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WFP's Corporate Emergency Response in Northeast Nigeria (2016–2018)

Corporate emergency response evaluation

Evaluation report: Volume II Annexes

Commissioned by the
WFP Office of Evaluation



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Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the evaluation team, and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Key personnel for the evaluation

Office of Evaluation (OEV)

Andrea Cook	Director of Evaluation
Gabrielle Duffy	Evaluation Manager
Yaver Sayyed	Evaluation Officer
Marte Hurlen	Research Analyst

External Evaluation Team

Nick Maunder	Team Leader
Sophia Dunn	Emergency Preparedness and Response, Nutrition and Livelihoods
Volker Hüls	Logistics, Supply Chain and Common Services
Mariangela Bizzarri	Gender, Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations

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Annex A: Summary Terms of Reference

Evaluation of WFP's corporate (Level-3) emergency response in northeast Nigeria (2016 – 2018)

Persistent inequality and poverty impact more than half the population of Nigeria and is most severe in the Northeast (NE) and northwest, characterized by marginalization, chronic under-development, illiteracy and youth unemployment. Since 2009, Non-State Armed Groups have caused devastation in NE Nigeria with conflict-induced displacements and destruction of vital infrastructure leading to significant loss of livelihoods. In 2016, food insecurity reached extremely high levels in NE Nigeria with an alert of famine-like conditions in Borno state. In August 2016, the World Food Programme (WFP) activated a Level 3 corporate emergency response to NE Nigeria. While a scaled-up and fast response by aid groups and the government helped avert the threat of famine in 2017, food insecurity and malnutrition remain high.

Subject and Focus of the Evaluation

The evaluation will cover operations implemented in response to WFP's corporate (Level 3) emergency response in NE Nigeria from March 2016 to August 2018: notably the Nigeria Component of regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200777, the country specific Special Operation (SO) 200834 and 201032, IR-EMOP 200969 and IR-PREP 200965.

The evaluation will not assess the overall performance of the regional EMOP 200777, whose Cameroon, Chad and Niger components have already been evaluated under Operations Evaluation EMOP 200777 in 2016. It will however consider evidence from operations in other countries affected by the crisis (Cameroon, Chad and Niger).

Objectives and Users of the Evaluation

The Evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning. It will assess the L3 response's i) appropriateness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and coordination and ii) performance and results; and iii) determine the reasons for the observed results and draw lessons to inform WFP's management decisions.

The expected main internal users are the WFP Nigeria Country Office, WFP Regional Bureau in Dakar (RBD), WFP senior management who may use the results to inform decision-making and provide accountability, as well as WFP's Executive Board.

Key Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will address the following three key questions:

Question 1: How appropriate was the design and delivery of the emergency response to the needs of the food insecure population, including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups?

- 1.1 To what extent was WFP's emergency response aligned with identified humanitarian needs, priorities, capacities and relevant national policies, and its design informed by a sound evidence base with quality context and risk analysis? [Appropriateness]
- 1.2 How were the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – and a "Do No Harm" commitment – applied in the response? [Coherence]

Question 2: What are the results of the emergency response?

- 2.1 To what extent did WFP achieve its stated objectives, including ensuring coverage of the specific needs of the most vulnerable groups and sub-groups? [Coverage]
- 2.2 Has WFP assistance been delivered in a timely and efficient manner, successfully innovating, adapting and scaling-up activities, avoiding duplication and filling gaps? [Efficiency]

2.3 To what extent were objectives on gender equality and empowerment of women (GEEW) mainstreamed and achieved in the response and promoted in partnership? [Appropriateness, Coherence]

Question 3: Why and how has the emergency response produced the observed results?

3.1 To what extent did WFP key corporate policies, guidance, tools, processes and systems support the delivery of the emergency response? [Effectiveness]

3.2 To what extent did WFP optimize its comparative advantage to consolidate partnerships with relevant humanitarian and development actors and secure the involvement and capacity building of key national and local stakeholders through emergency food assistance? [Coordination]

3.3 How did factors such as security, access, funding and political environment affect the WFP response? [Effectiveness]

Scope and Methodology

The evaluation team will take a rigorous approach to maximize the quality, credibility and use of the evaluation. Attention will be paid to ensuring that gender and protection analyses are mainstreamed throughout this process.

The methodology will feature participatory components, with a focus on affected people, throughout the evaluation process and include strong qualitative data collection methods to inform some of the evaluation questions.

Impartiality and lack of bias will be assured by relying on a cross-section of information sources, including beneficiaries and using a mixed methods approach to ensure triangulation of information obtained through a variety of sources and from a range of perspectives.

The evaluation will use secondary qualitative and quantitative data through comprehensive desk reviews, complemented with primary data collection as necessary and feasible.

Roles and Responsibilities

Evaluation Team: The evaluation will be conducted by a four-person team of independent consultants with relevant expertise for the emergency response, gender and protection, and the context of Nigeria.

OEV Evaluation Manager: This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) with Gabrielle Duffy as the Evaluation Manager. The Evaluation Manager will be responsible for the design, follow-up and quality assurance, and will be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

Stakeholders: WFP stakeholders at Nigeria Country Office, RBD, and Headquarters (HQ) levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation and facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders. The Country Office and RBD are also expected to provide logistic and administrative support during the fieldwork/ evaluation missions.

Communications

An Internal Reference Group will be established to ensure key stakeholders are involved throughout the evaluation process and provide inputs at key stages.

A country-level face-to-face learning workshop will be delivered by the evaluation team leader (and senior team member) to engage stakeholders on preliminary findings, emerging conclusions and areas of recommendations.

Timing and Key Milestones

Inception Phase: Initial HQ briefing and Inception missions will take place in September – October 2018. An Inception report is expected in early November 2018.

Fieldwork Dates: Evaluation Fieldwork (data collection) is planned from mid -November to early December 2018.

Briefings: Exit Brief at the end of fieldwork planned in early December 2018. Consultation with Country Office, RBD and HQ stakeholders will take place at the country-level workshop planned in March 2019.

Reports: The report drafting, consultation processes and finalization will take place between December 2018- May 2019. Presentation of the summary evaluation report to WFP's Executive Board (EB) is planned at EB.2/2019 in November 2019.

Annex B: Field Missions Schedule

DATE	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	PEOPLE ATTENDING	DESIGNATION	EVALUATION TEAM
19 – 20 NOVEMBER ABUJA MEETINGS					
DAY 1					
MONDAY 19 NOV	WFP Abuja	WFP Security Office	Justin Rashid	Security Officer	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Abdi Bishar Clare Mbizule	National Security Officer Compliance Officer	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Abuja	Office of Head of HR	Omoniyi Ogunrinde	Finance Associate	Mariangela Bizzarri Nick Maunder Sophie Dunn
	WFP Abuja	Office of Head of Programme	Esther Ouma	Head of HR	Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Abuja	WFP Glass conference room	Helen Bugaari Malick Ndiaye	Head of Programme	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Abuja	WFP Glass conference room	Bakri Osman	VAM Officers	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Abuja	WFP Glass conference room	Wuni Dasori Victor Chude	Head of Agriculture Production Enhancement	
	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	NPFS Office, Ministry of Agriculture	Anthony Amu	Assistant Director NPFS/ Head of M&E Unit	
	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	NPFS Office, Ministry of Agriculture	Samuel Ajuwom	National Facilitator M&E	Sophia Dunn
	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	NPFS Office, Ministry of Agriculture	Ike Nkechi	National Facilitator M&E (National focal point Cadre Harmonisé Analysis)	
National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	NPFS Office, Ministry of Agriculture	Bula X	Technical Assistant M&E/National Cell Cadre Harmonisé & HEA)		

			Ibrahim Iro	Technical Assistant M&E		
			Okorie Agwu	National Facilitator M&E		
	WFP Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Roberta Falciola	Senior Protection Officer	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzarri	
	Nigerian Ministry of Health	Sheraton Hotel, Abuja	Dr. Chris Osa	Head of Nutrition, Family Health Unit	Sophia Dunn	
DAY 2						
	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Eden Guizaw	Livelihoods Officer	Sophia Dunn	
	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Abiodun Oladipo	National Partnerships Officer	Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri	
TUESDAY 20 NOV	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Abiodun Oladipo Abiola Akanni	National Partnerships Officer Programme Policy Officer (Partnerships)	Sophia Dunn	
	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Aaron Sharghi	Head of Budget and Programme	Nick Maunder	
	WFP Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Clare Mbizule	Compliance Officer	Nick Maunder Sophie Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri	
	WFP Abuja	Country Director's Office	Myrta Kaulard Sarah Longford	Country Director Deputy Country Director	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri	
	21-25 NOVEMBER MAIDUGURI MEETINGS AND FIELD WORK EVALUATION TEAM TRAVELS TO MAIDUGURI					
	DAY 3					
WEDNESDAY 21 NOV	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Tito Nikodimos	Head of WFP Area Office Maiduguri	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri	
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Abdi Bishar	Security Officers	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzarri	

			Michel Emeryk		
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Josphat Mushongah	Emergency Coordinator and Head of Programme	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzari
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Barbara Clements	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)	Sophia Dunn
	UNHCR	UNHCR Guest House	Alfred Kanu	Assistant Representative (Operations)	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzari
	UNHCR	UNHCR Guest House	Brigitte Mukanga-Eno	Deputy Representative (Protection)	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzari
			Hilda Ochuonyo	Protection Officer	
	Food Security Sector	Red Roof Maiduguri	Michelle Hsu	Food Security Sector Coordinator	Sophia Dunn Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzari

DAY 4 DEEP FIELD MISSION BAMA

THURSDAY 22 NOV	DRC and WFP	Humanitarian Hub and Nutrition centre in camp	Mukhtar Babba-Kyari	DRC	
			Bello Kamal Kehinde	Nutritionist DRC	
			Mohamed Kamila	DRC	
			Musa Isa Ngulden	DRC	Nick Maunder Sophie Dunn Mariangela Bizzari
			M. Badamasi	DRC	
			Rashida Lamaru	DRC	
			Ayii Akol	WFP	
			Judith Obaseki	WFP	

	Food Management Committee	Distribution site	6 women	Women members of the Food Management Committee	Nick Maunder
DAY 5					
FRIDAY 23 NOV	Protection Committee	Pulka	4 men and 6 women	Members of the Protection Committee	Mariangela Bizzarri
	Food Management Committee	Pulka	5 men and 9 women	Members of the Food Management Committee	Sophia Dunn
	ADRA	Pulka	Eric Teku Emmanuel Yoksa	Third Party Monitors	Sophia Dunn
	MSF	Pulka	Audace Ntezukobagira	Field Coordinator MSF	Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri
DAY 6					
FIELD WORK DELORI AND NYSC CAMPS					
Saturday 24 Nov	Host communities	Delori 2	4 men and 4 women	Members of host communities, non-beneficiaries	Mariangela Bizzarri
DAY 7					
FIELD WORK MAIDUGURI/DAMATURU					
Sunday 25 Nov	WFP Damaturu	WFP Office Damaturu	Niamke Ezoua Kodjo	Head of Office/Nutrition Programme Officer	Nick Maunder
			Bakri Osman	VAM Officer	
	WFP Damaturu	WFP Office Damaturu	Lucas Alamprese	Nutrition Surge Team, WFP Rome	Nick Maunder
	WFP Maiduguri	Red Roof Maiduguri	Florence Lanyero	Programme Policy Officer (Livelihoods). Previously Emergency Officer in Damaturu.	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Maiduguri	Red Roof Maiduguri	Abiyu Ayele	Programme Policy Officer (Partnerships) Previously on CBT team.	Sophia Dunn
DAY 8					

Monday 26 Nov	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Martin Ahimbisibwe Charles Yadika	Nutrition Officer (Borno and Adamawa States) National Nutritionist	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Ahmed Baba	VAM Officer	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Mustapha Tanko	Protection Officer	Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Raymond Ssenyonga	M&E Officer	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Maiduguri	FAO Office Maiduguri	Clara Katena	Resilience Expert	Sophia Dunn
	SAFE Working Group	FAO Office	Jonas Bervoets	Chair SAFE Working Group	Mariangela Bizzarri
	Representatives of the Consortium of Local NGOs	YFWP Office	Ahmet Shiro Zara Satomi	Chairman Protection Officer, YFWP	Mariangela Bizzarri Sophia Dunn
	SEMA Maiduguri	SEMA Office Maiduguri	Abdullah	Director of Operations	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Raymond Ssenyonga	M&E Officer	Mariangela Bizzarri
	Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture	WFP Office Maiduguri	Samuel Mbaya Mari Muta	Director of Extension Services, Borno State Agriculture Development Programme Deputy Director of Extension Services, Borno State Agriculture Development Programme	Sophia Dunn
	WFP	WFP Office Damaturu	Mohamed Gimba Raymond Pamun	CBT team	Nick Maunder
	UNICEF, OCHA, FAO	WFP Office Damaturu	Odeh Patrick Anjo Perez	UNICEF Nutrition OCHA	Nick Maunder

Belay Mengesha

FAO Emergency Livelihood Specialist

DAY 9

IOM	WFP Office Maiduguri	Dave Bercasio Amal Raj	IOM Head of Office DTM Information Manager	Mariangela Bizzarri Sophia Dunn
OCHA	OCHA Office Maiduguri	Crispen Rukasha	Deputy Head of Office	Mariangela Bizzarri Sophia Dunn
WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Danjuma Saleh	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)	Sophia Dunn
DHC Maiduguri	OCHA Office	Yassine Gaba	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzarri
SEMA Maiduguri	SEMA Office Maiduguri	Ali Isa Goshe	Director of Risk Reduction and Management (Borno State). Liaison with WFP.	Sophia Dunn
UNICEF	UNICEF Office - Maiduguri	Gillian Walker	Emergency Coordinator/Nutrition Sector Coordinator	
		Sanjay Kumar Das	Nutrition Manager – Borno and Yobe States	Sophia Dunn
WFP Maiduguri	WFP Office Maiduguri	Sultan Ahmed Masahiro Matsumoto	Information Management Officer CBT Coordinator	Sophia Dunn
		Solomon Asea	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)	
WFP Maiduguri	Red Roof Maiduguri	Bruce Walker	Head of UNHAS	Sophia Dunn
ADP	ADP Office, Damaturu	Ali Kolo	Programme Manager, ADP	Nick Maunder
Nigerian Ministry of Health	Ministry of Health, Damaturu	Dr Umar Chiromo	Deputy Director, Primary Health Care	Nick Maunder
		Laraba Andu	Nutrition Officer, Primary Health Care	

**TUESDAY
27 NOV**

	WFP Damaturu	WFP Office Damaturu	Ghislain Leby	Head of Supply Chain, WFP SO	Nick Maunder
DAY 10					
WEDNESDAY 28 NOV	WFP Maiduguri	Red Roof Maiduguri	Ekue Ayii	ETC Coordinator	Nick Maunder
	PCNI	PCNI Office Maiduguri	Kyari Mshelia	Programme Manager PCNI	Nick Maunder
	WFP Maiduguri	Red Roof Maiduguri	Khawar Ilyas	Senior TC Specialist, ETS	Nick Maunder
29-30 NOVEMBER ABUJA MEETINGS					
DAY 11					
THURSDAY 29 NOV	DRC	DRC Office Abuja	Zeljko Tonicic	Country Director	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzarri
	FEWSNET Nigeria	FEWSNET Office Abuja	Isa Mainu	National Technical Manager	Sophia Dunn
	ICRC	ICRC Office Abuja	Patrick Bourgeois	EcoSoc Coordinator	Nick Maunder Sophia Dunn Mariangela Bizzarri
			Ashok Nawani John Muhia	Cash and Market Specialist Staff	
	WFP Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Christine Njiru Lassana Coulibaly	Nutrition Specialist Head of Finance, Administration and IT	Sophia Dunn
			Beatrice Fontem	Financial Services Officer	
IRC	IRC Office Abuja	Feargal O'Connell	Country Director	Mariangela Bizzarri	

	UNDP	United Nations House Abuja	Betty Wabunoha	Deputy Country Director (Operations)	Nick Maunder
	OCHA	OCHA Office Abuja	Ayo Ajayi Ayobamidele	Cash Working Group Coordinator	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Kalechi Onyemaobi	Communications Officer	Nick Maunder
	OCHA	Over the phone, Abuja	Auwal Abubakar	Coordinator of the AAP Working Group OCHA	Mariangela Bizzarri
DAY 12					
	Canadian Embassy Abuja	Canadian Embassy	Sophie Price	Prime Secretary and Senior Development Officer	Nick Maunder Mariangela Bizzarri
	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Carrie Morrison	Head of Nutrition	Sophia Dunn
	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Ifeoma Maduekegarba	Gender Focal Point	Mariangela Bizzarri
FRIDAY 30 NOV	WFP Abuja	Glass conference room	Awash Mesfin	Programme Policy Officer (Livelihoods)	Sophia Dunn
	NRC Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Astrid Sletten	Interim Country Director	Mariangela Bizzarri
	UNICEF Abuja	UNICEF Office, United Nations House	Simeon Nanama	Chief of Nutrition Section	Sophia Dunn
	ECHO Abuja	ECHO Office Abuja	Thomas Conan	Head of Office	Nick Maunder

Access and CMCoord Working Group	WFP Office Abuja, over the phone	Jochen Riegg	Coordinator, Access and CMCoord Working Group	Mariangela Bizzarri
WFP Abuja	WFP Office Abuja	Sara Netzer	Programme Policy Officer (CBT) (Previously Maiduguri Food Security Cluster Coordinator and Save the Children Director of Emergencies)	Sophia Dunn

Annex C: Evaluation Methodology

1. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Evaluation frameworks

1. The evaluation utilizes a number of methodological elements. Firstly, the evaluation is framed by the norms and standards set in corporate policies, strategies and guidance materials. The L3 activation protocols provide a key point of reference to the evaluation. As an evaluation of the WFP corporate response to the L3 crisis in Nigeria, the evaluation not only assesses the actions of the country office, but also the respective roles of the regional bureau in Dakar and headquarters units.

2. In addition to the L3 specific guidance, the evaluation is cognisant of the large body of corporate guidance that implicitly shapes the design and implementation of WFP operations. This includes both technical policies relating to food and nutrition programming, alongside broader guidance relating to cross-cutting issues, including gender, protection and principled approaches to humanitarian aid. The two WFP Strategic Plans – (2014-2017) and (2017-2021) – are used to understand the overall vision of WFP. The evaluation systematically assesses firstly, the extent to which relevant corporate policies and processes have been respected, and then secondly, draws conclusions on the utility, appropriateness and effectiveness of these corporate tools.

3. At the heart of the evaluation is the notion of scaling-up and scaling-down the use of resources in emergency operations. A logical framework developed by WFP auditors to analyse this process is shown in Table 1. The scope and linkages of expected actions, results, and effects identified is used as a framework for evaluating the Nigeria operations.

Table 1: Logical framework of WFP ability to scale resources

Immediate aims	Operational aims	Strategic aims
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect information necessary to understand the situation; • Establish a sufficient roster of qualified personnel available for deployment in an emergency; • Raise awareness among donors upstream and have access to immediately mobilizable reserves of funds; • Establish regional logistics platforms and preposition commodities (forward purchase facility (FPF), global logistics cluster (GLC)); • Precontactualize with suppliers of IT and financial services; • Identify reliable, suitable partners; • Adapt internal procedures to the limited time frames; • Define roles in advance, simplify administrative procedures, and clarify delegations of authority; • Establish clear rules relating to detections and transmissions of cases of fraud; • Establish a system to secure WFP's staff and assets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quantify and qualify needs; • Target the beneficiaries (number, nature, and location); • Recruit/deploy the necessary employees (number and skills); • Reallocate employees during the reduction of the intervention; • Choose the intervention methods; • Define the post-emergency activities; • Use clusters and rely on offers of external assistance; • Establish new sub-offices if needed; • Collaborate with the relevant agencies and players; • Guarantee effective supervision and support by headquarters and the regional offices; • Monitor and report on operations; • Obtain and disseminate accurate, sufficient data and detect any abnormalities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure an immediate, appropriate response; • Manage the reduction of operations and the transition to resilience activities; • Guarantee the availability of resources (financial, human, procurement, and infrastructures); • Ensure access to healthy, nutritious food; • Create synergies through solid partnerships (leverage); • Facilitate communication and coordination (chain of command); • Preserve WFP's credibility and reputation; • Minimize financial losses and cases of fraud; • Maintain strong internal controls despite the emergency context; • Meet the obligations of accountability towards donors.
Actions	Results	Effect

Source: Report of the External Auditor on the scale-up and scale-down of resources in emergency operations. Executive Board, Annual session, Rome, 18–22 June 2018

4. Project documents for the emergency operation and two special operations largely reflect the more operational aims. The logical frameworks contained within each of the documents is central to evaluating the planning and results of the response. The design recognizes that attributing results to interventions – particularly in humanitarian settings – is generally complex and sometimes unfeasible.

5. A contribution analysis helped map out the pathways from interventions to results, particularly where contexts were fluid and dynamic. A timeline construction was used to map out and analyse the strategic decision making with changes in a dynamic environment. This included identifying key decision points in relation to the information and analysis available at the respective points in time.

6. This evaluation stresses the use and operationalization of findings and focuses on forward-looking analysis to contribute to future planning. Regular workshops and briefings were held to ensure WFP stakeholders' strong and continued engagement in the process. In addition to commenting on the written outputs of the evaluation, this included:

- Initial group meetings with the country office and the regional bureau in Dakar, during the inception phase and at the start of the evaluation mission in Abuja, to build WFP ownership of the evaluation process and ensure agreement on the evaluation purpose, scope and approach
- An exit de-brief for country office staff at the end of the evaluation field mission to validate and agree on key evaluation findings – as a stepping stone to further analysis. The the regional bureau in Dakar and Office of Evaluation participated remotely
- A final workshop in Abuja, Nigeria with WFP staff and external stakeholders to discuss and refine the draft evaluation results in partnership with a wider stakeholder group.

7. Acknowledging WFP commitments to integrating gender in evaluations, a participatory and inclusive evaluation process aimed to account for the voices and perspectives of all stakeholders, including, whenever possible, men and women of different ages, and diverse backgrounds among the beneficiary population. The purpose was to gather information on how WFP activities in Nigeria have affected men, women, boys and girls and others and to produce recommendations for future strategies and planning that respond to the needs and constraints of all. To ensure adequate attention to gender, a team member with specific expertise on gender, protection, and accountability to affected populations was appointed to look into these issues. All team members have also demonstrated experience in conducting evaluations in a culturally appropriate and gender-sensitive manner.

Analytical approach

8. The evaluation adopts a systematic approach to analysis, ensuring validity and transparency in the relationship between findings, conclusions and recommendations. Findings from diverse evidence streams are consolidated in a structured way, through an evaluation grid (constructed in Excel) that triangulates the findings from different sources against the questions in the evaluation matrix.

9. Triangulation methods include: (i) the use of different team members to explore the same aspect of the evaluation and ensure that findings are fully endorsed by all team members rather than being the “province” of one particular area of specialism; and (ii) the use of different methods to explore the same aspect, and the use of multiple sources and types of data.

10. The evaluation team came together at analysis stage to ensure full consolidation of evidence against the evaluation matrix and to confirm and debate emerging analytical themes. The use of structured tools ensures that findings are directly traceable to evidence, and any tensions or contradictions within the evidence are transparently recorded, so that they are explored and assessed through the analytical process.

11. Validation took place through dialogue with key stakeholders with findings tested, nuanced and discussed with the evaluation's interlocutors throughout the evaluative process, and particularly through the validation and debrief workshops detailed above.

Gender and protection

12. The evaluation places a strong emphasis on the integration of gender and protection issues in its design, reflecting their centrality to the emergency response. This is reflected in:

- The mainstreaming of gender and protection throughout the evaluation matrix
- Embedding gender and protection-related questions into enquiry tools (analytical frameworks, interview and focus group tools)
- Ensuring that the methodology contains a gender-sensitive approach for example, separate focus groups for women
- Committing to embedding gender and protection concerns into analysis and reporting.

Efficiency analysis

13. The terms of reference address efficiency analysis with a question examining both timeliness and (cost) efficiency. In line with WFP evaluation guidance on efficiency analysis, the evaluation examines the extent to which the country office met corporate standards for cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency analyses by reviewing and validating any omega analysis and examining how the results of these analyses were applied to strategic or programming decision making. However, there was insufficient data to conduct additional, retrospective analyses of cost-effectiveness and cost-efficiency in relation to modality choice.

14. Other aspects of cost efficiency¹ were examined as far as possible, given data availability. This included an analysis of the economy of logistics and supply chains and changes in cost efficiency over time. Other efforts made to avoid duplication and coordinate the provision of services and other measures taken to improve efficiency were examined using qualitative evidence.

2. EVALUATION MATRIX

15. The terms of reference detailed three main evaluation questions (EQs), broken down into eight sub-evaluation questions. Based on these evaluation questions the evaluation team developed a more detailed evaluation matrix. This includes “sub-sub evaluation questions” with indicators and corresponding sources of evidence. The sub-sub-evaluation questions are shown in Annex D. As envisaged in the terms of reference, the internationally agreed evaluation criteria of appropriateness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and coordination are employed.

16. The evaluation matrix forms the main analytical heart of the evaluation, against which all data is gathered and analysed. All other enquiry tools, such as structured tools for data gathering and analysis, below, are geared towards the evaluation matrix.

3. DATA COLLECTION

Data sources

17. The main sources of information for the evaluation are as follows:

- Polices, strategies and operational plans: WFP corporate policies, strategies and standard operating procedures; government policies and strategies; United Nations strategies and plans (humanitarian response plans, United Nations plans); WFP operational plans (emergency operations, special operations, budget revisions BRs); other planning documents (country strategic plans, task force minutes, other action plans, field level agreements, memoranda of understanding)²
- Needs and context assessments: Cadre Harmonise; WFP assessments (EFSA, RFSA, market assessments); United Nations assessments (humanitarian needs overviews, joint missions, gap analysis); nutrition surveys; other assessments (cash feasibility, risk, protection, gender, capacities)

¹ A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities in order to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

² The bibliography at [Annex G](#) presents the e-library of documents gathered so far with the support of OEV and the WFP CO.

- Monitoring data and reports: Programme monitoring (post-distribution monitoring, standard project reports); briefs, updates, factsheets; feedback and complaints data; evaluations and audits
- National and international stakeholder perceptions: WFP headquarters, the regional bureau in Dakar, and country office; national authorities, United Nations (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, United Nations agencies), sector coordination groups; donors; international organizations (INGOs, ICRC, IOM)
- State level stakeholder perceptions: WFP field office (FO); state authorities; cooperating partners
- Views of affected populations: Beneficiaries, other internally displaced persons and host populations; public perceptions
- Programme data: WFP budget and resourcing; logistics and supply chain data; HR data; sector data; other data (financial comparators, government budgets).

Data collection

18. The evaluation draws heavily on secondary qualitative and quantitative data through comprehensive desk reviews. A comprehensive e-library including over 1600 documents has been compiled, which includes WFP corporate policies and strategies related to the response, relevant evaluations and audits, as well as a range of project documents. Data was compiled from relevant databases and disaggregated as far as possible by sex, age group and other relevant groupings (including people with disabilities).

19. Information from over 170 international, regional, national and state level stakeholders was collected through semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs). All key informant interviews are treated as confidential; they are systematically written up by team members using a standard template and shared through a confidential section of a team-only Dropbox.

20. Given WFP accountability to affected population commitments, the evaluation methodology included a focus on affected people throughout the evaluation process and included strong qualitative data-collection methods to inform relevant evaluation questions. Information from affected populations, both internally displaced persons and host populations, was systematically captured and analysed. This included the perspectives of affected populations, both beneficiaries in different activities and non-beneficiaries, and the views of both women and men. Oxford Policy Management (OPM) Nigeria was recruited to organise a number of focus group discussions in different locations and provided a team of local consultants with diverse local language skills and knowledge.

21. Twenty one separate focus group discussions were carried out, in which 159 participants (WFP beneficiaries) discussed three main themes, plus an ice breaker discussion in the beginning, about their life prior to escalation of the crisis. These are outlined in Table 2:

Table 2: Focus group discussion themes

	Needs and response	Participation and inclusion	Protection and gender
	NB: The responses of men and women of various ages, and ethnicity were asked and recorded separately		
WFP Beneficiaries (IDPs and host communities)	<p>Their daily needs and difficulties</p> <p>Experience of the registration process</p> <p>Assistance received (what it was and from whom)</p> <p>Issues with quantity and quality, other distribution issues</p> <p>How successfully (or unsuccessfully) the programme has addressed their needs</p> <p>Preferences in terms of modalities</p> <p>Changes in coping strategies</p>	<p>Awareness on the criteria for inclusion</p> <p>Inclusion and exclusion errors of the programme</p> <p>Access to and use of appeal and feedback mechanisms</p> <p>Other channels of engagement in programme design and delivery</p> <p>Participation in remote/technology-based assessment and monitoring mechanisms</p> <p>Beneficiaries perceptions of WFP presence and ability to access hard-to-reach areas</p>	<p>Safety to, at, and from distribution sites</p> <p>Tensions between IDPs and host communities, and any other group, in relation to WFP assistance, and targeting criteria</p> <p>What can be done to make it better?</p> <p>Impact of various transfer modalities on intra-households' dynamics</p> <p>Transformational impact of WFP activities on households' and communities' dynamics and women's roles therein, and in relation to the conflict</p> <p>Perception of WFP impartiality</p>
Non Beneficiaries (IDPs and host communities)	<p>Impact of IDPs and conflict on livelihoods</p> <p>Their daily needs and difficulties</p> <p>Assistance received from other agencies (what it was and from whom)</p> <p>How successfully this assistance addressed their needs</p> <p>Preferences in terms of modalities</p> <p>Changes in coping strategies</p>	<p>Awareness of the criteria for inclusion</p> <p>Inclusion and exclusion errors of the programme</p> <p>Did they try to register for WFP assistance, and with what results ?</p> <p>If not, why not</p> <p>Access and use of appeal mechanisms</p>	<p>Tensions between them and those receiving WFP assistance</p> <p>What can be done to reduce tensions?</p> <p>Perception of WFP impartiality</p>

22. The evaluation team carried out field visits to meet operational staff and direct beneficiaries and inspect or observe the activities and outputs of operations, including general food assistance and nutrition interventions and livelihood activities. Careful consideration was given to criteria for selecting the locations to be visited in Nigeria. The criteria considered included:

- Visiting a range of ongoing activities and cooperating partners. Proposed locations selected include sites with general food assistance, nutrition, any form of cash-based transfer (eVoucher, mobile cash) and livelihood activities.
- Different operating contexts. Locations contrast varying levels of security (proxied by road or air access), urbanization (proxied by whether a specific location is a local government area (LGA) headquarters town or a smaller centre), humanitarian presence (proxied by whether a humanitarian hub has been established) and arrival of recent internally displaced person caseloads.
- Capturing dynamics in different states. Given the caseload, the visits concentrated on Borno State, however a visit to Yobe State was also included. Given limited evaluation resources, and small and diminishing operations in the state, it was decided not to include a visit to Adamawa State.
- The final sites selected for the main evaluation mission to visit were Maiduguri municipality, Bama and Pulka camps in Borno State, and Damaturu municipality and Kukareta camp in Yobe State.
- A total of 21 focus group discussions were also organized. The distribution and location of the focus group discussions is given in Table 3.

Table 3: Distribution of focus group discussions

Location	IDPs			Host community - beneficiaries			Host community - non-beneficiaries		Total FGD per location		
	GFA		Nutrition	GFA		Nutrition	Livelihood support			Only nutrition support	
	F	M	F	F	M	F	M	F		M	
Dalori 1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Kilibiri	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
Ngala	1	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	7
Kukareta	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	7

Location	IDPs			Host community - beneficiaries			Host community - non-beneficiaries		Total FGD per location		
	GFA		Nutrition	GFA		Nutrition	Livelihood support			Only nutrition support	
	F	M	F	F	M	F	M	F		M	
Dalori 1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Kilibiri	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
Ngala	1	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	7
Kukareta	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	7

23. Other data-collection methods were considered and rejected. A telephone survey was rejected due to concerns raised during the inception phase on poor network coverage outside of the urban centres, low ownership rates of phones and limited access to available phones by women. Primary data collection through a field survey in affected areas was deemed unfeasible due to security, time and resource pressures. Social media harvesting was also explored but not found to be feasible.

24. All data-collection methods and tools integrated gender and protection dimensions, and to the extent possible, ensured that the views and experiences of men and women of various ages and diverse backgrounds targeted by WFP activities in Nigeria were adequately captured and used throughout the whole evaluation process.

4. QUALITY ASSURANCE

25. WFP has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out process maps with inbuilt steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products. EQAS was systematically applied during the course of this evaluation.

26. The evaluation team had the primary responsibility for ensuring the quality of evidence and analysis throughout the analytical and reporting phases. The Evaluation Manager was responsible for conducting the second level quality assurance of the evaluation products following WFP Office of Evaluation's evaluation quality assurance system. This quality assurance process did not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensured the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

27. EQAS called for carrying out gender responsive evaluations, including the identification and disaggregated analyses of gender roles and dynamics (guided by the WFP Gender Policy objectives and action plan) and inequalities, discriminatory practices and unjust power relations. The evaluation methodology reviewed the extent to which operations have appropriately analysed and integrated a contextual assessment of gender-related gaps and addressed the identified gender inequalities. In doing so, the evaluation applied the Office of Evaluation's Technical Note for Gender Integration in WFP Evaluations and the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan on mainstreaming gender equality and empowerment of women. The evaluation team systematically and appropriately reflected gender in findings, conclusions and recommendations.

28. The evaluation took place amid highly sensitive environments, and its design included focus groups with vulnerable beneficiaries. Accordingly, ethical concerns required particular consideration. The evaluation was conducted in full adherence to the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation in the United Nations System, and all evaluation team members had full access to, and applied, the guidelines. Table 5 provides information on key standards applied. At all times respect for the dignity and confidentiality of those involved was ensured. Anonymity of stakeholders was maintained and all references to specific stakeholder views are made in the form of coded references to interviews, rather than by the names or organizations of those involved.

5. RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

29. The terms of reference identify a range of potential risks to the evaluation. These were reviewed during the inception phase of the study and outstanding risks were identified, and their mitigating measures explained, in Table 4.

Table 4: Risks and mitigating measures

Risk	Mitigating measure
Security/access constraints in some areas of northeast Nigeria	The main information sources for the evaluation were secondary data and interviews, complemented by a pragmatic selection of field visits permitted by the security situation. There was an avoidance of overnight stays in remote field locations
Unforeseen political and security developments in Nigeria and in the region	The evaluation mission was scheduled well in advance of the elections scheduled for early 2019. In a worst-case scenario, alternative locations had been proposed as a mitigation strategy. If conditions deteriorated, the evaluation team was to discuss with OEV potential mitigation strategies, including a) more extensive remote data-collection process, b) delaying data gathering until stability was restored and c) altering fieldwork locations
Competing demands on country office management calendars (corporate initiatives, official/religious holidays, etc.)	The tentative timeline was developed taking into account various national holidays. The dates of the evaluation mission were discussed and agreed with the CO well in advance. Interviews with KIIs were requested well in advance
Sensitivities for primary data collection at community level	For the focus group discussions, local consultants were deployed, including women Kanuri-speaking consultants
Incompleteness and unreliability of data	Monitoring data on performance were at the outset only partially available to the ET. The standard project reports (SPRs) for 2018 performance data were only available in March or April 2019. It was therefore agreed with the CO that they would initially compile information on outputs and outcomes up to the end of August 2018 based on the first cycle of the EFSOM. Efforts were made to ensure triangulation of data e.g. through the collection of interview data where documentary evidence was lacking, and outstanding evidence gaps/incompleteness were transparently reported. The ability to evaluate cost efficiency was slightly compromised by limited disaggregated budget data and mitigation options are limited
High mobility of WFP staff and certain partners	The inception phase found that many key informants were still in place. An extensive list of other informants who have moved on from the Nigeria crisis was compiled to be interviewed remotely

30. As part of the evaluability assessment conducted during the inception, the strength of the available evidence was estimated for each sub-sub-question in the evaluation matrix as either high, medium or low. Issues rated as low included questions related to unanticipated effects of WFP interventions (which by definition are weakly monitored), aspects of cost efficiency analysis (due to known limitations in the disaggregation of WFP budget and expenditure data) and reduction of gender gaps at community level (where available evidence was found to be weak).

Table 5: Ethical standards

Issue	Standards applied
Honesty and integrity	Evaluation team members committed to adherence to the UNEG Code of Conduct for evaluators in the United Nations system, and to accurately presenting procedures, data and findings, including ensuring that the evaluation findings were transparently generated, had full integrity and were unbiased
Rights of participants	Prospective interviewees and participants in focus groups were given the time and information to decide whether or not they wished to participate. Informed verbal

	consent was sought in all cases. Efforts were made to ensure that marginalized or otherwise excluded groups were represented
Anonymity and confidentiality	All those providing information for this evaluation – whether affected populations or other stakeholders – were informed how that information will be used and how their anonymity will be ensured so that sensitive information could not be traced to its source. Evaluation team members respected people’s right to provide information in confidence
Data protection	All data generated by the evaluation team, including that collected from focus groups, remained internal to the evaluation, and were not shared without the express consent of participants. Furthermore, the evaluation team were given access to confidential information by WFP and undertook not to use this for any purpose other than evaluation services and did not disclose such information to any third parties
Avoidance of harm	The evaluation team sought to minimize risks to, and burdens on, those participating in the evaluation; for example by ensuring that focus group attendees and cooperating partners did not face physical or other risks in agreeing to provide data for the evaluation

Annex D: Evaluation Matrix

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
1. How appropriate was the design and delivery of the emergency response to the needs of the food insecure population, including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups?				
1.1 To what extent was the WFP emergency response aligned with identified humanitarian needs, priorities, capacities and relevant national policies, and its design informed by a sound evidence base with quality context and risk analysis? Including gender, protection, conflict, food security, market and nutrition analysis. [Appropriateness]	1.1.1 How relevant was the design to the immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished?	Availability and use of needs assessment data	Polices, strategies and operational plans; needs and ontext assessments;	High
		Transparent relationship between needs assessments and operational plans	national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs; beneficiaries	High
		Programming tailored to needs in different locations		High
		Periodic reassessment of affected population and updating of plans for food and nutrition interventions		High
		Appropriateness of modalities, including amount of cash transfers and composition of rations appropriately set to meet needs		High
		Needs of specific vulnerable groups assessed and reflected in operational design and delivery mechanisms		High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
	1.1.2 Was the programme design and delivery informed by a quality context analysis over time?	Design of food and nutrition interventions and choice of modalities utilizes a robust analysis of context, causes and capacities	Policies, strategies and operational plans; needs and context assessments; monitoring data and reports; national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs; beneficiaries	High
		Protection analysis conducted and used to inform programme design and implementation		High
		Gender analysis conducted and used to inform programme design and implementation		High
		Communication with diverse groups of affected people used to inform programme design and implementation		Medium
	1.1.3 Was the WFP strategy and portfolio aligned with national policies, programmes and capacities?	Evidence of consultation and partnership with government institutions	Policies, strategies and operational plans; needs and context assessments; monitoring data and reports; national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs	Medium
		Assessments of capacities of emergency response institutions		High
		Coherence between national policies and the objectives of WFP operations		High
		Exit strategies develop sustained provision of services by national institutions		High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
	1.1.4 To what extent were tools for risk analysis and mitigation applied?	Compliance and fraud risk management unit established and staffed	Polices, strategies and operational plans; needs and context	High
		Risk matrix developed and regularly updated	assessments; national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs	High
		Mitigation measures identified in risk matrix applied		Medium
		Other measures taken to monitor and minimize fraud risk		Medium
1.2 How were the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – and a “do no harm” commitment – applied in the response? [Coherence]	1.2.1 To what extent were humanitarian principles applied in all phases of the programme cycle?	Evidence that WFP strategy and programming respected the four humanitarian principles	Polices, strategies and operational plans; needs and context	Medium
		Adherence to humanitarian principles as criteria for partnership selection	assessments; monitoring data and reports; national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs	Medium
		Context specific tensions between principles identified and managed		Medium
		Advocacy conducted by WFP on the humanitarian principles		Medium
		CivMil guidelines applied in WFP operational relationships		Medium

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
	1.2.2 How were trade-offs between humanitarian principles managed?	Criteria used to manage any trade-offs identified	Policies, strategies and operational plans; national / international KIIs; state level KIIs	Medium
	1.2.3 To what extent was a "do no harm" approach applied in programming?	Evidence on adherence to "do no harm" approaches in design and delivery of assistance	Monitoring data and reports; national / international KIIs; state level KIIs	Medium
2. What are the results of the emergency response?				
2.1 To what extent did WFP achieve its stated objectives, including ensuring coverage of the specific needs of the most vulnerable groups and subgroups? [Coverage]	2.1.1 To what extent were beneficiary needs covered over time?	Targeting criteria defined and applied	Policies, strategies and operational plans; needs and context assessments; monitoring data and reports; national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs;	High
		Breaks in delivery		High
		Prioritization criteria defined and applied		High
		Extent of prioritization of most vulnerable groups across age, sex, and other diversity factors		High
		Achievement of planned food and nutrition outputs by sex and age		High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
		Achievement of planned outputs for common services	beneficiaries; programme data	High
	2.1.2 How effective were WFP operations?	Effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms, including feedback and complaint mechanisms established and used	Polices, strategies and operational plans; monitoring data and reports;	High
		Achievement of planned outcomes	national / international KIIs;	High
		Perspective of beneficiaries and other development actors (Government, UN, NGOs) on the effectiveness of WFP programmes	state level KIIs; beneficiaries	High
		User satisfaction with common services		High
	2.1.3 Were there any unanticipated effects, either positive or negative?	Contributions to peace building	Monitoring data and reports;	Low
		Contributions to building resilience	national / international KIIs; state level KIIs; beneficiaries	Low
		Evidence of knowledge and learning from Nigeria applied within the region or corporately		Low
		Other unanticipated effects - positive and negative		Low

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
2.2 Has WFP assistance been delivered in a timely and efficient manner, successfully innovating, adapting and scaling up activities, avoiding duplication and filling gaps? [Efficiency]	2.2.1 How efficiently were operations in Nigeria scaled up to deliver a timely response?	Period between identification of needs and establishment of operational capacity to respond	Polices, strategies and operational plans; needs and context assessments;	High
		Operational documents adapted according to changes in identified needs	monitoring data and reports; national / international KIIs;	High
		Comparison of actual and planned beneficiary coverage by month	state level KIIs; beneficiaries; programme data	High
		Time taken to register beneficiaries		Medium
	2.2.2 To what degree has the response been delivered cost efficiently?	Comparative cost efficiency of modalities analysed by WFP and results applied	Needs and context assessments; national / international KIIs;	Strong
		Economy of logistics and supply chains	programme data	Medium
		Benchmarked cost efficiency ratios		Low
	2.2.3 What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?	Changes in cost efficiency over time	National/ international KIIs; state level KIIs	Low
		Efforts made to avoid duplication and coordinate the provision of services		High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
		Other innovative measures taken to improve efficiency		Medium
2.3 To what extent were objectives on gender equality and empowerment of women (GEEW) mainstreamed and achieved in the response and promoted in partnerships? [Appropriateness, Coherence]	2.3.1 What organizational capacity was established for gender-related analysis and action?	Gender staff positions established and staffed (RB,CO and FO)	Policies, strategies and operational plans; monitoring data and reports; national / international KIIs; state level KIIs; programme data	High
		Gender strategies and plans prepared (Regional Gender Strategy, Country Gender Action Plan and Gender Baseline)		High
		Inclusion of gender aspects in advocacy efforts		Medium
		Strategic partnerships established on gender and gender-specific requirements included in FLAs		High
		Gender training conducted for WFP and partner staff		Medium
	2.3.2 To what extent did gender analysis and/or an understanding of gender-specific issues play a role in programme design or changes in WFP programme implementation over time?	Stand alone gender assessments conducted and gender analysis integrated in other assessments	Policies, strategies and operational plans; needs and context	High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
		Appropriateness of the gender marker scoring and maintenance of the necessary quality standards over time and across multiple operational revisions.	assessments; monitoring data and reports; national/ international KIIs; state level KIIs; beneficiaries	Medium
		Activities address the differentiated needs of men, women, boys and girls		High
		Integration of a gender dimension in the design and delivery of operations improved over time		Medium

3. Why and how has the emergency response produced the observed results?

3.1 To what extent did WFP key corporate policies, guidance, tools, processes and systems support the delivery of the emergency response? Including issues relating to e.g. Level 3 governance structures, technical support from	3.1.1 How effective was the strategic leadership provided by WFP?	RBD engagement in strategy setting, technical support and regional coordination	Polices, strategies and operational plans; national / international KIIs	Medium
		Effective supervision and support by HQ		Medium
		Establishment of country office leadership over time		Medium

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
RB/HQ, resource mobilization and staffing. [Effectiveness]	3.1.2 How efficiently and effectively were the human resource needs of the operation met?	Use of TDY/roster staff over time	National/ international KIIs; state level KIIs; programme data	Medium
		Rate of recruitment of fixed-term staff		High
		Training of fixed-term staff		Medium
		Coverage of functional areas in country office staffing and seniority levels of staff		High
	3.1.3 How efficiently were the financial needs of the operation supported?	Resources mobilized compared to requirements over time	National/ international KIIs; programme data	High
		Use and effectiveness of advance financing mechanisms		High
3.2 To what extent did WFP optimize its comparative advantage to consolidate partnerships with relevant humanitarian and development actors and secure the involvement and capacity building of key national and local	3.2.1 How effectively has WFP positioned itself to maximize its comparative advantage?	Contribution to setting, and participation in, collective UN humanitarian strategy	Policies, strategies and operational plans; monitoring data and reports; national /	Medium
		Evidence of strategic agreements/joint programming/collective operational action with individual UN agencies and CPs		High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
stakeholders through emergency food assistance? [Coordination]		Engagement with sector coordination mechanisms to harmonize strategy and programmes	international KIIs; state level KIIs	High
		Common registration and distribution platforms established		High
3.2.2 What progress has been made in building the capacity of national and local stakeholders?		National capacity-building strategy developed by WFP	Polices, strategies and operational plans; needs and context	High
		Awareness building on gender and protection	assessments; monitoring data and reports; national / international KIIs;	Medium
		Changing role of national stakeholders during assessments and determination of needs	state level KIIs; programme data	High
		Changes in levels of emergency assistance provided through national institutions		Medium
		Changes in national policies and strategies for humanitarian response and safety nets		Medium
		Establishment of system to monitor changes in capacity of national emergency response agencies		High

EQ	Sub Questions	Indicators	Source of evidence (minor)	Strength of evidence
3.3 How did factors such as security, access, funding and political environment affect the WFP response? [Effectiveness]	3.3.1 How did security and access affect the WFP response?	Conduct and use of security assessments	Policies, strategies and operational plans; needs and context assessments; national/international KIIs; state level KIIs	High
		Conduct and effectiveness of access negotiations		High
		Extent of coverage in areas outside of government control		High
		Stakeholder perceptions		High
	3.3.2 How did funding availability affect the WFP response?	Availability of funds compared to assessed needs	Monitoring data and reports; national/international KIIs; state level KIIs	High
		Stakeholder perceptions		High
	3.3.3 How did the political environment affect the WFP response?	Evidence of political considerations in strategies and plans	Policies, strategies and operational plans; national/international KIIs; state level KIIs	High
		Stakeholder perceptions		

Annex E: Evaluation Timeline

EVALUATION OF WFP CORPORATE (LEVEL 3) EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA		BY WHOM	KEY DATES (DEADLINES)
PHASE 1 – PREPARATION			
Desk review of documents. Draft/final concept note and expression of interest	EM		
Draft ToRs. OEV/D clearance for circulation to WFP staff	EM		
Circulate ToR to WFP staff	EM		
Review draft ToR based on WFP feedback	EM		
Final ToR sent to WFP stakeholders	EM		
Contracting evaluation team/firm	EM		1 Sep 18
PHASE 2 - INCEPTION			
Team preparation prior to HQ briefing (reading docs)	Team		
HQ briefing (WFP Rome)	EM & Team		Sep 12-13, 2018
Inception mission to regional bureau in Dakar	EM + TL		Sep 17-20, 2018
Inception mission to Nigeria	EM + TL		Oct 8-12, 2018
Submit Draft inception report (IR) to OEV	TL		Oct 22, 2018
OEV quality assurance and feedback	EM		Oct 26, 2018
Submit revised IR	TL		Nov 2, 2018
Circulate final IR to WFP key stakeholders for their information + post a copy on intranet.	EM		Nov 9, 2018
PHASE 3 – EVALUATION PHASE, INCLUDING FIELDWORK			
Field visit to Nigeria	Team		Nov 19- Dec 5, 2018
Exit/internal debrief on preliminary findings with country office. (PowerPoint presentation)	Team		Dec 5, 2018
Debriefing with HQ, RB and COs staff on preliminary conclusions and recommendations	EM & Team		Jan 18, 2019
PHASE 4 – REPORTING			
Draft 0 Submit draft evaluation report (ER) to OEV	TL		Feb 11, 2019
OEV quality feedback sent to the team	EM		Feb 15, 2019
Draft 1 Submit revised draft ER to OEV	TL		Mar 6, 2019

	EM seeks OEV Director's clearance prior to circulating the ER to WFP stakeholders. When cleared, OEV shares draft evaluation report with WFP stakeholders for their feedback	EM	Mar 22, 2019 Mar 25 2019
	Stakeholders learning workshop - Abuja	TL/EM	Apr 9-10 2019
	OEV consolidate all WFP comments (matrix) and share them with team. Team to consider them along with inputs from in-country workshop.	EM	Apr 15, 2019
Draft 2	Submit revised draft ER and draft summary evaluation report (SER) to OEV based on the WFP comments, and team's responses.	TL	Apr 26, 2019
	Review revised draft ER (D2) and draft SER.	EM	May 3, 2019
	Seek for OEV Director's clearance to send the summary evaluation report (SER) to Executive Management Group (EMG).	EM	May 10, 2019
	OEV circulates the draft SER to EMG for comments	EM	May 24, 2019
	OEV reviews EMG comments on the SER/revisions with the team	EM & TL	May 31, 2019
Draft 3	Submit final draft ER (D3) with the revised SER to OEV	TL	Jun 14, 2019
	Seek final approval by OEV Director. Clarify last points/issues with the team if necessary	EM & TL	Jun 28, 2019
PHASE 5 – EXECUTIVE BOARD (EB) AND FOLLOW-UP			
	Submit SER/recommendations to RMP for management response + SER to EB Secretariat for editing and translation	EM	Sep 6, 2019
	Dissemination activities, including evaluation brief, OEV website posting, EB round table, etc.	EM	
	Presentation of summary evaluation report to the EB	D/OEV	Nov 18, 2019
	Presentation of management response to the EB	D/RMP	Nov 18, 2019

EM = Evaluation Manager, TL = Team Leader, D/OEV = Director WFP Office of Evaluation, D/RMP = Director WFP Performance Management and Monitoring Division

Annex F: Mapping of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

REPORT SECTION	KEY FINDINGS + ADDITIONAL PARA NUMBERS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1.2 2.3.1	<p>The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) food security outlook updates has identified the presence of civil insecurity-related food insecurity in northeast Nigeria (NE) since February 2012. By January 2014, FEWSNET warned that households in Borno and Yobe States were in Crisis (Integrated (Food Security) Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3) and in April 2015, FEWSNET predicted that the areas worst affected by conflict would begin to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4). A December 2016 report argued that a famine had already occurred in Bama LGA and that it was probably ongoing in other parts of Borno State (para 25).</p> <p>The regional framework for consensual analysis of food insecurity, Cadre Harmonisé, was established in Nigeria with support from FAO in late 2015. By October 2016, Cadre Harmonisé analysis confirmed a very severe food insecurity and nutrition situation in Borno State (para 91).</p> <p>The WFP RBD and HQ were considering opening an office in Nigeria as far back as 2006 and have been monitoring the crisis in Nigeria since at least 2013. However, although the regional EMOP was initiated in early 2015 in neighbouring countries supporting refugees from Nigeria, the decision to operationalise</p>	<p>Working to support a government-led response appears to have been a reasonable starting point. However, ultimately limitations in national capacity dictated the need for WFP-led food and nutrition assistance programmes. This happened late, and WFP were not able to bring operations to scale before famine-like conditions had already occurred, despite information on the deteriorating food and nutrition situation in northeast Nigeria being available far in advance of the crisis</p> <p>There is a high probability of other major, acute food crises in other non-presence MICs, where WFP will be faced with similar challenging decisions on strategic positioning</p> <p>Corporately WFP should reflect on how it should respond in situations where there is no established country office and conditions warrant life-saving interventions. This requires a strong</p>	<p>Recommendation 1: WFP HQ (OSE), in conjunction with the regional bureau, should enhance coverage of, and preparedness plans for, selected non-presence countries.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Review the responsibilities for, and coverage by, regional bureaux of non-presence countries (NPCs) b) Consider posting WFP “antenna” staff in selected NPCs with responsibilities for early warning, capacity assessment and capacity building support. Arrangements should be explored for attachment to United Nations agencies (UNDP, FAO, UNICEF) and/or national counterparts c) Develop and regularly update scenario-based contingency plans for expanding the WFP footprint in NPCs d) Agree criteria for ending WFP participation in the emergency response from the start the operation.

REPORT SECTION	KEY FINDINGS + ADDITIONAL PARA NUMBERS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
	<p>in Nigeria took time, as did the process of acquiring the necessary permissions from the FGN. As a result, WFP only became fully operational after August 2016 just before the famine alert in December 2016. While there are clearly a wide range of factors that explain this timeline, ultimately the fact remains that WFP arrived relatively late and at a point where famine had already occurred in some parts of northeast Nigeria. (para 238)</p>	<p>understanding of the local context, not only the food and nutrition situation, but also the institutional context, including the capacities and limitations of national agencies charged with responsibility for mounting an emergency response</p>	
2.3.1	<p>Guidance and processes were deliberately skipped, which had significant repercussions for programme quality. This was compounded by the relative inexperience of staff at the start of the programme who lacked a knowledge of proper procedure (para 195).</p> <p>The WFP lack of presence in Nigeria prior to the response brought several human-resource challenges for the establishment and scale-up of the operation (para 183).</p> <p>With no previous country presence, it appears the early months of the operation (2016 to early 2017) were mostly run by staff on mission or secondment (TDY) arrangements (para 184).</p> <p>The effectiveness of competent TDYs was compromised by lack of continuity and handover arrangements. Evaluation interviews indicated that across the programme, personnel often arrived</p>	<p>Regular changes in senior leadership at country level, coupled with unclear responsibilities and reporting lines for staff in the Maiduguri and Abuja offices resulted in an overall lack of programmatic oversight and compromised the credibility with donors. Some key positions were staffed by relatively inexperienced staff</p> <p>The use of TDYs and short-term deployments from headquarters and the RBD provided only a partial solution to management needs due to lack of continuity and handover. Nor did oversight from the RBD substitute for the limitations of in-country leadership</p>	<p>Recommendation 2: WFP HQ(HR/OSE) should strengthen the corporate capacity to rapidly deploy sufficiently experienced staff to lead and manage the in-country emergency response, on a sustained basis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Urgently develop a pool of qualified and trained staff available for medium- to long-term deployments at short notice to fill senior positions in L3 emergencies, including emergency coordinator, Country Director and Deputy Country Director. b) Review and revise the emergency roster to ensure that (i) there are sufficient numbers of staff available, (ii) there is an appropriate balance of functional skills, and (iii) the

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	<p>without clear definitions of roles and limited or no handover or briefing (para 185).</p> <p>When the Nigeria L3 emergency was declared, five concurrent L3 emergencies were already stretching the ability of WFP to respond through the roster. The roster was also noted to include an uneven representation of different skill sets and lacked experienced staff from areas such as cash-based transfers, protection and gender (para 186).</p> <p>Personnel movement into and out of the operation during 2016 was high, with a reliance on temporary deployments from other WFP offices, and consultants, some of whom had no experience with WFP processes or corporate guidance. The gaps in staff capacity and skills in specific roles impacted operational efficacy (para 188).</p> <p>There were onboarding problems for staff that were totally new to WFP. No national staff had experience of key WFP systems including LESS and COMET and operations were broadly commenced using paper-based systems that progressively migrated to WFP corporate systems. This reduced efficiencies and caused data gaps (para 190).</p> <p>Over 2016-2018 there were three emergency coordinators, three country directors and two deputy country directors. Only in 2017 was a stable senior management team in place. Furthermore, not all of the leadership team came with experience of</p>	<p>Conversely, many of the functional areas where WFP has performed best were led by experienced staff, who were appointed early and remained in post</p>	<p>availability of roster staff is guaranteed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> c) Review arrangements to ensure that there is an effective handover from outgoing TDY staff and TDY replacements and/or longer-term staff d) Review institutionalized arrangements for the rapid onboarding of national staff through predefinition of mandatory training and induction packages, specifically on core corporate tools including COMET and LESS.

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	<p>managing an emergency response of the scale of Nigeria (para 192).</p> <p>There have been unclear responsibilities and reporting lines for staff. Available evidence suggests that this has improved over the years, but important challenges remain, particularly in relation to the allocation of responsibilities and reporting between the country office and area offices, including on gender and protection (para 193).</p>		
<p>1.3</p> <p>2.3.1</p> <p>2.3.2</p>	<p>The initial strategy of WFP was to ensure capacity to support a government-led response to the crisis. In September/October 2015 WFP deployed staff to Nigeria to work with NEMA and SEMA. Capacity development of NEMA was later extended to SEMA in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, and focused on beneficiary registration, supply chain management, distributions and food basket composition. At national level, support also included conditional transfer mechanisms, food security, and vulnerability and market analysis. Through this engagement it became clear that the Government did not have the logistic capacity to carry out large-scale food assistance, or to procure the necessary specialized nutritious foods for a large-scale nutrition response (para 30).</p> <p>64. Given Nigeria's status as a middle-income country (MIC), WFP made an appropriate initial decision to build Nigeria's emergency response capacity. WFP provided technical support to NEMA on integrated beneficiary assistance management to</p>	<p>Working to support a government-led response appears to have been a reasonable starting point. However, ultimately limitations in national capacity dictated the need for WFP-led food and nutrition assistance programmes</p> <p>The CSP has placed increasing attention on the role of the WFP in supporting the capacity development of national institutions, with a shift from direct operational engagement to transferring know-how and experience to national and local institutions and to communities. However, this has not yet been matched by investment in staff capacities, resources or guidance</p> <p>While there is evidence of consultation and partnership with</p>	<p>Recommendation 3: WFP HQ (OSZ) should strengthen support to country offices in planning, delivering and reporting on capacity building of national institutions in emergencies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Follow-up the implementation of specific recommendations of the evaluation of the WFP capacity development policy and operations. This includes (i) the provision of concrete and practical tools and guidance on capacity strengthening; (ii) enhanced internal capacity; (iii) heightening monitoring, evaluation and reporting of capacity strengthening work b) Appoint a focal point within regional bureau to support the implementation of the WFP capacity development policy

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	<p>support the cash-based transfers pilot. This approach was subsequently revised in the light of a better understanding of the limitations in NEMA's capacity, the scale and urgency of needs and the limitations of the mobile money pilot as a delivery mechanism. (para 64)</p> <p>There is no focal point to support the rollout of WFP capacity development tools and processes (para 172).</p> <p>The most notable qualitative outcome of the IR-PREP was the recognition by both WFP and NEMA/SEMA that the Government lacked the capacity to implement the large-scale food assistance response that was required. This led WFP to become directly operational and begin establishing partnerships with other agencies to implement the programme. However, the evaluation found no rigorous capacity assessment to support this conclusion. Instead this appears to have been a largely subjective judgement (para 209).</p> <p>While capacity strengthening interventions were well received and relevant, interviewees have pointed to missed opportunities in not building government capacity for preparedness and emergency response more holistically and at the national level. Capacity strengthening outputs seem to be ad hoc and with no monitoring of capacity strengthening outputs or outcomes. Similarly, there is no documented capacity strengthening strategy and the only documented assessment of the government's capacity in emergency preparedness and response is from 2010.</p>	<p>several government institutions and ministries, there is no clear vision for a handover strategy</p> <p>Capacity building support has remained ad hoc and no proper assessment of the capacity of Nigerian institutions has been conducted, or plan developed, to support the goal of supporting national ownership of the response</p> <p>Overall, it was difficult to see a clear exit strategy on how to successfully ensure that the beneficiaries are either transitioned to government support, provided with sustainable livelihood opportunities, or provided with other avenues for self-reliance. A primary exit strategy of transitioning out through household level livelihoods interventions is of doubtful effectiveness in the current circumstances</p>	

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	<p>Overall, there has been little real progress towards greater ownership of, or accountability for, meeting emergency needs amongst government institutions (para 210)</p> <p>Moving forward, the WFP country strategic plan for Nigeria (2019-2022) includes capacity strengthening as one pillar, with a view to supporting government actors to manage food security and nutrition programmes in line with national targets. The WFP Nigeria country office aims to strengthen partnerships with the government through (continued) capacity-building activities (para 211)</p>		
<p>1.2</p> <p>2.1.1</p> <p>2.2.1</p>	<p>FEWSNET's latest projections indicate that much of northeast Nigeria is likely to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3!) until at least May 2019 and large parts of Borno State are likely to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity as the military offensives continue, resulting in ongoing displacement. The conflict is also still severely restricting agricultural production, with the 2018 harvest season expected to be below average (para 21)</p> <p>The Nigeria Nutrition in Emergency working group undertook a large-scale nutrition survey in October/November 2016 together with the National Bureau of Statistics and multiple other government agencies. The survey found an overall prevalence of GAM of 11.4 percent in Yobe State, 11.3 percent in Borno State, and 5.6 percent in Adamawa State, with several local government areas having much higher</p>	<p>Overall food insecurity in northeast Nigeria has stabilized since 2016 and this can credibly be associated with the large-scale WFP food assistance</p> <p>At the same time large numbers of people remain highly food insecure and vulnerable to continued conflict</p> <p>WFP operations fell short of reaching the targeted number of beneficiaries. Moreover, large gaps in the overall humanitarian response in the food assistance, nutrition support and livelihood recovery sectors exist</p>	<p>Recommendation 4: WFP Nigeria should maintain a core strategic focus on addressing the immediate needs of affected populations in northeast Nigeria in line with the country strategic plan commitment to provide life-saving emergency assistance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Advocate clearly with all stakeholders on the need to continue to deliver lifesaving food assistance on the basis of assessed needs b) Provide a clear and transparent line of sight in the development of response plans between the numbers of affected people and the operational planning figures

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	<p>rates. In June 2016, the Ministry of Health declared a state of nutrition emergency in Borno State calling for urgent life-saving humanitarian assistance in newly accessible areas. The most recent nutrition surveys from Borno State (August/September 2018) continued to find high rates of acute malnutrition, above the global acute malnutrition and severe acute malnutrition emergency thresholds. High numbers of newly arrived children from previously inaccessible areas are being diagnosed with severe acute malnutrition, highlighting concern for areas that remain inaccessible to the humanitarian community (para 22)</p> <p>WFP operational plans from January 2017 indicate that WFP planned to provide assistance for up to 1.74 million beneficiaries (April 2017). However, these planned numbers represent only 37 percent of the total population of 4.67 million people assessed by the Cadre Harmonisé as in need of food security assistance. The planning documentation – for this and other operational plans - lacks a transparent explanation of the discrepancy between the WFP targets and overall need. It is unclear to what extent this difference relates to populations who were inaccessible due to insecurity, those whose needs were being met by other actors, or if this is simply the proportion that WFP chooses to target. Interviews with donors and cooperating partners indicate frustration that WFP is not clearly voicing the actual needs, nor</p>	<p>The transition to livelihoods appears to be at least partly driven by political priorities and perceived reductions in donor funding rather than an underlying improvement in the situation. As the largest food security actor, a WFP scale-down will significantly affect the food security of beneficiaries, many of whom are still reliant on humanitarian assistance</p> <p>Given the continuing high rates of food insecurity and the highly unpredictable security context, life-saving assistance is a continuing priority and WFP needs to advocate vigorously for these needs to be met in full</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c) Revise the current plans to transition from general food assistance to livelihoods assistance in line with a careful local contextual analysis of the viability of livelihood opportunities, implementation capacities of cooperating partners and evidence of effectiveness d) Align targeting guidance and procedures in line with strategic decisions on the objectives of the programme e) Develop a clear strategy to progressively handover responsibility for emergency assistance to national institutions

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	<p>adequately advocating for appropriate levels of funding (para 44)</p> <p>Overall, it was difficult to see a clear exit strategy on how to successfully ensure that the large number of general food assistance beneficiaries were adequately transitioned to government support, sustainable livelihood opportunities, or other avenues for self-reliance (para 63)</p> <p>WFP targeting guidance was clear and relevant but several WFP personnel reported that targeting was not appropriately prioritized, in terms of receiving adequate resourcing to carry out the exercise and that WFP verification of the targeting was inadequate. An internal audit in November 2017 noted that the re-targeting process continued to support inclusion and exclusion errors, as a result of poor beneficiary verification (para 91)</p> <p>In mid-2018, food security assessments indicated an improvement in many parts of northeast Nigeria. Anticipating reduced funding, WFP took the opportunity to embark on another re-targeting exercise as part of an overall strategy of transitioning to livelihoods or phasing out its support altogether (para 93)</p> <p>The evaluation found high levels of confusion and frustration over WFP targeting processes and the time taken to do the re-targeting exercises. Re-targeting</p>		

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	<p>exercises have been slow to complete and often overlapping (para 94)</p> <p>WFP livelihood projects are small scale relative to the needs within the community, and this made beneficiary targeting very difficult. Focus group discussions with beneficiaries indicate that many cooperating partners relied on the <i>Bulamas</i> (traditional leaders) to provide beneficiary lists, with some beneficiaries being selected for projects without their knowledge or consent (para 97)</p> <p>Although the livelihood recovery projects are relevant, WFP has faced several implementation challenges, many of which are due to the security situation (para 117)</p>		
2.1.2	<p>There was widespread concern amongst stakeholders about the extent to which the response has been able to maintain humanitarian principles. Humanitarian assistance is largely implemented in highly militarized areas, and through the support of, or under the direct protection of, the Nigerian security forces. In a context where dialogue with non-state armed groups is basically nonexistent and hostilities ongoing, there is no access to areas under the control of NSAGs (para 74)</p> <p>Often defined security perimeters and restrictions are enforced and monitored by Nigerian security forces. There are significant restrictions on humanitarian movements. Stakeholders argued that the United</p>	<p>In common with the United Nations response as a whole, WFP has struggled to adhere to humanitarian principles. A lack of leadership and commitment hampered access to areas and populations outside the military control, and seriously undermined a neutral, impartial and operationally independent humanitarian response</p> <p>A contributory factor to this situation was a generally poor understanding of humanitarian principles.</p>	<p>Recommendation 5: WFP HQ (OS/OSZ), regional bureau and WFP Nigeria should appropriately promote the application of humanitarian principles and equal access to food and nutrition assistance in line with the country strategic plan commitment to a principled approach to gaining and maintaining humanitarian access.</p> <p>a) Develop and disseminate practical guidance for senior field staff on the application of its corporate policies on humanitarian principles and access, including criteria for making context-specific decisions on balancing the</p>

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	<p>Nations in Nigeria has not been vocal enough on the need to ease some of the restrictions to humanitarian assistance enforced by the Nigerian security forces or to advocate for a more principled approach (para 75)</p> <p>The evaluation found a generally poor understanding of the humanitarian principles across the whole humanitarian community in general, including WFP staff. Many WFP and cooperating partners national staff were relatively inexperienced and came from a development background with little to no knowledge of humanitarian principles. The role of the military in enabling access was welcomed and close collaboration was actively welcomed by senior managers (para 76)</p> <p>Arguably, operational independence has also been compromised in Nigeria. Until recently, the United Nations has followed the Government terminology of “hard to reach areas” and only recently acknowledged (in the last OCHA access map) that large areas and over 800,000 people are in reality inaccessible. This narrative has contributed to an under attention of unmet needs in areas outside of government control (para 78)</p>	<p>Humanitarian assistance is largely implemented in highly militarized areas, and through the support of, or under the direct protection of, the Nigerian security forces</p> <p>The United Nations in Nigeria has not been vocal enough on the need to ease some of the restrictions to humanitarian assistance</p> <p>This negatively impacted on the reputation of WFP with key stakeholders</p>	<p>principle of humanity with other humanitarian principles</p> <p>b) Train staff and partners at all levels in humanitarian principles and how they apply to the practice of WFP</p> <p>c) Prioritize the completion of the organization-specific access strategy, based on the premises of ICRC Safer Access Framework</p> <p>d) Define responsibilities and capacities for integrating humanitarian principles and access in operations</p>
<p>2.2.3</p> <p>2.3.1</p>	<p>There has been inadequate attention on gender within the Nigeria response, with a failure to implement corporate guidance and standards. WFP Nigeria has not yet complied with the corporate requirements to develop a country level gender strategy and plan. The evaluation did not find evidence of any gender baseline conducted in Nigeria, while the WFP Nigeria</p>	<p>The rapid scale-up of the programme occurred partly at the cost of compromises in quality</p> <p>There was inadequate prioritization of gender issues. There was minimal staff capacity</p>	<p>Recommendation 6: WFP Nigeria should reinforce efforts to mainstream gender within the programme and build partnerships to deliver on the country strategic plan’s commitment to strengthen gender transformative programming, by:</p>

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	<p>Gender Action Plan was finally put on hold in relation to the development of the country strategic plan (para 154).</p> <p>Involvement and support of both HQ and RBD on gender has been uneven. A more meaningful engagement of HQ on gender was observed in relation to the development of the country strategic plan with a mission to the country office and an extensive exchange of comments to ensure gender considerations were adequately reflected in the country strategic plan. The development of the WFP Nigeria country strategic plan brought about opportunities to redress some of these shortcomings, with greater investment on gender, including by the allocation of dedicated budgetary resources, which was not there before (para 155)</p> <p>Responsibility for gender in WFP Nigeria remained an “add-on” and inconsistently acted upon. The first gender focal point was as a supplementary responsibility for the partnership officer in Abuja in March 2017. It was only in August 2018 when responsibility on partnership was transferred to another staff member that this freed up time and energy for more dedicated work on gender. In Maiduguri, the protection officer was, by default, also responsible for gender, though there was no evidence of any formal designation (para 156)</p> <p>The extent of a gender analysis appears quite limited, with use in programme design and implementation</p>	<p>and consequently limited gender-specific analysis to inform WFP programmes</p> <p>Gender has been addressed as an “add-on” to other staff responsibilities</p> <p>The treatment of gender in project documents has generally been inadequate</p>	<p>a) Appointing a fulltime gender officer, with a clear separation of functions from protection</p> <p>b) Developing a country-level gender baseline, strategy and action plan</p>

REPORT SECTION	KEY FINDINGS + ADDITIONAL PARA NUMBERS	CONCLUSIONS	RECOMMENDATIONS
	<p>also limited. All project documents display a gender marker code 2A. Exchange between the gender office in HQ and RBD in the approval of the EMOP budget revisions clearly indicated that this was a mistake and that the regional EMOP originally only deserved a gender marker code 1. Up to Budget Revision No. 3, gender considerations are basically absent. With Budget Revision No. 4 (December 2015), the gender marker was formally revised and up-rated from 1 to 2A, but comments on the need to maintain 2A quality standards continued to be found, in particular in relation to Budget Revision Nos. 7, 9 and 12. Sex-disaggregated figures remained absent until Budget Revision No. 12 (para 159)</p> <p>With few exceptions, most of the needs assessments do not disaggregate data by sex, age, and other diversity factors, and the extent of a gender analysis appear quite limited. In general, prioritization of young children and pregnant and lactating women is the only gender-specific reference often found in most of the assessments (para 160)</p> <p>WFP Gender Policy and Action Plan (2015-2020) commits WFP to work “towards equal representation of women and men employees at P3 and NOC levels and below”. However, in the rush to staff the newly established WFP office, the gender balance was disregarded, with negative implications for the organization’s capacity to reach out to the whole</p>		

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	population - for example during assessment and monitoring (para 190)		

Annex G: Evaluation Library

EVALUATION LIBRARY

1. Evaluation Process

1.1 Evaluation Quality Assurance System

- I. Guidance for Process and Content CEE_NE Nigeria.pdf
- II. Template for Inception Report_NE Nigeria.docx
- II. Template for Inception Report_NE Nigeria.pdf
- III. Quality Checklist for Inception Report_CEE_NE Nigeria.pdf
- IV. Template for Evaluation Report_CEE_NE Nigeria.docx
- IV. Template for Evaluation Report_CEE_NE Nigeria.pdf
- V. Quality Checklist for Evaluation Report_CEE_NE Nigeria.pdf
- VI. Template for Summary Evaluation Report_CEE_NE Nigeria.pdf
- VII. Quality Checklist for Summary Evaluation Report -CEE_NE Nigeria.pdf

1.2. Scoping Terms of Reference & Timeline

Terms of Reference CEE Nigeria L-3 29.8.2018_FINAL.PDF

1.3. Headquarters Briefing

- 2016 WFP Orientation Guide - ENGLISH.pdf
- 2018_5_WFP HQ Organigramme.pdf
- 2018_6_WFP HQ tel directory.pdf
- 2016 Reflecting Humanitarian Principles in Evaluation - UNEG working paper.pdf
- 2017 Draft Guidance For Evaluating HPs FOR PILOTING.pdf

2. Corporate Documents Monitoring Performance Management

- 2018 WFP HQ Organigramme 20180522.pdf
- 2018 WFP Organizational Acronyms List 20180613.docx

2.1. WFP Strategic Plan

- 2013 Strategic Plan (2014-2017).pdf
- 2013 Strategic Results Framework (2014-2017).pdf
- 2014 Management Results Framework (2014-2017) Brief.pdf
- 2014 WFP Performance Management Policy (2014-2017).pdf
- 2014 WFP Performance Management Policy Memo.pdf
- 2015 Indicator Compendium (2014-2017).PDF
- 2016 Mid Term Review - Strategic Plan (2014-2017).PDF
- WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2013).pdf
- WFP Strategic Results Framework (2008-2011).pdf

2.2. WFP Integrated Road Map to Zero Hunger

- 2016 Corporate Results Framework (2017-2021).pdf
- 2016 Financial Framework Review.pdf
- 2016 Policy on Country Strategic Plans.pdf
- 2016 Strategic Plan (2017-2021).pdf
- 2017 Corporate Results Framework Indicator Compendium (2017-2021).pdf
- 2017 Policy Compendium for Strategic Plan (2017-2021).pdf
- 2017 WFP Integrated Road Map in Brief - March.pdf

2.3. WFP Management Plans

WFP_ManagementPlan_(2013-2015).pdf
WFP_ManagementPlan_(2014-2016).pdf
WFP_ManagementPlan_(2015-2017).pdf
WFP_ManagementPlan_(2016-2018).pdf
WFP_ManagementPlan_(2017-2019).pdf
WFP_ManagementPlan_2018-2020.pdf

2.4. WFP Capacity Strengthening

001 WFP Approach to Country Capacity Strengthening.pdf
003 CNM - Early warning.docx
003 CNM.docx
Follow-up Recommendations to Country Capacity Strengthening Audit (May 2018).pdf

3. WFP Policies, Strategic Plans and Corporate Documents

3.1. Corporate Performance Management and Monitoring

3.1.1. Annual Performance Reports

Annual Performance Report 2010.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2011.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2012.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2013.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2014.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2015.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2016.pdf
Annual Performance Report 2017.pdf

3.1.2. WFP Zero Hunger Challenge Advocacy Framework

WFP Zero Hunger Challenge Advocacy Framework - Oct 2015.PDF
WFP Zero Hunger Challenge Advocacy Framework - Brief March 2016.pdf
WFP Zero Hunger Challenge Advocacy Framework - Feb 2016.pdf
WFP Zero Hunger Challenge Advocacy Framework - July 2016.pdf

3.2. Access and Principles

2001 PPI Info pack - WFP role in access negotiations.pdf
2004 WFP Humanitarian Principles.PDF
2006 WFP Note Humanitarian Access and implications.PDF
2015 OSZ AdvGroupAccess - Strategy paper.pdf
2015 OSZ AdvGroupAccess ToR.PDF
2017 - OSZPH Humanitarian Access - Operational guidance manual.pdf

3.3. Emergencies and Transition

2003 WFP Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies Strategies for WFP.pdf
2004 WFP Transition from Relief to Development.pdf
2005 WFP Definition of Emergencies.pdf
2005 WFP Exiting Emergencies.pdf
2012 UNHCR WFP Synthesis Impact Evaluations - Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protecting Refugee Sites.pdf
2013 OEV HCR Synthesis IE-FARPS MResponse.pdf
2013 OEV HCR Synthesis IE-FARPS SER.pdf

2013 Peace Building & Transition Setting Policy.pdf
2013 WFP Impact Evaluations – Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protecting Refugee Sits - Mgmt Resp.pdf
2014 WFP Update on WFP Peacebuilding Policy.pdf
2014 WFP WFP's use of Pooled Funds (2009-2013) – Management Response.PDF
2014 WFP WFP's use of Pooled Funds (2009-2013).pdf
2015 WFP ED Circular OED2015.014 Emergency Response Activation Protocol.pdf
2015 WFP OSZ Emergency and Transition Programming Framework – Brief.pdf
2015 WFP PREP Evaluation 2011-2014 – Evaluation Report vol.I.pdf
2015 WFP PREP Evaluation 2011-2014 – Evaluation Report vol.II.PDF
2015 WFP PREP Evaluation 2011-2014 – Management Response.PDF
2015 WFP Synthesis Report of the Evaluation Series of WFP's Emergency Preparedness and Response.pdf
2016 HCR WFP Joint Strategy Enhancing Self-Reliance in Protracted Refugee Situations.pdf
2016 HCR WFP Joint Strategy Self-Reliance in Food Security and Nutrition in Protracted Refugee Situations - Brief.pdf
2016 WFP Targeting Emergencies WFP policy.pdf
2017 WFP Emergency Preparedness Policy.pdf
2017 WFP OSZPH Refugee Assistance Guidance Manual.pdf

EPRP Annexes 2016

EPRP checklists v10 FINAL.pdf
EPRP NARRATIVE FINAL 9may2017.pdf
WFP 2018 Interim WFP Emergency Activation Protocol for Level 2 and 3 Emergencies.pdf

Annex 1 - IA ERP

Emergency Response Preparedness 2015 final (00000002).pdf

Annex 10 - List of Essential documents

Directive on Record Retention Policy in WFP.pdf
Documents for Hard Copy Retention ANNEX A.pdf
File plan and retention schedules ANNEX B.pdf
WFP Recods Management Handbook ANNEX C.pdf

Annex 11 - Sample Staff List - Contact and Tracking

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Annex 12 - Examples of Maps, Lists and Calendars

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2015 PG Partnership - Tools and Guidelines Booklet.pdf

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FLA 2012 template - Annex 1C Vouchers Monetization.docx

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3a Nigeria Price Collection Methodology-FINAL_HO_rev ASD.ppt
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TEAM8-RE-TARGETING EXERCISE 1st FIVE AREAS MASTER LISTS- AHIFF100.xlsx

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CHRISTIAN AID WFP TARGETING SURVEY MASTER LIST (00000004).xlsx
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Buzu Quarters Census and Targeted List.xls
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Partnerships data 2003-2015 – DACOTA countries only.xlsx

Project beneficiary data 2002-2014.xlsx

Project beneficiary data 2015.xlsx

SPR 2016_Full Programme Data Set.xlsx

6.4. COMET Data Nigeria

2018 DP and DDR achievement Summary.xlsx

CM-C004_Comparison_of_all_Planning_Documents_vs_Actuals_v1.2 (NBP & Actuals 2016-2018).xlsx

CM-R002_-_Annual_Project_Participants_and_Beneficiaries_v1.01_split_act_mod_gender.xls

CM-S007_Partnership_-_Monthly_Summary_v1.05.xlsx

6.5. Funding Data Nigeria

200777_ALL_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

200777_CM_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

200777_NE_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

200777_NG_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

200777_RBD_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

200777_TD_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

EMOP 200777 Resource Situation with Forecast_15.1.2018.pdf

EMOP 200777 Resource Situation_15.1.2018.pdf

EMOP 200777 Resource Situation_18.2.2018.pdf

EMOP 200777-Resource_Situation_21.2.2018.pdf

Nigeria Distribution Contribution and Forecast Stats_26.1.2018.xlsx

SO 200834 Resource Situation with Forecast_15.1.2018.pdf

SO 200834 Resource Situation_15.1.2018.pdf

SO 200834 Resource Situation_18.2.2018.pdf

SO 200834 Resource_Situation_21.2.2018.pdf

SO 200834_Funding_Overview_wAdvance_21.2.2018.pdf

SO 201032-Resource_Situation_21.2.2018.pdf

6.5.1. Funding Data for Evaluation Report

200777 ALL Funding_Overview 31.01.2019.xlsx

200777.NG Funding_Overview 31.01.2019.xlsx

200834 Funding_Overview 04.02.2019.xlsx

201032 Funding_Overview 04.02.2019.xlsx

CSP_Country_Historical_Timeline 20190204.pdf

IR-PREP 200965 IR-EMOP 200969 Funding 20190206.xlsx

Nigeria CEE Top 5 donors.xlsx

6.6. Budget Data Nigeria

Nigeria 2010_2017_WINGS_Report v0.1.xlsx

6.7. Logistics Data Nigeria

LESS Data for NGCO.xlsx

LESS Stock for NGCO.xlsx

Procurement POs.xlsx

6.8. Human Resources Data Nigeria

HR data gender analysis Jan 2019.xlsx

Nigeria CO Employees 31 Dec. 2015-16-17 and 31 Jul 2018.xlsx

Nigeria CO Staffing in 2015-16-17 and 2018 to 16 Oct.xlsx

Org Chart WFP Nigeria CO (02.02.2018).pdf

RBD ORG Chart Sept 2018.pdf

6.9. Monitoring and Evaluation Tools and Data

Beneficiary_Outreach_Monitoring.xls

CFM_Nigeria_vAugust2018.xls

INP+ Baseline Report.docx

Monitoring and Evaluation Monthly Bulletin, May 2018.docx

Nigeria_CO Monthly Monitoring Bulletin_July 2018 (004).docx

Nigeria_CO Monthly Monitoring Bulletin_ April 2018.pdf

Nigeria_CO Monthly Monitoring Bulletin_ August 2018.pdf

Nigeria_CO Monthly Monitoring Bulletin_ February 2018.pdf

Nigeria_CO Monthly Monitoring Bulletin_ January 2018.pdf

6.10. Beneficiary Data

Activities by LGAs Nigeria 2016-2017 CM-A003.xlsx

Copy of JUNE 2018 FLA CASELOAD UPDATE_Dashboard_16.07.2018.xlsx

EMOP 200777_Monthly bnfs by activity_Planned Prioritized Actual_2016-2018 20190121.xlsx

WFP Nigeria 2018 activities by LGA.docx

Annex H: People Consulted

#	NAME	DESIGNATION	POSITION
AFFECTED POPULATIONS			
1	N/A	Affected people from Dalori I, Kukareta and Ngala camps and Kilibiri host community	Focus group discussion participants
2	6 women beneficiaries	Food Management Committee Bama	Food Management Committee Members
3	5 men and 9 women beneficiaries	Food Management Committee Pulka	Food Management Committee Members
4	4 men and 4 women host community members	Host communities Delori 2	Host community members, non-beneficiaries
5	4 men and 6 women beneficiaries	Protection Committee Pulka	Protection Committee Members
DONORS			
6	Sophie Price	Canadian Embassy	Prime Secretary and Senior Development Officer
7	Mischa Foxell	DFID	Northeast & Humanitarian Team Leader
8	Emma Massey	DFID	Humanitarian Advisor - Health and Nutrition
9	Marianne Tinlot	ECHO	Regional Food Assistance Expert for Central Africa
10	Thomas Conan	ECHO Abuja	Head of Office
11	Friedrich Birgelen	German Embassy	First Secretary
12	Henock Kewendbelay	USAID	Food for Peace Officer
13	Shannon Rogers	USAID Dakar	Director, USAID Regional Office of Food for Peace
NGOs AND INGOS			
14	Jochen Riegg	Access and CMCoord Working Group	Coordinator, Access and CMCoord Working Group
15	Yannick Pouchalan	Action contre la Faim (ACF)	Country Director, (previous)
16	Eric Teku	ADRA	Third Party Monitor
17	Emmanuel Yoksa	ADRA	Third Party Monitor
18	Charles Usie	Christian Aid (CAID)	Country Director

19	Ahmed Shehu	Community Engagement Youth Federation World Peace (EYFP)	Regional Coordinator
20	Bello Kamal Kehinde	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Nutritionist
21	M. Badamasi	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
22	Mohamed Kamila	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
23	Mukhtar Babba-Kyari	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
24	Musa Isa Ngulden	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
25	Rashida Lamaru	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	
26	Zeljko Tonic	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	Country Director
27	Jonas Bervoets	FAO	Chair SAFE Working Group
28	Patrick David	FAO	Programme and Liaison Officer
29	Belay Mengesha	FAO Maiduguri	FAO Emergency Livelihood Specialist
30	Clara Katena	FAO Maiduguri	Resilience Expert
31	Michelle Hsu	FAO Maiduguri	Food Sector Coordinator
32	Nouru Tall	FAO Maiduguri	FAO Head of Office
33	Isa Mainu	FEWSNET Nigeria	National Technical Manager
34	Michelle Hsu	Food Security Sector	Food Security Sector Coordinator
35	Jennifer Jalovec	INGO Forum	Director
36	Ashok Nawani	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Cash and Market Specialist
37	Christine Njiru	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	Nutrition Specialist
38	John Muhia	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	
39	Patrick Bourgeois	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	EcoSoc Coordinator
40	Jolene Mullins	International Medical Corps (IMC)	Country Director
41	Dave Bercasio	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	Head of Office
42	Amal Raj	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	DTM Information Manager
43	Feargal O'Connell	International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Country Director
44	Ahmet Shiro	Local NGO Forum	Chairman

45	Allison Rudy	Logistics Sector	Civil/Military Coordinator
46	Katja Hildebrand	Logistics Sector	Logistics Sector Coordinator
47	Audace Ntezukobagira	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)	Field Coordinator
48	Luis Eguiliuz	Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)	Country Director
49	Astrid Sletten	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)	Interim Country Director
50	Crispen Rukasha	OCHA	Deputy Head of Office
51	Anjo Perez	OCHA	
52	Vincent Omuga	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
53	Yassine Gaba	OCHA	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
54	Auwal Abubakar	OCHA Abuja	Coordinator of the AAP Working Group
55	Ayo Ajayi Ayobamidele	OCHA Abuja	Cash Working Group Coordinator
56	Dagobert Blondon	Première Urgence Internationale (PUI)	Field Coordinator
57	Betty Wabunoha	UNDP	Deputy Country Director (Operations)
58	Alfred Kanu	UNHCR	Assistant Representative (Operations)
59	Brigitte Mukanga-Eno	UNHCR	Deputy Representative (Protection)
60	Hilda Ochuonyo	UNHCR	Protection Officer
61	Gillian Walker	UNICEF	Emergency Coordinator/ Nutrition Sector Coordinator
62	Michael Zanardi	UNICEF	WCA Regional Office Dakar (former Chief, Supply and Logistics)
63	Odeh Patrick	UNICEF	UNICEF Nutrition
64	Pernille Ironside	UNICEF	Deputy Country Director
65	Sanjay Kumar Das	UNICEF	Nutrition Manager – Borno and Yobe States
66	Sultan Ahmed	UNICEF	Information Management Officer
67	Simeon Nanama	UNICEF	Chief of Nutrition Section
68	Zara Satomi	Youth Federation for World Peace	Protection Officer

WFP			
69	Aaron Sharghi	WFP Abuja	Head of Budget and Programme
70	Abiodun Oladipo	WFP Abuja	National Partnerships Officer
71	Abiola Akanni	WFP Abuja	Programme Policy Officer (Partnerships)
72	Adeline Tomas	WFP Abuja	Procurement Officer
73	Barbara Clemens	WFP Abuja	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)
74	Carrie Morrison	WFP Abuja	Head of Nutrition
75	Clare Mbizule	WFP Abuja	Compliance Officer
76	Eden Guizaw	WFP Abuja	Livelihoods Officer
77	Esther Ouma	WFP Abuja	Head of HR
78	Gerard Rebello	WFP Abuja	Head of Supply Chain
79	Helen Bugaari	WFP Abuja	Head of Programme
80	Ifeoma Maduekegarba	WFP Abuja	Gender Focal Point
81	Justin Rashid	WFP Abuja	Security Officer
82	Kalechi Onyemaobi	WFP Abuja	Communications Officer
83	Lassana Coulibaly	WFP Abuja	Head of Finance, Administration and IT
84	Lucas Alamprese	WFP Abuja	Emergency Nutrition Surge Team
85	Mohamed Nasser	WFP Abuja	Head of Food Safety & Quality Assurance
86	Myrta Kaulard	WFP Abuja	Country Director
87	Roberta Falciola	WFP Abuja	Senior Protection Officer
88	Sara Netzer	WFP Abuja	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)
89	Sarah Longford	WFP Abuja	Deputy Country Director
90	Ayii Akol	WFP Bama	Consultant Programme Policy
91	Judith Obaseki	WFP Bama	Programme Associate
92	Doug Mercado	WFP Colombia	Programme Policy Officer
93	Abdou Dieng	WFP Dakar	Regional Director

94	Anna Horner	WFP Dakar	Senior Regional Nutrition Advisor
95	Elvira Pruscini	WFP Dakar	Deputy Regional Director
96	Eric Branckaert	WFP Dakar	RBD VAM Advisor
97	Filippo Pompili	WFP Dakar	Regional Evaluation Officer
98	Florian Baalcke	WFP Dakar	Regional Security Officer
99	Isabelle Mballa	WFP Dakar	Regional SCM Officer
100	Laurene Gouplet	WFP Dakar	Programme Policy Officer, CBT
101	Lydie Kouame	WFP Dakar	Senior Budget & Programming Officer
102	Malick Ndiaye	WFP Dakar	VAM Officer
103	Matthew Dearborn	WFP Dakar	Country Strategic Planning Consultant
104	Moustapha Toure	WFP Dakar	Regional Monitoring & Evaluation Officer
105	Oyinkan Odeinde	WFP Dakar	Senior Logistics Officer
106	Pascale Crapouse	WFP Dakar	Regional Head of Administration
107	Peter Musoko	WFP Dakar	Deputy Regional Director
108	Sarah Laure Tchala	WFP Dakar	Regional HR Officer
109	Silvia Moreira	WFP Dakar	Programme Policy Consultant
110	Simon Renk	WFP Dakar	VAM Officer
111	Volli Carucci	WFP Dakar	Head, Resilience & Livelihoods Unit
112	Wagdi Othman	WFP Dakar	Senior Government Partnerships Officer
113	William Affif	WFP Dakar	Regional Senior Programme Adviser
114	Ghislain Leby	WFP Damaturu	Head of Supply Chain
115	Mohammed Gimba	WFP Damaturu	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)
116	Niamke Ezoua Kodjo	WFP Damaturu	Head of Office/Nutrition Programme Officer
117	Raymond Pamun	WFP Damaturu	Programme Assistant, CBT
118	Timothy Tile	WFP Damaturu	Logistics Officer
119	Anthony Sabiti	WFP Damaturu	Programme Policy Officer

120	Mutinta Chimuka	WFP Djibouti	Country Director, former Emergency Coordinator Nigeria
121	Amir Abdulla	WFP HQ	Deputy Executive Director
122	Denise Brown	WFP HQ	Director of Emergencies, previous Regional Director, RBD
123	Dominique Debonis	WFP HQ	WFP Technical Assistance and Country Capacity Strengthening Service (OSZI)
124	Flavia Scarnecchia	WFP HQ	Human Resources Officer
125	Jean-Pierre Leroy	WFP HQ	Chief Food Safety & Quality Assurance
126	Abdi Bishar	WFP Maiduguri	Security Officer
127	Abiyu Ayele	WFP Maiduguri	Programme Policy Officer (Partnerships)
128	Ahmed Baba	WFP Maiduguri	VAM Officer
129	Aiedah Shukrie	WFP Maiduguri	Supply Chain Officer
130	Bruce Walker	WFP Maiduguri	Head of UNHAS, Chief Air Transport Officer
131	Charles Yadika	WFP Maiduguri	National Nutritionist
132	Danjuma Saleh	WFP Maiduguri	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)
133	Ekue Ayii	WFP Maiduguri	ETC Coordinator
134	Florence Lanyero	WFP Maiduguri	Programme Policy Officer (Livelihoods)
135	Jamie Watts	WFP Maiduguri	Deputy Head of Area Office, Senior Compliance Officer
136	Josphat Mushongah	WFP Maiduguri	Emergency Coordinator and Head of Programme
137	Kelly Bradley	WFP Maiduguri	Logistics Sector Coordinator
138	Khawar Ilyas	WFP Maiduguri	Senior TC Specialist, ETS
139	Martin Ahimbisibwe	WFP Maiduguri	Nutrition Officer (Borno and Adamawa States)
140	Masahiro Matsumoto	WFP Maiduguri	CBT Coordinator
141	Michel Emeryk	WFP Maiduguri	Security and Access Officer
142	Omoniyi Ogunrinde	WFP Maiduguri	Finance Associate
143	Raymond Ssenyonga	WFP Maiduguri	M&E Officer

144	Solomon Asea	WFP Maiduguri	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)
145	Tito Nikodimos	WFP Maiduguri	Head of WFP Area Office Maiduguri
146	Vilret Tongkam	WFP Maiduguri	HR Associate
147	Wuni Dasori	WFP Maiduguri	VAM Officer
148	Mustapha Tanko	WFP Maiduguri	Protection Officer
149	Sory Ouane	WFP Niger	Country Director
150	Ron Sibanda	WFP Retiree	Former WFP Nigeria Country Director

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT

151	Mustapha Maihaja	National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)	Managing Director
152	Anthony Amu	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	Assistant Director NPFS/ Head of M&E Unit
154	Ibrahim Iro	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	Technical Assistant M&E
155	Ike Nkechi	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	National Facilitator M&E (National Focal Point Cadre Harmonisé Analysis)
156	Okorie Agwu	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	National Facilitator M&E
157	Samuel Ajuwom	National Programme for Food Security (NPFS), Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture Abuja	National Facilitator M&E
158	David Babalola	Nigerian Bureau of Statistics	Deputy Director
159	Mari Muta	Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture	Deputy Director of Extension Services, Borno State Agriculture Development Programme
160	Samuel Mbaya	Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture	Director of Extension Services, Borno State Agriculture Development Programme
161	Victor Chude	Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture, National Programme for Food Security	Head of Agriculture Production Enhancement

162	Dr Chris Osa	Nigerian Ministry of Health	Head of Nutrition, Family Health Unit
163	Dr Umar Chiromo	Nigerian Ministry of Health	Deputy Director, Primary Health Care
164	Laraba Andu	Nigerian Ministry of Health	Nutrition Officer, Primary Health Care
165	Samuel Mbaya	Nigerian Ministry of Agriculture	Director of Extension Services, Borno State Agriculture Development Programme
166	Kyari Mshelia	Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI)	Programme Manager PCNI
167	Tijjani Tumsah	Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI)	Vice Chairman PCNI
169	Ali Isa Goshe	State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) Maiduguri	Director of Risk Reduction and Management (Borno State). Liaison with WFP.
170	Ali Kolo	Yobe State Agricultural Development Programme	Programme Manager, Yobe State Agricultural Development Programme

Annex I: Core Development Indicators


NIGERIA KEY COUNTRY DATA			
INDICATOR	YEAR	VALUE	SOURCE
Population (total) (people)	2000–2017	122,352,009–190,886,311	World Bank
Gross national income per capita (constant 2010 USD)	2000–2017	1,279–2,355	
Population average annual growth (%)	2000–2017	2.5–2.6	
Urban population (% of total)	2000–2017	34.8–49.5	
Human development index ranking	2001–2017	136/162–157/189	
Gender - inequality index	N/A	N/A	
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	1999–2015	700–814	UNDP
Infant mortality rate/1,000 live births	1998–2015	112–69.4	
Life expectancy at birth	2000–2017	50.1–53.9	
Fertility rate, births per woman	2005/2010–2015/2018	5.9–5.4	
Adult literacy rate	1999–2006/2016	62.6–51.1	
Net enrolment ratio – primary (% of primary school-age population enrolled)	2000–2010*	65.05-64.10*	UNESCO
Gross enrolment ratio – primary (% of official school-age population enrolled)	2000–2016	98.64-84.70	


Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators Data Bank January 2019, UNDP Human Development Reports 2001 and 2018, UNESCO Institute for Statistics data bank January 2019.


*Latest available.

N/A = Not available.

Annex J: Maps of WFP Activities by Year, by Local Government Areas







Annex K: WFP Portfolio in Northeast Nigeria and Donor Funding

DATE	KEY EVENTS
Jan 2015	WFP launched the regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200777 “Providing life-saving support to households in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger directly affected by insecurity in northern Nigeria” (January–December 2015) to reach vulnerable refugees, returnees and host communities affected by violence in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It focused on emergency food and nutrition assistance to complement already existing protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs) in-country. The EMOP initially targeted 238,068 beneficiaries in these three countries with a total of budget of USD 50 million
May 2015	At the request of the United Nations Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, WFP established its United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) in Nigeria through special operation (SO) 200834 “Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Nigeria” (May 2015 -June 2018) to provide flights to various locations in northeast Nigeria, facilitating access to crisis-affected areas hampered by insecurity. The SO is still ongoing
September 2015	A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed with NEMA and a Road Map developed to assist the affected populations in northeast Nigeria through December 2016. As a first step, WFP launched technical support to NEMA and SEMA staff in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States in northeast Nigeria, under the regional EMOP 200777 through the 3rd budget revision (BR No. 3) and then expanded under BR No. 4
March 2016	Under BR No. 5 of the regional EMOP 200777, WFP commenced a cash-based food assistance pilot for 70,000 severely food-insecure people in Borno and Yobe States. Assistance was delivered under the umbrella of the NEMA-WFP MoU in collaboration with humanitarian partners of the food security working group
April 2016	WFP launched a two-month IR-PREP 200695 to strengthen the preparedness and readiness of WFP for the subsequent scale-up and to ensure continuous analysis of the food security situation and displacement crisis. The project closed in June 2016 IR-EMOP 200969 was approved to provide immediate rations of life-saving assistance to 54,000 children aged 6-23 months in Maiduguri and Jere local government areas in Borno State. The project closed in June 2016 when nutrition interventions for children aged 6-23 months were officially included in EMOP 200777
June 2016	WFP joined the implementation of the Integrated Nutrition Programme (INP) in consortium with UNICEF and ACF. The INP planned a minimum packaging of interventions through community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM), supporting 44,000 children under 5 years with SAM in Borno and Yobe States
July 2016	Under BR No. 6 of the regional EMOP 200777, WFP targeted 431,000 beneficiaries with the introduction of in-kind general food assistance to affected people, as well as nutrition interventions for children aged 6-23 months in Borno and Yobe States

August 2016	WFP officially re-established its office in Nigeria, with the provision of immunities and privileges. Concurrently, WFP activated a corporate L3 emergency response for northeast Nigeria to support extensive expansion of life-saving operations. In accordance with the WFP Emergency Response Activation Protocol, the Regional Director was appointed as Corporate Response Director (CRD), responsible for operational management and first line support to the emergency coordinator. The emergency coordinator, who directly reported to the CRD, had full delegated authority for the management of relevant operations in northeast Nigeria
November 2016	SO 201032 (November 2016-June 2018) launched to provide “Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications Sector Coordination and Services to augment the Humanitarian Response in northeast Nigeria”. The SO provides logistics coordination, logistics information management, logistics service provision as well as emergency telecommunications sector coordination and service provision
May 2017	WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) implemented a joint approach to coordinate delivery of emergency food assistance provided by WFP with FAO fast tracking smallholder agriculture production through the provision of seeds, tools and fertilizers as well as small scale livelihoods starter kits
April 2018	Under BR No.12, WFP introduced a pilot targeted supplementary feeding programme to treat children with moderate acute malnutrition who were between 6 to 59 months, starting from the 2nd quarter of 2018, in locations where the health service delivery infrastructure and partners had sufficient capacity
2018	WFP piloted income generating activities, agriculture interventions, and social protection – cash-for-work interventions

OPERATION	TITLE	TIMEFRAME	USD REQUIRED 2016-2018	US\$ RECEIVED 2016-2018	% FUNDED	PROJECT OBJECTIVES
EMOP 200777	Providing lifesaving support to households in Cameroon, Chad and Niger directly affected by insecurity in northern Nigeria	01 Jan 2015 – 31 Dec 2018	200777 all countries: 1,240,366,998 200777 Nigeria component: 774,379,051	200777 all countries: 805,407,095 200777 Nigeria component: 534,952,727	200777 all countries: 65% 200777 Nigeria component: 69%	Through the regional EMOP 200777, WFP, in coordination with respective host governments, addresses urgent food and nutrition needs of the most vulnerable people and communities in conflict-affected areas and displacement sites in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, by: (i) responding to food needs of crisis-affected populations through context-specific responses; (ii) stabilizing the nutritional situation of crisis-

affected children through robust prevention programmes adapted to nutrition indicators of population groups; and (iii) strengthening the operational knowledge and reinforcing on the ground implementation capacities of Nigerian emergency management agencies. All these activities are combined with a capacity-strengthening component enabling national governments to support and assist vulnerable populations

WFP Nigeria implements the following interventions: general food distribution (in-kind food and cash-based transfers), integrated with preventative nutrition assistance for children aged 6 to 23 months, children aged 24 to 59 months with moderate acute malnutrition and pregnant and lactating women and girls, as well as livelihood protection and enhancement to support self-reliance. WFP uses the most appropriate and context-specific transfer modalities and delivery mechanisms to address the needs of the affected populations

SO 201032	Providing logistics and emergency telecommunications sector coordination and services to augment the humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria	01 Nov 2016 - 31 Dec 2018	20,214,166	11,765,153	58%	Special operation 201032 enables the logistics sector to support the humanitarian community in Borno State through logistics coordination, civil-military liaison for cargo movements, logistics information management and storage augmentation. The special operation also supports the emergency telecommunications sector in providing telecommunications services where basic infrastructure is limited, and in deploying and upgrading security telecommunications equipment in the established humanitarian hubs in northeast Nigeria
SO 200834	Provision of humanitarian air services in northeast Nigeria (Standard Project Report 2016)	01 May 2015 - 31 Dec 2018	58,231,370	54,185,440	93%	Special operation 200834 enables WFP to operate the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) on behalf of the humanitarian community, providing safe and reliable air transport to humanitarian personnel via one fixed-wing aircraft and four helicopters. Helicopter flights, introduced in July 2016, constitute a critical component to access remote and hard-to-reach areas in northeast Nigeria

IR-EMOP 200969	Providing emergency preparedness activities in Noertheast Nigeria	01 Apr 2016 – 30 Jun 2016	300,000	268,062	89%	<p>In light of the humanitarian imperative and growing concern around the famine-like conditions, and with the request of the Government of Nigeria to support them in reaching rural areas, it was agreed with the Executive Director that the WFP presence in Nigeria must be scaled up for a time-bound period in order for WFP, partners and the Government to be able to meet the urgent lifesaving needs</p> <p>To strengthen the preparedness and readiness of WFP for the foreseen scale-up and to ensure continuous analysis of the food security situation and displacement crisis (by producing an updated needs-assessment, access strategy, response plan and a reformulated and expanded mVAM), WFP aimed to undertake the following activities: 1) access and response planning mission; 2) rapid assessments; 3) multi-functional cash-based expert team mission to assess modalities for rural areas; and 4) mVAM scale-up</p>
	Providing lifesaving support to highly	15 Apr 2016 - 30 Jun 2016	1,500,000	1,389,490	93%	Due to signs of extreme stress within vulnerable populations

food insecure
young children
affected by conflict
and insecurity in
northeast Nigeria

and the lean season fast approaching, immediate lifesaving assistance targeting young children needed to be promptly provided. It was critical to address the immediate nutritional needs of children aged 6-23 months, many of them already malnourished, requiring energy/nutrients dense foods. To this end, and considering the emergency context (poor water and sanitation conditions, inadequate health facilities, markets limitations, and unavailability of locally produced ready-to-use foods for young children), the IR-EMOP aimed to urgently airlift age-adequate ready-to-use supplementary food from the most cost-effective location and transport it to Maiduguri (capital of Borno State) to be distributed to 54,000 children aged 6-23 months

FUNDING IN NIGERIA: GRAND TOTAL BY DONOR, BY YEAR

TOTAL DONOR FUNDING TO WFP NIGERIA 2016 – 2018				
COUNTRY	2016-2018	2016	2017	2018
USA	\$284,804,340	\$17,064,793	\$180,988,582	\$86,750,965
United Kingdom	\$193,856,200	\$41,830,724	\$68,383,020	\$83,642,455
European Commission	\$50,247,422	\$9,513,024	\$22,345,822	\$18,388,576
Germany	\$34,739,714	\$10,823,967	\$12,958,117	\$10,957,630
Canada	\$17,384,735	\$385,208	\$11,303,925	\$5,695,602
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	\$12,070,838	\$6,995,380	\$5,075,458	-
United Nations other funds and agencies (excl. CERF)	\$9,709,006	-	\$830,000	\$8,879,006
Norway	\$8,238,123	\$5,061,193	\$2,672,554	\$504,376
Nigeria	\$6,407,331	-	\$5,622,496	\$784,835
Switzerland	\$6,330,520	\$510,725	\$3,285,011	\$2,534,784
Sweden	\$5,878,553	\$2,389,171	\$1,885,245	\$1,604,137
China	\$5,000,000	-	\$5,000,000	-
Netherlands	\$4,479,283	-	\$4,479,283	-
Japan	\$3,500,000	-	\$3,500,000	-
Finland	\$3,369,040	-	\$2,134,472	\$1,234,568
Private Donors	\$3,308,338	\$365,656	\$1,707,171	\$1,235,511
United Nations country-based pooled funds	\$2,826,682	-	\$827,002	\$1,999,680
Australia	\$2,457,714	\$220,577	\$2,237,136	-
Belgium	\$2,229,699	\$1,109,878	\$1,119,821	-
Italy	\$2,223,433	-	\$1,085,776	\$1,137,656
Republic of Korea	\$1,000,000	-	\$500,000	\$500,000
Spain	\$585,480	-	-	\$585,480
France	\$419,933	-	\$419,933	-
OPEC Fund for International Development	\$400,000	-	\$400,000	-
Monaco	\$325,733	-	\$325,733	-
Hungary	\$182,708	-	\$182,708	-
Ireland	\$168,979	\$168,979	-	-
Mexico	\$150,000	-	\$150,000	-
Luxembourg	\$95,000	-	\$95,000	-
Lithuania	\$10,741	-	\$10,741	-
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	\$907,034,808	\$107,956,631	\$444,948,024	\$354,130,153
TOTAL RECEIVED*	\$662,399,543	\$96,439,275	\$339,525,007	\$226,435,261
% OF REQUIREMENTS FUNDED	73%	89%	76%	64%

*Total funds received here captures only direct donor contributions, and as such excludes multilateral allocations, stock transfer, miscellaneous income etc.

Source: Funds received sourced from WFP corporate system for contribution statistics WINGS, report: Distribution Contribution and Forecast Stats 03/02/2019. Total requirements sourced from the FACTory/WINGS, report: Country: Nigeria - Needs and Allocated Contributions. All data extracted between 3-5 February 2019.

FUNDING IN NIGERIA: BY OPERATION, BY DONOR, BY YEAR

EMOP 200777 – ALL COUNTRIES US\$		2016	2017	2018
DONOR	2016-2018			
USA	\$338,419,077	\$63,528,698	\$191,154,699	\$99,073,693
United Kingdom	\$159,624,571	\$42,687,529	\$65,671,559	\$51,798,891
Germany	\$70,988,934	\$22,335,601	\$29,954,870	\$18,698,463
European Commission	\$60,649,489	\$17,991,470	\$28,175,141	\$14,482,878
Multilateral	\$41,977,641	\$14,139,879	\$22,851,928	\$4,985,834
Canada	\$27,520,181	\$1,617,874	\$14,916,461	\$10,850,150
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	\$21,018,749	\$11,096,976	\$9,921,773	-
Japan	\$10,616,901	\$4,750,000	\$4,966,000	\$900,901
China	\$9,213,308	-	\$9,213,308	-
Netherlands	\$8,981,653	-	\$8,981,653	-
Switzerland	\$8,538,119	\$3,428,061	\$2,980,133	\$2,129,925
Norway	\$8,422,987	\$5,645,305	\$1,452,475	\$1,325,207
Nigeria	\$6,407,331	-	\$5,622,496	\$784,835
Australia	\$5,938,099	\$3,700,962	\$2,237,136	-
Private donors	\$5,607,793	\$1,423,584	\$2,581,678	\$1,602,532
Finland	\$3,369,040	-	\$2,134,472	\$1,234,568
United Nations other funds and agencies (excl. CERF)	\$2,640,530	-	\$830,000	\$1,810,530
Italy	\$1,616,562	-	\$1,616,562	-
Luxembourg	\$1,418,097	\$283,447	\$530,786	\$603,865
Sweden	\$1,301,112	\$70,301	\$1,230,811	-
Belgium	\$1,119,821	-	\$1,119,821	-
France	\$1,105,668	\$283,447	\$979,843	-\$157,622
Republic of Korea	\$1,000,000	-	\$500,000	\$500,000
OPEC Fund for International Development	\$400,000	-	\$400,000	-
Monaco	\$325,733	-	\$325,733	-
Hungary	\$182,708	-	\$182,708	-
Ireland	\$168,979	\$168,979	-	-
Iceland	\$150,000	-	\$150,000	-
Mexico	\$150,000	-	\$150,000	-
Saudi Arabia	\$72,443	\$72,443	-	-

Lithuania	\$10,741	-	\$10,741	-
Spain**	\$685	-	-	\$585,480
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	\$1,240,366,998	\$222,221,538	\$590,149,357	\$427,996,103
TOTAL RECEIVED*	\$805,407,095	\$198,971,494	\$439,946,135	\$201,410,294
% OF REQUIREMENTS FUNDED	65%	90%	75%	47%

* Miscellaneous income and stock transfers are also included in total funds received, but are not listed in the table.

** Out of the USD 585,480 grant from Spain in 2018, USD 584,795 were transferred to the Nigeria CSP and as such left USD 685 recorded in total funds received for EMOP 200777 as of 31 January 2019.

EMOP 200777.NG - NIGERIA COMPONENT US\$				
DONOR	2016-2018	2016	2017	2018
USA	\$251,111,221	\$13,059,337	\$174,154,699	\$79,235,197
United Kingdom	\$145,735,682	\$33,849,146	\$60,621,054	\$51,798,891
European Commission	\$34,790,733	\$8,380,521	\$18,076,879	\$8,333,333
Germany	\$28,620,121	\$8,106,576	\$12,421,060	\$8,092,486
Canada	\$16,467,920	\$385,208	\$10,314,944	\$5,384,802
Multilateral	\$11,675,505	\$3,350,020	\$7,266,921	\$1,058,564
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	\$10,320,058	\$5,995,380	\$4,324,678	-
Norway	\$6,513,668	\$5,061,193	\$1,452,475	-
Nigeria	\$6,407,331	-	\$5,622,496	\$784,835
Switzerland	\$5,110,059	-	\$2,980,133	\$2,129,925
China	\$5,000,000	-	\$5,000,000	-
Netherlands	\$4,479,283	-	\$4,479,283	-
Japan	\$3,500,000	-	\$3,500,000	-
Finland	\$3,369,040	-	\$2,134,472	\$1,234,568
Private donors	\$2,988,121	\$365,656	\$1,537,122	\$1,047,931
United Nations other funds and agencies (excl. CERF)	\$2,640,530		\$830,000	\$1,810,530
Australia	\$2,457,714	\$220,577	\$2,237,136	-
Sweden	\$1,301,112	\$70,301	\$1,230,811	-
Belgium	\$1,119,821	-	\$1,119,821	-
Italy	\$1,085,776	-	\$1,085,776	-
Republic of Korea	\$1,000,000	-	\$500,000	\$500,000
France	\$419,933	-	\$419,933	-
OPEC Fund for International Development	\$400,000	-	\$400,000	-
Monaco	\$325,733	-	\$325,733	-
Hungary	\$182,708	-	\$182,708	-

Ireland	\$168,979	\$168,979	-	-
Mexico	\$150,000	-	\$150,000	-
Lithuania	\$10,741	-	\$10,741	-
Spain**	\$685	-	-	\$585,480
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	\$774,379,051	\$86,018,722	\$389,097,767	\$299,262,562
TOTAL RECEIVED*	\$534,952,727	\$79,339,087	\$322,490,035	\$162,532,961
% OF REQUIREMENTS FUNDED	69%	92%	83%	54%

* Miscellaneous income and stock transfer are also included in total funds received, but are not listed in the table.

** Out of the USD 585,480 grant from Spain in 2018, USD 584,795 were transferred to the Nigeria CSP and as such left USD 685 recorded in total funds received for EMOP 200777 as of 31 January 2019.

SO 201032 US\$		2016	2017	2018
DONOR	2016-2018			
USA	\$4,000,527	-	\$3,355,106	\$1,500,000
Sweden	\$2,377,416	\$1,215,604	\$654,434	\$507,378
Germany	\$1,672,952	\$543,478	\$537,057	\$592,417
European Commission	\$1,435,334	-	\$1,067,236	\$368,098
United Nations country based pooled funds	\$827,002	-	\$827,002	-
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	\$750,780	-	\$750,780	-
Private donors	\$320,218	-	\$148,768	\$171,450
Norway*	\$285,925	-	\$1,220,079	-\$934,155
Luxembourg	\$95,000	-	\$95,000	-
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	\$20,214,166	\$2,031,395	\$8,213,820	\$9,968,951
TOTAL RECEIVED	\$11,765,153	\$1,759,082	\$8,655,462	\$2,205,189
% OF REQUIREMENTS FUNDED	58%	87%	105%	22%

* Out of the USD 1,220,079 grant from Norway in 2017, USD 934,154 were transferred to the Nigeria CSP and as such left USD 285,924 recorded in total funds received for SO 201032 as of 4 February 2019.

SO 200834 US\$		2016	2017	2018
DONOR	2016-2018			
United Kingdom	\$21,385,294	\$7,981,579	\$7,761,966	\$5,641,749
USA	\$13,500,000	\$4,000,000	\$3,000,000	\$6,500,000
European Commission	\$6,788,198	\$1,132,503	\$3,201,708	\$2,453,988
Germany	\$4,446,640	\$2,173,913	-	\$2,272,727
Sweden	\$2,200,024	\$1,103,266	-	\$1,096,758
United Nations country based pooled funds	\$1,999,680	-	-	\$1,999,680
Switzerland	\$1,220,462	\$510,725	\$304,878	\$404,858

Belgium	\$1,109,878	\$1,109,878	-	-
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	\$1,000,000	\$1,000,000	-	-
Canada	\$533,849	-	\$223,048	\$310,800
TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	\$58,231,370	\$12,385,203	\$20,458,550	\$25,387,618
TOTAL RECEIVED	\$54,185,440	\$19,011,864	\$14,535,875	\$20,637,702
% OF REQUIREMENTS FUNDED	93%	154%	71%	81%

Source all 'Funding in Nigeria by operation tables: Funding overview reports from WFP corporate system for contribution statistics 'FACTory'/WINGS. Extracted between 31 January and 4 February 2019.

IR-EMOP AND IR-PREP APR-JUN 2016			
OPERATION	TOTAL REQUIREMENTS	TOTAL RECEIVED*	% OF REQUIREMENTS FUNDED
IR-EMOP 200969	\$300,000	\$268,062	89%
IR-PREP 200965	\$1,500,000	\$1,389,490	93%

* Both the IR-EMOP and IR-PREP were funded by allocations from the Immediate Response Account under the delegated authority of the Director of Emergencies. Figures of total funds received here excludes Indirect Support Costs.

Source: Budget & Programming division, Information Systems and Reporting Branch (RMBI).

Annex L: List of Cooperating Partners

COOPERATING PARTNER	YEAR
2016 TOTAL	5
Action contre la Faim (ACF)	2016
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	2016
International Medical Corps (IMC)	2016
INTERSOS	2016
Social Welfare Network Initiative (SWNI)	2016
2017 TOTAL	17
Action contre la Faim (ACF)	2017
African Healthcare Implementation and Facilitation Foundation (AHIFF)	2017
CARE	2017
Christian Aid	2017
Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)	2017
Damnaish Human Capacity Building Initiative (DHCBI)	2017
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	2017
International Medical Corps (IMC)	2017
INTERSOS	2017
Mercy Corps	2017
National Youth Council of Nigeria (NYCN)	2017
Premiere Urgence - Aide Medicale Internationale	2017
Samaritan Care and Support Initiative (SACSUI)	2017
Save the Children	2017
Secours Islamique France	2017
Social Welfare Network Initiative (SWNI)	2017
Youth Federation for World Peace (YFWP)	2017
2018 TOTAL	22
Action contre la Faim (ACF)	2018
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED)	2018
Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)	2018
African Healthcare Implementation and Facilitation Foundation (AHIFF)	2018
Borno Women Development Initiative (BOWDI)	2018
CARE	2018
Centre for Community Development and Research Network	2018
Christian Aid	2018
Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI)	2018
Damnaish Human Capacity Building Initiative (DHCBI)	2018
Danish Refugee Council (DRC)	2018
eHealth Africa Foundation (eHA)	2018
International Medical Corps (IMC)	2018
Intersos	2018
Kanem Borno Human Development Association (KABHUDA)	2018
National Youth Council of Nigeria (NYCN)	2018
Nira Community Development Foundation	2018
Plan International	2018
Samaritan Care and Support Initiative (SACSUI)	2018
Social Welfare Network Initiative (SWNI)	2018
Yobe State Primary Healthcare Management Board (YSPHCMB)	2018
Youth Federation for World Peace (YFWP)	2018

Annex M: Findings on Emergency Preparedness and Response, Nutrition and Livelihoods


1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Country Context

1. The main livelihoods for people in northeast Nigeria are agriculture-related, with households engaging in farming and livestock rearing as their main source of income. Prior to the conflict, most households (80 percent) owned animals (cattle, sheep, goats and camels), and at least 30 percent of households also engaged in fishing activities.³ However, the conflict has resulted in destruction or looting of irrigation material, which means that farmers can no longer resume off-season crop production. Many animals have also been looted by insurgents, with less than 20 percent of households still owning their own livestock.

2. Figure 1 shows that even before the conflict, northeast Nigeria experienced ongoing high rates of malnutrition. The area generally experienced global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates close to or above the 15 percent emergency threshold, and above the severe acute malnutrition (SAM) emergency threshold of 2 percent. Similarly, northeast Nigeria regularly experiences stunting and underweight prevalence rates above emergency thresholds. The conflict has therefore exacerbated an already poor nutrition context.⁴

Figure 1: Rates of acute malnutrition in children under 5 years in northeast Nigeria (2007-2017)



Source: Compiled from national surveys: MICS 2007, DHS 2008, MICS 2011, DHS 2013, NNHS 2015 and MICS 2016/2017

3. Nigeria has had regular food security and market price monitoring by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) since January 2007. Since February 2012,⁵ FEWSNET reports have mentioned the civil insecurity in northeast Nigeria as affecting food security and increasing market prices of food and fuel.

4. Since early 2013, populations have been fleeing northern Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, albeit in relatively low numbers. Internal displacement was also occurring and, by January 2014, FEWSNET data indicated that many displaced households in Borno and Yobe States of northeast Nigeria were in Crisis (IPC Phase 3).⁶ By 2015 there was a sharp increase in internal displacement and by April 2015, FEWSNET

³ FAO (2016) Nigeria Food Security and Vulnerability Survey Report. November 2016.

⁴ It should be noted that although WHO emergency threshold for GAM is >15% or 10-14% with aggravating factors, in refugee settings such as the IDP camps in northeast Nigeria, UNHCR uses an emergency threshold of >10% GAM and ≥15% GAM as critical.

⁵ FEWSNET (2012) Nigeria Market Assessment Summary: Localized food insecurity in the extreme north as civil insecurity persists in the north. February 2012.

⁶ FEWSNET (2014) Nigeria Food Security Outlook: Crisis food insecurity in the northeast. January – June 2014.

predicted that the areas worst affected by conflict would begin to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4) food insecurity, as a large proportion of households in these areas faced greater food consumption gaps and higher risks for malnutrition and excess mortality.

5. The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) tracking of the displacement in northeast Nigeria started in late 2014, showing progressive increases in the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDP), rising to a peak of 1.65 million by June 2015 in Borno State alone (Figure 1). In the absence of large-scale humanitarian assistance at that time, an estimated 3.5 million people faced significant difficulty meeting their basic food needs. By August 2015, an assessment⁷ found that the ongoing insecurity had created an urgent humanitarian situation and noted that some households were already destitute.

6. In late 2015, the regional framework for consensual analysis of food insecurity, Cadre Harmonisé (CH), started in Nigeria with a specific focus on the Northeast States. The first Cadre Harmonisé assessment (October 2015) identified Borno and Yobe States as most in need of assistance. Households were showing larger food consumption gaps than other areas, and the median rates of global acute malnutrition were within the critical threshold of between 10 percent and 15 percent.⁸

7. By May 2016, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, was home to around 2.5 million people, of which the IOM displacement tracking matrix identified 1.4 million as being internally displaced persons, with most living among host communities.⁹ At that time, people depended on the numerous markets around the city to satisfy their food and non-food needs, with most households (69 percent) relying on some form of coping strategy due to the difficulties of supplying food needs with their own stock or through market purchase. Large proportions of households were already using severe coping strategies by that time.¹⁰

8. By October 2016, the Cadre Harmonisé analysis confirmed a very severe food insecurity and nutrition situation in Borno State, projecting that the population in Famine (IPC Phase 5) would increase from 55,000 to 115,000 people by the following year (June-August 2017).¹¹ A special report by FEWSNET in December 2016 indicated that a famine had already likely occurred in Bama local government area and that it was probably ongoing in other parts of Borno State.¹² The same special report stated that urgent humanitarian action was required to respond to elevated risk of famine in other areas, and highlighted that aside from the internally displaced persons, the most affected populations were located in areas that were inaccessible to the humanitarian community.

"The most affected populations are those without humanitarian assistance in inaccessible areas and IDPs. IDPs in the northeast region are estimated at 1.8 million, of which 1.4 million are in Borno State and one million are in and around Maiduguri, the state capital."¹³

9. In June 2016, the Ministry of Health (MoH) declared a state of nutrition emergency in Borno State calling for urgent life-saving humanitarian assistance in newly accessible areas.

10. During 2018, with the continuation of the offensive targeting Boko Haram, more areas of northeast Nigeria became accessible.¹⁴ FEWSNET's latest projections indicated that much of northeast Nigeria was likely

⁷ FAO (2015) Food Security & Livelihood Assessment in northeast Nigeria - August 2015. Food Security Cluster. September 2015.

⁸ FAO (2015) Cadre Harmonisé for identifying risk areas and vulnerable populations in The Sahel and West Africa. Results of analysis of current situation of acute food insecurity. 5th November 2015.

⁹ WFP & FEWSNET (2016) Emergency Food Security Assessment – Maiduguri. Data from May 2016.

¹⁰ <http://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/featured-stories/news-details/en/c/1134723>

¹¹ FAO (2016) Cadre Harmonisé for identifying risk areas and vulnerable populations in sixteen (16) States of Nigeria. Results of analysis of current (October–December 2016) and projected (June–August 2017) situations of acute food and nutrition insecurity. 28th October 2016.


¹² FEWSNET (2016) Famine risk in northern and central Borno State. A famine likely occurred in Bama LGA and may be ongoing in inaccessible areas of Borno State. 13th December 2016.

¹³ IPC (2016) Special Alert on Borno State, Nigeria. Urgent humanitarian action required to respond to elevated risk of famine. 16th December 2016.

¹⁴ FEWSNET (2018) Nigeria Food Security Outlook. Despite forecasts for favourable rainfall, well below-average harvests again expected in northeast Nigeria. July 2018–January 2019.

to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3!)¹⁵ until at least May 2019 (Figure 2)¹⁶ and large parts of Borno State are likely to experience Emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) as the military offensives continue, resulting in ongoing displacement. The areas that remain inaccessible to humanitarian actors will also be facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions, as the food security outcomes are thought to be worse than in adjoining accessible areas. As of October 2018, the food security outlook indicated that most of Borno State, southern Yobe State and northern Adamawa State continue to experience Crisis (IPC3) and Emergency (IPC4) outcomes.¹⁷ Borno State remains particularly precarious with the unpredictable security situation continuing to affect people's livelihoods and food security. Similarly, the most recent nutrition surveys from Borno State (August/September 2018)^{18 19} continue to report high rates of acute malnutrition, above the global and severe acute malnutrition emergency thresholds. High numbers of newly arrived children from previously inaccessible areas continue to be diagnosed with severe acute malnutrition, confirming the concern for people living in those areas. The intense Boko Haram-related conflict is also still severely restricting agricultural production, with the 2018 harvest season expected to be below average.²⁰

Figure 2: FEWSNET projected food security situation (February–May 2019)



Source: <http://fewsn.net/west-africa/nigeria>

1.2. The WFP Corporate Emergency Response in Northeast Nigeria

11. In September 2015, WFP signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to provide capacity strengthening to their response to the crisis in northeast Nigeria. The memorandum of understanding enabled WFP to set up a base in Borno and Yobe States and by October 2015 WFP had deployed staff to support the Government's response. A Road Map was developed together with NEMA to assist the affected populations until December 2016.

12. In March 2016, under Budget Revision No. 5 of the regional EMOP, WFP added Nigeria as a direct implementation country and commenced cash-based transfers (CBT) to deliver general food assistance (GFA) for 70,000 severely food-insecure people in Borno and Yobe States. Assistance was delivered under the umbrella of the NEMA-WFP memorandum of understanding in collaboration with humanitarian partners of

¹⁵ Phase 3! means Classified as IPC Phase 3 but likely to be at least one phase worse without current or programmed humanitarian assistance.

¹⁶ FEWSNET (2018) Nigeria Food Security Outlook Update. Assistance needs remain high as the main harvest concludes. December 2018.

¹⁷ FEWSNET (2018) Nigeria Food Security Outlook: Elevated food security outcomes persist again in 2018 in the northeast during the harvest season. October 2018–May 2019. October 2018.

¹⁸ Save the Children (2018) Nutrition and mortality survey report. Borno State, Nigeria. Final report. August 2018.

¹⁹ UNICEF evaluation team et al (2018) Nutrition and food security surveillance: Bama Emergency SMART Survey. Final Report. September 2018.

²⁰ FEWSNET (2018) Nigeria Food Security Outlook: Elevated food security outcomes persist again in 2018 in the northeast during the harvest season. October 2018–May 2019. October 2018.

the food security working group.

13. In April 2016, WFP also launched two short immediate responses: a two-month special preparedness operation (IR-PREP 200695) designed to provide technical support to NEMA and SEMA staff in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States to strengthen their preparedness and readiness for the required scale-up; and a two-month nutrition intervention (IR-EMOP 200969) to provide blanket supplementary feeding (BSFP) to 54,000 children aged 6-59 months in Maiduguri and Jere, local government areas in Borno State.

14. From June 2016, WFP joined the implementation of the Integrated Nutrition Programme (INP) in consortium with UNICEF and ACF. The programme planned a minimum packaging of interventions through community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM), supporting 44,000 children under 5 years with severe acute malnutrition in Borno and Yobe States. Activities included counselling on infant and young child feeding (IYCF), immunization services, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) components, as well as distribution of micronutrient powders and supplements, and deworming. WFP provided monthly cash transfers to the mothers of children with severe acute malnutrition equivalent to the urban food assistance cash transfer rate (17,000 NGN).

15. In July 2016, under Budget Revision No. 6 the regional EMOP was expanded to reach 431,000 people with the introduction of in-kind (IK) food distributions to affected people in areas where markets were not adequately functional, and the continuation and expansion of BSFP for children aged 6-59 months in Borno and Yobe States in order to prevent acute malnutrition.

16. In early August 2016, WFP was informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it had been granted immunities and privileges to operate in Nigeria. Since then, WFP has continued to provide general food assistance using both cash-based transfers and in-kind modalities and has continued to provide nutrition support for children under 5 years. Pregnant and lactating women (PLW) were added to the nutrition interventions from January 2017.

17. In the last budget revision (Budget Revision No. 12) of EMOP 200777, WFP introduced a pilot targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP) to treat 8,500 children (50 percent of whom were to be girls) with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) aged between 6 to 59 months. This project is implemented in eight locations in Yobe State with global acute malnutrition rates above 10 percent in specific areas not reached by BSFP. The project is a partnership between WFP and the Ministry of Health and is implemented where the health service delivery infrastructure and partners have sufficient capacity to integrate the TSFP into a broader package of health and nutrition services and CMAM activities.

18. As at September 2018, EMOP 200777 is targeting 2,087,119 beneficiaries, of whom 54 percent are women and girls.²¹ All the food and nutrition security-related activities described above are implemented under WFP Strategic Goal 1: to support countries to reach zero hunger. The programme contributes to Strategic Objective 1 – to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies, and Strategic Objective 2 – to improve nutrition.

2. EVALUATION FINDINGS

2.1. Appropriateness of the Design and Delivery and Alignment with Needs

2.1.1 Alignment with identified humanitarian needs and relevant national policies and use of context and risk analysis

Relevance of design to immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished


19. By September 2015, several food security assessments and nutrition surveys by other agencies, as well as the regular food security monitoring by FEWSNET and Cadre Harmonisé, and displacement tracking by IOM, indicated that the food security situation in northeast Nigeria was deteriorating rapidly. Similarly,

²¹ WFP (2018) Terms of Reference: Evaluation of WFP's corporate (Level-3) emergency response in northeast Nigeria (2016-2018).

several nutrition surveys were available from various locations by UNICEF and other agencies that were already operational,²² and these identified several areas with high acute malnutrition rates.²³ WFP also participated in the Joint United Nations Multi-Sectoral Assessment in April 2016²⁴ covering Borno and Yobe States. The mission including senior staff from the WFP regional bureau in Dakar and headquarters, and the findings served as the basis for the scale-up of the response.²⁵

20. Overall, assessment information indicated widespread need for humanitarian intervention, with millions of people in need of urgent food assistance and nutrition support. Borno and Yobe States were identified as being the locations most in need of assistance.²⁶ A review of the Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) from 2013 to 2018 clearly shows the scale of need throughout the evaluated period. People requiring food security support increased from around 4 million in December 2013,²⁷ to a peak of 5.8 million in November 2016²⁸ (Figure 3). At the same time, people requiring nutrition support increased from 4 million²⁹ to 6.7 million.³⁰ The Humanitarian Needs Overviews also clearly showed which geographic locations were most in need, and accessible to humanitarian actors.

Figure 3: Number of people needing food security and nutrition assistance in northeast Nigeria (2013-2018)



Source: Compiled from data in the 2014-2018 Humanitarian Needs Overviews. Please note that the HNOs for any given year are published in November/December of the preceding year, e.g. the HNO for 2018 was published in November 2017.

21. WFP operational plans from January 2017 onwards indicate that WFP planned to provide assistance for up to 1.74 million beneficiaries (April 2017) in Borno and Yobe States, with the majority of beneficiaries appropriately located in Borno State, the centre of the crisis. Two local government areas in Adamawa State (Madagai and Michika) were added to the operational plans in February 2017. These overall planned numbers represented around 30 percent of the total population in need of food security assistance, although at that time, most of the people in need were inaccessible. As of August 2018, humanitarian agencies were targeting a total of 3.7 million people across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States with food security and livelihood support, including 1.6 million from host communities, 1.5 million internally displaced persons and 0.6 million returnees.³¹

22. As more areas became accessible to the humanitarian community over time, the WFP operation expanded geographically from two local government areas in 2016 (Maiduguri and Jere in Borno State) to 27

²² For example - Njoroge, M. (2016) Report of Small-Scale SMART Survey in MMC, Jere LGAs, Borno State, Nigeria. Nutrition SMART Survey Report. April 2016. Action Against Hunger.

²³ For example - Konduga LGA: GAM 16.4% and SAM 5.0%; Kaga LGA - GAM 13.0 % and SAM 3.4%; and Monguno LGA - GAM 27.3% and SAM 8.7%..

²⁴ WFP et al (2016) Joint United Nations Multi-Sectoral Assessment. Borno and Yobe States, Nigeria. April 2016.

²⁵ WFP SPR 2016.

²⁶ FAO (2015) Cadre Harmonisé for identifying risk areas and vulnerable populations in The Sahel and West Africa. Results of analysis of current situation of acute food insecurity. 5th November 2015.

²⁷ OCHA (2013) 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. December 2013.

²⁸ OCHA (2016) 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. November 2016.

²⁹ OCHA (2013) 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. December 2013.

³⁰ OCHA (2016) 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. November 2016.


³¹ https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/nga_fss_sectordashboard_august2018_21092018_final.pdf.

local government areas in 2018 covering Borno, Yobe and parts of Adamawa States. WFP and partners essentially began implementing the same set of activities in each new operational area: general food assistance and nutrition support (BSFP) to children under 5 years and to pregnant and lactating women. The main difference between locations is the modality for the delivery of general food assistance, either through cash-based transfers or as in-kind (see Annex H). In addition, some projects such as the Integrated Nutrition Programme and some livelihood projects are implemented in specific locations outside of general food assistance areas.

23. Although the initial decision by WFP to respond in Nigeria was based on assessments and monitoring conducted by other agencies, once operational, WFP quickly established its own system of assessments and monitoring. WFP started mobile vulnerability, assessment and mapping (mVAM) in early 2016, and regular market monitoring from July 2016. The first WFP mVAM bulletin (May 2016)³² found that the food security situation in Borno and Yobe States was deteriorating and highlighted that internally displaced persons and poor households had worse food consumption and were using negative coping strategies more often than the host population. This provided WFP with the evidence to start targeting internally displaced persons as priority.

24. Over time, WFP assessments and monitoring information has provided the humanitarian community with a clearer picture of the operating context in northeast Nigeria. The main concern from stakeholders regarding WFP (and other humanitarian actors') assessments is that they are, understandably, confined to the areas that are accessible. The evaluation could not find any humanitarian agency that had been able to physically conduct assessments in the inaccessible areas. Early on, the WFP mapping of assessments clearly showed the actual locations that had been assessed (Figure 4, Map 1) however, recent maps show whole local government areas marked (Map 2) as though the findings can be extrapolated.

Figure 4: Different mapping styles of WFP and OCHA for showing assessment findings and accessibility



Source: Map 1: WFP Food Security Monitoring Results, September 2017; Map 2: WFP Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring, August 2018; Map 3: OCHA Map of humanitarian access by humanitarian actors, August 2018.

25. Stakeholders criticized both the WFP and Cadre Harmonisé maps saying that the extrapolation is inappropriate, and because they are so widely used, it contributes to humanitarian agencies (including WFP) having an overly positive view of the food security situation, particularly in Borno State.

26. Figure 4, Map 3 (OCHA's humanitarian access map) shows the inaccessible areas in blue, highlighting that the majority of Borno State is inaccessible. In fact, there is almost no data available on the inaccessible areas except that satellite imagery indicates approximately 823,000 people still living in these areas.³³ The security situation in Borno State also remains unpredictable, therefore assessment findings are likely to be highly variable from one location to the next, and from one point in time to another. Some WFP programming decisions were therefore also criticised by evaluation stakeholders for being over-reliant on assessment findings at one point in time, without sufficient consideration of the security and protection context or the fluidity of the situation.

2.1.2 Use of context analysis in the programme design and delivery

27. Although WFP appropriately utilized extensive assessment data to support the decision to become

³² WFP (2016) Nigeria mVAM Bulletin 1: May 2016. Food security in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States deteriorated between January and March.

³³ OCHA (2018) Northeast Nigeria: Humanitarian Situation Update – Progress on key activities from the 2018 Humanitarian Response Plan, November 2018 Edition.

operational, in the specific design of the food assistance, nutrition and livelihood recovery activities, WFP has not always utilized sufficient context analysis or capacity assessments to design appropriate interventions. This has contributed to reduced effectiveness of some activities and resulted in several implementation challenges for the programme.

General food assistance

28. Evaluation interviews indicate that initially, WFP was working on the assumption that the Government of Nigeria had the capacity to respond to the crisis. The WFP role would therefore primarily be capacity strengthening on emergency preparedness and response. As a result, in September/October 2015 WFP deployed staff to Nigeria to work with the NEMA and SEMA to support their response as needed. This included strengthening their capacity in food security assessment, targeting, and project monitoring. This provided an entry point into Nigeria and enabled WFP to better understand the context, particularly regarding the Government's emergency preparedness and response capacity and plans. It soon became clear that the Government did not have the logistic capacity to carry out large-scale food assistance, or to procure the necessary specialized nutritious foods for a large-scale nutrition response. It was therefore agreed that WFP would implement a pilot cash-based transfer response to demonstrate that food assistance can be provided quickly even when there is limited logistic capacity. The idea being that the project would then be handed over to the Government and scaled up.

29. The evaluation was not able to locate any assessment by WFP to determine whether a cash-based response was appropriate for the context. Despite this, in November 2015, a cash-based transfer specialist from WFP headquarters was deployed to Nigeria to develop a concept note for WFP technical support to NEMA on integrated beneficiary assistance management to support the cash-based transfer pilot.³⁴ The plan was that the pilot project would be implemented jointly between NEMA, WFP and IOM to develop a common platform that would enable NEMA to manage a multi-sectoral humanitarian response. This idea was based on global discussions between WFP and IOM at headquarters level about inter-operability between their systems.

30. Although evaluation interviews suggest that a cash-based response was an appropriate modality at the time given the urban operating context and the functionality of those markets, there is insufficient documented assessment information for the evaluation to determine so. It is clear however, that insufficient assessment was used in the choice of delivery mechanism. Further, as new operational areas became accessible and in need of food assistance, the in-kind modality became more appropriate, as many of those areas had damaged or poorly functioning markets.

31. WFP selected a cash delivery mechanism providing transfers through the mobile phone network (mobile money) in collaboration with a financial service provider (FSP). The selected network provider was chosen on the basis of a pre-existing global contract without any assessment of capacity of the Nigerian branch. Similarly, the capacity of the financial service provider to implement the project was also not assessed. Nor was there any assessment of WFP Nigeria's own capacity. Further, although there were other humanitarian actors providing food assistance through cash-based transfers at the time, their input was never sought. The majority of other actors were providing vouchers rather than mobile cash. In addition, WFP Nigeria was granted a waiver from headquarters so they did not have to follow the usual processes for contracting a service provider, citing pressure to scale up due to urgent needs. The waiver enabled WFP to engage the mobile phone company and the financial service provider without due diligence.

32. The implementation of the cash-based transfer pilot began in Maiduguri and Jere local government areas in Borno State in March 2016 for 70,000 beneficiaries. Due to the scale of need, the planned beneficiary numbers were quickly increased to 476,000. However, from the outset, WFP encountered significant challenges with the chosen cash delivery mechanism, including low beneficiary access to mobile phones, beneficiaries' low literacy levels and lack of familiarity with mobile phone technology, the contractors' lack of familiarity with humanitarian programmes, and inability of WFP staff to access the network's platform to perform programmatic reconciliation.³⁵ In addition, the financial service provider had liquidity problems as

³⁴ WFP (2015) National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) – Integrated Beneficiary Assistance Management. Draft, 11 December 2015.

³⁵ The 2018 update of the WFP Nigeria risk register provides an extensive list of the problems with the CBT implementation including insufficient CBT capacity within WFP Nigeria, liquidity challenges with service providers,

they were reluctant to keep cash in branches in northeast Nigeria because of conflict. Further, WFP personnel did not have sufficient experience with cash-based transfers or any experience with mobile money or tripartite agreements.

33. Many of these issues might have been identified through an assessment process if it had been done before embarking on a cash-based transfer pilot and/or during the process of selecting an appropriate cash delivery mechanism. As a result of these challenges, the cash-based transfer pilot was unable to be scaled up sufficiently, making it an inappropriate choice for such a large response.

34. WFP headquarters conducted a macro-financial assessment in March 2016 to serve as a baseline overview of the Nigerian financial sector.³⁶ The assessment raised several concerns about the choice of mobile money, including a lack of interest from banking service providers to work together with telecommunication companies, problems with float management and poor training of agents.

35. From July 2016, WFP management decided that, due to the urgency of needs, the slow scale-up of the cash-based transfer modality, and the extended geographic coverage of the operation into rural and remote areas where markets were not well functioning, in-kind distributions should be introduced as well. The addition of in-kind food assistance enabled WFP to rapidly scale up their response. At the same time, a special WFP report³⁷ showed that commodity prices had soared and suggested that inflation was likely to rise further.³⁸ This was shown to be true when in August 2016 the Government declared that Nigeria was in recession.³⁹

36. WFP eventually conducted multi-sectoral market assessments in both Borno and Yobe States in late 2016.^{40,41} These assessments confirmed that most markets in the operational areas were accessible throughout the year with the exception of some affected by insecurity. Further, at least half the traders in both States had the capacity to double their supplies within a week if required. The assessments do not mention commodity prices or any effect of inflation. On the basis of those assessments, WFP determined that cash-based transfer was still viable, and an e-voucher concept note was developed by headquarters. In February 2017, WFP then started implementing e-vouchers as an alternative cash-based transfer delivery mechanism. Once again, the evaluation found no assessments indicating that e-vouchers were a more appropriate cash-based transfer mechanism. Rather, interviews indicate that e-vouchers were chosen because they were a familiar delivery mechanism for WFP and were end-to-end, requiring no reconciliation as it was built into the system. In-kind distributions continued to be used in more rural and remote areas with poorly functioning or non-existent markets. Since then, WFP has implemented general food assistance using a combination of cash-based transfer and in-kind, including the two cash-based transfer delivery mechanisms already mentioned: mobile money and e-vouchers. In September 2018, WFP signed another contract with the same the mobile network and financial service provider to provide cash transfers. In November 2018, at the time of the evaluation field mission, WFP was carrying out multi-sectoral market assessments and cost efficiency calculations to determine the best cash-based transfer mechanism.

37. **Value of the cash-transfer:** Despite the challenges WFP encountered with the cash-based transfer delivery mechanism, throughout the evaluated period, the value of the cash transfer has been calculated in line with the cost of the food basket, and the market prices regularly monitored to determine if the value needed to be changed. At the start of the cash-based transfer response in March 2016, the value was calculated at NGN 23,500 (USD 66). This was the local market value of the WFP food basket that provides 100 percent of energy needs (2,100 kcal) per person per day for a household with five members. The value was reduced in late 2017 to NGN 17,000 (70 percent ration) in urban areas after discussion with donors and harmonization with the cash working group. When WFP started implementing e-vouchers in 2017, the value of the mobile money and e-vouchers were also harmonized. The same value was then used in WFP nutrition

insufficient understanding of other stakeholder presences, lack of timely follow up on weaknesses, and mobile money agents and retailers not performing their contractual obligations, among others.

³⁶ WFP (2016) Macro-financial assessment: Cash transfer interventions. Nigeria, March 2016.

³⁷ WFP (2016) Special Focus Nigeria – The Nigerian economy in turmoil – what does it mean for food insecurity in the conflict-affected states of the north-east? July 2016.

³⁸ Due largely to the unpegging of the Nigerian Naira (NGN) and its consequent devaluation, as well as the increase in fuel prices.

³⁹ <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/209605-nigerian-economy-officially-recession-govt-confirms.html>.

⁴⁰ WFP (2016) VAM-Supply Chain Market Assessment in Borno State, Preliminary Results. November 2016.

⁴¹ WFP (2016) VAM-Supply Chain Market Assessment in Yobe State, Preliminary Results. November 2016.

and livelihood projects as well. Beneficiaries received monthly transfers ranging from NGN 17,000 (USD 47.15) to 23,500 (USD 65.67) in Borno State, and from NGN 17,500 (USD 48.53) to 24,500 (USD 67.95) in Yobe State (Table 6).

Table 6: Value of WFP food assistance cash transfers and e-vouchers (2016-2018)

	Borno State		Yobe State	
	Urban centre	Rural areas	Urban centre	Rural areas
2016	23,500 (100% ration)	—	—	—
2017	17,000 (70% ration)	23,500	17,500 (70% ration)	24,500
2018	17,000 (70% ration)	25,000	17,500 (70% ration)	24,500

Source: WFP SPR EMOP 200777, 2016 and 2017, and evaluation interviews

38. **In-kind ration:** As with the cash transfer value, the in-kind ration was calculated to provide 2,100 kcal per person per day (100 percent ration). It includes cereals, (rice, millet or sorghum) pulses, oil and salt, as well as Super Cereal to support the nutritional status of children (Table 7). Although all targeted households initially received a 100 percent ration, as with cash-based transfer, this was revised in June 2017 through discussion within the food security sector in an effort to harmonize the food assistance response across agencies.

Table 7: General food assistance rations (2016-2018)

		General food assistance - grams per person per day					TOTAL
		Cereals	Pulses	Oil	Supercereal	Salt	
2016	100% ration all locations	320	120	35	50	0	525
2017	100% ration maintained in IDP closed camps, and in rural areas unable to access livelihood opportunities	350 rice/420 millet	100	35	50	5	540
	From June: 70% ration for urban areas	245	70	24.5	35	3.5	379
2018	100% ration maintained in IDP closed camps, and in rural areas unable to access livelihood opportunities	350	100	35	50	5	540
	70% ration for urban areas	245	70	24.5	35	3.5	379

Source: WFP SPR 2016; Food Security Sector (2017) Harmonization Guide, June 2017 and Update 1: December 2017.

39. The Food Security Sector Harmonization Guidance recommended reducing the ration size for people in urban locations to 70 percent (1,470 kcal per person per day) (Table 7) due to increased availability of livelihood opportunities. WFP therefore reduced its ration in the urban locations of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council, Konduga and Jere (Borno State) and Damaturu (Yobe State). Internally displaced persons in closed camps, and households in rural areas with limited access to labour opportunities, land, and markets still received a 100 percent ration. The guidance also recommended that the food basket be provided per capita rather than by standard household size of five.⁴² In December 2017 this guidance was revised when per capita distributions proved too difficult to implement.⁴³ However in November 2018, evaluation stakeholders were still reporting that mobile money and e-vouchers were being provided as a standard household ration, while in-kind distributions were per capita.

⁴² Nigeria Food Security Sector (2017) Harmonization guide. Validated 30 June 2017.

⁴³ Nigeria Food Security Sector (2017) Harmonization guide. Validated 30 June 2017. Update 1: 18 December 2017, Per Capita Addendum.

40. In May 2018, the food security sector also developed a minimum expenditure basket (MEB) for internally displaced persons and host communities, using a minimum household size of seven members.⁴⁴ This was piloted in the urban areas of Maiduguri, Jere and Konduga in Borno State. The minimum expenditure basket includes a list of food items including the WFP in-kind ration, as well as complementary foods (green leaves, meat, fruits, eggs and vinegar), and cooking stoves and food. There is also a minimum recommended package for agricultural livelihood support, including seeds, fertilizer, farm tools, labour costs and poultry and livestock cost. The evaluation did not find any evidence that WFP has utilized this guidance yet.

Nutrition support

41. From 2013, the WFP regional bureau in Dakar was monitoring the nutrition situation in northeast Nigeria through their regional nutrition sector meetings and discussing with UNICEF and donors the potential need for intervention. WFP has a global mandate to support the treatment and prevention of moderate acute malnutrition in emergencies, however the Government does not have a moderate acute malnutrition treatment protocol in place. This raised questions about sustainability of a large-scale United Nations-led moderate acute malnutrition treatment response. Nutrition stakeholders felt that, given that WFP had no relationship with the Ministry of Health, it was inappropriate to immediately initiate a large-scale intervention through the government health services. It was therefore agreed with the Nigeria nutrition sector⁴⁵ that as an initial step, WFP would implement a BSFP for children aged 6-59 months. By default, this would include all children with moderate acute malnutrition. If funding allowed, pregnant and lactating women would be added to the programme. If funding was limited, the BSFP would adopt a “hybrid model” that would prioritize children aged 6-23 months, while also including children aged 24-59 months of age with moderate acute malnutrition. Given the WFP situation in Nigeria at the time, with no partnerships in place and no relationship with the Ministry of Health, the evaluation finds these decisions to be appropriate and pragmatic.

42. Although no additional assessments were carried out by WFP, the need for nutrition support was clear, and WFP appropriately leveraged the expertise of UNICEF and partners to determine the most appropriate nutrition response.

43. For the BSFP for children, WFP initially provided 3kg of ready-to-use supplementary food (PlumpySup) per child per month; the equivalent of 100g per child per day as recommended (Table 8).⁴⁶ From July 2017, this was replaced with 200g per day of Super Cereal plus. When pregnant and lactating women were added in January 2017 they received a monthly ration of 7.5kg Super Cereal and 0.75kg of oil and equivalent to 250g Super Cereal per person per day and 25g of oil. Both these rations were appropriate for the context, as they include provision for household sharing.⁴⁷

Table 8: Blanket supplementary feeding programme rations (2016-2018)

		Nutrition (BSFP) - grams per person/child per day			
	Beneficiaries	PlumpySup	Super Cereal	Super Cereal+	Oil
2016	Children 6-59 months	100	--	--	--
2017	Jan-June: Children 6-59 months	100	--	--	--
	July-December: Children 6-23 months	--	--	200	--
	January-December: PLW	--	250	--	25
2018	From January: Children 6-23 months + MAM children	--	--	200	--
	PLW	--	250	--	25

Source: Evaluation interviews, and WFP operational plans

44. WFP also appropriately utilized the expertise of UNICEF and ACF when it joined the implementation

⁴⁴ Food Security Sector (2018) Minimum Expenditure Basket for IDPs and host communities. May 2018.

⁴⁵ Nigeria Nutrition Cluster (2016) Minutes of Nigeria Nutrition Sector Coordination Meeting – 16th May 2016. Maiduguri.

⁴⁶ <https://www.nutriset.fr/products/en/plumpy-sup>.

⁴⁷ WFP (2018) Specialized nutritious foods sheet. February 2018.

of the Integrated Nutrition Programme. The Integrated Nutrition Programme was designed to treat and support households with severe acute malnutrition children. Taking a role in this programme provided WFP with an opportunity to break into the nutrition landscape with limited partnerships in place and provided an opportunity to better understand the nutrition situation on the ground and promote linkages between severe and moderate acute malnutrition treatment.

45. WFP has also recently developed a concept note to pilot nutrition education messaging using social behaviour change communications (SBCC) and mVAM. The approach aims to help individuals and households to adopt nutrition-related practices, such as improved diet and hygiene, and optimal IYCF and care practices.⁴⁸ This is an appropriate addition to the nutrition portfolio as it will provide nutrition messaging that is in line with both WFP and government priorities and enable nutrition messages to reach a larger audience.

46. More recently, WFP and UNICEF collaborated on a Joint Approach to Nutrition and Food Security Assessment (JANFSA) and the findings aim to contribute to alignment of UNICEF and WFP country strategies over the next four years.

Livelihood recovery support

47. WFP also utilized assessments from other agencies as well as their own emergency food security assessments (EFSA) and programme monitoring reports to recognize that livelihood recovery support was needed. By November 2015, the 2016 Household Needs Overview reported seven million people in need of early recovery and livelihoods support.⁴⁹ An assessment in February 2016⁵⁰ found that 30 percent of households were economically inactive and significant percentages (16-33 percent) of the economically active households were earning very little income, making self-reliance difficult and resulting in high levels of dependence on humanitarian assistance.

48. A 2017 assessment⁵¹ found that most farmlands around Maiduguri in Borno State were inaccessible as they are located on the outskirts of town where security is poor. This reduced farm activity, affecting both food and income from agricultural labour. Further, the presence of internally displaced persons within the host communities increased demand and resulted in rising staple food prices and rental costs, but the oversupply of labour meant reduced wages. The burden of supporting the displaced therefore had a critical impact on host households, reducing their income and assets considerably over time. A study found that the majority of internally displaced persons are not ready to return home and a significant proportion are expected to remain for the foreseeable future.⁵² Establishing an operation that included livelihood activities for both internally displaced persons and host communities was therefore highly relevant.

49. WFP livelihood recovery activities commenced in October 2017, with a joint project of FAO and WFP providing seeds and cash transfers in areas of Borno State. Since then, two additional livelihood projects have been established. In all three projects, livelihood beneficiaries receive in-kind-food or cash (modality) together with agricultural inputs and training. Cooperating partners also provide a range of non-food related inputs depending on the project. The cooperating partners are responsible for the procurement and distribution of inputs, while WFP provides the cash transfer or in-kind food assistance

50. The combination of food assistance, nutrition support and livelihood recovery activities meet many beneficiary needs. However, the non-food needs such as soap, clothes, complementary foods (condiments), health care and education have largely been unmet. The provision of condiments is the responsibility of NEMA/SEMA, but there is limited evidence of these distributions taking place regularly or at scale. Few agencies regularly provide the necessary non-food items to complement the food assistance. The result is that beneficiaries reported using a range of coping strategies to meet their unmet needs, including selling a portion of the food entitlement.⁵³

⁴⁸ WFP (2108) mVAM for Nutrition: Social and behaviour change communication for strengthening nutrition programmes in Nigeria. Concept Note, July 2018.

⁴⁹ OCHA (2015) 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Nigeria. November 2015.

⁵⁰ UNDP (2016) Livelihood and Economic Recovery Assessment. Northeast Nigeria. May 2016.

⁵¹ Save the Children (2017) Displaced and host community livelihoods and food security, Borno State, Nigeria. HEA Urban Baseline Report. May 2017. USAID.

⁵² Norwegian Refugee Council (2017) Not ready to return: IDP movement intentions in Borno State, Nigeria. September 2017. The REACH Initiative.

⁵³ Refer to Annex O – Findings from Focus Group Discussions.

51. The overall planned design of the WFP operation specifically targeted the most nutritionally vulnerable groups both for general food assistance (internally displaced persons) and for nutrition support (children under 5 years, acutely malnourished children and pregnant and lactating women). As the operation expanded, WFP also worked with other agencies to provide food assistance to newly arrived people from previously inaccessible areas.

52. For general food assistance beneficiaries, WFP specifically included Super Cereal as an additional commodity to help ensure that children and other vulnerable household members would receive sufficient caloric intake to prevent the nutrition situation from deteriorating. WFP also recognized the additional needs of large and/or polygamous households by providing them with additional rations or cash transfers. In addition, during distributions, the elderly, sick, disabled and pregnant are prioritized so that they do not have to wait in line for extended periods. These groups are also assisted to transport their commodities home.

Protection analysis conducted and used to inform programme design and implementation

53. Annex O outlines the protection analyses carried out by WFP to inform the programme design and implementation. Overall, interviewed stakeholders were aware of protection issues, however some aspects of the programme design show limited systematic application, or weight, given to protection principles.

54. Evaluation stakeholders raised concerns about the selection of mobile money, stating inadequate training and monitoring of the mobile network agents in the early stages of implementation. Low beneficiary literacy and lack of familiarity with the technology made beneficiaries open to abuse by agents. The two main examples were that in some locations, the mobile network agents were charging beneficiaries to cash out, and the system was returning beneficiary entitlements to WFP while beneficiaries were still struggling to locate phones and SIM cards to access their entitlements. The 2017 Internal Audit also found that there was insufficient sensitization to beneficiaries on their individual monthly entitlement and communication was translated or made in only one local language in areas where beneficiaries spoke multiple ethnic languages.⁵⁴ This lack of sensitization exacerbated the potential for abuse. Similarly, e-vouchers are open to abuse by retailers, with the potential for increasing food prices, providing poor quality goods and asking for payments for allowing cash-out. These issues however, were identified from the outset and training of retailers has been ongoing.

55. Other protection concerns raised include the lack of early action to provide energy efficient stoves when the risks to women collecting firewood were clearly documented.⁵⁵ Likewise, although there were several assessments indicating that non-food needs were not being met, and beneficiaries were using damaging coping strategies to meet these needs, WFP has not taken action. Although non-food items are not the mandate of WFP, some stakeholders suggested that being the largest food security player, WFP had a role to lobby the Government to provide non-food item support, and/or include the provision of non-food items for general food assistance beneficiaries in their cooperating partner's field level agreements.

56. The WFP livelihood programme was also criticized for implementing the majority of livelihood activities in Borno State, particularly in urban areas where safe access to land is difficult, rather than in Yobe State where security risks were less, and for not doing more to support income generation in closed camps where negative coping strategies were being frequently employed.

2.1.3 Strategic alignment with national policies, programmes and capacities

57. The overall humanitarian response is government-led with NEMA/SEMA taking the lead at both federal and state levels. This aligns with the Government's National Disaster Response Plan (2002),⁵⁶ which puts the Government in the lead to address disasters, while the accompanying National Disaster Management Framework⁵⁷ recognizes that a strong response requires coordination and collaboration. The WFP operation aligns well with this premise as WFP operates in Nigeria in partnership with the Government.

58. The 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan⁵⁸ (HRP) focused on the states that were mostly affected by the Boko Haram violence – Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe States, which is mostly coherent with the

⁵⁴ WFP (2018) Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Nigeria. Office of the Inspector General. Internal Audit Report AR/1/03.

⁵⁵ Refer to Annex O – Findings from Focus Group Discussions.

⁵⁶ Federal Government of Nigeria (2002). National Disaster Response Plan.

⁵⁷ Federal Government of Nigeria (2010). National Disaster Management Framework.

⁵⁸ OCHA (2015) Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan: January – December 2016.

locations of the WFP operational response. The Humanitarian Response Plan serves as a framework for the Government and all other humanitarian actors to build a link between immediate and short-term humanitarian response and longer-term development activities. The WFP operation is in line with the key priorities of the Humanitarian Response Plan, which include access to quality lifesaving services for the prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition for children under 5 years, and pregnant and breastfeeding women.

59. The Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (2017-2020)⁵⁹ prioritizes agriculture and food security and provides government commitment to funding social safety nets. The countrywide National Social Investment Programme (NSIP)⁶⁰ focuses on job creation, home-grown school feeding, and cash transfers to the vulnerable. The WFP cash-based transfer modality aligns well with this, which is appropriate given that the new National Social Protection Policy⁶¹ indicates plans for scaling up the existing social investment programmes in Nigeria including those using cash-based transfer.

60. In 2017 the Government unveiled a ten-year food security and nutrition strategy for the country's agricultural sector,⁶² which includes nutrition-sensitive interventions in agriculture, social protection, and education, and the provision of locally processed nutritious foods to children and pregnant and lactating women and girls. This strategy aligns with the 2013 National Policy on Food and Nutrition in Nigeria⁶³ and the National Strategic Plan of Action for Nutrition (2014-2019),⁶⁴ which provide the framework for interventions on food and nutrition security. Specific reference is made to women of reproductive age, and pregnant and lactating women as priority groups throughout these documents. WFP priority target groups align well with the Government in this regard. Similarly, the National Policy on Infant and Young Child Feeding in Nigeria (2010)⁶⁵ promotes a prevention approach to nutrition. The new SBCC pilot, and the inclusion of preventive nutrition activities into the other nutrition activities of WFP therefore aligns well with the Government's nutrition priorities.

61. The agricultural activities included in the WFP livelihood projects also align with the Government's Agricultural Sector Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (2016-2025)⁶⁶ and with the agriculture and small business focus of the Buhari Plan. The Buhari Plan⁶⁷ managed by the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI) is the guiding document for all interventions in the region and the Government's blueprint for humanitarian relief.

62. The evaluation found several examples of WFP consulting, collaborating, coordinating or partnering with government institutions. At the national level, WFP works with line ministries and related institutions, including NEMA, the PCNI, the Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC), and the NSIP under the Office of the Vice-President. At the local level, WFP works with state governors and SEMA to provide ongoing humanitarian assistance. The initial capacity strengthening focus of WFP through IR-PREP 200965, has resulted in WFP having a strong foundation to provide ongoing support to the Government in disaster management and response.

63. Throughout 2016-2018, WFP also worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to chair/co-chair the food security sector, together with FAO. WFP also has an ongoing partnership with the Ministry of Health to support the development of technical guidance on moderate acute malnutrition treatment to be included in their CMAM guidelines, and the pilot TSFP in Yobe State. These activities align with the Government's overall strategic direction of supporting the first 1000 days of life and supporting women and children as priority.

⁵⁹ Federal Government of Nigeria (2017) Economic Recovery and Growth Plan. March 2017.

⁶⁰ <http://n-sip.gov.ng/the-nsio/>.

⁶¹ Federal Government of Nigeria (2017) National Social Protection Policy.

⁶² Federal Government of Nigeria (2016) Agricultural Sector Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (2016-2025). Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

⁶³ Federal Government of Nigeria (2013) National Policy on Food and Nutrition in Nigeria.

⁶⁴ Federal Government of Nigeria (2013) National Strategic Plan of Action for Nutrition (2014-2019).

⁶⁵ Federal Government of Nigeria (2010) National Policy on Infant and Young Child Feeding in Nigeria. Department of Family Health, Abuja. November 2010.

⁶⁶ Federal Government of Nigeria (2016) Agricultural Sector Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (2016-2025). Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

⁶⁷ Federal Government of Nigeria (2016). Rebuilding the North East. The Buhari Plan Volumes I-IV. Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative. June 2016.

64. The evaluation team did not find any evidence of a formal exit strategy being developed for national institutions to take over sustained provision of WFP services. Nor are there any documented assessments of the Government's capacity in emergency response and preparedness. Moving forward, the WFP Country Strategic Plan for Nigeria (2019-2022)⁶⁸ includes capacity strengthening as one pillar, with a view to supporting government actors to manage food security and nutrition programme in line with national targets.

Alignment with WFP corporate strategy

65. The global WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021)⁶⁹ seeks to leverage WFP strengths to contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, with the overall goal of supporting countries to end hunger. The WFP Nigeria operation specifically aligns to the global strategic plan and includes activities under Strategic Objective 1: save lives and Strategic Objective 2: improve nutrition, with an overall goal of achieving zero hunger by 2030. The operation also aligns well with several other WFP policies.

66. WFP has a new Emergency Preparedness Policy (2017)⁷⁰ with an overall objective of ensuring that WFP can respond to emergencies in an efficient, effective and timely manner. The policy focuses on reinforcing emergency preparedness, working together and enhancing the capacity of national governments and communities, and consolidating and expanding partnerships.

67. The WFP Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (2015)⁷¹ reflects the interest of WFP in resilience building, and prioritizes enhancing community capacities to absorb, adapt and transform in the face of shocks and stressors. This requires a significant level of collaboration over a prolonged period. WFP supports resilience-building by aligning its activities with the plans and actions of governments and partners as in the Nigeria operation.

68. The WFP Policy on the Use of Cash and Vouchers (2008)⁷² and the update on the implementation of the WFP Policy on Vouchers and Cash Transfers (2011)⁷³ are also highly relevant policies for the Nigeria operation. According to the 2008 policy, WFP cash transfer and voucher interventions should aim to promote immediate access to food and nutrition by vulnerable populations. The priorities of the 2011 update include ensuring programming is based on assessments, developing protocols and controls to scale up voucher and cash transfer programmes as appropriate, and ensuring proper integration of cash transfer and voucher programmes with national social protection and safety net systems. Although WFP Nigeria tried a cash-based transfer response as a first option, it was not based on the necessary assessments as stipulated in the policy.

69. WFP Nigeria is currently researching how to align the existing emergency cash transfers with Nigeria's social protection system. This is in line with the update on the WFP Safety Net Policy (2012)⁷⁴ which outlines several priority areas including providing national governments with technical support, ensuring that food and nutrition security objectives are embedded in safety nets programme design, supporting governments to build safety net systems, and helping to strengthen institutional mechanisms.

70. The new WFP Nutrition Policy (2017-2021)⁷⁵ states that WFP should focus its nutrition treatment programming on areas with high levels of global acute malnutrition⁷⁶ where the programming would work with governments to strengthen and expand programmes for treating children aged 6-59 months with moderate acute malnutrition and reduce undernutrition among pregnant and lactating women. The policy also includes a greater emphasis on incorporating nutrition-sensitive approaches, while continuing to work on some nutrition-specific areas, including a focus on the first 1,000 days of life (pregnancy to two years of

⁶⁸ WFP (2018) WFP Nigeria: Concept Note for Country Strategic Plan (2019-2022).

⁶⁹ WFP (2017) Strategic Plan (2017-2021). July 2017.

⁷⁰ WFP (2017) Emergency Preparedness Policy: Strengthening WFP emergency preparedness for effective response. WFP/EB.2/2017/4-B/Rev.1. 13 November 2017.

⁷¹ WFP (2015) Policy on building resilience for food security and nutrition. WFP/EB.A/2015/5-C. 27 April 2015.

⁷² WFP (2008) Vouchers and cash transfers as food assistance instruments: opportunities and challenges. WFP/EB.2/2008/4-B.

⁷³ WFP (2011) Update on the implementation of WFP's Policy on Vouchers and Cash Transfers. WFP/EB.A/2011/5-A/Rev.1.

⁷⁴ WFP (2012) Update on WFP's Safety Net Policy: The role of food assistance in social protection. WFP/EB.A/2012/5-A. 23 April 2012.

⁷⁵ WFP (2017) Nutrition Policy. WFP/EB.1/2017/4-C.

⁷⁶ In countries, provinces or districts where GAM prevalence is at least 10 percent among children aged 6-59 months – or where it is 5-9 percent, but aggravating factors exist.

age) and programmes for adolescents, and pregnant and lactating women. The policy specifically mentions moderate acute malnutrition treatment for children aged 6–59 months, pregnant and lactating women, and malnourished adults as appropriate, which is coherent with the WFP Nigeria operation. WFP has also made some effort to include nutrition sensitivity in its livelihood activities, in line with the WFP nutrition policy.

71. To complement the nutrition policy, in December 2017, WFP developed a set of Minimum Standards for Nutrition in Emergency Preparedness and Response (Nutrition in emergencies Minimum Standards).⁷⁷ The Nutrition in emergencies Minimum Standards were developed to ensure timely, efficient, effective and consistent emergency nutrition response through implementation of a minimum package of actions for emergency nutrition preparedness and response. The WFP nutrition response in Nigeria aligns with these standards, including seeking assistance from the regional bureau in Dakar to discuss ways to augment the limited government capacity in moderate acute malnutrition prevention, coordination with UNICEF to ensure a continuum of care between severe and moderate acute malnutrition cases where possible, engaging with the nutrition sector, and using cash-based transfer as part of the nutrition response.

2.1.4 Risk analysis and mitigation

72. The first risk register made available to the evaluation team is a November 2017 revision of an earlier 2017 version.⁷⁸ There is no evidence that a risk analysis was conducted during 2016 when the programme was established. This late systematic identification of risks and establishment of appropriate mitigation measures has affected the quality of the programme. There has since been significant improvement in risk analysis including documented identification of the causes of programmatic issues, and increased identification of appropriate mitigation measures over time.

73. The key programmatic risks identified in 2017 were highly relevant and include inadequate security for WFP staff/partners/beneficiaries at distribution sites, WFP programme quality standards not being maintained, cash-based transfer scale-up being hampered by operational and technical challenges, and food introduced within the WFP supply chain being unsafe for human consumption. The September 2018 update⁷⁹ expanded or revised some of the mitigation measures for these risks, and some key additional risks were added as a result of lessons learned (Table 9).

Table 9: Examples of programmatic risks and mitigation measures identified by WFP Nigeria (2017-2018)

Example of key programmatic risks identified in 2017	Examples of identified mitigation measures in November 2017	Examples of revisions/additions made in September 2018
Inadequate security for WFP staff/partners/beneficiaries at distribution sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Update and implement SOP on safe food distribution practices. Training on safe distribution points 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Update and enforce SOPs of management of newly arrived IDPs Undertake performance review of third party monitors (TPMs) Conduct multi-sectoral capacity assessment to examine feasibility of CBT.
WFP programme quality standards are not maintained	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP employs Omega tool for determining the most appropriate transfer modality Use of SCOPE for beneficiary registration Active and consistent engagement as co-lead of food security sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carry out rigorous financial and implementation capacity assessment of proposed partners WFP employs the regular market assessment and Omega value tool in determining the most appropriate transfer modality (food, cash or voucher) Develop and quarterly update emergency preparedness plans

⁷⁷ WFP (2017) Minimum Standards for Nutrition in Emergency Preparedness and Response (NIE Minimum Standards). Nutrition Division. Directive OSN 2017/002. December 2017.

⁷⁸ WFP (2017) Risk summary, Nigeria Country Office. November 2017.

⁷⁹ WFP (2018) Risk Register, Nigeria country office. September 2018.

<p>CBT scale-up hampered by operational and technical challenges</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure all functional areas are involved in the CBT WG and fulfilling their tasks • Strengthen hotline and other accountability systems • Fill vacant CBT posts asap 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use evidence-based data to target most vulnerable. • Conduct/mainstream all mandatory assessments (Omega tool) in programme design to inform on the most appropriate modalities and delivery mechanisms before any CBT expansion • Ensure all CBT beneficiaries are targeted and biometrically registered • Follow the CBT corporate business model • Finalize follow up on HQ/RB mission July 2017 • Develop CBT capacity strengthening plan for WFP staff (and retailers, partners, government counterparts)
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Source: Nigeria country office - Risk registers November 2017 and September 2018

74. Evaluation interviews with WFP personnel found that once identified, the programme has been slow to address problems, particularly around cash-based transfer implementation, but for other programme activities as well, and this is confirmed by a review of the risk register. For example, an internal audit in November 2017 identified that the group distribution approach⁸⁰ for general food assistance posed several risks to beneficiaries including increased risk of disagreements over sharing, incomplete rations reaching beneficiaries, and incurring of transportation costs. The evaluation field mission found that these issues were still present one year later.

75. A second example is cash-based transfer programmatic reconciliation. The cash-based transfer pilot faced reconciliation challenges from the first transfer in March 2016. Although financial reconciliation was done on a monthly basis, programmatic reconciliation was not being carried out. WFP staff could not access the “MobiQuity” platform until December 2016 when the head of information technology gained access and only after several meetings with the mobile network provider’s technical team. However, once accessed, the data necessary for programme reconciliation was not in a format that was usable for WFP. This was not rectified until March 2017 after a high-level meeting between all partners of the tripartite agreement. By this time, it was clear that neither the mobile network provider or the financial service provider were aware of their contractual obligations. However, even once the obligations were made clear, and WFP received the necessary data from the mobile network provider in an appropriate format, programmatic reconciliation was still not done. In November 2017, the internal WFP audit raised serious concerns about the cash-based transfer reconciliation,⁸¹ as USD 32 million was not adequately reconciled from MobileMoney transfers between March 2016 and December 2017. Following the audit, a special reconciliation team was formed, which started working in April 2018. At the time of the evaluation field mission, only USD 8,000 remained unreconciled due to lack of documentation.⁸²

76. In 2018, WFP identified two key additional risks regarding their scale-down and took mitigation actions including holding sensitization workshops with partners and using evidence to drive the change in programme direction. Despite this, several of the “effects” of the identified risks, including people who are no longer beneficiaries feeling deprived, and changes occurring seemingly without adequate sensitization (or too quickly), were still noted during the evaluation field mission.

77. The risks associated with implementing livelihood programming in areas of high insecurity have not yet been adequately identified in the risk register despite the challenges faced by the existing livelihood interventions. In particular, the risks of promoting agricultural activities in Borno State where farmers have

⁸⁰ At the primary distribution point WFP provides GFA to a group of 30 beneficiaries at a time. Beneficiaries then go to a secondary distribution point, where they have to open the bags of food, and re-distribute the food between households. Although this process is supposed to be done under supervision from the CPs, the process is open to mismanagement, with households at risk of not receiving all their entitlement.

⁸¹ WFP (2018) Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Nigeria. Office of the Inspector General. Internal Audit Report AR/1/03 – February 2018 (FA-NGR-17-07).

⁸² Evaluation interview 686.

been specifically targeted and attacked. Properly identifying and mitigating these risks will be critical for effective livelihood programming moving forward.

Key findings on appropriateness of the design and delivery and alignment with needs

- The overall design of the WFP Nigeria operation was appropriate and based on sufficient assessment information on the food and nutrition security context of northeast Nigeria. Borno and Yobe States were identified as being the locations most in need of assistance⁸³
- Since the start of the WFP operation, the programme has appropriately expanded into new local government areas as they became accessible to the humanitarian community. WFP implemented the same programme in each location with appropriate modality differences based on market functioning
- WFP assessments and monitoring information has provided WFP and other agencies with a clearer picture of the operating context in northeast Nigeria. However, interviews suggest that the current design of the WFP and Cadre Harmonisé maps are contributing to humanitarian agencies (including WFP) having an overly positive view of the food security situation, particularly in Borno State. Stakeholders also criticized some WFP programming decisions for being over-reliant on small-scale assessment findings at a particular point in time, without sufficient consideration for the fluidity of the context
- WFP has not always utilized sufficient context analysis or capacity assessments for the specific activity design. This has resulted in several implementation challenges for the programme. For example, insufficient assessment of an appropriate cash transfer delivery mechanisms resulted in the cash-based transfer response not being able to scale up as required
- The nutrition response was designed appropriately, leveraging the experience of other nutrition actors. Similarly, the addition of livelihood recovery activities was also appropriate, to help beneficiaries meet their non-food needs, and enable them to eventually start lessening their reliance on humanitarian assistance
- WFP has appropriately calculated the transfer value of the cash-based transfer, the general food assistance in-kind ration and the nutrition rations were appropriate for the context and according to international guidance
- There is evidence of consultation and partnership with several government institutions and ministries, but there is no formal handover strategy in place yet
- The overall programme design aligns well with WFP corporate policies
- Risk analysis began late and improved over time. Late systematic identification of risks and establishment of appropriate mitigation measures has affected the quality of the programme. Also, interviews with WFP personnel found that, once identified, the programme has been slow to address problems

2.3 Operational Performance and Results

2.3.1 To what extent were beneficiary needs covered over time?

Beneficiary targeting and registration

78. Section 2.2 described the high level of need in northeast Nigeria during the period under evaluation. To reach the affected population, WFP has faced several challenges including lack of operational partnerships, physical access to beneficiaries because of insecurity, and lack of sufficient resources to meet the high level of need. Targeting for the operation therefore required some pragmatic decisions to enable provision of food assistance as quickly as possible. The provision of general food assistance and the implementation of BSFP have largely been in the same locations, and with the same populations. Targeting the right people for general food assistance was therefore critical to the overall effectiveness of the operation. However, beneficiary targeting and registration for general food assistance have been problematic throughout the operation, with several concerns and criticisms being noted by a range of stakeholders.

⁸³ FAO (2015) Cadre Harmonisé for identifying risk areas and vulnerable populations in The Sahel and West Africa. Results of analysis of current situation of acute food insecurity. 5 November 2015.

General food assistance targeting

- **Initial targeting exercise**

79. Early assessments indicated that internally displaced persons were highly vulnerable, with some living in formal internally displaced person settlements, and the majority being hosted with community members. WFP therefore initially prioritized the internally displaced for support as they were clearly a highly vulnerable group, and because IOM already had a tracking system in place to identify them. Faced with limited human resources and no existing partnerships, WFP recruited students from local universities to conduct the initial targeting and registration exercise in August 2016. Evaluation stakeholders reported that there was limited meaningful engagement with the Government in this targeting process.⁸⁴ Although the students received some training, they were essentially asked to “go house to house, check if the people living there were internally displaced persons, and if they were, immediately register them for assistance.”⁸⁵ The targeting and registration process were therefore one and the same. This exercise resulted in high inclusion and exclusion errors.⁸⁶

80. **Geographic targeting:** The first WFP activities were implemented in two local government areas in Borno State. By the end of 2016, as more areas became accessible, and WFP increased their partnerships the operational area had expanded to six local government areas in Borno State⁸⁷ and ten in Yobe State.⁸⁸

- **First re-targeting exercise**

81. In March 2017, after discussion with donors, the regional bureau in Dakar and headquarters, it was agreed that WFP would re-target based on vulnerability rather than continue to target on internally displaced person status alone. This would also enable errors from the initial targeting exercise to be corrected, ensuring that the most vulnerable people received assistance. It would also better align WFP targeting with the criteria being used by other development actors.

82. **Geographic re-targeting:** WFP determined the most appropriate operational areas at local government area level, based on the Cadre Harmonisé results secondary data analysis on the food and nutrition situation, ad-hoc assessments by the joint WFP/UNICEF rapid response mechanism team, IOM and extensive discussions with the food security sector partners. Specific villages to be targeted were determined after a database was created, providing information on a list of specific characteristics of each village.⁸⁹

83. **Beneficiary re-targeting:** WFP developed targeting guidance⁹⁰ to help cooperating partners conduct the re-targeting exercise in the prioritized local government areas. The guidance indicated that beneficiary targeting should be based on the WFP list of prioritization criteria for urban and rural areas by livelihood group⁹¹ and contextualized to each location. The guidance was sound and linked appropriately to assessment findings.

84. In the internally displaced person settlements, cooperating partners worked with local authorities, traditional authorities (*Bulamas*), and community members to determine the most appropriate beneficiaries. Although the standard operating procedure stated that the cooperating partners and the local community should agree and select at least five selection criteria for each location and the list of selection criteria for each location should be made public before being finalized, this proved difficult. In practice, many cooperating partners relied on the *Bulamas* to produce beneficiary lists reducing the impartiality of the exercise. This re-targeting exercise was conducted in two phases from June to December 2017.

85. An internal audit in November 2017 noted that the re-targeting process continued to support inclusion and exclusion errors, as a result of poor beneficiary verification. The audit also found a lack of corporate guidance on thresholds for the validation of targeted beneficiaries and acceptable margins for

⁸⁴ Evaluation interviews 917, 114, 818.

⁸⁵ Evaluation interview 917.

⁸⁶ Evaluation interview 894.

⁸⁷ Borno State LGAs: Bama, Gwoza, Jere, Maiduguri, Kaga and Konduga; Yobe State LGAs: Bade, Nguru, Bursari, Gedan, Gujba, Damaturu, Yunusari, Uysufari, Gulani and Jakusko.

⁸⁸ WFP Nigeria SPR 2016.

⁸⁹ Including population, livelihoods, access to water, access to markets, schools, health facilities, benefiting from nutrition support, benefiting from national support, presence of new IDPs, and the presence of minority groups.

⁹⁰ WFP (2017) Guidelines for targeting and registration in NE Nigeria. February 2017.

⁹¹ Ibid.

inclusion and exclusion errors.⁹² Since then, WFP has provided new guidance on targeting, including clear targeting criteria. However, during the evaluation field work in November 2018, stakeholders were still reporting that categorical targeting (all internally displaced persons) was in use as it was easier to apply than a list of selection criteria.

- **Second re-targeting exercise**

86. In mid-2018, food security assessments indicated an improvement in many parts of northeast Nigeria. Fearing reduced funding, WFP took the opportunity to embark on another re-targeting exercise as part of a post-harvest strategy with an overall message of transitioning to livelihoods and “putting life-saving interventions first”.⁹³ The objective of the exercise was to identify three types of locations: 1. locations where general food assistance, nutrition and livelihood activities would be implemented together (the most vulnerable areas); 2. areas where general food assistance could be scaled down and WFP could implement livelihood and resilience building activities only; and 3. areas where WFP could phase out. WFP developed a set of sensitization messages to ensure that the messages to communities were consistent across partners.

87. **Geographic re-targeting:** Again, WFP used evidence from a range of assessments⁹⁴ to classify local government areas based on the severity of food insecurity (IPC Phases 3 or 4), along with other characteristics such as access to farming land, availability of livelihood opportunities, agricultural and labour markets, accessibility and coverage by other partners and level of vulnerability of beneficiaries living in camps. WFP also considered the potential impact of WFP/FAO’s ongoing seed and food assistance initiative during the 2018 planting season. During this exercise WFP discovered some duplication of operational areas with non-partner agencies and this was resolved through hand-over of beneficiaries.

88. Based on the geographic re-targeting exercise, WFP had intentions to transition out of six local government areas⁹⁵ and conducted community sensitization in those areas to that effect. However, later, the findings from the August Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring (EFSOM) showed limited livelihood opportunities in most of those areas (except Jakusko in Yobe State), so WFP decided to maintain general food assistance, nutrition and livelihood support.

89. **Beneficiary re-targeting:** A new beneficiary targeting standard operating procedure was developed for this exercise.⁹⁶ The standard operating procedure was more detailed than used for the first re-targeting and outlined a clear process of community engagement⁹⁷ and providing specific examples of primary and secondary inclusion criteria, and some exclusion criteria. The standard operating procedure also included processes for verification, with physical spot-checks by WFP stipulated. Considerations for protection and gender issues were also included as annexes. In November 2018, during the evaluation’s field mission, this second re-targeting exercise was ongoing.

90. Evaluation interviews indicated lack of clarity about who is now being targeted through the WFP programme and questions were raised about how and why WFP was reducing beneficiaries. Concerns were also raised about the locations being phased out or removed from general food assistance support too rapidly in favour of livelihood interventions that were currently at small scale, and/or not providing sufficient household income. In general, across stakeholders, the evaluation found high levels of confusion and frustration over WFP guidelines and the repeated need for re-targeting, coupled with the practical difficulties for cooperating partners to carry out the targeting process as per recommendations. Concerns were also raised about WFP selection of the targeted local government areas for the second re-targeting exercise, with criticism that WFP is trying to downscale in Borno State too quickly, despite a highly unpredictable and fluid security context.

⁹² WFP (2018) Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Nigeria. Office of the Inspector General. Internal Audit Report AR/1/03 – February 2018 (FA-NGR-17-07).

⁹³ WFP (2018) WFP County Strategic Plan: Caseload modelling (October 2018 – December 2022). July 2018.

⁹⁴ Including Cadre Harmonise, the EFSAs, market and livelihood assessments, and their own Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring reports.

⁹⁵ Kukawa, Mobbar, Nganzai, Magumeri, Jakusko and Michika.

⁹⁶ WFP (2018) Standard Operating Procedure: Beneficiary targeting in North Eastern Nigeria. WFP Nigeria Country Office. Version 1. July 2018.

⁹⁷ Including the formation of targeting committees, conducting a household head count, and developing specific targeting criteria for each location.

“The only thing worse than doing it (targeting) slowly, is doing it badly.”⁹⁸

91. Several WFP personnel reported that the whole targeting aspect of programming had not been appropriately prioritized, in terms of receiving adequate resourcing to carry out the exercise appropriately. Targeting was therefore dependent on cooperating partners with varying targeting experience and capacity.

92. In addition, since June 2016, WFP has included “prioritized” beneficiary numbers in its operational planning. These numbers are more achievable than the original “planned” numbers, however, it is unclear what criteria are being used to prioritize beneficiaries. Evaluation stakeholders were unable to specify the criteria used for prioritization, citing only that beneficiary numbers were reduced due to funding constraints. At the same time, interviews with donors and cooperating partners indicate frustration that WFP is not clearly voicing the actual needs, nor adequately advocating for appropriate levels of funding.

Targeting for joint programmes with other agencies

93. Aside from the targeting for general food assistance described above, WFP has implemented some projects in collaboration with other agencies. This includes the Integrated Nutrition Programme, and some livelihood projects. For these activities, WFP has utilized pre-existing targeting criteria from partner agencies, or harmonized WFP targeting criteria with their partners.

94. For the scale-up of the Integrated Nutrition Programme, due to the urgency of need, the targeting process was rushed and targeting criteria and modality decisions were not agreed in advance with cooperating partners and donors. As a result, the Integrated Nutrition Programme ended up overlapping with WFP GFA/BSFP locations with some households receiving double support (GFA + INP, or BSFP + INP). From December 2018 this duplication has been resolved.

95. For the FAO/WFP seed protection activity in 2017 as part of FADAMA, FAO targeted households with access to land for cultivation. While WFP did not consider these households to be the most vulnerable, after much discussion the FAO beneficiaries were added to the WFP beneficiary lists, to enable them to receive food assistance to prevent households from consuming the seed. This was appropriate from a seed protection approach, but not strategically aligned with the WFP focus on ensuring support to the most vulnerable households.

96. WFP livelihood activities generally target households headed by women or youth, which was in line with corporate guidance (Table 10). However, the projects are small scale relative to the need, and this made beneficiary targeting very difficult. For the Borno Women’s Development Initiative (BOWDI) implementing various income generating activities in camps, this was particularly difficult. Evaluation focus group discussions with beneficiaries indicate that many cooperating partners therefore once again asked the *Bulamas* to provide beneficiary lists, resulting in some beneficiaries being selected for projects without their knowledge or consent.

Table 10: Targeting criteria used for WFP livelihood projects

	Priority target group/s
FADAMA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Households headed by women Unemployed rural and peri-urban youths exposed to severe food insecurity
EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP beneficiaries or other food/cash assistance beneficiaries Most vulnerable/food insecure households among returnees, IDPS and host communities (as per IP participatory methodologies). Households with large numbers of members Households headed by women Households with children < 5 years Households with the presence of malnourished children
BOWDI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Households headed by women Child-headed households

Source: Evaluation interviews

⁹⁸ Evaluation interview 114.

Beneficiary registration process

97. Once beneficiaries have been identified through the targeting process, they must be registered as WFP beneficiaries. In the early stages of the operation, beneficiary registration was done at the same time as targeting, in partnership with IOM for identification of internally displaced persons using their displacement tracking matrix (DTM). As already mentioned, during 2016, WFP used a combined targeting and immediate registration process. Cooperating partners then developed beneficiary databases (in Excel) from the hand-written beneficiary lists and printed and distributed ration cards.

98. In December 2016, a mission from headquarters determined that the country office should introduce the WFP corporate beneficiary information management tool (SCOPE) to support the introduction of e-vouchers. Using SCOPE would provide WFP with a central platform for storing beneficiary information across the operation and would enable WFP to more easily provide the Government with a complete list of beneficiaries, by location and intervention as required.

What is SCOPE?

- SCOPE is the WFP beneficiary information management system.
- It is an online database system used by WFP for beneficiary registration, intervention setups, distribution planning, transfers and distribution reporting. Once initial registration is complete, an ID card is provided to participants allowing a more efficient monitoring and tracking of food and cash distributions⁹⁹
- SCOPE allows WFP to track its beneficiaries for both food and cash-based modalities
- SCOPE allows WFP to register beneficiaries with biometrics; this reduces duplicate identities and assures that the assistance is provided to the right person
- SCOPE allows e-vouchers to be redeemed through mobile point of sale (mPOS).

99. SCOPE is a closed-loop system that has the potential to mitigate identification problems. In addition, as the system is end-to-end, it requires no reconciliation as it is already built into the system. The reconciliation challenges faced with the MobileMoney system would therefore be removed. It was therefore agreed to introduce SCOPE as the new beneficiary registration system and e-vouchers into the operation as an alternative cash-based transfer delivery mechanism. This decision was in line with the WFP 2015 directive to ensure standardization of beneficiary information management across WFP.¹⁰⁰

100. The targeting guidance developed by WFP for the first re-targeting exercise¹⁰¹ also details the SCOPE registration process including the collection of biometrics (fingerprints). WFP continued its partnership with IOM, with IOM's biometric registration data of existing WFP beneficiaries first being imported into SCOPE, enhancing WFP internal control and verification capabilities. The SCOPE registration process required that in each household, one principle and two alternates would be identified, and their photographs taken, and fingerprint data collected. In line with the WFP Gender Policy, at least 50 percent of the principle recipients registered in SCOPE should be women, even if they are not the head of the household. The ownership of a SCOPE card is not transferable, and it is only used for identification purposes and redemptions.¹⁰² The first redemptions by beneficiaries using the new SCOPE e-voucher system happened in February 2017.

101. **Challenges using SCOPE:** WFP encountered several challenges with the SCOPE system, some of which were still ongoing during the evaluation field mission. A considerable number of SCOPE registration cards failed to work due to technical issues with smartcards and mPOS security keys. In addition, the mobile money activity had some specific SCOPE issues such as the system being unable to identify if multiple beneficiaries were using the same phone number for the transfers, and unable to match beneficiaries to specific transfers for programmatic reconciliation. Since SCOPE data cannot be edited in bulk before uploading, and it cannot be matched back to the data collector to help solve problems with data entry, any problem with beneficiary registration or redemption took time to rectify. The combination of late redemption and time-consuming problem solving meant that beneficiaries sometimes missed entitlements before the situation was resolved.

102. **Challenges using SIM technology:** Along with the challenges using SCOPE, there were several

⁹⁹ <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/7e86e5a6a70447aba713e3cd4e759d8d/download/>.

¹⁰⁰ WFP (2015) Standardization of Beneficiary Transfer Management in WFP. OED2015/015 date 11/9/2015.

¹⁰¹ WFP (2017) Guidelines for targeting and registration in NE Nigeria. February 2017.

¹⁰² WFP (2017) Guidelines for targeting and registration in NE Nigeria. February 2017.

challenges for beneficiaries using the SIM technology for mobile money transfers. Many beneficiaries did not have access to mobile phones, or a safe place to keep their SIM cards. Low beneficiary literacy also meant it was difficult for them to follow instructions on redemption or know the timing for payment. When coupled with inadequate sensitization from WFP/cooperating partners on the payment process, it was common for beneficiaries to come late in the payment/redemption period, which meant that if problems arose, they could not be addressed until the following month, leaving people without food assistance.

103. The headquarters SCOPE team and engineers from the mPOS supplier were required to assist in troubleshooting all these issues to enable scale-up. The challenges led to delays in beneficiary registration and issuance of SCOPE cards. There were also reports from beneficiaries and authorities of delays and lack of registration of newly arrived internally displaced persons and returnees, as well as cases of beneficiaries with cards not receiving assistance.¹⁰³

104. SCOPE was scaled up by mid-2017, with all pre-existing beneficiaries being included in the SCOPE system by the end of 2017. SCOPE registration was ongoing during the evaluation field mission. Having all WFP beneficiaries listed in a single platform enabled WFP to identify its unique beneficiaries as well as those benefiting from multiple WFP activities and/or from other partners interventions.

105. In March 2018, a headquarters SCOPE oversight mission¹⁰⁴ found some ongoing issues with registering mobile money beneficiaries into SCOPE as well as some differences in the IOM biometric requirements (two fingerprints per person) and WFP requirements (ten per person), which are still being resolved.

106. Evaluation focus group discussions with beneficiaries found that the registration process for newly arrived internally displaced persons was ongoing in Dalori I and Ngala camps, and for Kukareta and Kiribiri internally displaced persons and host communities.¹⁰⁵

107. Overall, the internal audit identified weaknesses in planning and coordination between the different units involved in targeting, registration and issuance of SCOPE cards.¹⁰⁶ The evaluation found that some of these issues had now been addressed, while some technical challenges, such as identification of beneficiaries through fingerprints, still occur. The evaluation team also found inconsistent registration processes across the programme primarily due to differing capacity of cooperating partners and their level of familiarity with WFP procedures and processes.

Achievement of planned food and non-food outputs by sex and age

108. **IR-EMOP 200969:** Figure 3 indicated that in November 2015, 2.5 million people in northeast Nigeria required nutrition support. The IR-EMOP was implemented in Maiduguri and Jere local government areas with a plan to reach 54,000 children aged 6-23 months.

¹⁰³ Refer to Annex O.


¹⁰⁴ PowerPoint presentation of findings of SCOPE oversight mission in Nigeria. April 2018.

¹⁰⁵ Refer to Annex O.

¹⁰⁶ Including delays in submission of targeting budgets by CPs, resistance from communities to targeting and insecurity in some locations, delaying or not permitting targeting, and difficulties in gathering all required stakeholders for beneficiary verification at each stage.

110. Figure 5 however, shows that by June 2016 when the IR-EMOP was closed, WFP had reached only 35.8 percent of this planned target (19,324 beneficiaries). This was due to a combination of late start in distribution, insufficient nutrition cooperating partners and lack of WFP human resources to directly implement the project. Over the two-month implementation period, WFP distributed 48 MT of Super Cereal plus through the IR-EMOP. All the IR-EMOP beneficiaries were rolled into EMOP 200777 in July 2016.


Figure 5: IR-EMOP 200969 planned versus actual beneficiaries (April-June 2016)



Source: WFP Nigeria SPR 2016.

111. **EMOP 200777:** Figure 6 shows the overall planned and actual beneficiary numbers of all of the activities in EMOP 200777 combined over the period under evaluation.


Figure 6: EMOP 200777 planned versus actual beneficiary numbers (2016-2018)



Source: WFP Nigeria SPRs 2016-2018.

112. The overall beneficiary numbers broken down into activity (Figure 7) shows that in-kind food assistance and livelihood recovery are the only activities that have reached or exceed the planned, or prioritized, beneficiary targets.

Figure 7: Total beneficiaries reached as a percentage of planned and prioritized (2016-2018) by activity




Source: WFP Nigeria SPRs 2016-2018.

General food assistance

113. Given the high level of need, it is noteworthy that the first food assistance intervention by WFP (the cash-based transfer pilot) targeted only 70,000 beneficiaries. However, at the time, WFP did not have any implementing partners and were planning to implement the general food assistance as a demonstration for the Government.

114. The first cash-based transfer disbursement took place in March 2016, but to only 1,819 beneficiaries, increasing to only 16,394 by May 2016 (Figure 8). In July 2016, WFP management decided that, due to the urgency of needs and the slow scale up of cash-based transfers, direct (in-kind) distributions should be introduced as well. The introduction of in-kind assistance enabled WFP to rapidly scale up their response (Figure 11), and by March 2017, WFP provided general food assistance to around 1 million beneficiaries on a month-to-month basis, decreasing from October 2018 to around 600,000.

Figure 8: Planned versus actual general food assistance beneficiaries (2016-2018)




Source: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018, figures provided by CO.

115. During 2016, cash-based transfers through mobile money reached only 24.8 percent of planned beneficiaries (Figure 8). The implementation challenges with that delivery mechanism led management to declare a moratorium on scaling up mobile money from January 2017. E-vouchers were introduced in February 2017 as previously described, helping to scale up the cash-based transfer response. Figure 9 shows the difference in planning and actual beneficiary numbers between general food assistance modalities, with WFP clearly planning for greater volumes of in-kind assistance. Despite the much lower planned cash-based transfer beneficiary numbers, the EMOP reached only 40.1 percent of planned cash-based transfer beneficiaries in 2017, and 69 percent in 2018. Conversely, WFP was able to reach or exceed their planned

beneficiary numbers in 2016 and 2017 and reach more than 80 percent in 2018 (Figure 7).


Figure 9: Planned and prioritized beneficiary numbers for the two general food assistance modalities (2016-2018)



Source: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019& SPR 2018

116. Figure 10 shows the value of cash and vouchers provided over the evaluated period, with the percentage being consistent with the lower than planned beneficiaries reached through this modality. In total, WFP provided almost USD 62 million through the cash-based transfer modality, 40.5 percent of planned. Annex K provides the details of the volumes of in-kind commodities provided.

Figure 10: Value of cash and vouchers provided (March 2016-December 2018)



Source: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019& SPR 2018

Implementation challenges – in-kind assistance

117. From April 2017, WFP experienced major pipeline breaks due to resource shortfalls and problems getting food from Lagos Port (Annex K). The timing of the pipeline break coincided with the start of the lean season, therefore it was necessary for WFP to take measures to ensure that the most vulnerable households continued to be provided with assistance. This was the reason behind the first re-targeting exercise described earlier. At the same time, the recommendations of the food security sector were implemented, reducing the general food assistance ration in urban areas to 70 percent while changing the in-kind food basket to per capita rather than by standard household size of five.¹⁰⁷ However the cash-based transfer remained as a standard household transfer. These two changes to the general food assistance ration caused tension, with cash-based transfer beneficiaries, especially larger households, asking cooperating partners to switch them to in-kind support, so they would receive more food.

118. Around the same time, WFP changed the cereals in the food basket from predominantly rice to predominantly sorghum/millet. The Food Security Section Harmonization Guide indicates that while rice is the preferred commodity, it is only used occasionally due to higher price. Households spend most of their

¹⁰⁷ Nigeria Food Security Sector (2017) Harmonization guide. Validated 30 June 2017.

money on maize, and sorghum is not purchased by the majority of households.¹⁰⁸ The change to sorghum/millet, therefore was not a popular decision, not only because of beneficiary preference, but because sorghum and millet require significantly more grinding/pounding, more water for preparation, more cooking time, and condiments (complementary foods) to make the meal palatable, while rice and beans/pulses provided originally by WFP are a complete meal. Evaluation interviews indicate that after the rice/sorghum change, beneficiaries claimed to have sold much of their sorghum for low prices so they could purchase other food commodities. This could not be verified by WFP monitoring data as there is no mention of food use (consumption, sale, trade etc) in any of the monitoring reports provided to the evaluation team.

119. WFP recognized the grinding requirements of sorghum/millet and established a milling pilot in Dikwa and Pulka local government areas, implemented from March to September 2018. The success of the pilot in reducing beneficiaries' milling costs led to the development of a livelihood project supporting groups of women to access grinding machines, which all households could access (with payment) to grind their food commodities as needed. The evaluation field visit to Pulka in November 2018 found the milling machines for the livelihood project had not yet been distributed and beneficiaries were complaining about the inclusion of sorghum in the food basket. The standard project report 2018 indicates that all milling machines had been distributed by the end of 2018.¹⁰⁹

120. Despite this issue, in general, the evaluation found that WFP had provided high quality food commodities, with beneficiaries in some locations reporting occasional worm and weevil infestations. The main food quality issue was the range of food quality provided by different retailers. However, beneficiaries had mixed reactions, with some findings it okay, as the price was lower, allowing them to buy more, while some beneficiaries felt that higher quality goods should still be provided, giving people a choice of what to purchase.

121. The Food Security Sector Dashboard from November 2018 shows that in total, out of 3.7 million people requiring food assistance under Food Security Objective 1 (provide emergency food assistance) only 1.3 million are being reached by all actors, leaving a 65 percent gap. WFP is the largest food security actor in northeast Nigeria, so any reduction in its general food allowance beneficiaries has a significant effect on the overall food security response. The Dashboard notes that this gap has widened as agencies transition from food assistance to livelihoods support. The largest gap identified is in Adamawa State, followed by Yobe and Borno States. The latest FEWSNET data indicates that people in several areas of Borno State would be classified at least one phase worse without the current humanitarian assistance.¹¹⁰

Nutrition

122. During IR-EMOP when BSFP started, WFP was directly implementing the activity. In August 2016, once WFP was given permission to operate in Borno State, Save the Children, International Medical Corps (IMC) and ACF immediately joined as partners and BSFP was scaled up. By December 2016, WFP had five nutrition partnerships enabling the operation to access populations in deep field locations in Borno State including Ngala, Dikwa, Mongudob, Goza as well as Maiduguri. By January 2017, WFP direct implementation of nutrition activities had reduced by around 60 percent.¹¹¹

123. Figure 11 shows the planned, prioritized and actual EMOP 200977 BSFP (children) beneficiary numbers. Initially, the BSFP in Yobe State was targeting all households with children aged 6-59 months as per international guidance on BSFP implementation. However, this was changed in late 2016 to align with Borno State, where only general food assistance-targeted households with children aged 6-59 months were being targeted for BSFP. This approach is not aligned with international guidance on BSFP as it does not prevent acute malnutrition as intended. A significant pipeline break in April 2017 then further affected the performance of the nutrition programme, when funding shortages¹¹² and Lagos Port congestion¹¹³ caused delays in the procurement and delivery of imported specialized nutritious foods. During this period, WFP

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., based on Save the Children (2017) Displaced and host community livelihoods and food security, Borno State, Nigeria. HEA Urban Baseline Report. May 2017. USAID.

¹⁰⁹ WFP (2018) WFP Nigeria Standard Project Report 2018.

¹¹⁰ FEWSNET (2018) Projected food security outcome map. October 2018-January 2019. As cited at: <https://www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/crisis-analysis>.


¹¹¹ Evaluation interview 301.

¹¹² WFP SitReps in 2017.

¹¹³ Interview 688, WFP SitReps between June and October 2017.

reduced the targeted beneficiaries to only the general food assistance-targeted households with children aged 6-23 months and did not include children with moderate acute malnutrition. This approach continued even after the pipeline improved in October 2017.

Figure 11: Planned versus actual blanket supplementary feeding programme beneficiaries (6 – 59 months) (2016-2018)




Source: Planned and Actual: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018, figures provided by CO. Prioritized: Nigeria Executive Briefs and Nigeria internal situation reports 2016-2018.

124. From October 2017, once the challenges at the port were addressed, nutrition activities were allowed to scale up again, although the BSFP for children under 5 never reached the March 2017 figures again and remained supporting only the children aged 6-23 months of age.

125. In January 2018, the original “hybrid model” that was initially agreed through the regional nutrition coordination meetings in 2013 was implemented to provide support to all children aged 6-23 months plus children with moderate acute malnutrition (24-59 months). The late inclusion of children with moderate acute malnutrition after the pipeline break meant that there was a 9-month period (April 2017-January 2018) when children with moderate acute malnutrition were not supported. To prevent a deterioration of the nutrition situation during this time, UNICEF used expanded criteria for their severe acute malnutrition treatment programme, providing moderate acute malnutrition and non-complicated severe acute malnutrition cases with the same treatment protocol.

126. In addition to the BSFP for children under 5 years, WFP added pregnant and lactating women to the BSFP in January 2017, with the first distribution done in February (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Blanket supplementary feeding programme beneficiaries (pregnant and lactating women) (2017-2018)



Source: Planned and Actual: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018, figures provided y CO. Prioritized: Nigeria Executive Briefs and Nigeria internal situation reports 2016-2018.

127. **Implementation challenges:** The main implementation issue with the BSFP is that it is not “blanket” as per international guidance. Although in Yobe State, the BSFP started out targeting all children aged 6-59 months within the catchment area (as per international guidance), in Borno State, the programme only ever targeted the same households as were being provided with general food assistance. Non-general food assistance beneficiary households that required nutrition support were therefore excluded. Management then requested the BSFP be reduced in Yobe State as well, to concentrate only on existing WFP beneficiaries. The reporting of the output indicator on proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions (Table 11 11) therefore only refers to the general food assistance population. So, although the data shows that the target has been met, the “target population” is inaccurate for a BSFP.

Table 11 11: Reported blanket supplementary feeding programme output indicators

	Target	Baseline	2016	2017	2018
Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	>66	0	73.9	77	83
% of eligible populations who participate in programme (coverage) – BSFP	>70	0	No data	75	19

Source: SPRs 2016-2018

128. Given the above targeting practice, it is unlikely that WFP achieved coverage rates of 75 percent as indicated in the FSOM 2017 (Table 11 11). Evaluation interviews with nutrition stakeholders indicate that the coverage rate is closer to 20-30 percent, although there is no documentary evidence to this effect. It is clear, however, that the coverage figures have been calculated as actual beneficiaries as a percentage of the general food assistance targeted households, rather than the actual beneficiaries as a percentage of the total population of children aged 6-23 years within the catchment area. Ongoing discussion between the WFP nutrition team and the monitoring and evaluation team resulted in no coverage data being included in reports after December 2017 as no agreement could be reached on the appropriate way to calculate BSFP coverage. The evaluation notes that this issue has been addressed in the standard project report 2018, with a reported coverage figure of 19 percent (Table 8).

129. The WFP nutrition response expanded in July 2017 when UNICEF, ACF and WFP started implementing the second phase of the Integrated Nutrition Programme (INP+) as part of the new Nutrition in Emergencies Sector Strategic Response Plan developed by the nutrition in emergencies working group (NiEWG).¹¹⁴ An analysis conducted by ACF had identified twelve key risk factors of chronic and acute under-nutrition, so the INP+ added interventions to the second phase of the programme to help address the underlying causal factors. INP+ therefore continued to provide beneficiaries with the same services/activities as the Integrated Nutrition Programme, with the addition of other nutrition-sensitive interventions such as food security and livelihoods, social protection, WASH, education (early childcare and development), children protection and women’s empowerment. The INP+ was scaled up in existing integrated nutrition programme local government areas and expanded to two additional local government areas. WFP continued to provide cash-based transfer support to pregnant and lactating women (including caregivers of children under 2 years of age). The INP+ was completed in March 2019.

130. WFP had already included some preventive nutrition education into the BSFP, and the NiEWG strategy provided additional stimulus to expand preventive aspects. In 2018 active moderate acute malnutrition case finding and regular IYCF in emergencies (IYCF-E) activities were included into the WFP nutrition portfolio. In addition, the WFP nutrition team started engaging with other programme departments such as livelihoods to help ensure that WFP activities were nutrition sensitive where possible.

131. WFP planned to undertake a pilot TSFP for 8,500 children with moderate acute malnutrition in Yobe State, through eight government health centres. Although implementation was planned for April 2018, the process was delayed and the pilot was launched in December 2018, which falls outside the period under

¹¹⁴ Nigeria Nutrition in Emergencies Working Group (2017) Nigeria Nutrition in Emergency Sector Strategic Response Plan 2017-2018.

evaluation.

132. As of December 2018, WFP is implementing BSFP in two locations that do not have general food assistance (standalone). Standalone nutrition programmes are implemented in areas identified as highly vulnerable to malnutrition but where WFP is not implementing general food assistance.

133. Recent reports by the NiEWG¹¹⁵ indicate large gaps (>50 percent) in almost all nutrition interventions in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States in terms of meeting the 2018 sector targets. The exceptions are IYCF and outpatient admissions. BSFP for under-5s shows a 20 percent achievement, with a 30 percent gap to meet the mid-year target and an 80 percent gap to meeting the whole year target. The Food Security Sector Dashboard also indicates that in some hard-to-reach areas in Borno State, the nutrition situation is of great concern. The food security sector therefore recommends sustaining the provision of necessary emergency food assistance through the most appropriate modalities and targeting to ensure availability of nutritious foods for the most vulnerable populations.¹¹⁶

Livelihoods

134. WFP included livelihood activities into the operation from October 2017. Funding for livelihoods has been channelled through three projects, two of which are already completed (Table 12). For all projects, WFP provides 17,000 NGN per household per month (or pro-rata for cash-for-work projects) or the WFP food ration as per general food assistance, together with agricultural inputs and training. All the existing WFP livelihood projects are implemented in Borno State and there are plans to expand livelihood programming in both Borno and Yobe States in 2019.

135. Unlike the other WFP activities, there is no available data showing month-to-month planned and actual beneficiaries for the livelihood recovery activities. Table 12 therefore shows the achieved number of livelihoods recovery beneficiaries by project, reaching a total of 29,586 households to date. One project, the Borno Women’s Development Initiative (BOWDI) is completed, reaching 99.2 percent of the planned number of beneficiaries. The Fadama project is ongoing due to a non-cost extension and has already reached 93.7 percent of planned beneficiaries. The EU project is ongoing until 2020 and reached 21.1 percent of the total beneficiaries over the three-year period.

Table 12: Livelihood projects’ non-food related project outputs (2017-2018)

Project	Period	Planned HHs	Actual HHs	Non-food related outputs
Fadama III (World Bank)	October 2017–September 2018	7,526	7,049 (93.7%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NRM: Soil conservation, compost pits, waste disposal pits, tree nursery for reforestation • Crop production: Boreholes, maize seed • Livestock production: Poultry • Income generating activities (IGA) inputs: Tailoring, food processing, and carpentry • Community infrastructure (through Cash For Work): Rehabilitation of community feeder roads, rehabilitation/construction of vocational centres, construction of new market stalls
“Sustainable agricultural-based livelihoods for food security, employment and	2018-2020	99,500	21,000 (21.1%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seed protection (from FAO) • Livestock (bulls, goats, poultry and aquaculture)

¹¹⁵ Nigeria Nutrition in Emergencies Sector Working Group (2018) Northeast Nigeria: Nutrition in Emergencies Bulletin, June 2018.

¹¹⁶ <https://fscluster.org/nigeria/document/food-security-sector-so1-gap-analysis-1>.

**nutrition in
Borno State” (EU)**

BOWDI (WFP)	January–August 2018	1,550	1,537 (99.2%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poultry • Business skills training and income generating activities (petty trading, sewing, grinding) • Sanitation activities
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Source: Fadama end of project report (November 2018); FAO, WFP, UN Women Proposal to EU (2018) and BOWDI Final narrative report (2018) and communication with WFP livelihoods team.

136. **Fadama III:** Fadama was a one-year project (October 2017–September 2018) funded by World Bank and implemented in partnership with Christian Aid and FAO. Fadama targeted 7,526 households, in Maiduguri and Jere local government areas in Borno State. The priority groups were women and youth from host communities (including internally displaced persons), and returnees. The objective of the project was “to improve beneficiary access to food, productive assets, skills and community assets resulting in a positive impact to food security and nutrition”. The project includes cash-based transfer and several inputs to support natural resource management (NRM), crop production, livestock production, income generating activities (IGA) and community infrastructure (Table 12). In addition, the project included SBCC covering a range of topics including IYCF, health services and care practices, birth spacing and family planning, kitchen/home backyard gardening, and several gender and protection topics.¹¹⁷

137. **Joint WFP/FAO/UN Women (and UNDP in Yobe State) project:** WFP, FAO, UN Women and UNDP are collaborating on a three-year project (2018-2020) covering 13 local government areas in Borno State and funded by the European Union. WFP is supporting the project in six local government areas, with a total of 99,500 households. The objective is to “provide conflict-affected populations with the means to resume agricultural-based and other environmentally-friendly livelihoods, allowing them to progressively sustain their own food and nutritional needs”.¹¹⁸

138. The project focuses on rainfed crop production (cowpeas, sorghum and maize seed, vegetables), dry season farming (supporting irrigation), and livestock production (fattening bulls, rearing goats, poultry, and aquaculture) (Table 12). The project provides an opportunity for the United Nations agencies to bring their respective strengths together, with FAO providing seeds, WFP providing cash-based transfers before households earn sufficient income, and UN Women providing gender training. UNDP is involved in the project in Yobe State only, with a focus on including additional livelihood activities for youth, such as agro-processing.

139. **Borno Women’s Development Initiative (BOWDI):** This project was implemented for eight months (January–August 2018) by BOWDI using WFP internal funds (ODOC). The project was implemented in Konduga local government area in Borno State, targeting 1,550 households. The project targeted women- and child-headed households with the objective of “improving quality of life through livelihood support and entrepreneurial programmes”. The project provided income-generating activity opportunities, poultry production and sanitation activities (Table 12).

140. **Implementation challenges:** Livelihood implementation has faced several implementation challenges, many of which are due to the security situation. For example, 197 Fadama beneficiaries in Ashameri lost poultry when their village was attacked. There were also challenges for agriculture-related projects to find suitable land, as most land is individually owned and not by the beneficiaries. Implementation of group projects that required input sharing (for example, sewing machines) were not well received by beneficiaries who felt it would be difficult for each household to have enough use of the inputs to earn adequate income.

141. The Food Security Sector Dashboard from November 2018 shows that in total, out of 2.9 million people requiring agriculture and livelihood support under Food Security Objective 2 (fostering resilience), 1.9 million are being reached by all actors, leaving a 34 percent gap. Given that WFP has reached less than 30,000 beneficiaries with livelihood support, WFP is clearly not a major player in the livelihood sector. Several stakeholders felt that WFP should better utilize its comparative advantage and expand its food assistance

¹¹⁷ Gender-based violence, sex, gender equality/equity, responding to GBV (safety and confidentiality), GBV/protection and food security.

¹¹⁸ FAO, UN Women & WFP (2018) “Restoring and promoting sustainable agricultural-based livelihoods for food security, employment and nutrition improvement in Borno State”. Project Proposal Annex 1: Description of the action.

interventions and leave livelihood activities to its partners and/or other actors. The largest identified gap is in Yobe State, followed by Adamawa and Borno States.

2.3.2 How effective was the WFP operation?

Effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms

142. One of the first WFP personnel deployed to Nigeria to support the Government's response was a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) officer, conversant with vulnerability assessment and mapping. This enabled WFP to quickly establish its own system of assessments and monitoring, with the first mVAM bulletin being released in May 2016, and regular market monitoring undertaken from July 2016. A special VAM/food security report focusing on Nigeria was also produced by WFP in July 2016 to highlight the emergency.¹¹⁹

143. WFP also introduced regular EFSAs, and these were first conducted in Borno (rural and urban areas) and Yobe States in May/June 2016 and then conducted regularly since then in collaboration with NEMA/SEMA and with the support of the regional bureau in Dakar. Several rounds of rapid food security assessments have also been done in various local government areas in collaboration with cooperating partners since December 2016.

144. The first WFP programme food security outcome monitoring (FSOM) was carried out in November/December 2016 in Borno and Yobe States¹²⁰ and regular programme outcome monitoring has been done since in collaboration with the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The latest outcome monitoring in August 2018 was expanded to include a more in-depth livelihood and agricultural opportunities component (EFSOM).¹²¹

145. From 2017, several joint missions were undertaken with the National Programme of Food Security (NPFSS), the Ministry of Agriculture, FAO and FEWSNET¹²² to assess the markets in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe States, including specific surveys for different local government areas within those areas. The regional bureau in Dakar also produced several regional food security market reports that contributed to the Nigerian market analysis. In addition, WFP has provided ongoing technical support and data input into the Cadre Harmonise, and collaboration with FEWSNET on food security analysis and early warning.

146. This extensive outcome monitoring of WFP projects has enabled WFP, its cooperating partners and other agencies to have a sound understanding of the implementation status in WFP operational areas.

147. The first post-distribution monitoring (PDM) report was produced for Yobe State in October 2016¹²³ and this was conducted by WFP directly. The evaluation team understands that the cooperating partners conduct regular process monitoring of the activities implemented as part of the WFP field level agreements but these reports were not made available to the evaluation team.

148. In 2017, WFP decided to outsource some of its monitoring activities to third-party monitors (TPM). Third party monitors were NGOs contracted to undertake process monitoring at WFP implementation sites, household level surveys for FSOM and qualitative data collection (focus group discussions with beneficiaries and beneficiary outreach monitoring). Third party monitors were challenged by late communication from WFP over the timing of food distribution plans as well as lack of clarity on the process of how to report identified issues (to cooperating partners or WFP) and which to escalate and how. Evaluation stakeholders questioned the extensive use of third party monitors in terms of cost-efficiency, quality/capacity, and the ethics of risk transfer.

149. From January 2018, WFP has produced monthly monitoring bulletins that provide an overview of outputs, and report on all processes related to input support, including the complaint and feedback

¹¹⁹ WFP (2016) Special Focus Nigeria. The Nigerian economy in turmoil – what does it mean for food insecurity in the conflict-affected states of the northeast? VAM/Food Security Analysis. July 2016.

¹²⁰ WFP (2016) WFP Nigeria Outcome Post-Distribution Monitoring Report. Borno and Yobe States. November 2016.

¹²¹ WFP (2018) Nigeria: Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring. August 2018.

¹²² Supported by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the West African market Information System Network (RESIMAO).

¹²³ WFP (2016) Post Distribution Monitoring Report. Bade and Nguru LGAs, Yobe State. WFP Damaturu Sub-Office. October 2016.

mechanism and on-site monitoring.¹²⁴ It also includes issues that have been identified for follow-up.

Achievement of planned outcomes

IR-EMOP

150. The evaluation was unable to locate any documentation showing monitoring or outcome results of the IR-EMOP. Implementation of the BSFP was continued under EMOP 200777, so it is likely that the results are incorporated in the EMOP results ahead.


EMOP 200777

151. **General food assistance:** The original, food assistance related, planned outcomes of EMOP 200777 are improved food consumption score (FCS), improved dietary diversity score (DDS) and reduced use of negative coping strategies in order to access food (Coping Strategy Index (CSI food)). These three outcome indicators have been monitored by WFP throughout the operation, with additional indicators being added over time. It is important to remember however, that the programme has been geographically expanded and scaled up over time, so the 2016 baselines are not a useful benchmark for the operation as a whole.

Food consumption scores

152. The WFP target (established in 2016) was to reduce the percentage of households having poor food consumption scores to less than 6 percent. However, WFP data (Figure 13) shows the opposite result in Borno State, with households with poor food consumption scores increasing from 9.8 percent at baseline to 22.3 percent in August 2018. This is accompanied by a decrease in the percentage of households with acceptable food consumption scores from 64 percent to 45.7 percent. In Yobe State the percentage of households with poor food consumption scores reduced from 28.3 percent to 16.7 percent in August 2018. Households with acceptable food consumption scores increased from 47.6 percent to 54.8 percent.

Figure 13: Changes in food consumption score by State (2016-2018)




Source: Compiled from WFP Outcome PDM (Dec 2016), FSOM Sept 2017 & FSOM August 2018

153. Figure 14 shows the disaggregation of households with poor food consumption scores by gender of the head of household over time, showing that more households headed by women had poor food consumption than households headed by men throughout the operation.

¹²⁴ Including food basket monitoring, delivery monitoring, warehouse monitoring, retailer monitoring and beneficiary outreach.

Figure 14: Changes in percentage of general food assistance beneficiaries with poor food consumption scores (2016-2018)



Source: SPRs 2016-2018


154. The EMOP standard project report 2017 reported that 71.5 percent of households had acceptable food consumption, 22.5 percent moderate while 6 percent had poor food consumption.¹²⁵ Across transfer modalities, recipients of e-vouchers were more likely to have poor food consumption (6.95 percent) in comparison to mobile money (5.5 percent) and in-kind (5.8 percent). The same information has not yet been compiled for 2018.

155. In August 2018, the EFSOM found that 56 percent of WFP beneficiary households in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States were food insecure, with 23 percent of households having poor food consumption. Food insecurity was most pronounced for households in camp-like situations with restricted movement and limited livelihood opportunities.¹²⁶

Dietary diversity scores

156. Dietary diversity is a measure of the number of food groups consumed by household members. Figure 15 shows that for general food assistance beneficiaries, the dietary diversity score has remained around four for the duration of the operation. This is unsurprising, given that many beneficiaries are receiving in-kind assistance of cereal, pulses, oil and salt (four food groups). The evaluation was not able to locate any information on the difference in dietary diversity score between cash-based transfer and in-kind beneficiaries, or between mobile money and e-voucher beneficiaries. The evaluation team could also not find data that showed what food items the e-voucher or mobile money beneficiaries were purchasing, to give any indication of their dietary diversity.

Figure 15: Changes in dietary diversity scores of a sample of WFP beneficiaries (2016-2018)



Source: Compiled from WFP Outcome data – SPRs 2016–2018

157. In July 2018, the country office introduced three new nutrition-related indicators for the general food activity, including the percentage of households consuming haem-iron-rich foods, vitamin-A rich foods, and protein-rich foods daily. For each of these indicators, the baseline figure was low: less than 10 percent of household consuming haem-iron rich foods daily, 29 percent of households consuming vitamin A-rich foods daily and 42 percent of households consuming protein-rich foods

¹²⁵ WFP EMOP 200777 SPR 2017.

¹²⁶ WFP (2018) Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring. August 2018.

daily, with lower percentages found on all indicators at the December 2018 follow-up. These findings confirm the reliance of households on WFP food assistance.

Coping strategies indices

158. The CSI (food) is a calculated index based on the types and frequency of coping strategies that household employ to access food. The higher the CSI (food), the most often, more serious coping strategies are used. Similarly, CSI (asset depletion) is calculated based on household experience with livelihood stress and asset depletion in the 30 days prior to the survey. Again, the higher the index, the more often households are undertaking more serious coping strategies.

159. Table 13 shows that both the coping strategy indices have increased between 2016 and 2017, indicating that households faced challenges to access sufficient food and tried to cope by depleting their assets. Improvement in CSI (food) was reported in 2018, and the programme target was met. However, the evaluation does not have any CSI (asset depletion) data for 2018.

Table 13: Changes in coping strategies indices (2016-2018)

	Target	Baseline	2016	2017	2018
CSI (food)	<15.8	15.8	17.8	17.06	12.93
CSI (asset depletion)	<9.2	No data	9.2	10.8	No data

Source: SPRs 2016-2018

160. In 2016, the CSI (food) was higher overall (worse) in Borno State (18.4) compared to Yobe State (15.6), with assessments¹²⁷ indicating that 69 percent of households in Borno State were engaging in negative coping strategies. The majority of internally displaced person households in Yobe State (85 percent) were also using negative coping strategies. A similar percentage reported spending more than 75 percent of their income on food, leaving them extremely vulnerable to price volatility. No breakdown of CSI (asset depletion) is available by state or by gender of the head of the household.

Percentage of household expenditure on food

161. WFP tracked beneficiary household expenditure on food throughout the EMOP with a target of reducing expenditure to less than 65 percent of all household spending. Table 14 shows that this is one of the few food security indicators that has met the target, however gender disaggregation of the data shows that in November 2018, households headed by women spent 67 percent of their income on food, compared with 63 percent for households headed by men.

Table 14: Household expenditure on food

	Target	Baseline	2016	2017	2018
Proportion of beneficiary household expenditure devoted to food (%)	<65	83.9	38.89	35.77	64

Source: SPRs 2016-2018


Consolidated approach to reporting indicators of food security

162. The consolidated approach to reporting indicators for food security combines three key food security indicators: food consumption score, livelihood coping indicators, and share of total expenditure on food, providing an overall assessment of household food security. Figure 16 shows the changes in consolidated approach to reporting indicators classifications since December 2016. The percentage of sampled beneficiary households that are food secure has been 20 percent or less in Borno State, and 26 percent or less in Yobe State. The percentage of food insecure households (moderate + severe) has been

¹²⁷ WFP (2016) Nigeria – Maiduguri, Borno State: Emergency Food Security Assessment, May 2016 and WFP (2016) Nigeria – Yobe State: Emergency Food Security Assessment, July 2016.

around 50 percent in both states.

Figure 16: Changes in overall food security (2016-2018)



Source: Compiled from WFP Outcome PDM Dec 2016, FSOM Sept 2017 & FSOM August 2018

163. The August 2018 EFSOM indicates that more than half the WFP in-kind beneficiaries (58 percent) are classified as food insecure (moderate + severe), compared to 52 percent of cash-based transfer households. Only a quarter of households (27 percent) who receive all modalities (in-kind, cash and vouchers) are classified as food insecure. However, these households have received duplicate assistance by error (GFA + BSFP + INP) and the duplication has been corrected as of December 2018. The EFSOM also indicated that high levels of food insecurity in a few areas, including some of the areas where WFP had planned to reduce general food assistance as part of the post-harvest strategy. Food insecurity was also found to be higher (64 percent) for beneficiaries living in camp-like situations with limited livelihood opportunities compared to counterparts in non-camp-like settings (52 percent).¹²⁸

164. Overall, these food security outcomes show that large proportions of WFP beneficiaries remain food insecure despite ongoing food assistance.

Nutrition

165. The above food security outcome data is taken from samples of general food assistance beneficiaries. In many cases, this includes nutrition beneficiaries, but there is less systematic monitoring and documentation of outcomes specific to the nutrition activities. Further, the nutrition-specific outcome indicators that WFP has used have changed over time, including mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) percentages, breastfeeding percentages, percentage of women who meet minimum dietary diversity, and minimum acceptable diet (MAD) for children aged 6-23 months. Only one outcome indicator has multiple data points since the December 2016 baseline: the minimum acceptable diet for children aged 6-23 months.

166. The evaluation team could not find any data related to moderate acute malnutrition treatment outcomes but note that several indicators have been added to the country strategic plan log-frame in this regard.

Minimum acceptable diet

167. The minimum acceptable diet is a compilation of meal frequency and dietary diversity.¹²⁹ Table 15 shows that overall, at baseline, less than half the children aged 6-23 months (40.7 percent) in the BSFP were consuming a minimum acceptable diet, decreasing to 22 percent by the end of 2018. This is not surprising as the general food assistance and BSFP ration includes only two of the food groups recommended by WHO for IYCF (cereals and legumes), and the WFP ration makes up the bulk of food consumed by beneficiaries. The seven food groups recommended for IYCF by the World Health Organization (WHO) are: grains, roots

¹²⁸ WFP (2018) PowerPoint presentation on Nigeria Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring (EFSOM): August 2018.

¹²⁹ Minimum meal frequency for breastfed children is defined as two or more feedings of solid/semi-solid or soft food for children aged 6-8 months, and three or more feedings of solid/semi-solid or soft food for children aged 9-23 months. Minimum dietary diversity for breastfed children is defined as four or more food groups out of the seven food groups recommended for IYCF by WHO. There are also guidelines on MAD for non-breastfed children.

and tubers; legumes and nuts; dairy products; flesh foods (milk, yoghurt, cheese); eggs; vitamin-A rich fruits and vegetables; and other fruits and vegetables.¹³⁰

Table 15: Nutrition-related outcome indicators

	Target	Baseline	2016	2017	2018
Proportion of children consuming minimum acceptable diet (%)	>70	40.7	No data	19.9	21
Proportion of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) who reached minimum dietary diversity (%)	>60	No data	No data	No data	54.2

Source: SPRs 2016-2018

Minimum dietary diversity of women

168. Minimum dietary diversity of women of reproductive age was added as a nutrition outcome indicator in 2018. It is a proxy indicator for micronutrient adequacy, with the minimum dietary diversity being consumption of at least five out of the ten defined food groups.¹³¹ The recommended food groups are: grains, white root and tubers, and plantains; pulses; nuts and seeds; dairy; meat, poultry and fish; eggs; dark green leafy vegetables; other vitamin A-rich fruits and vegetables; other vegetables and other fruits. WFP data indicates that around half the beneficiary women are consuming minimum dietary diversity.

169. Overall, evaluation stakeholders felt that WFP nutrition activities had not been implemented at sufficient scale to make a noticeable difference to the global and moderate acute malnutrition rates, although they have clearly made a contribution to improved nutritional status of the target population. Several stakeholders also criticized WFP for not doing enough advocacy on nutrition issues and putting too much emphasis on food assistance and not enough on nutrition support.

Livelihoods

170. The WFP livelihood projects are implemented with objectives around resilience and improved household income. However, the evaluation could not locate any outcome monitoring related to livelihood outcomes. The end of project report for BOWDI is output focused, outlining whether outputs were provided and used, but there are no indications of how much income was made, or the effect of that income or asset on household food security or livelihood security. The Fadama project is ongoing, so the outcomes are yet to be determined. A baseline exercise was carried out at the beginning of the project so there is still an opportunity to measure project outcomes at the endline evaluation.

171. Evaluation interviews with stakeholders highlighted the small-scale nature of the livelihood projects compared to the scale of need, particularly in camps, and when compared to the number of WFP general food assistance beneficiaries. Stakeholders also criticised the WFP focus on Borno State, where security is problematic, when Yobe State has critical livelihood programming gaps, despite the population having greater access to land and water.

2.4 Was WFP Assistance Delivered in a Timely and Efficient Manner?

2.4.1 Efficiency of scale-up

172. As previously described, northeast Nigeria experienced chronic food insecurity and high rates of malnutrition even before the conflict and the crisis exacerbated these problems. Despite this, it appears that few agencies were operational in northeast Nigeria before the conflict, with UNICEF and FAO being amongst the earliest. Once the conflict started, a few additional agencies including MSF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) started activities in northeast Nigeria. Although the WFP regional bureau in Dakar and headquarters were monitoring the Nigerian situation since at least 2013 and started

¹³⁰ https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/Nutrition_Indicator_Reference_Sheets.s2.pdf


¹³¹ FAO and FHI 360 (2016). Minimum Dietary Diversity for Women: A Guide for Measurement. Rome: FAO.

implementing the regional EMOP from early 2015, the decision to operationalize in Nigeria took time, as did the process of acquiring the necessary permissions from the Federal Government of Nigeria. As a result, WFP only became fully operational after August 2016, just before the famine alert (Dec 2016). The relatively late arrival of WFP into a crisis that required urgent, large-scale food assistance and nutrition support brought significant challenges.

“Overall, and rightly so, WFP has had scale-up as its focus. However, in many regards this focus has come at the expense of programme quality, with WFP playing catch up almost right from the start.”¹³²


173. Starting operations with an inappropriate cash-delivery mechanism added to delays in scale-up. It was only after management took the decision to introduce in-kind food assistance that WFP was able to scale up. Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the difference in scale-up of cash-based transfers and in-kind modalities. The introduction of e-vouchers in February 2017 helped the scale-up of cash-based transfers in areas with functional markets.

Figure 17: Number of WFP beneficiaries receiving general food assistance through cash-based transfers over time (2016-2018)



Source: Planned and actual: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018, final figures from CO.

Figure 18: Number of WFP beneficiaries receiving general food assistance through in-kind distributions over time (2016-2018)



Source: Planned and actual: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018, final figures from CO.

174. To support the scale-up of in-kind assistance, WFP established logistics hubs, and used the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) to bring in large quantities of specialized nutritious foods (Annex K). In addition, WFP looked for partnerships to support expansion of the operation. In November 2016 WFP also launched a rapid response mechanism (RRM) together with UNICEF. Rapid response mechanism teams flew into remote areas with the WFP-managed United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) helicopters, or

¹³² Interview 099.

travelled by road when security allowed, and stayed up to six days, providing a comprehensive package of food, nutrition, water and sanitation and other essential services. The rapid response mechanism focused on remote locations handed over by the ICRC in November 2016. By the end of December, just one month into the hand-over, WFP provided assistance to 627,514 people, and by January 2017 WFP was supporting more than one million beneficiaries on a month-to-month basis.¹³³

175. Several evaluation stakeholders credited WFP for the speed of their scale-up in such a difficult context, especially given that they were not in-country until 2015. The scale-up of general food assistance has been life-saving, and many stakeholders felt that WFP was instrumental in averting widespread famine.

2.4.2 Cost efficiency

176. WFP did not undertake any cost-efficiency analysis before deciding on their food assistance modalities. The lack of Omega value analysis was noted in 2016 by the regional bureau in Dakar, and conducting the analysis is acknowledged as a mitigation measure in the November 2017 risk register update and again in 2018. Although an Omega value analysis was started in June 2017, it was never finalized, or shared, and the results did not contribute to decision-making regarding modality choice.

177. The internal audit found that a thorough cost-review of the two cash-based transfer delivery mechanisms to help choose the most adequate and cost-effective modality in the various operational areas had not yet been performed.¹³⁴ At the time of the evaluation field mission, WFP was starting to conduct Omega analysis in some locations, with the calculations being completed only in Ngala (Borno State). The Ngala analysis (November 2018)¹³⁵ found that the most appropriate delivery mechanism for that location was e-voucher and the appropriate transfer value is approximately NGN 5,500 per person in order to achieve a 100 percent ration of 2,100kcal. This is larger than the current transfer value in Ngala of NGN 25,000 for a household with five members (i.e. 5,000 per person).

Key findings on operational performance and results

- The relatively late arrival of WFP into Nigeria to respond to a large-scale food and nutrition crisis brought significant implementation challenges
- WFP experienced difficulties from the onset of programme activities in reaching the affected population. Beneficiary targeting and registration have been problematic throughout the operation, with confusion and frustration from many stakeholders over WFP targeting processes and the duration of, and reasons for, multiple re-targeting exercises
- The IR-EMOP achieved 36 percent of its planned BSFP beneficiary numbers
- EMOP 200777 has also not met most of the planned beneficiary numbers, even after reducing targeted numbers prioritization exercises
- The latest sectoral analyses indicate large gaps in the overall humanitarian response in the food assistance, nutrition support and livelihood recovery sectors

General food assistance

- WFP did not conduct any assessment or cost-efficiency analysis before determining the transfer modalities or delivery mechanisms to be used. An inappropriate CBT delivery mechanism resulted in several implementation challenges and reduced the efficiency of scale-up. The decision to introduce in-kind assistance was key to the ability of WFP to scale up
- Several evaluation stakeholders credited WFP for the speed of their scale-up in such a difficult context. The scale-up has been life-saving, and many stakeholders felt that WFP was instrumental in averting widespread famine
- Food assistance has most likely saved lives but has not resulted in an improved food security situation. Outcome monitoring shows 58% of WFP beneficiaries are still food insecure (moderate + severe) as of August 2018
- Several stakeholders criticized 2018 plans of WFP to downsize the food assistance in Borno State given the high rates of food insecurity and the highly unpredictable security context

¹³³ WFP SPR EMOP 200777, 2016.

¹³⁴ WFP (2018) Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Nigeria. Office of the Inspector General. Internal Audit Report AR/1/03 – February 2018 (FA-NGR-17-07).

¹³⁵ DRAFT Omega Analysis by CBT team in Maiduguri. Provided to evaluation team by email on 3rd December 2018.

Nutrition

- A pipeline break in 2017 reduced BSFP (U5) beneficiaries by approximately 50% for a 9-month period during which time MAM children were not supported. Overall, the BSFP achieved 64% of planned beneficiaries
- There is limited nutrition programme outcome monitoring with the two indicators available not meeting the targets

Livelihood recovery

- WFP livelihood projects have been small-scale compared to the level of need, and the number of WFP beneficiaries. In addition, none of the livelihood projects have reported outcome results, therefore it is not possible to determine their effectiveness
- Stakeholders criticized the WFP focus on Borno State where security is problematic, while Yobe State has critical livelihood programming gaps and the context is more stable. The population in Yobe State also has greater access to land and water and therefore is more likely to benefit from livelihood support

Capacity strengthening

- Capacity strengthening of the FGN started with IR-PREP and continued into the EMOP. Throughout the operation, WFP has worked closely with the government, predominantly with NEMA and SEMA as well as with the MoH and the MoA
- Although there is currently no specific capacity strengthening strategy in place, it will be a pillar of the new WFP CSP (2019-2022).

2.5 Why and How Has The Emergency Response Produced the Observed Results?

2.5.1 Role of corporate policies, guidance, tools, processes and systems

How effective was strategic leadership?

178. The WFP operation in Nigeria has greatly benefitted from support from headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar. Initially, the whole operation was managed from the regional bureau in Dakar, with additional technical programme support and strategic guidance from headquarters.

179. Evaluation interviews indicate that the then Executive Director of WFP had a direct role in the decision to use cash-based transfers and headquarters directed the overall design of the cash-based transfers pilot. Both the regional bureau in Dakar and headquarters then had significant ongoing involvement in trouble-shooting the implementation challenges, including engagement in multiple high-level meetings with the network provider and the financial services provider. Recommendations from these missions were sometimes not operationalized by the Nigeria teams despite their appropriateness. The regional bureau in Dakar's cash-based transfer advisor has provided ongoing support to the cash-based transfers team throughout the operation.

180. The regional bureau's nutrition advisor was critical for the nutrition activity design in collaboration with the regional nutrition coordination forums. This includes the decision not to undertake a large-scale moderate acute malnutrition treatment intervention but instead to adopt a "hybrid" approach to ensure children with moderate acute malnutrition were included if funding was limited. Headquarters and the regional bureau's nutrition personnel then jointly managed the nutrition Dashboard. Regular meetings were conducted between the headquarters nutrition personnel and the regional bureau's nutrition personnel to ensure continuity of support to Nigeria, although the regional bureau in Dakar was the main direct support to the Nigeria office. The regional bureau's nutrition advisor continues to provide ongoing support to the Nigeria nutrition team.

181. The design of the livelihood activities, however, appears more ad hoc and opportunistic than the other programme activities, with no clear strategic direction on selection of projects, beneficiaries or targeted locations, or direction on how to transition from general food assistance to livelihoods.

182. Throughout the evaluation, there was no mention of any fast-tracking of programme-related WFP processes as a result of the L3 declaration and, although corporate guidance was utilized appropriate in some programme areas including nutrition and the provision of in-kind support, other areas, particularly cash-based transfer, has not been followed. Existing cash-based transfer guidance was available at the start of the operation that should have been used to support better programme design and implementation. Although WFP does not have guidance on cash-based transfer implementation specifically for a L3 emergency context, the Cash and Voucher Manual¹³⁶ outlines an appropriate process for risk analysis and response analysis including calculations of transfer values and cost efficiency (Omega value), and how to select the transfer modality and delivery mechanism.

183. The evaluation notes that during the period under evaluation, several additional corporate guides have been developed to support cash-based transfer programming. This includes the Cash-Based Transfer Manual – Financial Management (July 2016),¹³⁷ the Business Process Model¹³⁸ and its RACI¹³⁹ matrix, which detail all the business process of cash-based transfer interventions (October 2016), Interim Guidance for Cash-Based Transfer Reconciliation and Transaction Monitoring (July 2017),¹⁴⁰ and guidance on information and communication technology (ICT) capacity assessments.¹⁴¹ In 2018, some additional guidance was developed on specific topics: Essential Needs Approach (July 2018),¹⁴² which encourages WFP to take a broader view of essential needs beyond food; the Cash Playbook (September 2018),¹⁴³ which helps align strategic positioning, terminology and communications, and guidance on transfer modality selection and cost-efficiency and effectiveness analysis (November 2018).¹⁴⁴

184. The evaluation also notes that WFP targeting challenges may have been reduced if there were corporate guidance available on acceptable verification thresholds and targeting errors (both inclusion and exclusion).

How efficiently and effectively were the human resource needs of the operation met?

185. The lack of presence of WFP in Nigeria prior to the response brought several human resource challenges for the establishment and scale-up of the operation. Initially, since WFP was planning to only provide technical support to the Federal Government of Nigeria, programme personnel were deployed from headquarters or the regional bureau in Dakar or from other locations on special request. Additional headquarters personnel were then requested to support the cash-based transfer pilot project from March 2016. The subsequent evolution of the programme over 2016, including the need for multiple general food assistance modalities, the expansion of the operational areas as they became accessible, and the need to scale up to meet the high level of need, meant that WFP had to utilize multiple channels to recruit the required programme personnel.

186. With support from headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar, WFP was able to start the process of hiring long-term national and international staff and establish three offices – in Maiduguri, Damaturu and Abuja (country office). Once Nigeria was declared a L3 emergency, WFP was then able to request staff from other offices and use the emergency roster to bring in consultants. However, given the high number of concurrent L3 emergencies at that time, the roster was fairly depleted, and the Nigeria operation suffered as a result.

187. Local recruitment of national staff was also challenging because Nigeria did not have a history of humanitarian operations, so applicants generally lacked emergency expertise even if appropriately qualified. Additional difficulties were encountered because personnel were required to be in Maiduguri or Damaturu as priority, rather than Abuja, and national staff were reticent to be based in those locations due to insecurity.

¹³⁶ WFP (2014) Cash and Vouchers Manual. 2nd Edition. Rome, Italy.

¹³⁷ WFP (2016) Cash-Based Transfer Manual: Financial Management. July 2016. Rome, Italy.

¹³⁸ WFP (2016) Cash-based transfers business process model..

¹³⁹ Responsible, accountable, consulted and informed.

¹⁴⁰ WFP (2017) Interim Guidance for CBT Reconciliation and Transaction Monitoring. WFP Policy and Programme Division (OSZ). July 2017.

¹⁴¹ WFP (2017) Beneficiary and Transfer Management Assessment Process: ICT Capacity Assessment Guidelines for Cash-Based Transfers. Version 1.2, December 2017.

¹⁴² WFP (2018) Essential Needs Assessment: Interim Guidance Note. WFP VAM. Food Security Analysis. July 2018.

¹⁴³ WFP (2018) Cash Playbook: A guide for WFP staff to communicate on cash-based transfers. September 2018.

¹⁴⁴ WFP (2018) Cost effectiveness comparison between transfer modalities. Guidance Note. November 2018

The first local programme personnel were recruited from June 2016.


188. Personnel movement into and out of the operation during 2016 was high, with a reliance on temporary deployments (TDY) from other WFP offices, and consultants, some of whom had no experience with WFP processes or corporate guidance. This was particularly the case for cash-based transfers with at least 16 people involved since November 2015, the majority of whom were on short deployments. Although cash-based transfer staffing stabilized in mid-2017, two positions funded in late 2016 were not advertised until the end of 2017 leaving a gap in cash-based transfer expertise. Conversely, WFP was more easily able to find appropriate personnel to support the provision of in-kind assistance, mainly from headquarters, the regional bureau in Dakar or through temporary duty assignments (Annex K). The nutrition programme was also able to locate long-term staff by the end of December 2016, the majority of whom are still working with WFP Nigeria in the same roles.

189. Evaluation interviews indicate that across the programme personnel often arrived without clear definitions of roles and limited or no handover or briefing. In addition, longer term recruitment was slow due to additional due diligence required by WFP headquarters for the Nigeria context. The gaps in staff capacity and skills in specific roles impacted operational efficacy.

190. Recruitment for livelihood personnel started in mid-2017, initially by transferring people into the livelihood team from other programme positions regardless of their experience with livelihood programming. At the time of the evaluation field mission, WFP was recruiting specialized livelihood staff including a livestock veterinarian and an agronomist to support the livelihood activities under the country strategic plan.

191. Overall the number of programme personnel, including monitoring and evaluation, and vulnerability, assessment and mapping have increased over time from 48 in 2016 to 84 as of October 2018 (Figure 19). The current gender balance in programme personnel is 48 percent women.

Figure 19: Total WFP programme personnel (2016-2018)



Source: WFP HR Stats, HR Technology and Analytics HRMOI.

192. In addition to the challenges of staff recruitment, WFP has had ongoing issues with unclear responsibilities and reporting lines for programme staff. Initially, the programme was managed by the regional bureau in Dakar, then programme management was handed over to the Nigeria country office, with the establishment of a head of programme in Maiduguri in August 2016. In January 2017, the head of programme unit in Abuja was also in a position leading to confusion about who was making programme decisions. When coupled with the regular change of senior leadership, the result was an overall lack of programmatic oversight.

193. From mid-2017 the office went through a staff restructuring process to clarify roles and responsibilities. The field offices still implement and manage the emergency operation, while the Abuja-based programme staff provide technical support and strategic direction. The overall programme leadership rests with Abuja.

2.5.2 Extent to which WFP optimized its comparative advantage to consolidate partnerships with relevant humanitarian and development actors and national and local stakeholders

How effectively has WFP positioned itself to maximize comparative advantage?

Partnerships and involvement of national and local stakeholders

194. In the initial stages of its operation, WFP could not engage in partnerships due to the limited presence of humanitarian partners on the ground, particularly in inaccessible areas in both Borno and Yobe States. WFP therefore had no option but to be directly operational. However, once the Federal Government of Nigeria provided WFP with the necessary permissions to work in Nigeria, and the humanitarian community grew, WFP was able to progressively engage partners. This ability to work with other agencies and establish partnerships has been instrumental to the success of this operation. Since then, WFP Nigeria has worked hard to establish partnerships with a diverse range of stakeholders including government counterparts, United Nations agencies, NGOs, the private sector and local research institutions and academia.

195. Even before formal partnerships had been established, WFP engaged with other actors, including the ICRC and FAO to take over their food assistance activities since they had greater capacity in that area. Then, when other agencies become operational, WFP was able to increase operational coverage by increasing this engagement, both with international and national non-governmental organizations as well as other United Nations agencies and other international organizations. Field level agreements (FLAs) to implement food distributions and nutrition support began in October 2016. By the end of 2016, WFP had 5 field level agreements in place, increasing to 28 by the end of 2017. By 2017, all WFP activities were implemented with the engagement of partners. Most partners implement general food assistance and nutrition activities, or third party monitoring, and since 2017 new partnerships have been added for livelihood activities. By the end of 2017, partners had contributed over USD 1.2 million in complementary project funds to the WFP activities.¹⁴⁵ The recent downsizing of the WFP operation reduces the number of field level agreements from 21 to 10.

196. At the start of the operation, field level agreements were signed for short periods (3-6 months), increasing to 9 months, and now livelihood partners will be signed for up to one year. This is consistent with changing WFP operational plans, the extension of the operational timeline and availability of funding.

197. In the early stages of the operation, WFP experienced several challenges with the process to establish field level agreements as new staff were not familiar with the WFP corporate systems. This resulted in field level agreements taking extended periods before signing, and then signing them without undertaking sufficient capacity assessment of their partners. This meant that some partners were signed when they lacked the required capacity, while some experienced partners dropped out once they located their own funding, as they found the WFP process too laborious.

198. Over time, the signing of field level agreements became more streamlined, as WFP developed appropriate partner capacity-assessment tools and established a dedicated technical proposal review committee (in Maiduguri) and a partnership committee (in Abuja). The process was still being streamlined during the evaluation field mission, with the most recent addition being the establishment of a cooperating partners' field level agreement monitoring taskforce in October 2018 in line with corporate standards. This committee will be tasked with monitoring cooperating partners and ensure the terms of the field level agreements are being properly carried out.

199. **Engagement with sector coordination mechanisms:** WFP and FAO co-lead the food security sector (FSS) under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture, with WFP supporting the funding of the food security sector lead. Several stakeholders credited the food security sector as being the strongest sector. The food security sector has developed guidance on targeting and food basket harmonization, which has been utilized by other sectors and working groups to improve programming. The food security sector has two strategic objectives and coordinates all activities under SO1: Provide emergency food assistance, as well as

¹⁴⁵ WFP SPR EMOP 200777, 2017.

under SO2: Support livelihood recovery.

200. WFP is also a member of several other coordination fora including the nutrition sector, nutrition in emergencies working group, cash working group, and early recovery/LLH sector. In the nutrition sector, WFP works closely with UNICEF at regional, national and state levels and this relationship has been critical for the appropriate design of WFP nutrition activities, and for WFP establishing themselves in the Nigerian nutrition landscape.

Progress in building the capacity of national and local stakeholders

201. IR-PREP 200965 was implemented with an overall objective of strengthening the preparedness and response capacity of the Federal Government of Nigeria. The 2016 standard project report indicates that during the two-month implementation period WFP carried out several activities including training on the principles of cash-based transfers, beneficiary registration, food supply chain, food basket composition, food security and vulnerability assessment, EFSA methodology, data analysis, a review of the National Food Reserve Department, and data analysis.¹⁴⁶ WFP also worked closely with NEMA and SEMA to train national volunteers to provide food assistance, warehouse management and storage of humanitarian assistance, beneficiary registration and distribution, and mainstreaming protection.

202. NEMA/SEMA jointly managed the camps in Maiduguri and Jere local government areas where the operations started, therefore they were also involved in the distribution of specialized nutritious food alongside the wet feeding that the Government provided for the newly arrived internally displaced persons. Outside of those two locations, WFP organized the logistics support for the food distributions to ensure that commodities reached the targeted areas.

203. The results of the IR-PREP are, however, impossible to quantify as there is no documentary evidence of indicators, process monitoring, or targets. The most notable qualitative outcome of the IR-PREP was the recognition by both WFP and NEMA/SEMA that the government lacked the capacity to implement the large-scale food assistance response that was required. This led WFP to become directly operational and begin establishing partnerships with other agencies to implement the programme. Once WFP became fully operational, capacity-development activities were mainstreamed into EMOP 200777.

204. Throughout EMOP 200777, WFP has continued to work closely with the Federal Government of Nigeria, predominantly with NEMA and SEMA as well as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. Although there have been no formal partnerships outside of the original memorandum of understanding, WFP and NEMA/SEMA have continued a strong working relationship, with one SEMA staff in each state designated to liaise between WFP and the Government. Together, WFP and NEMA/SEMA have carried out several joint EFSA and joint monitoring missions with the support of the National Bureau of Statistics. Evaluation interviews also indicate that although NEMA/SEMA have a limited role in supporting the development of WFP operational plans, the plans are always shared. Interviews with SEMA and other government personnel who participated in these assessments indicate that this joint approach to assessments has been effective at improving the Government's understanding of the food security situation in northeast Nigeria.¹⁴⁷

205. WFP also works closely with the Ministry of Agriculture, particularly with the NPFS on food security assessments including the Cadre Harmonisé. The Ministry of Agriculture supports data collection and analysis and is keen to take over the full Cadre Harmonisé analysis in time. In November 2018, WFP and the NPFS were in discussion about a country strategic plan memorandum of understanding to this effect. The Ministry of Agriculture also participated in the seasonal livelihood programming with a view to supporting agricultural livelihood activities where possible. WFP also collaborates with the Fadama III National Coordination Office under the Ministry of Agriculture for the implementation of the Fadama livelihood project.

206. The WFP nutrition team also works with the Ministry of Health and UNICEF on activities related to the revision of the CMAM protocol to include moderate acute malnutrition treatment and prevention, with a draft protocol in discussion at the time of the evaluation field mission. The results of the implementation of the WFP pilot TSFP will be highly relevant in that regard.

¹⁴⁶ WFP SPR EMOP 200777, 2016.

¹⁴⁷ Interviews 916, 464 and 329.

207. While these interventions were well received and relevant, interviewees have pointed to missed opportunities in not building government capacity for preparedness and emergency response more holistically and at the national level.¹⁴⁸ Capacity strengthening outputs seem to be ad hoc and with limited monitoring of capacity strengthening outputs or outcomes until 2018. Similarly, there is no documented capacity-strengthening strategy and the only documented assessment of the government's capacity in emergency preparedness and response is from 2010.¹⁴⁹

208. Through the country strategic plan, under Pillar 4: capacity strengthening, WFP will also engage with the National Social Investment Office (NSIO) and others to support the Federal Government of Nigeria to manage social safety nets and therefore improve the food security, nutritional status and access to services for vulnerable people.

Key findings on factors and quality of strategic decision making

- The WFP operation in Nigeria has greatly benefitted from support from HQ and RBD. Initially, as managers and then through the provision of technical programme support and strategic guidance from HQ
- Throughout the evaluation, there was no mention of any fast-tracking of programme-related WFP processes as a result of the L3 declaration and although corporate guidance was utilized appropriately in some programme areas, other areas, particularly CBT, have suffered from a lack of appropriate corporate guidance, and/or not using available guidance
- The lack of WFP presence in Nigeria prior to the response brought several human-resource challenges for the establishment and scale-up of the operation. WFP has had ongoing issues with the level of expertise of staff, as well as unclear responsibilities and reporting lines for programme staff. When coupled with the regular change of senior leadership, the result was an overall lack of programmatic oversight
- Partnerships have been crucial to the success of the operation. Initially directly operational, WFP took available opportunities to partner with a diverse range of stakeholders and this facilitated the scale-up of the operation
- In the early stages of the operation, WFP experienced several challenges with the process to establish FLAs as new staff were not familiar with the WFP corporate systems. This resulted in FLAs taking extended periods before signing, and then signing them without undertaking sufficient capacity assessment of their partners. Over time, this process has been streamlined
- WFP and FAO co-lead the food security sector (FSS) under the leadership of the MoA, with WFP supporting the funding of the food security sector lead. Several stakeholders credited the FSS as being the strongest sector and the guidance the FSS has produced has been widely utilized
- WFP has implemented ongoing capacity strengthening with FGN including NEMA/SEMA, NBS, NPFS, MoH, MoA and NSIO. This will continue in a more systematic way as Pillar 4 of the CSP.

¹⁴⁸ Interview 523.

¹⁴⁹ WFP (2010) DRAFT – Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Assessment Mission: Nigeria. 10th-21st May, 2010.

Annex N: Findings on Logistics, Supply Chain and Common Services

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Country Context

1. Nigeria has fairly well-developed infrastructure, albeit with need for further investment¹⁵⁰ and an economy that has agriculture at its core as well as a vibrant commercial services sector.¹⁵¹ The rural road network is expansive and often asphalted.¹⁵² This provides an environment that is conducive to a food commodity supply chain that largely procures locally and taps into the private sector for transport and storage.

2. At the same time, Nigeria poses a number of challenges that are not necessarily encountered in similar countries. Firstly, the federal structure has created several layers of administration that on occasion increases the administrative burden for a supply chain operation.¹⁵³ The importation of goods can be affected by slow customs clearance processes.¹⁵⁴ Secondly, infrastructure maintenance or upgrades are not always timely, and have, in the evaluation period, led to bottlenecks at, or closures of, key access points. Prominent examples are the protracted congestion at Lagos Port in 2017 and the closure of the Abuja International Airport for all flight operations in March/April 2017.¹⁵⁵ Thirdly, a steady decline in agricultural production has led to an increasing proportion of food imports.¹⁵⁶ This has been particularly notable in rice farming, where local production is well below consumption needs. At the same time, the Government of Nigeria, in attempts to protect local rice production, has levied substantial import duties on rice with consequent substantial illegal importation.¹⁵⁷

3. Local procurement of food commodities requires working with traders who generally work on a cash basis and are not adapted to commercial contracts with requisite payment terms.¹⁵⁸ Buyers of large quantities therefore need to manage multiple procurement streams and have sufficient own storage space to consolidate commodities, which often are of different quality. Food quality standards in 2016 were only in place for food exports, and there was then little capacity for food quality assurance in the commercial food sector.¹⁵⁹

4. The conflict in northeast Nigeria has led to substantial military presence in the affected states, imposing restrictions on movement of staff and people, and adding one more layer of administrative burden for the movement of cargo.¹⁶⁰ No commercial air transport is available for destinations in the States affected by conflict, and road transport at times requires military escorts, and always military clearance.¹⁶¹ At the same time, while commercial transporters in the more developed parts of Nigeria are readily available, private sector transport capacity in northeast Nigeria is of poor quality and dominated by small-scale transporters. Transporting larger quantities therefore requires the coordination of multiple transport contracts with different operators.¹⁶² Despite tight control of convoys by the military, attacks on WFP trucks have occurred.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria>.

¹⁵¹ <http://www.fao.org/nigeria/fao-in-nigeria/nigeria-at-a-glance/en/>.

¹⁵² Interview 193.

¹⁵³ Logistics sector minutes between 2016 and 2018.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ WFP SitReps in 2017.

¹⁵⁶ <http://www.fao.org/nigeria/fao-in-nigeria/nigeria-at-a-glance/en/>.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Interview 688.

¹⁵⁸ Interview 688.

¹⁵⁹ Interview 688.

¹⁶⁰ Logistics sector minutes between 2016 and 2018.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² Logistics sector minutes between 2016 and 2018, Interviews 148, 193, and 237.

¹⁶³ EMOP200777 SPR 2017.

1.2. WFP Corporate Emergency Response in North-east Nigeria

5. WFP gradually built up and adapted logistics capacity in Nigeria in support of food assistance to affected populations in northeast Nigeria with the following events:

- a) In January 2015 the regional EMOP200777 was launched, although not initially focussed on Nigeria.
- b) WFP established UNHAS flight operations in May 2015 to serve the needs of the humanitarian community for staff and light cargo movement to the north (SO200834).
- c) In September 2015, WFP expanded its collaboration with the Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to provide dedicated capacity building in supply chain management under Budget Revision No. 3 to the regional EMOP 200777 (October 2015).
- d) WFP subsequently launched the time limited IR-PREP 200695 in April 2016 for cash assistance to affected populations, without a supply component.
- e) In May 2016, the IR-EMOP 200969 was launched with a supply component of 300 MT PlumpySup.
- f) In-kind assistance was introduced and scaled up through revisions to the EMOP 200777. Food commodities were first budgeted in Budget Revision No. 6 (June 2016) and their quantities steadily increased in ensuing revisions. Table 16 shows the adjusted planned tonnage over time.

Table 16: Planned food tonnage over time EMOP 200777

EMOP 200777 Budget Revision Nos	Date of budget revision	Planned food requirements (MT)	Planning period ¹⁶⁴
1-5	Up to January 2016	0	n/a
6	June 2016	15,235	until 31 December 2016
7	August 2016	21,100	until 31 December 2016
8	January 2017	193,622	until 31 December 2017
9	June 2017	238,253	until 31 December 2017
12	December 2017	334,160	until 31 December 2018
14	July 2018	416,251	until 31 December 2018

Source: EMOP 200777 budget revision documents 1-14


- g) Special operation 201032 was launched in November 2016, to provide logistics sector and emergency telecoms sector support.

6. WFP officially re-established an office in the country in August of 2016. While establishing a firmer presence in the country, WFP adapted its approach. Initially, it mostly worked through the Government, primarily NEMA at the federal level and state authorities for field operations. With better access for other humanitarian actors in northeast Nigeria, it worked increasingly through cooperating partners for distributions. The supply chain evolved alongside these changes.

7. WFP initially sourced both locally and regionally for staple foods, but over time was able to procure virtually all such commodities in Nigeria. International procurement remained only necessary for specialized nutritious foods. For shipments from abroad, WFP used several Nigerian ports, with Lagos the most prominent, but after congestion problems shifted significant tonnage to Port Harcourt in the south. Figure 20 shows an overview of the supply chain set-up as of February 2018.

¹⁶⁴ As per end date of the budget revision document.


Figure 20: WFP supply chain set-up as of February 2018



Source: Supply Chain Factsheet Nigeria February 2018

8. The composition of the food basket changed over time, as is evident in supply chain data. The two most significant changes were from rice to sorghum and millet in general food distribution and from PlumpySup to Super Cereal + for children’s nutritious food. Figure 21 shows these changes in relative warehouse stocks over time.^{165 166}

Figure 21: Relative commodity stock in field warehouses




Source: WFP LESS commodity management system.

¹⁶⁵ The stock data was only extracted for field warehouse locations, where commodities are consolidated and transported to partners for distribution.

¹⁶⁶ Stock data throughout this report are only used from January 2017. Before January 2017 stock data are incomplete, which according to WFP staff originates from transitioning paper-based systems to the corporate LESS commodity management system during the scale-up in 2016 (Interview 688).


9. WFP procured virtually all staples locally, while importing supplementary foods. Rice was an exception, due to the specifics of the Nigerian rice market, local rice was significantly more expensive than imported rice. As a consequence, rice was partly bought abroad.¹⁶⁷ While efforts are underway to commission production of supplementary foods in Nigeria,¹⁶⁸ in the evaluated period all supplementary food was procured internationally. In terms of value, the net proportion of local procurement steadily increased over the period under review. Figure 22 and Figure 23 show the relative proportion of local procurement over time and the proportional value by origin. On average, over the period April 2016 to October 2018, close to 70 percent of procurement value was expended in Nigeria.

Figure 22: Proportion of local procurement over time



Source: Procurement data provided by WFP Nigeria CO.

Figure 23: Origins of procurement (April 2016–December 2018)



Source: Procurement data provided by WFP Nigeria CO.

10. The establishment of the Kano hub in March 2017 and the location of a GCMF there¹⁶⁹ gave WFP additional flexibility in the supply chain. It used the pre-financing mechanism of the facility to procure locally as well as internationally ahead of fund receipts, and it used steadily increasing warehouse capacity to consolidate and store food that was bought strategically during harvest seasons and/or during periods of lower prices.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Interview 688. This however caused friction with the government, which made rice a less attractive commodity.

¹⁶⁸ Interview 554.

¹⁶⁹ WFP Nigeria SitRep March 2017.


¹⁷⁰ Interviews 523,554,688.

What is the GCMF?

The WFP Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF) was created in 2011 and has accounted for a growing share of the total amount of food distributed by WFP. Based on predictions of demand in a pool of countries, WFP releases funding to buy food in advance of projects' requests. This means that goods will likely be already at the delivery port, or at an advanced stage in the supply chain process, when country offices need them.¹⁷¹

11. The hub enabled WFP to establish sizeable storage space for strategic local procurement and pre-positioning. The proximity of Kano to the area of operations facilitated shipments to field warehouses in Damaturu and Maiduguri. The hub consequently became a central element in the supply chain beyond the GCMF, as reflected in the quantities stored in Kano warehouses over time (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Stock levels in Kano warehouses




Source: LESS commodity management system

12. During 2017 when donor funds were not coming in fast enough¹⁷² for the scale-up of the operation, the GCMF pre-financing proved particularly useful. Figure 25 shows the use of GCMF versus regular procurement over time, demonstrating its increasing importance.

¹⁷¹ <https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/how-wfp-has-cut-its-delivery-times-by-more-than-60-percent/>.

¹⁷² WFP SitReps through 2017.


Figure 25: Use of global commodity management facility and regular procurement over time



Source: Procurement data provided by WFP Nigeria CO

13. With the exclusive reliance on international procurement for specialized nutritious foods, the functionality of ports had effects on their lead times and the pipeline. In 2017, Lagos Port, then prominently used, had significant congestion problems, which led to pipeline breaks in this food group.¹⁷³ WFP in response shifted some importation to the Port Harcourt area. Figure 26 shows the relative use of ports over time.

Figure 26: Relative port usage over time



Source: LESS commodity management system

14. Two WFP field warehouses are located in Maiduguri and Damaturu. These serve as cross-loading points that receive commodities either from suppliers, from the Kano hub, or from the ports for imported goods.¹⁷⁴ From these two main field warehouses commodities are then dispatched directly to partners for distribution, usually through sub-warehouses that are operated by partners or common spaces under

¹⁷³ WFP SitReps between June and October 2017.

¹⁷⁴ Supply Chain Factsheet Nigeria February 2018.

management of the logistics sector that are co-located with the common humanitarian hubs.¹⁷⁵

15. Currently, WFP-provided commodities are usually transported from Maiduguri or Damaturu warehouses in convoys of trucks to the respective partner locations. Earlier in the operation, when partner presence was low or non-existent, commodities were dispatched directly from the warehouses to beneficiaries, tying up limited transport capacity.¹⁷⁶

16. Transport between Maiduguri and Damaturu and partner warehouses has been constrained by limited availability of trucks that often are old and in poor condition.¹⁷⁷ Transporters in northeast Nigeria had limited financial capacity to take on the larger contracts required by WFP, and it had not been possible to attract larger transport firms from other parts of Nigeria.¹⁷⁸ At the start of the operation sizeable truck fleets were consequently unavailable for transport in the Northeast. To overcome these constraints, a tariff system for contracting local transport was introduced between January 2017 and March 2018.¹⁷⁹

What is tariff system contracting?¹⁸⁰

Tariff system contracting establishes a transport rate, or tariff, that is proposed to the shortlisted transporters. All shortlisted transporters who accept the tariff are then paid the same rate. This type of contract is utilized in instances where WFP operational requirements mean that multiple transporters are needed on the same routes.

The establishment of a tariff requires a good understanding of the transport market in terms of capacities, supply and demand variables and transporter operating costs. Reasons for resorting to a tariff system award may include: no single transporter has the capacity for the entire tonnage to the required destination(s) within the required timeframe; the existence of government-controlled tariffs; and the need to counter cartels that control prices.

Ways to address the above issues may include direct negotiations with transporters, time-based agreements or attempts at building local transport capacity. However, if many transporters need to be engaged on a given route, they must all work at the same transport rate, and so a tariff system needs to be implemented.

17. As part of the provision of vouchers to beneficiaries, WFP supply chain staff were involved in the selection of, and support to, retailers in the Maiduguri and Damaturu area who were selling commodities for the vouchers distributed through the WFP programme.¹⁸¹ Supply chain staff, as part of the cash-based transfer teams, were part of the initial assessment process as well as the subsequent monitoring. They provided ongoing support aimed at increasing the quality of storage and food handling in the stores,¹⁸² involving site inspections and trainings.

18. Besides its own supply chain, WFP managed three common services. It provided UNHAS flight services, co-led the logistics sector and led the emergency telecommunications sector (ETS).¹⁸³

19. UNHAS flight operations preceded the general food assistance in northeast Nigeria by almost one year. It commenced in May 2015 with a fixed wing service connecting Abuja and Maiduguri. This at the time was seen as very relevant, in the absence of reliable commercial options for this route and passenger numbers increased steadily.¹⁸⁴ In July 2016 a rotary wing service was added to the operation during the rainy season to increase access to areas cleared by the Government.¹⁸⁵ A second rotary wing craft was added in

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Interview 688.

¹⁷⁷ Interviews 193, 237, 688, Logistics sector Minutes 2016-2018.

¹⁷⁸ Interview 148.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Taken from the WFP Transport Manual (extracted from WFP Go and formatted by OEV on 09 Feb 2018).

¹⁸¹ WFP SitReps 2017 and 2018, Interview 688 and follow-up clarifications with staff member.

¹⁸² WFP Nigeria Presentation: Quality Management System at Retailers and Wholesalers (May 2018).

¹⁸³ Although the sectors are similar to the IASC clusters found in other operations, the cluster system has not been activated in Nigeria and sectors are co-chaired between an international lead and the Government of Nigeria as co-lead.

¹⁸⁴ SO200834, subsequent BRs, WFP SitReps 2016-2018.

¹⁸⁵ SO200834 Budget Revision No. 3.

September 2016 to increase remote access capacity.¹⁸⁶ In July 2017 a third rotary wing was added, and subsequently a fourth, which remains the helicopter capacity to date.¹⁸⁷ Through 2017, these served 11 locations in Borno State and one location in Yobe State.¹⁸⁸

20. As co-lead of the logistics and emergency telecommunication sector, WFP has a direct role in providing additional common services to the humanitarian community in northeast Nigeria. The emergency telecommunication sector, under WFP co-leadership, gradually expanded demand-driven services to the humanitarian community, including shared internet services in the humanitarian hubs, radio programming, radio training, and management of shared United Nations frequencies.¹⁸⁹

21. The logistics sector was initially established to provide shared storage and UNHAS cargo handling services.¹⁹⁰ An added responsibility became the handling of consolidated military clearance requests for cargo movements by road on behalf of all humanitarian actors. At the end of 2018, the sector was managing eight common storage locations. The United Nations agencies utilize approximately 25 percent of the sector's services while the rest of users are NGOs.¹⁹¹

2. EVALUATION FINDINGS

2.1. Appropriateness of the Design and Delivery and Alignment with Needs

2.1.1 Alignment with identified humanitarian needs and relevant national policies and use of context and risk analysis

22. The appropriateness of a humanitarian supply chain can be benchmarked against how its overall concept of operations fits the circumstances in the country, how needs-driven or needs-informed it is (including the composition of the food basket and how it is determined), and how well supply chain management is linked to programme management.

23. The WFP concept of operations for northeast Nigeria appears highly appropriate for the country situation. It encompasses a supply chain that maximized local procurement from the start, while addressing structural challenges specific to Nigeria.

24. Challenges related to poor food quality of locally procured foods were addressed from December 2016 by operating with "early release memos". Goods could be released to WFP warehouses prior to full quality inspection to save time, while more extensive testing could be carried out later.¹⁹² In subsequent months a food quality and safety assurance strategy was developed, and consequently a comprehensive quality assurance system established and early release memos discontinued.¹⁹³

25. The characteristics of the Nigerian agricultural sector, where bulk buyers have to go through traders and millers to buy produce consolidated from smallholders, was addressed by establishing the dedicated hub in Kano. Here, in addition to operating as the GCMF facility, staples bought locally when prices were optimal (for example, during harvest seasons) could be stored and released when needed, rather than procuring separate batches every time food was required in the field. The use of Kano as a buffer and pre-positioning facility appears to consequently have reduced lead times as it is located closer to the area of operation than the port facilities or Abuja warehouses.¹⁹⁴

26. The timely shift of using port facilities at Lagos to Port Harcourt appears to have been very appropriate in addressing the congestion experienced during most of 2017 in Lagos. It was said that this decision by WFP was exemplary in its timeliness and the best solution for the problem, other agencies only

¹⁸⁶ SO200834 Budget Revision No. 4.

¹⁸⁷ SO200834 Budget Revisions Nos. 5 and 6.

¹⁸⁸ UNHAS Nigeria at a Glance, January 2018.

¹⁸⁹ ETS SitReps 2016-2018, ETS Working Group Minutes 2016-2018.

¹⁹⁰ SO201032.

¹⁹¹ Interview 193.

¹⁹² Interview 688.

¹⁹³ Interviews 531, 554, Food Quality Strategy- Nigeria country office SC Draft version 1.0 171114.

¹⁹⁴ Interviews 523, 688; There are references to reduced lead times from Kano throughout SPRs and SitReps, but no concrete statistics were available.


much later followed suit.¹⁹⁵

27. Local transport challenges in the area of operation included very low availability of serviceable trucks, often owned by individuals. This conflicted with the imperative to transport larger volumes in consolidated convoys to facilitate clearance with military authorities. The introduction of a tariff system for local transport, optional in WFP policy, appears very appropriate in this situation. The intent of using a tariff system is to increase diversity of transport options; evidence points to this effect in the northeast Nigeria operation. It appears that both the capacity and diversity of the local transporters in the area of operation had increased while the tariff system was used.¹⁹⁶

28. After initially aiming to provide cash instead of in-kind food distribution in mid-2016, WFP very quickly turned to a combined cash and in-kind food assistance programme and had to rapidly adapt to increasing demands for in-kind food while continuing cash assistance to other beneficiaries. The scale-up of the in-kind operation was overall successful.

29. It appears, however, that the numbers of cash versus in-kind beneficiaries fluctuated constantly (Figure 27). This demanded close collaboration between supply chain management and programme management to adjust the respective levels. Interviewees suggested that this interface, while working well, could have been handled better in terms of timeliness. Mention was made of final beneficiary figures at times only being given to supply chain management after a month had already started.¹⁹⁷ It was said in interviews that the sudden shifts were generally caused by issues with the functionality of the mobile cash provider, which meant that beneficiaries that were supposed to receive cash-based transfers had to fall back on in-kind food distribution at short notice.¹⁹⁸

Figure 27: Cash versus in-kind beneficiaries by month



Source: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019

30. The food basket had two significant changes in the evaluated period that, according to the available evidence, was not driven by beneficiaries' needs. In procurement, rice was replaced with Sorghum at the end of 2017, and PlumpySup for under 5 children with Super Cereal Plus from mid-2017.¹⁹⁹

31. The rationale for moving away from rice is summarized in the EMOP 200777 Budget Revision No. 9 of June 2017: "When we factor that country office intends to procure approximately 3,200/mt of Rice per

¹⁹⁵ Interview 237.

¹⁹⁶ Interviews 237, 381, 688.

¹⁹⁷ Interviews 523, 554, 688.

¹⁹⁸ Interview 523.

¹⁹⁹ Last procurement purchase order for rice was issued in November 2017 and the last purchase order for PlumpySup was raised in June 2017

month, shifting this tonnage to Sorghum/Millet will generate US\$ 800,000 savings/month.... Imported rice was one option to bring prices down and closer to Sorghum/Millet prices, but it became politically difficult to sustain a rice import strategy, and even with imported rice, sorghum/millet is still cheaper. Therefore, the suggestion is to remove rice from the procurement basket and cover the immediate volumes with Sorghum/Millet.”²⁰⁰

32. While there is no similar explanation in the available evidence for the replacement of PlumpySup with Super Cereal Plus, the WFP standard project report for 2017 points out issues of adjustment for users of the specialized nutritious food : “The change of specialised nutritious foods in the malnutrition prevention activities from ready-to-use supplementary food to Super Cereal Plus for children revealed awareness gaps by the caregivers on the product utilisation, thus requiring additional training and sensitisation. Adequate sensitisation activities were critical when introducing new specialised nutritious foods to minimise misinterpretation of the intended use.” These additional challenges when shifting to an alternative commodity would imply that the shift had more compelling underlying reasons, such as cost saving.

33. In the logistics sector, WFP appears to be generally appreciated as sector co-lead. ²⁰¹ The design of the common services provided by the logistics cluster followed larger considerations. The three main areas of service, coordination (including civil-military liaison and the consolidation of requests for light cargo for UNHAS), information management, and logistics services (common storage and common transport/consolidation for road movements)²⁰² appear very much demand-driven. The specific role of civil-military liaison is required to comply with the government-imposed conditions for road movement of cargo.

34. Logistics sector services are seen as generally relevant,²⁰³ but interviews also point to questions about the substantial warehousing capacity the sector is holding.²⁰⁴ As of end 2018, the sector manages eight facilities, one of them in Maiduguri.²⁰⁵ It was said that only two of the seven spaces outside of Maiduguri see significant usage.²⁰⁶

35. Common storage units were placed inside the ‘humanitarian hubs’, mostly driven by the need to be within a secure perimeter and attached to other facilities, including helicopter landing sites.²⁰⁷ With the restrictions on humanitarian hubs this may have affected the utility of the common storages in some places, and informants point to mixed uptake of storage space over time depending on the location.²⁰⁸ Interviewees have pointed to comparatively high cost and little understanding of the warehouses’ utility or efficiency.²⁰⁹ However, it was also pointed out that there were periods when WFP provided storage at crucial times, especially in some of the hubs when there was no alternative, effectively acting as provider of last resort.

36. There appear to be different opinions about the common storage facility in Maiduguri. According to the concept of operations for logistics in northeast Nigeria generally, the Maiduguri storage was used for transit goods only, allowing partners to receive goods from suppliers or the port, and loading them onto trucks for field locations.²¹⁰

37. After a cost/benefit analysis²¹¹ the common storage in Maiduguri, while well-used throughout, has been marked for phasing out by WFP. When it was conceived at the end of 2016, partners had little or no alternatives in the Maiduguri area for secure storage of goods.²¹² WFP has decided to reduce its financial support, pointing to commercial alternatives now being available.²¹³ However, partners feel that a common storage under logistics sector management in Maiduguri remains relevant and appear to be moving towards

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Interviews 193, 515.

²⁰² Logistics Cluster Concept of Operations 25th June 2018.

²⁰³ Interview 515, Log sector minutes 2016-2018.

²⁰⁴ Interview 193.

²⁰⁵ Logistics sector Concept of Operations - Update 25 June 2018.

²⁰⁶ Interview 130.

²⁰⁷ Interview 193.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Interview 193.

²¹⁰ Logistics Cluster Concepts of Operations between 2016 and 2018.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Logistics sector Minutes September to November 2016, Interview 515.

²¹³ Interview 193.

maintaining the facility through a cost-sharing arrangement.²¹⁴

38. The responsibility for civil-military liaison function for ground transport was assigned to the logistics sector, initially as support to the civil-military coordination mechanisms established by UNOCHA,²¹⁵ later as full responsibility for the facilitation of operations level liaison between humanitarian logistics actors and national military authorities.²¹⁶ The overall function involves consolidating road transport requests on behalf of all sector partners for weekly submission for clearance by the military. This appears logically placed in the logistics sector.

39. Logistics sector minutes, as well as interviews, however, point to an increasing dominance of this process in controlling the delivery of any aid.²¹⁷ With only very light cargo being shipped by rotary wing services from UNHAS, the bulk of any commodity inputs to partners' operations is transported by road. The military places extensive restrictions on geography, cargo composition, and quantities on such transport requests,²¹⁸ arguably controlling the delivery of programmes through the cargo clearance process. From interviews it is not clear how, if at all, overall access negotiations on behalf of the humanitarian community expedite these processes. Furthermore, the logistics sector in February 2017 took over access mapping with the departure of the OCHA humanitarian affairs officer for access.²¹⁹ It could be argued therefore that, from the sector coordination perspective, the set-up in northeast Nigeria was beyond what a "standard" logistics cluster coordination function performs.²²⁰

40. There appears to be no doubt about the pivotal role of UNHAS in enabling humanitarian operations in northeast Nigeria. It is evident from the documentation that the rotary wing assets deployed (presently four helicopters) are the only means of transport for humanitarian workers to areas where road access is not possible due to insecurity. Furthermore, despite the severely limited payload of the aircraft in service in northeast Nigeria²²¹ they have been vital for lifting cargo to remote locations in the early days of the operation when for six months WFP and UNICEF operated the rapid response mechanism that included limited direct food distribution.²²² The rapid response mechanism passenger and cargo operation appears to have been the origin for the now regular helicopter service for the whole humanitarian community.²²³

41. The majority of UNHAS cost is donor-funded, although partial cost recovery has been introduced.²²⁴ It appears that donors to the Nigeria operation had specifically encouraged UNHAS services, and funded them, to encourage more partners to work in northeast Nigeria. Evidence suggests that in particular the rotary wing service has substantially supported the ability and willingness of partners to work in previously inaccessible locations.²²⁵

42. From comments in interviews there is every indication that passengers found the service highly relevant and essential to humanitarian operations in northeast Nigeria.²²⁶ UNHAS appears to usually fully utilize the aircraft.²²⁷ The schedule takes into account predicted growth, and it was last amended in November 2016. Between Abuja and Maiduguri, UNHAS is no longer the only means of transport, there are now three commercial companies, which are all approved by UNDSS.²²⁸ However, an ECHO monitoring mission in November 2017 found that commercial schedules are not consistent, and that this is unlikely to change in the near future.²²⁹ UNHAS is seen to coordinate with the commercial carriers to avoid duplication, but to also

²¹⁴ Interview 515.

²¹⁵ Logistics Cluster Concepts of Operations 2016 and 2017.

²¹⁶ Logistics Cluster Concept of Operations 25th June 2018.

²¹⁷ Logistics sector Minutes 2016 to 2018, Interviews 193 and 247.

²¹⁸ Logistics sector Minutes 2016 to 2018, Interview 247.

²¹⁹ Logistics sector Minutes 7 Feb 2017.

²²⁰ Interview 193, logcluster.org.

²²¹ The Bell 412/212 used by WFP in Nigeria have a total theoretical load capacity of just over two tons (including fuel and passengers - http://global-helicopter-service.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Bell-412_Data_Sheet_DHAFW.pdf) and can seat up to 10 passengers (UNHAS Nigeria at a glance January 2018).

²²² Interview 688.

²²³ Interview 523.

²²⁴ UNHAS Nigeria SAOP Annex 6 - cost recovery.pdf, email from CATO 05 Dec 2018.

²²⁵ Interviews 193, 685 and Logistics sector Minutes 2016-2018.

²²⁶ Mentions in several interviews, including 130, 247, 515, 685.

²²⁷ Interview 685.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ ECHO 2017 Monitoring report_Nigeria_November DG ECHO_UNHAS.

make use of their capacity if needed.²³⁰ The ECHO monitoring mission confirmed that UNHAS Nigeria remains relevant, and is effectively implemented in line with international standard practices of aviation.²³¹

43. An additional benefit from UNHAS has been the safety of humanitarian workers as the flight services have been vital for medical evacuations. According to statistics compiled by MSF, between July 2017 and April 2018, 21 medical evacuations were conducted by helicopter, with 19 of these patients surviving and recovering.²³² A further 61 medical evaluations were made by road as conditions permitted.

44. The services of the emergency telecommunications sector have consistently been rated as highly appropriate and relevant to needs by its users.²³³ In the 2017 survey a respondent had suggested that the emergency telecommunications sector was biased towards WFP needs but there is no indication from other respondents and the documentation can corroborate this.²³⁴

45. The emergency telecommunications sector undertook a needs assessment in 2017.²³⁵ The sector has a catalogue and the range of services is fairly defined. Decisions are largely made based on user demand, and through a user survey.²³⁶ Although there appear to be fledgling telecommunication services in the Maiduguri area, organizations throughout valued the reliability of the emergency telecommunications sector -provided uplinks. Beyond Maiduguri there are very few options and agencies in the evaluated period largely relied exclusively on the common services provided by the emergency telecommunications sector in the humanitarian hubs. These are of limited bandwidth, also because space is a constraint as larger systems need more space and power. Therefore, the hubs also have strict time limits on usage of the systems for those who do not reside there, usually six hours per day.²³⁷

46. In its risk register in November 2017,²³⁸ WFP identified key risks relevant to the supply chain and common services. The risk of the diversion of commodities was defined at a level (likelihood x impact) of 15 out of 25, the risk of food commodities being unsafe for human consumption was defined at 15 out of 25, and the risk of a shortage of Jet A1 fuel for aircraft was rated at 20 out of 25. The measures proposed against diversion of goods included general due diligence controls, but also reinforcing capacities of the Government and partners in warehouse management and delivery tracking through LESS. These appear appropriate and adequate. The measures against food quality issues, mostly anticipated through scooping from larger packages appear equally soundly mitigated. Contingency measures for Jet A1 availability were identified in the 2017 risk register and included agreements with the military to host additional reserves as well as offering the temporary uplift of fuel as soon as delivery to WFP stocks are confirmed. These risk estimates and similar mitigation measures were continued in the 2018 risk register,²³⁹ with the exception of the UNHAS-related risk, which appears to have been dropped from the register.

47. The volatile security situation in northeast Nigeria for WFP constituted the most significant external risk, including for the supply chain (delivery to partners). To mitigate against these risks of attacks on cargo, WFP strengthened convoy security arrangements (working with the Nigerian Armed Forces and the National Union of Road Transport Workers).²⁴⁰ This permitted fast recovery of trucks that had broken down, as these were potential targets for attacks and looting. The office also planned for 2018 to further tighten controls over road transport by using GPS trackers and stronger monitoring of convoys.²⁴¹

2.1.2 Application of humanitarian principles and a “do no harm” approach

48. The impact of humanitarian supply chains on the environment in which they operate is usually related to their procurement and contracting volumes. The supply chains interact with local markets for goods and services, and it is in this area that they can be expected to follow a principled “do no harm”

²³⁰ Interview 685.

²³¹ ECHO 2017 Monitoring report_Nigeria_November DG ECHO_UNHAS.

²³² MSF UNHAS Stats on Medical Evac.

²³³ ETS User Satisfaction surveys 2017 and 2018.

²³⁴ ETS User Satisfaction surveys 2017 and 2018.

²³⁵ Interview 130, document was not obtained.

²³⁶ Interview 130.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Risk summary - Nigeria country office - updated November 2017.

²³⁹ 2018 NIG country office Risk Register - final September.

²⁴⁰ EMOP200777 SPR 2017.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

approach.

49. The WFP supply chain in Nigeria in this regard appears to minimize any unintended negative effects. With commodities being procured inside Nigeria to the furthest extent possible, and with the application of the tariff system to build up capacity in the local transport market, it has addressed the two main areas of impact from the significant tonnage it procures and transports. As a buyer, despite the volume it procures, WFP is small compared to the scale of food exports in Nigeria, and its procurement is therefore unlikely to affect market prices adversely. On the contrary, WFP appears to have to compete with other buyers to get access to the best value for money for the commodities it procures locally.²⁴²

Key Findings on appropriateness of the design and delivery and alignment with needs

- The design of the supply chain is very relevant for Nigeria. It maximizes local procurement and uses the available infrastructure to its advantage
- The initial set-up of the supply chain operation was demanding, following a rapid shift from cash-only to a mixed cash and in-kind operation, and subsequent fluctuations in target numbers for cash affected its planning
- The supply chain is fairly end-to-end, but some disconnects remain in the programme-supply chain interface in terms of coordinating target numbers well ahead of distributions
- Common services provided by the logistics sector are widely appreciated and seen as useful by partners. However, questions arise about the wider utility and logic of the hubs, the common storage in Maiduguri, and the heavy involvement of the sector in what effectively is humanitarian access management
- Common services provided by UNHAS are universally appreciated and widely seen as essential for the feasibility of the overall response in the Northeast (rotary wing services) and well matched to commercial alternatives (fixed wing services) without being in direct competition
- Emergency telecommunication sector common services appear to be universally appropriate and useful for partners' operations. They appear inclusive and supportive of private sector capacity in similar services
- The supply chain appears to minimize harmful or unintended consequences from its procurement of goods and services

2.2. Operational Performance and Results

2.2.1 Achievement of stated objectives


50. Throughout the evaluated period, WFP appears to have delivered lower than planned tonnage to partners. Figure 28 shows plots of planned versus actual figures for commodity deliveries to partners between 2016 and 2018.²⁴³

²⁴² WFP Nigeria country office Procurement Plan Dec 17-Sept 18 v6.pdf.


²⁴³ COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019.

Figure 28: Delivery to partners –planned versus actual


a: Specialized nutritious foods



b: Grains



c: Pulses



Source: COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019

51. There is evidence for known pipeline breaks, as shown in Figure 29, for specialized nutritious foods in 2017 when funding shortages²⁴⁴ and Lagos Port congestion²⁴⁵ caused delays in the procurement and delivery of imported specialized nutritious foods, respectively. These breaks, however, did not lead to complete stock-outs of respective commodities in field warehouses, although stocks at times in this period ran very low and the number and size of rations distributed had to be reduced. The cut appears to have been most severe for specialized nutritious products; from April-August 2017, all nutrition beneficiaries were provided with half rations.²⁴⁶ Figure 29 shows the stocks for nutritious food commodities in Damaturu and

²⁴⁴ WFP SitReps in 2017.


²⁴⁵ Interview 688, WFP SitReps between June and October 2017.

²⁴⁶ Ration table as per the respective operational plans.


Maiduguri warehouses over time²⁴⁷ plotted against the actual beneficiaries reached.²⁴⁸

Figure 29: Stocks of specialized nutritious foods in field warehouses over time

a: Super cereal + and PlumpySup (distribution to children under 5)



b: Super Cereal (distribution to pregnant and lactating women)




Source: LESS Commodity Management System (stock data); COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019 (beneficiary numbers)

52. The reasons for lower deliveries than planned do not appear to be internal to the supply chain. Procurement data in the same period shows that procurement of specialized nutritious foods was taking place in the lead-up and throughout the period, but, it seems, at insufficient volumes (Figure 30). This confirms that the reported funding shortage was the main cause of insufficient stocks, in addition to the Lagos Port congestion between June and October 2017 that delayed the delivery of nutrition products (see paragraph 13).

²⁴⁷ Stock data from LESS Commodity Management System; Stock data in metric tons were converted to equivalent full monthly rations as benchmark. Weight equivalent of monthly rations was calculated from ration table as per the respective operational plans as (MT*1,000/(daily ration weight x 30.5)). Actual beneficiary numbers were obtained from COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019.

²⁴⁸ In such comparison the delay between stock levels in warehouses and its effect on actual beneficiaries reached must be considered: goods in stock in one month may only be in distribution the following month. Charts should be interpreted accordingly.


Figure 30: Procurement of specialized nutritious food



Source: Procurement data provided by WFP Nigeria CO; COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019 (beneficiary numbers)

53. Further supportive of the impression of a functional supply chain throughout the evaluated period are stock trends in Kano and Field warehouses for grains. These mostly locally procured commodities point to funding as the main cause of the 2017 shortages as they were not directly affected by port congestion or other importation-related problems. Figure 31 shows these trends,²⁴⁹ Through 2017, stocks in Kano and field warehouses for grains were considerably lower than in the following year, pointing to financial rather than logistical limitations to sufficient stocks.

Figure 31: Grain stocks over time



Source: LESS Commodity Management System (stock data); COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019 (beneficiary numbers)

²⁴⁹ Stock data from LESS Commodity Management System; Stock data in metric tons were converted to equivalent full monthly rations as benchmark. Weight equivalent of monthly rations was calculated from ration table as per the respective Operational Plans as (MT*1,000/(daily ration weight x 30.5)). Actual beneficiary numbers were obtained from COMET report CM-C004 for 2016-2018 as at 8 January 2019.

54. WFP, in addition to diversifying the delivery ports for imported commodities, also executed measures to improve the efficiency of handling in Lagos Port. This included the introduction of a new clearing and forwarding agent and close liaison with Nigerian Port Authorities to allow easier access to the port. This, reportedly, had over the short-term increased WFP container movement compared to the previous month.²⁵⁰


55. UNHAS performance significantly exceeded plans, supporting the evidence of it being pivotal for humanitarian operations in the Northeast. Table 17 summarizes performance against the programme's targets.²⁵¹ Figure 32 shows more detailed passenger numbers and cargo volumes transported on UNHAS flights for 2017 and 2018. It is clear from these more disaggregated data that the growth in demand for passengers has been on the rotary wing service, the element of the UNHAS operation that is particularly vital and without alternative for the humanitarian community in Nigeria. Cargo on helicopters appears to fluctuate, with a clear correlation between the northern rain season (June to September) and higher demands for cargo lifts in 2018. This correlation points to an additional value of the helicopter routes for transporting light cargo when roads become less passable.

Table 17: UNHAS performance against indicators

Indicator	2016		2017	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Metric tons of cargo transported	25	59	84	159
Number of passengers transported	8,400	14,796	18,000	48,849
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	50	64	70	92
Number of destinations served	9	17	20	16
Percentage response to medical and security evacuation	100	100	100	100

Source: WFP SPR data for 2016 and 2017

Figure 32: UNHAS passengers and cargo per month



Source: UNHAS Reports

56. The logistics sector was only initiated in late 2016, and lower sector performance against initial plans in the same year likely reflects the start-up phase. In 2017, it appears that the sector has broadly over-performed against targets. Table 18 summarizes logistics sector performance against the programme targets.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ WFP SitRep September 2017.

²⁵¹ From SPR data obtained from the country office for 2016 and 2017, at the time of writing 2018 data were not yet available.

²⁵² From SPR data obtained from the country office for 2016 and 2017, at the time of writing 2018 data were not yet available.

Table 18: Logistics sector performance against indicators

Indicator	2016		2017	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Number of agencies and organizations using coordination and logistics services (2016) Number of agencies and organizations using logistics coordination services (2017)	27	15	27	44
Number of organizations contributing to pipeline/planning, logistics assessment and/or capacity information to be shared	N/A	N/A	13	12
Number of organizations utilizing storage and cargo consolidation services	N/A	N/A	13	30
Organizations participating in logistics sector activities (coordination, information management, or logistics services) responding to a user survey with a satisfaction rate of 85% or above	N/A	N/A	85	82
Percentage of cargo movement requests served against requested	N/A	N/A	95	92
Percentage of service requests to handle, store and/or transport cargo fulfilled	85	100	85	100

Source: WFP SPR data for 2016 and 2017. N/A = not applicable.

57. In addition to its support to core logistics capacity, the sector became the sole interlocutor between the military and the humanitarian community for cargo movement. This function was conceived in August 2016²⁵³ as the military requested a coordinated system and a joint operational cell outside of military base to improve civil-military coordination. Consequently, the logistics sector established a dedicated function that handled all interactions with the military in regard to cargo movements, on behalf of all humanitarian actors. The clearance process had subsequently been tightened with the introduction of a “security waybill” that trucks had to be able to produce at checkpoints.²⁵⁴ The waybill system was in effect from late August 2017. Movement clearances appear to be a tedious process that puts a heavy workload and responsibility on the sector team, but are usually executed well.²⁵⁵ Rejections occur, for example, on lacking details, stronger justifications, wrongly filled forms, and also because certain commodities such as fuel cannot be transported, or cannot be transported to certain locations, at certain times, or in certain quantities.²⁵⁶

58. The emergency telecommunications sector showed a more mixed performance against plans but performed better in 2017 over the previous year. Considering that the emergency telecommunications sector was only activated in November 2016 this is not surprising. Table 19 summarizes emergency telecommunications sector performance against the programmes indicators.²⁵⁷ When interpreting the data it needs to be considered that, for the establishment of radio rooms and coverage of operational areas, the emergency telecommunications sector was dependant on the completion of the respective humanitarian hubs, which was outside its control.

²⁵³ Log sector minutes 2016-2018.

²⁵⁴ Log sector meeting minutes 25 August 2016.

²⁵⁵ Interview 247.

²⁵⁶ Interviews 130, 247, Log sector minutes 2016 – 2018.

²⁵⁷ From SPR data obtained from the country office for 2016 and 2017, at the time of writing 2018 data were not yet available.

Table 19: Emergency telecommunications sector performance against indicators


Indicator	2016		2017	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Number of radio-rooms (communications centres (COMCEN)) established	3	2	3	6
Number of operational areas covered by common security telecommunication network	4	1	6	6
Number of operational areas covered by data communications services	5	0	6	5
Number of operational areas covered with charging stations	3	0		0
Number of UN agency/NGO staff members trained in radio communications	60	10	120	533
Number of ETS meetings conducted on local and global levels	6	5	48	31
Number of ETS user satisfaction surveys conducted	0	1	N/A	N/A
Number of needs assessments carried out	4	2	N/A	N/A

Source: WFP SPR data for 2016 and 2017. N/A = not applicable.

2.2.2 Timeliness and efficiency

59. An appropriate measure for the timeliness of the scale-up of the in-kind operation is to plot procurement volumes alongside tonnage delivered to partners (Figure 33). For the Nigeria operation this aptly demonstrates that not only was procurement actioned in a very timely manner, but also delivery to partners followed closely. In the period from August to December 2016²⁵⁸ the value of procurement increased by a factor of 7, while the tonnage of delivery to partners increased by a factor of 12.

Figure 33: 2016 scale-up in procurement and deliveries



Source: Procurement data provided by WFP Nigeria CO, COMET Report CM C004

60. This rapid scale-up was also accomplished by using standard corporate approaches that increase timeliness of supplies. In 2016, food supplier agreements²⁵⁹ were put in place for local procurement, and Banki and Maiduguri were temporarily served with commodities from Cameroon. Locally procured goods from suppliers were delivered directly to Maiduguri and Damaturu warehouses to save time.²⁶⁰

61. The movement of commodities for in-kind distribution is costly, and transport is a large component

²⁵⁸ Delivery data are only available from July 2016, with July only having very low tonnage delivered (COMET Report CM C004).

²⁵⁹ Food supplier agreements allow WFP to buy commodities at an agreed cost but as needed, i.e. the agency does not need to warehouse the full tonnage of the contract; rather it can draw on that tonnage from the suppliers' stores as required.

²⁶⁰ EMOP 200777 SPR 2016.

of any WFP operation. Efficiency gains in transportation are therefore a significant factor in the cost of the operation. Table 20 shows basic cost data for 2016 and 2017.²⁶¹ Between 2016 and 2017 the operation scaled up by a factor of 4.4 (in commodity value), while the cost for external transport increased by a factor of 12.8, and landside transport handling and storage (LTSH) by a factor of 13.8. With data for 2018 not available at the time of writing, a trend analysis beyond stating these proportions is not realistic.

²⁶¹ At the time of writing (early 2019) only 2016 and 2017 figures were available.

Table 20: Cost elements of the Nigeria operation (2016 and 2017)

	Sum of Actuals (2016)	Sum of Actuals (2017)	Proportion (2016)	Proportion (2017)
Cash & voucher transfers				
Value of the cash-based transfers transferred to beneficiaries	\$4,717,700.05	\$36,345,529.60	9.6%	14.3%
Capacity development & augmentation transfer				
The cost of activities or items which are: (a) capacity development aimed at establishing or improving full national managerial ownership of a food security programme; (b) technical assistance to national government to enhance/improve an on-going national food and nutrition security programme, EPR, home grown school feeding, and other related activities; or (c) capacity augmentation to provide goods and services in the absence of national capacity or ownership (special operations)	\$1,757,748.58	\$125,959.36	3.6%	0.05%
Cash & voucher-related costs				
Costs directly related to the delivery mechanism adopted to cash-based transfers from WFP to the beneficiaries as well as costs of all activity inputs provided to beneficiaries in conjunction with cash-based transfer activities or utilized by host governments, CPs or service providers to implement cash and voucher activities	\$177,736.89	\$2,002,970.00	0.4%	0.8%
Commodity	\$32,336,631.74	\$143,599,115.11	65.6%	56.6%
External transport				
Any transport undertaken between the country where WFP takes possession of donated or purchased commodities and the recipient country or a recipient's neighbouring country	\$512,033.16	\$6,572,282.99	1.0%	2.6%
LTSH				
Costs arising from the reception of commodities in the nearest port and delivery to the final distribution point	\$1,804,113.53	\$24,837,550.21	3.7%	9.8%
ODOC food				
Costs of all activity inputs provided to beneficiaries in conjunction with food activities or utilized by host governments or CPs to implement food-based activities.	\$475,920.93	\$9,460,391.13	1.0%	3.7%
PSA direct support cost (DSC)				
Costs directly linked with the provision of support to an operation and that would not be incurred should the activity cease. Cost items include staff salaries, travel and training, office rent and running costs, communication, vehicles, etc	\$7,474,922.49	\$30,751,842.61	15.2%	12.1%
Total	\$49,256,807.37	\$253,695,641.01	100.0%	100.0%

Source: WINGS Data provided by Nigeria CO.

62. There is, however, qualitative evidence of efforts to increase efficiency in the supply chain. First and foremost, the creation of a hub in Kano has arguably improved efficiencies in logistics between suppliers and field warehouses, as it allows consolidation of commodities and delivery to Maiduguri and Damaturu warehouses as required. Furthermore, its large storage capacity allowed WFP to buy food when prices were lowest, usually during harvest season, and pre-position them for later.

The WFP procurement plan provides an illustrative estimate:²⁶² “Suppliers don’t have the necessary working capital to build up stocks, and therefore, will procure their volumes during the contract time. This expose suppliers and WFP to market variations and can lead to systematic defaults, when prices increase during lean season. Therefore, in order to guarantee the availability and prices, WFP has to take delivery of the needed quantities as soon as possible... In this regard, a rapid expansion of WFP warehouse space is needed... The strategy to “buy and hold” will provide important savings to the programme. For example, if we compare the prices paid between November and January (Harvest) they are around US\$ 100/mt cheaper than other period of the year. Therefore, if we consider that with extra warehouse we will be able to save US\$ 100/mt for the next 41,600 MT, we are estimating over US\$4.0M in savings.”

63. While the introduction of sorghum/millet in exchange for rice, and the use of Super Cereal Plus instead of PlumpySup (see paragraphs 30 and 31) may have caused other issues at the beneficiary level, it has brought down the overall unit cost of procurement, achieving a cost reduction in a period when funds were limited.

64. UNHAS operates an internal performance management tool that provides data on passenger numbers, seats filled, and related data on efficiency and effectiveness, including no-show numbers. It is online and is accessible to WFP Aviation in Rome.²⁶³ This appears to be very appropriate for the management of an operation at this level of complexity. UNHAS Nigeria, as elsewhere, also operates under standard administrative and operating procedures, with revisions as needed.²⁶⁴ These appear well conceived and adhere to general practice in WFP aviation. Key revisions were done in March 2018 and in October 2018, introducing partial cost recovery, and penalties for helicopter no-shows,²⁶⁵ significantly reducing the number of no shows on both services.²⁶⁶

65. ECHO, a major donor to the UNHAS operation, found in a monitoring mission in November 2017 that the operation was run as efficiently as possible under the circumstances. It specifically stated that, based on aircraft utilization reports, there was no disruption of service in 2017 and only a few occasions of the crafts being “non-mission-ready” were registered. The mission confirmed the presence of adequate control functions that allow adequate monitoring by WFP aviation. UNHAS, furthermore, was found to have adequate aircraft for the usage patterns and the context, to have booking systems and cargo consolidation processes that maximize payload on aircraft, and to have helicopter flight times that are optimized to utilize all contracted hours.

2.2.2 Gender equality and empowerment of women

66. It is in the nature of the supply chain operation that there is no direct interface with beneficiaries. Supply chain staff, however, interacted directly with retailers for the cash and voucher programme component, and were involved in their selection. WFP had the stated objective to maximize equitable selection of both men and women retailers. In 2017, it reported that – for the first time – women retailers had been included, and constituted 25 percent of the total group of retailers.²⁶⁷

²⁶² Nigeria country office Procurement Plan Dec17-Sep18 v6.pdf.

²⁶³ Interview 685 and excerpts from the system provided by WFP.

²⁶⁴ UNHAS Nigeria SAOP - Rev 1.

²⁶⁵ Partial cost recovery and no-show penalties had also been recommended by the ECHO monitoring mission: ECHO 2017 Monitoring report_Nigeria_November DG ECHO_UNHAS.

²⁶⁶ UNHAS Nigeria SAOP Annex 6 - cost recovery.pdf, email from CATO 05 Dec 2018.

²⁶⁷ EMOP 200777 SPR2017.

Key Findings on operational performance and results

- Funding was a main constraint to the supply chain in 2017, and appears to have affected, among other things, the food basket, the ration size, the beneficiary numbers, and the ability to continuously provide specialized nutritious foods
- The supply chain had multiple logistical challenges but had no apparent gaps in procurement, delivery to field, or field stock. In 2017, field stock was briefly critically low for specialized nutritious foods due to external factors. The response to the challenges appears appropriate and timely
- Establishing a GCMF hub in Kano was an exemplary decision that took into account the local market characteristics, the funding challenges, and optimized transport links to the field. This was a strong factor in uninterrupted procurement and delivery to the field throughout the operation
- UNHAS over-performed against plans at a high level of quality and reliability. The operation appears to be well managed, with sound oversight by the user group, making relevant operational and administrative adjustments throughout to further strengthen its efficiency and effectiveness
- Common services provided by the logistics sector and the emergency telecommunications sector performed well against plans and in many instances exceeded them. WFP co-leadership of the sectors appears overall sound and appropriate.

2.3. Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

2.3.1 Role of corporate policies, guidance, tools, processes and systems

67. For the establishment of a functional supply chain in 2016 and into 2017 evidence points to determined and substantial support from headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar. Experienced staff were in Nigeria on extended missions or limited assignments in the second half of 2016 and the first half of 2017; some of these were interviewed for this evaluation.²⁶⁸ The success of a rapid scaling-up as presented in previous paragraphs point to a successful outcome of these deployments and the leadership they gave to the early supply chain operation.

68. The ability of WFP to mount and scale up a functional supply chain for northeast Nigeria essentially rested on its ability to build up a longer-term cadre of appropriately qualified staff in addition to the senior leadership from headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar. With not being able to rely on previous presence, it appears the early months of the operation were mostly run by staff on mission or secondment (TDY) arrangements.²⁶⁹ These temporary senior staff, at the same time as setting up and expanding a sizeable logistics operation, had to recruit national staff to establish more sustainable office structures. Recruitment was comparatively slow, also because of additional due diligence that the organization saw as necessary in the context of Nigeria. Recruitment lead times were said to be as long as six months.²⁷⁰

69. Fully functional data systems are vital to managing a complex humanitarian supply chain, and WFP has sound systems that can be deployed in new operations (for example, LESS and COMET²⁷¹).²⁷² In northeast Nigeria, however, newly recruited national staff had no prior experience with these systems. Early on, the agency was fully aware of the problem of onboarding staff that were totally new to WFP.²⁷³ Operations were broadly commenced using paper-based systems that only slowly were fully migrated to WFP corporate systems. This reduced efficiencies and caused data gaps for 2016 that are apparent in the datasets obtained

²⁶⁸ Interviews 523, 554, 688.

²⁶⁹ Interviews 208, 523, 554, 688.

²⁷⁰ Interview 688.

²⁷¹ LESS = Logistics Execution Support System, COMET = Country Office Tool for Managing Programme Operations Effectively.

²⁷² Ibid.


²⁷³ 2016_7_NfR Operational Task Force_2.pdf: Staff needs big scale-up, concern about large numbers of untrained non-WFP national staff.

for this evaluation.²⁷⁴

70. Staff interviewed that had been with the operation from the beginning, or early on, mentioned very high workload with insufficient staff numbers, and consequent challenges for operational efficiency.²⁷⁵ This continued into 2017, where the procurement plan mentioned in regard to the procurement team that "...the work load is excessive to only one person, and puts WFP in a vulnerable position. An additional G5 staff to be assigned to food procurement would greatly reduce the workload, and will help the other staff to focus on most strategic tasks related to food".²⁷⁶ In 2016 and into 2017, short-term assignments and temporary duty assignment rotations also affected normal operational efficiency.

71. It appears, however, that the supply chain team was built up reasonably fast, with a clear progression towards Maiduguri as the main field hub. Figure 34 provides an overview of staff by gender and duty station.

Figure 34: Supply chain and common services staffing²⁷⁷ over time



Source: HR data provided by Nigeria country office for this evaluation.

72. The staffing data also show that there was a clear transition from Maiduguri, where senior section staff were located, to Abuja over time. In 2016, two P5 and one P4 staff members were based in Maiduguri and none in Abuja. In 2017 one P5 staff member was based in Abuja and one P5 and two P4s staff members in Maiduguri. In 2018, only one P4 staff member remained in Maiduguri, while two P4 and one P5 staff members were now based in Abuja. However, there is evidence from interviews that there were unclear divisions of responsibilities between the two offices at times, and that consolidation of some functions in one office had to happen to address parallel responsibilities without clear distinction or division of labour.²⁷⁸ The impression was voiced that even now some staff appear to work in "silos" – also between international and national staff - with barriers to horizontal communication.²⁷⁹

73. Although staff interviewed mentioned the use of temporary duty assignment staff in the early phase as a major constraint, the data show a comparatively modest proportion of temporary duty assignment staff compared to all other contractual arrangements. Figure 35 summarizes these data.

²⁷⁴ LESS stock data have obvious gaps in 2016 and could not be used for reliable analysis.

²⁷⁵ Interview 208.


²⁷⁶ WFP Nigeria country office Procurement Plan Dec 17-Sept 18 v6.pdf.

²⁷⁷ Data was taken from Nigeria country office staffing in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 to 16 Oct.xlsx. Pivot tables were generated for each year. Chosen parameters were duty station and post category against count disaggregated by gender. To filter for supply chain and common services staff the post titles were used to identify relevant posts. Generic titles such as 'consultant' were therefore excluded, only titles with explicit reference to the group were included using slicers. The majority of staff in this selection are core supply chain staff, as the common services teams are comparatively small.

²⁷⁸ Interviews 208, 688.

²⁷⁹ Interview 554.

Figure 35: Supply chain and common services use of temporary duty assignment staff



Source: HR Data provided by Nigeria country office for this evaluation

2.3.2 Partnerships and involvement of national and local stakeholders

75. Initially WFP had worked through NEMA and SEMA, and subsequently continued to provide capacity building support to NEMA and SEMA staff. Within the scope of supply chain management, capacity building was given on emergency response capacity. Topics included overall supply chain management, coordination, warehouse management and storage, and the coordination of multi-sectoral convoys.²⁸⁰ At the same time, the logistics sector made use of existing NEMA capacity. In August 2017, at the height of the rainy season, it 'borrowed' NEMA-owned 6x4 and 6x6 trucks that were able to continue transport to otherwise inaccessible areas.²⁸¹ WFP also participated in different fora to provide technical advice to enhance the governmental policies on food safety and quality.²⁸² While these examples point to a close relationship between WFP and NEMA as well as other parts of the host Government, interviewees have also pointed to missed opportunities in not building NEMA capacity for preparedness and emergency response more holistically and at the national level.²⁸³

76. In its annual performance plan for 2018, the WFP Nigeria country office aimed to strengthen partnerships with the Government through (continued) capacity building activities including training of staff on procurement and commodity management, and by providing technical inputs into relevant policy processes (for example, food quality).²⁸⁴

2.3.3 Influence of other factors

77. Security challenges and the issues around the military control of ground transport are discussed elsewhere (paragraphs 47 and 48 for security risks and paragraph 38 for the process of military controls over transport).

Key Findings on factors and quality of strategic decision making

- The build-up of the supply chain in the early period of the operation appears to have had strong and dedicated leadership from headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar
- Setting up the supply chain operation for Nigeria on the ground suffered from the prior absence of a WFP office, the difficulty of recruiting and onboarding national staff, and from subsequent decisions about office locations, responsibilities, and (unclear) hierarchies between Maiduguri and

²⁸⁰ EMOP 200777 SPR 2016 and 2017.

²⁸¹ Logistics sector minutes August 2017.

²⁸² Nigeria Executive Brief July 2017.pdf.

²⁸³ Interview 523.

²⁸⁴ Country Office Nigeria Annual Performance Plan 2018.

Abuja. This appears to have affected performance, data integrity, and communication /coordination.

Annex O: Findings on Gender, Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. Country Context

1. Northeast Nigeria lags behind other regions in terms of education, wealth and health indices due to a mix of historical, cultural and other socio-economic factors.²⁸⁵ The ten-year conflict has deepened this divide, particularly to the disadvantage of women and children, who constitute 48 percent of internally displaced persons (IDPs).²⁸⁶ Households headed by women tend to have higher rates of food insecurity (44.3 percent), compared to their male counterpart (29.9 percent).²⁸⁷ In northeast Nigeria alone, anaemia affects 50 percent of women of reproductive age and nearly three-quarters of children under five. Contraceptive use is lowest in the northeast of the country, estimated at only 3 percent. As a result, northeast Nigeria remains the area with the highest fertility rate at 7.2,²⁸⁸ and women tend to become mothers earlier than in the rest of the country, at 17 to 19 years of age.²⁸⁹ Gender inequalities that prescribe different roles, responsibilities and command of resources to women and men are among the reasons behind the higher vulnerability to poverty, lower level of education, less access to land for farming, and limited financial capacity of women as compared to men. Women and girls have also been marginalized from the peacebuilding process, which is a reflection of their marginalization in the socio-political systems at large.

2. The increasingly violent attacks by the militant armed groups active since 2009 has been causing major displacements both within Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram²⁹⁰ - which subsequently divided into Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad (JAS) and Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) - constitute the main non-state-armed groups (NSAGs) active in northeast Nigeria. JAS is led by Shekau, a reactionary and extremely violent leader who has been regularly targeting communities with no regards to the civilian population, including the use of women and girls as suicide bombers. ISWAP on the other hand is headed by al-Barnawi, the son of Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram. ISWAP used to target almost exclusively military and Christian organizations perceived as converting Muslims, and to respond more to a political project, including rules on the use of violence, the protection of civilians and social/humanitarian action according to the Sharia Law.²⁹¹ This however has been changing over time, as demonstrated by the kidnapping and killing of two ICRC local staff working as midwives in September and October, and the killing of another woman aid worker and other four humanitarian workers in Rann in March 2018.²⁹² ISWAP said they had targeted the women because they considered them "apostates" for working with non-Muslim aid agencies.²⁹³ According to analysis, this extreme turn followed the killing by internal hardliners of Mamman Nur, the *de facto* leader of ISWAP in August 2018, allegedly because of his moderate approach.²⁹⁴ More in

²⁸⁵ PCNI, 2016, The Buhari Plan, Volume I.

²⁸⁶ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan.

²⁸⁷ WFP, 2017, Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States

²⁸⁸ A.I. Akinyemi, U.C. Isiugo-Abanihe (2014), Demographic dynamics and development in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives

²⁸⁹ UNOCHA, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan.

²⁹⁰ Boko Haram first emerged in 2003 to fight against the un-Islamic way of life of Muslims. The name means 'Western education is sin'. Attacks reached a climax in April 2014 when 276 school girls in Chibok town of Borno State were kidnapped. PCNI, 2016, The Buhari Plan, Volume I.

²⁹¹ PCNI, 2016, The Buhari Plan, Volume I.

²⁹² Zenn, J. 2018, Is Boko Haram's notorious leader about to return from the dead again?, Africanarguments, <https://africanarguments.org/2018/12/10/boko-haram-notorious-leader-shekau-return-from-dead-again/>.

²⁹³ N. Cohen, 2018, Aid under attack, IRINNEWS, <https://www.irinnews.org/news/2018/10/19/boko-haram-humanitarian-access-aid-attack>.

²⁹⁴ 'Hardline takeover' blamed for latest Boko Haram violence. News24, <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/hardline-takeover-blamed-for-latest-boko-haram-violence-20180918>; and Zenn, J., 2018, Boko Haram's Ultra-Extremist Side Resurfaces: From the Execution of Mamman Nur to Humanitarian Workers, The Jamstown Foundation,

general, the NSAGs' attacks against civilians include bombings, mass shootings, suicide attacks, kidnappings and property destruction. Thousands of women and girls have been subjected to sexual abuse and enslavement,²⁹⁵ and many have been used as suicide bombers.²⁹⁶

3. Counter-insurgency efforts by the army, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the non-state self-defence armed groups such as the Civilian Joint Task Force and the vigilante groups have also pushed civilians and militants into displacement.²⁹⁷ Members of these groups are believed to commit human rights violations such as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), rape, and judicial killings. This led to the creation of a human rights bureau in the army command to address these concerns within a martial court. With the declaration of the state of emergency in the States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in 2013, curfews and restriction on the freedom of movement have been having negative impact on trade, livelihoods and markets.²⁹⁸

4. Many of the people in northeast Nigeria have experienced insecurity such as extreme violence, and loss of family members, social connections and property. Cases of human rights violations, physical violence, coercion, forced displacement, forced recruitment, abuse, sexual violence, obstruction of movement and limited mobility, affect populations' access to land and sustainable livelihoods. Food insecurity, systemic inequalities and displacement contribute to negative coping practices, such as survival sex and child marriage.²⁹⁹ Unsafe conditions in displacement sites, insecurity and patterns of sexual exploitation and abuse, and other protection risks are common. Sexual violence is systematically used as a weapon of warfare and unaccompanied girls and boys, single-headed households, and women with disabilities are most at risk.³⁰⁰

2. EVALUATION FINDINGS

2.1. Appropriateness of the Design and Delivery and Alignment with Needs

2.1.1 Alignment with identified humanitarian needs and relevant national policies, and use of context and risk analysis

Relevance of design to immediate needs of the most food insecure and malnourished

5. Particularly vulnerable individuals such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, pregnant and lactating women and children are prioritized and supported during both targeting and implementation of food assistance activities. This is the case both with the initial status-based targeting and with the following community-driven, vulnerability-based targeting. Programmes are clearly tailored to the specific needs of pregnant and lactating women, and children under two with severe acute malnutrition.

6. Evidence from the evaluation indicates that despite the assumption at the corporate level that WFP should be implementing a disability- and age- inclusive approach in all its interventions, and despite reports from Nigeria country office indicating that this is happening, to date this has only translated in the prioritization of the elderly and persons with disabilities alongside other vulnerable groups during targeting and distribution.³⁰¹ Importantly, guidance on this seems to be broadly missing.³⁰²

<https://jamestown.org/program/boko-harams-ultra-extremist-side-resurfaces-from-the-execution-of-mamman-nur-to-humanitarian-workers/>.

²⁹⁵ According to reports, girls have been forced to marry Boko Haram fighters, systematically raped and forced to carry out domestic duties.

²⁹⁶ PCNI, 2016, The Buhari Plan, Volume I.

²⁹⁷ The latter are formally recognized by the central government and local authorities and are actually operating as paramilitary forces.

²⁹⁸ Clashes between the military and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) escalated into conflict in 2013 and resulted in the declaration of the state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. UNOCHA, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan.

²⁹⁹ WFP, 2018, Country Strategic Plan Nigeria Gender Budget.

³⁰⁰ UNOCHA, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan 2018.

³⁰¹ Interview 567.

³⁰² The evaluation had evidence of a draft guidance on this dated May 2018: WFP Guide to inclusion of persons with disabilities in food assistance.

7. Among the principles that should underpin humanitarian action³⁰³ is minimal consultation and information sharing with affected population during programme design, implementation and monitoring. This is critical to ensure assistance is appropriate and relevant, and is provided in a safe and dignified manner.³⁰⁴ WFP efforts to systematically gather affected populations' views in different locations and design and implement interventions accordingly have generally been limited in Nigeria. Beneficiaries were not consulted on their preferences, and their familiarity with, and ability to access and benefit from, various transfer modalities have not been adequately assessed. This resulted in several implementation challenges and negative, though unintended, effects for beneficiaries, particularly in relation to mobile cash transfer.³⁰⁵ Among them, abuses by the intermediary agents and traders particularly against the elderly, people who are illiterate and persons with disabilities, all of whom experienced more difficulties in the use of the technology and understanding the process.

8. Reports from affected populations collected during the evaluation suggest that challenges in relation to mobile money persist, and negatively affect beneficiaries' access to and perception of assistance. Of all the affected populations interviewed only those receiving mobile money (4 focus group discussions out of 21) were overtly not satisfied, and said they would prefer e-vouchers. In-kind beneficiaries were also generally satisfied with the assistance received, with only some expressing concerns about the risk of being assaulted on the way back from distribution. Among the factors explaining the dissatisfaction issues reported in relation to mobile money were: phones not available; inability to use the device and the SIM card; SIM cards being blacklisted;³⁰⁶ payments not received; and no correspondence between the supposed entitlements and the money actually received. Among the reasons for appreciating e-vouchers on the other side, beneficiaries mentioned satisfaction with the type and variety of commodities being offered, and the comfort and safety of not having to travel to town to get their commodities. In the word of one beneficiary: "It is preferred because the burden of managing cash is eliminated as you only have to worry about the choice of food items."³⁰⁷ More on this is provided in the following section.

9. Importantly, men and women generally expressed the same concerns across locations, with the only exception being e-voucher beneficiaries in one camp. There, women reported a sense of frustration on the side of the men as being dependant on the assistance and lacking a sense of self-worth and respect, as well as arguments in the household on how to use the assistance. Men on the other side were said to be happy about being able to provide for their family.³⁰⁸ A sense of frustration on the side of men for not being involved in the decision to designate their wives as the entitlement holder was also registered by the latest protection mission in March 2018.³⁰⁹

Use of context analysis in the programme design and delivery

10. None of the Cadre Harmonisé data were disaggregated by sex, age or other diversity factors, and neither gender nor protection was integrated into the analysis of the affected populations or vulnerability to food insecurity. WFP emergency food security assessments (EFSA) show improved analysis of gender and protection-related issues, with the latest carrying a dedicated section on the gender and protection dimensions of food insecurity in northeast Nigeria.³¹⁰ Pregnant and lactating women are indicated throughout as a very vulnerable group and prioritized accordingly. This was also consistently found across all project documents and reflects the WFP corporate approach on this. The 2018 EFSA and Joint Cash Feasibility Assessment³¹¹ reflect the views, needs and concerns of affected population. However, there is no

³⁰³ See the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability. <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/>.

³⁰⁴ HCT, 2018.

³⁰⁵ Refer to the Annex on Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods for an analysis of the appropriateness of WFP interventions, including the choice over the specific transfer modality.

³⁰⁶ Blacklisting was in relation to mistake in the PIN of the sim card. The evaluation gathered reports of mobile money agents taking advantage of the fact that many beneficiaries either did not remember, or did not know, how to digit their PIN and requested their support to purposely blocking their SIM card and then ask some tips for reactivation.

³⁰⁷ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

³⁰⁸ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori.

³⁰⁹ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report.

³¹⁰ WFP, 2017, Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States.

³¹¹ WFP, 2018, Joint Cash Feasibility Assessment.

analysis of possible protection risks associated with food insecurity such as transactional sex or the impact of insecurity on beneficiaries' preferences of transfer modality.

11. Protection has been prominent in the approach of WFP to Nigeria since the outset. It was already prioritized in the analysis that preceded the decision to establish an operation in-country, and continued to be so in the following years.³¹² Evidence of this can be found in the efforts made to ensure capacity on it at both WFP and partner organizations levels, and in the wealth of documents, tools and support materials that have been developed on the subject.³¹³

12. The first WFP protection-specific assessment in Borno and Yobe States dates back to April 2016, when WFP was not yet fully operational in-country, and informed the development of the WFP protection strategy for northeast Nigeria in May 2016.³¹⁴ The strategy is articulated along four main pillars: 1. institutionalize protection risk and context analysis with a particular focus on the cash-based transfer scale-up; 2. integrate protection into WFP programme tools³¹⁵ as a means to formulate and implement principled food assistance; 3. develop new partnerships with protection actors, civil society actors and key community-based stakeholders; 4. provide technical guidance and support to staff and partners to be able to integrate protection throughout the project cycle.³¹⁶

13. Unique features of WFP Nigeria as compared to other countries³¹⁷ are a protection strategy and a protection-specific risk register, which allows for protection risks to be systematically accounted for in WFP analyses, and for mitigating actions to be integrated into internal processes and procedures.³¹⁸ These efforts are extremely relevant in the context of northeast Nigeria, which has been labelled a protection crisis, and given the extent of violations and abuses reported over the years by all parties to the conflict.³¹⁹

14. In 2016, WFP Nigeria also developed an accountability to affected populations (AAP)³²⁰ strategy for Northeast Nigeria with six focus areas: 1. Development of a communication strategy for affected population on WFP eligibility and targeting criteria, entitlements, complaint mechanisms and people's rights; 2. Information on the prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse and where to complain; 3. Improved mechanisms to voice complaints and provide feedback in a dignified and safe manner; 4. Improved consultation with diverse groups within affected populations; 5. Strengthened capacity of staff and partners on principled responses; 6. Partnerships to strengthen accountability to affected populations. The evaluation found evidence of positive efforts in all six areas, with the exception of focus area 4 on consultations. This remained the least developed, as confirmed by the feedback of affected populations as well as by WFP corporate indicators on this.

15. The extent to which the protection and accountability to affected populations strategies actually guided WFP work on protection and accountability to affected populations in Nigeria however is unclear. While there is no doubt about the value of these strategies in setting the parameters and articulating the WFP

³¹² WFP, 201, Evaluation of WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy 2018; WFP, 2016, Strategic Note Nigeria.

³¹³ These include two fixed term positions on protection at WFP Maiduguri and Abuja levels. Attention to protection was also visible in other documents. For instance, WFP Nigeria situation reports from 2017 onwards increasingly contain reference to issues such as sensitization on the reasons for women being formally designated as ration card holders to avoid tensions at the household and community levels; cooperation with agencies such as UNHCR and UNFPA to introduce livelihood opportunities and vocational trainings for displaced women in a safe environment, to mitigate the need for negative coping strategies such as survival sex, among others. See for example, WFP, 2017, Situation Report No. 09 Nigeria 2017-03.

³¹⁴ WFP operations in northeast Nigeria started in March 2016 with a CBT programme, while GFA only started in July 2016. WFP, 2016, Protection Strategy for northeast Nigeria.

³¹⁵ Examples of these are VAM and M&E tools, including qualitative assessments.

³¹⁶ WFP, 2016, Protection Strategy for Northeast Nigeria.

³¹⁷ Nigeria is the only country among the 12 reviewed in the context of the 2018 evaluation of WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy with a fully fledged protection strategy. WFP, 2018, Evaluation on WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy.

³¹⁸ WFP, 2018, Evaluation on WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy.

³¹⁹ See also the highly controversial report by Amnesty International, 2018, "They betrayed us".

³²⁰ Accountability to affected populations is about engaging affected people in the processes and decisions that affect their lives, which is done by maintaining an open and transparent communication line between them and humanitarian workers. AAP is a core element of protection mainstreaming. WFP, 2018, AAP Strategy NE Nigeria Operation 2016-2018.

commitment to protection and accountability to affected populations, questions remain about the extent to which they have been actually applied in the practice of operations.³²¹

16. WFP has been conducting various protection assessments over the years. Overall, these resulted in a good understanding of the protection challenges facing the affected population and their relation with WFP food assistance. Evidence from the evaluation indicates that, while awareness on these risks has been there for quite some time, many of them have not been promptly and adequately acted upon.³²² A summary of the identified protection concerns, measures taken to mitigate them, and remaining challenges is provided in Table 21 below.³²³

Table 21: Summary of identified protection concerns, mitigating actions taken by WFP and remaining challenges for the period 2016-2018

PROTECTION CONCERNS	MITIGATING ACTIONS TAKEN	REMAINING CHALLENGES
REGISTRATION & TARGETING		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delayed and mistaken registration • Exclusion of newly arrived IDPs, non-accompanied/orphan children, and other vulnerable people (e.g. women heads of household in one camp) • Discrimination and abuses by the <i>Bulamas</i> in relation to community-based targeting • Community and intra-household tensions in relation to the designation of women as the entitlement holders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple re-registration/re-targeting exercises to address exclusion and inclusion errors • Active involvement of community leaders during registration to help coordinate staggering of beneficiaries • Sharing of checklists and guidelines with partners on working with community leaders, women’s groups and others to identify the most vulnerable • Community sensitization to ensure understanding of the importance of greater gender equality and the reasons to designate women as the entitlements holders thus preventing and mitigating intra-household and community-level tensions ³²⁴ • Consideration of access barriers such as distance, timing or cultural concerns, such as separate queues for women and men • Protection considerations in the selection of an alternate to ensure reaching the most vulnerable for cash and in-kind assistance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Late registration and/or exclusion of newly arrived IDPs, and other vulnerable groups • Discrimination and abuses by the <i>Bulamas</i> in relation to community-based targeting • Intra-household tensions in relation to designation of women as the food entitlement holders.
SAFETY AT DISTRIBUTION SITES		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overcrowding • Abuses and violations by Civilian Joint Task Force groups and security forces • Risk of attacks by the NSAGs • Riots • Looting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assignment of both women and men staff for crowd control at project locations • Distribution of colour-coded tokens to targeted beneficiaries to better organized distribution • Avoid cash distribution hours extending till late in the evening with high risks for women beneficiaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical and verbal violence by staff, partners and security forces during distributions ³²⁷ • Issues with scooping: overcrowding, most vulnerable left behind

³²¹ Interviews 537, 987, and 567. See also the findings of the 2018 WFP Nigeria Protection Mission, and more particularly recommendation 1, which calls for the update and operationalization of both the protection and AAP strategies. WFP, 2018, country office Action Plan for the Implementation of the Protection Mission Report.

³²² Interviews 537, 987, 567, 727, 898, and 824, among others.

³²³ The table reflects evidence collected from multiple sources, ranging from WFP project documents, SPRs, and other relevant documents, to interviews with stakeholders and FGDs with affected populations, to direct observations by the evaluation team.

³²⁴ WFP, Standard Project Report 2016 and 2017 EMOP 200777.

³²⁷ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report. Importantly however, the evaluation team did not experience this in any of the locations visited.

- Violence and tensions among beneficiaries, for example in relation to scooping

- Creation of water points close to beneficiaries to avoid long queue, and shaded waiting areas
- Establishment of help desks, suggestion boxes and other mechanisms for complaints and feedback in accessible areas and in the main local languages³²⁵
- Priority to persons with specific needs
- Crowd control by field monitors
- Locally arranged solutions to transport food
- Regular monitoring of partners' adherence to protection standards to ensure safe and dignified food assistance³²⁶
- Advocacy and sensitization of Nigerian security forces on protection.

or receiving less, confusion³²⁸

- Risks to beneficiaries in relation to the presence of security forces in distribution sites
- Potential risks to beneficiaries when distribution occurs outside the camp and in proximity to a road³²⁹
- Limited capacity on protection (partners, protection committees)³³⁰

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (GBV)³³¹ & PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE (PSEA)

- Risk of abduction and violence when fetching firewood or water³³²
- Risk of abuses by security forces during firewood escorts
- Men and boys are subject to abduction and forced recruitment by both the NSAGs and the security forces
- Negative coping mechanisms to diversify/integrate food basket, particularly sex in exchange for basic assistance and goods, such as condiments

- Avoid cash distribution hours extending till late in the evening with high risks for women beneficiaries
- Community sensitization to ensure understanding of the importance of greater gender equality and the reasons to designate women as the entitlements holders thus preventing and mitigating intra-household and community-level tensions
- Dissemination of information on existing GBV referrals and where to report protection issues³³³
- Training of WFP staff, volunteers and partners on how to best disseminate messages on GBV prevention and response to affected communities, including during food assistance activities

- Condiments still not provided to beneficiaries by either WFP or the government³³⁴
- GBV and SEA risks during escorts and in displacement sites due to presence and proximity with the security forces
- Poor GBV programming and limited presence of GBV actors³³⁵
- Existing monitoring and feedback mechanisms inadequate to capture

³²⁵ These are Hausa, Kanuri, Chuara, and English. This represents an important improvement since the findings of the WFP audit conducted in November 2017, according to which information were provided only in one local language in areas where beneficiaries spoke multiple languages. WFP, 2018, Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Nigeria. In addition, visuals such as boards, and panels were visible in all field locations visited.

³²⁶ According to the SPRs, the WFP protection advisor played a critical role in strengthening the integration of protection into food assistance, including through joint field missions and during meetings with partners and the food security sector. WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report 2016 EMOP 200777. See also WFP, 2018, NGO Capacity Assessment Template for existing indicators on partners' performance on protection.

³²⁸ It is important to note that group distribution is believed to mitigate the risk of mass attacks by reducing the time beneficiaries spend at distribution points.

³²⁹ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report, and direct observations during the field visit in Pulka.

³³⁰ While protection expertise within partner organizations, and protection committees have been established, their actual capacity and added value remain uncertain. Interview 472.

³³¹ WFP, 2017, Nigeria-Konduga, Joint Rapid Assessment.

<https://www.wfp.org/content/nigeria-konduga-joint-rapid-assessment-september-2017>.

³³² Limited access to water to cook creates tensions between IDPs and host communities, and poses a significant burden on women who have to travel long distances or wait in queue for a long time. WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report.

³³³ WFP, 2016, 2017, Standard Project Report 2016 and 2017 EMOP 200777.

³³⁴ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report; interviews 567, and 987.

³³⁵ J. Read, 2017, Sexual violence and the Boko Haram crisis in north-east Nigeria, HPN.

<https://odihpn.org/magazine/sexual-violence-and-the-boko-haram-crisis-in-north-east-nigeria/>.

- Lack of understanding and capacity by WFP to handle PSEA complaints
- No protocol of assistance for survivors of SEA

- Sensitization on PSEA and GBV during the 2018 celebration of the 16 Days of Activism Campaign 'Breaking the Silence to End GBV'
- Strengthening of community-based protection mechanisms such as encouraging women to travel in groups to reduce vulnerabilities to attacks
- Provision of milling machines
- Advocacy with the Government and other partners on the provision of charcoal and/or fuel to IDPs in camps
- Establishment and contribution to the SAFE working group and related activities such as provision of fuel-efficient stoves
- Nomination of a WFP PSEA focal point
- Completion of the compulsory training on PSEA by WFP staff and food security partners

GBV and SEA-related issues³³⁶

- Milling machines not enough to cover the needs of the assisted population, and issues about the ability of beneficiaries to procure fuel to use them
- Long queues and waiting time for fetching water
- Intra-household tensions in relation to designation of women as the food entitlement holders

CASH-BASED TRANSFER (CBT)

- Long waiting time during distribution
- Risks associated with cashing out all the money at once
- Abuses by Airtel agents in relation to phone and SIM card usage
- Suspension of SIM card after 40 days of disuse
- Abuses and fraud by traders, e.g. higher prices, lower quality of commodities, less variety, insects, less quantity for face value, etc

- Suggest to beneficiaries to use last numbers of chip card as SIM password to prevent forgetting it
- Continue sensitization of beneficiaries on their entitlements and how to access and best use CBT
- Negotiation with Airtel to increase the number of agents, amount of cash available for distribution, and more flexible distribution modalities

- Continued abuses, manipulation and fraud around mobile money: e.g. agents asking for a commission, fake agents offering services during distribution
- Long waiting time to get cash
- Suspension of cards due to disuse
- Some issues with traders not yet addressed

AAP

- Lack of awareness of AAP approach
- Information sharing with affected population limited, filtered by community leaders, and not systematically provided
- High reliance on community leaders for consultation, and voicing complaints and feedback, and possibility of abuses and discrimination
- Limited consultations with affected population for

- AAP strategy launched in mid-2016
- Establishment of specific protection expertise among partners' staff in-country
- Establishment of help desks, suggestion boxes and other mechanisms for information sharing and complaints and feedback in accessible areas and in the main local languages
- Community sensitization to ensure understanding of the importance of greater gender equality and the reasons to designate women as the entitlements holders thus preventing and mitigating intra-household and community-level tensions

- Lack of operationalization of the AAP strategy and limited strategic commitment on community engagement
- Issues with the appropriateness (privacy, confidentiality) and effectiveness of some CFMs such as help desks and protection committees
- Some language barriers persist and affect communication with

³³⁶ There is no trace of GBV-related issues in WFP CFM reports. This coupled with the limited experience and capacity of protection committees and the lack of privacy and confidentiality around help desks that was observed by the evaluation team during visits in Pulka and Bama raise concerns about the actual ability by WFP to capture, and address, GBV risks. More on this is discussed in the section on Effectiveness of WFP operations below.

- Limited consultations and information sharing with affected populations

17. Cash-based transfer was the first modality to be implemented by WFP in the Nigeria response in 2016.³³⁸ Since the beginning however implementation has been characterized by several protection concerns, most of which were still there at the time of the evaluation fieldwork.³³⁹ Examples from various locations include: intermediary agents requesting 1000 NGN for helping beneficiaries cashing out; older women being short-changed; and food items exhausting before all beneficiaries are served.³⁴⁰ In one location, livelihood beneficiaries denounced disparities in the amount of money received as compared to the sessions attended. Similar concerns were also raised through the WFP hotline.³⁴¹

18. In March 2018 the management of WFP Nigeria requested a protection mission³⁴² to “take stock of protection achievements, identify continuing protection concerns and challenges, and make recommendations for addressing identified protection risks in WFP response to the NE”.³⁴³ Findings from the mission were also intended to inform the development of the WFP Nigeria Country Strategic Plan (CSP). Recommendations were multiple and relate to: 1. continuous and comprehensive context and protection risks analysis, and update and operationalization of WFP protection and accountability to affected populations strategies; 2. access to the most vulnerable through strengthened understanding and integration of humanitarian principles in WFP operations and the development of a humanitarian access strategy; 3. enhancing WFP, partners’ and communities’ understanding and capacity on PSEA; 4. preventing and mitigating gender-based violence risks through provision of energy for cooking, mills, condiments, and support to gender-based violence survivors; and 5. strengthening accountability to affected populations through regular consultations, and information sharing with affected populations, and improved access and responsiveness of complaint and feedback mechanisms. Further, a concrete action plan was developed that include detailed actions, timing and specific responsibilities against each of the recommendation set forth by the mission.³⁴⁴

19. The evaluation found evidence of progress being made in implementing some of the recommendations. Examples include the distribution of fuel-efficient stoves and milling machines in some locations to mitigate the risks associated with firewood collection and alleviating the burden of milling; the designation of a WFP PSEA focal point and training of staff and partners on PSEA; and a WFP-specific access strategy under development. Another observed positive measure related to the establishment of multiple complaint and feedback mechanisms such as suggestion boxes, help desks, and the hotline, alongside protection committees, as per stated intention by WFP and consistent with the findings of the protection mission.³⁴⁵

20. Notwithstanding these achievements, and while understanding that addressing protection issues is an ongoing process that requires continuous efforts and investments, advances have been slow and mostly

³³⁷ During field visits for example, WFP was mostly reliant on either partners or third-party monitoring for translation. This was further confirmed by interview 567.

³³⁸ More details on this can be found in the Annex on Food Security, Nutrition, and Livelihoods.

³³⁹ Interviews 824, 651, 537, and 987.

³⁴⁰ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

³⁴¹ See the relevant section on this in 2.1.2.

³⁴² During the mission the regional protection advisor and the HQ-based AAP advisor worked in partnership with the newly recruited WFP senior protection advisor based in Abuja and the protection officer who has been working in Maiduguri since 2016.

³⁴³ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report.

³⁴⁴ For a detailed list of recommended actions, refer to the 2018 Nigeria Protection Mission Report: Annex 1. Action Plan Recommendation of Priority Activities.


³⁴⁵ These were seen during the team visit to Pulka and were established by WFP partner SWNI; WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777. WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report. More on this can be found in 2.1.2 below.

concentrated in the second half of 2018, while important gaps remain, particularly in relation to the capacity of WFP to analyse and act on protection risk in a rigorous and prompt manner.

Safe access to fuel and energy (SAFE)

21. The risks associated with collection of firewood for cooking were first formally captured by FAO in mid-2017 and led to the establishment of a working group on safe access to fuel and energy (SAFE) in August 2017 under the food security sector.³⁴⁶ Initially serving as an information-sharing platform on the sectoral implications of safe access to fuel, the group further developed into a fully-fledged coordination mechanism. A joint SAFE assessment was conducted by WFP-UNHCR and FAO in January 2018 in four local government areas in Borno state.³⁴⁷ Beneficiaries were asked about their energy needs and the challenges they face in accessing safe and sustainable energy resources. Figure 36 summarizes the key findings.

Figure 36: Safe access to fuel and energy - Northeast Nigeria: Assessment highlights



Source: Joint SAFE assessment was conducted by WFP-UNHCR and FAO in January 2018.

22. Among the identified negative coping mechanisms adopted by households to address scarcity of safe access to cooking fuel are: switching to lower quality food or eating fewer meals; families resorting to undercooking food to save on fuel; beneficiaries selling or exchanging part of their ration to procure fuel; begging and transactional sex. Risks of abduction and violence when fetching firewood, as well as rape and abuses by the militaries while escorting people to firewood collection have also been raised in the latest WFP protection mission report.³⁴⁸

23. WFP adopted various measures to mitigate the risks including strengthening community-based protection mechanisms, encouraging women to travel in groups to reduce vulnerabilities to attacks and advocating with the Government and other partners on the provision of charcoal and/or fuel to internally displaced persons in camps.³⁴⁹ Owing to its mandate and previous SAFE expertise,³⁵⁰ WFP has also been

³⁴⁶ Besides Food Security, linkages are there with the camp coordination and management (CCM), protection and early recovery sectors.

³⁴⁷ Jere, Konduga, Ngala and Gwoza.

³⁴⁸ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report. Similar challenges were reported by women street vendors in the 2017 Empowering Women in West African Markets – Street Vendor in Maiduguri.

³⁴⁹ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

³⁵⁰ WFP work on safe access to fuel dates back to 2007 when the first Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Safe Access to Firewood and Alternative Energy in Humanitarian Settings (IASC Task Force on SAFE) was established. WFP was co-chairing with the Women's Refugee Commission and UNHCR. Since then, WFP has been actively seeking ways to

working to mitigate the risks associated with access to cooking fuel through provision of cooking stoves to internally displaced person households and emphasis on newly arrived internally displaced persons, who are facing delays in accessing basic services.³⁵¹ Most recent measures include: 1. provision of 7,262 individual fuel-efficient stoves in Banki between August and October 2018, and 32,188 purchased in October for distribution in Bama, Dikwa, Ngala and Pulka; 2. 40 communal fuel-efficient stoves to be ordered in 2019 to serve overcrowded reception centres in Bama, Dikwa, Ngala and Pulka; 3. revamping the discussion with the International Centre Energy and Environment Development (ICEED)³⁵² on the project “Increased Energy Access for IDPs, Returnees and Host Communities in Borno State through improved cooking energy technologies” to provide youth and women with the financial and technical support needed to build fuel efficient stoves and fuel value chain, and explore its relevance in Yobe State.³⁵³ Finally, minimum standards on gender mainstreaming in SAFE interventions were also developed.³⁵⁴ WFP efforts are complementary to those of FAO, which, since November 2017, has been training people on the production of fuel-efficient stoves in partnership with ICEED and the World Bank, with a first distribution in May 2018.³⁵⁵ Despite these improvements, actions to date have been slow and not at all sufficient to address the extent of the risks associated with firewood collection.^{356, 357}

Communication with the affected populations to inform programme design and implementation

24. Notwithstanding WFP-reported efforts to intensify information provision on targeting criteria, ration entitlements and timing through community meetings, posters, and other information channels; and to regularly consult with communities on best accountability systems including mode of communication and the best language to use,³⁵⁸ accountability to affected populations remains by large a challenge across WFP operations in Nigeria.³⁵⁹

25. Beneficiaries in most locations reported not being consulted on their preferred assistance modality. In one location, some beneficiaries said they were consulted, but their suggestions were finally not taken into consideration. Information provision on food assistance is also reportedly an issue in all locations, but in one location beneficiaries said they are always informed of updates and changes. In one location, beneficiaries complained that they receive incorrect information, while those in two out of four locations referred to the community leaders as the ones receiving information and being involved in decision-making. All expressed the desire to be more involved in the interventions, take part in meetings and be able to express their opinions on what works and what should be improved.³⁶⁰

26. In the context of less direct contact by humanitarian organizations with affected populations and heavy reliance on local organizations and third party monitors, finding ways to meaningfully engage with the affected populations should be given more attentive thought. This suggests the need to better define standards for accountability to affected populations for WFP staff and partners.

Strategic alignment with national policies, programmes and capacities

ensure that beneficiaries can effectively and safely cook food, maximizing nutritional intake and without adverse health impacts, while at the same time minimizing protection risks often associated with the collection of firewood. For more information: <https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/safe>.

³⁵¹ See evaluation question 1.1.2 for more information on WFP SAFE programming in Nigeria.

³⁵² ICEED is a Nigerian based organization that established its office in Maiduguri in 2017, and first partnered with FAO for the establishment of centres for the production of fuel-efficient stoves with the involvement of IDPs, returnees and host community members.

³⁵³ Internal WFP correspondence and WFP Concept Note for the Provision of Fuel Efficient Stoves in Dikwa, Pulka, Bama and Ngala.

³⁵⁴ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

³⁵⁵ 100 trainees have been trained since, of whom 59 are returnees, 14 are from the host communities, and 27 are IDPs, and there is a 50 percent women representation.

³⁵⁶ Interviews 087 and 567.

³⁵⁷ WFP, 2017, GBV Sub-Sector Annual Report.

³⁵⁸ WFP, 2016, 2017, Standard Project Report 2016 and 2017.

³⁵⁹ The need for WFP to regularly assess and engage with communities in an inclusive and participatory manner is further reiterated in the most recent WFP Country Strategic Plan for Nigeria (2019-2022). WFP, 2018, Country Strategic Plan Nigeria.

³⁶⁰ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

27. Nigeria adopted a National Gender Policy in 2006 to address the systematic inequalities between men and women, prioritize the empowerment of women for gender equality, and seek balanced gender relations. This was followed by an implementation plan for the period 2008-2013. The Federal Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Development developed a new National Gender Policy that awaits validation and seeks to address five specific policy priority areas: health, survival and sustainable development, economic empowerment, productivity and livelihoods, political empowerment, leadership and good governance, educational attainment, vocational and life skills, and gender based violence.³⁶¹

28. Other relevant documents include the 2016 Buhari Plan, "Rebuilding the Northeast", which lists women and youth empowerment among the ten pillars for economic development through skills and entrepreneurship development initiatives and projects by empowering women and youth;³⁶² and a draft gender in disaster management policy³⁶³ to ensure integration of gender-aware and gender-responsive principles and practices in disaster management, and strengthen the capability of men and women as individuals and communities for response and recovery. None of the evaluation informants however made reference to them. This raises question about their actual use to frame the humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria. This despite the fact that, according to the latest Humanitarian Response Plan: protection and gender; and community engagement through strengthened accountability and community feedback are amongst the Government of Nigeria's priorities for 2018.³⁶⁴

Figure 37: WFP core humanitarian principles



Source: WFP Emergencies and Transitions Unit (OSZPH) 2017, Humanitarian Access: Operational guidance manual.

³⁶¹ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Country Strategic Plan, Gender Comments.

³⁶² PCNI, 2016, The Buhari Plan Volume III.

³⁶³ It is not clear whether the policy was finalized.

<http://www.ng.undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/articles/2017/06/02/nigeria-reviews-draft-policy-on-gender-in-disaster-risk-management-.html>

³⁶⁴ UNOCHA, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan.

Risk analysis and mitigation

29. WFP Nigeria has had a full time officer position on compliance since 2016.³⁶⁵ The risk register is developed at the beginning of every year and reviewed mid-yearly, together with the annual performance plan.³⁶⁶ Many of the risks and related mitigation measures identified in both 2017 and 2018 have a bearing on the protection of affected populations.³⁶⁷ These have been captured in a protection-specific risk register developed by WFP in 2017. While all the mitigating actions listed there are indicated as completed, the evaluation found evidence of improvements needed in some of them. For example, sensitization of beneficiaries on the feedback mechanisms, entitlements and rights is still a gap, and requires on-going and dedicated efforts. It is a similar situation with partnerships with I/NGOs working on gender and protection.³⁶⁸ Finally, progress has been difficult to assess as no -up-to-date version of the register is available for 2018.

2.1.2 Application of the humanitarian principles and a “do no harm” approach

Application of humanitarian principles

30. WFP core humanitarian principles were formally adopted in 2004 and include: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence. Figure 37 has a definition of each.

31. Ongoing hostilities, insecurity, restrictions posed by all parties in the conflict, and lack of safety assurances by both the security forces and NSAGs hinder access by the humanitarian community to all populations in need in northeast Nigeria. As a result, humanitarian assistance is largely implemented in highly militarized areas, and through the support of, or under the direct protection of, the Nigerian security forces. In such a challenging operating environment, military assets and escorts have often been used as the “first” rather than the last resort,³⁶⁹ and access to populations in need has been mostly determined by military analysis as independent context and security assessments in areas not accessible by the United Nations and INGOs have not been possible.³⁷⁰ This has negatively impacted on the perceptions and realities of a principled humanitarian response.

32. Without access, and in the absence of any dialogue and engagement with NSAGs and communities outside of the local government area headquarters, understanding the actual needs in inaccessible areas has and continues to be extremely difficult.³⁷¹ Yet, prevalence of malnutrition had been found to be considerably higher in those arriving from areas controlled by NSAGs. This is certainly the result of a combination of factors, including NSAGs looting food from civilians and leaving them with extremely limited resources, and the overall insecurity that negatively affects the ability of the populations living outside the government-controlled areas to indulge in farming and other livelihood options.³⁷²

33. According to stakeholders,³⁷³ the United Nations in Nigeria has long been risk-averse, and has not been vocal about the need to ease some of the restrictions to humanitarian assistance enforced by the

³⁶⁵ Since December 2016, there have been two compliance officer positions in WFP Nigeria, one at Abuja and one in Maiduguri respectively. Previously a compliance officer was deployed on TDY from the RBD for three months, of which two were spent in Maiduguri.

³⁶⁶ The last update of the Annual Performance Plan for Nigeria dates back to March 2018.

³⁶⁷ See for examples: Risk 1 is on security for staff/partners and beneficiaries at distribution sites; Risk 9 on breaches of beneficiaries’ data privacy; and Risk 10 is about misconduct by WFP/CPs/suppliers/security personnel and protection forces supporting food assistance activities. WFP, 2018, Nigeria Risk Register.

³⁶⁸ WFP, 2017, Revised Protection Register.

³⁶⁹ Evidence of this can be found in interviews 378, 247, 692, 676, as well as in the 2018 HCT CMCoord Guidance and Access Strategy, which points to the frequent use of military assets and escorts as the main cause for blurring the distinction between humanitarians and security forces, and argues for its discontinuation. Global guidance on CMCoord establishes that the use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military interventions and any actions involving visible interaction with the military must be option of last resort, i.e. only when there is no comparable civilian alternative available, and when it provides unique advantages in terms of capability, availability, and timelines to meet critical humanitarian needs. HCT, 2018, CMCoord Guidance.

³⁷⁰ HCT, 2018, Access Strategy.

³⁷¹ At the time of writing, it was estimated that more than 800,000 people were in areas inaccessible to international humanitarian actors. OCHA, 2019, Humanitarian Response Strategy.

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/28012019_ocha_nigeria_humanitarian_response_strategy.pdf.

³⁷² Interviews 737, and 836. OCHA, 2019, Humanitarian Response Strategy.

³⁷³ Interviews 727, 836, 740, 511.

Nigerian security forces or to advocate for a more principled approach.³⁷⁴ In the words of one informant: “Humanitarian assistance supports and enables the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. There has not been any attempt to establish any principles.”³⁷⁵ While the humanitarian country team (HCT) advocacy and access strategies specifically call for neutral, independent and impartial engagement of the humanitarian community in the crisis in Nigeria, including in the choice of terms used,³⁷⁶ communication by the United Nations has long been along the line of “the United Nations condemns terrorist attacks, and Boko Haram as being a terrorist group”, which makes claiming neutrality difficult, especially since dialogue with non-state armed groups is basically nonexistent.³⁷⁷

34. Donors have pushed for increased access and stronger, strategic and consistent advocacy by the humanitarian coordinator and humanitarian country team members with the Government of Nigeria for the provision of protection and life-saving assistance to all people in need, thus building the understanding that civilians in inaccessible areas are not necessarily terrorists and are in need of assistance as much as the others.³⁷⁸ Following the killing and abduction of aid workers by the NSAGs, and the debate on return and access to areas where the Government/military recently regained control, the humanitarian community started reflecting more consistently and strategically on how to best safeguard the humanitarian principles in the response in northeast Nigeria.³⁷⁹

35. The evaluation found a generally poor understanding of humanitarian principles across the whole humanitarian community in general, and by WFP staff and partners more specifically.³⁸⁰ This seems to be common to many WFP operations.³⁸¹ According to informants,³⁸² this is due essentially to two factors. The first and very critical one is the lack of commitment and push for a more principled approach at the senior leadership level both within the humanitarian country team, and among member organizations, which results in little priority accorded to these issues in the management of humanitarian response, including the establishment of a meaningful and concerted dialogue with the Government on this. Second, at the time the crisis started, the staff that were hired were mostly junior and inexperienced, and coming from a development background at best, thus with little to no knowledge of humanitarian principles and how they should apply to the response. Overall, this led to a failure to establish a principled humanitarian response at the outset, a situation that is now difficult to revert.³⁸³ Within this framework, local staff are in a particularly difficult position due to close proximity with the military in field locations,³⁸⁴ a perception they themselves have that it is generally safer to be close to the military, and the potential for greater pressure on them from local authorities and armed groups.

³⁷⁴ The need for a principled approach to humanitarian assistance in Nigeria was only formalized in May 2018 with the endorsement by the HCT of Nigeria’s first CMCoord Guidance and Access Strategy. Implementation however started only recently, mostly due to the lack of commitment at the HCT leadership level. Interview 511,

³⁷⁵ Interview 836.

³⁷⁶ See for example suggested terms for use by humanitarian partners in Nigeria when adhering to the neutral nature of the humanitarian work, in Annex 4 of the 2018 Access Strategy. HCT, 2018, Access Strategy; and HCT, 2018, HCT Advocacy Strategy.

³⁷⁷ Similar statements can be found in: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-02-27/statement-attributable-spokesman-secretary-general-nigeria>; <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-10-30/secretary-generals-remarks-15th-meeting-united-nations-counter>; as well as in the United Nations Security Council resolution 2349 in 2017, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/863830/files/S_RES_2349%282017%29-EN.pdf.

³⁷⁸ 2017, Joint Letter to WFP Leadership in Nigeria; 2018, Joint Donor Letter to the Attention of the Chair of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Emergency Directors Group (EDG) on ‘Improving Humanitarian Advocacy & Operational Response in North-East Nigeria; and interview 378.

³⁷⁹ IASC, 2018, EDG Chair Response to Joint Donor Letter on Nigeria; High-Level Conference on the Lake Chad Region, 2018, Panel on Humanitarian Assistance and Protection; Interviews 740, 247, 511, and 378.

³⁸⁰ Interviews 836, 247, 740, 567, and 737.

³⁸¹ Findings from the global evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts found that only 33 percent of WFP staff globally stated applying the humanitarian principles confidently to most decisions. WFP, 2018, Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts.

³⁸² Interviews 836, 567, 247, 378, 740, 421, 511, and 737.

³⁸³ Interviews 836 and 378.

³⁸⁴ There are reports of football fields where humanitarian staff and soldiers play together. Interview 247.

36. Despite this, efforts to build understanding and capacity on the humanitarian principles started only recently, in relation to the roll-out of the humanitarian county team's Humanitarian Access Strategy for northeast Nigeria, and of the CMCoord Guidance.³⁸⁵

37. The vast majority of the affected populations (18 out of 21 focus group discussions) consulted on this in northeast Nigeria described WFP as a neutral and impartial organization whose sole motivation is to help people in need of food assistance. Similar feedback was provided by non-beneficiaries in affected communities.³⁸⁶ This contrasts with the findings of the 2018 evaluation of WFP humanitarian principles³⁸⁷ where 46 percent of the surveyed affected population globally believed that WFP work is helping one side of the conflict. Within this, northeast Nigeria scored second-worst after the Philippines in the ratings by the affected populations on neutrality, with 242 respondents believing that "WFP is working to help any one side of the conflict to win".³⁸⁸ One of the reasons for this might reside in the diversity of understanding of affected populations of the humanitarian principles and what they entail in the practice of WFP operations. When pilot testing the guiding questions during the present evaluation, for example, the need for a simple formulation of these principles coupled with concrete examples to facilitate understanding by those interviewed was clear. Caution may also be needed in relation to perceptions surveys as data may be incomplete and there may be respondent and temporal biases. Hence there is a difficulty in reaching a conclusive remark on this. However, throughout the evaluation the general feeling was that WFP, as well as the rest of the humanitarian community, is generally performing poorly on neutrality and has been variously compromising its operational independence and impartiality by limiting the response to government-controlled areas.³⁸⁹ According to some informants,³⁹⁰ NGOs have generally been doing better than the United Nations on this, as they managed to maintain greater operational independence, and better distinguish themselves and their work from that of the security forces and of the Government.

38. Partnerships were found to be underutilized in implementing the WFP humanitarian principles and protection approach in general.³⁹¹ While references to impartiality and some aspects of neutrality is reflected in cooperating partners' agreements, adherence to the humanitarian principles does not appear among the criteria guiding partners' selection and management in northeast Nigeria.³⁹² Contracts with commercial suppliers do not reflect any such obligations.³⁹³ Given WFP heavy reliance on partners and commercial contractors for access and delivery, more efforts would be required to assess adherence to, and understanding of, humanitarian principles and access in partners' selection, management and monitoring. Informants reported that a due diligence capacity assessment is usually conducted for each new WFP partner, including international ones. This includes assessment of capacity on gender and protection, on the basis of standards developed at headquarters level, which however do not reflect specific considerations on the humanitarian principles.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁵ The evaluation revealed a total of six OCHA-led one-day training sessions in 2018, of which two were for the theatre command in Maiduguri. The plan is to cover all field locations by March 2019. Trainings are targeted to humanitarians, government staff and the security forces. In addition, two workshops were reportedly organized by DFID and USAID.

³⁸⁶ Of the other three FGDs, in one, beneficiaries stated that WFP is not on the side of the insurgents, but work alongside the government; in another, issues of neutrality and impartiality are not discussed; and in the third, beneficiaries said that "WFP makes decisions based on interest", though it is not clear what they are referring to.

³⁸⁷ The evaluation included data from Nigeria collected through desk review, a survey of affected people and quantitative analysis of existing data. The survey was actually tested in Nigeria before being rolled out in another five countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and The Philippines. WFP, 2018, Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts.

³⁸⁸ WFP, 2018, Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts.

³⁸⁹ Interviews 737, 567, 727, 384, 692.

³⁹⁰ Among the factors that seem to have ensured such a distinction are the decisions not to co-locate wherever possible, and not to rely solely on military premises and resources. For example, informants reported that NGOs do not generally use escorts for personnel movement, while the United Nations does. Interviews 247, 692, 737, 265, and 511.

³⁹¹ WFP, 2018, Evaluation of WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy.

³⁹² Interview 567.

³⁹³ Given WFP reliance on commercial transporters and vendors in northeast Nigeria, it would be desirable for WFP to define standards and monitor the conduct of commercial partners in relation to sensitive issues such as the use of armed escorts and access challenges. Also, the 2018 Nigeria protection mission report calls on staff, CP, contractors and community volunteers on the implementation of the PSEA policy and reporting. A specific recommendation on this was made in 2018 Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts.

³⁹⁴ WFP, 2018, NGO Capacity Assessment Template.

Trade-offs between humanitarian principles

39. Depending on the context, application of the humanitarian principles may entail some compromises. The inter-connectedness between the humanitarian principles and access negotiations means that in order to overcome access constraints and reach populations in need, some trade-off or prioritization between the humanitarian principles may be needed. Assessing the ability of WFP to preserve a principled approach therefore requires a focus on the relationships between WFP adherence to humanitarian principles, access level and the implications of this for staff and beneficiaries.

40. In the case of northeast Nigeria, the evaluation found a clear tension between the reality of having to work closely with the Government and the Nigerian security forces to gain access to affected populations in government-controlled areas and access to the areas controlled by NSAGs. Limiting access by humanitarian agencies to military-controlled areas created a trade-off between the principle of humanity and that of impartiality. Similarly, the heavy reliance on military escorts and premises to ensure delivery of assistance to the populations in need has compromised the principle of neutrality over humanity and impartiality.³⁹⁵ Finally, by abiding to the government counterinsurgency narrative and strategy in northeast Nigeria, humanitarians have compromised their independence. In sum, in northeast Nigeria the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence have been variously compromised over humanity and partial access, while populations in need in NSAGs territories are forced to relocate to government-controlled areas to access humanitarian assistance. This method of operating has created serious challenges for humanitarian staff and partners, who are perceived as associated with one party to the conflict and therefore at risk of being targeted, and also for parts of the affected population, which is either excluded from any form of assistance, such as in areas outside of government control, or might be at risk of attack for being assisted by those who are perceived to be working alongside the Government and the Nigerian security forces.

41. While understanding that compromises are not only inevitable, but could also be acceptable in the reality of complex emergencies like northeast Nigeria,³⁹⁶ questions remain as to whether decisions on these compromises have been made strategically and coherently among humanitarian agencies, and have been informed by a sound understanding of the evolving operational environment, and programme criticalities, independent from any non-humanitarian considerations. Since capacity and competence on humanitarian principles and access have not been significantly and consistently available in northeast Nigeria,³⁹⁷ and given the limited engagement on this by the senior humanitarian leadership to date, it is reasonable to believe that decisions and practices on such compromises were not grounded in a thorough independent analysis and were not the subject of duly concerted agreement among humanitarian organizations.

42. While in general WFP, like other humanitarian organizations, has been hesitant to better use its strategic position to influence decisions on humanitarian principles and access, the evaluation team registered a few instances where WFP has been “pushing the envelope” for a more principled engagement. After the kidnapping and killing of ICRC staff in Rann for example, WFP decided to go in to assess the situation against UNDSS advice. WFP was among the first to push back on the Government’s request to support returnees with assistance until minimum conditions for return were established and agreed upon with the humanitarian community.³⁹⁸ Other examples include WFP holding regular meetings with ICRC and MSF on humanitarian access and needs with a focus on inaccessible areas;³⁹⁹ advocacy efforts for freedom of movement and protection of civilians with the security forces and the Government; support to the NGO

³⁹⁵ HCT, 2018, CMCoord Guidance.

³⁹⁶ See discussion on this in the 2018 Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts.

³⁹⁷ See for example the call for the urgent instalment of senior CMCoord personnel familiar with global IASC standards to improve civil-military coordination by donors in August 2018. Joint Donor Letter to the Attention of the Chair of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Emergency Directors Group (EDG) on ‘Improving Humanitarian Advocacy & Operational Response in North-East Nigeria’.

³⁹⁸ According to informants, this significantly contributed to the debate on safe and dignified return between the humanitarian community and the Government of Nigeria, which culminated with the signature of a ‘Return Policy Framework’ in August 2018 between the governor of Borno State and the humanitarian coordinator, which posed the basis for the development of the Borno State Return Strategy. WFP, 2018, Position on Return, emails; interviews 567, 511. IASC, 2018, EDG Chair Response to Joint Donor Letter on Nigeria.

³⁹⁹ In partnership with the ICRC, UNHCR, and MSF and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, WFP contributed to the creation of a Centre of Competence on Humanitarian Negotiation in 2015.

community's advocacy efforts for a more principled approach;⁴⁰⁰ and awareness-raising activities on the humanitarian principles conducted by WFP protection and accountability to affected populations team for staff, partners and sectors' members. WFP is also the only organization amongst the ones interviewed, with dedicated responsibility and capacity on humanitarian access,⁴⁰¹ besides OCHA, which is leading the relevant working group.⁴⁰² All of the above however had to be leveraged against the high level of risk aversion within the United Nations, including severe restrictions by UNDSS.⁴⁰³

43. The CMCoord working group developed the CMCoord Guidance to provide a framework for effective and principled interaction, engagement and coordination with the Nigerian armed forces and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The guidance was finally endorsed by the humanitarian country team in May 2018, and dissemination has started since. The first CMCoord training was held by OCHA for the Nigerian armed forces and humanitarian partners at the end of 2018.⁴⁰⁴ The CMCoord guidance is meant for use in conjunction with the access strategy for northeast Nigeria, also from 2018.⁴⁰⁵ Among the key principles set in these guidance documents is the distinction of activities, identities and roles to prevent further blurring the lines between the humanitarian community and the Nigerian armed forces and promote a more neutral and impartial perception of the humanitarian work. Critical to this are: the identification of principled alternatives to the current use of military assets and armed escorts, which should remain options of last resort, including for personnel movement; clearer identification of staff, relief supplies, premises etc. for example by making logos and brands more visible; and avoiding having to co-locate with the armed forces altogether, including in remote field locations.⁴⁰⁶ Yet, at the time of the evaluation, the only routes used by the humanitarians were still those cleared by the military, and escorts were just the complete and unique response in insecure areas.

Application of a "do no harm" approach

44. "Do no harm" is a framework for analysing the impact of aid on conflicts that was first conceptualized by Mary B. Anderson in 1999.⁴⁰⁷ As far as WFP is concerned, protection and gender policies, in accordance with the "do no harm" approach require that interventions do not create, exacerbate or contribute to the harm of the beneficiary populations, including harms such as gender inequality, discrimination, and gender-based violence.⁴⁰⁸ As such, "do no harm" is a wide-ranging principle and encompasses all efforts to ensure the integration of a protection and gender lens in operations, including efforts to safeguard the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Examples of WFP efforts on this can be found in various sections of the present Annex. Here, discussion will focus on what remains to be done in the experience of affected populations, and in relation to more recent risks stemming from emerging issues such as transition to livelihoods and return of internally displaced persons to their areas of origin.

45. Negative coping strategies are reported in 14 of 21 focus group discussions with affected populations. Among them, firewood collection for selling is by far the most frequently mentioned (10 focus group discussions), despite the risks of attacks, kidnappings and killings for those venturing in insecure areas outside the camps. The second most frequently mentioned negative coping mechanism is to sell food to cater for other needs such as toiletries, coal and firewood for cooking, condiments and other foods. This, despite the majority of the respondents saying that food assistance is not enough, and lasts for no more than two weeks, especially for large households. Transactional sex and prostitution were also mentioned in four focus group discussions, including by men respondents as a practice that was in use some time ago, particularly with the military, though not in relation to food assistance (i.e. sex in exchange for food). Finally, buying poor

⁴⁰⁰ KII Abuja and Maiduguri, November 2018.

⁴⁰¹ The security officer in Maiduguri has been tasked with the development of WFP access strategy.

⁴⁰² Now coordinator of the recently combined access and CMCoord working group, Interview 740.

⁴⁰³ Informants reported that UNDSS has been extremely risk averse to the point of not doing any assessment of the security situation in country, claiming it was not their role to conduct such an analysis. Interviews 378, 727, 511.

⁴⁰⁴ OCHA, 2018, Humanitarian Situation Update, September 2018 Edition (covering 1 through 31 Aug) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/01102018_nga_ocha_humanitarian_situation_update.pdf

⁴⁰⁵ UNHCT, 2018, Humanitarian Access Strategy for North-east Nigeria.

⁴⁰⁶ HCT, 2018, CMCoord Guidance.

⁴⁰⁷ Mary B. Anderson, 1999, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Contribute to Peace – or War.

⁴⁰⁸ Food assistance and the ways it is implemented for example can prevent and mitigate the adoption of negative coping mechanisms that result in risks to the safety, dignity and integrity of beneficiary populations. This requires a careful context analysis and regular monitoring.

quality food to spare money was mentioned in Delori Camp. Interestingly, focus group discussions did not reveal any major coping mechanism being adopted by non-beneficiaries, which may be a confirmation of them being less in need, and of appropriate targeting by WFP.⁴⁰⁹ Finally, risks of exploitation by intermediary agents were also reported in various locations.⁴¹⁰

46. Other potential risks identified by the evaluation are related to food assistance becoming a pull factor for returnees and livelihood beneficiaries to move into insecure areas; and the risk of supporting the Government's counter insurgency strategy by not extending assistance into NSAG controlled areas. The evaluation team found additional analysis of these critical to further inform WFP actions.

Key findings on appropriateness of the design and delivery and alignment with needs

- WFP assistance is generally relevant, appropriate, and prioritized for the most vulnerable, but does not account for the specific needs of vulnerable groups beyond pregnant and lactating women and children. The needs of persons with disabilities and the elderly in particular are not comprehensively accounted for in the design and implementation of WFP programmes
- There were limited WFP efforts to systematically gather affected populations' views in different locations and design and implement interventions accordingly. Lack of consultations with beneficiaries on their preferences, familiarity and ability to access and benefit from various transfer modalities, resulted in several implementation challenges and negative unintended effects for beneficiaries, particularly in relation to mobile cash transfer
- There has been generally good capacity and understanding of protection concerns affecting WFP beneficiaries since the early stage, but a slow and still inadequate response to them in the context of WFP operations
- WFP consistently underperforms on AAP, particularly in relation to consultation with affected populations on the design and implementation of interventions, information sharing, and complaint and feedback mechanisms. There was heavy reliance on community leaders and cooperating partners, and risks of discrimination and abuses
- Clear trade-offs between the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence over humanity and partial access, created challenges for humanitarian staff and partners, who are increasingly targeted because they are perceived as associated with one party to the conflict, and for the affected population at large, which is either excluded or at risk of attack for being associated with humanitarian workers
- There were examples of WFP 'pushing the envelope' for a more principled humanitarian response, but still hesitant to take a stronger position on humanitarian principles and humanitarian access
- Decisions to compromise on the humanitarian principles were not made strategically and coherently among humanitarian agencies, and not informed by adequate and independent analysis of the evolving operational environment, and programme criticalities
- Negative coping mechanisms were reported in the majority of focus group discussions with affected populations, slow and late action was taken by WFP on fuel for cooking and milling, while other challenges remain.

2.2. Operational Performance and Results

2.2.1 Achievement of stated objectives

Coverage of beneficiary needs

47. At the beginning of the response, the targeting of beneficiaries by WFP was status-based, with displaced and returnee households prioritized over host communities. Over the years, following increased

⁴⁰⁹ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴¹⁰ These include agents trying to charge beneficiaries a commission or make a reduction on the amount provided; fake agents offering services during disbursement.

evidence of vulnerability of host communities to food insecurity, WFP started introducing needs-based, vulnerability targeting.⁴¹¹

48. The evaluation found evidence of various targeting criteria being outlined by WFP Nigeria in different moments in time. At first, vulnerability criteria were defined on the basis of the livelihood zones,⁴¹² and distinction between urban, semi-urban, and rural areas, with households headed by persons with disabilities, chronic sick members, and women; polygamous households and newly arrived internally displaced persons listed among the secondary prioritization criteria.⁴¹³ The move to vulnerability-based targeting also led to a shift in the priority accorded to vulnerability criteria. In the new WFP targeting standard operating procedures, disability, age, gender, and sickness are now listed among the primary criteria.⁴¹⁴ WFP targeting standard operating procedures clearly indicated the need to consult, inform and agree with the affected population, and not to undermine the dignity and security of individuals. Finally, WFP targeting methodology includes reference to the humanitarian principles and the gender policy's requirement of 50 percent women principal recipients registered in SCOPE, regardless of whether or not they are the head of the household.⁴¹⁵

49. In order to prevent and minimize any unintended harm to beneficiaries, the following clause was also added to the standard operating procedures: "no household should be asked for payment in kind or in cash for the registration, having their name entered in the beneficiary list."⁴¹⁶ As a member of the targeting task force, efforts have been made by WFP to ensure the targeting process is guided by the respect for the choices, wishes, rights and dignity of the communities, and to ensure a protection lens has been applied throughout.

50. Findings from focus group discussions confirmed that special attention is generally accorded to particularly vulnerable groups such as the elderly, persons with disabilities, unaccompanied minors, children under two, and pregnant and lactating women. This entails: prioritization during registration and distribution; targeted nutritional support for pregnant and lactating women and children under two; support provided in checking the price of commodities and/or using the SIM card during cash distribution; help during secondary distribution (scooping); and carrying food items to dwellings.⁴¹⁷ There was no evidence however of efforts from WFP to address the specific food and nutritional needs of groups other than pregnant and lactating women and children, nor of specific thought being given as to how impairment and age could negatively affect people's capacity to access and benefit from the assistance.⁴¹⁸

51. In 5 out of 21 focus group discussions beneficiaries reported issues with their local leaders, the *Bulamas*. In one camp for example, the women interviewed denounced unfair distribution of items by the *Bulamas*, who are believed to favour their friends and family members. Yet, once asked who they report to in case of problems, women said they preferred the *Bulamas* over other mechanisms, and at the same time they admitted that they generally tend not to complain because they are afraid of losing the assistance. In other locations, people reported general lack of trust in the *Bulamas* as an efficient and confidential complaint and feedback mechanism. In general, there is need for a closer follow-up on this issue as reliance on the *Bulamas* for targeting, information sharing and collecting the views of affected populations is high, and the potential for abuse and discrimination is certainly there.

52. Registration presents a series of challenges. In 8 focus group discussions out of 21, affected populations complained about exclusion from assistance, mostly due to absence at the time of registration

⁴¹¹ WFP started shifting to vulnerability-based targeting in 2017, but the process is still going on. Refer to the Annex on Food Security, Nutrition, and Livelihoods for a more detailed discussion on targeting.

⁴¹² These are geographical areas within which people share broadly the same patterns of access to food and income, and have the same access to market. WFP, Targeting to the most vulnerable – Quick Overview (CPs).

⁴¹³ See Guidelines for Targeting and Registration in Northeast Nigeria, Annex 1: Proposed Targeting Criteria in Northeast Nigeria.

⁴¹⁴ WFP, 2018, Standard Operating Procedures Beneficiary Targeting in Northeast Nigeria.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ WFP, 2017, WFP Guidelines for targeting and registration in northeast Nigeria.

⁴¹⁷ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴¹⁸ Examples of issues that require further consideration include: the use of inclusive and accessible methods and technologies for information sharing, registration, implementation of food assistance and complaint and feedback; disability and age-specific safety and protection concerns such as discrimination, marginalization, stigmatization, and GBV; and adaptation of the food basket to the specific needs of persons with disability and the elderly through, for example, the inclusion of easy-to-chew, and processed food, among others.

or mistakes during it. This includes newly arrived internally displaced persons.⁴¹⁹ In one group, current non-beneficiaries said that they were excluded because they were sick when the registration took place and they were not given another opportunity to register. In one camp, 2,000 individuals were reportedly excluded from the e-vouchers by mistake, and some complained that wealthy people were receiving assistance, while others more in need were not. In another, 250 women heads of household have not been receiving any assistance since February 2018, and it took a few months for WFP to finally include them. Investigations on the case revealed that they were initially excluded from registration because their husbands were in detention and they were believed to have links with NSAGs, and therefore stigmatized by the local leadership. In addition, they received incomplete/inaccurate information about registration.⁴²⁰

53. In one camp, registration of newly arrived internally displaced persons was still going on at the time the evaluation was conducted in November 2018.⁴²¹ The evaluation team found evidence that IOM data on newly arrived internally displaced persons was not shared in a timely manner in some locations, which resulted in delays and/or exclusion from the assistance.⁴²² Biometric registration and the issuance of the IOM card only occur one month after arrival, and only for those who remain where they first arrived. Only then will newly arrived internally displaced persons start receiving WFP food. According to informants, the time lag between arrival and formal registration is intended to avoid food becoming a pull factor and to exclude those who are arriving only when food distribution takes place. During this time however, wet feeding is provided at the reception centre.⁴²³

54. Informants reported that registration of biometric data is only on a demand basis, pending the consent from beneficiaries, and is intended for humanitarian purposes only. Data protection is reportedly given utmost priority by both IOM and WFP.⁴²⁴ NEMA refused to sign the data protection and confidentiality agreement as it was not in a position to ensure sufficient protection of data within the government offices, hence IOM has not been sharing any data with them.⁴²⁵

55. Affected populations also specified problems during redemption. Among them, missing data was probably the most worrisome as it concerned 2,000 individuals whose names were not found at verification stage in the list of one camp. Beneficiaries in the same camp also experienced issues with the verification of the SCOPE card, mainly for the elderly whose fingerprints were difficult to read. Other reported issues are: pairing of families to allow for the sharing of remaining resources among those whose names were missing; single mothers being told to register with a child above 10 years old to stand as proxy, while not everyone has a child that age; and host communities complaining about the brutality of the Civilian Joint Task Force for crowd control during redemption.⁴²⁶

56. While “notable gaps” in targeting and registration were already flagged in an internal audit conducted in November 2017,⁴²⁷ and reiterated in the protection mission report as well as in other

⁴¹⁹ In Kukareta, Kilibiri, and Ngala, newly arrived IDPs and those who were not available at the time of the first registration were excluded. FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴²⁰ The exclusion was detected during the Protection Mission in March 2018. Later investigations revealed that these women were relocated from Nasis Village IDP camp to Dalori 2 in 2017 and continued to receive limited assistance by SEMA only until February 2018. Since the protection mission in March 2018, WFP has been looking into this case, and finally integrated them into the Dalori 2 caseload in the last quarter of 2018.

⁴²¹ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴²² More information on the registration and targeting systems can be found in the Annex on Food Security, Nutrition, and Livelihoods.

⁴²³ Interview 500.

⁴²⁴ WFP developed a Guide to Personal Data Protection and Privacy in 2016. The guide outlines the following five principles as underpinning the management of data by WFP: 1. lawful and fair collection and processing; 2. specified and legitimate purpose; 3. data quality; 4. participation and accountability; and 5. data security. Informed consent by the beneficiary is central to all.

⁴²⁵ UNHCR has an agreement with the government for the sharing of data on refugees and returnees. Interview 384.

Globally, IOM and WFP are working on the interoperability of their systems, BRAVE and SCOPE respectively, which is still not the case in Nigeria. Interview 500.

⁴²⁶ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴²⁷ The audit covered the period from September 2016 to September 2017. WFP, 2018, Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Nigeria.

documents, findings from the evaluation show that important challenges still remain, particularly in relation to newly arrived internally displaced persons, unaccompanied children and others.⁴²⁸ Among the reasons for this are the lack of capacity by those conducting the first round of targeting and registration,⁴²⁹ and varying degrees of understanding of WFP targeting criteria by cooperating partners.

Effectiveness of WFP operations

57. Affected populations across visited locations recognized WFP effectiveness in addressing food and nutrition needs. Moreover, beneficiaries expressed their satisfaction with the assistance received, which gives them a sense of worth and attributed the success of the programme to the many levels of checks that are in place against abuses and for the resolution of disputes.⁴³⁰

58. WFP has been collecting data on two protection and accountability to affected populations (AAP) indicators: “Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme” (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) and “Proportion of assisted people who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programmes sites”.⁴³¹

59. Over the years, safety en-route to/from cash-based or in-kind distribution sites remained high for both men and women beneficiaries. Percentages range from 95.80 for women and 96.70 percent for men in 2016, to 87.38 percent for women and 89.52 percent for men in 2017, and to 97 percent for both sexes in 2018 not experiencing any protection challenge in relation to food assistance.⁴³² Within this, in-kind beneficiaries seem to be slightly more at risk than cash-based ones.⁴³³ According to WFP analysis, the decrease in safety registered between 2016 and 2017 is mostly related to under-reporting of security constraints on the side of beneficiaries in the initial stage of the operations for fear that complaints would lead to cessation of assistance. This misconception was later redressed by WFP through sensitization of beneficiaries on the importance of receiving honest feedback in order to improve future assistance.⁴³⁴

60. Similar findings emerged from the focus group discussions conducted during the evaluation where participants confirmed that they did not experience any particular risk in relation to food assistance, and only in-kind beneficiaries mentioned fear of attack and theft after distribution.⁴³⁵

61. On the other indicator, however WFP continues to underperform, with the “proportion of assisted people informed about the programmes” steadily under the target 70 percent over the years. Overall, accountability to affected populations improved slightly from 30 percent in August 2016 to 32.7 percent in November 2017,⁴³⁶ while preliminary data indicates a deterioration from the 49.20 base value in 2016 to 26 percent in November 2018.⁴³⁷ The 2016-2017 improvement has been attributed by WFP to the increased sensitization on the use of the hotline and improved monitoring through the use of third party monitoring. According to WFP analysis, among the reasons for low accountability are: i) limited consultation with communities on accountability systems and channels for communicating programmatic information to beneficiaries; and ii) flyers, megaphones, and banners mainly used during sensitization events with the assumption that everybody can read and understand them. Findings from the evaluation on the extent of communication with affected populations for the design and implementation of WFP programmes provide further confirmation of this.⁴³⁸

⁴²⁸ See for example the case of the 250 women heads of household in Dalori 2.

⁴²⁹ In the absence of staff and partners, WFP initially resorted to inexperienced student volunteers. To redress the multitude of inclusion and exclusion errors to the beneficiary list, a new comprehensive targeting exercise started in mid 2017 until July 2018, which is when vulnerability targeting was also added.

⁴³⁰ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴³¹ WFP, 2018, Corporate Results Framework – Outcome and Output Indicator Compendium 2017-2021.

⁴³² WFP, 2016, 2017, Standard Project Report 2016 and 2017, and 2018 EMOP 200777.

⁴³³ According to the August 2017 food security outcome monitoring (FSOM) for example, percentage of those experiencing risks varied from 26 percent for in-kind to 11 percent for both e-voucher and mobile money.

⁴³⁴ WFP, 2016, Standard Project Report 2016 EMOP 200777.

⁴³⁵ FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴³⁶ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777. This is taken directly from the 2017 SPRs narrative and refers to data from the 2017 Food Security Outcome Monitoring (FSOM) while the percentage at baseline in 2016 was 49.20.

⁴³⁷ WFP, 2018, Nigeria 2018 Standard Project Report Logframe Outcome Indicators Results.

⁴³⁸ More on this can be found in section 2.1.1.

62. This is in line with the general poor performance by the humanitarian community at large on community engagement⁴³⁹ and accountability to affected populations, which was reported by various informants.⁴⁴⁰

63. The evaluation found evidence of the existence of a wide range of complaint and feedback mechanisms established by WFP and partners across locations, though with various degrees of functioning and effectiveness. Complaint and feedback mechanisms are intended to give beneficiaries and other community members avenues for accessing information about WFP operations, and raising issues of concern in a safe and confidential manner. Table 22 22 below provides an overview of the existing ones, and a list of the observed strengths and weaknesses of each.

Table 22 22: Existing complaint and feedback mechanisms

COMPLAINT & FEEDBACK MECHANISMS	DESCRIPTION	STRENGTHS	WEAKNESSES
Hotline (4446)	Centralized automated system for receiving and managing feedback and complaints about WFP assistance provided	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly confidential • Direct receipt and handling by WFP, and relevant staff • High accountability • Clear feedback loop back to the caller • Effective system for monitoring and overseeing WFP activities • Signs of significant improvement over the years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complicated automated instructions (i.e. interactive voice response) • Costs of call (if not Airtel) • Access to phone and SIM card required • Difficult to access by those who are illiterate, the elderly, and persons with disabilities (e.g. blind & deaf people) • Ineffective on sensitive issues such as SEA and GBV • Lack of trust due to past difficulties (e.g. interactive voice response, limited functioning, costs, and so on)
Complaint/suggestion boxes	Clearly marked boxes placed in various locations to collect feedback and complaints by affected populations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easily accessible • Confidential 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impersonal • Difficult to access by those who are illiterate, the elderly, and persons with disabilities (e.g. blind people) • No system for handling and processing of complaints and feedback by CPs • Information sharing with WFP on the issues reported is discretionary, hence little oversight by WFP
Help and protection desks	Clearly designated desks specifically set up in central and highly visible locations during distribution of food assistance. Dual function:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly visible and easy to access • Attended by a person who can provide support (e.g. to the elders and those who are illiterate) and makes them less impersonal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited privacy and confidentiality (at the centre of distribution sites) • Manual recording, thus possibly timely and burdensome • Possible confusion between protection and help desks

⁴³⁹ Community engagement is a cross-cutting programmatic field of work through which humanitarian organizations can improve their effectiveness and achieve AAP. It includes: two-way communication, feedback and complaints mechanisms, and community participation.

⁴⁴⁰ Interviews 421, and 511.

	information sharing and collection of feedback and complaints. They are generally attended by one person who provides the necessary support to the claimant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher chances of immediate response/action, e.g. on minor issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fear of stigmatization and possible under-reporting of sensitive issues, (e.g. SEA and GBV) • No system for handling and processing of complaints and feedback by CPs • Information sharing with WFP on the issues reported is discretionary, hence little oversight by WFP • No shade or sitting for those lodging complaint
Protection committees	They are meant as a subset of the food management committees, with 50 percent women representation, and are intended as first point of contact for any protection and gender related issue at the community level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easily accessible • Good balance between men and women • Members chosen among affected populations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of specific capacity and expertise on protection by members • Unclear role and responsibilities • Risk of duplication with the food management committees • No system for handling and processing of complaints and feedback by CPs • Information sharing with WFP on the issues reported is discretionary, hence little oversight by WFP
Bulamas and Lead Mothers	Existing community-based leadership structures traditionally responsible for representing the voices and concerns of the population in their communities, including settling disputes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easily accessible • High reliance on them for a variety of issues, thus highly used • Broad responsibility, hence visibility over multiple issues of concern to the population 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of confidentiality • Fear of stigmatization and discrimination and possible under-reporting of certain issues, (e.g. fraud and abuses by the <i>Bulamas</i> themselves) • Highly discretionary handling and processing of complaints and feedback • Information sharing with WFP on the issues reported is discretionary, hence little oversight by WFP

64. Affected populations during focus group discussions were able to name all the available mechanisms for lodging complaints or reporting feedback on the assistance received. This can be interpreted as a confirmation of the fact that they are widely available and suggests a good level of awareness of them among affected population. Concerns about their functioning however were expressed in 10 out of 21 focus group discussions. In one camp, people said they do not complain for fear of losing the assistance or being penalized. Interestingly, these same beneficiaries raised concerns about *Bulamas* prioritizing their families and friends in the distribution of assistance. In 6 focus group discussions out of 21, beneficiaries said they do not feel listened to, and referred to complaints not being addressed or lack of consultations on decisions regarding assistance.

65. *Bulamas* are reportedly the most used and effective complaint channel (7 focus group discussions out of 21), though not necessarily on programme-related issues. In only one camp of those visited both men and women livelihood beneficiaries did not think *Bulamas* were an effective complaint mechanism. As for the

other available mechanisms, preference is for the help and protection/human rights desks as they allow interaction with another human being, it is easier to make oneself clear, and they provide higher chances for immediate response and action. The hotline on the contrary is rarely used and certainly not the option beneficiaries would resort to at first. This is mostly due to complicated automated instructions, and reported lack of functioning.⁴⁴¹ Finally, complaint boxes positioned in camps present challenges for those who are illiterate and persons with disabilities who would need someone to help them writing, thus jeopardizing confidentiality.

66. Evidence from an improvised focus group discussion with the protection committee in one location revealed lack of knowledge by members of the criteria for their selection by the partner organization as well as absence of any specific capacity or experience in dealing with sensitive issues. This raises concerns about their effectiveness on addressing sensitive and valuable support to beneficiaries on protection and gender-related issues, beyond referral (if any) to available services. Another concern relates to the fact that most of the issues reported by the protection committee during the discussion seem to echo those generally dealt with by the food management committees, hence there is a risk of the committees duplicating rather than complementing each other. While evidence on this was not enough to reach any conclusion on the actual functioning and added value of protection committees in general, certainly caution should apply when relying on them to address protection issues in relation to food assistance.

67. WFP first established the hotline in Nigeria in 2016, in relation to the cash-based transfer pilot. This started as a simple dedicated phone line accessible for free only by the provider's clients and it subsequently underwent a series of improvements. Among them, the installation of an interactive voice response to collect calls outside regular working hours and provide an automated (recorded) response;⁴⁴² an automated system to escalate real time to the relevant unit/individual, as a way to ensure duty bearers' timely engagement and action. This was finally established in August 2018 and includes a feedback loop back to the caller. These improvements have resulted in higher capacity by WFP to handle a beneficiary's feedback and complaint, and greater transparency and accountability to beneficiaries. Notably, investments in this has been strenuous by WFP Nigeria and culminated in a very promising system with potentials for replication and learning in other contexts.

68. As of October 2018, this system was one of the eight hotlines established by humanitarian actors in northeast Nigeria.⁴⁴³ Though understanding that a certain level of confidentiality is desirable among organizations when handling complaints, eight toll-free numbers, and what to report on and to whom may become confusing. Moreover, this raises concern about the lack of a coordinated approach among humanitarian agencies and the risk of fatigue on the side of beneficiaries.

69. Reports from WFP indicate high usage of the hotline by women beneficiaries, who represent about 85 percent of those calling over the years. The number of calls received increased from 6,136 in 2016 to 18,502 in 2017 and reduced to 7,635 in 2018. The key issues in 2016 were: reception delay (36 percent), quality of service (22 percent), scope (11 percent), quality of commodities (7 percent), quantity of food or amount of cash received (5 percent), with 1.8 percent of the calls made to request information.⁴⁴⁴ The issues raised in 2018 included: long hours of waiting at distribution sites; overcrowding of distribution sites; poor quality of products and high prices of commodities; delay in crediting accounts on a monthly basis; delay by the cash-out agents at the distribution sites; and scarcity of food received.⁴⁴⁵

70. To date, the WFP hotline has not registered any gender-based violence-specific issue, which suggests that this mechanism may not be adequate for reporting such concerns. Given what was observed in relation

⁴⁴¹ In one location, beneficiaries reported that complaints could only be reported on Fridays; in another they complained that the toll free number has not been connecting for about 5 months, while for affected populations in another location automated instructions are too complicated. FGDs with affected populations (IDPs, host communities, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) in Dalori, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala.

⁴⁴² This interactive voice response system gives beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries a platform to interact at any time suitable for them to record issues and compliments. In the Months of May, June and August 2018, the interactive voice response registered 199,712 calls and filtered 52,987 valid calls. WFP, 2018, CFR Reports.

⁴⁴³ Other organizations who have reported having a hotline are Catholic Relief Service, Save the Children International, NRC, FAO, ZOA, UNFPA, and Action Against Hunger. Data as of October 2018. HCT, 2018, Community Engagement Strategy and Action Plan for North-East Nigeria.

⁴⁴⁴ WFP, CFM Reports 2016.

⁴⁴⁵ WFP, CFM Reports 2016-2018.

to the other mechanisms however, a risk may be that such sensitive issues could “fall through the cracks”. Reports also revealed the need to invest more in information sharing on the hotline, as most people were not aware of its existence.⁴⁴⁶

71. Finally, WFP has been relying on third party monitors in hard to reach areas. There are currently three third party monitors under contract with WFP: ADRA, Kalem Borno, and Ehealth Africa. In general, third party monitors have helped the response by being the “eyes and ears” of WFP. However, a few issues were raised over the quality and professionalism of staff, particularly at the local level, and their understanding and capacity to adequately represent the WFP approach and standards of work on the ground.⁴⁴⁷

72. It is reasonable to assume that such a multitude of tools provide WFP with a good system for detecting and addressing issues affecting beneficiaries and represent an important contribution to the capacity of WFP to monitor and oversee the assistance provided, including in areas with limited direct access. However, most of these systems are heavily reliant on partners or people at the community level with no proper system for information sharing and feedback to WFP on the issues raised was discretionary.

Unanticipated effects

The evidence this Annex has to offer on this topic is already included in other sections (for example, the “do no harm” section).

2.2.2 Timeliness and efficiency

The Annex on gender, protection and accountability to affected populations does not have any evidence to offer under this sub-question.

2.2.3 Gender equality and empowerment of women

Organizational capacity for gender equality and empowerment of women (GEEW)

73. Gender has been a great challenge across the response, with no leadership and guidance on it among agencies,⁴⁴⁸ poor understanding and capacity among partner organizations, and limited emphasis and resources by donors to work on it.⁴⁴⁹ Informants indicated that CARE and Plan International are the only two organizations with strong capacity on it in-country.⁴⁵⁰ The evaluation found limited efforts and commitment by humanitarian organizations to fill this gap. One informant reported that the majority of the humanitarian organizations were against having a Gender Capacity (GenCap) advisor in-country to support gender integration across sectors, and the fact that the person acting as GenCap advisor was hosted by UN Women, which is not perceived as being particularly strong among all the humanitarian organizations operating in-country, did not help the cause.⁴⁵¹

74. WFP has been no exception to this. While in fact efforts were made to establish dedicated and strong capacity on protection early on, responsibility on gender in WFP Nigeria remained “add-on” and inconsistently acted upon until August 2018. The one and only gender focal point ever appointed by WFP in Nigeria was the partnership officer in Abuja in March 2017. However, time for gender issues was only residual and severely shrunk by the primary and formal work on partnership. It was only in August 2018 when the responsibility for partnership was transferred to another staff member that this freed up time and energy for more dedicated work on gender.⁴⁵² This inevitably resulted in very limited gender-specific initiatives and efforts, particularly in relation to the response in northeast Nigeria and limited ability to provide support on this to

⁴⁴⁶ WFP, CFM Reports 2016.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview 892.

⁴⁴⁸ At the time of the evaluation fieldwork, the Gender Theme Group, headed by UN Women was just revived after two years of inactivity. Interview 898.

⁴⁴⁹ Among the donors, Canada has made gender a priority; while of all the cooperating partners operating in the NE, only CARE is believed to have strong capacity on gender. Interviews 378, 898, and 511.

⁴⁵⁰ Interviews 511, and 378.

⁴⁵¹ Interview 378.

⁴⁵² In between, there was also a gap of a few months during which the staff member was on maternity leave and no replacement was arranged.

staff and partners. In Maiduguri, the protection officer was by default also responsible for gender, though there was no evidence of any formal designation.

75. The evaluation did not find evidence of any gender baseline ever been conducted in Nigeria, while the WFP Nigeria Gender Action Plan was finally put on hold in relation to the development of the country strategic plan.⁴⁵³ This deprived WFP of the opportunity to conduct a proper analysis of the differential needs, priorities and concerns of men and women across age and diverse backgrounds, and to plan the response accordingly.⁴⁵⁴ The focus on a transformative approach with men and women working alongside each other to address and mitigate the inequalities that underpin food insecurity and malnutrition has also been fundamentally lacking in the WFP response to the Nigeria crisis.

76. Analysis of WFP media messages from May 2016 to November 2017 reveals that reference to gender-related issues is generally absent, except for the special nutrition needs of pregnant and nursing women. The closest reference that can be found in most media messages is in relation to “WFP efforts to target the most vulnerable people in a way that meets their needs and allows them to participate in decision-making”.⁴⁵⁵ Tweets provide more punctual information on specific WFP activities, such as the tweets on the provision of fuel-efficient stoves by WFP in Banki to mitigate the risk of physical assault during firewood collection;⁴⁵⁶ or on the impact of cash-based interventions on women’s empowerment in Nigeria.⁴⁵⁷ Standard project reports indicate continued advocacy efforts by WFP on gender-related concerns with the Government such as providing charcoal/fuel to internally displaced persons living in camps with restricted freedom of movement.⁴⁵⁸

77. As far as partnership on gender is concerned, the due diligence assessment grid in use to check capacity of WFP cooperating partners since 2017 reflects considerations on gender and protection. More specifically, partners are assessed against the following: 1. whether the organization has a policy on gender; 2. the percentage of women staff, including in senior positions; 3. experience in gender analysis and programming, and presence of a full-time gender focal point; 4. capacity of the organization to deliver messages on gender to beneficiaries; and 5. past gender-related violations.⁴⁵⁹ Similar considerations are reportedly made when assessing partners’ performance at termination of the contract with WFP. National NGOs in northeast Nigeria have been scoring particularly poorly on gender, and efforts were made by WFP to strengthen their capacity. Partner staff are trained at their offices in order to target the main implementers on the ground and cover a bigger number of partner staff/volunteers.⁴⁶⁰ The modules on humanitarian work and gender included in WFP corporate induction training (and contextualized to the reality of operations in Nigeria) have been used for this purpose.

78. Field level agreements contain specific reference to the WFP Gender Policy as guiding partners’ activities on the ground and require partners to prioritize gender equality and women’s empowerment, as well as the overall safety of WFP beneficiaries in the execution of the agreement.⁴⁶¹ Other relevant initiatives to support partners’ capacity on gender include dissemination of guidance notes and checklists for gender mainstreaming.

79. More recently, the WFP gender focal point started some capacity-building initiatives on gender targeted to specific units within the country and area offices. At the time of the evaluation, the plan was to start with supply chain, followed by finance, human resources and administration. For each, the idea is to address gender-related issues of relevance to the unit and sensitize staff on the policies and tools that exist within WFP. Thus far the support provided to the Damaturu and Maiduguri area offices has been in the form of sensitization on corporate policies and tools on gender, and technical assistance to address specific gender

⁴⁵³ Zero Draft WFP Nigeria Gender Action Plan.

⁴⁵⁴ The WFP Gender Policy together with the WFP Gender Action Plan (GAP), provide normative and accountability frameworks for the development of regional and country-specific strategies and plans to illustrate regional and country office priorities and needs on gender. The 2016 regional gender implementation plan should have served as a guidance for the development of the country gender action plan.

⁴⁵⁵ WFP, 2016-2017, WFP media messages.

⁴⁵⁶ August-September 2018.

⁴⁵⁷ 8 March 2018.

⁴⁵⁸ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

⁴⁵⁹ WFP, 2018, NGO Capacity Assessment Template.

⁴⁶⁰ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

⁴⁶¹ WFP, 2018, FLA template.

issues within operations. Besides being mostly implemented in the past few months, the fact that they are not grounded in any formal gender action plan may undermine their effectiveness and continuation, as no accountability and leadership is there to push implementation forward.

80. The development of the WFP Nigeria Country Strategic Plan brought about opportunities to redress some of these shortcomings, with greater investment on gender, including by the allocation of dedicated budgetary resources, which were not there before.⁴⁶²

Use of gender analysis in programme design and implementation

81. The lack of prominence accorded to gender by WFP Nigeria is also apparent in the fact that it was often treated in combination with, and a subset of, protection. This is particularly evident in the assessments conducted in 2016 and onwards,⁴⁶³ which featured gender ‘in addition to’ protection, at times not even accounted for in the title of the document, as well as in the lack of dedicated attention and capacity to work on it at both the country and area offices level.⁴⁶⁴ The only stand-alone assessments on gender are those conducted in the framework of the vulnerability assessment and mapping gender and markets initiative led by the Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa (in Dakar). The studies provided the opportunity to strengthen gender-sensitive food security and nutrition analysis and identify gender-specific protection challenges women and girls are experiencing in markets in northeast Nigeria,⁴⁶⁵ in order to design market-based interventions that empower women and vulnerable populations. More specifically, in the case of Nigeria, these include the 2016 Lake Chad Basin region gender and market assessment, the case study of street food vendors in Maiduguri, and the case studies from Kano, Katsina (Nigeria) and Marad (Niger), both in 2017.⁴⁶⁶ These studies provide a very thorough analysis of the socio-economic role and opportunities for women in the assessed locations, and the gender inequalities and discrimination that often constrain them, as a way to identify opportunities for programmatic interventions to support livelihoods and food security and to promote a more informed empowerment and inclusion of women in WFP activities. Most recently, a “Gender Analysis for a Sustainable Agriculture and Livelihoods Improvement Project” and a “Gender and Sustainable Agriculture in Borno State: Exploring Evidence for Inclusion Programmes and Policies for Food Security” were conducted jointly by FAO, UN WOMEN, and WFP in July and October 2018.

82. For example, in Dawanau, women traders, while expressing their appreciation for WFP efforts to purchase food locally, were also disappointed at the male-dominated executive committee that did not involve them in supplying food for northeast Nigeria because the inclusion of women was not imposed by the buyers as a precondition for awarding these supply orders.⁴⁶⁷ Findings on these aspects are particularly critical in the context of the WFP intended transition from food assistance to livelihoods support in areas where food security has improved, and could guide WFP choices on the type of interventions that best ensure women’s inclusion and empowerment. The extent to which they have been used to inform the design and implementation of programmes is, however, unclear.⁴⁶⁸

83. A protection risk and gender assessment in relation to cash-based transfer was conducted by WFP in November 2016 to inform ways of addressing some of the challenges experienced by beneficiaries in the early stages of implementation.⁴⁶⁹ Findings revealed no major change in women’s status as a result of being the designated heads of households, since money was devoted to buying food, and cooking and handling of food was already women’s responsibility. However, women were reportedly happy to be the recipients on behalf of their families on the basis that if men were given the money, they might spend it in ways which could result in violence to women, for example increased drunkenness.⁴⁷⁰ Data from the 2017 food outcome monitoring report confirmed this finding with 57 percent of the food and spending decisions made by men and women jointly regardless to the transfer modality, while 78 percent of the households indicated that

⁴⁶² WFP, 2019, Country Strategic Plan Nigeria.

⁴⁶³ Examples of this include the WFP Protection Risk Analysis NE Nigeria in April 2016 that also highlights gender dynamics more in general; and the WFP Protection Risk and Gender Assessment in the context of CBT.

⁴⁶⁴ See considerations on this under ‘Organizational Capacity for GEEW’.

⁴⁶⁵ Safety does not seem to be one of them. The majority of vendors in fact, 98 percent, reported that they feel safe at the location where they sell food. VAM Gender and Market Studies Series 2016 and 2017.

⁴⁶⁶ WFP, 2016, 2017, VAM Gender and Market Studies Series 2016 and 2017.

⁴⁶⁷ WFP, 2017, Empowering Women in West African Markets-Street Vendors in Maiduguri.

⁴⁶⁸ Refer to the Annex on Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods for more details on this.

⁴⁶⁹ WFP, 2016, Protection Risk and Gender Assessment in the Context of CBT.

⁴⁷⁰ WFP, 2016, Protection Risk and Gender Assessment in the Context of CBT.

women made decisions over the use of food or cash resources alone or together with their partners, leaving only a few households where decisions are taken by men only. At the household level, this was positively correlated with women's increased ability to control and influence decisions in general, for example in relation to education, health, childcare, livelihood investment and savings.⁴⁷¹ Post distribution monitoring data from 2017 provided a different picture with a still low percentage of women making decisions over the use of cash or food in the household due to the restrictive cultural context in Nigeria, and the subordination of women.⁴⁷²

84. All project documents display a gender marker code 2A. Exchange between the gender service in headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar in relation to the approval of the EMOP budget revisions, however, clearly indicated that this was a mistake and that the regional EMOP originally deserved a gender marker code 1, which was never reflected in either the original document or subsequent budget revisions. It was only in relation to Budget Revision No. 4 (December 2015) that the gender marker was formally revised and rated upwards from 1 to 2A. Yet, comments on the need to maintain 2A quality standards continued to be found, in particular in relation to Budget Revision Nos. 7,9, and 12.⁴⁷³

85. WFP Nigeria regularly reports on three cross-cutting gender indicators, namely: "proportion of assisted women, men, and women and men together who make decisions over the use of cash, vouchers or food within the household"; "proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees"; and "proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash or voucher distribution". Overall, these are meant to measure progress towards "improved gender equality and women's empowerment among WFP-assisted populations",⁴⁷⁴ as well as progress towards the third objective of the WFP Gender Policy, which reads "women and girls have increased power in decision-making regarding food security and nutrition in households, communities and societies."⁴⁷⁵

Table 23: Overview of WFP performance on gender indicators (2016-2018)

CROSS-CUTTING GENDER INDICATORS	PROJECT END TARGET	GENERAL DISTRIBUTION		
		2016	2017	2018
Proportion of households where women and men together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	50	51	63	54
Proportion of households where women make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	25	20	19	31
Proportion of households where men make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	25	29	18	15
Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees	50	60	N/R	N/R
Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution	60	60	N/R	N/R

Source: WFP SPRs 2016-2018

86. Data from 2016-2018 standard project reports reveal that for all indicators WFP exceeded the set targets (Table 23 **Error! Reference source not found.**).⁴⁷⁶ Some data are missing for the last two indicators because in 2018 WFP Nigeria transitioned from the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) to the Corporate Results Framework (CRF), and those indicators are no longer a requirement.

⁴⁷¹ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

⁴⁷² WFP, 2016, 2017, Standard Project Report 2016 and 2017 EMOP 200777.

⁴⁷³ Gender comments on Nigeria L3.

⁴⁷⁴ This is one of the WFP corporate results.

⁴⁷⁵ WFP, 2018, WFP Corporate Results Framework – Outcome and Output Indicator Compendium 2017-2021.

⁴⁷⁶ These are =50 for joint decision making at the household level, and >50 for leadership and membership in project committees.

87. Among the explanatory factors provided for these achievements in the standard project reports are the designation of women as entitlement holders and the promotion of women's active participation in food assistance activities, which are believed first to have a positive transformational and empowering impact, increasing women's status and decision-making capacity within families and communities at large, and second to enhance consensus for women's increased role in other areas as well. Moreover, greater gender balance in food assistance and nutrition teams made it easier for women beneficiaries to resort to them for information and consultation on food and nutrition assistance, thus possibly contributing to a greater ability by women to make informed decisions and exercise greater control over the assistance provided.

88. In relation to nutrition, pregnant and lactating women and women of reproductive age receive nutrition sensitization activities that include: cooking demonstration classes; the importance of utilizing available health services; and the importance of increasing diversity in their daily diets. Field visits in 2017 highlighted that men too were expressing interest in joining nutrition-oriented informative activities and WFP intended to include them in such nutrition sensitization activities as a way to strengthen improved nutritional status for all household members.⁴⁷⁷ The extent to which this has happened however is not clear. While evaluation interviews did indicate that for the BSFP children there are some men caregivers who would be getting the same information, the actual numbers of men caregivers in the programme is unknown.⁴⁷⁸

89. WFP ensured that gender was integrated in the prevention and control interventions during the August 2017 cholera outbreak. More specifically, activities included: working with partners to enhance understanding among responders and communities on how cholera affects girls, boys, women and men differently; engaging communities, including women groups, in dialogue and information sharing about the different gendered roles in cholera prevention and response; and establishing measures to ensure that everyone, including women and girls, had equal access to information and treatment.⁴⁷⁹

90. Overall, WFP efforts to integrate gender in assessment and programmes have been limited and inconsistent, though some few improvements were observed over time, for example in relation to the capacity of cooperating partners. With the revamp of the gender theme group, the WFP decision to establish a position with full time responsibility on gender, and active support by headquarters in the framework of the development of the country strategic plan, the current environment presents new opportunities for a greater emphasis on gender within WFP. This includes a strengthened focus on gender transformative programming through increased engagement of men and women in addressing gender inequalities and existing power dynamics, and an increased understanding and capacity on gender.

Key findings on operational performance and results

- There are well-defined and appropriate targeting criteria, with priority accorded to particularly vulnerable groups and due consideration for gender, age and other diversity factors such as disability
- There are concerns on how these criteria actually translate into practice in operations, including issues with information sharing, consultations and accountability; there is heavy reliance on community leaders and partners, with the related possibility of abuses and discrimination
- More is needed to ensure a disability- and age-inclusive approach across phases of the response
- Registration remains challenging, especially for newly arrived IDPs, unaccompanied children and orphans, and other vulnerable groups such as women heads of household
- There have been progressive efforts by WFP to establish an open and transparent dialogue with affected populations on the assistance received through improved information sharing and sensitization, and multiple complaint and feedback mechanisms.
- A multitude of tools provide WFP with a good system for detecting and addressing issues affecting beneficiaries, and contribute to the capacity of WFP to monitor and oversee the assistance provided

⁴⁷⁷ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

⁴⁷⁸ Though it is likely to be very small since many interviews mentioned that the majority of people targeted in general are women.

⁴⁷⁹ WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

- Concerns remain about the actual functioning and effectiveness of some of these mechanisms, and there is uncertainty about the discretionary nature of information sharing and feeding back to WFP on the issues raised
- There is low prioritization, and limited time/capacity on gender across the response and within WFP, for example limited gender-specific analysis to inform WFP programmes
- There was an initial focus by both the country office and headquarters on gender in the country strategic plan, but also evidence of improvements at the end of 2018, with the revitalization of coordination efforts on gender, and greater support provided across all WFP activities and functions

2.3. Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making

2.3.1 Role of corporate policies, guidance, tools, processes and systems

Strategic Leadership

91. The evaluation found significant evidence of the regional bureau in Dakar's role and support on protection, ranging from the emphasis on protection in the northeast Nigeria entry strategy in 2016, to the extensive and continuous technical support in the forms of analysis, training and support missions, and the development of guidance materials. Concrete examples of this can be found in the relevant sections of this Annex.

92. Involvement and support of both the headquarters and the regional bureau on gender, however, has been uneven. For instance, while a regional implementation strategy on gender has existed since 2016, no country action plan on gender was ever finalized for Nigeria.⁴⁸⁰ There is no evidence of any major support provided in relation to assessments and training of staff and partners on gender, besides the gender and market studies conducted by the regional bureau in Dakar's vulnerability assessment and mapping unit mentioned above, and a gender support mission in May 2018.⁴⁸¹ This was counterbalanced by a strong reliance on existing corporate resources including tools, training and guidance materials such as the minimum standards on gender, and the gender parity approach. The relationship between headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar on gender in the Nigeria humanitarian response was also not ideal, as is evident from the exchange in relation to the mistaken attribution of a high gender marker score by the regional bureau in Dakar to the regional operation, which was never redressed.⁴⁸² A much more meaningful engagement of headquarters on gender was observed in relation to the development of the country strategic plan with a mission to the country office and an extensive exchange of comments to ensure gender considerations were adequately reflected in the country strategic plan.⁴⁸³

93. There is no trace of gender and protection considerations in the notes of the operational task force until November 2017, when for the first time the country office raised concern about the growing level of sexual exploitation and abuse beneficiaries are exposed to in overcrowded camps, and the need for strengthened prevention and monitoring. In this context, the Nigeria country office requested support from headquarters and the regional bureau in Dakar for the development of a gender and protection strategy and action plan, including support for implementation.⁴⁸⁴ The only other reference to protection issues was found in the notes from March 2018 when the regional bureau in Dakar was called to liaise with UNICEF, IOM, UNHCR, and WHO on a unified operational approach to security constraints and assistance delivery.⁴⁸⁵ Similarly in the level 3 decision memos, the only reference to protection was about the potential heightened

⁴⁸⁰ One was drafted, but then put on hold for the development of the country strategic plan.

⁴⁸¹ Regional bureau (RBD) Gender Support mission for WFP Nigeria's Country Office, Abuja 21-25 May 2018.

⁴⁸² A more detailed discussion on this can be found in the gender section above.

⁴⁸³ A 5-year country strategic plan is being outlined to guide WFP continuing engagement to help Nigeria achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2 and end hunger and malnutrition by 2030. The CSP will focus on supporting longer-term national social protection and resilience-building to achieve Zero Hunger, while also maintaining its strong humanitarian assistance capacity. WFP, 2017, Situation Report No 18 Nigeria.

⁴⁸⁴ WFP, 2017, Operational Task Force #09.

⁴⁸⁵ WFP, 2018, Operational Task Force #10.

risk of gender-based violence for women and girls in relation to the scale-up of population movement in May 2017.⁴⁸⁶

94. As for humanitarian access, the evaluation could not ascertain the extent to which policies, capacities and processes that exist at the corporate level have been leveraged to support access negotiations in Nigeria. The existing WFP policy framework on humanitarian access and principles does not provide any guidance on implementation and more importantly on how to deal with trade-offs and compromises that might be necessary to secure access to the populations in need.⁴⁸⁷ Though specific operational guidance on access has existed since 2017 and an inter-functional director-level advisory group on access and a technical access cell were established in 2015,⁴⁸⁸ the evaluation found little evidence of the impact of these on Nigeria operations. Findings from previous evaluations indicated staff discontinuity within the technical cell and limited knowledge of them in the field as possible explanatory factors.⁴⁸⁹ In addition, the decentralized nature of WFP coupled with the limited capacity available in a period of multiple emergencies, have probably compromised a more active reliance on these resources by the country office. Other evident shortcomings are in relation to staff competence and a weak induction system for newly recruited staff as well as those lacking prior experience in emergency contexts, including on sensitive issues such as gender, protection, humanitarian principles and access. A strong and coherent approach to this is in fact required for staff to be effective and to achieve consistency on these issues across the organization.

Human resources

95. The WFP Nigeria staffing situation presented a number of challenges. The biggest was that the country office had to be populated from scratch in the midst of the ongoing emergency response. At the time the L3 emergency was declared moreover, five other concurrent L3 emergencies were already stretching the ability of WFP to respond.⁴⁹⁰ This meant relying heavily on response staff from other emergencies as well as short-term consultants. The WFP emergency response roster, besides not being well staffed for all functions, was also quite exhausted by the number of simultaneous emergencies going on at that time. Overall, this resulted in a high number of inexperienced staff and high turnover, including at the management level. This also led to unclear and quickly mutating responsibilities in the allocation, duplication of roles and unclear and inconsistent reporting lines, including tensions between the regional bureau in Dakar, the country and the area offices. Available evidence suggests that this has improved over the years, but important challenges remain, particularly in relation to the allocation of responsibilities and reporting between the country office and area offices, including on gender and protection.⁴⁹¹

96. Similar challenges were reportedly experienced by other humanitarian actors. In the words of one informant: "...everybody sent their 'D-team' to Nigeria as there were too many crises going on at the same time in 2016, and expertise was very limited. This resulted in little capacity and understanding on the ground, including on key issue such as humanitarian principles, which has been very hard to rectify."⁴⁹² Similar views were expressed by others who confirmed that Nigeria has long had the reputation of being a "dumping ground" for staff, and this has not changed despite the fact that the quality of staff has clearly been improving over time.

97. As part of the United Nations System-Wide Action Plan (UN SWAP) for Implementation of the Chief Executive Board United Nations System-Wide Policy on Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, WFP is required to achieve the common goal of "equal representation of women for General Service staff and at P4 and above levels, including the senior most levels of representation in Field Offices, Committees, Advisory Bodies and Funds linked to the entity, irrespective of budgetary source".⁴⁹³ WFP Gender Policy and Action Plan (2015-2020) reiterates this by committing WFP to work "towards equal representation of women and men employees at P3 and NOC levels and below".⁴⁹⁴ This, together with the minimum standards on

⁴⁸⁶ WFP, 2017, Activation of Level 3 Decision Memo.

⁴⁸⁷ WFP, 2018, Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access.

⁴⁸⁸ The group includes the policy & programme, field security, emergency preparedness and support response, and supply chain divisions.

⁴⁸⁹ WFP, 2018, Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access.

⁴⁹⁰ There were Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Southern Africa, and South Sudan.

⁴⁹¹ Interviews 567, 898.

⁴⁹² Interviews 836, 247, 172, 378.

⁴⁹³ WFP, Gender and Human Resources.


⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

gender developed at the corporate level, provides the framework for WFP Nigeria’s efforts for greater parity in staffing.

98. In the rush to staff the newly established WFP office, gender balance was disregarded, with negative implications for the organization’s capacity to reach out to the whole population, for example during assessment and monitoring, as well as for gender and protection mainstreaming. Among the explanatory factors behind this are first the complete lack of attention to gender parity when recruitment started, and secondly the overall perception that northeast Nigeria is a difficult place for women to work due to poor working and housing conditions and security issues. Now all vacancy announcements include a clause that clearly states that women candidates are particularly welcomed and there is flexibility for the country director to go for a lower ranking candidate if this is a woman. This had reportedly created some frustrations among men staff members, which have now been lessened through sensitization of staff on the WFP gender parity strategy.⁴⁹⁵

99. The graph in Figure 38 shows the WFP Nigeria staffing situation from 2016 to 2018, women and men, national and international across all locations. Over the years, the number of women staff members increased both in absolute terms and in relation to the men. More specifically, women personnel went from 42 in 2016 (out of 179 total) to 162 in 2018 (out of 485 total). This represents an increase from 23 percent in 2016 to 33 percent in 2018 of all staff in Nigeria.


Figure 38: WFP Nigeria staff by gender (2016-2018)



Source: WFP HR Stats, HR Technology and Analytics HR MOI.

100. While greater gender balance could be seen in all WFP offices, the extent varied from one office to another and over time. Overall, Abuja is the most balanced, with 51 women employed in 2018 (out of 111 total, i.e. 45 percent), as opposed to Damaturu, which shows the widest gap between men and women employed, with 17 women out of the 89 total employed in 2018 (Figure 39).

Figure 39: WFP Nigeria area office staff by gender (2016-2018)




Source: WFP HR Stats, HR Technology and Analytics HRMOI.

101. Of the 162 women employed in the Nigeria country office in 2018, 119 (73.45 percent) were locally recruited. This proportion increased over time, and most significantly from 2016 to 2017, when it has grown

⁴⁹⁵ Key informants interview, Abuja, November 2018.

fourfold, from 25 to 100. A similar trend is also visible for locally recruited men staff members, whose number has almost tripled from 75 in 2016 to 226 in 2017 (Figure 40).


Figure 40: Number of internationally versus locally recruited staff by gender (2016-2018)



Source: WFP HR Stats, HR Technology and Analytics HRMOI

102. While the number of women staff members increased over time at both professional and general service levels, the man/woman ratio remained slightly better among general service staff than among professionals (Figure 41). This reflects a global trend whereby the higher the grade, usually the lower the proportion of women staff members. This is also evident in Figure 42, which shows a breakdown by grade and gender.


Figure 41: Number of professional versus general service staff by gender (2016-2018)⁴⁹⁶



Source: WFP HR Stats, HR Technology and Analytics HRMOI

⁴⁹⁶ This analysis considered the following grades 'professional': D1-2, P2-5, NO A, B and C, CST, CSD and SSA P. The following grades were considered 'general service': G2-7, SC GS and SSA GS.

Figure 42: WFP Nigeria country office staff by personal grade and gender (2016-2018)⁴⁹⁷



Source: WFP HR Stats, HR Technology and Analytics HR MOI

⁴⁹⁷ For professional grades in Figure 42: Consultant = consultants all levels and contracts (here, CST - monthly remuneration - and CSD - daily remuneration); SC GS = Service Contract Holder General Service; SSA GS = Special Service Agreement Field General Service; SSA P = Special Service Agreement Field Professional; NOA = National Professional Officer level A (least senior); NOB = National Professional Officer level B; NOC = National Professional Officer level B (most senior); P2 = International Professional Officer level 2 (least senior); P3 = International Professional Officer level 3; P4 = International Professional Officer level 4; P5 = International Professional Officer level 5 (most senior); D1 = Director level 1 (least senior); D2 = Director level 2 (most senior); G2 = General Service level 2 (least senior); G3 = General Service level 3; G4 = General Service level 4; G5 = General Service level 5; G6 = General Service level 6; G7 = General Service level 7 (most senior).

Financial Needs

The technical Annex on gender, protection and AAP does not have any evidence to offer under this sub-question.

2.3.2 Partnerships and involvement of national and local stakeholders

Comparative advantage

103. The evaluation did not find evidence of any particular role by either NEMA or SEMA on promoting the integration of cross-cutting issues such as gender, protection and accountability to affected populations in the humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria. SEMAs in northeast Nigeria have traditionally had limited response capacity, and no knowledge of humanitarian principles, international standards, or procedures of international humanitarian organizations.⁴⁹⁸

104. Humanitarian response plans (HRP) have been produced every year since 2015. The 2018 humanitarian response plan contains one entire objective out of three on protection and gender: “Ensure that all assistance promotes the protection, safety and dignity of affected people, and is provided equitably to women, girls, men and boys.”⁴⁹⁹ Recognizing the challenges posed by the heavy reliance on the army for access and security purposes, the humanitarian response plan calls for a more stringent adherence by the humanitarian community to the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, humanity and operational independence. This reflects the enhanced emphasis on gender and protection considerations, and the increased advocacy for a principled approach to humanitarian assistance across agencies and operations that was visible in 2018.

105. The protection, gender-based violence prevention⁵⁰⁰ and child protection sectors are present at federal level, with technical level working groups such as civil-military coordination (CMCoord),⁵⁰¹ access, and accountability to affected populations⁵⁰² at state level. The added value and extent to which these groups have been active varied. During the evaluation period, the CMCoord and the humanitarian access working groups were combined into one, and the accountability to affected populations working group was reactivated after being dormant for some months.⁵⁰³ In general, accountability to affected populations and community engagement has been a gap across the board. Commitment is lacking at both the humanitarian country team leadership level and within single organizations.⁵⁰⁴ A coordinated community engagement strategy for northeast Nigeria was finally developed in June 2018 with the aim of ensuring meaningful and coordinated participation of communities in all phases of humanitarian response through consultations, information sharing and feedback.

106. There are currently two coordination structures specifically on gender, both of which have been recently reactivated: 1. The Development Partners Group on Gender (DPGG) led by the Canadian International Development Agency, which rose from the ashes of a development partners group chaired by the Africa Development Bank and the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs in existence prior to the establishment of the humanitarian country team; and 2. A United Nations-specific gender theme group headed by UN Women, which used to be very active till 2016 when the person chairing it moved elsewhere.

⁴⁹⁸ Z. Murtala, B. Abubakar, 2017, State governance and coordination of the humanitarian response in north-east Nigeria, HPN,

<https://odihpn.org/magazine/state-governance-and-coordination-of-the-humanitarian-response-in-north-east-nigeria/> .

⁴⁹⁹ UNOCHA, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan.

⁵⁰⁰ UNHCR is the lead agency of the protection sector, while UNFPA is leading the GBV sub-sector working group.

⁵⁰¹ The OCHA-led CMCoord WG regulates the relationships between the Nigerian military and humanitarian organizations. It serves as a channel for regular information sharing between the military and humanitarian organizations, including on protection challenges faced by the affected population, such as SEA emanating from extended military operations. Attendance includes both humanitarians and military stakeholders. At the time of the evaluation, the logistic sector was playing a coordinator role.

⁵⁰² CE/AAP is meant to support the enhancement of AAP and two-way communication between decision-makers, humanitarian actors and affected populations for the effective and timely delivery of life-saving information.

⁵⁰³ Established in July 2017, and co-chaired by the Ministry of Information and OCHA, the group stopped being active in April 2018, and has now been revamped.

⁵⁰⁴ Examples of this are the lack of appointment of AAP focal points by organizations; and the fact that the AAP WG has not been provided any opportunity to present or discuss issues with the humanitarian coordinator. Interviews 421, 511.

While some reference to gender mainstreaming could be found across sectors, the lack of concerted efforts and leadership on it was acknowledged as a gap by various informants during the evaluation.⁵⁰⁵ WFP is an active member of all of the above, and acts as coordinator of the CMCoord working group through the logistic sector.

107. In its role as co-lead of the food security sector, WFP has been actively promoting the integration of gender, protection and accountability to affected populations in food security and nutrition interventions. The sector guidance recommends sensitization and targeting activities to be inclusive of women, youth and men, and interventions to consider and mitigate protection risks associated with food and livelihood assistance. Other relevant initiatives include: the development of a technical guidance and checklists to mainstream protection, gender, and accountability to affected populations; an action plan for the implementation of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender-based violence guidelines;⁵⁰⁶ capacity strengthening on gender, protection, and accountability to affected populations in food security and livelihoods for partners and government counterparts; coordination of the safe access to fuel and energy (SAFE) initiative, and active participation in the SAFE working group.⁵⁰⁷ WFP is among the entities that supported the development of the minimum standards on gender for SAFE programming, while a number of other efforts were undertaken to ensure mainstreaming of gender-based violence prevention in food assistance programmes and in the food security sector in general.⁵⁰⁸

108. Finally, WFP is also one of the supporters and active stakeholders in the gender-based violence Nigeria Road Map,⁵⁰⁹ and a member of the inter-agency network on PSEA.⁵¹⁰ In spite of numerous attempts, the evaluation team was not able to meet with any representative of the gender-based violence prevention community⁵¹¹ thus findings on this are mostly based on the review of existing documents and perspectives from other stakeholders. All of the above efforts granted WFP the credit of being “the best equipped on protection” of all the non-protection-mandated agencies.⁵¹² The same however did not apply to gender.

Progress in building national and local capacities

109. Over the years, WFP has made various efforts to ensure the integration of protection and gender in food assistance activities, including building the capacity of partners and other actors at national and local levels. Among them, five capacity strengthening events were conducted at the federal and state levels, including with the State Ministries of Women and Social Welfare, on, among other things, cross-cutting issues such as gender, protection and accountability to affected populations.⁵¹³ Initiatives however are mostly ad hoc, and do not appear to be informed by a specific capacity-building analysis and plan.

2.3.3 Influence of other factors

Security and access

110. Though the militaries along with the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) have retaken most of the territories in Yobe and Adamawa States and are extending their presence in Borno State, large parts of Borno State are still under control of NSAGs. According to the humanitarian country team estimates, 87 percent of the target population can be reached with humanitarian assistance, while about 800,000 people in need remain in areas inaccessible by humanitarian actors, and therefore without any assistance.⁵¹⁴ The fragmentation of the NSAGs, their shifting tactics, and the recent attacks against humanitarian workers have

⁵⁰⁵ Interviews 378, 511, 898.

⁵⁰⁶ UNOCHA, 2018, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Plan.

⁵⁰⁷ A one-day training session was organized in July in Borno State and included 47 participants from the UN, NGOs, the NEMA and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). The training was meant to be replicated in Adamawa and Yobe states. OCHA, 2018, Humanitarian Situation Update, August 2018 Edition (covering 1 through 31 July 2018).

⁵⁰⁸ WFP, 2017, GBV Sub-Sector Annual Report.

⁵⁰⁹ Call to Action on Protection from Gender-Based Violence in Emergencies: Northeast Nigeria Road Map 2018-2019.

⁵¹⁰ WFP contributed to the development of the action plan to strengthen the PSEA framework, supported the establishment of inter-agency referral systems, standard operating procedures and community-based complaint mechanisms to mainstream PSEA among humanitarian actors Nigeria. WFP, 2017, Standard Project Report 2017 EMOP 200777.

⁵¹¹ These included both the person leading the GBV sub-sector in Maiduguri and the UNFPA regional advisor.

⁵¹² Interview 384. Similar comments were made by various stakeholders interviewed during the field mission.

⁵¹³ WFP, 2018, Nigeria Protection Mission Final Report.

⁵¹⁴ OCHA, 2019, Nigeria Humanitarian Response Strategy.

made efforts on access negotiations more complex. Currently access to affected people is still restricted to areas controlled by the Nigerian security forces, with very clearly defined security perimeters and high restrictions to the freedom of movement of both civilians and humanitarians. This has posed a series of challenges to the humanitarian response in northeast Nigeria, including the impossibility of assessing security and the humanitarian needs of those living in inaccessible areas, who are in effect cut off from basic assistance and services.

111. Restrictions on the freedom of movement and other constraints that are imposed on civilians by the security forces for reasons related to the conflict, are also a source of concern for humanitarians as they seriously restrict the ability of internally displaced persons to engage in livelihoods by limiting access to farming land and markets. As mentioned, in this restricted operational environment it has been very hard to claim and maintain a distinction between needs-based, neutral and independent humanitarian assistance and the political and military objectives of the Government.

112. Prior to 2015, the United Nations had no dedicated civil-military or access-negotiation personnel.⁵¹⁵ While real expertise on access continues to be lacking in Nigeria, recent months have registered some important improvements. Among these have been: the adoption of the access strategy and the CMCoord guidance documents by the humanitarian country team in mid 2018 as well as the work of the respective working groups on these topics; the emerging realization of the need for a more principled humanitarian action and engagement in northeast Nigeria; and a general sense of frustration at the lack of leadership and concerted approach on this within the humanitarian community.

113. The humanitarian country team access strategy calls for humanitarian access negotiations as being essential to safe, rapid and unimpeded access, and details actions and responsibilities across all levels of the humanitarian country team.⁵¹⁶ It delineates a sequenced approach that ranges across: principled engagement; community engagement; strategic access negotiations; operational and tactical access negotiations; and distinction between humanitarian actors and the Nigerian security forces. Within this, the community engagement pillar, which is about increased engagement with local communities in areas outside of the local government area headquarters in order to gain acceptance and increase the safety of humanitarian staff and partners, has been on hold for some time due to its controversial nature. Other major impediments to the actual operationalization of the strategy to date have included the lack of strategic leadership and the lack of a coordinated approach by the humanitarian community on access negotiations as well as NGOs being criticized by the humanitarian coordinator for focusing on only one the four pillar of the strategy, which is about negotiating with the parties to the conflict.⁵¹⁷ As a result, there has not been any real dialogue on access with the Government, and humanitarian access negotiations have yet to start in northeast Nigeria.

114. WFP humanitarian access refers to the movement of humanitarian goods and personnel, while access for affected populations to humanitarian assistance and services is addressed through the humanitarian protection framework.⁵¹⁸ As such, access is, by default, part of the security portfolio, though with clear linkages to programmes and logistics. Humanitarian principles, as well as key instruments of international law, provide the normative framework for WFP humanitarian access and have specific implications for the ability of WFP to carry out its activities while minimizing harm and increasing acceptance by the affected populations.

115. At the time the evaluation took place, WFP was working on the development of an organization-specific access strategy, based on the premises of ICRC safer access framework (SAF).⁵¹⁹ This consists of the following four pillars: 1. perception: increase WFP visibility as a prerequisite to enhance acceptance among key stakeholders; 2. stay and deliver: increase presence in remote locations, closer to the people; 3.

⁵¹⁵ P. McIlreavy, J. Schopp, 2017, A collective shame: the response to the humanitarian crisis in north-eastern Nigeria, HPN,

<https://odihpn.org/magazine/a-collective-shame-the-response-to-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-north-eastern-nigeria/>.

⁵¹⁶ HCT, 2018, Humanitarian Access Strategy for North-east Nigeria.

⁵¹⁷ Interviews 740, 511, 836, 737.

⁵¹⁸ Access refers to the ability of communities to safely reach and participate in humanitarian programmes. Factors that may hinder access are age, sex, gender, sexuality, disability, religion, literacy and economic status, among others. WFP, 2016, Protection Guidance Manual; and WFP, 2017, Humanitarian Access Operational Guidance Material.

⁵¹⁹ The ICRC SAF consists of eight elements and actions to increase acceptance, security and access to people and communities in need. <http://saferaccess.icrc.org/>.

relationship with the military: move towards a systematic and consistent application of the last resort option on the use of armed escorts and military assets; and 4. security procedures: guide staff deployed to field locations on how to best care for themselves. Reportedly, a standalone document on visibility should have complemented this, but was not yet been started.⁵²⁰

116. On visibility, the principles underpinning civil-military coordination require a clear distinction of the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian and military actors, including through identification of staff, supplies, premises, hubs, vehicles, and so on. Depending on the context, making one's visual identity clear can have protective or detrimental effects. By communicating clearly who one is and what one is doing, and by doing it in a relevant and sensitive manner, transparency and accountability are ensured, and distinction from other actors on the ground is greater, including from the security forces, with positive implications for acceptance and therefore increasing access to people and communities. A possible drawbacks to this, however, is the chance of becoming a target.

117. For this reason, the trend in some highly volatile contexts has been to use unmarked vehicles and lower the profile of assistance and staff as a way to increase safety and lessen the chances of being targeted.⁵²¹ Ideally, decisions on this should be informed by a sound analysis of the context and the risks as well as its evolutions over time and across locations. Moreover, being a sub-optimal measure for most organizations, low profile should be temporary and be gradually replaced by other risk management measures. In the context of Nigeria, most organizations operating in northeast Nigeria have adopted a low visibility strategy since the beginning of the crisis. Low profile approaches observed by the evaluation team ranged from simple de-branding measures, such as removal of logos, markings, and signs from vehicles, office premises, and staff; to more comprehensive blending strategies such as the use of locally rented vehicles in place of the white four-wheel ones. The evaluation team was not able to trace the decision-making process underpinning this, thus could not verify what the rationale was.⁵²² According to a few informants however, organizations assumed from the start that they were a target, and in the absence of any dialogue and safety assurance by the NSAGs, they simply went for low visibility.⁵²³ Other risk management measures could now be considered as better suited in the framework of the current protracted conflict and displacement situation in Nigeria.

Political environment

Most of the evidence this Annex had to contribute on political environment has been already included under other sections.

Key findings on factors and quality of strategic decision making

- Consistent strong support and strategic priority is accorded to protection across WFP response
- Gender is mostly disregarded and had little corporate support until August 2018
- There is a gender unbalanced staffing situation, though there have been visible improvements since the current leadership was established
- There is a strong WFP comparative advantage on protection within the humanitarian response and among humanitarian organizations
- There is active participation and contribution by WFP to existing coordination and information sharing mechanisms on gender, protection, community engagement-AAP, and access
- There is no real concerted access negotiation capacity in country and the lack of leadership and commitment on it has thus far hampered access to areas and populations outside the military control and seriously undermined perceptions of neutral and impartial humanitarian assistance
- WFP is the only agency besides OCHA with dedicated capacity (and strategy) on access
- There is a need to reconsider WFP risk-management measures in the framework of the current protracted conflict and displacement situation in Nigeria, for example in the sense of a stronger and more meaningful engagement with communities, including in areas currently not accessible.

⁵²⁰ Interview 692.

⁵²¹ Examples of this can be found in Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. Harvard, 2016, Key Challenges in the Protection of Humanitarian Action.

⁵²² WFP security assessment in Nov 2016 indicated the UN and WFP as a possible target, but did not recommend anything about visibility. WFP, 2016, Nigeria Country Security Profile.

⁵²³ Interviews 692, 737, 163, and 740.

Annex P: Output and Outcome Performance by Operation (2016-2018)

This Annex presents output and outcome indicators and performance by operation across the entire evaluation period. All data is sourced from WFP standard project reports (SPRs). No output indicators were reported on for Nigeria in EMOP 200777 standard project reports for 2016 and 2017. For IR-EMOP 200969 and IR-PREP 200965, outputs and outcomes were reported in standard project reports only in narrative form. No outcomes were reported on for SO 200843 for the entire period, nor for SO 201032 for 2016-2017. Please note that in 2018, WFP Nigeria transitioned from the Strategic Results Framework to the Corporate Results Framework. As such, reporting categories are slightly different in the 2018 standard project report, which is reflected in the dataset.

EMERGENCY OPERATION 200777

OUTPUT	2018		RATIO
	PLANNED	ACTUAL	TOTAL A/P%
CRF SO1-SR1 Asset creation and livelihood support activities			
Number of non-food items distributed (tools, milling machines, pumps, etc.)	823	825	100%
Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes (including irrigation canal construction, specific protection measures, embankments, etc)	4	4	100%
Hectares (ha) of zai and/or planting pit system established	20	18	90%
Linear meters (m) of soil/stones bunds or small dikes created	15,000	600	4%
Number of boreholes for agriculture or livestock created	3	5	167%
Number of chicken houses constructed	1,200	1,200	100%
Number of people (women) trained in IYCF/MIYCN	10,400	10,400	100%
Number of people (men) trained in IYCF/MIYCN	9,600	9,600	100%
Number of people trained (organizational skills, management and marketing skills)	750	750	100%
Number of people trained on savings and loans	445	445	100%
Number of sewing machines distributed for tailoring groups	136	136	100%
Number of social infrastructures constructed (school building, facility centre, community building, market stalls, etc.)	32	32	100%
Number of training sessions for beneficiaries carried out (livelihood-support/agriculture & farming;/IGA/NRM)	144	144	100%

Number of tree seedlings produced	50,000	43,897	88%
Square metres (m2) of new nurseries established	10,000	10,000	100%
Total amount of seed funding provided	66,923	66,923	100%
CRF SO1-SR1: Asset creation and livelihood support activities and unconditional resource transfers to support access to food			
Number of retailers participating in cash-based transfer programmes	182	108	59%
CRF SO1-SR1: Institutional capacity-strengthening activities			
Number of counterpart staff members trained in food security monitoring systems	463	463	100%
Number of technical assistance projects conducted by WFP to strengthen the national capacity	7	7	100%
Number of technical reports shared with cluster partners	17	17	100%
Number of training sessions/workshop organized	8	8	100%
CRF SO1-SR1: Malnutrition prevention activities			
Number of people (women) trained in IYCF/MIYCN	92	681	740%
CRF SO1-SR1: Unconditional resource transfers to support access to food			
Number of fuel-efficient stoves distributed	7,340	7,262	99%
CRF SO2-SR2: Malnutrition prevention activities			
Number of health centres/sites assisted	36	52	144%
Number of men exposed to WFP-supported nutrition messaging	96,039	97,669	102%
Number of partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	245	212	87%
Number of people receiving nutrition counseling supported by WFP	89,514	53,725	60%
Number of people trained in IYCF/MIYCN	230	230	100%
Number of people trained on anthropometric data collection	262	331	126%
Number of people trained on food handling and warehouse management	64	36	56%
Number of project management committee members trained	96	144	150%
Number of targeted caregivers (men and women) receiving three key messages delivered through WFP-supported messaging and counselling	171,292	182,061	106%
Number of women exposed to WFP-supported nutrition messaging	150,214	152,764	102%
ACTUAL ACHIEVED OF PLANNED % AVERAGE			118%

SO	OUTCOME	PROJECT END TARGET	BASE VALUE	2016	2017	2018
SO1	Stabilized or reduced undernutrition among children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women					
	Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	>70.00	0	N/R	75	N/A
	Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	>66.00	0	73.9	77	N/A
	Proportion of children who consume a minimum acceptable diet	>70.00	40.7	N/R	19.9	N/A
SO1	Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals					
	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score	<5.70	28.61	18.2	6	N/A
	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score (women-headed)	<5.90	29.49	23.8	6.8	N/A
	FCS: percentage of households with poor food consumption score(men-headed)	<5.70	28.41	17.1	5.8	N/A
	Diet diversity score	>4.20	4.2	4.01	4.83	N/A
	Diet diversity score (households headed by women)	>4.01	4.01	4	4.66	N/A
	Diet Diversity Score (households headed by men)	>4.25	4.25	4.01	4.89	N/A
	CSI (Food): coping strategy index (average)	<15.80	15.8	17.8	17.06	N/A
	CSI (Asset Depletion): coping strategy index (average)	<9.20	9.2	N/R	10.8	N/A
	Proportion of beneficiary household expenditures devoted to food (%)	<65.00	83.9	38.89	35.77	N/A
	Percentage of women of reproductive age (15–49) who reached minimum diet diversity	60	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/A
CC	Cross-cutting Indicators - gender					
	Proportion of households where women and men together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food - general distribution	50	51.3	58.45	63.01	N/A
	Proportion of households where women and men together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	50	58.7	N/R	N/R	N/A
	Proportion of households where women make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food - general distribution	25	20.1	20.37	19.46	N/A
	Proportion of households where women make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	25	11.1	N/R	N/R	N/A
	Proportion of households where men make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food - general distribution	25	28.7	21.19	17.53	N/A

Proportion of households where men make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	25	30.2	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees - general distribution	50	60	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	50	100	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution - general distribution	60	60	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	60	60	N/R	N/R	N/A
CC Cross-cutting Indicators - protection and accountability to affected populations					
Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) - general distribution	>70.00	50.7	18.48	33.39	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	>70.00	36.8	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site - general distribution	>80.00	96.7	86.42	89.52	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	>80.00	92.4	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) - general distribution	>70.00	43	18.4	30.43	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	>70.00	44.7	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme sites - general distribution	>80.00	95.8	89.49	87.38	N/A
Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme sites - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	>80.00	77.4	N/R	N/R	N/A
Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) - general distribution	>70.00	49.2	18.46	32.66	N/A

	Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	>70.00	37.8	N/R	N/R	N/A
	Proportion of assisted people who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site - general distribution	>80.00	96.5	87.13	88.99	N/A
	Proportion of assisted people who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	>80.00	90.5	N/R	N/R	N/A
CC	Cross-cutting indicators - partnership					
	Amount of complementary funds provided to the project by partners (including NGOs, civil society, private sector organizations, international financial institutions and regional development banks) - general distribution	50,000	N/R	N/R	1,281,673	N/A
	Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services - general distribution	15	N/R	5	17	N/A
	Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	15	N/R	5	N/R	N/A
	Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners - general distribution	100	N/R	100	100	N/A
	Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners - nutrition: prevention of acute malnutrition	100	N/R	100	N/R	N/A
CRF SR1	Everyone has access to food					
	Maintained/enhanced individual and household access to adequate food					
	Consumption-based coping strategy index (average) / women and girls	<17.28	17.28	N/A	N/A	14.15
	Consumption-based coping strategy index (average) / men and boys	<16.98	16.98	N/A	N/A	10.15
	Consumption-based coping strategy index (average) / overall	<17.06	17.06	N/A	N/A	12.93
	Dietary diversity score / women and girls	4.01	4.01	N/A	N/A	4.41
	Dietary diversity score / men and boys	4.25	4.25	N/A	N/A	4.28
	Dietary diversity score / overall	4.20	4.20	N/A	N/A	4.32

Food consumption score / percentage of households with acceptable food consumption score / women and girls	>66.77	66.77	N/A	N/A	44.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with acceptable food consumption score / men and boys	>73.12	73.12	N/A	N/A	47.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with acceptable food consumption score / overall	>71.47	6.04	N/A	N/A	46.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with borderline food consumption score / women	<26.46	26.46	N/A	N/A	29.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with borderline food consumption score / men	<21.09	21.09	N/A	N/A	32.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with borderline food consumption score / overall	<22.49	22.49	N/A	N/A	31.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with poor food consumption score / women	<6.77	6.77	N/A	N/A	27.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with poor food consumption score / men	<5.79	5.79	N/A	N/A	22.00
Food consumption score / percentage of households with poor food consumption score / overall	<6.04	71.47	N/A	N/A	23.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed heme iron rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / women and girls	>10.00	7.60	N/A	N/A	5.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed heme iron rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / men	>10.00	7.60	N/A	N/A	5.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed vit A rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / women	>30.00	28.70	N/A	N/A	18.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed vit A rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / men	>30.00	28.70	N/A	N/A	18.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed vit A rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / overall	>30.00	28.70	N/A	N/A	18.00

Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed protein rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / women	>45.00	42.10	N/A	N/A	37.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed protein rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / men	>45.00	42.10	N/A	N/A	37.00
Food consumption score – nutrition / percentage of households that consumed protein rich food daily (in the last 7 days) / overall	>45.00	42.10	N/A	N/A	37.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed heme iron rich food (in the last 7 days) / women	<50.00	57.20	N/A	N/A	70.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed heme iron rich food (in the last 7 days) / men	<50.00	57.20	N/A	N/A	70.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed hem iron rich food (in the last 7 days) / overall	<50.00	57.20	N/A	N/A	70.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed protein rich food (in the last 7 days) / women	<5.00	8.30	N/A	N/A	9.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed protein rich food (in the last 7 days) / men	<5.00	8.30	N/A	N/A	9.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed protein rich food (in the last 7 days) / overall	<5.00	8.30	N/A	N/A	9.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed vit A rich food (in the last 7 days) / women	<20.00	25.90	N/A	N/A	28.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed vit A rich food (in the last 7 days) / men	<20.00	25.90	N/A	N/A	28.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that never consumed vit A rich food (in the last 7 days) / overall	<20.00	25.90	N/A	N/A	28.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed heme iron rich food (in the last 7 days) / women	40.00	5.20	N/A	N/A	25.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed heme iron rich food (in the last 7 days) / men	40.00	5.20	N/A	N/A	25.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed heme iron rich food (in the last 7 days) / overall	40.00	5.20	N/A	N/A	25.00

Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed protein rich food (in the last 7 days) / women	50.00	49.70	N/A	N/A	53.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed protein rich food (in the last 7 days) / men	50.00	49.70	N/A	N/A	53.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed protein rich food (in the last 7 days) / overall	50.00	49.70	N/A	N/A	53.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed vit A rich food (in the last 7 days) / women	50.00	45.40	N/A	N/A	54.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed vit A rich food (in the last 7 days) / men	50.00	45.40	N/A	N/A	54.00
Food consumption score –nutrition / percentage of households that sometimes consumed vit A rich food (in the last 7 days) / overall	50.00	45.40	N/A	N/A	54.00
Food expenditure share / women and girls	65.00	83.90	N/A	N/A	67.00
Food expenditure share / men and boys	65.00	83.90	N/A	N/A	63.00
Food expenditure share / overall	65.00	83.90	N/A	N/A	64.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households not using livelihood based coping strategies / women	>12.46	12.46	N/A	N/A	41.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households not using livelihood based coping strategies / men	>14.49	14.49	N/A	N/A	41.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households not using livelihood based coping strategies / overall	>13.97	13.97	N/A	N/A	41.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using crisis coping strategies / women	<19.38	19.38	N/A	N/A	19.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using crisis coping strategies / men	<20.01	20.01	N/A	N/A	19.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (Percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using crisis coping strategies / Overall	<19.85	19.85	N/A	N/A	19.00

Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using emergency coping strategies / women	<51.23	51.23	N/A	N/A	22.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using emergency coping strategies / men	<44.13	44.13	N/A	N/A	22.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using emergency coping strategies / overall	<45.98	45.98	N/A	N/A	22.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using stress coping strategies / women	<16.92	16.92	N/A	N/A	28.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using stress coping strategies / men	<21.36	21.36	N/A	N/A	18.00
Livelihood-based coping strategy index (percentage of households using coping strategies) / percentage of households using stress coping strategies / overall	<20.21	20.21	N/A	N/A	18.00
Minimum dietary diversity – Women	54.00	53.60	N/A	N/A	54.20
Proportion of children 6–23 months of age who receive a minimum acceptable diet / girls	>70.00	40.70	N/A	N/A	22.00
Proportion of children 6–23 months of age who receive a minimum acceptable diet / boys	>70.00	40.70	N/A	N/A	20.00
Proportion of children 6–23 months of age who receive a minimum acceptable diet / overall	>70.00	40.70	N/A	N/A	21.00
CRF SR2					
No one suffers from malnutrition					
Improved consumption of high-quality, nutrient-dense foods among targeted individuals					
Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme (coverage) / women and girls	>70.00	-	N/A	N/A	19.00
Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme (coverage) / men and boys	>70.00	-	N/A	N/A	19.00
Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme (coverage) / overall	>70.00	-	N/A	N/A	19.00
Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distributions (adherence) / women	>66.00	0.00	N/A	N/A	83.00
Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distributions (adherence) / men	>66.00	0.00	N/A	N/A	73.00

Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distributions (adherence) / overall	>66.00	0.00	N/A	N/A	81.00
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N/R = not reported in Standard Project Reports. N/A: Not applicable

SPECIAL OPERATION 200834

OUTPUT	2016		2017		2018		TOTAL		RATIO
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	TOTAL A/P%
SO1									
Metric tons of cargo transported	25	59	84	159	N/A	N/A	109	218	200%
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	50	64	70	92	N/A	N/A	120	156	130%
Number of destinations served	9	17	20	16	N/A	N/A	29	33	114%
Number of needs assessments carried out	4	2	0	0	N/A	N/A	4	2	50%
Number of passengers transported	8,400	14,796	18,000	48,849	N/A	N/A	26,400	63,645	241%
Percentage of cargo movement requests served against requested	0	0	95	92	N/A	N/A	95	92	97%
Percentage response to medical and security evacuation	100	100	100	100	N/A	N/A	200	200	100%
CRF SO4-SR5: Service delivery general									
Amount of light cargo transported	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	117	143	117	143	122%
Number of agencies and organizations using humanitarian air services	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95	92	95	92	97%
Number of locations served	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	12	19	12	19	158%
Number of needs assessments carried out	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2	1	2	1	50%
Number of passengers transported	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	42,142	62,962	42,142	62,962	149%
Percentage of passenger bookings served	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95	86	95	86	91%
Percentage response to medical and security evacuation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	100	100	100	100	100%
ACTUAL ACHIEVED OF PLANNED % AVERAGE									121%

N/A = not applicable.

SPECIAL OPERATION 201032

OUTPUT	2016		2017		2018		TOTAL		RATIO
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	TOTAL A/P%
SO1: Special operation (ICT)									
Number of ETC meetings conducted on local and global levels	6	5	48	31	N/A	N/A	54	36	67%
Number of ETC user satisfaction surveys conducted	0	1	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	1	NaN*
Number of United Nations agency/NGO staff members trained in radio communications	60	10	120	533	N/A	N/A	180	543	302%
Number of agencies and organizations using coordination and logistics services	27	15			N/A	N/A	27	15	56%
Number of operational areas covered by common security telecommunication network	4	1	6	6	N/A	N/A	10	7	70%
Number of operational areas covered by data communications services	5	0	6	5	N/A	N/A	11	5	45%
Number of operational areas covered with charging stations	3	0	6	0	N/A	N/A	9	0	0%
Number of radio-rooms (COMCEN) established	3	2	3	6	N/A	N/A	6	8	133%
SO1: Special operation (logistics)									
Number of agencies and organizations using logistics coordination services	N/R	N/R	27	44	N/A	N/A	27	44	163%
Number of organizations contributing to pipeline/planning, logistics assessment and/or capacity information to be shared	N/R	N/R	13	12	N/A	N/A	13	12	92%
Number of organizations utilizing storage and cargo consolidation services	N/R	N/R	13	30	N/A	N/A	13	30	231%
Organizations participating in logistics sector activities (coordination, information management, or logistics services) responding to a user survey with a satisfaction rate of 85% or above	N/R	N/R	85	82	N/A	N/A	85	82	96%

Percentage of service requests to handle, store and/or transport cargo fulfilled	85	100	85	100	N/A	N/A	170	200	118%
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CRF SO4-SR5: Service provision and platforms activities

Number of ETC meetings conducted on local and global levels	24	18	24	18	75%
Number of IM products (sitreps, factsheets, maps and other ETC information) produced and shared via email, information management platform, task force and ETC website	60	72	60	72	120%
Number of IT emergency management and specialized radio telecommunications trainings	8	0	8	0	0%
Number of United Nations agencies and NGOs provided access to data communications services	50	106	50	106	212%
Number of additional storage facilities established	4	5	4	5	125%
Number of agencies participating in the logistics cluster forum	40	45	40	45	113%
Number of common operational areas covered by autonomous hybrid power supply systems	14	0	14	0	0%
Number of inter-agency, NGO, and government organization staff who used ETS services	800	2,931	800	2,931	366%
Number of logistics-related trainings organized	6	10	6	10	167%
Number of operational areas covered by common security telecommunication network	16	9	16	9	56%
Number of operational areas covered by data communications services	14	8	14	8	57%
Number of organizations contributing to pipeline/planning, logistics assessment and/or capacity information to be shared	10	22	10	22	220%
Number of organizations using the humanitarian cargo movement notifications consolidation and coordination service	20	33	20	33	165%
Number of organizations utilizing storage and cargo consolidation services	30	35	30	35	117%
Number of radio-rooms (COMCEN) established	16	9	16	9	56%
Number of web-based information- sharing and collaboration platforms established/updated	1	1	1	1	100%
Percentage of service requests for cargo handling fulfilled	85	100	85	100	118%

ACTUAL ACHIEVED OF PLANNED % AVERAGE	119%				
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*NaN = Not a number

N/A = not applicable.

OUTCOME	PROJECT END TARGET	BASE VALUE	2018
SR5 Countries have strengthened capacity to implement the SDGs			
Partners' demand for quality services fulfilled			
User satisfaction rate - ETC user group	>80	-	94
User satisfaction rate - logistics cluster user group	>85	-	96

Annex Q: Findings of Focus Group Discussions

1. INTRODUCTION

1. Oxford Policy Management was commissioned by the WFP evaluation team to carry out an evaluation of the WFP Level 3 Emergency Response programme in northeast Nigeria. The study was intended to address three key evaluation questions:

- i. To what extent were beneficiary needs covered over time?
- ii. Why and how has the emergency response produced the observed results?
- iii. What are beneficiaries' perceptions of the programme so far?

This understanding is critical in building the evidence base for the intervention.

2. In coordination with respective host governments, WFP addresses the urgent food and nutrition needs of the most vulnerable people and communities in conflict-affected areas and displacement sites of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, by: (i) responding to food needs of crisis-affected populations through context-specific responses; (ii) stabilizing the nutritional situation of crisis-affected children through robust prevention programmes adapted to nutrition indicators of population groups; and (iii) strengthening the operational knowledge and reinforcing on-the-ground implementation capacities of Nigerian emergency management agencies.

3. In 2017, WFP scaled up its support, targeting 2.9 million beneficiaries from among refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, and vulnerable host populations through general food distributions and malnutrition prevention activities using a mix of in-kind and cash-based transfer modalities. General food assistance was provided via in-kind or cash-based transfer depending on market functionality and access in specific locations. For in-kind food assistance, from January to May 2017, WFP provided a monthly ration of mixed commodities per person consisting of cereal (10.5kg of rice or 12.6kg of millet), pulses (3kg), oil (1.05kg), salt (0.15kg) and Super Cereal (1.5kg). A cost-saving measure of providing a cereal commodity mix was used, wherein a mix of 60 percent sorghum and 40 percent rice was provided without compromising the nutritional values.

4. For cash-based transfers, beneficiaries received a monthly transfer ranging from Nigerian Naira (NGN) 17,000 (USD 47.15) to NGN 23,500 (USD 65.67) in Borno State, and from NGN 17,500 (USD 48.53) to NGN 24,500 (USD 67.95) in Yobe State.

5. The preventive nutrition approach aimed to deliver an integrated and comprehensive package of activities to prevent acute malnutrition, complemented with household food assistance. Children aged 6–59 months, and pregnant and lactating women, received specialized nutritious foods to protect their nutritional status and prevent deterioration into acute malnutrition.

1.1 Brief Background of Study Sites

6. A total of four locations were visited in Borno and Yobe States, three in Borno State and one in Yobe State. Data collection was undertaken between 26 November 2018 and 30 November 2018.


7. In the span of five days, 21 focus group discussions were conducted in two camps for internally displaced persons (Dalori 1 camp and International Secondary School Camp at Ngala), and three host communities (Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala communities), see Table 3 for more details. The field team was made up of two teams, with one facilitator and one note-taker per team.

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 Community characteristics

1.2.1.1 Dalori 1

8. Dalori 1 camp was established in 2014. It was formerly a primary school and is now structured into seven zones based on geography, with amenities such as boreholes and toilets scattered within the camp. The camp houses approximately 25,000 internally displaced persons, in 5,800 households, who benefit from e- vouchers. The Dalori 1 camp is a closed camp, meaning residents need to seek permission from the camp coordinators before leaving the camp. It was reported that upon receiving the news that the military had recaptured some areas some people had attempted to return to their indigenous communities. However, there were only a few emptied tents in the camp to attest to this. The partner revealed that a majority of those who left had returned to the camp because their indigenous communities were found to still be unsafe, contrary to the report received.



1.2.1.2 Kilibiri

9. Kilibiri is a small town and serves as a host community to internally displaced persons from Azaya and other neighbouring communities in Mafa, a local government area of Borno State. There are approximately 517 beneficiaries of the livelihood support programme, which is implemented by Christian Aid. The programme has two components: income-generating activities and irrigation farming. Income-generating activities include trades such as tailoring, carpentry, poultry, food processing, moringa tree planting, and compost making. The irrigation activities include dry season farming of maize. Beneficiaries were distributed into groups of 20 persons, each with a single facilitator, who spearheads their activities. Thirty individuals benefit from the irrigation component. A total of four focus group discussions were held here. There was no nutrition intervention at the Kilibiri host community, but all households were given moringa seeds to plant around their houses as nutrition support. They were also sensitized on the use of the plant and how to incorporate it into their diet.

1.2.1.3 Kukareta

10. Kukareta community became a camp in July 2015 and has 3,325 households benefitting from the cash-based intervention, and 3,000 women and children in the blanket supplementary feeding programme. The community has 13 wards, with a ward head or traditional leader (*Bulama*) nominated from the host community and a committee made up of a chairman, secretary, and eight members from among the internally displaced persons for each of the wards. Seven focus group discussions were conducted in this community.

1.2.1.4 Ngala

11. The International Secondary School Camp at Ngala is the largest internally displaced persons camp, with 10,630 households and a population of approximately 41,000 persons. Steps have been taken to decongest the camp and MercyCorps has built a new site, but it is yet to be occupied. The community is located between Cameroon and Chad. Seven focus group discussions were carried out at Ngala, four with internally displaced persons and three with members of the host community. In-kind food distribution and nutrition support are implemented in Ngala camp and at the host community level. Two separate partners, Danish Refugee Council and Intersos, were implementing projects at the internally displaced persons camp and with the host community respectively. The general food assistance intervention is benefitting 11,565 households, and approximately 53,000 persons in the Ngala community.

12. In Kilibiri and Kukareta internally displaced persons and members of the host community live together. In contrast, at Ngala, internally displaced persons were housed in a closed camp away from members of the host community. At the Ngala location, about 99 percent of the internally displaced persons were benefitting from the intervention, whereas only about 45 percent of the host community members were

beneficiaries. Indeed, many of the previous host community beneficiaries reported being delisted from the programme. The implementing partner disclosed that those delisted are being targeted to be included in the livelihood support programme scheduled to kick off in 2019, and as such were removed from general food assistance.

13. A majority of participants from the internally displaced persons camps reported having spent between one and two years at the camp. Respondents from host communities also included indigenes who returned post attack and had barely lived four to six months in the community. Three programmes being implemented in these areas were also evaluated: e-vouchers, being implemented in Dalori 1 and Kukareta camp; in-kind food assistance in Ngala; and a conditional cash transfer to beneficiaries on the livelihood support in Kilibiri.

1.2.2 Sampling

14. A total of 21 focus group discussions were held: three in Dalori 1, four in Kilibiri, seven in Ngala, and seven in Kukareta (see Table 24).

15. The ideal procedure for selecting a truly representative sample of participants for the focus group discussions would have been to have a list of all households in the community and to choose a selection from the list at random. However, this was not feasible in this case. Instead, the team opted for a simple sampling strategy whereby field teams used a transect walk across camps, selecting participants from every fourth to sixth household, depending on the camp population, until the target of 10–12 women respondents and 10–12 men respondents had been identified. Sampling in this way ('nth selection' sampling, whereby participants are selected from a set interval of numbers of houses) produces a near-random selection from the total population and limits the ability of field workers to make personal choices on participants, which may introduce bias.

16. Upon arrival at the camps/host communities, the field teams began each visit with a brief discussion with the implementing partners to familiarize themselves with the camp organization, activities, and the approximate size of the population benefitting from food assistance and other interventions. In all camps and communities visited, areas are divided into wards/zones. Each ward has a *Bulama* acting as a representative of the group. After the briefing with implementing partners, a representative took the field teams around the camp, to determine the most feasible route for the transect walk and to agree the appropriate sampling interval.

17. A total of 159 participants were interviewed in separate focus group discussions hosting men and women study participants. Out of the 21 focus group discussions conducted, 12 were with women participants. Participants were aged between 25 and 55 years. Interviews were often facilitated in Hausa and Kanuri, the predominant languages spoken across the study locations. Overall 75 percent of the women focus group discussion participants were involved in one form of petty trading in their respective homes before the crisis. More than half (55 percent) of the women participants were widowed and current household heads. Most men participants were commercial farmers, livestock farmers, or businessmen.

Table 24: Summary table for focus group discussions conducted

Location	Internally displaced persons			Host community –beneficiaries					Host community – non-beneficiaries		Total focus group discussions per location
	General food assistance		Nutrition	General food assistance		Nutrition	Livelihood support		Only nutrition support		
	F	M	F	F	M	F	F	M	F	M	
Dalori 1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3

Kilibiri	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
Ngala	1	1	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	7
Kukareta	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	7

2. FINDINGS

2.1 Daily Needs and Difficulties Accessing Them

18. The most common needs highlighted across all locations visited were: more food for the household (especially large households); better toilet facilities in terms of access and hygiene; toiletries; cooking utensils and condiments; appropriate clothing for the cold weather; fuel for cooking; and appropriate housing conditions.

19. Across all focus group discussions, respondents noted that the men *Bulamas* were biased during distribution of household items supplied by other agencies in the camp, such as toiletries, ensuring that only their relatives or close allies got supplies. Overall, women tended to report concerns around: food insufficiency; cooking fuel; education; and in one instance potable drinking water. Men most often cited as their main needs: a lack of funds to engage in trade and secure farmlands; the poor state of the available sleeping space; and available toilet facilities. The housing conditions were reported to be in a poor state, with tent coverings worn-out and torn, leaving little or no privacy for some households. Sleeping space was also reported to be a concern, with most of the internally displaced persons camp dwellers sleeping on mats, which were reported to be uncomfortable. Respondents also reported leaking roofs in the host community.

20. A number of other concerns reported, particular to different locations, were:

- **Access to primary education:** Education appears to have been an issue in Dalori 1 before the United Nations Children’s Fund opened a primary school for children, but access to primary education was not reported as an issue in the Dalori 1 camp. However, Kukareta and Kilibiri host communities did report access to education as problematic. Specifically, it was reported that the primary school in the Kukareta community is lacking adequate classrooms and teachers.
- **Access to water:** The Kukareta community and the internally displaced persons settlements, as well as the Ngala host community, reported insufficient water supply, and long queues to access water. To avoid queueing, members of the Kukareta community reported spending as much as NGN 25–30⁵²⁴ per 25 litres of water (the smallest household will require at least 75 litres of water daily). A woman beneficiary in Kukareta shared: “When we send our children to get water, they spend a lot of time in the queue, sometimes up to three hours, they stay out up to 9:00 pm just trying to get water. The water shortage affects everyone in the community.”
- **Access to household necessities:** Participants from Dalori 1 and Ngala reported that access to household items, particularly toiletries, is becoming a problem because they are no longer being distributed by philanthropists and non-governmental organizations, as they were before. Other household items identified as daily needs include buckets, mattresses, blankets, pots, and mats. Some respondents also complained of limited sleeping spaces.
- **Healthcare facilities:** Participants in Kilibiri host community and internally displaced persons settlements reported a need for functional healthcare facilities.
- **Secure livelihoods:** Some participants from Dalori 1 and Ngala reported having to resort to selling off a portion of the food items they receive from the food assistance programme to raise fund for other needs, as they lacked viable means of earning money. Participants from Ngala host communities complained about a lack of electricity, which they said was needed to facilitate the

⁵²⁴ NGN 30 is equivalent to USD 0.0833 at a conversion rate of USD 1 to NGN 360.

kinds of business activities they were engaged in before the attack, such as milling. Access to secure farmland was also reported as a strong need of both Kilibiri and Kukareta participants.

2.2 Difficulties Meeting Needs


21. One of the major difficulties in the camp, which is stopping beneficiaries from meeting their daily needs, is a lack of money. Most respondents indicated that they have no source of income in the camp. Some of the internally displaced persons engage in cap-making, but it takes them a long time to complete a single cap. In general, women highlighted the lack of spousal financial support as the major constraint to accessing their daily needs, while the men respondents reported the lack of means of livelihood as their challenge. About 55 percent of the women spoken to were heads of their households.

22. There were reports of insecurity as a major factor inhibiting the ability to meet daily needs, with specific examples shared around how this affected access to education and water. Parents in Kilibiri host community reported being afraid of sending their children to schools in nearby communities due to fear of sudden attacks. Similarly, people in Kukareta reported having inadequate water as too many people depend on a limited water source because they cannot safely access other sources that are far from the community or current living areas.

3. BENEFICIARY REGISTRATION

23. In all locations visited, everyone seemed to have gone through the same registration process, with some slight variations. Although some participants could not provide clear details of what went on at each of the stages and who was responsible for what, they all vividly remembered the SCOPING and the issuance of the SCOPE card.

24. As shown in the diagram, the entire process can be broken down into three phases.



25. Phase 1: Upon arrival at the camp, a screening procedure was carried out by the military. In Ngala, this was done by the Civilian Joint Task Force, with the coordination of the military. This was followed by a general registration of all internally displaced persons by International Organization for Migration, which then handed over these records to the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) for certification. SEMA in turn shared the information with implementing partners in each site. According to the implementing partners, they then shared the list with WFP. During the initial phase, wet feeding⁵²⁵ and sleeping arrangements were supplied by various organizations.

26. Phase 2: WFP SCOPING was carried out by various implementing partners, who accessed the list of registered internally displaced persons from SEMA. Each partner captured data using the equipment supplied by WFP. As the registration was done, the data was saved directly into the WFP portal. SCOPING commenced with a house-to-house registration process whereby all household members were registered (photographed and finger-printed). Everyone engaged during the study attested to the fact that the registration was carried out in a safe environment. The house-to-house registration also helped ensure that people were not double-counted, something the presence of the local committee leaders of each of the zones in the camp also ensured, as they were available to identify each household head and the family size. However, in Dalori 1, some households with less than five household members ended up with multiple vouchers, and participants felt that the presence of the local leaders was the reason why.

27. The elderly, disabled, heavily pregnant women, and mentally impaired individuals were classified as vulnerable groups. In Dalori 1, for example, the mentally challenged have a card that is exclusive to them,

⁵²⁵ Wet feeding – Supply of cooked meal.

irrespective of the presence or absence of a family in the camp. Those without families are entrusted to a caregiver, who is in charge of the card and collects rations for them during redemption.

28. At the Kilibiri camp, before SCOPE was undertaken, a targeting exercise called Kobo Collect was done. A paper card was issued to each registered person upon completion of the process. Afterwards, Catholic Relief Society identified the internally displaced persons among the community members and built tents at designated places within the community.

29. Registration of newly arrived internally displaced persons is still ongoing at the Dalori 1 and Ngala camps. However, for logistic reasons, the number of newly arrived internally displaced persons at Dalori 1 has to reach 20–30 households before registration is carried out. For the Kukareta and Kilibiri internally displaced persons and host communities the registration was a one-off event.

30. At the Kukareta host community, the first compilation of names was done by the ward heads, in coordination with the traditional leader. The register then became the master list used by any organization visiting the community for any intervention. The registration centre was situated in the community behind the traditional leader's house. It was easy to locate and secure. Each ward was told when to come for their registration and there were mats laid down for people to sit on while they waited their turn, with their ward head identifying them when they were called up for registration.

31. Phase 3: At the completion and validation of all registered persons per camp, the SCOPE card was issued. In all locations, polygamous families or households with more than ten members were issued two cards. Implementing partners shared the information that, the rule is that polygamous families comprising more than ten members should be issued with two vouchers, with only two main household members accessing the card. The head of household and a wife are placed on one card and the other wives are placed on another card. In Kilibiri, households headed by women were required to put forward a child older than ten as an alternative to be registered, who could access assistance in the absence of the parent. This was a challenge for women without children and those whose children were less than ten years old. In Dalori 1 camp, there were reported cases of households having multiple cards, despite being a smaller household size.

3.1 Registration for Nutrition Activity

32. For the nutrition programme, pregnant women in their first trimester were required to present their antenatal card to be registered in host communities. Birth certificates/immunization cards were required for children above five months and younger than 24 months. Severely malnourished children were first referred to a clinic for placement on ready-to-use therapeutic food for about a month, before being moved to the blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP). They were moved to BSFP even when they had not met the requirements of having an immunization/birth certificate to enrol into the programme. In Ngala and Kukareta, where camps are attached to host communities, enforcement of this rule was stricter and for host community members, not having antenatal cards, immunization cards, and birth certificates meant an automatic exclusion from receiving the nutrition benefits. There were reports of mothers utilizing access to multiple health facilities in Ngala to get more than one antenatal card to enable them to cheat the system (double ration of the nutrition supply).

33. Pregnant and lactating women present in the internally displaced persons camps during SCOPING were targeted to receive cereal ++. Almost all the respondents could only describe the nutritious meal given, they did not identify the name of the package as cereal ++.

3.2 Challenges of Registration Process

34. In almost all the camps and communities, after the completion of the SCOPE process, it was discovered that some eligible households were excluded. This was mostly due to technical issues or absence during the registration process. There was a greater percentage of excluded households in Dalori 1 camp. Several rounds of verification went on to validate the process for Dalori 1 before SCOPE cards were eventually issued. Even then, a few persons were missed. To address this, a decision was taken by all parties (the community committee, implementing partner, and affected households) to merge small families, two to a card, in order to have more households covered and to reduce the overall number of excluded households.

35. Although people applauded the system of identification using fingerprints, they felt it was too strict to require thumbprints be captured at every redemption cycle in order to access assistance. The system is

sometimes faulty, and as a result, there is no guarantee at each redemption point that the print will be able to be validated. Also, in the absence of the household member with the card, no food can be redeemed for that period: that is, the alternative household member's fingerprint cannot be used to access food.

36. In Kilibiri, there were complaints of SIM cards being blacklisted; that is, SIM cards were being barred from receiving cash credit. Some respondents reported occasions where an amount seemed to be reflected on their SIM card but when they attempted to access the cash, they were told that the money was not actually there. There were also reports that some retailers extorted money from beneficiaries during cash-out: local vendors in the town required beneficiaries to pay a token to the vendor before they would redeem their money for them.

3.3 Awareness of Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

37. Participants' awareness of the inclusion criteria for the WFP programme varied across camps, and in some cases within camps and groups. In Dalori 1, women respondents from the e-voucher group were unaware of the inclusion criteria for the WFP programme, while the men respondents from the e-voucher group and women participants from the nutrition programme were clear that the inclusion criteria for the WFP assistance is for those affected by the insurgency.

38. A majority of respondents from Kilibiri were unable to correctly identify the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the programme, as well as for the various livelihood activity groups. Some respondents believed that the process of selection was random, while others explained that they thought it was based on physical strength and agility. Two exceptions were the women's poultry group and the men's carpentry group, who correctly disclosed that the criteria for enrolment into their respective livelihood programmes was residency in the community and having some form of vulnerability. For these livelihood programmes, a 14-man committee was established, comprising seven men and seven women from the community. The committee was responsible for mobilization and sensitization of the community members on the programme, which was designed to empower them with different sources of livelihoods. The committee also helped to identify the vulnerable groups among the list compiled, using criteria such as a households headed by a women, any form of disability, and displaced persons etc. to target selection.

39. A majority of respondents in Kukareta and Ngala across the various groups sampled reported that the selection criteria for enrolment into the programme was residency in the community. This response was consistent across the various groups of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

40. Non-beneficiaries of Kukareta consistently reported that the programme has a lot of exclusion errors. For example, they reported that some people were excluded because they were not available during registration and not because they did not meet the criteria. They shared that some people who were around during registration but were too sick to participate in the data capture process were also excluded. They had tried to register with WFP after the initial registration was completed, but they were not given the chance and were told that the registration was over, and nothing could be done. Five of the participants said they were not registered because they were single at the time of the registration: now they have their own family without any means of taking care of them. The little money they are able to get from petty trading and menial jobs are used to buy medicines for their children, pay for school, and other basic needs. Another said he was travelling at the time of the registration, so he also missed out. And since all interventions implemented in the community use these registration lists, those who were not able to register (non-beneficiaries) continue to be left out of the benefits others receive. They suggested that every NGO willing to support the community should generate their own list separately so that they too can enjoy some benefits. One respondent from Kukareta said: "It saddens me to see people having several assistances while I am denied all."

41. Other inclusion/exclusion errors, challenges, and biases in selection shared by respondents include the following:

- Omission because of missing WFP registration, as reported by the Ngala IDP in-kind beneficiary group (men) and Kukareta host community non-beneficiary women's group
- Failure of the system to detect collection of double rations by women with multiple immunization and antenatal cards, as reported by participants in the Ngala host community women's nutrition beneficiary group and women's e-voucher group in Dalori 1 camp

- The Ngala host community men's in-kind beneficiary group reported unexplained exclusion of programme participants by programme implementers. Men beneficiaries of the Ngala host community complained that there are people who are benefitting from the programme, but who were later dropped from the programme, which has forced some people to move out of the community because sustenance was difficult without a source of livelihood
- Late arrival as an internally displaced person to the community often meant exclusion, as reported by men e-voucher beneficiaries in Kukareta.
- Exclusion due to technical glitches/errors
- Wealthy internally displaced persons – In Dalori 1, some persons were excluded because they were considered wealthy and not in need of food assistance
- A single case in Kukareta host community was shared of perceived bias based on ethnic and religious difference, which meant people who met the inclusion criteria were excluded
- In Kukareta, respondents reported that certain groups were also excluded based on nationality (Niger Republic)
- In Kukareta, Kilibiri and Ngala host communities, newly arrived internally displaced persons and those not available at the time of first registration were excluded, whereas for Dalori 1 and Ngala camp, registration is still ongoing for newly arrived internally displaced persons.

3.4 Support of Vulnerable Groups (Elderly, Disabled, Unaccompanied Minors, Pregnant Women)

42. Participants across the groups interviewed acknowledged that individuals were treated with respect and dignity throughout the process. Some highlighted that vulnerable people were given priority and privileges during registration and the distribution of food items (exchange of vouchers). Some of the privileges included queue exemption and exemption from physical activities. In Dalori 1, respondents reported that those with mental health issues were deliberately targeted and assigned a caregiver where needed (this was only reported for Dalori 1).

43. However, there were a few exceptions. Respondents from the Kilibiri host community men's farmers group reported that women were excluded from the irrigation farming group for cultural reasons. Beneficiary respondents from the Kilibiri tailoring and irrigation livelihood support group felt the group was not appropriate for the elderly as they lack the patience and zeal to complete the training required to perfect the skill.

3.5 Assistance Received (What and from Whom)

44. Participants were beneficiaries of the e-vouchers (Dalori 1 and Kukareta), mobile cash transfer and livelihood support (Kilibiri), and in-kind food distribution (Ngala). A nutrition component was also implemented in all locations except for Kilibiri.

45. E-voucher beneficiaries in Dalori and Kilibiri received vouchers worth NGN 17,000, while e-voucher beneficiaries in Kukareta (men and women, internally displaced persons and host community) received vouchers worth NGN 17,500. In Dalori 1, beneficiaries confirmed that the disbursement of vouchers was consistent and there was no time they received less than the stipulated amount.

46. A man e-voucher beneficiary in Kukareta IDP reported that Fadama II also provided them with livestock, and that Action against Hunger had at some point issued them a card with money worth NGN 21,500 on it. This seems to have been a one-off assistance, and respondents were not sure when this happened. Women in-kind beneficiaries at the Ngala camp reported that Mercy Corps was providing an additional NGN 22,000 to some vulnerable groups.

47. Women beneficiaries are most likely to redeem foodstuffs. Purchases are mostly staple food, such as maize, rice, and spaghetti, because these last longer, are easier to cook, and are preferred by the children. Women beneficiaries reported being happy with the range of commodities they had to choose from, the

availability of different vendors, and the ease and convenience of getting food items without the need to leave camp. Women's perception was that men prefer that the cash equivalent be given to them rather than the food. Pregnant women, lactating mothers, and mothers with children under five get cereals ++ and super +. There were reports that some internally displaced women were given sewing machines in the camp. Respondents felt that the selection criteria for those who received the machines were not transparent, but they were not able to identify the organization involved.

48. The Kilibiri carpenter group were given work tools, such as a saw, a plane jack, 2x2 wood, tape, a hammer, and timber. They all reported that they were also promised a monthly stipend of NGN 7,000 each to cover the cost of some learning materials, but that this was never given. The irrigation farming group had two boreholes constructed close to the farmland, and were given seedlings, a pumping machine, and other farming implements. Equipment was kept in a central location, and anyone needing to use a tool had to make a request through their support group leader. Each beneficiary from the poultry group was given a cage, three hens, and one cock. Livelihood programme beneficiaries in Kilibiri received a conditional cash transfer of NGN 17,000, depending on frequency of attendance at meetings in a month, where beneficiaries are trained on the various livelihood group they belong to.

49. Monthly assistance given to Ngala in-kind beneficiaries depends on the household size, with four measures of sorghum or millet, one measure of rice, and one litre of oil given per beneficiary.

50. In Kukareta, beneficiaries have access to a NGN 17,000 voucher each month, which is to be redeemed for foodstuffs. Those with disabilities were enrolled in some sort of skill acquisition programme by an unnamed organization. They were given wheelchairs and livestock: four sheep and one ram.

3.6 Issues with Quantity and Quality, Other Distribution Issues

Quality of foodstuffs received

51. Men participants from the e-voucher group in Dalori 1 reported an incident where worm-infested grain was supplied; this reduced the quantity they eventually received after the bad grain was removed at home. This distribution of bad grain persisted for two months before it was addressed. This was corroborated by several persons from the Dalori 1 women's group. A woman beneficiary from Dalori 1 camp reported: "Often, the beans distributed are weevils infested with the maize having a lot of chaff, so much that when the vendor gives out 20 measures, after you take out the chaff it reduces to 17 measures."

52. Men respondents in the Kukareta host community, on the other hand, shared that they received high quality food, acknowledging the quality control activities of the implementers in the community. Similarly, women respondents in Kukareta IDP corroborated that the food items received were of good quality because there are checks at different levels since the beneficiaries are made aware of their right to refuse items they do not consider to be good quality.

Quantity of foodstuffs received

53. In Kukareta alone, respondents shared that about three households were given three vouchers due to their extremely large household size. One respondent disclosed that his household was given three vouchers because he has four wives and 29 children: "In my family, I have four wives and 29 children during the registration, we are more now. I made a special appeal and we that have large families were considered and given three cards." Only about four households had three cards.

54. Across all groups, participants did not consider the quantity of the monthly food distribution received to be sufficient to meet their needs and those of their family until the next distribution. Most participants from the women's groups said items only last around two weeks, and less for those with a larger household size. One woman beneficiary in Kukareta shared: "I am a widow and I have six children and my aged mother living with me who feed off what I get, so it only lasts us two weeks or at most 15 days."

55. Men participants from Kilibiri farmers' group claimed that they were informed that the SCOPE card issued was for accessing food and the SIM card was for the NGN 17,000 to be received for attendance, yet nothing was received. Implementing partners have since clarified that the assumption of food redemption via the SCOPE card was erroneous. Furthermore, these participants expressed dissatisfaction about the use of attendance to determine pay because for a prolonged period, people had attended meetings and activities without being paid anything, or were paid less than they were due. The women's tailor group in Kilibiri

reported that ten sewing machines were shared among 60 beneficiaries. They felt that this was not sufficient and that it was not right for such a large number of beneficiaries to be learning the same trade in a small community, because if they are all tailors the market for the trade will be poor. The poultry group in Kilibiri were impressed with the breed of the poultry provided as they grow very big compared to the ones they see in the community.

Pricing

56. Women respondents from Dalori 1 reported that in the last two months, the price of a bag of maize sold to them in the camp had increased from NGN 7,000 to NGN 10,000. All of the participants said they would prefer that the prices of food given to them would not change with the changing seasons.

57. A wide gap was reported between the market and what was obtainable in the camp. Some participants felt they were being exploited at the camp in terms of the prices at which goods were sold. This was reported by all e-voucher beneficiaries in Dalori 1, with one woman beneficiary sharing: "For example, Maggi seasoning cube is sold at NGN 450, while in the open market it is NGN 350, palm oil is sold at NGN 2,200 in the camp, while in the open market it is NGN 1,600." E-voucher beneficiaries in Kukareta host community, on the other hand, felt the price differences were negligible compare to the amount they would have spent on transport if they were to travel to purchase this themselves.

58. All participants reported that they are treated well by vendors and there has not been any incidence of discrimination. The vendor waiting area is reportedly very conducive, with canopies that serve as shelter, and there is competition between the retailers to secure patronage.

3.7 How Successfully (or Unsuccessfully) Has the Programme Addressed Needs?

59. Acknowledgement of the programme's success and failure by respondents varied across the different programmes and groups with which the respondents were registered. E-voucher respondents in Dalori 1 and Kukareta host community and internally displaced persons groups reported that the programme is a success because it has effectively registered and consistently distributed food to beneficiaries throughout their stay in the camps and communities. They reported that the programme has addressed feeding needs positively, lifting individuals from near famine to healthy status, and restored dignity to household heads who in the past could not provide for their families. They felt that the supplementary food component had made children healthier. According to a participant in the men's e-voucher beneficiaries group in Kukareta host community, before the arrival of the WFP nutrition intervention, many children were malnourished, and now the impact of healthy feeding is evident. This was confirmed by a woman beneficiary in Kukareta, who shared: "This intervention has helped in keeping the family unit of the community intact. If not for this intervention, more than 50 percent of marriages will have ended up in divorce as the men will find it difficult to provide for their wives and choose divorce as a solution."

60. For recipients of the livelihood programme, the reaction was mixed. They reported that the programme has been successful and unsuccessful in equal fashion. The women's tailor group and the men's carpenter group in Kilibiri host community reported that the programme has been unsuccessful because they have not received adequate training. Participants from the tailor group reported that since receiving sewing machines, adequate training has not been provided to coach them on how to sew, and the number of sewing machines is not adequate for long-term practice. Conversely, the women's poultry group and the men's farmers group labelled the programme a success, albeit only in part. The farmers' group revealed that some parts of the programme's activities are successful, such as increased knowledge of irrigation farming, but that the harvests had been eaten by birds. In addition, they complained that although the farming skills are useful, they require energy from good daily food, which they lack, and this demotivates them from going to the farm as often as needed. The women poultry beneficiaries revealed that the programme has been a success because they enjoy better nutrition as a result of the poultry products they get from their farm, which often provides food (eggs) and income (from sale of eggs).

61. The men and women non-beneficiaries in Kukareta and Ngala host communities reported that the programme could not be termed successful since the intervention has not reached them and excludes the majority of them. They asserted that the programme would be considered successful if all those affected by the crisis were targeted and the current method of selective assistance in Kukareta was scrapped.

62. Both men and women beneficiaries of nutrition interventions in Dalori 1 and Ngala host community and internally displaced persons reported that the programme has been a success because of the drastic reduction in the number of malnourished children, and the provision of balanced and healthier food for a large number of children and pregnant women over the years. Likewise, both internally displaced men and Ngala host community beneficiaries of in-kind programme also judged the programme to be a success.

63. The involvement of the local leader, and various levels of supervision from different partners to strengthen monitoring system, were among the reasons cited for the programme's success.

3.8 Preferences in Terms of Modalities (General Food Assistance/Cash/Voucher), and Reasons

64. Most respondents are aware of the different support packages being implemented in other camps. During focus group discussions, they were asked to discuss their preferred package and their responses varied depending on what they were exposed to.

65. A majority of participants in Dalori 1 and Kukareta claimed a preference for the e-voucher programme, due to its ease of accessibility, its focus on the most pressing need (which is food), and how it eliminates the need to go to the open market for food. Their counterparts in the livelihood programme groups (farmers, tailors, and carpenters) in Kilibiri and the conditional cash support group reported that they would prefer to be on the e-voucher programme for the same reasons, and because of the flexibility in using the e-voucher to secure their immediate need(s). Others on the in-kind programme in Ngala also indicated that their preferred package was the e-voucher scheme as it allows them to choose what they want each time.

66. In addition, participants in the women's poultry group revealed that they preferred the e-voucher programme over the livelihood programme because they were not allowed to choose their trade but were randomly assigned.

3.9 Coping Strategies (Including Alternative Income Sources)

67. Coping strategies are getting better as there is a decline in risky practices, such as prostitution. A human rights desk mostly supports this across all camps (except Kilibiri) and it attends to vulnerability issues by sensitizing the women to maintain moral standards, manage disputes, etc.

68. In all locations, more than 60 percent of the respondents admitted to selling a portion of their foodstuffs to meet other needs, such as cooking fuel and soaps. A participant in Dalori 1 mentioned selling two to three plates of her grain (about 210 grams) to buy toiletries for her family. However, in Kukareta, women beneficiaries said it is rare to see people selling their foodstuffs. A woman participant asserted that a few women still turn to prostitution, while others receive financial support from family members in other cities.

69. Some of the internally displaced persons have learned new skills in the camp, such as knitting and cap-making, and engage in cap-making to earn a little income. This is especially done by women. A respondent said she knits caps to provide for other household needs but that it usually takes a long time for her to complete a single cap for sale (about two months). These participants also believe that in the near future, these skills will enable them to gradually integrate back into their communities.

70. Some men participants across the different groups interviewed, reported that household heads usually travel to bigger cities like Maiduguri for jobs, engage in menial jobs, such as working as farm labourers, and that a few engaged in petty trading in the camp, as coping strategies.

71. When redeeming their foodstuffs, some beneficiaries prefer to buy cheaper grain that is of a poor quality, but which will last the family longer. For example, in Dalori 1, some beneficiaries purchase unrefined rice that might have stones and sand in it, rather than the refined rice that is more expensive.

72. Street begging is mostly practised by household members with disabilities.

73. Non-beneficiaries in Kukareta reported coping by receiving assistance from other members of the community, who give them a portion of what they receive each month. This has really helped them mitigate the level of hunger they struggle with on a daily basis. Respondents disclosed that they have made several

attempts at talking to the camp managers and the host community *Bulamas* to see if they could be given a second chance at registration, but all to no avail.

74. For Ngala women non-beneficiaries, coping strategies include selling off property, such as ceramics, beds, and gold earrings, to feed their families. Some also go to the nearby bushes to fetch firewood to sell, but this involves a high risk that they might be killed or abducted by the insurgents. The men non-beneficiaries said that most of them migrated back to Cameroun since they cannot trade in the Ngala community.

3.10 Useful Livelihood Options

75. MEN participants from all groups reported that the most useful resource provided is start-up capital. Women participants stated that they would prefer training on tailoring, bag- and shoe-making, knitting caps, making dishwashing liquid, and milling, as these skills will aid in increasing their household's income while in the camp and empower them for when they return to their community. They further explained that such tasks require little training and would be in the interests of a lot of people.

76. Men participants in Kukareta also mentioned the provision of capital for boosting their businesses in order to improve their livelihood. They also want to be trained in agricultural activities. Kukareta women respondents mentioned that oil-pressing machines, ice block-making machines, tailoring, and grinding machines would be most useful.

77. In Ngala internally displaced persons and host community, a majority of both men and women respondents would prefer farming if secure access to farm land can be guaranteed. Some men participants also reported wanting to learn new skills which they believe would help generate income.

3.11 Appeal and Feedback Mechanisms

78. In Dalori 1, participants consider the feedback and appeal channels to be secure as there have not been any backlash experienced by those who have made use of the channels. Men participants reported that the human rights desk is the most efficient and preferred mechanism for appeal and feedback because they can speak to an actual person who will ask them to explain themselves better and who can empathize with them. Women participants in the nutrition group mentioned that the hotline, complaint box, and the 4046 channels, as well as the *Bulamas*, are frequently used channels for feedback. Fifty percent of the women participants believe that using the *Bulamas* as a way of channelling their complaints is the most effective. Women e-voucher respondents prefer the complaints box because it provides a private means of lodging complaints for those who can write, and they felt it was more confidential and secure than using the *Bulamas*, who usually complain that the issues reported to them are sometimes overwhelming.

79. In Kilibiri host communities, men respondents across the farmers and carpenter groups highlighted that feedback mechanisms have been accessible. Although those from the carpenter group preferred to complain to the *Bulamas*, participants in the farmers group did not like complaining to the *Bulamas* because they do not know how to follow up with their complaints. Men respondents from the farmers group did not have a preferred feedback mechanism but stated that they would prefer that the hotline provide direct access, rather than having to go through the compulsory automated process before a complaint is lodged. Women respondents from the poultry group reported that talking to implementing partners on the ground was the most effective feedback mechanism, as response was almost immediate.

80. Kukareta host community non-beneficiaries (men and women) prefer to use the *Bulamas* as their major feedback channel, while e-voucher beneficiaries (men and women) highlighted speaking to the ground staff as the most effective channel, since they can always follow up to request feedback, which they cannot do using the number.

81. Men in-kind beneficiaries in Ngala host communities prefer *Bulamas* as their most effective channel for feedback for most of their concerns. They believe the *Bulamas* are the most effective means to register a complaint, because the complaints they made were mostly solved.

3.12 Consultation and Information Provision

82. In Dalori 1, women beneficiaries reported that the partners conducted a sort of interview to register views on what works before the e-voucher system was implemented at inception. As reported by 90 percent of women nutrition beneficiaries, only the *Bulamas* are updated with information on camp activities. They felt left out of major updates. They felt that their opinions should be sought on how the programme can be better improved; as the periodic meeting held in the camp with the leaders of each zone does not represent their opinions and concerns. For instance, they are of the opinion that people should be advised on what food type to buy to meet their nutritional requirements.

83. In Kilibiri, all participants from the various livelihood programmes reported that their opinion was not sought on the type of intervention they would prefer. They also stated that even when they had shared their opinion with the programme implementers, their opinions were never taken into account. For instance, they were asked the skills they would prefer at the community entry stage, but when the list came out indicating which group people were assigned to, it was not in line with the interest earlier indicated.

84. Kukareta participants revealed that their opinion was often sought. Men beneficiaries in both host community and internally displaced persons settlements stated that their opinions were canvassed as to what they wanted, that is, their preferred modalities before the e-vouchers were issued. They also revealed that they were informed of the day-to-day dealings of the programme. Women e-voucher beneficiaries also reported that their views and opinions were sought in a general gathering, by show of hand, as to which of the components they preferred to be placed on, and they chose the e-voucher, which was what is being implemented.

85. In Ngala, beneficiaries reported that their opinions were not sought before the implementation of the programme. They revealed that they were usually not consulted on any matter, sometimes only being informed of the date when the next distribution will happen.

3.13 Safety in Relation to Food Assistance

86. Participants in Dalori 1 reported that collecting their ration is safe, the collection place is not overcrowded and is within the camp, and there has not been any report of cases of attack while accessing assistance. There were no reports of agents defrauding them, and the vendors themselves make sure that the value of the voucher is completely exhausted. The only report of fraud related to that occurring between the retailers and elderly and vulnerable beneficiaries: retailers sometimes short-change elderly people because they do not know much about digits and basic numeracy. Participants reported that the incidence of this has been reduced with the help of younger adults accompanying the elderly during redemption.

87. Livelihood beneficiaries in Kilibiri reported that their training centre is safe, although participants in the men's farmers group reported theft of maize from the farms, as well as grazing by cows and birds destroying their last harvest, which can be very discouraging.

88. Kukareta also reported that it is safe to collect food assistance. They revealed that there has never been any case of any attack or food being stolen. They also mentioned that they have never been cheated or defrauded of their dues.

89. Ngala host community members had experienced some forms of attack by insurgents after the food distribution. Generally, there is a feeling of unrest at the end of the month, towards the time of food distribution: they fear that the insurgents might attack them, to steal the supply.

3.14 Relationship Between Internally Displaced Persons and Host Communities

90. All participants engaged in Dalori 1, Kilibiri, Kukareta, and Ngala reported that there exists a cordial relationship between internally displaced persons settlements and their host communities. However, some participants in Ngala revealed that they were initially suspicious and scared that the insurgents might disguise themselves as internally displaced persons and penetrate their community. Also, some revealed that the presence of internally displaced persons in their community had brought with it added security, in the form of an increased military presence.

3.15 Changes in the Respective Roles of Men and Women in Decision Making

91. In Dalori 1, respondents in the men's e-voucher group reported that the assistance gives them a sense of worth since the food needs of their families are met through the programme. However, about 50

percent of the respondents in the women's e-voucher group revealed that some of the men do not feel respected by women any more since they rely on WFP for sustenance and not on the men, as was the practice before. Some women said the decision on how to use the foodstuffs has brought about conflict in the household, because some husbands prefer to sell most of the items and to use the money for something else, while the wives prefer to use the food for the needs of their children.

92. In Kukareta, respondents in the internally displaced persons' nutrition group revealed that there has been a change in the way they relate to their spouses. They are now actively involved in decision making about how the home is run, unlike before when it was just the husband who was providing and there was often friction over decisions as simple as what the family would eat. Men respondents in the internally displaced persons' e-voucher beneficiaries group revealed that the programme has positively improved the relationship between them and their household members, especially the relationship between spouses, as decisions are now made jointly on what variety of food to redeem vouchers for, which did not occur in the past. Similarly, women respondents reported that the assistance has greatly improved their sense of worth, as they are able to contribute to meeting their family's need.

3.16 Perceptions of WFP Impartiality and Neutrality

93. All participants view WFP as an independent organization that is devoid of external influence that could affect decisions on the needs of the people. According to participants in the men's farmers group in Kilibiri host community, WFP is implementing the project solely to improve the lives of people, through skills acquisition and livelihood support. They also believe that WFP is working neither for the Government nor the insurgents. Everyone was able to clearly isolate the role of WFP in helping to manage people affected by the conflicts from the role the Government is playing to combat the insurgents. They identified WFP as an organization that gives food and nutrition support.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Recommendations on How to Better Implement/Improve the Programme

Recommendations by participants in Dalori

- There should be a stricter control of prices of commodities being sold to them because items in the open market are cheaper than the price that the retailers offer them for same commodity within the camp.
- More than two persons should be allowed to collect food with the SCOPE card.
- Larger families with up to five members should be assigned more than one e-voucher (currently only households larger than nine members are issued this), and the value on the e-voucher should be increased.
- Fresh biometrics data capture should be carried out in the camp to identify those with more than one card.
- The verification and distribution of all commodities (e.g. toiletries) in the camp should be done by the implementing partners, because the local committee are sometimes biased in distribution. A participant highlighted that there are local committee leaders who have benefitted from almost all of what is made available to beneficiaries in the camp. For example, one of the leaders has both a grinding machine and a sewing machine. Also, some of the families that have members in the local committee have multiple cards, whereas other families with more members are sharing a single card.

Recommendations by participants in Kilibiri host community and internally displaced person settlements

- Participants need the programme to assist them with loans to engage in trade and building a school because the closest school is about 30 minutes' walk away. They also need a hospital.
- Participants want the e-voucher added to the programme to enable them to live well while growing their business or acquiring the skills.

- Every beneficiary in the tailoring group should be given a single sewing machine, because this will enable the beneficiary to learn better.
- Older women should be given a chance to practise household petty business, because some of the selected women among the tailoring group cannot handle the sewing machines.
- Food distribution should also be introduced to the community, as birds have destroyed their farms.
- Participants prefer that the hotline provide direct access, without going through an automated process before the complaint is lodged.

Recommendations by participants in Kukareta host community and internally displaced person settlement

- Participants want to be provided with blankets, more bore holes, and building materials, as many are still living in temporary housing.
- Participants mentioned that they want WFP to increase the food assistance for everyone, especially those who have large households.
- Participants suggested that large grinding machines, milling machines, sewing machines, oil extracting machines, livestock, farm inputs, and start-up capital be provided.
- Participants would like assistance with fertiliser and seedlings to improve farm yield.
- Participants also talked about the registration process; they want those who were not registered to be included as people usually give a token amount of their foodstuffs to those not registered, to aid them.

Recommendations by participants in Ngala host community and internally displaced person settlements

- Teenagers should be allowed to stand in the line for their parents, and possibly allowed to collect the rations for the family using the card when parents are unable to do it themselves.
- Some of the newly arrived internally displaced persons in the host community without an immunization and antenatal card should also be considered upon arrival, because it will take some time for them to get registered.
- Sufficient food should be shared. The implementing partners should ensure that everyone gets food, no matter the population in the camp, rather than on a first-come-first-served basis only, which participants said increases the struggle and fights in the queue.
- Participants advocated for a skills acquisition programme, such as tailoring, knitting, etc so they can engage in a trade to allow them to purchase other household supplies.

4.2 Reasons for Programme Success

94. **Consistency:** The programme has consistently distributed food to those in need for several years, without a break. A respondent said the incidence of deaths in the camp was a lot when they arrived, but that the programme has really helped in reducing this through the provision of food. Another respondent (from Dalori 1) said that, as a result of the intervention, there is a visible change in their physical appearance, and they now look full and even have better skin texture than they did when they were not in the programme. Participants described their physical appearance before the programme as skinny and weak, and others all readily agreed with this. They also said they have regained their dignity, as they are now able to provide for their family food needs and do not have to beg or rely on the goodwill of strangers.

95. **Checks in place to guard against abuse:** Participants attributed the success of the programme to the many levels of checks that are in place to prevent possible abuses, and to the involvement of the human rights protection desk in dispute resolution. The thumbprint and pictures have ensured only those who are meant to be beneficiaries benefit from the programme. They also attributed the success of the programme to the involvement of some of the internally displaced persons in the system interfacing between the implementers and the internally displaced persons.

96. **Meeting food needs:** Two respondents said their children were wasted when they came to the camp initially, but now they look healthy. They attribute this to the assistance from WFP. Everyone said the assistance gives them a sense of worth, since the food needs of their families are met through the programme. Participants also mentioned the decline in the rate of maternal/child mortality. An active committee that carries out checks to identify children with severe acute malnutrition, and the use of the antenatal SCOPE card as registration criteria were also mentioned.

4.3 Drawbacks

97. **Limited training session for livelihood support:** Beneficiaries from the Kilibiri host community did not judge the programme a success: since inception, the carpentry group has had just one session of training; birds had eaten farm produce from the irrigation farming; and five to six women have to share a single sewing machine, leaving little room for practice.

98. **Sales of foodstuffs to meet other household needs:** This has meant a reduction in household members' daily portion.

99. **Relevance and inclusion:** Respondents also shared that they felt they had no say in the choice of livelihood activities they were allocated to.

100. **Insecure farmlands:** There are limited safe farming plots for scale-up. Sixty percent of beneficiaries expressed a desire to scale up irrigation farming but noted insecurity as a challenge. The internally displaced persons in Kilibiri pointed out that they did not own farmland around the community to support them.

Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
BOWDI	Borno Women's Development Initiative
BR	Budget Revision
BSFP	Blanket Supplement Feeding Programme
CAID	Christian Aid
CBT	Cash-Based Transfers (modality)
CCS	Country Capacity Strengthening
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFM	Complaint and Feedback Mechanism
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CILSS	Comité Permanent Inter-États De Lutte Contre La Sécheresse Dans le Sahel (Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel)
CivMil	Civilian Military
CMAM	Community Management of Acute Malnutrition
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
COMCEN	Communications Centre
COMET	Country Office Tool for Managing Programme Operations Effectively (WFP)
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
CP	Cooperating Partner
CRF	Corporate Results Framework
CSI	Coping Strategies Index
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDS	Dietary Diversity Score
DoE	Director of Evaluation (WFP)
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DSC	Direct Support Cost

DTM	Displacement tracking matrix
EB	Executive Board
EFSA	Emergency Food Security Assessments
EFMOM	Expanded Food Security Outcome Monitoring
EM	Evaluation Manager (OEV)
EMG	Executive Management Group
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
ETS	Emergency Telecommunications Sector
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FMARD	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
FO	Field Office
FS	Food Security
FSOM	Food Security Outcome Monitoring
FSP	Financial Service Provider
FSS	Food Security Sector
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCMF	Global Commodity Management Facility
GEEW	Gender Equality and Empowerment for Women
GFA	General Food Assistance
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview

HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICEED	International Centre Energy and Environment Development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IMC	International Medical Corps
INP	Integrated Nutrition Programme
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated (Food Security) Phase Classification
IR	Inception Report
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRG	Internal Reference Group
ISWAP	Islamic State's West Africa Province
IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
JANFSA	Joint Approach to Nutrition and Food Security Assessment
JAS	Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad
KII	Key Informant Interview
L3	Level 3 Emergency
LCB	Lake Chad Basin
LESS	Logistics Execution Support System
LGA	Local Government Areas
LTSH	Landside Transport Handling and Storage
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAD	Minimum Acceptable Diet
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MICS	Multi-indicator Cluster Survey
MNJTF	Multi National Joint Task Force
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture

MoH	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
mPOS	Mobile Point of Sale
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
MT	Metric Ton
MUAC	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
mVAM	Mobile Vulnerability, Assessment and Mapping
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDMF	National Disaster Management Framework
NDRP	National Disaster Response Plan
NE	Northeast (Nigeria)
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGN	Nigeria Naira (currency)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NHGSF	National Home-Grown School Feeding
NiEWG	Nutrition in Emergencies Working Group
NNHS	National Nutrition and Health Survey
NPFS	National Programme of Food Security
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSAG	Non-State Armed Group
NSIO	National Social Investment Office
NSIP	National Social Investment Programme
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
ODOC	Other Direct Operating Costs
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
OSE	Emergency Preparedness and Support Response Division
OSZ	Policy and Programme Division
PCNI	Presidential Committee of the North-East Initiative
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation

PSA	Programme Support and Administration
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PUI	Premiere Urgence Internationale
RBD	Regional Bureau for the Central and West Africa (in Dakar)
REACH	Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
SAF	Safer Access Framework
SAFE	Safe Access to Fuel and Energy
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SBCC	Social Behaviour Change Communication
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SEMA	State Emergency Management Agency
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
SO	Special Operation
SO	Strategic Objective
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition
TDY	Temporary Duty Assignment
ToR	Terms of Reference
TPM	Third Party Monitor /Third Party Monitoring
TSFP	Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme
UHC	Universal Healthcare
UN	United Nations
UN SWAP	United Nations System-Wide Action Plan
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security

UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability, Assessment and Mapping
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme (United Nations)
WG	Working Group
WHO	World Health Organization (United Nations)
WINGS	Information Network and Global System (WFP)

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Office of Evaluation

World Food Programme

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70

00148 Rome, Italy

T +39 06 65131 wfp.org