

A Comprehensive Regional Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa

Executive Summary

In 2018, the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and diplomatic overtures involving Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti changed the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is now positioned to embrace cooperation and compromise, rather than maintain the old narrative of conflict, large-scale displacement and humanitarian catastrophe. For a region with enormous potential, innovation, vast resources and some of the fastest growing economies in Africa, the persistence of crises is anathema, but opportunities for transformation, peace and development are numerous.

The five-year Strategy is the United Nations support framework for the Horn of Africa. It aims at operationalizing the Secretary-General's vision of prevention by rationalizing United Nations prevention-related mandates and encouraging joined-up action and system-wide ownership of outcomes. The Strategy employs a regional approach – not just the sum of national approaches in the region – to prevention in the Horn of Africa and considers regional strategies of the AU and sub-regional strategies of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This is guided by the understanding that contemporary conflicts and crises in the region are complex and protracted, and often spill over national borders; responses to them must correspondingly be multidimensional. Given the fast-changing environment in the region, this Strategy is a living and flexible framework and will evolve in light of emerging priorities.

The Strategy is additionally informed by insight from partners, such as the IGAD, AU, African Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank and the European Union (EU). In the medium to long term, the Strategy will focus its interventions on four pillars: regional peace and security; resilience and socio-economic development; inclusive and responsive governance; and sustainable natural resources management and climate adaptability. These pillars represent the core elements of the proposed United Nations prevention agenda in the Horn of Africa for the 2019–2023 period.

The Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will lead the implementation of the Strategy at the regional level and will serve as the liaison with United Nations Headquarters. Implementation of the Strategy will be guided by the Charter of the United Nations and other normative principles that define United Nations partnerships with regional and sub-regional entities, particularly the principles of comparative advantage, mutual respect, burden sharing and complementarity. The Strategy reflects United Nations' overall responsibility in maintaining international peace and security.

1. Introduction

Upon taking office, the United Nations Secretary-General identified prevention as a key area for the United Nations to concentrate its efforts and resources. The recent surge in diplomacy in the Horn of Africa – defined here to include all Member States of IGAD¹ – provides an opportunity for the United Nations to rally system-wide mandates in support of the Secretary-General’s appeal for multi-stakeholder prevention. This proposed five-year Comprehensive Regional Prevention Strategy (the “Strategy”) operationalizes the Secretary-General’s vision and Integrated Platform on Prevention, by leveraging the United Nations’ convening authority and multi-tiered presence. This vision aims to reinforce countries of the Horn of Africa region in capitalizing on emerging opportunities and incentives for peace, security and development.

In 2018, political reforms in Ethiopia triggered wide-ranging diplomatic shifts across the Horn of Africa and gave rise to a new narrative of compromise, cooperation and economic complementarity in the region. The détente between Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, the diplomatic overtures between Djibouti and Eritrea that led the United Nations Security Council to lift sanctions against Eritrea in November 2018, and the revitalized peace agreement in South Sudan increased international confidence in regional solutions to regional problems. The emerging discourse has elevated the region’s global appeal and importance, and revived optimism for long-term growth and stability. As the Secretary-General stated at the African Union Summit in February 2019, the wind of hope is blowing throughout Africa, and it is now possible to better solve and prevent conflicts.

This positive narrative should complement the resolution of structural causes of conflict and crises (such as flailing economies, climate extremes and environmental degradation, rapid urbanization and overpopulation) which take a long time to address. The Horn of Africa is still burdened by legacies and manifestations of conflict and crises, including prolonged social exclusion and marginalization, displacement, humanitarian emergencies, radicalization and violent extremism, inadequate social services, and generally weak institutions. Indeed, between 1990 to 2011, the overall economic cost of conflict in the Horn of Africa was 18.29 per cent of the economic growth rate per capita.²

This Strategy proposes four key pillars for a United Nations prevention agenda. These include: (i) regional peace and security; (ii) resilience and socio-economic development; (iii) inclusive and responsive governance; and (iv) sustainable natural resources development and climate Resilience (see Section 5). These four pillars integrate cross-cutting issues such as gender, youth, migration, and human rights in their operationalization. They underpin the United Nations’ medium- to long-term response to underlying structural challenges in the Horn of Africa and short-term approach to supporting the region in consolidating the emerging opportunities for peace and stability in the region.

The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) led the development of this Strategy in consultation with United Nations stakeholders at the Headquarters and in the Horn of Africa region.³ Throughout the document, prevention is used to encompass all actions and processes aimed at anticipating the risk of conflict and crises, and all responses aimed to forestall their outbreak or escalation.

2. United Nations Strategic Objectives in the Horn of Africa (2019–2023)

This Strategy ultimately aims to achieve two broad and interlinked goals. First, it encourages joined-up action and coherence within the Secretariat and among agencies, funds and programmes that are active in the Horn of Africa. Second, the Strategy aims to galvanize consensus towards a prosperous, stable and peaceful region. It is consistent with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and The New Way of Working (NWOW) and aligns with the implementation of ongoing United Nations reforms. It is also context-sensitive and operationally nimble. This flexibility allows for interconnections with other frameworks and strategies for the region, including for the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Union, IGAD and the World Bank, among others.

3. Context: Anatomy of a complex region

The complex social and political makeup of the Horn of Africa offers insight into its history of periodic conflicts and crises. With an estimated 290 ethnic groups, the combined population of the region exceeds 260 million people,⁴ 70 per cent of whom are 30 years of age or younger, and approximately 50 per cent, children. The Horn of Africa is among the youngest and most diverse regions on the African continent. Its land surface area of 5.2 million square km⁵ is 70 per cent arid or semi-arid, and agriculture is the economic mainstay, which supports 80 per cent of the livelihoods in the region.⁶ The region is water- stressed, and the coming decades look grim because of climate change.⁷

3.1. Inter-state Dynamics

The Horn of Africa is also characterised by inter-state conflict and political tensions, in which conflict in one country is linked to political undercurrents in another. In most countries of the region, legacies of longstanding mistrust have bred internal strife and perceptions of marginalization, especially in the borderlands. This has generated severe humanitarian needs, which habitually spill over national boundaries and exacerbate or foment new conflicts. Indeed, every country in the region is either in active armed conflict or borders at least one country experiencing armed conflict, or its internal politics are influenced by other regional developments. The stability of some countries is regularly eroded by routine democratic activities such as elections, revealing the extent of fragility and the looming possibility of relapse into conflict.

This context is exploited by extremist groups, whose appeal in increased as a result of economic, political and social exclusion. Today, terrorism and violent extremism have become a feature of the sub-region, and the emergence of groups such as Al-Shabaab has changed the nature and methods of violence, rendering conventional military approaches ineffective. Indeed, in the region, not only is conventional conflict at times difficult to distinguish from extremist violence, but also armed groups have frequently resorted to asymmetrical methods to express their grievances.

In fact, in the Horn of Africa, the causes of conflict and crisis are multifaced and linked to multiple factors such the lack of full enjoyment of socio-economic and political rights, and to deliver on services enshrined in social and economic rights covenants, contests over access to resources, exclusion, climate variability and economic mismanagement.

Due to the impact of natural disasters and stresses and humanitarian emergencies, the region has lost several years of development time. The human and economic cost of state-based conflicts resulted in approximately 203,429 fatalities, which is slightly less than ten times the human cost of civil disobedience and extrajudicial killings, and around nine times the fatalities resulting from non-State conflicts.⁸ In 2015, there were an estimated 2,728,503 refugees and 6,575,230 internally displaced persons (IDPs), making the Horn of Africa a region with the world's highest population of refugees and IDPs. In economic terms, this accounts for a total loss of between US\$4,757.24 and US\$8,777.96 in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2007.⁹

In the 1960s, many countries in the Horn of Africa were classified as least developed countries (LDCs). From 2011 onwards, however, the region posted an annual economic growth average of 5.9 per cent. These improvements have raised hope for an economic take-off and an overall boost in the quality of life. Combined with other factors, for example, the advent of the blue economy, politics of integration, and the recent discovery of oil and gas in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda the economic profile of the region is steadfastly raising. But there is another side to this economic narrative. While countries like Ethiopia host the fastest-growing economies on the continent, they also have untenable numbers of poor people. Growth has not been equitably distributed in all countries, unequally benefiting different regions and vulnerable populations, particularly youth, women and children. Millions of people still suffer from chronic food insecurity due to conflict, climate-sensitive livelihoods, and use of non-mechanised crop and animal husbandry, and require humanitarian assistance when faced with new shocks.

Moreover, due to high population growth and rapid urbanization, fast-growing cities such as Addis Ababa, Kampala, Mogadishu and Nairobi are attracting streams of young migrants and IDPs, complicating an already precarious urban situation. Within cities, new arrivals quickly become disenfranchised, especially women and children, and are at risk of extreme poverty and exclusion from services, with many being trafficked or forced into transactional sex. The combination of population growth, urbanization, economic and environmental vulnerability, and social exclusion has created new governance challenges, including crime and lawlessness, insufficient services, lack of opportunities and substance abuse.¹⁰

3.2. Regional Dynamics in the Horn of Africa

Efforts at establishing a coherent approach to tackling the challenges of the Horn of Africa have been hampered by several factors. There is a perception that the region is split between multiple affiliations, namely IGAD and the East African Community (EAC), and between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula – three members of IGAD are also members of the League of Arab States (LAS). Accordingly, each of these blocks and geographical entities attracts different countries and pulls in different directions.¹¹ The region is in danger of becoming a global common, less than the sum of its parts. The recent surge in diplomacy has also rejuvenated discussions on the merger of the EAC and IGAD, and indeed on the possibility of creating a new smaller Horn of Africa Economic Community.

Developments in the region are nevertheless still fluid and the unfolding developments are yet to be anchored in strong institutional foundations. Moreover, the epicentre of political influence in the region shifted in the past and will likely shift again. IGAD has demonstrated the ability to align the interests of its member states, for example, in the South Sudan peace process and in the Nairobi

Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees, and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia (25 March 2017). Nevertheless, the region has yet to develop enough collective interest to facilitate a united front against their challenges. This is increased by internal challenges within IGAD as well.

Functional integration is on course, and is often linked to multinational energy, commerce and transport projects, for example, the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET). Yet these undertakings too are bedevilled by funding shortages and political squabbles between the respective countries. They have also ignited communal tensions, most prominently over land and related resources.

3.3. The Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula

These intra-regional challenges have been exacerbated by extra-regional influences. The region's proximity and interconnectedness to the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf of Aden, and its growing importance in the Red Sea littoral zone have attracted attention from external actors. Increasing investments in strategic resources such as ports and hydrocarbon deposits, and regional and global competition for military bases illustrate the strategic importance of the region. The relationship between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula is nevertheless perceived as largely transactional, bilateral, events-driven, and at times, an extension of global superpower rivalries in both regions.

Between 2004 and the onset of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, the Sana'a Forum was established, bringing together Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen, and marked a first attempt to link the two sides of the Red Sea. Similar attempts to create a Red Sea Forum or a governing entity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Eden have recently been made by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, respectively. Today, the Horn of Africa is one of the epicentres of internationalized efforts to curb terror and violent extremism, a rear base for the humanitarian operation in Yemen, an investment destination, and a site for inter-state military, commercial and diplomatic competition. Multilateral institutions and regional and sub-regional organizations, such as the AU, AfDB, World Bank, Islamic Development Bank, the EU and IGAD, have also demonstrated a renewed interest in the region by launching their own initiatives. This interest is engendering a new debate on which a country, region or entity, if any, has the legitimate and internationally recognized obligation to exercise control over and provide security in the Red Sea and its surroundings. This has been exemplified by efforts to frame the narrative through the creation of new political platforms.

4. Five-Year Strategic Priorities for Change and Partnership in the Horn of Africa (2019–2023)

Over the next five years, this Strategy will support processes and actions that promote common regional aspirations, as articulated in the establishment protocols and Strategies of IGAD and AU. Actions emanating from it will be both demand- and supply-driven, and catalytic in nature. The strategy will also explore joint initiatives and analyses with other actors active in the region, including financial and non-financial institutions, for example, the World Bank.¹² It does not intend to substitute or duplicate already existing or ongoing frameworks, processes and efforts. Additionally, its implementation requires a phased rollout in tandem with United Nations reform. The United Nations will undertake real-time monitoring of the implementation of the Strategy, and based on learned lessons, strengthen innovation at the leadership, operational and conceptual levels.

The implementation of this Strategy will be inclusive throughout its lifespan. Cross-border collaboration and the good offices of the Secretary-General will serve as entry points for implementing the key pillars of the Strategy: supporting regional peace, security and long-term stability; building resilience and promoting socio-economic development; promoting inclusive and responsive governments and respect for human rights; and supporting sustainable natural resources development and climate resilience.

Given the volatile and fast-evolving character of the peace and security situation in Horn of Africa, coupled with still evolving peace and security architecture, linking the UN's priorities to a regionally driven prevention and response agenda exposes it to programmatic, funding, reputational, and relational challenges. Changes in the political, economic, and diplomatic environment can easily undermine the prevailing equilibrium, and lead to significant shifts in policy, and a discrepancy between the operational context of the Strategy and its proposed interventions. The success of the Strategy, therefore, requires a change of attitude and practices within the United Nations, and complementarity with regional, sub-regional and national partners. Within the context of mushrooming strategies and actors in the region, the implementation of this Strategy must be flexible and allow the UN and the region to adapt, and to nurture linkages between approaches to peace and security, humanitarian and development interventions.

4.1. Support for regional peace, security and long-term stability

The United Nations will support the efforts of countries of the Horn of Africa to deepen a regional and integrated approach to the prevention of crisis and conflict, and to establish a firm link between early warning and early action, and between the peace, human rights and development. This approach is in line with the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which emphasizes burden sharing in crisis response, IGAD's peace and security frameworks as well as the Joint UN-AU Framework on Implementation of Agenda 2063 and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. To this end, the United Nations will engage with actors at the regional, sub-regional and national levels in joint analyses of risks and threats and to design and deliver appropriate response options.

Furthermore, the United Nations will continue its close relationship with the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the African Union Continental Early Warning System (AU CEWS), the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), the IGAD Mediation Support Unit and the IGAD Climate Prediction and Application Centre (ICPAC), among others, as well as other multilateral agencies and institutions involved in peace and security in the region. This will be in addition to support to other normative frameworks in the region, such as the 2004 Nairobi Protocol for Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa.

4.1.1. Early warning and early action

As core elements of prevention, early warning and early action entails two levels of engagement; the information level and the level of action or response. The United Nations will continue to support activities aimed at improving the collection of reliable information to facilitate and simplify joint analysis and evidence-based decision-making, which require strong links within the United Nations, and with regional and sub-regional organizations and civil society. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will link United Nations agencies, funds, programmes and presence to actors in the region in a two-way

relationship aimed at improving information flow. This should strengthen early detection of potential threats to peace and security in the region and help identify prompt response options in structured platforms. The United Nations will take steps to enhance the capacity of regional actors to collect, analyse, present and share information that supports decision-making.

4.1.2. Conflict response and resolution

Based on open and continuous discussions with IGAD, the AU and other multilateral and bilateral actors, the United Nations will undertake joint response analyses in identifying efforts and actions that secure continued improvements in relations between countries of the region and will respond to emerging threats. The United Nations will support the transition from peacekeeping in Darfur, and continue efforts to resolve residual issues, including in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. It will also continue to support AUHIP in its work towards reaching an agreement between South Sudan and Sudan on the final status of Abyei and in implementing the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan. The United Nations will work with governments both in the region and beyond, political actors, women, youth, civil society and the private sector to help construct alternative, more inclusive narratives and structures of governance and cooperation. The United Nations will collaborate with IGAD and AU in encouraging women and youth's participation in peace negotiation and mediation and will support existing regional structures. These efforts will extend beyond traditional conflicts and include assistance to states with addressing emerging non-conventional transboundary issues, for instance, violent extremism and conflicts over natural resources. Correspondingly, non-state armed actors and other influential actors may be targeted for engagement.

4.1.3. Strengthening of regional peace and security architecture

Ensuring coordination and coherence, and conceptual clarity of the prevention agenda at the national and regional levels is essential to address widely known constraints to the mandates and capacities of regional and sub-regional peace and security institutions. The United Nations will continue to provide advice and share comparative experiences on the development of normative frameworks for the region. This concerns situation-specific advice, such as on the finalization of the IGAD Treaty, as well as avenues for supporting institutions to address some of the underlying causes of conflict. Working in concert with IGAD and the AU, the United Nations will support governments in developing policies and actions that apply the 'do no harm principle'.

Discussions will be held with relevant actors, including Member States and civil society, and with secretariats of regional and sub-regional organizations, to establish capacity baselines and identify areas that require support. The United Nations will also engage with and support networking efforts of civil society, academia, think tanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other interest groups in the region. To ensure the sustainability of joint initiatives, the United Nations will support the capacity of regional actors in exploring partnerships, including for mobilizing resources.

4.2. Support for resilience building and promoting socio-economic development

The goal of the Strategy is to rally multi-sectoral resources to lay the foundation for longer-term stability of communities, societies and nations across the region.¹³ This requires breaking the cycles of recurrent

crises and disasters that undermine individual and communal resilience, and that perpetuate the root causes of conflict. Hence, the Horn of Africa must be supported to better coordinate: risk-informed programming and preparedness for emergency response; disaster risk reduction; climate change adaptation; and conflict-prevention and peace-building while seeking to better integrate humanitarian and development programming where feasible and appropriate. This will be achieved by enhancing the ability of individuals, communities and states to better prepare, manage and recover from crises through capacity and system development, particularly in remote areas in arid and semi-arid borderlands.

This response, as outlined in the R-UNSDGs Africa Resilient Development Framework, will help address the underlying causes of recurrent crises while ensuring that lifesaving humanitarian assistance is provided where needed. Resilience interventions will focus on strengthening the effectiveness of governance and institutions. The United Nations will pay special attention to the cross-border cooperation needed to address many of the root causes driving needs in the region. There will be an optimal coordination between United Nations' development and humanitarian efforts, by leveraging the comparative advantages of different United Nations actors. Additionally, UN will partner with governments and private sectors to leverage economic opportunities in the region to promote the achievement of the SDGs and inclusive and sustainable development.

4.2.1. Advocating for streamlining resilience building, policy and programming

The United Nations will advocate for and assist the region in making resilience a priority of policies and programmes of action and will promote risk-informed programming in line with IGAD's commitments to resilience building. United Nations agencies will collectively decide and agree on the sub-regional and cross-border outcomes necessary for strengthening resilience to conflict and natural disasters. Evidence will be collected to generate a baseline and a better understanding of the underlying factors of vulnerability and the drivers of resilience. The United Nations will coordinate with IGAD, COMESA and other relevant organisations, to promote sub-regional trade and formalizing cross-border trade. This will aim to improve the socio-economic conditions of the population, in particular youth. The United Nations will facilitate the enhancement of regional and sub-regional sharing of experience and best practices among countries and communities on resilience towards regional ownership. Furthermore, it will continue its commitment to support the governments in the region to effectively own and integrate the SDGs in the regional, national and local development plans and relevant sectorial strategies that build resilience.

4.2.2. Supporting improved economic opportunities and tailoring social services

The Strategy will support the provision of technical knowledge, and policy advice to support the diversification of the economies including productions and services. Conflict-sensitive and local economic development lens will be applied. The United Nations will work closely with the region to help ensure that more services and social protection schemes are provided in borderlands. Grievances against government and state security actors in those remote areas as well deep-seated scepticism about the possibility of positive change are some of the drivers of recruitment for terrorist group.

Through inclusive innovation platforms and processes that bring together public institutions, the private sector and civil society (both in-country and abroad), it will facilitate discussions on key bottlenecks to sustainable development in the region. It will explore creative ideas for attracting investments to the region, working closely with regional and sub-regional organizations and governments. The United Nations will undertake a study on diaspora involvement in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the United Nations will support the promotion of development opportunities in the blue economy, which has the potential for considerable socio-economic growth.

The United Nations will assist in scaling up the agribusiness sector in hard-to-reach areas and borderlands, which is largely unexplored in the region. The United Nations will also support accountable partnerships between public and private agribusinesses and smallholder producers, drawing on cross-border initiatives for the mutual benefit of producers and processors.

4.2.3. Support for regional integration

According to UNECA, the Horn of Africa is the least integrated region in Africa. Nevertheless, the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and the recent African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) form a normative foundation for integration in the Horn of Africa. Investment in regional integration has the potential to unlock trade and investment and accelerate the structural transformation and economic diversification in the sub-region. The United Nations will support the development of policies that facilitate labour migration, reduce costs of remittances, protect migrant workers, and increase people-to-people engagement and increase the number of functional integration projects. The current cross-border projects will be assessed to draw lessons learned for potential expansion to include other countries within the region.

4.3. Promotion of inclusive and responsive governance

United Nations assistance to the region and Members States will broadly focus on building capacities for governance, promoting rule of law, accountability, State legitimacy and collaboration with civil society. A stronger engagement by the United Nations with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) would offer a useful platform to achieve this goal. Fragile countries such as Somalia and South Sudan will benefit from special attention in terms of improving long-term governance at all levels.

4.3.1. Building capacity for governance and service provision

Several countries in the region are moving towards different types of decentralization or devolution but face challenges at the level of sub-national governance entities. The United Nations will support their approaches to governance by advocating for equal distribution of access to services, the lack of which drive grievances. The United Nations will support capacity enhancement of national, sub-national and municipal governance systems towards a conducive environment to sustain peace and development. Deploying a conflict-sensitive lens is essential because new governance structures may exacerbate or create local conflicts. The United Nations can also help clarify roles where the division of competencies between national and sub-national levels of government is unclear by providing comparative examples. It will also promote the sharing of best practices between countries in implementing reforms.

The United Nations will advocate for and support the domestication of existing protocols and treaties on governance, elections and constitutional processes as relevant and applicable. The United Nations will develop actions aimed at strengthening promotion of anti-corruption efforts and the provision of support to the regional mechanisms for accountability and against impunity (e.g. AU Panel of the Wise).

4.3.2. Promoting human rights

The Strategy aligns its implementation with the three changes identified in the Human Rights up Front (HRuF) initiative, namely a cultural change,¹⁴ an operational change,¹⁵ and the change to the United Nations engagement with Member States.¹⁶ Accordingly, the Strategy acknowledges the centrality of human rights to durable development and the creation of more equitable, inclusive and just societies. Helping to foster an environment that is more conducive to civic participation is key to preventing increased violence and conflict in the region, and indeed in the development of solutions to crises. The Universal Periodic Review as well as the recommendations of the Treaty Bodies' and United Nations Special Procedures provide a strong entry point to engage with governments on delivery on their human rights commitments. This will also help address some of the root causes of violence and displacement. Indeed, human rights frameworks, which are consistent with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, call for transparent, effective, inclusive and accountable institutions that ensure responsive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels. In the implementation of this Strategy, all-encompassing human rights promotion and protection will be mainstreamed in its core pillars.

4.3.3. Promoting improved collaboration between civil society and governments, and civic education.

The United Nations will support initiatives that promote consultative decision-making, including peer-to-peer networking with all aspects of civil society. It will also support civil society, including women's groups, in developing policy ideas, monitoring the fulfilment of human rights, promoting gender equality, and implementing innovative programmes, as well as helping link the latter with government programmes and decision makers. The United Nations system will support information sharing and training in this area, as well as strengthening women and youth's leadership roles in conflict resolution, peace architecture and democratic governance. The United Nations will advocate for the adoption of legislation that enable establishment and operations civil society organizations in individual Horn of Africa countries.

4.4. Promoting sustainable natural resources development and climate resilience

This Strategy will help improve governance and the management of natural resources to create better economic opportunities and reduce local friction linked to competition. This will be achieved by assisting harmonization of policy, legal and institutional frameworks of regional governments and regional authorities for the sustainable use and management of the environment and natural resources. Most of these activities are aligned with the objectives of IGAD's Environment and Natural Resources Strategy but also national development plans and indeed nationally determined contributions (NDC) that countries have prepared for the Paris Agreement.

Focus will be placed on improving the analysis of environmental risks, including climate-security risks, more consistent adoption of conflict-sensitive methodologies, transboundary water resources management, and transparent and accountable management of extractive resources. This will involve the full participation of women, migrants, displaced peoples, refugees, returnees, agriculturalist as well as borderland communities, and pastoralists. Building on its recent policy development initiatives with the AU Panel of the Wise, the United Nations will engage governments and regional organizations to assist locally driven efforts to improve transparency and accountability of extractive natural resources and better distribution of benefits.

4.4.1. Promoting climate-resilient sustainable development in arid and semi-arid zones

The United Nations will work with Member States, IGAD, the private sector and communities to identify and promote public and private investments in economic land use models and management approaches that improve productivity and increase economic participation. These approaches will be based on the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. They will entail a combination of new infrastructure and technologies for crop and livestock production, linked to supply and market chains, ecosystem-based adaptation, and the provision of technical and financial support. The United Nations will support Member States in biodiversity protection and strengthening transboundary pests and water resources management. This will be achieved through transboundary water diplomacy, mediation and the involvement of regional United Nations capacities.

4.4.2. Monitoring climate change strengthen early warning and preparedness

Support will be provided to regional meteorological agencies, including IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), to enhance their short-term, seasonal and long-term weather/climate prediction capacities, and the collection of related data through the installation of locally automated weather stations. A multi-hazard approach will be applied, and climate early warning data systems will inform the CEWARN and the conflict early warning system, which will contribute to anticipate threats and better orient decision-making for conflict prevention and dispute resolution. Moreover, impact scenarios will be developed for key economic and social sectors, introducing rangeland/pasture, environmental and macro-economic modelling, and linked to humanitarian and nexus-sensitive response mechanisms and action plans at the regional, national and local levels. Emphasis will be given to the cross-border nature of the warnings and their implications. ICPAC recent capacity assessment will be the basis of our support. The United Nations must focus on the most vulnerable and understand the differentiated impact of environmental stress on men and women, boys and girls. Disaster preparedness and risk reduction solutions focusing on resilience will be implemented together with humanitarian action through the development of response and contingency plans at all levels. Response measures will also be developed to mitigate the impact of disasters and accelerate recovery and rehabilitation of affected communities.

5. Framework for operationalizing and coordinating the Strategy

The expansion of the mandate of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan to cover the whole of the Horn of Africa region in October 2018 was an essential first step in addressing United Nations' structural shortcomings in the region and in helping to strengthen and reinforce regional prevention efforts. Using the

enhanced good offices of the Secretary-General mechanism, the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will provide overall United Nations political leadership, leverage institutional knowledge in support of the region, engage in resource mobilization efforts for regional intervention, and coordinate with other stakeholders in the implementation of this Strategy.¹⁷ A commitment to close collaboration and regular interaction between the Special Envoy and different regional presences of the United Nations system will therefore be critical to creating an effective and efficient regional prevention mechanism.

Harmonizing prevention-related mandates and efforts across the United Nations system and with IGAD and other partners will be challenging. The United Nations has invested substantial political capital and resources in the Horn of Africa and has Teams present in all eight countries of the region. Significant support is provided to this presence by R-UNSDG East and Southern Africa regional offices in Nairobi and R-UNSDG Arab States-Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, peacekeeping operations have been deployed in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia,¹⁸ as well as special political missions (Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and United Nations Mission in Somalia), in addition to other United Nations presences, such as the DPA Liaison Team at United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON).

6. Partnerships

Ownership of this Strategy by various United Nations prevention-mandated agencies and buy-in at a regional and sub-regional level are central to sustaining its implementation and to keeping it in line with the regional priorities of the Member States. The effectiveness of this Strategy will be ensured through partnerships with major actors in the region, specifically IGAD and the AU, as well as international financial institutions and multilateral and bilateral actors. The pillars of this Strategy, therefore, represent entry points for high-impact engagement with regional actors, and for encouraging and enriching prevention-related strategic collaboration.

Given the Strategy's ambitious and multidimensional nature it will be necessary to constructively divide labour between country teams, regional and sub-regional organizations, civil society (including faith-based organizations, youth and women's organizations, and think tanks), the private sector and academia to achieve its overall aims. This calls for, but is not limited to, transparent leadership, coordination, flexibility and co-dependency in the ownership of outcomes. The role of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), for example, AfDB, World Bank, Islamic Development Bank and other development partners, is critical to supporting the Strategy and deepening its sustainability. Indeed, the ambitious prevention agenda outlined in the Strategy implies a shift away from traditional funding partnerships to adopting funder-as-stakeholder partnerships.

7. Conclusions

This Strategy builds on the recent political changes in the Horn of Africa to operationalize the Secretary-General's vision of prevention. Its underlying goal is to support the Horn of Africa region in establishing or strengthening systems, processes and actions that reduce the risk of the outbreak of crises and violent conflict. It is a framework for supporting efforts of the region in realizing sustainable peace and development. The Strategy was developed in consultation with United Nations stakeholders at the Headquarters and UN presences in the Horn of Africa region, and includes contributions by the AU, IGAD and other partners such as the World Bank. Additionally, the Charter of the United Nations and the 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development, and normative frameworks of the African Union and IGAD underpin its philosophy. Although buy-in by IGAD and its Member States is essential for its success, actions derived from this Strategy are exclusively the responsibility of the United Nations – at the country, regional and global levels. In addition to institutional agility and responsiveness, system-wide support and multilateral and funding partnerships are core to implementing the Strategy and will determine the extent to which it is impactful.

Recommendations

A. General recommendations

The Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and, subsequently, the Regional Office can significantly improve overall coordination by establishing and maintaining information-sharing and coordination mechanisms. But the United Nations structural challenges cannot be addressed fully without the realignment of the current geographic mandates and the physical presence of all parts of the system. Building on the Secretary-General's reforms of the peace and security pillar (enabling 'whole of the pillar' approaches), the development system (with empowered Resident Coordinators) and the United Nations management structures, options should be developed to realign other parts of the United Nations system, geographically, conceptually, and structurally to enable regional level focus for its analysis and outputs. This would support an effective regional prevention agenda, which would also be applicable to the Horn of Africa region.

Such realignment would also allow to avoid gaps and duplications and reduce the transaction cost of coordination while acknowledging diverse governance and financing models of different agencies, departments, funds and programmes. The Special Envoy will have the capacity to develop regional level conflict analysis and to update the UN family, to allow for a better and shared understanding of the drivers of tension and conflict in the region. The Special Envoy Office may also include a development adviser who can analyse the development opportunities.

B. Internal coordination

The Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa will provide ad interim political leadership and coordination of the United Nations' prevention efforts in the region until a United Nations/DPPA Regional Office is established based on the request from the region. Experience from West Africa and Central Africa shows that regional United Nations presence that closely collaborate with regional and sub-regional counterparts may be the best solution for addressing United Nations' structural shortcomings and for contributing to strengthening and reinforcing regional efforts. Lessons should be drawn from the cross-pillar cooperation with the United Nations Special Envoy for the Great Lakes to adopt the best approach. The coordination mechanism led by the Office of the Special Envoy and, subsequently, the Regional Office needs to link with, and will be complemented by, the Regional Quarterly Review mechanism led by the Secretary-General's Senior Adviser on Policy, until the contours of a coordination platform are complete. The Regional Quarterly Review will also help assess the progress in the implementation of the strategy and the need – when required – for adjustments or Headquarters' support.

C. Partnerships and cooperation

IGAD should be partner in the implementation of the priorities in this Strategy and the main vehicle for ensuring buy-in and cooperation of its Member States, given its universal membership in the Horn of Africa. This should be in addition to direct engagement with concerned Member States in order to compensate for non-participating member States in the Mechanism. In this regard, IGAD should also benefit from capacity-building efforts aimed at institutionalizing a sustainable stand-alone, sub-regional prevention platform. To ensure that such support is systematically absorbed by the institution, it would be important to ensure that all engagements with IGAD are fully coordinated within the United Nations system and that lessons learned are drawn to review the successes and failures of capacity building to date. In line with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the existing partnership agreements and legislative mandates, close collaboration with the AU Commission and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) will be essential, in addition to cooperation with other important multilateral and bilateral partners including EAC, the League of Arab States (LAS), the EU as well as the World Bank, AfDB and Islamic Development Bank, among others.

D. Funding

It is important to recognize the structural limitations derived from diverse governance and funding structures of different agencies, departments, funds and programmes, and acknowledge that the current funding arrangements prioritize funding at the global and country levels over the regional level. Innovation in this area would be essential in averting a situation whereby the internal governance of funding stands as an obstacle to joint and coordinated efforts of the United Nations system in implementing the priorities identified above. The Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund is one option to catalyse innovation in conflict prevention in the region. It is already active in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. Furthermore, cross-border interventions to tackle transnational drivers of conflict will be an even greater priority in the Fund's new Strategic Plan for 2020 – 2022. Efforts should also be made to reinforce efforts in fundraising for joint United Nations-IGAD activities for implementing some of the agreed priorities.

IGAD has limited capacity for its own financial management. Specifically, a new mechanism within the Sustainable Development Goals Trust Fund should be considered to ensure joint programming among United Nations agencies and United Nations Country Teams, and to make United Nations interventions for the region more effective and catalytic. A regional cross-border Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTF) has already been established for the Great Lakes region; a review should be carried out to determine whether a similar model could be used for the Horn of Africa, including by incorporating lessons learned from the MPTF DPA paper on funding mechanisms in the Horn of Africa. The United Nations should also assess the feasibility of social impact funds in relative sectors to leverage private sector investment.

E. Monitoring and review

The Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and subsequently, the United Nations Regional Office, in consultation with DPPA and UNDP as well as the other agencies, departments, funds and programmes, should establish a timeline and mechanism to evaluate the implementation of the strategy. These should be based on regular updates from all parts of the United Nations system at the country, regional and Headquarters levels.

To assist with the review process and complement the internal analysis with an external perspective, DPPA will organize an annual meeting with external experts and scholars (in collaboration with the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum). As in the past, it will convene diverse entities of the United Nations system. In addition, a biannual High-Level Dialogue between IGAD and UN on peace and security matters in the Horn of Africa will be organized by the DPPA, which includes IGAD Member States and the two Secretariats. This will aim to secure the continued Member States' support for IGAD-UN cooperation as well as provide a forum for a senior level discussion on emerging challenges and priorities for the region and the UN. DPPA will also continue its support to grassroots efforts aimed at developing and strengthening networks among scholars and civil society organizations in the Horn of Africa region in support of the United Nations' early warning and prevention efforts in the region.

Annex 1. Methodology and normative foundation

Methodology: Following a request by the Executive Committee (EC) in March 2018, this Strategy was developed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), now the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and UNDP, in consultation with other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

In April, DPA and UNDP conducted a review of relevant literature generated by the United Nations family¹⁹ and by other multilateral actors, such as the AU, IGAD, the AfDB, the EU and the World Bank. From the review, an extensive list of themes common to all countries in the Horn of Africa was identified, including: livelihoods, services provision, environmental adaptability, inclusive governance, sustainable growth and development, natural resources management, national cohesion, resilience, institutional strengthening and stabilization, humanitarian response, as well as gender and youth. In many countries, these themes have been organized in the form of United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and are in line with the national development plans and priorities of the countries of the Horn of Africa. Many of the themes cut across national boundaries, for example, conflict, climate variability, displacement and migration, and humanitarian emergencies. The UNDAFs integrate cross-cutting subjects such as gender, youth, human rights and migration.

In April 2018, consultations within the United Nations system were held in New York, subsequently with the support of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) in June 2018, and in Nairobi also in June 2018. These consultations narrowed the above list of themes to the four broad pillars that form the foundation of this Strategy, namely: (i) peace and security; (ii) growth and livelihoods; (iii) inclusive and responsive governance; and (iv) natural resources management. UNHQ colleagues reviewed the first draft of the Strategy in August and September. Consultations were held with AU in September and early October. In November 2018, a review workshop of the draft strategy was conducted in Addis Ababa, with the support of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) and the United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), and included participants from all major United Nations presences in the region and United Nations Headquarters. Additional written comments were solicited and integrated into this Strategy throughout the consultation process and within the framework of the Horn of Africa Informal Working Group (IWG).²⁰ The workshop in Addis Ababa, which included consultations with the EU, World Bank and IGAD, completed the circle of regional consultations and validated the limited set of thematic pillars on which to anchor the United Nations in the region. The Strategy also benefited from insights obtained during the IGAD-United Nations High-Level Dialogue held in late November 2018 in Kampala.

Normative foundation: In addition to the Charter of the United Nations and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the twin resolution...i.e. S/RES/2282 (2016) and A/RES/70/262 (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 27 April 2016), the Strategy takes into consideration the norms and principles that apply at the regional and sub-regional levels, primarily the African Union Constitutive Act (and Protocols) and Agenda 2063, and the agreements and strategies of IGAD. The AU and IGAD analytical frameworks link the pursuit of peace and security to development, and their operational mechanisms prioritize early warning relating to conflict as well as natural hazards.


This Strategy underscores complementarity of efforts with the AU and IGAD, in line with the Joint United Nations-AU Framework for Partnership in Peace and Security, as well as the Joint Framework for Cooperation on Peace and Security between IGAD and the UN Department for Political Affairs. Collectively and individually, the above institutional frameworks are in tandem with the Secretary-General's vision of prevention and the importance of early warning and early action underpinned by the primacy of politics.²¹ The vision for this Strategy is guided by these resolutions and takes into consideration the findings of the report of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO).²² The HIPPO report established the primacy of politics as a key factor guiding United Nations peace operations.

Annex 2: High-level logical framework for the Comprehensive Regional Prevention Strategy for the Horn of Africa

Long-term goal	Strengthen the regions' resilience to crises and build a prosperous, stable and peaceful region			
Five-year goal	Support the region to improve interstate-state relations and sub-regional collaboration, and prevent new outbreaks of crises			
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Common conflict prevention narrative and analysis • Examples of donor programmes in the region aligned with this Strategy • Decrease in inter-state rhetoric in the Horn of Africa • Examples of interstate cooperation and collaboration in peace and security • Increased engagement between the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations agencies • Decrease in armed violence in the region • Reduced levels of forced displacement due to armed conflict, drought and other climate-related disasters • Decreased support in humanitarian needs • Increased cross-border programmes and initiatives • Gender-responsive frameworks and supported policies/initiatives contributing to a protective environment • Greater access to decent work and productive employment for youth and women • Greater involvement for youth and women in peace and security, and public and political affairs. 			
Priority themes	5.1 Support for Regional Peace, Security and Long-term Stability	5.2 Support for Building Resilience and Promoting Socio-Economic Development	5.3 Promotion of Inclusive and Responsive Governance	5.4 Promotion of Sustainable Natural Resources Management and Climate Resilience
Rationale	To improve security, peace and development in the region by establishing a firm link between early warning and early action, and by addressing the root causes of conflict and crises.	To enhance the ability of individuals, communities and states to better prepare, manage and recover from natural and man-made shocks to livelihoods.	To improve decision-making and execution to foster the culture of accountability, diversity, inclusiveness and respect for human rights.	To improve governance and management of natural resources to create economic opportunities and reduce resource-based friction.

Interventions (indicative)	<p>4.1.1 Early Warning and Early Action</p> <p>4.1.2 Conflict Response and Resolution</p> <p>4.1.3 Strengthening of Regional Peace and Security Architecture</p>	<p>4.2.1 Advocacy for Streamlining Resilience-building and Programming</p> <p>4.2.2 Support for Improving Economic Opportunities and Tailoring Social Services</p> <p>4.2.3 Support for Regional Integration</p>	<p>4.3.1 Capacity building for governance and service provision</p> <p>4.3.2 Promotion of Human Rights</p> <p>4.3.3 Promotion of improved collaboration between civil society and governments and civic education</p>	<p>4.4.1 Promotion of climate resilient sustainable development in arid and semi-arid zones</p> <p>4.4.2 Monitoring of climate change strengthen early warning and preparedness.</p>
Major risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challenges identifying joint United Nations-IGAD funding • Cooperation from extra-regional actors • Political turbulence due to factors outside the United Nations' sphere of influence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficulty in persuading governments to adopt regional investments • Adequate economic development models for boosting jobs and economic participation are not identified • The severe environmental crisis overwhelms the United Nations and other parties, leading to the removal of peace from the central agenda. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resistance of political actors to improved governance because they are not convinced it will be in their best interests • Civil society misinterprets increased openness as a licence to push too far, creating push-back and human rights violations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate economic development models for boosting jobs and economic participation are not identified.

Figure 1. United Nations Humanitarian, development and peace expenditures in the eight countries of the Horn of Africa, 2016 (US\$ million)(defined as the IGAD countries)



Sources:

For Humanitarian + Development: DESA-data as issued by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). The data cover United Nations Operational Activities for Development only (i.e. Development + Humanitarian), i.e. about 60 per cent of the total United Nations United Nations expenditures. It forms the basis for the financial reporting in the annual report of the Secretary-General on the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR). The best way to feed corrections into this data set is **through the agency of the United Nations**.

www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/statistical_annex_tables_on_funding_flows_2016.xlsx


For Peace: DPKO + DPA data: "3 DPKO+DPA-data" have been collected manually to supplement the DESA data set with expenditure data for United Nations special political missions and United Nations peacekeeping operations as carried out by the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). As such, this data set adds the "Peace and Security" component to the "Humanitarian" and "Development" components of the DESA data set, and allows a full picture of expenditures across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. The best way to know more about this data set will be through the Headquarters of DPKO and DPA.

[www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/5\(Vol.II\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/5(Vol.II)) (Peacekeeping 2016, p. 165, Table V)

[www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/5%20\(Vol.%20II\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/5%20(Vol.%20II)) (Peacekeeping 2017, p. 185, Table V)

www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/365 (Political Missions 2016 and 2017, p. 33, Table 4)

Figure 2. Aggregated United Nations expenditures in countries of the Horn of Africa (defined as the eight country members of IGAD) per agency (US\$ million)



Note: This shows the expenditures that the agencies have reported to be spent in the respective countries. As such, it excludes expenses channelled through regional offices (e.g. WFP or UNICEF regional offices in Nairobi). A number of the agencies have not reported (UNESCO, UNEP, etc.) and are represented by a **zero, as the figure** shows “reported expenditure”.

Sources:

For Humanitarian + Development: DESA-data as issued by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). The data cover United Nations Operational Activities for Development only (i.e. Development + Humanitarian), i.e. around 60 per cent of the total United Nations expenditures. They provide the basis for the financial reporting in the annual report of the Secretary-General on the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR). The best way to feed corrections into this data set is through United Nations agency.

www.un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/statistical_annex_tables_on_funding_flows_2016.xlsx

For Peace: DPKO + DPA data: "3 DPKO+DPA-data have been collected manually to supplement the DESA data set with expenditure data for United Nations special political missions and United Nations peacekeeping operations as carried out by the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). As such, this data set adds the "Peace and Security" component to the “Humanitarian” and “Development” components of the DESA data set, and allows a full picture of expenditures across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. The best way to know more about this data set will be through the Headquarters of DPKO and DPA.

[www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/5\(Vol.II\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/5(Vol.II)) (Peacekeeping 2016, p. 165, Table V)

[www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/5%20\(Vol.%20II\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/72/5%20(Vol.%20II)) (Peacekeeping 2017, p. 185, Table V)

www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/365 (Political Missions 2016 and 2017, p. 33, Table 4).

Annex 3. Acronyms and abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism
DESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department of Political Affairs and Peace-building
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HIPPO	High-Level Panel on Peace Operations
HRuF	Human Rights up Front
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office
NWOW	The New Way of Working
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UN Youth Strategy	Youth 2030: UN Youth Strategy
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMID	United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNON	United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNSOM	United Nations Mission in Somalia
USESSS	United Nations Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan
WFP	World Food Programme

WMO

World Meteorological Organization

¹ Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

² United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Human and Economic Cost of Conflict in the Horn of Africa Implications for a Transformative and Inclusive Post-Conflict Development 2016, <https://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/23726/b11836143.pdf?sequence=1> (Accessed February 2019).

³ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Department of Political Affairs and Peacebuilding (DPPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)/Department of Peace Operations (DPO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON), United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan (OSESS), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and Resident Coordinators in all IGAD countries.

⁴ World Bank, <https://data.worldbank.org>. Accessed 26 May 2018.

⁵ Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) state of the region report, a popular version: formulation of IGAD strategy and medium-term implementation plan 2016–2020: baseline studies at the national level on IGAD priority sectors, January 2016, p. 6.

⁶ Ibid, p. 7.

⁷ World Bank (2018). *Groundwell: Preparing for internal climate migration*. Washington DC.

⁸ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Human and Economic Cost of Conflict in the Horn of Africa Implications for a Transformative and Inclusive Post-Conflict Development 2016. <https://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/23726/b11836143.pdf?sequence=1>. Accessed February 2019.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See World Bank (2018). *Groundwell: Preparing for internal climate migration*. Washington D.C. The World Bank estimates that climate change could force 86 million people in sub-Saharan Africa to migrate by 2050.

¹¹ United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Report of the Strategic Review of the Horn of Africa, August 2016.

¹² World Bank (2018). Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict). <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/pathways-for-peace-inclusive-approaches-to-preventing-violent-conflict>

¹³ Regional United Nations Development Group (R-UNDG) Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) & Western and Central Africa (WCA). Strategic Framework to Support Resilient Development in Africa, www.preventionweb.net/files/57759_undgframeworkforresilientdevelopment.pdf

¹⁴ “A cultural change through which HRuF: asks all staff to recognize human rights and protection of civilians as a core responsibility; asks staff to be principled and act with moral courage; ensures United Nations Headquarters backing for those who do; and demands greater accountability for United Nations action.” https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/overview_of_human_rights_up_front_july_2015.pdf

¹⁵ “An operational change, in the field and at Headquarters, through which HRuF: requires the United Nations system to stay attuned to human rights violations that can signal worse to come; supports better early warning, shared analysis, and strategies; and ensures better coordination and better adapted capacity to respond.” https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/overview_of_human_rights_up_front_july_2015.pdf

¹⁶ “HRuF requires: (i) proactive engagement with national authorities about concerns identified in analysis; and (ii) early and full engagement with Member States to prevent large-scale human rights violations.” https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/overview_of_human_rights_up_front_july_2015.pdf

¹⁷ Antonio Guterres, Integrated Platform on Prevention, Secretary-General’s Memo to Senior United Nations Leadership, February 2018.

¹⁸ United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), a United Nations-AU hybrid mission, United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as well as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), an AU-led operation supported by the United Nations.

¹⁹ See, for example, the DPA Strategic Review of the Horn of Africa, conducted in 2016, as well as the Horn of Africa Assessment, coordinated by UNDP in July 2018.

²⁰ The Informal Working Group is co-chaired by OCHA, UNDP and DPA (now DPPA), and includes agencies, funds and programmes based in the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

²¹ Secretary-General's memo on Integrated Platform on Prevention.

²² HIPPO. Report of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf