and in relation to disputes between Somali and Oromia regions.

³⁵ cf. EQ6. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

food assistance channelled through WFP. Somali region became more prominent within the portfolio mainly because of the reduced WFP role elsewhere in Ethiopia.

- c) This in turn gave greater prominence to the role of WFP in giving technical support to the supply chain and logistics for national humanitarian response, but its role in supporting the national logistics system as a whole (Annex R) also pre-dates the evaluation period. For example, the ongoing food management improvement project (FMIP) was launched in 2010. There was even more emphasis on the overall capacity-development role of WFP in the context of the El Niño and Indian Ocean Dipole responses, but this was an accentuation of a well-established strategy.
- d) The WFP nutrition strategy (Annex P), with its primary focus on supplementary feeding, also continued an established pattern.
- e) The WFP school feeding strategy (Annex Q) was also a legacy, with the dimensions of WFP work during the evaluation period largely determined by availability of USDA funding.

Box 3 Origins and implications of the WFP role in Somali region

The significance of Somali region is highlighted in the portfolio analysis (¶65 above). This is long-standing: the "hubs and spokes" system through which WFP supports food logistics there was started in 2008/2009. This initiative established warehouses and logistics hubs in strategic locations to reduce the time taken to deliver food to beneficiaries, using private transporters to deliver food from hubs to end user points.

The growing relative importance of Somali region in the portfolio in recent years is mainly due to decline in WFP's share of humanitarian aid delivery in the rest of Ethiopia.

Based on interview accounts, WFP's role arose from a convergence of aid agency and government preferences. For the Federal Government and the Somali Regional Government (SRG), at a time when there was armed conflict between separatists and government forces, WFP vehicles were able to operate neutrally whereas government vehicles were being attacked. On the aid agency side, there was a loss of confidence in NGOs that had led operations. All parties recognised the low capacity of the Somali authorities, and the exceptionally difficult political and geographical environment, alongside the high global reputation of WFP for humanitarian logistics. WFP was seen as being able to ensure stronger monitoring and oversight.

These factors are still in play. On the SRG side there is long-run desire to assume more responsibility, but a recognition that the SRG does not yet have the capacity to assume the same level of responsibility for logistics as Ethiopia's advanced regions. Aid agencies have supported an NGO consortium (JEOP) to supplement government logistics in most of the rest of Ethiopia, but continue to see WFP as best able to operate in the special circumstances of Somali region.

There are practical and reputational risks for WFP in performing this role. Weak governance and high risks of corruption add to the challenges of working with spread-out pastoral populations, especially since the regional government is responsible for final deliveries. The recent resurgence of conflict along the border between Somali and Oromia regions adds to the difficulties of balancing humanitarian principles in the way WFP operates (Annex O).

96. A number of well-placed international interviewees considered that WFP in Ethiopia has in recent years lacked a coherent strategic direction. Some felt that different specialist representatives of WFP whom they encountered each spoke as if their component were the centrepiece of WFP work in Ethiopia, without conveying a clear sense of an overall strategy. Others argued further that WFP interests in innovation (for example on livelihoods and climate change) were detracting from attention to its core business of humanitarian relief.

97. There seems to be some agreement among external stakeholders and country office leadership that WFP in Ethiopia has lacked a well-articulated strategy. Thus the country office leadership team for the second half of the evaluation period considered that "repositioning" was necessary:

The magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition in Ethiopia remains staggering. In this light, WFP now must work to *reposition* itself in Ethiopia; ... the "transporter of choice" perception also overlooks some of the other *technical and advisory services* WFP can offer. The CO will need to strike a balance between continuing with the delivery of food assistance—albeit at a significantly lower volume—and moving towards playing a more technical assistance role that helps the [Government of Ethiopia] achieve its economic and social development goals. (WFP, 2016u p.4-5)

98. This perception underpinned the structure and staffing review and is likely also to influence I-CSP preparation (see Annex K). Meanwhile, there have been various efforts to avoid being typecast as an "emergencies only" organisation. In this vein: the country office has sought to strengthen its role vis-à-vis the PSNP (at the same time as relinquishing MERET); it has also shown interest in stunting prevention and nutrition innovations such as the imminent fresh food voucher project; and, as well as seeking to strengthen livelihoods components within the PSNP and its support to refugees, WFP undertook some discrete interventions focused on livelihoods, resilience and/or climate change. These include the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4), the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIPE) Programme³⁶ and the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme.³⁷

99. Country office staff argue that all these initiatives are in line with the comparative advantage of WFP, and strengthen its overall strategy. Among Ethiopia representatives of major donors to WFP, however, some see such activities as a distraction from the core, emergency-related, business of WFP.

2.2 Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

Space for strategic decision making³⁸

External parameters

100. The scope for strategic decision-making by the Ethiopia country office was affected by both external and internal constraints; these are considered before offering judgements on the choices made. Working within government-led systems (¶79-82 above) is strategically appropriate, but limits the freedom of manoeuvre for WFP: it cannot separately decide its own targeting criteria or beneficiary rations, for example, though it can seek to influence the focus and content of government-led programmes. WFP is also constrained by the established historical patterns noted in ¶95 above.

101. On balance, changes in the aid landscape have been unfavourable: the ability of WFP to innovate as opposed to holding existing ground has been limited by scarcity of funding. Refugee assistance is a good example: in principle the international moves towards a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and the Government's positive reaction to it, provide important new opportunities; however, in practice – as spelled out in Annex N – the evaluation period was dominated by the increasing struggle to secure adequate funding for basic humanitarian food assistance.

Country office leadership

102. WFP in Ethiopia has also experienced internal constraints. Most internal and external observers agree that discontinuities in the leadership of the country office had a detrimental effect. The Country

³⁶ SIPE was launched in March 2018 but preparatory activities were taking place during the evaluation period.

³⁷ For more detail see Annex L, ¶33ff.

³⁸ cf. EQ9. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?

Director in place at the beginning of the evaluation period nominally served from mid-2011 until the end of 2014, but was effectively absent throughout 2014, having been assigned to work on major emergencies elsewhere. A temporary Country Director served for five months in 2015, and his successor served for only two years,³⁹ until July 2017, before being reassigned to Rome. His successor served for only about six months before she too was reassigned to Rome. Ethiopia is an exceptionally complex country, as well as being a very high profile operation for WFP, yet for about half of the six years from 2012–2017 the Country Director position was either vacant or occupied by a caretaker posting or by an incoming Country Director with less than six months' experience in the role.

103. Interviews with external stakeholders left the evaluation team in no doubt that WFP has incurred reputational damage as a result of its failure to ensure leadership continuity in Ethiopia. The evaluation team shares the view expressed by several interviewees that Ethiopia's size, complexity and uniqueness puts a premium on accumulated country experience; the costs of discontinuity are correspondingly high. The evaluation team repeatedly heard concerns that WFP was not as effective as it needed to be in joint planning and coordination forums. This was variously said to reflect that the two or three most senior people had too much to cover; that WFP was sometimes absent from forums where its participation was needed; or that WFP was represented by staff who were insufficiently expert or insufficiently senior for the role. These points were made at both national and regional levels. Critical comments were almost invariably prefaced by appreciation for the calibre of certain WFP staff and for the value of the WFP contribution in responding to major crises, but it was clearly implied that WFP in Ethiopia has been struggling to cope.⁴⁰

The structure and staffing review

104. The country office leadership team that took over in 2015 were very concerned about the situation they found. As described in Annex K, they quickly diagnosed an unsustainable divergence between rising staff costs and declining income, and formally launched the structure and staffing review in 2016. Thus the period from 2015 onwards was dominated by preparing for and implementing a reorganisation and restructuring exercise, which, although unavoidable, was both time-consuming and morale-sapping – see Box 4 below. As it happened, there were full-blown crises to attend to at the same time, so the scope for organisation-wide strategic reflection and action was further limited.

Box 4 Significance of the structure and staffing review (SSR)

This review involved a comprehensive restructuring as well as downsizing of the country office. The restructuring was linked to strategic perceptions of the future role for WFP in Ethiopia, but was pressured by the need to reduce staff costs. The review was naturally of particular concern for national staff, the majority of whom were either retrenched or had to re-apply for positions within the new structure.

Partly because it was careful to follow due processes, the SSR took much longer than first envisaged (it was still being finalised during the first half of 2018). As noted in ¶172 above, the full effects of retrenchment are not yet visible partly because staff are retained while they still have an opportunity to apply for available posts in the new structure.

³⁹ The expected duration of such a posting would be four years.

⁴⁰ At a mundane level, the evaluation team had much more difficulty in obtaining basic data and in getting meeting schedules and field visits organised than Mokoro portfolio evaluation teams have experienced in other countries. This was certainly not due to any lack of goodwill from the country office, but seemed to reflect the levels of stress it was experiencing.

As well as creating uncertainties for so many employees, the exercise was extremely time-consuming for senior staff, who were involved in the organisational redesign, the preparation of new job-descriptions, and then the interview processes.

It was clear to the evaluation team, from field visits and interviews, that, although the country office's many dedicated staff continued to do much good work, the SSR had a debilitating effect on morale and was, inevitably, a major added burden for senior staff who were already stretched.

Analysis and advocacy⁴¹

Analysis

105. WFP has undertaken and/or contributed to relevant analytical work related to all its main areas of activity. In Ethiopia, such work regularly has multiple functions: to inform the design and implementation of its own services; to contribute to joint decision-making by the Government and its partners; and to support capacity building at national, regional and district levels. Each of this report's thematic annexes reviews related analytical work by WFP. As regards WFP contributions to data on early warning (Annex L), stakeholders struggled to identify unique characteristics of the WFP early warning data but still appreciated its contribution to the overall data pool. However, the WFP information products which combine early warning data with information on response are particularly valued for including data that cannot easily be found elsewhere. WFP participates in seasonal needs assessments and is also a member of the sub-group responsible for determining and improving the needs assessment methodology. The vulnerability analysis and mapping unit regularly undertakes market assessments to inform choices between cash or in-kind modalities.

106. WFP support to capacity development for the humanitarian logistics and supply chain in Ethiopia was consistently based on relevant analysis (Annex R). During its mobilisation between 2016–2017, the logistics cluster played a particular role in identifying logistics gaps and proposing mitigating measures.

107. Opportunities for strong nutrition situational analysis for Ethiopian nationals are limited (Annex O). WFP takes part in government-led multi-agency needs assessments, but nutrition surveys are rarely conducted. Few analyses of the underlying causes of malnutrition for Ethiopian nationals have been conducted and, in the absence of regular surveys which collect data on contributing factors such as feeding practices, availability of nutritious foods at the household level, hygiene practices, and access to health care, as well as household food security, opportunities for in-depth analysis are limited. However, the potential for strong situational analysis is much higher in the refugee programme and this could be used more systematically. Nutrition surveys are conducted in the majority of refugee camps annually and often collect information on a wide variety of indicators for potential underlying causes of malnutrition, but the absence of technical nutrition staff on the WFP refugee programme has limited internal analysis and use of available data.

108. As regards gender analysis (Annex T), the 2016 gender baseline study for Ethiopia (WFP, 2016v) was an important step towards operationalising the revised gender policy. Although there have been some improvements in the way gender is addressed in WFP project documents and reporting, it was consistently

⁴¹ This section addresses two EQs:

EQ7. To what extent has WFP analysed the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Ethiopia - including gender equality and protection issues? and taken account of related logistics and capacity development challenges?

EQ8. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?

reported that real mainstreaming and analysis of sex disaggregated data to inform programmatic decision making was lacking; this is reflected in the lack of analytical evidence in project reports. Moreover, although Ethiopia is a very diverse country, contextual analysis of gender issues has been poor.

Advocacy

109. There were numerous cases of successful advocacy and influence by WFP in Ethiopia, although it often takes time for advocacy to be effective. Some relevant examples:

- a) The Government's emergency school feeding programme (ESFP) was inspired both by the experience of the WFP school feeding programme in Afar and Somali regions and by the home-grown school feeding approach demonstrated by a WFP pilot programme in Southern and Oromia regions (Annex Q).
- b) WFP has helped towards adapting the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance to the special circumstances of pastoral regions, e.g. through pastoral public works guidelines, and advocacy for more appropriate timing to match the seasonality of needs in pastoral lowlands (Annex L).⁴²
- c) WFP contributed helped to put better targeting of supplementary feeding programmes on the national agenda by piloting an improved "second generation" approach. This paved the way for an approach to the management of malnutrition which is integrated with the health system and improves the continuum of care between SAM and MAM (Annex P).
- d) WFP also contributed through financial support, technical assistance and advocacy to the development of the National School Health and Nutrition Strategy (Government of Ethiopia, 2012 – see Annex Q, ¶64ff).
- e) the urban HIV/AIDS project was a vehicle for support to the policy process which led to the adoption of the National Social Protection Policy: WFP was one of several stakeholders involved but helped to ensure: (i) greater visibility of key vulnerable groups such as HIV/AIDS affected populations in the policy; (ii) provisions for both conditional and unconditional transfers; and (iii) a greater focus on the importance of targeted livelihood support (Annex P and Annex L).

Learning from experience⁴³

Overview

110. The record on learning from experience is mixed. On the plus side, the successful advocacy noted above represented shared learning. Also, there was a significant programme of evaluations during the period (for details see Annex J). The recent school feeding evaluation underpins the analysis in Annex Q. The recommendations of all the other evaluations are summarised in Annex J, Table 20. In several cases there has clearly been an influence on subsequent programme design and implementation. However, learning from experience has not been as consistent or as thorough as it should have been, because of (a) weaknesses in managing the response to evaluations; (b) weaknesses in managing evaluations and the poor quality of some of the evaluations commissioned; (c) acknowledged deficiencies in monitoring and reporting; and (d) the lack of a country strategy since 2015.

⁴² Although they preceded the CPE period, the Community Based Participatory Watershed Development Guidelines, which were developed through MERET and issued in 2005, continue to underpin a number of large scale Government of Ethiopia programmes in natural resource management: the PSNP, the Sustainable Land Management Programme and local activities implemented by districts using free community labour.

⁴³ cf. EQ10. To what extent has WFP generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners? This section draws particularly on Annex J.

Using and learning from evaluations

111. The Ethiopia country office has not had a systematic way of recording and responding to recommendations made in decentralised evaluations, and there is therefore no simple way to determine which recommendations from decentralised evaluations have been accepted and acted upon.⁴⁴ Corporate systems do exist for tracking responses to centralised evaluation recommendations, but they were not drawn to the attention of the evaluation team by the country office and in any case are not very informative (Annex J, ¶7). The country office was unable to locate one of the evaluations to which country office documents referred.⁴⁵

112. Nonetheless, the evaluation team was able to gauge responses in several cases. The MERET impact evaluation (2012) made a number of recommendations on how MERET could be more strategic and mobilise resources to ensure its future (Tango & IDS, 2012) but these recommendations were not implemented because funding constraints faced by MERET 'virtually eradicated their ability to change direction' (Annex L). The evaluation of PRRO 200290 (2014) recommended that the country office build on the gains made under the FMIP and Hubs & Spokes; Annex R documents how these recommendations were followed up. Another key recommendation by that evaluation (Frankenberger et al, 2014) was to strengthen monitoring systems; we note below (¶116ff) the efforts made to do so.

113. Many evaluations of relevance to WFP are commissioned by other agencies. The PSNP, for instance, has a series of process and impact evaluations. More than one external stakeholder noted that WFP staff did not seem familiar with these.⁴⁶

Quality and management of evaluations

114. Several of the decentralised evaluations listed in Annex J, Table 20 are acknowledged to have been relatively weak, and so less useful than they could have been. The Urban HIV/AIDS project evaluation was recognised by WFP country office and regional bureau staff as weak, with issues in the evaluation process and poorly developed findings. Similarly, there was a common view that the Second Generation Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme Evaluation lacked strong evidence; this was referenced by external stakeholders as a reason why the uptake of the Second Generation approach was slow. The Rural Resilience Initiative evaluation also documented that, due to a lack of resources, the sample size was too small and unrepresentative and that better planning for baseline data and control villages is needed as the programme expands.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Under the Evaluation Policy adopted in 2016, decentralised evaluations which are commissioned and managed by country offices or regional bureaus follow guidance provided by the WFP Office of Evaluation – including impartiality safeguards and quality assurance system. However, they are not the responsibility of the WFP Office of Evaluation, which only performs an ex-post quality assessment to monitor overall standards of decentralised evaluations. Only one decentralised evaluation (PEPFAR HIV/AIDS), as per WFP definition, has come to a conclusion since the approval of the 2016 Evaluation Policy. A Management Response was approved and published (although the Regional Bureau acknowledges that the quality of recommendations is low). The Regional Bureau is responsible to follow up on decentralised evaluation management responses. All the other WFP decentralised evaluations listed in Annex J, Table 20 were commissioned before 2016.

⁴⁵ The concept note for a draft 2018 Interim Country Strategy Plan (WFP, 2017i) mentions a recent evaluation reporting on a MAM treatment programme, but the evaluation team was unable to trace this. This was not an evaluation managed under the decentralised evaluation system as it cannot be found in the WFP systems.

⁴⁶ For example, the overall PSNP evaluations include highly relevant observations on targeting in Afar and Somali regions.

⁴⁷ This was an Oxfam evaluation of the joint Oxfam-WFP programme.

115. There have been issues too in the management of evaluations: the evaluation of the McGovern-Dole school feeding programme was initiated too late for it to feed usefully into the application for further funding. This was one of several evaluations commissioned during 2017. Two of the others (fresh food vouchers and satellite indexed insurance) are temporarily being managed from Nairobi, in recognition of limited capacity at the country office. But it is commendable that the Rural Resilience Initiative, satellite indexed insurance and fresh food voucher pilots have each had an in-built evaluation process from the outset.

Quality of monitoring and reporting⁴⁸

116. The quality and effectiveness of monitoring and reporting has been a concern throughout the evaluation period. In 2010 a comprehensive review by WFP headquarters highlighted systemic weaknesses in monitoring and self-evaluation across the organisation; it led to the development of a corporate Monitoring and Self-Evaluation Strategy implemented during 2011–2013 (WFP, 2010h). The Ethiopia country office responded with a country-level M&E strategy for 2012–2015 (WFP, 2012b). Its areas of focus (listed in full in Annex J) included strengthening of sub-office and field staff capacity for data collection and analysis, and strengthening cooperating partners' capacities in M&E. However, a review in 2015 found that "Current monitoring coverage, sample methodology and reporting are far below the targets set by WFP global MMR [minimum monitoring requirements]". Among the explanatory factors identified were alternative calls on the time of staff tasked with monitoring, low monitoring coverage with a tendency to visit the easy to reach food distribution points, and poor management and coordination of staff.

117. In May 2016, with the support of the WFP regional bureau, the country office produced a standard operating procedure (SOP) for M&E and an accompanying directive (WFP, 2016y). The SOP was issued in order to clarify minimum monitoring requirements in light of the drought in Ethiopia. Required improvements included: increased coverage and multiple visits for all food distribution points; prioritisation for relief and targeted supplementary feeding monitoring tasks (avoiding being drawn into logistic support); more systematic use of IT and standard forms; and establishment of a complaints and feedback mechanism.⁴⁹

118. Over the evaluation period, the country office also had to adapt to changes in corporate systems,⁵⁰ as well as to new technical possibilities, with growing use of tablets and, recently, mobile phones to collect data. Linking monitoring to GPS coordinates has helped to strengthen accountability.

119. Despite these efforts, it was noted by donors, WFP staff and the evaluation team that further improvements are needed, particularly in analysis and reporting of data. Sub-office staff noted that they are given little training or responsibility for analysis and reporting and that the heavy analysis and storytelling is done in Addis Ababa. Having said that, there is also scope for considerable improvement in the analysis of data in Addis Ababa. Only one current staff member in the country office is trained to use standard statistical analysis software; staff recognised that more time was spent on data reconciliation and cleaning, than analysis and learning. Although much effort goes into satisfying corporate requirements for standard project reports (SPRs), little data compilation and analysis takes place beyond this; there is scope for much more granular analysis from the distribution and post-distribution reports that the sub-offices

⁴⁸ This topic is more fully discussed in Annex J.

⁴⁹ The full list of improvements is in Annex J, ¶120.

⁵⁰ e.g. in 2015 the Country Office Monitoring and Evaluation Tool (COMET) and the Logistics Execution Support System (LESS) were both introduced to supersede earlier corporate systems. See Annex J for more on WFP's evolving data systems.

compile. The difficulties encountered by the evaluation team in compiling data for this evaluation (described in detail in Annex J, ¶37 onwards) reflected basic weaknesses in the underlying monitoring and reporting system, but also an M&E unit that was clearly overstretched.

120. It is likely that more systematic efforts to use the data that WFP collects would lead to reconsideration of the indicators being used. The evaluation team found that the outcome data reported had very limited explanatory power (see the introduction to Annex I). Indicators like food consumption scores and dietary diversity and coping strategy indexes are difficult to interpret when the WFP operational area changes from year to year, as does the food security situation, and there is no comparison group which can tell us whether a change in, say, food consumption score is due to WFP activities or to particular circumstances in a particular geographic area at the time data was collected. Additional concerns apply to most WFP activities in Ethiopia:

- a) When programmes are government-led and involve multiple agencies, indicators may not represent outcomes over which WFP has significant control (the attribution problem).
- b) Delivery of food assistance is only one way in which WFP supports the overall effort. Other support – fund raising, logistics, assistance in coordination and capacity development – may be even more significant, but is rarely captured in standard outcome indicators.
- c) There are wider frameworks for M&E which may be at least as important as the monitoring by WFP itself. Thus, for example, the PSNP has its own system of robust evaluations, and WFP has much to learn from these too.

Monitoring and reporting in Somali region

121. The challenges faced by WFP in monitoring activities in Somali region were emphasised by WFP and its partners.⁵¹ During the emergency in 2016, there were over 1,200 food distribution points in Somali and it was a challenge for field monitors to reach each one at least every three months. Monitors prioritised points that experienced issues in the past or weren't recently visited. The scarcity of beneficiary lists has been a major limitation on effective monitoring and accountability. It was estimated that 60–70 percent of food distribution points that WFP manages don't have a registration list available (see Box 10 in Annex J). This is a very unusual circumstance in a protracted humanitarian situation. WFP attracts criticism for not reporting against beneficiary lists, but in practice this situation has been tolerated by the federal government and humanitarian partners collectively, and it requires joint action to insist on systematic beneficiary registration.

122. The WFP role in Somali is to partner with the Government on programme monitoring and provide capacity support particularly at woreda level and below. In 2017 the country office initiated the Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (MEAL) support in Somali region, which was to be fully rolled out in 2018 (WFP, 2017zd). This was a specific approach to strengthen the process monitoring of cash and food transfer activities, improve and enhance the timeliness and quality of reporting, and support the coordination, integration and complementarity of existing monitoring mechanisms and tools already in place. The MEAL approach involves Government, NGOs and WFP sitting together to bring consensus on M&E principles and to identify platforms upon which to share knowledge and to agree on indicators that can show what works and what does not.

⁵¹ Concerns are as much about accountability for the allocation of resources as about evidence of effectiveness and efficiency in their use.

Donor perspectives

123. Among donors, concerns were expressed not only about the quality and timeliness of reports from WFP but also about its attitude to transparency. Some donors were frustrated by a perception that WFP always wanted to put a positive spin on information, whereas it would be more helpful to acknowledge problems and show how they are being addressed. However, donors observed that WFP had made improvements recently.

Hiatus in country strategy

124. Preparation of a country strategy (although not mandatory during the evaluation period) can promote corporate reflection and learning. However, as chronicled in Annex K, there was no successor to the country strategy for 2012–2015; this inevitably meant that corporate learning was not as systematic as it could have been.

2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results

Overview and Approach

125. As already emphasised, most WFP activities in Ethiopia are integrated with wider programmes led by the Government and supported by a range of development partners. WFP explicitly aims to support wider humanitarian and development efforts not only through its own operations but also, no less importantly by supporting wider analysis and logistic systems that contribute to the overall response. It is therefore rarely possible to attribute outcomes specifically to WFP inputs: the aim rather must be to assess the WFP contribution to collective efforts. This section on performance and results therefore follows the logic of contribution analysis as well as the main components of the WFP portfolio, as follows:

- We start with the bigger picture – how effective have joint humanitarian efforts been in Ethiopia?
- We then consider WFP logistics and supply chain (drawing on Annex R), since this has played a major role in underpinning humanitarian response generally as well as in WFP operations.
- Subsequent sections follow the logic of the portfolio with sections on: support to food security and livelihoods (Annex L); support to refugees (Annex N); nutrition (Annex P); and school feeding (Annex Q). For each component we consider: the intended programme and its rationale; programme delivery and results; followed by an assessment against the criteria of effectiveness,⁵² efficiency⁵³ and sustainability.⁵⁴
- We then review internal⁵⁵ and external synergies⁵⁶ for the portfolio as a whole.
- We then bring gender issues together in a consolidated section.⁵⁷
- Similarly, we provide portfolio-wide comments on efficiency, and on sustainability.

⁵² cf. EQ11. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

⁵³ cf. EQ13. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?

⁵⁴ cf. EQ14. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

⁵⁵ cf. EQ15. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?

⁵⁶ cf. EQ16. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?

⁵⁷ cf. EQ12. To what extent has WFP contributed to the reduction of gender inequality in control over food, resources and decision-making?

The Bigger Picture – Effectiveness of Humanitarian Response in Ethiopia

126. Since 2015 Ethiopia has faced two major drought-related emergencies. All stakeholders consulted by the evaluation team emphasised the scale of the 2015/16 El Niño and 2016/17 Indian Ocean Dipole crises and highlighted the WFP contribution to the combined response by Government and humanitarian partners. Ethiopia experienced unprecedented need in 2016; the annual appeal identified 10.2 million people in need of emergency food assistance in addition to those supported under the Productive Safety Net Programme. Population densities in the area affected by the 2016/2017 drought are much lower and so the 2017 caseload was smaller; but many of those affected in Somali region experienced devastating livestock losses, wiping out livelihoods for many households.

127. Systematic humanitarian support to millions of people succeeded in averting famine. A recent study of country-wide nutrition data confirms the effectiveness of the El Niño response – see Box 5 below.

Box 5 Evidence of disaster averted

In 2015, Ethiopia experienced one of its worst droughts in decades. Hirvonen et al used nationally representative data from before and after this event to assess the drought's effect on chronic and acute child undernutrition.

In stark contrast with the earlier research on the droughts that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s: *"our findings suggest that the meteorological drought that occurred in 2015 did not translate into widespread catastrophe in terms of child undernutrition."*

There is strong evidence that the humanitarian response made the difference between drought and catastrophe. Firstly, the number of food/cash aid recipients doubled in 2015 relative to 2013 and this increased aid was largely directed to the areas hit by the drought. Secondly, however, chronic undernutrition rates did increase due to the drought in areas characterized by limited road network. *"Together, these findings highlight the role of road infrastructure in contributing to resilience as well as the efficiency of the humanitarian system in delivering and targeting aid in the country."*

Source: Hirvonen et al., 2018

128. The non-WFP stakeholders consulted for this evaluation all credited WFP with a major role in the successful humanitarian responses. They emphasised the overall contribution by WFP to the national logistics effort as well as its more limited role in direct aid delivery. WFP performance and results at the level of logistics and supply chain are considered next.

Logistics and Supply Chain⁵⁸


Intended programme and its rationale

129. The Country Strategy 2012–2015 recognised WFP logistics capacity as a vital contribution in Ethiopia, and envisaged greater emphasis on supporting national capacities for emergency response. WFP had to manage supplies for its own programmes (where delivery was dominated by, but not confined to, Somali region), but also had a role in supporting the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and the humanitarian logistics response as a whole. Deliveries in Somali region were based on the hubs and spokes system that was established to optimise the use of transport and warehousing. Capacity development for national logistics centred on the Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP). Both the hubs and spokes and FMIP were established before the evaluation period and continued throughout. WFP logistics and supply chain activities also embraced a number of Special Operations: one for construction of a bridge in Somali region, and three of wider relevance to national and cross-border logistics, namely

⁵⁸ This section draws particularly on Annex R.

support to the Logistics Cluster – activated in 2016 and 2017, construction of a humanitarian logistics hub in Djibouti, and operation of the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS).

Figure 19 General food assistance beneficiaries, planned vs actual 2012–2017



Source: WFP standard project reports.

130. Effective and efficient supply chain management is central to providing successful humanitarian assistance, and WFP humanitarian supply chain efforts have needed to respond quickly to multiple interventions. The El Niño and IOD droughts caused surges in humanitarian needs (illustrated in Figure 19 above), and responses had to take account of logistic bottlenecks and constraints.

131. Congestion in Djibouti has been a longstanding bottleneck for Ethiopia's imports, adding to the challenge of timely emergency responses; in the more recent years of the evaluation period, unrest in Oromia and on the borders between Oromia and Somali regions became a further obstacle. The WFP relationships with NDRMC, as its chief counterpart, and with the Somali Regional Government were particularly important.

Programme delivery – Somali region

132. WFP, in collaboration with NDRMC, continued the hubs and spokes for humanitarian supplies to Somali region. There were logistical and bureaucratic challenges to the timely delivery of assistance during the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Somali region during the early part of the evaluation period, when the time lag between assessment and distribution was regarded as unacceptable (Frankenberger et al, 2014). The timeliness of targeted supplementary feeding was also hindered by pipeline breaks and limited strategies for the prepositioning and secure storage of food. Guidelines for relief distribution in Somali region were strengthened, involving a system of beneficiary selection based on input from food distribution committees (FDCs), and agreed distribution arrangements between WFP, local officials and the FDC. Many of the issues identified earlier had been resolved by the end of 2017 (according to evaluation team interviews). Government officials regarded the system as having been effective, as it had greatly improved the timeliness of distributions, improved targeting, and reduced misuse. While NDRMC (and the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau – DPPB) provided guidance, WFP has been the main implementing organisation regarding transport and warehousing.

133. Ongoing challenges included insufficient local transport capacity for last mile deliveries (beyond the main routes), security escort requirements, poor road networks resulting in limited access in the rainy season, and remote delivery points. There was occasional reluctance on the part of commercial transporters to go into insecure or remote areas as they could make more money with larger consignments on the main

routes. WFP attempted to address this by supplementing its core fleet of off-road trucks with 20 6x4 (20 mt capacity) trucks⁵⁹ that had been operated in Sudan. In 2017, these trucks were transferred to Somali region DPPB management as part of a capacity building agreement. During the Jijjiga field visit, the evaluation team observed that this fleet was largely unserviceable due to poor maintenance and that new trailers that had been purchased by WFP for the trucks were of an incorrect specification and so could not be used.

134. WFP took several initiatives to address supply bottlenecks in Djibouti. These included pre-positioning using the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF),⁶⁰ borrowing from the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA), and – of great significance – reopening the Berbera supply route, which accounted for the majority of WFP imports in 2016 and 2017 (see Figure 68 in Annex R).

135. Construction of Geeldoh Bridge (through a special operation predominantly funded by DFID) was intended to reduce journey times for deliveries to remote woredas of Somali region, and also to create socio-economic benefits by connecting communities on either side of the Wabe Shebelle river. The bridge was completed in early 2017. By easing interactions between communities, it already appears to be producing socio-economic benefits. However the regional roads authority had not upgraded the approach roads by early 2018, and so the logistic gains of a shorter route for heavy lorries were yet to be realised.⁶¹

Programme delivery – Food Management Improvement Project and support to national logistics

136. By the end of the evaluation period the FMIP had been in existence for over eight years. Progress had been made in some areas, but challenges remained in others. Concerning the programme's five pillars:

- a) Framework contracting: from 2012, the project facilitated a road transport tendering process for the NDRMC to enable the contracting of trucking services under framework contracts (long term agreements) each with a validity of six months. This helped to reduce the time taken to arrange commodity transport services and deliveries to final delivery points. However, there were times when truck availability was reduced because truckers had more lucrative alternative work.
- b) The WFP logistics team collaborated with various authorities to develop and later enhance the Commodity Management Procedures Manual (CMPM) used at regional, zonal and woreda level distribution points as a management guide for humanitarian relief commodities and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The CMPM was supported by training programmes. There were varying levels of uptake, but overall the CMPM process is credited with helping to reduce the average time taken to conduct a food distribution 'round' from 60 days to 45 days.
- c) Supply-chain management training was provided for private sector personnel as well as government. The evaluation team considers that this has provided a good framework for improving skills and knowledge of the government's mid and senior level logistics managers.
- d) An internet-based Commodity Allocation and Tracking System (CATS) was introduced, aiming to improve pipeline management through better reporting and information management. Later in the period data management was also supported via the WFP Logistics Execution Support System (LESS). In both cases there were positive effects, although roll-out was not as rapid or as complete as intended.
- e) Over the evaluation period, assistance was provided to NDRMC to strengthen its warehouse network and logistics management (this also drew on the Logistics Cluster, discussed below). The

⁵⁹ The 20 IVECO trucks had been donated by the Canadian Government.

⁶⁰ See the analysis in Annex S.

⁶¹ See Annex R, ¶36ff for a full account.

country office also provided advice on supply chain improvements for the strategic food reserve authority.

137. A special operation supported the logistics cluster, which was activated from March 2016 to March 2017 to enhance emergency coordination and information sharing, identify logistics gaps and bottlenecks, and propose mitigating measures to the government (NDRMC) and other humanitarian actors to tackle the food security crisis. With an approved budget of USD 12.7 million, the cluster deployment was intended to supplement NDRMC capacity and fund the rehabilitation of storage facilities, the installation of temporary warehouses, and hire, pay and train 900 staff (through a human resources company). WFP also seconded personnel to the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority, the NDRMC and Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC). The logistics cluster deployment was regarded as unusual because it was activated to support the Government and not to provide direct logistics coordination for other humanitarian agencies.

138. Other special operations had intended benefits wider than Ethiopia, supporting the operation of UNHAS and the construction of a humanitarian logistics base in Djibouti.

Programme delivery: Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS)

139. The UNHAS special operations had three main objectives: to provide safe and efficient air access for the humanitarian community to remote locations; to ensure the necessary air capacity for medical and security evacuations; and to respond in a fast, efficient and flexible manner to changing needs. Cargo transportation was a key part of the services delivered, without which support to the refugee programme in Dollo Ado would have been challenging. During the evaluation period, UNHAS transported an average 7,249 passengers per year and 34,417 kilograms of miscellaneous cargo.⁶²

140. Evaluation team interviews confirmed that UNHAS frequently responded in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to the changing needs of the humanitarian community. The sometimes fluid security situation, poor infrastructure, long distances and lack of reliable commercial air transport to key locations in Somali region, necessitated the continuing presence of UNHAS. The evaluation team's detailed review (Annex R, ¶78–88) finds that WFP management of UNHAS was generally effective and efficient.

Programme delivery: the Djibouti logistics hub

141. The Djibouti hub is reviewed in detail in Annex S. It was conceived well before the evaluation period, with a land concession obtained from the Government of Djibouti in 2010. SO 200358 was approved in 2012. Construction was expected to be completed before the end of 2013, at a total cost of under USD 20 million. In the event, the project was constructed in two stages, with a separate contract for the bulk silos, and not completed until 2017, by which time costs had risen to almost USD 31.5 million. It was financed by various donors, but completion of the silos required two loans from the Common Budgetary Framework (CBF) totalling USD 5.4 million, which remains as a charge on the Ethiopia country office.

142. The hub was intended to relieve congestion at Djibouti port, with potential benefits for the wider humanitarian community in relation to other countries in the region as well as Ethiopia. It was expected to benefit the Government of Ethiopia too, offering opportunities, inter alia, for the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA). SPRs do not provide clear utilisation data, but the hub has not yet played its envisaged role in facilitating humanitarian grain imports to Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the major humanitarian crises of 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 were successfully addressed without significantly using it.

⁶² Separately, the UNHAS Ethiopia team also provided critical air support for WFP's South Sudan crisis response in order to implement airdrops to deliver food assistance to various locations. All activities in support of WFP South Sudan were funded through the relevant South Sudan budgets.

143. Interviews (in Rome, Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Nairobi) with those involved revealed differing opinions as to whether the hub was originally well-conceived and/or whether it still has relevance to the humanitarian needs of Ethiopia and the region. The evaluation team did not have the resources for a detailed study to resolve this question, but did consider possible lessons from the experience. Apart from already acknowledged lessons concerning delays in obtaining financing and completing construction, the evaluation team considers that such projects should, from the outset, include much more detailed assessments of risks and of possible alternative options that may affect the services provided; detailed management arrangements should also have been addressed much earlier.

Assessment

144. The evaluation team's overall assessment is that WFP logistics made an effective and extremely important contribution not only to the delivery of WFP programmes but to the government-led humanitarian logistics system as a whole. Ethiopia's ability to cope with the humanitarian demands generated by the El Niño and IOD crises was greatly assisted by efficiency gains in procurement and distribution, with lead times reduced by an estimated 74 percent. The GCMF was central to this (with advance procurement also reducing costs), but, as demonstrated by the case study in Annex S, its utilisation depended also on new advance facilities put in place by WFP headquarters and the use of storage facilities within Ethiopia, aided also by large-scale use of the Berbera corridor. The efficiency gains reflected astute management by the Ethiopia country office in exploiting the options available. WFP support to capacity development of NDRMC and the national logistics system generally was a significant contribution to sustainability. Infrastructure investments aimed at the reduction of transport costs (the Djibouti hub and Geeldoh bridge) were generally not successful within the period of the evaluation, although these may provide a future return on investment.

Food Security and Livelihoods⁶³

The intended programme and its rationale

145. WFP food assistance programming is closely linked to the government's system of humanitarian response and to its Productive Safety Net Programme. Most WFP activities are contributions to government-led programmes which are financially supported by multiple donors and technically supported by several development partners.

146. The rationale for continued WFP food assistance is that by supporting both the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance, WFP is able to support those suffering from chronic food insecurity (often the poorest) and those affected by shocks. As already noted, WFP operations have heavily focused on Somali region and to a lesser extent Afar, but some support – particularly in terms of cash for relief – has been programmed in other regions.

147. Elements of WFP assistance included:

- a) Vulnerability analysis, and the work that the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit does in order to generate data for both internal and external use and to support the Government of Ethiopia in its vulnerability analysis, early warning and needs assessment.
- b) Food assistance comprising both general food and cash distributions to relief beneficiaries and core food transfers to PSNP beneficiaries.

⁶³ This section draws mainly on Annex L.

- c) Food assistance for assets and other natural resource management focused technical support – through MERET, the PSNP or in dialogue with the sustainable land management programme.
- d) Interventions related to livelihoods and climate change..

Programme delivery and results

148. Vulnerability analysis: WFP contributions to early warning analysis were noted in ¶105 above. It has also promoted LEAP software. There is evidence that LEAP is used by NDRMC staff and other key stakeholders, but it is not yet fulfilling its main objective of triggering an early response to food security crises. In reality, humanitarian food assistance is almost always only provided on the basis of field assessments – and usually only the twice yearly seasonal assessments. Furthermore, plans that LEAP data might be disseminated to woredas for onward communication to farmers to allow them to mitigate the effects of droughts have not yet been operationalised. However, despite weaknesses, there is consensus that this tool is an important step in the right direction and that either it, or the learning from it, can form the basis of future directions. There is less evidence that woreda disaster risk profiles (WDRPs) – a government initiative which WFP and others have supported over many years – can ever achieve sufficient coverage or utility to play their desired role in woreda-level disaster risk reduction.


149. WFP frequently responds to NDRMC requests for support to training, the sharing of information and provision of key inputs into the seasonal assessments (both in preparatory activities for the assessments and in providing staff and vehicles to allow assessments to be carried out). NDRMC clearly states its appreciation for the support. However, it is widely agreed (including by key WFP staff) that there are significant constraints to government early warning and needs assessment processes and that substantial barriers to overcoming these constraints remain. WFP cannot be held responsible for the limited progress in this area, but nor can it claim that its investments have borne fruit.

150. Food assistance: as already noted, WFP played an important role in the humanitarian food assistance responses to the 2015/16 El Niño and 2016/17 Indian Ocean Dipole related crises. In addition to playing a substantial role in direct food assistance, WFP food assistance support included direct responsibility for food management in core operational areas, and the provision of 60,000 mt of food to NDRMC to address needs in other parts of the country. WFP also played a key role in supporting the coordination of the response, and was instrumental in increasing the efficiency of distribution in Afar and Somali regions. More generally, WFP has been active in supporting a “transition from relief assistance to support for the expansion and national ownership of long-term social-protection programmes” (WFP, 2015z). WFP has also worked with other PSNP donors to support the evolution of the PSNP into a scalable safety net programme through consolidating PSNP and humanitarian food assistance operations. Recently, it supported implementation of an integrated humanitarian food assistance and PSNP response through a pilot humanitarian cash transfer in two zones of Somali region – using PSNP modalities.⁶⁴

151. Figure 20 and Figure 21 below show general food distribution and PSNP beneficiaries. The former shows the scaling up in response to drought in 2015 and 2016. By contrast, WFP was assisting fewer PSNP beneficiaries at the end of the period than initially, because its support is now limited to Afar and Somali regions.


⁶⁴ This has not proved straightforward – see the discussion in Annex S.

Figure 20 Ethiopian nationals: general food distribution beneficiaries 2012–2017



Source: SPRs 2012-2017 for PRRO 200712 and 200290. Assumes no double counting between PRRO 200712 and 200290 in 2015.

Figure 21 Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) beneficiaries 2012–2017




Source: SPRs 2012-2017. PRRO 200712 and 200290. May include a small number of R4 beneficiaries. Not clear.

152. As explained in ¶120 above, use of the outcome indicators from standard project reports PROVIDES only limited insights into the effectiveness of WFP activities to support humanitarian relief and the PSNP. The reported indicators are difficult to interpret, and direct delivery by WFP of relief and safety net support in certain geographic areas is only a part of its overall contribution. Box 6 below illustrates this point.

Box 6 Interpreting food consumption scores of relief beneficiaries

The graph below compares available data on food consumption score of relief beneficiaries with the cut-offs outlined in the 2012 PRRO document (WFP, 2011h). In at least half the years the threshold was not met and in two of the other three years it was only met by male household members. This can tell us that WFP is not meeting its objectives of ensuring “adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households,” and it is particularly not meeting its objectives during crisis years (2017 was probably the worst year for the main WFP operational area). It cannot tell us more than that because: the WFP operational area changes from year to year, as does the food security situation, and there is no comparison group which can tell us whether the changes in food consumption score can be attributed to WFP or to particular circumstances in a particular geographic area at the time data was collected



Source: SPRs(cf. Annex I).

153. WFP is in an unenviable position regarding its support to both PSNP and general food assistance. It is caught between donor expectations about standards of implementation (such as targeting) and a reality of government frontline implementation. The WFP focus on Somali and Afar, regions with lower capacity and greater governance issues, exacerbates the gap between expectations and reality. There is substantial evidence that the quality of PSNP operations in Somali and Afar lags significantly behind operations in other regions. Repeated PSNP process evaluations highlight weaknesses, and PSNP impact assessments show very poor targeting outcomes in these regions. WFP does not have authority over government frontline implementers, and therefore cannot be held responsible for these deficiencies, but there is a strong feeling among external stakeholders that WFP could and should do more to persuade and support government implementers to improve performance.

154. WFP is well aware of the seasonality of need in different parts of Ethiopia and has provided technical support to the pastoral regions' governments to adjust PSNP transfer schedules; however, it has been unable to reflect this understanding in the timing of its general food assistance distributions. More positively, WFP has directly engaged in support to the governments of Afar and Somali to make adjustments to their transfer (and public works) schedules to better reflect the timing of needs.

155. WFP is increasingly using the PSNP as a platform for other parts of its portfolio. Examples include: (i) the targeting of rural resilience interventions to PSNP beneficiaries and the use of similar PSNP public works modalities to allow households to 'earn' a portion of their insurance premium; (ii) the plan that any payouts under the satellite index insurance programme will be targeted to PSNP beneficiaries and, again, the use of PSNP modalities (including public works) to channel these payments.; and (iii) the nutrition voucher programme to address stunting which will also be targeted to PSNP beneficiaries to explore whether such an approach can improve the nutrition impact of the PSNP.

156. Food assistance for assets and other technical support focused on natural resource management:
- a) The MERET programme was long regarded as a flagship, and previous evaluations have pointed to the significant positive impact of MERET on improving the livelihoods and resilience of participating communities. However, throughout the period of the evaluation, MERET failed to achieve the planned financing levels and therefore fell significantly short of planned targets, before eventually being discontinued in 2016.⁶⁵
 - b) WFP also supported public works through the PSNP. However, WFP support to the PSNP is largely confined to Afar and Somali regions where capacity is lower and public works implementation does not meet the same quality standards found elsewhere in Ethiopia (BDS, 2018 and Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). WFP cannot be held accountable for these deficiencies: front line public works are the responsibility of the Government and all PSNP development partners have a shared obligation to support improvements. WFP did recently provide significant support to the publication of Pastoral Public Works Guidelines. Also recently, WFP has provided support to the regional Governments of Afar and Somali to a) review their transfer and public works schedules (as discussed above) and b) undertake analysis to inform realistic public works objectives according to different clusters of woredas.
157. Separate livelihoods and climate change related interventions:⁶⁶
- a) The Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) programme, a collaboration with Oxfam, has made encouraging progress in piloting an approach that links climate insurance to public works. Coverage has increased and there have been refinements to the insurance indices along with progress in other activities related to disaster risk reduction. An impact evaluation of the programme in Tigray covering the period 2012–2016 had largely positive findings (Madajewicz et al., 2017). It found: (i) R4 is helping smallholder households, particularly those headed by women, to reduce the impact of drought on food security; (ii) R4 is supporting enhanced food security through increased savings and borrowing, and through diversification away from cereal production; but (iii) little evidence that R4 is improving agricultural production.
 - b) The Rural Women Economic Empowerment programme (a multi-country Rome-based agency collaboration, supporting rural women in agricultural production and income diversification) began operations in 2014 and WFP is now reaching 2,500 women (58 percent of the target) in three woredas of Oromia region and one woreda of Afar. Annual reports claim strong outcome indicators, such as large increases in agricultural yields, but the methodological basis for these claims is unclear.
 - c) The Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIPE) was still in its preparatory phase, but it will launch in 2018 with a concurrent impact evaluation.

⁶⁵ There were earlier hopes MERET might be handed over to Government as a going concern to be continued. In reality however, it came was terminated fairly abruptly once the country office decided it could no longer support it in the absence of external funding.

⁶⁶ The three interventions mentioned here are all discussed at more length in Annex L, ¶33ff.

Approaches to resilience⁶⁷

158. The country office's ability to reflect on resilience issues was limited by its preoccupation with humanitarian crises which coincided with restructuring and downsizing of the country office. There is, therefore, a feeling that a resilience approach is very relevant to the Ethiopia context, and that the WFP portfolio in Ethiopia includes a number of resilience related programmes but that there is much scope for more thinking about how to operationalise resilience within its Ethiopia programme.

159. The country office tends to think of resilience programming mainly in terms of household and livelihood focused interventions. Such interventions may be important in supporting enhanced resilience, but they are not the only such interventions. Several stakeholders pointed to WFP work on logistics and the supply chain for humanitarian food assistance as perhaps the most innovative support by WFP to enhanced resilience. They observed that this work drew on the logistics strengths of WFP and was underserved by other institutions.

Assessment

160. Vulnerability analysis work by WFP made a useful contribution to needs assessments by Government and its partners, as well as to analysis of WFP programmes. Although the MERET programme faded out, WFP continued to play an effective role in food security support through the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance, particularly in Somali and Afar regions. The programmes to which WFP contributed made a big difference to beneficiaries' ability to survive a major drought. However, these programmes, in design and delivery, need to be tailored more effectively to the nature and timing of needs in lowland pastoral areas. WFP made more progress in identifying the necessary changes than in securing their implementation. The discrete WFP livelihoods and climate related projects, although small-scale, are useful pilots for various approaches to resilience. However, WFP should not overlook the relevance of its core logistics and emergency preparedness roles to resilience on a national scale.

Support to refugees⁶⁸


Intended programme and its rationale

161. PRROs 200700 and 200365 were similar in objectives and strategy, focusing on meeting refugees' minimum nutritional needs, with general food assistance complemented by targeted supplementary feeding and school feeding. WFP worked closely with the relevant government agency, ARRA, and with UNHCR. Due to constraints on funding, WFP assistance has been dominated by relief, with only very limited resource allocation towards recovery. The refugee programme accounted for about 23 percent of expenditure over the evaluation period (Figure 5 above). Donor funding covered approximately 56 percent of planned expenditure on refugees during the evaluation period, and there was a growing gap between requirements and funds obtained (Figure 22 below), although actual beneficiaries were much closer to anticipated numbers.

⁶⁷ The evaluation team's review of how resilience concepts are being operationalised by WFP in Ethiopia is summarised in Annex M.

⁶⁸ This section draws mainly on Annex N.

Figure 22 Refugee operations, beneficiary numbers and budgets 2012 –2017



Source: WFP financial database.

Programme delivery and results


162. Adaptation and innovations: During the evaluation period, WFP had to adapt its refugee assistance to changing patterns and rising levels of refugee need. There was a resurgence of Somali refugees, requiring upscaling of assistance in Dollo Ado at the beginning of the period, then the major influx from South Sudan generating the increased caseload in Gambella shown in Figure 23 below. This took place against a background of increased humanitarian requirements globally and, apparently, growing difficulty in raising the resources needed to ensure sufficient food assistance to refugees in Ethiopia. This in turn led to substantial ration cuts, and the risk of more to come.

163. There was innovation as well as adaptation:

- WFP took the lead in introducing biometric systems, which are credited with a major role in increasing the efficiency of refugee assistance. They led to a sharp reduction in the numbers of eligible beneficiaries.
- There was increasing use of cash alongside food in kind (see ¶170 and Figure 17 above).
- There was some work on refugee livelihoods, engaging with host communities in the process.

164. Caseload: During the CPE period, allowing for fluctuations, the scale, distribution and significance of refugee response has increased, although actual beneficiaries were slightly fewer than planned initially in each PRRO (Figure 22 above). Figure 23 below shows the trend in caseload, including the massive increase in refugee numbers in Gambella.

Figure 23 WFP refugee caseload (actual) by region, 2012-2017




Source: WFP Ethiopia CO dataset.

Note: WFP supports all refugees registered to the refugee camps so the change in refugee caseload reflects the change in number of refugees requiring assistance from WFP by region.

165. Outcome indicators: the outcome indicators for WFP refugee programmes are collated in Annex I (see indicators #71-97 in Table 18). These focus on the coping strategy index (CSI), dietary diversity, and food consumption scores (FCS), as well as other summary data on nutrition and school feeding indicators. Data reported in SPRs are, naturally, aggregated across refugee camps. However, with support from the regional bureau, the country office has recently undertaken an analysis of its refugee operations from 2015 based on distribution and post-distribution monitoring reports (WFP, 2018e). These data allow more granular analysis than the summary indicators provided in the SPRs. Figure 24 below, reproduced from this recent analysis, illustrates the variations in outcomes across different geographical groups of refugees.

Figure 24 Refugee food security snapshot by area (2015–2018)



Source: reproduced from WFP, 2018e.

166. Key findings from the same review are reproduced in Box 7 below. (Findings on refugee nutrition are elaborated in the nutrition section that follows.)

Box 7 WFP support to refugees: key findings as reported by a review of monitoring reports, 2015–2018

- **Food security** of WFP beneficiaries under the refugee operations has remained rather stable since 2015. Of WFP beneficiaries, 90 percent fall into the acceptable and borderline food consumption categories. Households consume 4.5 food groups on average. Frequency of adoption of negative consumption coping strategies has decreased over time.
- **Effectiveness & Efficiency.** Food security is extremely sensitive to food distribution and utilization. The longer the interval between the distribution and the interview, the worse is the food consumption score. And food security is worse if less of the entitlement is used.
- **Resilience Approach.** Beneficiaries who have an income source alternative to WFP assistance also have better food consumption scores and tend to adopt negative coping strategies less frequently. This demonstrates the importance of adopting a resilience approach in dealing with food insecurity.
- **Food security trends are sensitive to geographical breakdown.** In Mekelle, Jigjiga, and Dollo Ado sub-office areas, the food consumption score has improved over time, and dietary diversity score performs well, while for the Gambella, Semera, Assosa sub-offices the proportion of beneficiaries with poor food consumption score has increased and dietary diversity is limited.
- **Assistance Modality.** The more cash received, the better is the beneficiaries' food security.⁶⁹ Beneficiaries who receive combination of cash and food are also performing better with regards to some protection indicators (information provision, safety issues, etc.).
- **Nutrition.** Households with pregnant and lactating women enrolled in blanket supplementary feeding programmes, as well as households with a caregiver receiving messages on child feeding and care practices, also have better food consumption scores.
- **Gender & Protection.** Female respondents, beneficiaries who more frequently face safety and other issues, and beneficiaries with limited knowledge about WFP operation are also the most food insecure. Additional attention is required for these categories of beneficiaries.

Source: WFP, 2018e.

167. It is notable that indicators for Gambella were consistently the worst during the period. This does not necessarily imply worse performance by WFP, as it may reflect the greater challenges that recent arrivals from South Sudan have faced. However, it does highlight that some groups of refugees have greater needs than others.

Assessment

168. **Effectiveness:** WFP programmes of support to refugees have generally been effective. WFP and key partners (ARRA and UNHCR) responded to very substantial and, at times, rapid increases in refugee numbers during the period. The main challenge for effectiveness has been the growing scarcity of resources, leading to ration cuts in recent years and the threat of further ration cuts to come.

169. **Efficiency:** The scarcity of funding for food assistance to refugees naturally increases pressure for the most efficient use of resources available. WFP has made very significant contributions to increased efficiency, through its support to biometric registration, and through increased use of cash-based transfers. As well as strengthening the management of food assistance, the introduction of biometrics has significantly reduced the numbers claiming food assistance. However, there is now a very large divergence between the total numbers of refugees reported by UNHCR, and the numbers successfully claiming food assistance from

⁶⁹ This finding shows a suggestive association between cash provision and levels of food security, but a more rigorous study (using a counterfactual) would be needed to prove causality.

WFP. This has led donors to press forcefully for a reconciliation of the data sets. Whilst the process of data alignment has started, continuing gaps in consistently reliable numbers creates a risk that lack of credibility on refugee numbers could hamper fund-raising, especially with leading donors.

170. Sustainability: An apparently more stringent funding environment poses a direct threat to refugee welfare. There are signs of a very significant review of government approaches to refugees, embodied in the Road Map for implementing the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (ARRA 2018). In the long run this could allow refugees to be more self-reliant, but it will not quickly transform humanitarian obligations. In particular, policies that favour viable and effective livelihood opportunities, including jobs, are not yet evident, and will take time to make a big difference.

Nutrition Programmes⁷⁰

Intended programmes and their rationale

171. WFP programmes for Ethiopian nationals and for refugees both have important nutrition components, to which common themes apply. This section considers them in more detail. Nutrition programmes accounted for approximately 18 percent of all beneficiaries (both planned and actual – Figure 6 above).


172. The WFP nutrition programme for Ethiopian nationals mainly focuses on humanitarian response through targeted supplementary feeding programmes to treat moderate acute malnutrition in children and all acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women. Most of this programme addresses needs identified in Humanitarian Requirements Documents. WFP supports operations across the country in Priority 1 hotspot woredas. Where there are additional aggravating factors, such as disease outbreak, Priority 2 woredas are also included. WFP also occasionally supports blanket supplementary feeding programmes to prevent increases in acute malnutrition.

173. Figure 25 shows planned⁷¹ and actual beneficiaries of targeted supplementary feeding through the PRROs for Ethiopian nationals. Numbers rose from a low of just under 2 million in 2014 to a peak of almost 2.6 million in response to the El Niño crisis in 2016. Because of the surge in needs, actual beneficiary numbers exceeded those planned in both 2016 and 2017.

⁷⁰ This section draws mainly on Annex P.

⁷¹ In some cases initial projections were lower than the final plan, which in turn was sometimes overtaken by actual requirements and deliveries.

Figure 25 Ethiopian nationals: planned and actual beneficiaries from targeted supplementary feeding, 2012–2017



Source: SPRs – full details in Annex P, Table 39.

174. The WFP nutrition programme for refugees is part of the Government’s support to refugees and focuses on prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition through targeted or blanket supplementary feeding with provision of specialised nutrition products to partners to deliver these services. The rationale for these programmes was that global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates in refugee camps are generally high and, amongst newly arrived refugees, they are often well above emergency thresholds. Blanket supplementary feeding was planned in all camps for pregnant and lactating women and children aged 6–23 months. Where GAM rates were above 15 percent the blanket feeding extended to children aged 24–59 months. The programme aimed to prevent spikes in acute malnutrition. Table 1 below shows that total beneficiaries in most years were close to or exceeded planned numbers. However, the detailed numbers in Annex P show that the relationship between planned and actual numbers is not very meaningful, since in several years there were significant actual numbers in some sub-categories where no target had been set.

Table 1 Targeted supplementary feeding beneficiaries, refugees, 2012–2017

Year	Planned	Actual	% planned v actual
2012	40,900	39,900	98%
2013	23,100	43,217	187%
2014	90,800	67,600	74%
2015	105,300	106,850	101%
2016	105,300	109,864	104%
2017	107,313	109,904	102%

Source: Refugee PRRO SPRs. Full details in Annex P, Table 45.

175. Other nutrition activities included an urban HIV nutrition and food security project that was designed to mitigate the impacts of HIV on adults and children, and a project to support local production of a chick-pea based ready-to-use supplementary food (RUSF). The more recent PRRO included a focus on

prevention of stunting: a fresh food voucher project has been developed but its implementation will fall outside the evaluation's timeframe.

Programme delivery and results

176. Ethiopian nationals: Ability to assess performance is limited by lack of good data both on the details of programme delivery and on nutrition outcomes. Box 8 below explains the available data. Field monitoring focused mainly on supply⁷² and findings were not generally shared outside WFP.

Box 8 Targeted supplementary feeding programmes: performance 2012–2017

Outcome indicators were reported only for the woredas implementing second-generation targeted supplementary feeding or using mobile health and nutrition teams and NGO-supported programme.* As shown below, these programmes met the Sphere standard of >75 percent recovery rate in every year except the first year, 2012. Default rates were below 15 percent and mortality rates under 3 percent, which was also in line with Sphere standards. Non-response rates remained high and it was thought internally and externally that this was due to the sharing and selling of rations.

The evaluation team was unable to obtain data to assess what percentage of the overall targeted supplementary feeding these programmes represented, but they are known to have been a small proportion for most of the evaluation period, and there is reason to believe that first-generation programmes are less effective.

Year	Recovery rate (%)	Mortality rate (%)	Default rate (%)	Non-response rate (%)
2012	64.4	0.4	1.5	
2013	83.2	1.4	1.2	
2014	93.7	0.1	1.9	4.3
2015	95.4	0	2.2	2.4
2016	93	0	3	4
2017	95.8	0.01	1.92	2.25
End target	>75	< 3	<15	<15

Source: Relief PRRO SPRs 2012-2017

*The programmes keeping outcome data require additional funding and are often short-term (e.g. three months). As a result, the number of programmes able to report properly was constantly changing; it would have required very effective data management to keep track of this.

177. WFP played a large role in the humanitarian responses to the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 crises, which undoubtedly saved lives. For 2015, there was an initial projection of 507,643 requiring targeted supplementary feeding. However, the estimated needs had risen to 700,000 in the hotspot classification in August and to 2.2 million by the end of the year. WFP scaled up its response from 519,258 beneficiaries in 2015 to close to three times that number in 2016 and nearly five times that number in 2017. (Figure 25 above). However, the targeted supplementary feeding response in 2015/2016 was very late, reflecting delays in donor funding and bottlenecks in commodity delivery. A surge in SAM rates is considered to have been partly the result of delays in MAM treatment.

178. WFP contributed to strengthening the humanitarian nutrition response by advocating improved approaches to targeted supplementary feeding and by advocating a ‘bundle’ approach in responding to high malnutrition rates; this aimed to ensure that other causes of malnutrition, such as lack of access to water and sanitation, were factored into response plans where the caseload of SAM and MAM was high.

⁷² Field monitors visited regularly, but reports from partners and a review of the monitoring checklists indicate that the predominant focus was on stock management and much less focus was given to other issues affecting the quality of programme delivery such as whether measurements were taken correctly, whether staff followed protocols, and the referrals or continuum of care between MAM and SAM treatment programmes.

WFP piloting of a "Second Generation" approach to targeted supplementary feeding paved the way towards integrated MAM treatment. Second-generation targeted supplementary feeding is closer to the international standard approach of delivery through the health system and this pilot involved routine identification of beneficiaries and nutritional monitoring by the health extension workers, more timely delivery of food to targeted individuals through the creation of decentralised food distribution centres at the kebele level close to the beneficiaries, and prepositioning of food three months in advance.⁷³ This also led to an improved continuum of care between SAM and MAM treatment. Following this demonstration of an improved model, a task force was established to integrate MAM treatment into the health system. Although there has been strong recent progress in moving this agenda forward, this was slower than expected. The initial plan for the pilot was to scale up the programme to 100 woredas by 2014, but it will be 2018 before scale-up takes place.

179. WFP negotiated the introduction of improved nutrition products. However this involved ceasing use of locally produced corn soya blend (CSB), which had been found to be of poor quality. The pilot programme for local production of ready-to-use supplementary food did not lead to local procurement because of high local prices of chick-peas.

180. HIV/AIDS urban programme: Initial target beneficiary numbers for this programme (up to 290,000 in 2013) were never achieved, and the target was reduced to match the actual numbers of around 100,000 before the project was scaled down on 2016, its final year.⁷⁴ However, WFP achieved good outcomes for people living with HIV and AIDS in this programme. Adherence to anti-retroviral therapy was 96 percent or above in all the years measured, the nutritional recovery rate was above 80 percent and survival rate at 12 months was 99 percent in all three years where this was measured. Nutrition recovery rates improved from 18.8 percent at baseline to 81 percent in 2016, and improvements were made in food consumption scores from baseline. The programme pioneered the use of cash-based transfers in an urban setting.⁷⁵

181. Key findings on refugee nutrition:

- a) The refugee nutrition programme is generally of higher quality than that for Ethiopian nationals; the programme follows international standards and protocols and improved products were introduced earlier than in the national programme.
- b) There were some shortfalls in planned targeted supplementary feeding beneficiary numbers. However it is difficult to assess the significance of the shortfall, because the criteria for calculating malnutrition rates appear to have been different from the those used in screening for admission to targeted supplementary feeding.⁷⁶
- c) The programme met performance targets in terms of outcomes, although numbers included in both targeted and blanket feeding were lower than planned.

⁷³ For a fuller account of the evolution of First and Second Generation approaches from the earlier Enhanced Outreach Service (EOS) approach, see Annex P, ¶22–24.

⁷⁴ Precise details are in Annex P, Table 42.

⁷⁵ For more details see Annex P, ¶83ff.

⁷⁶ As noted in Annex P, successive SPRs cited the use of weight-for-height data to calculate malnutrition rates whereas screening and admission were predominantly using MUAC. Rates of acute malnutrition when calculated using weight-for-height can be as much as double or triple that found using MUAC, contributing to poor target setting. While overestimations can prevent stock out of supplies, they can also mask incorrect admissions to the programmes which, in the context of funding constraints should be prevented as much as possible.

- d) Malnutrition rates did not go up as expected following ration cuts. Ration cuts began in 2015, but malnutrition did not significantly increase. This may be in part due to blanket supplementary feeding and other programmes in the camps such as the provision of improved water sources. However, it is surprising and should be investigated further. Impacts on stunting may yet emerge. (At the same time, there are significant variations in food security trends across different geographical areas – as illustrated in Figure 24 above.)
- e) Pilots of cash transfers were promising for preventing malnutrition. Dietary diversity scores were higher in the camps where WFP provided cash, as refugees could purchase more meat, eggs, fruits and vegetables. Re-sales of food commodities were significantly reduced in the camps receiving cash transfers, and the WFP ration overall lasted longer. Malnutrition rates were found to be lower for camps where cash was combined with food than in the food-only camps.
- f) WFP was not seen to be playing a leading role in refugee nutrition. While the coordination with key agencies such as UNHCR and UNICEF at field level has been good, the WFP staff leading on nutrition were field monitors, not nutrition specialists.

Assessment

182. **Effectiveness:** By scaling up its humanitarian nutrition programming in response to large-scale crises, particularly between 2015–2017, WFP undoubtedly helped to save lives. However, challenges with programme timeliness (including the delayed targeted supplementary feeding response in 2015/2016), quality and scale likely limited the effectiveness of the programme. Second-generation targeted supplementary feeding and the targeted supplementary feeding programme for refugees were effective at treating MAM.

183. **Efficiency:** Global evidence suggests that treatment of acute malnutrition is one of the most cost-effective public health interventions in terms of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) as it treats a life-threatening condition at relatively low cost in young children (who therefore have many possible healthy years ahead of them). WFP has promoted improved and integrated approaches to treatment: the move to monthly screening and delivery of targeted supplementary feeding is likely more efficient as malnourished children are detected earlier and enrolled in the programme more rapidly. They are therefore likely to be less malnourished and treatment should take less time, using fewer resources. However, the slow roll-out of second-generation treatment can be expected to have slowed efficiency gains.

184. **Sustainability:** Delivery of programmes through government systems increases the sustainability of the WFP nutrition programmes. However, capacity-building during this time was quite sporadic and product-focused. Reliance on imports of specialised foods also limits the sustainability of the programmes. The health system integration, local production pilot and WFP work on food safety and on an improved approach to supplementary feeding are good examples of moving towards a more sustainable model.

School Feeding⁷⁷

Intended programme and its rationale

185. School feeding has long been a WFP signature activity, globally and in Ethiopia. Figure 6 above shows that school feeding (including take-home rations) accounted for about 9 percent of total beneficiaries (planned and actual) over the period 2012–2017. It was included in CP 200253, with three main components:

⁷⁷ This section is distilled from Annex Q.


- a) The largest component was the school feeding programme in Afar and Somali regions, funded by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) through its McGovern-Dole programme; this included take-home rations (THR) for girls as well as school meals. It covered 292,249 children (of whom 45 percent were girls) in 590 schools in Afar and Somali; this represented just under one third of the primary school children in these two regions.
- b) A smaller home-grown school feeding (HGSF) programme continued in Southern and Oromia regions. It built on the WFP Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme; the HGSF programme links the existing school feeding programme demand with local agricultural production through the provision of locally produced food purchased from smallholder farmers through their Cooperative Unions. It also aims to build the Government's capacity to plan and manage a sustainable national school feeding programme. This programme is primarily supported by WFP with contributions from the Southern and Oromia regional governments; it currently target 139,000 students in 286 schools (WFP, 2017w).
- c) Continued efforts to foster national school feeding capacity were funded in part through the McGovern-Dole programme. As well as advocacy by the country office, staff were seconded to the Ministry of Education.

186. In addition successive PRROs for support to refugees included school feeding components in all refugee camps, and the urban HIV/AIDS project included a school feeding element.

Programme delivery and results

187. Total beneficiaries and tonnage are shown in Figure 26 below. The shortfall in actual tonnage exceeds the shortfall in beneficiaries, implying that beneficiaries received fewer meals than intended.

Figure 26 School feeding: total beneficiaries and tonnage 2012–2017



Source: SPRs.

188. Outputs and outcome data for school feeding, as reported by SPRs, are presented in Annex I. However, few of these data are available consistently over the whole period, and the breakdown between different school feeding operations is not shown; they are therefore of limited value for this evaluation. The recent impact evaluation of the McGovern-Dole programme (Mokoro, 2018b) is more useful; its quasi-experimental design allowed rigorous comparison of participating schools with nearby non-participating schools.

189. School feeding programme in Afar and Somali regions: Quantitative and qualitative data from the impact evaluation consistently underscored significant outcome and impact level results and provided a convincing case for the importance of school feeding for areas that are severely affected by food insecurity. The evidence demonstrates that school feeding, supplemented by specific interventions targeted at girl students, improves inclusiveness, participation and achievements in education. Specifically, the statistical analysis comparing schools with school feeding with those without showed that:

- In both Afar and Somali regions, enhanced enrolment was associated with school feeding, and schools with school feeding had a significantly more favourable gender parity index than those without school feeding.

- Grade repetition rates were consistently lower in school feeding schools in Somali region than in schools outside the programme, although there was more limited evidence of this effect in Afar.
- Completion rates were significantly higher for the programme schools than for non-programme schools with a difference to the magnitude of 10 percent in Afar and Somali. This improvement was higher for girls than for boys.
- Additional important outcomes included higher food consumption scores for boys and girls, as well as better perceived attentiveness and lower absenteeism in the programme schools.

190. These results have to be seen in the context of the very difficult environment of regions with low capacity, and the many difficulties entailed by operating in pastoral areas under stress. In these circumstances, school feeding also constitutes an important value transfer to poor households.

191. The McGovern-Dole programme experienced major difficulties, and key relationships were undermined, when the Somali authorities, without authorisation from WFP or the USDA, diverted USDA commodities to schools within the Government's emergency school feeding programme (for details see Box 21 in Annex Q).

192. School feeding for refugees: This was intended both to incentivise school attendance and to provide additional nutritional support to families. The output data recorded at national level (Annex I, Table 17, indicators #171ff) are patchy. The narratives accompanying outcome data (Table 18, indicators #91–97) indicate that school enrolment rates in the refugee camps remain unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, there is consensus among staff and beneficiaries that school feeding is an important incentive for attendance and an additional support to families under nutritional stress. In line with this perspective, school feeding has so far been exempted from the ration cuts discussed in Annex N.

193. The home-grown school feeding programme: This has attracted interest from other regional governments, and, most notably, it inspired an emergency school feeding programme initiated and financed by the Government as part of its drought response after El Niño. This targeted up to 2.8 million children and appears to have been an effective component of humanitarian response (see full discussion in Annex Q, ¶154–63).

Assessment

194. Effectiveness: The effectiveness of the school feeding programme in Afar and Somali has been demonstrated by the recent impact evaluation, including evidence of the particular effectiveness of efforts to support girls' education through take-home rations (Mokoro, 2018b). However, the programme needs a more effective and reliable monitoring, reporting and evaluation system. The HGSP pilot helped inspire the Government's emergency school feeding programme (ESFP), which has been a valuable component of the humanitarian response to recent drought. WFP is also credited with considerable technical and practical support to the ESFP. More generally, WFP is credited for supporting efforts to strengthen government capacity; its technical assistance was considered to be very relevant and appropriate.

195. Efficiency: The impact evaluation found that efficiency of the McGovern-Dole programme could have been greater if targeting had used a cluster approach. Long lead times in procurement, logistics and organisation because of various constraints related to internal capacity and the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Education are a major challenge. The HGSP pilot achieved a significant reduction in per-pupil costs (from USD 0.18/child/day to USD 0.15/child/day) although this is still higher than planned.

196. Sustainability: The impact evaluation concluded that the McGovern-Dole programme's many positive effects on households – who live in extremely precarious conditions – cannot be sustained once

the programme is discontinued as households would have to find the means to offset the loss of income that the school feeding and take-home rations represent. The Government is not yet ready to finance and efficiently run a national school feeding programme, though there is clearly growing interest and commitment to establish a sustainable national school feeding programme in Ethiopia.

WFP contribution to gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE)⁷⁸

The WFP gender strategy in Ethiopia⁷⁹

197. The 2009 Gender Policy (WFP, 2009c) guided WFP Ethiopia during the first half of the period under evaluation. It attempted to shift from “commitments to women” to a more comprehensive understanding of gender, but the subsequent gender policy evaluation (Betts et al., 2014) found that it failed to develop a comprehensive and shared understanding of what gender means within WFP. The revised WFP Gender Policy 2015–2020 (WFP, 2015c) addresses previous weaknesses to reinforce a gender- rather than women-focused approach. The Nairobi regional bureau prepared an implementation strategy to guide country offices in operationalising the new policy. In 2016 the regional bureau conducted a gender baseline study in Ethiopia (WFP, 2016v) which informed the Country Gender Action Plan for 2017–2020 (WFP, 2017l). Its objectives include:

- Improving depth and quality of gender analysis and reporting related to the WFP areas of intervention, to better adapt food assistance to the needs and capacities of women, men, girls and boys.
- Strengthening beneficiary engagement and supporting government capacities to incorporate a gender perspective and promote equal participation in food and nutrition security programmes.
- Increasing women’s and girls’ decision-making for the benefit of food and nutrition security.
- Mainstreaming gender and protection considerations into existing modalities and innovations.

198. The implementation of the country gender action plan requires transformative change in the country office in functional areas of human resources, staff capacity strengthening, communications, knowledge and information management, and accountability. This includes the establishment of a gender results network (GRN) in the country office, convened by Head of Programmes.

199. The reorientation of WFP gender strategy within Ethiopia is still in its early stages, and could not be expected to have had much influence on the portfolio for most of the period from 2012–2017.

Gender analysis and reporting

200. Country Programme, PRRO and EMOP programme/project documents and SPRs provide sex-disaggregated beneficiary data for all of the evaluation period and SPRs report against gender indicators.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ cf. EQ12. To what extent has WFP contributed to the reduction of gender inequality in control over food, resources and decision-making?

⁷⁹ A full gender analysis is provided in Annex T.

⁸⁰ Such as the following noted in Annex 8 to the CPE TOR:

1. Proportion of households where females and males together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.
2. Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.
3. Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.
4. Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees.

However, in some cases, particularly capacity enhancement, disaster management and social protection, the language and indicators used are presented in non-gender terms, with no mention of focusing capacity building on beneficiary women and bringing them more into management and decision-making roles.

201. The later SPR reports (from 2015 onwards), demonstrate increased gender-sensitive monitoring by WFP, with cross-cutting strategic outcomes. However, reporting of the gender outcome indicators was inconsistent. Gender indicators were lost in 2016 as survey questionnaires were shortened to focus on key food security outcomes to understand how households were faring in the face of drought. Since 2016, WFP has collected data on who in the household makes decisions over the use of cash, vouchers and food; but this is difficult to interpret in a meaningful way. The two years for which data are available show such significantly different results that it is difficult to conclude what data best reflect reality, let alone the extent to which WFP has influenced the results.

202. The changes to the M&E system in 2015/2016 (Annex J) also brought changes to the quality of sex-disaggregated data, with new M&E checklists which ensured sex-disaggregated data throughout. Sub-office staff reported that they had received training on collecting and analysing gender-based information.

203. However, it was consistently reported that real mainstreaming and analysis of sex-disaggregated data to inform programmatic decision making was lacking. This was reflected in the lack of analytical evidence in project reports, and more generally in weak contextual analysis of gender issues.

204. WFP works alongside the Government and other partners on data collection and many vulnerability analysis and monitoring activities are not directly implemented by WFP. This is seen by some country office staff to make collecting sex-disaggregated data and conducting analysis more challenging. However, this opinion is viewed by other country office respondents as a weak justification for poor data collection and analysis, as the Ethiopian Government is supportive of achieving gender equality.

GEWE in programme design and delivery

205. An analysis of project documents for the evaluation period shows that, in terms of language and the content of the programmes and projects proposed, there has been a clear move by WFP away from seeing women through the 'vulnerability lens' only, towards increasingly and primarily using the 'gender lens'.

206. There is still a long way to go in making sure the programme activities in Ethiopia are a model of success in terms of gender, although the evaluation team and the recent gender baseline study report (WFP, 2016v) do note several achievements. The MERET programme design took into consideration the potentially different needs of men and women and the importance of both male and female household members playing key roles in decision-making. Under the refugee programme, gender is considered as part of the needs assessments and the joint assessment missions, and in school feeding activities WFP addresses gender disparities with take-home rations provided to girls regularly attending primary schools. Furthermore, the P4P programme sought to address the low involvement of women in cooperatives and the construction of the Geeldoh bridge was seen to enable women's and girls' access to basic services. The PSNP made provisions regarding women's participation in key community decision-making forums and has paid particular attention to providing privileges and social protection supports to help women participate in public works activities. However, the PSNP gender action plan was driven by the EU and CIDA, rather than

5. Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution.

Source: 2016 SPR PRRO

by WFP, and operationalising of gender provisions for the PSNP is weaker in Somali and Afar, the two regions where WFP is most active.

207. There are still significant gaps and challenges in mainstreaming gender into operations, as reported by the gender baseline study. The evaluation team noted, for example, that although the nutrition programmes target women and children, their gender approach is limited. Most WFP nutrition programming works solely with women and children on nutrition issues. Some messaging about nutrition was provided to men in 2015, but how this was done and its outcomes were not well documented.⁸¹ The provision of food rations in the general food distribution that were unpreferred and often time-consuming to prepare also indicated that there was insufficient consideration given to the workload and preferences of female caregivers.⁸² There are limitations also in the R4 programme, particularly in reaching women in households headed by men. With its focus on agricultural production, access to land acknowledged through a land certificate is a key programme requirement; and land is nearly always registered in the name of the household head. Despite this, the one third of the programme targets households headed by women and 38 percent of insurance policy holders and 38.5 percent of credit recipients were women in 2017.

Stakeholder perspectives

208. Throughout the evaluation, it was noticeable that few stakeholders were forthcoming about any contributions WFP had made regarding gender. Gender was not an area of expertise or advocacy that was particularly associated with WFP.

Conclusions

209. It is clear that with the changing corporate approach, gender programming has come into focus from 2017, with the new gender policy and the country gender action plan (CGAP) for 2017–2020. However, the changes are gradual and the CGAP has yet to be fully implemented. Not all staff are yet aware of the CGAP and the effectiveness of the Gender Results Network has yet to be demonstrated. Gender is also still not well reflected in the country office's staffing (see ¶173 and Figure 18) and there is a feeling that WFP should be more proactive about employing more women if there is a serious commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment. Furthermore, there is an incomplete understanding of what gender means and what gender integration in the country office's portfolio of programmes means, although there are case studies of gender sensitive and transformative programming. There has been no systematic engagement with Government on gender, and stakeholders do not see WFP as having particular strengths in gender.

Internal Synergies⁸³

210. There have been numerous internal synergies within the portfolio. At a fundamental level, WFP support to logistics and supply chain systems (Annex R) has been a platform for the rest of the portfolio. WFP has brought a common perspective on nutrition to its programmes for refugees as well as Ethiopian nationals (Annex P), though ability to exploit synergies has been affected by staffing constraints. Experience from the P4P pilot influenced approaches to home-grown school feeding (Annex Q) as well as the gender

⁸¹ According to country office staff, this messaging continued beyond 2015, but data were not adequately collected because of challenges related to staffing capacity during the drought and so there is no evidence of this in the reports.

⁸² Where in-kind donations are used, WFP has limited control over the products used, but where food is purchased by WFP, the impact on the workload, energy expenditure and the requirement for fuel and water of products should be considered as all of these factors can affect malnutrition rates. (See nutrition review in Annex P.)

⁸³ cf. EQ15. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?

approach to rural women's economic empowerment (Annex T) – although there appeared to be limited mainstreaming of the P4P approach itself once the pilot was concluded.⁸⁴ WFP is an active participant in efforts to strengthen synergies between the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance. Some interviewees noted that WFP participation in the PSNP has also influenced other WFP initiatives, including its approaches to satellite indexed insurance and the fresh food voucher scheme. The recent absence of an agreed country strategy (Annex K) has perhaps inhibited the more systematic exploitation of internal synergies.

External synergies⁸⁵

211. The thoroughgoing coherence of the WFP portfolio with Ethiopia's national policies and systems (described earlier, ¶179 onwards) means that external synergies are the norm rather than the exception. This is reflected in the way that WFP works with and within the national humanitarian system, and leverages its logistics and supply chain expertise to support the system as a whole. Similar points apply to the WFP engagement with the PSNP, its work with ARRA and UNHCR in support of refugees, and, not least, to the synergies created by its engagement across a range of programmes as well as fundamental logistics, with the Somali region. The discussion of efficiency that follows also illustrates the exploitation of available synergies. Nonetheless, WFP could do more to influence the wider programmes within which it operates.⁸⁶

Efficiency of WFP Programme Activities⁸⁷

212. Efficiency has already been considered in earlier reviews of the performance and results of the main components of the portfolio. The present section highlights some of the main efficiency gains during the period, and reviews the efficiency implications of modality choices between in-kind food transfers and alternative cash-based transfer approaches. It draws on the review of cost analysis and efficiency issues in Annex S.

213. WFP made two exceptional contributions to efficiency. First, the introduction of biometrics to the refugee programme is credited by all stakeholders with making a major difference both to the overall refugee count and to the efficiency of food distribution (see Box 12 and the subsequent discussion in Annex N).

214. Second, as already noted, WFP achieved improvements in supply chain efficiency which are explored in Annex S. The WFP Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) was central, but taking full advantage of its possibilities also depended on use of a new macro-advance facility (MAF) and of physical storage facilities within Ethiopia. The country office was proactive in taking advantage of the new facilities available.

215. The evaluation team assessment is that the gains in procurement efficiency during the evaluation period were dramatic. The headline is an estimated 74 percent reduction in lead times, but there were collateral benefits in lower average prices and increased use of local and regional purchase. It would require a major econometric exercise to attach a financial value to the costs and benefits of these efficiency gains, but it is possible to demonstrate that the potential gains are huge. WFP expenditure on Ethiopian nationals

⁸⁴ However, in 2016, WFP established a smallholder market support and coordination group to develop and improve linkages among its smallholder-support initiatives. The P4P unit supported the group as its secretariat.

⁸⁵ cf. EQ16. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?

⁸⁶ See this report's recommendations.

⁸⁷ cf. EQ13. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?

(CP 200253 and PRROs 200290 and 200712) during the evaluation period was approximately USD 1.5 billion (see Annex H, Table 11). A one percent gain in the value of deliveries would be worth USD 15 million, and a five percent gain would be worth USD 75 million. Although the GCMF and MAF were initiatives by WFP headquarters, it required planning and foresight by the country office to take full advantage of them, including by re-opening the Berbera corridor (see Annex R, Figure 68) and utilising in-country storage facilities and channels for local purchase.

216. Among donors to WFP, some take a strong view that cash-based transfers (CBTs) are generally more efficient than in-kind transfers, and consider that WFP is reluctant to switch to cash. However, ability to use cash depends on political economy factors, including government preferences and the extent to which WFP receives in-kind donations. WFP has considerably expanded the use of cash during the evaluation period (see above, ¶169, Figure 15 and Figure 16) although it still represents a small share of the total portfolio; in 2017 the cash component represented less than 10 percent by value of WFP refugee assistance, and only 12 percent of support to Ethiopian nationals (Figure 74 and Figure 75 in Annex S). Currently a pilot to trial cash for humanitarian relief and the PSNP in Somali is under way and a fresh food voucher pilot is about to start.

217. There is significant evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of cash-based transfers, as noted, for example in Box 7 above. However, a fully cash option has not been trialled, and the fresh food voucher pilot is designed only to compare different values of voucher and not a cash alternative. The evaluation team understands that WFP is currently collaborating with the World Bank with the aim of developing evidence-based guidance on how to decide whether cash or food will be more appropriate in different areas and at different times in Ethiopia (taking account of market access, prices, and other factors). In any such review, the full range of options – cash, vouchers, food or a hybrid – should be considered.⁸⁸

Sustainability⁸⁹

218. Sustainability can be considered from two perspectives: the durability of benefits experienced by recipients of assistance (including increased resilience to future shocks), and the capacity of national systems to operate with less external support. Across most of its programmes WFP is working with beneficiaries who are amongst the poorest and most vulnerable people in Ethiopia, and experience during the evaluation period shows how easily climate-related and other shocks can jeopardise their lives and livelihoods. An effective humanitarian response and safety net system is a continuing necessity. At the same time, Ethiopia's economic growth and development is increasing the Government's capacity to lead the response, and all partners agree on the need to strengthen future humanitarian-development links.

219. Across the portfolio, WFP programmes have characteristically included explicit efforts to strengthen national systems and institutional capacity, and there is evidence of significant progress but also of continuing challenges that need to be addressed. WFP support to capacity development of NDRMC and the national logistics system generally was a significant contribution to sustainability. However there is a continuing institutional strengthening agenda that is reflected in a supply chain strategy developed during 2017. This strategy, as well as continuing support for the food management improvement project, envisages strengthening of the commercial road transport sector, enhancing food quality and safety systems, and providing other support to emergency preparedness and logistics management. On nutrition, capacity-

⁸⁸ The country office also notes that between March - June 2018, WFP led the national Cash Working Group and the NDRMC Cash Feasibility Assessment in three Somali region woredas. This assessment will be replicated in other areas of Somali region and beyond.

⁸⁹ cf. EQ14. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

building has been sporadic, and reliance on imported foods reduces sustainability. The health system integration, local production pilot and work on food safety and on an improved approach to supplementary feeding are good examples of WFP moving towards a more sustainable model. Funding constraints are a threat to adequate humanitarian support for refugees: policy changes linked to the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, could, in the long run, reduce support requirements by enabling refugees to be more self-sufficient but will not quickly diminish humanitarian obligations. The benefits achieved by the McGovern-Dole school feeding programme will not survive discontinuation of the programme. There is growing interest in the possibility of establishing a national school feeding programme, but the Government does not have the financial capacity to implement large-scale school feeding except as an emergency intervention.

Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1 Overall Assessment

Alignment and strategic positioning

220. All the main elements of the WFP portfolio were found to be relevant to Ethiopia's humanitarian and development needs. Moreover WFP remained relevant by responding well to emerging needs. However, WFP and others are not yet meeting the needs of conflict IDPs as systematically as the needs of other distressed people. The scale of humanitarian needs restricted the scope for developmental work by WFP, but WFP has been active amongst agencies seeking to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus. The strong WFP focus on pastoral lowlands, and on Somali region in particular, was also relevant; Government and other partners recognise the challenges of working effectively in this very difficult context and continue to value the willingness and ability of WFP to do so.

221. The Ethiopian government exerts strong leadership and is the main partner for WFP in almost all areas of WFP work; this ensures strong coherence with national policies and strategies. Alignment is ensured not only at the level of policy and strategy documents, but also in the working relationships between WFP and key government agencies. WFP activities are generally integrated with national systems for targeting and delivery. Using government systems is positive; although it can limit the freedom of manoeuvre for WFP, it also brings opportunities for dialogue and influence, and pathways for sustainability.

222. Government-led coalitions are also the main framework within which WFP achieves coherence with other UN agencies and development partners. The UNDAF plays a secondary role in ensuring coherence amongst UN agencies. WFP had particularly strong working relationships with UNOCHA, UNHCR and UNICEF throughout the period, and has strengthened its relationship with the World Bank.

223. The overall orientation of WFP and its specific activities in Ethiopia have been consistent with the evolving global strategies and policies of WFP. It will take time to adapt fully to the revised gender policy and new policies on environment, climate change and emergency preparedness are too recent to have been reflected in the portfolio yet. The country office recognises the importance of resilience approaches and concepts as reflected in the 2015 resilience policy, but is still in the early stages of absorbing their implications for programme design and implementation. There is a tendency to think of resilience at the level of households and individuals, but WFP support to national logistics and emergency preparedness systems can also contribute to national resilience.

224. There are sometimes trade-offs between working within government-led systems and fully adhering to WFP guidelines; as noted above, WFP does not have autonomy in targeting and sometimes accepts service standards that are lower than WFP norms (but which may allow wider coverage).

225. The humanitarian principles need to be addressed jointly by WFP and its implementing partners. There is strong alignment between humanitarian and developmental objectives of the Government and its development partners. Operational collaboration therefore serves the interests of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, but it makes conscious attention to the principles of neutrality and impartiality all the more important. Although neutrality vis-à-vis conflict has not emerged as a key issue in Ethiopia, the nature of WFP's working relationship with Government does require vigilance by WFP, particularly as regards its close identification with the Somali regional government.

226. As regards strategic positioning, the choice of WFP partners was strategically appropriate. However, the present configuration of the portfolio reflects patterns that were set before 2012, and the main changes

in the contours of the portfolio were matters of adaptation rather than choice. For example, Somali region became more prominent within the portfolio mainly because of the reduced WFP share of humanitarian assistance delivery elsewhere in Ethiopia; this in turn gave more prominence to the WFP role in technical support and capacity development for national systems. There is agreement amongst external stakeholders and recent country office leadership that WFP in Ethiopia has lacked a sufficiently well articulated strategy. Several recent initiatives linked to livelihoods represent an effort to complement emergency humanitarian work, but some donor representatives have seen this as detracting from the core, emergency-related, business of WFP.

Quality of strategic decision-making

227. Space for strategic decision-making is limited by the government-led frameworks within which WFP works. The ability of WFP to innovate as opposed to holding existing ground has been limited by difficulty in obtaining funding within an increasingly difficult international aid landscape. WFP in Ethiopia also experienced internal constraints: discontinuities in the country office's leadership were detrimental, and the latter half of the evaluation period was dominated by a structure and staffing review; this was necessary but morale-sapping for all staff and an additional burden for senior staff who were already stretched (not least because of concurrent emergencies). There are strong external perceptions that WFP has been less effective than it needs to be in joint planning and coordination forums at all levels. Equally, there is appreciation for the calibre of certain WFP staff and for the value of the WFP contribution in responding to major crises.

228. There are several examples of successful advocacy, and of the government seeking to emulate WFP approaches. However, learning by WFP from its own experience has not been as consistent or as thorough as it should have been, because of weaknesses in managing and in responding to evaluations, and serious deficiencies in monitoring and reporting. Beyond obligatory corporate reporting, use and analysis of data is weak; the evaluation team found that available outcome indicators had little explanatory power, and there is too little attention to the wider M&E frameworks of the national programmes to which WFP contributes. Quality, timeliness and transparency of reporting (for accountability as well as analysis) were regarded as weak by significant donors, although the particular difficulties of operating in Somali region are acknowledged, as are some recent improvements. The lack of an operational country strategy since 2015 inevitably means that corporate learning has not yet been as systematic as it could have been.

Portfolio Performance and Results

229. Effectiveness: The integration of WFP work in Ethiopia with wider programmes led by the government and supported by a range of partners means that it is rarely possible to attribute outcomes specifically to the WFP inputs; the challenge is to assess the WFP contribution to the overall efforts. The major humanitarian achievement during the period was the successful emergency response to large-scale droughts from 2015/16 onwards. Non-WFP stakeholders all credit WFP with a major contribution to the national logistic response in addition to its own direct deliveries. WFP. The main WFP programmes (humanitarian assistance, support to safety nets, nutrition, school feeding and food assistance for refugees) were all broadly effective. The main challenges to effectiveness came from resource constraints (especially for the refugee programme) and from weaknesses in targeting by programmes to which WFP contributes. WFP helped to pilot improvements in supplementary feeding approaches which should improve future effectiveness of all nutrition programmes. An impact evaluation provided rigorous evidence of the school feeding programme's effectiveness

230. Efficiency: Ethiopia's ability to cope with the El Niño and Indian Ocean Dipole crises was greatly assisted by gains in supply chain efficiency which substantially reduced lead times for procurement and distribution. WFP can also take credit for efficiency gains associated with biometric identification for refugees. Increased, although still limited, use of cash-based transfers across the portfolio should be seen as contributing towards both efficiency and effectiveness. As it considers future strategy in Ethiopia, WFP should recognise the need to advocate and support increasing use of cash-based transfers, and to shake off the perception that it is a self-interested advocate for in-kind transfers.

231. Gender: WFP has made systematic efforts to strengthen its gender approach in Ethiopia in line with the new corporate gender policy. However changes are gradual and the country gender action plan has yet to be fully implemented. Women are still grossly under-represented in the country office's staffing, there has been no systematic engagement with the Government on gender, and stakeholders do not see WFP as having particular strengths in gender.

232. Internal and external synergies: There have been numerous internal synergies within the portfolio. Not least, WFP support to logistics and supply chain systems has been a platform for the rest of the portfolio. The recent absence of an agreed country strategy has perhaps inhibited the more systematic exploitation of internal synergies. The thoroughgoing coherence of the WFP portfolio with Ethiopia's national policies and systems means that external synergies are the norm rather than the exception, although the country office could do more to influence the programmes in which it participates.

233. Sustainability: WFP support to capacity development of the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and the national logistics system generally was a significant contribution to sustainability. Across the WFP portfolio, delivery of programmes through government systems enhances prospects for sustainability, but Ethiopia's needs for humanitarian support (both financial and technical) are likely to continue, in a context where there is increasing attention to better integration of humanitarian and development efforts.

Key Conclusions

234. During 2012–2017, WFP in Ethiopia played a substantial role in responding to emergencies, through support to national systems and logistics as well as its own deliveries. It continued to lead on food assistance to refugees, although funding constraints made it increasingly difficult to provide adequate rations. Its school feeding programmes were demonstrably effective, and influenced the Government's emergency school feeding responses. WFP helped strengthen national approaches to targeted supplementary feeding, though this proceeded more slowly than intended. Of most significance, WFP played a major role in preventing the 2015/2016 El Niño crisis from becoming a catastrophe, and subsequently in averting famine in Ethiopia's pastoral lowlands.

235. However, WFP saw its overall role in humanitarian response change, and became increasingly focused on the more challenging Somali and Afar regions. The country office suffered, practically and reputationally, from lack of leadership continuity and a perceived lack of strategic focus. Trying to match staffing to income levels while simultaneously dealing with major humanitarian crises put WFP under unprecedented strain. Acknowledged weaknesses in monitoring and reporting hampered strategic reflection as well as affecting donor confidence.

236. In the coming period, with the staffing review nearing completion, significant improvements to M&E initiated, new leadership in place, and the country strategic plan process under way, WFP in Ethiopia has an unmissable opportunity to address past shortcomings and to define and strengthen its future role.

237. During the evaluation period, the effectiveness of WFP in Ethiopia was jeopardised, and it incurred reputational damage, on account of discontinuities in senior leadership. With its structure and staffing review now complete, there is a need to restore the country office's morale and strengthen its efficiency and effectiveness. Ethiopia is a complex country that requires sustained attention from senior staff with accumulated country experience.

238. Absence of an explicit country strategy since 2015 has also been a weakness. CSP preparation provides a key opportunity, aided by the portfolio-wide rigour of analysis required by the CSP system. WFP staff must align to a common vision which is also credible to external stakeholders. Taking full advantage of the new WFP approach to planning and budgeting depends on donors earmarking less and budgeting further ahead, which in turn requires donor trust, in Ethiopia and at HEADQUARTERS level. Implementation will require continued partnerships with key government agencies, who must be willing partners for any capacity-building proposals. WFP needs to convince all key stakeholders that activities such as livelihoods resilience or stunting prevention will reflect WFP comparative advantages, without undermining what they see as the core emergency functions of WFP.

239. This last point is important as there is an opportunity for WFP to use resilience as a conceptual framework to bridge humanitarian and development objectives. The WFP portfolio includes several resilience-related programmes but more thinking is needed about how to operationalise resilience approaches and to go beyond household and individual resilience to look at institutional resilience as well. The PSNP and humanitarian food assistance provide an opportunity to be considered from a resilience perspective.

240. The quality of monitoring, reporting and analysis has been inadequate, and has hampered learning. High-level indicators reported in SPRs are insufficiently granular to gauge performance, especially because WFP usually works jointly with others. The country office needs to consider explicitly how WFP can both use and complement the monitoring and reporting systems of the wider programmes within which it operates (e.g. PSNP, refugees), ensure adequate staffing of the M&E function, factor in the (reasonable) reporting requirements of donors, and ensure timely implementation and adequate supervision of a prioritised programme of evaluations. A clear and comprehensive M&E plan could also support requests for stand-alone donor funding of M&E.

241. Staffing constraints (with the head of nutrition post vacant for more than two years) limited the attention that the nutrition team were able to provide to: (a) persistent advocacy, particularly around the scale-up of "second-generation" targeted supplementary feeding; (b) capacity-building and holding partners to account for the quality of programme delivery; and (c) overseeing evaluations and ensuring adequate evidence generation. There was also insufficient attention to refugee nutrition activities and WFP did not receive funding for activities to prevent stunting. WFP needs a clear strategy for nutrition, showing how it complements other actors in Ethiopia, to guide advocacy and staffing priorities.

242. Government's road map for refugee support in line with UNHCR's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework is promising and should be supported, but this will take time to change the magnitude of humanitarian resource requirements. Meanwhile, there is a continued challenge to achieve consistent and predictable funding for more efficient delivery of essential assistance. Greater collaboration on viable livelihood strategies for refugees should also be pursued with other agencies and partners. Discrimination in the treatment of different groups of refugees is inconsistent with humanitarian principles and should continue to be actively resisted.

243. Much more attention is required to gender dynamics across all elements of the programme. It is about ensuring that all the work the country office does, and the way it does it, contributes to gender

equality and transforming the balance of power between women and men. It is essential to recognise the links between gender inequality and poverty and the different implications interventions have for women and men, and tailor WFP strategy and operations accordingly. The country office's internal practices, including its staffing, need to be consistent with this. More broadly, protection and accountability to affected populations are vital elements in all WFP work and should continue to receive attention in the new CSP.

3.2 Recommendations

244. Formal recommendations respond to the key conclusions above. They are pitched at strategic level and linked to CSP preparation, but various operational recommendations are subsumed within the relevant strategic recommendations, as set out in the table below.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
1	WFP staffing and continuity	Discontinuities in senior leadership impaired performance and caused reputational damage.	Ensure that the discontinuities in senior staffing that were experienced during the 2012–2017 period do not recur and prioritize recruitment for core senior posts, including heads of nutrition and the monitoring and evaluation function, in the country office.	Human Resources Division and country office supported by the Nutrition Division, Performance Management and Monitoring Division, Office of Evaluation and Regional Bureau. June 2019.
2	Strategic focus and preparation of the country strategic plan	Absence of an explicit country strategy since 2015 has been a weakness.	<p>Ensure that the CSP preparation process is outward-looking so that the CSP is credible with the Government and donors, who must share WFP's perspective on WFP's future role.</p> <p>Among issues to be addressed with Government and other development partners are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WFP's dual mandate, areas of comparative advantage and appropriate long-term role in Ethiopia; • an appropriate geographical focus for WFP activities and roles; • ways of mitigating governance and accountability risks in the delivery of food and nutrition assistance in Ethiopia, with 	Country office. November 2019.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<p>particular focus on Somali region; and</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> evidence-based discussions of cash-based versus food transfers and appropriate levels of benefits. 	
3	Focus on resilience	More thinking is needed about how to operationalize approaches to resilience building.	<p>Use work on resilience as a conceptual framework for linking humanitarian and development objectives, addressing the resilience of national institutions as well as that of households and individuals.</p> <p>This should include providing support for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> emergency planning and response and national capacities in supply chains and logistics; strengthening of humanitarian needs analysis and the targeting of responses; integration of humanitarian support, safety nets and development; and initiatives that focus on capacity strengthening and building household resilience. <p>The PSNP and humanitarian food assistance programmes should be considered in terms of resilience building. In particular, WFP should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> work more closely with the Government and other stakeholders in order to strengthen integration between the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance and develop relevant capacities within the Government; 	<p>Country office supported by the Regional Bureau and Policy and Programme Division.</p> <p>November 2019.</p>

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • contribute to better adaptation of the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance programmes to pastoral regions; and • continue to support government capacities to manage in-kind food assistance programmes, with a view to achieving full implementation by the Government. 	
4	Monitoring, evaluation and learning	The quality of monitoring, reporting and analysis has been inadequate.	<p>Ensure adequate staffing and leadership in the country office's monitoring and evaluation function. Rethink the priorities for monitoring and evaluation in order to better reflect the reality that WFP is predominantly a contributor to joint programmes. Ensure that each main activity has a monitoring and evaluation plan that explicitly considers what WFP can draw on and contributes to the monitoring and evaluation of WFP's overall efforts in Ethiopia.</p> <p>Areas where more evidence-based learning is required include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • effective use of cash-based transfers, with attention to the full spectrum of transfer options, from solely cash-based transfers to solely in-kind food distributions; • strengthening of cost analysis generally, during the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes; • stronger nutrition analysis (see recommendation 5); and • stronger gender analysis (see recommendation 7). 	<p>Country office supported by the Regional Bureau, the Performance Management and Monitoring Division and Office of Evaluation.</p> <p>November 2019.</p>

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
5	Nutrition programming	WFP needs a clear nutrition strategy, showing how its work complements that of other actors in Ethiopia.	<p>The country office should conduct a situation analysis and develop a nutrition plan for the next CSP period, working with the Government and other actors in order to identify where WFP has the most added value; it should prioritize recruitment of the staff required to deliver this plan.</p> <p>Priorities for the WFP nutrition strategy should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • humanitarian nutrition, with advocacy and support for measures that address stunting; • support for a more rapid roll-out of the “second-generation” approach to targeted supplementary feeding; • strengthening of technical support for the refugee programme; • increased analysis, with partners, of nutrition trends among refugees and the effects of ration cuts on nutrition; and <p>ensuring a nutrition-sensitive approach in all WFP activities.</p>	Country office with support from the Regional Bureau. November 2019.
6	Refugee assistance	More consistent and predictable funding is needed for more efficient delivery of essential assistance to refugees.	<p>Work with partners with a view to ensuring adequate and timely funding that meets humanitarian needs while also supporting evolution towards more sustainable approaches. Join other United Nations agencies on insisting that humanitarian principles are observed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocate for and support greater use of cash-based transfers in refugee assistance. 	Country office. November 2019.

No.	Issue	Rationale	Recommendation	Responsibility and timing
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support stronger analysis of the effects of ration cuts on nutrition (see recommendation 5). • Support reconciliation of refugee numbers and continued strengthening of registration systems. • Support moves towards responses that are better tailored to the different needs and capacities of different groups of refugees. • Promote realization of the objectives of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. 	
7	Gender	Much more attention is required to gender dynamics in all elements of the programme.	Gender issues should (continue to) be addressed in an integrated way, building on the country gender action plan. Actions should include proactive measures for boosting recruitment of women national staff and more attention should be directed to context-specific gender issues throughout the portfolio including appropriate mainstreaming of gender equality and the empowerment of women in all components.	Country office with support from the Regional Bureau. November 2019.
8	Protection and accountability to affected populations	Protection and accountability are vital elements in all WFP's work.	Strengthening protection and accountability to affected populations should continue to be a priority, but WFP should work on strengthening national systems wherever doing so is consistent with the needs of beneficiaries.	Country office. November 2019.

Annexes

Annex A	Terms of Reference
Annex B	Methodology
Annex C	Evaluation Matrix
Annex D	Evaluation Process
Annex E	People Consulted
Annex F	Chronology
Annex G	Additional Country Data
Annex H	Additional Portfolio Data for Ethiopia
Annex I	Output and Outcome Data 2012–2017
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Annex K	WFP Strategy for Ethiopia
Annex L	Vulnerability Analysis, Food Security and Livelihoods
Annex M	Resilience
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Annex A Terms of Reference

ETHIOPIA:⁹⁰ AN EVALUATION OF WFP'S PORTFOLIO (2012- 2017)

1. Background

1. The purpose of these Terms of Reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Section 1 provides information on the context; Section 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Section 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Section 4 identifies the evaluation approach and methodology; Section 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information.

1.1 Introduction

2. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, program design, and implementation. Country Portfolio Evaluations help Country Offices in the preparation of Country Strategic Plans and provide lessons that can be used in new programme design⁹¹.

1.2 Country Context

Socio-economic overview

3. Ethiopia is a landlocked country bordering with Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan and Djibouti (see Annex 1 for map). Ethiopia's population of about 102 million (2016) makes it the second most populous nation in Africa (after Nigeria).

4. Over the past seven years, Ethiopia has achieved high economic growth averaging 11 percent per annum and reduced extreme poverty from 60.5 to 30.7 percent, enabling it to eradicate extreme poverty and cut hunger rates by half, as was expected in Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1.

5. Nonetheless, Ethiopia is also one of the poorest countries in Africa, with a per capita income of \$1.530 and ranking number 174th out of 188 countries in the 2016 UNDP Human Development Report. Many rural households find it impossible to survive without access to seasonal wage employment or assistance from the National Productive Safety Net and related social protection programs. Some 25 million Ethiopians remain in poverty and live just above the poverty line, making them vulnerable to seasonal climatic shocks and food insecurity.

6. Ethiopia also hosts the second largest refugee population within east and central Africa (after Uganda), in 26 camps across the country. Refugees originate from Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia.

⁹⁰ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, but for the purposes of [these TOR], from now on referred to as "Ethiopia"

⁹¹ See <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/eb/wfp291538.pdf> for additional background on Country Strategic Plans and their role in the new Integrated Road Map of WFP.

Agriculture and food security

7. Agriculture is one of the highest contributors to economic growth and contributes to 45 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). About 12 million smallholder farming households account for an estimated 95 percent of agricultural production and 85 percent of all employment in Ethiopia.

8. In 2016 and 2017, the country was impacted by the El Nino phenomenon, which induced a drought affecting 20% of the Ethiopia population. Whereas the 2010-2011 Horn of Africa drought affected lowland areas, the 2015/16 drought has also affected the highlands, where population densities are high and households depend on rainfed agriculture, livestock and seasonal wage labour.⁹² The onset of El Niño combined with failed *belg* (spring harvest) and *meher* (main harvest) rains in 2015 left 10.2 million people in need of emergency food and nutrition assistance.

9. While the Government and partners averted a major humanitarian catastrophe, the drought has left a negative legacy on many families, who lost livestock and other productive assets. The residual needs from the past year have been compounded by a new and devastating drought which hit Ethiopia and other parts of the Horn of Africa in early 2017. In August 2017, the Government of Ethiopia released the Mid-Year Humanitarian Requirements Document which outlined the need to support 8.5 million people with emergency food, nutrition, health, water and education programmes.

Health and Nutrition

10. Despite rapid expansion in the availability of health facilities, problems related to quality, logistics, medical supplies, the availability of drugs, and human resources for health have prevented the full utilization of existing facilities. Maternal and neonatal health care represent one of the critical areas where health services have fallen short of their intended targets⁹³.

11. According to the 2016 Ethiopia Demographic Health Survey (EDHS), the national prevalence of wasting was 9.9 percent, stunting was 38.4 percent and underweight was 23.6.

Gender

12. In 2015, the country ranked 116 out of 188 on the Gender Inequality Index and according to the UNDAF 2016-2020 analysis, gender inequality is still the most prevalent form of inequality in Ethiopia.

Government Framework: The Growth and Transformation Plans⁹⁴

13. The umbrella document under which most development interventions are taking place in Ethiopia is the "Growth and Transformation Plan" (GTP), which was first developed for the period 2010/11 to 2014/5 (GTP I), and which is currently in its second iteration (GTP II – 2015/16 to 2019/2020). The objective of the GTP II is "to serve as a spring board towards realizing the national vision of becoming a low middle income country by 2025" and is based on four pillars: (1) a Productive Safety Net Programme for very poor households (mainly cash or food transfers for participation in public works); (2) Provision of agricultural and financial services to the poor through the Household Asset

⁹² During the Inception Phase of the Evaluation, the Evaluation team will be expected to identify any additional key trends relevant for the purpose of the evaluation.

⁹³ UNDAF 2016-2020

⁹⁴ Based on extract from the original document available at https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/resilience_ethiopia/document/growth-and-transformation-plan-ii-gtp-ii-201516-201920

Building Program (HABP) and other livelihood support activities; (3) Resettlement of families from land suffering from erosion and loss of soil fertility; (4) Provision of critical community-level infrastructure.⁹⁵

14. Together with WFP, the Government is currently leading a “Zero Poverty and Hunger Strategic Review”. Additional participants, including UN agencies are currently being brought on-board. Preliminary recommendations from the Review are expected to be available between April and June 2018. *International Assistance*⁹⁶

15. In the period 2014-2015, Ethiopia was the fourth largest recipient of Gross Official Development Assistance (ODA). Yet the value of ODA (US\$3.7 billion p.a. for between 2013 and 2015) and the proportion of ODA over the Gross National Income is decreasing, and ODA accounted for 5.3% of GNI in 2015 compared to 8.2% in 2013. The top three donors are the World Bank, the US and the UK, followed by the EU and the African Development Bank. An increasing share of assistance is being channelled directly through the government.

United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)

16. The umbrella for the UN Country Team activities is the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which was first prepared in 2002. The relevant documents for the evaluation period are the UNDAF 2012-2015 and UNDAF 2016-2020, with a total budget for the period of US\$ 3 billion. The five UNDAF pillars are Inclusive growth and structural transformation; Investing in human capital and expanded access to quality, equitable basic social services; Good Governance, participation and capacity development and Equality and empowerment and they respond to eight of the nine GTP II pillars. Annex 6 includes a chart describing the UN/Government Coordination mechanism in country.

UN-Government Joint Humanitarian Appeals⁹⁷

17. The UN together with the Government of Ethiopia, have issued a Humanitarian Appeal (referred to as the Humanitarian Requirements Document) for every year covered by the evaluation. Needs have dramatically increased in 2016 as a result of recurrent droughts, and whilst the original 2017 appeal was based on the assumption of a significant reduction of needs, the revised 2017 appeal issued in September 2017 is only 15% lower than the one for 2016. (see Annex 6 for annual trends). In addition to the traditional donors and the traditional UN mechanisms, some of the activities are funded through two specific funding mechanisms the One UN Fund and the Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund, described in more detail in Annex 6. Ethiopia has also been a recipient of funding from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).^{98,99}

⁹⁵ For additional information on the PSNP programme, see <http://projects.worldbank.org/P146883>; more information on other legislation relevant for the WFP activities can be found in the copies of the project documents approved by the Board and available on the Board Website.

⁹⁶ Source: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm>

⁹⁷ Additional information on current and previous crisis can be found on <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ethiopia/>

⁹⁸ Based on extracts from <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/ET100>

⁹⁹ <https://fts.unocha.org/countries/71/summary/2017>

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

Rationale

18. The evaluation is an opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its portfolio of operations. The timing will enable the CO to use the CPE evidence on past and current performance in the design of the CO's new Country Strategic Plan (CSP) – scheduled for Executive Board approval in February 2019.

19. There have been several centralized and decentralized evaluations covering different aspect of WFP's activities in the country during the evaluation period and several new activities are about to launch in early 2018. However, there has never been an evaluation looking at all the activities together from a strategic and operational point of view.

Objectives

20. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Ethiopia (accountability); and
- determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Ethiopia, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation

21. The evaluation will seek the views of, and be useful to, a broad range of WFP's internal and external stakeholders. The key standard stakeholders of a CPE are the government, WFP's Country Office, Regional Bureau and HQ Units, followed by, other UN agencies, local and international NGOs and beneficiaries (see Annex 10 for additional details in their interests and their role in the process). The evaluation team will be expected to prepare a more detailed and focused matrix of the stakeholders with their respective interests as part of the Inception Report.

3. Subject of the Evaluation

3.1 WFP's Portfolio in Ethiopia

General overview

22. The WFP Country Office currently has almost 800 staff in Ethiopia, of which 1/3 are based in Addis, and the rest across the country in 13 locations (see Annex 1 for locations and areas of intervention).

23. Ethiopia's is one of the largest operations of WFP. In 2012, it was the largest one and only one of three countries with operations worth over US\$ 200 million. Even in 2015 and in 2016, in spite of the large number of emergency operations, it is still the country with the third-largest operation. The cumulative value of spending in Ethiopia during the period 2012-2016 (see table 1 below) was US\$ 1.6 billion million i.e. an average of over US\$ 320 million spending p.a. Its programmes cover Ethiopian nationals (approx. ¾ of the value of operations over the evaluation period), refugees and some special operations (including humanitarian flights, building of a bridge, a logistics hub and logistics capacity development).

24. The country prepared a Country Strategy covering the period 2012-2015 which informed the design of its most recent operations. It is now in the process of preparing a new Country Strategic Plan which will be presented to the Board for discussion and approval in February 2019¹⁰⁰.

25. In spite of the large size of operations, annual funding levels over the evaluation period have fluctuated between 50% and 70% of the original budget requests. Moreover, funding directly to WFP and other organizations is decreasing as more funds are being channelled directly through the Government or through NGOs working with the government.¹⁰¹ The top donors over the evaluation period are the US (1/3 of total), followed by the UK, Canada and the EU (approx. 10% each), and smaller donors including: Ethiopia itself, Saudi Arabia, private donors and several UN funds. (see Annex 2 for more details on funding patterns and trends).

26. The projects active during the evaluation period are summarized below¹⁰²

[TOR] Table 1. Annual WFP expenditure by project

Project number	Evaluation Period						Ratios			
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Oct 2017	2012 to Oct 2017	2012 to 2016	Average per year active (2012-2016)	Total as % of budget (2012-2016)
Ethiopian Nationals (CP and PRROs)	322	291	177	212	315	159	1,475	1,317		71.7%
CP 200253	37.6	34.2	20.9	19.8	14.7	3.6	130.8	127.2	25.4	6.9%
PRRO 200290	284.5	256.6	156.3	91.6	10.0	0.0	799.0	799.0	159.8	43.5%
PRRO 200712				100.2	290.3	155.0	545.5	390.5	195.3	21.3%
Refugees	55.9	72.9	101.9	103.9	87.7	57.7	480.0	422.3		23.0%
IR-EMOP 200656			1.3			0.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.1%
PRRO 200700			10.8	86.1	87.7	57.7	242.3	184.6	61.5	10.1%
PRRO 200365	55.9	72.9	89.8	17.8		0.0	236.4	236.4	59.1	12.9%
Special Operations and Trust Funds	1.2	4.1	9.4	2.0	51.7	13.1	81.5	68.4		3.7%
SO 200358	0.8	3.5	7.9	1.7	8.2	4.3	26.4	22.1	4.4	1.2%
SO 200752			0.3	0.2	5.3	0.0	5.8	5.8	1.9	0.3%
SO 200977					5.0	5.6	10.6	5.0	5.0	0.3%
TF 200812				0.0	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.0%
TF 201035						2.1	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0%
TF 200909					32.3	1.0	33.3	32.3	16.2	1.8%
TF 200427	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.1	0.6	0.0	2.9	2.9	0.6	0.2%
UNHAS flights	6.2	7.3	6.5	5.1	3.4	2.9	31.4	28.5		1.6%

¹⁰⁰ : This new document is in line with the Integrated Road Map for the Strategic Plan (2017–2021), which is based on: a) a new Country Strategic Planning Approach (in the past, country strategies were not mandatory and were not approved by the Board) and a new Financial Framework. For more information, please see <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/eb/wfp291538.pdf>

¹⁰¹ Over the course of 2015-2016, the Joint Emergency Operation Programme (consortium is led by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and includes CARE, Save the Children International (SCI), World Vision (WV), Food for the Hungry (FH) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST)) received four times more funding from USAID than WFP.

¹⁰² Please note that 2017 expenditure data is only expenditure to October 2017 and does not cover the full evaluation period. The evaluation team will be expected to obtain the latest data once in the field during the Inception Phase. Also note that this data do not include Indirect Support Costs and ad-hoc adjustments e.g. from stock transfers, which are reflected in the SPR data.

SO 200364	6.2	7.3	6.5			0.0	20.0	20.0	6.7	1.1%
SO 200711				5.1	3.4	2.9	11.4	8.5	4.3	0.5%
Total Country	385	375	295	323	458	232.3	2,068.2	1,835.9	367.2	100.0%

Source: OEV analysis based annual SPR data for 2012 to 2016 and actual expenditure extracted from WINGs for 2017¹⁰³

Programmes for Ethiopian nationals (CP 200253 and PRRO 200290, 200712)

27. The Country Programme (CP) (which started in 2012 and closed in June 2017) is based on five components: disaster risk management capacity; natural resource management capacity, including community-based watershed development under MERET¹⁰⁴ (now mainly transferred to the government); food for education in primary schools; access to HIV care, treatment and support in urban areas; promoting food marketing and rural livelihoods (including P4P – purchase for progress), especially for women.. The programme was originally designed only using the in-kind transfer modality, but a C&V component was added quite early on. The CP support approximately 2 million beneficiaries p.a.

28. The PRRO (200290 until June 2015 followed by 200900 to mid-2018) aims at assisting around 3.6 million people through General Food Distributions (for participants to the government Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP)), Food Assistance for Assets and Nutrition interventions. The programme is fully aligned with the Government GGTP II plan, and the government is itself very much involved in this project: a) it does the beneficiary targeting; b) it selects the emergency relief, nutrition and PNSP activities carried out by WFP.

Programmes for Refugees (Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali) (PRRO 101273, 200365, 200700)

29. WFP has provided food assistance for refugees in Ethiopia since 1988. As at 30 September 2017, Ethiopia was hosting almost 900,000 refugees (up from around 600,000 at the end of 2016) in 26 camps across the country, of which 43% in the Gambella region (Western Ethiopia bordering with South Sudan) and 25% in the Melkadida region in close to the border with Somalia and Kenya. South Sudanese currently account for 47% of total refugees followed by Somalis (28%), Eritreans (18%), Sudanese (5%) and Yemenis and other nationalities (1%). WFP, UNHCR and the national Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) are the main actors dealing with assistance for refugees.

30. Assistance provided by WFP in the camps includes both a relief and recovery component with the following objectives: i) enabling refugees to meet minimum levels of food security through General Food Distribution (GFD); ii) treating acute malnutrition in children, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable refugees with special nutrition needs, by implementing Targeted Supplementary Feeding; iii) stabilizing school enrolment of refugees girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools, through School Feeding Programme and iv) increasing livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile settings through Income Generating Activities (i.e. beekeeping, fruit trees and vegetable gardening, provision of fuel-saving stoves and the rehabilitation of degraded environments). In 2013, WFP introduced combined cash-and-food assistance in two camps, where a cash transfer replaced part of the cereals distributed through GFD. The rationale was to enable

¹⁰³ The values are consistent with expenditure included in the Standard Project Reports to donors (SPRs) except for the following: these numbers are before indirect support costs and do not include any adjustments such as stock transfers.

¹⁰⁴ MERET (Managing Environmental Resources To Enable Transitions) was launched by WFP and the Ethiopian government in 2003, to help poor farmers manage land better, so that it becomes more productive and does not become desert. Participants to the programme undertake environmentally-focused public works and receive 3 kilograms of wheat per day in return. Their work contributes to sustainable land and water management through practices like crop diversification, terracing and rehabilitating wells that have silted up. MERET currently operates in six regions with 451 communities. More than 400,000 ha of degraded land have been rehabilitated in 72 chronically food insecure districts and an average of 648,000 people have been assisted each year in the period (2012-2015).

refugees to buy food commodities of their choice and to diversify their diet. Over the years, this combined modality has now been implemented in over 10 camps. The amount of cash distributed depends on the camp and on the local price of cereals.

31. Over the entire evaluation period, WFP was responsible for providing Humanitarian Air Services and for the execution of several other special projects including: Construction and Management of the WFP Humanitarian Logistics Base at Djibouti Port; Construction of Geeldoh Bridge to Facilitate Humanitarian and Trade access to Nogo/Fik Zone in the Somali region of Ethiopia and Logistics Cluster and WFP Logistics augmentation in support of the Government of Ethiopia for the drought response. Additional details can be found in Annex 2.

32. The country office also set-up several trust funds, with very different objectives such as procurement of CSB on behalf of the government and use of funding received from PepsiCo. See Annex 2 for a more detailed description.

Gender, Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations and Partnerships¹⁰⁵

33. These are three important cross-sector topics which the evaluation will be expected to look into in detail. An example of the indicators used by the CO to monitor progress in the implementation of the corporate policy covering these three topics can be found in Annex 8.

34. Regarding gender, it is important to note that the Country Office has recently approved a Country Gender Action Plan (CGAP) (2017-2020) which should improve depth and quality of gender analysis and reporting related to WFP's areas of intervention. It is also in the process of mainstreaming gender in its operations in order to strengthen service delivery and capacity building.

Supply Chain and Emergency Preparedness and response

35. Commodities distributed in Ethiopia are procured both within the country (through purchase from farmers or through use of government reserves) or from the international markets¹⁰⁶. The main port of entry for all WFP purchases is Djibouti, though the port of Berbera (Somaliland) is increasingly used.

36. Regarding roles and responsibilities in the supply chain, for the relief and PSNP components, food is stored in government warehouses and distributed by implementing partners, mainly from the government; in the Somali region, WFP manages the entire supply chain directly and for Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF), items are delivered directly at government health posts. Logistics capacity is an issue and WFP is involved, through the Special Operations described in more detail in Annex 2, in capacity building activities for the benefit of the government and/or the entire humanitarian community.¹⁰⁷

3.2 Scope of the Evaluation

37. The evaluation period has been chosen so as to be aligned with the cycle of the current Country Programme i.e. 2012-2017. This CPE will cover all the WFP portfolio of operations ongoing during this period, as described in the previous pages and summarized in Annex 2 i.e. 16 operations (1 CPs, 1 IR-EMOP, 5 PRROs, 2 SOs relating to UNHAS, 4 other SOs and 4 Trust Funds) for an overall total

¹⁰⁵ See <http://executiveboard.wfp.org/board-documents> for copies of the relevant Corporate Policies approved by the Board

¹⁰⁶ Purchases are financed using funds from signed donor agreements but also making use of the WFP Global Commodity Management Facility which enables a country to buy food in anticipation of future needs before formally committed funds are available from donors.

¹⁰⁷ The UN logistics cluster was activated in support to the El Nino emergency from May 2016 to March 2017, and was lead by WFP.

expenditure over the period of approximately US\$ 2 billion. Cross-cutting issues such as needs assessments, monitoring and evaluation, gender equality and women's empowerment, national capacity strengthening, protection, and humanitarian principles and access will also need to be assessed.

38. For activities included in the scope of the evaluation but which has been the object of a WFP Evaluation (see list of relevant evaluation in Annex 9), the evaluation team will have to explicitly review the level of implementation of the recommendations included in those reports.

4. Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology

4.1 Evaluation Questions

39. The CPE will be addressing the following three key questions, which will be further detailed in a matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions. It should be noted that question three will constitute the largest part of the inquiry and evaluation report.

40. As part of the Inception Phase, the Evaluation team is expected to review standards the sub-questions listed below, to customized them if needed to reflect the local context and, if appropriate, add any other relevant sub-questions which the team will deem relevant in order to be able to conclude on the three evaluation questions and key strategic, operational and technical issues of relevance for WFP's future positioning and programming.

41. **Question 1: How has WFP strategically positioned itself and aligned itself to the humanitarian and development needs of the population, the government's national agenda and policies, and partners' objectives and strategies?** The evaluation team will reflect on whether i) its main objectives and related activities have been in line with and relevant to the country's humanitarian and developmental needs, priorities and capacities and; ii) its objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies, including sector policies; iii) its objectives have been coherent and harmonized with those of partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs); iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignment and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; and v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies(including regarding the Humanitarian Principles and protection). (see Annex 7 for WFP's strategic objectives over the evaluation period)

42. **Question 2: What is the quality of WFP's strategic decision making and what factors have driven it?** The evaluation team will reflect on the extent to which WFP has: i) analysed or used existing evidence to understand the hunger, food security and nutrition challenges, in the country, including gender equality and protection issues; and ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues. iii) Identify the factors that determined choices made (e.g. perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure, monitoring information) to understand these drivers of strategy and how they were considered and managed.

43. **Question 3: What results have been achieved?** The evaluation team will reflect on the following: i) the level of efficiency¹⁰⁸, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the main WFP

¹⁰⁸ Efficiency specific question could include: How efficient has the programme delivery been (for FFA, FFW, school feeding, nutritional education programmes)? How cost-effective is the choice of the selected food assistance modality (commodity-based vouchers) compared to the other alternatives considered (food-in-kind, cash or value-based voucher alternatives)? For more information refer to the Technical Note on Efficiency, Section V.

programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control); ii) the extent of WFP's contribution to reduction of gender inequality in control over food, resources, and decision making; iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various activities regardless of the operations (to 2017); and iv) the extent of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) at operational level. The evaluation will assess the "dynamic" nature of WFP activities, including the extent to which they have been developmental in approach in the context, supporting early recovery or development, where possible; and the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures. Additional information on specific risks relating to WFP Operations in Ethiopia can be found in the last section of Annex 2.

4.2 Evaluability Assessment¹⁰⁹

44. Assessing any limitations in the evaluability of the three key questions is a key objective of the Inception Phase and it is expected that any limitations should be identified by the Evaluation Team by the time of completion of the Inception Report, together with potential solutions to deal with these limitations or, in case of lack of possible mitigating actions, a clear statement on the need to modify the scope of the assignment and the implications regarding the usability of the final evaluation report, in terms of learning and accountability.

45. Examples of factors which the evaluation team should explicitly consider include:

a) availability of data (e.g. needs data, monitoring data, etc.); b) reliability of data; c) adequacy of proxy indicators used to identify needs or to monitor impact; d) access to all relevant stakeholders; e) access to all the relevant sites¹¹⁰; f) pressure from any of the stakeholders; g) budget constraints (time and value).

46. With regard to Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (GEEW), the evaluability assessment will determine whether: 1) GEEW aspects can be evaluated or not; 2) identify and implement the measures needed to address/maximize the evaluability of GEEW aspects.

4.3 Methodology

47. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness.

48. The methodology should:

- Build on the logic of the portfolio and Country Strategy (if one exists) and on the common objectives arising across all components of the portfolio;

¹⁰⁹ Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.

¹¹⁰ Security risks exist mainly around all the country borders (except for Djibouti) and 1) the Gambela region in the border with South Sudan and 2) a large part of the area to the east, on the border with Somalia and part of the border with Kenya. See <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/ethiopia> for additional information and a good summary map. A State of Emergency was called in October 2016 in response to protests and unrest in the Oromia and Amhara regions and was lifted on 4 August 2017. Some of the food assistance activities in those areas were affected by the unrest.

- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions presented in 4.1. The model should look at groups of “main activities” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations.
- Take into account and make explicit the limitations to evaluability pointed out in 4.2 as well as budget and timing constraints.

49. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using a mixed method approach (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. The sampling technique to impartially select geographical areas to be visited and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

50. The methodology should be GEEW-sensitive, indicating what data collection methods are employed to seek information on GEEW issues and to ensure the inclusion of women and marginalised groups. The methodology should ensure that data collected is disaggregated by sex and age; an explanation should be provided if this is not possible. Triangulation of data should ensure that diverse perspectives and voices of both males and females are heard and taken into account.

51. As part of the effectiveness and efficiency criteria review¹¹¹, the evaluation team is expected, as a minimum, to perform a comparative cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses of: a) different food assistance transfer modalities (e.g. Cash Based Transfers (CBTs) versus in-kind or versus a combination of the two); b) different procurement alternatives (local from small producers, large producers, the government, regional suppliers or international suppliers); c) different intervention modalities (pure transfer or transfer linked to work on the creation of assets).

52. Specific OEV Technical Notes will be made available to cover, amongst others, the following topics: stakeholder analysis and mapping, efficiency, gender, food-for-assets, evaluation criteria and evaluation matrix.

53. CPEs primarily use longitudinal data, relying on primary data for the qualitative evidence from interviews of key stakeholders such as government, UN partners, NGO partners, commercial partners and beneficiaries, and on secondary data for most of the quantitative evidence. The methodology designed by the Evaluation Team should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources and using a mixed method (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of tools.

54. It is also extremely important that the evaluation team looks at the three evaluation questions covering all the programme phases systematically: from identification of needs, to design of the programme, execution, monitoring and evaluation and feed-back mechanisms to ensure that project design is adjusted in case of changes in the needs or when evidence emerges of systematic issues affecting the delivery of the intended objectives.

55. As part of the Inception Mission, the Evaluation Team should also assess the extent to which it can rely on work already performed by independent evaluation teams working directly for OEV in the context of centralized evaluations) (see evaluations as listed in Annex 9) or evaluation teams hired by the Country Office to performed de-centralized evaluations¹¹². The team should also assess whether there are any other independent evaluations that can be relied upon and used as part of the evaluation evidence, to avoid duplication of work.

¹¹¹ OEV defines cost-effectiveness analysis as the measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes whilst cost-efficiency measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms.

¹¹² See <https://www.wfp.org/content/wfp-evaluation-policy-2016-2021> for copy of WFP Evaluation Policy.

56. This Evaluation is being planned so as to support the Country Office in the preparation of its Country Strategic Plan, which will be presented to the WFP Board for comments and approval in February 2019. The Country Office has already started working on the new strategy, and as part of this ongoing process some activities such as a Strategic Review in consultation with the Government and other local stakeholders have already started. It will be important for the Evaluation team during the Inception phase to review the status of these activities and to liaise with all the partners already involved in the process. Nonetheless, in line with the UNEG Code of Conduct,¹¹³ it is important that at any point in time during the evaluation process, the evaluation team maintains its independence and impartiality.

57. The Evaluation team should also be aware of several centralized and decentralized evaluations which are either in progress or starting to 2018 (listed in the table below), and should assess how best to make the best of the work already performed by the other evaluation teams.¹¹⁴

58. By the end of the Inception Phase, the evaluation team will be expected to prepare an Evaluation Matrix which, for each high level questions, and for the revised list of sub-questions will include: a) an explicit identification of any limitations to the evaluability and a proposed mitigation plan; b) a clear description of the data sources, the data collection methods and the data analysis that that will be performed by the Evaluation Team in order to gather sufficient evidence to support the conclusions on the objectives of the evaluation.

59. It will be important for the team to remember at any point in time, that this is a Strategic Portfolio Evaluation and that all the activities of WFP should be looked at holistically across operations and that given the importance of the question on the mainstreaming of gender, beneficiary data will always need to be collected and analysed disaggregating data by age and by gender.¹¹⁵

60. The list of sources used in the preparation of this document is listed in Annex 3 of this report. As soon as the contract is signed with the selected evaluation firm, additional documents will be made available to the team (e.g. on WFP, on WFP Ethiopia and on EQAS) and these documents will constitute the starting point of the inception mission preparation. The evaluation team will be expected to complement the library with additional document from its own research and from the meetings in Rome and in the Country Office, and to use 4.4

4.4 Quality Assurance

61. WFP's centralized evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. CEQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the CPE Coordinator will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but

¹¹³ See copy of the code at <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100>

¹¹⁴ They are as follows: Centralized Evaluation on Resilience which includes Ethiopia as one of its sample countries; decentralized evaluations: Final McGovern-Dole evaluation of school feeding program in Afar and Somali region (2013 – 2016); Impact evaluation of fresh food vouchers pilot (endline); Impact evaluation of livestock insurance pilot (endline).

¹¹⁵ In analysis gender, the team will apply OEV's Technical Note for Gender Integration in WFP Evaluations and the UN System-Wide Action Plan (UNSWAP) on mainstreaming Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. The evaluation team is also expected to assess Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Gender Marker levels for the CO, and to systematically and appropriately reflect gender in findings, conclusions and recommendations.

ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

62. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases. A thorough quality assurance review by the Evaluation Company is expected to be carried out before sharing any draft document with OEV.

5. Organization of the Evaluation

5.1 Phases and Deliverables

63. 63. The evaluation is structured in five phases summarized in the table below. The Country Office and the Regional Bureau have been consulted on the timeframe to ensure good alignment with the country office availability and with any of their current or future activities which might benefit the most from the evidence generated by CPE (e.g. preparation of the Country Strategic Plan, budget revisions, etc.).

[TOR] Table 2: Summary Timeline - key evaluation milestones

Main Phases	Timeline	Tasks and Deliverables
1. Preparatory	November/December 2017	1. Draft and Final TOR 2. Evaluation Team and/or firm selection & contract. 3. Briefing at HQ
2. Inception	January/March 2018	4. Document Review 5. Inception Mission and inception reports.
3. Evaluation, including fieldwork	April/May 2018	6. Evaluation mission, data collection. 7. Exit debriefing 8. Analysis
4. Reporting	June/October 2018	9. Report Drafting 10. Comments Process 11. Learning Workshop 12. Final evaluation report
5. Dissemination	November 2018/February 2019	13. Summary Evaluation Report Editing / Evaluation Report Formatting 14. Management Response and Executive Board Preparation

64. The key phases, deliverables and timelines are summarized in the table below. For more precise dates, see Annex 4.

5.2 Evaluation Team Composition

65. In line with OEV's strategy, the evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant evaluation expertise, which will be selected by OEV. A call for proposals will be sent to the companies with a Long Term Agreement (LTA) with WFP which have expressed an interest in working on this assignment. Companies will receive a copy of these TORs and will be expected to send a detailed proposal in line with the OEV template proposal and taking into account the information contained in these TORs. Annex 3 also includes a list of internet sites where the firms may find additional public information on Ethiopia and WFP's operations. Given the size of Ethiopia in the overall WFP portfolio, the type of activities being carried out by the Country Office and the level of partnership with the government, OEV would like to work with a very experienced team with the following characteristics:

- a) A very strong Team Leader with an in-depth knowledge of Ethiopia, a proven track record of high level government relations in the context of development and of UN operations (including UN reform)

- b) A strong Economist, who will be able to carry out the efficiency and effectiveness analysis, and also analyse the synergies and multiplier effect of the different types of interventions (including local purchases) in the context of SDG2.
- c) An Expert in Food Assistance in refugee camps settings, familiar with both in kind and cash and vouchers transfers.
- d) A Livelihoods, food security and resilience Expert who will be looking at all the activities benefitting Ethiopian Nationals. Sound knowledge of safety nets is a must.
- e) An Emergency and Preparedness Expert with strong expertise in logistics, who will be reviewing the emergency response mechanisms (including UNHAS) and the government logistics capacity building activities, including the construction of warehouses and bridges.
- f) A nutrition expert who will look at the targeting and type of support given across all projects.
- g) Focal points for: school feeding, gender, humanitarian principles, humanitarian access and protection. This could be one specific person or the competencies could be divided between the other team members if they have proven relevant senior expertise.
- h) A research analyst.

66. The majority of team members should have a very good knowledge of WFP operations. All team members should have strong and proven evaluation competencies in designing and conducting data collection, analysis, synthesis and strong evaluation experience in the humanitarian and development sector, particularly in a similar context to that of Ethiopia and ideally in the UN. All team members should have experience in projects which involve a large component of government capacity building.

67. The evaluation will be conducted by a gender-balanced, geographically and culturally diverse team. The evaluation team will have appropriate skills and competencies to assess the GEEW dimensions of the evaluation as specified in the scope, approach and methodology sections of the TOR. A more detailed description of the qualifications and areas of focus of the experts can be found in Annex 5.

5.3 Roles and Responsibilities

68. This evaluation is managed by OEV. Elena Figus has been appointed as evaluation manager. She has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. Supported by a Research Analyst, the Evaluation Manager is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the reference groups; organizing the team briefing in HQ; participating in the inception phase; assisting in the preparation of all field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products; consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products; implementing the Communications Plan. She will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth evaluation process.

69. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels are expected to engage with the evaluation team; provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Ethiopia; set up meetings and field visits, organise interpretation (if required) and provide logistical support during the fieldwork. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report.

70. The Regional Evaluation Officer (REO) has a distinct role. He will be consulted on preparation of the Communication and Learning Plan and included in all key communications concerning the CPE.

He will not be a member of the Internal Reference Group (IRG) but from outside the IRG, his comments on the major evaluation products from the regional perspective are welcomed.

71. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of other stakeholders. Meetings of groups of stakeholders (including WFP staff, where appropriate) to share perspectives may be organised in addition.

5.4 Communication

72. A communication plan will be refined by the Evaluation Manager in consultation with the evaluation team during the inception phase¹¹⁶. The plan will be based on the stakeholder analysis, users of the evaluation, duty bearers, implementers, and beneficiaries, including gender perspectives (see Annex 11 for a high level draft communication and learning plan). The Communication and Learning Plan should include a GEEW responsive dissemination strategy, indicating how findings including GEEW will be disseminated and how stakeholders interested or affected by GEEW issues will be engaged.

73. An internal reference group including some of the key WFP's internal stakeholders at HQ, RB and CO, will be established for the evaluation to serve as contact point for communication with WFP stakeholders. They will be invited to provide comments on the main CPE deliverables. OEV will explore the feasibility of a workshop in country after the field work to discuss the draft preliminary findings and recommendations with stakeholders in the field and a further Lessons Learned exercise at the end of the whole process

5.5 Budget

74. The evaluation will be financed from the Office of Evaluation's budget. The total budget covers all expenses related to consultant and/or company rates, international travels, logistics and OEV staff travel.

Annexes

Annexes to the Terms of Reference are not reproduced here, but the supplementary information they provided was incorporated in the inception report.

¹¹⁶ It is important that Evaluation Reports are accessible to a wide audience, as foreseen in the Evaluation Policy, to ensure the credibility of WFP – through transparent reporting – and the usefulness of evaluations. The dissemination strategy will consider from the stakeholder analysis who to disseminate to, involve and identify the users of the evaluation, duty bearers, implementers, beneficiaries, including gender perspectives.

Annex B Methodology

Introduction

1. The methodology for this country portfolio evaluation (CPE) was fully set out in the inception report (IR) (Mokoro, 2018a). This Annex summarises the methodology adopted and comments on the team's experience in conducting the evaluation. The full evaluation matrix is reproduced in Annex C. For a description of the evaluation process, including fieldwork itinerary, see Annex D.

Evaluation guidelines and standards

2. The WFP Office of Evaluation's EQAS guidelines for country portfolio evaluations provided a strong procedural and methodological framework. The templates for the inception report and evaluation report offered clear guidelines. The OECD DAC and UNEG evaluation standards were adhered to. The evaluation employed the evaluation criteria according to WFP standard practice set out in the OEV Technical Note on the subject (WFP, n.d. c), as well as following the OEV guidance on efficiency (WFP, 2013e). All evaluation outputs have undergone quality assurance.

Evaluation matrix

3. The evaluation team took the key evaluation questions from the Terms of Reference (see Annex A above) and broke these down into a more detailed series of evaluation questions (EQs). The evaluation matrix in Annex C shows these questions and amplifies the points addressed in answering each of them, as well as the analysis and indicators used for this purpose, the main sources of information, and the approach to triangulation. The detailed evaluation questions and the matrix were designed to ensure balance between the three overarching key questions as well as an intuitively logical sequence of enquiry. Taken together, the main report above and the thematic annexes below attempt to answer all the detailed evaluation questions and the subquestions that they contain.

4. A theory of change (ToC) approach was used to inform the design of the evaluation matrix, though it was not considered appropriate to reconstruct a theory of change in full for the portfolio, or for its individual components (see Annex K of the inception report, Mokoro, 2018a). The evaluation team used recent WFP guidelines and theories of change as reference points, but, to avoid unfair assessment, took careful account of what the available guidance was at the time of programme decision-making and implementation.

Methodology and data collection instruments

Mixed methods

5. The evaluation used a pragmatic mixed methods approach in addressing the evaluation questions. This section explains the different instruments employed and the approach to triangulating evidence from different sources. As envisaged in the inception report:

We will seek both triangulation and complementarity between methods (see Box 9 below). We will also triangulate within methods where appropriate (e.g. comparing the perspectives of different stakeholders interviewed). The final column of the evaluation matrix in [Annex C] notes approaches to triangulation for each EQ.

Box 9 Triangulation and complementarity

Methods can be combined in different ways:

'Triangulation': confirming and corroborating results reached by one method with other results reached by another method. For instance, when beneficiaries of a project's services state that they judge it good (or bad); this can be cross-checked by collecting quantitative data on coverage and accessibility of the service.

'Complementarity': results obtained by a method help better understand those obtained by another method. In-depth theory-based approaches may help understand reasons why a project led to unexpected results; qualitative methods may help clarify concepts and define variables; and large-scale data sets may be analysed by multivariate and case-based methods.

Source: Stern et al, 2012

Data collection instruments

6. The main instruments for assembling data and stakeholder views were:
- (a) Document/literature review. The bibliography at Annex V is drawn from a much larger e-library of documents gathered with the support of OEV and the Ethiopia country office.
 - (b) Review of secondary data. The e-library includes a comprehensive collection of WFP's internal data, including standard project reports (SPRs) and annual work plans, together with country-level data on performance in the various sectors in which WFP is engaged. During the inception phase, all the information from SPRs was consolidated in a single workbook, to facilitate activity- and theme-wise analysis by team members. SPRs for 2017 which became available in April 2018 (while field work was already under way) were factored into the CPE analysis. As well as data consolidated in the SPRs, the evaluation team sought more disaggregated data held by the country office that might offer possibilities of analysis by geographical location/distribution site, and might also include ad hoc indicators additional to the standard indicators that feature in SPRs. In practice, as discussed in Annex J, the evaluation team experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining such data, especially for the earlier years of the evaluation period. A special effort was made, with the assistance of OEV, to assemble consolidated activity-wise output and outcome data: the resulting tables are in Annex I; the introduction to that annex explains the challenges of compiling those tables, and the limitations on their use.
 - (c) Key informant and stakeholder interviews: These were the main form of primary data collection. The range of interview targets was indicated in the stakeholder analysis (annex j of the inception report). By default, interviews were treated as confidential; they were systematically written up by team members using a standard template and shared through a compendium in a confidential section of the e-library. The compendium enabled interview notes to be easily searched by topic, and facilitated triangulation of different interviewee recollections and perspectives. Interviewees were very helpful in indicating additional key documents and data sources. The Office of Evaluation and the country office were helpful in facilitating interviews. See Annex E for the list of people consulted.
 - (d) Field visits: The field visit programme is described in Annex D. The purpose of the field visits was *not* to evaluate individual operations, but to give the team a more grounded understanding of WFP

activities and facilitate interviews and focus group discussions with stakeholders, including beneficiaries, at local levels. The team engaged independent interpreters as necessary.¹¹⁷

- (e) Focus group discussions (FGDs): The field included focus group discussions with beneficiaries (with separate groups for women) and with WFP, Government and other staff involved in delivering programmes. Annex D summarises the groups met.
- (f) Workshops/seminars: The inception mission held introductory discussions with staff drawn from all sections of the country office. The evaluation team held additional consultation/feedback sessions as follows:
- A meeting was held with senior country office staff at the outset of the main evaluation mission, to brief staff on the work so far and the plans for the field mission, and seek informal feedback on issues, data, interviewees etc.
 - A one-day workshop was held with national staff of the country office.
 - At the end of the main evaluation mission, an exit debrief for country office staff was held. An informal PowerPoint presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions was discussed.
 - Following the mission, an online debriefing with headquarters and regional bureau staff, also joined by the country office, was held (see detailed timetable at Annex D). This was a useful opportunity for early feedback from headquarters stakeholders, including members of the reference group.

7. In September, workshops were held in Addis Ababa to discuss the draft evaluation report before its finalisation. Held on consecutive days, one was with country office staff and the other included external stakeholders (from the Government and development partners). Both were supported by the same external facilitator, and attended by the head of the Office of Evaluation as well as the evaluation manager.

Thematic Areas and Cross-Cutting Issues

8. As proposed in the inception report the portfolio was analysed through a number of thematic and cross-cutting lenses; these are reflected in supporting annexes. The thematic lenses are:

- a) Emergency response, logistics and supply chain – see Annex R.
- b) Food security, livelihoods support and vulnerability analysis – see Annex L.
 - Closely related resilience issues are reviewed in Annex M.
- c) Food assistance to refugees – see Annex N.
- d) Nutrition – see Annex P.
- e) School feeding – see Annex Q.

9. Some of these thematic topics include cross-cutting elements (e.g. vulnerability analysis has relevance across the portfolio). Additional cross-cutting topics are:

- a) Gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) – see Annex T.
- b) Humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations – see Annex O.
- c) Cost analysis and efficiency – see Annex S.

¹¹⁷ Interpreters were hired by WFP but were not WFP employees and had not been involved in the operations being reviewed.

- d) Strategic analysis and learning – drawing on monitoring, evaluation and learning as manifested in all components, but also drawing on overall analysis of WFP's M&E system (Annex J) and strategic planning at country level – see Annex K.
- e) Capacity development is considered in all components, with particular reference to the development of sustainable institutional capacity.

10. Each cross-cutting annex includes a summary of the methodological approach adopted.

Limitations

11. As discussed in Annex K, there was not an explicit strategy for the second half of the evaluation period against which to evaluate the portfolio.

12. As explained in Annex J, it was even more difficult than expected to assemble detailed country-level data on WFP's operations. This reflected weaknesses in the M&E functions of the country office, and known systemic weaknesses in WFP's M&E systems, as well as discontinuities in data sets due to changes in specified indicators and in related information technology systems.

13. As explained in Annex I, recorded outcome data were of limited value; this was partly due to discontinuities in recording of indicators, methodological issues in their definition in some cases, but, more fundamentally to the limited ability of selected outcome indicators to explain WFP's performance.

14. Overall there was a general bias toward the present; it was harder to find protagonists from the earlier portfolio years, and recollections of earlier events were more uncertain (and data less complete or reliable).

15. These limitations were mainly addressed by triangulating across available evidence. Where limitations were serious findings in the main text are qualified accordingly.

Annex C Evaluation Matrix

1. The evaluation matrix shown in Table 2 below was developed drawing on the questions posed in the terms of reference. The main questions and subquestions were addressed from the perspective of the lines of enquiry that were adopted for this evaluation. These comprised:

- Activities that recur across different operations (and in many cases apply both for Ethiopian nationals and refugees), namely:
 - Food assistance for relief and resilience building,
 - Nutrition programmes
 - School feeding
 - Capacity development, including strengthening of logistics, and leveraging supply chains to reinforce resilience
 - Analytical work, including work linked to disaster preparedness, and climate change and joint planning with the Government and other agencies
- Cross-cutting issues, namely:
 - Application of humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations
 - Country strategy formulation
 - Partnerships and capacity development
 - Gender
 - Choices between in-kind and cash-based modalities.

Table 2 Evaluation Matrix

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
KEY QUESTION 1: PORTFOLIO ALIGNMENT AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING			
EQ1. What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in Ethiopia?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political and institutional context of Ethiopia ▪ Economic and social characteristics and trends (gender disaggregated) ▪ Key elements of Ethiopia's international relationships, including aid ▪ Significant changes in the international context during the evaluation period (including developments concerning nutrition, climate change, humanitarian and development aid landscape, etc.) ▪ Relevant aspects of WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies 	<p>Standard international comparisons on economic, social and governance data, linked to Ethiopia-specific assessments.</p> <p>Standard international comparisons on food security and nutrition.</p>	<p>International data sets</p> <p>Secondary material on changes in international context</p> <p>Regular analytical work on Ethiopia (e.g. by EIU, WB, IMF, AfDB) as well as national data</p> <p>Ethiopia-specific studies and reports</p> <p>Government and partner policy statements and plans</p> <p>WFP policy and strategy documents</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Variety of analytical sources, ensuring a range of stakeholder perspectives.</p> <p>Awareness that opinion in and on Ethiopia may be polarised. Range of stakeholder interviews.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
EQ2. To what extent have the portfolio's main objectives and related activities been relevant to Ethiopia's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups and vulnerable people), priorities and capacities?			
<p>What are the needs? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What are the needs in terms of food security and nutrition (and what are the characteristics of vulnerability)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Which are the most vulnerable groups and why? ○ Which geographical areas are most vulnerable and why? ▪ How has the changing context during the evaluation period affected the nature of needs in Ethiopia? ▪ To what extent does the WFP programme/ portfolio assess the real needs of the most vulnerable, including the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition? ▪ How are data on needs regularly gathered? I.e. how are needs monitored over time? ▪ How is need disaggregated by gender, and what are WFP efforts to address this? ▪ What efforts does WFP make to ensure that its interventions are culturally sensitive? 	<p>Nutritional and food security status of population, morbidity and mortality, other relevant social indicators, and policy makers' perceptions.</p> <p>Extent and quality of WFP's analytical work (including food security assessments, emergency assessments, market assessments).</p> <p>Review of treatment of gender in WFP project documents and draft strategy.</p> <p>Comparison of programme data and needs data.</p> <p>Check against comparable WFP and partner programme documentation and data.</p>	<p>Analysis generated for EQ1.</p> <p>Key surveys, by the Government, WFP and others.</p> <p>Government national and sector planning documents.</p> <p>WFP project documents and reporting.</p> <p>Analytical and project documents from other agencies</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Again, note potential polarisation on issues of needs (e.g. the controversy over IDP numbers and others affected by war). Range of stakeholder perspectives and emphasis on evidence-based documentary sources.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
EQ3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?			
<p>In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Alignment with government policies ▪ Alignment with government systems (bearing in mind Ethiopia's federal, decentralised structure) <p>Extent to which government documents have provided a clear and comprehensive framework to align with.</p> <p>Quality of government systems.</p> <p>Mechanisms for mutual accountability.</p>	<p>Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy with those set out in government national and sector policy and planning documents, and with government and national systems</p> <p>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</p>	<p>Government policy and planning documents, at national and sector level.</p> <p>WFP programme documents.</p> <p>Analysis generated for EQ1</p> <p>External assessments (e.g. PEFA) of quality of government systems</p> <p>Informant perspectives (especially government, at national and local levels) on alignment.</p>	<p>Triangulate government and non-government perspectives; views of independent observers as well as WFP and government stakeholders; to the extent possible assess whether government priorities vary between central/local government levels and across geographical areas; note that government policy emphasis may have shifted over time; compare current interview evidence with historical documentary record.</p>
EQ4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?			
<p>How effective are WFP partnerships? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ How well WFP works collaboratively within UN, and with other donors, on a strategic policy level and at an implementation level. ▪ How well WFP manages partnerships with other non-government stakeholders. 	<p>To consider whether partnerships have been effective and efficient in practice (cf. EQ11 and EQ13) as well as relevant in principle</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy with relevant partner strategies and plans and coordination frameworks • Degree of active harmonisation and collaboration achieved between WFP and partners <p>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</p>	<p>Planning documents and performance information on WFP interventions, with special attention to joint interventions and assessments.</p> <p>Analysis generated for EQ1.</p> <p>Government, other partner and beneficiary perspectives.</p>	<p>Range of documentary sources and stakeholder interviews.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
EQ5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including protection and the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand? Has WFP dealt appropriately with such trade-offs?			
<p>Extent to which WFP's portfolio and its components in Ethiopia have adapted to evolving WFP policies and guidelines.</p> <p>Extent to which there have been tensions or trade-offs between WFP corporate policies etc. and alignment with government strategies and systems.</p>	<p>Extent to which WFP has adhered to international standards and WFP corporate standards (including the humanitarian principles).</p> <p>Extent to which adherence to such standards has been constrained by government policies and standards.</p> <p>Extent to which any compromises are identified as such and acknowledged.</p> <p>NB. Judgment on WFP performance to take account of policy guidance and international standards available at the time strategic decisions were made.</p> <p>(To be considered at the level of thematic components and the portfolio as a whole.)</p>	<p>Documentation on WFP corporate strategy and thematic policies and standards.</p> <p>Project documents and performance information on WFP interventions.</p> <p>WFP, UN and other reports on the humanitarian situation and UN performance)</p> <p>Analysis generated for EQ1.</p> <p>Key informant interviews.</p>	<p>Ensure that documents and stakeholders consulted reflect different time periods as well as different stakeholder groups. HQ vs. RB vs. CO perspectives etc.</p>
EQ6. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?			
<p>Who are the other key players in addressing food insecurity, relief and resilience in Ethiopia?</p> <p>How has WFP positioned itself vis-à-vis these players, and/or actively collaborated with them?</p> <p>Has WFP (or the Government) explicitly identified the comparative advantages of different players in analytical work, service delivery, capacity development, and acted accordingly?</p>	<p>Context analysis (EQ1), and analysis of alignment (EQ4, EQ5). (Especially seek conscious statements of WFP's perceived comparative advantage.)</p> <p>Quality of joint UN planning.</p> <p>Operation of joint forums with Government and other partners addressing food security, nutrition, climate change, disaster preparedness, etc. and WFP's role in these.</p>	<p>Documentation of policy and planning processes in Ethiopia (e.g. coordinating committees' membership, record of meetings and decision making, analytical and policy documents resulting).</p> <p>Key informant perceptions of these processes, their quality, and WFP's contributions to them.</p>	<p>Range of documentary sources and interviews, capturing external as well as internal perspectives on WFP role and performance.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
KEY QUESTION 2: FACTORS AND QUALITY OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING			
EQ7. To what extent has WFP analysed the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Ethiopia - including gender equality and protection issues? and taken account of related logistics and capacity development challenges?			
<p>For each of its interventions, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene?</p> <p>In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Use of data and analysis gathered by WFP and others for strategy formulation, for choice of intervention, and for influencing others. ▪ Analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods and gender context, and how this is used for effective targeting. ▪ Analysis of logistics and capacity development requirements. ▪ Use of WFP research and monitoring data to inform strategic decision-making. 	<p>Analysis of programme direction against needs set out in food security assessments and other key analytical work</p> <p>Assessment of clarity and thoroughness with which PDs etc. refer to relevant data and analysis</p> <p>Quality of attention to gender issues in analysis planning and monitoring.</p>	<p>Analytical work undertaken directly by WFP or in collaboration with partners.</p> <p>Other relevant analytical work to which WFP had access.</p> <p>Project documents and monitoring reports</p> <p>Key informant interviews</p>	<p>Stakeholder interviews with those undertaking analysis; independent assessment of quality of analytical documents etc.; extent to which analytical work is reflected in operational documents.</p>
EQ8. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?			
<p>What explicit efforts has WFP made:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ in advocacy on hunger-related issues? ○ towards developing national capacity for monitoring, analysis and decision-making (as well as implementation)? <p>Is there evidence that WFP has</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ influenced Government and/or other partners, or public perceptions? ○ strengthened national capacity for analysis and decision-making? 	<p>Analysis of documentary record and participant perceptions.</p> <p>Assessment of effectiveness of capacity development efforts (EQ11, EQ13)</p>	<p>Cf. EQ6 above</p> <p>Documents on the evolution of strategy and capacity.</p> <p>WFP records including SPRs</p> <p>Key informant perceptions.</p>	<p>Range of documentary sources and interviews, capturing external as well as internal perspectives on WFP role and performance.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
EQ9. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?			
<p>External factors to consider include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Changing economic, budgetary and capacity context in Ethiopia (EQ1 above) ○ Evolution of geo-political situation in the region (EQ1 above) ○ context for WFP, including its financing environment <p>Internal factors to consider include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Staffing and capacity of the WFP CO and support from RB and HQ ○ Roll-out of WFP strategic, policy and financial reforms, and the extent to which these have (in practice) increased flexibility and scope for strategic decision-making 	<p>Reconstruct the influences at play in WFP's decision-making processes, with particular attention to factors that constrain or enhance the real effective discretion of the CO in determining the what, when, how and where of its component activities.</p> <p>Assess against international good practice on strategic decision-making, including attention to predictability in facilitating strategic approaches.</p>	<p>Documentation of decisions on programme components, their design, implementation and the perceived trade-offs between them.</p> <p>Key informant interviews with participants.</p> <p>International perspectives on strategic decision-making.</p>	<p>Compare documentary record on decision processes and rationale for decisions taken against recollections of participants and independent observers.</p>
EQ10. To what extent has WFP generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners?			
<p>What (systematic or ad hoc) efforts has WFP made to learn from experience in Ethiopia, including adaptations to the changing Ethiopia context (cf.EQ1,)</p> <p>How has WFP responded to developments in international understanding of food insecurity, resilience, nutrition, school feeding, etc. (including the developing context of WFP's global strategy and policies)?</p> <p>Do WFP's (and Government's) monitoring systems provide feedback loops from beneficiaries (individuals and communities)?</p> <p>To whom is WFP accountable, at portfolio and component level?</p>	<p>Documentary and oral record of WFP decision-making vis-à-vis Ethiopia.</p> <p>Ways in which this reflects, or fails to reflect, (explicit or implicit) adaptation to lessons learned in Ethiopia or internationally.</p> <p>WFP's current guidance on accountability to affected populations as a reference point for analysis.</p>	<p>Findings on needs monitoring under EQ1 above.</p> <p>Key informant interviews within WFP.</p> <p>Perspectives of WFP partners, including Government.</p> <p>FGDs on accountabilities.</p>	<p>Stakeholder interviews and documentary record, as for EQ9 above.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
KEY QUESTION 3: PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF THE WFP PORTFOLIO			
EQ11. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?			
<p>What outputs and outcomes were planned and what was achieved? To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?</p> <p>How was effectiveness affected by WFP's (and Government's) levels of emergency preparedness?</p> <p>How have outputs attributable to WFP contributed to outcomes and (to the extent data are available) impacts at the levels of joint intervention performance and sector performance?</p> <p>How effective was targeting?</p>	<p>Direct outputs of WFP activities, with attention also to indirect and/or unintended results. (With appropriate disaggregated analyses by activity, geographical focus etc. and trend analyses over time.)</p> <p>Contribution of WFP outputs to desired outcomes (using contribution analysis approach¹¹⁸ to assess WFP contribution to joint results and sector/national level indicators).</p> <p>Assess plausibility of WFP contribution to impact.</p> <p>Analysis of ex ante and ex post targeting.</p> <p>Assess influence of WFP on policy, practice, capacity building. (to be considered separately for different lines of enquiry)</p> <p>Reasons for effectiveness/ineffectiveness to be considered in terms of the implicit ToC for different types of intervention (e.g. were any shortfalls due to problems in implementation or problems with the key assumptions linked to the intervention?)</p>	<p>Data and existing analyses/reports on sectors in which WFP is engaged.</p> <p>WFP SPRs and detailed monitoring reports.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs with key informants, including beneficiaries.</p> <p>(Relevant ToC assumptions to be deduced from project documents, together with – as a reference point – recent WFP work on ToCs)</p>	<p>Recorded performance indicators vs. perceptions of beneficiaries and other stakeholders.</p>

¹¹⁸ See definition and illustration of contribution analysis in the inception report (Mokoro, 2018a) Annex C.

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
EQ12. To what extent has WFP contributed to the reduction of gender inequality in control over food, resources and decision-making?			
<p>Have WFP-supported interventions paid explicit attention to the gender dimension of control over food, resources and decision making?</p> <p>Have the effects on gender inequality of different approaches to food assistance been monitored?</p> <p>Is there evidence/examples of (emerging) changes in relevant gender roles and relationships in Ethiopia?</p> <p>If so, is there evidence of WFP contributing to such reductions?</p>	<p>Draw on gender analysis for EQ2 above. Use broad contribution analysis approach¹¹⁹ in reviewing main WFP interventions and also WFP participation in wider programme design and implementation.</p>	<p>WFP project documents and reporting.</p> <p>Contextual analysis of gender issues in Ethiopia. general evidence of good practice and of trends in gender inequality in Ethiopia.</p> <p>Interviews with key informants.</p>	<p>Recorded performance indicators vs. perceptions of stakeholders. Bear in mind that progress may be local and specific, and compare different contexts.</p>
EQ13. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?			
<p>For all main components (taking account of data availability) to consider the following dimensions of efficiency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • timeliness of interventions and the efficiency of logistics • continuity – effects of underfunding and of pipeline breaks • efficiency in relationships with partners • overhead and administrative costs • any evidence of increased efficiency over time 	<p>(to be considered separately for different components of the portfolio)</p>	<p>WFP project documents and reporting (special attention to available data on programme costs that can be linked to effects at different levels of the results chain).</p> <p>NB efficiency assessments require prior information on results at each level of the logical framework, so findings against EQ11 above will input to the efficiency analysis.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs for perceptions on efficiency.</p> <p>Interviews with engaged WFP staff to understand the decision-making process at the time, and the quality of subsequent monitoring</p>	<p>Recorded performance indicators vs. perceptions of beneficiaries and other stakeholders.</p>

¹¹⁹ See definition and illustration of contribution analysis in 1.

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
EQ14. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?			
<p>To what extent are the benefits of WFP assistance likely to be continuing, in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Enduring benefits for individual beneficiaries? ▪ Maintenance of assets created with WFP assistance? ▪ Policy changes and capacity development? 	<p>Experience of interventions already completed; design quality (including government and beneficiary ownership of those under way) (to be considered separately for different operational components, analytical work and planning)</p>	<p>Project reports and evaluations. Interviews and FGDs (supplemented by site visits)</p>	<p>Documents, range of stakeholder perspectives, including beneficiaries.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development of partners' (especially government) capacity to operate systems for analysis, decision-making and service delivery? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How has capacity been conceived and measured? ○ How have capacity requirements been identified and addressed? ○ How have capacity interventions been coordinated (or not) with other partners, and with what implications for sustainability? 	<p>Capacity at individual, organisational and institutional levels.</p>	<p>Independent commentary. Interviews.</p>	<p>Documents. Perspectives of those involved and of detached observers.</p>
EQ15. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?			
<p>Degree to which WFP's operations and its other activities (analysis, monitoring, advocacy etc.) have complemented each other</p>	<p>Stakeholder perceptions, plus evaluation team findings on EQ1–EQ13.</p>	<p>Interviews, secondary documents, plus findings on previous EQs.</p>	<p>Documentary record, plus internal and external stakeholder perspectives.</p>
EQ16. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?			
<p>To what extent have WFP's operations (to be considered according to thematic area) and the portfolio as a whole complemented (or been effectively integrated within) government and other agencies' activities?</p>	<p>Stakeholder perceptions, plus evaluation team findings on EQ1–EQ13.</p>	<p>Interviews, secondary documents, plus findings on previous EQs.</p>	<p>Documentary record, plus internal and external stakeholder perspectives.</p>

Annex D Evaluation Process

Inception phase activities

1. The evaluation team's contract was issued on 24 January 2018. The inception phase, involved developing the e-library (cf. the bibliography at Annex V), extensive work on the country context and initial analysis of the portfolio. The team undertook inception visits to Rome, Addis Ababa and Nairobi as follows:
 - a) A briefing mission to WFP headquarters was held from 6-9 February 2018, attended by all but one of the evaluation team members. In addition to briefings with the Office of Evaluation and other relevant units in Rome, the team spent a day on an internal workshop to develop evaluation tools, including the stakeholder analysis and evaluation questions.
 - b) Between 15-16 and 21-23 February, the team leader, research analysts and the evaluation manager held meetings in Addis Ababa with the country office staff, and with various stakeholders who engage with or fund WFP activities in Ethiopia.
 - c) On 19-20 February the team leader, a research analyst and the Evaluation Manager held meetings with staff of the WFP regional bureau in Nairobi (RBN).

Evaluation phase

2. The main evaluation mission took place from 10-27 April, with inputs from Doe-e Berhanu, Alison Donnelly, Zoe Driscoll, George Fenton, Adam Leach and Judith Sandford, led by Stephen Lister. Liv Bjørnstad, the economist on the team, joined the mission for the period 23-27 April.
3. The second week of the fieldwork phase, 16-19 April, was spent outside Addis Ababa travelling to various sites relevant to the portfolio activities under review. For this week, the evaluation team split into three teams, spending the first half of the week visiting Gambella region, Tigray region, and Djibouti country office, and the second half of the week visiting various activities in Somali region. The team were accompanied by independent interpreters as necessary. George Fenton and Liv Bjørnstad also visited the Adama sub office on 23 April to cover supply chain activities. A broad range of stakeholders were consulted in each region. Table 3 below gives a summary of the team division during the week and Table 4 below gives an overview of the sites and beneficiaries visited by type. Map 3 below shows the areas visited by the sub-teams.
4. There were further contacts with the country office after the evaluation mission as the team validated data and sought additional information. In addition the team carried out remote interviews with former senior staff of the country office.
5. Following the main field work, Judith Sandford and Doe-e Berhanu devoted a few extra days to interviews and analysis linked to the WFP Strategic Evaluation of Resilience (see Annex M).

Table 3 List of field visits 16–23 April 2018

Dates	Location	Team members	Areas/Activities covered
16–17 April 2018	Djibouti country office and Djibouti logistics hub	George Fenton	Supply chain
	Gambella sub-office/Tierkidi and Kule refugee camps, Gambella	Doe-e Berhanu, Alison Donnelly, Adam Leach	Refugees and capacity development (supply chain)
	Shire field office/ Hitsats refugee camp and Mekelle sub-office /	Zoe Driscoll, Stephen Lister, Judith Sandford	MERET, R4, nutrition, refugees


Dates	Location	Team members	Areas/Activities covered
	Atsbi Wenberta woreda / Enderta WOREDA, Tigray		
1820 April 2018	Jigjiga (area office and sub-office and Dolo sub-office/Melkadida refugee camp, Somali	Doe-e Berhanu, Stephen Lister, Adam Leach	Regional Government and WFP relationship, Refugees
	Jigjiga (area office and sub-office)and Kebribeyah woreda Somali	Alison Donnelly, Judith Sandford	PSNP and humanitarian food assistance (cash-pilot), nutrition, IDPs
18–19 April 2018	Jigjiga (area office and sub-office)	Zoe Driscoll, George Fenton	Logistics and M&E
23 April 2018	Adama sub-office	George Fenton and Liv Bjørnstad	Logistics, capacity development (supply chain)

Table 4 Overview of sites and beneficiaries visited

Refugee camps	
Tierkidi refugee camps, Gambella	Group of 12 men and 8 women beneficiaries
Kule refugee camps, Gambella	Group of 8 women and 2 men beneficiaries
Hitsats refugee camp, Tigray	Group of 10 men and 9 women beneficiaries; visits to NGO education and school/child feeding facilities.
,Melkadida refugee camp, Somali	Group of 15 men and 4 women beneficiaries; visit to Save the Children's alternative basic education (ABE) and early childhood care and development centre (ECCDC); IMC nutrition centre visit
Health centres	
Romanat Health Centre, Enderta Woreda, Tigray	Group of 13 targeted supplementary feeding beneficiaries, three health centre staff members and targeted supplementary feeding woreda coordinator
Elbahay Health Centre, targeted supplementary feeding distribution centre, Tigray	Discussions at the health centre in with the health centre staff (all men) and 2 women conducting MUAC screening. Brief individual conversations 2 female beneficiaries of targeted supplementary feeding.
R4 site	
Barka Adisubha R4 site, Tigray	Group of 11 men and 9 women beneficiaries, REST NGO member, and agricultural development agency representative
MERET site	
MERET sites in Kalamín kebele, Tigray	Group of 9 men and 4 women beneficiaries
PSNP	
Kebribeya humanitarian food assistance and PSNP site, Somali	Group discussion with a total of 15 men and 1 women, including 1 kebele administrator, 1 development agent, 7 PSNP beneficiaries, 1 humanitarian beneficiary, 6 kebele food task force members (5 male, 1 female), and 1 representative of the kebele appeals committee
Warehouses	
GOAL warehouse Tierkidi refugee camp, Gambella	GOAL warehouse staff
WFP new warehouse, Jigjiga, Somali	Warehouse staff
WFP old warehouse, Jigjiga, Somali	Warehouse staff
Other logistics	
Airdrops from WFP Gambella	Routine crew briefing attended.
UNHAS Gambella	UNHAS pilot and WFP logistics staff

WFP port operations and logistics hub project (warehouses and silos), Djibouti	WFP Djibouti country office logistics staff
Oromia Transporters	Meeting with agents of main private sector transport companies used by WFP from Adama.
Government transport fleet	Manager and operations director of government fleet ('heavy machinery administration rental and garage service enterprise')

Map 3 Evaluation team field visits



People met

6. A full list of people interviewed in the course of the evaluation is at Annex E below.

Annex E People Consulted

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
WFP ROME			
Sally Burrows	Office of Evaluation	Deputy Head	f
Andrea Cook	Office of Evaluation	Director	f
Elena Figus	Office of Evaluation	Evaluation Manager	f
Deborah McWhinney	Office of Evaluation	Evaluation Manager	f
Mike Reynolds	Office of Evaluation	Evaluation Manager	m
Lia Carboni	Office of Evaluation	Research Analyst	f
Federico Doehnert	African Risk Capacity Division (ARC)	Early Warning & Risk Analyst	m
Carlos Botta	Aviation Service (HQ Supply Division)	Deputy Chief	m
Barbara van Logchem	Cash-Based Transfer (OSCT)	Supply Chain Officer	f
Deborah Yohendran	Cash-based Transfer (OSCT)	Programme Officer	f
Sheila Grudem	Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division (OSE)	Deputy Director of Emergencies	f
Veronique Sainte-Luce	Gender Office	Senior Programme Advisor	f
Mutinta Hambayi	Nutrition-Sensitive Programmes, Nutrition Division (OSN)	Chief	f
Jennifer Rosenzweig	Nutrition Division (OSN)	Knowledge Management Officer	f
Johannes Braun	Policy and Programme Division (OSZ) – IRM Team	Programme Policy Officer	m
George Fedha	Market Access Programme Unit (OSZIC)	Programme Officer	m
Angie Lee	Vulnerability Analysis Unit (VAM) (OSZIF)	Programme Policy Officer	f
Azzurra Massimino	Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes (OSZIR)	Consultant	f
Sarah Laughton	Safety Nets & Social Protection Unit (OSZIS)	Chief	f
David Ryckembusch	School Feeding Team, Safety Nets & Social Protection Unit (OSZIS)	Senior Programme Policy Officer	m
Rebecca Richards	WFP Humanitarian Crises and Transition Unit (OSZPH)	Chief	f
Scott Ronchini	Asset Creation and Livelihoods Unit (OSZPR)	Senior Programme Policy Officer	m
Steven Were Omamo	Food System Strategy Service (OSZS)	Director	m
Gianluca Ferrera	Purchase for Progress Coordination Unit (OSZSF)	Senior Policy Officer	m
Pasqualina Di Sirio	Government Partnerships Division (PGG)	Head of Operations Support Team	f
Kathinka Lyche	Government Partnerships Division (PGG)	Consultant	f
Betty Ka	Project Budget and Programming Service (RMBP)	Programme Officer GCMF Coordinator	f
Michele Righi	RMMI (WFP Management Services Division)	Chief Engineer	m
Caterina Kireeva	Monitoring and Evaluation Service (RMPM)	Monitoring Officer	f
Peter Jonsson	Performance Management & Reporting Branch (RMPP)	Programme Officer	m
Sogol Akef	WFP Engineering	Senior Engineer/ Team Leader	f

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
WFP RBN AND DJIBOUTI			
Adrian Van der Knapp	RBN / Former Head of Logistics WFP Ethiopia	Deputy Regional Director	m
Illaria Dettori	RBN	Head of Programmes	f
Isabel Burchard	RBN	Head of External Relations and Partnerships	f
Genevieve Chicoine	RBN	Monitoring Officer	f
Daniel Christiansen	RBN	Emergency preparedness and response	m
Anna Fernandez-Martinez	IRM; RBN	Programme Officer	f
Roberto Borlini	RBN	Regional Evaluation Officer	m
Alison Oman	RBN	Nutrition Officer	f
Analee Pepper	RBN	Gender and AAP	f
Etienne Labande	WFP Djibouti	Deputy Country Director & Head of Programme	m
Amir Ismail	WFP Djibouti	Senior Logistics Officer	m
WFP ETHIOPIA			
Joyce Luma	WFP Ethiopia	Representative and Country Director	f
Matthew Chentsil	WFP Ethiopia	Deputy Representative	m
Samir Wanmali	WFP Ethiopia	Deputy Country Director	m
Yared Ayelew	FMIP; WFP Ethiopia	Manager	m
Yebeltal Fentie	WFP Ethiopia	P4P Manager	m
Mohammedamin Ahmed	WFP Ethiopia	Deputy Head of Programme	m
Claude Kakule	WFP Ethiopia	Deputy Head of Programme	m
Pierre Lucas	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Aviation/UNHAS	m
Ryan Pittock	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Finance	m
Lionel Marre	WFP Ethiopia	Head of ICT	m
Oleh Maslyukov	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Logistics	m
Padraig McCarron	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Engineering Unit	m
Sibi Lawson Marriot	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Programmes	f
Paola Corrado	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Supply Chain	f
Yohannes Desta	WFP Ethiopia	Head of refugee team	m
Intisar Birkia	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Resource Management (RMA)	f
Ayderus Hasaan	WFP Ethiopia	Head of National Logistics and Supply Chain	m
Virginie Seznec	WFP Ethiopia	Head of HR	f
Violeta Palma-Perez	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Procurement	f
Shakeela Ellahi	WFP Ethiopia	Protection Advisor	f
Wendy Alvarado	WFP Ethiopia	M&E Team Leader	f
Hanna Assefa	WFP Ethiopia	Desk Officer	f
Kebede Assera	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Associate Smallholders Support Officer	m
Tadesse Bekele	WFP Ethiopia	Senior Disaster Risk Management Advisor	m
Birru Dali	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Officer	m
Mamo Getahun	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Policy Officer	m
Chelsey Graham	WFP Ethiopia	Logistics Officer	f
Bekelu Gullema	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Business Support	f
Halake Bante Guyo	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Policy Officer	m

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
Hannah Haaij	WFP Ethiopia	Gender and Social Protection	f
Kassu Kebede	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Officer	m
Mulugeta Dessalegn	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Associate	m
Messele Gebregziabher	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Associate	m
Lachezar Lechev	WFP Ethiopia	Security Officer	m
Nebras Mahjoub Mohammed	WFP Ethiopia	Logistics Officer	m
Meherete-Selassie Menbere	WFP Ethiopia	SOLVE Project Lead	f
Zeleka Negesse	WFP Ethiopia	IT Operations Officer	m
Ama Nettey	WFP Ethiopia	Donor Relations Officer	F
Elijah Odundo	WFP Ethiopia	Nutrition Data & Information Management Officer	m
Eleni Pantiora	WFP Ethiopia	Food technologist	f
Silvia Pontillo	WFP Ethiopia	Logistics Officer	f
Molla Sharew	WFP Ethiopia	Procurement Officer	m
Abenet Sohilue	WFP Ethiopia	HR Officer	m
Nida Tariq	WFP Ethiopia	OIM and Reports Officer	f
Ezgimelese Tecleab	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Officer	m
Gebremedhin Teklu	WFP, Ethiopia	TSF Coordinator	m
Melanie Thurber	WFP Ethiopia	Nutrition Advisor	f
Zelalem Woldemariam	WFP Ethiopia	Security Associate	m
Tayech Yimer	WFP Ethiopia	Nutrition Specialist	f
Mehali Yoseph	WFP Ethiopia	Programme Officer	m
Rupak Manvatkar	Climate Solutions Service; WFP Ethiopia	Team Lead	m
Alycan Mushayabasa	Food Cluster Coordination; WFP Ethiopia	Consultant	m
Claudio Delicato	GCMF; WFP, Ethiopia	Demand Planner	m
Askale Teklu	FFE Team Leader; WFP Ethiopia	Programme Officer	f
Sarah Sandrian	ICSP; WFP Ethiopia	HOP	f
Fragrance Manyala	Nutrition team - fresh food vouchers focal point; WFP Ethiopia	Programme Policy Office	f
Imed Khanfir	P4P; WFP, Ethiopia	Programme Policy Officer	m
Segen Tewelde	PSNP; WFP Ethiopia	Team Leader	f
Abenet Sahilue	Recruitment Team; WFP Ethiopia	HR Officer	m
Abeba Mulugeta	Resource Management; WFP Ethiopia	Budget and Programme Assistant	m
Abdu Sulta	WFP SC; WFP Ethiopia	QA Officer	m
Tigist Tadesse	Servicing & Entitlement Team; WFP Ethiopia	HR Officer	f
Reylaura Cantave	Strategic partnership officer; WFP Ethiopia	Programme Support	f
Kemeria Barsenga	TSF Team; WFP Ethiopia	Programme Associate	f
Asfaw Ayelign	UNHAS	OIC (Consultant)	m
Alemtsehai Alemu	VAM; WFP Ethiopia	Programme Policy Officer	f
Zeff Kapoor	Sub office, Adama	Head of Sub Office	m
Fued Admen	Sub office, Adama	National Programme Officer	m
Itenew Demelash	Sub office, Adama	Logistics officer	m
Ashenati Takele	Sub office, Adama	Logistics Assistant	m
Yvonne Rademacher	Sub office, Adama	EPR officer	f

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
Fuad Adem	Sub office, Adama	Programme Officer / M&E	m
Ascholew Abote	Sub office, Assossa		m
Abdikadir Mohamed	Sub office, Dollo	National Programme Officer	m
Melaku Getahun	Sub office, Gambella	Programme Associate	m
Seid Mohammed	Sub office, Gambella	WFP Gambella Monitoring Assistant	m
Okello Owiti	Sub office, Gambella	Monitoring Assistant	m
Nixon	Sub office, Gambella	Logistics Officer	m
Herman Puente	Sub office, Gambella	Logistics Officer	m
Eskinder Tilahun	Sub office, Gambella	Programme Officer	m
Simon Dradri	Sub office, Jigjiga	Head of Area Office	m
Mohammed Yusuf	Sub office, Jigjiga	Head of Sub office	m
Mustafe Adau	MVAM; Sub office, Jigjiga	Data Collection Call Centre Operator	m
Haziz Adem	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	m
Hadis Ahmed	Sub office, Jigjiga	Programme Officer	m
Habsa Ahmed	Sub office, Jigjiga	Field Monitor Assistant	f
Keder Ahmed	Sub office, Jigjiga	Logistics Reporting Focal Person	m
Habsa Ahmed Abdi	Alternate Refugee Focal Point; Sub office, Jigjiga	Programme Monitoring Assistant	f
Daryll Ainsworth	Sub office, Jigjiga	Logistics Officer	m
Mulugeta Arussi	Sub office, Jigjiga	Programme Officer	m
Mowhid Abdi	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	m
Mohammed Barud	Sub office, Jigjiga	Field Monitor Assistant	m
Mohamed Baruel	Sub office, Jigjiga	Field Monitor Assistant	m
Christine Clarence	Sub office, Jigjiga	Emergency Coordinator	f
Abdikadir Mahad	Sub office, Jigjiga	Programme Assistant	m
Fowziya Kassim	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	f
Abirahman Kassim	Sub office, Jigjiga	Programme Assistant	m
Abdikarim Haji	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	m
Ihsan Khan	Sub office, Jigjiga	WFP Head of Dire Dawa Sub-Office/Logistics Officer	m
Kadi Mohamed	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	m
Mohamed Mussie	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	m
Joseph Njan	Sub office, Jigjiga	Nutrition Coordinator	m
Mohammed Adulaku	Sub office, Jigjiga	Manager, Government Fleet	m
Abdul Fatah Osman	Sub office, Jigjiga	Operation Director, Government Fleet	m
Tahir Sheika	Sub office, Jigjiga	Programme Assistant	m
Dessalegne Tadesse	Sub office, Jigjiga	Bio Coordinator	m
Amha Wolde	Sub office, Jigjiga	Warehouse Manager	m
Feysal Yahya	Sub office, Jigjiga	Monitoring Assistant	m
Mulat Zerfaw	Sub office, Jigjiga	Biometrics Coordinator	m
Hadera Haile	Sub office, Mekelle	National Programme Officer	m
Aydahis Afkea	Sub office, Semera	Senior Programme Associate	m
Mulubrhan Atsbha	Sub office, Shire	Shire field office monitoring assistant	m
Solomon Gezae	Sub office, Shire	Monitoring Assistant	m
Tesfaye Gebretsadik	Sub office, Tigray	Monitoring Assistant and R4 Focal Point	m
Muliya Meresa	Sub office, Tigray	Programme Assistant	m
FORMER WFP ETHIOPIA STAFF			
John Aylieff	WFP Ethiopia	Former Country Director	m

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
Stephen Cahill	WFP Ethiopia	Head of Logistics Cluster/Previous Head of Logistics in Ethiopia	m
Delphine Dechaux	WFP Ethiopia	Former Head of Refugee programme	f
Purnima Kashyapp	WFP Ethiopia	Former Deputy Country Director	f
Hakan Tongul	WFP Ethiopia	Former Head of Programmes	m
Paul Turnbull	WFP Kenya	Former WFP Ethiopia staff and Incoming Deputy Country Director	m
Abdou Dieng	WFP Regional Bureau West Africa; WFP, RBD	Regional Director/Former Country Director, Ethiopia	m
GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA			
Zeynu Jemal	ARRA	Deputy Director	m
Eyob Awoke	ARRA	Head of Program Implementation and Coordination Department	m
Hannah Asefa	ARRA	Desk Officer	f
Seifuden Kassom	ARRA	Programme Officer	m
Fisseha Meseret	ARRA	Project Head, M&E Division	m
Haftom Tesfa Michael	ARRA	Camp Coordinator	m
Dawit Addis	ARRA, Gambella	M&E Officer	m
Jemal Ali	ARRA, Malkadida	Protection Officer	m
Almaz Kebebe	ARRA, Malkadida	Gender Officer	m
Mohammed Mitikie	ARRA, Shire	Programme Head	m
Biratu Yigezu	Central Statistical Agency	Director General	m
Lijalem Kahsay	DPPB, Mekelle	Early Warning Response	m
Desta Gebremichael	EWRFS, Mekelle	Department Head	m
Berhanu Mogussie	EWRFS, Mekelle		m
Ahmed Abdi Dawd	Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga	Regional PSNP Coordinator, Somali region	m
Abdi Ahmed	Early Warning and Response; Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga		m
Abdirezak Ali	Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga	FFE Technical Advisor	m
Abdiwahab Hassan Farh	Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga	Regional Health Bureau Information Management Officer	m
Mohammed Hussein	Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga	Finance PSNP	m
Abdilaki Meldi	Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga	DPPB/TSF	m
Muktar Mohamed	Government of Ethiopia, Jigjiga	Response Section Expert	m
Anwar Ali	Ethiopian Somali Regional President's Office	Humanitarian Advisor to Ethiopian Somali Regional State President	m
Teklay Teweldemariam	Regional Health Bureau, Mekelle	Deputy Head	m
Ayderus Ahmed	Bureau of Health, Somali region	Deputy Head	m
Mohammed Ahmed Nur	Bureau of Health, Somali region	Deputy Head	m
Administrator	Elbahay Health Centre, Somali	Administrator	f
CMAM Focal Point	Elbahay Health Centre, Somali	CMAM Focal Point	m
Kebribeya woreda finance officer	Kebribeya woreda	Finance Officer	m
Berhanu Woldegiorgis	Food Security Unit; Ministry of Agriculture	Director	m
[Male coordinator]	Ministry of Agriculture	M&E Case Team Coordinator	m
[Male coordinator]	Ministry of Agriculture	Somali Livelihoods Team Coordinator	m

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
Nesredin Rube	Ministry of Agriculture, Ethiopia	Natural Resource Management Directorate	m
Yasabu Berkneh	School Improvement & Support; Ministry of Education	Director General	m
Bereket Akele	Ministry of Education	Technical Assistant	m
Rahel Asfaw	Disaster Response and Rehabilitation Directorate; NDRMC	Director	f
Almaz Demissie	Early Warning Directorate; NDRMC	Director	f
Abera Kassa	Disaster Response and Rehabilitation Directorate; NDRMC	Director	m
Tadesse Bekele	NDRMC	Senior DRM Advisor	m
Alemayehu	NDRMC Office, Adama	Head of Regional Office	m
Fasika Mulat	NDRMC Office, Adama	Data Entry (CATS)	m
Yalemzewd Shiferaw	NDRMC Office, Adama	Logistics Officer	m
Kiflom Abadi	NRMD, Mekelle	Director	m
Zekaris Haili	MERET; NRMD, Mekelle	M&E	m
Arege Kiros	MERET; NRMD, Mekelle	Team Leader	m
Badal Kenadid Mohamed	NRMD; Somali Regional Government Office	Director	m
Mokonnen Abera	Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia; Ethiopia Maritime Affairs Authority	Director General	m
Gebre Egziabgher	TSF, Tigray	Health Worker	m
Teame Gebre	TSF, Tigray	Woreda Coordinator	m
AID AGENCIES/DONORS			
Cathy Tremblay	Development; Global Affairs Canada	First Secretary	f
Samantha Yates	DFID	Head of Livelihoods and Humanitarian Team	f
Jyoti Tewari	DFID	Senior Health Advisor	m
Emebet Kebede	Livelihoods & Humanitarian Team (LHT), DFID	Humanitarian Advisor	f
Ciara Silke	LHT, DFID	Resilience Advisor	f
Pierre Townsend	LHT, DFID	Senior Humanitarian Advisor	m
Abinet Woldegebriel	LHT, DFID	Programme Officer	f
Segolene De Beco	ECHO	Head of Office	f
Andualem Assefa	International Medical Corps	Programme Coordinator	m
Mohamed Bishar	International Medical Corps	Deputy Nutrition Programme Manager	m
Weldekiros Assefa	IRC	Water Team Officer	m
Yilmas Belete	IRC	Education Officer	m
Aileen O'Donovan	Irish Aid	Deputy Head of Development	m
Hiwot Mebrate	Irish Aid	Programme Executive	f
Matt Hobson	(former) World Bank	Former Coordinator for the Ethiopia's PSNP's Donor Coordination team; Senior Social Protection Specialist	m
Kristine Hambrouck	UNHCR	Assistant Representative (Programme)	f
Dorothy Gazarwa	UNHCR	Nutrition Officer	f
Patrick Malekelma	UNHCR, Gambella	Head of Office	m
Mai Kaizawa	UNHCR, Gambella	Assistant Protection Officer	f

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
Millicent Lusigi	UNHCR, Gambella	Food and Nutrition Officer	f
Mmone Moletsane	UNHCR, Gambella	Child Protection Officer (Gender Focal Person)	f
Abdala Yassin	UNHCR, Gambella	Food and Nutrition Officer	m
Kofi Duomo	UNHCR, Jigjiga	Head of Sub Office	m
Nassir Mohammed	UNHCR, Jigjiga	Protection Officer	m
Mohamad Abdullah	UNHCR, Malkadida	Security Assistant	m
Florah Bukania	UNHCR, Malkadida	Public Health Officer	m
Abdikadir Mohammed Farah	UNHCR, Malkadida	Programme Associate	m
Edward Moyo	UNHCR, Malkadida	WFP Sub-Office Head	m
Jimmy Obomba	UNHCR, Malkadida	Field Officer	m
Henok Amare	UNHCR, Shire	Registration	m
Adame Debebe	UNHCR, Shire	Hitsats	m
Mamo Fofa	UNHCR, Shire	Field Officer	m
Daniel Ruiz Coll	UNHCR, Shire	Senior Protection Officer	m
Shigeyuki Sato	UNHCR, Shire	Senior Protection Officer	m
Joyce Wahome	UNHCR, Shire	APO (CB)	f
Binyam Teshome	UNHCR, Shire	Senior Outcome Monitoring Assistant	m
Atakilti Michael	UNHCR, Shire	Protection	m
Shalini Bahuguna	UNICEF	Deputy Representative	f
Eric Alain Ategbo	UNICEF	Chief of Nutrition	m
Jasinta Achen	UNICEF	Nutrition Specialist	f
Orla O'Niell	UNICEF	Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit	f
[Staff member]	UNICEF, Jigjiga		m
Clara Dube	UNICEF, Mekelle	Chief of Mekelle Zonal Office	f
Yemane Hailus	UNICEF, Mekelle	Nutrition Officer for Tigray	m
Paul Handley	UNOCHA	Head of Office	m
Cedric Petit	UNOCHA	Humanitarian Policy Unit	m
Michal Ullmann	UNOCHA	Inter-cluster coordinator	f
Rekha Shreshtha	UNRC office	Policy Advisor, Humanitarian and development nexus	f
Etagegnehu Getachew	JP RWEE; UNWOMEN	National Programme Coordinator	f
Simegn Kuma	UNWOMEN	Programme Officer	f
Mary Florence Ngima	USAID	Commodity Management Specialist	f
Melanie Thurber	USAID	Nutrition Officer	f
Billy Woodward	USAID	Deputy Chief, Emergency Programs	m
Jason Taylor	USAID		m
Scott McNiven	Regional Food for Peace; USAID	Advisor	m
Million Alemayehu	World Bank	Sustainable Land Management Project Team Member	m
Ian Campbell	World Bank	Consultant working on environment safeguards	m
Bagashaw Wukow Woldu	World Bank	Public Works Focal Point on Donor Coordination Team	m
Abu Yadetta	PSNP, World Bank	Team leader	m
LOCAL NGO PARTNERS AND SUPPLIERS			
Aurelie Carmeille	ACF/Action Against Hunger	Country Director	f

Name	Organisation/section	Role	Gender
Matiwos Misha	Bekele Wolde Transport, Adama	Agent	m
Esther Watts	CARE	Country Director	f
Tibeb Abate	CRS	Deputy Chief of Party	f
Erit Keddar	CRS	Customs Clearing and Shipping Coordinator	f
Elias Zenebe	CRS	Deputy Head of Logistics	m
Rahwa Yohannes	Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI), Tigray		m
Lesley Ann Devereux	GOAL	Grants Coordinator	f
Sa'ada Fedula	GOAL, Gambella	Health Supervisor	f
Rahel Addis	GOAL, Gambella	Storekeeper	f
Mustafa Abdi	GOAL, Jigjiga		m
Teshome Samuel	Hosana Transport Company	Agent	m
Esther Stewart	Mercy Corps	Country Director	f
Zemen Abdera	Mercy Corps		m
Atakit Berhe	NRC, Tigray	Child Protection Team Leader	m
Tedros Haile	NRC, Tigray	Education Programme Officer	m
Getachew Tesfray	NRC, Tigray	Feeding Programme	m
Tilahum Gameda	Oxfam	Programme Officer	m
Gemechu Kebede	Oxfam	Programme Manager	m
Lam Duop Lam	RCC, Gambella	Deputy Chair	m
Hailay Gebremeskal	REST, Tigray	R4 Programme Coordinator	m
Roba Halake	Save the Children	Senior Human Response Manger	m
Helina Nequessie	Save the Children	Nutrition Commodity Specialist	f
Nutritionist	Save the Children, Elbahay Health Centre	Nutritionist	m
Ahmed Abdi	Save the Children, Jigjiga		m
Abdullahi Adow	Save the Children, Melkadida	Health and Nutrition Coordinator	m
Biruk Sahilu	Tenagne Work Transport	Agent	m

Annex F Chronology

Year	Ethiopia contextual events	WFP general	WFP Ethiopia	WFP operations
Pre 2000	<p>1987: Mengistu Haile Mariam, Derg chairman since 1977, abolished the Derg and replaced it with the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Mengistu elected president under a new constitution.</p> <p>1991: Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of rebel groups led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), overthrew the government in 1991. Mengistu fled the country.. TPLF leader Meles Zenawi becomes Prime Minister.</p> <p>1993: Eritrea becomes independent following a referendum.</p> <p>1994: New federal constitution divides Ethiopia into ethnically-based regions.</p>		<p>1980: Ministry of Agriculture and WFP, with technical support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), began implementing Development Project Ethiopia 2488: Rehabilitation of Forest, Grazing and Agricultural Lands – known as “Project 2488”. Project 2488 laid the foundations for MERET</p> <p>1992: With FAO technical support, Project 2488 developed the local-level participatory planning approach (LLPPA).</p> <p>1999: Building on the experiences of Project 2488, MERET was adopted as a community-based participatory integrated watershed development approach. (Nedessa & Wickrema, 2010)</p>	
2000s	<p>2005: Ethiopia launches first five-year Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).</p> <p>2005: Violence follows elections, and suspension of General Budget Support follows.</p> <p>2005: PSNP is established, with aim of enabling the rural poor to resist shocks, create assets and become food self-sufficient.</p> <p>2009: Third Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) established to run 2009-2015.</p>	<p>2008: WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013 marks a shift from WFP as a food aid agency to WFP as a food assistance agency.</p> <p>2008: P4P is officially launched at the UN General Assembly.</p> <p>2009: WFP's first gender policy launched</p> <p>2009: Humanitarian assistance on conflict and complex emergencies policy</p> <p>2009: School feeding policy</p> <p>2009: Cash and vouchers manual launched</p>	<p>October: 2008 New “Hubs and Spokes” delivery system introduced by WFP and the Ethiopian Government to provide food and nutrition relief in Somali region.</p>	<p>PRRO 101273 (2009-2011, but extended to March 2012)</p>

Year	Ethiopia contextual events	WFP general	WFP Ethiopia	WFP operations
		2009: WFP Capacity Development Policy launched		
2010	<p>Next five year Growth and Transformation Plan - GTP (2010/11- 2014/15) begins. It sets the vision of Ethiopia becoming a middle-income country and carbon-neutral economy by 2025.</p> <p>Ruling parties win all seats in the federal parliamentary election.</p> <p>Ethiopian Government introduced a new policy allowing Eritrean refugees to reside outside camp</p> <p>In 2010 Ethiopia joined the SUN Movement</p> <p>Ethiopia's Agriculture Sector Policy and Investment Framework (2010–2020)</p>	2010: WFP publish book ' <i>Revolution: From Food Aid to Food Assistance</i> '. The book documents a compilation of food assistance innovations by WFP and marks a major reassessment of WFP's approach.	<p>WFP and Government of Djibouti sign agreement to set-up a Humanitarian Logistics Base. (WFP, 2015u)</p> <p>2010: WFP Ethiopia launched the Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP), a flagship WFP capacity building initiative within WFP Ethiopia's Logistics Unit. This project is a collaboration with the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and aims to build the overall capacity of the Ethiopian Government in the management of the food assistance supply-chain</p>	
2011	<p>Two consecutive rains fail in Ethiopia resulting in drought affecting the southern, eastern and north-eastern parts of the country.</p> <p>Drought and conflict in Somalia led to an influx of Somali refugees. By July 2011, 228,014 refugees had arrived (OCHA).</p> <p>National Guidelines on Targeting Relief Food Assistance 2011 (Government of Ethiopia, 2011)</p>	<p>School feeding policy updated</p> <p>P4P undergoes a mid-term evaluation</p> <p>Update on the implementation of WFP's policy on vouchers and cash transfers</p> <p>20 July: WFP declare a L3 emergency in the Horn of Africa, which lasts until August 2012. This declaration triggered a whole-of-organization response for emergency operations in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda</p>	June: Abdou Dieng takes over as Country Director for Ethiopia	
Start of the evaluation period				
2012	<p>Third United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDAF 2012-2015.</p> <p>Death of Meles Zenawi; succeeded as Prime Minister by Hailemariam Desalegn.</p>	<p>Nutrition policy launched</p> <p>Humanitarian protection policy launched</p> <p>Launch of WFP's capacity development toolkit</p>	<p>WFP Ethiopia Country Strategy 2012-2015</p> <p>UNHCR, Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and WFP conduct Joint Assessment Mission to several refugee camps (WFP, UNHCR & ARRA, 2012 ARRA, UNHCR & WFP, 2014, ARRA, UNHCR & WFP, 2016).</p> <p>MERET impact evaluation conducted</p>	<p>Country Programme (CP200253) 2012-2017</p> <p>PRRO 200290 2012-2013 (extended to mid-2015)</p> <p>PRRO 200365 (mid-2012-mid-2015)</p>

Year	Ethiopia contextual events	WFP general	WFP Ethiopia	WFP operations
		July 2012: A WFP level 3 Emergency was declared to respond to drought in the Horn of Africa. This was downgraded to level 2 in August 2012 and deactivated in January 2016	HIV/AIDS programme initiated voucher transfers as modality (WFP, 2013k)	SO 200358 (2012 – mid 2013 (extended to September 2017) UNHAS 200364 (2012 – extended to end of 2015) TF200427 set up to support the development, testing and pilot distribution of a locally produced chick-pea based ready-to-use supplementary food, with the goal to improve nutritional status of children under 5.
2013	Cost of Hunger study produced looking at the social and economic impact of child undernutrition in Ethiopia New National policy and strategy on disaster risk management	Revised school feeding policy launched	WFP, UNHCR and ARRA initiate a pilot project to substitute a proportion of the food basket with cash in refugee camps (JaRco Consulting, 2015b). The relief cash transfer assistance modality was launched in Amhara, Oromia and Somali regions (WFP, 2014t). End-2013: Abdou Dieng (Country Director) is posted to CAR as The Humanitarian Coordinator in the Central African Republic until mid-2014	
2014	As a result of conflict in South Sudan, a total of 191,698 refugees arrived in Gambella region to seek protection in 2014 The National Social Protection Policy is finalised (<i>Government of Ethiopia, 2014</i>) . The Fourth Productive Safety Nets Project (PSNP) is initiated in September to run 2014-2020	New Strategic Plan 2014-17 P4P pilot comes to an end	Operation evaluation of PRRO 20090 (2012-2013) Ethiopia is a desk study for the WFP Cash and Voucher Policy Evaluation (2008-2014) Ethiopia country case study conducted for WFP strategic evaluation on WFP's use of pooled funds for humanitarian preparedness and response (2009-2013) Evaluation of P4P pilots. UNHCR, ARRA and WFP conduct joint assessment mission to several refugee camps	EMOP 200656 (January – March 2014) SO 200752 (September 2014 – October 2015 (extended to December 2016)) November: The RWEE – Rural Women Economic Empowerment Programme is launched in Ethiopia.

Year	Ethiopia contextual events	WFP general	WFP Ethiopia	WFP operations
			December: Abdou Dieng leaves as Director of Ethiopia Country Office	
2015	<p>2015/16 El Nino leads to the worst drought in Ethiopia in decades.</p> <p>Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) 2015/16 – 2019/2020.</p> <p>Ethiopia accepted and endorsed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with national commitments and ownership to implement the 2030 Agenda and its sustainable development goals (SDGs) as integral part of its national development framework.</p> <p>Ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) wins general election.</p>	<p>New WFP Gender Policy 2015-2020</p> <p>WFP Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition</p>	<p>February –July: Mohamed Diab on temporary duty as Country Director</p> <p>June: John Aylieff takes over as Country Director of Ethiopia</p>	<p>TF 200026 set-up in May 2015 to procure internationally fortified blended food and vegetable oil and make them available to local NGOs involved in nutrition interventions.</p> <p>TF 200812 created to receive funds from the UN Trust Fund for Support to the Implementation of the Joint UN Programme “Accelerating Progress Towards Economic Empowerment of Rural Women in Ethiopia”.</p> <p>TF200909 set up at request of the Government of Ethiopia to procure Super Cereal (CSB+) on the international markets, as the local production was no longer sufficient to meet demands.</p> <p>PRRO 200712 (mid 2015 – mid 2018)</p> <p>PRRO 200800 (April 2015- March 2018)</p> <p>UNHAS 200711 (2015 – extended to end of 2018)</p>

Year	Ethiopia contextual events	WFP general	WFP Ethiopia	WFP operations
2016	<p>Fourth United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2016-2020 (signed July 2015)</p> <p>Education sector development plan V 2016-2020</p> <p>New National Community Management of Acute Malnutrition guidelines developed</p> <p>Change in institutional arrangements for disaster risk management. Early Warning Response Directorate under the Ministry of Agriculture converted to a new National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) which reports directly to the Prime Minister.</p> <p>Increasing unrest in Oromia and Amhara led to a declaration of a State of Emergency in October 2016.</p>	<p>Policy on Country Strategic Plans</p> <p>2016-2018 Logistics Cluster Strategy</p> <p>RBN Regional Implementation Strategy of the Gender Policy 2016-2020 (WFP, 2016w)</p> <p>WFP Regional Partnership Strategy East and Central Africa (RBN) 2016-2018 (WFP, 2016x)</p>	<p>An evaluation of WFP's current operation and transition period: PRRO 200700 (2015-2018).</p> <p>UNHCR, ARRA and WFP conduct Joint Assessment Mission to several refugee camps</p> <p>Structure and Staffing Review (2016) initiated in Ethiopia Country Office</p> <p>Standard Operating Procedures for Minimum Monitoring Requirements in Ethiopia produced (WFP, 2016y)</p> <p>Biometrics verification procedures initiated in refugee camps in partnership with UNHCR and ARRA (WFP, 2017c)</p> <p>Household food security monitoring quarterly surveys are shared externally from 2016</p> <p>Construction of the Geeldoh Bridge (SO 200752) started and took 12 months to complete. It was WFP's first modular steel bridge to be constructed.</p> <p>MERET programme closed, largely due to funding constraints</p>	<p>TF 201035 set up in October 2017 with Funds from PEPFAR to strengthen community response for HIV in Ethiopia.</p> <p>SO 200977 (May – November 2016 (Extended to December 2017))</p>
2017	<p>Late 2016/early 2017 poor rains in predominantly pastoral areas led to severe food crises for affected populations</p>	<p>New Strategic Plan 2017-2021</p> <p>WFP Policy on climate change</p> <p>WFP Environmental Policy</p> <p>February: WFP declares a Level 2 Emergency Response for the Horn of Africa drought following large-scale failure of rains during October-December 2016</p>	<p>Ethiopia Country Gender Action Plan 2017-2020 (WFP, 2017l)</p> <p>Evaluation of USAID/PEPFAR Funded Urban HIV/AIDS, Nutrition and Food Security Project in Ethiopia 2011-2017.(Belew et al., 2017)</p> <p>Refugee Livelihoods Assessment conducted in order to identify opportunities for livelihoods and self-reliance in refugee camps.(TANGO, 2017)</p> <p>Complaints & feedback mechanisms (CFM) standard operating procedures produced for the first pilot phase of the CFM in selected projects and locations (WFP, 2017n)</p> <p>July: John Aylieff leaves as Director of Ethiopia Country Office</p> <p>September: Joyce Luma takes over as Country Director for Ethiopia</p>	<p>Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia Programme pilot launched (WFP, 2017o).</p>

Year	Ethiopia contextual events	WFP general	WFP Ethiopia	WFP operations
			End 2017: the final phase of the Djibouti logistics hub construction completed	
2018	<p>February: Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn announces resignation and a State of Emergency is introduced amid ongoing anti-government protests.</p> <p>April: Ethiopia's new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, is sworn in by parliament.</p> <p>June: State of Emergency lifted.</p>		<p>Final stages of Structure and Staffing Review (SSR)</p> <p>April: Joyce Luma leaves as Director of Ethiopia Country Office</p>	

Annex G Additional Country Data

Overview

1. This annex contains additional data to support the background and context analysis in the main text:

- Table 5 shows evolution of some key social and economic indicators.
- Figure 27, and Figure 28 below provide an overview of humanitarian financing and official aid to Ethiopia.
- Table 6 through Table 9 provide additional data on refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Social and economic indicators

Table 5 Key socio-economic indicators for Ethiopia


	Parameter/(source)	2010	2015
	General		
1	Population total (*)	87.6 million <i>OEV: Total pop. expected to grow to 138.3 million by 2030</i>	99.4 million
2	% of urban population (**)	17.3% <i>OEV: In 2015, average for developing countries was 48.5%</i>	19.5%
3	GDP per capita (USD)(**)	1,162 <i>OEV: In 2015, average for developing countries was 9.376</i>	1,530
4	Human Development Index (*)	0.411 <i>OEV: In 2015, ranked 174 out of 188 (up 1 ranking since 2010). For reference: ranking 173 is Gambia and 175 is Mali</i>	0.448
	Economy		
5	Income Gini Coefficient (**)	33.2 (2010-2015)	
7	Foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP) (**)	96%	440%
8	Net official development assistance received (**)	3,455,160,000	3,233,990,000
	Poverty		
9	Population living below income poverty line USD 1.90 a day (%) (*)	33% (2005-2014)	
10	Population near multidimensional poverty (%) (*)	6.7% (2015)	
11	Population in severe multidimensional poverty (%) (*)	67% (2015)	
	Health		
12	Maternal Mortality ratio (%) (lifetime risk of maternal death: 1 in:) (***)	64% (2015)	
13	Life expectancy at birth (**)	61.6	65
14	Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) (**)	1.4%	1.1%
15	Public expenditures on health (% of GDP) (*)	2.9 (2015)	
16	Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) (*)	49.1 (2005-2015)	
	Gender		
17	Gender Inequality Index (*)	0.499 (2015) <i>OEV: Ranked 116 out of 188 For reference: ranking 115 is Nepal and 117 is Guyana . Average for developing countries is 28.3%</i>	
18	Maternal Mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) (**)	523	353
19	Seats in national parliament (% female) (**)	27.8%	38.8
20	Population with at least some secondary education, female, male (% aged 25 and above) (*)	Female: 7.8% Male: 18%	Female: 10.8% Male: 20.7%
21	Births attended by skilled health personnel (% of total) (**)	10% (2011)	27.7%
22	Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) (modelled ILO estimate) (**)	83.6% Female population: 61%	83.9% Female population: 64%
23	Employees, agriculture, female (% of female employment) (**)	9.3%	6.5% (2014)
24	School enrolment, primary (% net) (**)	73%	85%
	Nutrition		
25	% of under age 5 with stunting (*)	40% (2010-2015) <i>OEV comment: In 2015, average for developing countries was 28.3%</i>	
26	Weight-for-height (Wasting), prevalence for < 5 (%) (***)	9% (2010-2015)	
27	Height-for-age(Stunting), prevalence for < 5 (%) (***)	40% (2010-2015)	
28	Weight-for-age (Underweight), prevalence for < 5 (%) (***)	25% (2010-2015)	
29	< 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) (**)	80.9	61.3
	Education		
30	Population with at least secondary education (% ages 25 and older) (*)	12.5%	15.8%
31	Public expenditures on education (% of total expenditure in public institutions) (**)	65%	63% (2013)

	Parameter/(source)	2010	2015
32	School enrolment, primary (% gross) (**)	73%	85%
33	Net attendance ratio, primary school (%)(***)	65% (2009-2014)	
34	Net attendance ratio, secondary school (%)(***)	15% (2009-2014)	

Sources: (*) UNDP Human Development Index Report – 2016; (**) World Bank. WDI; (***) UNICEF SOWC 2016 and 2015


Official Aid and Humanitarian Assistance

Figure 27 Value (USD million) and composition of joint UN/Ethiopian Government humanitarian appeals (2012–2017)



Source: OEV analysis based on data from the Annual Joint appeals (from ToR Annex 6)

Figure 28 Ethiopia – aid at-a-glance 2014–16



Source: OECD DAC

https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglacebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=y&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no&:showVizHome=no

Refugees and IDPs

Table 6 ARRA figures on refugees in January 2018

Country of origin	Sub-office	Camp/Site	Population per Camp/Site
Eritrea	Shire	Mai-Aini	36,890
		Adi Harush	56,182
		Shimelba	7,421
		Hitsats	73,435
		Total	173,928
	Semera	Aysaita	13,920
		Barahle	12,141
199,989	Total	26,061	
South Sudan	Gambella	Pugnido	66,497
		Kule	53,374
		Jewi	60,289
		Akula	1,680
		Tierkidi	71,691
		Pugnido II	17,334
		Nguenyiel	87,970
	Total	358,835	
	Mizan	Okugo	13,665
		Total	13,665
372,500			
Sudan	Assosa	Gureshabola (South Sudanese)	4,095
		Sherkole	11,826
		Bambasi	17,279
		Tongo	12,706
		Tsore	14,123
	Total	60,029	
60,029			
Somalia	Jigjiga	Kebribeyah	14,702
		Aw-barre	12,282
		Sheder	11,024
		Total	38,008
	Melkadida	Melkadida	34,255
		Kobe	47,644
		Hilaweyn	49,929
		Buramino	41,117
		Bokolmayo	43,071
	Total	216,016	
254,024			
Kenya	Moyale	Dilo and Megado	3,924
		Total	3,924
3,924			
Different Countries	Urban	Urban Refugee	4,201
		OCP	16,044
		Total	20,245
20,245			
Total Refugees in Ethiopia			910,711

Source: ARRA, 2018

Table 7 Number of individuals living in IDP sites as of March 2018, by region

	Conflict			Drought			Fire			Flash Flood			Landslide			Other			Seasonal Flood			Total		
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Grand Total
Addis Ababa	2,996	3,359	6,355			0			0			0			0			0			0	2,996	3,359	6,355
Afar	2,138	1,869	4,007	10,798	10,853	21,651			0	7,283	7,056	14,339			0	2,890	2,792	5,682	5,336	5,360	10,696	28,445	27,930	56,375
Amhara	2,424	2,555	4,979	87	88	175	93	94	187			0	262	284	546	46	60	106	423	472	895	3,335	3,553	6,888
Dire Dawa	5,959	5,991	11,950			0			0			0			0			0			0	5,959	5,991	11,950
Gambella	6,012	6,265	12,277			0			0			0			0			0			0	6,012	6,265	12,277
Hareri	1,931	2,096	4,027			0			0			0			0			0			0	1,931	2,096	4,027
Oromia	282,874	293,806	576,680	44,915	46,442	91,357	91	85	176	2,842	2,888	5,730	153	166	319	21,783	23,648	45,431	765	849	1,614	353,423	367,884	721,307
Somali	202,560	222,278	424,838	168,735	167,192	335,927			0	1,729	1,651	3,380			0			0			0	373,024	391,121	764,145
Tigray	15,823	12,828	28,651	148	145	293			0			0			0			0	673	495	1,168	16,644	13,468	30,112
Grand Total	522,717	551,047	1,073,764	224,683	224,720	449,403	184	179	363	11,854	11,595	23,449	415	450	865	24,719	26,500	51,219	7,197	7,176	14,373	791,769	821,667	1,613,436

Source: IOM, 2018

Table 8 Number of conflict-affected IDP sites, by region and date the site was opened

	Maximum number of people per site	Minimum number of people per site	Average number of people per site	Number of sites opened before 2017	Number of sites opened during 2017	Number of sites opened in 2018	Total number of sites
Addis Ababa	6,355	6,355	6,355		1		1
Afar	1,678	325	801	4	1		5
Amhara	831	75	277	11	7		18
Dire Dawa	8,485	3,465	5,975		2		2
Gambella	2,800	330	1,116	7	4		11
Hareri	1,152	100	403	1	9		10
Oromia	28,785	26	1,681	17	314	12	343
Somali	48,723	194	3,056	79	53	7	139
Tigray	3,483	35	398	55	5	12	72
Total				174	396	31	601

Source: IOM, 2018

Table 9 Number of drought-affected IDP sites, by region and date the site was opened

	Maximum number of people per site	Minimum number of people per site	Average number of people per site	Number of sites opened before 2017	Number of sites opened during 2017	Number of sites opened in 2018	Total number of sites
Afar	2,400	180	866	22	3		25
Amhara	175	175	175	1			1
Oromia	8,010	103	2,855	26	6		32
Somali	9,791	227	1,623	26	181		207
Tigray	293	293	293			1	1
Total				75	190	1	266

Source: IOM, 2018

Annex H Additional Portfolio Data for Ethiopia

Introduction

1. This annex provides supplementary data to support the portfolio description and analysis in the main report. It includes sections on:

- the overall timeline and funding level of the portfolio;
- implementation, in terms of expenditure and beneficiary numbers;
- country office structure and staffing;
- financing of the portfolio;
- portfolio performance and results.

2. Full tables on reported outputs and outcomes by activity are in Annex I.

Portfolio components and timeline

Figure 29 Timeline and funding level of WFP portfolio in Ethiopia 2012–2017

Operation	Timeframe	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
PRRO 101273	January 2009 - December 2011 (extended to March 2012)	←	Req: 131,946,240; Rec: 89,804,583; Funded: 68%				
CP 200230	2012 - 2015 (extended to end 2017)			Req: 339,459,465 Rec: 137,280,395; Funded: 40%			
PRRO 200230	January 2012 - December 2013 (extended to mid-2015)		Req: 1,496,167,505; Rec: 800,797,866; Funded: 54%				
SO 200358	January 2012 - August 2013 (extended to September 2017)			Req: 31,439,779; Rec: 27,726,065; Funded: 88%			
SO 200364	January 2012 - December 2012 (extended to end of 2015)		Req: 22,627,815; Rec: 20,040,055; Funded: 89%				
PRRO 200365	April 2012 - March 2015		Req: 356,769,969; Rec: 247,940,217; Funded: 69%				
EMOP 200656	January - March 2014			Req: 1,499,997; Rec: 1,260,506; Funded: 84%			
SO 200752	September 2014 - October 2015 (extended to December 2016)				Req: 6,281,982; Rec: 6,285,391; Funded: 100%		
SO 200711	January 2015 - December 2015 (extended to end of 2018)					Req: 16,324,590; Rec: 12,959,196; Funded: 79%	→
PRRO 200700	April 2015 - March 2018 (extended to June 2018)					Req: 493,559,948; Rec: 296,352,859; Funded: 60%	→
PRRO 200712	July 2015 - June 2018					Req: 1,354,263,236; Rec: 755,135,544; Funded: 56%	→
SO 200977	May 2016 - November 2016 (extended to December 2017)					Req: 12,685,861; Rec: 11,304,412; Funded: 89%	
TF 200126	August 2009 - November 2012	←	Req: 586,600 Rec: 586,600 Funded: 100%				
TF 200842	June 2011 - June 2016	←	Req: 1,144,333. Rec: 1,144,333 Funded: 100%				
TF 200026	July 2009-May 2016	←	Req: 17,586,758 Rec: 10,952,859 Funded: 62%				
TF 200023	March 2009 - December 2013	←	Req: 62,590,738 Rec: 62,590,738 Funded: 100%				
TF 200427	February 2012 - October 2016	←		Req: 3,300,000. Rec: 3,156,647 Funded: 96%			
TF 200812	mid 2015 - mid 2016 (extended to end of 2018)					Req: 2,245,154 Rec: 1,297,781; Funded: 58%	→
TF 200909	January 2016-December 2016 (extended to end of 2017)					Req: 34,625,625 Rec: 34,625,625 Funded: 100%	
TF 201035	October 2016 - May 2017						Req: 2,968,359 Rec: 2,293,636 Funded: 77%
Total Beneficiaries (actual)		6,209,900	5,004,038	5,272,030	6,196,996	9,236,347	6,870,809
% female beneficiaries		51%	52%	51%	50%	50%	50%
Food Distributed (MT)		502,069	390,759	357,241	444,058	491,558	407,682

Source: Resource situation documents and SPRs. Requirements (Req.). Received funding (Rec.). Req. and Rec. in USD. TF data from CO

3. The evaluation period included twelve operations and eight trust funds, which are detailed in Table 10 below.

Table 10 Ethiopia portfolio overview 2012–2017

	Code/status	Title	Last/Latest budget	Period (latest version)	Annual Beneficiaries (latest)	Activities	Funding status %
1	CP-200253 (ongoing)	Country Programme (2012–2017),	USD 339 million	4 years (2012-2015) / extended until end of 2017	0.4 million	Food distributions, capacity building (emergency preparedness and response), school feeding, purchase for progress from small farmers, promotion of watershed management and other environmental practices including carbon financing mechanisms	41% (ongoing)
2	PRRO200290 (closed)	Responding to Humanitarian Crisis and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity	USD 1.496 million	2 years (2012- 2013) / extended to mid-2015	2.7 million	Food distributions, capacity building, nutrition, development of public works plan. Supports PSNP of government.	54% (closed)
3	PRRO200712 (ongoing – following on PRRO 200290)	Responding to Humanitarian crisis and Transitioning Food-Insecure Groups to More Resilient Strategies	USD 1,356 million	2 years (mid- 2015, to mid-2018)	8.2 million	Food distributions, C&V distributions (new), nutrition, food for assets, capacity building Supports PSNP of government.	54% (ongoing)
4	PRRO-101273 (Refugees) (closed)	Food Assistance to Sudanese, Somali and Eritrean Refugees	USD 131 million	3 years (2009-2011)/extended to March 2012	0.3 million	Food distributions, C&V distributions, nutrition, school feeding	68% (closed)
5	PRRO200365 (Refugees) (closed)	Food Assistance for Somali, Eritrean and Sudanese Refugees	USD 357 million	3 years (mid- 2012, to mid-2015)	0.5 million	Food distributions, C&V distributions, nutrition, school feeding	69% (closed)
6	PRRO200700 (Refugees) (ongoing)	Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees	USD 494 million;	3 years (April 2015 to March-2018); extended to June 2018	0.5 million	Food distributions, C&V distributions, nutrition, school feeding	59% (ongoing)
7	IR-EMOP 200656 (closed)	Assistance to people affected by fighting in South Sudan	USD 1.4 million	3 Months (January-March 2014)	0.04 million	HEB distribution	84% (closed)
8	SO-200358 (closed)	Construction and Management of the WFP Humanitarian Logistics Base at Djibouti Port	USD 31 million	2 years (2012-mid 2013)/extended to September 2017	n/a	Construction and management of a warehouse facility in Djibouti	88% (closed)
9	SO-200977 (ongoing)	Logistics Cluster and WFP Logistics augmentation in support of the Government of Ethiopia for the drought response	USD 12 million	May-November 2016/extended to December 2017	n/a	Logistics capacity assessments, storage augmentation, non-food items transportation.	89% (ongoing)
10	SO-200752 (closed)	Construction of Geeldoh Bridge to Facilitate Humanitarian and Trade access to Nogo/Fik Zone in the Somali region of Ethiopia	USD 6.3 million	1 year (September 2014 to October 2015)extended to December 2016	n/a	Construction of Geeldoh bridge to facilitate humanitarian and trade access to Somali region	100% (closed)
11	UNHAS-200364 (closed)	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service in Ethiopia	USD 22.6 million	1 year (2012)extended to end of 2015	n/a	Transports of passengers, food and non-food items; medical evacuations	89% (closed)
12	UNHAS-200711 (ongoing)	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service in Ethiopia	USD 16.3 million	1 year (2015) – extended to end of 2018	n/a	Transports of passengers, food and non-food items; medical evacuations	76% (ongoing)
13	TF-200909	Procurement and delivery of Super Cereal (CSB+) for the government of Ethiopia	USD 34.6 million	Dec 2015 – April 2017	n/a	Purchase and transport of 50,000 mt of CSB+	100%
14	TF-200427	PepsiCo (piloting local production of ready-to-use supplementary food)	USD 3.3. million	Feb 2012 – Dec 2016	n/a	Support development, testing and pilot distribution of a chick-pea based ready-to-use supplementary food.	96%

	Code/status	Title	Last/Latest budget	Period (latest version)	Annual Beneficiaries (latest)	Activities	Funding status %
15	TF-201035	Strengthening Community Response for HIV in Ethiopia	USD 2.9 million	Oct 2016 - May 2017	n/a	Capacity building for improved community response to HIV	77%
16	TF-200812	Support to the implementation of the Joint UN Programme "Accelerating Progress Towards Economic Empowerment of Rural Women in Ethiopia" (JP RWEE)	USD 2.2 million	1 year (mid 2015 - mid 2016)/ extended to 2018	n/a	Management of JP RWEE funds and provision of business, marketing and entrepreneurship skills training	57.8%
17	TF 200026	Central Procurement of CSB+ and Vegetable Oil	USD 17.6 million	July 2009-May2016	n/a	Procurement of CSB+ and Vegetable Oil from international market	62%
18	TF 200842	R4 core programme	USD 1.1 million	June 2011-June 2016	n/a	Insurance-for-work vouchers	100%
19	TF 200126	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Operation National Nutrition Program	USD 0.6 million	August 2009 - November 2012	n/a	Support local procurement of blended food.	100%
20	TF 200023	BIL/TF-ETCO-Government's Safety Net Program	USD 62.67 million	March 2009-December 2013	n/a	Procurement and transport of food commodities at the request of the Government of Ethiopia	100%

Source: Updated from ToR. WFP project documents, SPR, Budget Revisions, and Resource Situation Reports.

Portfolio implementation

Expenditure

4. Table 11 below provides an expenditure overview of the portfolio, while Table 12 below shows annual expenditures.

Table 11 WFP expenditure summary by project (USD millions)

Project number/name	Funding status	Total 2012- 2017	Total as % of expenditure 2012-2017
Ethiopian Nationals (CP and PRROs)		1,499	71%
CP 200253	40% (Ongoing)	133.6	6%
PRRO 200290	54% (closed)	731.2	34%
PRRO 200712	56% (ongoing)	633.7	30%
Refugees		497.3	23%
IR-EMOP 200656	84% (closed)	1.3	0%
PRRO 200700	60% (ongoing)	259.6	12%
PRRO 200365	69% (closed)	236.4	11%
Special Operations and Trust Funds		97.0	5%
SO 200358 (Djibouti logistics base)	88% (closed)	27.2	1%
SO 200752 (Geeldoh bridge)	100% (closed)	6.29	0%
SO 200977 (Logistics cluster support)	89% (ongoing)	11.3	1%
TF 200812 (Joint programme for rural women)	58% (ongoing)	0.4	0%
TF 201035 (Community response for HIV)	77% (closed)	2.1	0%
TF 200909 (Procurement of CSB+ for government)	100% (closed)	33.3	2%
TF 200427 (Support local RUSF development)	96% (closed)	2.9	0%
TF 200023 (Safety net programme)	100% (closed)	5.2	0%
TF 200026 (Procurement of CSB+ and Vegetable Oil)	62% (closed)	7	0%
TF 200126 (TSF Operation National Nutrition Programme)	100% (closed)	0.2	0%
TF 200842 (R4 Core programme)	100% (closed)	1.1	0%
UNHAS flights		32.4	2%
SO 200364	89% (closed)	20	1%
SO 200711	79% (ongoing)	12.4	1%
Total Country		2,125	100%

Source: Funding status from Annex H, Table 10 which also includes other programme details. Funding status shows percentage funded for the whole project period, not just the period being evaluated.

CP = Country Programme; IR- EMOP =Immediate Response Emergency Operation; SO = Special Operation; TF = Trust Fund; PRRO = Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation; R4 = Rural Resilience Initiative.; TSF = targeted supplementary feeding.

Table 12 Annual WFP expenditure by project (USD millions)

Project number/name	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total 2012-2017	Average per year 2012-2017	Total as % of overall expenditure 2012-2017
Ethiopian Nationals (CP and PRROs)	322	291	177	212	295	247	1,499	257	71%
CP 200253	37.6	34.2	20.9	19.8	14.7	4.02	133.6	22	6%
PRRO 200290	284.5	256.6	156.3	91.6	-10		731.2	156	34%
PRRO 200712				100.2	290.3	243.2	633.7	211	30%
Refugees	55.9	72.9	101.9	103.9	87.7	75.1	497.3	83	23%
IR-EMOP 200656			1.3				1.3	1	0%
PRRO 200700			10.8	86.1	87.7	75.1	259.6	65	12%
PRRO 200365	55.9	72.9	89.8	17.8			236.4	59	11%
Special Operations and Trust Funds	5.0	10.1	10.4	3.8	52.5	14.1	97.0	16	5%
SO 200358	0.8	3.5	7.9	1.7	8.2	5.1	27.2	5	1%
SO 200752			0.3	0.2	5.3	0.47	6.29	2	0%
SO 200977					5	6.3	11.3	6	1%
TF 200812				0	0.3		0.4	0	0%
TF 201035						2.1	2.1	2	0%
TF 200909					32.3		33.3	32	2%
TF 200427	0.4	0.6	1.2	0.1	0.6		2.9	1	0%
TF 200023		5.2					5.2	5	0%
TF 200026	3.8	0.7	1.0	1.5	0.1		7	1	0%
TF 200126	0.1	0.2					0.2	0	0%
TF 200842				0.3	0.7	0.1	1.1	0	0%
UNHAS flights	6.2	7.3	6.5	5.1	3.4	3.84	32.4	5	2%
SO 200364	6.2	7.3	6.5				20	7	1%
SO 200711				5.1	3.4	3.84	12.4	4	1%
Total Country	385	381	296	324	439	340	2,125	361	100%

Source: WFP SPRs 2012-2017

Beneficiaries

Table 13 Distribution of WFP portfolio activities by beneficiaries 2012–2017

		Food For Assets	General Food Assistance	Nutrition-HIV/AIDS	Nutrition-MCH	School Feeding	School Feeding-Take-home rations	Cash and Voucher	Average total beneficiaries 2012-2017
CP 200253 2012-2015 (extended to end of 2017)	Planned	570,420		151,840		628,164	154,620	61,349	669,348
	Actual	165,238		85,021		511,186	132,033	61,583	652,731
	% planned v actual	29%		56%		81%	85%	100%	98%
PRRO 200290 2012-2013 (extended to mid-2015)	Planned	1,739,390	2,413,675		966,375			330,000	4,233,000
	Actual	1,353,435	2,471,741		748,793			260,164	3,827,602
	% planned v actual	78%	102%		77%			79%	90%
PRRO 200712 mid 2015-mid 2018	Planned	1,414,950	5,862,858		1,828,814			185,767	8,037,775
	Actual	1,391,813	4,313,426		1,793,099			196,932	6,028,964
	% planned v actual	98%	74%		98%			106%	75%
PRRO 200365 mid 2012-mid 2015	Planned		531,475		89,225	71,900		45,333	531,475
	Actual		464,676		77,838	49,142		42,160	464,676
	% planned v actual		87%		87%	68%		93%	87%
PRRO 200700 April 2015 - March 2018 (extended to June 2018)	Planned		643,751		131,871	115,833		50,774	643,751
	Actual		596,382		122,289	57,986		61,329	596,382
			93%		93%	50%		121%	93%
EMOP 200656 Jan 2014 - March 2014	Planned		5,000						5,000
	Actual		45,000						45,000
	% planned v actual		900%						900%
TOTAL	Planned	3,724,760	9,456,759	151,840	3,016,285	878,333	154,620	673,223	
	Actual	2,910,486	7,891,225	85,021	2,742,019	634,351	132,033	622,168	
	% planned v actual	78%	83%	56%	91%	76%	85%	92%	

Source: SPR data.

Notes: Number of beneficiaries given as an average of beneficiaries per year over the period 2012-2017.

Country Office structure and staffing

Overall staffing


Table 14 WFP Ethiopia - Overall Staffing Numbers in Country Office's Duty Stations, 2011–2018

Year	2011				2012				2013				2014				2015				2016				2017				Apr-18			
	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%	Int'l	Nat'l	Total	%
Addis Ababa	41	210	251	38%	38	214	252	37%	41	217	258	36%	35	220	255	39%	33	213	246	32%	35	212	247	31%	50	229	279	33%	39	211	250	33%
Asosa	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0%	0	3	3	0%	0	8	8	1%	0	13	13	2%	0	11	11	1%	0	13	13	2%		10	10	1%
Awasa	1	32	33	5%	1	27	28	4%	1	28	29	4%	1	29	30	5%	1	29	30	4%	1	26	27	3%	0	23	23	3%		18	18	2%
Degahabur	0	15	15	2%	0	20	20	3%	0	23	23	3%	0	20	20	3%	0	33	33	4%	0	32	32	4%	0	30	30	4%				0%
Dese	3	37	40	6%	2	30	32	5%	1	32	33	5%	1	32	33	5%	1	33	34	4%	0	34	34	4%	0	31	31	4%		36	36	5%
Dire Dawa	2	60	62	9%	0	48	48	7%	1	53	54	8%	1	37	38	6%	2	42	44	6%	2	42	44	5%	1	57	58	7%	1	40	41	5%
Dollo Addo	0	0	0	0%	5	11	16	2%	5	21	26	4%	3	19	22	3%	5	27	32	4%	2	28	30	4%	2	43	45	5%	1	30	31	4%
Gambela	1	14	15	2%	1	18	19	3%	2	28	30	4%	1	23	24	4%	7	47	54	7%	8	65	73	9%	5	48	53	6%	4	42	46	6%
Gode	6	64	70	11%	3	58	61	9%	4	53	57	8%	4	46	50	8%	3	40	43	6%	1	39	40	5%	1	37	38	4%	3	43	46	6%
Jijiga	8	58	66	10%	5	72	77	11%	5	38	43	6%	5	22	27	4%	9	60	69	9%	8	61	69	9%	5	61	66	8%	6	94	100	13%
Kebridehar	0	23	23	3%	0	27	27	4%	0	30	30	4%	0	30	30	5%	0	30	30	4%	1	27	28	3%	0	26	26	3%		33	33	4%
Mekelle	1	26	27	4%	1	26	27	4%	1	29	30	4%	2	22	24	4%	2	32	34	4%	1	43	44	5%	0	34	34	4%		27	27	4%
Nazareth	1	57	58	9%	2	57	59	9%	2	73	75	11%	2	79	81	12%	1	89	90	12%	1	109	110	14%	4	121	125	15%	2	101	103	14%
Semera	0	0	0	0%	0	8	8	1%	1	16	17	2%	1	12	13	2%	1	15	16	2%	1	18	19	2%	1	25	26	3%		16	16	2%
Total	64	596	660		58	616	674		64	644	708		56	599	655		65	703	768		61	746	807		69	778	847		56	701	757	
% Int'l/Nat'l	10%	90%			9%	91%			9%	91%			9%	91%			8%	92%			8%	92%			8%	92%			7%	93%		

Source: WFP Ethiopia CO, April 2018.

Note: These data do not yet show the full effect of reductions under the structure and staffing review. The process of advertising and recruiting for re-designated posts is not complete, and existing staff are retained until it is clear they will not be selected for an available post. Moreover, the SSR period coincided with two drought emergencies which temporarily increased staff requirements.

Figure 30 Geographic distribution of staff over time in WFP Ethiopia



Source: WFP Ethiopia CO, April 2018


Sub-offices and their workloads

Table 15 List of sub offices, and number of staff September 2016

Duty Station	Total Staff	Percentage
1. Addis Ababa country office	274	32%
2. Hawassa, SNNPR	26	3%
3. Dessie, Amhara	22	3%
4. Kombolcha, Amhara	11	1%
5. Dire Dawa	53	6%
6. Gambella	48	6%
7. Pugnido, Gambella	7	1%
8. Assosa, Benishangul Gumuz	13	1%
9. Jijiga, Somali	71	8%
10. Gode, Somali	40	5%
11. Kebridehar, Somali	31	4%
12. Dollo Addo, Somali	44	5%
13. Degahabur, Somali	36	4%
14. Semera, Afar	25	3%
15. Mekelle, Tigray	36	4%
16. Shire, Tigray	10	1%
17. Nazareth (Adama), Oromia	116	13%
18. Jimma, Oromia	5	1%
TOTAL	868	100%

Source: WFP Ethiopia CO dataset.


Figure 31 Breakdown of total beneficiaries by sub-office for 2016 and 2017



Source: Sub-office summary data provided by CO.

Financing of the Portfolio

Figure 32 Percentage funded by operation



Source: Resource situation documents.

Table 16 WFP Ethiopia Top 20 donors (2012–2017)

	Donor	Cumulative funding in evaluation period (2012–2017) (USD million)	% of total funding	% of cumulative funding
1	USA	746	33%	33%
2	United Kingdom	286	13%	46%
3	Canada	233	10%	56%
4	European Commission	200	9%	65%
5	Multilateral	132	6%	71%
6	Germany	131	6%	77%
7	Ethiopia	87	4%	81%
8	UN CERF	78	3%	84%
9	Japan	54	2%	87%
10	Stock Transfer	51	2%	89%
11	Saudi Arabia	45	2%	91%
12	UN Humanitarian Response Fund	31	1%	92%
13	Miscellaneous income	26	1%	93%
14	Sweden	20	1%	94%
15	Private Donors	17	1%	95%
16	Switzerland	16	1%	96%
17	China	14	1%	96%
18	Norway	11	1%	97%
19	Russian Federation	8	0%	97%
20	Finland	8	0%	98%
	Other	51	3%	100%

Source: Evaluation team analysis of data from “WFP Donor Information Hub”.

Annex I Output and Outcome Data 2012–2017

Introduction

Collating indicators per activity

1. Output and outcome indicators are routinely included in WFP project documents and subsequent Standard Project Reports (SPRs). However each project usually spans multiple activities, and most activities occur in multiple projects. Output and outcome data are not routinely aggregated or analysed activity-wise, although this is the obvious perspective for a Country Portfolio Evaluation (CPE) – or a future Country Strategic Plan – to take. The evaluation team was unable to find any previous analysis by the country office activity-wise trends in output and outcome indicators.
2. Table 17 and Table 18 below respectively collate the output and outcome data presented in the SPRs from 2012–2017. The data show planned and actual figures, and are sorted by activity, with activities further broken down to illustrate which indicators fall under refugee operations and which indicators are under operations for Ethiopian nationals.

Challenges in assembling the data

3. There were some challenges in collating this data, for both outputs and outcomes. Firstly, it was time consuming to sort the data primarily by activity, rather than – as WFP routinely does – by operation. Secondly, the indicators collected from year to year often changed in substance, and they also often changed in wording. It therefore took the evaluation team some time to match indicators between different years. There were also changes in how indicators were reported by sex, which prevented trends being seen for the evaluation period. Thus, for example, an indicator may have been reported in one year as an aggregated figure for men and women, and then the following year it may have been reported as a disaggregated figure for men and women, with no aggregate figure also given.
4. For the outcome data, the baseline changed for some indicators from year to year. The SPRs gave little or no narrative explanation on changes like this. Similarly there was little text to illustrate the methodology used to collect the data and therefore which areas and sample sizes the data represented. The final columns of Table 18 below show what the evaluation team was able to glean from the SPRs in terms of sources for indicators, explanations of methodology, and commentary on the figures presented.
5. It was also challenging to present the outcome data by activity for 2015 as two relief PRROs (PRRO 200290 and PRRO 200712) overlapped, as one came to an end and the other started. The two PRROs presented different outcome data for 2015.

Challenges in using the data

6. A first challenge is continuity. Table 17 includes 215 output indicators altogether, but only 9 of those are reported for at least 5 of the 6 years covered by this evaluation. The prima facie continuity of the outcome indicators in Table 18 below is slightly better: 15 out of 97 indicators are reported for at least 5 years, but that is still a small minority of the indicators available.

7. There are numerous further challenges of interpretation. The SPR indicators were always the evaluation team's starting point in seeking to explain WFP performance, but they typically had very limited explanatory power. By way of illustration:

- a) There was a dearth of good data on nutrition outcomes. Outcome indicators were reported only for the woredas implementing second-generation targeted supplementary feeding or using mobile health and nutrition teams. The evaluation team was unable to obtain data to assess what percentage of the overall targeted supplementary feeding these represented, but they are known to have been a small proportion for most of the evaluation period.¹²⁰
- b) The school feeding analysis noted that few of the indicators are available consistently over the whole period, and the breakdown between different school feeding operations is not shown. They were therefore of limited value, and the analysis drew heavily on the recent school feeding impact evaluation which included its own survey. (For details see Annex Q.)
- c) The analysis of refugee operations noted that the indicators reported in SPRs are, naturally, aggregated across refugee camps; more emphasis was therefore placed on the disaggregated data from distribution and post-distribution monitoring reports. (This was the only example the evaluation team found where such data had been systematically compiled and analysed – see Annex N.)
- d) The analysis of food-security-related activities (Annex L) notes that the key outcome data for WFP food assistance interventions (coping strategy index, dietary diversity and food consumption score) are difficult to interpret in any meaningful way. For example, below-threshold food consumption scores show that WFP is not meeting its objective of ensuring "adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households", but they cannot tell us more than that because the WFP operational area changes from year to year, the food security situation changes from year to year, and there is no comparison group that can tell us whether the changes in food consumption score can be attributed to WFP or to the particular circumstances in the particular geographic area at the time data was collected.

8. The same annex highlights points that apply to WFP activities in most sectors in Ethiopia:

- a) When programmes are government-led and involve multiple agencies, indicators may not represent desirable outcomes over which WFP has significant control (the attribution problem).
- b) Moreover, delivery of food assistance is only one of the ways in which WFP supports the overall effort. Other forms of support – fund raising, logistics, assistance in coordination – may be even more significant, but are not captured in the standard outcome indicators.
- c) There are wider frameworks for monitoring and evaluation which may be at least as important as monitoring by WFP itself. Thus, for example, the PSNP has its own system of robust evaluations, and all PSNP stakeholders, including WFP, have much to learn from these.

9. The evaluation team also found that there was not a clear and consistent approach to measuring outcomes related to resilience (Annex M).

¹²⁰ As noted in the main text, Box 8, the programmes keeping outcome data require additional funding and are often short term (e.g. three months). As a result, the number of programmes able to report properly was constantly changing, and it would have required very effective data management to keep track of this.

Table 17 Outputs, planned vs. actual 2012-2017

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
A. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT – STRENGTHENING NATIONAL CAPACITIES AND LOCAL PURCHASES							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
1. Monetary value of food commodities purchased locally by WFP (USD)	P				8,500,000	11,000,000	
	A		5,683,893	42,795,562	8,483,503	10,818,687	
2. Food purchased locally, as percentage of total food purchased	P						
	A			27			
3. Number of cooperatives societies supported	P				34	42	
	A				36	44	
4. Number of farmer groups supported through local purchases	P	112	16	27	270	288	
	A	42	16	25	270	350	
5. Number of farmer individuals supported through local purchases	P	37,687	43,529		73,000	97,560	
	A	13,200	60,465		126,310	119,134	
6. Number of farmer organisations linked to agro input dealers	P					15	
	A					0	
7. Number of farmer organizations supported with equipment (tarpaulins) for post-harvest handling	P				4		
	A				4		
8. Number of farmer organizations trained in market access and post-harvest handling skills	P				160		
	A				160		
9. Number of individual farmers trained in post-harvest handling practices	P				525		
	A				525		
10. Number of food security monitoring/surveillance reports produced with WFP support	P					5	
	A					8	
11. Number of Multi-stakeholder Platform (MSPs) meetings on grain markets and marketing	P					2	
	A					2	
12. Number of smallholder farmers supported by WFP	P			49,638	256		
	A			100,000	223		
13. Quantity of food purchased locally from pro-smallholder aggregation systems	P				30,000	40,000	
	A			33,186	30,000	39,420	
14. Quantity of food purchased locally through Local and Regional purchases (expressed in mt)	P						
	A			123,925			
B. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: DISASTER/EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
	P					1,280	

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
15. Number of people trained (Peace building/Protection/Human rights/Resilience/Citizen participation/ Gender-related issues)	A					2,755	
16. Number of contingency plans created	P	2	10	50	12	25	
	A	2	10	50	12	22	
17. Number of counterparts staff members trained in contingency planning	P			20	60		
	A			20	60		
18. Number of counterparts staff members trained in disaster and climate risk management	P	1,200				50	
	A	155				50	
19. Number of counterparts staff members trained in early warning systems	P		175			35	
	A		162			0	
20. Number of government staff members trained in contingency planning	P			50	60		
	A			50	60		
21. Number of government staff members trained in disaster and climate risk management	P	8	400			228	
	A	155	327			266	
22. Number of government staff members trained in early warning systems	P	20	400				
	A	40	327				
23. Number of government staff members trained in food security monitoring systems	P			20			
	A			20			
24. Number of disaster preparedness and risk management tools (contingency plans, early warning systems, food security monitoring systems, weather and climate related tools and services) incorporated in government core functions and budget	P	3	2		11	5	
	A	3	2		98	5	
25. Number of food security and nutrition monitoring/surveillance reports produced with WFP support	P				7	12	
	A				7	7	
26. Number of local early warning systems in place	P	1	12		1		
	A	2	12		5		
27. Number of technical assistance activities provided	P			1	20	4	
	A			1	64	13	
28. WFP expenditures for technical assistance to strengthen national capacity	P				198,000	27,500	
	A				205,000	27,500	
Ethiopian Nationals (PRRO)							
29. Number of government staff members trained in disaster and climate risk management	P	1,860					
	A	2,555					

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
C. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: FOOD FORTIFICATION							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
30. Number of counterparts trained in capacity development on MCHN and nutrition activities	P	370	170				
	A	570	139				
D. FFA/FFT							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
31. Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated with biological stabilization or agro forestry techniques only (including multi-storey gardening, green fences, and various tree belts)	P	2,500	6,480		110	31	
	A	6,873	546		55	28	
32. Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated with both physical soil and water conservation measures and biological stabilization or agro forestry techniques	P	25,000	13,670	7,288	10,020	1,390	
	A	6,873	2,499	308	95	0	
33. Hectares (ha) of forests planted and established	P	25,000	12,460	25	6,060	1,610	
	A	17,821	11,760	10	2,480	1,240	
34. Kilometres (km) of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	P	150	278		10		
	A	121	20		0		
35. Kilometres (km) of feeder roads rehabilitated and maintained	P				0	2	
	A				2	2	
36. Number of assets built, restored or maintained by targeted communities and individuals	P				54	27	
	A				27	15	
37. Number of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3000-15,000 cubic meters)	P	25	25	50	20	2	
	A	46	3	4	2	0	
38. Number of existing nurseries supported	P	368	368	153			
	A	338	368	153			
39. Number of farmers who have adopted fertility management measures (e.g. compost making, green manuring, mulching, etc) in their homestead and cultivated fields	P	126,000	135,055				
	A	130,480	8,103				
40. Number of homestead level micro-ponds constructed (usually 60-250 cubic metres)	P		152		120	99	
	A		14		27	0	
41. Number of members of food management committees (female) trained on modalities of food distribution	P		5,640				
	A		5,600				
42. Number of members of food management committees (male) trained on modalities of food distribution	P		5,640				
	A		5,560				
43. Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	P	50					
	A	50					
	P		2,255				

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
44. Number of women in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	A		2,255				
45. Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	P	50					
	A	50					
46. Number of men in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		2,255				
	A		2,255				
47. Number of tree seedlings produced	P	100,000,000	84,000,000	43,000,000	90,000,000	45,120,000	
	A	82,200,000	82,500,000	41,000,000	44,550,000	22,275,000	
48. Number of water springs developed	P	110	14		10	29	
	A	17	2		0	0	
49. Volume (m3) of check dams and gully rehabilitation structures (e.g. soil sedimentation dams) constructed	P	79,000	160,200	112,000	112,000	14,000	
	A	24,600	46,819	25,000	9,970	0	
Ethiopian Nationals (PRRO)							
50. Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes (including irrigation canal construction, specific protection measures, embankments, etc)	P						196
	A						196
51. Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures only	P					640	4,833
	A					427	4,833
52. Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated with biological stabilization or agro forestry techniques only (including multi-storey gardening, green fences, and various tree belts)	P	1,200	1,200	1,200	451		
	A	996	1,040	1,110	381		
53. Hectares (ha) of gully land reclaimed as a result of check dams and gully rehabilitation structures	P	19,000	19,000	19,000	5,368	375	
	A	15,485	17,300	18,100	1,820	375	
54. Kilometres (km) of feeder roads built and maintained	P		127			49	1,862
	A		103			41	1,862
55. Kilometres (km) of feeder roads rehabilitated (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	P	220		127	1,209		
	A	203		112	780		
56. Number of buildings rehabilitated / constructed (School Building, Facility Center, Community Building)	P					11	726
	A					11	726
57. Number of classrooms rehabilitated	P	200	200	200			
	A	172	184	180			
58. Number of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3000-15,000 cbmt)	P					1	1,269
	A					1	1,269
59. Number of fish ponds constructed (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	P	6,840					
	A	5,620					

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
60. Number of households who received fuel efficient stoves	P		24	100			
	A		24	94			
61. Number of shallow wells constructed	P	100	100	210	202		
	A	88	92	195	130		
62. Number of water springs developed	P	210	210	100	50		
	A	191	200	92	21		
63. Percentage of tree seedlings produced used for afforestation, reforestation and vegetative stabilization	P	100	100	12,000			
	A	88	90	12,000			
Refugees (PRRO)							
64. Number of excavated community water ponds for livestock uses constructed (3000-15,000 cbmt)	P				3		
	A				3		
65. Number of people engaged in income diversification strategies to reduce risks and vulnerability of food security to climate	P			225			
	A			210			
66. Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution	P				500	546	1,150
	A				500	336	1,150
67. Number of water springs developed	P			3			
	A			3			
68. Quantity of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer) distributed	P				0	3,400	0
	A				0	2,914	0
69. Quantity of agricultural tools distributed	P				1,504	5,100	2,400
	A				1,504	4,659	2,400
E. GENERAL GENDER INDICATORS							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
70. Number of food monitors - men	P	73					
	A	73	74				
71. Number of food monitors - women	P	12					
	A	12	10				
72. The project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	P	3					
	A	3					
73. The project has activities to raise awareness of how gender equality goals can increase effectiveness of WFP interventions	P		4				
	A		4				
74. The project has initiatives to reduce risk of sexual and gender-based violence	P	2					
	A	2					

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Ethiopian Nationals (PRRO)							
75. Number of food monitors - men	P						
	A	73	74				
76. Number of food monitors - women	P						
	A	12	10				
77. The project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	P						
	A	1					
78. The project has activities to raise awareness of how gender equality goals can increase effectiveness of WFP interventions	P		1				
	A		1				
79. The project has initiatives to reduce risk of sexual and gender-based violence	P						
	A	1	0				
Refugees (PRRO)							
80. The project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality	P	2					
	A	2					
81. The project has activities to raise awareness of how gender equality goals can increase effectiveness of WFP interventions	P		1				
	A		1				
82. The project has initiatives to reduce risk of sexual and gender-based violence	P	2	1				
	A	2	1				
F. GENERAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
83. Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in men's name	P		142,600				
	A		27,200				
84. Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in women's name	P		136,100				
	A		25,900				
85. Training on food distribution includes a solid explanation for gender sensitive provision of food	P		1				
	A		1				
Ethiopian Nationals (PRRO)							
86. C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	P		15,989	39,640			
	A		20,623	22,660			
87. C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	P		15,694	40,360			
	A		20,267	22,276			
88. Number of days rations were provided	P	270	270	270			
	A	240	250	180			
	P	270,259	189,220				

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
89. Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in men's name	A	183,776	189,210				
90. Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in women's name	P	270,259	120,960				
	A	172,965	120,970				
91. Number of members of food management committees (female) trained on modalities of food distribution	P						
	A	1,385					
92. Number of members of food management committees (female) trained on modalities of food, cash or voucher distribution	P		1,950				
	A		1,908				
93. Number of members of food management committees (male) trained on modalities of food distribution	P						
	A	256					
94. Number of members of food management committees (male) trained on modalities of food, cash or voucher distribution	P		2,850				
	A		2,850				
95. Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	P	3,392					
	A	3,392					
96. Number of women in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		800				
	A		760				
97. Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	P	4,100					
	A	4,100					
98. Number of men in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		1,140				
	A		1,140				
99. Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution	P		935			197	
	A		857			197	
100. Number of timely food distributions as per schedule	P					10	
	A					10	
Refugees (PRRO)							
101. C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	P			6,349			
	A			5,108			
102. C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	P			6,209			
	A			6,100			
103. Number of days rations were provided	P	266	365	365			
	A	254	365	365			
104. Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in men's name	P	90,100	19,895				
	A	93,400	21,772				
	P	78,300	24,046				

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
105. Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in women's name	A	74,100	16,781				
106. Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	P	44					
	A	43					
107. Number of women in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		24				
	A		19				
108. Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	P	49					
	A	50					
109. Number of men in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		25				
	A		27				
110. Number of timely food distributions as per planned distribution schedule	P	12	12	12			
	A	12	12	12			
G. HIV/TB: CARE & TREATMENT AND HIV/TB: MITIGATION & SAFETY NETS							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
111. C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving a combination of cash transfers and food	P			93,700			
	A			98,750			
112. C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving a combination of cash transfers and vouchers	P		67,245	68,600			
	A		66,384	66,730			
113. C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving cash transfers	P			15,974			
	A		12,718	9,580			
114. C&V: Number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers	P		67,245	52,626			
	A		53,666	57,150			
115. C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	P	26,200	23,011				
	A	23,900	22,695				
116. C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	P	41,100	44,234				
	A	37,600	43,689				
117. C&V: Total food equivalent of commodity vouchers distributed	P		1,220				
	A		1,191				
118. C&V: Total monetary value of cash vouchers distributed	P			5,783,978			
	A			4,892,548			
119. Number of ART beneficiaries who received both individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance	P	32,200					
	A	12,878					
120. Number of beneficiaries (PLHIV and or HIV affected) participating in food assisted business educational or agricultural training activities	P				19,075	12,834	
	A				19,075	12,834	

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
121. Number of beneficiaries (PLHIV and/or HIV affected) participating in food assisted business, educational or agricultural training activities	P		6,543	19,188			
	A		6,543	19,188			
122. Number of beneficiaries of ART individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance	P		223,455				
	A		25,246				
123. Number of beneficiaries of PMTCT individual nutritional food supplement and household food assistance	P	6,512	2,109				
	A	6,792	2,109				
124. Number of institutional sites assisted	P				190	190	
	A				190	190	
125. Number of members of food management committees (female) trained on modalities of food distribution	P		95				
	A		90				
126. Number of women receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP	P				25,370	29,525	
	A				25,370	42,679	
127. Number of men receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP	P				20,053	15,898	
	A				20,053	22,982	
128. Number of OVC supported with household food assistance	P	49,200					
	A	63,100					
129. Number of OVC receiving take-home rations through school	P		56,282	57,455			
	A		56,282	49,537			
130. Training on food distribution included awareness of reasons for gender sensitive provision of food	P	1					
	A	1					
H. NUTRITION: PREVENTION OF ACUTE MALNUTRITION AND NUTRITION: TREATMENT OF MODERATE ACUTE MALNUTRITION							
Ethiopian Nationals (PRR0)							
131. Number of beneficiaries/caregivers who received messages/training on health and nutrition	P				547,500		
	A				465,375		
132. Number of women exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP	P				949,629	937,516	396,102
	A				418,838	0	396,102
133. Number of women receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP	P				949,629	937,516	396,102
	A				246,375	0	396,102
134. Number of men exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP	P				105,514	104,168	44,012
	A				46,538	0	44,012
135. Number of men receiving nutrition counselling supported by WFP	P				105,514	104,168	44,012
	A				27,375	0	44,012
136. Number of pregnant/lactating women assisted	P	363,500	347,800				
	A	283,400	438,750				

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
137. Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution	P	1,385	3,493			4,436	5,206
	A	1,321	3,490			4,436	5,206
138. Number of targeted caregivers (male and female) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counseling	P				507,643	1,041,684	533,505
	A				0	0	533,505
139. Number of timely food distributions as per schedule	P						9
	A						7
Refugees (PRRO)							
140. Energy content of food distributed (kcal/person/day)	P	2,202					
	A	2,202					
141. Number of health centres/sites assisted	P				24	24	26
	A				24	24	26
142. Number of pregnant/lactating women assisted	P	67,600	21,700				
	A	37,150	15,458				
143. Number of targeted caregivers (male and female) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counselling	P				64,350	51,521	35,963
	A				54,601	47,915	35,962
I. SCHOOL FEEDING (ON-SITE)							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
144. Girls' Education: Number of WFP-assisted schools with gender-targeted programmes or initiatives	P	620	1,186	1,186	799		
	A	787	1,186	847	702		
145. Health, Nutrition and Hygiene: Number of teachers trained in health, nutrition and hygiene education	P			70			
	A			61			
146. Number of feeding days	P				1,320	200	
	A				501	67	
147. Number of feeding days as % of actual school days	P	200	200	100			
	A	176	110	63			
148. Number of fuel or energy-efficient stoves distributed in WFP-assisted schools	P				253	150	200
	A				106	118	200
149. Number of kitchens or food storage rooms rehabilitated or constructed	P			12	48	20	34
	A			10	40	24	34
150. Number of latrines rehabilitated or constructed	P			14	11	15	6
	A			10	13	29	6
151. Number of members of food management committees (female) trained on modalities of food distribution	P		3,000				
	A		1,652				
	P		4,394				

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
152. Number of members of food management committees (male) trained on modalities of food distribution	A		3,942				
153. Number of women in leadership positions on food management committees	P	5,970					
	A	1,898					
154. Number of men in leadership positions on food management committees	P	5,970					
	A	4,072					
155. Number of women in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		2,372				
	A		826				
156. Number of men in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P		2,372				
	A		1,914				
157. Number of Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) or similar "school" governance structures supported	P						409
	A						409
158. Number of primary school boys assisted by WFP	P	371,800	410,300	497,000			
	A	350,600	348,100	315,230			
159. Number of primary school children assisted by WFP	P	688,500	757,316	917,000			
	A	649,200	669,400	596,440			
160. Number of primary school girls assisted by WFP	P	316,700	347,000	420,000			
	A	298,600	321,300	281,210			
161. Number of primary schools assisted by WFP	P	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,150	798	590
	A	1,186	1,186	1,170	829	740	590
162. Number of schools supported through home-grown school feeding model	P				0	141	
	A				130	63	
163. Number of schools using an improved water source	P						30
	A						30
164. Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution	P						680
	A						680
165. Number of WFP-assisted schools that benefit from complementary HIV and AIDS education	P				20	55	
	A				117	55	
166. Number of WFP-assisted schools that have school gardens for learning or complementary food input	P				40	85	
	A				55	115	
167. Number of WFP-assisted schools that promote health, nutrition and hygiene education	P				329	232	409
	A				267	310	409
168. Number of WFP-assisted schools with adequate hand washing stations	P				20		
	A				0		

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
169. Number of WFP-assisted schools with adequate safe water for drinking	P				4	10	
	A				5	8	
170. Training on food distribution includes a solid explanation for gender sensitive provision of food	P		1				
	A		1				
Refugees (PRRO)							
171. Actual Kcal value per meal per day per type of school meals programme model against the planned Kcal value	P						
	A			450			
172. Number of classrooms rehabilitated	P	4					
	A	3					
173. Number of feeding days	P				44	22	22
	A				42	21	22
174. Number of feeding days as % of actual school days	P	200	100	80			
	A	200	80	75			
175. Number of pre-school boys assisted by WFP	P			800			
	A			488			
176. Number of pre-school girls assisted by WFP	P			700			
	A			426			
177. Number of primary school boys assisted by WFP	P	114,050	32,350	40,400			
	A	86,800	28,580	31,040			
178. Number of primary school girls assisted by WFP	P	110,750	32,350	40,600			
	A	83,000	19,470	32,300			
179. Number of primary schools assisted by WFP	P	28	18	17	21	21	24
	A	31	16	16	18	20	24
J. SCHOOL FEEDING (TAKE-HOME RATIONS)							
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)							
180. Girls' Education: Number of WFP-assisted schools with gender-targeted programmes or initiatives	P					811	590
	A					699	590
K. SPECIAL OPERATION (CLUSTER)							
181. Number of cluster coordination meetings conducted	P					14	3
	A					25	6
182. Number of information management products produced and shared, including bulletins, maps, guidance documents, and other logistics information	P					28	20
	A					100	20
183. Number of Logistics Capacity Assessments developed or updated	P					1	1
	A					1	1

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
184. Number of mobile storage tents/units made available	P					112	4
	A					121	4
185. Number of partner organizations participating in the cluster system nationally	P					10	26
	A					26	26
186. Number of training sessions / workshops organized	P					3	3
	A					20	3
187. Percentage of logistics service requests fulfilled	P					100	
	A					100	
188. Total storage space made available (mt)	P					50,000	9,000
	A					64,200	9,000
L. SPECIAL OPERATIONS (AIR OPS)							
UNHAS							
189. Average no. of mt (food or NFI) transported monthly	P	4	5	2			
	A	2	3	5			
190. Average no. of passengers transported monthly by air	P	400	1,000	800			
	A	879	758	826			
191. Average weight of light cargo transported monthly	P				2	2	2
	A				4	4	21
192. Frequency of the users' groups meetings	P	12	12	6			
	A	9	6	6			
193. Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	P	50	35	35	35	35	35
	A	55	60	32	46	45	79
194. Number of aircrafts made available	P	2	3			2	2
	A	2	3			2	5
195. Number of locations served	P	7			7	6	6
	A	9			7	10	20
196. Number of meetings conducted	P				6	6	6
	A				7	6	10
197. Number of needs assessments carried out	P					4	4
	A					4	9
198. Number of passengers transported	P				7,680	5,800	5,800
	A				5,654	4,270	10,026
199. Percentage of passenger bookings served	P					95	95
	A					100	200

	Planned /Actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
200. Percentage of requests for medical and security evacuations fulfilled / Percentage response to medical and security evacuation	P	100	100	100	100	100	100
	A	100	100	100	100	100	100
201. Percentage utilization of the contracted hours of aircraft	P	100	100	100	100	100	100
	A	108	106	92	100	100	236
202. Utilisation of available aircraft capacity	P	1	1				
	A	1	1				
M. SPECIAL OPERATIONS (LOGISTICS)							
203. Kilometres of roads built	P					1	
	A					1	
204. Number of agencies and organizations using storage facilities	P					3	3
	A					1	4
205. Number of bridges built/rehabilitated	P					1	
	A					1	
206. Number of Government counterparts trained	P	10	140	35	400		
	A	10	156	35	186		
207. Number of hubs established	P				1	1	0
	A				1	0	
208. Number of staff trained	P					400	0
	A					0	
209. Total storage space made available (m2)	P				2,800	6,000	0
	A				2,800	6,000	
210. Total storage space made available (mt)	P				24,000		40,000
	A				24,000		40,000

Table 18 Outcome Data 2012-2017¹²¹

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
Ethiopian Nationals PRRO											
RELIEF											
1. CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	10.6 (2012); 10.70 (2015a); 16.4 (2015b); 14.19 (2016)	10.7 (2014); <10.70 (2015a); <14.2 (2015b)	10.7	13.2	12.75	14.9 (2015a) 16.4 (2015b)	14.05	10.85	Community Household Survey (CHS) of Relief beneficiaries	Methodology: CSI measured for relief for first time in 2012 so 2012 is baseline. End target only given from 2014 SPR onwards. CSI disaggregated for mhh / fhh from 2014 but values are the same. Narrative: CSI increased in 2013 suggesting delay in provision of assistance resulted in an increased use of negative coping mechanisms at the time CSI was measured. CSI decreased in 2014 suggesting food and cash transfers helped protect households from using severe short-term coping strategies. 2015 CSI above targets due to drought.	
2. Diet Diversity Score	3.67 (2015a); 3.9 (2015b)	>3.67 (2015a); >3.9 (2015b)				3.87 (2015a); 3.6 (2015b)	4.1	3.83	CHS, WFP survey	Methodology: Baseline and end target only given from 2015 SPR onwards. Narrative: 2015 diet diversity low – lack of food available from own production or local markets as a result of drought. Beneficiaries' dietary diversity score (DDS) did not improve over the course of 2017, although WFP endeavoured to improve this through the provision of cash transfers. In the locations where cash was distributed, some households were able to diversify their diets with meat, milk and eggs. However, this was limited and not significant enough to influence the average DDS.	
3. Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3.52 (2014); 3.52 (2015a); 3.8 (2015b)	3.56 (2014); >3.52 (2015a); >3.8 (2015b)			3.9	3.81 (2015a); 3.5 (2015b)	4	3.79	CHS, WFP survey	Methodology: Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards. CSO disaggregated for mhh / fhh from 2014 but values are the same. Narrative: 2014 diet diversity score low – relief beneficiaries received 3 food groups.	
4. Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	3.77 (2014); 3.77 (2015a); 3.9 (2015b)	3.78; >3.77 (2015a); >3.9 (2015b)			3.9	3.89 (2015a); 3.6 (2015b)	4.1	3.86	CHS, WFP survey	Methodology: Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards. CSI disaggregated for mhh / fhh from 2014 but values are the same. Narrative: 2014 diet diversity score low – relief beneficiaries received 3 food groups	

¹²¹ (a) Two sets of data from 2015 as two relief PRROs are overlapping: 2015a = PRRO 200290; 2015b = PRRO 200712

(b) The dates of the baseline and endline are listed in the methodology column. Where the baseline/endline changes over 2012–2017, the dates of each value are listed in brackets.

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
5. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS	36; 57 (2015a)	< 70 (2015a)	57	70		58.20 (2015a)			Base value from post distribution monitoring survey of relief beneficiary households; follow on from CHS of relief beneficiaries		% with acceptable FCS higher in 2013 than 2012 due to improvement in the distribution of full rations as per entitlement.
6. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS (female-headed)	57	70			59.9	57.10 (2015a)				Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
7. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS (male-headed)	57	70			71.6	58.6 (2015a)				Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
8. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS	25 (2014); 31 (2015a)	<20 (2015a)	31	23		26.2 (2015a)			Base value from post distribution monitoring survey of relief beneficiary households; follow on from CHS of relief beneficiaries		
9. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)	31	20			27.9	25.7 (2015a)				Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
10. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)	31	20			20.1	26.5 (2015a)				Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
11. FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS	39 (2012); 12 (2015a); 15.50 (2015b)	<10 (2015a); <3.10 (2015b)	12	7		17.2 (2015a); 15.5 (2015b)	7.3	26.9	Base value from post distribution monitoring survey of relief beneficiary households; follow on from community household survey of relief beneficiaries (CHS)		Methodology: FCS does not show regional differences around country as it is an average. Narrative: The date of the baseline and endline are listed in the methodology column. Where the baseline/endline changes over 2012-2017, the dates of each value are listed in brackets. The:% with poor consumption scores in 2015 was low but the average masks regional differences around the country. For example, the proportion of households with poor FCS in Afar and Oromia regions were 25 and 22 percent (well above the national average). The proportion of households with poor FCS dropped from 2015 to 2016 – this could be due to the timeliness of distributions. However, 80% of relief households could not meet their minimum caloric requirement from the own means, so food assistance was critical. The proportion of households with poor food consumption score (FCS) increased from 7.3 percent in 2016 to 26.9 percent in 2017. The proportion of households with poor FCS was higher among male-headed than female-headed households. Beneficiary Contact Monitoring analysis showed that food assistance was consumed in the case of female-headed households, while-male headed households often sold the received food commodities to acquire other types of food or services (such as health and education).
12. FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (female-headed)	12 (2014 and 2015a); 17.2 (2015)	10 (2014 and 2015a); <3.44 (2015)			12.2	17.20 (2015a); 15.2 (2015b)	11.1	25.6	CHS, WFP survey	Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
13. FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (male-headed)	12 (2014 and 2015a); 14.9 (2015)	10 (2014 and 2015a); <3.00 (2015)			8.4	14.90 (2015a); 16 (2015b)	6.2	27.7	CHS, WFP survey	Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	In 2015 the proportion of mhh with poor FCS was higher than fhh. Men tend to have greater income earning opportunities than women, the deterioration of FSC among these households is likely a result of dramatic reduction in seasonal livelihood opportunities.
14. Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions											
15. Supplementary feeding death rate (%)	0.52		0.4	1.4					TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey		

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
16. Supplementary feeding default rate (%)	1.2		1.5	1.2					TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey		
17. Supplementary feeding recovery rate (%)	65.1		64.4	83.2					TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey		2013 recovery rate improved significantly because of strengthened linkages with the health system, and improved beneficiary monitoring, awareness creation and counselling, which were possible due to enhanced monthly screenings.
18. TSF: MAM treatment default rate (%)	1.2 (2014); 1.98 (2015b)	15 (2014); <15 (2015)			1.9	1.98 (2015a); 2.2 (2015b)	3	1.92	TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey; from 2014 WFP monitoring survey; 2015 end target secondary data from health facilities and 2015 (onwards) follow up from secondary field level programme data	Baseline and End target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	2014 supplementary feeding performance attributed to concerted efforts by all partners in providing immediate assistance, regular screening, and timely referrals to treatment.
19. TSF: MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	0.52 (2014); 0.4 (2015a); 0.04 (2015b)	3 (2014); <3 (2015)			0.1	0.04 (2015a); 0 (2015b)	0	0.01	TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey; from 2014 WFP monitoring survey; from 2015 end target secondary data from health facilities and 2015 (onwards) follow up from secondary field level programme data	Baseline and End target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	In 2015 where TSF support was provided, outcome targets were largely successful. However, the geographic coverage of TSF activities was limited. Out of the 97 Priority 1 woredas requiring WFP MAM support, the needs were addressed in only 58 woredas. WFP suspects that the inability to cover all 97 woredas contributed to the rise in the number of reported cases of SAM.

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
20. TSF: MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	5.06 (2015)	15 (2015); <15 (2015)			4.3	2.4 (2015b); 5.06 (2015a)	4	2.25	TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey; from 2014 WFP monitoring survey; from 2015 end target secondary data from health facilities and 2015 (onwards) follow up from secondary field level programme data	Baseline and end target only given from 2015 SPR onwards.	
21. TSF: MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	65.1 (2014); 64.4 (2015a); 92.36 (2015b)	75 (2014); >75 (2015)			93.7	92.36 (2015a) 95.4 (2015b)	93	95.8	TSF Outcome Evaluation Study, WFP survey; from 2014 WFP monitoring survey; from 2015 end target secondary data from health facilities and 2015 (onwards) follow up from secondary field level programme data	Baseline and end target only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
22. TSF: Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)		>50 (2015a)				86.6 (2015a); 89 (2015b)	98.3	81	From 2015 end target secondary data from health facilities and 2015 follow up from WFP programme monitoring household interview through CHS.	The data on TSFP coverage was not collected in 2014 but was made a priority in 2015 monitoring plan	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP)											
23. CAS: Community Asset Score (average)	70 (2014); .70 (2015a); 9 (2016)	10 (2014)	50	65	70	9 (2015a)	6.2	6.22	CAS for PSNP beneficiaries; 2013 onwards CHS, WFP survey	CAS asset samples were collected from pastoral communities of Afar and Somali regions. CAS baseline in 2013/2014 not available due to change in methodology. Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards. End target from 2015.	In 2016 CAS has improved from the baseline. The assets create will contribute to increasing community resilience to shocks.
24. CSI (Asset Depletion): Percentage of households implementing crisis and emergency coping strategies	6.45 (2014); 61.10 (2016)	<4.5 (2015a); 61.10 (2016)			6.45	3.58 (2015a)	40	33.1	CHS, WFP survey	Methodology: Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards. In 2015 the improvement of the livelihood CSI was not necessarily correlated with increases in livelihood productivity or household welfare. Rather, the perceived improvement was related to how the score is calculated and interpreted. As the drought unfolded over the course of 2015, the most severe negative livelihood coping strategies (e.g. selling of livestock and productive assets) happened between March and June. By the time the latest follow-up values were collected in August, many households had therefore already sold all key livelihood assets, and did not report using those coping strategies in the recent weeks. This may have resulted in an underestimation of the severity of the strategies used.	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
25. CSI (Food): Coping Strategy Index (average)	20.3 (2012); 12.07 (2014); 12.40 (2015a); 15.5 (2016)	12.05 (2014); <12.40 (2015); <15.5 (2016)	12.4	11.5	9.6	14.48 (2015a)	16.65	10.36	Base value from post distribution monitoring survey of PSNP beneficiary households; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Change in methodology for CSI in 2012: 'seven days recall from the previous one month recall'.	CSI decreased in 2013 as more people targeted under PSNP, meaning sharing of food assistance was less common. CSI continued to decrease in 2014 indicating that food assistance provided to PSNP households over the years has enabled them to build their resilience and reduce their need to employ negative coping mechanisms; The drought affected the manner in which households were able to cope with external shocks in 2015. The CSI for PSNP beneficiaries was higher in 2015 than in 2014.
26. Diet Diversity Score	2.96 (2015a); 3.35 (2016)	>2.96; > 3.35 (2015)				3.3 (2015a)	3.9	3.96	CHS, WFP survey	Baseline only given from 2015a SPR onwards.	2015 PSNP transfer includes only cereals and pulses. Between 2015 and 2016, the FCS and DDS improved for PSNP beneficiaries due to WFP's concerted effort with the Gov. and other development partners to mitigate the negative effects of the El Nino. In 2016 the introduction of pulses and the injection of cash transfers are factors that helped beneficiaries improve diet diversity.
27. Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	3.19(2014); 3.56 (2016)	3.2 (2014); > 3.19 (2015); >3.19 (2016)			3.7	3.44 (2015a)	3.85	4.03	CHS, WFP survey	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	2014 diet diversity score low – PSNP beneficiaries received 3 food groups
28. Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	2.89 (2014); 3.21 (2016)	2.9 (2014); > 3.19 (2015); 3.21 (2016)			3.5	3.25 (2015a)	3.87	3.94	CHS, WFP survey	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
29. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS	23 (2012); 28.70 (2016)	15 (2014); >15 (2015); <5.74 (2016)				24.9 (2015a)	29	46.5	Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries		

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
30. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)	23 (2014); 30.5 (2016)	15 (2014); >15 (2015); <6.10 (2016)	23	15	32.2	20.6 (2015a)	32.4	50.7	Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
31. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)	23 (2014); 28.20 (2016)	15 (2014); >15 (2015); <5.64 (2016)	23	15	22.6	26.6 (2015a)	27.3	44.8	Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
32. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS	69	75 (2014); >75 (2015)				44.2 (2015a)			Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries		
33. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS (female-headed)	69	75 (2014); >75 (2015)	69	74	63.2	47.6 (2015a)			Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	% with acceptable FCS higher in 2013 than 2012 due to receiving full rations and beneficiaries benefitting from improved food security situation following favourable rains during <i>meher</i> [main rainy season]
34. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS (male-headed)	69	75 (2014); >75 (2015)	69	74	68.8	42.9 (2015a)			Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
35. FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	8; 15.7 (2016)	10 (2014); >10 (2015); <3.14 (2016)				30.9 (2015a)	9.8	11.8	Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries		In 2015 food consumption deteriorated for both relief and PSNP households

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
36. FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	8 (2014); 14.50 (2016)	10 (2014); >10 (2015); <2.9 (2016)	8	11	4.6	31.7 (2015a)	12.9	9.6	Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	In 2016 a higher proportion of FHHs had poor FCS as women had less access to land and job opportunities compared to men.
37. FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	8 (2014); 16 (2016)	10 (2014); >10 (2015); <3.2 (2016)	8	11	8.7	30.5 (2015a)	8.3	12.8	Base value from WFP programme monitoring; follow on from community household survey of PSNP beneficiaries	Baseline only given from 2014 SPR onwards.	
Ethiopian Nationals (CP)											
CP component 1- Disaster Risk Management Capacity											
38. Disaster preparedness index	5	6	6	6	6				WFP consultation process with Government	Baseline and end target from 2014	
39. Number of WFP-supported national food security and other policies, plans, and mechanisms that improve disaster risk management and climate change adaptation	2	2			2			2	WFP programme monitoring Regular monitoring	Baseline and end target from 2014	In 2012 WFP's support to Woreda Disaster Risk Profiling programme, guidelines were produced for Early Warning Systems, Disaster Risk Reduction and Contingency planning.
CP component 2-Natural Resource Management Capacity											
40. FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	20.3	<15.00	20.3		20.3				MERET impact evaluation report, WFP survey	Baseline and end target from 2014	Taking into account the low performance of MERET and the resource constraints, WFP did not conduct and outcome performance survey in 2014 or 2015.
41. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	51.3	>75.00	51.3		51.3				MERET impact evaluation report, WFP survey	Baseline and end target from 2014	
42. FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	28.3	<10.00	28.3		28.3				MERET impact evaluation report, WFP survey	Baseline and end target from 2014	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
CP component 3-Food for Education in Primary Schools											
43. Attendance rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	95.4	99			94	87	96.9	95.9	WFP annual monitoring findings, WFP survey		Methodology: baseline and endline from 2014 Narrative: The annual enrolment increased in 2014 compared to the previous year which may be attributed to WFP's school feeding interventions; The attendance rate for school feeding schools was 94 percent in 2015, lower than the targeted 99 percent. This may be attributed to a gradual spill-over effect from the on-going drought on the students' attendance, particularly girls, in affected areas.
44. Attendance rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	95.4	99			97	95	94.8	99	WFP annual monitoring findings, WFP survey		Methodology: Baseline and end target from 2014 Narrative: The annual enrolment increased in 2014 compared to the previous year which may be attributed to WFP's school feeding interventions. In 2016 The attendance rate for girls dropped marginally whereas the rate for boys improved significantly. The drop in attendance for girls could be attributed to the fact that take-home rations for girls was cut for two terms as a result of resource shortfalls.
Attendance rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	95.4		98.7	99					WFP annual monitoring at end of first term of sampled schools; Programme monitoring.	Baseline from 2012	
45. Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	7	6	3.6	5.5	8	7.6	8.5	3.6	WFP annual monitoring at end of first term of sampled schools,, Programme monitoring.		Methodology: Baseline and end target from 2014 Narrative: The percentage change in enrolment for 2016 was 8 percent – 8.5 percent for boys and 7.3 percent for girls, which was an overachievement against the target of 6 percent. This was a positive change in spite of the resource shortfalls faced by the school meals programme. Factors which contributed to this include the government's continued commitments improve education as outlined in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II 2016 -2019),
46. Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	11	6	9	4.7	9	4.9	7.3	5.2	WFP annual monitoring at end of first term of sampled schools,, Programme monitoring.		Methodology: Baseline and end target from 2014 Narrative: 2017: the enrolment rate for boys and girls has decreased over time. The government has taken different measures to improve access to education nationwide, like establishing satellite schools in highland areas and under the Alternative Basic Education in pastoralist regions, which consequently resulted in a decreased enrolment in WFP-targeted schools.

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
47. Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	0.88 (2013); 0.95 (2014)	1	0.85	0.93	0.95	0.84	0.84	0.82	WFP regular monitoring data, Programme monitoring.	Baseline from 2013 SPR	2017: Girls' education is still hampered by the deep seated gender inequality in Ethiopia and WFP and its partners continued in their effort to reach the planned gender parity index of 1:1.
48. Pass rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	80	50			82			92		Baseline and end target from 2014	
49. Pass rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	80	50			86			92		Baseline and end target from 2014	
50. Pass rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	87.2 (2012); 80 (2013)		93	84					WFP annual monitoring at end of first term of sampled schools,, Programme monitoring.	baseline from 2012	
CP component 4-Access to HIV Care, Treatment											
51. ART Adherence Rate (%)	97.6	98		98.6	96	99.4	99.8		Pre 2014: Health facility records, Secondary data; 2014: Secondary data HIV/AIDS Information captured by UHIMS	baseline and end target from 2014	As the nutrition intervention was carried out for only three months in 2012, the complete results for ART adherence rate for the full treatment period of six months were not yet available.
52. ART Nutritional Recovery Rate (%)	18.8	80	32.2	78	84.2	77.5	81		Pre 2014: Health facility records, Secondary data; 2014:Secondary data HIV/AIDS Information captured by UHIMS	Methodology: baseline from 2013 SPR and endline from 2014 SPR Narrative: Nutrition recovery and ART adherence rates increased in 2014 because of a combination of treatment provided by partners and WFP's food assistance; The MAM PLHIV on ART recovery rates were lower in 2015 than 2014 due to sharing of the specialized foods by the whole family mainly in Afar and Somali regions. In 2016 there has been a significant improvement in the ART nutritional recovery rate from the baseline of 18.8 percent to 84.9 percent in 2016 which highlights the significant role the provision of food assistance.	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
53. ART Survival Rate at 12 months (%)		85			99	99	99		Base value: Tufts University survey, secondary data; 2013: health facility records, secondary data; 2014: Secondary data HIV/AIDS Information captured by UHIMS	Methodology: End target from 2014 Narrative: Commendable performances in 2014 may be reflection of the integrated service provided by health facilities and community level support provided. In 2016tThe high ART survival and adherence rates are a result of the increased engagement of community resource persons who conducted household level nutrition counselling and follow ups in addition to the treatment adherence counselling provided at the health centre.	
54. ART Survival Rate at 6 months (%)				99.03							
55. FCS: percentage of households with acceptable FCS	65.4		70.3	70.1					WFP HIV/AIDS survey		
56. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS	24.9		19.9	21.8		10.2	7		WFP HIV/AIDS survey		
57. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)	24.9	4.98			15	9.8	7		WFP outcome survey	baseline and end target from 2014	
58. FCS: percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)	24.9	4.98			13	11.4	7		WFP outcome survey	baseline and end target from 2014	
59. FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS	9.7		9.8	8.3		4.8	6		WFP HIV/AIDS survey	Baseline from 2012.FCS was a new indicator for the country programme in 2012.	
60. FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (female-headed)	9.7	1.94			2	4.9	5		WFP outcome survey	baseline and end target from 2014	
61. FCS: percentage of households with poor FCS (male-headed)	9.7	1.94			2	4.6	7		WFP outcome survey	baseline and end target from 2014	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
62. MAM treatment default rate (%)		15			6.8	8.5	3.6		WFP survey	Methodology: End target from 2014 Narrative: The MAM default and non-response rates have increased after May 2015 in Afar and Somali regions. The main reasons observed were that many of the PLHIV on treatment defaulted and a lot of the specialized food sharing was reported from the same regions.	
63. MAM treatment mortality rate (%)		3			0.4	1	0.1		WFP survey	End target from 2014	
64. MAM treatment non-response rate (%)		15			8.6	14	11.5		WFP survey	End target from 2014	
65. MAM treatment recovery rate (%)		75			84.2	77.5	84.9		WFP survey	End target from 2014	
66. Attendance rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	97.6	98			99	99			Secondary data WFP outcome survey	Baseline and end target from 2014	
67. Attendance rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	97.6	98			99	99			Secondary data WFP outcome survey	Baseline and end target from 2014	
68. OVC Attendance rate: number of schooldays that OVC boys and girls attend classes, as % of total schooldays	99		98	99	99				Baseline: HIV/AIDS Outcome Survey, WFP survey. 2012: WFP monitoring survey, WFP survey.	Baseline from 2012	
CP component 5-Promoting Food Marketing & Rural Livelihoods											
69. Food purchased from aggregation systems in which smallholders are participating, as % of regional, national and local purchases	3	25			27	25	35			WFP programme monitoring P4P monitoring data collection	Baseline and end target from 2014
70. Food purchased from regional, national and local suppliers, as % of food distributed by WFP in-country	15.7	30	18	11	35	48.5	44		WFP programme monitoring P4P monitoring data collection	Baseline and end target from 2014	Procurement through P4P grew in 2014 and is attributed to the solid partnership between WFP and the Maize Alliance and the careful monitoring of cooperative unions and the support extended to them.

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
REFUGEES (PRRO)											
GFD AND NUTRITION											
71. CSI: Percentage of households with reduced/stabilized Coping Strategy Index					17				Refugee baseline survey/refugee follow up survey.	Methodology: Baseline from 2014 SPR Narrative: According to the December 2015 CHS survey, households headed by women were employing more coping strategies than those headed by men, with a CSI of 15.4 against 13.7. Collecting grasses and wood from the locality and selling in the nearby market were among the coping practices frequently reported in the CHS; these strategies can cause disputes with the host community as well as negatively affect the physical environment.	
72. Diet Diversity Score	4.44	>4.4				5.02	4.34	4.52		Methodology: End target and baseline 2015 Narrative: In 2015 DDS across all camps were, on average, five. The normal threshold for poor dietary diversity is considered to be four and below. MHHs also had better dietary diversity.	
73. Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)	4.21	>4.2			3.58	4.66	4.35	4.56		End target and baseline 2015	
74. Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)	4.81	>4.4			3.31	5.54	4.2	4.48		End target and baseline 2015	
75. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	72.7 (2012); 47 (2013); 67 (2015)	>70		75	41	78.3	63.3	64.8	2012: WFP refugee baseline survey report; 2013: WFP follow up survey, Sheder camp; WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	Methodology: Baseline from 2012 – WFP conducted this baseline survey in all camps. Endline from 2015 Narrative: In 2014 WFP conducted an assessment in all camps at the beginning of the year to determine the level of food security outcomes. While quantitative measures showed a general deterioration in food consumption scores (FCS), focus group discussions indicated that in general refugees felt that their food security situation was improving. WFP believes that the recent arrival of large numbers of new refugees from South Sudan and the timing (seasonality) of the survey may explain the deterioration in the FCS.	
76. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with acceptable FCS (female-headed)	62.9	75 (2014); >65 (2015)			51	68.8	59.7	62.6	WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
77. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with acceptable FCS (male-headed)	73.3	75 (2014); >75 (2015)			36	92.3	67.5	67.4	WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
78. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with borderline FCS	21.6 (2012); 35 (2013); 19.7 (2015)	<18		17	30	13.1	28.1	25.5	2012: WFP refugee baseline survey report; 2013: WFP follow up survey, Sheder camp; WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	Methodology: baseline from 2012; 2013 data for Sheder camp only (More will be learned in 2014 when a follow-up survey measuring food consumption scores in other camps will be carried out) Endline from 2015 Narrative: A significant improvement in food consumption was registered in Sheder camp where the cash pilot was carried out.	
79. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with borderline FCS (female-headed)	18.7	25 (2014); <18 (2015)			36	17.5	31.9	27.3	WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
80. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with borderline FCS (male-headed)	21.3	25 (2014); <20 (2015)			25	6.7	23.5	23.4	; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHSWFP follow up survey	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
81. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with poor FCS	5.8 (2012); 18 (2013); 13.3 (2015)	<10		8	29	8.5	8.6	9.7	2012: WFP refugee baseline survey report; 2013: WFP follow up survey, Sheder camp; WFP follow up survey.; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	Methodology: Baseline from 2012. Endline from 2015 Narrative: In December 2015, about 78 percent of the refugees had acceptable food consumption scores (FCS), which is a 10 percent improvement compared to June 2015. Since only 8.5 percent of the respondents reported a poor food consumption score, the overall food security situation was considered to be acceptable. MHHs were found to be in a better position than FHHs regarding food consumption; women had more limited access to income opportunities, since options for daily labour were generally not suitable for women. The food consumption pattern was found to be better for refugees in camps where cash as well as food was provided, compared to camps with only in-kind assistance	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
82. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with poor FCS (female-headed)	18.4	18 (2014); <15 (2015)			13	13.7	8.4	10.1	WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
83. FCS (ALL CAMPS): percentage of households with poor FCS (male-headed)	5.4	18 (2014); <5 (2015)			39	1	8.9	9.3	WFP follow up survey; 2015: WFP survey household interview through refugee CHS	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
84. MAM treatment default rate (%)	6	15 (2014); <15 (2015)			6	4.1	2	3.8	Programme monitoring	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
85. MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	0.3	3 (2014); <3 (2015)			0	0.5	0.05	0.03	Programme monitoring	End target from 2014	
86. MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	3	15 (2014); <15 (2015)			3	5.4	4.2	2.4	Programme monitoring	End target from 2014	
87. MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	92	72 (2014); >75			92	92.2	94	93	Programme monitoring; 2015: Refugee CHS	End target from 2014; baseline from 2015	
88. Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) – BSFP	83.5	>70				79		63	end target and baseline 2015		
89. Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) – TSFP	91	>90				92	24	64	end target and baseline 2015		
90. Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions		>66				92	85	89.7	end target 2015		
SCHOOL FEEDING											
91. Attendance rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	59.4		73.43	75					Monthly monitoring reports	Narrative: In 2013 the school meals programme encouraged children to attend schools in the refugee camps. However, the attendance was below the acceptable threshold of 80 percent because of delays in opening of some of the schools.	

	Base value	end target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Source	Methodology	Narrative
92. Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	32	6			54	14	3	9	Refugee school reports		Methodology: Baseline and end target from 2015 Narrative: The enrolment figures received from the refugee schools indicate an average growth rate of 8 percent between 2014 and 2015. In part due to the stabilization of new refugee arrivals from South Sudan in 2015, the increase in school enrolment between 2015 and 2014 was relatively lower than the between 2013 and 2014. Both the enrolment figures submitted from the schools and the recent CHS survey have indicated that gender ratios in the primary schools are approaching parity.
93. Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	32	6			46	1.2	22	7	Programme monitoring		Methodology: Baseline and end target from 2015 Narrative: In 2014 school feeding made a significant contribution to increasing school enrolment and to improving girls' participation in the refugee schools
94. Gender ratio: ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	0.69		0.81						Monthly monitoring reports		
95. Percentage of targeted households with increased number of income and food source		>50				75	47	60		End target from 2015	
96. Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools		70				82	83	85.1		End target from 2015	
97. Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools		70				85	81	84.8		End target from 2015	

Annex J Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of the Portfolio

Introduction

1. It is recognised that monitoring, evaluation and reporting have been challenging for WFP in Ethiopia. There is internal recognition of shortcomings, and external stakeholders were frequently critical of the quality of WFP monitoring, reporting and evaluations. The evaluation team experienced exceptional difficulty in compiling the data presented in this report. This annex therefore explores M&E¹²² issues in some detail.

2. This annex has the following sections:

- **Evaluations.** The section reviews relevant evaluations. In particular, it adds to the inception report's overview of evaluation evidence, by reviewing evaluations conducted and used by WFP in Ethiopia during the evaluation period.
- **WFP Ethiopia M&E planning and performance.** The section reviews the country office's M&E plans for the evaluation period, and its experience in implementing them.
- **Issues encountered by the evaluation team.** The section reviews the main data challenges that the evaluation team encountered, and their implications for future approaches to monitoring, reporting and evaluation.
- Overall **conclusions.**

Evaluations

Recent evaluations

3. In the inception report, the evaluation team provided a matrix summarising the recommendations from key evaluations that are relevant to the Ethiopia country office (see Mokoro, 2018a, Annex F). As well as including Ethiopia-specific operational and programme evaluations, the matrix included central WFP policy and strategic evaluations that are particularly relevant to Ethiopia, and/or for which Ethiopia was a country case study. Table 20 below (placed at the end of this annex) builds on the inception report's list by adding Ethiopia-specific evaluations that have taken place during the evaluation period.¹²³

Managing current evaluations

4. In addition, the following evaluations were ongoing as this country portfolio evaluation (CPE) was conducted:

- an impact evaluation of the WFP fresh food voucher pilot programme in Amhara region (2017–2019) (Hirvonen et al., 2017);

¹²² M&E should be understood to incorporate reporting of monitoring and evaluation findings.

¹²³ In view of the current weaknesses in following up evaluation recommendations (see ¶18 below), this summary should be a useful input to CSP preparation.

- an evaluation of the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIPE) programme from 2017 to 2018 (terms of reference at WFP, 2017o);
- an evaluation of the WFP-implemented USDA McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Programme's Support in Afar and Somali regions 2013–2017 (now completed, see Mokoro, 2018b).

5. UNWOMEN also told the evaluation team that an evaluation is planned for the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme.

6. The ongoing evaluations were commissioned during 2017. This was recognised by WFP staff in the regional bureau and country office to be a significant undertaking for the country office, especially given that two of these evaluations were impact evaluations. Therefore, two current evaluations (fresh food voucher and satellite indexed insurance) are (temporarily) being managed by the evaluation unit in the regional bureau (RBN) because the country office did not have the capacity to manage them.¹²⁴ Making the regional evaluation adviser responsible is the last of four options given in the Decentralised Evaluation Quality Assurance System (DEQAS) Process Guide (WFP, 2018g), as it is recognised it would be unsustainable for the regional evaluation advisor to manage all decentralised evaluations in a WFP region.

Use and learning from evaluations

7. The Ethiopia country office has not had a systematic way of recording and responding to recommendations made in evaluations. WFP HEADQUARTERS does keep records on the implementation of recommendations from centrally managed evaluations, but these are at a high level of generality and not very informative for the purposes of the CPE.¹²⁵ The country office is in the process of developing its own tracking system on decentralised evaluation recommendations. In the meantime it was not possible to provide the evaluation team with a comprehensive summary as to whether evaluation recommendations have been implemented. However, the evaluation team has tried where possible to note country office responses to recommendations. Thus, for example:

- The MERET impact evaluation (2012) made a number of recommendations on how MERET could be more strategic and mobilise resources to ensure its future (Tango & IDS, 2012). However, as noted in Annex L, these recommendations were not implemented because funding constraints faced by MERET "virtually eradicated their ability to change direction".
- There are areas where the country office has made progress in addressing evaluation recommendations.:

¹²⁴ The WFP CO are actively supporting the RBN on the SIPE evaluation and the Evaluation Reference Group largely comprises of WFP Ethiopia staff.

¹²⁵ As illustrated by this extract from the spreadsheet (*Ethiopia_OPEVs_recommendation_status_31_07_2018.xlsx*) shared by OEV after the evaluation mission (the country office had made no reference to its existence):

	Project #	Project	Task # Group	Status	Estimated End Date	Details
2						
40	MR-10037	Ethiopia PRRO 200700	8.2 CO Ethiopia	Implemented	31/12/2017	The concerted and coordinated effort of WFP in collaboration with all actors in the camps experiencing high global acute malnutrition rates (Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar camps) should be strengthened to develop a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of under-nutrition in each camp and develop a multi-sector approach to address them.
41	MR-10037	Ethiopia PRRO 200700	8.3 CO Ethiopia	In Progress	31/12/2017	The concerted and coordinated effort of WFP in collaboration with all actors in the camps experiencing high global acute malnutrition rates (Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar camps) should be strengthened to develop a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of under-nutrition in each camp and develop a multi-sector approach to address them.

- The evaluation of PRRO 200290 (2014), for example, recommended that the country office build on the gains made under the Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP) and hubs & spokes by developing a comprehensive food management system that can be institutionalized. In Annex R it is noted that WFP is considered to have taken a systematic approach to strengthening the food management system operated by the government in the Somali region.
- As discussed below, from 2015 onwards the country office made key changes to its monitoring systems, which was a key recommendation of the evaluation of PRRO 200290 (Frankenberger et al, 2014).

8. There is also evidence that the country office is not using evaluations as well as they could for learning and to inform future programme design. One symptom is that the evaluations are often not readily available. For example, the concept note for a draft 2018 Interim Country Strategy Plan (WFP, 2017i) mentioned a recent evaluation reporting on MAM treatment programmes; however, the country office was not able to provide this for the evaluation team. The evaluation team heard suggestions that the country office does not pay enough attention to evaluations other than its own, even when they concern joint programmes. For example, it was noted by more than one external stakeholder that WFP staff did not appear to have read the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) impact evaluations (e.g. IFPRI, 2016); although the country office staff have received the evaluations from the donor coordination team, they did not have these PSNP evaluations easily accessible when asked for them by the evaluation team and therefore recommended the evaluation team to obtain them from external sources.

9. Issues have been noted on the quality of certain evaluations, meaning that not all evaluations were as useful as they could have been for the country office. The Urban HIV/AIDS, Nutrition and Food Security Project evaluation was recognised by country office and WFP regional bureau staff as weak, with issues in the evaluation process and poorly developed findings. Similarly, there was a common view that the Second Generation Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme evaluation lacked strong evidence; this was referenced by external stakeholders as a reason why both donor interest and government buy-in were poor. The Rural Resilience Initiative evaluation also documented that, due to a lack of resources, the sample size and number of villages included was low, which inhibited the identification of areas where progress is taking place; it acknowledged that the set of villages was not representative of the range of conditions in Tigray and that better planning for baseline data and control villages is needed as the programme expands.

10. Furthermore, the planning of recent evaluations could have been improved. The recent evaluation of the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Programme (school feeding in Somali and Afar regions, Mokoro, 2018b) noted that the final evaluation of the programme was commissioned very late, which limited its utility in terms of feeding into preparation of the next McGovern-Dole grant application.

11. However, the country office has recognised the importance of strong evaluation components for pilot projects. The designs for the Rural Resilience Initiative, satellite indexed insurance and fresh food voucher pilots have all included an in-built evaluation process, with emphasis on the need for the learning generated from these evaluations to inform potential scale-up.

WFP Ethiopia M&E planning and performance

Evolving data systems

12. There have been significant changes in data management systems over the evaluation period, and continuity between old and new systems has sometimes been problematic. Table 19 below is a guide to systems that feature in the discussion that follows.

Table 19 Glossary of data systems

CATS	<u>Commodity and Allocation Tracking System</u> . CATS is an internet-based database system which aims to improve the visibility of commodities as they move from the donor to the beneficiaries. CATS was launched in Ethiopia in July 2014. CATS is owned and operated by the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC).
COMET	<u>Country Office Monitoring and Evaluation Tool</u> . In 2011, WFP committed to the implementation of a corporate monitoring and evaluation tool (COMET) to provide a comprehensive M&E/results-based management tool for users across the organization from Country Office to Regional Bureau to Headquarters. COMET was rolled out in Ethiopia in 2015 with the help of a consultant. Data prior to 2015 was stored in the country office's own spreadsheets and has not been systematically stored or transferred onto COMET.
COMPAS	<u>Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System</u> . This was an electronic system that allowed WFP staff to monitor the progress of commodities from the time they are first requested by country offices. In 2015 WFP replaced COMPAS with a new food supply chain management system called LESS (see below).
LESS	<u>Logistics Execution Support System</u> (integrated supply chain management system). LESS replaced COMPAS in 2015. LESS was initially rolled out in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2014 and was subsequently adopted globally. LESS covers the entire food supply chain by integrating Programme, Finance, Procurement, Logistics and Pipeline.
ONA	<u>Mobile Data Collection solution and application</u> . ¹²⁶ RBN and WFP Ethiopia changed to obligatory use of tablets and the use of ONA to enable process and outcome monitoring data to be entered on tablets and go straight into a data visualisation platform, enabling real time access of data by programme staff. Before ONA was introduced in 2015, sub-office staff used hard-copy checklists at the field level and data was then uploaded manually.
ProGres	<u>UNHCR's registration, population & case management system</u> . Since 2004, UNHCR has used ProGres, a database application that contains written details and photos of individuals. ProGres is used in Ethiopia, rather than SCOPE (see below).
SCOPE	<u>Digital Platform for Beneficiary and Transfer Management</u> . The SCOPE platform is a WFP web-based application used for beneficiary registrations, intervention set-ups, distribution planning, transfers and distribution reporting. SCOPE currently supports WFP transfer modalities: in kind, voucher and cash for a variety of project activities.
WINGS	<u>WFP Information Network and Global System</u> . WINGS II is the updated version of the WINGS system that WFP has used since 2001 to keep track of all of its activity, from planning projects and tracking food aid shipments to managing finances and paying staff salaries.

WFP corporate monitoring requirements

13. In 2011 WFP conducted a comprehensive review of its monitoring and self-evaluation function. This provided evidence of systemic weaknesses in monitoring and self-evaluation across the organisation and led to the development of a corporate monitoring and self-evaluation strategy implemented during 2011–

¹²⁶ <https://ona.io/home/>

2013 (WFP, 2010h). This strategy had dedicated funding and included a range of interventions intended to achieve organisation-wide improvements to monitoring and self-evaluation practices.

14. As a result a Normative Framework for Monitoring was developed, comprising the 2014–2017 Strategic Results Framework (SRF), a set of SRF business rules, standard operating procedures for monitoring (SOPs – WFP, 2013n) and minimum monitoring requirements (MMRs – WFP, 2016ze). The SRF provides a standard set of corporate outcomes, outputs and indicators for each of the WFP strategic objectives. The SOPs describe standard process steps for the conduct of monitoring by country offices and facilitate the clarification of roles and responsibilities for monitoring at country level. The minimum monitoring requirements prescribe minimum coverage, frequency and statistical requirements for all outcome, output, process and cross-cutting indicators.

15. The roll-out of a standardised IT system to support monitoring (COMET) was also initiated, along with the expansion in the use of mobile technologies for monitoring, delivery of training initiatives, and enhanced support to country offices' monitoring efforts by dedicated M&E staff at regional level.

16. In 2015 a new Corporate Monitoring Strategy (2015–2017) was introduced to continue the push to make WFP monitoring fit for purpose and also to align the timeframe of work-streams initiated under the previous (2011–2013) Monitoring and Self-Evaluation Strategy while adding new work-streams for the 2015–2017 period (WFP, n.d. w).

Ethiopia country office M&E 2012–2017

17. After the development of the corporate M&E policy in 2011, the WFP Ethiopia country office responded with a more strategic approach to M&E in 2012 to 'demonstrate the performance of its operations, enhance project design, improve implementation based on M&E findings and strengthen partnerships'. The M&E Strategy 2012–2015 was produced as a dynamic document to be reviewed and updated regularly (WFP, 2012b). The strategy noted the strengths of WFP Ethiopia's existing M&E system, including its widespread field presence and generally robust systems for outcome level monitoring using regular surveys and studies, as well as close collaboration with cooperating partners by some programmes. However it also identified numerous gaps at various levels, around staff capacity, M&E coordination, the relevance of data collected, and the limited skills to analyse and use evidence from field level information. These gaps were echoed by country office staff and donors who noted the lack of evidence that was shared by WFP externally. It is also notable when looking at the outcome data (Annex I) that the early years of the evaluation period (2012–2014) lacked consistent reporting of outcomes and many baseline values did not appear until later in the period.

18. The 2012–2015 strategy had nine areas of focus:

- Reinforce results based management;
- Strengthen outcome and impact M&E using mixed methods, pre-post analysis, and control groups where appropriate.
- Improve the output, process and activity monitoring with relevant and efficient M&E tools, clear guidelines and technology for data capture and consolidation.
- Enhance sub offices and field staff capacities with the appropriate field presence, terms of reference , and training.
- Provide tools for information analysis at sub office and strengthen reporting and feedback structures.
- Strengthening cooperating partners' capacity in M&E, particularly in terms of information systems, training and handover of M&E systems.

- Improve M&E coordination and capacity at the country office to ensure that the country office has good coordination structures and the appropriate staff with the right skills sets;
- Enforce cooperating partner distribution reporting, verification and reconciliation of reports and timely reporting in corporate systems (COMPAS).
- Joint Monitoring with UN and government under the UNDAF M&E plan.

19. Between 2015–2016 the country office did not have an up-to-date guiding document on M&E. A review was carried out in 2015 which highlighted areas of concern as follows:

- Monitoring coverage, sample methodology and reporting were far below the targets set by WFP global minimum monitoring requirements.
- Counterparts continually requested WFP staff members to get involved in other tasks (transport, distribution implementation, etc.).
- Challenges identified during field mission were not recorded systematically.
- There was not a functioning complaints feedback mechanism although, since the last minimum monitoring requirements review in 2009, the telecom services and mobile phone networks had expanded exponentially.
- Some staff were focusing on only one thematic area and/or geographical area irrespective of the workload (HIV, school feeding, P4P).
- The use of the recommended and available monitoring tools was limited (checklists and/or tablets, narrative reports).
- Monitoring data, while in most cases it was summarised, was not analysed and was not shared with the country office M&E unit.
- The decentralisation and discontinuation of the Action Based Monitoring database resulted in a lack of oversight by the country office.
- As the overall coverage of all food distribution points was not followed, staff tended to visit the ones that were easy to reach.
- Non-prioritisation of the emergency relief and TSF response for monitoring, and monitoring of activities which have lower priority (MERET), led to improper use of the sub-office/field office staff and assets and lower monitoring coverage.

20. In May 2016, with the support of the WFP regional bureau, the country office produced an M&E standard operating procedure (WFP, 2016y). The SOP was issued in order to clarify minimum monitoring requirements in light of the drought in Ethiopia. The following improvements to monitoring coverage and analysis were laid out as needing to be implemented with immediate effect by the SOP:

- Increased coverage and multiple visits for all food distribution points.
- Prioritisation of relief and targeted supplementary feeding monitoring tasks in all regions.
- Improved monthly monitoring plan format fully implemented.
- Obligatory use of tablets for all monitoring activities.
- Country office and sub-office/field office use of ONA for monitoring and reports.
- Establishment of a call centre for monitoring deliveries, receipts and distributions.
- Establishment of a complaints [and] feedback mechanism.
- Field mission narrative reports and monthly reports to include a section on corrective measures taken, challenges/issues identified and recommendations.
- Obligatory use of the standard issue tracking sheet by sub-office/field office which is shared on a monthly basis with the country office M&E section.
- Clear reporting mechanism for reported High and Medium risk issues to management within 24 hours.

- Immediate reduction in the provision of logistical support to counterparts by field staff, with an exception for pre-planned joint missions (which were pre-approved as per the sub-office/field office monthly monitoring plan) and only if the provision of logistical support does not result in an augmented security risk for WFP staff and assets.

21. It is clear that M&E weaknesses were due not only to deficiencies in M&E systems themselves, but to the frequent diversion of monitoring staff to other activities. The 2012 M&E strategy and 2016 M&E Standard Operating Procedure implied significant overhauls of the country office M&E system, but the 2016 SOP was a recognition that the 2012 strategy had not been very effective.

22. In 2015 a consultant was brought into the country office to help with the country office transition to COMET in order to comply with corporate guidelines. This was a challenge for the Ethiopia country office as adaptations had to be made to comply with the corporate template. For example, a few activities in the WFP Ethiopia portfolio are not standard to WFP, such as under the Productive Safety Nets Programme where food for assets and general food distributions are both carried out. The process also involved working with partners to report in more accurate ways, and revising report templates.

23. The change to obligatory use of tablets and the use of ONA was noted as a key change by staff at sub-offices, the country office and the regional bureau. This was an initiative taken by WFP regionally that enabled process and outcome monitoring data to be entered on tablets and go straight into a data visualisation platform, enabling real time access of data by programme staff. It also ensured that all checklists have gender disaggregated data. Before ONA was introduced in 2015, sub-office staff used hard-copy checklists at the field level and data was then entered manually. The sub-office staff reported that ONA worked well, although sometimes there were issues with the GPS points recorded by the tablets when the weather was cloudy. Nevertheless the addition of GPS coordinates to monitoring has been valuable in making a more robust system, which has strengthened the ability of WFP to hold partners to account.

24. Improvements to the system continue. At the end of the evaluation period, in 2017, WFP piloted RapidPro, which is a digital platform that enables the real time transfer of data via SMS. This was a country office initiative that received the support of the regional bureau. The pilot was carried out on the targeted supplementary feeding programme in SNNPR (WFP, 2017zc). Before this shift, the food movement delivery and distribution data at WFP hubs, woreda level and food distribution points, was collected manually. As a result, delays were experienced in accessing information. By using mobile phones, WFP expected to have real time information using text messages from distribution points. The pilot, carried out in 26 woredas within SNNPR, saw a decrease in time taken to receive information from four to six weeks to two to four days, as well as an increase in response rate from 20 percent to 70 percent.

25. Various initiatives by the country office were scheduled to begin in 2018, including conducting trend analysis of outcome data and also undertaking a reporting and data warehousing project, to harmonise data between WFP systems (WFP, 2018h). The country office has recognised that the same location may be given different names in LESS (logistics system) and ONA and they are striving to create a harmonised and reliable data source for logistics, M&E and programmes departments in order to reduce delays in the production of country reports, maps, infographics, snapshots and dashboards.

26. Despite these efforts, it was noted by donors, WFP staff and the evaluation team that the country office still has improvements to make, particularly with regards to analysis and reporting of data. Sub-office staff felt that they were not given enough training or responsibility for analysis and reporting,¹²⁷ and that

¹²⁷ Recently the country office has been bringing together monitors twice a year for capacity building and training.

the heavy analysis and story-telling is done in Addis Ababa. Having said that, there is also scope for considerable improvement in the analysis of data in Addis Ababa. Currently only one staff member in the country office is trained to use the standard Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software and the country office staff recognised that a lot of time was spent on data reconciliation and cleaning, rather than analysis and learning. Although a lot of effort goes into supplying data for the corporate SPR requirements, there is little data aggregation and analysis beyond this and there is scope for much more granular analysis from the distribution and post-distribution reports that the sub-offices compile. A comprehensive analysis of distribution and post-distribution reports on refugee operations was prepared in 2018 (WFP, 2018e), and has been extensively cited in this report. However, this was the only such analysis made available to the evaluation team, and was prepared by an evaluation specialist from the Nairobi regional bureau.¹²⁸

27. Donors are concerned that they are not being provided with the correct information and timely monthly reporting of findings doesn't take place. However, some donors did state that, more recently, they had noticed a difference in WFP reporting and they were being provided with more regular and systematic updates.

Monitoring and evaluation in Somali region

28. The challenges faced by WFP in monitoring activities in Somali region were emphasised by WFP and its partners. During the emergency in 2016, there were over 1,200 distribution points in Somali and it was a challenge for field monitors to be able to reach each one at least every three months. Monitors prioritised distribution points that have had issues in the past or those that weren't visited by a monitoring officer in the last two months. There have also been challenges arising from the lack of registration lists in Somali region for relief beneficiaries. It was estimated that 60-70 percent of food distribution points that WFP manages did not have a registration list available (see Box 10 below).

Box 10 Somali region: monitoring without beneficiary lists

Food distribution in Somali region is undertaken by government officials. WFP provides capacity support and is responsible for programme monitoring (although many programme monitors are recruited by the Somali Regional Government). The selection of woredas for support occurs through a process that involves political as well as technical considerations. Household targeting is done using a community targeting approach which is assisted by local government staff. There is no comprehensive system for registering beneficiaries, and only in a minority of cases is WFP provided with a detailed beneficiary list at food distribution points. This limits the scope for detailed monitoring, and for checking that distribution follows humanitarian principles. In any case, it is well known that considerable sharing between households takes place through traditional systems of mutual obligation within clans.

The scarcity of beneficiary lists is a major limitation on effective monitoring. It is a very unusual circumstance in a protracted humanitarian situation. WFP attracts criticism for not reporting against beneficiary lists, but in practice this is a situation that has been tolerated by the federal government and humanitarian partners collectively, and it requires joint action to insist on systematic beneficiary registration.

29. The WFP role in Somali is to partner with the Government on programme monitoring and provide Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (MEAL) support in Somali region, which is being fully rolled out in 2018 (WFP, 2017zd). This was a specific approach to strengthen the process monitoring of cash and food transfer activities, improve and enhance the timeliness and quality of reporting, and support the coordination,

¹²⁸ The Regional Bureau is also supporting the CO to analyse the PSNP-HRD Cash Pilot results (WFP, 2018f).

integration and complementarity of monitoring mechanisms and tools already in place. The MEAL approach requires Government, NGOs and WFP to sit together to bring consensus on M&E principles and to identify platforms upon which to share knowledge and to agree on indicators that provide a useful measure of what works and what does not.

Ethiopia country office M&E staffing

30. A key challenge faced by WFP throughout the evaluation period was the low number of staff working on M&E, as well as limited technical capacity. This was particularly noticeable at the time of the evaluation, as the fieldwork coincided with the SSR implementation and the transition of the M&E team leader to another country office. Also, as noted earlier, existing M&E staff are often diverted to other tasks. This was a concern within the country office that since the Structure and Staffing Review (SSR) both the M&E and VAM teams had suffered. Unfortunately the evaluation team was not able to obtain data on numbers of field monitoring staff and M&E staff in the country office throughout the evaluation period. However, it was reported that before the SSR there was a P4 level (mid-career professional staff) person in charge of M&E and VAM but that post was stopped because of funding issues. At the end of the evaluation period, there were just four people in the M&E team in the country office; at the field level, and the number of monitoring assistants had been cut by the staffing review. The country office had struggled to recruit M&E staff of a high enough calibre.

31. There were also some issues around roles and responsibilities within the Country Office. It was felt that the staff within the country office hadn't been communicating well, and there were questions about how well the VAM and M&E team had been working together. Outcome monitoring, for example, was being passed between the VAM and M&E teams.¹²⁹ It was also felt by the M&E team that a lot of the burden of monitoring and analysis was put on them, and individual units did not take much ownership in their areas of responsibility within the country office.

32. The limited resources under some programme areas for monitoring was particularly noted by the school feeding evaluation (Mokoro, 2018b). The insufficient staffing of the project prevented frequent and thorough monitoring of all school feeding programme components. Monitoring visits to target schools once a semester were not always carried out. Also, discrepancies in reporting and lack of clarity were found in processes and procedures at school and woreda levels, which compromised the overall quality and integrity of reporting.

33. The M&E team did note that surge staff based in the woredas supported by WFP had improved reporting from the ground. The surge staff had received laptops to help with reporting. They also noted that the recent changes to the M&E system – introducing tablet data collection and the SMS pilot – were creating a smarter M&E system that lessened some of the impacts of the reduction in staff.

Issues Encountered during the Evaluation

External stakeholder viewpoints

34. Donors consulted by the evaluation team were frustrated that WFP programmes were not sufficiently evidence based, and that there was a lack of information provided to them. Donors pointed to

¹²⁹ We were informed by the country office, in response to the draft of this report, that there is now a clear division: VAM focuses on food security and vulnerability at national level whereas the Monitoring team monitors performance of WFP activities.

cases where they knew food was not being delivered to certain areas, but WFP was not informing them about this.

35. Donors also felt that a culture change was needed in WFP, who needed to be more open and frank with donors, rather than presenting WFP interventions in a favourable light all the time. Donors understood the complex environment that WFP were working in and felt that WFP should be open about its mistakes. It was felt that WFP 'played games' in order to get resources. WFP was seen as worse than other UN agencies and NGOs in terms of transparency and frankness with donors.

36. It was felt by donors, however, that improvements had been made by WFP in the latter stages of the evaluation period. One donor showed the evaluation team a series of monthly bulletins that had started coming from WFP to donors, and another noted a recent presentation given by WFP to donors around lessons learned and accountability in the recent drought response.

Obtaining data for the country portfolio evaluation

37. The evaluation team were aware of the changes put in place on M&E by the country office and it was visible from the field visits that a significant amount of programme monitoring takes place, including post distribution monitoring. Supplementary feeding partners reported regular field visits from monitors who used a structured checklist and provided helpful feedback on issues identified during distributions. However, the regular post-distribution monitoring carried out at field level should enable the country office to conduct more detailed analysis than what is routinely reported to headquarters through the SPRs. It appeared that a lot of data is routinely collected but very little is ever used for analysis, reporting and learning to inform programme design, adjustments or other forms of decision making.¹³⁰ The same is true for gender analysis. Although the country office have collected sex-disaggregated data and specific gender indicators, there is little evidence of analysis and learning from this information.

38. The WFP regional bureau, however, has supported the country office to carry out analysis latterly, firstly of the PSNP-humanitarian food assistance cash pilot results (WFP, 2018f) and secondly of results from post distribution and distribution monitoring (2015–2018) of refugee operations (WFP, 2018e). The regional bureau are also currently supporting the country office in analysing the data collected on gender.

39. Data management and data retention are problematic. There was a lot of basic data that the country office did not have easily to hand. This was firstly in relation to data before June 2015 when the new corporate system COMET was introduced. The data before this date had not been stored systematically and its availability to the evaluation team varied by country office unit. For example, the evaluation team was not able to obtain data on the tonnage of food imported via Djibouti and Berbera between 2012 and 2015, nor on the tonnage of food commodities transhipped through Ethiopia for the South Sudan operations for the same dates. In addition, the information before 2015 on food distribution and number of beneficiaries, by activity and by location, was stored at different levels of detail depending on the year and activity, which made cross-analysis more difficult. The evaluation team was also unable to obtain nutrition survey data for refugees, broken down by camp, from the country office but managed to find this externally.

40. Output and outcome indicators are routinely included in WFP project documents and subsequent standard project reports (SPRs). However, the evaluation highlighted challenges with these indicators which are outlined in detail in the introduction to Annex I.

¹³⁰ A conspicuous exception is the analysis of refugee monitoring data (WFP, 2018e), but that was a very recent exercise led by the WFP regional bureau.

41. There were also issues faced by the evaluation team in being able to assess the WFP contribution to Government capacity building. It was unclear from interviews and the SPRs how WFP measures the outputs and outcomes of its technical assistance efforts in relation to government capacity building and what the WFP contribution is to broader government policy and programme design issues (Annex L).

42. The evaluation team were also unable to obtain information on budget and expenditure to different activities, including nutrition and PSNP, because the budget structure of their projects is not broken down by activity (this is a corporate WFP issue). The change to the I-CSP and different budget structures will enable this information to be extracted in future, but there has been no exercise to undertake such analysis of recent years as an input to CSP preparation.

43. The Corporate Monitoring Strategy (2015–2017) highlighted that country office staff globally are requesting a more structured approach to be applied to the monitoring of trust funds. This was recognised as an issue by the evaluation team as it proved difficult to obtain any systematic data on the trust funds managed by the country office.

44. Throughout the evaluation it has been clear to the evaluation team that the country office is overstretched, particularly with respect to M&E. There were significant delays in receiving any data from the country office and it was difficult to find time to arrange meetings with the M&E team.

Conclusions

45. Both monitoring and evaluation of the WFP country portfolio fell well short of expected standards during the evaluation period, despite some recognition of the problems and efforts to address them. Problems arose at different levels:

- a) In some cases the basic framework for monitoring is deficient (notably beneficiary lists in Somali); this requires action by humanitarian partners and the federal government jointly, to support WFP efforts.
- b) Staffing (including the leadership) of the overall M&E function has been inadequate, especially since the staffing review, and problems were exacerbated by pressures to divert monitors to other activities.
- c) Although data systems have been improved over the years (e.g. COMET and LESS, more use of tablets for data entry, use of GPS coordinates, etc.), there have been weaknesses in data management; data from earlier years are often either not comparable with later years or not readily available at all.
- d) Analysis and learning from monitoring data has been neglected. (And, as noted in Annex I above, there have been weaknesses in the selection, as well as the reporting, of output and outcome indicators – though in many cases these respond to corporate requirements.)
- e) The country office has not been systematic enough in following up the recommendations of central and decentralised evaluations, and its management of several decentralised evaluations was weak.
- f) All these factors have tended to reduce WFP's credibility with donors.

Table 20 Recommendations from evaluations of WFP Ethiopia 2012–2017

Evaluation title	Recommendations	Date of publication	Authors
<p>MERET Impact Evaluation (Tango & IDS, 2012)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Integrate MERET into a comprehensive NRM [natural resource management] strategy. b) Link MERET interventions to other technical sectors. To optimize the positive impact of any of the MERET structures, systems and services, there should be a more strategic link to other sectors outside of the Ministry of Agriculture technical sectors so that environmental and livelihood changes derived from MERET activities do not have adverse effects on the health and wellbeing of the population. c) Scale up promising cost-effective packages. An explicit scale-up strategy should be developed for each catchment area implementing MERET better practices to diffuse promising practices to adjacent watersheds d) Systematically document MERET impact on communities, households, and other programmes. MERET has successfully applied RBM [results-based management] to monitor performance, training MERET and other programme field personnel at the woreda and regional levels. MERET, however, has not systematically documented its programme impact. MERET should conduct baselines in every new watershed in order to document adequately the NRM, food security and livelihood improvements and impacts. These monitoring and evaluation systems will use criteria (including cost versus quality) to determine better practices that can be scaled up and to use for phasing out of a watershed. e) Strengthen knowledge management. Improving the monitoring and evaluation system will help strengthen knowledge management and transfer the successes of the MERET programme. A unit should be created to document better practices in each region where MERET is operating f) Explore other modalities through which funding mechanisms are used to manage MERET. One potential model would be to mobilize resources to extend a basket of funding to the Government of Ethiopia, which then allocates funds to support MERET and other programmes within an integrated NRM programme. g) Strengthen PSNP from lessons learned from MERET. Lessons learned from MERET should be incorporated into PSNP programming approaches. h) Develop an effective resource mobilization strategy. MERET's resource base has declined in recent years, affecting the programme's ability to accomplish all of the goals of the programme, including achieving scale. The Government of Ethiopia and WFP should work together to mobilize sufficient funding and resources 	<p>November 2012</p>	<p>Tango</p>
<p>PRRO 200290: Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity: An Evaluation of WFP's Operation (2012-2013) (Frankenberger et al, 2014)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Need to design a strategy and strategic, result-based framework for WFP capacity development activities b) Need to develop a comprehensive approach to WFP resilience building capacity and programme c) Suggestion for scaling up TSF programming and advocate for it with donors d) Strengthen M&E Systems for all components e) Strengthen government capacity for emergency response, by improving WFP monitoring systems, increasing M&E Staff and relying on NGOs' work where feasible. f) Build on the gains made under the FMIP and Hubs & Spokes by developing a comprehensive food management system that can be institutionalized g) Integrate WFP's NRM technical expertise into the PSNP more explicitly by setting up an NRM technical support unit and engaging WFP NRM technical staff in planning the new PSNP strategy 	<p>May 2014</p>	<p>Tango</p>
<p>Second generation targeted supplementary feeding programme evaluation</p>	<p>Overall the evaluation recommends that the second generation TSF programme should continue and be scaled up to other needy woredas by taking into consideration the strengths and comparative advantages of this programme. A transition to routine services delivery is the correct path, but this needs to be done in such a way that that the current health extension program can absorb the workload without compromising the quality and quantity of services. Recommendations specific to WFP were as follows:</p>	<p>April 2015</p>	<p>JaRco Consulting, WFP</p>

Evaluation title	Recommendations	Date of publication	Authors
in Ethiopia (JaRco Consulting, 2015a)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) The Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH), jointly with WFP, should design a standard on-the-job training guide for HEWs to address the knowledge gap and orient health extension worker supervisors to use the guide to improve the quality of the service. b) WFP's support needs to be continued throughout the time of the programme to further strengthen the TSF programme management capacity at different levels. Also a regular mechanism to train new health officers and a refresh the training of existing staff. c) WFP needs to secure more funds to expand the service to additional food insecure areas not yet covered by this project to equitably distribute the resource to eligible beneficiaries in the country. d) To ensure the sustainability of the programme WFP and the government together needs to develop ways for WFP to gradually withdraw and allow a full takeover by the government. 		
Refugee cash pilot representative survey and final evaluation report (JaRco Consulting, 2015b)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Consider expansion of the cash pilot to more camps. b) Reflect on whether the current objectives for the combined modality are what WFP wants to achieve and whether the desired outcomes are the likely outcomes. c) If WFP wishes to achieve improvements in food consumption and dietary diversity, it should consider changes to the piloted modality. d) To further improve beneficiary satisfaction, or prevent it falling, and to create fairness in purchasing power across regions, WFP and Administration for Refuge and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) should consider tailoring to each region the content of the combined ration. e) Conduct further research to understand how people use their combined ration. f) Decouple the cash distribution processes in the event of a food delay g) WFP needs to decide whether it is comfortable with providing for refugee's other basic needs, such as education, clothes, and compound improvements, through cash transfers. If it is not, and if it chooses to not to use vouchers, then it should encourage other agencies and organizations operating in the camps to meet the refugees' other needs. 	June 3, 2015	JaRco Consulting
The Influence of the MERET Programme on Resilience to the 2015 El Niño-Induced Drought in Ethiopia: Adapting to Climate Change (Nelson et al., 2016)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Integrate MERET principles into existing Government mechanisms. b) Scale-up MERET better practices to more watersheds. c) More emphasis on diversifying into non-climate-sensitive livelihoods. d) Improve monitoring and evaluation. e) Transfer the MERET model to other countries. 	2016	Tango, WFP, Sweden, Ministry of Agriculture
Ethiopia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200700 (2015-2018) Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees: An evaluation of WFP's current operation and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Reintroduce BSFP to Dolo Ado for children 24-59 months, until Super Cereal is reinstated as part of the general food ration, as GAM rates are high in this age group as are admissions in TSFP. b) Strengthen the models and approaches for sharing key infant and young child feeding (IYCF) messages at household and camp levels c) Promote more proactive WFP field monitor engagement with ARRA to ensure that recommendations are implemented and that warehousing and the food distribution system are operating effectively, efficiently, and for the refugees; this includes field monitor reports that incorporate process and outcome results of the institutionalisation of the biometric system. d) Suggestion for scaling up innovative livelihood activities to reach all camps by the end of the next PRRO in 2021- need to develop a joint (WFP UNHCR ARRA) a 5-year strategy for a coordinated livelihoods approach that can be implemented on a large scale and can ensure a significant proportion of refugee households have access to one income-generating activity by 2021 	June 2016	Tango

Evaluation title	Recommendations	Date of publication	Authors
transition period (Downen et al, 2016)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> e) Need to develop a strategy with UNHCR to minimize the use of firewood for cooking with the long-term objective of eliminating the use of firewood in Ethiopia Refugee camps. f) Need to ensure greater participation of women in camp leadership positions g) Expand CBT as a principal strategy of the GFD component of the PRRO, in conjunction with market assessments, including a study of the potential for CBT in Dolo Ado, and introduce cash for milling costs based on cost per kilo in camps so that refugees are not forced to use their rations or cash to mill their cereals h) Need for WFP to strengthen collaboration with actors in the camps to develop a strategy to understand the drivers of the high GAM rates in camps. Also, need to increase provision of WFP nutrition expertise for the refugee programme i) Increase provision of WFP nutrition expertise in the form of strategic as well as technical support, j) WFP and UNHCR should increase formal collaboration on strategic planning, advocacy, and programme prioritisation 		
Programme Evaluation of Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF) Pilot Programme in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region, Ethiopia (Gardiner et al, 2016)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Policy frameworks stand to be better capitalised upon with the completion of the National HGSF Strategy. b) Funding mechanisms for uninterrupted resource allocation are the single greatest driver for long-term implementation. Achieving this will require coordinated advocacy between programme stakeholders and national government. c) To catalyse adoption of the programme and overcome ongoing staff turnover, standardised training materials in local languages for all programme implementers is required, this should be supported by an exchange programme whereby programme leaders in SNNPR can provide a mentorship facility to those initiating HGSF engagement in other parts of Ethiopia. At strategic levels, linkages with other national programmes should be forged, this can be achieved through the network of WFP. d) Consideration needs to be given to the means by which the programme will achieve 1/3 RDA of micronutrients and how in the future more perishable fresh commodities could be included in the menu. e) The Monitoring and Evaluation systems need to be better integrated in the EMIS system, while adoption of appropriate electronic reporting across programme activities should be explored f) Working capital for procurement by cooperatives needs to be better organized and available, as currently misalignment of capital availability, production cycles and school terms is causing addition expense to the programme. g) Finally, the value chain, although appears to be working appropriately, stands to be improved through the inclusion of vulnerable groups in such areas as processing. This could include women's groups for example, thereby increasing the multiplier effect of the HGSF programmes. 	December 2016	Dubai Cares, PCD Imperial College London, WFP
USAID/PEPFAR Funded Urban HIV/AIDS, Nutrition and Food Security Project in Ethiopia 2011–2017 Evaluation Report (Belew et al., 2017)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) WFP should advocate to Community Care Coalition (CCC) and national social protection system the use of a real-time information system of beneficiaries and its incorporation into national HIV/AIDS related assistance programmes b) Need for WFP to continue to provide technical support to CCC c) WFP should share the success factors (community-based mobilization, cash & voucher based delivery system, facilitation of direct support by coordination committee) should be shared with wider audience across Africa d) For future projects, need to ensure a wider engagement of stakeholders at the design stage e) WFP needs to have a well-designed advocacy plan for creating a strong influence on governmental and non-governmental development actors. 	July 2017	Public Health Consulting
Managing risks in smallholder agriculture: the impacts of R4 on livelihoods in Tigray, Ethiopia from 2012-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) The programme should scale up existing risk reduction activities rather than investing in new ones b) Significant improvements in agricultural production may not be possible without more investment in irrigation in some locations c) the programme should extend training in income generating activities to village residents who do not purchase insurance d) The programme should address the delays in the flow of funds for payment of insurance premiums. e) Even though farmers have been allowed to participate more in planning risk reduction activities over time, farmers would like to have more input. 	September 26, 2017	Oxfam, WFP, Center for Climate Systems Research

Evaluation title	Recommendations	Date of publication	Authors
2016 (Madajewicz et al., 2017)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> f) The programme should prioritize scaling up saving and credit services to include more villages and more farmers. g) Male farmers would like to have the option to request bigger loans in order to undertake more productive business activities h) Few farmers are graduating from paying with labour to paying in cash and the proportion of farmers who pay fully in cash has declined over time. One possible future avenue is to experiment with raising the cash requirement at different rates in different places to identify an appropriate rate of increase. Another is a scaled cash requirement that increases with the household's ability to pay according to transparent criteria. i) The programme should invest more in improving the understanding of index insurance among farmers. j) The programme needs more investment in implementation capacity. REST staff should receive more capacity building relevant to the various components of the R4 programme k) Farmers would like to have a clear, transparent system through which they can communicate feedback to the programme and receive responses l) A public-private partnership (PPP) with the Ethiopian government may help to expand R4's reach to the many more farmers who would like to be included in the programme, and possibly to expand risk reduction activities m) Evaluation and monitoring need more resources to improve their contribution to the growth of the programme and to knowledge about managing risks in smallholder agriculture. The sample size and number of villages included in future evaluations should increase substantially. The small sample inhibits the identification of areas where progress is taking place. The current set of villages is not representative of the range of conditions in Tigray. Also, evaluation needs better planning for baseline data and control villages as the programme expands. n) The current monitoring system does not keep track of critical indicators such as retention and dropout rates in the insurance programme, and length of time that each farmer has been purchasing insurance. The latter is important for the evaluation. The monitoring system should expand to track selected outcomes on a regular basis in both programme and control villages. 		(Colombia University)

Annex K WFP Strategy for Ethiopia

Introduction

1. This annex provides an overview of (formal) strategic planning by the Ethiopia country office during the evaluation period. Only one strategy document was formally adopted (WFP Ethiopia Country Strategy for 2012–2015, WFP, 2011e), but a number of other draft documents shed light on strategic concerns and processes. Successive sections of this annex:

- note the global strategic objectives of WFP as they applied during the CPE period;
- provide an overview of strategy-related documents identified by the evaluation team;
- describe the articulation between WFP strategies and the UNDAF;
- note the significance of the country strategic plan (CSP) process linked to the reforms embodied in the WFP Integrated Road Map.

WFP Global Strategy

2. Two WFP corporate strategic plans straddled the evaluation period, and are the relevant ones against which to assess the portfolio's strategic fit and performance. However, the most recent strategic plan is also relevant because it provides the strategic framework for the Ethiopia CSP, and lessons from the country portfolio evaluation are envisaged to feed into that. Table 21 below shows strategic objectives/goals across the three plans.

Table 21 WFP Strategic Objectives (2008–2021)

WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013	WFP Strategic Plan 2014–2017	WFP Strategic Plan 2017–2021
Strategic Objective	Strategic Objectives	Strategic Goal
1. Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.	1. Save lives and protect livelihoods	1. Support countries to achieve zero hunger (SDG 2)
2. Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures.	2. Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies	2. Partner to support implementation of the SDGs (SDG 17)
3. Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post disaster or transition situations.	3. Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs	Strategic Objective
4. Reduce chronic hunger and undernutrition	4. Reduce malnutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger	1. End hunger by protecting access to food
5. Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase	<u>Note:</u> Capacity development (previously under Strategic Objective 5) is mainstreamed into the four strategic objectives	2. Improve nutrition
		3. Achieve food security
		4. Support SDG implementation
		5. Partner for SDG results
		Strategic Results
		1. Everyone has access to food (SDG Target 2.1)
		2. No one suffers from malnutrition (SDG Target 2.2)
		3. Smallholders have improved food security and nutrition through improved productivity and incomes (SDG Target 2.3)
		4. Food systems are sustainable (SDG Target 2.4)
		5. Developing countries have strengthened capacities to implement the SDGs (SDG Target 17.9)
		6. Policies to support sustainable development are coherent (SDG Target 17.14)

WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013	WFP Strategic Plan 2014–2017	WFP Strategic Plan 2017–2021
		<p>7. Developing countries access a range of financial resources for development investment (SDG Target 17.3)</p> <p>8. Sharing of knowledge, expertise and technology, strengthen global partnership support to country efforts to achieve the SDGs (SDG Target 17.16)</p>

Source: WFP Strategy documents; ToR Annex 7.

Strategising by the Ethiopia Country Office

3. Only one formal country strategy was prepared, for the period 2012–2015. Table 22 below shows the extensive process and timetable for its preparation, with WFP consultations dovetailing with preparation of the UNDAF and the national Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). (It should be borne in mind that, although encouraged, preparation of country strategies was not mandatory during this period.)

Table 22 Preparation of the WFP Ethiopia Country Strategy 2012–2015

1. February 2010	2010 Annual Work planning including discussion on Country Strategy timeline and objective
2. May 2010	Country Office Retreat on the Country Strategy to determine WFP's position in UNDAF formulation
3. June 2010	UNDAF formulation process and GTP sector discussions
4. August 2010	Draft Growth and Transformation Plan launched
5. Sept. – Oct. 2010	UNDAF strategic alignment with GTP
6. Oct. – Nov. 2010	WFP/Government consultations on the Country Strategy
7. Oct. – Nov. 2010	Donor/Other Stakeholder Consultations on the Country Strategy
8. November 2010	UNDAF document prepared
9. November 2010	National Stakeholder Workshop on the Country Strategy
10. January 2011	Draft Country Strategy prepared

Source: WFP, 2011e, Annex 3.

4. The country strategy identified the comparative advantages of WFP in Ethiopia as including "[being] a leading partner in humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management; staff capacity and knowledge on community-based natural resource management; [being] a partner in supporting access to basic social services; extensive field presence and relationship with local governments and communities; and, a proven ability to innovate in partnership with government". In addition, WFP logistics capacity was recognized as a vital contribution in Ethiopia and WFP procurement was seen to play an important function in supporting food markets, local food processing and food market analysis in Ethiopia. To keep in line with these comparative advantages and to also support the Government's own agenda, the WFP Ethiopia Country Strategy 2012–2015 had three objectives: (i) to enhance capacities to reduce disaster risks, (ii) to prevent food poverty and nutrition inadequacy from diminishing food-insecure households' nutrition, education and health outcomes, and (iii) to promote livelihood diversification and improved access to food markets.

5. Although the 2012–2015 strategy was never formally updated, the evaluation team noted a number of relevant drafts and discussion papers that reflect continued strategic thinking by the country office (see Table 23 below). (There has also been further work during 2018 to develop the I-CSP for 2019-2020.)

Table 23 Sequence of strategy papers


Date	Paper	Reference
2010 (May)	Country Strategy Retreat for 80+ staff (see Table 22 above)	
2011	WFP Ethiopia Country Strategy 2012–2015	WFP, 2011e
2016 September	Repositioning WFP in Ethiopia	WFP, 2016u

Date	Paper	Reference
2017 April (?)	Ethiopia T-ICSP Line of Sight/Country Portfolio Budget (January-June 2018)	WFP, 2017za
2017	Concept Note for Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan (January to June 2018)	WFP, 2017i
2017 (post August)	Ethiopia Zero Poverty and Hunger Strategic Review Concept Note	WFP, 2017zb
2017 (October)	A Roadmap to Implement Ethiopia's Zero Poverty and Hunger Strategic Review, Draft for Discussion	CDRC, 2017

Articulation between WFP country strategy and UNDAFs

6. Ethiopia is a "One UN" country, and the 2012–2015 strategy was explicitly aligned with the UNDAF for 2012–2015 (UN, 2011) as well as Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan. This was directly reflected in the strategy's results framework – as illustrated in Figure 33 below.

Figure 33 Results Framework – Country Strategy 2012–2015



Source: WFP, 2011e, Diagram 3.

7. Although WFP did not produce a strategy to coincide with the 2016–2020 UNDAF (UN, 2015), it participated in its preparation, and WFP contributions are listed against its pillars and outcomes; for various components WFP budgets, funds available and gap are listed, but there is no obvious way of linking these figures to WFP budgets and expenditure reports. The UNDAF itself is explicitly aligned with GTP II, but it includes a review of experience with the previous UNDAF which acknowledges significant limitations: its monitoring framework was handicapped by lack of clear baselines and targets for indicators, and by the difficulty of tracking UNDAF budgets and disbursements.

8. The UNDAF preparation process seeks to ensure coherence and coordination among UN agencies, and their alignment with government policies and programmes. While it may serve these high-level objectives, it does not result in a very operational document. The UNDAF has not served as a practical programming framework for UN agencies, and given the strong government-led frameworks already in place it is not clear how much value a UN programming framework per se would add. For WFP, direct relationships with Government also provide a framework for collaboration with other UN agencies.

"Repositioning" and the Structure and Staffing Review

9. The most significant of the documents listed in Table 23 above is the 2016 paper on "repositioning" WFP in Ethiopia. This was an informal country office document which, represented the views of an incoming Country Director and Deputy Country Director who sought some significant changes of direction. It was a key input to the structure and staffing review (SSR) which was of immense strategic importance. The SSR was planned from 2015 and the "repositioning" paper was part of its formal launch. It was a reaction to perceptions that the gap between funding and staffing levels was rapidly becoming unsustainable, and it has led to a major downsizing as well as restructuring of the country office and its sub-offices.

10. The paper detected a fundamental shift in the humanitarian landscape in Ethiopia:

Particularly worrisome for WFP Ethiopia is that it received only 38 percent of the funding for the food sector. Over the course of 2015-2016, the Joint Emergency Operation Programme (JEO) received four times more funding than WFP from USAID—traditionally WFP's biggest donor. Nowhere else in the world does WFP receive such low levels of resources in a large-scale emergency, not least in the context of the worst drought in 30 years.

... even if another emergency does arise, donors are expecting that the [Government of Ethiopia] will bear the financial burden of the response. Finally, the CO has a large number of programmes and staff that are not working exclusively on emergency relief/nutrition or refugees. School Feeding, PSNP, P4P, MERET, R4/Livestock Insurance, HIV/AIDS, and Disaster Risk Management programmes are all affected by declines in funding. Of the latter, only HIV/AIDS has strong funding prospects. The remainder are being cross-subsidized by PRROs (200712 or 200700) to meet the cost of their staffing at both CO and SO/AO levels. This is not a sustainable approach to funding or an advisable business model. (WFP, 2016u p.2-3)

11. A premise for the SSR was a view that WFP had become too narrowly focused on its traditional humanitarian roles:


The magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition in Ethiopia remains staggering. In this light, WFP now must work to *reposition* itself in Ethiopia ... [As] the "transporter of choice" perception also overlooks some of the other *technical* and *advisory services* WFP can offer. The CO will need to strike a balance between continuing with the delivery of food assistance—albeit at a significantly lower volume—and moving towards playing a more technical assistance role that helps the [Government of Ethiopia] achieve its economic and social development goals." By definition, this means that the CO needs to be both *strategic* and *tactical* in its programme of work over the next five years. Strategic in terms of anticipating the next wave of challenges that Ethiopia will face, and tactical by capitalising on WFP's existing comparative and competitive advantage both locally and internationally. (WFP, 2016u p.4-5)

12. The paper proposed to categorise WFP services into four quadrants, as shown in Figure 34 below:

- High current demand for a particular WFP service and a high probability of funding (HH);
- Low current demand for selected WFP services coupled with a low probability of funding (LL);
- High current demand, but low probability of funding (HL); and
- Low current demand, but high probability of funding (LH).

13. The figure highlights an anticipated move away from traditional food assistance programmes (bottom left quadrant) towards capacity strengthening for government systems and specialised food assistance programmes (including refugees) in the top right quadrant. It can be expected that this perspective will inform I-CSP preparation.

Figure 34 Analytical framework from the "repositioning" paper



Source: WFP, 2016u

The WFP Integrated Road Map and Country Strategic Plans

14. WFP is currently pursuing radical reform through its Integrated Road Map (IRM). The IRM's four pillars – the strategic plan, the corporate results framework (CRF), the financial framework review (FFR) and the country strategic plans (CSPs) – are interlocking reforms that introduce integrated country-level budgets, within which the previous programme categories are replaced by budget components linked to specific WFP strategic results and focus areas (crisis response, resilience building, root causes). This has implications not only for the WFP planning and budgeting process and the authorising documents that emerge from it, but also for the underlying culture and behaviours of WFP as an organisation and for its relationships with its donors, with country governments and with other partners at country level. The IRM is being rolled out in phases (waves of CSPs) with systematic efforts to learn from early experiences and refine procedures accordingly. Ethiopia is in the last wave of CSP preparation.

15. The evaluation team took note of the general guidelines from WFP HEADQUARTERS concerning the IRM and the purposes of, and preparation processes for, the CSP. We note that these processes are supported by the WFP regional bureau, and have also noted relevant regional bureau guidance and preparatory work (e.g. concerning donor landscape analysis and the preparation of Partnership Action Plans – see WFP, 2017g and WFP, 2016x).

16. As an input to the CSP, a country-led Zero Poverty and Hunger Strategic Review has been launched (WFP, 2017k), but, because this exercise is still incomplete, Ethiopia will begin with an Interim CSP, effective from January 2019. The CSP was originally scheduled to begin earlier, hence the transitional "line-of-sight" document prepared in early 2017 (WFP, 2017za) – see Table 23 above. This was a first effort to conceptualise WFP activities in Ethiopia under the overarching categories of "crisis response", "resilience building" and "root causes", and was superseded in early 2018 by work on the forthcoming I-CSP.

Annex L Vulnerability Analysis, Food Security and Livelihoods

INTRODUCTION – SCOPE OF THIS ANNEX

1. This annex covers substantial parts of the WFP portfolio in terms of (i) vulnerability analysis, (ii) direct food and cash distributions, (iii) key support to the Government of Ethiopia’s food assistance for assets type programming, and (iv) a number of climate change and livelihood focused interventions. Table 24 summarizes the programmes and intervention areas under these four areas of support.

Table 24 Food security and livelihoods components of the WFP portfolio

Thematic area	Interventions
Vulnerability analysis	Internal data collection and analysis, regular bulletins, and periodic CFSVA reports Support to the Government of Ethiopia including: financing and technical assistance to the disaster risk profiles, ongoing support to seasonal needs assessments, financing and technical support to LEAP
Food assistance	General food and cash distributions to relief beneficiaries PSNP transfers
Food assistance for assets and other natural resource management focused technical support	MERET programme Support to PSNP public works Inputs into the broader sustainable land management agenda
Livelihoods and climate change	Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) and the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIIPE) programme RWEE

2. This annex is structured as follows:

- **Context:** which describes the overall context of food security programming by WFP, including the food security context in Ethiopia, key government of Ethiopia policies and programmes, and a summary of the key WFP policies and strategies affecting this sector of the portfolio
- **Intended WFP Programme and its Rationale:** which provides more detail the interventions under the four thematic areas described in Table 24 above.
- **Programme Delivery and Results:** which details what was actually delivered compared with plans
- **Assessment:** which provides the evaluation team's overall of assessment of performance against the main evaluation criteria

CONTEXT

Food Security Context


3. **Despite high rates of economic growth over the past decade and a decline in the percentage of people living in poverty, poverty rates remain high in Ethiopia.** Between 2004/05 and 2015/16 the share of the population below the poverty line fell from 38.7 percent to 23.5 percent.¹³¹ However, with a population growth rate of around 2.6 percent, the number of people living in poverty has largely remained stable since 2004/05 (at around 25 million).

4. **Ethiopia’s mountainous landscape, combined with its location in the Horn of Africa, results in enormous variations in agro-ecology and livelihood.** The most important weather systems that


¹³¹ Using a poverty line of \$1.25 per day (CSA 2018).

influence rainfall and patterns over Ethiopia are: the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), tropical upper easterlies, and local convergence in the Red Sea coastal region. These systems are influenced in different ways by the El Niño and La Niña events in the Pacific Ocean, and the Indian Ocean Dipole.¹³² These varying influences interact with Ethiopia's highlands leading to significant differences in the timing, duration and quantity of rainfall from place to place. These differences, in turn, lead to variations in livelihood strategies (pastoral, agro-pastoral and crop dependent) in the livestock reared, the crops grown, the timing of planting and harvesting, and vulnerability (see the maps below).


Map 4 Rainfall¹³³



Map 5 Different livelihood types in Ethiopia¹³⁴



Map 6 Variations in rainfall timing



5. **Most rural households make a living on subsistence agriculture and livestock despite declining farm sizes and the impacts of environmental degradation** (Headey et al., 2014). Average farm sizes in 2011/12 were 0.96 ha, with 40 percent of the population depending on less than 0.5 ha. The impacts of population pressure on land holdings can be seen in the fact that younger farmers tend to have significantly smaller landholdings. Population pressure has also resulted in populations gradually moving out of the highlands where rainfall is higher and more reliable. This move has led to the clearance of forest

¹³² The Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), also known as the Indian Niño, is an irregular oscillation of sea-surface temperatures in which the western Indian Ocean becomes alternately warmer and then colder than the eastern part of the ocean(Wikipedia).

¹³³ LIU, 2010

¹³⁴ LIU, 2010

for agriculture, cultivation on steep slopes and erodible volcanic soils, which in turn has left people more vulnerable to the effects of environmental degradation.

6. **With the majority of its population dependent on rain-fed agriculture or pastoralism, Ethiopia remains highly vulnerable to rainfall shocks.** During the period covered by this evaluation between 5 and 8 million people received support through a rural safety net programme and an additional 2 to 10 million people received humanitarian food assistance (see Figure 2 in the main text). The last two years of the evaluation period were both characterized by severe crises. A *krempt*¹³⁵ rain failure in 2015 led to almost 19 million people receiving some form of food assistance (either in the form of safety net transfers or through general food distributions) in 2016; while in late 2016/early 2017 poor rains in predominantly pastoral areas led to severe food crises for affected populations.


7. **Failures of the *krempt* rainy season affect the largest number of people, but droughts in pastoral areas can be devastating for affected populations.** Ethiopia's largest crises 1973–1975, 1984/1985, 2002/2003, and 2015/2016 have largely been the result of *krempt* failures; but for populations living in Somali region or southern parts of Oromia region it is the years of 1994/1995, 2004/2005, 2010/2011 and 2016/2017 that are remembered for being times of hardship. These pastoral area droughts tend to have lower visibility because they affect fewer people.

8. **Food insecurity is very seasonal in nature, with different parts of Ethiopia experiencing periods of hunger in different months of the year.** The peak hunger season for the majority of crop-dependent populations is between June and October, while in pastoral areas the typical hunger season falls between January and April (Figure 35 below). This has implications for the time periods when needs assessments are best conducted and the most appropriate timing for safety net support and humanitarian food assistance.

9. **Early analysis of potential climate change trends in Ethiopia indicates that the March-May rains (commonly known as the *belg* in agricultural areas or the *gu* in Somali region) are reducing in volume and becoming increasingly erratic** (WFP, 2013g). This same analysis suggests that the June to September rains (commonly known as the *krempt*) may actually increase in volume, although there will also be more frequent extreme weather events. As such, these trends are likely to have a particularly negative affect on the pastoral southern and south-eastern areas of Ethiopia for which the *gu* rains are key. But they also have big implications for agricultural areas; not only agricultural areas that expect to benefit from a *belg* harvest but also those areas where a significant proportion of planting is undertaken during the *belg* rains in order to allow crops to benefit from both the *belg* and *krempt* rains (see Map 7 below).

¹³⁵ The 'long rains' for many of Ethiopia's crop dependent population falling between June and September.


Figure 35 Typical hunger season, month-by-month, for Ethiopia



Source: FEWS NET, 2009

Map 7 Percent of grain harvested and planted during *belg* season


Percent of grain production **harvested** in *belg* Percent of grain production **planted** in *belg*



Source: World Bank, 2015

10. **Socio-economic status affects how households and individuals are impacted by drought and climate change. Poorer households and individuals, and those with a lower social status (including women) tend to be more severely affected by shocks and stresses.** A consolidated gender analysis undertaken for the 2016 drought response found that women, even pregnant and lactating women, were given a lower priority for food intake than infants, children or men (Figure 36). Furthermore, while income sources for both men and women are similarly affected; there are differences in how droughts impact the different sexes. For example, men are more likely to migrate in search of seasonal employment opportunities with the risks this entails and women can be severely impacted by the effects of drought on water availability, with the result that they have to walk further to find water, wait longer to collect the water, and may have to travel to collect water several times a day (Oxfam, 2016).

Figure 36 Priorities for food in-take for households in Somali and Afar regions




Source: Oxfam, 2016

11. Gender also affects individuals' ability to adapt to stresses such as climate change (Mersha & Van Laerhoven, 2016). Women face greater barriers to adaptation because:

- Gendered rules and norms reduce potential adaptation measures. For example, in Ethiopia women traditionally are barred from ploughing; as a result female headed households are forced to sharecrop land which means they have to share the resulting harvest. Furthermore, the reliance on male neighbours to plough means women have limited influence over the timing of land preparation which can be important when trying to adapt to changing rainfall patterns.
- Women face more barriers to access financial and physical capital. For example, land is typically registered in the name of the household head – typically a man. Land certificates, and other assets often also under the control of men, are often more preferred forms of collateral by finance institutions.
- Women are often underserved by Government extension services. Extension services most typically engage with household heads who are usually men. This means that women in households headed by men are often the most underserved by extension services.

Figure 37 Effect of gender and economic status on access to extension services and input credit



12. **Recent conflict between ethnic Somali and Oromo communities has resulted in more than 1 million conflict affected internally displaced people (IDPs)** – see main text ¶16 and Figure 1.

National Policies and Programmes

13. Four relevant government policies guide interventions in the food security sector:

- The National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (Government of Ethiopia, 2013).
- The National Social Protection Policy (Government of Ethiopia, 2014).
- The Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (Government of Ethiopia, 2010a).
- The Ethiopia Strategic Investment framework for Sustainable Land Management (Government of Ethiopia, 2008).

14. These policies are implemented through a number of government programmes and services:

- Early warning and needs assessment. The Government has a decentralized system of early warning which involves staff at woreda level collecting monthly data on a range of indicators including rainfall, production, livestock and market prices. The government has also (with support from WFP) embarked on a process of establishing woreda risk profiles for every woreda in the country. In addition, the Government leads periodic multi-stakeholder needs assessments. These assessments take place at least twice a year but may be supplemented by additional assessments, particularly in crisis years.
- Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA). This is provided to households that are food-insecure because of a shock, most often drought, in rural areas. The number of people supported (and duration of this support) is determined through a twice yearly needs assessment. Humanitarian food assistance is largely provided in the form of food, but can also be provided in cash. Households are selected through a community-based targeting process. While the needs assessment will recommend that households receive transfers each month for three to twelve months, the actual amount of support depends on the amount of funds allocated in response to the humanitarian appeal. Regions have the flexibility to impose public works requirements, and some form of participation in public works takes place in SNNPR, Oromia, Amhara and Tigray. Transfers in food are provided through the Government's food management systems and through the WFP and NGOs. Transfers in cash have largely been through the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC). The typical food basket is comprised of 15kg of cereal, 1½kg pulses and 0.45 litres of oil. (HRD & PSNP DPs, 2017)
- The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Launched in 2005 and funded by the Government and development partners (DPs), the PSNP provides food and/or cash transfers to food insecure households in chronically food insecure woredas. Households that can provide labour (the majority of PSNP beneficiaries) earn their safety net transfers in exchange for participation in labour-intensive public works. Unconditional, direct support transfers are provided to households without adult able-bodied labour (permanent direct support (PDS) households). These make up approximately 15 percent of the PSNP caseload. Public works beneficiaries receive six months of support in a year. Until 2015, PDS beneficiaries also received six months of support; but from 2016 they received 12 months of support. From 2011 to 2015 the transfer (whether provided in food or cash) was expected to be indexed to 15kg of cereal. The design of the fourth phase of the PSNP recommended an increase in the transfer value, benchmarking it against 15kg of cereal and 4kg of

pulses. This transfer value was in operation in 2016 and for the first half of 2017. However, budget constraints have led to a reduction in the benefit level to pre-PSNP IV levels.

- The Sustainable Land Management Programme. Key components of the programme include the rehabilitation of degraded lands using an integrated watershed approach, support to climate smart agriculture, the introduction of results-based payments to communities for environmentally responsible stewardship, improvements to the natural resource management policy framework and a rural land administration component focused on increasing tenure security of small holder farmers (World Bank, 2013).

15. **Integration of PSNP and humanitarian food assistance:** The 2016 drought response highlighted the challenges created by the artificial divide between support provided through the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance. While the PSNP was designed to have some capacity to scale up in response to shocks, in reality the financial resources available were limited and the triggers for scale-up were unclear. The scale of the 2016 drought meant that many humanitarian food assistance beneficiaries received 9 or 10 rounds of support; meanwhile PSNP beneficiaries (who are expected to be amongst the poorest) were only scheduled to receive six months of support, and some of these transfers were delayed (because of 'normal' internal challenges to the programme and because of a change in the responsibility for the management of Government-managed PSNP food commodities). Agreement was made to release additional transfers to PSNP beneficiaries, but in reality only one additional transfer was released and this was released late. In 2017 there was strong interest by development partners and government to learn from this experience and identify ways of improving integration. A number of woreda level opportunities for integration were identified through a field assessment and subsequent workshop, and the mid-year humanitarian update saw an attempt to provide an integrated food-cash plan which considered core PSNP transfers, PSNP contingency financed assistance, and in-kind food aid in one overall planning tool (HRD & PSNP DPs, 2017).

16. Each of these programmes/interventions is financially supported by multiple donors and technically supported by a number of development partners. A number of coordination efforts exist to support these investments, as described below.


17. **Overall sector coordination:** The Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group (RED&FS) is the government-donor coordination platform for agriculture, natural resource management and food security. Its objective is to jointly review sector level implementation status, and to coordinate and harmonize efforts of various development partners supporting thematic areas under RED&FS. It was formally established in April 2008 and is composed of an Executive Committee and three technical committees (Agricultural Growth; Sustainable Land Management; and Disaster Risk Management and Food Security). (World Bank, 2014)

18. **Disaster risk management:** Multiple donors are involved in financing disaster preparedness, including early warning, and humanitarian assistance, including humanitarian food assistance. A series of higher level coordination committees and technical working groups/task forces support coordination of interventions and technical support to the National Disaster Risk Management Agency. These are outlined in Figure 38 below. Particularly relevant to this sector are the overarching Disaster Risk Management Technical Working Group, the Prioritization Committee which coordinates humanitarian food assistance, and a methodology sub-group (not listed in Figure 38) which coordinates technical discussions regarding early warning and needs-assessment methodologies. These joint (development partner and Government) coordination mechanisms are complemented by the Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) – which is chaired by the Resident Humanitarian Coordinator for the UN and comprised of donors, NGOs, UN agencies and the Red Cross – and the Humanitarian Resilience Donor Group.

19. **PSNP:** The ten donors which support the PSNP have made significant efforts to abide by the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Financing (for both cash and in-kind contributions) is pooled and they have agreed to provide a unified pool of technical advice and analytical work. Coordination is facilitated by a PSNP donor working group, supported by a donor coordination team which sits within the World Bank. A number of joint Government-Development Partner coordination bodies provide opportunities for day-to-day implementation support. These include an overall Coordination and Management Committee and a number of technical committees, including a public works technical committee and a transfers technical committee (World Bank, 2016).

20. The PSNP also includes a livelihood component (up to 2015 this was a separate project called the Household Asset Building Project – HABP) which provides technical support to households along three livelihood pathways (crop, off-farm and employment). It supports households to develop business plans and links them to micro-finance institutions (World Bank, 2014).

Figure 38 Coordination Mechanisms for Disaster Risk Management in Ethiopia



Source: Government of Ethiopia, 2017a

21. **Sustainable land management programme:** The Government has formally established a national sustainable land management (SLM) platform. This comprises a national SLM steering committee (with high level representation, and chaired by the State Minister for Natural Resources). The SLM taskforce is made

up of senior technical staff from relevant institutions, including development partners (and doubles up as the SLM technical committee under RED&FS) (World Bank, 2013).

WFP Policies

22. Not surprisingly, there are a significant number of WFP policies related to the food security sector (see Table 25 below). However, the Compendium of Policies Relating to the Strategic Plan (WFP, 2017z) shows that eight of the fifteen policies released between 2002 and 2011 are directly related to this sector but only five of the sixteen policies released after this date have the same direct relevance. As Table 25 below shows, a large proportion of the older policies are clearly focused on emergency preparedness and response with only one of the newer policies for this sector, the Emergency Preparedness Policy (WFP, 2017r),¹³⁶ having an emergency focus.

Table 25 WFP policies related to food security, livelihoods and vulnerability analysis

Year	Policy
2003	Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies (WFP, 2003)
2004	Emergency Needs Assessment
2005	Definition of emergencies (WFP, 2005c)
2005	Exiting emergencies (WFP, 2005d)
2006	Targeting in Emergencies (WFP, 2006a)
2010	Revolution: From Food Aid to Food Assistance (Omamo et al., 2010)
2011	Cash and Voucher Policy Update (WFP, 2011b) <i>an update to Vouchers and Cash Transfers as Food Assistance Instruments: Opportunities and Challenges</i>
2011	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (WFP, 2011f)
2012	Update of WFP's Safety Nets Policy – The Role of Food Assistance in Social Protection (WFP, 2012f)
2015	Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (WFP, 2015e)
2017	Environmental Policy (WFP, 2017t)
2017	Climate Change Policy (WFP, 2017u)
2017	Emergency Preparedness Policy (WFP, 2017r)

THE INTENDED WFP PROGRAMME AND ITS RATIONALE

Vulnerability Analysis and the Work of the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit

23. The work of the VAM unit, including its technical support to government in the areas of early warning, preparedness and needs assessment, is financed through a combination of Component 1: Disaster Risk Management Capacity of the Country Programme (WFP, 2011i) and PRRO 200712 (WFP, 2015z). The main rationale for this work is (i) the need for WFP to have core information to inform the design and implementation of its services, and (ii) the need to contribute to capacity building at the national, regional and district levels of the government's disaster management agency.

24. Key products and services include:

- Comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis (CFSVA). WFP supports the Government's Central Statistics Agency to a) include additional key modules developed with WFP support in the Welfare Monitoring (WMS) and Household Income Consumption and Expenditure (HICE) surveys and b) analyse this data to produce a separate CFSVA report.

¹³⁶ This policy isn't, in fact, listed in the compendium as it was released towards the end of the year.

- Household food security monitoring.¹³⁷ Quarterly surveys initially only reported internally, but since 2016 are shared externally. The surveys cover beneficiaries of the PSNP, beneficiaries of humanitarian food assistance and non-beneficiaries, and provide regular information on indicators such as food consumption and negative coping mechanisms.
- Market assessments. These inform whether humanitarian food assistance should be provided in food or cash (approximately five are conducted per year).
- Engagement with the Government-led seasonal needs assessment. WFP supports data collection and analysis and has periodically supported the government through training. WFP is also a member of the methodology sub-group which has the responsibility for determining and improving the needs assessment methodology.
- Early warning. WFP, through its field presence, regularly collects field-level data, including market data. It also makes use of satellite information.
- The Livelihoods Early Assessment and Protection system (LEAP). This was developed in part to support potential scaling up of the PSNP in response to shocks. The LEAP software uses agro-meteorological monitoring data to estimate future crop yields and rangeland production. Support to the development of LEAP began before the evaluation period but continued during the period 2012–2017.
- Support to the Government in its development of Woreda Disaster Risk Profiles. In 2008, the Government embarked on a programme of developing Woreda Disaster Risk Profiles for each of its districts. WFP provided early technical assistance to this programme (prior to the evaluation period) to help design the process and continued to provide financial and technical assistance throughout 2012–2017.

Food Assistance

25. WFP food assistance programming is closely linked to the Government's system of humanitarian response and to its Productive Safety Net Programme. The rationale for continued WFP food assistance is the high numbers of people living in poverty and the high proportion of these who have unacceptable food consumption. By supporting both the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance, WFP is able to support those suffering from chronic food insecurity (often the poorest) and those affected by shocks. Financing has been provided for WFP support to these systems through two protracted relief and recovery operations (200290 (2012 to 2015) (WFP, 2011h) and 200712 (2015 to present) (WFP, 2015z)). WFP operations have heavily focused on Somali region and to a lesser extent Afar, but some support – particularly in terms of cash for relief – has been programmed in other geographic areas. The rationale for this focus is the more limited government capacity in these regions and donor concerns about governance which have meant that the WFP potential for stronger monitoring and greater oversight is welcomed.

26. Under the PSNP, WFP provides the 15kg basket; under its humanitarian general food assistance (GFA) WFP typically provides 15kg of cereal 1.5kg of pulses and 0.45 litres of oil. These baskets are in line with government guidance regarding the two systems of support. Whether supporting PSNP or GFA distributions, WFP is operating within a government-led system. This means that while WFP may procure and transport food, key programmatic and operational decisions are made by the Government at federal and woreda level. The Government leads the needs-assessment process that results in the geographic targeting of GFA and has defined woreda level quotas for PSNP. Household targeting is done using a

¹³⁷ E.g. WFP (2016) Drought Emergency Food Security Monitoring Bulletin #4 (WFP, 2016h).

community targeting approach which is assisted by local government staff. Food distributions are conducted by local government-employed storekeepers, with records maintained following government guidelines.

27. In addition to in-kind food transfers, WFP began to pilot the use of cash for humanitarian food assistance in 2013. Cash transfers have been provided in selected woredas in Amhara, Oromia and Somali regions. Before implementing a cash transfer programme WFP (through its VAM team) conducts a market assessment in order to ensure that cash-based transfers have the potential to have a consumption smoothing affect.

28. In 2017, WFP received funding to support humanitarian cash transfers in Somali region but with a focus on using PSNP modalities; financing was to flow through the Ministry of Finance's 'Channel One', beneficiary information was to be entered into the PSNP's payroll software, and transfers were to be paid by cashiers employed by woreda finance offices. These humanitarian cash transfers were to be targeted to non-PSNP beneficiaries living in selected PSNP woredas of Somali region, with top-ups to PSNP beneficiaries living in the same woredas to bring the value of the transfers they received into line with the value of an humanitarian food assistance ration. With the focus on integrating PSNP and humanitarian food assistance, implementation of the pilot relied on collaboration between federal, regional and woreda level government PSNP implementing agencies and disaster risk management agencies.

29. WFP participates in the key Government/development partner coordination forums (cf. Figure 38 above), playing a lead role in the (food) prioritization committee within the disaster risk management coordination structures. It is also a member of the PSNP donor working group and participates in the various technical committees of the PSNP.

Food Assistance for Assets and Other Technical Support Focused on Natural Resource Management

30. WFP does not have a standard 'food assistance for assets' programme in Ethiopia. Instead, its interventions in this area have mainly consisted of the Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition (MERET) programme and its technical support to the public works component of the PSNP. The MERET programme was financed through component 2 of the country programme (WFP, 2011i) (natural resource management capacity, including community-based watershed development using the MERET approach). WFP technical support to the public works component of the PSNP was also partially financed by the country programme but also formed part of its overall support to the PSNP under two successive PRRO operations – 200290 (WFP, 2011h) and 200712 (WFP, 2015z).

31. MERET was implemented in partnership with the Natural Resource Management Sector (NRMS) of the Government. Under the MERET programme WFP provided technical assistance to the NRMS (within the framework of the sustainable land management (SLM) platform) and, through food assistance, supported communities to create community assets, restore the natural resource base, improve homestead production and promote income generating activities. The programme was closed, largely because of funding constraints, in 2016. The country programme document also envisaged wider engagement with the sustainable land management platform. The MERET programme was operational in selected woredas of Tigray, Amhara, Dire, Dawa, Oromia, SNNPR and Somali.

32. WFP support to public works under the PSNP largely took place through the various PSNP coordination mechanisms, particularly the PSNP Public Works Joint Technical Committee. Much of this support was directed at national level institutions but has become particularly focused on public works in pastoral areas. This has led to some specific interaction between WFP and regional and woreda officials in Somali and Afar regions.

Livelihood and Climate Change-Related Interventions.

33. WFP interest in climate change and livelihoods is not confined to just one or two programmes. MERET and PSNP public works have a natural resource management focus, and they have often been seen as useful instruments to address climate change issues; the Government's broader PSNP programme includes a livelihoods component for which the cash and food transfers (in part supported by WFP) provide a consumption smoothing affect that encourages and enable households to take the risks necessary for livelihood diversification; and the WFP HIV/AIDS programme included a significant livelihoods component. However, WFP has also had a number of discrete interventions focused on livelihoods, resilience and/or climate change. These include: the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4), the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIPE) Programme¹³⁸ and the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme.

34. The Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) has been a collaboration between WFP and Oxfam. R4 was developed on the basis of experience generated through Oxfam's Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) programme.¹³⁹ The programme has four broad components: a disaster risk management component (disaster risk reduction) with labour intensive public works addressing some of the underlying causes of food insecurity; a crop insurance component (risk transfer) which allows eligible farmers to insure a proportion of their crop production against the risk of drought; a savings component (risk reserves) which encourages participating farmers to regularly save – providing a financial base for investing but also acting as a short-term buffer; and a credit, financial literacy and business development component (prudent risk taking), which enables farmers to invest in future production and livelihood diversification. The programme aims to work alongside the PSNP and, while it isn't limited to PSNP beneficiaries, they are the main target group. PSNP beneficiaries who cannot afford to pay insurance premiums can participate in the public works under the disaster risk management component to earn up to 85 percent of their insurance premium. Only farmers with land are eligible for the insurance component. The programme operates in selected woredas of Tigray and Amhara regions, with WFP leading the relationship with the implementing partner in Tigray and Oxfam leading the relationship with the implementing partner in Amhara. The R4 initiative is financed through a combination of the country programme (200253 – WFP, 2011i), the current PRRO (200712 – WFP, 2015z) and a trust fund (200842).¹⁴⁰

35. The Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia (SIPE) programme is a new initiative which started preparatory activities in 2017. It is a pilot project that aims to test the use of livestock insurance linked with the Productive Safety Net Programme. The regional government is the policy holder for the insurance, with pay-outs being directed to pastoralist households, already benefiting from the PSNP who have livestock equivalent to five tropical livestock units. SIPE is financed by Sida and the Swiss Development Cooperation through the PRRO.

36. The Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme is part of an international collaboration between the three Rome-based UN agencies to work in seven countries over five years starting in 2012 (WFP, 2015p). Financing is provided through Trust Fund 200812. Key activities under the programme, which began operations in Ethiopia 2015, include (i) the establishment and management of a revolving fund for promotion of saving and credit, and (ii) the provision of basic business, marketing, life

¹³⁸ SIPE was launched in March 2018 but preparatory activities were taking place during the evaluation period.

¹³⁹ This programme had a number of partners including the Relief Society of Tigray, Swiss Re and the International Research Institute for Climate and Society at Columbia University

¹⁴⁰ The trust fund is an administrative mechanism to handle "insurance-premiums-for-work" as a cash-based transfer.

and entrepreneurship skills training, business development services and functional literacy to 2,000 rural women in selected sites of Oromia and Afar.

PROGRAMME DELIVERY AND RESULTS

Vulnerability Analysis and the Work of the VAM Unit

37. The country programme (200253) includes a brief summary of planned activities to support the capacity building of national, regional and district levels. In particular, it highlights support to: Woreda Disaster Risk Profiles, early warning and assessment capabilities, weather data collection capacities of the National Meteorological Agency (NMA),¹⁴¹ and Government contingency planning. Table 26 below highlights the limitations to the available data to assess the performance of this thematic area of work: data is reported inconsistently and the limited narrative explanations provided in the SPRs provide little extra detail.¹⁴² Furthermore, it is difficult to discern data regarding two key WFP investments in the capacity of Government: support to the Woreda Disaster Risk Profiles¹⁴³ and maintenance and further refinements of the Livelihoods Early Assessment and Protection (LEAP) system (which included support to the NMA).

Table 26 Output data for vulnerability analysis (extracted from SPRs)

Indicator	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
# people trained (peace building/protection/ human rights/resilience/citizen participation/gender issues)									1,280	2,755
# contingency plans created	2	2	10	10	50	50	12	12	25	22
# counterpart staff members trained in contingency planning					20	20	60	60		
# counterpart staff members trained in disaster & climate risk management	1,200	155							50	50
# counterpart staff members trained in early warning systems			175	162					35	0
# government staff members trained in contingency planning					50	50	60	60		
# government staff members trained in disaster & climate risk management	8	155	400	327					228	266
# government staff members trained in early warning systems	20	40	400	327						
# government staff members trained in food security monitoring systems					20	20				
# DRM tools in government core functions & budget	3	3	2	2			11	98	5	5
# food security & nutrition monitoring reports produced with WFP support							7	7	12	7

¹⁴¹ Actually, financed under R4.

¹⁴² Outcome data are even more scanty and therefore have not been repeated here, but can be found in Annex I.

¹⁴³ The 2016 Country Programme SPR (WFP, 2017b) makes the only direct reference to the financing of WDRPs by stating that “WFP... engaged in the development of 22 disaster risk profiles”.

Indicator	2012		2013		2014		2015		2016	
	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual	Plan	Actual
# local early warning systems in place	1	2	12	12			1	5		
# technical assistance activities provided					1	1	20	64	4	13

Source: Annex I. Note: No data for these indicators in 2017

38. Interviews with WFP staff and representatives from counterpart agencies have highlighted that achievements have been made, beyond what is reported in Table 26. These are noted in the discussion that follows.


39. **WDRPs:** Woreda Disaster Risk Profiles (WDRPs) have been a major focal area of the Government; the target of all woredas having their own disaster risk profile has been included as an indicator in the Government's overarching plan (GTP II). For the Government, these profiles are a first step in supporting disaster risk reduction at woreda and community level. Prior to the evaluation period WFP provided significant technical support to the design of the data collection and analysis tools which would enable the government to prepare the profiles, and throughout the evaluation period a combination of international and national technical assistance has been seconded to the Government. However, and despite starting the WDRP programme in 2008, only 347 profiles have been completed to date (financed by multiple partners including WFP) with data collected for a further 76 (see Figure 39 below). This slow progress (fewer than half of all woredas) reflects the level of effort each woreda profile takes;¹⁴⁴ the cost (estimated at USD 9,000–10,000); and the resource constraints faced by Government.

40. Throughout this period there is little evidence that any effort has been made by the Government, WFP or any of the stakeholders who have invested in the Government's programme to assess whether and how the profiles and accompanying plans (made up of a disaster risk reduction plan and a contingency plan) are actually used.¹⁴⁵ Interviews conducted during this evaluation were not able to identify any concrete examples of how plans or WDRPs were used. The NDRMC specifically highlights the potential for the disaster risk reduction plans resulting from the profiling process to inform PSNP public works planning; but other interviews highlight a number of challenges including the fact that plans do not exist for the majority of woredas, that these plans tend to be generic woreda-level plans rather than identifying specific public works sub-projects as is needed, and that the planning of PSNP public works (along with the majority of woreda activities in this area) follows a clearly defined community planning procedure. Unfortunately, these findings question whether the WDRPs and accompanying plans can actually play a significant role in disaster risk reduction. Such a role will not be achieved without a clearly identified pathway for how a profile and its plan can be linked to actual investments through planning and budgeting processes of Government or other large-scale programmes. It is also not clear whether (even if such a pathway could be defined, and assuming that the right data has been collected and is of sufficient quality) the Government would ever have the capacity and financial resources to complete data collection and keep profiles and plans up to date.

¹⁴⁴ The NDRMC estimates that the fieldwork for each profile takes a team 25 days, with subsequent analysis and disaster risk reduction planning on top of this time.

¹⁴⁵ The European Delegation have recently launched a review of Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity in areas where they are supporting NGOs through their RESET programme. This review will explicitly look at how WDRPs and DRR plans are used; but this assessment has only been recently launched.

Figure 39 Woreda disaster risk profiles – progress 2008–2018



Source: http://profile.dppc.gov.et/Pages/Wereda_Disaster_Risk_Profile_Status.aspx accessed 24/05/2018 and adjusted to reflect current number of woredas.

41. **LEAP:** WFP continued to support the functioning of the LEAP software throughout the evaluation period. Relevant NDRMC staff report that they are easily able to use the software interface and generate graphics that they use in their regular early warning bulletins. Furthermore, LEAP forecasts feed into the data provided to the seasonal assessment teams to allow them to validate proposed woreda and zonal beneficiary figures and recommend any adjustments, and it is also taken into account for FEWSNET.

42. Despite this evidence of use, LEAP is not yet fulfilling its main objective of triggering an early response to food security crises. In reality, humanitarian food assistance is almost always only provided on the basis of field assessments – and usually only the twice yearly seasonal assessments. Furthermore, plans that LEAP data might be disseminated to woredas for onward communication to farmers to allow them to mitigate the effects of droughts have not yet been operationalized. And while government staff at the national level are able to use the software, regional government staff reportedly are not using it (the reason given by NDRMC is that high staff turnover means that trained staff are no longer in position). There are also recognised weaknesses in LEAP: functioning of the system is dependent on WFP support to a consultant working out of the Netherlands; the system relies on baseline data to make its predictions, and much of this data has not been kept sufficiently up to date; there have been advances in satellite-based weather monitoring that have not yet been incorporated into LEAP; and LEAP didn't successfully predict the large scale of need in 2016 (evaluation team interviews, Porter, 2017 and Drechsler & Soer, 2016).

43. Despite these weaknesses, there is a general consensus that this tool represents an important step in the right direction and that either it, or the learning from it, can form the basis of future directions.

44. **CFSVA:** A comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis (CFSVA) report was released in 2014 (with support from WFP) on the basis of data collected during the 2010/2011 Welfare Monitoring (WMS) and Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey (HICES). The recent (2016) WMS and HICES have also included key modules, and data analysis is currently ongoing. There hasn't been a review of how CFSVA data is used by internal and external stakeholders, but WFP planning documents post-2014 do reference it.

45. **Other support to Government:** WFP maintains frequent contact with NDRMC, responding to requests for support to training, the sharing of information and provision of key inputs into the seasonal assessments (both in the significant preparatory activities for the assessments and in providing staff and vehicles to allow assessments to be carried out). It is difficult to quantify this support, but NDRMC clearly states its appreciation for it. However, there is broad consensus (including by key WFP staff) that there are significant constraints to government early warning and needs assessment processes and that substantial

barriers to overcoming these constraints remain. WFP cannot be held responsible for the limited progress in this area, but nor can it be claimed that WFP investments have borne fruit.

46. **Routine VAM monitoring:** WFP monitors collect regular early warning and food security information to inform internal programming and to share with external stakeholders. Data is shared in the form of Emergency Situation Reports, Household Food Security Bulletins, and various briefings to stakeholders (for example during the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team Meetings).

47. VAM monitoring data only explores food security information at the community and household level. As such it is not able to shed light on intra-household dynamics. It includes some gender disaggregated data between male and female headed households, but not how food insecurity affects different members of a household differently and what implications this might have for programming.

Food Assistance

48. **As with the work of the VAM unit, there are serious limitations to the data held in the SPRs to assess performance in this thematic area of work.** Limitations of the output data include: that data has been recorded inconsistently even within the lifetime of a single PRRO; and that although the PRRO logframes differentiate between general food assistance and PSNP interventions, there appears to be no separate reporting of output data (or commodity data) in the SPRs. Despite these weaknesses a combination of WFP administrative data, externally sourced data, and evaluation team interviews have identified the following key themes with regards to programme performance.

49. **WFP played a large and important role in the humanitarian food assistance responses to the 2015/2016 El Niño and 2016/2017 Indian Ocean Dipole related crises.** Ethiopia experienced unprecedented need in 2016 with the annual appeal identifying 10.2 million people in need of emergency food assistance in addition to those receiving support under the Productive Safety Net Programme. Population densities in the area affected by the 2016/17 Indian Ocean Dipole event are much lower and so the 2017 caseload was smaller; but many of those affected in Somali region experienced devastating livestock losses wiping out livelihoods for significant numbers of households. Food assistance support by WFP included direct responsibility for food management in core operational areas, and the provision of 60,000 mt of food to NDRMC for them to address needs in other parts of the country. WFP also played a key role in supporting the coordination of the response. WFP acts as secretary to NDRMC-led committees (the Food Management Taskforce and the Prioritisation Committee) which oversee humanitarian food assistance and trouble shoot issues as they arise. One of the key achievements in 2016 was a reduction in the duration of monthly distribution cycles from eight weeks to four weeks (with the support of the logistics cluster further discussed in Annex R); this helped to ensure that the planned increased number of rounds of assistance in drought affected areas could be achieved. Unfortunately, in 2017 there were significant gaps in response. This was not due to significant challenges in logistics, but instead a) shortages of resources early in the year and disagreements regarding the mode of response (in Somali region) affecting the second half of the year (Figure 41 below shows the approximate timing of food assistance in Somali region late 2016 and 2017).

50. **However, the WFP role in directly managing food assistance is declining in Ethiopia.** Although the USD value of the WFP response rose dramatically to respond to the crises of 2015/16 and 2016/17, the WFP share of the total response decreased sharply. (See main text ¶164 and Figure 11.)

51. As the WFP proportion of the response has declined, the proportion of the appeal supported through the NGO managed Joint Emergency Operations (JEOP) consortium, financed by USAID, has grown. From 2015 to 2017 there was also significant support by Government, reflecting enhanced government

capacity to manage food assistance because of the efforts of WFP and other stakeholders. This is a positive shift, but there is a need for caution, because Government may find it difficult to mobilise funds in response to smaller crises. Finally, the contingency budget of the PSNP also featured more actively in the response, particularly in 2017.

52. **One potential reason for this declining role is the WFP focus on pastoral regions with the result that they only have a small general food assistance role in non-pastoral areas and, in recent years, no role in providing food for the PSNP outside Afar and Somali.** See the main text, ¶65ff, for an analysis of the geographic footprint of WFP which uses available data to illustrate the degree to which WFP is focused in Afar and Somali, and the extent to which the concentration of activities was greater than planned. WFP plays its most prominent role in Somali region on account of capacity constraints, concerns about governance and sizeable food security challenges (see Box 3 in the main text). However, the 2015/16 El Niño drought and the current IDP crisis highlight that significant vulnerability exists throughout Ethiopia.

53. **WFP has been active in supporting a “transition from relief assistance to support for the expansion and national ownership of long-term social-protection programmes”** (WFP, 2015z). Budget constraints affecting PSNP have limited the absorption of additional ‘chronically food insecure’ households into the core caseload of the PSNP; but WFP (in collaboration with OCHA) has been vocal about the need to pursue this agenda. WFP has also worked with other PSNP donors to support the evolution of the PSNP into a scalable safety net programme through consolidating PSNP and humanitarian food assistance operations. Although sometimes seen as a sceptical partner, WFP has also been considered an important partner because of its strong humanitarian experience and good relationship with NDRMC. WFP was actively involved in a series of engagements in 2017 to further discussions on consolidation and significantly supported the development – by NDRMC – of an integrated food/cash response plan that helped to define how both traditional humanitarian resources and PSNP contingency funds would together support a response in the second half of 2017).

54. **In addition to the above policy engagement and capacity building activities, WFP supported the implementation of an integrated humanitarian food assistance and PSNP response through a pilot humanitarian cash transfer in in two zones of Somali region – using PSNP modalities.** Operationalizing this pilot proved challenging: there were significant delays to the signing of a memorandum of understanding, disagreements regarding administrative budgets, and a series of other delays which led to transfers not being distributed to beneficiaries until three months later than planned (around eight months after initial funds were received, and after the period covered by this evaluation. Some of these challenges have highlighted important points of learning such as the risk of turf battles between the two Government institutions that have had traditional responsibilities for the implementation of humanitarian response and the PSNP respectively; and the importance of clarifying the budget calculations for administrative costs for the scaling-up of the PSNP in the future. Enhanced routine monitoring of the pilot is also likely to contribute significant learning and the evaluation team was aware that preliminary analysis had been undertaken although these findings were not ready for external circulation at the time of the evaluation. This learning should be seen by WFP as one of the most important results of this pilot.

55. **WFP is increasingly using cash as a modality but is fighting a perception that it has a food bias.** For summary and analysis of cash-based transfers during the evaluation period, see main text ¶69 and Figure 15.

56. External stakeholders regularly alluded to a reluctance by WFP to use cash referring to (i) the requirement to do detailed market assessments prior to cash programming in a way that is not required


for food programmes, and (ii) the perception that when WFP has been involved with cash it has been at the direct request of the donor (and not the other way around). Given the huge variations in humanitarian need and response between 2012 and 2017 it is difficult to infer any clear pattern regarding WFP's appetite for use of cash. The low level of actual cash distributions in 2017 was a result of delays in cash distributions, with sizeable transfers taking place in the first quarter of 2018.

57. A number of stakeholders reported weaknesses in the discourse regarding the debate over when to use cash and when to use food; there is a view that personal opinions and institutional positions have dominated discussions – rather than evidence. WFP and the World Bank have recently committed to undertaking two studies to improve evidence for decision making: the first will be a nationwide assessment on how to make decisions regarding the use of cash or food (for both PSNP core transfers and general food assistance), and the second is more focused on Somali region.

58. WFP has not yet made progress identifying and testing alternative cash delivery platforms (an intention laid out in the more recent PRRO – WFP, 2015z). WFP proposed the use of mobile money providers to donors under its 2017 pilot humanitarian cash-transfer intervention in Somali region, but at that point donors were keen for WFP to pursue a model which maximised integration with the PSNP.

59. **WFP is in an unenviable position regarding its support to both PSNP and general food assistance. It is caught between donor expectations regarding key standards of implementation (such as targeting) and a reality of Government frontline implementation.** The WFP geographic focus on Somali and Afar, regions with lower capacity and greater governance issues, exacerbates the gap between expectations and reality. There is substantial evidence that the quality of PSNP operations in Somali and Afar lags significantly behind operations in other regions. Repeated PSNP process evaluations highlight weaknesses, and PSNP impact assessments show very poor targeting outcomes in these regions (see Figure 40 below).

Figure 40 Predicted probability for selection into PSNP by household wealth, Somali and Afar regions



Source: IFPRI, 2016.

60. While WFP does not have authority over government frontline implementers, and therefore cannot be held responsible for these deficiencies, there is a strong feeling held by external stakeholders that they could and should be doing more to advocate with and support government implementers to improve performance. PRRO 200712 includes a specific commitment to “support the Afar and Somali regional governments in adapting PSNP eligibility criteria to reflect the needs of pastoralist communities” but little progress has been made on this. WFP expects to conduct a targeting study in Somali region in the coming months and this may form a basis for future support and advocacy.

61. **The design of both the PSNP and the humanitarian food assistance response system includes measures aimed to ensure that women are adequately represented in community decision making**

bodies. WFP's own monitoring has not consistently collected data on the number or proportion of women in leadership positions. Routine PSNP evaluations do provide evidence on this and indicate that guidelines are largely adhered to in highland regions, but that representation by women is lower in Afar and Somali.

62. **WFP is well aware of the seasonality of need in different parts of Ethiopia, and has provided technical support to the pastoral regional governments to adjust PSNP transfer schedules, but has been unable to reflect this understanding in the timing of its general food assistance distributions.** Figure 41 below illustrates the timing of greatest need in the Keren and Deyr rainfall zones of Somali region and the months in which WFP food was distributed. As the figure shows, the timing of the response was the same for both the Keren and Deyr areas despite the different timing of need; in neither area did response correlate with need.

Figure 41 Timing of hungry season and humanitarian response in Keren and Deyr receiving zones of Somali region

Rainfall zones	Need or response	2016				2017												
		S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	
Keren	Need																	
	Response#			8	9		1		2	3	4		5		6		7	
Deyr	Need																	
	Response#			8	9		1		2	3	4		5		6		7	

Numbers refer to which round of response

Source: Evaluation team.


63. In reality, the timing of any humanitarian response is a function of the overall humanitarian food response system and the process by which rounds of response are launched by the NDRMC's prioritisation committee. The twice-yearly seasonal assessments are expected to identify in which months responses should be provided in different areas of Ethiopia; but there is a tendency for rounds of assistance to be launched on exactly the same date for all parts of Ethiopia. The needs-assessment data might result in woredas skipping rounds at the beginning or end of the year; but within this period, it is the date at which a round is launched (which in turn tends to be the result of funding decisions), which dictates the timing and frequency of distributions. This issue is another example of an area where WFP does not have direct control, but where its operations suffer from a collective failure to understand and address an issue.

64. More positively WFP has directly engaged in support to the regional governments of Afar and Somali to make adjustments to their transfer (and public works) schedules to better reflect the timing of needs. The new transfer schedule for Somali region came into effect in the second half of 2017, and discussions are still ongoing in Afar to finalize their proposed revisions. The newly defined schedule directly mirrors the hungry seasons outlined in Figure 41 above; and has the potential to dramatically increase the impact of PSNP transfers if adhered to. (Previously transfers were scheduled for the period February to July.) While WFP is not the only stakeholder to have recommended that pastoral regions should adjust their schedule, but WFP technical support has informed the details of this shift.

65. **The ability of WFP to support conflict-displaced people is limited by the low level of recognition of the scale of the issue by Government.** IDPs in Somali region reportedly receive significantly higher benefits than those in neighbouring Oromia, because of the operational presence of WFP. But in neither region is the Government yet willing to undertake a full needs assessment and to publicly appeal for the resources needed to address these needs.

66. **The key outcome data for WFP food assistance interventions (coping strategy index, dietary diversity and food consumption score) are difficult to interpret in any meaningful way.** Figure 42 below compares available data on food consumption score of relief beneficiaries with the cut-offs outlined in the 2012 PRRO document (WFP, 2011h). In at least half the years the threshold was not met and in two of the other three years there is evidence that it was only met by male household members. From a binary perspective this can tell us that WFP is not meeting its objectives of ensuring "adequate food consumption over assistance period for targeted households", and it is particularly not meeting its objectives during crisis years (2017 was probably the worst year for the main WFP operational area). It cannot tell us more than that because: the WFP operational area changes from year to year; the food security situation changes from year to year; and there is no comparison group that can tell us whether the changes in food consumption score can be attributed to WFP or to the particular circumstances in the particular geographic area at the time data was collected.¹⁴⁶


Figure 42 Percentage of relief beneficiaries with at least a borderline food consumption score



Source: SPRs (cf. Annex I).

67. **Since 2016, WFP has tried to collect data on who in the household makes decisions over the use of cash, vouchers and food; but this too is difficult to interpret in a meaningful way.** The two years for which data is available show such significantly different results that it is difficult to conclude what data best reflect reality, let alone the extent to which WFP has influenced the results (see Figure 43 below).

Figure 43 Proportion of households in which decisions over cash, vouchers or food are made by women, men or together



¹⁴⁶ For none of the three years for which data was collected (2012,13 &14) did PSNP beneficiaries of WFP meet the higher threshold for food consumption.

68. **In the context of Ethiopia, where food assistance programmes are Government led, such indicators may not best reflect desired outcomes within the manageable interest of WFP.** WFP is one of many stakeholders trying to support consumption smoothing for vulnerable Ethiopians. Direct provision of food assistance is only one of the ways in which WFP is supporting this overall effort, and it may not even be the most important way it supports these efforts. Throughout the evaluation period, the evaluation team consistently heard from stakeholders that WFP had played critical roles in the 2015/2016 El Niño and 2016/2017 Indian Ocean Dipole related crisis responses. Direct distributions had been part of this, but also important had been fundraising and awareness raising efforts by WFP, its logistics support (covered in Annex R), and its overall role in supporting coordination of the response.

69. **Furthermore, with regards to the PSNP, there is already an independent process for robustly evaluating the programme. Impact assessments for this programme show that the programme is having considerable impact in highland areas, but that poor implementation is undermining impact in lowland areas.** Between 2010 and 2014 the food gap in PSNP areas fell in both highland and lowland regions, with these decreases affecting PSNP beneficiaries. However, analysis comparing PSNP beneficiaries with a counterfactual found that in highland areas a high proportion of the decrease could be attributed to PSNP transfers (80 percent), but in lowland areas there was no evidence of impact of PSNP transfers on food security (IFPRI, 2016).

70. **WFP also has stated commitments to contribute to broader policy and design issues that are not well articulated in their results frameworks.** Under the most recent PRRO, this includes an intention to improve targeting in pastoral regions; an interest in facilitating transition from relief assistance to an expanded nationally owned safety net; and a commitment to identify, test and institutionalize more efficient cash delivery platforms (e.g. mobile money). Progress in these areas has already been noted in the paragraphs above, but potentially important policy initiatives might receive greater attention during day-to-day implementation if they were better captured in results frameworks.

71. **A further important achievement by WFP was the release of the National Social Protection Policy** (Government of Ethiopia, 2014). Support to this policy process had largely been supported through the WFP HIV/AIDS programming but has positive implications for the food security sector. WFP was one of several stakeholders involved in the policy process but believe that its involvement ensured: (i) greater visibility of key vulnerable groups such as HIV/AIDS affected populations in the policy; (ii) provisions for both conditional and unconditional transfers; and (iii) a greater focus on the importance of targeted livelihood support.

Food Assistance for Assets and Other Technical Support Focused on Natural Resource Management

72. **The MERET programme has long been seen as a flagship programme both for WFP and for Ethiopia.** Government officials from within the Natural Resource Management Directorate (NRMD) and elsewhere (Food Security Coordination Directorate and NDRMC) describe the value of the programme, how it helped set standards for natural resource management in Ethiopia, and the transformations that have taken place at the watershed level. Development partners with significant involvement in the Sustainable Land Management Sector Investment Framework echo these views, describing MERET's role in the design of the public works component of the PSNP (in 2004) and the Sustainable Land Management Programme (in 2007); and in supporting the NRMD to develop the Community Based Participatory Watershed Management Guidelines which underpin the planning for both programmes.

73. **Previous evaluations have pointed to MERET's significant positive impact on improving the livelihoods and resilience of participating communities.** The 2012 impact evaluation found that MERET activities had "resulted in the emergence of new springs, rising ground water tables, flood control, reduced soil erosion and an increase of flora and fauna" and that "all of these developments are rehabilitating the land and increasing agricultural productivity" (Tango & IDS, 2012). A 2016 evaluation looking at whether MERET had affected how people were influenced by the 2015/16 El Niño crisis found that "households that participated in the MERET programme were more resilient than households in control sites, due in part to their better adaptive capacity. In particular, more and/or higher value assets and the awareness and use of certain [soil and water conservation] practices appear to underlie their capacity to better adapt to drought" (Nelson et al., 2016).

74. **Evaluations have also highlighted improvements in gender relations in MERET programme sites, but attributed these changes mainly to local government initiatives and improved economic opportunities.** Although improved gender relations cannot be easily attributed to MERET, the MERET programme design did take into consideration the potentially different needs of men and women and the importance of involving both male and female household members in decision-making.

75. **However, throughout the evaluation period (until its termination in 2016) MERET failed to achieve planned financing levels and therefore fell significantly short of planned targets.** The programme did not reach its planned beneficiaries target nor planned per person levels of support (each household was expected to receive food assistance for three months). Influenced by these financing constraints, WFP involvement ceased in 2016. Figure 45 below shows the planned and actual beneficiary numbers and metric tonnes of support during the evaluation period. The evaluation team compared this with data from the previous country programme which showed that prior to 2012 WFP had been able to resource MERET adequately (see Figure 44 below).

76. **Plans to ensure that natural resource management directorate would be able to mainstream areas of learning within other programmes did not receive the attention required.** Key stakeholders of the two key programmes that MERET had previously influenced (PSNP and SLMP) were unaware of any specific activities to support better mainstreaming during the evaluation period. Instead there is a feeling that MERET quietly died. People were aware of efforts to develop a sustainable land management for food insecure and pastoral areas (SLM-FIPA), but not of efforts outside this to mainstream MERET learning. The SLM-FIPA concept did not get much support from wider development partners because it remained a very resource intensive approach. This criticism was also levelled at MERET which was seen as a good 'WFP programme', but not one which could be mainstreamed in Government because of its high cost.

Figure 44 Planned and actual tonnage of food and beneficiary numbers for MERET 2007-2011





Figure 45 Planned and actual tonnage of food and beneficiary numbers for MERET 2012-2017



77. **WFP support to the PSNP also supports Food Assistance for Asset type activities.** WFP support has been less than planned under PRRO 200712. The PRRO document envisaged WFP support totalling 686,947 mt over the period January 2016 to July 2018; actual support provided over the two years to date is only 83,409 mt; this reduction in metric tonnes reduced the number of person days of public works that WFP support can pay for. Table 27 below summarises some of the combined achievements of MERET and PSNP in community asset creation.

78. **WFP support to the PSNP is largely confined to Afar and Somali regions where capacity is lower and public works implementation does not meet the same quality standards found elsewhere in Ethiopia** (BDS, 2018 and Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). WFP cannot be held accountable for these deficiencies, as front line public works implementation is the responsibility of the Government and all PSNP development partners have a shared obligation to support improvements.

Table 27 Selected public works achievements under MERET and PSNP

Public Work	Planned/actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Ha of cultivated land treated with biological stabilization or agro-forestry techniques only (PSNP and MERET)	P	26,200	14,870	8,488	10,471	1,390	
	A	7,869	3,539	1,418	476	0	
Ha of cultivated land treated with both physical soil and water conservation measures and biological stabilization or agro-forestry techniques (PSNP and MERET)	P	25,000	13,670	7,288	10,020	2,030	4,833
	A	6,873	2,499	308	95	427	4,833
Ha of forests planted and established (MERET)	P	25,000	12,460	25	6,060	1,610	
	A	17,821	11,760	10	2,480	1,240	
Ha of gully land reclaimed as a result of check dams and gully rehabilitation structures (PSNP)	P	19,000	19,000	19,000	5,368	375	
	A	15,485	17,300	18,100	1,820	375	
Km of feeder roads built and maintained (PSNP and MERET)	P	370	405	127	1219	51	1862
	A	324	123	112	782	43	1862
Number of excavated community water ponds for domestic uses constructed (3000-15,000 m ³) (PSNP and MERET)	P	25	25	50	20	3	1269
	A	46	3	4	2	1	1269
Number of homestead level micro-ponds constructed (usually 60-250 m ³) (MERET)	P		152		120	99	
	A		14		27	0	
Number of water springs developed (PSNP and MERET)	P	320	224	100	60	29	320
	A	208	202	92	21	0	208

Public Work	Planned/actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of tree seedlings produced (MERET)	P	100 m	84 m	43 m	90 m	45.1 m	-
	A	82.2 m	82.5 m	41 m	44.5 m	22.3 m	
Number of buildings rehabilitated / constructed (school, facility, community) (PSNP)	P	-	-	-	-	11	726
	A					11	726
Number of classrooms rehabilitated (PSNP)	P	200	200	200	-	-	-
	A	184	180	184			

Source: SPRs.

Note: The significant variances in the data from year to year, particularly as regards PSNP achievements, raise questions over the quality of the data, which has been extracted from the SPRs.

79. **WFP provided significant support to the publication of Pastoral Public Works Guidelines.** Much of this technical assistance, including a support mission from Rome and the hosting of a series of consultative workshops in each of the four regions with pastoral populations, took place prior to the evaluation period. Nevertheless, the resulting guidelines were published in May 2012.

80. **However, most stakeholders perceived a slump in WFP support during the first few years of the evaluation period, with WFP only showing renewed commitment in the past 18 months.** Prior to the evaluation period WFP had been seen as a valued member of the public works technical working group, which had been active in supporting key events such as the public works review. The perception is that the level of WFP engagement faded from 2009 onwards, and this reduction coincided with increased criticism of the programme leading to questions whether WFP continued to see itself as a partner or more of an outsider. WFP has become more active in the past 18 months and, in particular, is providing valuable inputs on the basis of its work in Somali region.

81. **Recently, WFP has provided support to the regional governments of Afar and Somali to (i) review their transfer and public works schedules (as discussed above) and (ii) undertake analysis to inform realistic public works objectives according to different clusters of woredas.** Public works schedules have been adjusted to reflect periods of the year when there are fewer demands on adult able bodied labour, and when the climate is more suitable for public works (the previous 'standard' schedule required people in Afar to work at the peak of the hot season when temperatures regularly exceed 40°). The clustering approach recognises the variety of landscapes in pastoral areas; in some areas a typical watershed management approach remains appropriate, but in others (particularly very arid areas with low population densities) the range of possible public works are much smaller. By clustering woredas, each woreda can be guided to design public works appropriate to their context. A "clustering report" was produced for Somali region in 2017 but was still in process in Afar region.

Livelihood and climate change related interventions.

82. **Coverage of the R4 programme, as measured by uptake of insurance products, has increased over the evaluation period.** As Figure 46 below shows, the number of farmers taking premiums has increased from 19,000 in 2012 to 32,000 in 2017. The total premiums paid and the total sum insured has also increased. In 2017 USD 369,723 in premiums were paid with the total sum insured reaching USD 2,291,930. The majority of these premiums were paid by WFP, with households 'earning up to 84 percent of their premiums by participating in insurance for assets programmes'. There have been several payouts (see Figure 47 below). The biggest payouts were in 2012 and 2015 (when there was the El Niño event), and payouts were also expected for the 2017 agricultural season. Tigray region provides the majority of beneficiaries of the risk transfer component, and therefore the majority of farmers receiving payouts. This reflects a larger programme in Tigray, but Tigray region is also where WFP (which leads on the insurance component) plays a larger role.

Figure 46 Number of farmers taking out insurance premiums





Figure 47 Number of farmers receiving and total value of payouts



Source: Data derived from the global R4 annual reports (Oxfam & WFP, 2014, Oxfam & WFP, 2015, Oxfam & WFP, 2016, Oxfam & WFP, 2017, Oxfam & WFP, 2018).


83. **There have been a number of refinements to the insurance indices during the evaluation period.** Challenges experienced in 2013 when indices in Tigray did not trigger payouts despite farmers experiencing significant rains shortages led to a review of the insurance indices in 2014. These indices were again revised in 2015 and work begun on complementing the ARC2 index (initially the only satellite index used to trigger payments) with a hybrid product that also included an enhanced vegetation index (EVI). This hybrid product has been in use in Tigray since 2016.

84. **Other elements of the Rural Resilience Initiative have also seen progress.** A large number of disaster risk reduction activities, mainly soil and water conservation activities, were completed in both Tigray and Amhara regions (but more in Tigray, because these activities are linked to the insurance for assets component which now allows households to earn up to 80 percent of their premium¹⁴⁷). While risk reduction and risk transfer activities are significantly larger in scale in Tigray, the risk reserve and prudent risk-taking activities are much more balanced between the two regions, as Figure 48 below shows. Interestingly, in Amhara numbers saving and numbers who participate in the risk transfer component are similar; whereas in Tigray savers are a small proportion (13 percent) of those participating in the risk transfer component. This reflects the relative interest in insurance and savings and credit by WFP and Oxfam (with WFP focusing on the former and Oxfam on the latter), and their regional roles (WFP takes a lead in Tigray, Oxfam takes a lead in Amhara).

85. **The Rural Resilience Initiative does pay attention to how the programme interacts with male and female community members.** The programme monitors the uptake by men and women of different programme components such as insurance or credit. Gender and women’s empowerment was also considered during a recent evaluation (Madajewicz et al., 2017). The programme acknowledges some limitations, particularly with respect to reaching women in households headed by men. With its focus on agricultural production, access to land evidenced through a land certificate is a key programme requirement; and land is nearly always registered in the name of the household head. Despite this, 38 percent of insurance policy holders and 38.5 percent of credit recipients in 2017 were women (Oxfam & WFP, 2018).

¹⁴⁷ Maximum share of the premium that can be earned was 85% (2013–2015,) but reduced to 80% in 2018 (country office information).

Figure 48 Number of households participating in risk reserve and prudent risk-taking components



Source: R4 annual reports.

86. **In 2017, an impact evaluation of the programme in Tigray was published. It covered 2012–2016 with largely positive findings** (Madajewicz et al., 2017). It found that (i) R4 is helping smallholder households, particularly those headed by women, to reduce the impact of drought on food security; (ii) R4 is supporting enhanced food security through increased savings and borrowing, and through income diversification away from cereal production; but (iii) there is little evidence that R4 is improving agricultural production.

87. **The Rural Women Economic Empowerment programme began operations in 2014 and is now reaching 2,500 women in three woredas of Oromia region and one woreda of Afar (58 percent of the target).** Although the programme was officially launched in 2014 support to beneficiaries did not begin until 2016. It has provided a number of services to its female beneficiaries as summarized in Table 28 below. Project reports record strong ownership by Government offices, but the evaluation team was not able to meet with government partners as neither Afar nor Oromia were selected as field visit locations. Annual reports also include data on outcome indicators such as “frequency and composition of meals and dietary diversity among targeted women and family members” and “percentage increase in agricultural production”; but without understanding the methodology used for data collection it is difficult to quote results as reliable.

Table 28 Rural Women Economic Empowerment – Results 2016–2017

Results	2016	2017
Total beneficiaries	2,374	2,500
# of targeted women accessing integrated agricultural services and inputs	1,964	1,233
# of targeted women using improved production techniques	587	896
# of targeted women getting access to diversified market opportunities		1,097
# of women accessing loans	900	2,127
% of previous years loan repaid		83%
# of targeted women benefiting from training on IGA and business skills	1,313	1,943
# of women initiating IGAs as a result of intervention	900	1,066
# of women provided with time and labour-saving technologies		617
# of women obtaining joint land certificates		195
# of community members reached through awareness raising efforts on gender issues and women’s economic rights	3,104	7,990

Source: Data from annual reports (RWEE, 2015, RWEE, 2016, RWEE, 2017 and RWEE, 2018).

Note: It has not been possible to disentangle results achieved by WFP from those achieved by other implementing partners. Furthermore, the annual reports do not present the planned vs the actual results. However, the RWEE project aims to accelerate the economic empowerment of 4,300 rural women in total.

88. **WFP only began preparatory activities for the SIPE in 2017.** Agreements have been reached with key partners (the Somali Regional Bureaus of Agriculture and Natural Resource Development and Livestock and Pastoral Development, the Somali Micro Finance Institution, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), and a pool of insurance companies). The programme was expected to be launched in 2018 with the first potential payouts later in the year.

ASSESSMENT

Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

Vulnerability analysis and the work of the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit

89. The WFP commitment to working with the Government and to supporting the development of government systems demonstrates an alignment with the humanitarian and development needs of the country and of the Government. This work is also widely appreciated and considered to be an important role that WFP plays. Non-government stakeholders, including WFP, have recently been reflecting on their engagement with Government and have expressed the view that a lack of coordination between them has contributed to wasted investments. This waste is partially a result of competing investments, but also because a coordinated dialogue with Government might have improved the technical quality of key government early warning and assessment products; and improved uptake of important reforms.¹⁴⁸

90. In terms of WFP monitoring for early warning, stakeholders struggled to identify unique characteristics of WFP early warning data (the NDRMC did highlight the market information provided by WFP, but development partners did not); but still appreciated the WFP contribution to the overall pool of data. However, WFP information products that combine both early warning data and information on response are seen as particularly valuable, because such correlated data cannot easily be found elsewhere.

Food Assistance

91. The WFP role in food assistance was, for the duration of the evaluation period (and before), part of an overall response led by the Government. As such, it was extremely well aligned strategically with the Government's national agenda, objectives and strategies. This is true for both the food assistance provided through the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance. Humanitarian food assistance and the PSNP remain important and relevant programmes in the context of the humanitarian and development needs of the country. WFP is seen as a trusted partner by Government, particularly by NDRMC, and as an important stakeholder by the broader humanitarian and development community. Despite this recognition, WFP financing for food assistance has seen a decline, particularly when viewed as a proportion of the overall response. Some of this decline reflects greater Government financing of humanitarian food assistance and how resources typically flow within the PSNP (through government systems); but it is likely that it also reflects declining trust or interest in WFP approaches.

92. Alignment with government priorities and systems has involved significant trade-offs: benefit levels in the PSNP are below WFP standards; WFP has limited involvement in front-line targeting (which is

¹⁴⁸ Instead there is a perception that a number of stakeholders carried favour with the Government by financing WDRPs despite technical reservations about their validity. This was not WFP's situation at the start of their investment in the WDRPs but staff do report having reservations in recent years.

particularly poor in its main operational area), WFP is dependent on government reporting which is weak;¹⁴⁹ and so on. As a means of engaging with these trade-offs, WFP could do more to plan and articulate its non-direct-implementation role. In particular, it should articulate a vision for how it will engage in national policy and programming processes. This would help it to better define areas where improvement is needed, where evidence is weak and needs to be supplemented (through analysis and/or action research); and to dedicate appropriate resources to undertake necessary analysis, documentation and support to change management.

93. The strong WFP role in Somali region is an appropriate response to the high levels of food insecurity in this region along with the capacity and governance challenges this region experiences. However, there is room for a more defined agenda on how WFP will work to improve government capacity and systems in this region.

Food assistance for assets and other technical support focused on natural resource management

94. In general, the objectives and approaches of MERET were very consistent with Government policies and initiatives, in particular the sustainable land management sector investment framework (SLM-SIF). MERET could also be seen as highly relevant in terms of addressing development needs for interventions addressing land degradation and food insecurity. However, as the 2012 evaluation stated (Tango & IDS, 2012), “despite this broad sense of relevance... there is a lack of strategic integration and coordination between MERET and [government] initiatives... The failure to conceive MERET within a holistic national plan... results in resource limitations and strategic gaps.”

95. The country programme 2012–2015 document (WFP, 2011i) did envision efforts to broaden the application of lessons learned from MERET; but little actually happened as a result of the limited financing for MERET under the new country programme and a tendency for WFP MERET staff to cling to the “MERET model” rather than develop a vision of how MERET learning could be incorporated into other interventions.

96. WFP is now positioning itself, within the PSNP public works group, as an agency with good knowledge and access that can support public works in pastoral areas. In the early years of the evaluation period, stakeholders perceived lower engagement by WFP but this has changed in the past 18 months.

Livelihood and climate change related interventions.

97. With all three programmes focused on improving resilience, reducing risk and enhancing livelihoods there are obvious links between programmes under this sector and the humanitarian and development needs of the population. However, the two programmes with an insurance component (R4 and SIPE) do raise some interesting philosophical questions for WFP. Both programmes explicitly DO NOT target the poorest:

- To be eligible for R4, the policy holder needs to have user rights to land in the form of a land certificate. This criterion not only excludes the poorest, but it excludes the majority of women (women in households headed by men rarely have land certificates in their own name).
- Under SIPE only households with livestock holdings of five or more tropical livestock units will be eligible for a payout; again a criterion which explicitly excludes the poorest.

¹⁴⁹ WFP are dependent on reports from Government run Final Distribution Points and these are often very poor and incomplete (both for PSNP and for GFD). This was something orally reported by WFP staff but is backed up by the PSNP ‘commodity audits’ which highlight a wide range of food management issues including reporting.

98. This touches on an issue that is not always explicit in the discourse around insurance: whether insurance will ever be an appropriate means of reaching the poorest. And, if insurance is not appropriate for the poorest, whether unconditional transfers to the poorest and insurance for the less poor can really co-exist.

99. While the Government has expressed interest in all three programmes, there are not, at present, clear counterpart initiatives for the insurance initiatives that WFP could be feeding into. In part this is what justifies pilot initiatives in this area, but thinking through what learning Government could and should be gaining from these interventions is important. There could, for example be risks to the Government taking a quota-driven approach to micro insurance.

100. The livelihood component of the PSNP could be considered a counterpart initiative for the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme; however, there have been no attempts to link RWEE to this or any other government programme. This does create a risk of an abrupt end of support to programme beneficiaries when funding through the RWEE Trust Fund comes to an end. It would be appropriate to build in a handover strategy into the programme from its inception, not just at the end.

101. Stakeholders do question whether more livelihoods focused work is an area where WFP has a comparative advantage. WFP needs to demonstrate why it does have this comparative advantage and how its role differs from the role played by other UN agencies (particularly FAO and IFAD).

Factors and quality of strategic decision making

Vulnerability Analysis and the Work of the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit

102. The VAM unit has been a source of information to inform WFP decision-making and other sections of the report, including other sections of this Annex, will confirm that VAM data has fed into decision-making processes.

103. WFP has not established an effective system for monitoring and evaluating the efforts of the VAM unit; this gap is particularly severe for investments in Government capacity. This lack of an effective system is evident both from the weaknesses in the monitoring data illustrated by Table 26 above; and in the lack of review or evaluation of the WFP capacity-building support to Government. WDRPs and the LEAP software both reflect considerable investments by WFP and by Government; and both institutions (along with other development partners) would have benefited from an independent assessment of the design and implementation of these sizeable investments and whether the products are having their desired impacts. An overall improvement in the quality of monitoring this aspect of the portfolio is necessary to both better understand what the VAM unit has achieved and to inform how this portfolio evolves in the future.

Food Assistance

104. Food assistance programming by WFP is heavily dependent on Government decision making. Humanitarian food needs are defined by multi-agency needs assessments, with the Government having the final decision on the exact numbers to be released. The geographic targeting of the PSNP is also largely Government led. WFP does engage in the humanitarian needs assessment process but shares reservations with other stakeholders over its quality. A key gap in the needs assessment process is the lack of an effective process to assess needs of IDPs. As a consequence, their needs are not reflected in appeal documents and this also hampers donors' ability to respond. WFP does make use of IOM and OCHA provided data to inform decision making over humanitarian food assistance resources in Somali region and to use some of these resources for IDP needs, but the lack of a formal mechanism for doing this (i) hampers the ability of WFP to

respond and (ii) means there is no agreed standard of response (size of food basket, duration etc.) in place nationwide.

105. Before undertaking any cash programming, the VAM unit of WFP undertakes a market assessment. This both informs the final decision as to whether or not to go ahead with a cash-based intervention and informs the value (in Ethiopian currency) of the benefit. This approach does help to ensure that WFP does not implement cash programming in locations where it would not be appropriate, but it holds cash transfers to a higher standard than food transfers (no equivalent assessment is done before a food-based intervention). WFP, in partnership with the World Bank, has recently started a process that will provide guidance on how to decide whether cash or food will be more appropriate in different areas and at different times in Ethiopia.

106. The evaluation team heard from monitors and the country office in Addis Ababa that a significant amount of programme monitoring takes place including post distribution monitoring regarding the use of assistance received. However, it proved difficult to extract any of this data from the country office and to find any examples of analysis of this information. This suggests that there isn't much use of this data for learning and to support improvements in programme management. Lack of control by WFP over front-line implementation also seems to have encouraged a sense of resignation because of how difficult it was to actually effect change in front-line delivery. A stronger focus has been put on learning lessons from the recent cash pilot in Somali region. The tools used to monitor this intervention were reviewed prior to the pilot becoming operational, and the evaluation team are aware that a preliminary analysis of results has happened and that findings will be shared with government and development partner stakeholders.

107. There is also a question as to whether its current M&E framework effectively allows WFP to monitor the totality of its support. In particular, there are gaps in how WFP measures the outputs and outcomes of its technical assistance efforts whether related to government capacity building or to the WFP contribution to broader Government policy and programme design issues.

108. A number of stakeholders expressed frustration that WFP was too timid in their engagement with the Government and that there was room for it to expand its role as critical friend. Analysing, documenting and sharing lessons learned will be an important step in bringing issues to the attention of the Government. WFP should also recognize its convening power both with other UN agencies and the wider development community, and work with other stakeholders to support the Government to make needed changes.

Food Assistance for Assets and other technical support focused on natural resource management

109. The main factor affecting decision making regarding food assistance for asset programming by WFP has been resource constraints. Both activities under the MERET programme and WFP support to PSNP (including PSNP public works) have been significantly less than envisaged; WFP was forced to close MERET earlier than intended and were not able to implement the phasing out activities that were planned. As Figure 44 and Figure 45 above show, the scale of the funding constraints for MERET could not easily have been foreseen.

110. Two sizeable evaluations of MERET took place during the evaluation period: an overall impact assessment (Tango & IDS, 2012) and a review looking at how MERET may have improved resilience to the 2015/2016 El Niño crisis (Nelson et al., 2016). The latter was more of an ex-post evaluation with MERET activities already significantly scaled down; but the former made a number of observations and recommendations on how MERET could be realigned. These recommendations (which were, to some extent, echoed in the country programme document) were not implemented, but the funding constraints faced by MERET virtually eradicated their ability to change direction. However, there is a perception that the WFP staff working on MERET tended to cling to the "MERET model" and were not able to develop a vision of

how MERET learning could be incorporated into other interventions. This lack of vision could be seen in efforts to develop a sustainable land management for food insecure and pastoral areas (SLM-FIPA) Programme, which did not get much traction with donors because it too closely echoed the MERET model.

111. Comments were made in previous sub-sections of this annex about the limitations of the current WFP M&E framework; the same comments apply to WFP food-for-asset programming, both in terms of data quality and analysis, and in terms of the inability of the current M&E framework to support effective monitoring of the totality of WFP support.

Livelihood and climate change related interventions

112. Both the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) and Rural Women Economic Empowerment programme are global initiatives with Ethiopia selected for participation. There is a degree of fatigue in the country office that Ethiopia is so frequently selected as one of the laboratories for new global initiatives, and a perception that these more externally designed programmes can contribute to a degree of fragmentation and incoherence in the overall programme portfolio. This is not a critique levelled at any one programme; Ethiopia has also been selected as a test country for P4P, and home-grown school feeding. It is the sheer number of these initiatives, on top of an already expansive portfolio, that comes at a cost. (However, this perspective was not unanimous: a contrasting view was that Ethiopia, as a large country, should expect, and welcome, participation in a variety of initiatives.)

113. When comparing activities of R4 in Tigray with those in Amhara one is struck by the varying prioritisation of different components. In Tigray the ratio of insurance premium holders to participants in savings programmes is 7.5:1; in Amhara it is 1:1.03. These differences probably reflect more the different interests and strengths of WFP and Oxfam, than they do any underlying need. Oxfam has a closer relationship with the Amhara programme and leads on the savings component, WFP has the closer relationship with the Tigray intervention and leads on the insurance component.

114. Both Rural Resilience Initiative and SIPE have an in-built evaluation process in the design of the programme. This reflects their status as pilot projects, and the fact that the learning these projects generate is as important, or even more important, than any results these programmes have on direct beneficiaries. However, the evaluation team did feel that there were other aspects of the portfolio that could also benefit from a high degree of reflection. There is sometimes an overemphasis on the 'new and exciting' to the detriment of parts of the portfolio that are larger in scale.

Performance and Results

Vulnerability analysis and the work of the vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit

115. A detailed analysis of results can be found in the section on Programme Delivery and Results above. Three key findings are summarized below:

- a) The VAM unit's early warning information is valued as a contribution to a broader pool of data. The WFP information products that combine both early warning data and information on response are seen as particularly valuable, because such correlated data cannot easily be found elsewhere.
- b) The continued participation of WFP in seasonal assessments is highly valued and its contribution has been critical to ensuring that assessments happen and that assessment teams have a reasonable set of guidance materials. However, there is a broad consensus that there are significant constraints to government early warning and needs assessment processes and that substantial barriers to overcoming these constraints remain. WFP cannot be held responsible for the limited

progress in this area, but nor can it be claimed that its investments have borne fruit with regards to improving – at a national level – the evidence used to plan humanitarian responses.

- c) Continued investment by WFP in Woreda Disaster Risk Profiles throughout the evaluation period appears to be an example of giving the Government "what it wants and not what it needs". While a number of outputs have been achieved, the Government is still a long way from achieving its desired target of WDRPs for every woreda in the country; and there are even more significant concerns about the practical utility of WDRPs in relation to humanitarian response.

Food Assistance

116. Ethiopia experienced unprecedented need in 2016 following an El Niño event which was closely followed by an Indian Ocean Dipole related crisis affecting south and south-eastern areas. WFP interventions – both directly in terms of food assistance, and indirectly in terms of coordination and logistics support – had significant impacts in saving lives. In 2016 and 2017 WFP distributed food assistance (a combination of food and cash) to 8 million and 4.1 million beneficiaries respectively.

117. WFP is in an unenviable position regarding its support to both PSNP and general food assistance. It is caught between donor expectations about key standards of implementation (such as targeting) and a reality of government frontline implementation. The geographic focus on Somali and Afar, regions with lower capacity and greater governance issues, exacerbates the gap between expectations and reality. WFP does not have authority over government frontline implementers, and therefore, cannot be held responsible for these deficiencies, but external stakeholders feel strongly that WFP could and should be doing more to advocate with and support government implementers to improve performance.

118. WFP has some stated commitments to contribute to broader Government policy and design issues and has had some success in this area. WFP has worked with other PSNP donors to support the evolution of the PSNP into a scalable safety net (through consolidating PSNP and humanitarian food assistance) and 2017 saw some significant steps forward by Government in this regard. WFP support to the development of a Government integrated food/cash plan was a key measure to taking this consolidation forward. WFP also supported the regional governments of Afar and Somali to make adjustments to their PSNP transfer schedules so that public work payments would reach beneficiaries during periods of greatest need. In Somali region the new transfer schedule came into effect in the second half of 2017; the newly defined schedule directly mirrors the hungry seasons; it has the potential to dramatically increase the impact of PSNP transfers if adhered to. In Afar region, a new schedule is expected to come into effect in the next Ethiopian financial year (starting in July 2018). Finally, support by WFP's (and other stakeholders') support to the development of a National Social Protection Policy bore fruit with the release of the policy in 2014.

119. WFP is increasingly seeing the PSNP as a platform for other parts of the portfolio. Examples of this include: (i) the targeting of Rural Resilience Initiative interventions to PSNP beneficiaries and the use of similar PSNP public works modalities to allow households to 'earn' a portion of their insurance premium; (ii) the plan that any payouts under the SIPE programme will be targeted to PSNP beneficiaries and again, the use of PSNP modalities (including public works) to channel these payments; and (iii) the design of the nutrition voucher programme to address stunting will also be targeted to PSNP beneficiaries to explore whether such an approach can improve the nutrition impact of the PSNP.

120. Further details on the wide range of results achieved under this programmatic area can be found in the section on Programme Delivery and Results above.

Food assistance for assets and other technical support focused on natural resource management

121. Funding shortfalls meant that results have also been far below what was anticipated. In particular, results of the MERET programme during this period were far below target. Nevertheless, over its lifetime, MERET was a very influential programme that changed the Government's approach to natural resource management.

122. At a national level and as a programme MERET could not be sustained; neither donors or the Government were willing to continue funding programme. At a household and community level there is significant evidence that these results are being sustained. The 2016 evaluation found that "even in light of the El Niño-induced drought, the benefits accrued to [households participating in MERET] at the time of the MERET impact evaluation in 2012 did not erode after four years...". During its field visits the evaluation team found that community structures created by the MERET programme were still operational and were still organising activities on the watershed, with labour provided as a community contribution.¹⁵⁰

123. A range of public works activities have been undertaken by the PSNP, but there are recognized deficiencies in the quality of public works implementation in the two regions where WFP provides support. WFP has recently provided support to the regional governments of Somali and Afar to (i) review their public works schedules and (ii) undertake analysis to inform realistic public works' objectives according to different clusters of woredas.

Livelihood and climate change related interventions

124. WFP engagement in livelihood and climate ch

125. ange related interventions has expanded during the period covered by the this evaluation. This expansion includes an increase in coverage by the Rural Resilience Initiative programme and the addition of the Rural Women Economic Empowerment and SIIPE programmes. Details on the key results achieved under this programmatic area can be found in ¶82–88 above.

¹⁵⁰ The provision of labour for free by community members is currently a standard requirement by Government. In the MERET site visited it was interesting to see that some of this labour contribution could be used on 'MERET activities'.

Annex M Resilience

Introduction

1. Scheduled to take place concurrently with this country portfolio evaluation (CPE), WFP has commissioned a strategic evaluation of its work to support enhanced resilience. The strategic evaluation notes the definitions and components of resilience set out in Box 11 below, and aims to answer the following key questions:

1. How relevant is WFP's resilience work and for whom?
2. Is WFP engaged in the right partnerships to enable strong resilience outcomes?
3. Is WFP "fit for purpose" to implement resilience programming?
 - a) Are WFP country offices able to generate and use data to make informed decisions related to resilience-related programming?
 - b) Does WFP have a clear and consistent approach to measuring outcomes related to resilience?
4. What emerging lessons can be identified?

Box 11 Working definition and components of resilience

Working definitions in WFP

Resilience is largely understood as being a set of capacities or capitals – of individuals and communities, of social, ecological and economic systems – that can be strengthened such that people and systems are better able to prepare for, recover from, adapt to, and even transform in the face of shocks, stresses and mega-change processes. Climate change, and the uncertainty it brings, is one particular source and amplifier of shocks that has driven the need for resilience approaches. In its 2015 Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition, WFP defines resilience as —the capacity to ensure that shocks and stressors do not have long-lasting adverse development consequences. WFP also describes resilience building as providing support to people and institutions and enabling communities and institutions to develop their assets and capacities to prepare for, respond to and recover from crises

Components to be addressed in the strategic evaluation

The key components of resilience that will be used to assess WFP's capacity to carry out resilience strengthening work are:

1. Resilience defined in relation to shock or stressors.
2. Resilience as an "ability" – or a set of capacities for dealing with a shock or stressor. Resilience-building should not be reduced to focussing purely and primarily on households and communities as passive, primary recipients or beneficiaries.
3. Resilience as a short and long-term capacity; it is a means rather than end goal itself.
4. Resilience involving multiple actors: different groups have different contributions to and requirements from resilience-building projects. Projects often need to draw-on different knowledge and expertise from a wide range of actors and perspectives within a system to promote legitimacy and ownership of the processes and outcomes.
5. Resilience facilitated through systems- "risk and vulnerability to specific shocks and stresses is the consequence of multiple interacting factors operating within complex, inter-connected systems. Those designing resilience-building operations should aim to build an ever-deeper understanding of the multiple actors and interest groups involved, the wider structural and institutional processes and constraints at play, and the complex and often unpredictable nature of these interactions.

Source Bene et al, 2018

2. Ethiopia was originally included in the list of potential case study countries, but was subsequently omitted because timing of the strategic evaluation would clash with the timing of the CPE. Instead it was proposed that members of the evaluation team would increase the scope of their work to include data collection related to the strategic evaluation. The additional findings generated would feed into the CPE itself as well as the resilience strategic evaluation.

3. This process involved introducing, where appropriate, questions regarding WFP support to enhance resilience into core CPE key informant discussions; and conducting specific interviews in relation to the strategic evaluation with key informants subsequent to the CPE process. The specific interviews undertaken for the purposes of the strategic evaluation are listed in Table 29 below.

Table 29 Interviews undertaken specifically for the resilience strategic evaluation

Name	m/f	Organisation/Position	Reason selected
WFP			
Samir Wanmali	M	WFP/Deputy Country Director	Strong overview of WFP's programming in Ethiopia
Sibi Lawson-Marriott	F	WFP/Head of Programmes	Good overview, particular focus on a) livelihood programming & b) gender
Claude Kakule	M	WFP/Deputy Head of Programmes	Good overview, particular focus on emergency programming
Rupak Manvatkar	M	WFP/ Climate Solutions Lead	Specific knowledge of some of WFP's more resilience focused programming
Alemtsehai Alemu	F	WFP/ VAM Unit	To address specific questions regarding WFP VAM systems
Interviews were also sought with M&E staff, but nobody was available during the period to speak to the team.			
Government			
Nesredin Rube	M	Natural Resource Management Directorate (NRMD) of the Ministry of Agriculture: Member of Public Works Focal Unit	NRMD is a key WFP partner for both its support to the Productive Safety Net and, in the past its MERET programme.
Interviews were also sought with the Special Advisor to the Commissioner of the National Disaster Risk Management Commission and the focal person for MERET at the Natural Resource Management Directorate (NRMD), however neither stakeholder responded to requests. Interviews conducted for the CPE from which data were extracted included meetings with the NRMD in Tigray region, and a number of National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) staff.			
Development Partner			
Ciara Silke	F	DFID, Resilience Advisor	Good awareness of resilience concepts and key partner for WFP
Million Alemayehu	M	World Bank, Sustainable Land Management Project	The 'other team' in the World Bank with good knowledge of WFP's work (members of the safety net team had already been interviewed by the evaluation team)
Immaculada Guixé-Ancho	F	EU Delegation, responsible for EU's resilience programme	Responsible for managing the EU's support to resilience programming in Ethiopia (largely through NGOs)
UN			
Paul Handley	M	OCHA, Country Director	Close partner to WFP
Abdoulkarim Bah	M	FAO, Deputy Representative	FAO and WFP are in discussion regarding the establishment of a joint resilience programme in Somali region
Randall Purcell	M	WFP	Team working on a Global UN Framework for Resilience
Angelika Planitz Sylvie	F	UNDP	
Wabbescandotti	F	FAO	
NGOs			
Gemechu Kebede	M	Oxfam, R4 Manager and colleague	In partnership with WFP on R4 programme
Tilahun Gemebe	M		
Esther Steward	F	Mercy Corps, Country Director	In partnership with WFP on SIPE programme
Esther Watts	F	CARE, Country Director	CARE manages a resilience programme consortium; strong gender perspective

Key Findings

How relevant is WFP's resilience work and for whom?

4. There isn't a single definition of what resilience or support to enhanced resilience means in the Ethiopia country office. Most interviewed staff members talked about communities and households being able to withstand shocks but only senior managers tended to use the language of anticipate, absorb and transforming. Other staff members talked more about predicting, mitigating and coping with shocks.

5. The view that resilience meant that communities and households should be able to withstand shocks was very much shared by staff of the Government of Ethiopia, although they often particularly emphasized the ability to withstand shocks without external support. A number of other external stakeholders referenced the need to take a more systems approach to resilience, examples (mentioned by NGO staff members) included the importance of understanding power dynamics and how this relates with other forms of vulnerability. There was a perception that this was an area neglected by WFP and that WFP was more focused on technical responses to different hazards and less about power dynamics and differences in vulnerabilities and capacities. A number of NGO representatives also specifically referenced the importance of understanding the differing roles and vulnerabilities of women and men in order to undertake resilience programming effectively. WFP shared other stakeholders' views that they had not done enough to look at the gender dimension of resilience in Ethiopia; there was recognition that work to improve gender analysis and programming in Ethiopia was at a nascent stage.

6. There was some discussion about what constituted WFP's resilience programming. A list of programmes had been used to help undertake the country selection for the resilience evaluation and this had included programmes such as P4P and Purchase from Africans for Africa. WFP staff in Ethiopia questioned the extent to which these should be highlighted as resilience programmes: yes, they were programmes intending to have positive economic impacts but not particularly focused on resilience. Staff were keener to point to their programmes that: (i) provided safety net support to poor households (support to the Government's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)); (ii) specifically addressed risk mitigation and management measures (such as the two programmes that include drought insurance); (iii) focused on the livelihoods of the poor (such as the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) or the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) programme); and/or (iv) addressed land degradation and the need to enhance the natural resource base (Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition (MERET), PSNP and R4). Some staff also pointed to WFP's support to school feeding and the management of acute malnutrition as programmes that help to prevent short term shocks from leading to long term impacts, and school feeding also has the potential to help future adults to adapt and transform livelihoods.

7. External stakeholders also tended to mention similar interventions. However, some questioned whether WFP was really significantly involved in resilience – "they are more a humanitarian organisation"; and at least one stated strongly that it was WFP's support to a humanitarian food response that was a precondition to more "development/resilience focused work". Two agencies highlighted WFP's work to improve the supply chain for humanitarian food assistance as an example of the kind of work to support resilience that WFP had unique skills in. An effective supply chain will continue to be important in Ethiopia, and WFP's support to improving this has been a very holistic approach focusing on how the system as a whole can be improved. A five-year strategy has been conceived and a supply chain capacity strengthening project developed. This project includes a food management improvement project sub-project which supports the NDRMC's food management capacities, investments in food quality assurance, support to the Government Departments responsible for maritime affairs and roads and links to national food transporting companies.

8. There was some suggestion that WFP's commitment to resilience tended to rise and fall with donor interest, and a need for resilience to be consistently a management priority if WFP was really going to make significant changes to how it approached programmes. But there was also a recognition that the scale of humanitarian programming in Ethiopia made it difficult for WFP to focus prolonged attention on topics outside the humanitarian sphere. With such a large-scale humanitarian intervention, there was a lot of time doing and not so much time thinking.

Is WFP engaged in the right partnerships to enable strong resilience outcomes?

9. The Government of Ethiopia is WFP's lead partner for all its work. The strongest relationship is with the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) but important partnerships have been established with the Ministry of Education (school feeding), Ministry of Health (nutrition), and the Ministry of Agriculture (the Productive Safety Net Programme). With NDRMC, the partnership is heavily focused on emergency response and engagement around anticipating or predicting shocks with investments in early warning systems and woreda disaster risk profiles. The national appeal document in Ethiopia has recently been renamed. It was previously known as the Humanitarian Requirements Document but is now known as the Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan (HDRP). It lays out the government's ambition to take a more "disaster risk management approach" to predictable humanitarian crises and talks about planning through a three-pillared model with the three pillars including: (i) prevention and mitigation measures; (ii) preparedness and response; and, (iii) national system strengthening and recovery. Resilience interventions, as listed in the HDRP, fall under the first pillar and include activities such as: rehabilitation of livestock water points, irrigation support, crop and vegetable production, strengthening community seed banks, irrigated fodder production, and establishment of feedlots.

10. During the life of the MERET programme, a key partnership was with the Natural Resource Management Directorate (NRMD) of the Ministry of Agriculture, and its counterparts at regional and district level. MERET is most frequently listed as a key WFP resilience building programme, and the relationship with the NRMD helped ensure what was seen as a very successful programme.

11. WFP is actively engaged in the various working groups which make up the institutional architecture of key programmes/interventions. With regards to the disaster risk management architecture, they are members of a number of committees and act as secretary (the NDRMC is chair) to the Food Aid Management Task Force and the Prioritisation Committee. With regards to the PSNP they are members of the donor working group and active participants in the public works technical working group. With regards to the nature of their contribution, stakeholders perceive their areas of focus to be humanitarian risks, food management and logistics, and Somali/pastoral issues.

12. A United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) provides an overarching strategic framework for the UN in Ethiopia. The current UNDAF (2016–2020) is the fourth in Ethiopia with the first dating back to 2002. The vast majority of WFP's investment was expected to be for the second UNDAF pillar focusing on "resilience and green economy" and an output focused on "people in disaster prone areas having diversified sources of income and being better able to prepare, respond and recover from emergencies and disasters" (UN, 2015). WFP is an active member of the Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team, providing regular bulletins on food needs and humanitarian response and actively collaborates with UNICEF and OCHA on nutrition and emergency preparedness and response.

13. In 2017, an expected visit by the Executive Directors of the three Rome based Agencies led to a specific focus by these three agencies (FAO, WFP and IFAD) on opportunities for complementarity. Discussions before and after this visit have led to the concept of some joint resilience programming in Somali region. The vision is not a traditional joint programme, but rather to recognise that the three agencies have interventions in the same geographic areas; that these interventions are complementary and impact could be increased if linkages are made during the planning process; and, therefore, that agencies should seek to coordinate at the district

level in their engagement with government implementing agencies. Prior to this, there has been little joint programming between WFP and other UN agencies.¹⁵¹

14. Donors are seen both as providing an incentive for and as hindering resilience programming. A major challenge seen by a range of stakeholders is that the majority of financing for WFP comes through agreements that are four one year or less. This dependence on short term funding limits WFP's ability to develop a long-term vision and to have the necessary type of longer term interventions that are required for effective resilience programming. Furthermore, resilience type interventions can get lost in the gap between traditional development and humanitarian funding streams. There is the perception that resilience interventions can be seen as "too humanitarian" for development funding, but too long-term for humanitarian financing. Conversely, views were expressed that donors' interest in resilience was resulting in WFP seeking to develop such programmes in an effort to secure funding. Exasperation was expressed regarding the broader UN that they were "only interested in resilience because they want money"; while expressed as a criticism, this demonstrates the importance of the availability of funding and nuancing of donor language over funding opportunities in encouraging resilience programming. However, there is a concern that WFP (and other agencies) may just be trying to repackage existing interventions as resilience programmes in order to secure funding (Anderson, 2016).

Is WFP "fit for purpose" to implement resilience programming?

15. Ethiopia has not yet gone through the new country strategic planning process. The country office is currently developing an interim country strategic plan but a full country strategic plan (CSP) will not be in place until 2020. The last country strategy was developed for the period 2012–2015, so it has been a considerable time period since the Ethiopia office last went through a strategic planning process (see Annex K). There is the perception that the new CSP approach will better enable them to incorporate resilience more strategically in their programming both because of the planning approach and because it is hoped that the new CSP will enable/encourage donors to provide longer term funding. As highlighted above, dependence on single year funding is seen as a significant limit at present.

16. There is recognition by senior WFP staff, that there is still a tendency for siloed programming and a failure to make the linkages between different interventions that could really support improved resilience programming. There have been efforts to address this recently, with attempts to see the PSNP as a basis on which other interventions can be built. Examples of this can be seen through WFP's R4 programme, which targets PSNP beneficiaries and echoes some PSNP modalities in terms of its 'insurance premiums for work' component; the SIPE programme which will provide transfer top-ups to livestock-holding PSNP beneficiaries affected by drought; and the planned chronic malnutrition focused fresh food voucher programme which also aims to target PSNP beneficiaries.

17. Senior staff are aware of the various relevant policies and strategies – specifically mentioned were the Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (WFP, 2015e) and the Climate Change Policy (WFP, 2017u), but point to the need for additional support on how to contextualise and operationalize these policies. This is not just a gap for resilience related policies and strategies but a broader challenge for country offices as can be seen in the gaps in implementation of the gender strategy discussed further in Annex T. Cross learning,

¹⁵¹ One possible exception has been work on the treatment of acute malnutrition where WFP takes a lead on supporting the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition through the provision of Targeted Supplementary Feeding commodities and technical assistance, and UNICEF has the lead on supporting the treatment of severe acute malnutrition. While these two streams of support have not been as integrated as they should have been, this is largely as a result of delays within the Government of Ethiopia in implementing a commitment that the Ministry of Health should become the overall coordinating agency. Annex P on nutrition describes in more detail the progress and limitations of this work.

through technical and management meetings, can play a more important role in understanding how to contextualise a new policy than written guidelines which can take a more academic approach. Senior staff also recognize the need for in-service training of staff. Improved understanding of resilience concepts and approaches are important internally for the design and implementation of programmes and externally, both in how WFP dialogues with the Government of Ethiopia and other stakeholders who might be involved in operationalizing resilience interventions, and in how it represents itself to donors and those who can influence the resourcing of activities.

18. The Ethiopia programme is starting to make use of the theory of change approach in programme design. At present only one or two programmes have developed a theory of change, but as time goes on more programmes will develop. Senior management expressed appreciation of the approach which helps programme teams to think through what it is they are trying to achieve/transform and how best to achieve this transformation.

19. The three pronged approach (3PA) has not been much used in Ethiopia. This is partly because the approach built on the work of Ethiopia's MERET programme and while internationally this was 'repackaged' as 3PA, Ethiopia has continued to use guidelines that were developed jointly with Government. These Community Based Participatory Watershed Development Guidelines, which were issued in 2005, underpin a number of large scale Government of Ethiopia programmes in natural resource management: the PSNP, the sustainable land management programme and local activities implemented by districts using free community labour.

20. WFP in Ethiopia have recently undertaken a large scale human resourcing restructuring. While this was necessary given resourcing constraints it has, in the short term, reduced WFP's capacity to engage in resilience programming and dialogue (for example through the loss of staff who worked on the MERET programme). However, there remain a number of teams which, in principle work on activities that relate to improved resilience. These include the climate, PSNP, logistics and nutrition teams. However, as highlighted above, there is a need to ensure that staff are adequately aware of resilience concepts and approaches and how these concepts could and should influence the design and implementation of WFP activities.

Are WFP country offices able to produce, access, analyse and use (relevant, accurate, timely and sex- and age-disaggregated) data to make informed decisions related to resilience-related planning? Does WFP have a clear and consistent approach to measuring outcomes related to resilience?

21. WFP through its VAM unit and a number of tools or programmes is engaged in the collection of a range of data related to resilience. While the VAM unit does collect some relevant data, there has not been any specific effort to review indicators or analysis specifically in relation to resilience related programming. Much of the data the VAM unit does collect is related to the incidence and impact of shocks, particularly drought and price related. The VAM unit uses both secondary data (generated by Government, FEWSNET and others) and primary data collected by field monitors to inform its analysis and reporting. Particular attention is paid to information related to rainfall (both long-range forecasting and available data on actual rainfall), price data and local information on the incidence and impact of shocks. WFP regularly collects household information. This data collection does allow it to disaggregate analysis on the basis of the gender of household heads but does not enable WFP to understand dynamics within the household.

22. WFP has supported the Government of Ethiopia through the development of the Livelihoods Early Assessment and Protection System. The LEAP software uses agro-meteorological monitoring data to estimate future crop yields and rangeland production and, in turn, impacts on household food security and potential food needs. The NDRMC does make use of LEAP-generated information for its own consumption and early warning bulletin and uses LEAP forecasts as part of the background data provided to seasonal assessment teams. However, LEAP was initially designed to trigger early responses to food security crises and this is not

yet happening – instead humanitarian food assistance is almost always only provided on the basis of field assessments (usually the twice yearly seasonal assessments). The WFP-supported comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis report includes a specific component looking at vulnerability to shocks. However, the approach pre-dates the development of WFP’s resilience policy and it has not been revised to reflect the needs of a more resilience-focused approach.

23. WFP has also supported the Government of Ethiopia in its development of district level disaster risk profiles. While this support is much appreciated by Government (which sees these profiles as a first step in supporting disaster risk reduction at woreda and community level), there are significant concerns about: (i) whether the data collected is actually used to inform programming ;(ii) limits in how resulting disaster risk reduction plans can actually inform interventions by other government programmes (e.g. the PSNP) because they are not compatible with the planning approach of these other programmes; (iii) there being no clear pathway for how a profile and its plan can be linked to actual investments through Government planning and budgeting processes; and (iv) the resource intensity of the approach (both in terms of staffing and cost) . (See Annex L, ¶139ff for further information).

24. While the Country Office does collect some monitoring data which is related to resilience, there is not a clear and consistent approach to measuring outcomes related to resilience. Examples of the data on outcomes related to resilience which the country office collects include: dietary diversity, food consumption and coping. Analysis of this data for the broader CPE shows some challenges in the consistency with which data is collected and the extent to which it can demonstrate outcomes that can be attributed to WFP’s efforts (see Annex J and Annex L for further information). The broader CPE also found that the country office underused the data that it collected. A large quantity of routine data is collected and reported in SPRs, but there are only infrequent examples of analytical work using this data and subsequently being used to inform programme design, adjustments or other forms of decision making.

25. There were attempts by the country office to use resilience related composite indices such as the emergency preparedness and response capacity index and national capacity index but these were abandoned. Staff found it difficult to be consistent about how they collected and aggregated the data required to make up the index. There are concerns that the new zero hunger capacity scorecard under the corporate results framework will face similar challenges.

What emerging lessons can be identified?

26. In Ethiopia, the period since the release of the Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition has seen two large scale crises – the 2015/2016 El Niño crisis and the 2016/2017 Indian Ocean Dipole event. WFP’s engagement with these crises coincided with a process of restructuring resulting a significant downsizing in terms of staffing and a period of uncertainty and upheaval for all staff. These events have limited the Country Office’s ability to consider how best to operationalize resilience concepts in Ethiopia. There is, therefore, a feeling that a resilience approach is very relevant to the Ethiopia context, that WFP’s portfolio in Ethiopia includes a number of resilience related programmes but that there is a need for a lot more thinking about how to operationalize such an approach within WFP’s Ethiopia programme.

27. There is a tendency for the country office to think of household and livelihood focused interventions with regards to resilience programming. While such interventions may play important roles in supporting enhanced resilience, they are not the only interventions that can. A number of stakeholders pointed to WFP’s work on logistics and the supply chain for humanitarian food assistance (described in Annex R) as perhaps WFP’s most innovative support to enhanced resilience. They cited the fact that this work both played to WFP’s logistics’ strengths and was underserved by other institutions.

Annex N Support to Refugees

INTRODUCTION – SCOPE OF THIS ANNEX

1. This annex addresses food assistance to refugees; successive sections:
 - provide an overview of the context for refugees in Ethiopia;
 - describe WFP's programme and role in providing assistance;
 - review the delivery of the programme and the results achieved;
 - discuss a number of key issues underlying programme performance; and
 - provide an overall assessment with reference to the main evaluation questions and evaluation criteria adopted for the country portfolio evaluation (CPE).

CONTEXT FOR REFUGEES IN ETHIOPIA

Origins and Numbers

2. Ethiopia has a long history of welcoming refugees. At the time of writing, it provides protection to about 900,000 refugees and asylum seekers from over 20 countries (see Map 8 below). It is the second largest hosting country in Africa and the sixth largest hosting country worldwide. Successive severe droughts and persistent conflict in the Horn region have fuelled refugee movements throughout the evaluation period, adding to the national burden of fulfilling humanitarian response alongside achieving development goals (UNHCR, 2017a). The dynamics of refugee movements vary: some groups (such as refugees from Eritrea) have been relatively stable, while the largest current group (South Sudanese) has been the most volatile and also outnumbers the host population in Gambella.


Government Responsibility and Policy

3. The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the main governmental counterpart to United Nations agencies for refugee response. Through collaboration with other partners, at international, national and regional level, ARRA oversees the responses to both complex emergencies and protracted situations in the country.

4. Long-term government policy on refugees has been to permit entry but to restrict them to camps, with clear limits to livelihood opportunities, access to local resources and agricultural lands, job opportunities and national services. During the evaluation period, progress has been made towards inclusion of refugees within the national systems of Ethiopia with the aim of ensuring cost-effective investments that will benefit host communities and refugees through the expansion of quality services. Challenges that impede inclusion are the location of refugees in camps in the peripheral, poorest regions where public investment in development has been limited, and external financing of service delivery through humanitarian aid (WFP, 2017c, p. 4).

5. Recently there have been the beginnings of significant change in the Government's refugee policy. Following the World Humanitarian Summit (UN, 2016a) and UNHCR's propagation of a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF, UNHCR, 2016), the Government has made public pledges and published a road map towards implementing the CRRF in Ethiopia (ARRA 2018); this envisages expanded out-of-camp and livelihoods opportunities for refugees in the long term.

Map 8 Number and location of refugees in Ethiopia, January 2018



Source: UNHCR Refugee Infographics as of 31 January 2018.

Government and Donors

6. The USA is the largest donor currently for refugees; others include ECHO, DFID, and Germany with smaller funds from Finland and Canada. The lead agency for refugee operations is UNHCR, in collaboration with government systems.¹⁵²

7. WFP considers good collaboration between WFP, ARRA and UNHCR as essential. The Government feels a strong sense of ownership over programmes and works closely with WFP on the understanding that WFP designs everything with UNHCR. WFP has made sustained efforts to achieve effective working relationships at national and regional levels.

WFP Policy and Guidance on Refugee Assistance

8. Relevant country strategy papers (WFP, 2011e, WFP, 2016u, WFP, 2017i, WFP, 2017k – all reviewed in Annex K) say little explicitly about refugee assistance, and refugee programming appears to be handled separately. Nevertheless, PRRO reporting aligns responses to WFP objectives (WFP, 2017a).

9. A joint impact evaluation by UNHCR and WFP documents the contributions that food assistance can make (UNHCR & WFP, 2012),¹⁵³ and notes that while it support initial food security for refugees, this diminishes over time especially for households headed by women. Moreover the study notes that, “food assistance has not been used to open pathways to self-reliance and durable solutions” (UNHCR & WFP, 2012, p14 ¶84).¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² UNHCR's mandate does not extend to IDPs, but IOM has a role in monitoring the IDP situation.

¹⁵³ WFP Synthesis Evaluation: Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations, 2013 (UNHCR & WFP, 2012)

¹⁵⁴ For a broader overview of relevant evaluations, see Annex F of the inception report, Mokoro, 2018a. Key evaluations mentioned include: Joint UNHCR-WFP Impact Evaluation on the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in

INTENDED WFP PROGRAMME OF FOOD ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND ITS RATIONALE

Refugee assistance within the WFP portfolio

10. During the evaluation period, refugee assistance was provided through three successive WFP PRROs (101273, 200365, 200700) and one regional emergency operation (IR-EMOP 200656). The latter was a short term intervention, beginning December 2013, for provision of high energy biscuits (HEB) to refugees within South Sudan but also for those arriving near Gambella and Assosa. The three PRROs represent a continuation of WFP assistance to refugees in Ethiopia that began in the 1980s. They are similar in objectives and strategy, focusing on meeting the minimum nutritional needs of the refugees, with general food assistance complemented by targeted supplementary feeding and school feeding. Project documents note that handover is not a realistic objective, since refugees' displacement from their country of origin is in most cases protracted, and Ethiopia, although generous in providing asylum, does not have a policy for integration of refugees. PRRO 200365 (commencing 2012) noted that, due to constraints on funding, WFP assistance has been dominated by relief, with only very limited resource allocation towards recovery. The project documents also note that "In partnership with ARRA, WFP will study the feasibility of cash or voucher transfers, to decide whether to implement these transfers on a pilot basis in selected areas".

11. In terms of expenditure, WFP refugee assistance represents between one fifth and one quarter of the total portfolio (Table 11 in Annex H).

Components of WFP assistance to refugees

12. As noted in the terms of reference (Annex A, ¶30), assistance provided by WFP in the camps includes both relief and recovery components with the following objectives: (i) enabling refugees to meet minimum levels of food security through General Food Distribution (GFD); (ii) treating acute malnutrition in children, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable refugees with special nutrition needs, by implementing targeted supplementary feeding; (iii) stabilizing school enrolment of refugees girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools, through the school feeding programme and (iv) increasing livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile settings through income generating activities (e.g. beekeeping, fruit trees and vegetable gardening, provision of fuel-saving stoves and the rehabilitation of degraded environments).

13. In 2013, WFP introduced combined cash-and-food assistance in two camps, where a cash transfer replaced part of the cereals distributed through GFD. The rationale was to enable refugees to buy food commodities of their choice and to diversify their diet. Over the years, this combined modality has now been implemented in 13 camps. The amount of cash distributed depends on the camp and on the local price of cereals.

Fit with portfolio

14. Refugee food assistance has long been a feature in the WFP country portfolio as reflected in specific operations. The scale and nature of the response raises issues about its significance in relation to the portfolio including targeting and selected modalities, nutrition impact, and consistency between food assistance and livelihoods.

Protracted Refugee Situations 2003-2010; Refugee cash pilot representative survey and final evaluation report 2015; PRRO 200700: Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees: An evaluation of WFP's current operation and transition period 2014-2015.

15. Given the interlocking nature of operational efficiencies, institutional capacity and the learning and implications for forward strategy development (CSP), the evaluation team has assessed the fit between refugee response and other aspects of the portfolio. Particular focus has been given to food security and humanitarian food assistance nationally, nutrition status, and capacity development and partnership with ARRA.

16. Nutrition assessments are done every year in all camps to assess the nutrition status. WFP has also engaged with the joint assessment mission between WFP and UNHCR, which is focused on food security, livelihoods and nutrition and is completed every two years. The most recent joint assessment was done at the end of 2016. FAO also joined the assessment mission to focus on livelihoods. ARRA and NGOs also partner in the joint assessment missions.

17. The future of refugee operations is now subject to the CRRF Road Map (ARRA 2018), which is bringing changes, but how it fits with the refugee response as yet remains unclear. The government priority is for host communities to have access to land and jobs. Currently most refugees have no access to jobs or land and limited freedom of movement. Despite some relaxation of this by the Government, refugees are very vulnerable and are almost entirely dependent on WFP and other humanitarian assistance (for cash and food); refugee children also benefit from school meals. Recently, WFP has tested a new pilot to improve livelihoods involving the sharing of land between refugees and host communities, income generating activities, and strengthened live distribution monitoring at sites (see ¶32 below).

18. WFP's comparative advantages and effectiveness in partnerships with government and with other agencies over the evaluation period have presented dilemmas that have yet to be resolved. "The magnitude of food insecurity and malnutrition in Ethiopia remains staggering. In this light, WFP now must work to *reposition* itself in Ethiopia ... [As] the 'transporter of choice' perception also overlooks some of the other *technical* and *advisory services* WFP can offer. The country office will need to strike a balance between continuing with the delivery of food assistance—albeit at a significantly lower volume—and moving towards playing a more technical assistance role that helps the Government achieve its economic and social development goals."¹⁵⁵ In view of limits to available funding, the scope for achieving this balance in refugee programming will very much depend on the financial constraints for funding refugee support and also on the evolution of government policy and strategy towards refugees. Both these issues are prominent in this evaluation's review and assessment of WFP's support to refugees during the 2012–2017 period.

PROGRAMME DELIVERY AND RESULTS

Implementation During 2012–2017

Adaptation and innovations

19. During the evaluation period, WFP had to adapt its refugee assistance to a changing pattern and rising levels of refugee need, including a resurgence of Somali refugees, requiring upscaling of assistance in Dollo Ado at the beginning of the period, then the major influx of refugees from South Sudan. This took place against a background of increased humanitarian requirements globally and, apparently, growing difficulty in raising the resources needed to ensure sufficient food assistance to refugees in Ethiopia. This in turn was reflected in substantial ration cuts beginning in 2015, and the risk of more to come.

¹⁵⁵ *Repositioning WFP in Ethiopia 2016* (WFP, 2016u) p.4-5, including scenarios which may serve as a basis for appraisal of refugee assistance prospects with stakeholders.

20. There was innovation as well as adaptation. WFP played a leading role in the introduction of biometric systems, discussed next. Other innovations involved increasing use of cash alongside food in kind (Figure 54 below charts the increasing use of cash); and work on refugee livelihoods (see ¶30ff below).

Biometrics

21. The initiative to introduce consistent biometric registration is one of WFP's major achievements during the period, and has important implications going forward. All stakeholders (including Government, donors, implementing partners, and beneficiaries) attest the important difference that introduction of biometric registration has made, both to the overall refugee count (sharply reducing the number of legitimate claimants) and to the efficiency of food distribution. Biometric registration has not only helped with refugee food assistance and camp management (see Box 12 below) but also contributed to increase protection and security.

Box 12 More efficient distribution with biometrics

As observed by the evaluation team, in Melkadida the monthly general food distribution usually takes about 3–4 days to complete, with about 1,200 households getting served in one day. The distribution schedule is determined by family size (e.g. first day of distribution for families of 5, second day for families of 4....) On their assigned distribution day, beneficiaries who are registered to collect the family's rations queue up in the waiting hall to first do their biometric registration before getting their GFD. The waiting hall is well ventilated and furnished with benches and a wide screen TV, with wire fencing separating one queue line from the next in a maze formation.

The biometric registration system is powered by two sources of power supply (generator and solar power) to ensure that power outage will not disrupt the registration process. Each registered beneficiary's fingerprint is verified and they are given coupons to collect the GFD ration, if their fingerprint matches with what is registered in the system.

If the fingerprints or ration cards don't match, the beneficiaries are referred to the case management team (ARRA and UNHCR) for verification. Punch cards were used prior to the introduction of the biometric system. There are two warehouses next to the distribution site, where GFD items are prepositioned for the next month's distribution.

Source: evaluation team visit, April 2018.

22. Beginning in 2015, WFP country office staff agreed with UNHCR bilaterally at national level to address significant discrepancies in refugee numbers and the need to verify those actually registered. Despite some initial resistance, UNHCR had agreed to make changes and there was good, well-informed collaboration between WFP and UNHCR staff. Impetus for the change in registration was achieved with the support of ARRA and key donors (including ECHO, DFID, and the USA). Donors shared the costs of implementation and roll-out of new systems. In implementing new approaches to refugee registration, WFP was willing to adapt its own systems (SCOPE), which accommodate both data on registration and modality (cash, food-in-kind). In Ethiopia, UNHCR had introduced ProGres and most refugees were registered there. WFP was concerned that data was not being used. At the time of CPE field work, progressive data reconciliation between UNHCR and WFP was under way and was expected to be completed within two years.

23. As well as strengthening the management of food assistance, the introduction of biometrics has significantly reduced the numbers claiming food assistance.¹⁵⁶ However, there is now a very large


¹⁵⁶ It is difficult to be precise about the reduction in numbers on account of more rigorous, biometric, identification requirements, because of the underlying volatility in refugee numbers. However, WFP is now feeding only 70% of the numbers that appear on the UNHCR register.

divergence between the total numbers of refugees reported by UNHCR, and the numbers successfully claiming food assistance from WFP. Some gap between the totals is to be expected, given possible delays in initial registration, and significant numbers of registered refugees living out of camps, especially in urban areas, but the scale of the gap between the UNHCR total and the numbers being fed by WFP (a difference of around 250,000) has led donors to press forcefully for a reconciliation of the data sets. There is a risk that lack of credibility of data on refugee numbers could hamper fund-raising efforts.

Beneficiary numbers and regional distribution of caseload


24. During the evaluation period, allowing for fluctuations, the scale and significance of refugee response has increased, although actual beneficiaries were slightly fewer than planned initially in each PRRO (Figure 49 below). There is some inconsistency between different estimates of the refugee population in Ethiopia. ARRA figures (see Annex G, Table 6) record almost 900,000 officially registered refugees from South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and Kenya residing in 26 camps located in the five regional states of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Somali and Tigray at the beginning of 2018. This is similar to the figures presented by UNHCR (see Map 8 above). However, the number of food assistance recipients is significantly lower – as indicated in Figure 49. The refugee caseload is broken down by region in Figure 50 below.

Figure 49 Refugee beneficiaries 2012–2017, planned and actual by sex



Source: SPRs

Figure 50 WFP caseload by region, 2012–2107




Source: WFP Ethiopia CO dataset.

Financing of food assistance to refugees

25. The pattern and uncertainty of funding is shown in Figure 51 below. Tight budget constraints were dictated by actual funding which was consistently far short of requirement, on average by some 60 percent (see Figure 51 below). Funding appears increasingly hard to secure, with actual expenditure falling increasingly short of budget requirements: 66 percent in 2015, 52 percent in 2016 and only 44 percent in 2017.


26. Major donors, by share, over the whole period are shown in Figure 52 below. Annual trends for the top donors (Table 30 below) show significant decline over the period. Smaller donors were more constant and some donors have come and gone with differing scale impact (e.g. Japan and Saudi Arabia made large contributions between 2013–2015, linked to the South Sudan crisis).

Figure 51 Budget vs actual expenditure for all refugee operations 2012 -2017



Source: WFP financial database

Figure 52 Top ten donors to WFP Ethiopia refugee programme 2012-2017



Source: WFP Resource Situation Database.

Table 30 Top ten donors 2012–2017 to WFP Ethiopia refugee programmes


Donor	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
USA	55,036,467	13,474,537	29,074,770	65,697,293	53,092,374	20,000,000	236,375,441
European Commission	4,000,000	1,269,476	9,151,486	5,592,841	25,330,943	8,485,499	53,830,245
Saudi Arabia		926,945	10,000,000	32,332,488			43,259,433
United Kingdom			12,757,338	10,716,675	7,597,322	7,792,208	38,863,543
MULTI-LATERAL	7,905,133	3,745,000	13,482,000	1,391,000		2,247,000	28,770,133
Japan		15,000,000	4,200,000	5,000,000			24,200,000
UN CERF			14,311,601		7,961,416		22,273,017
Canada	2,956,134	2,921,130	2,692,998	2,360,346	3,852,080	2,973,978	17,756,666
Germany	1,298,701	977,836	1,019,022	1,122,334	7,769,145	3,233,020	15,420,058
Finland	1,066,667	1,340,483	1,367,989		2,234,637	888,626	6,898,402

Source: WFP resource data

Food and cash distribution


27. Figure 53 below shows food distribution tonnage between 2012–2017, as compared with planned and actual beneficiary numbers; it shows clearly that, although refugees aided in most years have been fewer than anticipated, the proportionate shortfall in food available has been much greater, putting rations under increasing pressure. Figure 54 below charts the increasing use of cash over the evaluation period.

Figure 53 Planned and actual refugee food distribution (mt) 2012–2017



Source: WFP SPRs PRRO 200700 and PRRO 200365.

Figure 54 Planned and actual refugee cash distribution (USD) 2012-2017




Source: WFP SPRs PRRO 200700 and PRRO 200365.

28. During the evaluation period, refugees have generally been provided with a monthly general food distribution or a combination of food and cash. In 2017, WFP provided assistance of 112,754 Mt of food and USD 8,376,567 of cash-based transfers to 636,451 beneficiaries in 26 camps across seven regions of Ethiopia. Of those reached, 19 percent were children under 5, 45 percent were children aged 5-18, 36 percent were adults, and 53 percent were female. For 2016, it was estimated that the cash interventions injected about ETB 8 million into the local markets on a monthly basis. The cash provided to refugees enabled them to purchase food items that were not included in WFP's general rations as well as to buy various non-food items.¹⁵⁷

29. Figure 55 below illustrates the change in food types distributed between 2012 and 2017 (for more annual detail see Table 31 below). Some of the substitutions were contentious, e.g. where they did not match refugee taste preferences (the displacement of wheat by sorghum) or required labour-intensive, or fuel-intensive, preparation. Sugar was a casualty of constrained resources and sorghum/millet was increasingly substituted for wheat.

Figure 55 Refugee food distribution by commodity type for 2012 and 2017



Source: WFP SPRs PRRO 200700 and PRRO 200365 2012-2017.

Note: 2012 total commodity size is 61,238 Mt and 2017 total commodity size is 112,754 Mt.

¹⁵⁷ WFP, PRRO 200700 SPR 2016 (WFP, 2017c) p.8.

Table 31 Refugee food distribution by commodity type 2012 – 2017

Commodity	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Beans	145	1,771	364	1		1,056
Corn Soya Blend	6,502	6,054	9,397	9,711	12,631	14,500
Dried Fruits		459	4	159	3	
Faffa	632	6,654	514			
High Energy Biscuits	28	40	186	46	36	102
Iodised Salt	366	809	594	635	809	779
Lentils		3,263	120		1,288	
Maize				63		10,885
Maize meal			1,072	4		
Peas					35	
Ready To Use Supplementary Food	147	426	67		206	279
Rice	8,509	10,818	444			
Sorghum/Millet			36,345	29,858	36,172	49,804
Split Peas	4,100	2,865	7,771	7,809	8,039	9,377
Sugar	1,523		2,176	1,988	1,346	619
Vegetable Oil	2,753	5,056	5,275	4,488	6,579	6,440
Wheat	36,533	74,267	52,950		40,562	18,913
Wheat flour		2,280	367			

Source: WFP SPRs PRRO 200700 and PRRO 200365.

Livelihoods activities¹⁵⁸

30. The livelihoods activities have been a very small component of the refugee PRROs but have been present throughout the evaluation period. The refugee livelihood programming served two purposes: to provide income opportunities for refugees and host populations, while also reducing conflict between the two communities. Main activities were as follows:

- In 2012–2014, the livelihood and rehabilitation project was implemented in Kebribeyah, Awbarre and Shedder refugee camps of Somali region. Activities included planting trees, beekeeping, water and soil conservation and establishment of grinding mills.
- In 2014, WFP together with Lutheran World Federation (LWF) supported a refugee women's group to establish milling facilities at Bambasi camp in Benishangul-Gumuz region.
- In 2015, a total of 500 households benefited from livelihood interventions in two camps, Berhale and Aysaita, in Afar region. In partnership with a local NGO, WFP supported income-generating activities such as business skill training, multi-story vegetable gardening, and provision of seedlings for gardens. Refugees and the host community in Jijjiga also benefited from ponds that were built in Jijjiga camps to improve water supply during the dry season.
- In 2016 livelihood activities were extended in Gambella, Tigray and Afar camps but the 2016 SPR noted that the overall impact on livelihoods from livelihood activities was minimal as the number of refugees involved in these undertakings compared to the total refugee population was quite small.
- In 2017 WFP provided livelihood support to refugees in the Somali and Afar camps. Beneficiaries were provided with seed capital to implement activities including *injera* making, animal rearing and fattening, milk production, preservation and processing and vegetable gardening. Livelihood activities were not provided in the other camps due to funding constraints.

¹⁵⁸ This section is drawn mainly from successive SPRs.

31. In 2016 the evaluation of the PRRO saw the relevance and potential of livelihood programming, allowing refugees to acquire skills and means to supplement the food and cash assistance they receive. It noted that livelihood activities have been unequal across the camps. The government's 2010 "out of camp policy" allowed Eritrean refugees who do not have a criminal record to live in any part of Ethiopia, but most refugees have been required to live in camps, severely affecting their ability to pursue livelihoods strategies. The PRRO evaluation recommended that the livelihoods component should be expanded, noting that this had not yet been possible because of WFP struggles to finance the high costs of the refugee operation.

32. In 2017 funding constraints again meant that, despite the evaluation recommendations, WFP was still not able to scale up livelihood activities. However, in late 2017, WFP, in partnership with ARRA, Farm Africa and Mercy Corps, developed a multi-year livelihood project to benefit refugees as well as the host community around the refugee camps of Dollo Ado in the Somali region. The activities to be piloted include irrigation for crop-livestock production and access to micro credit and market linkages for households.

33. In 2017 WFP also commissioned a refugee livelihoods assessment to be conducted in refugee camps in Tigray, Afar and Somali (Jigjiga) regions of Ethiopia to identify opportunities for livelihoods and self-reliance in the refugee camps and host communities. The assessment suggests that the most pertinent theme overshadowing all of the findings is that the vast majority of refugees will not be able to achieve any substantial form of economic self-reliance if policies remain in place that dissuade and prevent refugees from pursuing income-earning opportunities outside of the camps.

34. In 2017 Ethiopia's pledge to the Leaders' Summit on Refugees was made, which included allowing refugees to work outside the camps, open bank accounts, and obtain IDs and work permits. However, realisation of the government pledge is an essential prerequisite for refugee self-reliance and their achievement of realistic livelihoods strategies. The change in government policy was seen to have already made a difference to WFP Ethiopia funding, according to country office informants. They suggested that they were seeing increased funding for livelihoods activities within the refugee PRRO, raising hopes for a strategic shift towards refugee livelihoods for WFP Ethiopia towards the end of the evaluation period.

Reported outputs and outcomes

35. Currently, PRRO 200700 (2015–18; approved budget, including revisions, USD 493.9 million) contributes to meeting the basic nutritional needs of refugees through the distribution of food assistance and the expansion of cash distributions. It has addressed acute malnutrition in children, and pregnant & lactating women through the provision of specialized nutritious foods. The PRRO has also sought to contribute to stabilizing school enrolment of refugee girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools and to increased livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile transition situations (WFP, 2017c p5). Reported outputs (aggregated across refugee camps) are shown in Table 32 below. It is notable that not one of these indicators was used for reporting across all six years of the evaluation period, and that no general food distribution indicators for refugees were reported on after 2015.

36. Outcome indicators for WFP's refugee programmes are collated in Annex I (see indicators 71–97 in Table 18). These focus on the coping strategy index (CSI), dietary diversity, and food consumption scores (FCS), as well as other summary data on nutrition and school feeding indicators. Nutrition outcomes for refugees are reviewed in detail in Annex P, ¶¶93–102 (see below, ¶¶39-40, for a summary of findings on refugee nutrition), and school feeding is reviewed in Annex Q. Data reported in SPRs are, naturally, aggregated across refugee camps, and we have therefore placed more emphasis on the disaggregated data from distribution and post distribution monitoring reports, discussed next.

Table 32 Reported outputs for the refugee programme 2012-2017

Output	plan/actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
GFD							
C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	P			6,349			
	A			5,108			
C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	P			6,209			
	A			6,100			
Number of days rations were provided	P	266	365	365			
	A	254	365	365			
Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in men's name	P	90,100	19,895				
	A	93,400	21,772				
Number of household food entitlements (on ration cards or distribution list) issued in women's name	P	78,300	24,046				
	A	74,100	16,781				
Number of timely food distributions as per planned distribution schedule	P	12	12	12			
	A	12	12	12			
Number of women in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P	44	24				
	A	43	19				
Number of men in leadership positions on food, cash, voucher management committees	P	49	25				
	A	50	27				
Nutrition							
Energy content of food distributed (kcal/person/day)	P	2,202					
	A	2,202					
Number of health centres/sites assisted	P				24	24	26
	A				24	24	26
Number of targeted caregivers (male and female) receiving 3 key messages delivered through WFP supported messaging and counselling	P				64,350	51,521	35,963
	A				54,601	47,915	35,962
School feeding							
Actual Kcal value per meal per day per type of school meals programme model against the planned Kcal value	P						
	A			450			
Number of classrooms rehabilitated	P	4					
	A	3					
Number of feeding days	P				44	22	22
	A				42	21	22
Number of feeding days as % of actual school days	P	200	100	80			
	A	200	80	75			
Number of pre-school boys assisted by WFP	P			800			
	A			488			
Number of pre-school girls assisted by WFP	P			700			
	A			426			
Number of primary school boys assisted by WFP	P	114,050	32,350	40,400			
	A	86,800	28,580	31,040			
Number of primary school girls assisted by WFP	P	110,750	32,350	40,600			
	A	83,000	19,470	32,300			
Number of primary schools assisted by WFP	P			17	21	21	24
	A			16	18	20	24

Output	plan/actual	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of schools assisted by WFP	P	28	18		21		
	A	31	16		18		
FFA/FFT							
Number of excavated community water ponds for livestock uses constructed (3000-15,000 cbmt)	P				3		
	A				3		
Number of people engaged in income diversification strategies to reduce risks and vulnerability of food security to climate	P			225			
	A			210			
Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution	P				500	546	1,150
	A				500	336	1,150
Number of water springs developed	P			3			
	A			3			
Quantity of agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer) distributed	P				0	3,400	0
	A				0	2,914	0
Quantity of agricultural tools distributed	P				1,504	5,100	2,400
	A				1,504	4,659	2,400

Source: WFP SPRs PRRO 200700 and PRRO 200365 (see also Annex I).

Findings from distribution and post-distribution monitoring reports

37. With support from WFP regional bureau, the country office has recently undertaken an analysis of its refugee operations from 2015 based on distribution and post-distribution monitoring reports (WFP, 2018e). These data allow more granular analysis than the summary indicators provided in the SPRs. Key findings are as reproduced in Box 13 below.

38. It is notable that indicators for Gambella are consistently the worst during the period. This does not necessarily imply worse performance by WFP, as it may reflect the greater challenges that recent arrivals from South Sudan have faced. However, it does highlight that the needs of some groups of refugees are greater than others'. Figure 24 (in the main text of this report) illustrates the contrasts in food security status and trends across different geographical groups of refugees.

Box 13 WFP support to refugees: key findings as reported by a review of monitoring reports, 2015–2018

- **Food security** of WFP beneficiaries under the refugee operations has remained rather stable since 2015. Of WFP beneficiaries, 90 percent fall into the acceptable and borderline food consumption categories. Households consume 4.5 food groups on average. Frequency of adoption of negative consumption coping strategies has decreased over time.
- **Effectiveness & Efficiency.** Food security is extremely sensitive to food distribution and utilization. The longer the interval between the distribution and the interview, the worse is the food consumption score. And food security is worse if less of the entitlement is used.
- **Resilience Approach.** Beneficiaries who have an income source alternative to WFP assistance also have better food consumption scores and tend to adopt negative coping strategies less frequently. This demonstrates the importance of adopting a resilience approach in dealing with food insecurity.
- **Food security trends are sensitive to geographical breakdown.** In Mekelle, Jiggiga, and Dollo Ado sub-office areas, the food consumption score has improved over time, and dietary diversity score performs well, while for the Gambella, Semera, Assosa sub-offices the proportion of beneficiaries with poor food consumption score has increased and dietary diversity is limited.

- **Assistance Modality.** The more cash received, the better is the beneficiaries' food security.¹⁵⁹ Beneficiaries who receive combination of cash and food are also performing better with regards to some protection indicators (information provision, safety issues, etc.).
- **Nutrition.** Households with pregnant and lactating women enrolled in blanket supplementary feeding programmes, as well as households with a caregiver receiving messages on child feeding and care practices, also have better food consumption scores.
- **Gender & Protection.** Female respondents, beneficiaries who more frequently face safety and other issues, and beneficiaries with limited knowledge about WFP operation are also the most food insecure. Additional attention is required for these categories of beneficiaries.

Source: extracted from WFP, 2018e.

Refugee nutrition

39. WFP's support to refugee nutrition is reviewed in detail in Annex P, ¶93–102, which amplify the following key findings:

- a) The refugee nutrition programme is of higher quality than that for Ethiopian nationals because the programme follows international standards and protocols and improved products were introduced earlier than in the national programme.
- b) The programme met performance targets in terms of outcomes, although numbers included in both targeted and blanket supplementary feeding were lower than planned.
- c) Malnutrition rates did not go up as expected following ration cuts. Ration cuts began in 2015, but malnutrition did not significantly increase. This may be in part due to blanket supplementary feeding and other programmes in the camps such as the provision of improved water sources. However, it is surprising and should be investigated further. Impacts on stunting may not be seen yet, however. (As illustrated in Figure 24, there are significant variations in food security trends in different geographical areas.)
- d) Pilots using cash were promising for preventing malnutrition. Dietary diversity scores were higher in the camps where WFP provided cash, as refugees could purchase more meat, eggs, fruits and vegetables. Sales of food commodities were also significantly reduced in the camps receiving cash transfers, and the WFP ration overall lasted longer. Malnutrition rates were found to be lower for camps where cash was combined with food than in the food-only camps.
- e) WFP was not seen to be playing a leading role in refugee nutrition. While the coordination with key agencies such as UNCHR and UNICEF at field level is currently good, the WFP staff leading on nutrition are field monitors, not nutrition specialists.

40. WFP has relied on implementing partners, including NGOs and in collaboration with ARRA and UNHCR, for the delivery of supplementary feeding. The relationship between food assistance and nutrition status for refugees, however, varies significantly between camps (as illustrated by Figure 24). In Tigray, there have been no major concerns about nutrition and even some improvement has been noted. In Somali, levels of GAM and SAM have been kept mainly under control: in 2016, malnutrition rates reduced to 14.1 percent (from c.21 percent since 2009/2012 and consistently above 15 percent emergency level). For most of the period, this has also been true in Gambella but there are now more worrying trends. Refugees

¹⁵⁹ This finding shows a suggestive association between cash provision and levels of food security, but a more rigorous study (using a counterfactual) would be needed to prove causality.

met by the evaluation team there had a clear sense of growing anxiety and desperation: they said that food supply, nutrition, security, trauma, and deaths had worsened.

KEY ISSUES UNDERLYING PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

41. Observations on key aspects of WFP performance on food assistance to refugees have been drawn from a wide range of stakeholders including refugees themselves, Government, donors, UN and NGO partners, and WFP staff. The following sections consider, in particular:

- Resource availability and ration cuts.
- Supporting comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF) approaches.
- Key aspects of gender and humanitarian principles relating to refugees.

42. The discussion of modality choices in Annex S also has strategic relevance for WFP's refugee operations.


Resource Availability and Ration Cuts

43. Although WFP has a supporting role to UNHCR and ARRA, its central involvement in food assistance puts it at the centre of fund-raising and in the front line when it comes to managing and explaining shortages of food. As noted in ¶25 above, the ratio of budget requirements to actual expenditure has declined sharply since 2015. Funding for refugee assistance is now a big, perennial concern (and not only in Ethiopia). Donor fatigue, generally and for Ethiopia, is making it hard for WFP to get funding for food. Global factors since 2011/12 include growing number and scale of crises (natural disasters, IDPs) and acute crises alongside protracted crises.

44. Funding is often last-minute, ad hoc and unpredictable. This makes WFP's tasks more difficult: on the one hand there is a risk of "crying wolf" and losing credibility if fund-raising efforts are perceived as too alarmist; on the other hand, being forced into ration cuts at short notice can exacerbate an already difficult situation. At times WFP has attracted criticism on both counts. Some observers considered that WFP could be more energetic, and collaborate more effectively with UNHCR, in fund-raising. And there was at least one instance where ration cuts at short notice led to disturbances in some camps. The latter lesson appears to have been learned and in early 2018 the country office adopted more systematic protocols for pre-announcing changes to rations, and for planning further ahead to ensure that any given level of rations is sustainable for several months before making changes in either direction.

45. This is reflected in recent briefings to donors, which have highlighted alternative scenarios and also the serious welfare implications if further cuts ensue. WFP country office has set out an overview of current funding shortfalls for the immediate period ahead, March-December 2018 at differing ration levels, and of the potential consequences if funding requirements are not met (see Figure 56 below). To date, ration cuts have affected only the general ration, with allocations for supplementary feeding and school feeding protected, but such protection is not sustainable indefinitely.

Figure 56 WFP pipeline overview for March–December 2018




Source: Consultative Meeting with Donors on Refugee Programme in Ethiopia (ARRA, UNHCR & WFP) February 28, 2018

46. With limited options for refugees, widespread concern has been expressed about the dangerous impacts of ration cuts – both for security, especially in relation to young people, and also in relation to nutrition, especially amongst children, given high GAM rates in Gambella and Dollo. If food cuts continue at the rate they are, the potential consequences are extremely serious. As one UN observer put it, “It is irresponsible of countries to expect African countries to host these refugees and not to support them.”

47. As noted earlier (¶39 above) ration cuts have not yet led to a rise in recorded malnutrition rates in camps (although GAM rates are anyway at unacceptable levels). The reasons for this need to be investigated, not only from the immediate nutrition perspective (e.g. the mitigating effects of supplementary feeding programmes) but also to gain a deeper understanding of refugee coping strategies and their long term implications. Figure 57 below summarises strategies adopted by refugees. In a context where rations are frequently sold to meet non-food requirements, and the monthly ration often runs out before the next distribution, it would be particularly important to monitor household debt, as many refugees report borrowing or taking credit from shops as a means of surviving from one distribution to the next (see Box 14 below).

Figure 57 Refugee coping strategies, December 2017



Source: Consultative Meeting with Donors on Refugee Programme In Ethiopia (ARRA, UNHCR & WFP) Feb 2018

Box 14 Credit as a coping strategy in Melkadida

In Melkadida, in the face of ration cuts and insufficient food as well as other necessities, families resort to taking credit from the local shops run by the host community. Refugee families are increasingly in debt, as they need to sell the ration from the next distribution to pay back the credit they took from the local shops the previous month. "It is a never ending cycle of debt." The food basket has never included meat, milk and vegetables and sugar is no longer provided. So refugees need to supplement what they get from WFP. Also, families that send their children to Quran schools need money to pay for that, so they either have to sell part of their ration or take a loan from the local shops.

Source: evaluation team visit, April 2018

Supporting Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) Approaches

48. WFP work on refugee livelihoods has linked food assistance to coping strategies, balancing short-term coping with long-term solutions. WFP approaches have long included an ambition to support livelihood strategies, but such approaches have been characteristically squeezed out by resource scarcity, leaving insufficient resources for relief and only token amounts for recovery (see ¶30–34 above).

49. Longer-term, as noted, there are signs of a very significant review of government approaches to refugees, embodied in the road map for implementing the CRRF (published in 2018). Shifts in national and international policies are beginning to be reflected in institutional development. The CRRF presents a big opportunity for adjusting key relationships within Government and with key partners, including UNHCR and WFP, to new realities in resourcing, ways of working, and refugee assistance. However, there is recognition that CRRF approaches will not transform humanitarian imperatives in the medium term.

50. Location of the refugees is very significant for Coping strategies in relation both to cash and to alternative means of livelihoods. Because of the sensitivity and remoteness of camps, movement restrictions place severe limitations on the coping strategies for refugees. These include out- of -camp policies, access to land and employment, market accessibility.

51. The CRRF Job Compact could help but is long term and long distance (requiring refugee movement and relaxation of out of camp restrictions). There are good prospects for integration in some areas, e.g. Kebreaya, with economic and social preconditions largely in place; legal framework and enforcement now needs to happen. By contrast, Gambella is considered a 'developing region'. While the Jobs Compact has planned 100,000 jobs with 30 percent for refugees, there are no industrial parks planned for Gambella. Strategies for viable economic integration are urgently needed (e.g. building on the UNHCR *Livelihood Plan for Refugees in Ethiopia*, November 2017 (UNHCR, 2017d).

Key Aspects of Gender and Humanitarian Principles Relating to Refugees

Gender

52. Reporting on gender and age dimensions (women, youth, children) over time reveals significant changes in relation to earlier projects (Tanner, 2018) in terms of gender awareness, activities, language and in relation to WFP strategy (WFP, 2008e, WFP, 2012m). Attention is given to numbers and differentiated Status roles of women and men; planning and implementation reveals growing awareness of how participation of women and focus on gendered roles of men and women, can enhance programme delivery and lower risks (WFP, 2012l, WFP, 2013j, WFP, 2014s, WFP, 2015q, WFP, 2015s, WFP, 2015u). Changes in strategy and practice are noted that empower women in relation to other significant and powerful groups; focus on their "dignity" also important as part of the wider move away from seeing them only via the

vulnerability lens, as a specific and particularly vulnerable recipient group (Tanner, 2018, WFP, 2016zb, WFP, 2017c).

Humanitarian principles

53. Annex O provides a detailed review of how humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations have been reflected in the WFP portfolio, including the refugee programmes. The general assessment is that WFP has integrated these considerations into its approaches, though various aspects could be strengthened. As with most other aspects of WFP's work in Ethiopia, its close integration into wider government-led programmes means that WFP must consider these programmes as a whole and advocate for effective system-wide approaches.

54. Preferential treatment of Eritrean refugees in relation to ration cuts is a clear infraction of the impartiality principle, WFP and other humanitarian agencies should continue to raise this issue with the government and seek more equitable treatment.

55. Concerns about infractions of the humanity principle have also been expressed about ARRA policy not to give any support to refugees for the first 7-10 days (so as not to create a "pull factor"). Remote from any form of assistance and with no support, this is a major issue of humanitarian principle and protection with concerns about sexual exploitation of women seeking food to keep their children alive.

ASSESSMENT

Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

56. There was strong continuity in WFP's food assistance to refugees during the period. All components of the programme (general food assistance, nutrition, school feeding) remained relevant to the needs of beneficiaries, and WFP and its partners adapted well to emerging needs such as the influx from South Sudan. Efforts to support refugee livelihoods were also relevant, but resource e constraints meant they were on too small a scale to do more than demonstrate possibilities.

57. WFP worked in close coordination with national authorities, particularly ARRA. During most of the period, national policies limited the scope for out of camp solutions and working for the joint benefit of refugees and host communities. However towards the end of the period the government Road Map for implementation of a CRRF approach held possibilities of more work towards durable solutions in the future.

58. WFP has continued to work closely with UN partners, and in particular in support of the UNHCR's leading role; collaboration with UNHCR on the rolling out of biometrics was especially important. Relationships with funding agencies were, as always, crucial. There was strong alignment on objectives, but increasing difficulty in raising sufficient funding. WFP has had to recognise that different main donors have different preferences about cash versus food modalities.

59. As noted, there have been trade-offs concerning the humanitarian principles (i) in terms of having to apply ration cuts at odds with the principles of humanity, and (ii) in terms of disagreement with government policy that discriminates in favour of refugees from Eritrea.

60. The appropriate partners for WFP support to refugees are those of longstanding already mentioned. However, WFP's ability to influence policy and programming seems to have been limited by the greater salience of, and attention to, other humanitarian crises during the evaluation period, and by staff limitations that meant WFP was not always adequately represented in the key forums dealing with refugee policy and programmes.

Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making

61. The context for refugee food assistance has created considerable complexity – conflicting demands, challenging trends in resourcing, confusing and contrary institutional stance on key issues, differing refugee situations, and dilemmas about how to balance change and internal approaches on food assistance modalities with external imperatives. As already noted, WFP's ability to analyse and adjust to changing circumstances was constrained by staff limitations and by an apparent greater concentration on other issues than the refugee programme.

62. Anticipation of uncertainties, especially in relation to donors' funding commitments, has presented major challenges for strategic and operational decisions. Donor funding is now the binding constraint for conventional approaches to food assistance. Competition for funding has created friction and this must be overcome through coordinated approaches to shared strategic goals and programming for food security.

63. In face of the scale of the wider crises especially since 2016 and four decades of refugee assistance, increasing numbers, decreasing donor funding and competition a greater level of attention to alignment and strategic positioning could have been expected. Several stakeholders observe that more could have been done earlier to mobilise vision and strategy to differentiate based on more accurate assessment of needs, combined with vigorous advocacy to make the case for minimum humanitarian assistance where most needed. Important opportunities now exist with changes in global and national context for more effective and progressive approaches to refugee assistance and integration.

64. Decisions to reduce general food assistance to parlous levels now imperil nutrition and risk compromising humanitarian principles. In light of reduced and restricted funding, it is reasonable to wonder whether more could have been done by WFP and other key partners and donors to raise essential resources.

65. In view of resource constraints, WFP may be credited for strategic decision-making in relation to efforts to (i) implement and learn from use of cash, and (ii) maintain an interest in developing livelihoods approaches.

Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio

66. WFP's programmes of support to refugees have generally been effective, though subject to resource limitations. WFP and key partners (ARRA and UNHCR) have responded to very substantial and, at times, rapid increases in refugee numbers during the period and in the context of major droughts and internal conflict in Ethiopia that have impacted the food pipeline.

67. Generally, during the CPE period, refugee entitlements to food assistance have been addressed in line with core humanitarian principles. Capacity building for coordination with refugees and management of food assistance has also been supported effectively by WFP. However, it proved difficult to maintain the programme at a sufficient scale to meet humanitarian needs. Thus, during the latter part of the period, growing numbers of refugees needing food, alongside uncertainties about funding, have driven cuts in the food ration and this has created considerable and growing distress for refugees.

68. During the CPE period, WFP has made progress in addressing key dimensions of gender, protection and accountability to affected populations in its refugee support programme and in ensuring that refugees know and can articulate their entitlements.

69. Efficiency has been manifest in a record of timely delivery, with few pipeline breaks, biometric registration that has made major efficiency gains, and growing evidence that cash plus food is both more efficient and more effective than food alone.

70. Sustainability remains hugely problematic. Whilst this is a joint problem and not exclusive to WFP, key problems relate to securing adequate funding to maintain adequate standards of support and nutrition and the need for sufficient attention to livelihoods strategies.

71. Internal synergy between different components of the WFP refugee programme generally can be strengthened. Attention to refugee nutrition is a critical issue, especially in a context where WFP technical capacity on nutrition has been weak (see Annex P).

72. With regards to external synergy, there have been good working relationships among WFP, UNHCR, ARRA and other partners, but there will be challenges in addressing the future scale of requirements, adapting to new (CRRF) strategies, and achieving greater sustainability in refugee assistance and progress in assisting refugees with their own coping strategies.

Specific Lessons and Future Directions

73. WFP food assistance for refugees will be needed for the foreseeable future. Strategy for food security for refugees and funding dilemmas demand a sustainable approach, based on predictable funding for long-term refugees, allied to approaches that can support appropriate livelihood strategies for refugees and their host communities. The long-term status of refugee presence means that refugee food needs must be determined in context of real and progressive economic integration and programmatic approaches to achieving sustainable food systems.

74. A key strategic goal is to secure the nutritional status of refugees, noting the long-term damage to health, and the vital importance of coordinated, multi-sectoral and multi organisational approaches. Nutrition and well-being status is a sound basis for advocacy and is a system-wide responsibility. Nutrition is a multi-sectoral responsibility and multi-causal. Donors' criticism of WFP on general food distribution should recognise that nutrition is not only about food as being critical but also other aggravating factors (notably water, sanitation and health services).

75. Concerning appropriate modalities in food assistance, there is a strong case for increasing use of cash – see Annex S for a portfolio-wide analysis.

76. WFP should continue to work with other humanitarian agencies to ensure respect for the principles of humanity and impartiality (see Annex O).

Annex O Protection and Humanitarian Principles

Introduction and approach

Annex outline

1. This annex explains how humanitarian principles, protection, and accountability to affected populations (AAP) have been addressed by WFP and their relevance to the portfolio. The main sections cover:

- relevant WFP policy commitments;
- Ethiopia context;
- country office activities to address humanitarian principles, protection and AAP;
- main findings; and
- summary assessment and recommendations.

2. The terms of reference make specific reference to assessing the consistency of WFP's portfolio with the humanitarian principles to which WFP and other UN agencies are committed. Three important cross-sector topics for assessment in detail in the evaluation are (i) gender, (ii) protection and accountability to affected populations, and (iii) partnerships. Taking into account the relevant corporate policies approved by the Executive Board¹⁶⁰ (WFP, 2015c, WFP, n.d. zc) and the indicators used by the country office to monitor progress in the implementation of the corporate policy covering these three topics.¹⁶¹ The evaluation team's gender analysis is presented in Annex T.

Guidance and precedents for evaluating humanitarian principles

3. OEV led a joint agency review on "Reflecting Humanitarian Principles in Evaluation" (UNEG, 2016). The review found that "there is currently no common understanding within the sector, and sometimes within agencies, of the Humanitarian Principles, in terms of concepts and implementation". It concluded that good practice is rare and clear guidance for evaluators is lacking. However, the Ethiopia evaluation

¹⁶⁰ See <https://executiveboard.wfp.org/documents> for relevant corporate policies approved by the Board.

¹⁶¹ Illustrated thus in Annex 8 of the TOR:

Protection and Accountability to Affected Population

1. Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)
2. Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site
3. Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)
4. Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme sites

Partnerships

1. Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services
2. Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners

Source: 2016 SPR PRRO

team has drawn on experience from the evaluation of humanitarian principles within the Sri Lanka country portfolio evaluation (Lister et al., 2016b, Annex L).

4. Several of the theories of change noted in the inception report (Mokoro, 2018a, Annex K) have potential relevance for the operational application of humanitarian principles, protection and AAP in so far as they provide a systematic approach to humanitarian assistance. However, none of these documents are explicitly framed in terms of the humanitarian principles, protection, or AAP. Moreover, during the CPE period these documents do not appear to have explicitly informed programme design; nor were they referred to during the course of the CPE interviews.

Country portfolio evaluation approach

5. As envisaged in the inception report (Mokoro, 2018a, Annex N), the evaluation team has:

- Noted applicable WFP policies and guidelines on protection and accountability to affected populations, and associated draft theories of change.¹⁶²
- Situated the humanitarian dilemmas faced by WFP during the evaluation period within the regional and national context of conflict and drought responses.
- Considered each of the main humanitarian principles, noting also any potential conflicts amongst them, and their application to core aspects of WFP work addressed in the CPE.
- Taken account of WFP's working arrangements with the Government of Ethiopia at both federal and regional levels.
- Relied mainly on written statements of policy and practice (from WFP and other sources) supported by interviews with stakeholders and participants in the CPE.

6. The evaluation team has considered how the humanitarian principles, protection and AAP are reflected in: design of operations (including targeting, modalities and delivery process, etc); M&E, including mechanisms for accountability to affected populations; training of WFP staff and partners; ways of working with the Government (at federal, regional and local levels) and with UN and other partners – seeing this both as a particular issue for WFP, and as general issue for "One UN and the donors' Development Assistance Group (DAG).

Relevant WFP Commitments

Humanitarian principles

7. The humanitarian principles include humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – see Box 15 below. See Box 16 below for the full set of Humanitarian Principles and their foundations adopted by WFP in 2004.

8. During the evaluation period, new impetus for humanitarian reform and global commitments has been expressed for humanitarian principles, their application and implementation. The World Humanitarian Summit 2016 (WHS, 2016) inter alia, sought "to re-inspire and reinvigorate a

¹⁶² An evaluation of WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy was published after this report was drafted. A key finding is: "Two significant internal factors, however, constrained the implementation of the policy. The first relates to the diffuse normative framework made up of a large number of policies with varying degrees of relevance to protection, which make protection more difficult to grasp by WFP staff. The second factor is the lack of clear and explicit corporate support for protection, which means that engagement often depends on the personality and motivations of specific managers on the ground. These factors are compounded by limited human resources and the lack of a common vision and protection evidence base." (WFP, 2018i, ¶218)

commitment to humanity and to the universality of humanitarian principles" affirming core responsibilities and linking action to wider, relevant commitments in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.¹⁶³ Other related initiatives (including the Grand Bargain, "No time to retreat" (OCHA, 2017) take forward the World Humanitarian Summit affirmations of humanitarian principles in relation to financing, member state commitments etc.

Box 15 International humanitarian principles¹⁶⁴

CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES	
Humanity	WFP will seek to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respond with food assistance when appropriate. It will provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity.
Neutrality	WFP will not take sides in a conflict and will not engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Food assistance will not be provided to active combatants.
Impartiality	WFP's assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and vulnerabilities of women, men and children.
Operational Independence	WFP will provide assistance in a manner that is operationally independent of the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where such assistance is being provided.

Box 16 Humanitarian principles adopted by WFP, 2004

CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES	
I.	Humanity. WFP will seek to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respond with food aid when appropriate. It will provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity.
II.	Impartiality. WFP's assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk from the consequences of food shortages, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and vulnerabilities of women, men and children.
III.	Neutrality. WFP will not take sides in a conflict and will not engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Aid will not be provided to active combatants.
FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTION	
IV.	Respect. WFP will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the state in which it is working. WFP will respect local customs and traditions, upholding internationally recognized human rights. WFP will act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and consistent with international humanitarian law and refugee law. WFP will also take into account the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, when applicable.
V.	Self-reliance. WFP will provide humanitarian assistance with the primary objective of saving lives, in ways that support livelihoods, reduce vulnerability to future food scarcities and support durable solutions. WFP will work to ensure that food aid does not undermine local agricultural production, marketing or coping strategies, or disturb normal migratory patterns or foster dependency. WFP's programmes will be planned and implemented in ways that facilitate the link from relief to development.
VI.	Participation. WFP will involve women and men beneficiaries wherever possible in all activities and will work closely with governments at the national and local levels to plan and implement assistance.
VII.	Capacity-building. Within its own capacity and resources, WFP will strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises. WFP will ensure participation by women's organizations and will integrate a gender perspective in capacity-building activities.

¹⁶³ See <http://research.un.org/en/whs>, including http://www.un.org/ga/WHS_Report_of_the_SecGen2016

¹⁶⁴ As quoted in Annex I of the 2014–2017 Strategic Plan (WFP, 2013g), which notes "The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality were endorsed in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, adopted in 1991. The fourth principle of independence was added in 2004 under Resolution 58/114."

VIII.	Coordination. WFP will provide assistance with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by the affected country. All States Members of the United Nations or Members or Associate Members of any specialized agency or of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are eligible to submit requests for consideration by WFP. WFP may also provide emergency food aid and associated non-food items and logistics support at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. WFP will work within established United Nations coordination structures at the global and field levels. This will include working with other humanitarian actors such as NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM	
IX.	Accountability. WFP will keep donors, host country governments, beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders informed of its activities and their impact through regular reporting.
X.	Professionalism. WFP will maintain the highest standards of professionalism and integrity among its international and national staff to ensure that its programmes are carried out efficiently, effectively, ethically and safely. All staff will adhere to the <i>Standard Code of Conduct for the International Civil Service</i> and the <i>Secretary-General's Bulletin on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in Humanitarian Crises and Other Operations</i> .

Source: WFP, 2004b.

WFP commitments to protection

9. WFP has an established policy (WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy 2012 –WFP, 2012k) based on core principles of responsibility, accountability, assistance, humanitarian priorities, and protection. WFP's definition of protection is captured in excerpts from the Policy shown in Box 17 below. It is recognised that 'measuring protection outcomes in the field is difficult' (WFP, 2012k, ¶69). This matter is not addressed in the 'Update on the implementation of the protection policy 2014' (WFP, 2014r).

Box 17 WFP's definition of protection

<p>Humanitarian protection involves humanitarian agencies doing all they can to ensure that human rights are respected – in accordance with international law – within their work. Agencies should seek to minimize the negative impacts of their assistance, to avoid increasing the harm or risk to already vulnerable populations in conflict or natural disaster settings.</p> <p>The concept of humanitarian protection is broadly captured in the definition agreed during an ICRC-led process in 1999 and subsequently adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which includes United Nations agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, NGOs and the International Organization for Migration. According to this definition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law i.e., human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law. • Human rights and humanitarian organizations must conduct these activities in an impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national, ethnic origin or gender). • Drawing from global conceptual debates, WFP has adopted a practical definition, centred on assistance: protection means designing and carrying out food and livelihood assistance activities that do not increase the protection risks faced by the crisis-affected populations receiving assistance. Rather, food assistance should contribute to the safety, dignity and integrity of vulnerable people. • The inclusion of safety, dignity and integrity in WFP's definition of protection captures the fundamental guiding principle of a humanitarian agency – humanity – and ensures that the whole individual, and not just his or her basic material needs, is considered. <p>WFP's protection approach also recognizes that rights violations or abuses that contribute to food insecurity and hunger can diminish the effectiveness of WFP's food assistance, or even render it meaningless. Coordinating with State entities, cooperating partners and field-based protection clusters, WFP seeks to empower vulnerable, food-insecure people by supporting their existing capacities to protect themselves.</p> <p>Source: WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy (WFP, 2012k), ¶6–13.</p>
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10. WFP is not a protection-mandated agency but engagement in protection does not require a change in WFP's mandate and is consistent with WFP efforts to meet SDG2 (WFP, 2016q). Protection responsibilities are relevant to WFP operations both on a spectrum of action (from programming, through integrated objectives, to mainstreaming) and by level of influence (direct action, wider food insecurity, broader operational context).

11. As a corporate cross-cutting issue in WFP, protection is relevant to all areas of programming "As a core responsibility, WFP must ensure that food assistance is designed and implemented in ways which contribute to the safety, dignity and integrity of all persons with respect for people's needs, rights and capacities." (WFP, 2016q).

12. The "General Conditions" of field level agreements (FLAs) provide guidance for WFP and its cooperating partners in the design and delivery of food assistance ensuring that it "advances gender equality and does not increase protection risks of affected populations but rather contributes to their safety, dignity and integrity based on humanitarian principles and the "do no harm approach" (and) must also ensure accountability to affected populations (AAP). Gender equality, protection and AAP are integrated across the programming cycle, including the humanitarian programming cycle, encompassing, *inter alia*, assessment, design, implementation, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation."(WFP, n.d. zc).

13. WFP relies mostly on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government partners for implementing its food assistance programmes. While some have protection experience and mandates, WFP and partner staff can cause protection risks.

14. Reporting on protection and accountability to affected populations is included in corporate and regional synthesis evaluations at a high level of abstraction. (WFP, 2017b, Betts & Diaz, 2017)

15. Explicit attention is given to the application of humanitarian principles by both WFP regional bureau and country office but enforcing strict adherence presents challenges with potentially negative impact on food assistance for beneficiaries – in practice there may be trade-offs between the different principles.¹⁶⁵

WFP commitments to Accountability to Affected Populations

16. WFP is signed up to Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) commitments to ensuring accountability to affected populations (AAP) and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). As noted in Box 17 above, the IASC defines humanitarian protection in the following way: "Protection encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law".

17. The AAP commitments are reflected in WFP's standard FLAs ("WFP's first accountability is to food insecure people who are the primary actors in their own survival and protection." (WFP, n.d. zc)) and highlighted in its Regional Partnership Strategy (see Box 18 below). WFP's Cooperating Partners should integrate AAP throughout their programmes and projects by ensuring (i) that all beneficiaries are properly informed about entitlements, (ii) they have safe means of communications for complaints and feedback, (iii) that this feeds into improved programme quality, and (iv) that planning and implementation are based on understanding of demographic composition, consultation and participation.

Box 18 WFP regional bureau partnership strategy on accountability to affected populations

Extracts from Regional Partnership Strategy 2016–2018 (WFP, 2016x)

The two foundational principles that underpin the goals and priorities articulated in this strategy are 'accountability to affected populations', and capacity building of national and local institutions. Affected populations are WFP's most important partner in

¹⁶⁵ Potential trade-offs are highlighted in a recent evaluation of WFP policies on humanitarian principles (see Table 2 in WFP, 2018k).

the region and as such this strategy dedicates a chapter and goal to exploring how this partnership can be strengthened. Capacity strengthening of national and local institutions cuts across many aspects of the strategy, as the means through which WFP can best deliver lasting impact and ensure governments are in the driving seat when it comes to achieving the SDGs.

The following four partnership goals for WFP in East and Central Africa are proposed:

- 1) Strengthen WFP positioning in critical partnership processes;
- 2) Strengthen and prioritize existing partnerships that increase operational efficiency and lasting impact;
- 3) Prioritize and pursue new partnership opportunities; and
- 4) Strengthen accountability mechanisms to foster WFP's partnership with affected populations.

IV. Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP)

40. As [WFP's Corporate Partnership Strategy] highlights, the most central relationship for WFP is with the women, men, girls and boys that it serves. It is this relationship with affected populations that should drive all of WFP's programmes, policies and activities. WFP's first accountability is to food insecure people who are the primary actors in their own survival and protection, and as such AAP is considered to be a foundational principle of this strategy.

41. Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) is important not only because affected people have a right to influence and assess the programmes that impact their lives, but also because the quality and effectiveness of programming is improved if populations are involved in the decisions that affect them.

42. In the RBN region, many COs have put major efforts into strengthening AAP in recent years. Transparent information provision is generally promoted through pre- and post-distribution community meetings, signboards depicting ration entitlements at distribution sites, and in some countries through sophisticated communication strategies using new technologies. Participatory community consultations are held to inform programme design, and affected populations usually participate actively in programme implementation and monitoring. WFP and its partners also operate different forms of complaints and feedback mechanisms (CFMs) throughout the region.

43. The findings of a recent AAP baseline study conducted by WFP Headquarters indicate that the RBN region lies above the WFP global average in a majority of the assessed elements. However, the COs in the region are still facing different challenges when it comes to the implementation of strong accountability mechanisms:

- **Information:** It seems that despite regular communication, WFP's messages are not well understood by affected people in several countries. While most beneficiaries in the RBN region are aware of their entitlements, transparent information regarding targeting criteria and complaints procedures needs to be strengthened.
- **Participation:** While there are currently numerous opportunities for beneficiaries to participate, such participation is not always meaningful and often does not adequately influence programme design. Furthermore, vulnerable groups are not included in the process in all cases.
- **Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms:** Several of the complaints and feedback mechanisms across the region still require strengthening and further efforts are necessary to review how modern technology can be better used to strengthen AAP, particularly regarding feedback and complaints management.

44. Overall, through the establishment of effective accountability mechanisms, and by recognizing the capacities of affected populations, WFP strives to become real partners with the people that it serves. The opportunity has therefore been taken in this regional partnership strategy to reaffirm WFP's commitment to strengthening this partnership.

Goal Four: Strengthen accountability mechanisms to foster WFP's partnership with affected populations

67. The purpose of this goal is to strengthen WFP's positioning vis-à-vis the affected populations who we aim to assist. As explained above, WFP strives to become real partners with the people that it serves by recognizing the capacities of affected populations. This does not only respect the rights of women, men, girls and boys, but also contributes to more effective programming.

68. Priority actions under this goal include:

Objective	Roles and responsibilities
<p>i. Information: Increase efforts to provide affected populations with transparent information about WFP’s programmes, particularly regarding targeting criteria and complaints procedures.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In collaboration with partners, COs to develop or improve communication strategies, which have been informed by consultations with women, men, girls and boys of different ages and backgrounds. - COs to ensure that requirements for information provision are clearly reflected in FLA’s and are being monitored. - RBN Gender and Protection unit to provide guidance and support for CO’s on the development and implementation of communication strategies.
<p>ii. Participation: Document and share existing successful practices in the field of community participation, and promote a community based participatory planning approach to make sure that participation of affected populations is meaningful and informs programme design.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - RBN Gender and Protection unit to assist CO’s in documenting and disseminating best practices and lessons learned in the field of AAP. - RBN Gender and Protection unit to provide guidance and support for CO’s on community participation. - CO’s to ensure that AAP activities (including participatory assessments) and related costs are included from the project planning stage.
<p>iii. Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms: Expand Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms (CFM’s) across the region based on current best practices, ensure they operate according to minimum standards and review how modern communication technologies can be better used to strengthen AAP, with a specific focus on the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - RBN Gender and Protection unit to assist CO’s in documenting and disseminating best practices and lessons learned on the implementation of CFM’s. - RBN Programme unit to provide guidance and support for CO’s to roll out effective CFM’s. - CO’s to ensure that the set-up of CFM’s and related costs are included from the project planning stage, and that the systems used have been informed through consultations with women, men, girls and boys of different ages and backgrounds.
<p>iv. Staff and partner skills: Invest in building of appropriate skills and capacities of cooperating and government partners’ staff on AAP.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - RBN Gender and Protection unit to provide capacity building in AAP to WFP staff, cooperating partners and government partners through the facilitation of trainings and by leading joint assessments. - CO’s (protection focal points) to replicate trainings at the field level to WFP staff, partner staff and government counterparts.

Ethiopia Context¹⁶⁶

18. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been in power since 1991. This coalition is made up of four constituent parties that reflect four of the major ethnic regions of Ethiopia: Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR. Regions not included in this coalition also have political parties affiliated to the EPRDF. At present all seats in parliament are held by EPRDF or its affiliated parties.

19. When the EPRDF came to power, it inherited a centralized, authoritarian state with a command economy. Since then, there have been major changes, but also a degree of continuity. The EPRDF pursued policies of ethnic federalism and decentralization which have indeed had impacts on the architecture of Government and how services are delivered. But, parallel processes have ensured that local administrative

¹⁶⁶ The first three paragraphs of this sub-section draw heavily on Lie & Mesfin, 2018.

structures are heavily dependent on the party apparatus¹⁶⁷ thereby retaining strong central authority. And while a degree of economic liberalisation has taken place, a number of sectors are dominated by politically connected companies and two conglomerates have largely dominated the large-scale private business sector.¹⁶⁸

20. A combination of factors has resulted in Ethiopia having significant 'negotiating capacity' in its relations with donors. These factors include (i) the Government of Ethiopia's strong ideological convictions; (ii) Ethiopia's relative stability and regional importance for the "war against terror"; and (iii) Ethiopia's relative strong performance on international indicators for poverty reduction. As a consequence, and despite its dependence on official development assistance for more than a third of its annual budget, the extent of the Government's dominance in policy discussions, programming and implementation in the development and humanitarian domains is heavily emphasized in discussions with WFP staff, NGOs and donor agencies.

21. In line with this dominance, the Government plays a leading role across the spectrum of humanitarian response in Ethiopia, covering those in need because of climate and other natural shocks, people displaced by internal conflict, and cross-border refugees. Government engagement is in general a very positive feature, but at times, inevitably, it raises issues about neutrality, impartiality and operational independence for the humanitarian agencies working alongside the Government.

22. Globally, WFP regularly faces a dilemma in its dealings with national parties, especially governments, since it may have to make compromises in order to align itself with national priorities or to ensure access to people in need. WFP's focus on Somali region and some of the specific challenges faced in this region (with regards to: weak governance, high risk of corruption, and insecurity within the region and in neighbouring Somalia and resulting strong presence of Ethiopian federal military and other forces), mean that issues regarding neutrality, impartiality and operational independence may be even more salient in WFP's relations with the Somali Regional Government.

23. The second half of the evaluation period has seen significant political tension and internal conflict within Ethiopia. A first significant outbreak of unrest flared up in response to plans for the expansion of Addis Ababa into surrounding parts of Oromia region (a plan that was dropped by the Government). Late 2015 saw the spread of unrest to Amhara region in relation to disputes of the ethnic and regional border between Amhara and Tigray and a state of emergency was imposed. Late 2016 saw a new¹⁶⁹ outbreak of violence in border areas between Oromia and Somali region resulting in large scale population displacements.

24. The Government of Ethiopia has played a part in contributing to the development of the newly emerging global humanitarian-development-peace agenda (WHS, 2016; OCHA, 2017). For example, in response to the global refugee turbulence it has revised its Refugee Proclamation 409/2004 and committed to being a roll-out country for the UNHCR-led efforts to implement the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) – see the discussion in Annex N above.

¹⁶⁷ Key examples include the assignment of federally appointed bureaucrats in strategic positions at the regional and sub-regional level; and increasing pressure for bureaucrats to be party members

¹⁶⁸ The Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) and Mohamed International Development Research Organization Companies (MIDROC)

¹⁶⁹ There have been previous conflicts in border areas.

Country Office Activities to Address Humanitarian Principles, Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations

References to humanitarian principles in country office documents

25. Although the Humanitarian Principles were adopted by WFP in 2004 (Box 15 above), neither the Country Strategy for 2012–2015 (WFP, 2011e) nor the Ethiopia Transitional ICSP Concept Note for 2017 (WFP, 2017i) makes more than very limited reference to adherence to humanitarian principles beyond mention of the Government's humanitarian leadership. Little reference is made to key WFP policies, although Ethiopia was included (WFP, 2012k, p4 ¶12; WFP, 2013h).

26. However, since 2013 WFP in Ethiopia has paid increased attention to issues of protection and accountability to affected populations, as required by standard headings in SPRs for all projects from 2014. For PRRO 200290 (WFP, 2014t, WFP, 2015v, WFP, 2016r) issues reported on include: training and awareness, beneficiary feedback on safety, and proportion of people assisted informed about the programme with increasing data measurement. For PRRO 200712 (WFP, 2016zd, WFP, 2017q), information is provided about programme access and community and household surveillance (CHS) surveys. For PRRO 200365 (WFP, 2015s, WFP, 2016t), the focus was on programme design, access, and information. The same was reported for PRRO 200700 (WFP, 2016zb, WFP, 2017c) but with more detail and data, and with explicit reference to the application of core humanitarian principles.

Key activities to operationalize humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations in WFP programmes

27. Table 33 below shows performance against relevant indicators reported in the SPRs. These generally show satisfactory trends, but do not by themselves reveal much about the quality of WFP's interaction with beneficiaries (e.g. how well informed they are) or the changes in external context that might affect their experiences of safety problems.

28. Accordingly Table 34, Table 35 and Table 36 below aim to provide a fuller description of the extent to which adherence to humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations has been effectively mainstreamed.

29. Assessing WFP's adherence to humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations is challenging because (i) effective adherence has to be woven into the fabric of all WFP's work, and (ii) most of WFP's interventions are implemented jointly with other partners, which makes these matters a shared responsibility. That the partner is often the Government of Ethiopia, usually as the lead partner, adds to the complication.

Table 33 Protection and accountability to affected populations indicators

	Indicator	Baseline	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	End target
Relief general food distribution (PRROs 200290 and 200712)	Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)	48			48	71.5	77	62.8	80
	Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to/from and at WFP programme sites	97			97	99.1	98.5	100	90
	Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)	44			44	62.6	76.1	70	80
	Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to/from and at WFP programme sites	100			100	99.1	98.9	98.9	90
Refugee general food distribution (PRROs 200365 and 200700)	Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)	91			98	91	88	95.3	80
	Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to/from and at WFP programme sites	93			92	93	96.6	94.8	90
	Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)	93			95	93	91	93.6	80
	Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to/from and at WFP programme sites	93			86	93	79	86.2	90

Source: SPRs

Table 34 Commentary on application of International Humanitarian Principles

CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES	Intrinsic Issues (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	Application in Ethiopia (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Ethiopia portfolio?)
<p>Humanity WFP will seek to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respond with food assistance when appropriate. It will provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity.</p>	<p>This principle, in seeking to address human suffering “wherever it is found”, sets a high bar. In reality food assistance will be constrained by available finances, requiring a prioritisation even amongst those in need.</p>	<p>WFP’s largest programmes are focused on the alleviation of human suffering whether by refugees or Ethiopian Nationals.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA) is provided to households that are food-insecure because of a shock, most often drought, in rural areas. WFP has played a large and important role in the humanitarian food assistance responses to the 2015/2016 El Niño and 2016/2017 Indian Ocean Dipole related crises. • WFP also provides in-kind support to the Government of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme which targets chronically food insecure populations. • WFP is the main provider of food assistance to refugee populations. The majority of this is provided in kind, but cash is also used to make up part of the ration in some locations. • Nutrition support through targeted supplementary food (and occasionally blanket supplementary feeding is provided to both Ethiopian Nationals and refugee populations – see Annex P). <p>WFP’s support is to food assistance for Ethiopian nationals (whether through the PSNP or as part of an emergency response) is part of a much larger overall intervention. WFP’s support is focused on Ethiopia’s pastoral regions which do suffer high levels of chronic and transitory food insecurity and where government implementation capacity is more constrained. WFP works with the key stakeholders (Government and other development partners) to improve overall design, management and implementation of programmes, but a number of weaknesses do remain (as highlighted in Annex L).</p> <p>For refugees WFP is the majority provider for food assistance but frontline implementation is the responsibility of ARRA. Again WFP works with ARRA, UNHCR and other stakeholders to develop adequate systems for the delivery and distribution of food items (as described in Annex N).</p>
<p>Neutrality WFP will not take sides in a conflict and will not engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Food assistance will not be provided to active combatants.</p>	<p>The demands and potential tensions of this principle are greater in periods of conflict. A potential tension arises if donors and the Government of the land have different priorities with WFP caught in the middle.</p>	<p>Neutrality vis-à-vis conflict has not emerged as a key issue in Ethiopia. However, the nature of WFP’s working relationship with Government does pose some concerns.</p> <p>Both UNHCR and WFP face difficult politics and have to handle relations with the Government carefully through ARRA. Close proximity to ARRA, can blur boundaries for UNHCR and WFP with regards to adherence to humanitarian principles (HPs). Knowing that there is progress in the relationship is important and open dialogue makes it possible to explain fundamental positions on HPs. The Government is responsive and UNHCR is attentive on HPs but there are questions about the extent to which WFP has pushed and voiced concerns.</p> <p>Similarly, in Somali region, a number of stakeholders perceive that WFP’s operations are too tied to the regional government. There are a number of concerns regarding actions of the Somali Regional Government such as whether it geographically allocates (through the needs assessment process) food assistance resources in ways that do not reflect real needs. While WFP is obliged to follow the results of the needs assessment process, there is more room for them to highlight concerns and advocate for improved processes. IDPs are a growing issue in Somali region and there are concerns that some people identified as conflict IDPs may have been moved into an area with a risk that WFP support may play a role in supporting disputed claims.</p> <p>One feature of the political economy of the humanitarian environment in Ethiopia is the dual mandate held by national institutions; this can prejudice the independence and neutrality for implementing partners. ARRA has both governance and implementing agency roles with respect to refugees. The degree of proximity between UNHCR and ARRA has raised concerns for donors about potential conflicts of interest (e.g. shared premises, use of vehicles, sector divisions and bidding for UNHCR funding). There is a similar situation with regards to NDRMC.</p>

CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES	Intrinsic Issues (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	Application in Ethiopia (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Ethiopia portfolio?)
<p>Impartiality</p> <p>WFP's assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and vulnerabilities of women, men and children.</p>	<p>This principle both overlaps with and complements those of neutrality and humanity.</p>	<p>WFP's humanitarian support is guided by seasonal assessments. Although imperfect, these are the main form of evidence available for identifying and prioritising need. Needs of IDPs are not routinely assessed through the needs assessment process and this affects WFP's ability to respond to IDP needs. While WFP has managed to provide some support to IDP populations (i) there have been some problems of access in southern Somali region and (ii) the amount of support provided to IDPs tends to be similar or less than is provided for a drought related response when conflict related needs are typically much higher. Furthermore, IDP populations in Somali region – where WFP is operational – are reportedly receiving higher levels of support than just across the border in Oromia region. Overall much more attention is being paid to IDPs in Somali region (because of the greater presence of WFP and other UN and NGO actors) but the needs will be similar both sides of the border and the response should reflect this.</p> <p>In the past (prior to the evaluation period) there have been concerns expressed regarding Government targeting of PSNP and humanitarian resources and the risk that there might have been incidents when opposition supporters were excluded from receiving support.¹⁷⁰ The evaluation team were not aware of any recent reports raising similar concerns, but past reports highlight the need to monitor this risk.</p> <p>An issue of major concern has been ARRA's decision to protect Eritrean refugees from the depth of ration cuts experienced by refugees from South Sudan or Somalia. This is a clear transgression of the humanitarian principle of impartiality and one that cannot be endorsed by WFP or the wider UN and donor community. Concerns have been raised, but Government continues to discriminate.</p>
<p>Operational Independence¹⁷¹</p> <p>WFP will provide assistance in a manner that is operationally independent of the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where such assistance is being provided.</p>	<p>This principle seeks to ensure that there is no bias or interference in the provision of assistance. This particular principle may be more relevant during times of conflict.</p>	<p>This principle requires that WFP assistance is not distorted by non-humanitarian objectives of the government or any other actor. So long as there is strong alignment between the humanitarian and developmental objectives of the Government and its development partners, operational collaboration serves the interests of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. However, such collaboration makes conscious attention to the principles of neutrality and impartiality all the more important.</p>

¹⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch, 2010.

¹⁷¹ Identified in the 2015 WFP 'Compendium of Policies relating to the Strategic Plan' as a core principle applicable to 2014–2017 Strategy (WFP, 2015i).

Table 35 Commentary on application of WFP commitments to protection

COMMITMENTS TO PROTECTION¹⁷²	Intrinsic Issues (what the commitment implies, possible tensions with other commitments, etc.)	Application in Ethiopia (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Ethiopia portfolio?)
<p>Safety – from injury, violence, coercion, deprivation, or the threat of any of these.</p>	<p>Safety problems refer to those related to physical injury, violence, coercion, deprivation or intimidation, including of a sexual nature. These problems can be generated by specific actors – people receiving assistance, community members, armed groups, government representatives, humanitarian staff and others – or derive from the context (e.g. generalised violence), or from WFP's activities and/or presence (e.g. injuries at programme sites).</p>	<p>Standard operating procedures of the Government aim to ensure that food and cash distributions for both PSNP and humanitarian food assistance are conducted in locations close to beneficiary communities to reduce travel time and minimize the likely of any security risks to beneficiaries. In areas where WFP directly supports food distributions (through provision of commodities and on site monitoring), over 70% of distribution points were less than one hour from beneficiary communities and >90% of beneficiaries report that they do not experience problems travelling to or from WFP programme sites.¹⁷³ However, travel times in Afar region do tend to be longer than in Somali region.¹⁷⁴ Crowd management measures are in place at distribution points to minimize risks of theft during distributions and long waiting times by carefully scheduling the timetable for food distributions for different villages.</p> <p>Similar crowd management measures are in place during distributions in refugee camps and a survey conducted in 2016 found that over 90% of the sampled respondents indicated that they were aware of entitlements and the dates of distributions, and did not experience any safety and protection risks in relation to food and cash distribution.</p> <p>There have been some reports, particularly in the camps for Eritrean refugees, of some protection issues for women and girls when they exit the camp in search of firewood.¹⁷⁵ UNHCR has tried to put in mitigation measures such as the production of fuel briquettes and provision of energy.</p>
<p>Dignity - self-determination, respect for aspirations and wishes, self-worth.</p>	<p>Providing assistance in a dignified manner means treating people with respect, as well as giving due regard to their aspirations and wishes. WFP's interventions should never humiliate affected people or treat them as objects of charity. Assistance should be designed taking into account the opinions of affected people and involve them in the decisions that affect their lives.</p>	<p>Careful management of food and cash distribution points (for refugee, PSNP and humanitarian food assistance) helps to ensure that beneficiaries are treated with dignity and respect. No specific data were made available to the evaluation team about perceptions of PSNP and humanitarian food assistance beneficiaries, regarding their treatment, but Figure 58 below shows the systematic monitoring of beneficiary concerns about protection and accountability at refugee sites.</p> <p>During this evaluation period WFP has increased its use of cash programming. Cash assistance (combined with food) is now functioning in 10 out of 24 refugee camps and WFP has engaged in a number of pilots of "in-cash" humanitarian food assistance. The use of cash enables people to prioritise their own basic needs, to make choices for themselves and do what is best for their family rather than limiting them to a particular selection of food items. While deciding on transfer modalities WFP does conduct a market assessment and beneficiary consultations to confirm the appropriateness of using cash as a transfer modality in the given setting.</p> <p>The dignity of beneficiaries cannot be upheld if rations fall far below minimum food requirements and refugees do not have acceptable coping strategies available. Recent and potential future ration cuts have made this a real risk (see Annex N).</p>

¹⁷² The description of commitments to protection and any intrinsic issues draws on WFP's Protection Guidance Manual (2016) (WFP, 2016q).

¹⁷³ 2017 Refugee PRRO SPR

¹⁷⁴ BDS, 2018

¹⁷⁵ The evaluation team heard similar concerns in Gambella.

COMMITMENTS TO PROTECTION¹⁷²	Intrinsic Issues (what the commitment implies, possible tensions with other commitments, etc.)	Application in Ethiopia (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Ethiopia portfolio?)
Integrity – respecting the full spectrum of people’s needs, rights and capacities	In addition to their food and nutritional needs, people receiving assistance from WFP have a range of other needs and rights, including physical, emotional, social, cultural and spiritual, as well as capacities that WFP should take into account. Considering these variables helps ensure that everyone benefits equally from WFP’s assistance and that we do not inadvertently perpetuate or exacerbate discrimination.	Standard operating procedures regarding targeting for both PSNP and humanitarian food assistance specifically recognize key vulnerable groups such as the elderly, disabled, women headed households and those people living with HIV/AIDS. Guidance is also given for how to effectively address polygamous households during targeting. Evidence on how well this guidance is implemented, however, is limited. WFP successfully advocated for the inclusion of people living with HIV/AIDS as a recognized vulnerable group in the recently released National Social Protection Policy (Government of Ethiopia, 2014). In 2016, WFP scaled up its support to address the protection risks of unaccompanied minors coming from Eritrea in all the refugee camps in Tigray, in partnership with the Norwegian Refugee Council. In addition, specific provisions are made for specific vulnerable groups in refugee camps. Pregnant and lactating women with children under a year old and elderly beneficiaries are given priority during distributions in all the camps, and supported by targeted supplementary feeding.

Table 36 Commentary on application of WFP commitments to accountability to affected populations

COMMITMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED POPULATIONS¹⁷⁶	Application in Ethiopia (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Ethiopia portfolio?)
<p>Information provision: WFP must provide to affected people accurate, timely and accessible information about its assistance. Information provided has to be clearly understandable by everyone, irrespective of their age, gender, or other characteristics.</p>	<p>Standard operating procedures for both the PSNP and humanitarian food assistance describe key communication requirements and processes to ensure that beneficiaries receive accurate, timely information. Data reported in WFP SPRs indicated that the majority of PSNP and GFD beneficiaries are aware of key programme information such as targeting, complaint procedures and ration entitlements. However, there tends to be more of a challenge with predictability of transfers. PSNP monitoring data indicates that beneficiaries, particularly in lowland regions, report a lack of predictability (IFPRI, 2016). This reflects both delays in transfers and poor communication.</p> <p>Mechanisms have also been put in place to ensure that refugees know their entitlements. Signs showing entitlements (food and cash) are posted at distribution sites and monthly pre-distribution meetings are organized to inform beneficiaries about their entitlements.</p>
<p>Participation/Consultation: WFP must seek the views of all segments of the affected population and invite feedback throughout each stage of the project cycle.</p>	<p>The WFP supported PSNP, humanitarian food assistance and refugee programmes all comprise systems which allow affected populations to participate in key stages of programme implementation. Community targeting committees play key roles in selecting eligible households to receive PSNP transfers and humanitarian food assistance, community committees identify public works to be implemented under the PSNP and there are a range of community committees which provide a forum for refugees to highlight and discuss issues.</p>

¹⁷⁶ The description of commitments to accountability to affected populations draws on WFP’s Protection Guidance Manual (WFP, 2016q).

COMMITMENTS TO ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED POPULATIONS ¹⁷⁶	Application in Ethiopia (how well has this been reflected – or not- in the Ethiopia portfolio?)
<p>Complaints and feedback mechanisms (CFM): WFP must provide a means for affected people to voice complaints and provide feedback on areas relevant to operations in a safe and dignified manner. A CFM system must include established procedures for recording, referring, taking action and providing feedback to the complainant. Valid complaints and useful feedback must be taken into account to ensure improved programming.</p>	<p>Standard operating procedures for the PSNP, humanitarian food assistance and support to refugees include the formation of complaints handling structures, and evidence suggests that these are largely in place. In addition the PSNP has developed a charter of rights and responsibilities which is printed on the back of beneficiary cards to help beneficiaries know their rights and entitlements and ensure they are better informed in order to make any complaints. However, there are weaknesses in the functioning of these structures. Committees may not have the authority to effectively resolve complaints and affected populations are often unclear as to where to present complaints. A survey of refugees in 2016 found that 38 percent of the respondents reported dissatisfaction with the feedback mechanism and the way their complaints were handled, 37 percent reported satisfaction and 25 percent reported that they did not get any feedback on their complaints.</p> <p>In response to these limitations WFP is developing its own CFM mechanism (in parallel to the existing Government one).¹⁷⁷ This mechanism will initially be established in Somali region (will be piloted for three interventions: TSF, PSNP-HRD pilot and in 1 refugee camp). The mechanisms will include a help desk in each of the refugee camps and a hotline hosted by the WFP Addis Ababa office. In developing and operating the complaint feedback mechanisms, operators were trained in how to handle reports of sexual exploitation or abuse or other protection concerns, in line with the protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) policy. This system will run parallel to the standard complaints' systems described above. As a consequence there is a concern about how WFP's CFM mechanism will link to standard programme processes which would enable the resolution of complaints and a question regarding the relative value of establishing a parallel process rather than working to improve/reform the existing procedures.</p>

¹⁷⁷ The Country Office provided the following response to the concerns raised about parallel complaints systems:

it can be elaborated that a participatory gender assessment was conducted to identify the needs and preferred mechanisms for CFM and that based on that the pilot was informed. CFM falls under AAP which falls under Objective 4 of the CGAP. In general this document does not reflect on the significance of this pilot and mentions it sporadically and incomplete.

Additionally, WFP is accountable to affected populations and therefore requires to provide beneficiaries with a neutral and safe CFM to share grievances. As mentioned in the analysis, 36% of beneficiaries was unsatisfied with existing mechanisms. In FGDs, WFP learned that this is because of fear of oppression and lack of confidentiality in existing procedures. Especially in high priority cases (level P1) related to SEA, theft and fraud, beneficiaries need to be able to use an anonymous and safe CFM is necessary.

Although there are some local processes in camps, and PSNP has a grievance mechanism, people have little trust in them. For PSNP, the appeal committee tends to focus on exclusion or inclusion errors related to targeting and this "kebele appeal committee" (KAC) meets only quarterly. Furthermore, it may very well be that where WFP staff is involved, beneficiaries may want to use government structures, and where government staff is involved, they feel safer to use WFP's CFM. Hence, the two channels will complement each other. In all pilot sites WFP works closely with the government, who is informed hereof. Furthermore, the lessons learned and best practices will be shared and used to support government in building the capacity of existing structures.

30. **Protection and capacity building.** In 2013, Ethiopia was selected as one of ten countries to pilot the launch of WFP's protection policy. Key activities included: all staff (about 735 staff at all levels) trained on protection over a nine month period; incorporation of protection indicators in M&E tools; and the development of a protection risk analysis matrix (for general food distribution staff/PSNP staff). On the basis of these activities, a workplan was developed with a number of activities included to improve the mainstreaming of protection in core programme activities. These activities included training of food committees in protection issues, and the creation of a separate queue for vulnerable groups such as the elderly.

31. This piloting was undertaken with the support of short term technical assistance, but after this input there was limited follow-up and therefore problems of continuity. The person who provided this assistance in 2013 has now joined the country office on a longer term assignment. Although she has not been able to track progress in implementing the earlier action plans, she has begun a process of providing refresher training. This training is being provided as a joint protection and gender training.

32. Even prior to the 2013 pilot, there was some consideration of protection and accountability to affected populations incorporated in WFP's support to the food assistance sector. Standard operating procedures for food distributions sites included the aim to reduce travel times to food distribution points and measures to ensure that food distributions took place in an orderly (and safe) way. WFP participated in the development of these procedures for both the PSNP (as one of a number of stakeholders) and humanitarian food assistance (where WFP has played a leading role through its food management improvement programme).¹⁷⁸ Following the 2013 pilot, WFP provided further support through the provision of training on protection to government counterparts (National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and Ministry of Agriculture) to ensure that they can better understand and handle protection concerns in the context of food assistance operations. This training was cascaded to frontline food distribution committees.

33. As a response to the 2016/2017 humanitarian crisis in Somali region and in light of some of the specific risks related to operations in that region, the UN agreed to appoint a deputy humanitarian coordinator to be based in the region. This appointment has the potential to enable high-level interaction with the Somali Regional Government regarding sensitive issues such as humanitarian principles and protection, and thereby provide a level of protection for more junior staff who are often Ethiopian nationals. There is a perception that this potential has not yet been fulfilled and that too much effort has been put into ensuring a smooth working relationship with the Somali Regional Government at the cost of addressing contentious issues.

¹⁷⁸ Humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations are not explicitly covered in either the PSNP manual or the Commodity Management Procedures Manual, but such documents (and accompanying guidelines such as the relief targeting manual) do cover key issues such as safety, communication to beneficiaries and complaints procedures.

Main Findings


34. Table 34, Table 35 and Table 36 above summarize the extent to which WFP has succeeded in applying key principles and concepts related to humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations in its work. A consistent theme related to these efforts is the fact that the Government of Ethiopia is a core implementing partner for much of WFP's programming: ARRA (Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs) staff are the front-line implementers of almost all of WFP's support to refugee populations, and woreda staff of the relevant government line agencies are responsible for implementation of general food distributions provided in response to emergency appeals and safety net transfers under the PSNP. As such, key successes and weaknesses cannot solely be attributed to WFP, but rather a combination of agencies including the Government. However, it remains valuable to assess whether key principles and concepts are being addressed and, whether or not they are, whether WFP has been instrumental in advocating for them and/or raising concerns regarding deficiencies.

35. Table 34, Table 35 and Table 36 above rely mainly on SPRs to track attention to humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations across the evaluation period, supported by evaluation team interviews. The evaluation team also met staff and beneficiaries across a range of WFP operating sites (see Table 3 and Table 4 in Annex D) and heard their concerns. Some key impressions from the site visits were:

- a) That protection issues (not least PSEA for women) are a significant concern for refugees, and require the ongoing concerted attention of all major partners (ARRA, UNHCR, WFP).
- b) That WFP staff show awareness of protection issues, and recognise that they have wider relevance than food distribution per se. However there is a tendency to regard such wider issues as primarily the responsibility of other agencies, especially Government.
- c) Similarly, there is wide, though sometimes mainly implicit, understanding of the humanitarian principles and their implications for WFP's work.
- d) WFP's close working relationships with Government in general and with the Somali Regional Government in particular, do raise challenges concerning WFP's ability to ensure neutrality and to monitor impartiality in the deployment of food assistance.
- e) WFP does monitor beneficiary perceptions of its services (as illustrated by Figure 58 below), but it is less clear how well the information collected is used. The evaluation team was not made aware of other examples of systematic analysis of beneficiary feedback.
- f) Resource scarcities present a major challenge to the principle of humanity, most starkly illustrated in the dilemmas around refugee ration cuts. Conflict IDPs do not receive such systematic and impartial attention as other vulnerable people.
- g) Where there are challenges to the humanitarian principles (e.g. in discriminatory implementation of ration cuts) it is important for the humanitarian agencies to work together in their dialogue with the Ethiopian authorities.

Figure 58 Refugees: monitoring protection and accountability

“WHY & HOW”: Protection and Accountability to WFP’s clients



1. The primarily **sources of information** are 'loudspeaker' (58%), 'Refugee Committee (RC)' (15%), 'Block leader' (14%) and 'notice board' (10%)
2. 14% of HHs declared to **have complained** the 6 months before the interview, mainly in Gambella (46%) and Semera (32%)
3. The **most common types of complaint** are 'less food given due to scooping' (43%, and especially in Semera), and 'some family members are not included in the ration card' (34%, and especially in Gambella). 13% of complaints concerns 'card lost or stolen'.
4. Female-headed HHs complain more about 'members missed in the ration card' compared to male-headed HHs who complain about 'less food received'
5. To **submit a complain** most of the HHs contact the RC (41%) followed by ARRA (32%), and Joint Committee WFP, ARRA, and RF (19%).
6. Male-headed HHs prefer to contact the RF, while female-headed HHs contact ARRA, followed by the RC and the Join Committee

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
“WHY & HOW”: Protection and Accountability to WFP’s clients

Note: definition of people with vulnerabilities in the CHS is ‘pregnant and nursing mothers, seriously sick, disabled, very old.

WHY is it important?

$p < \alpha$

HHs declaring having experienced safety problems and FCS



	Consumption Copying Strategies (rCSI)
NOT have experienced safety problem	7.6
Have experienced safety problem	12.6
NOT have a member vulnerable in the HH	7.8
Have a member vulnerable in the HH	9.4

Size (N): safety issues yes (146), no (1315)

HOW do we perform?

- ✓ **Prioritisation of persons with vulnerabilities:** 81% of HHs stated that people with vulnerabilities are given priority during food distribution (89% during cash distribution). Attention to be paid to Dollo Ado below the average (64%). Overtime: strong improvement is recorded since 2015: from 67 to 81 for food distribution, from 77 to 89 for cash. Semera has improved significantly
- ✓ **Assistance provided to persons with vulnerabilities during distribution:** 76 % of HHs mentioned that assistance is given to people with vulnerabilities (peak in Jijiga -95%). Overtime: improvement since 2015 from 64 to 76%
- ✓ **Safety and Wellbeing:** 90% of HHs had not experienced safety problems. The few incidents are concentrated in Gambella and Semera. It is notable that female-headed HHs are more likely to become victims of safety incidents (14% female vs 5% male-headed HH)

THE STORY

Safety problems, which vary from theft/ harassment to long queues, are negatively correlated with Food Consumption Score (graph) and coping strategies index (table). It is recommended to continue the current efforts aimed at providing tailored support to people with vulnerabilities and decreasing the frequency of safety incidents. Gender approach is essential when dealing with safety issues



1. **Safety issues** are faced more by female- than male-headed HHs. Female-headed HHs are affected by ‘theft’ and ‘conflict with refugees/communities’
2. Most of the safety incidents occurs at the distribution site (90%) while a minority happens when travelling to/from the site (5% and 12%)
3. In 2017, the **main issues** faced were: ‘long queue’ (53%), ‘pushing due to overcrowding’ (37%), ‘theft’ (31%), ‘conflict with refugees and communities’ (20%)
4. In 2016, ‘pushing due to overcrowd’ was more frequent (56%), whereas ‘theft’ was less (13%). Also, ‘intimidation /harassment was more relevant in 2016
5. While in Semera ‘intimidation’ is a concern, in Gambella attention must be paid to ‘theft’, ‘conflict with refugees/community’, and ‘overcrowd’
6. About 9% of the HHs have a child under the age of 14 working in a danger environment (particularly in Dollo and Gambella)

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Assessment

WFP performance

36. In the context of Ethiopia, WFP is clearly committed to the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence. These are central to all that WFP does. There is equal commitment to protection and accountability to affected populations. There is a good, general understanding of humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations which is supported at least in principle, by the Government, donors, and implementing partners.

37. WFP has systematically sought to address protection and accountability to affected populations issues in the design and delivery of its operations in Ethiopia. This has included training of its staff on protection issues (though with limited continuity and follow-up) and systematic reporting on protection and AAP issues.

38. WFP's operations have been consistent with the humanitarian principles. There are inevitable difficulties in fulfilling the principle of humanity ("to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found) in the face of resource scarcities. There are also tensions implicit in the close working relationships between the Government and its humanitarian partners in Ethiopia, and these are especially evident in relations with the Somali Regional Government. Vigilance is needed in ensuring that humanitarian assistance is allocated in accordance with need, and development partners including WFP must continue to challenge the government if breaches of humanitarian principles occur (as in the case of discriminatory treatment in favour of Eritrean refugees).

Key issues to address going forward

39. In relation to humanitarian principles and protection, key issues identified by the evaluation team as the likely challenges in future and for which the country office can prepare itself are as follows.

- There are inevitable trade-offs, and a particular tension is maintaining operational independence and neutrality, especially when the principal implementing partner is Government (and the Somali Regional Government in particular). This links to Humanity and matters of dignity in relation to the access to those in need.
- Tensions relating to and between principles are exacerbated by funding shortfalls. "Alleviating human suffering wherever it is found" costs money. This necessitates prioritisation amongst those in need.
- Practical implications of the humanitarian principles are most acute in relation to:
 - (a) Ration cuts: Preferential treatment for Eritrean refugees is a clear breach of humanitarian principles (impartiality).
 - (b) Concerns about neutrality in relation to IDPs.
- Collective responsibility is crucial. UN agencies need to act together in the spirit of "Human Rights Up Front".

40. The CSP process provides important scope to develop explicit strategy and goals to enhance national institutional and organisational application building on key agreements and strategies, for

example, key UNHCR/WFP agreements.¹⁷⁹ Targeting, in particular, is a specific matter for attention and application to differential and equitable needs-based assistance between refugee populations is crucial as a matter of Humanity and Impartiality.

41. Greater impact may be achieved through a more explicit, strategic approach to all aspects of humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations. WFP can use these humanitarian imperatives to strengthen advocacy influencing, give sharper focus to institutional relationships and capacity building, and increase impact of operational performance. This could serve both to underpin WFP's role and to enhance the implementation of humanitarian principles in Ethiopia.

42. WFP needs to consider protection and accountability to affected populations mechanisms holistically, since most of its operations are conducted jointly with the Government and other partners. Often it may be more effective to advocate for stronger collective systems than to work in parallel on WFP-specific measures.

¹⁷⁹ UNHCR livelihood plan for Refugees in Ethiopia, November 2017 (UNHCR, 2017d); Joint UNHCR/WFP Principles for Targeting (UNHCR & WFP, 2017).

Annex P Nutrition

INTRODUCTION – SCOPE OF THIS ANNEX

1. This annex covers WFP's nutrition response for refugees and Ethiopian nationals, and WFP's urban and community HIV/AIDS programmes. This includes the following components:

- a) Nutrition programme for Ethiopian nationals:
 - Targeted supplementary feeding (for children with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and acutely malnourished pregnant and lactating women), blanket supplementary feeding.
 - Urban HIV nutrition and food security project.
 - Fresh food vouchers (scoping study took place in 2017, implementation not yet started).
 - Local production of ready-to-use supplementary food.
- b) Nutrition programme for refugees: targeted or blanket supplementary feeding .

2. The annex also mentions other aspects of the portfolio which are important for nutrition. The annex is structured as follows:

- **Context:** describes the overall context of WFP's nutrition programming, including the nutrition and HIV/AIDS situation in Ethiopia, key Government of Ethiopia policies and programmes, and major factors influencing this sector of the portfolio.
- **Intended WFP programme and its rationale:** the WFP programme and the rationale for the programme adopted.
- **Programme delivery and results:** delivery against planned programme.
- **Assessment:** the evaluation team assessment of performance against the main evaluation criteria.

CONTEXT

Ethiopia Context

Nutrition issues

3. **Despite recent improvements, child mortality and malnutrition remain critical issues in Ethiopia.** One in 14 children die before their fifth birthday (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017) with undernutrition believed to be an underlying cause of more than half of these deaths (The Lancet, 2008) An estimated 38 percent of children under five are stunted (chronic malnutrition) and 10 percent wasted (acute malnutrition). **One fifth of women (22.4 percent) of reproductive age are undernourished with a body mass index of less than 18.5** (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017).

4. **Moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) in Ethiopia stands at 7 percent**, compared to 2.9 percent prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (SAM). MAM is estimated to affect more than 600,000 children (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017), Although it poses a lower risk of death, moderate acute malnutrition, which WFP

is mandated to address, contributes more to the overall disease burden than severe malnutrition, as it affects many more children.¹⁸⁰

5. **The average diet in Ethiopia is lacking in adequate nutrients.** There is a per capita food deficit of 236 kcal per day. Even where households are able to meet their calorie requirements, on average, 76 percent of energy is derived from staples, indicating that the diet is lacking in diversity and adequate nutrition. The rate of exclusive breastfeeding up to 6 months is 57 percent of infants and just 7.7 percent of children 6-23 months received the minimum acceptable diet in terms of frequency of feeding and diversity of foods. (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017).

6. **Lack of access to safe water, poor sanitation and high morbidity rates are also contributing factors.** More than a third of households in Ethiopia do not have access to an improved water source. More than half of rural households (53 percent) travel 30 minutes or longer round trip to fetch drinking water.

HIV/AIDs in Ethiopia

7. **Ethiopia has a high caseload of HIV and AIDS.** The national HIV prevalence (0.9 percent, UNAIDS, 2017) is low in comparison to many other African nations, but given Ethiopia's population, this represents a high total caseload. HIV prevalence is seven times higher in urban areas than in rural settings (CSA & ICF, 2012).

8. **People Living with HIV and AIDS (PLHIV) are more vulnerable to malnutrition than the general population.** Increased resting energy expenditure, loss of appetite, diarrhoea, fever, nausea and frequent vomiting, fungal infections of the mouth, tongue, oesophagus and intestines are all symptoms of the illnesses. These can result in inadequate intake of food, and poor absorption, and are the key factors contributing to malnutrition in HIV and AIDS. Weight loss and malnutrition, which are common in HIV infection or AIDS, are likely to accelerate disease progression, increase morbidity and reduce survival due to the impact of malnutrition on immunity.


Fundamental issues and trends

9. Trends in stunting, wasting and underweight are shown in Figure 59 below. **Although strong progress has been made on stunting, Ethiopia is not on track to meet the World Health Assembly target** of a 40 percent reduction in stunting rates between 2012 and 2025. At the current rate of progress, Ethiopia will have a 31.9 percent prevalence of stunting in 2025 compared to the target of 23.1 percent (EC, 2016).

10. **Little progress has been made on the prevalence of wasting (acute malnutrition) in recent years** with a 2016 estimate of 9.9 percent compared to 10.5 percent in 2002. This is in part due to successive, large-scale droughts (the 2016 survey was conducted during the El Niño drought). The highest rates were in drought-affected Somali (22 percent), and Afar (18 percent) as well as Gambella.

¹⁸⁰Weight for height between -2 and -3 Z scores.


Figure 59 Nutrition trends in Ethiopia 2002–2016.



Source Demographic and Health Surveys 2002, 2005, 2011, 2016.

11. **Regions affected by the country's 2011 drought made little or no progress on stunting reduction in the subsequent years**, as shown in Figure 60 below; many regions saw increases in wasting rates when the droughts of 2015/2016 and 2017/2018 affected a large proportion of the country. There are potentially long-term and severe effects on nutrition from these droughts, which may not be measured until the next demographic and health survey (DHS) in 2020. Therefore further emphasis is needed to ensure that the decline in stunting will meet the WHO target.


Figure 60 Trends in stunting in Ethiopia 2011–2014



Source: DHS 2011 and 2014.

12. **Undernourished women are more likely to give birth to low-birth-weight infants, perpetuating the inter-generational cycle of poor nutrition and poverty.** In Ethiopia, 22.4 percent of women have a body mass index under 18.5 and only limited progress has been made on this indicator in recent years with a comparative rate of 26 percent in 2002 (Figure 61 below).

Figure 61 Percentage of women 15-49 years of age who have a body mass index (BMI) of less than 18.5.



Source: DHS surveys 2002–2016.

13. **Overweight and obesity are an emerging issue.** Nationwide the issue of overweight and obesity is not currently a huge concern, at 7.5 percent of women and 3.5 percent of men. According to the DHS 2016, 29 percent of women in Addis Ababa are overweight or obese compared to 19.9 percent in 2011, a 50 percent increase in 5 years (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017). As economic growth and urbanisation drive increases in overweight and obesity, this issue has the potential to become a public health concern in Ethiopia in the coming years.

14. **Malnutrition rates among refugees have been consistently high,** but there were not significant increases in the last three years, despite ration cuts. Ethiopia is the second largest refugee hosting country in Africa and the sixth largest hosting country worldwide with a current caseload of 900,000 refugees predominantly from Somalia, South Sudan, Eritrea, Sudan and Kenya. Refugees reside in 26 camps located in the five regional states of Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Somali and Tigray. The malnutrition rates in refugee camps are shown in Table 37 and Table 38 below.

Table 37 Refugees: global acute malnutrition among children 6-59 months (%) 2012–2017.

Region	Camp	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Somali	Bokolmayo	12.3			13.7		13.8
	Melkidika	15			19.6		11.9
	Buramino	32.7			19.9		16.9
Gambella	Teikidi			30.3	28.3	24.4	23.2
	Kule			28	21.3	26.1	23.4
	Pugnido 1		12.5		24.2	24.7	16.8
	Pugnido 2					16.8	16
	Leithchuor			25.8			
Tigray	Shimbela		10		11.3		12.4
	Main-Aini		7.5		8.2		6.5
	Adi-Harush		7.8		7		7.1
Afar	Asaiyta	28.5		17.1	19.8	13.7	

Source: NHCR, WFP, ARRA and NGO nutrition surveys.

Table 38 Refugees: stunting among children 6-59 months 2012-2017 (%).

Region	Camp	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Somali	Bokolmayo	22.1			39.3		25.1
	Melkidika	25.1			41.8		36.5
	Buramino	24.1			39.6		32.7
Gambella	Teikidi			12.4	12.4	11.4	12.7
	Kule			7.5	16.4	7.6	10
	Pugnido 1				14	4.2	9.1
	Pugnido 2					15.2	2.4
	Leithchuor			12.7			
Tigray	Shimbela		33.1		26.8		30
	Main-Aini		26.2		24.3		18.4
	Adi-Harush		25.9		25		27.8
Afar	Asaiyta	41.3		19.1	26.2	31.4	

Source: NHCR, WFP, ARRA and NGO nutrition surveys.

National Policies and Programmes

Policy framework

15. Five major relevant policies or guidelines have guided nutrition and HIV/AIDS interventions in Ethiopia:

- a) *The National Nutrition Plan (2008-2015)* (Ministry of Health, 2008a). The key reference document for this evaluation period is the National Nutrition Plan (NNP) 2008-2015. The NNP was implemented through the health sector with a key focus on growth monitoring, micronutrient supplementation and treatment of SAM.
- b) *The Health Sector Transformation Plan IV (2010-2015)* The Health Sector Transformation Plan IV (2010-2015) provided the framework for the NNP with a basic package of nutrition services delivered by the health extension programme (HEP) at a network of community-level health posts staffed by health extension workers (HEWs) responsible for primary health care.
- c) *The Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD)* (Government of Ethiopia, 2017a) is the annual humanitarian response plan, which reports the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance following food security and nutrition assessments, including the expected number of acutely malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women. Budgets and supply calculations are based on the numbers provided in this document.
- d) *The National Guidelines for HIV/AIDS and Nutrition in Ethiopia* define the nutrition actions for service providers to take in providing quality care and support to people living with HIV and AIDS at sites that provide HIV counselling and testing (HCT), maternal and child health (MCH) care, anti-retroviral therapy, services for orphans and vulnerable children, and home-based care.
- e) *National CMAM Guidelines 2012*. These guidelines for community-based management of acute malnutrition did not move to the WHO 2006 admission guidelines; they retained an admission threshold for SAM treatment at <11cm (compared to WHO standard of 12.5) and a MAM treatment admission threshold at <12cm. Updated guidelines that adhere to the WHO guidelines are in draft. It is expected that if the WHO guidelines are adopted, the caseload will significantly increase.

16. **Ethiopia is a signatory to the Scaling Up Nutrition movement (SUN)¹⁸¹ and in 2015, the Government made the “Seqota Declaration”** committing to end child undernutrition by 2030 (Government of Ethiopia, 2016c). The Government has established various multi-sectoral groups to coordinate and support efforts including: The Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group (RED&FS); the Nutritional Development Partners Group; the National Nutrition Committee; and the National Nutrition Technical Committee.

17. **A number of other initiatives to combat undernutrition have also been announced** including the Accelerated Stunting Reduction Strategy, the Food Fortification Initiative (USAID, 2014), as well as improved linkages between the NNP and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP)

Key Programmes involving WFP

Nutrition programmes for Ethiopian nationals

18. **The national nutrition programme (NNP) manages SAM treatment with delivery through the health system.** However, for most of the country, programmes to address MAM and malnourished pregnant and lactating women are not delivered routinely, but are launched in response to a worsening humanitarian situation.

19. **Targeted supplementary feeding/MAM treatment is usually initiated as part of the programme identified in the Humanitarian Requirements Document.** The Government has a system of hotspot classification based on food security and nutrition assessments where it determines which are the highest priority woredas. This differs from most contexts as it not necessarily based on nutrition surveys that assess the malnutrition rate. Once the government has classified the woredas, interventions for MAM and pregnant and lactating women are initiated in the most severely affected, Priority 1, and often Priority 2, woredas.

20. **Treatment of acute malnutrition is divided between two government departments and two UN agencies.** SAM is managed through the Ministry of Health and the Health Extension Programme, supported by UNICEF. MAM and pregnant and lactating women are treated through targeted supplementary feeding programmes (TSFP) managed through the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) supported by WFP.

21. **Treatment of SAM is part of the NNP and is delivered through the health system.** However, for most of the country, programmes to address MAM and malnourished pregnant and lactating women are not delivered routinely, but are launched in response to a worsening humanitarian situation.

22. **The mode of outreach for screening has changed over this time period.** At the start of the evaluation period, the health system used the enhanced outreach strategy (EOS) approach to for screening for acute malnutrition, as well as delivery of vitamin A supplementation and deworming. This was a twice-yearly nationwide campaign, which received significant external support in terms of funding, logistics and supervision. In 2012, the Ministry of Health began to transition to community health days in more developed woredas. Through community health days, the health extension worker (HEW) is expected to visit every kebele in her catchment area every quarter. This scheme has less external support. In recent years, the MOH has been continuing the transition to routine health extension programme (HEP) where there are no

¹⁸¹ A "global movement to end malnutrition in all its forms" – see <http://scalingupnutrition.org/>.

stand-alone days for these services, they are integrated into broader services. HEWs are expected to conduct outreach activities on an ongoing basis and screen all children monthly.

23. **Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programmes (TSFPs)** are used to treat moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) in children 6-59 months and acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women. The majority of services are managed nationally by NDRMC and sub-nationally through Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureaus, with services delivered at food distribution points using a network of Food Distribution Assistants (FDAs).

24. **The TSFP for Ethiopian nationals is implemented using a different model to that used in most countries.** In most countries targeted supplementary feeding is delivered alongside SAM treatment to ensure continuity of care between treatment of SAM and MAM, with the child returning to the programme every two weeks for follow up and to receive more supplementary food. Efforts are being made to improve delivery in Ethiopia resulting in a number of programmes and initiatives. The different models used are described below.

- **First Generation TSFP:** This modality was used for the majority of TSFP programming 2012-2017. This modality is managed through the NDRMC (and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureaus at regional level). Programmes are usually launched in Priority 1 and sometimes Priority 2 woredas following the hotspot classification exercise. During this evaluation period, mass screening took place every three to six months depending on the region and, following this exercise, a three-month ration of supplementary food was delivered quarterly at food distribution points in the woredas. Outcomes of children and pregnant and lactating women were not followed or recorded. In 2016, developed regions moved to monthly screening. Where an NGO supported implementation during this period, screening was sometimes monthly. However, data were not available on which woredas had NGO support during the evaluation period.
- **Second Generation TSFP:** To address some of the concerns surrounding First Generation TSFP and increase programme effectiveness, a pilot of delivery through the health system – “second Generation TSFP” – was launched in 44 woredas. In the Second Generation TSFP the management of moderate acute malnutrition is integrated into the health system, specifically by allowing the Health Extension Workers (HEWs) to identify and treat moderate acute malnutrition at health post alongside SAM treatment.

This pilot has allowed regular screening, nutritional follow up and linking of severely malnourished children to the management of moderate acute malnutrition services upon discharge in the 44 pilot woredas of Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR and Tigray regions.

- **Emergency TSFP:** In response to large-scale emergencies 2015-2017, and the recognised limitations of standard TSFP programming, the Nutrition Cluster/Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU) encouraged NGO technical support for the delivery of TSFP. NGOs received funds through the Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund (EHF) or other donors for technical support for SAM and MAM and would either support transport of supplies from the government or would receive supplementary food directly from WFP. The NGO would then support the health posts to deliver both SAM and MAM treatment with TSFP operating on a monthly basis.
- **Mobile health and nutrition teams:** Where malnutrition rates were high, the population was hard-to-reach and the health system was weak, integrated MAM and SAM services were delivered using mobile health and nutrition teams (MHNTs) which visit several different locations each week.

25. **Blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP).** This provided a supplementary ration to pregnant and lactating women and children 6-23 months regardless of nutrition status. Children 24-59 months can also be included in blanket supplementary feeding where GAM rates are thought to be above 15 percent. It has not been possible to get data on the locations where blanket supplementary feeding was used for Ethiopian nationals throughout the project period.¹⁸² It was used in 2016–2017 for three months instead of targeted supplementary feeding in 45 woredas. This was due to an increasing caseload of malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women and concerns over insufficient capacity to deliver high quality targeted supplementary feeding.

Integrated road map for targeted supplementary feeding.

26. An advisory group chaired by the NDRMC and the Ministry of Health and supported by UN agencies and donors is working to integrate targeted supplementary feeding services for Ethiopian nationals into the health system, building on lessons learned and the experiences from the pilot “Second Generation” targeted supplementary feeding in the 44 woredas. The plan proposed (WFP, n.d. zb) has three delivery options:

- Integrated management of SAM and MAM services within the health system to improve the continuum of care.
- Strengthening the Mobile Health and Nutrition Team (MHNT) activities through integrating MAM services in Somali and Afar regions.
- Implementation of emergency targeted supplementary feeding services in response to sudden onset shocks and acute needs, with support from NGOs and other agencies as needed.

Nutrition programmes for refugees

27. **Targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP).** The TSFP programme operates in all refugee camps in coordination with ARRA (Administration of Refugee and Returnee Affairs), UNHCR and UNICEF. It is delivered mostly by NGO partners with ARRA as the implementer in some locations. This programme integrates MAM and SAM treatment and follows the WHO 2006 guidelines.

28. **Blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP).** Blanket supplementary feeding was implemented in all refugee camps for the majority of the programme. Information was not available on the programme evolution or the numbers of camps where this was implemented at any given time, but for the majority of the evaluation, blanket supplementary feeding was implemented in all camps. Under this programme, all children 6-23 months and pregnant and lactating women were eligible for a supplementary ration regardless of nutrition status. Where rates were particularly high (above 15 percent), 24-59 month old children were also included.

29. Programmes are financially supported by a number of donors and supported by various government departments, UN agencies and NGOs. Coordination takes place through the following bodies:

- Humanitarian coordination is through the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit (ENCU), which is co-chaired by the NDRMC and UNICEF. This body coordinates all partners involved in humanitarian response to ensure appropriate interventions and lack of duplication of response.

¹⁸² Blanket supplementary feeding interventions require additional funding and are often short term. As a result, the number of programmes frequently changed, and it would have required very effective data management to keep track of this.


- The Nutrition Development Partners Group, led by the European Union and UNICEF, convenes donors around nutrition development issues with civil society participation.

WFP Policies

30. The WFP Nutrition Policy released in 2012 emphasized the critical window of opportunity between conception and 2 years of age, outlined nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive programmes, and defined the contribution WFP can make with its partners to fight undernutrition through ensuring access to “the right food, at the right place, at the right time”. Based on the Nutrition Policy, several WFP guidelines were developed to assist country offices in the design of nutrition programmes.

31. The nutrition policy has four nutrition-specific pillars: 1) treatment of moderate acute malnutrition among children under 5, pregnant and lactating women and people living with HIV or receiving treatment for tuberculosis; 2) prevention of acute malnutrition; 3) prevention of stunting during the first 1,000 days; and 4) addressing micronutrient deficiencies (see Figure 62 below). The fifth pillar highlights the importance of ensuring that other WFP activities are "nutrition-sensitive".

Figure 62 WFP nutrition strategy, policy framework



Source: WFP, 2012a

32. **The programmatic framework on nutrition is complemented by a “WFP food and nutrition security conceptual framework”.** This is aimed at mainstreaming nutrition through interventions that address the immediate and the underlying causes of child malnutrition: livelihoods and other interventions to improve access to food, improvement of health status and the health environment, and better care practices, including balanced dietary intakes in line with physiological needs.

33. **The Strategic Results Framework (2014–2017)** introduced new measurement requirements for all nutrition programmes. Guidance on methodologies for supporting the new framework was developed in late 2013, and revised in 2014 and 2015 to suit evolving measurement requests from the field. Pilot assessments were conducted to test the feasibility of large-scale coverage of measurement techniques for MAM treatment programmes. Multiple training sessions were held at all regional bureaus to expose

nutrition and M&E staff from regional bureaus and country offices to the new nutrition measurement requirements.

34. **The update to the nutrition policy that was released in 2017 has a greater emphasis on nutrition-sensitivity.** This Nutrition Policy (2017–2021) is intended to be an extension of 2012 nutrition policy. It includes a continued focus on treatment of acute malnutrition and prevention of malnutrition, but has a greater emphasis on incorporating nutrition-sensitive approaches more broadly across all WFP activities. This new nutrition policy will be operationalized within country strategic plans or interim country strategic plans.

35. **The focus of HIV support changed in the 2013 update to the nutrition policy,** from mitigation to enabling access to obtaining positive treatment outcomes through food and nutrition support. WFP collaborates with national stakeholders and governments to ensure that food and nutrition support is included in HIV and TB programmes. A 2011 gap analysis showed that this approach is effective. WFP's other programmes in areas of high prevalence are HIV-sensitive and TB-sensitive with a view to mitigating the consequences of the two diseases: these include school feeding programmes, life-skills training and general food distributions.

Nutrition policy evaluation

36. The WFP Nutrition Policy Evaluation (Mokoro, 2015b) highlighted some key points that potentially are of special relevance for the country portfolio evaluation in Ethiopia:

- a) For the majority of WFP's global portfolio, the emphasis is on treatment of acute malnutrition, as WFP's main comparative advantage is still perceived to lie in short-term emergencies.
- b) There is increased awareness and focus on programmes for prevention of both acute and chronic malnutrition. It was insufficiently acknowledged however that this leads to much larger programmes requiring a larger funding base (this has been a constraining factor).
- c) Overall, however, there is no evidence of a significant scale-up of nutrition-specific programmes. Nutrition-sensitive interventions and support to build nutrition governance are still relatively scarce in WFP programming, among others, because of lack of technical guidance due to a general scarcity of knowledge of what works in these areas.
- d) The corporate nutrition framework explicitly commits to scale up programmes to distribute high-quality food products targeting the most nutritionally vulnerable people. There is scope for further cross-fertilization among policies, e.g. with the cash and voucher policy, and with the new gender policy within WFP.
- e) Although the widened scope in relation to prevention of chronic malnutrition in development and emergency contexts was not intended to displace that of any other agency, there is a risk of WFP encroaching on areas of work where agencies like UNICEF and FAO should lead.
- f) Capacity development of government and partners is a specific objective within the nutrition framework, but this has not taken off at large scale. Long-term progress must depend on nationally owned, multi-sector strategies that address food systems as a whole.
- g) WFP nutrition indicators in strategic results frameworks have shifted from impact-level to outcome- and output-levels, which indicates a closer focus on the direct influence of WFP programmes. For nutrition-sensitive programmes, there are significant gaps in indicator sets. More technical guidance

is needed at Country Office levels for rolling out and supplementing indicators where needed, and on how to support and link with national M&E systems.

THE INTENDED WFP PROGRAMME AND ITS RATIONALE

Nutrition programme for Ethiopian nationals (PRROs 200290 and 200712, CPs 104300 and 200253)

37. WFP's nutrition programme for Ethiopian nationals predominantly focuses on humanitarian response through targeted supplementary feeding for the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition in children and all acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women. The majority of this programme forms part of humanitarian response as indicated in the Humanitarian Requirements Document. WFP provides specialised nutrition products and some capacity-building support to the Government to deliver these services. In some locations, the Government will be technically supported by an NGO to deliver supplementary feeding. Recently in areas where the government system is weak and malnutrition rates are very high, WFP has contributed to financing operational costs for NGOs to provide this support using field level agreements (FLAs). The rationale for continued support for this area is frequent shocks resulting in elevated rates of malnutrition where the health system and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureaus are weaker and not able to meet needs without significant support.

38. Financing has been provided to WFP's support to these systems through two PRROs (200290, 2012–2015 and 200712, 2015–present). WFP focuses operations for these programmes across the country in Priority 1 woredas following the hotspot classification exercise described above. Where there are additional aggravating factors, such as disease outbreak, Priority 2 woredas are also included.

39. WFP also operates Second Generation targeted supplementary feeding through the health system in 44 woredas in Tigray, Oromia, Amhara and SNNPR. The rationale for this component is that these are chronically food insecure woredas, but have health systems that are strong enough to integrate targeted supplementary feeding services. This supports the Ministry of Health National Nutrition Programme as well as the Humanitarian Requirements Document.

40. WFP also occasionally supports blanket supplementary feeding to prevent increases in acute malnutrition as a result of shocks. WFP does not appear to have clear criteria for when it does and does not operate blanket supplementary feeding for Ethiopian nationals; requests for WFP support arise from the process linked to the preparation of the Humanitarian Requirements Document (in which WFP participates).

41. In the recent PRRO, 200712, WFP has included a focus on the prevention of stunting. The rationale for this area is that stunting rates are still very high in Ethiopia and a focus on this area is in line with government objectives.

Ready-to-use supplementary food production

42. The PepsiCo-funded "EthioPEA Alliance" Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food Programme (WFP Trust Fund 200427) supported the creation of a locally-produced ready-to-use supplementary food (RUSF) product. This formula was designed to use locally available food and to take into account Ethiopian eating habits by using the fourth most cultivated indigenous crop in the country, the chickpea. This formula was approved by Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) for the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition in children between the ages of 6 to 59 months (ETHIOPEA Alliance, 2016).

Urban HIV nutrition and food security

43. The Urban HIV Nutrition and Food Security Project was designed to mitigate the impacts of HIV on adults and children while the specific objectives were to: improve nutritional status and health of malnourished people living with HIV; improve their food security status; prevent mother-to-child transmission; to support beneficiaries including orphans and vulnerable children; and to strengthen the evidence base for programming, shared learning and policy formulation. The rationale for the programme was the high caseload of HIV in Ethiopia and the gaps in urban programming.

44. WFP assistance through the Urban HIV Nutrition and Food Security Project targeted urban and peri-urban areas with the highest prevalence of HIV and food insecurity; nutritional assistance for people living with HIV focused on towns in the four developing regional states (Afar, Somali, Gambella, and Benishangul).

45. Through the HIV component of the country programme, malnourished people living with HIV on anti-retroviral therapy or under "pre-treatment follow-up" received special foods after nutrition screening and counselling at clinics. Beneficiaries were referred to community-level partners, who assessed household food security, and ensured that food assistance was provided if needed and linked participants with income-generating activities after nutritional recovery.

46. WFP provided food assistance through cash and vouchers to food insecure pregnant and lactating women living with HIV to enable them attend the elimination of mother to child transmission services provided through health institutions, where they were provided with basic counselling and education on nutrition and HIV during pregnancy and lactation and the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV.

47. Food-insecure orphans and other vulnerable children under 18 received food assistance in exchange for attendance at school and those that were malnourished were referred to clinics for therapeutic or supplementary rations.

48. A web-based information system called Urban HIV and AIDS Information System (UHAIS) was also set up to capture output and outcome data at individual level, generate aggregate reports at multiple levels, and to serve as evidence for informed programing and strategic planning.

49. The major partners for the implementation were the health/HIV and AIDS prevention and control offices (HAPCOs) at town and regional-level, as well as NGOs. Food assistance for orphans and vulnerable children was carried out in partnership with a national project led by PACT International.

50. Financing was provided through country programme 200253. The major donor for the Project was USAID/PEPFAR, while contributions were made from Network of Networks of HIV Positives in Ethiopia (NEP+) with funding from the Global Fund and other bilateral and private donors to address more beneficiaries. The total amount of funding received from different sources during the five-year project period was USD 56,054,469.

Strengthening community response for HIV in Ethiopia (TF 201035)

51. The multi-donor trust fund for "Strengthening Community Response for HIV in Ethiopia" (WFP, 2017 zk; WFP, 2016zf) ran for nine months from October 2016 to July 2017, targeting 25,956 beneficiaries and aiming to assist the Government of Ethiopia to strengthen community-based responses to HIV. The activities included a pilot of a community based adherence service, which involved training people living with HIV (PLHIV) to identify PLHIV with adherence challenges and also to provide adherence counselling and to link PLHIV to nutrition and food security assistance. The food-insecure PLHIV facing challenges to access and adhere to treatment were also provided with either vouchers or cash assistance for 6 months and were

linked to economic strengthening activities upon graduation. These interventions were aligned to the Government of Ethiopia's urban safety net programme and were implemented in partnership with the Ministries of Health and Labour and Social Affairs.

52. The trust fund was a shift from how the HIV response was implemented under the country programme, which only dealt with health institutions and individual PLHIV beneficiaries.

53. At the time of the trust fund, the country office were phasing out the existing country programme, as it was no longer seen as appropriate for the programmatic approach in the country office and the funding projections. The country office created the trust fund as they wanted to ring-fence the funds for this HIV project, rather than having the funds subsumed into a larger body of funds where expenditures might be lost to other activity lines within the country programme. Therefore, all PEPFAR funds remaining under the country programme were moved to the trust fund to start the activities.

54. The initial project documents note that PEPFAR proposed to provide WFP with a multi-year contribution and that by June 2017 an incremental funding was expected as part of a five year project. However, the trust fund ceased to be extended beyond July 2017.

Nutrition Programme for Refugees (PRROs 200365 and 200700)

55. WFP's nutrition programme for refugees is part of the government's support to refugees and focuses on prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition through targeted and blanket supplementary feeding with provision of specialised nutrition products to partners to deliver these services. The targeted supplementary feeding programme was integrated with treatment for SAM in line with WHO 2006 guidelines and was usually implemented by NGOs. The rationale for these programmes was that GAM rates in refugee camps are generally high and, amongst newly arrived refugees, they are often well above emergency thresholds. Targeted supplementary feeding is implemented to prevent spikes in SAM and mortality.

56. Blanket supplementary feeding was planned in all camps and targeted pregnant and lactating women and children 6-23 months. Where GAM rates were above 15 percent the blanket supplementary feeding extended to children 24-59 months. The rationale of this programme was to prevent spikes in acute malnutrition.

PROGRAMME DELIVERY AND RESULTS

Ethiopian Nationals

Available evidence

57. There were a number of limitations to assessing the performance of this area of work with the data available. There were very few nutrition surveys between 2015–2017 from which to assess the severity of the nutrition situation, and it was not possible to obtain the data from the biannual nutrition surveys conducted prior to 2015. There was no consistent collection of outcome data for most of the targeted supplementary feeding programme for Ethiopian nationals, and little documentation on how targets were set.

58. It was also not possible to obtain information on which modalities were implemented where, when or for how long for most of this component (interventions were short-term and numerous, and WFP's data systems were clearly not sophisticated enough to maintain comprehensively detailed records). Nevertheless, some explanations of differences between planned and actual figures do exist in the programme SPRs. A breakdown of the percentage of needs for nutrition as identified in the Humanitarian

Requirements Documents that were funded also does not exist. However, some explanations of differences between planned and actual figures do exist in the programme SPRs./

Programme delivery and beneficiaries


59. As shown in Table 39 below, the total number of beneficiaries covered by the targeted supplementary feeding programme increased significantly from 885,500 in 2012 to 2,288,573 in 2017. Their geographic distribution is shown in Figure 63 below.

Table 39 Beneficiaries reached through targeted supplementary feeding: Ethiopian nationals, 2012-2017.

Year	Nutrition activity	Planned	Actual	% actual v planned
2012	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	264,400	206,100	78%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	508,100	396,000	78%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	363,500	283,400	78%
	Total	1,136,000	885,500	78%
2013	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	251,328	181,951	72%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	487,872	353,199	72%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	347,800	438,750	126%
	Total	1,087,000	973,900	90%
2014	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	377,992	135,141	36%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	366,608	254,989	70%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	350,400	363,570	104%
	Total	1,095,000	753,700	69%
2015	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	206,813	141,357	68%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	511,285	349,461	68%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	337,045	410,511	122%
	Total	1,055,143	901,329	85%
2016	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	364,720	409,755	112%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	901,668	1,013,006	112%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	823,200	1,173,078	143%
	Total	2,089,588	2,595,839	124%
2017	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	368,010	329,794	90%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	909,805	815,325	90%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	433,789	1,143,454	264%
	Total	1,711,604	2,288,573	134%

Source: Relief SPRs 2012-2017

Figure 63 Geographic distribution of targeted supplementary feeding beneficiaries (Ethiopian nationals)




Source: Relief SPRs 2012-2017.

Note: The data obtained were not comparable between years, so are only able to display proportions.

60. **WFP played a large role in the humanitarian responses to the 2015/2016 El Niño and 2016/2017 Indian Ocean Dipole induced crises, which undoubtedly saved lives.** The scale of need increased to unprecedented levels during these years, as illustrated in Figure 64 below. For 2015, there was an initial projection of 507,643 requiring targeted supplementary feeding. However, the estimated needs had risen to 700,000 in the hotspot classification in August and to 2.2 million by the end of the year. WFP scaled up its response from 519,258 beneficiaries in 2015 to close to three times that number in 2016 and nearly five times that number in 2017.

61. **However, the targeted supplementary feeding response in 2015/2016 was very late.** According to the SPR, WFP faced significant challenges in meeting needs, due to late and insufficient contributions from donors as well as bottlenecks at Djibouti Port affecting the availability of commodities. A budget revision took place for WFP in August and was approved by the Board in November 2015. However, acute malnutrition numbers were not adjusted in this budget revision. The reason provided is that, as the MOH had not started screening in August, the country office did not have concrete data on increases in malnutrition. However, spikes in SAM admissions indicated higher than expected numbers as early as June. Instead, the decision was taken to rely on its existing planning figures for July–December 2015 of 510,000 children and pregnant and lactating women. By the end of the year, it was estimated that the caseload was close to four times that figure.

Figure 64 Severe acute malnutrition admissions 2013–2016



Source: Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit data

62. WFP reports that large delays in screening and funding resulted in delays in the start of targeted supplementary feeding in many locations. The SPR states that the seriousness of these delays and inadequate funding were visible by mid-year, when UNICEF reported a significant surge in admissions for SAM; the SPR explains the surge as being partly a result of MAM treatment being insufficient.

63. **WFP played a critical leadership role in improving the humanitarian nutrition response.** Interviews conducted during the evaluation indicate that WFP also played a critical leadership role in improving the response for nutrition, by advocating for improved modalities of targeted supplementary feeding and also for a 'bundle' approach to the response to address high malnutrition rates, which aimed to ensure that other causes of malnutrition, such as lack of access to water and sanitation, were incorporated into response plans where the caseload of SAM and MAM was high. The use of Field Level Agreements (FLAs) in 2017 for NGO-supported programmes was a positive shift toward improving TSFP delivery in Somali region. This allowed for improved targeted supplementary feeding where screening, admissions and distribution took place at least once a month and beneficiaries were followed up. This most likely contributed to stabilisation of SAM rates and prevented increases in mortality.

64. **Programme quality and scale were likely insufficient.** In its 2018 draft interim country strategic plan (ICSP), WFP reported that "Recent evaluation reports of the MAM treatment programme targeting children aged 6-59 months pregnant and lactating women and anti-retroviral therapy beneficiaries confirmed that though the impact of these interventions is significant, and contributed to the improved nutritional status of the targeted individuals, the scale of the programme against need was not sufficient, given the lack of other support programmes" (WFP, 2017i). However, the evaluation team was unable to obtain these evaluations. Interviews with stakeholder and field site visits indicate that although WFP supported scale-up and improved modalities of targeted supplementary feeding, the technical capacity of some partners was limited. Feedback from partners indicated that although WFP provided strong capacity-building support on the management of commodities, feedback on adherence to protocols and programme quality was not generally provided following monitoring visits from WFP. The targeted supplementary feeding programme used for the majority of the programme during this period is widely agreed, both internally and externally, to be inadequate in quality and not meeting global standards. WFP was largely

constrained by government guidelines and the separation of MAM and SAM treatment between different government departments. The credibility of reported outcomes (Table 40 below) needs to be considered against this background.

Table 40 Targeted supplementary feeding outcome indicators by region, Ethiopian nationals (2017)

Outcome Indicators		Afar	Amhara	Oromia	SNNPR	Somali	Tigray
Cured Rates	Cured 6-59 m	98.3%	91.8%	98.4%	96.2%	99.1%	77.6%
	SPHERE Cured	>75%	>75%	>75%	>75%	>75%	>75%
Death Rates	Death 6-59 m	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	SPHERE Death	<3%	<3%	<3%	<3%	<3%	<3%
Defaulters Rates	Defaulter 6-59 m	1.7%	3.3%	0.9%	0.3%	0.6%	15.2%
	SPHERE Defaulter	<15%	<15%	<15%	<15%	<15%	<15%
Non-responder Rates	Non-Responder 6-59	0.0%	4.9%	0.7%	3.5%	0.3%	7.2%
	Non-Responders Threshold for a good program	<5%	<5%	<5%	<5%	<5%	<5%

Data source: Combined data source from NGO woredas (49), Second Generation woredas (44) and mobile health and nutrition team (MHNT) sites in Afar (20) and Somali region (29).

65. **Piloting of Second Generation paved the way towards integrated MAM treatment.** WFP began piloting ‘Second Generation TSFP’ in 2012 in 38 woredas in Tigray, SNNPR, Amhara and Oromia. This was subsequently scaled up to 44 woredas. Second Generation targeted supplementary feeding is closer to the international standard approach of delivery through the health system and this pilot has seen routine identification of beneficiaries and nutritional monitoring by the health extension workers; improvement of food delivery (for timely delivery of food to targeted individuals in need) through the creation of decentralized food distribution centres at the kebele level close to the beneficiaries, and prepositioning of food three months in advance. This has also led to an improved continuum of care between SAM and MAM treatment. This allowed for demonstration of an improved model and a task force has subsequently been established to integrate MAM treatment into the health system. The draft updated guidelines for the Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition also include this modality.

66. **Although there has been strong recent progress in moving this agenda forward, this was slower than expected.** The initial plan for the pilot was to scale up the programme to 100 woredas by 2014, but scale-up did not take place until 2018. Some reasons given for this delay include lack of funding and government constraints followed by humanitarian crises. There is a view from external stakeholders that the absence of strong evidence due to poor quality evaluation hindered both donor interest and government buy-in.¹⁸³ A number of those interviewed also felt that WFP have too few technical staff and that, while the staff in place were strong and worked hard to take this agenda forward, they were overstretched and did not have the time for persistent advocacy with donors and government.

67. **Performance targets for Second Generation and other improved modalities against Sphere standards were met.** As shown in Table 41 below, improved targeted supplementary feeding modalities met the Sphere standard of >75 percent recovery rate in every year except the first year, 2012. Default rates

¹⁸³ See the discussion of quality issues for decentralised evaluations in Annex J.

were below 15 percent and mortality rates under 3 percent, which was also in line with Sphere standards. However, coverage of the programme was not measured in this period.¹⁸⁴

68. Non-response rates remained high and it was thought internally and externally that this was due to the sharing and selling of rations. This was believed to be in part due to insufficient general food distribution in terms of amount for the family size and food ration as well as the provision of items that were not in line with recipients' preferences.

Table 41 Targeted supplementary feeding programme performance (Second Generation, mobile team and NGO-supported programmes)* 2012–2017

Year	Recovery rate (%)	Mortality rate (%)	Default rate (%)	Non-response rate (%)
2012	64.4	0.4	1.5	
2013	83.2	1.4	1.2	
2014	93.7	0.1	1.9	4.3
2015	95.4	0	2.2	2.4
2016	93	0	3	4
2017	95.8	0.01	1.92	2.25
End target	>75	< 3	<15	<15

Source: Relief PRRO SPRs 2012-2017

*The proportion of TSFP that this represents is not known.

Introduction of new products.

69. **WFP successfully negotiated the use of improved nutrition products with the government.** From 2014, WFP introduced new, improved nutrition products and stopped the use of locally produced Corn Soya Blend (CSB), which had been found to be of poor quality. Partners and staff interviewed reported that the introduction of these products was the result of significant negotiation by WFP senior management and was an important step for improving the effectiveness of the programme. (It should be noted that WFP's nutritionally improved food supplements are not yet included in the Government's official humanitarian food basket and therefore their use is where UN agencies and/or NGOs are involved in procurement and delivery. The Government still uses Super-Cereal (CSB+) in its nutrition programmes. Continued efforts should be made in advocacy to include improved products in the humanitarian food basket.)

70. **The EthioPEA Alliance project paved the way for local production of specialised nutrition products** by developing a chickpea-based recipe which was adapted to Ethiopian taste preferences. This project also strengthened the capacity of local manufacturers to comply with international hygiene and manufacturing standards and practices by: supporting Hazard Analyses Critical Control Points (HACCP) systems; developing a range of analytical capabilities within Ethiopian food laboratories and increasing knowledge of inspection companies on the procedures for the quality control of pre-packaged processed foods.

¹⁸⁴ For the last 3 years, ensuring coverage surveys has been a WFP HQ requirement. However, guidelines for Ethiopia for coverage surveys we only finalised at the end of 2016 and without these, the government might not have agreed to WFP conducting surveys. (NGOs have, however, managed to do occasional coverage surveys in the past.) The first year when WFP could have surveyed coverage was 2017, after the government had approved surveys. However, according to staff, the emergency response and the ongoing structure and staffing review prevented them from having time to organise these.

71. **However, due to the cheaper unit cost of imported ready-to-use supplementary food from Nutriset, this product is not currently being produced in Ethiopia.** WFP headquarters signed a global supply agreement with Nutriset, which led to a reduced unit cost of RUSF. During the same time period, exports of chickpeas from Ethiopia increased significantly driving up the price of the main raw ingredient for the EthioPEA Alliance local product. As a result, there was insufficient demand for the continuation of production.

72. WFP have developed a business case scenario, estimating the necessary investment at USD 3.6 million to establish a factory in Ethiopia, which would operate according to international food safety and quality standards, and would produce the ready-to-use supplementary food as well as a variety of other commercial products, recapitalising the same equipment and raw materials. The country office intends to continue to advocate with donors to invest in this area of work (using the argument that higher unit costs in the short term may be justified by prospects of long-term sustainability and greater government ownership).

WFP monitoring

73. **WFP invested in field monitoring and had strong reach down to the field level.** Partners reported regular field visits from monitors who used a structured checklist and provided helpful feedback on any issues identified during a supplementary feeding distribution.

74. **But monitoring was focused on supply management and findings were not generally shared outside WFP.** Although WFP conducted a significant number of visits, opportunities were missed to monitor the technical quality of the programmes, particularly whether admission and discharge criteria were properly applied. Partners reported that visits focused on commodity management, a number of stakeholders reported that programme quality was poor and that WFP did not focus sufficiently on this area. Findings were not routinely shared with regional and woreda level government or the ENCU.

75. **There were improvements in data management and reporting to the ENCU.** At the beginning of the evaluation period, WFP's nutrition activities were treated within the organisation and within government largely as a food distribution programme. Reporting focused on numbers reached overall and metric tonnage. Criticisms were made that WFP did not share data and there was little understanding of who had been reached. WFP have made significant efforts at improving this, but criticisms were still made as the speed of information sharing.

76. **Data management and reporting were not optimal.** To improve TSFP reporting and data sharing, WFP also engaged an information management consultant in 2016/2017 to support the regional nutrition data collection, compilation and analysis. In spite of these efforts, there were some constraints such as late and poor quality reporting by WFP's government and NGO partners.

Stunting prevention

77. **Stunting prevention activities were also not implemented in this evaluation period.** Although activities to prevent stunting were included in PRRO 2001712, WFP did not receive funding to take these forward. It is also likely that an overstretched nutrition team would not have had the capacity to work on this area while also responding to large-scale emergencies.

78. **The scoping study for the fresh food voucher (FFV) pilot, conducted in 2017 (WFP, 2017zh), will move forward the stunting reduction agenda for WFP.** The fresh food voucher is designed to increase access to nutritious fresh foods by vulnerable groups in order to improve their dietary diversity and thereby contribute to reduced stunting. The region targeted for the implementation of this programme, Amhara,

has the highest stunting rates in Ethiopia at 46 percent compared to the national average of 38 percent (DHS 2016 – CSA & the DHS Program, 2017). WFP with its experience in cash and vouchers, particularly in the HIV programme is well placed to lead in this area.

79. **The fresh food voucher pilot has been carefully designed** with an extensive scoping study which assessed attitudes and behaviours towards the feeding of fresh foods to pregnant and lactating women and young children; it also conducted a market bottleneck assessment. The voucher aims to target the households of all pregnant and lactating women and children 6-23 months with a voucher that will enable households to buy fresh food. The programme will also have an engagement and a behaviour change strategy. Implementation of the vouchers was due to start at the beginning of 2018. The use of mobile money is also still quite innovative in Ethiopia and this may be an important test for its use in other areas.

80. **However, the potential for scale-up will be limited if system bottlenecks are not addressed.** WFP, in its scoping study, identified post-harvest losses, market infrastructure, the centralised supply chain of fruit and vegetables, transport and packaging leading to quality loss and high costs of transportation as major impediments to access fresh fruit and vegetables. The pilot will take place in locations where there are strong markets, but if WFP aims to demonstrate a modality that can be scaled up nationwide and eventually be taken forward by the Government, then it should be planning and engaging in discussions with key partners such as FAO about how to address food system bottlenecks as part of this programme.

81. **The fresh food voucher pilot has built in a strong research and evaluation component.** This will test the impact of different values of voucher against a control group. This will be important for potential scale up and understanding the relative benefits of providing different values of transfer.

82. **The research does not cover an important question: how do vouchers perform against cash in improving dietary diversity?** It is assumed that vouchers will perform better, but there is very limited evidence globally to determine which modality yields better results. It is also necessary to generate country-level evidence to inform decision-making about which modality to use and when. WFP reports from where cash has been piloted – in the refugee programme, HIV programme and relief – also found that cash led to improved dietary diversity. Given the complications of establishing a voucher programme and the limits to the number of vendors who can be supported, the pilot should have tested vouchers against a cash transfer so as to enable a cost-effectiveness comparison between the different modalities.

HIV/AIDS Urban Programme

83. There were significant limitations to the CPE evaluation of the Urban HIV/AIDS programme as WFP were not able to arrange any external meetings with the Government or stakeholders involved in this component of the portfolio. The assessment of the performance of this programme is based on an interview with one former staff member after the evaluation team visited (so guidance on other potential contacts for interview was also not possible), a brief email discussion with one external stakeholder and review of programme documents. The country office commissioned an external evaluation which was conducted in 2017. However, this was of poor quality so is not viewed by the evaluation team as a reliable source to assess the overall performance of the project.

84. **The 2011–2017 programme design reflected concerted effort to learn from past experience.** In the past, HIV work was mainstreamed in to WFP's programming. Until anti-retroviral therapy treatment started becoming available in 2006, the focus was 'palliative' with short-term handouts. After anti-retroviral therapy was introduced, the programme design focused more on creating self-reliance. In the new design, people living with HIV would have access to anti-retroviral therapy, then receive food assistance for 6 months. Following this they were linked to NGOs running income generation and back to work

programmes. The project involved training economic strengthening beneficiaries in financial education, business skills, and saving and loan management to enable them to engage in group or individual microenterprises and therefore enable them to address their food and nutrition requirements. Further technical training was given related to specific enterprises and beneficiaries were also linked to micro-finance institutions, following a mid-term evaluation of the HIV/AIDS programme in 2014 that recommended the need for an effective link to these institutions. The programme also introduced the tracking of nutrition status and used this as criteria for entry to and exit from the programme. Initially, beneficiaries received cereal, pulses, oil and CSB. However, it was recognised that people living with HIV require nutritionally-dense food as they have increased nutrient requirements and often have reduced appetite. For the redesign, it was decided that food vouchers were more cost-effective and better than "trucking food to places where there are markets". The decision was also taken to provide energy-dense food to those who are severely malnourished and to include a strong livelihood component. In the past, there were capacity issues with tracking nutrition status; in the redesign, there were strong linkages with health services.

85. **WFP understood the need to envisage an exit strategy.** This resulted in significant investment in new social protection and strategy as well as an effective upgrading of government's data management systems from manual to computer-based/automated and web based managed information. Successful advocacy with government resulted in people living with HIV and orphans and vulnerable children being included in the policy. Furthermore, WFP's economic strengthening strategy was adopted by the Government Urban Job Creation and Food Security Agency. In particular, after WFP shared its experience of using matching funds and monetary financial institutions (MFIs) to create financial access to beneficiaries, the Government's Agency proposed to utilize MFIs for a revolving fund mechanism to provide a matching fund required by economic strengthening participants (WFP, 2018m). However, there were limited explicit provisions in Urban Productive Safety Net Programme (UPSNP) for HIV-affected households.

86. **Lessons learned were not used to design the government Urban Productive Safety Net Programme.** External stakeholders involved in the design of the UPSNP were aware that WFP was engaging in social protection and HIV, but were not aware of this urban programme. The programme did not appear to be reflected in the government long term Urban Food Security and Job Creation Strategy which was a basis for UPSNP design. Investments in policy and strategy were insufficient to ensure continuity of services provided under WFP's HIV programme.

87. **WFP was not considered a potential stakeholder during the design of the UPSNP.** Although WFP, was involved in the donor working group for the PSNP, they did not have any significant involvement in the design of the UPSNP. This is in part due to the Government wishing to limit the number of partners involved in the early stages of the design of the programme to ensure a strong government lead.

88. There was underachievement in the initial years and target numbers of beneficiaries were more than halved in 2014; thereafter, WFP reached the planned number of beneficiaries (see Table 42 below).

Table 42 HIV/AIDS urban programme, planned & actual beneficiaries, 2012–2016

	Planned number of beneficiaries	Actual number of beneficiaries	% Actual v planned
2012	237,100	89,400	37.70%
2013	290,700	91,630	31.50%
2014	93,700	98,750	105.40%
2015	93,700	103,604	110.60%
2016	44,000	41,720	94.80%

Source: CP SPRs 2012-2016.

89. Outcome indicators are shown in Table 43 below. **WFP achieved good outcomes for people living with HIV in this programme.** Adherence to anti-retroviral therapy was 96 percent or above in all the years measured, the nutritional recovery rate was above 80 percent and survival rate at 12 months was 99 percent in all three years where this was measured. Nutrition recovery rates improved from 18.8 percent at baseline to 81 percent in 2016 and improvements were made in food consumption scores from baseline.

90. **The project reflected achievements in line with project objectives,** which included increasing anti-retroviral drug adherence, improving livelihoods, ensuring food security and breaking the inter-generational cycle of transmission of HIV from mother to child. It also reflected improved recovery from malnutrition and increased school enrolment and attendance, which contributed to mitigating the social and economic impacts of HIV/AIDS.

91. **WFP effectively mainstreamed gender concerns into its design and implementation of activities related to access to HIV care, treatment and support in urban areas.** Women were involved in beneficiary selection, referring beneficiaries from the community to the service point, as well as in town coordination committees, and there was considerable growth in the representation of women at the supervisory level of food transfer activities. A community resource person model was also put in place whereby volunteer resource persons living with HIV were deployed to monitor households that receive WFP support and use these home visits and beneficiary discussion sessions as an opportunity to encourage joint decision-making at the household level between women and men. Furthermore, in targeted urban areas, every woman receiving pre-natal care was tested for HIV and a follow-up process encouraged her to go on medication and follow certain instructions to prevent mother-to-child transmission. The economic strengthening was also seen to have clear positive impacts on the economic and social empowerment of women and men with HIV who were often previously hiding their illness (WFP, 2016v). Among the female participants in the economic strengthening component, income, consumption and wealth improved (WFP, 2017l).

92. **Results of the end line evaluation indicated that beneficiaries were generally satisfied with the services received,** and that strong linkages were created between communities, health facilities and households in providing care and support to malnourished people living with HIV. The evaluation also showed that the upgrading of the Government's data management system to an electronic system was effective, allowing effective monitoring and corrective measures to be taken, and that the project built the capacity of the government health system to assess, counsel and treat malnourished people living with HIV. The project achieved objectives of increasing anti-retroviral therapy drug adherence, improving livelihoods, ensuring food security, breaking the inter-generational cycle of transmission of HIV from mother to child, increasing school enrolment and attendance and mitigating the social and economic impacts of HIV/AIDS.

Nutrition Programme for Refugees

Programme standards

93. **The refugee nutrition programme is of higher quality than that for Ethiopian nationals.** This programme follows international standards and protocols and improved products were introduced earlier than in the national programme. The programme integrates the prevention of malnutrition through blanket supplementary feeding and counselling with treatment of MAM and SAM. In some locations, where it is thought that there is a risk of sharing and selling of rations, measures have been put in place to minimize this risk. These includes weekly follow up for all programmes in some locations, cutting open of packets to prevent selling and requesting that the beneficiaries return the packaging of ready-to-use foods.

Outcomes

94. **The programme met performance targets in terms of outcomes.** Recovery rates were above 90 percent in all the years reported and non-response rates remained low despite significant cuts to the ration in the General Food distribution (Table 44 below).

Table 43 HIV/AIDS Outcome Indicators

Outcome	Base value	End target	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
ART Adherence Rate (%)	97.6	98		98.6	96	99.4	99.8	
ART Nutritional Recovery Rate (%)	18.8	80	32.2	78	84.2	77.5	81	
ART Survival Rate at 12 months (%)		85			99	99	99	
ART Survival Rate at 6 months (%)				99.03				
FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score	9.7		9.8	8.3				
FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score	65.4		70.3	70.1				
FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score	24.9		19.9	21.8		10.2	7	
FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	24.9	4.98			15	9.8	7	
FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	24.9	4.98			13	11.4	7	
FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score						4.8	6	
FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)	9.7	1.94			2	4.9	5	
FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)	9.7	1.94			2	4.6	7	
MAM treatment default rate (%)		15			6.8	8.5	3.6	
MAM treatment mortality rate (%)		3			0.4	1	0.1	
MAM treatment non-response rate (%)		15			8.6	14	11.5	
MAM treatment recovery rate (%)		75			84.2	77.5	84.9	
Attendance rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	97.6	98			99	99		
Attendance rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	97.6	98			99	99		
OVC Attendance rate: number of schooldays that OVC boys and girls attend classes, as % of total schooldays	99		98	99	99			

Source: CP SPRs 201–2017.

Table 44 Performance of TSFP programmes 2012–2017 (refugees)

Year	Recovery rate (%)	Mortality rate (%)	Default rate (%)	Non-response rate (%)
2012				
2013				
2014	92	0	6	3
2015	92.2	0.5	4.1	5.4
2016	94	0.05	2	4.2
2017	93	0.03	3.8	2.4
Target	>75	< 3	<15	<15

Source: Refugee PRRO SPRs.

Beneficiaries

95. **The achievement in terms of refugee numbers reached by targeted supplementary feeding was under the planned figure every year** (see Table 45 below). This is often due to matters beyond WFP's control such as a lower influx or a lower malnutrition rate than expected. However, successive SPRs also cited the use of the weight-for-height data to calculate malnutrition rates when screening and admission were predominantly using mid upper-arm circumference (MUAC). Rates of acute malnutrition when calculated using weight-for-height can be as much as double or triple that found using MUAC contributing to poor target setting. While overestimations can prevent stock out of supplies, they can also mask incorrect admissions to the programmes which, in the context of funding constraints should be prevented as much as possible.

96. **Blanket Supplementary Feeding did not reach the planned total number of beneficiaries in any of the years of operation** (see Table 46 below). Project SPRs largely report the reason for this as being the difficulty in predicting the refugee caseload in any given year. WFP operated blanket supplementary feeding in all camps throughout which may have contributed to malnutrition rates staying relatively stable. WFP used information from regular nutrition surveys to decide whether or not to include children 24-59 months. Where GAM was above 15 percent, the programme was extended to this age group.

Table 45 Beneficiaries reached through TSFP - Refugees 2012-2017

Year	Nutrition activity	Planned	Actual	% planned v actual
2012	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	21,700	20,700	95%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	19,200	19,200	100%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding			
	Total	40,900	39,900	98%
2013	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	23,100	21,100	91%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding		22,117	
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding			
	Total	23,100	43,217	187%
2014	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	51,600	43,008	83%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	9,200	6,519	71%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	30,000	18,073	60%
	Total	90,800	67,600	74%

Year	Nutrition activity	Planned	Actual	% planned v actual
2015	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	30,327	21,571	71%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	74,973	53,328	71%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding		31,951	
	Total	105,300	106,850	101%
2016	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	30,326	17,883	59%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	74,974	44,212	59%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding		47,769	
	Total	105,300	109,864	104%
2017	Children 6 to 23 months given food under supplementary feeding	37,875	23,140	61%
	Children 24 to 59 months given food under supplementary feeding	37,875	57,208	151%
	Pregnant and lactating women participating in targeted supplementary feeding	31,563	29,556	94%
	Total	107,313	109,904	102%

Source: Refugee PRRO SPRs

Table 46 Refugees reached with blanket supplementary feeding 2012-2017

Year	Target Group	Planned	Actual	Planned v actual
<i>PRRO 101273</i>				
2012	6-23 m	59,250	15,800	27%
	24-59m	88,950	15,800	18%
<i>PRRO 201365</i>				
2012	6-23m	21,700	20,700	95%
	24-59m	19,200	19,200	100%
2013	6-23m	23,100	21,100	91%
	24-59m	0	22,117	
2014	6-23m	51,600	43,008	83%
	24-59m	9,200	6,519	71%
	PLW	30,000	18,073	60%
2015	6-23m	17,943	14,643	82%
	24-59m	44,357	36,201	82%
	PLW	30,700	24,781	81%

Year	Target Group	Planned	Actual	Planned v actual
<i>PRRO 200700</i>				
2015 (PRRO 200700)	6-23m	30,327	21,571	71%
	24-59m	74,973	53,328	71%
	PLW	0	31,951	
2016	6-23m	30,326	17,883	59%
	24-59m	74,974	44,212	59%
	PLW	0	47,769	
2017	6-23m	4,320	3,544	82%
	24-59m	10,680	8,762	82%
	PLW	19,100	18,713	98%

Source: Refugee PRRO SPRs. PLW = pregnant and lactating women.

97. **Whether blanket supplementary feeding is effective or not is unclear.** During 2013, WFP reported in their SPR that they learned that implementing blanket supplementary feeding for more than six months does not bring significant changes in the nutritional status, as children are not screened and followed up. Thus, WFP stated an intention to use blanket supplementary feeding in camps where the GAM rate is above 15 percent and proceed to targeted supplementary feeding after 6 months with regular monitoring through standard nutrition surveys. WFP also ceased operating blanket supplementary feeding in the five Dollo camps as the GAM rate had not gone down.

98. **Despite stating that it was ineffective, blanket supplementary feeding continued or was reintroduced for refugees.** In 2015, blanket supplementary feeding was discontinued in Dollo camps, then in 2016 it was reintroduced. Wet feeding was also introduced for children 3-6 years in these locations, but the rationale for the use of the modality was not clear. A review of the effectiveness of this type of blanket supplementary feeding was planned, but it is not clear whether this took place. There also does not appear to be guidance on when this should be used or when it should discontinue.

Ration cuts

99. **The General Food Distribution (GFD) ration in refugee programmes was cut at the end of 2015** following critical funding shortfalls. Ration cuts reached as much as 37 percent between July and September 2017. This was revised to a 20 percent reduction from October to December. The in-kind milling allowance and sugar were not part of the ration throughout 2017. As a result WFP's objective of meeting refugees' food and nutrition needs was likely not achieved.

100. **Malnutrition rates did not go up as expected following ration cuts. Ration cuts began in 2015, but malnutrition did not significantly increase.** This may be in part due to blanket supplementary feeding and other programmes in the camps such as the provision of improved water sources. However, it is surprising and should be investigated further. Impacts on stunting may not be seen yet, however.

Nutrition partnership

101. **WFP was not seen to be playing a leading role in refugee nutrition.** While the coordination with key agencies such as UNCHR and UNICEF at field level is currently good, the staff leading on nutrition are field monitors, not nutrition specialists. The refugee camps had not received a technical support visit from a nutrition specialist in the last year despite this and the expected complexities following the cut in the general food distribution ration. WFP does not have a countrywide lead for refugee nutrition and therefore is viewed to not play a major contributing role in addressing issues around refugee nutrition programmes.

As the Addis Ababa-based team were unstaffed and overstretched during emergency responses, support to the refugee programme was not prioritised.

Cash pilots

102. **Pilots of cash were promising for preventing malnutrition.** Dietary diversity scores were higher in the camps where WFP provided cash, as refugees could purchase more meat, eggs, fruits and vegetables. Sales of food assistance also significantly reduced in the camps receiving cash transfers, and the WFP ration overall lasted longer. Malnutrition rates were found to be lower for camps where cash was combined with food than in the food-only camps. These findings indicate that if it is possible to use cash in the refugee programme, this will limit the sharing of nutrition rations as well as supporting improved nutrition.

ASSESSMENT

Strategic Positioning

103. This evaluation period has seen large-scale humanitarian crises, beginning during the Horn of Africa drought, with subsequent droughts in 2015- 2017, which affected large parts of the country and led to rapidly increasing numbers of acutely malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women. Due to crises in neighbouring countries, there have also been significant influxes of refugees resulting in Ethiopia hosting the second largest caseload in Africa. Malnutrition rates in the countries of origin were often very high resulting in significant need for nutrition services in Ethiopia's refugee camps. As a result, the major focus of WFP's nutrition programme has been to support the Government to deliver humanitarian response to these crises. However, during this time, external funding to crises in Ethiopia has been declining with WFP often not receiving its required budget.

104. With the Seqota declaration (2015) the Ethiopian government pledged to eliminate chronic undernutrition by the year 2030. The stated objective of these WFP programmes is to "support government policies, programmes and systems that address the multiple dimensions of chronic hunger and undernutrition among the most vulnerable segments of the population". WFP has had limited programming aimed specifically at addressing stunting/chronic malnutrition, with the majority of operations supporting humanitarian response. However, treatment of moderate acute malnutrition is an important component of stunting reduction and therefore can be viewed as contributing towards this objective.

105. The humanitarian response is led and delivered by the government; in the case of the programme for Ethiopian nationals, this is led by NDRMC. As a result, it is also very well aligned with the government humanitarian response objectives. In the context of large-scale humanitarian crises, with high acute malnutrition rates and overall numbers in need WFP has had a leading role in delivering treatment for acute malnutrition, is viewed as a critical player in the nutrition sector and as a trusted partner by the government, particularly NDRMC.

106. The nutrition programme for refugees has been well aligned with the government's agenda. The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the main governmental counterpart to UN agencies for refugee response and oversees the refugee response as well as being an implementing partner and sub-grantee of UNHCR to deliver certain services. ARRA, UN and NGO partners in the field report the coordination between agencies around nutrition to be strong. However, some partners do not believe that WFP takes a leading technical role in nutrition, partly due to the lack of qualified nutrition staff in the field in the refugee programme.

Recommendation: Increase technical support for the refugee programme and assign at least one focal nutrition specialist to oversee refugee nutrition programming and provide technical support to the field.

107. The Urban HIV/AIDS programme was aligned to government priorities and evolved in line with government policies and programmes. Significant investment was made in upgrading the Government's data management systems and successful advocacy with government resulted in people living with HIV and orphans and vulnerable children being included in the Government's social protection policy. However, there were limited explicit provisions in Urban Productive Safety Net Programme (UPSNP) for HIV-affected households and WFP was not considered as a potential stakeholder during the design of the UPSNP.

108. There have been trade-offs in WFP's alignment with the Government's objectives. Aside from the 44-woreda pilot of "Second Generation", most targeted supplementary feeding for Ethiopian nationals during this period was delivered using a model that is widely agreed both internally and externally to be poor in quality and effectiveness. The division of treatment of MAM and SAM between two government programmes was believed to lead to poor continuity of care of malnourished children and the delivery of rations every three months led to late identification and treatment for many children and pregnant and lactating women.

109. Furthermore, although WHO revised its guidelines on targeted supplementary feeding in 2006 to change admission criteria, government guidelines and admission criteria for Ethiopian nationals were not adjusted accordingly. In practice, that meant that many children who, if they were living in a refugee camp or in a neighbouring country, would be classed as malnourished and would receive treatment, were not eligible for support. Stakeholders have commended WFP's recent successful advocacy with the Government to move to monthly screening and to update guidelines. However, with WFP's close alignment to government policy, the programme was not optimally aligned with the needs of the population during this evaluation period.

110. The targeted supplementary feeding programme for refugees, unlike the programme for Ethiopian nationals, follows WHO protocols with integration of the different stages of treatment for acute malnutrition in each site, which enables continuum of care for malnourished children. Services operate regularly within reasonable walking distance from settlements. Blanket supplementary feeding provides a supplementary ration to groups at high risk of developing malnutrition. Therefore the refugee programme was well aligned to beneficiary needs.

111. Treatment of MAM in children and acute malnutrition in pregnant and lactating women is WFP's technical responsibility and this is often around 75 percent of the humanitarian nutrition caseload. When blanket supplementary feeding is included as a modality, this proportion rises even further. Despite this, WFP has experienced difficulty in getting adequate and timely funding from donors for supplementary feeding and its biggest contributor, USAID, continues to also finance targeted supplementary feeding activities, including supply chain management of specialised foods, through an NGO consortium. This is an arrangement not often seen in other locations and may reflect the level of trust in WFP's delivery.

112. The work of the supply chain team through the "EthioPEA Alliance" project supported the creation of a locally-produced ready-to-use supplementary food. Local production of specialised nutritious foods could contribute significantly towards improving the sustainability of MAM treatment in Ethiopia and support integrated government-led programmes.

113. The food technology team also strengthened the capacity of local manufacturers to comply with international hygiene and manufacturing standards and practices as well as providing support to local laboratories in initiating food-safety testing services. An area of nutrition-sensitive work recommended in WFP's nutrition-sensitive guidelines is support to public and private sector actors to improve the food system to ensure better access to safe and nutritious foods. Given the existing in-country experience on

food safety, production of specialised food and supply chain, this may be an area where WFP has added value compared to other actors.

Recommendation: WFP should consider continuing/expanding on this work as part of their nutrition-sensitive strategy.

114. The urban HIV/AIDS programme positioned itself well to meet beneficiary needs linking people living with HIV with schemes to improve economic security and access to nutritious food while also promoting adherence to taking anti-retroviral medication. WFP also aligned itself well with the strategies of other stakeholders, partnering with a range of government departments, international and national NGOs, UN agencies, civil society organisations and communities.

115. Decisions around food assistance to refugees are less well aligned to beneficiary needs and preferences. Changes to the food basket, particularly the change from wheat to sorghum, have been unpopular with many refugees. Wheat and sorghum both often require milling before preparation, which either must be paid for by refugees or be hand milled by the household with the responsibility generally falling on female household members. This can lead to significant added workload and energy expenditure. Provision of cheaper pulses which require more lengthy preparation, can lead to increased use of firewood and water which again may impact on time for childcare practices as well as water availability for hand-washing and ensuring good hygienic practices.

116. WFP's food pipeline is often dependent on products available as gifts in kind. However, where WFP has a choice in food commodities, these considerations should be factored into the decision-making process as well as the unit cost of the item. One reason stated for providing sorghum was its lower market price discouraging onward sale. However, in the absence of provisions for fresh food, or opportunities for income generation, sale of staple foods may be a means of purchasing more nutritious foods and promote a more varied diet. In WFP's assessments of the cash plus food pilots, this intervention consistently showed improved dietary diversity. Where possible, there should be persistent advocacy for the use of cash or vouchers for refugees at least as a top-up to food assistance.

Recommendation: consider a cost benefit analysis of using different commodities in the food basket.

Influencing Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

117. **Opportunities for strong nutrition situational analysis for Ethiopian nationals are limited.** WFP takes part in the government-led multi-agency needs assessments, but nutrition surveys are rarely conducted. In terms of analysis of the underlying causes of malnutrition for Ethiopian nationals, few causal analyses have been conducted and opportunities for in-depth analysis are limited in the absence of regular surveys which collect data on contributing factors such as: feeding practices; availability of nutritious foods at the household level; hygiene practices; access to health care of malnutrition; as well as household food security. The Government permits programme coverage surveys which assess the extent to which malnourished children are able to access treatment services and key barriers. WFP had planned to conduct coverage assessments in 2016 and 2017, but were not able to do so due to staffing gaps for nutrition and competing priorities.

Recommendation: prioritise coverage surveys for upcoming years

Recommendation: include one or two fresh foods in market assessments to act as proxy to monitor the price of fruit and vegetables as well as animal-source foods.

118. **The potential for strong situational analysis is much higher in the refugee programme than the programme for Ethiopian nationals and this could be used more systematically.** Nutrition surveys

are conducted in the majority of refugee camps annually and often collect information on wide variety of indicators on potential underlying causes of malnutrition. A qualitative assessment, the joint assessment mission (JAM) led by WFP, UNHCR and ARRA takes place every two years. An in-depth Nutrition Causal Analysis led by ACF was also recently conducted in selected camps. Feedback from various stakeholders interviewed suggested that the JAM methodology was a 'tick box' exercise and rarely led to changes in nutrition programming. It is likely that the absence of technical nutrition staff on WFP's refugee programme limits internal analysis and use of available data.

119. WFP did use nutrition data for refugees to inform decision-making about blanket supplementary feeding, but this information was not prioritised in deciding how to implement the general ration cut. WFP has used overall GAM rates to determine when to extend the blanket supplementary feeding to include 24–59 old month children. When camps are found to have a GAM prevalence of greater than 15 percent, blanket supplementary feeding is extended to this group. When piloting cash as part of food assistance for refugees, WFP also used survey information to compare the impact of food only and food plus cash. However, according to those interviewed, use of JAM findings to inform programming is limited. Furthermore, when cuts to the general food ration were implemented, it was the group with the lowest rates of acute malnutrition, the Eritrean refugees, who were exempted from the cut, although WFP and other donors did notify the Government of their dissatisfaction with the Government's decision. There also appears to be very little ongoing assessment at global or country level of the impact of changes in the food ration on malnutrition rates

Recommendation: given the global funding environment and that ration cuts are taking place in many countries, assess the impact on malnutrition and feeding practices.

120. WFP contributed significantly towards placing the issue of improving targeted supplementary feeding on the national agenda by piloting improved "Second Generation" targeted supplementary feeding. This pilot demonstrated an improved model and paved the way for the roadmap for integration into the health system. The Second Generation model is closer to the international standard approach of delivery through the health system and this pilot has seen routine identification of beneficiaries and nutritional monitoring by the health extension workers; and more timely delivery of food to targeted individuals in need through the creation of decentralized food distribution centres at the kebele level and repositioning of food three months in advance. This has also led to an improved continuum of care between SAM and MAM treatment. This allowed for demonstration of an improved model and a task force has subsequently been established to integrate MAM treatment into the health system. The draft updated guidelines for the Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition also include this improved modality.

121. WFP learned from previous emergency responses and showed strong leadership in addressing weaknesses in programming of targeted supplementary feeding, particularly in Somali region. WFP developed a joint response strategy with UNICEF for the El Niño response resulting in strong partnership and led to improved modalities for helped to address a high caseload of SAM, supporting UNICEF and the government to reduce this burden while improving services for beneficiaries. WFP senior management were also credited with advocating for a multi-sectoral response, the "bundle" approach, to also address some underlying causes and reduce the incidence of acute malnutrition. The use of field level agreements in 2016-2017 to allow NGOs to enhance their technical support to government TSFP delivery was also widely praised by external stakeholders.

122. Although the nutrition programmes target women and children, they are not a model of success in terms of gender. The nutrition programme targets women and children and as a result is often mentioned by staff as a programme where gender mainstreaming has been successful. However, for the

programme for Ethiopian nationals there is minimal consideration of gender issues. WFP does provide gender disaggregated data, but there is little evidence of this being used in any meaningful way. Needs assessments for Ethiopian nationals are led by the Government with gender information not systematically collected and used to influence nutrition programme design. The majority of WFP's nutrition programming works solely with women and children on nutrition issues so therefore cannot be classed as gender transformative. Some messaging about nutrition was provided to men in 2015, but how this was done and the outcomes were not well documented. Stakeholders interviewed were not aware of WFP's gender policy and could not recall WFP systematically promoting gender considerations during policy discussions or in coordination fora.

123. In the refugee programme gender is considered as part of needs assessments and the joint assessment mission in the refugee programme. However, there is minimal evidence of WFP promoting gender considerations in nutrition programme design and policy for refugees.

124. WFP's strategic decision-making is heavily influenced by the need to align with government processes and targeting. For Ethiopian nationals, WFP takes part in the government-led multi-agency needs assessments, which lead to hotspot prioritisation and geographic targeting of interventions. Nutrition surveys are rarely conducted for Ethiopian nationals making it difficult for WFP to (i) determine whether geographic targeting is correct and (ii) assess the impact of interventions on malnutrition rates. Although screening campaigns are conducted regularly by the Government, the results are not easily accessible and there are reservations about the reliability of the screening data. It is also difficult to obtain information on capacity of the health system and potential gaps to understand where technical support is most needed. This hampers decision-making on how to support government systems and improve delivery of essential nutrition services.

125. WFP's decision-making for the refugee programme is also strongly influenced by the Government with ARRA being responsible for the overall direction of nutrition programming. However, in the case of the refugee programme, there appears to be less sensitivity around assessments, surveys and the sharing of nutrition data than with the programme for Ethiopian nationals. Most camps are surveyed every year to assess malnutrition rates and the results of these guide planning and decision-making, particularly around when to use blanket supplementary feeding for children 24-59 months. WFP is viewed as a trusted partner by ARRA and an important player by UNHCR. The decision on how to apply the general food distribution ration cut appeared to be driven by government preferences. The Eritrean refugees, the only population protected from the ration cut, had the lowest acute malnutrition rate (although stunting rates were high) and a lower proportion of women and children than the South Sudanese and Somali refugees groups.

126. The move into stunting reduction programming is based on changes in the corporate nutrition policy as well government commitment to stunting reduction. It is also viewed by many both internally and externally as a move to stay relevant in the context of declining funding for humanitarian work. With its experience in cash and voucher programming, particularly through PSNP, refugee food assistance and the urban HIV/AIDS programmes, WFP could be in a strong position to lead in this area. It is not clear, however, how much these experiences and those of others providing fresh food vouchers in Ethiopia have fed into the design of this pilot. The scale up of vouchers may be also be limited by system bottlenecks and there is a need to generate evidence about which type of transfer (cash or voucher) is most appropriate in different contexts.

Recommendation: consider the addition of a cash-transfer arm to the fresh food voucher pilot and research.

127. **WFP needs to be careful not to lose focus on improving the core business of humanitarian response.** A number of partners interviewed voiced concerns that, given the scale of humanitarian crises in Ethiopia and the complexity of the operating environment, WFP risked losing its focus with a move into stunting reduction programming. Strategies which improve humanitarian nutrition response and those which address MAM and support pregnant and lactating women contribute to stunting reduction. There is a continued need for innovation to improve humanitarian nutrition programming and WFP has a major player in this area.

Recommendation: WFP should continue to prioritise humanitarian nutrition and the Integrated Road Map and improving delivery of targeted supplementary feeding.

Recommendation: in the context of many agencies increasing their focus on achieving outcomes for nutrition, especially stunting, it would be useful for WFP to assess the plans of others in this area and where WFP has the most added value.

128. **WFP may not have applied their its own lessons-learned in decision-making in certain areas of programming.** Decision-making around the use of blanket supplementary feeding through this period was unclear. In 2014, the SPR stated that WFP had learned that blanket supplementary feeding had no impact on reducing malnutrition rates so would therefore only be used for six months before moving to just targeted supplementary feeding. Following this, the 2015 SPR stated that blanket supplementary feeding would discontinue in the Dollo camps due to there being no reduction in the GAM rates in recent years. However, the following year this component was implemented in all camps including the Dollo camps. The reasons for these decisions are not clear. WFP also states in its SPRs that the use of weight-for-height data led to overestimation of the caseload in camps – a factor that would also influence the target group for blanket supplementary feeding. However, this measure appears to have been used in subsequent years.

129. **Despite WFP's corporate policy of increasing focus on nutrition, there has been a lack of investment in human resource and data and evidence generation to support this move.** Information about staffing levels for nutrition during this time is not available, but the Head of Nutrition post has been vacant for more than two years and the perception is that WFP is critically short-staffed for nutrition. Surge staff have been rotated in for short periods (three to six months), but given the operational complexities of Ethiopia, this is not viewed as useful and is possibly an additional burden on existing staff while they “induct” this staff member into the Ethiopia context. This decision not to invest in this area has consequences in terms of the level of attention that staff are able to provide to (i) persistence in taking forward advocacy objectives (ii) capacity-building and holding partners to account for the quality of programme delivery (iii) overseeing evaluations and ensuring adequate evidence generation. Knowledge and data management during this period has also been weak with basic information of what was delivered and where not available as well as results and evaluations cited in key reports, which were not known to the country team.

Recommendation: develop a nutrition strategy for the next CSP period and assess the human resource requirements to deliver this plan.

Performance and Results

130. Details of the key results delivered under this programmatic area have been noted above (¶57ff).

131. **WFP scaled up its humanitarian nutrition programming in response to large-scale crises, particularly 2015-2017.** This supported reductions in incidence of severe acute malnutrition and undoubtedly saved lives. Interviews conducted during the evaluation indicate that WFP also played a critical leadership role in improving the response for nutrition, by advocating for a more effective approach to the

response to address high malnutrition. The use of field level agreements in 2017 for NGO-supported programmes was a positive shift toward more effective delivery of targeted supplementary feeding in Somali region.

132. **Challenges with programme timeliness, quality and scale likely limited the effectiveness of the programme.** Outcome data are not reported for the majority of WFP's targeted supplementary feeding activities and the evaluation team were not able to obtain all evaluation reports, but the majority of targeted supplementary feeding delivery was "first generation" which was widely acknowledged to be an ineffective modality. In 2015 due to funding and logistics issues, there were delays to the scale up of the targeted supplementary feeding programme which are thought to have contributed to the high numbers SAM cases. SAM carries a high risk of mortality and more expensive to treat than MAM so it important that future responses are not delayed. Due to lessons-learned in 2015, WFP were able to respond rapidly in the 2016-2017 Indian Ocean Dipole drought.

Recommendation: Ensure that contingency plans for nutrition include a budgeted plan for responding to large-scale crises including provision for logistics and the need to import high quantities of specialised foods. Advocate with donors that they build this contingency into their budgets on the basis early response saves money and lives.

133. Capacity-building on supply management appeared to support an important gap in capacity for government and NGO partners, but there was a lack of focus on other technical areas. Stakeholders interviewed had positive feedback about the training received, but there was a lack of focus on technical areas such as taking correct measurement screening and following of protocols which may have limited the effectiveness of delivery.

134. **Second Generation targeted supplementary feeding and the refugee targeted supplementary feeding programme were effective at treating MAM.** Second Generation targeted supplementary feeding is closer to the international standard approach of delivery through the health system. Outcome data collected on this programme met Sphere standards in all years apart from the first year in term of recovery, default and mortality rates. The refugee programme also met Sphere standards for the majority of the evaluation period. However, coverage of these programmes is also not known.

135. **The Urban HIV/AIDs programme was effective.** Good outcomes for people living with HIV were achieved through this programme. The project reflected achievements in line with project objectives, which included increasing anti-retroviral drug adherence, improving livelihoods, ensuring food security and breaking the inter-generational cycle of transmission of HIV from mother to child. It also reflected improved recovery from malnutrition and increased school enrolment and attendance, which contributed to mitigating the social and economic impacts of HIV/AIDS.

136. **There is little evidence to suggest that WFP has significantly contributed to the reduction of gender inequality** in control over food, resources and decision-making through the nutrition programme. Although nutrition rations are usually provided to women (either for their consumption or for their children), it is doubtful that this will have made a long-term impact on the control of household resources and decision-making. Very few nutrition activities in this period engaged men or attempted to address issues of gender inequality. The provision of food rations in the general food distribution that were unpreferred and often time-consuming to prepare also indicated that the workload and preferences of female caregivers may not have been prioritised in the decision-making process.

137. There has been limited analysis on the efficiency of the nutrition programme. However, **global evidence suggests that treatment of acute malnutrition is one of the most cost-effective public health interventions** in terms of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) as it treats a life-threatening

condition at relatively low cost in young children (who therefore have many possible healthy years ahead of them). The move to monthly screening and delivery of supplementary rations is likely more efficient as malnourished children are detected earlier and enrolled in the programme more rapidly. Therefore they are likely to be less malnourished and treatment should take less time, using fewer resources.

138. Cuts to general food rations in the refugee programme, and caps in the household size covered by PSNP, along with delays in distributions, are reported to have led to increased sharing of nutrition rations within the household and may have increased length of stay in targeted supplementary feeding and impacted on the efficiency of the programme. This suggests some limits to synergy of programmes within WFP, but there has been limited analysis on these issues.

139. Delivery of programmes through government systems increases the sustainability of the WFP's nutrition programmes. However, capacity-building during this time was quite sporadic and product-focused. The reliance on imports of specialised foods also limits the sustainability of the programmes. The health system integration, local production pilot and WFP's work on food safety and on an improved approach to supplementary feeding are good examples of moving towards a more sustainable model.

Annex Q School Feeding

INTRODUCTION – SCOPE OF THIS ANNEX

1. This annex addresses school feeding. Successive sections:
 - provide an overview of the context for school feeding in Ethiopia;
 - describe WFP's programme and role in providing assistance;
 - review the delivery of the programme and the results achieved;
 - provide an overall assessment.
2. As envisaged in the inception report, this annex draws heavily on an impact evaluation of school feeding in Afar and Somali regions that overlapped in timing with the country portfolio evaluation (CPE) (Mokoro, 2018b).¹⁸⁵ Some passages from the earlier report have been included more or less verbatim in this annex, but we are careful to distinguish between findings and conclusions of the school feeding evaluation and those that represent the judgements of the evaluation team.

CONTEXT– THE GENESIS AND EXPANSION OF SCHOOL FEEDING IN ETHIOPIA

School feeding in Ethiopia¹⁸⁶

3. School feeding in Ethiopia was started in 1994 with the support of WFP. The initial pilot project covered 40 primary schools in Amhara, Tigray, Afar and Oromia regions and further expanded to SNNPR and Somali region in 2002, targeting chronically food insecure districts in these six of the country's nine regional states.
4. Since 1996/1997, the Government has implemented five phases of its multi-year Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP). One of the components of the successive ESDPs is the school feeding programme. The third phase of the ESDP gave emphasis to expanding school meals to schools in food insecure and vulnerable areas of the country, with a particular focus on pastoralist areas and chronically food deficit highland districts with lower school enrolment and higher gender disparity. School feeding was identified as a strategic instrument for increasing enrolment and retention and increasing girls' enrolment in programme areas with a view to bringing about gender parity in school enrolment.
5. In 2004/2005 the Government and WFP introduced a new community-based effort by launching a participatory planning tool called Children in Local Development (CHILD) to assist local communities to utilise schools as development training centres and build the capacity of the education sector at the local level to integrate children education in its development programme. In 2007, based on lessons learned, CHILD was expanded and became the framework for implementing school feeding. The approach is aimed to improve the school premises, encourage community ownership of education and make environmental improvements that support school feeding and also improve the community's awareness of environmental sustainability. The CHILD approach focuses on: i) teaching basic organizational concepts of planning and managing local development initiatives, ii) providing basic information on health, hygiene and nutrition and

¹⁸⁵ Two members of the country portfolio evaluation team were also involved in the school feeding evaluation. Doe-e Berhanu was a research coordinator and evaluator; Stephen Lister joined the inception mission and provided quality assurance.

¹⁸⁶ This section is drawn from Mokoro, 2018b, Annex D.

iii) providing training and information on small-scale horticulture to encourage the establishment of school gardens that could potentially supplement the school meals.

6. So far WFP has been the largest provider of school meals in the country. There are a few local and international NGOs providing school meals to vulnerable urban and rural school children but their efforts are independent and not centrally coordinated.

WFP Policies

7. WFP adopted a school feeding policy in 2009 which was applicable to the beginning of the evaluation period (WFP, 2009g). The 2009 policy was strongly influenced by Bundy et al, 2009 ("Rethinking School Feeding") and emphasised the multiple potential benefits of school feeding. As noted in the 2011 evaluation of the policy,

The policy proposes social protection as an overarching framework for a number of possible outcomes. These can include a direct safety net function (value transfer), educational benefits (through incentives for enrolment and attendance, and by enhancing the ability to learn) and nutritional benefits (by alleviating short-term hunger and improving children's nutritional status, particularly when food is fortified and accompanied by deworming); school feeding's potential to support gender equality; and school feeding as a "platform" for pursuing wider benefits, not the least of which is supporting small-scale agriculture through HGSF [Home Grown School Feeding]. It identifies roles for school feeding as a safety net in emergencies and protracted crises; in post-conflict, post-disaster and transition situations; and in situations of chronic hunger. School feeding is expected to help break the inter-generational cycle of hunger by contributing to learning and school completion. (Mokoro, 2011).

8. Following the 2011 evaluation, an update of the school feeding policy was adopted in 2013 (WFP, 2013d). There was much continuity with the previous policy, but it reinforced the importance of supporting governments to develop sustainable school feeding systems, and aligned the policy more closely with recent policies on safety nets and nutrition. Home-grown school feeding continues to be advocated for wider benefits and sustainability.

THE INTENDED WFP PROGRAMME AND ITS RATIONALE

Strategic Approach to School Feeding

WFP activities

9. The country strategy for 2012–2015 included the following approach to school feeding, (this was the only mention of school feeding in the document):

Pillar Two: Basic Social Services

Outcome 3: equitable access provided to boys and girls at primary school with a focus on the most marginalized food-insecure areas and vulnerable children.

The Government has recognized the success of school feeding in reaching out to children in food insecure communities and enabling them to attend and be attentive in school. While WFP will focus its efforts on getting the last 2.8 million children into primary school, continued support will be provided in marginalized food insecure areas to ensure gains in attendance and concentration are not lost. Linkages to MERET and the PSNP will be strengthened in order to capture synergies between access to education, community awareness, disaster risk reduction and hunger reduction. (WFP, 2011e, ¶54)

School feeding in WFP's country portfolio

10. The main school feeding activities envisaged were set out in CP 200253 as shown in Box 19 below.¹⁸⁷ In practice three main strands emerged:

¹⁸⁷ There was an additional intention to strengthen links between school feeding and the MERET programme:

"WFP will explore the feasibility of accessing carbon financing by promoting fuel-efficient stoves in households and schools in MERET areas, and will improve the synergy between MERET and schools."

- a) the largest component was the school feeding programme in Afar and Somali regions, funded by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) through its McGovern-Dole programme;
- b) a smaller home-grown school feeding programme continued in Southern and Oromia regions;
- c) there were continued efforts to foster national school feeding capacity, funded in part through the McGovern-Dole programme.

11. Home-grown school feeding (HGSF) was initiated as a result of a recommendation made during a consultative workshop organized to discuss the sustainability of school feeding programmes in August 2011. The recommendation centred around the need to collect evidence through a pilot programme for clear understanding of the benefits of the adoption of the HGSF approach, as a means to facilitate the transition to government ownership. The particular focus of HGSF is to both increase children's well-being and promote local agricultural production and development by expanding an ongoing market for small landholders. As implemented, the HGSF activities drew on the procurement experience of the P4P pilot.

12. In addition:

- a) successive PPROs for support to refugees included school feeding components in all refugee camps;
- b) the urban HIV/AIDS project included a school feeding element (as noted in Box 19 below).

Box 19 School feeding as described in the country programme

Component 3: Food for Education in Primary Schools

30. Food for education will prioritize pastoral areas of Afar, Oromia, SNNP and Somali regions, where education indicators are particularly poor; it will also include schools in highly food-insecure highlands, especially in MERET and PSNP areas, to improve retention rates. Bearing in mind the anticipated annual 10 percent increase through increased enrolment and reduced dropouts, this component will expand during CP 200253 to target 917,000 schoolchildren in 2015.

31. In pastoral areas, WFP will provide a daily meal for pupils in targeted primary schools and targeted alternative basic education centres in pastoral regions to respond to the special needs of pastoral populations. To address gender disparities, take-home rations will be provided for up to 174,000 girls regularly attending primary school.

32. To counter the high drop-out rates in highland areas of Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray, where enrolment rates are high but food insecurity remains acute, WFP will provide a daily meal at school. It will continue the CHILd approach to improve the learning environment by encouraging communities to engage with school activities that address nutrition, household food security and the environment. WFP is developing an evidence base on the role of food assistance in maintaining community participation and improving the quality of learning: this will be used by WFP and the Government to design approaches and safety nets to keep vulnerable children in school and to develop a hand-over strategy for food-insecure areas where enrolment is high.

33. WFP will continue partnerships with FAO, the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Health Organization to enhance the sustainability of school feeding through joint support for the "essential package" [The Essential Package to improve the health and nutrition of school-age children consists of: i) basic education; ii) food for education; iii) promotion of girls' education; iv) potable water and sanitary latrines; v) health, nutrition and hygiene education; vi) deworming; vii) micronutrient supplementation; viii) HIV and AIDS education; ix) psycho-social support; x) malaria prevention; xi) school gardens; and xii) improved stoves]and improved household food security. Inter-sectoral linkages with agriculture, health and water authorities at the federal and district levels will be enhanced through engagement in policy and strategy development and through synergy with MERET at the grass-roots level. WFP will contribute to support for the Ministry of Education and the Ethiopian Health and Nutrition Research Institute to build government capacity in school health and nutrition: this will include research on micronutrient deficiencies among school-age children. Pilot testing will explore improvements in the cost-effectiveness of the food basket in view of micronutrient needs.

Component 4: Access to HIV Care, Treatment and Support in Urban Areas

Food-insecure OVC under 18 will be selected at the community level; food assistance will be provided in exchange for attendance at school.

Source: WFP, 2011i

However, as noted elsewhere, MERET failed to attract funding during the evaluation period and was eventually closed in 2016.

PROGRAMME DELIVERY AND RESULTS

Approach

13. Data against school feeding indicators for outputs and outcomes for the 2012–2017 period are included in the collated tables in Annex I. Output data for school feeding appear in Table 17 (indicators #144ff), and outcome data in Table 18 (indicators #43ff.). However, few of these data are available consistently over the whole period, and the breakdown between different school feeding operations is not shown. They are therefore of limited value for the CPE. In what follows, we first note the overall dimensions of school feeding within the portfolio; we then draw on the recent evaluation of school feeding in Afar and Somali regions to review programme delivery and results for what was much the largest component of WFP school feeding; we then draw on more eclectic sources to review the other activities and components within the programme, and the government activities that WFP supported.

14. The McGovern-Dole programme implemented by WFP in Afar and Somali regions provides approximately 50 percent of all the school meals in Ethiopia (this includes other donors and government meals). A WFP/Ministry of Education HGSF pilot programme is on-going in Oromia and SNNPR with support from other donors and regional government funding. In addition, in 2014–2017, the Ministry of Education has also run an emergency school feeding programme in drought-affected regions of the country in schools that are not covered by WFP. And school feeding has been a component of food assistance to refugees (the PRRO component in Table 47 below).

Overall dimensions of school feeding

15. Figure 6 in the main text shows a close match between the planned and actual proportion of school feeding beneficiaries over the 2012–2017 period, with school feeding beneficiaries recorded as 7 percent of planned and actual beneficiaries, with beneficiaries of take-home rations accounting for a further 2 percent of total WFP beneficiaries.¹⁸⁸ The figures break down as shown in Table 47 below. However, actual beneficiaries were fewer than planned across all WFP's activities: actual school feeding beneficiaries were only 72 percent of planned; actual take-home ration beneficiaries were 85 percent of planned.

Table 47 School feeding beneficiaries by operation 2012–2017

Operation		School Feeding	School Feeding-Take-home rations
CP 200253 2012-2015 (extended to end of 2017)	Planned	690,600	154,620
	Actual	527,223	132,033
PRRO 200365 mid 2012-mid 2015	Planned	71,900	
	Actual	49,142	
PRRO 200700 April 2015 – March 2018 (extended to June 2018)	Planned	115,833	
	Actual	57,986	
TOTAL	Planned	878,333	154,620
	Actual	634,351	132,033

Source: SPR data. Number of beneficiaries given as an average of beneficiaries per year over the period 2012-2017. Extracted from Annex H Table 13.

¹⁸⁸ There is an element of double-counting in the WFP data, since THR beneficiaries are also beneficiaries of in-school meals.

School Feeding Programme in Afar and Somali Regions

16. The McGovern-Dole funded school feeding programme for Afar and Somali regions followed on from an earlier similar phase, but there was no final evaluation of that phase, so findings focus mainly on the period from 2013–2017.

Programme design

17. The McGovern-Dole programme¹⁸⁹ was approved in November 2012. The programme involved daily school meals provided to 289,000 primary school children, and capacity building aimed at supporting increased dietary and health practices and improved student attendance. The programme provides children with one hot meal per day, corresponding to 647 calories per day. In addition, a monthly Take-home Ration (THR) of two litres of vegetable oil is provided to girl pupils as an incentive to attend school (conditional on an 80 percent attendance record).

18. The capacity-building component (about USD 1.8m or 6 percent of the total budget) comprised activities such as: teaching materials and equipment; financial and technical support to regional level Education Management Information System (EMIS), adaptation of the Child in Local Development (CHILD) manuals to pastoralist communities; provision of financial and technical support to water and sanitation; capacity development for school health and nutrition (SHN) education; promotion of health clubs and school gardens; building and rehabilitation of school facilities; provision of energy-saving stoves; training in food handling activities; strengthening of SHN planning and management capacity at woreda and school level.

19. The McGovern-Dole funded interventions sought to promote equal access for boys and girls at primary school, with a focus on marginalized food-insecure areas and vulnerable children. The envisioned outcomes included: i) increasing enrolment and attendance in the Afar and Somali regions to achieve the government target of 100 percent enrolment; and, ii) improving the management capacity of school health and nutrition programmes and of school infrastructure through participatory community planning.¹⁹⁰ Intermediate programme results aimed at contributing towards improving health and dietary practices. Major outcome indicators for the programme included: the percentage change in the enrolment, attendance rate, and attentiveness and gender parity index (GPI). Contrary to some of the other McGovern-Dole programmes in the region (Kenya, Rwanda) this programme did not target improving literacy or numeracy levels, because the Ministry of Education has an intervention – the General Education Quality Improvement Programme (GEQIP) – funded by several donors which has been focusing on improving quality since 2008.

20. The key counterpart ministry for the programme is the Ministry of Education, which oversees the implementation of the programme. The Bureaus of Education for Afar and Somali regions are responsible for the overall management and implementation of the programme in their respective regions, including handling food transportation from WFP warehouses to the schools. The non-food activities that contribute to education, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), construction, health and dietary objectives are implemented by WFP in collaboration with the Bureaus of Education. WFP also engages with each region's Bureau of Urban Development on construction-related activities such as improving water and sanitation facilities in programme schools.

¹⁸⁹ FFE 663-2013/026-00; project number 200253.

¹⁹⁰ Essential to this is the use of a participatory community planning tool called Child in Local Development (CHILD) which had earlier been used in other regions of the country and under this programme was adapted for the pastoralist regions.

Budget

21. The FFE programme had a total budget of USD40.7 million, up from the original commitment of USD26.5 million (see Table 48 below). The programme had one extension and two budget revisions .

Table 48 McGovern-Dole school feeding programme budget, 2014–2017

	Original commitment	BR1	BR2
Additional commitment	N/a	USD 2,209,835	USD11,999,970
New total	USD26,500,000	USD 28,709,835	USD40,709,850
Date	November 2012	March 2015	July 2016

Source: Mokoro, 2018b

Implementation

22. The programme covered 292,249 children (of whom 45 percent are girls) in 590 schools in Afar and Somali (see Table 49 below). This represents just under one third of the primary school children in these two regions (which hold 1 million pupils in total), and five percent of the total of 19 million primary school children in the country. In each targeted school, all children benefited from the school meals, and all girls received a take-home ration. The school feeding does not officially cover pre-school children.

Table 49 McGovern-Dole school feeding beneficiaries in Afar and Somali regions

Beneficiary schools and pupils	Afar	Somali	Totals
Number of schools in the programme	361	229	590
Percentage of schools with McGovern-Dole school feeding support versus all primary schools in the region	47%	19%	33%
On-site feeding beneficiaries (boys and girls)	93,983	198,266	292,249
Female school feeding beneficiaries and percentage of total beneficiaries	43,119 (46%)	88,410 (45%)	131,529 (45%)
Percentage of pupils in Afar and Somali receiving McGovern-Dole school feeding	48%	22%	29%
Girls' THR	43,119	88,410	131,529

23. There were three modifications to the programme:

- The ration size for CSB was modified from 150gm to the actual size of 120gm retroactively, to address the imbalance between the released resources and beneficiary numbers.
- The ration was changed from CSB to CSB+ when the programme was extended.
- During the extension phase the programme was amended to include financial and technical support to the national school feeding programme.

Impact evaluation methodology

24. The evaluation used a quasi-experimental design where WFP intervention schools were compared with non-intervention schools in Afar and Somali regions through a survey that covered a total of 1,080

students in 90 randomly selected schools.¹⁹¹ This was complemented by an analysis of EMIS Education Statistics of the Ministry of Education comparing programme schools with non-programme schools, a desk review and analysis of documents and data, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and observations during several field visits to both regions. Primary data collection was conducted in February 2018. The evaluation also included two mini-case studies: one of the separate emergency school feeding programme (ESFP) introduced by the Government of Ethiopia; and one of the Take-Home Rations – Girls Initiative Programme within the school feeding operation. Significant limitations of the evaluation included the absence of any baseline study or data, challenges in identification of school locations due to faulty lists and challenges in security issues which interfered with data collection.

Key findings of the McGovern-Dole school feeding impact evaluation

25. **Appropriateness:** The interventions have appropriately focused on areas that are acknowledged to be among the poorest in the country, where people live in a context marked by poverty and hunger and face significant challenges including prolonged drought; and issues like girls' education remain pertinent. The relevance and importance of the WFP-supported school feeding to children's needs were confirmed and appreciated by beneficiaries and other stakeholders at various levels.

26. The McGovern-Dole school feeding programme is generally well aligned with national policies and strategies, including in the areas of education and social protection, except with the Government's priority of home-grown school feeding, as the food is currently imported from the United States. The programme is coherent with WFP's overarching policies on school feeding and nutrition. While it is also broadly in line with WFP's gender policy, only a basic gender analysis has been conducted. The programme, however, is currently not actively collaborating with other UN or NGO programmes in the project areas.

27. Generally, the programme's design is appropriate. The intervention includes important aspects that are essential contributors to its success, namely water and sanitation activities and strengthening of parent-teacher associations (PTAs). However, it is questionable whether school gardens in arid zones are a realistic endeavour.

28. **Results:** Quantitative and qualitative data consistently underscore significant and important output and impact level results and provide a convincing case for the importance of school feeding for areas that are severely affected by food insecurity. The evidence demonstrates that school feeding, supplemented by specific interventions targeted at girl students, improves inclusiveness, participation and achievements in education. Specifically, the statistical analysis comparing schools with school feeding with those without shows that:

- In both Afar and Somali regions, enhanced school enrolment is associated with school feeding, and schools with school feeding have a significantly more favourable Gender Parity Index compared to those without school feeding.
- Grade repetition rates are consistently lower in McGovern-Dole programme schools in Somali region than in non- McGovern-Dole schools, although there is more limited evidence of this effect in Afar.

¹⁹¹ The absence of baseline data meant that a double-difference analysis between baseline and endline was not possible. To ensure that sampling met criteria, schools were replaced from a pre-established reserve list as necessary, and the evaluation team are confident that the survey findings are robust.

- Completion rates are significantly higher for McGovern-Dole schools than for non- McGovern-Dole schools, with a difference to the magnitude of 10 percent in Afar and Somali. This improvement is higher for girls than for boys.

29. Additional important outcomes include higher food consumption scores for boys and girls in McGovern-Dole schools, as well as better perceived attentiveness and lower absenteeism in these schools. All these effects are statistically significant. See also Box 20 below for more evidence of the effectiveness of the THR component.

Box 20 The effect of take-home rations (THR) on girls' education and welfare

Historical evidence

In addition to the main school meal programme, the WFP launched 'The Girls' Initiative' intervention in 2002 in food insecure pastoralist areas of four regional states (Afar, Somali, Oromia and SNNPR). The initiative had the objective of encouraging girls' education and narrowing the gender gap in pastoralist communities. The programme provided eight litres of vegetable oil per semester ('take-home rations') conditional on 80 percent girl's attendance in addition to on-site school meals. In the first semester of 2010, 81,000 girls received take-home ration. The estimated cost of take-home rations was USD 8.1 per beneficiary girl (during the first semester of 2010).

WFP carried out an impact assessment in 2011 using qualitative and quantitative methods. The assessment found that THR has positive effects on females' participation in education. It has been most successful in the chronically food insecure communities. WFP's assistance framework that links poverty and food insecurity with education is found to be sound and relevant for addressing gender inequality. Although the programme had attempted to enhance the capacity of stakeholders (WAO, PTA, school community), given the high turnover of trained personnel and low capacity at woreda and school levels, this was not achieved. THR was designed as a standalone programme with limited synergy with other initiatives such as WASH, separate toilets for girls, nutrition and health intervention. The baseline data was not exhaustive enough and did not include programme impact indicators. It was also found that the programme had weak monitoring systems, particularly from the partners. THR greatly increased girls' enrolment, maintained school attendance, prevented school dropout, and narrowed gender gaps in the target schools. The initiative also motivated parents to send their daughters to school. The assessment further explored factors that affect girl's education and also the challenges in study areas. These include pervasive chronic food insecurity and poverty, socio-cultural factors and school-related factors that are still a hindrance to girls' schooling. The assessment also showed that there has been late delivery of THR due to lengthy process of tendering for hiring transport service. It was also felt that providing take-home rations to girls may lead to families' withdrawal of boys from school in favour of girls (WFP, 2011g).

Results from the 2018 evaluation

- Data from the survey and the interviews with various stakeholders underscores that the introduction of the THR has greatly increased girls' enrolment, maintained school attendance, prevented school dropout, and narrowed gender gaps in the target schools. The initiative motivated parents and the communities to send their daughters to school. In-depth interviews suggest that from the perspective of the community the THR are leading to a decrease in (the risk of) early marriage and is increasing the income transfer to food insecure households.
- The survey data on programme status and grade completion rates shows improvement for the girls is greater than for the boys, with the girls in the non-FFE schools having higher dropout rates than for boys. In Afar completion rates are lower than in Somali region for both FFE and non-FFE schools, and the non-completion rate for girls also notably worse than in Somali. Table 28 reflects the data.
- The effect of take-home ration is evident in the reducing gender gap. The data from WFP shows the gender parity index has improved and the enrolment and attendance and literacy have significantly gone up. The GPI for Afar region is 0.9 and is almost equivalent to the national GPI (0.91), while the GPI for Somali region is at 0.86.
- THR have brought an effect on income transfer to parents and education benefits to their daughters. Most parents stated that the programme has contributed to supplement household food income to cover the cost of learning materials, clothing for their school age children and of course the diet diversity.

Source: Mokoro, 2018b, Annex H – Nutrition,

30. **Factors affecting results:** The school selection process was participatory but resulted in a selection of schools that are geographically spread out. This has complicated support to the schools. It makes frequent monitoring costly and also reduces efficiency in conducting school visits.

31. While WFP generally has very clear guidelines and an efficient procurement system in place, issues with the timeliness of delivery were found due to regular pipeline breaks, and the first semester delivery was consistently late. There were some complaints about the quality of the food (too close to its 'best before' date and often damaged oil tins).

32. Government ownership of and commitment to school feeding, both at federal and regional levels, have increased, and various high-level persons in Government became champions for school feeding. A school feeding policy is yet to be put in place, but progress has been made in terms of committing to a school feeding strategy in line with its international, regional and national commitments (such as inclusive right to food, health and education, expansion of local school meals programmes using home grown food where possible and effective governance and sustainable financing of school feeding programmes). The ESFP, which is largely implemented with the Government's own funds, is also a good complementary programme to WFP's school feeding programme and builds on many of the lessons learned from the previous and current McGovern-Dole programmes.

33. **Challenges of operating in pastoral areas under stress:** The external operating environment has at times made implementation difficult or caused disruption, e.g. schools being geographically spread out, severe droughts, school closures, or conflict-induced displacement in 2017. Extreme poverty and the specific conditions in the regions made it difficult for the programme to mobilize community resources that were assumed to be available for the implementation of an integrated package of support.

34. Some continued challenges in the implementation of the CHILD approach in both Afar and Somali regions were noted during the in-depth visits. According to the Regional Bureaus of Education, school directors and PTA members contacted during the evaluation, although the CHILD manual was adapted to the local context and training was provided on the approach, the CHILD package was less successful than anticipated because it did not succeed in mobilizing resources from the community for its implementation. The high mobility of communities, especially during drought seasons, has made it generally difficult for schools to have the expected level of community participation and engagement for this approach to be transformative. The complete essential package that is promoted as part of the McGovern-Dole intervention¹⁹² was only in place in one of the nine schools visited in both regions.¹⁹³ Visits showed that there are very few partners in Somali and even fewer in Afar that could step in to fill the gap in essential package provision in participating schools.

35. The programme design did not take into consideration the impact drought has on the ability of communities to contribute towards implementation. While community engagement has been robust for the most part, the requirements placed on communities to pay the salaries of cooks, construct a kitchen/shed and provide firewood and water necessary for meal preparations have been excessively cumbersome and put an additional burden on families during times of drought. The inability of communities to meet these obligations has caused disruptions to the provision of school meals and in a way minimized the success of the programme.

¹⁹² The essential package includes water, sanitary latrines, deworming, micronutrient supplementation, and health, nutrition and hygiene education.

¹⁹³ The school that has all the components of the essential package as part of the MGD intervention is Deghale School in Somali, which is one of the two MGD model schools.

36. **Capacity challenges:** High turnover of government staff at all levels, including senior federal level management as well as regional, woreda and school level administration, presented a challenge to the efficiency of the school feeding programme and reduced the effectiveness of staff to properly manage the programme. Staff turnover at senior federal government level made it challenging for WFP to make the progress it had expected to make on strengthening the policy environment on school feeding and undermined its high-level advocacy efforts on the issue of transitioning to a national school feeding programme.

37. The capacity of the regions has been rather weak to run the programme efficiently. While transferring the responsibility of direct implementation of activities from WFP to the Government was done as a way of building government capacity and instilling a sense of ownership, it has at times compromised the quality and timeliness of the activities and negatively impacted results. With the responsibility of non-food item procurement transferred to the regional Bureaus of Education, there is a decline in the quality and quantity of items provided to the schools, with schools not having enough utensils such as bowls, spoons and cups compared to the number of students and/or the utensils being of very poor quality (non-durable) so that they break easily or sometimes melt when the hot CSB porridge is served in them.

38. **School targeting:** This has not taken into consideration clustering for impact and has been politically motivated to some extent, with the regions deciding which woredas will be included in the initial list of schools to be considered for selection. The government's view on equity over need in terms of which schools get targeted has led to school feeding resources being spread too thinly and presented a challenge for WFP to concentrate its inputs for maximum programme impact. Even more seriously, a unilateral decision by the Somali Regional Government to divert McGovern-Dole supplies to ESFP schools undermined key relationships – see Box 21 below.

39. **Synergies:** The evaluation did not find evidence of collaboration or complementarity with the work of other UN or NGO partners, or even collaboration with other WFP programmes in Ethiopia, although opportunities could exist for example for complementarity with WFP's engagement in social protection.

Box 21 Overview of the 2017 food diversion in Somali region

In 2015 and 2016, the two main rainy seasons that supply over 80 percent of Ethiopia's agricultural yield were not successful. The multi-agency *belg* assessment conducted in December 2016 estimated that 2 million students were affected by the drought. According to the report, Somali, Oromia and SNNPR were the worst-affected regions. The report further confirmed a number of school closures due to the emergency situation, with Somali region having the highest number of schools closed. The situation led the Government to allocate emergency funding for school feeding to the worst affected regions and led to the introduction of an Emergency School Feeding Programme..

In February 2017, the Somali Regional Bureau of Education (BoE) diverted 532 mt (approximately one sixth of the allocated food commodities) from the McGovern-Dole schools to 51 schools which it had identified as being worse-affected by the drought. The BoE used the ETB 22 million allocated by the Ministry of Education under the EFSP to procure food for additional schools, including 65 school that were not reached with the diverted commodities. With these funds, the BoE procured 800 mt of locally blended food, 140 quintals of sugar, 90q salt, 90q tealeaf. ⁽¹⁾_(SEP)

In subsequent explanations the regional government stressed that the BoE the diversion took place in circumstances that were of extreme urgency. However, the fact that the diversion took place without seeking the consent from WFP or from the donor violated the agreement that had been signed with the Government of Ethiopia for the McGovern-Dole FFE programme. Because of this WFP immediately suspended all food delivery to Somali region when it discovered the diversion and pending clarification. As the clarification was not forthcoming WFP then commissioned an independent verification of the diversion (WFP, 2017x).

The independent verification concluded that the reallocation was justified given that the targeted schools were the most affected by the drought and had had to close as a result of the drought. It also found that the distribution to the newly identified priority schools had been well organized, had taken place in an orderly fashion, and had included training and the provision of all essential non-fod items. Additional observations of importance by the

verification team included the high level of community involvement and mobilisation in the ESFP efforts including and consistent community reports that the food had made a significant difference. As noted in the verification report “to avoid further suffering of children, as soon as the verification mission was complete and with the support of USDA, WFP lifted the suspension of dispatch of FFE commodities”. When food distribution resumed, WFP took over the transportation of food commodities from the central warehouse to schools. This procedure continued in place until the time of this evaluation (close to the end of the McGovern-Dole programme).

The regional government almost immediately presented a formal apology to WFP and the donor for the breach in procedures and provided assurances that events of this kind would not be repeated. Nonetheless, for WFP and for the donor the fact that procedures were not followed and that the BoE took a unilateral decision without consultation, and did not replace the food, created a rift and jeopardized the trust established between partners.

This situation continued to be of great concern to the regional authorities in Somali when the evaluation team visited as it was understood by the latter that because of these events Somali region is excluded from the next McGovern-Dole school feeding proposal.

Source: WFP Programme Unit Addis Ababa and Jijiga Area Office (March 2017). Food diversion fact verification report – Food for Education Programme (WFP, 2017x) and interviews by the MGD evaluation team.

40. **Sustainability:** The evidence reviewed strongly suggests that with the end of the McGovern-Dole programme in Afar and Somali regions the many positive effects on households – who live in extremely precarious conditions – would not be sustained after cessation of the programme, as it would effectively require households to have the means to fill the gap (financially) that is being left through the loss of income which the school feeding and THR represent. The Government is not yet ready to finance and efficiently run a national school feeding programme, though there is clear evidence of a growing interest and commitment to establish a sustainable national school feeding programme in Ethiopia.

41. **Overall Conclusions:** The impact evaluation’s overall assessment was that the direct school feeding component of the McGovern-Dole-funded school feeding intervention has many very positive features, including a demonstrable impact on attendance and enrolment, particularly by girls. However, it also raises some concerns. On the positive side, the core activity of providing nutritious daily school meals, appears to be generally well-designed, well-implemented and effective. Ethiopia’s experience of emergency school feeding suggests that key elements in terms of systems and capacity are in place. WFP’s work on school feeding is highly credited in strengthening the government capacity for planning and implementation of school feeding interventions. Deployment of technical assistance is considered very relevant and appropriate at both the regional and federal levels. WFP through the McGovern-Dole funds has provided financial and technical support to the regional education management system and to the national school feeding programme. There is evidence of learning between different models of school feeding as the McGovern-Dole model is mirrored in both the Home Grown School Feeding programme and the ESFP.

42. However, key challenges remain to be addressed. These include the nature of funding, which to date, on the government side, has come from additional allocations on an emergency basis and as such is not sustainable. Long lead times in terms of procurement, logistics and organization because of various constraints related to internal capacity and the bureaucracy (of the Ministry of Education) are a major challenge and jeopardise the purpose of addressing emergency needs. Furthermore, the programme needs a more effective and reliable M&E and reporting system.

43. **WFP performance:** WFP is recognized for its leadership and strong technical capacity in school feeding, being referred to by many, including beneficiary communities, as “the backbone” of the school feeding programme in the country, without which many would not have had the chance to go to school. The country office has developed a strong relationship with the Ministry of Education and regional Bureaus of Education. This is in part a reflection of WFP’s long engagement in school feeding in the country but it is also the result of deliberate investments WFP has made to further strengthen this relationship as well as

build the capacity of the Ministry and the Regional Bureaus of Education to manage and potentially transition the school feeding programme. WFP is credited for supporting efforts to strengthen government capacity and the technical assistance it has provided through the McGovern-Dole programme is considered to be very relevant and appropriate.

44. **Monitoring and evaluation:** There is weak monitoring and reporting by WFP and by the regional Bureaus of Education. The very limited resources under the McGovern-Dole programme for monitoring and technical support have kept WFP from sufficiently staffing the project and has prevented it from conducting frequent and thorough monitoring of all school feeding programme components. Discrepancies in reporting and lack of clarity on processes and procedures start at school and woreda levels, compromising the overall quality and integrity of the reporting. Delays from Bureaus of Education in distributing school feeding registers¹⁹⁴ and logbooks to schools have also created a challenge to timely reporting. Furthermore, in the absence of a mid-term evaluation, there was not a reassessment of the programme during implementation and no systematic lesson learning.

Recommendations

45. Table 50 below reproduces the recommendations of the school feeding evaluation.

Table 50 Recommendations of the school feeding evaluation 2018

Recommendation	Timing	Responsibility
Strategic issues		
R1 Prioritize fundraising for the continuation of school feeding and a THR for girls to the schools that were covered under the McGovern-Dole FFE programme in Afar and Somali regions as a matter of absolute priority.	by the new school year (September 2018)	WFP CO with support from the WFP RB
R2 Prioritize finalization of the national strategy and use it as the basis to develop an implementation guideline with different types of school feeding scenario, including a separate guideline for the pastoralist context.	during 2018	WFP CO with support from a consultant (in collaboration with Ministry of Education)
R3 Develop and implement an adequately funded advocacy strategy that builds on the key findings of this evaluation and previous strategic work to scale up political and financial commitment to school feeding in Ethiopia. This could include developing short learning papers based on the findings of this evaluation.	by December 2018	WFP CO with support from the WFP RB
R4 Advocate with the Government to ensure that government policies and strategy include an incentive for girls' education in food-insecure /pastoral societies using funds from the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).	in the course of 2018 and 2019	WFP CO
Design of future WFP school feeding interventions		
R5 Conduct an independent assessment of needs of vulnerable populations for the next McGovern-Dole FFE programme and use the findings of this assessment to identify suitable design options for school meals in pastoralist areas.	in the start-up phase of the next McGovern-Dole school feeding programme (and at the latest by mid-2019)	WFP CO with external consultancy support
R6 Include continued investment in government technical capacity for the logistical management of school feeding at federal and regional levels in all future school feeding support by WFP in Ethiopia	in time for the new school feeding programme	WFP CO
R7 Ensure future school feeding interventions include multi-year evaluations in the design of the programme with baseline, midline, follow-up and endline surveys, and recommendations for adjustments as appropriate during implementation.	In time for the new school feeding programme	WFP CO
R8 Ensure that future school feeding in Ethiopia by WFP includes attention to specific strategies, targets and indicators for increasing the participation of women and girls in school feeding design and implementation stages.	by July 2018	WFP CO with support from the WFP RB

¹⁹⁴ The registers are printed by WFP and handed to the education authorities for distribution.

Recommendation	Timing	Responsibility
R9 Ensure that the selection of beneficiary schools under the next phase of McGovern-Dole support to school feeding in Ethiopia is based on a clustered approach so that the distances between schools do not make monitoring overly onerous or complicated.	in time for the new school feeding programme	WFP CO with support from the WFP RB
Operational issues		
R10 Strengthen the monitoring and reporting capacity of WFP, and regional and woreda level Bureaus of Education in the area of school feeding so that the data collection allows for efficient management of school feeding.	by July 2019	WFP CO with support from the WFP RB
R11 Ensure improved coordination with other education sector stakeholders and working in complementarities for greater impact and critically assess capacity of communities to support the CHILD approach.	by July 2019	WFP CO with support from an external consultant

Source: Mokoro, 2018b

Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF) Programme

46. As noted in ¶10 above, an HGSF programme has been an additional component of the WFP portfolio. There has been a growing interest to establish sustainable national school feeding programme in Ethiopia, which resulted in collaboration between WFP and the Ministry of Education to pilot a Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF) programme in 37 schools in SNNPR (Southern region) in 2012 and later expanding to an additional 50 schools. In 2014, the HGSF model was replicated in 18 primary schools in Oromia region (SABER, 2015).

47. Structured around WFP's Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme, the HGSF programme links the existing school feeding programme demand with local agricultural production through the provision of locally produced food purchased from smallholder farmers. The way the HGSF programme is structured is also intended to build the Government's capacity to plan and manage a sustainable national school feeding programme in Ethiopia. This programme is primarily supported by WFP with contributions from the regional governments of SNNPR and Oromia. The two HGSF programmes operating in SNNPR and Oromia currently target 139,000 students in 286 schools (WFP, 2017w).

48. The country office reported the following lessons from the HGSF programme:

- It increased government ownership of the program, which is demonstrated through increased budget allocated for HGSF by regional governments.
- It served as a vehicle for introduction of new menu and diet diversity among school children and community.
- It improved operational capacities of government institutions such as the Ministry of Education and regional Bureaus of Education.

49. The pilot has showed evidence on key cost drivers of the HGSF program and managed to reduce the cost from USD 0.18 /child/day to USD 0.15/child/day. However, the cost reduction to the initially planned amount did not materialize due to the utilization of high value commodities in the menu.

50. The programme has created a foundation for better institutional market access for smallholder farmers and motivated farmers to engage in the production of diversified high value crops productions. However, the proportion of market access created for surplus commodities like maize is still low compared to wheat.

51. As described below (¶54ff) the HGSF approach was highly influential in the design of the government-initiated Emergency School Feeding Programme.

School Feeding for Refugees

52. Refugee assistance is reviewed in Annex N, with further analysis of its nutritional aspects in Annex P. School feeding was intended both to incentivise school attendance and to provide additional nutritional support to families. The output data recorded at national level (see Annex I, Table 17, indicators #171–179) are patchy. The narrative reports accompanying outcome data (Table 18, indicators #91–97), indicate that school enrolment rates in the refugee camps remain unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, there is consensus among staff and beneficiaries that school feeding is an important incentive for attendance and an additional support to families under nutritional stress. In line with this perspective, school feeding has so far been exempted from the ration cuts discussed in Annex N.

School Feeding in the Urban HIV/AIDS Project

53. The urban HIV/AIDS project is reviewed in more detail in Annex P. According to the project evaluation:

All school aged children receiving food assistance and other psychosocial supports from Yekokeb Birhan Project are expected to enrol and attend school in formal or informal settings. Document reviews indicated a substantial increase in school enrolment from 80.1% at baseline to 97.1% in year 4 of the Project", at which point this component of the assistance was ended. (Belew et al., 2017).

The number of beneficiaries appears to have been around 50,000 – see Annex I, Table 17, indicator #129.

Performance of Government's Emergency School Feeding Programme (ESFP)¹⁹⁵

Contours of the ESFP

54. The ESFP was a Government initiative. However, it drew on WFP-developed models, WFP provided technical support to its design and implementation, and it represents evidence (i) of WFP's success in advocacy and capacity building and (ii) of school feeding's relevance in emergency contexts.

55. Ethiopia recently experienced its worst drought in 30 years as a result of the El Niño crisis, with levels of acute need across all humanitarian sectors exceeding levels seen in the 2011 Horn of Africa drought. According to Government and UN partners, the prolonged food insecurity and disruption to livelihoods greatly affected seven regional states and one city administration of the country (Afar, Somali, Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, Harari, SNNPR and Dire Dawa). As per a rapid assessment conducted by the Ministry of Education and Regional Bureau of Education Cluster in August 2015, about 3 million school children in these areas of the country were affected by the emergency.

56. The Ministry of Education developed an education in emergency response plan as an integral part of the broader government-led response to the El Niño crisis to provide educational supplies, WASH facilities and a school feeding programme, as well as psychosocial support and temporary learning spaces to prevent children in drought-affected areas from risk of dropping out of school. The Ministry of Education required around USD 53m to implement the plan and requested the assistance of development partners. However, the expected funding support did not materialize and the Ministry of Education had to scale down the plan and focused its implementation on the emergency school feeding by allocating around ETB 570m (approximately USD 27.5m) of government budget.

57. The ESFP is set up with a framework similar to the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme, with linkages to local cooperatives to provide the grains and legumes needed for the school meals. It provides

¹⁹⁵ This section again draws on the MGD school feeding evaluation (Mokoro, 2018b), which included a case study of the EFSP, as well as interviews by the ET.

children in affected schools with one basic meal. All commodities are locally procured within Ethiopia although usually in regions other than the ones that are directly affected by the drought. Wheat flour and chickpea mix is processed. Analysis of the composition of the meals shows that the meal provides 450 calories per day.

58. The emergency school feeding target beneficiary number of 739,740 that was indicated in the education in emergency response plan for the 2015-2016 school year had to be increased to 2.8 million as the drought conditions continued and additional beneficiaries were included during the second semester (Government of Ethiopia, 2015b). Out of the 6,742 schools targeted for the 2015-2016 school year, 653 and 692 were in Afar and Somali regions respectively. And out of the 2.8 million students that received school meals, 93,904 and 168,085 were in Afar and Somali regions respectively.

Performance of the ESFP

59. Evidence of the performance of the ESFP comes from an assessment by the Ministry of Education for the 2015/2016 school year. Further evidence comes from the school feeding evaluation which included the ESFP schools in a school based survey and conducted interviews in selected schools and with education officials, as well as with key partners of the Ministry of Education. The following results were recorded from the ESFP:

- a) Following the school meal response, anecdotal and survey evidences showed students went back to school and attendance stabilized. Even students who had dropped out a long time ago returned to school. Participation of pre-primary children increased proportionately more than that at other levels. In Amhara and Tigray regions where school feeding and water was provided, the dropout rate was almost nil. (Ministry of Education findings)
- b) A number of schools that had closed during the drought re-opened. The closure of schools reduced from 400 to 158 in Somali region and from 137 to 45 in Oromia region after the provision of school feeding in the 2016/2017 academic year. (Ministry of Education and evaluation team findings)
- c) The ESFP also contributed to bringing back parents from migration. Receiving food in the schools improved household food security through the provision of a meal that functions as an income transfer to poor families and averted negative coping strategies. (Ministry of Education findings)
- d) Teachers in drought-affected area reported that up to 50 percent of the children were sleepy in the class before the school meal intervention as they were coming to school with empty stomach. Following the intervention the concentration and attentiveness in the class was reported to have improved significantly. (Ministry of Education findings)
- e) Survey results showed that girls' schooling was more affected than boys' due to increased household demands and dwindling finances, which put girls at risk of early marriages and pregnancy as well as increased burden of supporting household income and survival. The ESFP response therefore likely protected children from abuse and increased vulnerability that occurs during migration/displacement, with particular benefits for girls. (Ministry of Education findings)
- f) Various anecdotal psychological and social benefits, such as increased togetherness as children eat together and increased security for parents who were worried about their children, were also reported. (Ministry of Education findings, and also mentioned to the evaluation team in some interviews)

- g) The multi-sectoral nature of the response (which involved various government departments as well as donors) had a positive effect on increased coordination and integration at all levels. (Ministry of Education and evaluation team findings)
- h) Interviews by the school feeding evaluation team also suggest that the Government's ownership of and commitment to school feeding in general increased through the ESFP. Various high-level persons in government have become champions for school feeding, including the former First Lady of Ethiopia.
- i) There is some anecdotal evidence that the programme stimulated the local economy through procurement of products on the local market. (Ministry of Education findings, and also mentioned to the evaluation team by some informants)
- j) Some of the decentralized government structures are now budgeting for school feeding. In the case of ESFP the federal government delivers the emergency school feeding, and the local government allocates a budget for non-food items. Parents also provide voluntary activities – cooking, firewood, etc. (Ministry of Education and evaluation team findings)

60. **Challenges:** Now in its third year, the ESFP has seen a good evolution. Nonetheless key challenges remain to be addressed. These include:

- a) The emergency nature of the ESFP – funding comes from additional allocations by the Government (on an emergency basis only). This means the additional funding has no sustainable base.
- b) Costs for school feeding programmes are too high for many of the regions to consider funding this from the regular budget, although some regions have also now started funding school feeding from their own budget on a limited scale (this is the case for SNNPR and Oromia).
- c) There are long lead times in terms of procurement and organization because of various constraints related to internal capacity (of the Ministry of Education), slowness of government systems (e.g. for procurement) and capacity of transporters and other sub-contractors, as well as capacity of communities to transport food from the woreda centres to the schools. As a result, the funds made available in the first semester only result in food being distributed to schools in the second semester. This contradicts the emergency nature of the intervention and potentially reduces its impact.
- d) While the government has shown strong leadership in taking initiative to fund the ESFP and has been at the forefront of its organization, technical knowhow on how to implement the programme falls short of what is needed. This puts a heavy burden on the federal Ministry of Education staff and structures for support.
- e) Reports indicate that, in spite of best efforts, the quality and quantity of the meals provided has not been consistent. The grains and legumes provided by some of the cooperatives have been reported to be of poor quality and meals have not consistently been served as per the recommended mix.
- f) The nutritional value of the meals provided falls short of international recommendations in terms of calories provided (450cal/day for ESFP compared to 650/day for the WFP model). The ingredients are also not fortified (WFP CSB and oil are fortified) and lack essential vitamins and minerals. In addition, the locally produced mix is not comparable to CSB, either in taste or quality. This has contributed to some instances where children have refused to eat the food.
- g) Conditions for school feeding are not adequate in a number of places. Many schools are still reported to lack proper feeding places, and face challenges in terms of ensuring other basic

conditions such as water, affecting proper hygiene and food preparation. It should be noted that these issues are not unique to the ESFP but have also affected the WFP school feeding programme.

- h) In contrast to the McGovern-Dole programme which has the THR, the ESFP does not include specific gender angle or focus and also does not include a capacity building/training component as the focus is solely on food provision; this is a challenge as many regional offices do not have the requisite expertise.

WFP support to the ESFP

61. Overall, there is strong recognition by key stakeholders of the role that WFP played in the establishment of the ESFP. WFP contributed directly to its design and implementation (Government of Ethiopia, 2017c) by providing:

- a) Technical support to the planning of the ESFP through mapping the food insecure areas and estimating number of children in need of school feeding.¹⁹⁶
- b) Support to the design of the intervention, identifying the food requirements (preparing food allocation table), and designing menu options based on local food availability in the market.
- c) Technical guidance to the preparation of an ESFP implementation manual at federal level, which will be adopted by the regional and local governments. The manual includes many lessons from WFP's work in Ethiopia, and also provides monitoring and reporting formats.
- d) Training of government in provision of food handling and management to focal persons and school directors. WFP-seconded technical staff – contracted with funds from the McGovern-Dole programme – played an important role in providing support to the design and the training.
- e) Guidance and operational support to the Ministry of Education in the day-to-day implementation process.
- f) Technical assistance to the design of a survey tool to assess the outcome of the emergency school feeding program. WFP also took part in the survey with its technical staff.

62. It should be noted that other partners were also critical to the rolling out of the ESFP. UNICEF has been important partner given its global responsibility for education in emergencies. In Ethiopia the education cluster is co-chaired by UNICEF and Save the Children. UNICEF has provided support in the form of a data specialist, and has placed an education cluster coordinator in the Ministry of Education.

Observations by the school feeding evaluation 2018

63. The Government's ESFP is a strong example of government capacity. The design and rolling out of this programme, which has gradually expanded, is fully modelled on WFP's "way of working" and has included training of staff in the case of the Somali ESFP.¹⁹⁷ Important issues related to delays in procurement, and other logistical challenges remain to be further improved. While it had other negative consequences for school feeding in Somali (see Box 20 above on the unauthorized re-allocation of McGovern-Dole commodities in Somali region), it showed some of the strengths of capacity built, including a preoccupation with targeting and securing a minimum quality of interventions (by including training etc.).

¹⁹⁶ As part of WFP's involvement in the Ethiopia Education in Emergencies (EiE) cluster.

¹⁹⁷ Evidence collected by the impact evaluation team suggested this was not the case in Afar region.

School Health and Nutrition (SHN)¹⁹⁸

64. **Context:** WFP work on school feeding in Ethiopia has been linked to school health and nutrition. This section notes relevant developments during the evaluation period.

65. School age children in Ethiopia are affected by a wide range of health and nutrition problems that limit their ability to benefit from education. Some of the common health issues are parasitic infections, malaria, anaemia, trachoma, skin diseases, disabilities, injuries, sexual and reproductive ill-health, and psychosocial and substance abuse. And the common nutrition problems are poor diet diversity and inadequate food consumption associated with high prevalence of malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies such as iodine and vitamin A, in most of the Ethiopian regions. Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness on the effect of poor health and nutrition on children's ability to learn.

66. **SHN Strategy:** To deliver a comprehensive school health and nutrition (SHN) intervention, a National School Health and Nutrition Strategy (Government of Ethiopia, 2012) was developed in October 2012 with technical and financial support from UNICEF and WFP. The goal of the strategy is to improve access and education achievement of schoolchildren through health and nutrition interventions in schools with the aim to promote joint planning, design and implementation of sustainable and quality health and nutrition interventions across the education sector. The mechanisms are put in place for ownership and sustainability of SHN programmes (such as school feeding programmes and nutrition interventions, cooking demonstrations and school gardens) thereby, increasing access and completion rates by reducing dropout and absenteeism prevalent in chronically food insecure areas of the country.

67. This National SHN Strategy adopts the FRESH (Focusing Resources for Effective School Health) framework as its guiding principles for enabling effective coordination and organization of SHN responses in the country. As part of the main strategic component, three priority areas are being identified; i) safe and sanitary school environments; ii) skills-based health and nutrition education; and iii) school-based health and nutrition services.

68. The Ministry of Education is the primary body responsible for providing SHN interventions, with collaboration and support from the Ministries of Health and Water Resources. School-based health and nutrition services highlighted in the strategy are: provision of WASH, weekly iron supplementation, immunization, health check-up including eyes, dental, and control of intestinal worms, bilharzia, and other parasitic diseases. The deworming serves a preventive and treatment measure that results in immediate improvement in child health and anaemia which leads to learning ability and attentiveness.

69. **Findings:** Despite a strong national SHN strategy and commitment from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, the implementation is very poor due lack of resources. WFP provided technical and financial support to the Ministry of Education on the development of SHN strategy and developed a training manual and provided training of trainers at national level on SHN in all regions. It was noted that the trainings are continued at the regional levels either through the technical assistance or through the regional universities. In Afar region, the Bureau of Education has worked closely with Semera University to provide training on SHN to cluster leads, Health officers, Directors, Woreda officials and teachers, cooks and PTAs. The focus of the training is safe food preparation, use of WASH facilities, provision of non-food items and energy stoves.

70. WFP supported health services in the targeted schools in Afar and Somali regions through provision of first aid kits, school health and nutrition clubs, trainings and materials support. It was found in some

¹⁹⁸ Based on Mokoro, 2018b, Annex P.

schools that the school health and nutrition clubs are active. During the school visits by the school feeding evaluation team, with observations and interviews with various stakeholders, the evaluation team found that a component of the essential package –safe water and toilets – are not in place. It was observed that separate toilets are built for girls and boys but not maintained and not in use any more. In general, the Afar and Somali evaluation highlighted the financial and technical challenges of translating the SHN strategy into practical facilities and practices in schools.

WFP Advocacy and Capacity Building

71. Throughout the evaluation period, school feeding staff of the country office have continued work on advocacy and capacity building with Government, in addition to supervision of the school feeding operations already described. As part of this effort, two experts, a school feeding policy adviser and a programme coordinator, were seconded to the Ministry of Education from 2016 onwards. Their role has been much appreciated by the Ministry (interviews by CPE and school feeding evaluation teams), and they have contributed to the evolution of national school feeding capacity that is discussed below.

72. Both evaluation teams have seen clear evidence of a growing interest and commitment to establish a sustainable national school feeding programme in Ethiopia. The collaboration between WFP and the Ministry of Education to pilot the HGSF Programme in SNNPR and Oromia in 2012, which has seen the regional government contributing a matching fund which has grown eightfold (from ETB 2 million to ETB 16 million (2018)), testifies to this. Other actors are also supporting school feeding, for example Ye Enat Weg, a charitable organisation which initiated school feeding in 2014 under the leadership of H.E. the former First Lady of Ethiopia with the objective of improving the life of impoverished children in Addis Ababa.

73. Government officials report that although there is no formal school feeding policy, there is high-level national commitment. The Parliament, the previous prime minister, and other senior government officials all in principle appreciate the importance of school feeding. The former first lady has a school feeding programme in Addis, and is an advocate for the school feeding programme. There are several policies such as education, SHN, and nutrition that integrate school feeding .

74. During the interviews at senior level within WFP and the Government, it was promising to note the commitment at the highest level and a substantial financial contribution in HGSF and ESFP. In addition, in the current financial year for the first time the Government has decided to use USD 4m from the World Bank grant for the improvement of girls' education for school feeding. An important achievement in the past years has been the establishment of a separate directorate on the school improvement programme, Quality Education for All.¹⁹⁹

75. An analysis based on the World Bank SABER (Systems Approach for Better Education Results) tool reported overarching policies for school feeding in alignment with national level policies (SABER, 2015). The school feeding evaluation's assessment of progress against the SABER baseline (see Mokoro, 2018b, Annex Z) suggests that Ethiopia has made considerable progress from 2015 to 2018, particularly in increasing commitment at the highest levels of government, in providing resources through provincial budgets as well as considerable resources from emergency government funding (related to the drought), and in moving forward with a Home-Grown School Feeding model in regions of the country where this is appropriate. Ethiopia's experience of emergency school feeding suggests that key elements in terms of systems and capacity are in place. The meetings held with WFP regional bureau's focal person in school

¹⁹⁹ The personnel outposted by WFP are attached to this unit.

feeding provided the team with the procedures, budget and systems of the ESFP. This is a significant achievement, although challenges remain, as discussed earlier

76. WFP's work on school feeding is highly credited in strengthening the government capacity for planning and implementation of school feeding. Amongst other activities WFP has supported the Ministry of Education in the development of the national school feeding strategy, and in drafting of region-specific standards for kitchens, stores and canteens. In addition, WFP has supported capacity strengthening of regional Bureaus of Education to work with universities on research and advocacy. Deployment of technical assistance is considered very relevant and appropriate at both the regional and federal levels. WFP through the McGovern-Dole funds has provided financial and technical support to the regional education management system and to the national school feeding programme. There is evidence of learning between different models of school feeding as the McGovern-Dole model is mirrored in the HGSF and ESFP models.

77. WFP's work is recognised by senior government officials. The biggest achievement is the establishment of a directorate in the Ministry of Education "School Improvement Programme" under which the school feeding falls. This has enhanced the visibility of school feeding in Ethiopia and the accountability of the Government and made it possible to roll out the ESFP. There is a growing recognition of financial commitment by the Government, although no fixed budget line is allocated to school feeding and no funding has been forthcoming at regional level in Somali and Afar, seemingly due to competing priorities. There have been increasing monetary and non-monetary contributions from woredas, kebeles and communities in these areas. Overall the HGSF experience is still being consolidated but it is seen as the future way forward.

78. As part of country-level advocacy for school feeding, an "Investment Case" school feeding in Ethiopia was prepared (WFP, 2017w). This is reviewed in Annex S (Cost Analysis).

ASSESSMENT

79. The impact evaluation of school feeding in Afar and Somali regions has provided robust evidence of the effectiveness of this intervention. It had a demonstrable effect on school enrolment and pupils' performance, and it was a valuable element of social protection in pastoral regions under stress. Through the take-home ration component there were strongly positive gender effects. These results were achieved in spite of the considerable challenges of operating in these regions.

80. There is also substantial evidence of success, over a long period, for WFP's advocacy of school feeding, and associated efforts to build national capacity. The home-grown school feeding model in SNNPR and Oromia, is attracting increasing support from regional governments. Most significantly, the national emergency school feeding programme clearly drew, both conceptually and practically, on WFP experience and support, and proved to be a valuable response to reinforce food security during drought. And there is significant progress towards strengthening national capacity for school feeding, judged by the SABER criteria.

81. These developments have had a long gestation period; their origins can be traced to analysis and workshops that precede the evaluation period, and they represent a reward for WFP's persistence in advocacy and capacity building over many years.

Annex R Logistics, Supply Chain and Emergency Response

INTRODUCTION – SCOPE OF THIS ANNEX

1. Ethiopia borders Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan and Djibouti, which has been its primary port since the early 1990s. It is the most populous landlocked country in Africa, supply chains are long and road conditions poor, but the country has been one of the most prone to natural or man-made disaster and has continued to be one of the world's largest recipients of humanitarian food assistance.

2. Accordingly one of the greatest challenges for humanitarian logistics, emergency preparedness and response (EPR) in Ethiopia has been the efficiency and effectiveness of supply chains for relief commodity importation, local procurement and distribution. Between 2015 and 2017, Djibouti port congestion was a major problem. The goal of WFP's humanitarian supply chain efforts has been to quickly respond to multiple interventions. Hence, effective and efficient supply chain management has been central to providing successful humanitarian assistance and is the focus of this annex to the country pofo evaluation (CPE) for WFP Ethiopia. The annex also focuses on two inter-agency common services²⁰⁰ hosted by WFP Ethiopia: the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and the logistics cluster.

3. The WFP country programme (CP 200253) included five components, two of which are relevant to this annex: 1. Support to the Government in developing a national disaster risk management system; and, 2. Support to smallholder farmers through the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme that cut across several projects, enabling food to be procured for drought-affected people and for contributions to the Global Commodity Man"hub and spokes|" operation in Somali region, a Food Management Improvement Project (FMIP) that established a commodity management system within the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), and two infrastructure projects: the Geeldoh bridge and Djibouti logistics hub.

4. During the evaluation period WFP's logistics and emergency preparedness and response (EPR) focus was primarily on addressing humanitarian need in the Somali region of the country, but also on building the government's humanitarian supply chain management capacity. The evaluation team reviewed the range of logistics, emergency preparedness and response interventions that have been implemented over the period 2012 to 2017 and considered individual project elements only as they related strategically to programme operations.

5. Due to the turnover of staff and other key informants, and the dynamic nature of operations caused by fluctuations in the security situation, the evaluation team faced limitations in obtaining some information. Therefore findings mre stronger and more detailed for the period 2014 to 2017.

CONTEXT

Context for Aid Delivery in Ethiopia (2012–2017)

6. WFP's protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) 200290, superseded by PRRO 200712, was designed in alignment with the Government's Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). The GTP aimed to

²⁰⁰ WFP also co-hosts (with FAO) the Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster, which is not evaluated in this annex.

promote strong economic growth driven by the agricultural sector and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. WFP's main partner has been the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC), which was responsible for the coordination and leadership of Ethiopia's disaster risk management strategy, and regularly supported the transport of food assistance to over 1,500 distribution locations.

7. Emergency food needs were identified through a joint needs assessment process, most commonly undertaken two times per year. These needs assessments resulted in the annual production of a humanitarian requirements document (HRD) that was released each January. In 2015 the drought emergency was at its peak with the HRD recording over 9 million people in need of food assistance. By the end of the evaluation period the scale of the crisis had declined, with just over 3 million people having received humanitarian food assistance in 397 districts of 10 regions.

8. The Government allocated resources to finance humanitarian interventions and led humanitarian donors, partners, communities and the private sector in their contributions to support joint efforts to save lives and protect livelihoods. The HRD facilitated preparedness each year and ensured a coordinated humanitarian response. Most humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia was coordinated through the Government, where WFP and other partners provided technical and material support for systems at various levels.

9. Large areas of south-eastern Ethiopia, which has been the focus of WFP operations, faced acute food insecurity throughout the evaluation period. Some worst affected households, particularly displaced pastoralists, were at risk of moving into catastrophe (IPC5),²⁰¹ according to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET). Severe drought decimated livestock herds, sharply reduced crop production and led to widespread disease outbreaks. Large-scale, sustained emergency food assistance in Somali region was needed to mitigate high levels of acute malnutrition and the threat to loss of life.

10. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), representing the Joint Emergency Operation (JEOP)²⁰² consortium, and WFP participated in monthly NDRMC-led prioritization committee meetings, which were the forum for reviewing the national food pipeline and recommended allocations to address the emergency food needs of the country.²⁰³ CRS, NDRMC and WFP also participated in monthly Food Aid Management Task Force meetings, which met to discuss operational challenges such as road transport constraints and Djibouti port congestion problems.

11. The NDRMC had overall responsibility for coordinating and managing humanitarian responses with its own logistics department responsible for the transportation of any food resources managed by the Government, or destined for national or district storage hubs.²⁰⁴ The PRRO included support to the Government's disaster risk management programme by providing general food assistance and technical inputs to support between 2.4 and 7.5 million beneficiaries per year. In 2015, WFP responded to a dramatic

²⁰¹ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a standardised tool to classify the severity and magnitude of food insecurity. The IPC scale, comparable across countries, ranges from Minimal (IPC 1) to Famine (IPC 5). Famine is determined when more than 20 percent of households in an area are classified as experiencing Catastrophe, when the global acute malnutrition level exceeds 30 percent and when the crude mortality rate exceeds two people per 10,000 persons per day.

²⁰² JEOP partners - CRS (JEOP lead agency), CARE, World Vision, FHE (Food for the Hungry, Ethiopia), Save the Children US, Save the Children UK, and Relief Society of Tigray (REST).

²⁰³ Additionally, CRS and WFP co-lead the Food Security Cluster in Ethiopia.

²⁰⁴ Government targeting guidelines were developed and were used by all stakeholders. Local government authorities have had to be involved in household targeting regardless of which agency manages the food resource.

rise in relief food needs due to the failure of both the spring and summer rains and the onset of the El Niño-related drought.

12. Aligned with WFP Strategic Objective 1, the provision of emergency food assistance was intended to support the disaster risk management policy and the NDRMC – formerly the Disaster Risk Management Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) – to strengthen their emergency preparedness and response capabilities. Linking early warning information to effective and efficient supply-chain systems aimed to ensure that emergency food assistance could be targeted, coordinated and tracked by WFP, the NDRMC and the JEOP.

WFP Policies and Strategy Relevant for Logistics & EPR

13. The WFP Strategic Plan guides all interventions and for the purposes of the Ethiopia CPE includes both the 2008–2013 and 2014–2017 plans. Under the 2014–2017 plan the most relevant section is Strategic Objective One (SO1) to Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies. Under this are three goals: to meet urgent food and nutrition needs of vulnerable people and communities and reduce under-nutrition to below emergency level; to protect and livelihoods while enabling safe access to food and nutrition for women and men.; and to strengthen the capacity of governments and regional organizations and enable the international community to prepare for, assess and respond to shocks.

14. WFP has several policies that are relevant to the logistics, preparedness and response theme. WFP's Role in the Humanitarian System (2010) supports IASC humanitarian systems reforms in three areas. Most relevant to this annex is to improve humanitarian response capacity, leadership accountability and predictability, in sectors/areas of response through the cluster approach.

15. WFP has committed to mainstreaming cluster management and operational support functions by including the requisite cost items in biennial management plans. WFP assumes leadership roles for the global logistics and emergency telecommunications clusters, established to support country-level clusters²⁰⁵ and address gaps in country-level responses. They are concerned with building, maintaining and constantly seeking ways to improve capabilities to efficiently and effectively deliver assistance.

16. The WFP Enterprise Risk Management Policy (2015) lays out WFP's approach to risk management to help the organisation deal with uncertainty, reduce the likelihood of negative outcomes and ensure that WFP achieves its objectives. WFP's decisions to engage are based upon understanding how to engage in a way that does not cause harm or come at an unacceptable cost.²⁰⁶

17. WFP purchases food in advance of need using a USD 350 million Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF), which uses supply chains from the ports of Djibouti, Berbera and Mombasa, as well as the western, eastern and coastal Sahel, southern Africa and the Middle East. In 2016, WFP exceeded its target to reduce average lead times for the delivery of food assistance by 50 percent (WFP, 2017ze).

18. Under the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme, WFP worked closely with the Ethiopian Government (and others) to help purchase food commodities from smallholder farmers to meet the needs of public institutions, such as schools and hospitals.

²⁰⁵ Additionally, WFP leads the Food Security Cluster together with FAO.

²⁰⁶ The WFP Risk Appetite Statement identifies a number of risks and mitigation measures in the following areas: Security, Wellness and Safety Risks to Personnel, Well-Being of Beneficiaries, Operations, Demonstrating Results, Staff Capacity, Partnerships, WFP's Reputation and Risk Tolerance Decision Making. (OED2012/015, WFP/EB.1/2016/4-C)

THE INTENDED WFP PROGRAMME AND ITS RATIONALE

Hubs and spokes

19. WFP has managed two major logistics and supply chain improvement operations, which were instituted prior to the evaluation period. The first was the hubs and spokes delivery system, which was designed to meet the logistical challenges of delivering food to approximately 650 distribution points in the Somali region amid insecurity, poor road conditions, and widely scattered and remote communities. This initiative established warehouses and logistics hubs in strategic locations to reduce the time taken to deliver food to beneficiaries, using private transporters to deliver food from hubs to end-user points.

20. Somali region has been the main operational area for WFP during the evaluation period. The logistics concept of operations (prior to 2012) planned food dispatches from a regional government warehouse in Dire Dawa (supplied from Djibouti Port) to 39 districts in the Somali region. Due to security constraints, long distances from the main hub to final delivery points and limited warehouse capacity in the region, it was difficult to assure deliveries. Food convoys also had to be escorted by the military. The "Hubs and Spokes" initiative (started in 2008/2009) established warehouses and logistics hubs in strategic locations to reduce the time taken to deliver food to beneficiaries, using private transporters to deliver food from hubs to end user points.²⁰⁷

21. WFP logistics also provided services to other humanitarian organisations, and supported WFP in South Sudan and Somalia through transshipment operations by road, air and barge.

The food management improvement project (FMIP)

22. The second initiative was the food management improvement project (FMIP). At the government's request, and in alignment with the Disaster Risk Management Strategic Programme and Investment Framework, WFP launched the FMIP in 2010; the first phase ran from 2010 to 2014 (budgeted at USD 6.5 million). The project has, during the evaluation period, been managed in collaboration with the NDRMC and aimed to build the capacity of the Government in the management of the food assistance supply-chains and address systemic challenges in accounting for and reporting on food movements.

23. The FMIP had five major components with each one attempting to address government limitations:

- a) streamlined tendering processes for transport contracting;
- b) a commodity management procedure manual²⁰⁸ (CMPM) to improve reporting – the first such guide was specifically designed for government operations, with a comprehensive focus on developing the capacity of field-level staff such as warehouse managers and storekeepers;
- c) training through the implementation of a professional-level 18-month course in supply chain management that issued an internationally recognised certificate;
- d) a commodity allocation and tracking system (CATS) that was due to be fully operational by mid-2014 and was expected to help with pipeline management through improved reporting; and
- e) improvements to NDRMC warehouse infrastructure and food storage practices.

²⁰⁷ SPR 200290. The Hubs and Spokes system was first implemented under Special Operation 10721.1 (September 2008 to December 2009) at an initial cost of \$2,788,471, increased through Budget Revision 2 to a total of \$6,384,547.

²⁰⁸ The manual was translated into Amharic.

Supply routes and programmes supported

24. From 2012, until the opening in 2015 of the corridor to the Somali region from the port of Berbera,²⁰⁹ WFP managed the food commodity supply chain for all projects around the country from the port of Djibouti. Although commodities were handed over to government counterparts at pre-defined locations, WFP maintained a monitoring role except in Somali region where deliveries were made to final distribution points²¹⁰ through the hubs and spokes system based on allocation requests from the Government (NDRMC).

25. Aligned to the Government's Growth and Transformation Plan, the PRRO supported the national Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), national relief response and the child survival programme (targeted supplementary feeding.). Through the FMIP, WFP supported the Government to improve the management of relief and PSNP food supply chains. The project has been managed in collaboration with the NDRMC and also aimed to address systemic challenges in accounting for, and reporting on, food movements.

Special operations

26. A key component of the logistics and EPR portfolio has been the implementation of four special operations (see Table 51 below) that were designed to address the exceptional challenges related to:

- a) enabling humanitarian access to remote parts of south east Ethiopia;
- b) supporting the scale up to the drought emergency response in 2016/17;
- c) addressing the significant supply chain challenges associated with importing and distributing food assistance; and
- d) humanitarian access challenges.

Table 51 Special operations for logistics

NO.	Date	Operation
SO 200752	2014 – 2017	Construction of a bridge in the Somali region (Geeldoh) to facilitate access to isolated districts
SO 200977	2016 – 2017	Logistics cluster support to the Government of Ethiopia's drought response operations
SO 200358	2012 – 2017	Construction of a Humanitarian Hub in Djibouti
SO 200364	2012 – 2015	United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), enabling the humanitarian community
SO 200711	2015 – 2017	to reach remote refugee camp locations

Source: SPRs

Country office configuration

27. As a strategic initiative, a supply-chain unit was formed in 2017 to replace the former logistics unit, its main functions being to focus on the effective delivery of food commodities plus integrated market-based programming and procurement support.

²⁰⁹ From 2015 to 2017 the majority of food commodities for Somali region have been imported through Berbera.

²¹⁰ Distributions in most woredas of Fik Zone of Somali region were generally carried out by the Government due to security restrictions.

PROGRAMME DELIVERY AND RESULTS

Overview

28. Throughout the evaluation period, Djibouti port congestion and transportation shortages were the main logistical challenges facing WFP and NDRMC operations. Further challenges were due to limited capacity within government departments as well as insecurity along the border areas between Somali and Oromia, resulting in access constraints. WFP worked with the Government to improve transport, storage and emergency preparedness and operated a truck fleet (based in Dire Dawa) to enable food deliveries to inaccessible areas not served by the private sector.²¹¹ Since 2015, WFP has used the supply corridor to the Somali region from Berbera port in Somaliland, which allowed faster responses to emergencies and alleviated access challenges due to insecurity in the border areas between Oromia and Somali regions.

Hubs and Spokes Operation

29. The PRRO faced logistical and bureaucratic challenges to the timely delivery of assistance during the on-going humanitarian crisis in the Somali region during the early part of the evaluation period, when the time lag between assessment and distribution was regarded as unacceptable (Frankenberger et al, 2014). The timeliness of targeted supplementary feeding was also hindered by pipeline breaks, and limited strategies for prepositioning and secure storage of food. The hubs and spokes operation, run jointly between NDRMC and WFP, had been established to address these issues, many of which had been resolved by the end of 2017 (according to interviews by the evaluation team).

30. The hubs and spokes operation issued guidelines for relief distribution in Somali region, which outlined a system of beneficiary selection based on input from food distribution committees (FDCs); agreed distribution arrangements between WFP, local officials and the FDC, and responsibilities for proper handling and reporting of food assistance. While food commodities have been targeted according to the guidelines and available resources, in practice, food does not always reach the intended recipients because sharing food is a widespread cultural practice (evaluation team interviews).

31. During a field visit to Jigjiga, the evaluation team was able to discuss the hubs and spokes operation with key WFP and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) staff. Government officials regarded the system as having been effective, as it had greatly improved the timeliness of distributions, improved targeting, and reduced misuse through more efficient use of transport and storage resources, improved reporting and better tracking and tracing capabilities. While NDRMC (DPPB) provided guidance, WFP has been the main implementing organisation regarding transport and warehousing. Six hubs were set up in Nazareth (Adama), Dire Dawa, Jigjiga, Degehabur, Kebridehar and Gode. WFP has managed these by ensuring receipt, storage and dispatch of commodities to final delivery points. In Jigjiga, Degehabur, Kebridehar and Gode, joint committees were established to oversee operations, decentralise decisions on food movements and ensure ownership among all stakeholders. In addition to the joint committees in Somali region, a joint committee was set up in Addis Ababa to oversee the overall operation. This level of oversight was considered to have enhanced the level of efficiency of food deliveries but the evaluation team was not able to quantify this.

32. Through interviews, these mechanisms were regarded as having been effective and generally worked well, demonstrating good synergy with partners (government, and agencies) at the operational level. For example, at the peak of drought response operations in 2016, weekly coordination meetings were organised by the DPPB for all sectors and monthly reports shared with stakeholders. The DPPB further

²¹¹ WFP now have 3,000 final distribution points in Somali region.

confirmed that WFP's inputs and hubs and spokes management has been "highly important" and that they could not foresee a time in the near future when they would have sufficient government capacity to be able to handle independently the complexity of operations. Similarly, during interviews with USAID, the hubs and spokes operation was commended for having helped to avert a famine in 2016 in Somali region while recognising the challenges regarding post distribution monitoring and the overall high costs associated with the approach.

33. Ongoing challenges included insufficient local transport capacity for last mile deliveries (beyond the main routes), security escort requirements, poor road networks resulting in limited access in the rainy season, and remote delivery points. There was occasional reluctance on the part of commercial transporters to go into insecure or remote areas as they could make more money with larger consignments on the main routes. WFP attempted to address this by supplementing its core fleet of off-road trucks with a fleet of 20 6x4 (20 mt capacity) trucks²¹² that had been operated in Sudan. In 2017, these trucks were transferred to Somali region DPPB management as part of a capacity building agreement. During the Jigjiga field visit, the evaluation team observed that this fleet was largely unserviceable due to poor maintenance and that new trailers that had been purchased by WFP for the trucks were of an incorrect specification and so could not be used.

34. While there were significant improvements to logistics in the Somali region between 2012 and 2017, WFP acknowledged that challenges remained, including that of timely reporting of distribution figures, due to the limited number of WFP field monitors, and difficulty in retaining staff. Delayed deliveries due to congestion at Djibouti port from January to March/April remained a problem throughout, but this was addressed by pre-positioning under the GCMF²¹³ and by borrowing food from the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA). Overall, as had been recommended by an operational evaluation conducted in 2014 (Frankenberger et al, 2014), WFP is considered to have taken a systematic approach to strengthening the food management system operated by the government in the Somali region.

35. The hubs and spokes arrangements were also used to address the logistical and programmatic challenges of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Somali region but due to time constraints this aspect of the operation could not be reviewed in any detail. Data regarding the tonnage of food assistance delivered within the Somali region through the hubs and spokes operation were available only for 2016 and 2017 (through the COMET database); approximate totals were 313,000 mt in 2016 and 284,000 mt in 2017.

Geeldoh Bridge

36. Special Operation (SO) 200752 supported the construction of the Geeldoh bridge to facilitate access to Lagahida and Salahad woredas for the more timely, cost effective and efficient distribution of humanitarian assistance. The operation was intended, in part, to augment the hubs and spokes operation and also to create positive socioeconomic impact²¹⁴ for the woreda populations, which received one of the lowest levels of basic services in the Somali region, primarily due to their inaccessibility. The construction of a bridge over the Wabe-Shebelle River that divides the woredas, would improve access and contribute to WFP's Strategic Objective 1, to Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies. The project aimed to

²¹² The 20 IVECO trucks had been donated by the Canadian Government.


²¹³ The latter use of the GCMF and Berbera corridor was regarded as having made the biggest difference to improving timely food deliveries.

²¹⁴ The socioeconomic impact would be to open up a neglected area for further humanitarian assistance and development by improving access to health care facilities, education, trade and justice systems, and enhancing security and access for monitoring and evaluation.

enhance efficiencies in the supply of food by reducing transport costs and delivery times, and by increasing local access and trade between communities on both sides of the river.

37. The plan was for a reduction in the turnaround time, and therefore also costs, for trucks delivering humanitarian assistance. The intended new route was estimated to provide 28 percent savings in transport costs for deliveries through the Djibouti corridor and a potential saving of 68 percent for deliveries through Berbera (see Figure 65 below).

Figure 65 Map of Fik Zone: old route and proposed new route via bridge



Source: WFP Engineering

38. The primary donor was DFID, which contributed a total of USD 5,812,113 and a further USD 473,278 was obtained through multilateral contributions (WFP, 2017y). DFID’s contribution was contingent on there being a strong socioeconomic impact through construction of the bridge.²¹⁵

39. A memorandum of Understanding between WFP and the Somali Regional Government was signed in October 2014, outlining the commitment of the regional government to the rehabilitation of the approach roads and ownership of the infrastructure upon completion of the construction. The regional government was expected to partner with the Ethiopian Somali Roads Construction Enterprise (ESRCE) for road repairs on the eastern and western approaches to the Geeldoh bridge site (WFP, 2015zb). Inprocon Africa Engineering Services PLC was subsequently awarded the contract to manage the construction of the bridge.

40. During 2015, additional funding was required in order for the project to proceed. The budget shortage was caused by underestimated mobilisation costs, and rising construction rates in Ethiopia since the initial drafting of the budget (WFP, 2016za). Although WFP maintained a good working relationship with

²¹⁵ WFP Engineering reported difficulty in creating an accurate budget, as there were no other examples of constructing a single span bridge in a similar context.

the regional authorities, the access road repair works to be conducted (by the regional government) were not implemented. The evaluation team considers that oversight of such issues could be improved in future proposals, and market prices monitored closely so that changes can be better communicated during funding approval procedures. However, a further unforeseen funding delay was caused in 2016 due to the Brexit vote that caused a drop in the Sterling/USD exchange rate, which affected the value of DFID's contribution. Other delays were caused by changes in staff and the requirement (from DFID) for a socioeconomic assessment of the region.

41. Construction took approximately 12 months and was completed in early 2017. It was the first modular steel bridge (Bailey bridge concept) constructed by WFP.²¹⁶ Three major modular bridge suppliers had bid to provide a standardised approach to bridge construction under a corporate long-term agreement (LTA).²¹⁷ Figure 66 shows the completed bridge and surrounding area.

Figure 66 Completed Geeldoh bridge



42. By the end of the evaluation period, road access to the bridge had not been improved (by the ESRCE), although the roads authority initially had conducted temporary road repairs so that the bridge could be constructed. The reasons for the delay could not be verified but are likely to have been due partly to the prevailing humanitarian situation; so remote road improvements were not a government priority. Also there was a border dispute between Somali and Oromia regions, as the Government demarcated the border more formally. This sparked conflict near the route to the bridge, which is only 50 kilometres from the perceived border. According to information obtained from WFP logistics, during 2017 larger trucks were not able to use the bridge effectively because the approach roads were not suitable. One truck carrying WFP food overturned on the approach road. (ETHSOM002 MISSION, 2017)

43. The construction of the bridge was seen to have the potential to reduce occurrences of conflict and would improve the security condition in the area, as regional governments from both Oromia and Somali

²¹⁶ Information based on interview with the WFP Engineering Team at Rome HQ.

²¹⁷ The supplier used was Matiere Bridges, France.

could more easily intervene to stop any escalation of disputes. Also it would improve integration of the communities and enable humanitarian response. (Mohammud & Bedel, 2015)

44. The bridge was one of the centrepieces of the DFID-funded Peace and Development Programme (PDP) that aimed to increase access and mobility for 120,000 people across three districts in Somali region, and reduce the costs of humanitarian operations. An annual review of the Peace and Development Programme (PDP) acknowledged the work of the WFP Ethiopia Engineering Unit. As part of the review, it was noted that the Geeldoh Bridge Construction Project met almost all socioeconomic expectations. Access remained an important element of the PDP and noted that more work was required to ensure that DFID's investment could be sustained. (DFID, 2016)

45. An impact assessment team that interviewed local elders after the bridge was completed found that market access had improved, resulting in better prices being obtained by local traders. Elders commented that "the bridge was very helpful at times of drought because we can easily move our cattle, camels and goats to any place for grazing". (ETHSOM002 MISSION, 2017)

46. Overall, the evaluation team found that, despite numerous delays, the project was successful in meeting the socioeconomic aspects of the project in terms of relevance to humanitarian needs, priorities, capacities and harmonisation with partners but, as at the end of the evaluation period, had not been successful in addressing intended transport efficiency and effectiveness, to augment the hubs and spokes operation, due to incomplete access roads to the bridge. This latter issue was expected to be resolved in 2018.

Food Management Improvement Programme

47. By the end of the evaluation period the FMIP had been in existence for over eight years. While progress had been made in some areas, challenges still remained in others. To address the five main project pillars (noted above) five products had either been developed or enhanced from earlier plans:

- a) Framework contracting – From 2012, the project facilitated a road transport tendering process for the NDRMC to enable the contracting of trucking services under framework contracts (long term agreements) each with a validity of six months. This helped to reduce the time taken to arrange commodity transport services and deliveries to final delivery points (Frankenberger et al, 2014). WFP and government field staff²¹⁸ cited the streamlined transport tendering processes developed as being effective in reducing delays in many areas. However, private transporters interviewed admitted taking on multiple commercial contracts to supplement the availability of work through WFP and because, over a six month commitment, higher transport rates could often be obtained, making it uneconomical for them to adhere to WFP's fixed rates. This situation in turn affected truck availability for the movement of WFP commodities.²¹⁹
- b) The WFP logistics team collaborated with various authorities to develop and later enhance the Commodity Management Procedures Manual (CMPM) used at regional, zonal and woreda level distribution points as a management guide for humanitarian relief commodities and the Productive

²¹⁸ Based on key informant interviews in Jijiga, Adama and Addis Ababa. WFP contracting procedures do work but are difficult to enforce, particularly when there was major congestion in Djibouti port and truck demand was high (with rates higher than those offered by WFP available). (This is a common feature of fwk agreements.) WFP worked with the government to resolve the issue of port congestion in order to smooth out demand for trucks during emergency operations.

²¹⁹ Information based on key informant interviews with transporters in Adama and with JEOP officials.

Safety Net Programme (PSNP). A variety of training workshops²²⁰ were conducted around the country (mainly in Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions). The FMIP baseline survey for CPM covering 2015/16 identified a notable adoption of the tools at regional level (see Table 52 below regarding knowledge generated) but while the reporting guideline had been intended for use at the lowest level (woreda and kebele) of the supply chain, time and scarce resources precluded the effective widespread roll out and adoption of the manual. Based on interviews with FMIP staff, the CPM was regarded as having been expensive to implement and follow up, and the level of uptake varied between regions. This has largely been due to the scale of the task to roll out (two- to three-day) training workshops for personnel working in over 5,000 food distribution points nationally.²²¹ Overall, however, the process to introduce the CPM helped to reduce the average time taken to conduct a food distribution 'round' from 60 days to 45 days.²²²

- c) Most training work had been assigned to a local company ABH Consulting Services (which is an affiliate of Jimma University) but in 2014 the Kuehne Foundation (KF)²²³ began supporting the expansion of training to include building capacity for other supply chain actors in the country, including the private sector. The plan was to provide an internationally accredited (modularised) diploma. Prior experience had been that dropout rates were high and graduation levels very low. The change in training delivery modality meant that students could choose a module that would most benefit them in their work. Certificate courses were delivered in one-week sessions, which proved to be successful, and encouraged the completion of all modules in order to gain an international diploma. Four rounds of capacity building trainings were conducted in partnership with the Kuehne Foundation for supply chain actors from various sectors.²²⁴ The evaluation team considers that supply chain management (SCM) training conducted has provided a good framework for improving skills and knowledge of the Government's mid and senior level logistics managers on planning and coordination and has provided an overview of the way supply chains inter-related.²²⁵

²²⁰ More than 50 percent of the participants reportedly received an international certificate in supply chain management and some studied for an advanced certificate. The first tranche of 30 students from eight government agencies and NGOs completed their supply chain management (SC) training in February 2014.

²²¹ A baseline survey conducted in 2016 identified a notable adoption of the tools at regional level.

²²² 'Rounds' were born out of the 'monthly distribution ration'.

²²³ <https://www.kuehne-stiftung.org/index.php?id=1275>

²²⁴ WFP Supply Chain Strengthening Project reports.

²²⁵ Based on interviews with senior NDRMC staff.

Table 52 Knowledge of the Commodity Management Procedures Manual (CMPM) Reporting Procedure

Region	Number of regional staff:		No of zonal staff:		No of woreda staff:			No of food distribution point staff:	
	Trained	Trained but left the office	Trained	Trained but left the office	Trained	Trained but left the office	Not trained but working	Trained	Not trained but working
Oromia	12	2	10	2	47	10	24	12	27.27
SNNPR	16	4	9	1	27	17	20	6	31.58
Amhara	23	4	12	3	38	15	12	10	47.62
Tigray	17	1	1	1	18	9	7	5	62.50
Afar	7	1	--	--	18	3	1	17	85.00
B/G	10	4	2	1	6	2	19	3	60.00
Gambella	3	0			8	2	6	3	60.00
Harari	6	2						--	
Total	94	18	34	8	162	58	46%	56	54%
Turnover	19.14%		23.53%		35.80%				

Source: CMPM Baseline Survey Report 2017.

- d) an internet-based commodity allocation and tracking system (CATS)²²⁶ was planned to be fully operational by mid-2014, with the aim of improving pipeline management through better reporting and information management.²²⁷ While preliminary testing and handover to the NDRMC at its three central warehouses (hubs) in Adama, Kombolcha and Dire Dawa was completed at the end of that year, uptake in its regular use was very low due mainly to issues of internet connectivity and unreliable power supply.²²⁸ In 2015 an assessment was conducted and system enhancements proposed, resulting in improved reliability at the main NDRMC hubs but not at lower level operating centres. Data management was also supported via WFP's logistics execution support system (LESS), a business management tool developed to support the management supply chain processes,²²⁹ which enhanced the visibility, control and monitoring of commodities being handled in WFP's pipeline.²³⁰ The evaluation team observed effective use and sustainable practices of the CATS at the NDRMC facility in Adama.
- e) An assessment of the NDRMC's national warehouse network was initially conducted in 2010/2011. This was updated in 2016, with support from the Logistics Cluster, as part of its deployment to the drought emergency response programme, to determine where to position relief food supplies. Solutions included the upgrading of storage facilities, offices and generators etc. (See section below on logistics cluster special operation 200977, ¶61ff.) The FMIP was able to piggyback on this intervention and as a result developed a longer-term approach to capacity building for the Government as part of the WFP supply chain strengthening project started in 2017. Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture Food Security Coordination Directorate, which had not previously

²²⁶ Project started in 2011

²²⁷ The CMPM training programme was also linked to the CATS project.

²²⁸ It was NDRMC that needed to address the issue of internet connectivity and power supply for the use of computerised systems.

²²⁹ LESS is integrated with WINGS, WFP's ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning) system. LESS is a WFP-specific system that was used to support NDRMC operations while CATS was rolled out. CATS is owned and operated by the NDRMC.

²³⁰ SPR 200290. The System for Cash Operations (SCOPE) has also been used for emergency preparedness and response operations.

coordinated with NDRMC regarding commodity storage, agreed to establish a joint commodity management unit (CMU). Funding was provided through the PSNP, and the CMU hosted by the NDRMC due to their logistics capabilities. WFP/FMIP's capacity building support to the CMU is considered by the evaluation team to have been a strategically important initiative.²³¹

48. The country office contributed to supply chain improvements for the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve Administration.²³² WFP provided guidance regarding the national grain storage network and identified strategic locations for pre-positioning of food supplies.²³³ Recommendations included shifting from out-dated grain storage practices to a bulk supply chain, although this was not realised during the evaluation period due to the lack of bulk handling and transport investment within the national food commodity supply chain.

Global Commodity Management Facility

49. Between 2012 and 2017, WFP Ethiopia sourced an average of 63 percent of food commodities via the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF), which pre-financed imports via the Djibouti and Berbera corridors or through local purchases (see Figure 67 below). The model²³⁴ was established in 2011 and served as a vital resource for WFP Ethiopia.²³⁵

50. The opening of the Berbera corridor for shipments to Yemen (as well as Ethiopia) in 2015 led to a considerable increase in activities at Berbera Port in Somaliland. In 2016 the volumes²³⁶ handled rose by over 250 percent. Consequently, a cost sharing agreement was made with WFP Ethiopia and Yemen country offices, which led to a 90 percent drop in fixed costs for WFP Somalia (as expenses were absorbed by operations for three countries). The port was used by the GCMF as a hub for Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen, offering lower costs and shorter transit times compared to Djibouti and reduced delivery lead times²³⁷ especially during emergencies. By 2017, the majority of food imports were via Berbera (see Figure 68 below). This helped to mitigate distribution delays by enabling the PRRO (200290 and 200712) to benefit from timely access to commodities.

²³¹ Government counterparts were interviewed in Adama and Addis. The interventions of the logistics cluster were considered positively.

²³² The EFSRA went through a significant change in the early 1990s when it became an autonomous agency.

²³³ WFP Ethiopia occasionally borrowed food stocks from the EFSRA.


²³⁴ The GCMF has grown to USD350 million, enabling the forward positioning of more than 1 million metric tons of food in 2016. Approximately 70% of GCMF commodities are procured for country operations in East Africa.

²³⁵ Once the CO has confirmed funding they can source food from GCMF stocks.

²³⁶ SPR 200844


²³⁷ In 2016, COs purchasing from GCMF received food after an average 46 days as opposed to the 120 days average under the conventional procurement process – representing a 62 percent reduction in lead-time.

Figure 67 GCMF as a proportion of total food handled in Ethiopia by WFP 2012–2017



Source: Data from WFP, 2018c.

Figure 68 WFP tonnage for Ethiopia received from Djibouti and Berbera 2015–2017



Source: WFP Ethiopia CO Dataset

51. The GCMF ensured that food commodities could be positioned²³⁸ at WFP warehouses when needed or as funds became available, which ensured that pipeline breaks were minimised. Receiving and storing GCMF commodities in regional hubs within Ethiopia also reduced the risks²³⁹ and costs associated with long-term storage in the port of Djibouti and Berbera. Warehouse capacity at Adama (Nazareth) acted as a primary hub both for WFP Ethiopia²⁴⁰ and for South Sudan airdrop operations²⁴¹ from Gambella and Jimma. Adama was also used to consolidate food supplies obtained through local procurement under the P4P programme.

²³⁸ GCMF pre-positioning takes three forms: physical stocks, “virtual stocks” or contracts and cash to be used to buy commodities and services.

²³⁹ Food commodities (particularly bagged) cannot be stored easily in Djibouti due to the high humidity and temperatures, which cause weevil infestation.

²⁴⁰ Due to conflict between Oromia and Somali, supply to the Somali region was only feasible through Berbera. Since the opening of the Berbera corridor in 2015 there was a 50:50 split in food tonnage delivered directly to the Somali region and to Nazareth

²⁴¹ WFP Ethiopia also facilitated limited road and river transport deliveries to South Sudan during the evaluation period.

Purchase for Progress

52. The Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot programme started in Ethiopia in January 2010 in Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR, in areas where there is surplus production. The P4P initiative in Ethiopia combined WFP's purchasing power with partners' technical contributions to strengthen the management and marketing capacities of cooperative unions and to provide them with market opportunities, as an incentive to increase production. This in turn increased the sales of produce to WFP and other institutional buyers beyond WFP.


53. Activities carried out under P4P in Ethiopia included: food procurement through the "forward delivery contract" modality with cooperative unions; capacity building for the cooperatives, which included training, technical support, warehouse rehabilitation, provision of postharvest handling equipment, and supporting record keeping of cooperative unions; linking the cooperatives to other institutional buyers, both private and public; and facilitating cooperative unions to access loans from commercial banks by supplying WFP contracts as collateral.

54. The P4P approach fitted within the Government of Ethiopia's objectives in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which aimed to double the production of main crops by the end of 2015, and to further strengthen farmers' organisations to expand exports, particularly of beans and cereals. Project documents, project reports, and the P4P pilot evaluation highlight the strong government engagement with P4P through the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), which coordinated the implementation of P4P among various stakeholders to secure markets for the smallholder farmers. Under the leadership of ATA, The Maize Alliance was formed, which included WFP, the Federal Cooperative Agency, USAID, and the Regional Cooperative Promotion Agencies of Amhara, Oromia and SNNPR, as well as other partners. These partners provided various support to cooperatives in order to address the main bottlenecks of maize in the sector.

55. The P4P programme had a strong gender component, which was introduced because leadership and membership of women in the cooperatives was low and a significant challenge. A concept note was developed to pilot activities to involve women. This included organising community conversations within cooperatives and developing a community conversation manual to encourage discussion of issues pertinent to gender and women's participation within cooperatives. A fund was also created to enable women to engage in business activities so they could earn enough money to register in cooperatives. Furthermore, eight women's rural saving and cooperative savings groups were supported with technical input and training. P4P also supported three women-only primary cooperatives.


56. Over the evaluation period the P4P purchase was scaled up. In August 2013, WFP signed forward delivery contracts with 29 cooperative unions, adding 14 cooperative unions, compared to the previous year. At its peak, 36 cooperative unions were supported and over one million member farmers benefited directly. Furthermore, over the evaluation period, local procurement through P4P grew. In 2012/2013 34,730 mt of food was contracted through P4P and 26,625 mt was delivered by the cooperative unions. By 2015/2016 50,800 mt of food was contracted through P4P and 48,283 mt of food was delivered. This is illustrated in Figure 69 below, which also illustrates the increasing performance of cooperative unions in delivering the food over the period.

Figure 69 Total food purchased by P4P from all targeted groups in Ethiopia



Source: SPR outcome data and Summary of P4P in Ethiopia..

Figure 70 P4P: Output financing for targeted cooperative unions



Source: Summary of P4P in Ethiopia..

57. Early on in the evaluation period, the main reason for contracts not being delivered was a delay in bank loan disbursement that forced cooperative unions to miss the peak marketing season. Figure 70 above illustrates the proportion of loans requested that were granted, which increased over time. Shortage of storage was also a problem early on in the evaluation period.

58. Further achievements from P4P in Ethiopia are illustrated in Table 53 below. In 2014 the P4P pilot underwent an external evaluation, which illustrated the large volume of food procurement, with P4P-supported farmers in Ethiopia supplying more food to WFP than in any other pilot country. This was attributed to the use of forward delivery contracts, enabling a successful collaboration between donors, banks, cooperative unions, NGOs and the Government.

Table 53 WFP P4P Ethiopia achievements from 2010–2017

Description	Planned	Achieved
Food procurement (mt)	126,482	158,000
Number of farmers who supplied commodity to WFP-P4P through cooperatives	50,850	126,310
Number of people trained	-	288,430
Number of FOs (cooperatives) supported with loan for commodity aggregation	-	28
Number of FOs (cooperatives) supported with quality control and analysis equipments	-	36
Number of cooperatives (PCs and CUs) supported	-	35
Number of women's groups supported	-	8
Number of farmers benefiting directly and indirectly from the initiative	-	1,180,087

Source: Summary of P4P in Ethiopia.

59. Based on budget revision seven of the country programme 200253, the P4P component was discontinued in June 2016, along with MERET. This is because there were resource constraints on the operation. However, it was believed by some informants of the evaluation that P4P was one of a large number of pilot initiatives that were imposed on WFP Ethiopia corporately. It was therefore fragmented from the rest of the Ethiopia portfolio, not integrated within the programmes team, and not mainstreamed within WFP activities.

60. However, the P4P programme has had continuing influence. Annex Q notes its influence on the development of the Home-Grown School Feeding pilot, which in turn set a pattern for the Government's much larger Emergency School Feeding Programme (ESFP), and its gender approach has influenced the Rural Women's Economic Empowerment project which is discussed in Annex L. By stabilising demand, smallholder farmers have been encouraged to invest, which further catalysed support from partners. In 2016, WFP established a smallholder market support and coordination group to develop and improve linkages among its smallholder-support initiatives. The P4P unit supported the group as its secretariat.

Logistics Cluster

61. SO 200977 for "Logistics Cluster and WFP Logistics augmentation in support of the Government of Ethiopia drought response" was activated from March 2016 to March 2017 to enhance emergency coordination and information sharing, identify logistics gaps and bottlenecks, and propose mitigating measures to the government (NDRMC) and other humanitarian actors to tackle the food security crisis that affected 10.2 million people.

62. With an approved budget of USD 12.7 million, the cluster deployment was intended to supplement NDRMC capacity and fund the rehabilitation of storage facilities, installation of temporary warehouses, and hire, pay and train 900 staff (through a human resources company). WFP also seconded personnel to the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority, the NDRMC and Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC).

63. The deployment was regarded as being unusual because it was activated to support the Government and not to provide direct logistics coordination for other humanitarian agencies, although this had been intended through the development of an information-sharing website that only gained government approval for activation at the end of the special operation. The cluster also developed a valuable link to the FMIP.

64. The cluster initially updated the Ethiopia Logistics Capacity Assessment (LCA), an important source of information for the humanitarian community, and conducted a gap analysis of roads, storage, ports, aviation and the railway. The main challenge determined was the shortage of storage, given the large volume of cargo being delivered to nearly 1,000 final delivery points that had been targeted for the

emergency response. Over 200 field assessments were conducted and mobile storage units were subsequently identified as the best solution. The rapid sourcing and import of 125 mobile storage units (funded mainly by USAID and ECHO – see Table 54 below) was implemented. By the end of the special operation, WFP had not received all of the utilisation reports for the mobile storage units and so was not able to confirm whether all units were used.

Table 54 Logistics Cluster Donors 2016/2017

	EEC ECHO	SWE MSB	UN HRF	USAID OFDA	RedR	Total USD
In kind	0	829,349	0	0	97,045	926,394
Cash	3,332,323	0	1,045,695	6,000,000	0	10,378,018
						11,304,412

Source: SPRs.

65. Due to unrest in the Amhara and Oromia regions, there were challenges in setting up several of the mobile storage units but the cluster finalised two projects in Somali and SNNPR, providing additional storage capacity of 700 mt. The greatest technical challenge reported was the erection of many mobile storage units without the provision of a concrete slab or gravel base. A key donor reported that the Cluster was asked to develop a mechanism to permit the application for grants to build permanent stores, rather than import mobile storage units, in order to help channel resources into communities. It was further noted that logistics cluster reporting was often confusing and lacked clarity, and WFP leadership rarely attended cluster meetings, which resulted in misunderstandings on the Cluster’s roles and responsibilities that had been established in its gap analysis.

66. A further 64,200mt of storage was rented by WFP in more than 90 locations for NDRMC and JEOP use, and over 5,000mt of storage provided in Somali, Oromia and SNNPR for the Government. Longer-term solutions were also implemented such as the construction of 19 permanent stores and the rehabilitation of seven warehouses. For example, during a field visit to the Adama logistics hub the evaluation team observed rehabilitated NDRMC warehouses, refurbished office space and a new telecommunications network.

67. Prior to the logistics cluster activation, there was no integrated reporting system for relief food deliveries and there were significant delays for relief distributions. To assist the FMIP the Cluster established a weekly reporting system and provided funds, training and equipment to regional, zonal and woreda level DPPB to support an improved reporting system. Before the establishment of this, food dispatches and distribution reports were received sporadically from approximately 224 distribution points but by December 2016 reports were received from 1,756, resulting in better management visibility and a significant improvement in the percentage of food delivered and distributed within the agreed four-week target period.²⁴²

68. Due to the limited number of storekeepers compared to warehouses existing staff were overwhelmed by the relief operation. The logistics cluster therefore funded the hiring of 982 storekeepers and tally clerks as surge staff on behalf of the NDRMC. When the Cluster was deactivated in March 2017 the NDRMC requested a six-month extension of a number of staff contracts through FMIP.

69. To further address a number of logistics gaps and constraints, the Cluster seconded eight advisors into key government authorities to provide support and advice on port operations, railways, warehouse and supply chain management and pipe-line reporting. A logistics cluster shipping expert²⁴³ worked

²⁴² SPR 200977 (2016)

²⁴³ The shipping expert was funded and seconded from the NGO RedR

alongside the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority to support port planning operations, identify incoming tonnages and vessel performance in terms of documentation, discharge rates etc. As a result, the Authority was able to establish a humanitarian cargo prioritisation process and reduce vessel time at anchorage, helping to reduce demurrage fees.²⁴⁴ A railway expert worked with the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) to identify gaps and prioritise actions to enhance the use and development of the new Ethiopian railway system by supporting officials to define service requirements.

70. Table 55 below highlights several of the planned vs actual activities conducted by the Ethiopia logistics cluster during its 12-month deployment.

Table 55 Logistics cluster output / activity 2016–2017

Description		2016	2017
Number of cluster coordination meetings conducted	Planned	14	3
	Actual	25	6
Number of information products produced and shared, including bulletins, maps, guidance documents, and other logistics information	Planned	28	20
	Actual	100	20
Number of logistics capacity assessments developed or updated	Planned	1	1
	Actual	1	1
Number of mobile storage tents/units made available	Planned	112	4
	Actual	121	4
Number of partner organizations participating in the cluster system nationally	Planned	10	26
	Actual	26	26
Number of training sessions / workshops organized	Planned	3	3
	Actual	20	3
Percentage of logistics service requests fulfilled	Planned	100	
	Actual	100	
Total storage space made available (mt)	Planned	50,000	9,000
	Actual	64,200	9,000

Source: SPRs.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

71. The logistics cluster interventions helped to inform WFP’s future government capacity strengthening support and also the approach towards EPR capability, from a logistics services perspective. In late 2017, plans were included in a WFP project for “Innovative Approaches to Building Resilience for Vulnerable Populations in Ethiopia” that aimed to supplement the FMIP through “Logistics Capacity Strengthening”, and improve the Government’s system-level resilience to responding to humanitarian crises. The longer-term vision was to reduce reliance on donor funding and strengthen EPR capability within the Ethiopian national logistics system.²⁴⁵ Lessons learned from the drought emergency response indicated that future interventions should include supply chain support to the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority, the Federal Transport Authority, the Ethiopian Food Standards Agency, the food safety authorities and the Food Security Coordination Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture. This was also in line with national policies, strategies and plans.

²⁴⁴ Information based on key informant interviews with WFP and Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia in Addis Ababa and Djibouti.

²⁴⁵ Project 1B: Logistics Emergency Preparedness and Response “Innovative Approaches to Building Resilience for Vulnerable Populations in Ethiopia”.

72. To address the gaps and constraints that had been identified as the main bottlenecks affecting both the ability of the Government to respond to emergencies and manage regular supply chain operations, the following strategic interventions were designed and became the new focus for WFP supply chain / logistics and EPR:

- The provision of assistance to the Maritime Affairs Authority.
- Emergency preparedness through supporting humanitarian staging areas.²⁴⁶
- Strengthening the commercial road transport sector.
- Enhancing food quality & safety systems.
- Providing continuity for the FMIP.

73. Through logistics cluster support to second specialists to the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority to address problems in the port of Djibouti, WFP successfully helped to create a council of logistics practitioners and bulk importers working group, which provided weekly reports to advise the Ministry of Transport on logistics issues, including how the Government could get the private sector more involved in humanitarian operations.

74. Institutional preparedness, including the operation of humanitarian staging areas in Adama, Dire Dawa and Kombolcha, helped in the rapid scale up to respond to the 2016 drought emergency. WFP has since used the staging areas, such as Adama, to preposition and recondition emergency equipment (e.g. pre-used mobile storage units²⁴⁷). Other UN agencies are also using the capacity.

75. As part of a five-year supply chain strategy that was developed in 2017, WFP Ethiopia became one of the few programmes globally to incorporate a food quality team, composed of a food technologist and a warehouse and pest management expert.²⁴⁸ Trained food quality and safety focal points were assigned in all sub-offices, to ensure improvement of the internal supply chain.

76. Due to government demand,²⁴⁹ WFP identified critical gaps in their suppliers' capacity including those of pest control services and inspection companies, and worked on improvements to food safety and quality. The food quality team also worked to enhance the capacity of national authorities and to support food manufacturers (though gap analyses and efforts to improve hygiene and end-product compliance in the manufacturing process)..

Djibouti Logistics Hub

77. The construction of the Djibouti logistics hub under SO 200358 has a history predating the evaluation period, and by the end of the portfolio evaluation period its future was still uncertain. A detailed review of the hub, and of possible lessons from the experience, is included in the annex on cost analysis and efficiency (Annex S).

²⁴⁶ Work to establish Humanitarian staging areas has enabled better collaboration with JEOP to address opportunities for common storage in Kombolcha, Dire Dawa and Adama.

²⁴⁷ Over USD300,000 in savings has been generated through reconditioning mobile storage units for future use.

²⁴⁸ Information gathered from interviews with country office staff.

²⁴⁹ In support of a government requirement to increase the supply of fortified food, WFP managed two trust funds for disaster relief: 200026 (May 2015-2016) for USD1.5 million and 200909 (October 2015-2016) for USD34.6 million that supported the central procurement of locally produced blended food (Corn-Soya Blend, CSB+) and internationally procured vegetable oil, and the logistics services needed to deliver these products to government partner agency warehouses. The ET did not review this procurement intervention.

United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS)

78. The UNHAS special operations had three main objectives: to provide safe and efficient air access for the humanitarian community to remote locations; to ensure the necessary air capacity for medical and security evacuations; and to respond in a fast, efficient and flexible manner to changing needs. Cargo transportation was a key part of the services delivered, without which support to the refugee programme in Dollo Ado would have been challenging.²⁵⁰ Primary operators have been Abyssinian Flight Service (using 2 x Cessna Caravan C208B aircraft) and ALS Limited from Kenya (using 1 x DHC 8/100). Ethiopian Airlines have also been used on several occasions for ad hoc flights.

79. UNHAS policies and procedures, staff qualification criteria and aircraft chartering agreements are based on the United Nations Common Aviation Safety Standards (UNAVSTADS); jointly agreed between WFP and the Department of Field Support (DFS) under the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In addition, UNHAS operates under a number of other legal, contractual, and safety obligations.

80. To provide safe, effective and efficient air transport to remote locations in the Somali region,²⁵¹ SO 200364 for UNHAS expanded operations in 2012 due to increased need by contracting a DHC-8 series 19 seat aircraft to perform five scheduled flights a week to Dollo Ado from Addis Ababa. WFP also constructed a new all-weather airstrip in Dollo Ado to add reliability to the flight schedule during the rainy seasons.²⁵²

81. Passengers were charged a nominal booking fee of USD 100 (subsequently rising to USD 200) that generated 11 percent of the project funding requirements at the time. Full cost recovery methods were applied to dedicated agency charter flights as directed by the User Group Committee. In 2014, UNHAS further expanded operations to include air transport for missions to Gambella region and delivered humanitarian assistance in the form of food and non-food items to refugee camps using a fleet of three contracted aircraft.

82. SO 200711 replaced SO 200364 in 2015, and in 2016 the number of aircraft operated was reduced.²⁵³ The project implemented a dedicated communication system to monitor flight progress and a web-based electronic flight management application (E-FMA). Operations mainly served the Somali region where continued drought, flash flooding, disease outbreaks, as well as the growing presence of refugees increased humanitarian need. Of the total number of passengers served, NGOs constituted 60 percent and UN agencies 35 percent, while donors and governmental bodies constituted the remaining 3 percent and 2 percent respectively.

83. The UNHAS Ethiopia team also provided critical air support for WFP's South Sudan crisis response²⁵⁴ in order to implement airdrops to deliver food assistance to various locations. All activities in support of WFP South Sudan were funded through the relevant South Sudan budgets. Between 2015 and 2017 there was significant increase in food assistance supplied via the WFP Ethiopia supply chain to South Sudan, with over 45,000 mt delivered in 2017 (see Figure 71 below). In general, and based on interviews conducted by the evaluation team with the air crew in Gambella, operations went smoothly with only minor handling issues in Jimma occurring due to labour disputes. The food supply chain from Djibouti (via Adama) to supply

²⁵⁰ Based on key informant interviews.

²⁵¹ Long distances between humanitarian project sites, poor infrastructure and bad roads made access to key locations in Somali region very challenging.

²⁵² UNHAS Ethiopia transported more than 10,000 passengers in 2012.


²⁵³ The original end date of this Special Operation was December 2015; however, given the continued need, the project was extended until the end of 2018.

²⁵⁴ During various periods between 2012 and 2017 UNHAS supported the operation from Jimma and Gambella of four Illyusion-76 aircraft, two C-130 aircraft and one UNHCR helicopter.

the airdrop operations was regarded as efficient. Re-bagging operations observed in WFP's Adama warehouses were also highly efficient.

84. UNHAS/WFP partnered with the Government of Ethiopia through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority (ECAA),²⁵⁵ which, according to interviews conducted by the evaluation team, not only strengthened WFP's overall relationship with the Government but also enabled the smooth running of regular UNHAS operations – including the (more sensitive) support to South Sudan operations²⁵⁶ – by providing clearances for flights and technical assistance for communications, flight follow-up, weather monitoring, crew proficiency and monitoring of aircraft airworthiness requirements.

Figure 71 Tonnage of food commodities trans-shipped to South Sudan 2015–2017.



Source: WFP Ethiopia supply Chain Unit.

85. During the evaluation period, UNHAS transported an average 7,249 passengers per year and 34,417 kilograms of miscellaneous cargo (see Table 56 below). UNHAS played a critical role in reducing risks to humanitarian staff working in remote locations by providing a prioritised medical and security evacuation service – achieved by keeping one aircraft on standby at all times.

Table 56 UNHAS Ethiopia passengers, cargo and aircraft 2012–2017

Year	Passengers transported	Cargo transported	Evacuations medical & security	Average fleet size
2012	10,381	30,000 kg	47	2x C208B and 1xDHC 8/100
2013	9,096	32,000 kg	80	2x C208B and 1xDHC 8/100
2014	8,800	45,000 kg	101	2x C208B and 1xDHC 8/100
2015	5,085	33,218 kg	88	2x C208B and 1xDHC 8/100
2016	4,291	30,265 kg	90	2x C208B
2017	5,840	36,017 kg	102	2x C208B

Source : UNHAS / WFP Aviation.

²⁵⁵ The ET was not able to determine the extent to which the ECAA monitors the safety standards of commercial air operators.

²⁵⁶ Aviation fuel for the South Sudan operation relies on the supply chain from Djibouti controlled by the National Oil Company (NOC).

86. Based on information from the UNHAS global operations database for 2016, Ethiopia fulfilled 86 percent of booking requests at a cost per passenger kilometre of USD 1.0. These figures compare favourably with UNHAS's global efficiency and effectiveness benchmarks. Approximately 35 percent of donor funds were recovered through fees charged to users, but the recovery percentage almost doubled in 2017 when booking fees were doubled to USD 200 – a move reflecting donor demands for more cost-recovery (see Table 57 and Table 58 below).

Table 57 UNHAS annual cost recovery percentage 2012–2017

Year	Budget approved (USD)	Funds received		Percentage of total funds received
		Donor contribution	Cost recovery	
2012	\$7,538,783	\$5,663,493	\$1,647,430	29%
2013	\$7,405,687	\$5,324,123	\$391,427	7%
2014	\$7,683,345	\$5,257,327	\$2,043,196	39%
2015	\$4,678,449	\$2,943,626	\$914,140	31%
2016	\$3,337,553	\$2,732,174	\$933,096	34%
2017	\$3,898,928	\$1,811,880	\$1,220,716	67%
Total	\$34,542,745	\$23,732,623	\$7,150,005	

Source: UNHAS / WFP Aviation.

Table 58 Donor contributions to UNHAS Ethiopia 2012–2017

Donor	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total USD
BELGIUM	483,453						483,453
EEC ECHO	1,683,552	1,345,435	1,322,412		1,132,174	751,880	6,235,453
SWI SDC				505,269			505,269
UK/DFID		817,315					817,315
UN CERF			500,000				500,000
UN HRF	1,998,538	936,373	2,026,627	738,357			5,699,895
USAID-PRM	697,950	1,425,000	1,100,000	1,200,000	1,100,000	560,000	6,082,950
USAID/OFDA	800,000	800,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	500,000	3,600,000
Total USD	5,663,493	5,324,123	5,257,327	2,943,626	2,732,174	1,811,880	23,732,623

Source: UNHAS Ethiopia.

87. There was close coordination between UNHAS and UNDSS to ensure the timely sharing of security situation information at all destinations, resulting in well-informed adjustments to operations. Through the WFP aviation safety office,²⁵⁷ operational hazard identification has constantly been implemented, relevant risk analyses carried out and mitigation actions adopted. UNHAS Addis Ababa confirmed that it regularly conducted airstrip assessments to ensure that locations served meet safety and security standards.

88. Evaluation team interviews confirmed that UNHAS frequently responded in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to the changing needs of the humanitarian community. The sometimes fluid security situation, poor infrastructure, long distances and lack of reliable commercial air transport to key locations in Somali region, necessitated the continuing presence of UNHAS under SO 200711. Abyssinian Flight

²⁵⁷ Key personnel are based at HQ, United Arab Emirates and in Kenya.

Services²⁵⁸ has generally provided efficient and reliable operations and there were no serious security incidents reported during the evaluation period.

ASSESSMENT

Alignment & Strategic Positioning

89. Overall WFP's portfolio for logistics (supply chain), emergency preparedness and response work in Ethiopia has aligned with the 2014-2017 corporate strategy and policies – in particular (as noted in the above sections), strategic objective one to "Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies" and sub-goal three concerning government capacity strengthening and support to prepare for and respond to crises.

90. As part of the Humanitarian Requirements Document (HRD) planning processes, several strategic contributions to supporting improved humanitarian response capacity, accountability and predictability through WFP and the logistics cluster approach (2016/2017) were made. These included the continuation and expansion of the hubs and spokes operations in Somali, the FMIP and associated capacity building and training initiatives, humanitarian staging areas and the establishment through the Maritime Affairs Authority of a bulk importers coordination group. These activities provided broad support to and alignment with NDRMC and Bureaus of Disaster Prevention and Preparedness. While the country office logistics team was strategically prepared to respond to the emergency spike in humanitarian need, the scale and scope of the crisis put significant pressure on systems, particularly due to the serious congestion that occurred at the port of Djibouti.

Factors Influencing, and Quality of, Strategic Decision Making

91. Not all of WFP's strategic decisions paid off during this period (the Djibouti hub did not fulfil expectations, for example). However, The major humanitarian achievement during the period was the successful emergency response to large-scale droughts from 2015/2016 onwards. Non-WFP stakeholders all credit WFP with a major contribution to the national logistic response in addition to its own direct deliveries. Ethiopia's ability to cope with the El Niño and Indian Ocean Dipole crises was greatly assisted by WFP's supply chain efficiency gains which substantially reduced lead times for procurement and distribution.

92. Decision making regarding supply chains for the delivery of general food assistance during humanitarian operations in Somali was in general found to have been effective through the work of joint committees that were established to oversee operations, decentralise decisions on food movements and ensure ownership among all stakeholders. Strategic decisions made for the design of transport tendering processes, the commodity allocation and tracking system (CATS) and the Commodity Management Procedures Manual (CMPM) under the Food Management Implementation Project (FMIP) were also found to have worked effectively. Software roll-outs were slower than planned but there was progress, drawing among others, on support from the logistics cluster.

93. Supply-chain gaps identified, principally during the drought emergency response, were to some extent successfully addressed, such as for storage, transport and bulk commodity import coordination. WFP and partners supported the provision of temporary and long-term storage facilities, and enabled the establishment of an effective importers' forum chaired by the Maritime Affairs Authority, which helped to

²⁵⁸ UNHAS generally serves locations where Ethiopian Airlines does not fly. Abyssinian Flight Services is the only local operator holding a frame agreement with WFP. Its potential competitors are: National Airways, Aquarius Aviation, East Africa Aviation, Trans-National Airways, Aberdare Airways and Ethiopian Airlines.

alleviate Djibouti port congestion challenges. The decision taken by WFP to receive commodities via direct delivery²⁵⁹ also improved throughput.

94. UNHAS was found to have effectively analysed, managed and mitigated 'risk' in alignment with the WFP Enterprise Risk Management Policy. There was good coordination between UNHAS and UNDSS to ensure the timely sharing of security situation information, resulting in well-informed adjustments to operations. Through the WFP aviation safety office, operational hazard identification has been implemented and any mitigation actions adopted.

Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio

95. Follow up plans made to ensure that initial gains achieved (prior to the 2012) under the hubs and spokes and FMIP mechanisms were continued and potentially institutionalised included collaboration with various authorities to enhance the CMPM, used at key points in the food supply chain, and by the PSNP. Training workshops²⁶⁰ were conducted around the country but time and scarce resources precluded the effective widespread adoption of the manual. Overall, however, the process to introduce the CMPM helped to reduce the average time taken to conduct a food distribution 'round' from 60 days to 45 days. Plans for NDRMC to institutionalise elements of the FMIP were included in the country office's five-year supply chain strategy developed in 2017.

96. Key infrastructure investments aimed at the reduction of transport costs were generally not successful within the period of the evaluation, although potential was generated for these to provide a future return on investment. While the Geeldoh Bridge was successfully completed, it could not be used effectively as the access roads were not completed (by the roads authority) within the intended timeframe. However, the evaluation team found that, despite construction delays, the operation was successful in meeting the socioeconomic aspects of the project in terms of relevance to humanitarian needs, the local community and harmonisation with partners. For a detailed assessment of the Djibouti logistics hub, see Annex S.

97. Feedback on the logistics cluster performance was generally positive. The logistics cluster deployment supplemented government capacity to assist with the 2016 humanitarian operation. Inputs made were sustained through the rehabilitation of storage facilities at key staging areas and through capacity-building initiatives undertaken for the Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia and NDRMC. While the hiring of warehouse staff through a human resources company was initially successful, this capacity was not required after the emergency operation and no government budget was allocated to continue the payment of salaries.

98. UNHAS Ethiopia has managed two air operations: flights to support humanitarian operations in remote locations, and management support for airdrop operations to South Sudan. Strategically, these services have performed well and were regarded as efficient and effective. Alternative air transport options to serve remote locations within the country have been considered but Abyssinian Flight Services remains the only local operator holding a frame agreement with WFP Aviation.

99. The receipt and storage of Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) commodities in regional hubs helped to reduce the costs associated with long-term storage in the port of Djibouti. Interventions also

²⁵⁹ Commodity consignments are loaded directly onto trucks from vessels.

²⁶⁰ More than 50 percent of the participants reportedly received an international certificate in supply chain management and some studied for an advanced certificate. The first tranche of 30 students from eight government agencies and NGOs completed their supply chain management (SCM) training in February 2014.

helped to improve the 'safe' food supply to the country by reducing the level of infestation that occurred when commodities were delayed in Djibouti. During the evaluation period, WFP Ethiopia sourced the majority of food commodities via the GCMF. The opening of the Berbera corridor to Somali region was regarded as having made the biggest difference to improving timely food deliveries. In 2016 country offices including Ethiopia, purchasing from GCMF received food after an average 46 days as opposed to the 120 days average under the conventional procurement process – representing a 62 percent reduction in lead-time.

Gender assessment

100. In its EPR and logistics interventions, crosscutting issues of gender, protection and accountability to affected populations were, based on discussion with key informants, found to have been addressed to a limited degree and had little influence on operations. For teams in logistics and procurement, there is a lack of clarity on how they can support WFP gender commitments and where this impacts their work.²⁶¹ Due to time constraints, detailed analysis of these issues, and their integration into supply chain activities, was not feasible as part of fieldwork conducted in relation to this annex.

101. The evaluation team did, however, determine that through the P4P gender component, women's groups were supported with training and the introduction of household storage options (silos and hermetic bags). WFP was party to the Rural Women Economic Empowerment Joint Programme (UN Women, FAO, WFP, and IFAD). Benefits from WFP's P4P experience included knowledge and lessons learned from the field, as well as capacity to initiate the transfer of revolving funds, adapting community tools and training for cooperative unions which include female small-holder farmers.

102. Among the special operations reviewed, SO 200752 for the construction of the Geeldoh Bridge, to facilitate access to isolated districts in the Somali region, was noteworthy in terms of support to gender and protection programmes. The bridge was regarded as an important centrepiece of the DFID-funded Peace and Development Programme (PDP); DFID having also funded the bridge construction project. According to its annual review (2016), the PDP was expected to have a significant development impact on men, women, boys and girls with greater benefits for women and girls. Violence against women and children has been widespread in the Somali region and there was an increasing awareness among law enforcement bodies and society that these practices were harmful to families. Evidence indicated an increased willingness of people to interact with the police and report violence. Despite this attitudinal change, major barriers to women and children accessing services were reported. Many people were not aware that protection and special treatment for women and children were available and, although women were more inclined to report violence to the public justice system, it was still difficult for many, particularly in rural areas, to come forward due to physical as well as social barriers.

103. WFP's efforts to complete the construction of the bridge (in 2017) were seen to enable women and girls' (physical) access to basic services. For example, legal aid services and support services for women and child victims of violence. The bridge also made it much safer for women and children to cross the Wabe Shebelle River.

104. WFP Ethiopia has observed that there are opportunities for partnerships to help better understand how to support logistics and procurement teams in making gender a tool for better performance. For example, to build on the knowledge base of others, partnerships could be established with groups such as "women in logistics". It has further been noted that while it may not be possible or appropriate to introduce

²⁶¹ As also noted in the Baseline Study report on Gender Mainstreaming and Women's Empowerment in Ethiopia (WFP, 2016v).

gender equality provisions for supplier contracts, other solutions could be identified to leverage WFP's position to encourage more gender-equal and protection-aware practices within private sector companies that WFP works with.

Annex S Cost Analysis and Efficiency

Introduction and Scope of Analysis

1. In the light of references to cost analysis in the terms of reference (Annex A above), the inception report (Mokoro, 2018a, Annex U):

- provided a preliminary review of how cost analysis has been used, and where cost analysis might be most relevant, within WFP's Ethiopia portfolio; and
- identified areas of focus for the country portfolio evaluation (CPE) work on efficiency and cost analysis that should maximise the value-added of this component of the CPE.

2. The inception report proposed focusing on the topics listed below. In doing so, the evaluation team would rely on data that had already been assembled, and the emphasis would be more on the high-level assessment of the quality of cost analysis and its influence on decision-making than on undertaking specific cost calculations. Agreed topics were:

- Documenting and understanding improvements in **supply-chain efficiency** that had been identified.
- Reviewing the **humanitarian hub in Djibouti**: to assess the quality of the economic analysis incorporated in the decision-making, and whether the anticipated benefits have been realised in practice.
- To review issues and decision-making connected to choices between **in-kind modalities and cash-based transfers for the PSNP and for refugees**.
- **Fresh Food Voucher programme**: to review the design choices made for this imminent project, and the extent to which relevant cost analyses have fed into them.
- **School feeding**: to provide an overview of available cost analysis work.

Supply-Chain Efficiency and the Global Commodity Management Facility

Relevant developments

3. As described in Annex R, WFP achieved a major reduction in lead times for procurement, especially of grain, during the evaluation period. This was linked to use of the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF), but the new Macro-Advance Facility (MAF) also helped the country office take full advantage of GCMF possibilities. Storage facilities within Ethiopia also played a role.

4. The GCMF is a WFP facility which enables advance purchase and pre-positioning of commodities:

The GCMF enables food purchases to be made in advance of requests from projects. It improves WFP's effectiveness by anticipating needs and resources and setting the supply process in motion early, enabling WFP to exploit favourable market conditions and reduce response times in emergencies. It is administered through a special account for purchasing food in advance of requests from projects.

WFP maintains food inventories for certain planning zones to reduce delivery lead times: the inventories are replenished according to aggregated demand and projected resources and shortfalls. Food is released to projects on receipt of confirmed contributions or advances from [special WFP accounts]. Since its inception in 2008, the approved level of the GCMF has increased from USD 60 million to USD 350 million to provide for operations covering large areas and for more non-cereal foods. (WFP, 2017zf, ¶41-42)

5. Stocks can be procured from the GCMF much faster than if a full international procurement has to take place after funding is assured. In Ethiopia's case the GCMF was able to finance purchases through the Djibouti and Berbera corridors and from local procurement. Ability to procure within Ethiopia has been

enhanced by the relationships with smallholder cooperatives developed by the P4P project. As shown in Table 59 below, GCMF procurement as a proportion of food handled by WFP in Ethiopia has risen from 50 percent in 2012 to 62 percent, 74 percent and 82 percent in the successive crisis years of 2015, 2016 and 2017, with conventional cash purchase shrinking to tiny proportions.


Table 59 Ethiopia GCMF vs. conventional cash purchases & in-kind funding, 2011–2017

Year	GCMF purchases (mt)	Conventional cash purchases (mt)	In-kind funding	GCMF purchases (%)
2011	165,000	277,000	286,000	23%
2012	217,000	56,000	157,000	50%
2013	233,000	62,000	89,000	61%
2014	195,000	87,000	103,000	51%
2015	267,000	57,000	104,000	62%
2016	413,000	1,000	146,000	74%
2017	307,000	6,000	60,000	82%

Source: WFP, 2018c (see also Annex R, Figure 67).


6. A GCMF review of Ethiopia's use of the facility (WFP, 2018c) has assessed the gains as follows:
- Ethiopia has been the main GCMF client in East Africa since the activation of the supply line, with a total of 1.8 million mt of food purchased from 2011 to 2017.
 - GCMF now accounts for 98 percent of total cash-funded purchases.
 - In 2017, food purchased through GCMF by Ethiopia was delivered after an average 31 days; this represents a 74 percent reduction of the average lead time under the conventional procurement process.
 - The share of local and regional procurement in Ethiopia increased from 0 percent in 2011 to 53 percent in 2017 (see Figure 72 below); 100 percent of GCMF purchases of sorghum and beans were sourced locally or regionally in 2017; more than 50 percent of maize was also sourced in local and regional markets.
 - Thanks to better planning, seasonal market opportunities and improved contracting modalities, average prices paid by Ethiopia for GCMF purchases decreased for almost all commodities since 2014 (see Figure 73 below).

Figure 72 Ethiopia GCMF local/regional vs. international purchases 2011–2017



Source: WFP, 2018c.

Figure 73 Ethiopia average price for GCMF purchases, 2014 vs. 2017



Source: WFP, 2018c.

7. WFP's ability to take advantage of GCMF was enhanced by a new macro-advance financing (MAF) facility. A long-standing internal project lending (IPL) facility allows advance financing to be provided to projects if suitable collateral exists in the form of forecast contributions; MAF is similar to the IPL facility, but MAF advances are not directly linked to specific contribution forecasts as collateral. MAF advances instead rely on the level of resources that a country office may reasonably expect based on past contribution trends and an assessment of the likely funding intentions of donors. MAF was employed for the first time in 2016. Box 22 below highlights its use in Ethiopia.

Box 22 The Global Commodity Management Facility and the Macro-Advance Facility in Ethiopia

In 2015 and 2016, Ethiopia experienced one of its worst droughts in more than 30 years. As the humanitarian community responded to this emergency, the rate of donor contributions did not keep up with changing needs. In January 2016, when the pipeline was facing substantial shortfalls and a complete pipeline break was anticipated by March, the country office submitted an advance financing request for nearly USD 54 million against forecast donor contributions. This financing was intended to complement the Government's efforts to meet the needs of 7.6 million beneficiaries. The advance was made in full, with spending authority delegated to the country office within one week. Taking advantage of stocks already in the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) inventory, the country office purchased 47,300 mt of food, assisting more than 2.3 million beneficiaries – particularly in the Somali region – in days rather than months. The forecast contributions were confirmed in late January and mid-May, and the advance was promptly repaid.

As the year progressed, government-led efforts to manage the crisis were challenged by dwindling resources. A new advance of USD 62 million was submitted at the end of April to cover shortfalls from May to August. The performance of Purchase-for-Progress cooperatives was exceptional, making 40,000 mt of maize available for purchase as soon as the advance request was approved. This, combined with international purchases of wheat, allowed the country office to provide more than 111,600 mt to meet the needs of 6 million beneficiaries with full rations until August 2016.

Source: Extracted from WFP, 2017zf, p4.

8. The MAF has also been used to facilitate food assistance to refugees under PRRO 200700. The country office availed USD 42.1 million in 2016 and a further USD 20 million in 2017 to prevent delays in securing donor funds from leading to pipeline breaks (WFP, 2017zf, Table 1 and Table 2). In a context where ration cuts were necessary because of inadequate funding (see Annex O), the MAF prevented the situation from becoming even worse:

In Ethiopia, PRRO 200700 "Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees" received MAF totalling USD 42.1 million in two tranches in January and May 2016, which were used to procure 54,838 mt of food, principally wheat, for general food distribution. From February to August 2016, WFP was able to reach more than 90 percent of its planned beneficiaries – approximately 500,000 people – each month. Contributions used to refinance the first MAF tranche were forecast in February and March. The contribution that financed the second tranche was confirmed in July without being previously forecast. MAF has therefore provided time savings of up to two months more than traditional IPL. The greater funding predictability provided by MAF has enabled steadier provision of support to beneficiaries over time. (WFP, 2017zf, ¶14)

9. Taking full advantage of GCMF required use of storage facilities within Ethiopia. As noted in Annex R (¶51), the GCMF ensured that food commodities could be positioned at WFP warehouses when needed or as funds became available, which ensured that pipeline breaks were minimised. Receiving and storing GCMF commodities in regional hubs within Ethiopia also reduced the risks and costs associated with long-term storage in the ports of Djibouti and Berbera. Warehouse capacity at Adama (Nazareth) acted as a primary hub both for WFP Ethiopia and for South Sudan airdrop operations from Gambella and Jimma. Adama was also used to consolidate food supplies obtained through local procurement under the P4P programme.

Assessment

10. The gains in procurement efficiency during the evaluation period were dramatic. The headline is the estimated 74 percent reduction in lead times (¶6 above), but there were collateral benefits in lower average prices and increased use of local and regional purchase. It would require a major econometric exercise to attempt to quantify the benefits in financial terms. The challenges for such an estimate would include:

- Constructing a counterfactual to estimate alternative lead times and costs in the absence of GCMF.

- Estimating lives saved. The most difficult aspect of such a counterfactual would be to estimate the lives saved by more efficient procurement. Key informants were in no doubt that the El Niño and IOD droughts took Ethiopia to the edge of catastrophe, and that a less rapid response would have cost lives.
- Quantifying variables in commodity pricing. While Figure 73 above is suggestive of a price advantage through avoiding last-minute procurement, many factors affect commodity prices from year to year and a detailed market analysis would be required to confirm and quantify price gains.
- Estimating the collateral benefits from local purchase would be similarly complex.

11. However, it is possible to demonstrate that the potential gains are huge. WFP expenditure on Ethiopian nationals (CP 200253, and PRROs 200290 and 200712) during the evaluation period was approximately USD 1.5 billion (see Table 11 in Annex H). A one percent gain in the value of deliveries would be worth USD 15 million, and a five percent gain would be worth USD 75 million.

12. Although the GCMF and MAF are initiatives by WFP headquarters, it required planning and foresight by the country office to take full advantage of the potential gains, including by re-opening the Berbera corridor (see Annex R, Figure 68) and leveraging in-country storage facilities and channels for local purchase.

Humanitarian Hub in Djibouti

Relevant developments

13. In 2010, WFP signed an agreement with the Government of Djibouti for overall project approval and a land-use concession for 30 years.²⁶² In 2012 the WFP Executive Director formally approved the special operation. The original cost estimate was identified as USD 19.4 million and the project was expected to take 20 months for full implementation. However, it took another three years before the infrastructure project was actually launched in 2015, although the training of 35 Djibouti counterparts was undertaken in 2014 (revised original stage one of the project).

14. The original proposal highlighted the core economic rationale for the investment, namely that Djibouti is the principal transit point for Ethiopian cargo and a key link in commercial transport routes to and from the greater Horn of Africa. The backlog in the port has been widely documented by WFP, dating back to the mid-1990s, as a barrier for Ethiopia and its partners in delivering relief and humanitarian assistance inside the Horn of Africa.²⁶³ The humanitarian logistics hub/base construction was thus delivered to “Enhance efficiencies in both humanitarian and commercial logistics within a broader sector plan... as such the government of Djibouti and WFP propose to cooperate on the development of [a humanitarian logistics base] in the port”. In particular, the 40,000 square metres of concessional land would be used to construct a facility offering containerised, bulk, break bulk and non-food item (NFI) storage services for WFP operations and to the wider humanitarian community. The project proposed to meet the following four strategic objectives:

- i) Enhanced efficiencies of supply chains in the Horn of Africa.
- ii) Augmented regional humanitarian response capabilities.

²⁶² The land was valued at USD1.2 million (in 2012)

²⁶³ See for example ‘commercial throughput for the rapidly expanding Ethiopian market, combined with continued high volumes of food assistance, have generated significant strain on the Djibouti port and transport sectors, resulting in escalating logistics costs and increasing congestion and bottlenecks (WFP, 2011j).

- iii) Alignment of port operations with Ethiopia's expanding strategic reserves.
- iv) Strengthened logistics systems and capacities in Djibouti Port.

15. According to the project document, cost benefits would be achieved through reduced rates for stevedoring, as bagging would not be required;²⁶⁴ lower transport rates due to faster vessel offloading; and savings in additional storage which would otherwise be required at peak times when cargo needed to be shifted to commercial warehouses in Djibouti town.

16. As of 2016, WFP pledged that upon completion of the hub, the facility would run under full cost recovery through a business model that foresaw a very competitive charging system against cargo routed through the facility. In addition, the facility would provide cost savings for users throughout the various stages of the supply chain. WFP assumptions suggested that the hub would generate as much as USD 16.6 of savings for each metric ton of cargo transiting through Djibouti. This was however a sharp reduction from two years earlier when the standard project report (SPR 200358) dating to 2014 provided assumptions suggesting that the project would generate up to USD 24 of savings per metric ton of transit cargo.

17. Initially the hub was approved in 2011 to be finished in 2013 at an estimated cost of USD 19.4 million. However, two years later in April 2013, a contract with the main company (DJI-FU) for the construction works was signed for a value of USD 16.7 million. Owing to a lack of funding, the project did not in fact start in 2013 and was ultimately delivered as a reconfigured two stage project, to be implemented across different years, between 2015 and 2017, with various delays occurring also during this period.

18. According to available documents and key informant interviews in country, the project division was based on fund availability and the need to organise a separate tender to select a supplier for the building of storage silos. Stage one thus consisted of the construction of warehouses and stage two the building of the storage silos. The first phase was completed in 2015; the second phase started at the end of 2015 and was completed by the end of 2017. However, the phase two construction work in the same compound compromised access to the completed warehouses.

19. The initial proposal approved by the WFP Executive Director (2012) did not specify the financing mechanisms that would ultimately be used for project implementation. Ultimately, funding proved to be a major challenge: (i) costs were significantly more than was initially planned; (ii) there was a major underestimation of the time that would be needed to secure project financing channels; and (iii) the unpredictability of donor funding was also underestimated.

20. According to the final report for project completion, the two phases of the project were estimated to cost a total of USD 31.4 million (USD 12 million more than the original project proposal). Financing came through different channels, with approximately USD 27.7 million being contributed primarily from Canada with smaller contributions from the USA, Finland, Norway and from unspecified multilateral institutions. USD 5.4 million was eventually secured exclusively for the second phase, silo construction, and was directly financed by WFP itself through the Common Budgetary Framework (CBF). The CBF is a common UN fund that can be accessed by the WFP as well as other UN agencies under the UNDAF.²⁶⁵ This left an overall project deficit of USD 1.6 million (see Table 60 below).

²⁶⁴ As also noted in this annex, WFP had advised the EFSRA to consider using bulk grain storage nationally.

²⁶⁵ The investment case for building storage silos was initially costed at a loan of USD 6.5 million. In 2015, the approval of the first CBF loan of USD 3.0 million was allocated for the silos. In 2016, a second CBF loan was approved for USD 2.4 million to complete construction works.

Table 60 Sources of finance for Djibouti hub

Project Stage 1	USD
Donation CANADA	18,833,049
Donation FINLAND	1,357,513
Donation NORWAY	297,969
Donation USAID	1,600,000
MULTILATERAL	5,637,534
Sub Total	27,726,065
Project Stage 2	
Loan CBF 2015	3,000,000
Loan CBF 2016	2,400,000
Sub Total	5,400,000
Revised budget #6	31,439,779
Budget shortfall	1,686,286

Source: (SPR 2017 and BR6)

21. At the time of project closure in 2017, completion of the final phases of the hub construction enabled the closure of old and inadequate rented warehouses and offices and the relocation of logistics staff to new offices within the hub. The hub consisted of 40,000 metric tons of bulk storage and 12,000 metric tons of break-bulk food storage, a temperature-controlled storage area, as well as 2,500 square metres of non-food item storage, partly equipped with an efficient racking system – offering all the related infrastructure and services necessary for a multipurpose storage and handling facility. Additionally, the base included container terminal capabilities and meeting facilities. During the construction of the hub there was a significant expansion of the port, which has grown as a regional hub under an agreement with Djibouti port authority's partner China Merchant Holding International. Port statistics for 2016 show a three-fold growth in cargo since 2010. Expansion plans have included the construction of a new multi-purpose port in the Doraleh district – the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port (DMP), which was commissioned in early 2017. Additionally, a new terminal at Ghoubet was completed plus a new livestock port in Damerjog district and a new port in Tadjourah. Two Chinese companies have completed the new 756km electrified railway that links the Djibouti port to Addis Ababa, with potential to connect to other East African countries such as Uganda and South Sudan. To support the expansion strategy the Djibouti port authorities finalised a feasibility study for a new free trade zone covering 43.5 km² adjacent to the DMP, which will include warehousing for cargo to be re-distributed to neighbouring countries. The hub has been located within the new free trade zone, which is to be connected via a new road network to the DMP. This massive expansion of Djibouti port capacity had not been anticipated.

22. In 2017 WFP developed a full cost-recovery business model that forecast a competitive charging system for cargo routed through the facility. The Djibouti hub was also registered as a customs bonded storage area. However, actual usage of the facility is only documented as including three other UN agencies as at the end of 2017. During 2017, the country office implemented the direct delivery from Djibouti port to Ethiopia of the majority of cargo, which eliminated transit storage at the Djibouti hub and mitigated the risk of demurrage, warehouse shunting services and food loss during storage and transport (SPR 2017). Further use of the alternative Berbera corridor for food deliveries to Somali region also avoided the risk of congestion and demurrage at Djibouti.

23. According to the final SPR, the project provided direct solutions to logistical bottlenecks, which included:

- availability of space for trucks to await loading directly at the hub, rather than in the Ethiopian Parking Lot, which enabled faster off-take and related savings on external transport rates;
- bulk storage to reduce stevedoring costs;
- ability to shunt bulk grain from the port to the hub's silos, thus avoiding vessel demurrage and higher costs associated with commercial warehousing;
- provision of a non-food item warehouse and container yard, to enable savings on storage and detention charges, which have been incurred at the Djibouti container terminal; and
- pre-positioning of humanitarian goods in transit at the logistics hub bonded warehouses and silos, which saved time and additional expenses related to customs clearing and re-export of cargo.

24. The case that had been made for gains to be achieved through a two-stage project were fairly clearly stated; however, it does not appear that either the project completion report or the SPR released in 2017 have been able to provide clear evidence of whether or not any cost savings were actually achieved. Based on monitoring indicators used for the project, the number of agencies and organisations using the hub storage facilities met the expected target for 2017 (namely that three organisations, up from one the previous year, had been achieved), and the total storage capacity had also reached its intended target. Some capacity building had also notably taken place in training Djibouti counterparts in warehouse management and other useful activities such as forklift operating.

25. More concrete evidence on how the hub enabled the humanitarian community to conduct operations in a more cost effective and sustainable way will result from the findings of a business case study (by the regional bureau) planned for 2018 (according to the most recent SPR). This report has not yet been made available and it is not clear whether or not it has been actually been prepared. Amongst stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation team, there was most interest in use of the warehouses as an inter-agency storage facility for non-food items; the future potential use of the silos was less clear but the planned business study may help.

Assessment

26. From interviews (in Rome, Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Nairobi) with those involved, the evaluation team found differing opinions as to whether the hub was originally well-conceived and/or whether it still has relevance to the humanitarian needs of Ethiopia and the region. The evaluation team did not have the resources for a detailed enough study to resolve this question, but did consider possible lessons from the experience.

27. As regards project planning and execution, implementation appears to have been bogged down with unrealistic planning assumptions on overall costs, timelines for completion of key activities, actual staff costs involved in implementing large infrastructure projects, internal WFP business processes, the predictability of funding streams, and on the need to incorporate political economy concerns into project design.

28. As regards the political economy concerns, it appears there was not enough attention to the institutional practicalities for WFP in terms of delivering a single country special operation managed by the Ethiopia country office, but being executed in a third country (with direct implications therefore for the Djibouti country office, and intended to be of benefit to several other countries in the East Africa region and beyond (e.g. Yemen). Moreover, while the Government of Djibouti was engaged from the outset, no formal commitments seem to have been obtained from key government institutions including the National Disaster Risk Management Commission (NDRMC) and the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve Administration

(EFSRA). It seems to have been assumed that the financial savings offered by the project were so significant that, once it was built, attracting customers would not be a problem. Hence the ironic position of needing, apparently, to develop a new business case at this late stage.

29. The original project document characterised risks as follows:

There are few contextual risks to this project with Djibouti a relatively stable country which has been only marginally touched by recent events in the Middle East. Financial uncertainty could hamper project implementation although active [government of Djibouti] commitment to the SO and strong engagement with regional donors will help to mitigate this risk. *It is unlikely that commercial and humanitarian demand for services in the Djibouti Port will reduce significantly in the coming years.* The key risk to the HLB [Humanitarian Logistics Base] is reputational risk should services fall short of the humanitarian community's expectations. WFP seek to mitigate this risk with early and intensive fundraising to ensure costs will be fully covered in order to ensure timely project completion and service start-up. (WFP, 2011j ¶32, emphasis added).

30. Of course, there is now the benefit of hindsight, but a USD 20 million project document should provide a more thorough analysis of the assumptions upon which its success will depend. The italicised sentence quoted overlooks several important practical factors that did, as it turned out, affect demand for the hub's services. These factors (all of which are extensively discussed above) included:

- Construction of massive new port facilities in Djibouti.
- The use of Berbera as a major alternative for humanitarian supplies.
- The reduction in WFP's share of responsibility for humanitarian aid delivery.
- The use by JEOP of through bills of lading, and by WFP Ethiopia of direct delivery mechanisms for cargo, which reduced the demand for transit storage.
- The way the GCMF (see ¶13–12 above) was utilised meant that more of the pipeline was stored at hubs within Ethiopia and not in Djibouti. This reduced the risks²⁶⁶ and costs associated with long-term storage in Djibouti or Berbera.

31. Clearly it was too simplistic to assume (correctly) that overall demand for services at Djibouti port would remain high. A more detailed set of assumptions should have accompanied the initial costing, including assessments of the different factors that could affect demand for each of the services/facilities to be offered by the hub. A standard practice in such project documents is to specify alternative solutions considered and rejected. Such analysis might have led to refinements in the original design; it would almost certainly have highlighted the need to ensure robust management arrangements for the hub from the outset and to undertake proactive marketing of its services; and it ought to have prompted the adoption of less superficial indicators for the project's progress and effectiveness.

32. A decision as to whether the Djibouti hub should be commercialised, outsourced or leased (perhaps to the Government of Djibouti) will need to be made by the WFP regional bureau, Nairobi (RBN).²⁶⁷ Meanwhile, as a state-of-the-art facility, the hub should, if practical, be used (as intended) as a cargo-handling hub and buffer in case of border issues or shortage of trucks (a renegotiation of port and stevedoring rates with both SDTV Bulk Terminal and the Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port may be required). Future consideration should also be made as to the strategic use of the new railway.

²⁶⁶ Food commodities (particularly bagged) cannot be stored easily in Djibouti due to the high humidity and temperatures, which cause weevil infestation.

²⁶⁷ The RBN took over management oversight for the Djibouti Logistics Hub upon its completion.

Using Cash- or Food-Based Modalities for the PSNP and Refugees

Trends in use of cash-based transfers (CBTs)

33. During the evaluation period WFP has made increasing use of cash-based transfers (CBTs) in Ethiopia. Planned and actual use of CBTs is summarised in the main text's portfolio analysis (see ¶69 and Figure 15 concerning Ethiopian nationals; ¶70 and Figure 16 on refugees). Before implementing a cash transfer programme WFP (through its VAM team) conducts a market assessment in order to ensure that cash based transfers have the potential to have a consumption smoothing affect.

Box 23 WFP's role in PSNP / humanitarian food assistance cash pilot

In both PSNP and humanitarian food assistance (and in the planned improved linked system of the two), there are a number of channels for both financing and resourcing the programme. This is because the programme is large and requires all the help it can obtain. For example, PSNP has recently had to reduce ambitions due to resource shortfalls (e.g. an increase in benefit levels was reversed, and a contingency budget line does not have a set budget). It is clearly hoped that WFP involvement will help to expand the resource envelope.

As regards the approach to the cash pilot, financing was to flow through the Ministry of Finance's 'Channel One', with beneficiary information to be entered into the PSNP's payroll software, and transfers to be paid by cashiers employed by woreda finance offices. Humanitarian cash transfers were to be targeted to non-PSNP clients living in selected PSNP woredas of Somali region, with top-ups to PSNP clients living in the same woredas to bring the value of the transfers they received into line with the value of a humanitarian food assistance ration. With the focus on integrating PSNP and humanitarian food assistance, implementation of the pilot relied on collaboration between federal, regional and woreda level government PSNP implementing agencies and disaster risk management agencies.

WFP's role was to:

-) design the approach (in collaboration with the different levels of government);
- a) provide technical support to the different levels of government (which included significant efforts to address emerging issues including contention between two government agencies about their respective responsibilities (and consequent budgets);
- b) undertake real-time monitoring in a weak capacity, poor governance environment; and
- c) identify lessons learned.

34. In particular:


- a) WFP has used cash and vouchers under its HIV programming since the beginning of the evaluation period.
- b) In addition to in-kind food transfers, WFP began to pilot the use of cash for humanitarian food assistance in 2013. Cash transfers have been provided in selected woredas in Amhara, Oromia and Somali regions.
- c) The PSNP from its inception has had a cash-first principle, but until recently food has been the dominant modality in Afar and Somali (hence part of WFP's comparative advantage for supporting PSNP in these regions). In 2017, WFP received funding to support humanitarian cash transfers in Somali region but with a focus on using PSNP cash transfer modalities (see Box 23 above). This pilot is the subject of an ongoing study.
- d) As regards refugees: PRRO 200365 (commencing 2012) noted that "In partnership with ARRA, WFP will study the feasibility of cash or voucher transfers, to decide whether to implement these transfers on a pilot basis in selected areas". In 2013, WFP introduced combined cash-and-food assistance in two camps, where a cash transfer replaced part of the cereals distributed through

GFD. The rationale was to enable refugees to buy food commodities of their choice and to diversify their diet. Over the years, this combined modality has now been extended to 13 out of 26 camps. In all cases, a mixed modality has been adopted, with cash substituted for part of the grain entitlement. The amount of cash distributed depends on the camp and on the local price of cereals.

e) At the end of the period a new fresh food voucher scheme was being launched (discussed in ¶43ff of this annex).


35. However, for both Ethiopian nationals and refugees, CBTs remain a small proportion of total WFP operations. Figure 74 below shows that in 2017 CBTs accounted for only about 12 percent, by value, of WFP operations for Ethiopian nationals. For refugees (Figure 75 below), the share of CBTs rose steadily over the evaluation period, but was still under 10 percent in 2017.

Figure 74 Food and cash & voucher related costs for operations supporting Ethiopian nationals 2012-2017



Source: SPRs 2012-2017 for PRRO 200712, PRRO 200290, CP 200253.

Figure 75 Food and cash & voucher related costs for operations supporting refugees 2012–2017



Source: SPRs 2012-2017 for PRRO 200365, PRRO 200700 and EMOP 200656.

Political economy factors

36. Over the evaluation period there has been a growing trend towards advocacy for cash across all groups of stakeholders (e.g. UNHCR now using cash to cover non-food items for refugees). Some major donors (notably ECHO and DFID) advocate strongly for the use of cash wherever practical, and believe switching to cash could significantly reduce the total costs of sustaining the refugee population. But assistance from the USA, the largest donor, is predominantly in kind (where cash is provided, it is usually for the local purchase of food). Moreover, although the Somali regional government has become more amenable to cash, the refugee administration (ARRA) is cautious about introducing cash in certain contexts, expressing doubts about the capacity of local markets to cope with additional demand and fearing that cash could be more easily diverted for use by combatants.

37. External stakeholders regularly alluded to a reluctance by WFP to use cash, referring to (i) the requirement to do detailed market assessments prior to cash programming, without any equivalent requirement in advance of a food programme, and (ii) the perception that when WFP has been involved with cash it has been at the direct request of the donor (and not the other way around). WFP interlocutors, on the other hand, point to constraints that they face: in-kind donations limit efficiency and constrain decision-making, and WFP has only limited discretion in the choice of modalities.

WFP analytical guidance

38. As noted in the CPE inception report, alpha value and omega analysis have been the main techniques advocated by WFP to guide modality choice. The evaluation team found no example of the use

of omega analysis in Ethiopia, but there have been alpha value calculations linked to market analyses. It should be noted that alpha calculations (which compare the cost of local purchase with the delivered cost of in-kind food) may not be stable in a context of highly volatile food prices (as in Ethiopia). On the other hand, the same volatility may lead beneficiaries to prefer an in-kind modality if that is seen as a form of inflation-proofing (and implies that any cash transfer should be regularly adjusted to take account of its food-purchasing power).

Evidence on the effectiveness of cash


39. Support for cash is based on growing global research and wider practice, with justification based on arguments for efficiency and the economic efficacy of market-based approaches, and evidence of refugee preference where it is well implemented and properly supported. As noted in Annex O (humanitarian principles), there is an argument that provision of cash is more consistent with the dignity of beneficiaries: the use of cash enables people to prioritise their own basic needs, to make choices for themselves and do what is best for their family rather than limiting them to a particular selection of food items.

40. Evidence in Ethiopia tends to support the effectiveness and efficiency of CBTs. For example, the recent analysis of refugee food assistance monitoring data undertaken by the country office and regional bureau (WFP, 2018e) includes useful insights into the use of cash and how it is perceived by refugees (see Figure 76 below). Refugees who receive some cash are likely to have a more diverse diet, and to re-sell less of the in-kind food they receive. It is noticeable that there is a strong preference to continue receiving a cash component amongst refugees who have experienced it.

41. WFP's food pipeline is often dependent on products available as gifts in kind. However, where WFP has a choice in food commodities, these considerations should be factored into the decision-making process as well as the unit cost of the item. One reason stated for providing sorghum was its lower market price discouraging onward sale. However, in the absence of provisions for fresh food, or opportunities for income generation, sale of staple foods may be a means of purchasing more nutritious foods and promote a more varied diet. In WFP's assessments of the cash plus food pilots, this intervention consistently showed improved dietary diversity. Where possible, there should be persistent advocacy for the use of cash or vouchers for refugees at least as a top-up to food assistance.

42. WFP appears to be reluctant to test wholly-cash modalities against vouchers (see the discussion of fresh food vouchers that follows). However, the evaluation team understands that WFP is currently collaborating with the World Bank with the aim of developing evidence-based guidance on how to decide whether cash or food will be more appropriate in different areas and at different times in Ethiopia (taking account of market access, prices, and other factors). In any such review, the full range of options – cash, vouchers, food or a hybrid – should be considered. As it considers future strategy in Ethiopia, WFP should recognise the need to advocate and support increasing use of CBTs, and to shake off the perception that it is a self-interested advocate for in-kind transfers.

Figure 76 Refugees: assistance modality and food security



Source: reproduced from WFP, 2018e.

The Fresh Food Voucher Scheme

*Relevant developments*²⁶⁸

43. Largely due to lack of funding and the need to focus on humanitarian response, WFP was unable to take forward its stunting prevention agenda during the evaluation period. However, in 2017, WFP began preparatory work on its fresh food voucher programme, which is designed to increase access to nutrient-dense fresh foods for vulnerable populations through targeted vouchers for pregnant and lactating women as well as children 6-23 months old in the Amhara region, with the objective of improving dietary diversity and contributing to the reduction of stunting. The Amhara region has the highest stunting rates in Ethiopia at 46 percent compared to the national average of 38 percent (CSA & the DHS Program, 2017).

44. The programme will target the households of pregnant and lactating women and children 6-23 months in three woredas in the region through the use of a voucher that allows purchase of fresh produce including fruit, vegetables, milk and meat amongst other fresh products. This is a sharp contrast to the traditional food basket received by these communities, which only receive dried food in kind through a variety of mechanisms including the PSNP. The programme not only wants families to be able to access fresh food but also has built in a behaviour-change strategy, which aims to change various perceptions in the target community about the importance of food variety and the effect food variety (increased vitamins for example but not increased calories) can have on malnutrition and, in turn, on stunting rates. Delivery of the vouchers was to start at the beginning of 2018 and thus falls out of the evaluation period. The vouchers will be delivered electronically, using mobile phones, which is innovative for Ethiopia where the use of mobile transactions is still fairly limited. (WFP, 2017zg)

45. The total budget for the one-year pilot programme is USD 4.3 million, funded by KfW (Germany) and Australia. An impact evaluation has been commissioned, and will be undertaken in one of the woredas involved in the pilot. The evaluation is a collaboration between the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Ethiopian Development Research Institute, and the Centre for Food Science and Nutrition at Addis Ababa University. It is a mixed methods evaluation that combines a randomised control trial (RCT) with qualitative surveys with caregivers and traders as well as analysis of the monitoring data collected by the WFP (WFP, 2017zh)

46. Overall, the pilot programme has two objectives. First, it aims to improve dietary diversity among children between 6 and 23 months of age and among pregnant and lactating women. Its second objective is to stimulate the local fresh food market to ensure a stable supply of fruits and vegetables that persists beyond the duration of the pilot. Choice of beneficiary woredas has taken account of market studies to assess the capacity of local traders to meet demand (e.g. WFP, 2017zj). Participants will be in three groups: all will be exposed to the social behaviour change communication programme; one group will receive no voucher; a second will receive a standard value voucher; and a third group will receive a higher value voucher, on the assumption that this will allow purchase of animal source foods.

47. The evaluation (which is confined to one of three beneficiary woredas) will seek to answer the following questions:

Q1. What are the differential impacts of the programme on diet diversity for the different voucher values?

Q2. What are the main changes in knowledge, attitude and practices of the beneficiary households regarding access and use of nutritious foods?

²⁶⁸ See also Annex P, ¶¶77-82.

Q3. Which transfer value is more cost-effective in delivering nutritional results?

Q4. What are the impacts of the project on the local markets of fresh foods?

48. The first three questions will be answered using RCT techniques; the fourth can only be addressed qualitatively. Key indicators will be:

- Minimum acceptable diet scores (MAD) for children aged 6 to 23 months.
- Minimum diet diversity for women (MDD-W) in the reproductive age (15-49 years).
- Minimum diet diversity (MMD) for children aged 6 to 23 months.
- Minimum meal frequency (MMF) for children aged 6 to 23 months.
- Household diet diversity score (HHDDS).
- Food consumption score – nutrition.

49. The evaluators expect that comparison of the voucher values and combining that with costing data collected from the WFP will permit them to measure efficiency (or cost-effectiveness) by comparing the costs to the positive impacts attributable to the programme.

Assessment

50. Although the fresh food voucher scheme has not been implemented during the evaluation period, the evaluation team reviewed it to gain insight into the methods for modality choice and programme design currently employed by WFP. There is a strong empirical basis for believing that more diverse diets can help to prevent stunting and, although trends in stunting can only be measured over long periods, changes in dietary diversity can be monitored more readily. The target groups and location for the pilot also appear well chosen, and WFP is to be applauded for ensuring an impact evaluation is under way before implementation begins.

51. However, there is also a major missed opportunity because the research does not cover an important question: How do vouchers perform against cash in improving dietary diversity? It is assumed that vouchers will perform better, but there is very limited evidence globally to determine which modality yields better results. It is also necessary to generate country-level evidence to inform decision-making about which modality to use and when. WFP reports from programmes where cash has been piloted – in the refugee programme, HIV programme and relief – also found that cash led to improved dietary diversity. Given the complications of establishing a voucher programme and the limits to the number of vendors who can be supported, the pilot should have tested vouchers against a cash transfer so as to enable a cost-effectiveness comparison between the different modalities.

School Feeding

52. In 2017, a "cost benefit analysis" report on Ethiopia School Feeding was prepared (WFP, 2017w). As the document acknowledges, this does not represent empirical findings. It is an advocacy tool, which models the potential benefits of school feeding, albeit using parameters that are adapted as far as possible to the country concerned. Predictably, the lifetime potential benefits to individuals are shown to be high. However, realisation of those benefits is long-term and depends on auxiliary factors for benefits to be realised (e.g. potential benefits may be frustrated by poor quality teaching, or sub-optimal timing of school meals). Such models can be very effective in drawing attention to the potential benefits of school feeding, but it is also essential (i) to highlight the factors on which effectiveness of school feeding depends, and (ii) to consider the fiscal sustainability of whatever approach to school feeding is adopted.

53. Meanwhile, monitoring and analysis of costs in WFP's school feeding programmes has been rather weak (see Annex Q above). Since the coverage sustainability of school feeding is highly dependent on its affordability, such analysis needs to be strengthened.

Annex T Gender Analysis

Status of Gender in Ethiopia

1. Ethiopia has seen strong economic growth in the past two decades and an economic growth rate of 11 percent on average, which is well above the Sub-Saharan average. However, despite the country's constitutional guarantees for gender equality, women in Ethiopia do not equally participate in and benefit from this growth and development, although they account for 50 percent of the population and play a pivotal role as productive members of the society.

2. In a country where 80 percent of the population resides in rural areas and is mostly agrarian, women provide the majority of the agricultural labour, working alongside men in farming and cultivation of food and commercial crops as a source of income for their households. As the ones responsible for food selection and preparation as well as the care and feeding of children, women have a key role to play in the food and nutritional security of their households. However, women's access to resources and community participation are usually mediated through men, either their fathers or husbands, and their agricultural contributions often go largely unrecognized (USAID, 2017).

3. Gender disparities remain vivid in Ethiopia, deeply rooted in a patriarchal and conservative society that leaves women structurally and systematically disempowered and creates barriers to meaningful gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE). The position and empowerment of women and girls in society are hindered by negative attitudes perpetuating inequality, affecting all aspects of their lives. Ethiopia entered the twenty-first century with extremely low maternal and reproductive health indicator levels and gender-based violence (GBV) remains a persistent concern (WFP, 2016v).

4. Nonetheless, the Government has made significant strides over the past couple of decades in setting policies and mechanisms in place both at federal and regional levels to guarantee women gender equality and has achieved marked progress. In the context of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Government has intensified its efforts to integrate gender equity and made progress in some areas, achieving all but two of the MDGs (MDG 3 and 5). In the education sector, national strategies to ensure equal access to education are bearing fruit, especially in terms of access to primary education, with significant achievements in increasing the number of enrolled girls and boys across different regions. However, the gender parity index (GPI) indicates that gaps still exist at all levels of education; the GPI varies by region, with the current data for 2015/16 showing the GPI for Somali region being the lowest in the country at 0.86 compared to the national GPI of 0.91 (WFP, 2016b). Gender disparities in the education sector are widely attributed to societal gender roles and socio-economic challenges, including girls' responsibilities for household chores and lack of gender sensitive facilities and services around schools (UN Women, 2014).

5. The country's standing in the Global Gender Index is at 115 out of 144 countries with an overall score of 0.656, which is below average in the distribution of countries by score, shows that women's participation in key sectors and their role in decision-making are still not at par with men. The current data for 2017 shows increased overall score compared to last year; however, it also presents a widening of its gender gap in basic literacy and primary enrolment compared to the previous year, despite continued progress towards closing its gender gap in secondary and tertiary education enrolment. Although women's political representation has improved over the years, with the number of seats in parliament held by women reaching 28.8 percent in 2017 (higher than the rate in many developed nations), a number of factors contribute to women still being largely underrepresented in decision-making positions, including the

negative social perceptions about the leadership abilities of women, their low socio-economic status and low educational and skills levels due to inequitable access to higher education. This is reflected in the fact that only 10 percent of ministerial positions and only 26.5 percent positions as legislators, senior officials and managers were held by women in 2017, with women across the board earning less than men (w/m ratio of 0.59) for similar work (WEF, 2017).

Table 61 Ethiopia gender score card 2017

	Rank	Score	Average	Female	Male	F/M
Economic participation and opportunity	109	0.604	0.585			
Labour force participation	43	0.885	0.667	79.9	90.3	0.88
Wage equality for similar work (survey)	95	0.588	0.634			0.59
Estimated earned income (PPP, USD)	74	0.604	0.509	1,308	2,163	0.6
Legislators, senior officials and managers	83	0.361	0.320	26.5	73.5	0.36
Professional and technical workers	114	0.484	0.758	32.6	67.4	0.48
Educational attainment	134	0.819	0.953			
Literacy rate	131	0.589	0.883	28.9	49.1	0.59
Enrolment in primary education	121	0.929	0.979	82.4	88.7	0.93
Enrolment in secondary education	116	0.965	0.971	30.5	31.6	0.97
Enrolment in tertiary education	130	0.481	0.938	5.3	10.9	0.48
Health and survival	44	0.979	0.956			
Sex ratio at birth	1	0.944	0.92			0.96
Healthy life expectancy	55	1.057	1.037	57.7	54.6	1.06
Political empowerment	50	0.223	0.227			
Women in parliament	17	0.633	0.279	38.8	61.2	0.63
Women in ministerial positions	109	0.111	0.209	10.0	90.0	0.11
Years with female head of state (last 50)	69	0.000	0.200	0.0	50.0	0.00

Source: WEF, 2017.

Government Policies

6. The 1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and its National Policy on Women guarantee women gender equality and protection of their human rights in various spheres of life. The constitution prohibits gender discrimination and stipulates the right to affirmative action for women in order to fight prevailing inequalities and level the field for equal participation of women in all sectors, including political and social-economic life. The Government's primary instruments in support of gender equality also include reforms to the penal code, legal guarantee of equal rights for women, and the ratification of international women's right conventions, children's and human rights treaties, and various civil sector reforms, with the aim of creating a favourable environment for women workers and supporting the broader goal of promoting greater levels of gender equality.

7. The first ever policy on women was formulated in 1993, with the aim of promoting equal participation of women in the political, social and economic spheres. The National Policy on Women underscored the need to move towards an institutionalized strategy for women's empowerment through policy frameworks and gender equality structures at all levels of the Government, including federal, regional and sub-regional. This resulted in the establishment of the Women's Affairs Office (WAO) within the Prime Minister's Office, with subordinate structures in all government ministries and public organizations, both at federal and regional levels. In 2005, WAO was elevated to ministry level, following the proclamation 471/2005 for the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs. In 2010, the ministry went through another restructuring under proclamation 691/2010, resulting in the establishment of the Ministry of

Women, Children and Youth Affairs (UN Women, 2014). The MoWCYA is now responsible for implementation of the National Women's Policy, and the establishment of gender focal points in federal ministries and regional councils remains one of the main strategies for the implementation of gender and sectoral policies.

8. The key strength of Ethiopia's gender equality mechanisms is the integration of gender in all sector ministries and government institutions and the fact that these mechanisms are also established at regional, sub-regional and kebele levels, indicates the Government's commitment to implementing the National Policy on Women and attaining gender parity (UN Women, 2014). The National Growth and Transformation Plans (GTPs) I and II also reflect a clear gender component, showing the Government's commitment to gender mainstreaming and gender equality.

9. The MoWCYA's gender strategy is currently under review to incorporate lessons learnt and best practices from past implementations, giving particular attention to the engagement of men in achieving better gender results (WFP, 2017l).

WFP corporate policies and programmes

10. WFP's 2009 Gender Policy guided WFP Ethiopia during the first half of the period under evaluation through the 2010–2011 Gender Policy Corporate Action Plan (WFP, 2009k). The action plan specified WFP's corporate commitments on gender across four dimensions as shown in Box 24 below.

11. An assessment in 2012 of implementation of this corporate plan reported that WFP had made progress on the dimensions of accountability and in partnership and research. Funding constraints had resulted in slower progress in capacity development for staff and partners and in gender analysis and mainstreaming (WFP, 2012j).

12. While the Gender Policy of 2009 attempted to denote a shift from "commitments to women" to a more comprehensive understanding of gender with an examination of the interacting roles of both men and women, the subsequent Gender Policy Evaluation (Betts et al., 2014), for which Ethiopia was one of five country case-studies, found that it failed to develop a clear comprehensive and shared understanding of what gender means within WFP. It found that gender integration in WFP programmes had largely been a bottom-up, country-led process, rather than one influenced by a clear organisation-wide vision. While it found evidence of progress in identifying gender-based needs and priorities in many programme areas, including nutrition, it noted less evidence of WFP contributing to transformative changes in gender relations. Although it found some good examples of gender-sensitive programming, it also found that capacity development of WFP staff in gender had been inadequate and there was no shared definition of what gender means for WFP; there was still a strong focus on enhancing women's engagement in programmes or specifically targeting women, so that while it found strong evidence of increased inclusion of women and girls, this "results mainly from a vulnerability rather than a gender lens".

Box 24 Gender dimensions of the WFP corporate action plan 2009

<p>Capacity development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• WFP will ensure that staff members develop the capacity to mainstream gender into their work, including gender analysis.• As part of United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) and through its involvement in Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) processes, WFP will advocate for and support governments and cooperating partners in strengthening their capacity to incorporate a gender perspective into national food and nutrition plans, policies and programmes.
<p>Accountability</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• WFP will improve its accountability systems and review and revise its accountability tools to incorporate a gender perspective, promote accountability for gender mainstreaming among its partners, and strengthen its monitoring and evaluation systems to measure and report on progress in gender mainstreaming, including tracking and reporting on gender-related allocations and expenditure.
<p>Partnerships, advocacy and research</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• WFP will work with its partners to raise awareness of the importance of promoting gender equality and empowering women to achieve sustainable food and nutrition security.• WFP will collaborate with academic institutions on research to improve its policies and programmes and with partners to assess the impact of its interventions.• WFP will continue to strengthen partnerships at all levels, including work at the inter-agency level to address gender issues.
<p>Gender mainstreaming in operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• WFP will make it mandatory to incorporate a gender perspective into operations at all stages of a project cycle and will revise its assessment and evaluation tools to support this process.• WFP will launch a gender-friendly/sensitive country office initiative which will recognize country offices for compliance with measures set out in the policy.

Source: WFP, 2009k.

13. WFP's latest Gender Policy 2015–2020 (WFP, 2015c) was approved in May 2015 and therefore in force from the middle of the evaluation period. The new policy addresses previous weaknesses (Betts et al., 2014) to reinforce a gender- rather than women-focused, approach; it established four objectives: adapt food assistance to the different needs of men and women, pursue equal participation, empower women and girls in decision-making regarding their food security and nutrition, and ensure the protection of men and women. A Gender Action Plan was in place from 2016 to help transform the goal of the gender policy into concrete and measurable actions with accountabilities to be implemented and achieved between 2016 and 2020 in two layers which are outlined in Box 25 below. The Gender Action Plan promotes the message that gender considerations are everyone's business and that it is the responsibility of all WFP staff to make decisions that promote GEWE.

Box 25 2016 Gender Action Plan actions and accountabilities

Layer 1: driving gender equality programming results

- The programme indicators linked to each gender policy objective are mapped and embedded in WFP's reporting frameworks, and new indicators are proposed for inclusion in future WFP result framework.
- Reporting on gender indicators at the corporate level will enable WFP to measure the outcomes and outputs that contribute to GEWE.

Layer 2: programme processes and organisational change

- Internal work that WFP needs to carry out to ensure concrete results related to GEWE. The programme processes introduced in layer 2 will enhance the influence of GEWE mainstreaming on WFP's needs assessments, programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and lesson-learning, including through the collection, analysis and use of sex- and age-disaggregated data.
- Actions for organizational change, including strengthening human resources, financial resources, oversight and partnerships, will strengthen WFP's ability to deliver effective and efficient services to the people it assists

Source: WFP, 2016zg.

14. WFP Strategic Plans have included gender commitments. The Strategic Plan of 2008–2013 (WFP, 2008d) stressed that WFP would aim “to ensure gender sensitivity and equality in all its efforts.” Under Strategic Objective Two (Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies) of the WFP Strategic Plan 2014–2017, Goal 4 is to “Ensure equitable access to and control over food and nutrition assistance for women and men”:

“WFP will... seek to reduce undernutrition, accelerate recovery and increase social cohesion and stability in fragile settings and following emergencies by systematically integrating gender equality in the design and execution of food assistance programmes” (WFP, 2013g).

Evolution of WFP Ethiopia's Approach to Gender

15. The country office did not have any strategic document or formal guidelines on gender at the start of the evaluation period, although it has been noted that there was a gender focal point in the country office.

Gender markers

16. WFP applied gender marker codes in 2012 to newly designed programmes and projects, and retrospectively reviewed and coded all programmes and projects that were launched before 2012 but were still active at the time. These markers are based on the UN system wide action plan (SWAP) indicators on gender and are used as a corporate tool to grade programmes and projects as gender blind, gender sensitive or gender transformative, with possible scores ranging from 0–2a. Based on these classifications, project documents now have to score 2a in order to be approved.

17. Initially, the WFP headquarters' gender office was responsible to provide gender marker codes to new projects during design stage, and by 2013, country office and regional bureau staff, including Heads of Programme, Country Directors and Deputy Country Directors were trained on the use of the gender marker. As part of the decentralization process, the gender marker responsibility has been transferred to the regional bureau as of June 2016, with the Gender Office providing oversight. In 2014, the front page of new documents was modified to display the gender marker awarded and while the gender marker codes for pre-2012 projects are not displayed on the front page of the documents, all projects are in principle to be coded on the System for Project Approval (SPA).

18. As summarized in Table 62 below, out of the 17 operations included in the scope of the evaluation, gender marker coding has only been applied to the PRROs and country programme (five within the portfolio), showing inconsistency in the implementation of the markers across different project categories (EMOP, special operation and trust fund). The trust fund projects could possibly be exemptions as they do

not have project documents like the other project categories but instead have simpler documents that are used to request the setting up of the funds.

Table 62 Ethiopia portfolio operations gender markers

code	title	gm code	year
Ethiopian nationals			
CP 200253	Country Programme	2	2012-2015 (extended until end of 2017)
PRRO 200290	Responding to Humanitarian Crisis and Enhancing Resilience to Food Insecurity	2	Jan 1, 2012 – Dec 31, 2013(extended to mid-2015)
PRRO 200712	Responding to Humanitarian Crises and Transitioning Food-Insecure Groups to More Resilient Strategies	2a	July 2015-June 2018
Refugees			
PRRO 101273	Food assistance to Sudanese, Somali and Eritrean refugees	2	2009-2011 (extended to March 2012)
PRRO 200365	Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali refugees	1	Apr 1, 2012 – Mar 31, 2015
IR-EMOP 200656	Immediate Response for South Sudanese Conflict Affected	no code	Dec 30, 2013-Mar 31, 2014
PRRO 200700	Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees	2a	Apr 1, 2015 – Mar 31, 2018
Special Operations and Trust Funds			
SO 200358	Construction & Management of the WFP Logistics Base at Djibouti Port	no code	Jan 1, 2012 – Aug 31, 2013 (extended to Sept 30, 2017)
SO200752	Construction of Geeldoh Bridge to Facilitate Humanitarian and Trade Access to Nog/Fik Zone in the Somali region of Ethiopia	no code	Sept 1, 2014 – Oct 1, 2015 (extended to Dec 2016)
SO200977	Logistics Cluster and WFP Logistics Augmentation in Support of the Government of Ethiopia for the Drought Response	no code	Mar 24, 2016 – Mar 31, 2017
TF200812	Support to the Implementation of the Joint UN Programme "Accelerating Progress Towards Economic Empowerment of Rural Women in Ethiopia" (JP RWEE)	no code	May 2015 – May 2016 (extended to May 2017)
TF200909	Procurement and Delivery of CSB+ for the Government of Ethiopia	no code	Dec 1, 2015 – Oct 31, 2016 (extended to 2017)
TF200427	PepsiCo	no code	Not available
TF200026	Procurement of Locally Produced CSB+ and Internationally Procured Vegetable Oil	no code	May 25, 2015 – May 31, 2016
TF201035	Strengthening Community Response for HIV in Ethiopia	no code	Oct 1, 2016 – Mar 31, 2017
UNHAS flights			
SO200364	United Nations Humanitarian Air Services in Ethiopia	no code	Jan 1, 2012 – Dec 31, 2012 (extended to end of 2015)
SO200711	United Nations Humanitarian Air Services in Ethiopia	no code	Jan 1, 2015 – Dec 31, 2015(extended to end of 2018)

Source: GEN, HQ (GM codes highlighted in yellow applied retrospectively). NB The gender marker coding has only been applied to the PRROs and Country Programme (six operations within the portfolio).

19. There was a lack of clarity in the country office on the gender markers, in terms of how they were applied and what they meant. It was noted that the regional bureau are responsible for the gender markers and that there was not any dialogue on them with country office staff. Most staff were not aware of the gender markers that had been applied to different operations. In addition, the country office pointed out

that the gender markers apply to the operations as a whole, rather than individual activities within an operation so there was no way to distinguish between the scores, and therefore the strengths and weaknesses, of individual activities. It was also unclear why the special operations, trust funds and EMOPs did not require classification. It was suggested that there was not time to score an EMOP due to the short timeframe in its emergency design and preparation; however, retrospective scoring of EMOPs would be an aid to corporate learning.

Regional strategy and country action plan

20. The WFP Gender Policy (2016–2020) called for the development of regional implementation strategies and the global Gender Action Plan (GAP) served as a guidance tool for transforming the goal of the gender policy into concrete and measurable actions and indicators, divided into layers of gender equality programming results and programme processes and organizational change. The Regional Gender Implementation Strategy developed by the WFP regional bureau is meant to serve as a road map to guide the development of country office action plans to operationalize the new gender policy in a way that is tailored to the specific country context. Based on analysis of the most prominent gender issues in the region and priority actions to mainstream gender in WFP programming, the strategy has also identified three gender-transformative regional priorities, including evidence-based programming, increased meaningful participation of affected populations, and gender and nutritional sensitive programmes. The main goal of the strategy is:

“To contribute to gender equality and equity in countries assisted by WFP in East and Central Africa, at household, local and national level, through the integration of gender equality, equity and empowerment of disadvantaged population groups into all aspects of its activities” (WFP, 2016w)

21. In order to ensure that the Country Gender Action Plan (CGAP) is in line with the Global Gender Action Plan, the WFP regional bureau conducted a 2016 gender baseline study in Ethiopia (WFP, 2016v). This identified achievements and lessons learned as well as challenges and gaps, and formed the basis for the 2017 CGAP (WFP, 2017l). The CGAP's objectives include:

- Improving depth and quality of gender analysis and reporting related to WFP's areas of intervention, to better adapt food assistance to the needs and capacities of women, men, girls and boys.
- Strengthening beneficiary engagement and support government capacities to incorporate a gender perspective and promote equal participation in food and nutrition security programmes.
- Increasing women's and girls' decision-making for the benefit of food and nutrition security.
- Mainstreaming gender and protection considerations into existing modalities and innovations.

22. The implementation of the CGAP requires changes in the organizational structure of the country office to ensure transformative change at the institutional level in functional areas of human resources, staff capacity strengthening, communications, knowledge and information management, and accountability.

23. The regional bureau appreciated the country office's commitment to putting together the CGAP, especially that of senior management, and noted that they were "hands-on" in the process. The evaluation team found that the country office staff in Addis Ababa were fully aware of the CGAP but there were some comments within the country office that the CGAP is not yet fully understood by everyone and therefore that there is a long way to go to be able to implement it. However, there were staff in sub-offices who were not aware of the CGAP at all.

WFP organisational processes

24. The Ethiopia Country office has had a gender focal point throughout the evaluation period, with a programme officer from the P4P team taking this role, which included overseeing the RWEE programme. Under the structure and staffing review (SSR) a position was made for a full-time gender advisor in the country office who is expected to start in September 2018.

25. In line with the 2016–2020 Gender Policy guidance on organisational change and capacity development, the country office formed a gender results network (GRN), which was created in 2016 before the CGAP was finalised. The gender policy states that the GRN requires "strong managerial oversight and gender balance through the inclusion of senior women and men from all functional areas, particularly those at P4 level and above and the equivalent national employee levels, or as appropriate for smaller divisions. Network members have written terms of reference, and at least 20 percent of their time is allocated to their functions as gender focal points".

26. The CGAP for Ethiopia (WFP, 2017l) states that the GRN committee are 'responsible for the implementation and monitoring of systems, capacity strengthening, and resource allocation processes outlined in the CGAP'. The GRN was championed by the WFP regional bureau and coordinated by the Head of Programmes in the country office. There were more than 20 staff elected onto the network,. The network was seen as an effective way of getting more people in the country office to share the responsibility of gender, rather than making it the responsibility of a single focal point. The country office was also successful in bringing in senior staff members to the network.

27. However, in spite of efforts, the GRN hasn't yet been well actioned and it is seen by some as an initiative 'pushed' from headquarters. Efforts have been made to make the expectations of the network more realistic. For example, even though the guidelines state that everyone must spend 20 percent of their time working on gender if they are in the network, the country office made it clear that this was optional but members of the network are accountable to do certain gender activities when they are asked for. However, attendance has been dwindling at meetings of the GRN and it has been difficult to get some units within the country office to buy in to the network.

28. The support provided by WFP regional bureau in setting up the GRN and other gender initiatives has been seen to be very valuable to the country office. The regional gender focal point has worked tirelessly with the country office in putting together the CGAP and also in supporting the country office with gender training in line with objectives laid out in the CGAP. In 2017, gender capacity was built through a gender analysis training course run by a UNWOMEN facilitator for 32 WFP staff (WFP, 2018j). This included two technical days for VAM and M&E focal points, focusing on evidence-based programming, collecting better sex-disaggregated data, and conducting stronger data analysis. A significant number of staff met by the evaluation team in the country office and sub-offices had also completed the UNWOMEN online course "I know Gender", which is now mandatory for all WFP Ethiopia staff.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, "gender clinics" were delivered by the WFP regional bureau focal point to various units in the country office (WFP, 2018j). The evaluation team were not able to gain any feedback on analysis on how the gender training is being used.


Gender balance in the country office

29. As highlighted in the CGAP, there is a significant gender imbalance among staff in WFP Ethiopia, with the greatest gender disparity between national staff. In September 2016, 36 percent of international staff

²⁶⁹ UNWOMEN - <https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/enrol/index.php?id=2>

were women and only 21 percent of national staff were women.²⁷⁰ The WFP regional bureau told the evaluation team that Ethiopia has worst gender balance of any office in the region. The CGAP aims to attract more qualified women candidates and retain and promote women. However, the Structure and Staffing Review (SSR) was an opportunity for the country office to attract more qualified female staff but this has not been capitalised upon. The gender statistics now that the SSR is nearing completion do show some improvement, but there is still a long way to go. As illustrated in Figure 77 below, between 2016, at the start of the SSR, and April 2018, the number of men decreased and the number of women increased for both national and international staff positions. However, the proportion of women staff remained very low with women comprising 22 percent of staff in September 2016 and 29 percent of staff April 2018 (WFP HR data received 2018). Looking at national staff alone in Figure 78, it can be seen that the number of women has changed very little (a small decrease of 15), but the number of men has decreased significantly (a decrease of 88). According to WFP Ethiopia informants, the CGAP did inform the SSR and there were efforts to recruit shortlisted women. Senior staff working in the country office earlier in the evaluation period, before the CGAP, also stated that gender perspectives were taken into consideration when hiring. However, women were not applying with the qualifications stipulated, which was related to a deeper issue within Ethiopia, especially within Somali region and remote field offices.


Figure 77 Men and women staff in WFP Ethiopia, before and after the structure and staffing review



Source: WFP CO HR data.

²⁷⁰ WFP Ethiopia Country Office HR data, received 2018.

Figure 78 Men and women national staff in WFP Ethiopia, before and after the structure and staffing review



Source: WFP CO HR data

30. Other informants in Ethiopia, external to WFP, thought that WFP should be more proactive about increasing the number of their female staff if they are serious about gender equality and women's empowerment. It was recognised that this is an issue amongst all organisations in Ethiopia, and that senior management needs to put GEWE as a top priority and be more proactive. An example was given of CARE in Ethiopia who have managed to bring up their men to women staff ratio to fifty-fifty.

Expenditure targets

31. The CGAP pursues increased budgetary expenditure on gender, and the provision of adequate human resources to support the implementation of the CGAP. The WFP regional bureau has supported the country office with funds for the training activities that have taken place, but the majority of the CGAP activities are required to be integrated into existing programmes that are required to allocated 15 percent of project funds to GEWE activities (WFP, 2015c). However, the country office stated that they had received little guidance on how to do this and there were many challenges faced in implementing this policy. Therefore no progress had been made on capturing gender related expenditure in the financial system, and the evaluation team couldn't see how much funding had been allocated to GEWE activities.

Gender analysis and reporting

32. Country programme, PRRO and EMOP programme/project documents and SPRs provide sex disaggregated beneficiary data for all of the evaluation period and SPRs report against gender indicators.²⁷¹ From 2012 to 2013, cross-cutting *output* indicators for gender are presented. These include presenting whether or not the project has activities to raise gender awareness, the number of male and female food monitors, and whether the project has initiatives to reduce risk of sexual and gender-based violence. There

²⁷¹ Such as the following noted in Annex 8 to the CPE TOR:


1. Proportion of households where females and males together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.
2. Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.
3. Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.
4. Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees.
5. Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution.

Source: 2016 SPR PRRO

are also separate GFD indicators reported upon, illustrating, for example, the number of men and women in leadership positions on food management committees. These indicators were not continued in the SPRs from 2014 onwards. The later SPR reports (from 2014 onwards), demonstrate gender-sensitive outcome monitoring, reporting against cross-cutting strategic outcomes such as: (a) the proportion of households where women and men together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food; (b) the proportion of households where women (men) make decisions over the use of cash, vouchers or food; (c) the proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees; and (d) the proportion of women project management committee members trained in modalities of food, cash or voucher distribution. These are illustrated in Figure 79 below for refugees, and in Table 63 below for relief general food distribution.

33. As shown in Table 63 below, under the relief operations, reporting of the gender outcome indicators was inconsistent. Under PRRO 200712, the cross-cutting questions for gender, protection and accountability to affected populations were dropped from the November 2015 community and household surveillance survey. Because key outcome data was needed urgently in order to prepare proposals for donor funding and as inputs for the preparation of the Government’s 2016 Humanitarian Requirements Documents, the survey questionnaires were shortened to focus on key food security outcomes to understand how households were faring in the face of drought. This made it difficult to track progress on the gender equality indicators.

Figure 79 Cross-cutting gender outcome indicators for refugee operations 2012–2017



Source: WFP Ethiopia SPRs

Table 63 Cross-cutting gender outcome indicators for general food distribution relief activities 2012–2017

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	end target
Proportion of households where females and males together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	Indicator not reported	Indicator not reported	GFD specific values not reported	not available	32.75	41	32
Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	Indicator not reported	Indicator not reported	GFD specific values not reported	not available	43.45	46	43
Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	Indicator not reported	Indicator not reported	GFD specific values not reported	not available	23.35	13	25
Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees	Indicator not reported	Indicator not reported	GFD specific values not reported	not available	27	38	50
Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution	Indicator not reported	Indicator not reported	GFD specific values not reported	not available	not available	not available	50

Source: WFP Ethiopia SPRs

34. It is also possible to see a change in the way sex-disaggregated outcome data is presented in SPRs from 2015 onwards to make them more meaningful. Before 2015 indicators were sex-disaggregated but the totals were not given, so it was difficult to interpret whether there was a significant difference in the data by sex. From 2015 onwards for the Food Consumption Score (FCS), for example, the FCS for both male and female headed households is given, as well as the aggregated FCS.

35. In some cases, particularly for those related to capacity enhancement, disaster management and social protection activities, the language and indicators used are presented in non-gender terms, with no mention of focusing capacity building on beneficiary women and bringing them more into management and decision-making roles. In the same way, discussion on natural resources management capacity makes no mention of the role of women or bringing them into the process in any explicit way.

36. Gender is not articulated in the Logistics and Humanitarian Air Services project documents and SPRs, with no gender indicators at output or outcome levels.

37. The changes to the M&E system in 2015/16 (Annex J) also brought changes to the quality of sex-disaggregated data, with new M&E checklists created for the ONA system, which ensured sex-disaggregated data throughout. Sub-office staff reported that they had received training on collecting and analysing gender-based information.

38. However, it was consistently reported that real mainstreaming and analysis of sex disaggregated data to inform programmatic decision making was lacking. This is reflected in the lack of analytical evidence in project reports. Although disaggregated data is displayed in the SPRs, it is used very little in the narrative text.

39. It was also reflected by country office staff that it is not just the analysis of WFP disaggregated data that is weak, but also that contextual analysis of the gender issues in the country has been poor across WFP Ethiopia units and projects. It was noted that Ethiopia is a very diverse country and that understanding the different gender dynamics of different regional contexts is therefore essential. The recent McGovern-Dole school feeding evaluation (Mokoro, 2018b) noted that gender analysis before the programme started was superficial and baseline information was poor.

40. The country office work alongside the Government and other partners on data collection and many VAM/M&E activities are not implemented by WFP. This is seen by some country office staff to make collecting sex-disaggregated data and conducting analysis more challenging. However, this opinion is viewed by some

country office respondents as a weak justification for poor data collection and analysis, as the Ethiopian Government are supportive of achieving gender equality.

GEWE in programme design and delivery

41. The evaluation team have applied a 'gender lens' throughout this report in the analysis of WFP Ethiopia's portfolio. A summary of some of the key findings relating to GEWE is illustrated in table below.

Table 64 Summary of evaluation team findings on gender equality and women's empowerment

Subject area	Summary	Cross- reference
M&E	The obligatory use of tablets and the use of ONA ensured that all checklists have sex disaggregated data.	¶123, Annex J
M&E	Although the country office have collected sex-disaggregated data and specific gender indicators, there is little evidence of analysis and learning from this information.	¶137, Annex J
VAM	VAM monitoring data is not able to shed light on intra-household dynamics and how food insecurity affects different members of a household differently.	¶147, Annex L
GFD	Since 2016, WFP has tried to collect data on who in the household makes decisions over the use of cash, vouchers and food; but this too is difficult to interpret in a meaningful way. The two years for which data is available show such significantly different results that it is difficult to conclude what data best reflect reality, let alone the extent to which WFP has influenced the results.	¶167, Annex L
MERET	Although improved gender relations cannot be easily attributed to MERET, the MERET programme design did take into consideration the potential different needs of men and women and the importance of both male and female household members playing key roles in decision-making.	¶174, Annex L
R4	The R4 programme acknowledges some limitations particularly with respect to reaching women in households headed by men. With its focus on agricultural production, access to land acknowledged through a land certificate is a key programme requirement; and land is nearly always registered in the name of the household head. Despite this, the one third of the programme targets households headed by women and 38 percent of insurance policy holders and 38.5 percent of credit recipients in 2017 were women.	¶185, Annex L
Refugees	Changes in strategy and practice are noted in refugee operations that empower women in relation to other significant and powerful groups.	¶152, Annex N
Refugees	In the refugee operations gender is considered as part of needs assessments and the joint assessment mission in the refugee programme.	¶123, Annex P
Refugees	There is minimal evidence of WFP promoting gender considerations in nutrition programme design and policy for refugees.	¶123, Annex P
Nutrition	Although the nutrition programmes target women and children, they are not a model of success in terms of gender. Furthermore, WFP does provide sex disaggregated data, but there is little evidence of this being used in any meaningful way. Needs assessments for Ethiopian nationals are led by the Government with gender information not systematically collected and used to influence nutrition programme design. The majority of WFP's nutrition programming works solely with women and children on nutrition issues so therefore cannot be classed as gender transformative. Some messaging about nutrition was provided to men in 2015, but how this was done and the outcomes were not well documented.	¶122, Annex P
Nutrition	Very few nutrition activities in the evaluation period engaged men or attempted to address issues of gender inequality. The provision of food rations in the GFD that were unpreferred and often time-consuming to prepare also indicated that there was minimal consideration to the workload and preferences of female caregivers.	¶136, Annex P
School feeding	In pastoral areas, WFP addressed gender disparities with take-home rations provided to girls regularly attending primary school. Data from the recent evaluation underscores that the introduction of the Take-home Ration has greatly increased girls' enrolment, maintained school attendance, prevented school dropout, and narrowed gender gaps in the target schools.	Box 19 and Box 20, Annex Q

Subject area	Summary	Cross- reference
School feeding	The McGovern Dole school feeding programme is broadly in line with WFP's gender policy but only a basic gender analysis has been conducted.	¶26, Annex Q
School feeding	In both Afar and Somali regions schools with school feeding have a significantly more favourable Gender Parity Index than those without school feeding.	¶28, Annex Q
Logistics and Procurement	For WFP Ethiopia teams in Logistics and Procurement, there is a lack of clarity on how they can support WFP gender commitments and where this impacts their work.	¶100, Annex R
P4P	Through the P4P gender component, women's groups were supported with training and the introduction of household storage options (silos and hermetic bags).	¶101, Annex R
Special operation: Geeldoh bridge	SO 200752 (the construction of the Geeldoh Bridge) was noteworthy in terms of support to gender and protection programmes. WFP's efforts to complete the construction of the bridge were seen to enable women and girls' (physical) access to basic services.	¶102, Annex R

42. In addition, an analysis of project documents for the evaluation period shows that in terms of language and the content of the programmes and projects proposed, there is a clear move away from seeing women through the 'vulnerability lens' only, and increasingly and primarily using the 'gender lens' by WFP. There is also a clear move towards seeing women as important (and useful) resources who can improve the implementation of WFP activities on the ground and a commitment of resources to creating the capacity to consolidate and reinforce these changes.

43. The CGAP (WFP, 2017l) and the Gender Baseline Study Report (WFP, 2016v) noted the efforts of the Ethiopia country office to mainstream gender into its operations, with several achievements. One success, also noted by the evaluation team, was the P4P programme, which had a strong gender component, supporting women with training and the introduction of household storage options. Gender analysis of the P4P programme was carried out and efforts were made to address challenges identified, particularly the lack of women in leadership positions and taking part in cooperatives. Pilot activities were carried out in cooperatives, including carrying out "community conversation" sessions with women cooperative members, their husbands and religious and community leaders, using trained facilitators. These showed significant changes in shifting gender dynamics and perceptions within households and communities. WFP have been able to use this experience from P4P in the Rural Women Economic Empowerment programme.²⁷² However, these are small parts of WFP's overall portfolio in Ethiopia.

44. Other achievements noted by the baseline include the MERET programme, which ensured high participation of women in management and leadership and tailored jobs and activities to the needs of different groups. The PSNP also made provisions regarding women's participation in key community decision-making forums and has paid particular attention to providing women privileges and social protection supports to help women's participation in public work activities. However the evaluation team notes that the PSNP gender action plan was driven by the EU and CIDA, rather than WFP, and operationalising of gender provisions for the PSNP is weaker in Somali and Afar, the two regions where WFP are most active. Within the Rural Resilience Initiative too there are attempts to look at gender difference. For example, some of the disaster risk reduction activities (e.g. rainwater harvesting and micro gardens) are focused on the land of households headed by women to create assets.

45. The CGAP and baseline study report also report significant gaps and challenges in mainstreaming gender into their operations, primarily that there is "limited or lack of understanding of the relation between gender and protection and food security in Ethiopia. This includes a lack of awareness of the utility of and the technical skills to meaningfully mainstream gender and protection elements in all WFP operations country-wide". The evaluation team noted, for example, that although the nutrition programmes target

²⁷² The RWEE programme is described and reviewed in Annex L.

women and children, they are not a model of success in terms of gender. The majority of WFP's nutrition programming works solely with women and children on nutrition issues, with no systematic work done with men. Some messaging about nutrition was provided to men in 2015, but how this was done, and what the outcomes were, was not well documented. (See nutrition review in Annex P.)

Donors and other partners

46. Throughout the evaluation, it was noticeable that few stakeholders were forthcoming about any contributions WFP had made regarding gender. Gender was not an area of expertise or advocacy that was particularly associated with WFP. However, it was also noted that donors have not pushed WFP to prioritise gender in their programming, a weakness that was noted by some donors themselves. The only donor giving focused funding is Sweden, which is funding the complaints and feedback mechanism (CFM).

47. The CGAP identifies that a central focus for WFP should be on government-focused capacity building on linkages between gender, food security, nutrition and emergency response. WFP has not carried out specific capacity development or advocacy on activities on GEWE with government partners. The Administration of Returnee and Refugee Affairs (ARRA) have a gender unit but capacity development is needed. There is scope for training, both internally and with the Government to enhance and extend gender awareness and implementation.

48. WFP also has a very strong relationship with UNWOMEN and FAO on the Rural Women Economic Empowerment (RWEE) project, aiming to accelerate progress towards the economic empowerment of rural women in two pilot regions, Afar and Oromia. Through UNWOMEN, WFP have been working with the MoWCYA, the co-chairs of RWEE. However, this project is quite independent from WFP's main portfolio of operations and WFP does not have any systematic engagement with UNWOMEN or MoWCYA in other streams of work. There are also other partnerships where WFP has agreements focusing on GEWE. These include the Rural Resilience Initiative (with Oxfam and REST) and P4P (WFP, 2016v).

Conclusions

49. It is clear that with the changing corporate approach, gender programming has come into focus from 2017, with the new WFP gender policy and the Country Gender Action Plan (CGAP) 2018–2020. Gradual changes have come in, with the establishment of the gender results network, gender training to staff, and improvements in gender-sensitive monitoring. The support from the WFP regional bureau in achieving these changes was particularly noted.

50. However, the changes are gradual and the CGAP has yet to be fully implemented. Not all staff are yet aware of the CGAP and the effectiveness of the Gender Results Network has yet to be demonstrated. Gender is still not well reflected in the country office's staffing structure and there is an incomplete understanding of what gender means and what gender integration in the country office's portfolio of programmes means, although there are case-studies of gender sensitive and transformative programming.

51. It has been noted that WFP's corporate gender policies and guidelines have not always been clear. For example, there is a lack of clarity on how to tag budgets to ensure 15 percent of funding for gender activities. There is also uncertainty over the decision-making and meaning behind the gender markers.

52. Although WFP has been working through MoWCYA on the Rural Women Economic Empowerment project, there has been no systematic engagement with Government on gender and stakeholders do not see WFP as having particular strengths in gender.

Annex U Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Table 65 Recommendations and the CPE text that supports them

Recommendation	Recommendation addressed to:	See main text paragraph number(s)	See SER paragraph number(s)
<p>R1. WFP staffing and continuity Ensure that the discontinuities in senior staffing that were experienced during the 2012–2017 period do not recur and prioritize recruitment for core senior posts, including heads of nutrition and the monitoring and evaluation function, in the country office..</p>	WFP HQ	102-103, 227	S22
<p>R2. Strategic focus and preparation of Country Strategic Plan Ensure that the CSP preparation process is outward-looking so that the CSP is credible with the Government and donors, who must share WFP's perspective on WFP's future role.</p>	WFP	95-99; Annex K	S16-S20
<p>R3. Focus on resilience Use work on resilience as a conceptual framework for linking humanitarian and development objectives, addressing the resilience of national institutions as well as that of households and individuals..</p>	WFP	92, 158-159, 223; Annex M	S19, S27, S43
<p>R4. Monitoring, evaluation and learning Ensure adequate staffing and leadership in the country office's monitoring and evaluation function. Rethink the priorities for monitoring and evaluation in order to better reflect the reality that WFP is predominantly a contributor to joint programmes. Ensure that each main activity has a monitoring and evaluation plan that explicitly considers what WFP can draw on and contributes to the monitoring and evaluation of WFP's overall efforts in Ethiopia.</p>	WFP, with partners	116-123, 176, 194, 209, 228; Annex J	S23, S44
<p>R5. Nutrition programming The country office should conduct a situation analysis and develop a nutrition plan for the next CSP period, working with the Government and other actors in order to identify where WFP has the most added value; it should prioritize recruitment of the staff required to deliver this plan.</p>	WFP, with Government and nutrition actors	98, 107, 109, 171-184; Annex P	S45
<p>R6. Refugee assistance Work with partners with a view to ensuring adequate and timely funding that meets humanitarian needs while also supporting evolution towards more sustainable approaches. Join other United Nations agencies on insisting that humanitarian principles are observed.</p>	WFP, with partners	94, 101, 161-170; Annex N	S31, S38, S46
<p>R7. Gender Gender issues should (continue to) be addressed in an integrated way, building on the country gender action plan. Actions should include proactive measures for boosting recruitment of women national staff and more attention should be directed to context specific gender issues throughout the portfolio including appropriate mainstreaming of gender equality and the empowerment of women in all components.</p>	WFP	73, 197-209, 231; Annex T	S12, S33, S47

Recommendation	Recommendation addressed to:	See main text paragraph number(s)	See SER paragraph number(s)
R8. Protection and accountability to affected populations Strengthening protection and accountability to affected populations should continue to be a priority, but WFP should work on strengthening national systems wherever doing so is consistent with the needs of beneficiaries.	WFP, with partners	94; Annex O	S36, S46-S47

Table 66 Where the CPE responds to each evaluation question

Key Question 1: Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning.	Where in main report
EQ1. What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in Ethiopia?	10-33
EQ2. To what extent have the portfolio's main objectives and related activities been relevant to Ethiopia's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups and vulnerable people), priorities and capacities?	75-78
EQ3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?	79-82
EQ4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?	83-89
EQ5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including protection and the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand? Has WFP dealt appropriately with such trade-offs?	81, 90-94
EQ6. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?	95
Key Question 2: Factors and quality of strategic decision making	
EQ7. To what extent has WFP analysed the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Ethiopia - including gender equality and protection issues? and taken account of related logistics and capacity development challenges?	105-108, 116-120
EQ8. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?	109
EQ9. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?	100-104
EQ10. To what extent has WFP generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners?	110-113

Key Question 3: Performance and Results of WFP Portfolio		
EQ11.	How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?	126-128, 144, 144, 182, 194, 209, 227, 229
EQ12.	To what extent has WFP contributed to the reduction of gender inequality in control over food, resources and decision-making?	197-209
EQ13.	How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?	144, 163, 169, 183, 195, 212-217, 230
EQ14.	How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?	144, 170, 184, 196, 218-219
EQ15.	What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?	210
EQ16.	What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?	79-82, 211

Annex V Bibliography

"Location" in the listing below refers to folder and document numbers in the evaluation team's electronic library.

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Acronyms

3PA	Three Pronged Approach
AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ARRA	Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs
ART	Anti-Retroviral
ASF	Animal Source Food
BMI	Body Mass Index
BoE	Bureau of Education
BR	Budget Revision
BSFP	Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme
C&V	Cash and Vouchers
CAS	Community Asset Score
CATS	Commodity Allocation and Tracking System
CBF	Common Budgetary Framework
CBT	Cash-Based Transfer
CD	Country Director
CDRC	Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation
CFM	Complaint and Feedback mechanism
CFSVA	Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis
CGAP	Country Gender Action Plan
CHD	Community Health Day
CHILD	Children in Local Development
CHS	Community and Household Surveillance
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMAM	Community-based management of acute malnutrition
CMPM	Commodity Management Procedures Manual
CMU	Commodity Management Unit
CO	Country Office
COMET	Country Office Monitoring and Evaluation Tool
CP	Country Programme
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CRF	Corporate Results Framework
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSA	Central Statistics Agency

CSB	Corn Soya Blend
CSB+	SuperCereal
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CU	Cooperative Union
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DAG	Development Assistance Group
DALY	Disability Adjusted Life Year
DaO	Delivering as One
DEV	Development Operation
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DMP	Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port
DP	Development Partner
DPPB	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRMFSS	Disaster Risk Management Food Security Sector
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EB	Executive Board (of WFP)
EC	European Commission
ECAA	Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid
ECY	Ethiopian Calendar Year
ED	Executive Director
EDHS	Ethiopia Demographic and Health Survey
EFA	Education for All
EFSRA	Ethiopian Food Security Reserve Administration
EFY	Ethiopian Fiscal Year
EHF	Ethiopia Humanitarian Fund
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EMAA	Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Agency
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ENCU	Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit
EOS	Enhanced Outreach Strategy
EPHI	Ethiopian Public Health Institute

EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System (of OEV)
ER	Evaluation Report
ERC	Ethiopian Railways Corporation
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
ESDP	Education Sector Development Programme
ESFP	Emergency School Feeding Programme
ESRCE	Ethiopian Somali Roads Construction Enterprise
ET	Evaluation Team
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
ETL	Evaluation Team Leader
EU	European Union
EVI	Enhanced Vegetation Index
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDA	Food Distribution Assistant
FDC	Food Distribution Committee
FDP	Food Distribution Point / Final Delivery Point
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFA	Food (Assistance) for Assets
FFE	Food (Assistance) for Education
FFR	Financial Framework Review
FFT	Food for Training
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FHE	Food for the Hungry, Ethiopia
fhh	female-headed household
FIPA	Food Insecure and Pastoral Areas
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FMIP	Food Management Improvement Project
FNS	Food and Nutrition Security
FO	Field Office
FRESH	Focusing Resources for Effective School Health
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCMF	Global Commodity Management Facility
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GFA	General Food Assistance
GFD	General Food Distribution
GFP	Government Flagship Programme
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German aid agency)
GLC	Global Logistics Cluster
GM	Gender Marker
GNC	Global Nutrition Cluster
GNI	Gross National Income
GNR	Global Nutrition Report
GPI	Gender Parity Index
GPPI	Global Public Policy Institute
GPS	Global Positioning System
GRN	Gender Results Network
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
H&S	hubs and spokes
HABP	Household Asset Building Project
HARITA	Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (Oxfam)
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HDRP	Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan
HEB	High Energy Biscuits
HEP	Health Extension Programme
HEW	Health Extension Worker
HFA	Humanitarian Food Assistance
HGSFP	Home-Grown School Feeding Programme
HICES	Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Virus
HLB	Humanitarian Logistics Hub/Base
HP	Humanitarian Principle
HQ	Headquarters
HRD	Humanitarian Requirements Document
HRF	Humanitarian Response Facility
IASC	UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and communication technology
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFI	International financial institution
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IGA	Income Generating Activities
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
IMAM	Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IOD	Indian Ocean Dipole
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPL	Internal Project Lending
IR	Inception Report
IRG	Internal Reference Group
IRM	Integrated Road Map
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
IT	information technology
IYCF	infant and young child feeding
JEOP	Joint Emergency Operation
JP	Joint Programme
KF	Kuehne Foundation
KII	Key Informant Interview
LBW	Low birth weight
LEAP	Livelihoods Early Assessment and Protection system
LESS	Logistics Execution Support System
LIC	Low Income Country
LIU	Livelihoods Integration Unit
LMIC	Lower Middle Income Country
LTA	Long Term Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAF	macro-advance financing
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions
MGD	McGovern-Dole
mhh	male-headed household
MHNT	Mobile Health and Nutrition Team

MMR	Minimum Monitoring Requirement
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MoWCYA	Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs
MSU	Mobile Storage Unit
mt	metric ton
n.d.	no date
NDPG	Nutrition Development Partners Group
NDRMC	National Disaster Risk Management Commission
NEP+	Network of Networks of PRS Positives in Ethiopia
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NFI	non-food item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMA	National Meteorological Agency
NNP	National Nutrition Programme
NNS	National Nutrition Strategy
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NRMD	Natural Resource Management Directorate
NRMS	Natural Resource Management Sector
NSFP	National School Feeding Programme
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEV	(WFP) Office of Evaluation
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable children
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PAA	Purchase from Africans for Africa
PD	Project Document
PDP	Peace and Development Programme
PDS	Permanent Direct Support
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PEPFAR	US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PF	Pooled Funds
PLHIV	People Living with HIV and AIDS
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women

PMTCT	Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission
PRC	Programme Review Committee (of WFP)
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
QS	Quality Support
R4	Rural Resilience Initiative
RB	Regional Bureau
RBM	Results Based Management
RBN	Regional Bureau in Nairobi
RC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
RCT	Randomised Control Trial
REACH	Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition – Ending Child Hunger and Undernutrition Partnership (FAO, WHO, UNICEF, WFP)
RED&FS	Rural Economic Development and Food Security Sector Working Group
REST	Relief Society of Tigray
RMMI	Infrastructure and Facility Management (WFP)
RTA	Road Transport Authority
RUSF	Ready to Use Supplementary Food
RUTF	Ready to Use Therapeutic Food
RWEE	Rural Women Economic Empowerment
SABER	Systems Approach for Better Education Results
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SBCC	social behaviour change communication
SBN	Sun Business Network
SC	Supply Chain
SCM	Supply Chain Management
SCN	(UN) Standing Committee on Nutrition
SCOPE	System for Cash Operations (WFP)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SE	Strategic Evaluation
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SFP	School Feeding Programme
SHN	School Health and Nutrition
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SIPE	Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists in Ethiopia
SLM	Sustainable Land Management

SLMP	Sustainable Land Management Programme
SMP	School Meals Programme
SNF	Specialised Nutritious Food
SNNPR	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
SO	Special Operation <i>or</i> Strategic Objective <i>or</i> Sub-office (according to context)
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SP	Strategic Plan
SPA	System for Project Approval
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
SRG	Somali Regional Government
SSR	Structure and Staffing Review
SSRC	Structure and Staffing Review Committee
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition movement
SWAP	System Wide Action Plan
SWC	soil and water conservation
TF	Trust Fund
THR	Take-Home Rations
TL	Team Leader
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
UN	United Nations
UN CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNAIDS	the joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department for Safety and Security
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNHQ	UN Headquarters
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UNRC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
UPSNP	Urban Productive Safety Net Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USD	United States Dollar
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WAO	Women's Affairs Office
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WDRP	Woreda Disaster Risk Profile
WEF	World Economic Forum
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WINGS	WFP Information Network and Global System
WMS	Welfare Monitoring Survey

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