Monitoring food security in countries with conflict situations

A joint FAO/WFP update for the United Nations Security Council

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Spotlight on Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lake Chad Basin, South Sudan, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen
“This joint report clearly demonstrates the impact of armed violence on the lives and livelihoods of millions of men, women, boys and girls caught up in conflict. As you read, I would strongly encourage you to keep in mind that behind these seemingly dry statistics are real people experiencing rates of hunger that are simply unacceptable in the twenty-first century.”

José Graziano da Silva
FAO Director-General

“We need better and quicker access in all conflict zones, so we can get to more of the civilians who need our help. But what the world needs most of all is an end to the wars.”

David Beasley
WFP Executive Director
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This report, facilitated by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises, provides United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members with an overview of the magnitude, severity and drivers of acute food insecurity in eight countries and regions that have the world’s highest burden of people in need of emergency food, nutrition and livelihood assistance as a result of protracted conflict combined with other factors. These countries are: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, South Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. According to latest analyses from late 2018 (mainly Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]), around 56 million people need urgent food and livelihood assistance in these countries.

In five of these countries (Yemen, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic) the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity increased in the latter part of 2018 because of conflict, demonstrating that the link between conflict and hunger remains all too persistent. The other three (Somalia, Syrian Arabic Republic and Lake Chad Basin) have seen improvements in food security in line with improvements in security, although a major deterioration is projected during the 2019 lean season across Lake Chad Basin.

The United Nations (UN) is working to reduce conflict – and the impact of it – in all countries covered in this report. UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018) calls on all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) regarding the protection of civilians – including aid workers – in conflict. However, violence against humanitarian workers is growing, sometimes forcing organizations to suspend operations and depriving vulnerable populations of humanitarian assistance. Ensuring all parties to conflict honour their obligations under IHL to minimize impact of military actions on civilians, their livelihoods and medical facilities is critical if this growth in acute food insecurity is to be stemmed. All parties to conflict must do more to enable humanitarian actors to reach civilians in need with lifesaving food, nutritional and medical assistance in a safe and timely manner to reduce the millions of men, women and children going hungry as a result of armed conflict.

Afghanistan

In late 2018 Afghanistan was experiencing the worst food insecurity emergency since 2011 because of large-scale drought taking place amid the protracted conflict, forcing more than half a million to abandon their homes in 2018. The percentage of rural Afghans facing acute food insecurity in line with improvements in security, although a major deterioration is projected during the 2019 lean season across Lake Chad Basin.

Central African Republic

In the Central African Republic, acute food insecurity rose during the lean season, despite assistance. The situation was particularly dire for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host families in conflict-affected areas of the centre north and east. Some 1.9 million people were experiencing severe food deficits in August 2018 with over half a million classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Armed conflict remained the major driver of this alarming situation, especially in prefectures where both host communities and displaced people had lost access to their livelihoods and insecurity undermined the consistent delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Executive summary

1 The Global Network Against Food Crises, launched by the European Commissioners for International Cooperation and Development and for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, the FAO Director-General and the WFP Executive Director at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016, is conceived as a consensus-building coordination and decision support platform to combat food crises from humanitarian and development perspectives and tackle the root causes of these crises.

2 FEWS NET. Afghanistan Key Message Update, November 2018.
Democratic Republic of the Congo

After Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had the highest number (13 million) of acutely food insecure people in urgent need of assistance in the second half of 2018. Although at 23 percent of the population analysed, the prevalence was far lower than that in Yemen, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Afghanistan, it marked a big rise since the latter half of 2017 (11 percent). The rise in armed conflict in Ituri and South Kivu, escalation of fighting in the eastern and southern areas, and the humanitarian crisis in the Kasai region were key contributors to this worsening situation. Localized floods compounded the impact of persistent insecurity, disrupting agricultural activities, markets and humanitarian assistance. An ongoing outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) has seen more than 300 cases confirmed in the eastern part of the country.³

Lake Chad Basin

Although security improved in Lake Chad Basin in the second half of 2018, food security eluded millions of people as the nine-year conflict and population displacements continued to undermine food production and trade, humanitarian access, households’ purchasing power, and people’s ability to stay healthy. The number of people needing urgent assistance in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states almost halved from around 2.6 million in October–December 2017 to 1.7 million in October–December 2018. Yet nearly one million people remained in hard-to-reach areas. At the regional level, around 1.8 million people were in need of urgent assistance across the three northeastern Nigerian states, the Lac region in Chad and the Diffa region in Niger between October and December 2018. A major deterioration is projected during the lean season (June–August 2019) when 3 million people are expected to face Crisis (Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3), Emergency (CH Phase 4) and Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity across northeastern Nigeria’s three states, Chad’s Lac region and Niger’s Diffa.

Somalia

In Somalia, the number of people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance in July 2018 was almost half that of a year earlier (down to 1.8 million in July 2018 from 3.3 million in July 2017) when the country was in the grip of an alarming drought situation.⁴ The availability of the 2018 Gu season crops and the delivery of sustained and large-scale humanitarian assistance prompted a marked recovery. However, acute food insecurity remained severe in some areas, with the centre north and east the worst hit. The country’s 2.6 million people internally displaced by drought, floods, conflict and insecurity⁵ were extremely vulnerable to acute food insecurity. Pastoralist populations in the northwest and central areas that suffered massive livestock losses during the 2016/17 drought and cyclone Sagar, and riverine populations in the south affected by flooding in April and May 2018 were also highly vulnerable.

South Sudan

At the peak of the 2018 lean season, 59 percent of the analysed population in South Sudan or 6 million people needed urgent food and livelihood assistance compared with 55 percent during the same period last year. Several counties had populations classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Five years of persistent conflict, widespread and recurrent displacement, record low 2017 cereal production, very high food prices, loss of livelihoods and limited access to markets drove hunger. Although insecurity severely restricted the ability to reach many of those in need, large-scale humanitarian assistance was instrumental in preventing a further deterioration of the food security situation. A September peace deal provided for the resumption of oil production in some areas,⁶ which strengthened the local currency and pushed down prices of staple foods. However, different forms of conflict persisted, and the lean season is expected to start earlier than normal, pushing those in need of urgent support up to more than 5 million between January and March 2019.

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⁵ UNHCR. Somalia Factsheet 1-30 September 2018.
⁶ FAO GIEWS. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis bulletin, October 10, 2018.
Syrian Arab Republic

In the Syrian Arab Republic, where the conflict is now in its eighth year, 5.5 million people were in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance in August 2018. This marks an improvement upon the 6.5 million Syrians in need of urgent food assistance in November 2017. While security considerably improved in many parts of the country, conflict continued in other areas, undermining the country’s socio-economic base and agricultural production. When combined with erratic weather, this rendered millions of Syrians reliant on food and livelihood assistance. About 1.2 million people were in hard-to-reach areas, particularly in Rural Damascus, Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Deir ez-Zor, Quneitra and Dar’a, where agencies struggled to carry out assessments and consistently reach those in need with humanitarian assistance.

Yemen

In late 2018 the crisis in Yemen reached a critical point that starkly demonstrated the unequivocal link between conflict and hunger and the urgent need for an implemented cessation of hostilities to avert famine. It was labelled as the worst human-made disaster in modern history. Some 15.9 million people – more than half (53 percent) of the total population – were in urgent need of food and livelihood assistance (IPC Phases 3 and above) from December 2018 to January 2019, even when taking into account the mitigating effects of the current levels of food assistance. Around 65 000 of them were classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and 5 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). However, in the hypothetical case of a complete absence of Humanitarian Assistance, a number of districts should be classified as Famine Likely.

Since the middle of 2018 the stop-start battle for control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast has compounded the hardships facing the highly vulnerable population of Hodeida, home to 600 000 people and a gateway for trade that is a lifeline for two thirds of the country’s population. At the same time, a long-running siege of Taizz created widespread food insecurity and, in addition to two million severely food insecure, there was a pocket of 10 000 people in the city in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

Conflicting parties disregarded the protected status of humanitarian facilities and personnel, making scaling up operations to prevent famine a difficult and dangerous endeavour. However, as this report went to press, the Yemeni parties had agreed to a mutual withdrawal from Hodeidah, a role for the UN in supporting managing the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Isa, and partial lifting of the siege of Taizz for humanitarian purposes.

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10 WFP. Yemen Market Watch Issue No. 28, September 2018.
11 Famine Likely means famine is likely happening but limited evidence does not allow confirmation.
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVD</td>
<td>Ebola virus disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Cadre Harmonisé</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FEWS NET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning Systems Network</td>
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<td>FSIN</td>
<td>Food Security Information Network</td>
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<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Global Acute Malnutrition</td>
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<td>GIEWS</td>
<td>Global Information and Early Warning System</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Phase Classification</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>Non-state armed group</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHZ</td>
<td>Weight for height z score</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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This is the fifth report that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) have jointly produced for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since June 2016, but with a marked shift in focus from the previous four reports. In May 2018 the UNSC passed Resolution 2417, which condemned the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare and the unlawful denial of humanitarian relief supply in situations of armed conflict. Seven months on from the adoption of the Resolution, this report examines ongoing hunger-conflict dynamics and shines a spotlight on the people in eight countries experiencing protracted conflict and who are in urgent need of food, livelihood and nutrition assistance. For each of these countries this report provides updated figures on the numbers of acutely food insecure people since the last update for the UNSC in July 2018 and highlights the worst-affected areas within these countries and how the situation has changed since the last comparable period in 2017.

The overall aim of this report is to provide UNSC members with up-to-date acute food insecurity estimates in this group of key conflict-affected countries and to reinforce the urgent need to target efforts towards resolving conflict in order to end hunger.

This report is part of a series of analytical products facilitated by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) which also include the publication of the annual Global Report on Food Crises and inform the Global Network Against Food Crises.
Methods

Selection of countries/territories

This fifth issue of the FAO/WFP joint report to the UNSC on acute food insecurity in countries affected by conflict analyses eight countries that are experiencing protracted conflict and extremely grave levels of conflict-related hunger. The Global Report on Food Crises 2018 had identified these eight countries as being those with the world’s highest burden of conflicted-related acutely food insecure people in need of life-saving assistance. Across all eight countries and regions the total peak number of acutely food insecure people in 2017 was 59 million.

Six of the countries have a UN peacekeeping mission and/or political mission to reduce conflict and the impact of it: Afghanistan and Somalia host United Nations Assistance Missions (Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA] and Assistance Mission in Somalia [UNSOM]), while the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Somalia have peacekeeping missions (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic [MINUSCA], Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUSCO], Mission in South Sudan [UNMISS]). There are UN Special Envoys for the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

Data sources

The data for six out of the eight countries comes from the latest IPC analyses, which provide a ‘common currency’ for classifying food insecurity into different phases of severity. IPC analyses use international standards that allow for comparisons of situations across countries and over time. This report includes the numbers of people in the three most severe phases considered Crisis (Phase 3), Emergency (Phase 4) and Catastrophe (Phase 5) (See Annex 1 – IPC table), and who are in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance. Populations in Stress (IPC Phase 2) are also indicated where relevant, although they require a different set of actions – ideally more long-term resilience-building interventions.

For northeast Nigeria the data is from the November CH analysis, which is employed in the Sahel and West Africa, and uses similar standards to IPC to classify acute food insecurity. IPC and CH share the same phase scales and descriptions.

For the Syrian Arab Republic, where no IPC was available, the number of food insecure people in need of assistance came from the October 2018 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission. The assessment employed extensive qualitative research methods to complement a national quantitative survey of 6 012 households as well as data from WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping surveys and the Syrian Arab Republic’s Food Security Sector.

For the analysis of drivers of food security in each of these countries, the authors have employed a wide range of secondary data sources to support the information provided in the IPC analyses themselves. These include situation reports from agencies such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), country briefs from FAO, Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS), Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU); food assistance fact sheets from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); food security and crop prospect outlooks from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET); market price watch bulletins from WFP and humanitarian bulletins and needs overviews from OCHA.

1 FSIN, March 2018.
2 This is authorised by the UNSC but run by the African Union.
Upholding Resolution 2417: opportunities and challenges

On 24 May 2018, UNSC unanimously endorsed Resolution 2417, which paves the way for addressing conflict-induced hunger. The Resolution is an unambiguous condemnation of starvation and a tool of war and places the protection of, and access to, the most vulnerable in situations of conflict on the agenda of the UNSC.

UNSC Resolution 2417 identifies a series of actions and measures to address IHL violations. It also calls for early warning briefings when the risk of conflict-induced famine and wide-spread food insecurity in armed conflicts occurs, calls for humanitarian access to be granted, and provides the UNSC with a toolkit for action to respond to situations where denial of access takes place. It calls on all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under IHL regarding the protection of civilians and highlights that armed conflicts, violations of international law and related food insecurity can also be drivers of displacement. Securing the means to produce food and investing in safeguarding agriculture-based livelihoods during conflicts is also essential.

This section seeks to inform the monitoring of implementation of Resolution 2417 by UNSC members in the eight countries and regions profiled in this report. It explores some of the impacts of armed conflict on civilians, the challenges of securing safe, timely and unimpeded humanitarian assistance, as well as the humanitarian and development work that has been undertaken to mitigate food insecurity. It argues that seven months after the passage of UNSC Resolution 2417, the situations in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lake Chad Basin, South Sudan, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen demonstrate that the link between conflict and hunger remains all too persistent. Not only are civilians put at risk, displaced and subject to trauma during conflict, but also, they all too frequently find themselves severely food insecure and even at risk of famine.

The UNSC Resolution 2417 is a clear message from the UN that the growing number of protracted conflicts in the world is creating unprecedented and unacceptable levels of hunger. All parties to conflicts are responsible for ensuring they do not target civilians and objects necessary for food production and distribution, or objects that are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, including crops, livestock and water sources. Beyond that, conflict actors must do more to enable humanitarian actors to reach civilians in need in a safe and timely manner. Only when these fundamental principles are followed will we be able to reduce the millions of men, women and children going hungry due to armed conflict.

**Conflict and hunger dynamics in protracted conflicts**

The situations in the countries covered in this report are indicative of two wider trends affecting conflict and hunger – the global increase in both the number and duration of conflicts. Each affected country is experiencing a complex, protracted emergency. Conflict has been persistent for decades in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and South Sudan, in one form or another. While the civil conflicts in Central African Republic, Yemen and Syrian Arab Republic began more recently, attempts to secure a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen this year and in the Central African Republic last year – on top of years of peace efforts in all three countries – have been unable to halt conflict and generate sustainable peace on the ground.

As new conflicts emerge and finding sustainable political resolutions to ongoing crises is increasingly difficult, the number of acutely food insecure civilians continues to grow, with 74 million people in conflict-affected areas experiencing acute food insecurity. Adherence to IHL is critical if this growth in acute food insecurity is to be stemmed. This means ensuring wars are fought in ways that their impact on civilians’ homes and livelihoods is avoided and that civilians’ access to lifesaving food, nutritional and medical assistance and the ability to produce food is ensured.

The UN is working to reduce conflict – and the impact of it – in the countries covered in this report. Afghanistan and Somalia host UN Assistance Missions; there are UN Special Envoys for the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen; and there are peacekeeping missions in Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia (authorized by the UNSC but run by the African
Union) and South Sudan. Despite these ongoing efforts, conflicts persist and each of these countries experience conflict-related hunger on a massive scale, due in part to clear IHL violations by conflict parties.

**Attacks on aid workers**

Aid workers and facilities were attacked this year in all eight countries covered in this report. Deliberate targeting of aid workers is an IHL violation specifically mentioned in UNSC Resolution 2417, and it undermines humanitarian efforts to reduce conflict-related food insecurity. While there are many motives behind attacks on aid workers and facilities, in some areas of northern Nigeria, armed groups have abducted and killed aid workers based on their rejection of principled humanitarian action.

In the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, UN peacekeepers have at times, and upon request, provided force protection to humanitarian agencies that could otherwise not serve populations in hard-to-reach areas. The use of armed escorts is a last resort that illustrates the extent to which some local armed actors in these countries do not adhere to the basic tenets of IHL.

In other locations, aid workers have engaged in extensive discussions over the use of humanitarian corridors, which often do not provide the kind of sustained and quality access that is required to address a chronic food deficit, and which present additional security risks for humanitarian actors.

**Cessations of hostilities**

Despite calls for cessations of hostilities in both the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen in 2018, conflict and conflict-related hunger continued. In February 2018, the UNSC passed Resolution 2401, calling for a one-month humanitarian pause in the Syrian Arab Republic. This was not implemented and fighting led to an unprecedented level of displacement with 1.3 million civilians forced out of their homes by fighting and/or loss of their livelihoods in the first half of 2018.

In 2017, regional leaders developed the Astana Process for the Syrian Arab Republic, which called for the cessation of hostilities between government forces and most non-state armed groups in four de-escalation zones. The deal laid out areas where government forces and most non-state armed groups should halt hostilities for six months and where the Syrian government would allow unhindered humanitarian aid and restore public services, such as electricity and water.

Currently, Idlib is the only remaining de-escalation zone in the Syrian Arab Republic. The area now hosts nearly three million people, some of who moved there from other de-escalation zones that no longer exist.

In early September, the UN Secretary-General said that a battle for Idlib could unleash a “humanitarian nightmare unlike anything seen in the blood-soaked Syrian conflict so far.” Soon after, there was an agreement to maintain the Idlib de-escalation zone, though a permanent solution remains elusive.

Regarding Yemen, in September, WFP’s Executive Director called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and condemned “any attempt to use humanitarian aid and facilities as tools of war” while FAO’s Director-General said in November that “Yemen was living proof of an apocalyptic equation: conflict and food insecurity go hand in hand.”

After months of fighting, hostilities increased in early November around the critical port city of Hodeidah through which the vast majority of food imports pass. In response, WFP is working with partners to establish humanitarian hubs around the city. This protection-oriented programming enables civilians to leave their homes when there is a break in fighting, seek immediate assistance through a blanket distribution and return back to safety, ensuring civilians are not exposed to additional protection risks when seeking assistance.

Hodeidah is of particular importance because there is only one open road between it and much of the rest of the country. Fighting also risks a de facto siege of the 200,000 people who have not been able to flee the city and cuts off the lifeline for much of the rest of the country. Conflicting parties in Yemen agreed in December to

7 AWSD. The Aid Worker Security Database, 1997-present.
8 UN Press Statement, UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria, 17 September 2018.
11 Ibid.
12 UN News. Save Idlib from ‘transforming into a blood bath’, 11 September 2018.
13 Ibid.
14 WFP. WFP Chief urges all sides in Yemen to end conflict and support peace, 19 September 2018.
15 FAO. The world cannot stand by watching Yemen’s human tragedy 6 November 2018.
16 WFP. WFP Chief urges all sides in Yemen to end conflict and support peace, 19 September 2018.
mutual withdrawals from the city and ports and to the UN’s support for port management.\textsuperscript{17}

The IPC released in December 2018 reported that 53 percent of Yemen’s population face severe acute food insecurity – or worse.\textsuperscript{18} WFP will scale up its response to provide assistance to up to 12 million people and FAO is expanding livelihoods support to Yemen’s predominantly rural population and at-risk communities to enable them to produce and access food, even when other forms of assistance are infrequent or disrupted by fighting. However, conflicting parties continue to disregard the protected status of humanitarian facilities and personnel, making scaling up operations a difficult and dangerous endeavour. The consequences could be dire unless the conflicting parties take action and adhere to commitments to protect critical infrastructure and humanitarian facilities and to enable humanitarian access by protecting humanitarian operations and reducing bureaucratic impediments.

\textbf{Hard-to-reach areas}

Overall, humanitarian actors were able to reach most areas in the countries covered in this report, but some locations have been and remain hard to reach. Even when access was obtained, in some areas it came after lengthy delays, with restrictions on personnel or the type or quantity of aid supplies, or was limited by insufficient security guarantees.\textsuperscript{19} Overall, this meant securing access was more time consuming, costly and that aid delivery to civilians in need was inadequate or inconsistent during certain periods.\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, it is estimated that nearly 3 million people live in parts of northeastern Nigeria and Somalia where armed groups who reject principled humanitarian action operate, often making it impossible to provide assistance.\textsuperscript{21, 22}

In some parts of the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, civilians have been subject to siege conditions. In these locations, conflict or acts by conflicting parties inhibited the commercial supply of food, disrupted market functionality, and placed arbitrary restrictions on humanitarian access. The longest-running siege in the modern era, in Eastern Ghouta, ended in April.\textsuperscript{23} Prior to that, an uptick in bombardment prevented civilians from farming in the area’s breadbasket while conflict actors increasingly limited humanitarian assistance, leading to malnutrition.\textsuperscript{24, 25, 26} Also in the Syrian Arab Republic, for most of this year (until early November) the UN was unable to reach Rukban, home to 50,000 of the most desperate people in the country.\textsuperscript{27} Other areas, such as Taiz in Yemen, remain hard to reach, at least some of the time.\textsuperscript{28}

Parties with responsibilities under IHL to ensure that siege warfare tactics spare civilian populations, objects necessary for food production and distribution, markets and humanitarian personnel and consignments have, at times, not lived up to their responsibilities, putting civilian populations in danger and in dire need of assistance that cannot reach them.

South Sudanese counties that were in famine in 2017 – in part because they were hard to reach – were again hard to reach in early 2018. After months of work to secure safe humanitarian access, a WFP-led humanitarian response began in Leer and Mayendit counties in Unity state in July.\textsuperscript{29} FAO participated in the response providing fast-maturing vegetable seeds and fishing equipment to provide affected households with quick access to nutritious food. Since armed actors frequently attacked civilians, forcing them to flee, the humanitarian response included plastic sheeting, so civilians could wrap their food and bury it to prevent it from being stolen during attacks. Simultaneous assessments conducted during the aid operation found that areas were

\begin{itemize}
  \item UN OSESGY. Security Council Briefing of the Special Envoy for Yemen, 14 December 2018.
  \item UN. Briefing Security Council on Syria Ceasefire Resolution, 12 March 2018.
  \item Ibid.
  \item Kallon, E. Humanitarian Response Plan for Spreading Crisis in Nigeria. IPS News Agency. 8 February 2018.
  \item WFP. WFP reaches families trapped in Eastern Ghouta, 31 October 2017.
  \item UN. Briefing Security Council on Syria Ceasefire Resolution, 12 March 2018.
  \item WFP. Life under bombardment in Syria’s Daouma, 22 March 2018.
  \item UNSG. Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Eastern, 20 February 2018.
  \item UN News. Syria: UN chief welcomes first aid convoy to Rukban camp since January, 3 November 2018.
  \item OCHA. Syrian Arab Republic: Overview of hard-to-reach locations, 29 October 2018.
  \item WFP. WFP South Sudan Situation Report #233, 6 July 2018, and WFP South Sudan Situation Report #235, 4 August 2018.
\end{itemize}
in Famine (IPC Phase 5) before receiving assistance, while those assessed after distributions had better food security conditions, demonstrating that assistance can be the difference between life and death for those living in hard-to-reach areas.

In Afghanistan, the deteriorating security has adversely affected humanitarian space across the country in 2018. The ability of aid workers to move staff and assets throughout the country has increasingly been hampered by insecurity along key transit routes. Violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities continued to be the most reported of all access constraints in 2018. At the same time however new opportunities have emerged, through the work of the Humanitarian Access Group, for both direct and indirect humanitarian negotiations with parties to the conflict. Both government and non-state armed group (NSAG) representatives have recently emphasized their willingness to allow cross line operations to alleviate human suffering, in particular in drought affected areas. In this regard the Humanitarian Access Group continues to support a humanitarian environment that fosters a more open dialogue around engaging with NSAG for improved humanitarian outcomes. 

Dedicated funding from the Afghanistan Humanitarian Fund to selected hard-to-reach areas influenced or controlled by NSAGs, together with greater investment in partnership with national NGOs has increased operational capacity in some of these locations in 2018.

Protecting medical facilities and personnel to enable nutrition responses

UNSC Resolution 2417 also identifies the linkage between protection of medical facilities and the prevention of famine and food insecurity. In Yemen, conflict, attacks on medical facilities and the lack of salary payments to medical staff have led to the closure of more than half of the country’s medical facilities. This has left most of the country’s 500,000 children who are suffering from severe acute malnutrition unable to receive life-saving nutritional support and other treatment. Malnutrition makes children more vulnerable to illness and, combined with lack of access to healthcare, leads to preventable deaths.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed conflict is inhibiting the response to the second largest EVD outbreak in history in North Kivu – an area plagued by armed conflict and long-standing food security challenges. Medical responders work closely with WFP to ensure that affected populations have nutritionally-appropriate food while ill and in recovery, and that those under quarantine are provided with food so that they do not need to leave their homes and risk spreading the disease. FAO's support for the public health crisis during the 2018 EVD outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo included the establishment of an FAO Incident Coordination Group. The group, activated on 11 May 2018, also supported the sharing of information and coordination of resources for rabies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Attacks on health workers and food security and nutrition actors’ inability to obtain security guarantees from NSAGs means it is much more difficult to provide the food and nutrition response necessary to contain the outbreak.

In Afghanistan attacks on education and healthcare facilities are now almost a daily occurrence. By September 2018, 72 health facilities had been forcibly closed and four destroyed depriving additional 3.5 million people of access to primary healthcare.

Drought and conflict

The food security consequences of drought in parts of Afghanistan and South Sudan, and of devastating floods following four consecutive years of drought in Somalia, have been aggravated by the impact of decades of conflict in these countries. Persistent insecurity undermines efforts to develop long-term solutions to cyclical drought and erodes the resilience of households to withstand and bounce back from climatic disasters.

In Afghanistan, decades of conflict have undermined the country’s coping mechanisms and protective capacity increasing the likelihood that hazard events turn into disasters with large humanitarian and economic consequences. Protracted conflict had already uprooted millions from their homes, destroyed livelihoods and driven down wages, so by the time the drought emergency was declared in April 2018, people had...
exhausted their capacities to cope and food insecurity rose to staggering levels. \(^38\)\(^39\) The November 2018 IPC report indicated that 9.8 million people were facing severe acute food insecurity (IPC Phases 3 and 4), representing more than 40 percent of the total rural population. Farmers were particularly hard hit, with 92 percent having no means to plant for the main season’s production, with major implications for food availability in 2019. While FAO hugely scaled up its support in time for the main season, millions still need urgent assistance. Drought-induced displacement has resulted in significant demographic changes across various parts of the country. Between June and August 2018 alone 263,000 people were displaced by drought in Badghis and Hirat provinces leading to sprawling informal settlements which expose affected populations to a number of additional threats.\(^40\)

It has been documented that, in certain contexts, drought can exacerbate existing tensions and increase the likelihood of violence in communities that are agriculturally dependent, already vulnerable and/or politically marginalized.\(^41\) In some parts of South Sudan, communities have resorted to raiding livestock and destroying or stealing crops, contributing to a cycle of violence that undermines livelihoods and further exposes rural communities to acute hunger. Successful examples of conflict prevention intervention exist. For example, in the Horn of Africa, FAO is working with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to build the resilience of cross-border communities, including in Liben (Ethiopia), Mandera (Kenya) and Gedo (Somalia). Activities are aimed at preventing and mitigating the aggravating factors of conflict and displacement, particularly around natural resource access and use, cross-border trade and marketing, and prevention of livestock pest and disease spread. These include enhancing the capacities of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism to monitor cross-border pastoralist-related conflicts and develop contingency plans and early action mechanisms. Similar interventions can and should be replicated.

Localised raiding, skirmishes and attacks on civilians fuel conflict-related hunger

In the Central African Republic and South Sudan, political crises have led to persistent violence, armed groups are still highly active and often prey on civilians, and the number of food insecure people in both countries continues to grow. Traders transporting food must pay to pass armed checkpoints, which raises food costs beyond what most people can afford. Armed actors have also looted civilians’ food and, during fighting, targeted crops by burning fields.\(^42\)

In South Sudan, a June 2018 peace agreement reduced the overall level of violence, while in the Central African Republic the number of armed groups operating along communal or ethnic lines is growing. Both countries experience cattle raiding and intercommunal conflict.\(^43\) Cattle raiding deprives pastoralists of their livelihoods, raises food insecurity levels, and can lead to cycles of revenge violence. It causes displacement and restricts humanitarian access. In both countries, abuses by armed groups and/or security forces are driving repeated displacement and plunging communities, already weakened by the multiple cycles of conflict, into humanitarian crisis with increased rates of food insecurity and malnutrition.\(^44\)

Localized insecurity, particularly when violence targets civilians and their livelihoods, is an increasingly common by-product of protracted conflicts and an under-recognised driver of food insecurity. Even when wars end, localized violence and food insecurity may persist. This is why UNSC Resolution 2417 calls upon all actors to redouble efforts to prevent and reduce conflict in order to reverse the trend in increasing numbers of food insecure people and to prevent famine. In some parts of the Sahel and West Africa, the relations between farmers and pastoral livestock herders, which was once cooperative and symbiotic, has become increasingly confrontational and violent in a context of increasing insecurity. The direct impacts of these conflicts include intentional targeting and physical destruction of lives and livelihoods. Less apparent, but more pernicious, are the indirect impacts caused by the gradual erosion of livelihoods assets, such as those resulting from disruption of mobility, population displacement, disease and pest outbreaks, and food insecurity and malnutrition.\(^45\)

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\(^38\) UN News. ‘Time for important decisions,’ head of UN in Afghanistan tells Security Council, 17 September 2018.

\(^39\) The Government of Afghanistan officially declared a drought emergency in April 2018 following months of persistent dryness in at least 20 provinces.

\(^40\) Afghanistan 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan


\(^43\) FAO GIEWS. Food Price Monitoring and Analysis bulletin, No. 8, October 10, 2018.


\(^45\) FAO. Internal sources – Violent conflict between herders and farmers in West and central Africa: drivers and the way towards peace building.
Afghanistan

Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Drought, conflict, forced displacement and returnees
Large-scale drought in 2018 taking place amid a protracted conflict escalated the food crisis, making this Afghanistan’s worst food insecurity emergency since the 2011 drought. The percentage of rural Afghans facing acute food deficits was projected to reach 47 percent (10.6 million) from November 2018 to February 2019 if urgent life-saving assistance was not provided. Of these, 2.9 million people could face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity in the winter if they do not receive support, according to preliminary IPC indications.

- Poor households are dependent on rainfed wheat production and livestock. Particularly in northern, northeastern, and northwestern areas, they are most likely to face severe food deficits until the spring crops are harvested.

- Some 27 of Afghanistan’s 34 rural provinces were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Three provinces – Bagdhis, Nuristan and Kandahar – were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).
- In the worst-affected province of Badghis, 45 percent of the population was facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The highest absolute numbers of people in need of assistance were in Hirat, Helmand, Nangarhar and Badakhshan provinces.
- The actual food security outcomes may be worse than those indicated in the latest IPC analysis. While the previous IPC exercise covered urban as well as rural areas, it excluded urban settings. Cities are absorbing many displaced people who might have exhausted their capacities to cope.

Afghanistan, IPC acute food insecurity situation

August–October 2018

November 2018–February 2019

IPN acute food insecurity phase classification

Source: IPC Afghanistan Technical Working Group, August 2018

1. FEWS NET. Afghanistan, Key message update, September 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

A year of increasing violence

Last year saw a further increase in violence across Afghanistan, as the Taliban made territorial gains, targeted Afghan National Defense and Security Forces bases and outposts, and carried out high-profile attacks across the country. In July, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released figures showing that the first half of 2018 was the deadliest for Afghan civilians since the Mission began documenting casualties in 2009. The number of civilians harmed in the October parliamentary elections was higher than in the four previous elections with at least 435 casualties of whom 56 people were killed. In the first seven months of 2018, 23 aid workers were killed, 37 injured and 74 abducted, making Afghanistan the second most dangerous country to work in the aid sector and blocking relief from reaching civilians.

Although imported staple foods were available, and a lid was largely maintained on food prices, conflict limited physical and financial access to markets.

Drought

The great majority of people in need in 2018 have been affected by drought (4 million out of 6.3 million people in need) and the steep increase in food insecurity in rural areas in 2018 was to a great extent because of drought. The lack of water had such a dramatic effect because the local coping capacities (of institutions and households) are depleted by decades of conflict and the ability to deliver aid was highly constrained by the intensification of violence.

The Government of Afghanistan officially declared a drought emergency in April 2018 following months of persistent dryness in at least 20 provinces over the winter. Many farmers, particularly in the rainfed areas, were unable to cultivate spring and summer crops, and the area of cultivated irrigated land fell, mostly because of lack of water availability. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock estimated a national wheat production deficit for the 2017/18 main cropping season of 2–2.5 million tonnes, with production 28 percent below the five-year average. Preliminary production estimates indicated that the 2018 wheat harvest would be the lowest since 2011.

During the post-harvest period (July–August 2018), the drought was most severe in the western, northern and southern regions. Most households resorted to emergency livelihood coping techniques such as moving to cities, distress-selling of breeding livestock, consuming seeds and reducing planting areas, compromising their ability to deal with future shocks. Some 92 percent of farmers reported having insufficient or no seeds for the next planting season. Livestock farmers pointed to desiccation of extensive pastureland, and almost half (48 percent) of pastoralists reported reduced livestock productivity and an increase in animal deaths. Based on historical trends and on the likelihood of El Niño phenomenon occurring in 2018/19, above-average snowfall/rainfall could benefit the winter grains season in Afghanistan, but could also potentially provoke flooding, and increased risk of landslides washing away seeds, destroying standing crops/stocks and increasing livestock mortality.

Conflict and drought-displaced Afghans and returnees face bleak winter

Afghanistan presents a complex picture of displacement. As of June 2018, about 1.9 million people were internally displaced in host communities. Between 2012 and 2018 about the same number returned to Afghanistan from abroad and more than 2 million IDPs returned to their homes. In the first ten months of the year, 271,857 people were reportedly newly displaced by

3 Council on Foreign Relations. War in Afghanistan, November 2018.
5 UNAMA. 2018 Elections Violence, 6 November 2018.
7 FAO. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture, October–December 2018.
9 USAID. Food Assistance Fact Sheet (Updated), 22 September 2018.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 FAO. 2018/19 El Niño, High risk countries and potential impacts on food security and agriculture.
15 IOM. DTM Afghanistan Baseline Mobility Assessment Summary Results, April–June 2018.
conflict, with northeastern, northern and western regions most affected.\textsuperscript{16} By September 2018, 275,000 had been internally displaced by drought over the course of the year,\textsuperscript{17} primarily people leaving their rural homes for urban centres in Badghis, Daykindi, Ghor and Hirat provinces.

OCHA’s July–September bulletin reported that despite increased efforts of humanitarian partners, living conditions for families displaced by the drought in Hirat City remained harsh as winter approached.\textsuperscript{18}

According to IOM, in the first eight months of 2018 around 538,000 undocumented Afghani nationals repatriated from Iran and about 25,000 from Pakistan,\textsuperscript{19} many of whom were likely facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity.\textsuperscript{20} Limited access to potable water and poor sanitation conditions, particularly among IDPs, increased rates of malnutrition.\textsuperscript{21} According to a recent perception survey, 39 percent of the population would now leave the country if they had the opportunity to do so, with insecurity and unemployment given as top reasons. However, an increasingly untenable and inhospitable environment in Iran and Europe has left many with no alternative but to stay.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
  \item UNHCR. Operational Portal Refugee Situation – Afghanistan, November 2018.
  \item FAO. Early Warning Early Action report on food security and agriculture, October–December 2018.
  \item FEWS NET. Afghanistan, Key Message Update, September 2018.
  \item USAID. Food Assistance Fact Sheet September 2018.
  \item Afghanistan 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan
\end{itemize}
The Central African Republic

Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Armed conflict and intercommunal violence, displacement, agricultural stagnation and high food prices
Armed conflict remained the major driver of the alarming food security situation, especially in the IDP sites of Batangafo, Kaga Bandoro, Rafai and in the prefectures of Ouham Pendé, Nana Gribizi, Ouaka and Haut-Mbomou as both host communities and displaced people had lost access to their livelihoods.

- In August 2018 the number of acutely food insecure people was 300,000 higher than in March, according to the September IPC analysis.
- Around one in four of the acutely food insecure people in the Central African Republic were in concentrations – relatively safe zones in main towns – where IDPs are living in settlements or are hosted by families.
- As of October 2018, internal displacement reached about 643,000 people.  

The number of people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance increased – by 13 percent – since the previous IPC analysis in March mainly because of the ongoing armed conflict affecting households' livelihoods and access to food.

IDPs and host families in conflict-affected areas of the northwest, centre and east were the worst hit with an alarming gap between food availability and food needs.

The Central African Republic, IPC acute food insecurity situation

August 2018

IPC acute food insecurity phase classification
- Minimal
- Stressed
- Crisis
- Emergency
- Famine
- Areas with inadequate evidence
- Not analysed

Displaced population in camps (colour depicts phase classification)
No longer a camp area (colour depicts phase classification)
Area would likely be at least 1 phase worse without the effects of humanitarian assistance

Source: IPC The Central African Republic Technical Working Group, August 2018

1 OCHA. Bulletin humanitaire République centrafricaine, October 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

Increase in abuses by armed groups and intercommunal conflict

The number of security incidents and conflict-related civilian deaths fell in 2018 – attributed to local peace agreements and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes – but the security situation in the Central African Republic remained dire. Documented human rights violations and abuses by armed groups and security forces increased, particularly around Bria, the capital of Haute-Kotto, where tensions drove a flow of displaced people into the city. At the end of September, Bria was hosting around 94,000 displaced people compared with 50,000 in August 2018, most of them living in the PK3 site, putting huge pressure on humanitarian assistance.

Acts of violence against humanitarian workers persisted: 338 cases of violence were registered in the first 10 months of the year. Between August and September, there were 39 armed robberies of humanitarian facilities, involving physical violence against personnel and forcing several organizations to suspend operations, depriving vulnerable populations of humanitarian assistance.

Intercommunal conflict between farmers and nomadic pastoralists during the transhumance season (October–May) in the border areas with Cameroon, Chad, South Sudan and the Sudan destabilized food availability and access. Households were unable to engage in agricultural and livestock activities, which depleted their food stocks, inflated prices, and compelled nearly half to adopt negative coping mechanisms.

Repeatedly displaced people and returnees highly vulnerable

Repeated displacement is plunging communities, already weakened by the multiple cycles of conflict, into humanitarian crisis, and increasing the rates of malnutrition. As of October, internal displacement reached about 643,000 people. Most IDPs (60 percent) live with host families and the remainder in settlements. They live in precarious conditions and often have movement restrictions imposed on them by armed groups, preventing them from accessing agricultural fields, and buying food at the market. Poor sanitation, poor access to safe drinking water and the collapse of the primary health care system increase the risk of diseases spreading and epidemics erupting.

In some prefectures, displaced populations represented a significant proportion of the total population, particularly in Haute Kotto where they significantly outnumbered their hosts (85 percent), followed by Haut Mbomou, Nana Gribizi and Ouaka. Host families have to cope with the increase in household size, the squeeze on their household budgets and competition for work, which can become a source of conflict.

The number of displaced ebbs and flows according to the intensity of violence. While some people still continued to abandon their homes, more than 300,000 returned to their homes in 2018, often to find their houses burned or badly vandalised. Returnees urgently need support as their coping capacities have been exhausted and livelihoods lost.

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2 UNSC. Central African Republic Monthly Forecast, November 2018
4 OCHA. Bulletin humanitaire République centrafricaine, October 2018.
7 Ibid.
8 OCHA. Bulletin humanitaire République centrafricaine, October 2018.
11 Ibid.
Agricultural stagnation and high food prices

The persistence of violent clashes and inter-communal tensions since 2013 has significantly reduced agricultural activities and diminished food availability. People continued to abandon their farms, reducing the total area of land planted, and armed gangs often looted crops. Having experienced five years of depleted production, poor farmers were even less able to invest in inputs, particularly seeds and tools. Despite favourable weather conditions, crop prospects for 2018 were below average and significantly below the pre-crisis levels.\textsuperscript{12}

Since November 2017, cereal prices progressively increased mainly as a result of multiple years of reduced harvests and insecurity preventing adequate and regular market supply.\textsuperscript{13} Insecurity, lack of transportation, degradation of roads, and illegal taxes imposed by armed groups disrupted food and livestock markets, especially in northwest, southeast and central conflict-affected areas.\textsuperscript{14} The country is largely dependent on imports, both for food and non-food products, but intra-country trade flows were hampered by conflict and logistical constraints.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} FAO GIEWS. Country Briefs, Central African Republic, 5 November 2018.
\textsuperscript{13} FAO. Central African Republic Situation Report, October 2018.
\textsuperscript{14} FAO GIEWS. Country Briefs, Central African Republic, 5 November 2018.
\textsuperscript{15} OCHA. République centrafricaine, Humanitarian Needs Overview, October 2018.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Conflict, pests, flooding, low wages, displacement and epidemics
The humanitarian crisis in the Kasai region as well as the escalation of civil conflict in eastern and southern areas of the country continued to impair food availability and access, by disrupting agriculture, markets and humanitarian assistance and causing massive population displacements. In June 2018, inter-ethnic clashes created new pockets of insecurity in South Kivu, displacing about 76,000 people. Since September 2016 nearly 2.4 million people have been displaced in the Kasai region, but since late 2017, over 1.4 million refugees have returned thanks to a relative improvement in security.1

• Between August 2018 and June 2019, nine territories were classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) across the regions of Ituri, Tanganyika, Haut-Katanga, Kasai and Eastern Kasai. In addition, 31 territories were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).

• Overall, 13.1 million people faced Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4), representing 23 percent of the rural population in 101 territories of the country.2

• Massive population displacements put further strain on the already scarce resources of host communities.

• Localized floods raised concerns over the secondary 2018 season crops.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Between the second half of 2017 and 2018, the population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) increased from 11 percent of the population analysed to 23 percent.

The escalation of the crisis is mainly because of the rise in armed conflict in Ituri and South Kivu, the escalation of conflicts in the eastern and southern areas, and the humanitarian crisis in the Kasai region.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, IPC acute food insecurity situation

August 2018–June 2019

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2  IPC Democratic Republic of the Congo Technical Working Group, August 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

Conflict and flooding undermined crop production

Despite overall favourable weather conditions, aggregate crop production for 2018 was expected to be below average. Cropping areas, particularly for cassava, maize and rice were lower than a year earlier, mainly because ongoing conflicts in the Kasai, North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika regions continued to disrupt agricultural activities. In addition to population movements preventing farmers from engaging in production activities, poor quality of agricultural inputs, limited knowledge of good agricultural practices, lack of farmer organizations, and the poor quality of rural roads and storage infrastructure increasing post-harvest losses and reducing market access all undermined agricultural production. Returnees were likely facing difficulties in accessing land in areas frequently ransacked or looted, and found themselves without seeds and tools. Heavy rainfall and flooding damaged crops, particularly in North Kivu, South Kivu and Tanganyika regions.

Low wages, high food prices and displacement severely curtailed food access

The lean season started early because stocks were depleted by two consecutive seasons of poor harvests. People’s purchasing power was further eroded, mainly by deteriorating daily labour wages (down by 19 percent in July and 25 percent in August). High inflation rates – attributed to Government spending combined with declining export revenues from mining commodities – also undermined purchasing power. Meanwhile the significantly depreciated national currency reduced imports from neighbouring countries and pushed domestic food prices up.

On a more positive note prices of cassava flour mainly remained stable or decreased between July and September. For instance, the price of cassava flour generally decreased since March, but it remained 45 percent above its year-earlier levels and above the five-year average as of August. By contrast, prices of staple foods increased in most regions, particularly in the southeastern region, as a result of low market supplies and restrictions on imports from neighbouring countries such as Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania.

Internal and cross-border displacement strained already stretched livelihoods

In late September, the IDP caseload was estimated at 4.5 million people – mainly in central, eastern and southeastern provinces – putting additional strain on host communities. The country also hosts close to 540 000 refugees and asylum-seekers mostly from Rwanda, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Burundi – mainly in the northern and eastern provinces. In addition, mass returns of refugees – around 350 000 – were reported mostly in the Kasai region in October following an expulsion order by the authorities in Angola. Many have lost their productive assets and are likely to face extremely limited access to livelihoods.

Ebola virus disease, cholera and measles outbreaks risk spreading further

Outbreaks of cholera, Ebola virus disease (EVD) and measles continued spreading in the second half of 2018. Between January and the end of October there were over 23 000 cases of cholera including 798 deaths across 20 provinces. As of early November, about 300 EVD cases had been confirmed including 186 deaths since the outbreak was declared in July in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces. This emergency overlapped with the severe humanitarian crisis caused by insecurity in these provinces, which hindered the implementation of response. In particular, the attacks in Beni on 22 September and on 20 October caused dozens of civilian deaths – including health workers – triggering general strikes and demonstrations that targeted humanitarian operators and disrupted the efforts to contain the EVD outbreak in North Kivu. Given these conditions, WHO raised the national and regional level risk of spreading from “high” to “very high”.

1  FAO. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Situation Report, October 2018.
3  WFP et al. Bulletin trimestriel d’information sur la sécurité alimentaire, June–August 2018
5  UNHCR. Democratic Republic of the Congo, Regional Update, September 2018.
8  UNHCR. Rapport de situation no.1 – Épidémie de choléra en République démocratique du Congo, October 2018.
10 WHO. Bulletin d’information sur les flambées épidémiques, October 2018.
11 WHO. Communiqué de presse, 22 October 2018.
Lake Chad Basin

Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Conflict, displacement, epidemics and localized climate hazards
Although security has improved in the second half of 2018, food security remains a challenge for millions of people in the Lake Chad Basin as the nine-year conflict and population displacements continued to undermine food production and trade, households’ purchasing power and health conditions, as well as humanitarian access.

- A major deterioration in food security is projected during the lean season (June–August 2019) when 3 million people are expected to face Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4) – representing a 70 percent increase compared to the October–December 2018 situation.1,2,3
- Almost all the population in need of urgent assistance between October and December 2018 (95 percent) was in Nigeria’s three northeastern states. Although no areas were classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4) during the reporting period (October–December 2018), 16 out of 63 Local Government Areas remained classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3): three in Adamawa, six in Borno and seven in Yobe.
- During the same period, five out of six areas in Niger’s Diffa region and the entire region of Lac in Chad were classified in Stress (CH Phase 2).4,5
- The protracted conflict has resulted in massive displacement, as well as major human, social and economic losses. As of December 2018, the Lake Chad Basin hosted close to 2.5 million IDPs, about 1.6 million returnees (former IDPs), 200 000 returned former refugees and 230 000 refugees.6

Lake Chad Basin, CH acute food insecurity situation

October–December 2018

June–August 2019

IPC acute food insecurity phase classification

Minimal  Crisis  Famine
Stressed  Emergency  Areas with inadequate evidence

Source: Cadre Harmonisé Lake Chad Basin, November 2018

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2 Cadre Harmonisé: Chad, November 2018 and projected August 2019.
3 Internal source: Cadre Harmonisé internal unpublished figures as of 12 December 2018.
4 Cadre Harmonisé: Chad, November 2018 and projected August 2019.
5 Internal source: Cadre Harmonisé internal unpublished figures as of 12 December 2018.
6 IOM. Lake Chad Basin Crisis Monthly Dashboard, 14 December 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

Northeastern Nigeria

Restricted access to agriculture because of hostilities

Food security continued improving at the end of 2018 compared to late 2017 mainly as a result of enhanced security, humanitarian interventions and favourable agro-climatic conditions. The number of people needing urgent assistance in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states almost halved from around 2.6 million\(^7\) during the last comparable Cadre Harmonisé\(^8\) analysis period (October–December 2017) to 1.7 million. However, the protracted conflict and population displacements continue to ruin lives and livelihoods as military operations and hostilities thwart access to fields, livestock movements and food trade.\(^8\)\(^9\) As of August 2018, only around half of households had access to fields and were able to cultivate crops in Yobe and Adamawa, falling to one in three in Borno\(^10\) – which resulted in below-average harvest prospects in the three states.\(^11\) In Adamawa and Borno, food availability was further curtailed by the impact of natural hazards such as floods and fall armyworm infestations.\(^12\)

Insurgency reduced purchasing power

In September, although seasonal harvest prospects eased pressure on prices, in Borno and Yobe households’ food access remained limited by severely reduced food stocks and low purchasing power.\(^13\) In particular, households affected by the insurgency in the northeast had reduced access to income-earning activities and had to face lower market supply levels as well as higher prices because of high demand and restricted mobility. For instance, major disruptions were reported in most monitored markets of Borno, and the cost of a Minimum Survival Expenditure Basket for a family of five had increased by 13 percent in September 2018 compared to September 2017 in Maiduguri (Borno).\(^14\)

New population displacements stemming from insecurity

In the second half of 2018, attacks continued to trigger further population displacement.\(^15\) Cattle rustling activities persisted, leading to increased population displacement. In December, although 1.6 million displaced people had returned because of improved security conditions, 2 million people remained internally displaced and relied heavily on humanitarian assistance to meet their food needs.\(^16\) However, aid workers still faced limited access to certain areas, such as in Abadam and Marte (Borno),\(^17\) and continued to face elevated risks of abduction and killings.\(^18\) Humanitarian operations had to be downsized in several locations of northern Borno as a result of insecurity.\(^19\)

Epidemics continued to undermine food security

Among the main shocks reported by households, sickness was the most significant.\(^20\) After the cholera outbreak in Borno and Yobe reportedly ended in July,\(^21\) new outbreaks were declared in Borno on 5 September by the State Ministry of Health\(^22\) and two weeks later in Yobe.\(^23\) As of 10 November, 1 771 cases of cholera had been reported in Yobe, and 5 923 in Borno – including 134 associated deaths in the two states.\(^24\)\(^25\)

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\(^7\) Cadre Harmonisé. Nigeria, October–December 2017 and projected June–August 2018.
\(^8\) FAO GIEWS. Country Brief Nigeria, 2 August 2018.
\(^10\) WFP. Nigeria Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring, August 2018.
\(^12\) Cadre Harmonisé. Nigeria, October–December 2018 and projected June–August 2019.
\(^15\) IOM. DTM Nigeria Emergency Tracking Tool Report No. 92, 5–11 November 2018.
\(^16\) IOM. Lake Chad Basin Crisis Monthly Dashboard, 14 December 2018.
\(^17\) IOM. DTM Nigeria Baseline Dashboard Round 24, August 2018.
\(^18\) UN. Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria condemns killing of abducted aid worker, 17 September 2018.
\(^19\) OCHA. Northeast Nigeria Humanitarian Situation Update, September 2018.
\(^20\) WFP. Nigeria Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring, August 2018
\(^21\) OCHA. Northeast Nigeria Humanitarian Situation Update, September 2018.
\(^22\) OCHA. Nigeria – North-East Flash Updated No. 4 – Cholera outbreak, 14 September 2018
\(^23\) OCHA. Nigeria – North-East Flash Updated No. 5 – Cholera outbreak, 21 September 2018.
Chad: Lac region

At the beginning of the second half of 2018, the pastoral situation in the Lac region was characterized by a complete exhaustion of inland pastures, while pastures on islands could not be exploited because of Boko Haram presence. For instance, as of June, the insurgent group had reportedly stolen thousands of cattle.\(^{26}\) Pastoralists’ hardship was further compounded by the reduced exports to Nigeria which affected their purchasing power.\(^{27}\) Access to food was also curtailed by government restrictions on fishing – which usually reached its peak between June and July – for security reasons.\(^{28}\) Displacement remained considerable in the Lac region as 122,000 people were still internally displaced in addition to around 40,000 returnees and 11,000 refugees, as of December.\(^{29}\) As of September, livestock prices were increasing as a result of insecurity,\(^{30}\) and trade flows remained disrupted in conflict-affected areas.\(^{31}\) Nevertheless, at the peak of the lean season in August food prices were lower than the five-year average because of low demand.\(^{32}\) About 25,000 people remained in Crisis (CH Phase 3) in the Lac region of Chad between October and December 2018.\(^{33}\)

The Niger: Diffa region

The food security situation continued to be characterized by disrupted livelihoods, limited trade opportunities, limited humanitarian access and continuous flows of IDPs, refugees and returnees. Pastoralists in N’Gourti faced critical conditions because of lack of access to Lake Chad’s fall-back areas and to Komadougou given the security restrictions,\(^{34}\) and access to rainfed and irrigated fields remained limited in the region.\(^{35}\) In December 2018, Diffa hosted almost 120,000 Nigerian refugees in addition to around 104,000 IDPs and 26,000 returnees.\(^{36}\) Displaced populations add pressure on host communities’ already stressed stocks and sources of food and incomes. Reportedly, households surveyed by WFP resorted at least once every five days to negative coping strategies such as borrowing food, diminishing the number of daily meals or having recourse to credit to buy food.\(^{37}\) As a result, close to 55,000 people faced Crisis (CH Phase 3) and Emergency (CH Phase 4) between October and December.\(^{38}\)

Cameroon: Far North region

Although Boko Haram incursions and suicide attacks decreased in 2018, the security situation remained precarious regarding local populations’ livelihoods in the Far North.\(^{39}\) For instance, fishing activities were reduced during the lean season in the Lake Chad Basin area because of insecurity.\(^{40}\) As of mid-September, the region still hosted around 244,000 IDPs, 100,000 refugees and 101,000 returnees.\(^{41}\) Almost all of them were displaced because of the conflict, while five percent of them were displaced because of floods, drought and other climate hazards.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{26}\) FEWS NET. Chad Food Security Outlook, June 2018–January 2019.
\(^{27}\) FAO GIEWS. Country Brief Chad, 15 June 2018.
\(^{28}\) FEWS NET. Chad Food Security Outlook, June 2018–January 2019.
\(^{29}\) IOM. Lake Chad Basin Crisis Monthly Dashboard, 14 December 2018.
\(^{30}\) FEWS NET. Chad Food Security Outlook Update, September 2018.
\(^{31}\) FEWS NET. Chad Food Security Outlook, December 2018.
\(^{32}\) FEWS NET. Chad Key Message Update, August 2018.
\(^{33}\) Cadre Harmonisé. Chad, November 2018 and projected August 2019.
\(^{35}\) FEWS NET. Niger Key Message Update, August 2018.
\(^{38}\) Internal source: Cadre Harmonisé internal unpublished figures as of 12 December 2018.
\(^{39}\) FEWS NET. Cameroon Remote Monitoring Report, December 2018.
\(^{40}\) FEWS NET. Cameroon Remote Monitoring Report, June 2018.
\(^{41}\) IOM. Lake Chad Basin Crisis Monthly Dashboard, 14 December 2018.
Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Climate shocks, insecurity and displacement
The availability of the 2018 Gu season crops and the delivery of sustained and large-scale humanitarian assistance prompted a marked recovery from previous drought-affected seasons and resulted in a substantial overall improvement in the food security situation.

- Between August and December 2018, about 1.6 million people were projected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
- IDPs represented 58 percent of the total population projected in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse through December. Some IDPs were likely to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), in particular in Hargeisa, Burao, Bossasso, Beletweyne and Mogadishu.

As of 30 September 2018, about 2.6 million people were internally displaced across the country. Most of them had abandoned their homes because of drought, floods, conflict and insecurity between January 2017 and August 2018. In addition, the country hosts close to 32,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, mainly from Ethiopia and Yemen.

Humanitarian assistance is also required for pastoralist populations in the northwest and central areas that suffered massive livestock losses during the 2016/17 drought and cyclone Sagar as well as for riverine populations in the south affected by flooding in April and May 2018. These areas were classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) in July 2018. Humanitarian needs of pastoralist households will be greater after December, during the Jilaal dry season (January–March).

The number of people in need of urgent food, nutrition and livelihood assistance in July 2018 was almost half that of a year earlier when the country was in the grip of an alarming drought situation.

Acute food insecurity remained severe in some areas with the centre north and east the worst hit.

Somalia, IPC acute food insecurity situation

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Factors driving food insecurity

Flooding, cyclone Sagar and rainfall deficits

Crop and livestock production, seriously affected by a prolonged and severe drought between mid-2016 and late 2017, benefited from abundant Gu (April–June) rains in 2018. While floods in southern riverine and low-land areas and rainfall deficits in northern areas resulted in localized crop losses, high moisture levels boosted yields in rainfall areas and induced farmers to expand plantings of the off-season crops harvested in September in riverine areas. As a result, the 2018 aggregated Gu cereal production in southern Somalia was estimated at almost 60 percent above the previous five-year average. By contrast, in the northwestern Woqooyi Galbeed region, the 2018 Gu/Karan cereal production was estimated at 56 percent below average, due to erratic rains and stalk borer infestations. In northwestern Somalia, tropical cyclone Sagar in May caused widespread floods resulting in damage to infrastructure and productive assets as well as losses of livestock.

Poor rains damaged the establishment and development of Deyr (October–December) season crops, harvested in early 2019 and typically accounting for about 40 percent of the total annual cereal output. The most severe rainfall deficits were recorded in the main maize-producing areas of Lower and Middle Shabelle regions, where up to 85 percent of cropland was affected by drought. Comparatively better growing conditions prevailed in the “sorghum belt” in Bay and Bakool regions and in the “cowpea belt” in Galgaduud and Mudug regions, where cowpeas are usually intercropped with sorghum, as the intermittent showers received were more intense. However, overall crop prospects were unfavourable.

Pastoralists suffered lingering effects of 2016/17 drought

With most of Somalia’s landscape arid or semi-arid, livestock herding is the largest livelihood group and engages two out of every three Somalis. Pastoralists roam the land in search of water and pasture and depend on their animals for survival. During the long dry seasons, the survival of animals and humans is threatened, especially when the rains fail. During the 2016/17 drought distress sales and high mortality rates reduced herd sizes by 25 to 75 percent and, although birth rates improved during the 2018 Gu season, herds were still well below-average and the availability of livestock products generally low and prices high. In October prices of livestock were at near-record levels. As a result of increasing livestock prices and declining cereal prices, terms of trade for pastoralists significantly improved in 2018, allowing pastoralists to repopulate their herds, but not necessarily improve their food access as they had few animals to sell.

Food access constrained in Middle Juba and northwestern areas

Access to food improved in most of Somalia in the second half of 2018 as a result of increased cereal production, better agricultural labour opportunities pushing up wage rates, and declining cereal prices. Prices began to seasonally increase in October in Mogadishu, while they levelled off or continued to decline in other markets. In October were up to 50 percent below the levels of one year earlier, due to the above-average 2018 Gu production and sustained food assistance operations.

In northwestern Somalia, a reduced Gu/Karan 2018 harvest pushed up cereal prices. In the Middle Juba region, access to food was affected by conflict, with heavy fighting between government forces and insurgents in July and August disrupting agricultural operations and resulting in a sharp decline in labour opportunities and wage rates.

Insecurity, displacement and limited humanitarian access

In September, improved security conditions prompted the return of 122 000 people from neighbouring countries, but over 2.6 million vulnerable people remained internally displaced by conflict, floods and drought. In late 2018, conflict continued to claim civilian lives and constrain humanitarian access to populations in most urgent need.

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5 FAO GIEWS. Crop Prospects and Food Situation, September 2018.
7 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
An increasing number of illegal checkpoints manned by armed clan militias blocked road access and in the first eight months of 2018, 90 violent incidents against humanitarian actors were reported, including the deaths of eight humanitarian workers.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite the overall improvement in the nutrition situation, humanitarian assistance remained critical, as 294 200 children were projected to remain acutely malnourished through December, 55 000 of them severely so. The Crude Death Rate was Critical (1 to <2/10 000/day) among three surveyed groups, and morbidity rates remained high (>20 percent) across many areas of the country.\textsuperscript{14} Although the number of cases of cholera had been decreasing since mid-July, the cumulative caseload reached 6 394 in October, with 42 associated deaths since the outbreak of the disease in December 2017.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} OCHA. Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia, 5 September–4 October 2018.
\textsuperscript{14} FSNAU FEWS NET. Technical Release, 2 September 2018.
\textsuperscript{15} WHO EMRO. Outbreak update, Cholera in Somalia, October 2018.
South Sudan

Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Armed conflict, massive widespread and recurrent displacement, poor economic conditions, and severe restrictions to reach those in need
The humanitarian crisis in South Sudan continued to be driven by persistent armed conflict, widespread and recurrent displacement, economic contraction and poverty, and severe restrictions to reach those in need. While the record low 2017 cereal production weakened food availability, food access was impeded by very high food prices, loss of livelihoods and limited access to markets.

- In the post-harvest period (October–December), the number of people in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse was expected to fall to about 4.4 million people – of whom almost one million were likely to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 26,000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
- However, even with humanitarian assistance, an anticipated earlier than normal start of the lean season as a result of reduced food stocks was expected to leave more than 5 million (49 percent of the total population) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse acute food insecurity between January and March 2019, with 36,000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).
- In September 2018, populations classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) were in Leer, Mayendit (former Unity state), Yirol East, Yirol West (former Lake state), Canal/Pigi (former Jonglei state), Panyikang (former Upper Nile state) and Greater Baggari in Wau (former Western Bahr-el-Ghazal state).
- From October to December 2018, Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes were anticipated in Leer, Mayendit, Pibor, Panyikang, and Greater Baggari in Wau.¹ In January to March 2019, Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes were expected in Pibor, Canal/Pigi, Leer and Mayendit.
- As of 30 September, about 1.96 million people were internally displaced and the country was hosting over 300,000 refugees, mostly originating from the Sudan.²

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2. OCHA. South Sudan Humanitarian Dashboard, September 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

Gloomy 2018 crop forecasts

Prolonged dry spells and below-average rains diminished yields in the latter half of 2018 in southern bimodal rainfall areas of the Greater Equatoria region, and in several northern and central uni-modal rainfall areas. Although some refugees were reportedly able to return home and engage in farming activities, and a slight increase in planted area was expected compared to 2017, widespread violence and large-scale and recurrent displacement continued to impair agricultural activities, constraining access to fields and inputs, and damaging and destroying households’ productive assets. Inputs continued to be in short supply and increasingly expensive. Although infestation levels of fall armyworm were generally low, farmers could not afford to buy pesticides, and could only resort to traditional practices to control the pest, which further constrained crop production, mainly maize.

Food prices exceptionally high

In the capital Juba, prices of key staples (maize, sorghum, wheat, cassava and groundnuts) fell by 15–45 percent between June and November. The decline was mainly driven by a substantial appreciation of the local currency following the signing of a peace agreement between the warring parties in late June, which boosted investors’ confidence over greater political stability and prompted the resumption of oil production. The 2018 first season harvest in southern areas and reduced prices of imports from Uganda exerted additional downward pressure on food prices. Despite these declines, October prices of several food commodities were 2–4 times higher than their levels of two years earlier, as widespread insecurity continued to disrupt transport and trade.

Continued displacements and restricted humanitarian access

Hostilities, inter-communal violence and cattle-raiding continued to cause displacement and to restrict humanitarian access, mainly in the former Central Equatoria, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states. As of 30 September, about 1.96 million people were internally displaced across the country. About 65–80 security incidents were reported monthly across the country between July and September – most of them targeting humanitarian operators. Approximately 1.5 million people, mostly in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance, were located in counties with severe access constraints. For instance, as of late August, fighting had delayed the humanitarian response planned in Leer and Mayendit (former Unity state) for several months, and access to Greater Baggari was allowed only after two months of restrictions imposed by government security forces. In addition, the rainy season, which frequently renders roads impassable, hindered humanitarian access to populations in need.

Improved acute malnutrition, but expected to worsen early 2019

The nutrition situation was slightly better in September 2018 compared to the same period last year according to the September 2018 IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis. No counties were classified with Extreme Critical levels (Global Acute Malnutrition [GAM] above 30 percent) of acute malnutrition, but 31 counties in the former states of Warrap, Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei had Critical (GAM weight for height z score [WHZ] 15.0–29.9 percent) levels of acute malnutrition and 20 counties in Lakes, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile Serious (GAM WHZ 10.0–14.9 percent).

These high levels of acute malnutrition are attributed to severe food insecurity, poor access to health and nutrition services, high morbidity (malaria, acute respiratory infection and diarrhea), extremely poor diets and poor sanitation and hygiene. Morbidity and mortality rates exceeded the expected levels in 15 counties in the former states of Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, Lakes, Warrap, Unity, and Central Equatoria, according to OCHA. Levels of acute malnutrition were expected to improve marginally between October and December 2018 thanks to the seasonal availability of local production, increased availability of fish and milk, and relatively better access to markets and key services. However, they were expected to deteriorate in the first quarter of 2019 with an early onset of the lean season.
The Syrian Arab Republic

Factors driving acute food insecurity:
Conflict, displacement, low wheat production, high food prices
Security in the Syrian Arab Republic, where the conflict is now in its eighth year, considerably improved in many parts of the country and the conflict became more localized. But it continued to undermine the country’s socio-economic base and agricultural production, particularly when combined with erratic weather, making millions of Syrians reliant on food and livelihood assistance.

- In several areas improved security and market access alleviated food insecurity over the past year. WFP mobile surveys of nine governorates show that 27 percent of households were highly vulnerable or vulnerable to food insecurity in January to June 2018 compared to 40 percent during the same period in 2017.
- About 1.2 million people live in hard-to-reach areas, particularly in Rural Damascus, Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Deir ez-Zor, Quneitra and Dar’a where agencies cannot carry out assessments or reach those in need with humanitarian assistance.
- Hundreds of thousands of Syrians were still fleeing their homes, while many, encouraged by improved security, returned. Around 5.6 million have sought refuge abroad and 6.2 million continued to be displaced within the country – the largest internal displacement in the world.

The Syrian Arab Republic, estimated number of people in need of food assistance

August 2018

The 2018 FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission estimated that 5.5 million were food insecure nationally. In addition, as many as 500,000 to 800,000 people may be food insecure in Idlib.

The 2018 assessment indicates a slight fall in the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity since the November 2017 OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview reported 6.5 million Syrians needed urgent food assistance.

1 FAO and WFP. Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Syrian Arab Republic, October 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

Newly displaced and returnees highly vulnerable

Population displacement continued to be the main driver of food insecurity in the country. Rural Damascus, Idlib and Aleppo host the largest number of the 6.2 million IDPs, straining the humanitarian response. Displaced households are more likely to be vulnerable or highly vulnerable to food insecurity (32 percent) than the non-displaced (18 percent) and more likely to resort to consumption-based coping strategies such as restricting food consumed by adults to prioritize children.

Between January and June 2018, some 1.3 million people were newly displaced, forced out of their homes by fighting and/or loss of their livelihoods. Households displaced for less than one year were more likely to be vulnerable or highly vulnerable to food insecurity than those displaced for longer periods (35 percent versus 31 percent).

Meanwhile hundreds of thousands of vulnerable IDPs returned to their homes in 2018, often as result of sub-standard living conditions in sites, protracted displacement, movement restrictions and a lack of information on the scale and scope of dangers facing them in their places of origin. Between October 2017 and the end of September 2018 more than 150,000 returned to Ar-Raqqa city, where they face destruction and explosive hazard contamination, which is hampering humanitarian access. Over 200,000 returned to areas within Deir ez-Zor between November 2017 and the end of September 2018. Returnees require urgent support to restore livelihoods.

Wheat production hit three-decade low following erratic weather

Access to agricultural land increased and some irrigation systems were reconstructed. The better security situation facilitated transport of farm inputs and produce. However, an extended period of dry weather early in the cropping season followed by heavy, out-of-season rains, coupled with the ongoing effects of conflict, caused wheat production in the Syrian Arab Republic to hit its lowest level since 1989. The FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission reported that wheat production in 2018 dropped to 1.2 million tonnes, about two-thirds of the 2017 levels and less than one-third of pre-conflict 2002–2011 averages (4.1 million tonnes). Barley production, at 390,000 tonnes, was the lowest since 2008.

Erratic rainfall affected in particular Al-Hasakeh, the northeastern governorate that typically provides almost half of the country’s wheat, and where most of the rainfed wheat and barley crops failed. There were also substantial crop losses in Raqqa, Hama, Homs, Rural Damascus and Dar’a. Significant concerns regarding people’s food security and livelihoods, particularly of those relying on agriculture as a primary source of income, prevail. The country likely faces seed shortages given the poor 2017/18 season as many farmers rely on planting seeds saved from the previous harvest. Although abundant rainfall improved pasture conditions, livestock farmers struggled with increased fodder prices and low purchasing power.

Food prices fell – but remained well above pre-crisis levels

Food prices decreased across all governorates partly because of improved security and market access resulting from restored trade routes that have been disrupted since 2013. In September 2018, a standard food basket was between 12 and 45 percent lower than the previous September, depending on the governorate. However, commodity prices were still seven times higher than the five-year pre-crisis average. In areas such as Idlib and south Deir ez-Zor, market access remained very difficult, and infrastructure, such as warehouses and milling plants, had not been rehabilitated.

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 OCHA. Syria Crisis: Northeast Syria Situation Report, September 2018
Yemen
Factors driving acute food insecurity: Conflict, displacement and economic collapse
Even when taking the mitigating effects of the current levels of Humanitarian Food Assistance into account, Yemen’s food insecurity situation remained dire, according to the December 2018–January 2019 IPC analysis, with more than half (53 percent) of the total population in urgent need of food and livelihood assistance (IPC Phases 3 and above). In the hypothetical case of a complete absence of humanitarian assistance, a number of districts should be classified as Famine Likely.\(^1\)

The multi-faceted impacts of the three-year war have caused unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the country, labelled as the worst human-made disaster in the modern history of the world\(^2\) and the largest food security emergency today.

Yemen, IPC acute food insecurity situation

December 2018–January 2019

- Of greatest concern were the 63,500 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) experiencing extreme food gaps and/or unable to meet basic food needs even with full employment of coping strategies. About 5 million people (17 percent of the population analysed) were in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and about 10.8 million people (36 percent) in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).
- The latest IPC analysis shows that if Humanitarian Food Assistance had not been delivered, 20.1 million people (67 percent of the total population) would be in need of urgent action (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 238,000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). This would represent an 18 percent increase from 17 million in the March 2017 analysis.
- Eight governorates had populations experiencing catastrophic food gaps, with Hajjah, Amran, Taizz, Al Mahwit, Sa‘ada and Hodeidah the worst-affected. Without Humanitarian Food Assistance this would rise to 13.

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\(^1\) IPC Famine Review Committee, conclusions and recommendations on the IPC Yemen Analysis, Summary Report, 28 November 2018.

\(^2\) WFP Yemen Market Watch, September 2018.
Factors driving food insecurity

Escalating conflict

From the middle of 2018 the stop-start battle for control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast became the most active theatre in the country’s three-year civil war. By the end of October, fighting reached the outer edges of the city of Hodeidah, a gateway on Yemen’s Red Sea coast for trade – lifeline for two thirds of the country’s population.3

The fighting compounded the hardships facing the highly vulnerable population of the city, home to 600,000 people, already driven to the brink by over three years of conflict. It has exacted a high civilian toll and destroyed civilian infrastructure including hospitals and health centres.4

At the end of 2018 the humanitarian community was calling for a halt to the violence in Yemen, full engagement in the peace talks, and the re-establishment of humanitarian and commercial import flows into all ports and onwards to their final destinations to avert a famine. Conflicting parties in Yemen agreed in December to mutual withdrawals from the city and ports and to the UN’s support for port management.5

As of the last week of October, IOM had recorded that more than 545,000 people had fled their homes since 1 June 2018, equating to almost 3,700 each day. Of this population, 83 percent came from Hodeidah governorate and 14 percent from Hajjah to the north of Hodeidah.6 By early December 2018, there were approximately 2 million IDPs.7 The overwhelming majority (89 percent) had been displaced for more than a year, straining host communities that are struggling to cope with already-stretched resources.8

Soaring prices of basic commodities

Since 2015, the economy has shrunk by half, very few Yemenis have any source of income and more than 80 percent now live below the poverty line.9 The macro-economic situation has deteriorated even further since mid-2018 in tandem with escalating conflict. The fall in revenue from exports and other sources of GDP led to the collapse of the Yemeni Riyal, pushing up the cost of basic food and putting what limited food there is beyond the reach of many families.

Besides the currency crisis, other factors that reportedly contribute to the rapidly increasing food prices are: increased transportation costs because of shortages and high prices of fuel; movement restrictions and insecurity associated with the ongoing escalated conflict disrupting market supplies; double taxation of commodities; lack of foreign currency in banks and importers’ heavy reliance on parallel foreign exchange markets; lack of credit for traders and collapse of banking systems. Governorates including Hodeidah and Sa’dah that are experiencing intensified conflicts continued to suffer the most from soaring prices of basic commodities.10

In October retail prices of food commodities were 73–178 percent higher than in the pre-crisis period, and national average fuel prices 137–261 percent higher and expected to rise further. The cost of the minimum survival food basket continued to increase on a monthly basis. In October the average cost of the monthly minimum food basket was 137 percent higher than before the crisis.11

Non-payment of public salaries and pensions has undermined people’s ability to purchase food and other essential goods – this lower demand weakens the ability of traders to buy supplies and keep commercial imports flowing.

Lack of food availability

More than 20 million Yemenis rely on the markets to meet their food and fuel needs. Unless the Central Bank of Yemen provides timely letters of credit to food and fuel importers to facilitate imports at official exchange rates, they have to use money exchangers to obtain US dollars.

As food prices rise and people’s purchasing power falls, traders respond to the lower demand by importing less food, adversely affecting market availability in general. Heavy congestion of containerized cargo at the port of Aden and containerized shipping lines not calling on the

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5 UN OSESGY. Security Council Briefing of the Special Envoy for Yemen, 14 December 2018.
6 Norwegian Refugee Council. Update on the situation in Hodeidah, Yemen, 9 November 2018.
7 UNHCR. Yemen Operational Update, 7 December 2018.
8 UNHCR. Yemen update, 27 October–9 November 2018.
9 OCHA. Dispatch from Yemen, tackling the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, November 2018.
10 WFP. Yemen Market Watch, September 2018.
11 WFP. Yemen Market Watch, October 2018.
port of Hodeidah have had a serious impact on availability and prices of commodities. Commercial food imports in October through Hodeidah and Saleef ports – where most food enters the country – fell by more than 50 percent compared to September.\(^1^2\)

Although only a small proportion of food is produced domestically, local production could help improve market supplies and keep a lid on prices. However, rainfall shortages, highly priced farm inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, tools, veterinary services and fuel for pumping irrigation water, have contributed to shortages of locally-produced food. Fishing opportunities have been affected by either conflict, or climatic events such as cyclones and hurricanes.

**Access challenges**

Limited funding and access issues in the areas most affected by the conflict mean there are huge gaps in humanitarian assistance. Around 8.4 million people are currently being targeted for food assistance with a food basket covering 80 percent of a household’s kilocalorie needs. According to the IPC analysis the sharp increase in the number of populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is because populations in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) are currently not being targeted with Humanitarian Food Assistance. The analysis called for an urgent scale-up of humanitarian food and livelihood assistance and for access to be granted to all districts under active fighting, with special attention given to IDPs.

Fighting has made humanitarian movement and access to warehouses and to people in need in Hodeidah Governorate difficult or impossible in some cases. As a result of the fighting, some humanitarian programmes were scaled back and the staff overseeing them left.\(^1^3\) From mid-October to mid-November, WFP was unable to access 51,000 metric tonnes of wheat grain stored at the Red Sea Mills, enough to feed 3.5 million people for a month. Similarly, a key UNHCR warehouse where emergency shelter and non-food items were stored became inaccessible because of fighting.\(^1^4\) In August a WFP truck carrying around 30 tonnes of food assistance, enough for nearly 2,000 people for one month, was hit by shellfire while carrying out a delivery to Al Tuhayta, in southern Hodeidah.

Following week-long peace talks in Stockholm the two warring parties committed to an immediate ceasefire in Hodeidah and its surrounding governorate in mid-December. If it holds, this agreement has the potential to allow the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef to operate at near-normal capacity, allowing the free flow of food and fuel as well as commercial and humanitarian goods into Yemen and preventing further increases in food prices.\(^1^5\)

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\(^1^2\) OCHA. Mr. Mark Lowcock, Briefing to the Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Yemen, 16 November 2018.
\(^1^3\) Ibid.
\(^1^5\) UN Department of Public Information. 14 December 2018: Yemen peace talks and impact for WFP.
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WFP. 2018. WFP South Sudan Situation Report #235, 4 August 2018.


Afghanistan


Lake Chad Basin


FEWS NET. 2018. Chad Key Message Update, August 2018.


Somalia


South Sudan


The Syrian Arab Republic


Yemen


Annexes

Annex 1. Acute food insecurity reference table for area classification

**Purpose:** To guide short-term strategic objectives linked to medium- and long-term objectives that address causes of chronic food insecurity.

**Usage:** Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects of humanitarian assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase name and description</th>
<th>Phase 1 Minimal</th>
<th>Phase 2 Stressed</th>
<th>Phase 3 Crisis</th>
<th>Phase 4 Emergency</th>
<th>Phase 5 Famine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 80% of households in the area able to meet basic food needs without engaging in atypical, unsustainable strategies to access food and income, including any reliance on humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</td>
<td>Even with any humanitarian assistance at least one in five HHs in the area have the following or worse:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority response objectives</td>
<td>Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction</td>
<td>Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods</td>
<td>Urgent action required to:</td>
<td>Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition</td>
<td>Save lives and livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food consumption and livelihood change</td>
<td>More than 40% of households in the area are able to meet basic food needs without engaging in atypical strategies to access food and income and livelihoods are sustainable.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 2 or worse.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 3 or worse.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 4 or worse.</td>
<td>Based on the IPC household group reference table, at least 20% of the households in the area are in Phase 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutritional status*</td>
<td>Acute malnutrition: &lt;15% BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: &lt;12%</td>
<td>Acute malnutrition: 5–10% BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: 10–20%</td>
<td>Acute malnutrition: 10–15% BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: 20–40% 1.5x greater than reference</td>
<td>Acute malnutrition: 15–20% BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: &gt;2x OR &gt; usual and increasing BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: &gt;2x OR &gt; usual and increasing BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: &gt;2x OR &gt; usual and increasing</td>
<td>Acute malnutrition: &gt;20% BMI &lt;16.5 prevalence: far &gt;4x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortality*</td>
<td>CDR: 0.5–1/10,000/day USDH: &gt;4/100,000/day</td>
<td>CDR: 0.5–1/10,000/day USDH: &gt;4/100,000/day</td>
<td>CDR: 1.5–5/10,000/day USDH: &gt;1/100,000/day</td>
<td>CDR: 1–2/10,000/day OR &gt;2x CDR reference USDH: &gt;2–4/100,000/day</td>
<td>CDR: &gt;2/10,000/day USDH: &gt;4/100,000/day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For both nutrition and mortality area outcomes, household food consumption deficits must be an explanatory factor in order for that evidence to be used in support of a Phase classification. For example, elevated malnutrition due to disease outbreak or lack of health access – if it is determined to not be related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for an IPC classification. Similarly, excess mortality rates due to, murder or conflict – if they are not related to food consumption deficits – should not be used as evidence for a Phase classification. For Acute Malnutrition, the IPC thresholds are based on percent of children under 5 years that are below 2 standard deviations of weight for height or presence of oedema. BMI is an acronym for Body Mass Index. CDR is Crude Death Rate. USDH is Under 5 Death Rate.
**Annex 2. Acute food insecurity reference table for household group classification**

**Purpose:** To guide short term strategic objectives tailored to the needs of household groups with relatively similar Phase classifications, which should complement medium- and long-term objectives that address underlying causes and chronic food insecurity.

**Usage:** Classification is based on convergence of evidence of current or projected most likely conditions, including effects humanitarian assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase name and Description</th>
<th>Phase 1: None</th>
<th>Phase 2: Stressed</th>
<th>Phase 3: Crisis</th>
<th>Phase 4: Emergency</th>
<th>Phase 5: Catastrophe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood change</td>
<td>Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition</td>
<td>Save lives and livelihoods</td>
<td>Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(assets and strategies)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Household outcomes         | Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction | Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods | Urgent action required to: |
| direct measures inferred    |                                           |                                           | Protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition | Save lives and livelihoods | Prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods |

| Household outcomes         | Quantity adequate (≥ 2 100 kcal pppd), stable | Quantity minimally adequate (≥ 2 100 kcal pppd) | Quantity food gap below 2 100 kcal/day OR ≥ 2 100 kcal/day via asset stripping | Quantity = large food gap much below 2 100 kcal pppd | Quantity = extreme food gap |
| Direct measures inferred    | HDDS: no recent deterioration and no food groups (based on 12 food groups) | FCS: “acceptable” consumption (but deteriorating) | HSDS: recent deterioration of HDDS (loss of food group typical based on 12 food groups) | HSDS: Substantial deterioration of HDDS (loss of food group typical based on 12 food groups) | HSDS: much below 2 100 kcal pppd |
| Livelihood change           | Sustained livelihood strategies and assets | Livelihood: stressed strategies and assets, reduced ability to invest in livelihoods | Livelihood: accelerated depletion/ liquidation of strategies and assets that will lead to high food consumption gaps | Livelihood: extreme depletion/ liquidation of strategies and assets that will lead to very high food consumption gaps | Livelihood: near complete collapse of strategies and assets |
| (assets and strategies)     |                                           |                                           |                                           |                                           |                                           |

| Contributing Factors        | Adequate to meet food consumption requirements and short-term stable | Borderline adequate to meet food consumption requirements | Highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements | Very highly inadequate to meet food consumption requirements | Extremely inadequate to meet food consumption requirements |
| Food availability, access, utilization, and stability | Safe Water ≥ 11 litres pppd | Safe Water ≥ 5 litres pppd | Safe Water ≤ 2 100kcal pppd | Safe Water ≤ 7.5 litres pppd | Safe Water ≤ 4 litres pppd |

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### Annex 3: People in need of food, nutrition or livelihoods assistance, by selected countries, for Issue No3 (December 2017), Issue No4 (August 2018) and Issue No5 (January 2019)

* Projected figures are reported for the following countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Niger, Nigeria), Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia.

^ Afghanistan and Central African Republic’s population analysed are significantly different when comparing estimated figures in Issue No3 and Issue No4, therefore these figures are not comparable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Information</th>
<th>Country Population (million)**</th>
<th>People in Need (million)*</th>
<th>People in Need in Population analysed (%)</th>
<th>People in Need (million)*</th>
<th>People in Need in Population analysed (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue No3, December 2017</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Country population figure corresponds to latest analysis figure presented for each country.

* People in need figures are reported for the following countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Niger, Nigeria), Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia.

* Projected figures are reported for the following countries: Burundi, Central African Republic, Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Niger, Nigeria), Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia.

^ Afghanistan and Central African Republic’s population analysed are significantly different when comparing estimated figures in Issue No3 and Issue No4, therefore these figures are not comparable.
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