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Cash transfers and vouchers in response to drought in Mozambique

Lessons on social protection linkages and separation of functions



July 2019

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Summary

Improving assistance to people affected by food insecurity and disaster in Mozambique is a pressing matter. The country is highly exposed to weather-related hazards and faces periodic cyclones, droughts and floods. Mozambique suffered a severe El Nino-induced drought in 2015-16 and below average agricultural yields in 2017-18. In March 2019, Cyclone Idai wreaked incredible damage on lives and infrastructure, followed by Cyclone Kenneth. Lines between vulnerability, poverty and disaster are blurred, with routine spikes in food insecurity during the 'lean season' ahead of crop harvests.

With predictions that more than 800,000 people would face severe food insecurity in the 2018-19 lean season, DFID funded the World Food Programme (WFP) and HelpAge to provide cash transfers or food commodity vouchers in Tete province. The objective was to mitigate the predicted situation of acute food insecurity through assistance to drought-affected households. The project reached 24,354 recipient households, of which 85% received commodity vouchers and 15% cash transfers.

Two notable features were introduced in the intervention. The first was linking the lean season assistance with social protection. The intervention prioritised households assisted by (or meeting the selection criteria of) the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB). The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) and the National Institute of Social Action (INAS), which respectively are responsible for policy and implementation of non-contributory social protection, were involved in some elements of the programme design and implementation. The cash transfer value was established at 2,500 MZN per household per month, which aligned with the post-emergency Direct Social Support Programme (PASD-PE) – a recovery social assistance programme conceived in 2016 that has faced delays in implementation. These linkages are part of broader thinking on 'shock responsive social protection' and 'adaptive social protection', which concern the role of social protection in responding to and reducing vulnerability to major shocks such as drought and floods.

The second unique feature was providing transfers through a 'separation of functions' approach, with programme implementation and accountability roles divided between WFP and HelpAge (which worked in partnership with the local civil society organisation APITE). Separately funding certain project activities based on their cost and the expertise of different organisations has been recommended as an alternative model of implementing cash-based humanitarian assistance. WFP was responsible for geographic targeting of intervention areas, delivery of cash and voucher assistance and monitoring outputs and outcomes of assistance. HelpAge oversaw the selection of beneficiary households, accountability and monitoring the distribution of transfers. DFID saw the Tete project as an opportunity to test the separation of functions approach.

The decision of DFID to pursue linkages with social protection was driven by a desire to provide unconditional cash transfers and vouchers. Unlike other countries in the region, cash transfers have not been used in disaster response owing to government concerns about dependency, expectations, responsible spending and market access in rural areas. Cash transfers are, however, provided through social assistance.. It also created an opportunity to develop lessons on the use of social protection systems to support relief and recovery.

Owing to these innovative aspects, a learning component was included in the project. It examined the implicit and explicit assumptions underpinning the decisions to link to social protection systems and separately contract implementation activities, and the intended and unintended results of doing so. Following Cyclone Idai, the breadth of the exercise was expanded to consider emerging issues on the planned use of social assistance for recovery.

IMPLICATIONS OF LINKING WITH SOCIAL PROTECTION AND SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS

The main areas influenced by the social protection linkages and separation of functions were targeting, registration, coordination and accountability. Other factors also influenced how the programme implementation evolved, notably organisational capacity, systems and the shifting operational and policy context.

TARGETING

The prioritisation of PSSB recipients and those meeting the PSSB criteria resulted in a high proportion of elderly beneficiaries (42% of recipients were over 60, compared to 17% in other WFP projects). The project design assumed a strong correlation between the PSSB criteria – which assists elderly, disabled and other vulnerable households – and food insecurity. PSSB recipients accounted for 17% of project beneficiaries. However, their prioritisation was controversial, with most stakeholders outside of the project expressing that they should not be prioritised given their regular benefits through the PSSB, even though that transfer value is lower than the project's.

Household targeting was affected to a lesser extent by the separation of functions. The limited experience of APITE in large-scale household targeting appears to have contributed to inclusion errors in one area identified prior to the first distribution. As a result, WFP became involved in a re-targeting exercise, owing in part to its strong relationship with local authorities. This issue is more strongly tied to organisational capacity than separation of functions.

REGISTRATION

The separation of registration and delivery tasks impacted the registration process, because WFP used its beneficiary information management system (SCOPE) for the delivery of electronic vouchers. HelpAge and APITE therefore had to use SCOPE for registering the targeted households, which necessitated training, hardware and software. Localities had to be entered into SCOPE prior to registration, which created delays, and APITE staff could not trouble-shoot certain technical issues that impacted registration (e.g. mis-spelling of community names in SCOPE).

Social protection linkages also influenced registration to a certain degree. The project design included using or uploading beneficiary household data to e-INAS – a social assistance information management system that had been under development for several years. Because it was reportedly not possible to import SCOPE data, INAS registered some project households alongside APITE, with each using different registration software. INAS involvement increased logistical coordination requirements for registration and resulted in some delays. As with SCOPE, the issue at play was the desire to use a specific management information system in the registration process (though with a view to populating that system rather than delivering the lean season assistance).

COORDINATION

The straddling of social protection, disaster risk management and humanitarian worlds necessitated coordination with many stakeholders spanning these sectors. Compared with implementation by a single organisation or a sub-contracting arrangement, separation of functions also increased coordination requirements. Both of the partners were accountable to DFID rather than one managing another, but their programming functions were mutually dependent (registration informs delivery, accountability informs changes to implementation, etc.). A memorandum of understanding likely would have clarified and streamlined coordination between WFP and HelpAge/APITE, though some challenges may not have been anticipated from the beginning given the newness of their partnership. The arrangement benefited substantially from their good working relationship and mutual desire to solve issues that arose.

ACCOUNTABILITY

The accountability dimensions of the project were highly influenced by the direct contracting of HelpAge by DFID, which ensured HelpAge and APITE's independence. However, the arrangement would have benefited from a stronger vision on how the independent accountability function would be harnessed to improve the project as it went along – especially as HelpAge needed WFP to resolve operational challenges identified, and WFP needed to be aware of all issues raised

through HelpAge's processes. At the end of the project, WFP and HelpAge were not entirely aware of the feedback received by the other. This gap was symptomatic of decreased communication and coordination between HelpAge and WFP on accountability compared to registration, which was influenced by their focus on fulfilling their individual functions and also attention diverted to responding to Cyclone Idai.

SOCIAL PROTECTION TO SUPPORT CYCLONE RECOVERY: ISSUES TO CONSIDER

Cyclone Idai was a disaster of unprecedented scale for Mozambique. Less than a month after Cyclone Idai, the World Bank and WFP, with support from UNICEF and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), developed a concept note for discussion with MGCAS and INAS on options for using social protection to bridge relief and recovery efforts. While the details were to be worked out in June 2019, social protection is anticipated to play a major role in reaching affected households.

The PASD-PE is set to be the heart of social assistance recovery efforts. Initial planning is that a large-scale version of the PASD-PE (over 100,000 households) will provide unconditional cash transfers through INAS, with support from partners for registration, monitoring and payment delivery as needed. It is anticipated that the PASD-PE recipients will include existing social assistance beneficiaries and other cyclone-affected households registered for disaster assistance.

While such assistance holds important potential to reach people at scale, multiple risks should be anticipated and mitigated:

- Speed and timing: Previous efforts to implement the PASD-PE were severely delayed; there is no experience with the programme in the cyclone-affected provinces (or elsewhere in the country as of July 2019).
- Data, targeting and registration: expanding social assistance programmes beyond pre-existing beneficiaries is complex and requires time and resources. The administrative ease of reaching existing beneficiaries must not disadvantage disaster-affected households not in the INAS management information system.
- Capacity: INAS delegations have limited capacity to make payments to existing social assistance recipients given limited resources and the time-intensive process of making payments manually. They have faced multiple demands in the disaster response and are still responsible for the implementation of regular social assistance programmes. The political will to implement and expand social assistance programmes through the PASD-PE will need to be accompanied by additional capacity within INAS and complemented by support from development and humanitarian partners as needed.

CONCLUSION

While this paper covered both separation of functions and linkages with social protection, the operational and policy implications are somewhat different. Separation of functions is fundamentally about how different entities (mainly aid organisations, donors and companies that facilitate the delivery of money and vouchers) relate to one another, the government and to beneficiaries when implementing a humanitarian programme and promoting accountability. This includes what their tasks are, how they work together and to whom they report. The building blocks of the Tete programme were similar to a 'usual' humanitarian responses but arranged slightly differently. The operational advantages and disadvantages of issuing contracts for different functions looked different depending on the agency's specific role (delivery v. accountability). Had the scale of the response been greater or the reformulation of roles more radical – such as DFID contracting the delivery of transfers to a payment company rather than an aid organisation – the implications likely would have been more radical too.

Whereas separation of functions mainly concerned relationships and responsibilities within humanitarian assistance, linking with social protection opened the door to programmes, institutions and systems largely external to those of disaster management and humanitarian aid. In the case of the Tete response, the links were relatively limited, mirroring social assistance

targeting criteria and transfer values within a humanitarian programme. These links influenced who did and did not benefit from the project and the amount of assistance received.

Plans to utilise social assistance in the cyclone recovery will presumably create a stronger shift towards social protection information management and delivery systems, which will require adequate support to take on the increased responsibilities. The resources and capacities required to start and expand social assistance programmes cannot be underestimated, and time is of the essence when supporting disaster-affected people. There is a risk of directing cyclone recovery social assistance towards those who can be most readily reached rather than those in the greatest need.

The advantages and trade-offs of linking with social protection and separating functions are inherently tied to how these approaches are taken forward and the dynamic policy and operational context of disaster response and social protection in Mozambique. The capacities, systems and normative frameworks of those involved also played significant roles in shaping implementation. Government, donors and aid organisations should consistently consider the added value and trade-offs of different approaches to partnership and linkages to social protection.

The below table identifies recommendations for each of the two aspects, when they are deemed appropriate.

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LINKING WITH SOCIAL PROTECTION

- 1. Identify and mitigate risks of providing disaster or recovery aid through or linked to social protection** – notably related to potential delays, inadequate transfer values or exclusion of disaster-affected people not already in social assistance schemes.
- 2. Closely coordinate assistance provided through or linked to social protection** with other assistance provided through DRM and humanitarian channels.
- 3. Provide adequate capacity-building support to government agencies leading the provision of social assistance emergency/recovery support and complement with support humanitarian and development partners as needed** -particularly if government capacity alone cannot ensure timely delivery of assistance.
- 4. Anticipate and mitigate technical and political challenges of linking disaster response and social protection** – including recognising who may benefit or lose resources as a result of working with and through social protection systems. Measures and incentives should be put in place for responsible data-sharing to facilitate for the registration and delivery of assistance to disaster-affected households.
- 5. Do not exclude social assistance beneficiaries from humanitarian assistance. When emergency and recovery responses are implemented through social protection systems, ensure that affected people not previously benefiting from social assistance are helped too.** In the latter scenario, this means ensuring adequate resources and processes to identify and assist people not already part of social assistance. It may take the form of temporarily expanding an emergency social assistance programme to reach new people and/or providing complementary assistance through DRM and humanitarian channels (if, for example, resources through social protection were insufficient or administratively challenging to register/reach new households in the needed timeframe).
- 6. Ensure that household targeting of lean season responses always includes food security and livelihood related criteria.** It
- 7. Look ahead to how responses linked to social protection will be triggered, financed and coordinated with DRM and humanitarian assistance.**

SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS

- 8. Clearly define responsibilities, coordination and communication channels among partners.** This may include developing an MOU delineating roles and coordination, while allowing flexibility to adapt processes given that unforeseen issues may arise.
- 9. Recognise the inter-dependence of programme functions and how information management and delivery systems influence implementation.** All actors involved in implementation and accountability should be cognisant of how their individual systems could impact the arrangement. This includes how the delivery systems may influence registration and vice versa.
- 10. Ensure a strong feedback loop between accountability functions that raise challenges and operational efforts to resolve them.** When accountability is supported through an organisation not directly involved in other aspects of implementation, mechanisms need to be in place for problems raised through their channels to be resolved – otherwise accountability risks becoming delinked from problem-solving. Measures should be outlined in advance how particularly sensitive cases (e.g. related to corruption, sexual exploitation) will be handled.
- 11. Consider organisations' added values when establishing their roles and involve them in determining how roles relate to one another.** Potential added values include capacities, systems, past experience, government relationships and community presence.

1. Introduction

Mozambique faced a severe El Nino-induced drought in 2015-16 and below average agricultural yields in 2017-18. With predictions that more than 800,000 people would face severe food insecurity in the 2018-19 lean season, DFID funded the World Food Programme (WFP) and HelpAge to provide cash transfers or commodity vouchers in Tete province. The objective was to mitigate the predicted acute food insecurity in the lean season through assistance to drought-affected households. The project reached 24,354 recipient households as of May 2019, of which 20,799 (85%) received commodity vouchers and 3,555 (15%) cash transfers. Two notable features were introduced in the intervention – linkages to national social protection systems and separation of functions between different aid agencies.

The first was the alignment of some programme design features with social protection. The intervention prioritised households assisted by the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB), which is the largest social assistance programme in Mozambique. It also targeted drought-affected households that met PSSB selection criteria. The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) and the National Institute of Social Action (INAS), which respectively are responsible for policy and implementation of non-contributory social protection, were involved in some elements of the programme design and implementation. The cash transfer value was 2,500 MZN per household per month, which aligned with the PASD-PE – a planned post-emergency social assistance programme conceived in 2016 that has faced delays in implementation. These linkages are part of broader thinking on ‘shock responsive social protection’ and ‘adaptive social protection’, which concern the role of social protection in responding to and reducing vulnerability to major shocks such as drought and floods.¹

The second unique feature was providing transfers through a ‘separation of functions’ approach, with programme implementation and accountability roles divided between WFP and HelpAge (which worked in partnership with the national non-governmental organisation (NGO) APITE). WFP and HelpAge held separate grants with DFID for the following functions:

- Geographic targeting of interventions areas by WFP in coordination with the National Institute of Disaster Management (INGC) and the Technical Secretariat of Nutrition and Food Security (SETSAN). INGC and SETSAN are government bodies respectively responsible for the coordination of disaster risk management (DRM) and the coordination of actions to promote food and nutrition security.
- Household targeting by HelpAge/APITE in coordination with INAS.
- Registration of recipients using WFP beneficiary information

management system (SCOPE) by HelpAge/APITE/WFP and INAS local representatives based in the delegations of Tete and Moatize.

- Delivery of cash transfers (via mobile money) and commodity vouchers by WFP, with the choice of modality dependent on market conditions.
- Household-level monitoring by HelpAge and WFP (e.g. transfer receipt, food security outcomes).
- Accountability and grievance redressal mechanism by HelpAge/APITE, with WFP collecting feedback through a hotline already in place.

There was also a third aspect new to humanitarian efforts in Mozambique – the provision of unconditional cash transfers. Unlike many countries in the region, unconditional cash transfers have not been used in any previous response to disaster or acute food insecurity. Vouchers were only used for the first time in 2016-17 in response to El Nino-induced drought. While some donors and aid agencies have been interested in providing cash transfers given other experiences in the region, the government of Mozambique has not allowed their use in response to major drought, floods or anything other than social assistance. The government has expressed concerns related to dependency, access to markets, risks that people would not spend the money wisely, price-gouging by traders and worries that people would expect the cash assistance to continue (Bailey, 2016).

Substantial advocacy efforts have been undertaken by international agencies to enable the use of cash transfers in emergencies. WFP also piloted a cash-for-assets intervention in Cahora Bassa in 2018-19. However, at the time the project was implemented, the provision of unconditional cash transfers was only possible by working in collaboration with MGCAS and INAS. Cash transfers accounted for 15% of the project assistance based on market analysis finding that commodity vouchers were more appropriate in most areas.

1.1 LEARNING ON SOCIAL PROTECTION LINKAGES AND SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS

Given the innovative features, a learning component was included in the project to analyse lessons and inform future assistance. The focus of the study is on the implications on the links to social protection and the separation of functions. It examines the programming model through which cash and vouchers were provided, exploring the implicit and explicit assumptions underpinning the decisions to link to social protection systems and separate certain functions, and the intended and unintended results of doing so.

The breadth of the learning component was expanded following Cyclone Idai, which hit Mozambique in March 2019

¹ Shock responsive social protection focuses on the intersection of social protection and disaster risk management, while adaptive social protection tends to have a greater focus on climate change adaptation and building resilience in the longer-term. While they are not perfect synonyms, this paper uses both terms to broadly refer to the role of social protection in emergency response in Mozambique.

followed by Cyclone Kenneth in April 2019. The devastating storms resulted in destruction of unprecedented scale in Mozambique and triggered massive relief efforts. The policy and operational landscapes shifted, including substantial attention and planned resources for social protection in recovery efforts. The study touches on some potential implications of the findings from the Tete project for the use of social assistance in cyclone recovery and vice versa. This topic is evolving as recovery plans take shape; the data collection sought to identify emerging issues in order to contextualise the drought response findings within the bigger picture of the cyclone response and raise questions to explore in the future.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

The study approach was centred on two rounds of in-country data collection – one in February 2019 and the second in June 2019. Ahead of the first mission, documents were reviewed on the programme design, baseline report, targeting, government policy and perceptions of cash transfers, shock responsive social protection, gender, protection and accountability issues. The purpose of the February 2019 mission was to identify key themes, emerging lessons and issues to follow up. It included key informant interviews in Maputo and Tete, as well as community key informant and group discussions with recipients in five communities in Marara, Chiuta and Cahora Bassa districts in Tete over a three-day period. The discussions focused on the experience receiving the assistance, views on the targeting and changes in the household and community

resulting to date. The number and depth of community-level discussions varied given the short time for the field visit and ambition to reflect diverse experiences with commodity vouchers and cash transfers in different areas. A total of 112 people were consulted (58 women and 54 men).

The second mission in June 2019 focused on updating the drought assistance findings and exploring the implications of the Cyclone Idai response, through consultations with WFP, HelpAge and DFID and limited interviews with other organisations involved in the Cyclone Idai response. A workshop was held during the second mission with WFP, HelpAge and DFID to discuss and deepen the findings.

A total of 44 people were interviewed. These included 20 individuals from the government (in Maputo and Tete province) and 18 interviewees from WFP, HelpAge, APITE and DFID (see Annex 1). One-third of the key informants were women. With the exception of the interviews with HelpAge, all were conducted by an independent consultant with the support of the WFP Programme Policy Officer on social protection. The questions focused on how different actors perceive the logic and appropriateness of separating functions and linking with social protection, challenges experienced and emerging lessons. The interviews with WFP, HelpAge, APITE and DFID focused on how those aspects have influenced design and implementation. All interviews and discussions included an introduction explaining the study and noting it was a learning exercise and not an evaluation.

TABLE 1 Project summary

<p>TARGET AREA</p> <p>Tete Province: 6 Districts classified IPC3 or above</p> <p>Communities selected jointly by WFP, SETSAN, INGC, DPGCAS, INAS and district government</p>	<p>TARGET HOUSEHOLDS</p> <p>PSSB Beneficiaries</p> <p>PSSB waiting lists</p> <p>People not included but eligible for PSSB</p> <p>PASD-PE criteria</p>	<p>TRANSFER VALUE AND TYPE</p> <p>Food commodity vouchers and M-Pesa</p> <p>Cash transfer value = 2,500 MZN per month per</p> <p>Six transfers</p>
<p>MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY</p> <p>Perception, use and impact of the transfer</p> <p>Complaints: box, phone line</p> <p>Community monitors and committee</p>	<p>LEARNING</p> <p>Use of mobile money for transfers, separation of functions, links to social protection</p>	<p>TRAINING AND WORKSHOPS</p> <p>Launch in Tete (Sep. 2019)</p> <p>Training of 400 local committee Members</p> <p>Tete learning workshop June 2019</p>

2. Disaster response and social protection in Mozambique: systems and linkages

This section provides a brief overview of disaster response and social protection systems in Mozambique and steps taken to more closely link the two. Poverty and vulnerability to hazards mean that social protection and DRM are essential in Mozambique. The country is highly exposed to weather-related hazards – a reality driven home by the severe El Nino-induced drought in 2015-16 and Cyclones Idai and Kenneth in 2019. A 2016 poverty assessment found poverty rates of 41-45% (Government of Mozambique, 2016). While a slight improvement from a decade prior, the assessment estimated that between 10.5 and 11.3 million people were living in poverty.

2.1 DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The government of Mozambique has made significant efforts in building DRM systems since major floods in 2000/2001, which exposed its lack of preparedness. DRM is characterised by the importance placed on preparedness, government leadership in coordinating disaster response, government discouragement of forms of assistance perceived as linked to dependency, and firmly established DRM procedures for floods and cyclones (Kardan et al., 2017). The INGC leads the coordination of disaster responses. While some government funding is provided for emergency relief through a budgeted contingency fund, international humanitarian agencies and funding play a primary role in larger events, as described in Box 1.

BOX 1 Disaster response in Mozambique: the INGC and international humanitarian assistance


The INGC was established in 1999, from elements of the government's operational relief infrastructure during the civil war. While the INGC does a small amount of relief implementation, its main role is leading the coordination of disaster response and undertaking actions to prepare for and mitigate the impact of disasters. Since 2007, the INGC has led an annual contingency planning process with government ministries, international aid agencies and some district-level representatives. In times of disaster, the needs of affected populations often exceed the resources in the contingency plan, and not all of the funding outlined in the contingency plan is provided by the government. International aid agencies fill some of the gap between the assistance provided by the government and actual relief needs that are often significantly higher. For flooding in 2013 and 2015, the government respectively financed about 6% and 28% of disaster relief. Beyond smaller emergencies, such as minor flooding, most disaster response implementation is by international aid agencies using resources from international donors.

Source: Kardan et al., 2017

The El Nino-induced drought and tropical cyclones in 2019 both severely tested disaster management in Mozambique. As shown in Figure 1, the number of people affected by these disasters is three to five times greater than previously. The slow onset and widespread impacts of the drought were relatively uncharted territory for a disaster management system mainly focused on preparing for and responding to floods and cyclones. The sheer scale of Cyclone Idai – one of the strongest storms on record in Africa – was overwhelming. The logistical challenges of accessing affected areas have been severe.



FIGURE 1 People affected by disaster in Mozambique (2007-2019)




Sources: Kardan et al. (2018) with 2019 data from USAID (2019)

The amount of international humanitarian funding skyrocketed following Cyclone Idai. The Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan estimated requirements to be \$441m, of which \$175m was funded as of June 2019 (when humanitarian

funding outside of that process is considered, the total increases to \$223m). WFP has been the primary recipient with 40% of the funds.

FIGURE 2 International humanitarian funding to Mozambique (2000- June 2019)



Source: 2001-2008 from Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2009-2019 from OCHA Financial Tracking Service

² OCHA FTS accessed June 2019.

WFP and its partners have played a central role in the cyclone response. WFP established the logistical arrangements (e.g. air transport, storage facilities, trucks) to move food aid to affected areas. WFP and NGOs have also provided vouchers for food assistance, with plans for a joint UNICEF and WFP voucher programme to enable households to access food and critical household goods. The INGC requested that WFP undertake a large-scale data collection of affected households who received humanitarian food assistance. Data collection exercises by WFP, its NGO partners and INAS will have implications for opportunities to link with social protection, as discussed in Section 5.

2.2 SOCIAL PROTECTION

MGCAS is in charge of the coordination of non-contributory social protection and the policy direction of the sector, guided by the National Strategy for Basic Social Security II (ENSSB II) (Kardan et al., 2017). INAS is responsible for the implementation of social assistance programmes. It is a centralised administrative agency that has 30 offices (known as delegations) across Mozambique. INAS delegations are present in all provincial capitals, Maputo city, and 19 other districts (out of 128) across the country. Owing to this limited district-level footprint, delegations usually are responsible for a number of districts (Kardan et al., 2017).

The main social assistance programmes are as follows:

- The Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) provides a regular monthly cash transfer to poor and vulnerable individuals without working capacity.
- The Productive Social Action Programme (PASP) is a public works programme that provides a monthly cash transfer to poor households with working capacity.
- The Direct Social Assistance Programme (PASD) provides temporary support (e.g. food, clothing, housing material) to families experiencing a household level shock.

The PSSB and PASP payments are made manually, making for an administratively burdensome and time-consuming process for INAS delegations, which have limited resources (e.g. vehicles, fuel). Making timely payments has been a challenge (Kardan et al., 2017). Progress has been made with outsourcing payments to financial service providers – which is expected to change significantly how INAS and MGCAS will deploy human resources and equipment.

Table 2 summarises the number of beneficiaries and transfer values in 2018. The ENSSB II established that the transfer values of the PSSB and PASP should be the equivalent of 66% and 100% of the poverty line, respectively. This was achieved with transfer values approved by the government in 2018.

TABLE 2 Actual social assistance beneficiaries (2018)

PROGRAMME	BENEFICIARIES	SUBSIDY AMOUNT (MZN PER MONTH)
PSSB	404,355	540-1,000
PASD	16,628	1,650
PASP	93,681	1,050

Source: GoM: PES 2018 report; Decree 59/2018

The ENSSB II foresees the use of social assistance in response to natural disasters and climate change, specifically through the PASP and PASD. The ENSSB II included three specific actions:

- Strengthen the role of PASP in response to disasters and the effects of climate change.
- Improve budget planning mechanisms for multi-sector support under the PASD in response to situations of one-off shocks and natural disasters.
- In coordination with INGC, determine the package of interventions to be provided by MGCAS/INAS in response to disasters, and establish Protocols and Procedures for its implementation (Government of Mozambique, 2016). This initiative has been described as the post-emergency PASD (PASD-PE).



The inclusion of objectives related to climatic shocks in the ENSSB II signalled an increased role for social protection in disaster assistance. A 2017 case study that considered the potential use of social protection programmes in disaster response in Mozambique was sceptical about a role for the PASD given its low coverage, the administrative and capacity challenges of rapidly identifying new households and the danger of over-burdening payment processes at the delegation level that were already stretched thin (Kardan et al., 2017). It considered the PSSB to be a more suitable programme for an emergency role – specifically the potential of increasing transfer values of recipients in affected areas. It noted that complementary measures would be needed as the PSSB does not operate in every locality or community and non-beneficiaries would be affected too. For example, in 2016, Massangena district in Gaza province had 89% of its population affected by drought and 41% reached by the PSSB (ibid.). In October 2018 quarter of people in Changara district in Tete province were estimated to be in need of assistance (SETSAN, 2018), while only about 13% of the total population were PSSB recipients.

The PASD-PE is not so much an extension of the PASD as it is a new programme with different operational guidance, payment system and transfer value to the PASD. It is anticipated that the programme will provide 2,500 MZN per month per household for six or 12 months depending on the type of shock. Unlike the PSSB, PASD and PASP, the PASD-PE is not included in

the government decree establishing the transfer values of programmes.³ In theory this makes the transfer value and duration flexible for future scenarios.

The PASD-PE was intended to be piloted in Gaza as a post-emergency programme to provide cash transfers to households that had been affected by the 2015-16 drought (WFP and World Bank Group, 2018). As of June 2019, it had not started owing with the delays caused by several factors:

- Time was spent creating a PASD-PE operations manual.
- A plan was put in place for INGC to communicate the list beneficiaries, but the INGC does not maintain its own data on affected households; lists had to be created in coordination with humanitarian agencies.
- A decision was made to contract out payments to a private sector provider; the process of identifying and contracting a company reportedly took a year.

Because the DFID-funded project resembles to PASD-PE, some in the government have referred to it as a PASD-PE pilot.

Following Cyclone Idai, the government, UN agencies and the World Bank have explored how social protection programmes could contribute to recovery efforts. The ambitions are higher than for Gaza PASD-PE pilot, which has yet to get off the ground, as are the stakes given the severity of the destruction. Issues to consider are discussed in Section 5.

³ PASD-PE has a legal basis in the Decree n. 47/2018 (Decreto de Revisao de Programas); however the programme was not included in the subsequent Decree n. 59/2018 (Decreto de Revisao de Subsídios de Programas) which sets the values for PSSB, PASP and PASD.

3. Separation of functions

DFID funded WFP and HelpAge to undertake different components of the project. This section examines how the separation of functions evolved in implementation and the implications of doing so.

3.1 WHY SEPARATE FUNCTIONS?

To understand DFID's motivations on separating functions, it is helpful to consider global-level policy discussions occurring among humanitarian donors and organisations on finding more effective and efficient ways of providing assistance amid growing needs globally. The High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (2015), High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers (2015), World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) (2016) and Grand Bargain have encouraged finding new programming and financing approaches to maximise the reach and impact of assistance. Cash transfers have featured prominently in these discussions as they provide some unique opportunities and shift how aid agencies implement and coordinate.

The potential to separate functions is one option among many possible ways to reconfigure how assistance is provided. Disaster assistance funded by international donors to UN agencies and NGOs tends to follow a few basic models for how organisations work separately or in partnership to implement a project and its components, including assessing needs, targeting/registering beneficiaries, delivering assistance, monitoring results and setting up accountability systems to identify if beneficiaries or others have issues that need to be resolved. Donors can fund an NGO (or NGOs) that undertakes all of the project activities, a UN agency that implements some activities but contracts NGO partners for the bulk of the implementation, or a consortia of NGOs that band together for a larger programme – usually dividing their roles by intervention areas.

The High Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers (ODI, 2015) saw the provision of cash transfers as an opportunity for exploring alternative models. The Panel was concerned about the tendency of a proliferation of projects in a single context, with every organisation establishing internal mechanisms to provide payments, individual contracts with providers, and their own monitoring and accountability systems. One suggestion was to finance the delivery of humanitarian cash transfers separately from assessment, targeting, monitoring and protection – drawing on the added value and specific expertise of humanitarian organisations and the private sector. A subsequent paper prepared by the World Bank Group for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals recommended trying this approach (World Bank Group, 2016).

In 2017, the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) produced guidance for its financing of large-scale transfers, dividing programmes into component A (assessments, targeting,

beneficiary registration, reporting, process and post distribution monitoring), component B (delivery of transfers) and component C (monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning) - with component C intended to be a separate contract (DG ECHO, 2017). This guidance note provided the starting point for DFID to pursue the separation of functions in the Tete project.

The idea of different organisations performing or bolstering specific functions is not new or unique to cash transfers. Examples include organisations and initiatives that support assessments, accountability, monitoring and evaluation. REACH – an initiative established in 2010 to provide contextual data and analysis – facilitates and conducts multi-sector assessments.⁴ Ground Truth Solution develops processes for community feedback on humanitarian assistance. Evaluations are often undertaken by firms and universities in order to promote independence. NGOs, universities, think tanks and consultancy firms in contexts such as Jordan, Afghanistan and Somalia also have been contracted to undertake monitoring data collection and analysis (referred to as 'third party monitoring'). Third party monitoring has been used primarily in insecure settings with limited access by humanitarian staff, but also to bring more rigour to monitoring processes and/or to consolidate findings across multiple organisations (the Overseas Development Institute undertook monitoring covering the assistance of 14 NGOs responding to famine in Somalia in 2011-12).⁵

One motivation to fund monitoring, protection, accountability, etc. separately from delivery is to ensure that these functions are adequately resourced and strengthened. These tend to be weak points in humanitarian assistance, but there are different views whether separating functions will strengthen them. Some donors and aid agencies think that such separation will create efficiency and draw on added values, while others believe that implementing agencies are best placed to monitor the assistance delivered and be accountable to recipients – indeed that these functions cannot be separated from delivery (World Bank Group, 2016; Bailey and Harvey, 2017). Debate on the topic of new assistance models became quite intense when DFID and ECHO sought to shift cash programming in Lebanon by jointly launching a \$85m call for proposals for cash transfers with independent monitoring and evaluation (Bailey and Harvey, 2017).

In Mozambique, issues of competing models, roles and mandates of humanitarian agencies in the implementation of cash transfers have been much less prominent compared to many other contexts. Indeed, humanitarian agencies have been working together to advocate for vouchers and cash transfers to be options in disaster assistance. DFID in Mozambique saw the Tete project as an opportunity to test the ECHO guidance and separation of functions at a small scale.

⁴ www.reach-initiative.org

⁵ A review of third party monitoring in insecure contexts found that third party monitoring 'can provide a meaningful contribution to the broader monitoring and evaluation toolbox by strengthening compliance in places where access is limited'. It also concluded that third party monitoring 'works best when used as a last resort measure or in conjunction with recipient agencies' internal monitoring and verification approaches' (Sagmeister and Steets, 2016).

3.2 WHAT WAS THE SEPARATION OF TASKS?

As noted in the introduction, the separation of programme functions was planned along the following lines:

- Geographic targeting of interventions areas by WFP in coordination with INGC/SETSAN
- Household targeting by HelpAge/APITE in coordination with INAS
- Registration of recipients by HelpAge/APITE/WFP and INAS local representatives based in the Delegations of Tete and Moatize using SCOPE (WFP registration software)
- Delivery of cash transfers (via mobile money) and commodity vouchers by WFP, with the choice of modality dependent on market conditions
- Household-level monitoring by HelpAge and WFP (e.g. transfer receipt, food security outcomes)
- Accountability and grievance redressal mechanism by HelpAge/APITE, with WFP using a hotline already in place

WFP and HelpAge were selected by DFID to perform these tasks based on their areas of expertise. WFP globally and in Mozambique has experience providing vouchers. In 2018, WFP also began a pilot cash-for-assets project in Tete, which provided transfers via mobile money. WFP has a regional agreement with Vodacom for the delivery of cash transfers through mobile money, as well as a long-established presence in Tete and a sub-national office located there.

HelpAge and APITE staff have many years' experience undertaking independent monitoring of the implementation of government social protection programmes in Mozambique, including through civil society initiatives supported by IrishAid and the governments of Netherlands and Germany. These initiatives monitor if people are able to understand the processes, access the programmes and receive their payments in a timely fashion, in order to advocate for improvements in social assistance over time. This experience with promoting social accountability and engagement with MGCAS and INAS was a major reason that DFID targeted HelpAge for involvement.

3.3 HOW SEPARATION OF TASKS EVOLVED

DFID's intention was to have a clear distinction between the delivery of assistance by WFP and the implementation of household targeting, registration, monitoring and accountability measures by HelpAge. WFP did independently implement the delivery by contracting businesses to provide food in communities receiving food vouchers and working with Vodacom and mobile money agents for the provision of cash transfers via mobile money. However, both organisations were involved to a certain extent in all of the other programme functions.

3.3.1 Targeting

Targeting involved two stages – the selection of communities to assist and choosing households within the communities. The selection of geographic areas went largely as foreseen. WFP led a process to identify the intervention areas by choosing six districts classified as IPC 3 and coordinating with INGC and SETSTAN to prioritise districts and communities. The household targeting was led by HelpAge in coordination with INAS. The approach prioritised existing PSSB beneficiaries, those on PSSB waiting lists and then other households that met the PSSB criteria (as discussed in greater detail in 4.3.1).

HelpAge was tasked with targeting, and as a result they did not have the capacity or positioning to provide an accountability-focused function to the targeting process, since they themselves were conducting it. That may or may not have contributed to inclusion errors that became apparent in one area ahead of the first distribution. These challenges appear mostly to be due to APITE's limited experience with a targeting exercise of this scale. APITE engaged community monitors (who were from the area assisted) to undertake the targeting, and they were not well placed to counteract the influence of locally powerful people involved in the selection. Household targeting was redone with support from WFP, owing to its experience and strong relationships with authorities. A positive working relationship between WFP and HelpAge in Maputo and Tete facilitated the resolution of targeting and registration challenges.

3.3.2 Registration

Registering households for assistance was done by APITE. However, registration was conducted using SCOPE software, because WFP used SCOPE as the delivery mechanisms for vouchers. SCOPE is the WFP beneficiary information management system. It can also be used as the delivery system for electronic vouchers, with smart cards printed that contain beneficiary data (vendors are provided point of sale devices). The registration required very close collaboration between WFP and HelpAge/APITE, including:

- WFP conducting training on SCOPE
- WFP supplying the hardware for registration because SCOPE software could not be uploaded on the tablets that had been procured by HelpAge
- WFP entering into SCOPE the names of the targeted communities in advance of the household registration by APITE. Only after areas are approved by different units in WFP and entered into SCOPE by WFP in Nairobi could households be registered (which could take up to a week).

This process resulted in initial challenges. WFP had less control compared to when it contracts a cooperating partner – in which case WFP indicates when and where to conduct the

registration once areas are uploaded. APITE and HelpAge (as with any organisation) are not used to depending or waiting on another organisation's data entry prior to sending teams to communities. When technical issues occurred related to SCOPE, APITE could not resolve them, which resulted in delays. For example, if the name of a community was misspelled in SCOPE, APITE staff could not register the households. Even WFP in Tete or Maputo could not quickly correct such errors as they depend on staff in Nairobi. In some cases, APITE did the registration in an excel format and subsequently the data was entered in SCOPE.

SCOPE registration was more time-consuming than simply entering names and other identifying information into an app or spreadsheet. Fingerprints were collected, and there were sometimes difficulties with the hardware reading the print. Because of the heaviness of the SCOPE registration process, some recipients that were added at a later period were provided with paper vouchers to retrieve their food from vendors rather than electronic SCOPE cards. While it is outside the purview of this learning exercise, one could also question whether collecting biometric data or issuing electronic cards via SCOPE is necessary for commodity vouchers. While it slowed registration, WFP has found that biometric data makes distributions easier and faster.

A lesson arising is that registration is closely linked to the delivery mechanism and any associated information management systems. In turn, these systems are influenced by the entities selected for delivery and registration. In this case, the challenges were more to do with the use of SCOPE than the separation of functions. At the same time, the use of SCOPE for voucher delivery (and therefore beneficiary registration) was a choice rather than an obligation. The delivery of mobile money payments in this project was not dependent on SCOPE – data on those recipients was first entered in excel to communicate the necessary information to Vodacom.

3.3.3 Delivery

WFP undertook delivery through SCOPE e-voucher cards for commodity vouchers and Vodacom M-PESA for cash transfers. WFP already had a regional agreement with Vodacom and recently implemented a pilot project using mobile money in Tete in 2018-19. That experience greatly facilitated engagement with Vodacom for this project. As a result, WFP shifted the way that mobile numbers were assigned to beneficiaries.⁶ Mobile money penetration remains limited outside urban areas and many of the areas assisted were far from markets. WFP therefore worked with vendors and mobile money agents to distribute the food and money in the communities (as opposed to having vendors going to stores and mobile money agents) to ensure that the supply of food and money and avoid the challenge of beneficiaries travelling long distances.

WFP still faced some operational challenges. In the case of vouchers, motivating vendors to participate in the programme and provide food on-time was an issue, WFP does not provide any payments in advance, so retailers must make up-front investments in increased stock and travel substantial distances on distribution days. Some vendors faced technical difficulties redeeming SCOPE vouchers with the point of sale devices. Mobile money agents, who also had to travel to communities for the distributions, similarly were not very motivated to participate given the time and profits involved. They did not always complete all payments on scheduled days. Because WFP's agreement was with Vodacom and M-Pesa agents are independent operators, WFP did not have a large amount of leverage beyond finding ways to motivate them. WFP worked through 'super agents' and eventually provided agents with transport in an effort to mitigate this problem.

These challenges were mainly linked to the strength of markets and financial services. The delivery also began later than planned owing to targeting and registration delays and localised flooding. The only issue related to the separation of functions was that HelpAge and APITE felt that they did not receive adequate notice about the delivery schedule to mobilise the committees that they had formed to provide information to beneficiaries and assist them at distributions (e.g. ensuring that elderly were able to access entitlements, transporting food for people unable to do so).

3.3.4 Monitoring and accountability

It was initially envisioned that HelpAge would be responsible for most of the household monitoring. WFP, however, always undertakes certain monitoring activities to fulfil its corporate requirements. It therefore was decided that WFP would undertake household-level monitoring on outputs (e.g. transfer receipt) and baseline/endline surveys that included food security data. Similarly, DFID's initial plan to centralise grievance redressal with HelpAge ended up being shared WFP because WFP already had a hotline in place for other projects.

WFP and HelpAge both had monitoring and accountability functions. The term 'monitoring' encompassed several tasks – WFP did a baseline and endline survey to gather information on demographics, food consumption, their experience of the assistance and issues such as access to markets. WFP collected data on project outputs that went hand in hand with delivery (e.g. amount of money transferred). HelpAge also sought to use WFP tools for process monitoring but this did not occur. HelpAge worked with APITE to do monitoring of the cash and voucher/food distributions through APITE Community Monitors – who served an accountability function. More precision would have been useful on the roles of each actor in the different types of monitoring (e.g. output, outcome, process), levels (e.g. household, community), processes (e.g. post-distribution

⁶ At first Vodacom was responsible for assigning phone numbers to beneficiaries. This resulted in multiple errors, and subsequently WFP requested SIM cards in the names of beneficiaries and did the allocation of phone numbers. Vodacom did registration for mobile money.

monitoring) and the relationship between project monitoring and accountability. Monitoring and accountability were typically grouped together in project documents and presentations, which may have contributed to some confusion on how these functions overlapped and related to one another.

HelpAge and APITE had previous experience monitoring national social protection programmes. The Tete project differed in that it was short-term and accountability issues or problems receiving assistance required timely resolution by WFP given their control over delivery. To identify issues, APITE distributed boxes in communities into which people could submit written feedback. At first the boxes were mainly brought during distributions, meaning that people had to slip the paper in the box at that time. Owing to concerns that people may be unwilling to do so in the presence of those attending or watching the distribution, boxes were later left in communities. A HelpAge staff member focused specifically on monitoring and accountability was placed in the APITE office, which increased the amount of feedback. However, the process of leaving boxes and then retrieving them at a later date has meant that several weeks would pass before feedback was known.

At the end of the project, WFP and HelpAge were not entirely aware of the feedback received by the other. WFP was aware of 275 individual pieces of feedback,⁷ of which 83% were through the boxes. HelpAge, meanwhile, identified over 1,000 pieces of feedback – many of which were identified at a later stage in the project when the boxes left in communities were retrieved. WFP also used an existing project helpline to solicit feedback. The feedback received was not shared with HelpAge; WFP dealt with them directly.

These issues were symptomatic of the decreased communication and coordination between HelpAge and WFP on accountability compared to during registration. Several factors contributed to this:

- WFP was very focused on the day-to-day requirements of delivering assistance and trouble-shooting issues raised through its own channels
- Compared to registration, WFP was not as dependent on HelpAge for accountability
- Both WFP and HelpAge in Maputo became focused on responding to Cyclone Idai
- HelpAge and APITE at the Tete level did not convene regular meetings with WFP to discuss issues raised
- The drive from HelpAge and APITE to increase feedback from communities did not correspond with an effort to share the feedback with WFP in a timely enough manner for issues to be resolved.

The contracting of HelpAge for accountability functions provided much more independence than if WFP had sub-contracted HelpAge. It placed HelpAge in a strong position to promote accountability in the ways it deemed most appropriate. However, the arrangement would have benefited from a stronger vision on how the independent accountability function would be harnessed to improve the project as it went along – especially as HelpAge needed WFP to resolve operational challenges identified, and WFP needed to be aware of all issues raised through HelpAge's processes.

The varying monitoring and accountability roles of WFP field staff, APITE monitors and the community committees appear to have overlapped somewhat. This is not problematic per se, since it provides more opportunities to identify issues from different standpoints. However, their precise functions do not appear to have been well communicated. During the distributions, HelpAge reported that some vendors were unaware of the nature of APITE's involvement and suspicious of why the monitors were closely observing the process. Committees and APITE monitors were also not in a position to resolve certain issues on the spot, given their lack of involvement in the delivery. The approach would have benefited from a clear delineation on the respective responsibilities through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) – and strongly communicating these roles to vendors, leaders, committees and WFP field staff.

3.3.5 Coordination

The separation of functions increased the importance of coordination for two main reasons. First, it created a partnership that was new to both WFP and HelpAge/APITE. They had not previously worked together, and normally WFP would directly sub-contract and manage a partner. Second, this section highlights how project functions are mutually dependent – delivery depends on registration, resolving accountability concerns identified by HelpAge depends on actions by WFP, etc. The fact that each partner reported directly to DFID increases the importance of defining how their roles relate to one another and how coordination will occur. An MOU WFP and HelpAge outlining these issues would have been useful. At the same time, it is unlikely that an MOU could resolve every operational challenge – ad-hoc problem solving and goodwill will remain important in such a scenario.

⁷ Of the 275 of which WFP was aware, 38 were requests for support and 148 were complaints about the assistance (mainly requesting cash instead of vouchers, issues with quality/quantity of food, registration problems).

TABLE 3 Summary of separation of functions: planned and actual

TARGETING	<p>Geographic targeting: Targeting WFP.</p> <p>Household targeting: HelpAge/APITE.</p> <p>WFP to pick up exclusion/inclusion errors that may have been done at registration, and in collaboration with HelpAge/APITE, correct these.</p>	<p>WFP undertook the geographic targeting with INGC and other partners as planned, but became more involved in household targeting than anticipated after inclusion errors in first registration in Doa (WFP's strong operational presence in Tete made it well placed to become involved with re-targeting when the issue was identified).</p>	<p>HelpAge/APITE had limited experience with household targeting and faced a learning curve. Having community monitors involved in targeting contributed to inclusion error challenges, leading to more involvement of WFP.</p> <p>District authority in Cahora Bassa took issue with the prioritisation of PSSB recipients, which resulted in some delays to negotiate solution.</p>
REGISTRATION	<p>WFP provision of SCOPE software and IT support to HelpAge for beneficiary registration.</p> <p>HelpAge registration of households using SCOPE.</p> <p>WFP provision of logistic support- should this be needed.</p> <p>WFP to lobby government should there be issues to resolve.</p> <p>WFP and HelpAge, design and disseminate key messages for community mobilization and programme awareness.</p>	<p>WFP technical support of SCOPE occurred but to a greater degree of time and resources than WFP had originally anticipated.</p> <p>INAS (at the central level) became involved in household registration in some areas in an effort to populate their new MIS system.</p> <p>WFP sub office in Tete provided important support to rally local government authorities.</p>	<p>There were SCOPE/IT challenges (due to SCOPE being new to HelpAge/APITE and requiring some steps by WFP office in Nairobi). These 'teething' issues were mainly at beginning of registration, which led to more WFP support and for HelpAge/APITE to register some households in alternative format (i.e. excel).</p> <p>INAS was not able to register all beneficiaries as desired owing to insufficient funding via the project and SCOPE and INAS MIS were not interoperable.</p>
DELIVERY	<p>WFP responsible for delivering cash and vouchers:</p> <p>Contracts with M-Pesa and commodity providers.</p> <p>Distribution of both cash and vouchers to beneficiaries.</p>	<p>Contracts signed with 21 retailers for vouchers and worked with Vodacom and M-Pesa agents for delivery.</p> <p>Delays in some districts for voucher/food delivery.</p>	<p>No difference in planned roles but some delays in delivery owing to delays in registration and some supply challenges.</p> <p>Some challenges M-Pesa agents (e.g. adequate liquidity, interest).</p>
MONITORING	<p>Output monitoring: WFP.</p> <p>Process/implementation monitoring: HelpAge (WFP were to provide corporate monitoring tools).</p> <p>Outcome monitoring: HelpAge, WFP.</p> <p>WFP and HelpAge: joint planning for donor monitoring visits.</p>	<p>WFP Baseline survey done on 12-23 December 2018 (report in Feb).</p> <p>WFP endline survey planned for 17-25 May 2019 (analysis in June, report expected in July).</p> <p>Field monitors used Open Data Kit (ODK) software.</p>	<p>WFP activities occurred as planned (one-week delay in baseline survey, due to rains).</p> <p>HelpAge monitoring of distributions was through observation and working with committees as opposed to using WFP tools.</p>
ACCOUNTABILITY, GENDER AND PROTECTION	<p>HelpAge: Responsible for the Independent Community Monitoring to ensure social accountability both at registration and distribution.</p> <p>WFP: facilitate use of WFP hotline and share complaints/feedback with HelpAge.</p> <p>-Timely sharing of distribution agenda with HelpAge/APITE for the mobilisation of community monitors.</p> <p>-Coordinate with HelpAge in preparing for joint visits.</p>	<p>Hotline used but HelpAge did not have data collected through WFP hotline.</p> <p>Distribution agenda shared by WFP but with timing challenges.</p> <p>Training of HelpAge/APITE staff and key stakeholders by WFP on gender and GBV (although not initially planned).</p> <p>District authority in Cahora Bassa took issue with the prioritisation of PSSB recipients, which resulted in some delays to negotiate solution.</p>	<p>Initial rounds of box feedback were examined jointly, but HelpAge did not have access to WFP hotline feedback and WFP did not have final round of complaints box data.</p> <p>The timing of WFP's sharing of distribution agendas was not consistently sufficient for APITE to arrange for the presence of monitors at distribution centres.</p>

4. Linking with social protection

The lean season assistance programme was funded by DFID as a humanitarian response to a predicted situation of food insecurity. This section explores how and why links were made with social protection, as well as the implications.

4.1 WHY LINK TO SOCIAL PROTECTION?

The motivation to make links with social protection and involve MGCAS and INAS was driven primarily by the following factors:

- Include cash transfers in the programme. Substantial advocacy has been done by humanitarian agencies in Mozambique to include cash transfers as an option for responses to drought and flood. However, the government has not yet authorized the provision of cash transfers outside of social assistance. The only option as of mid-2018 to provide cash transfers was by aligning the drought assistance closely with social protection programmes, systems and actors.
- Provide unconditional assistance (i.e. no work requirement). There is a pervasive concern among government officials and others that assistance should include some work (for households with labour capacity) as otherwise it leads to a 'hand-out' mentality. The PASD-PE and PSSB have no work requirements. In the case of the PSSB, this reflects cultural acceptance that older

persons and those with disabilities should not be made to work to receive assistance. Aligning the project with these social assistance programmes made it possible to provide transfers unconditionally.

- Increase options for future lean season and drought assistance. The El Nino-induced drought of 2015-16 revealed shortcomings in the DRM system, which was centred on floods and cyclone risks. How to better address drought and lean season food insecurity in Mozambique is a dynamic question that may involve both DRM and social protection systems in the future. The project has sought to test and expand options for future efforts.

Linking disaster assistance to social protection is also a part of global efforts to find ways to improve how people are assisted in response to disaster, crisis and seasonal food insecurity. In many countries, social protection programmes that provide assistance to households, and the systems that underpin these programmes, are playing a role in responding to, preparing for and mitigating the impacts of major shocks such as cyclones, floods and droughts, as well as promoting resilience (OPM, 2015; O'Brien et al., 2018; Beazley et al., 2019). Box 2 outlines ways that social protection programmes and systems can support emergency response and recovery.

BOX 2 Ways social protection systems can support emergency response and recovery

When thinking about the role of social protection in drought or flood response in Mozambique, it is useful to consider the ways that social protection programmes or their systems can directly provide assistance or play a supportive role in an emergency response. These can be used in any combination:

1. **Vertical expansion:** increasing the benefit value or duration of an existing social protection programme or system.
2. **Horizontal expansion:** temporarily extending social protection support to new households.
3. **Piggybacking:** utilising elements of an existing social protection programme or system for delivering a separate emergency response. For example, using a social protection management information system (MIS) or payment system for a separate assistance effort.
4. **Alignment:** aligning some aspects of an emergency response with current or possible future national social protection programmes. For example, if emergency assistance uses the same transfer value, modality or targeting approach as a social protection programme.
5. **Design tweaks:** making small adjustments to the design of a core social protection programme to make it more responsive. For example, adjusting payment schedules to ensure people receive their benefits ahead of a major shock.

The logic of linking to social protection programmes and targeting, management information and payment systems is that doing so may be quick, efficient and reach people at scale. However, the potential advantages of working through or linking with social protection are not automatic for several reasons:

- Social protection institutions may not have a mandate or strategies for engagement in emergency assistance.
- Social protection programmes operate on a different and less urgent time-scale than disaster responses.
- Social assistance transfer values are lower than what would be provided via humanitarian agencies (and governments may be uncomfortable with temporarily increasing values).
- Social protection programmes and systems never cover all of those affected by a disaster – bringing new people into a programme can be time-consuming and complementary assistance measures may be needed to reach them.

Broader dialogue on the role of social protection in disaster resilience and response was taking place in Mozambique at the time the project was conceived, which it sought to advance. In June 2018, MGCAS, the World Bank and WFP organized a national Dialogue on Social Resilience, which focused on potential synergies between the social protection, DRM and adaptation to climate change sectors and developing a roadmap for adaptive social protection system in Mozambique. Coordination between social protection and DRM was identified as an obstacle at that forum. Subsequently, WFP and the World Bank collaborated with MGCAS, INAS and INGC to undertake a study on INGC and INAS coordination.

4.2 WHAT LINKS WERE MADE?

The project linked to social protection in three main ways. First, MGCAS and INAS were involved as key stakeholders in

the project design, and MGCAS approved the project on 24 September 2018. By contrast, humanitarian assistance by international agencies is usually preceded by a government request for it, and the design is discussed with local authorities and the INGC. Second, the transfer value was set at 2,500 MZN per month per household and did not vary according to household size, which was aligned with the planned PASD-PE. Third, the targeting criteria considered the following drought-affected households (in order of priority):

1. PSSB beneficiaries
2. Those PSSB waiting lists⁸
3. Those meeting PSSB criteria but who are not beneficiaries or on waiting lists
4. Those meeting PASD-PE criteria

The links to social protection were therefore aligning and coordinating with existing and planned social protection programmes – the project was not implemented through the PSSB and PASD-DE government programmes or systems. However, as discussed below, INAS did eventually seek for the registration process to use a newly created INAS management information system.

4.3 IMPLICATIONS OF LINKING WITH SOCIAL PROTECTION

4.3.1 Targeting

Based on SETSAN analysis from October 2018, an estimated 40% of people were in need of assistance in the target districts (SETSAN, 2018). The project assisted 24,000 households, which accounted for approximately 19% of the total population in those districts and half of those in need (assuming that all of those assisted were in need) (see Table 4).



⁸ Waiting lists do not exist in all areas and have not been a formal process. In the future waiting lists will be accessible through e-INAS now being operational, including its social registry module, which will retain data on beneficiaries and those eligible for all programmes

TABLE 4 Estimated population in need and assisted per district

DISTRICT	TOTAL POPULATION	POP EST IN NEED OF AID	% POP EST IN NEED OF AID	HH ASSISTED BY PROJECT	COVERAGE (AS % IN NEED OF AID)*	COVERAGE (AS % OF TOTAL POP)*	PSSB RECIPIENTS (AS % OF BENEF)	HH HEADED BY OLDER PEOPLE	HH HEADED BY WOMEN	HH HEADED BY PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES	HH HEADED BY CHILDREN	HH WITH CHRONIC ILLNESSES	TOTAL
Doa	87,454	43,957	50%	5,000	57%	29%	19%	44%	32%	11%	1%	12%	100%
Chiuta	103,875	32,201	31%	4,000	62%	19%	12%	44%	32%	11%	1%	11%	100%
Marara	74,659	31,357	42%	3,200	51%	21%	22%	44%	32%	11%	1%	12%	100%
Cahora Bassa	132,972	66,486	50%	5,000	38%	19%	15%	44%	32%	11%	1%	12%	100%
Mágoè	91,313	41,091	45%	2,800	34%	15%	14%	44%	32%	11%	1%	12%	100%
Changara	128,453	32,112	25%	4,000	62%	16%	19%	34%	46%	11%	1%	8%	100%
Total	618,726	247,204	40%	24,000	49%	19%	17%	42%	35%	11%	1.1%	11%	100%

*Based on an average of 5 persons per household. Sources: SETSAN (2018); Project data from HelpAge, WFP

As shown in **Table 5**, there is substantial overlap between the PSSB, PASD-PE and humanitarian guidance for targeting drought assistance. All consider the elderly, disabled and chronically ill, which are usually seen as proxies for vulnerability. The humanitarian criteria also include PSSB beneficiaries, who initially had been left out of some

humanitarian assistance during the 2015-16 drought on the basis that they were 'covered' by the PSSB.⁹ A difference is that humanitarian agencies often include some criteria related to food security and livelihoods, rather than only categories (e.g. elderly, disabled). Humanitarian agencies may also include additional categories, such as pregnant and lactating women.

TABLE 5 Household targeting criteria: The DFID-funded project, PSSB, PASD-PE and humanitarian drought assistance

DFID-FUNDED PROJECT		HUMANITARIAN (INDICATIVE)	
<p><i>Households who are:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> PSSB beneficiaries On PSSB waiting lists Meet PSSB criteria PASD-PE criteria 		<p><i>Households who are: PSSB beneficiaries or meet PSSB criteria</i></p> <p><i>Households who are headed by:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elderly Single parent Children Disabled <p><i>Or have members who are</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pregnant/lactating More than 6 dependants Disabled <p><i>And</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have 1.5 ha of land or less Have lost/reduced labour opportunities Have lost/reduced agricultural and productive assets Have lost livestock 	
<p>PSSB</p> <p><i>Individuals without labour capacity who are:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elderly Disabled Chronically ill or bedridden Students under 18 or under 22 + enrolled in a teaching institution 	<p>PASD-PE</p> <p><i>Households who are headed by:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Elderly Disabled Women Children Bedridden individuals Someone temporarily incapacitated 		

⁹ The exclusion of PSSB beneficiaries from humanitarian assistance during the 2016 drought was concerning because PSSB transfers were not consistently provided on time and their values were much lower than the amounts of food assistance provided by humanitarian agencies (Kardan et al., 2016).

The prioritisation of PSSB recipients was controversial. Key informants outside of project, MGCAS/INAS and the beneficiaries consulted felt that they should not be prioritised given that they receive benefits and others do not – even though the amounts that PSSB recipients receive is lower per household per month (540-1000 MZN for PSSB households compared to 2500 MZN for six months for project recipients). This concern was exacerbated by the relatively low coverage of the project in each community. In one community visited of about 2,500 households, 145 households received assistance, of which 32 were PSSB beneficiaries.


On average, 17% of the project beneficiaries were also PSSB recipients (see Table 4). This varied from locality to locality, as the PSSB is not operational in all localities or communities. In Cahora Bassa district, the district government would not agree with prioritising PSSB recipients for the drought response given that they already benefited from the PSSB. A compromise was reached whereby vulnerable drought-affected households who were not benefiting from the PSSB were prioritised over those who were. However, 15% of the lean season recipients in Cahora Bassa were PSSB beneficiaries, which was relatively similar to other districts.

Key community informants viewed the project as assisting the elderly. Indeed, the use of PSSB criteria did result in a different age profile of recipients compared to other WFP assistance, as shown in Figure 3. People over 60 comprised 42% of beneficiaries, whereas in other WFP projects in Mozambique they are only 17%. By contrast the breakdown by sex was similar, with 63% female recipients compared 61% in other projects.

Data indicates that most of those assisted were food insecure. WFP baseline data (of targeted households prior to the first transfer) found that 42% had poor consumption, 43% had borderline consumption and 15% had acceptable levels. These levels were much worse than national averages assessed in

October 2018 – which is unsurprising since the project targeted the most food insecure districts (WFP Mozambique, 2018). Community-level informants consulted felt that those receiving the assistance were very vulnerable, but that many people needing assistance were left out.

FIGURE 3 Age profile of Tete project recipients compared to other WFP projects



Source: WFP Mozambique

Identifying the ‘most’ vulnerable and food insecure is always challenging in communities with pervasive poverty and food insecurity. It is not possible to draw a conclusion on whether the use of PSSB criteria improved the identification of food insecure households. Data was not collected that would enable a baseline comparison of the food security of those selected compared to others in the community who were not. Even such data would make it hard to analyse exclusion error since the limited coverage means that inevitably some food insecure households were excluded. An issue to consider for future lean season and drought interventions is that the use of PSSB criteria excludes households with labour capacity, such as smallholder farmers, who are affected by drought and seasonal food insecurity. It also did not include any specific criteria related to food security and livelihoods.

4.3.2 Registration

As noted in the previous section, WFP had planned to use SCOPE for the delivery of vouchers – and as a result APITE used SCOPE to register recipients. However, ahead of the registration process, INAS requested that the registration be done through e-INAS – a management information system that had been under development since 2011 with support from ILO and UNICEF. It was formally launched on 19 July 2019.

While e-INAS will eventually include PSSB recipients, at the time the project began this had not yet occurred because data migration was still ongoing. An advantage of including the project recipients in e-INAS is that the system would then have data on people eligible for (but not receiving) the PSSB, should the PSSB be expanded. However, there were concerns about deviating from the planned project registration process of HelpAge/APITE registering recipients through SCOPE. Using the e-INAS could create delays if WFP did not have readily available access to the data needed for delivery. In addition, biometric data is not collected by INAS, which WFP uses for SCOPE e-vouchers.

Rather than using e-INAS, WFP suggested that the household data collected for the project via SCOPE could be imported into it. The data fields collected for e-INAS were also collected for SCOPE, though a difference is that e-INAS defines geographic areas as neighbourhoods/villages and SCOPE as communities. While WFP could export SCOPE data, e-INAS reportedly did not have the functionality to import the data. In the end, INAS staff were deployed from Maputo to conduct the registration side-by-side APITE staff and enumerators – with each entering the data into its respective system. This increased resource and coordination requirements, as the APITE team needed to align its schedule with INAS, and INAS needed financial support to participate. At one point there was a delay of a week when the INAS team had ceased registration owing to lack of resources – eventually APITE continued on their own. Because INAS did not have sufficient resources to accompany the registration process in all areas, not all project recipients were also registered in e-INAS.

4.3.3 Transfer value

Normally the amount of cash or food provided through social assistance is lower than that of humanitarian assistance, given the focus of the latter on meeting the larger needs that people face as a result of a major shock. In this case, however, the transfer value of 2,500 MZN was aligned with the value planned for the PASD-PE, which was influenced by the values of voucher assistance provided by humanitarian agencies for drought. However, it is still lower than what humanitarian NGOs have provided. In 2016, the COSACA NGO consortium provided 3,800 MZN; in 2019, World Vision provided vouchers valued at 4,200 for four months and followed by 1,800 MZN for two. While those designing the lean season project proposed the option of varying the transfer values by household size, INAS and MGCAS preferred to maintain one standard value – meaning that all households received 2,500 MZN regardless of whether they had two members or ten.

Smaller households therefore received more per individual than larger ones. As shown in Table 6, those benefiting most were households headed by someone under 26 and by women over 60. The larger households disadvantaged were those headed by men aged 36-60 years (and, to a slightly lesser extent, women-headed households in that same age range). Had the project been able to provide lower transfer values to smaller households, resources would have been freed up to assist more people.

A question for the future is the flexibility of the 2,500 MZN transfer value for cash transfers. It is not entirely clear whether the PASD-PE transfer value or duration could be adjusted if needs or prices change. In September 2018, the government issued Decree 59/2018, which established transfer values for the PSSB, PASP and PASD but not the PASD-PE. While this implies some flexibility, the 2,500 MZN amount could also become a standard value for the PASD-PE. Regardless, there will inevitably

TABLE 6 Average household size by sex and age of household head

AGE RANGE (HH HEAD)	FEMALE HEADED		MALE-HEADED	
	% OF TOTAL HH	AVG HH SIZE	TOTAL HH	AVG HH SIZE
17-24	7.3%	1.88	2.4%	3.69
18-25	4.2%	3.88	2.9%	3.76
26-35	6.3%	4.99	4.4%	4.88
36-40	4.6%	5.68	2.8%	6.22
41-50	8.6%	5.38	5.2%	6.69
51-60	10.0%	4.65	6.1%	5.83
61-70	13.3%	3.96	(NOT AVAILABLE)	
71-80	8.5%	3.63	6.1%	4.70
81-90	3.6%	3.30	2.5%	4.11
91-100	0.6%	3.01	0.4%	4.15
100+	0.1%	4.83	0.1%	4.29

Source: WFP Mozambique

be some coordination challenges between the type, value and duration of transfers provided through the PASD-PE (and programmes aligned to it) and those provided by humanitarian agencies calculated on households' food and other needs.

4.3.4 Monitoring and accountability

WFP and HelpAge directly undertook the activities needed to meet their own monitoring and accountability requirements – such as the baseline and endline survey, feedback boxes and the WFP phone line. It was also originally intended for INAS to participate to a greater extent in monitoring given the involvement of MGCAS and INAS in the project. However, most of those resources were used by INAS to support their involvement in registration. Staff from INAS Delegations were part of monitoring visits (including WFP, HelpAge and DFID) in December 2018 and April 2019. The INGC was in a similar position, with substantial interest at the district level in following up on the project activities but without resources to do so.

4.3.5 Coordination

The links with social protection increased coordination requirements because stakeholders from both disaster management and social protection were involved – namely the INGC, SETSAN, MGCAS and INAS. Coordination was also essential with District authorities, who are always key intermediaries. A launch meeting was held in Tete in September 2018 to bring all parties together and present the project objectives and processes. The meeting was highly appreciated by those consulted who attended, but INAS and INGC at the district levels in particular were interested in continued involvement beyond that meeting. In addition, the fact that a District Administrator later took issue with the targeting criteria suggests that more direct communication was needed at that level during design stage. In the future, organising regular meetings at the district level among the project implementers and government stakeholders could facilitate coordination, especially in this case given the different roles of WFP and HelpAge/APITE in registration, monitoring and delivery.

From a policy standpoint, the project included efforts to bring together social protection and DRM actors to explore thinking on adaptive social protection. This included WFP support for the 2018 national Dialogue on Social Resilience, which familiarised stakeholders with basic concepts of adaptive social protection and explored how to improve coordination between DRM and social protection systems in Mozambique. Because the PASD-PE had not yet been implemented, the project also set an operational precedent for how social assistance could be linked to drought response. The precedent and policy work undoubtedly laid some of the groundwork for the planned use of social protection systems to promote recovery in the aftermath of Cyclones Idai and Kenneth.

5. Social protection in response to Cyclones Idai and Kenneth: issues to consider

Cyclone Idai was a major disaster of unprecedented scale for Mozambique. A Post-Disaster Needs Assessment estimated \$3.2 billion in recovery and reconstruction needs, of which \$1.1 billion was pledged by development partners at a conference in Beira in June 2019 (UNDP, 2019). The large-scale destruction and the severity of the impacts resulted in substantial engagement of international agencies in the INGC-led response, particularly from WFP and its partners.

Approximately 1.6 million people had been reached with humanitarian assistance as of May 2019 (OCHA, 2019). At the request of INGC, WFP conducted a major data collection exercise in April to June 2019 to register affected households, in order to facilitate the targeting of humanitarian and recovery efforts. The process included collecting additional vulnerability data on households receiving humanitarian assistance (for example, the number of children and their ages, if households have pregnant or lactating women, elderly, disabled members).

Less than a month after Cyclone Idai, the World Bank and WFP, with support from UNICEF and the ILO, developed a concept note for discussion with MGCAS and INAS on options for using social protection to bridge relief and recovery efforts. The following was proposed, though the precise number of target households has shifted during the planning:

- PASP: In July 2019, a simplified version of the PASP would be implemented for three months in affected areas for 33,000 households.¹⁰ Registration for PASP had taken place ahead of Cyclone Idai, and an assumption was made that people from areas hit by the cyclone were disaster-affected.
- PASD-PE: Starting in September 2019 for six months, a large-scale version of the PASD-PE would provide unconditional cash transfers through INAS, with support from development partners for registration, monitoring and payment delivery as needed. Initial planning figures of 120,000 households were subsequently revised downwards to 105,000.
- PSSB child grant: Starting in March 2020, a PSSB child grant programme would be implemented for 24 months, to bolster support to households with children (0-2). As of July 2019, funding had been secured for 4,500 households.

The exact role for social protection in the recovery response was still evolving in June 2019, with the World Bank playing a very influential role as the primary donor for these efforts. While the details were to be worked out, social protection is anticipated to play a major role in reaching households.

Data on affected households and social assistance recipients will heavily influence the implementation of the PASD-PE – the largest of social assistance recovery efforts. It is planned that the PASD-PE recipients would include PSSB beneficiaries, those on PSSB waiting lists, PASP and PASD participants and other cyclone-affected households that had been registered by the INGC (mainly through the WFP-led data collection). This approach mirrors the DFID-funded Tete lean season assistance and appears to have been directly influenced by it. As of June 2019, data on affected households was being collected and held by different actors:

- In Beira, INAS collected data on 31,000 affected households at the request of INGC and supported by WFP resources. These were entered into e-INAS.
- In other areas (i.e. not in Beira), WFP had collected and entered into SCOPE data on additional 130,000 households in Sofala, Manica, Zambezia and Tete.
- NGO partners of WFP had data on tens of thousands of households reached with food assistance. This data had not been provided to WFP owing to NGO data protection policies and their concerns about subsequently being able to access it. WFP and NGO partners were in discussion about data-sharing.
- INAS had data on people registered for the PASP.
- WFP, INGC and INAS were in the process of establishing a data-sharing protocol so that data from SCOPE to e-INAS could be shared and viceversa.

As noted above, there were on-going discussions about using PSSB and PASP lists to identify recipients. In essence, this means providing existing recipients more benefits (i.e. vertical expansion) and adding new recipients that need assistance but aren't part of the PSSB and PASP programmes (i.e. horizontal expansion). These social assistance programmes are not present in all affected areas, and being included in social assistance is not a strong predictor of having been affected by a flood. While the lists are important for identifying vulnerable people in flood-affected areas, complementary measures will be essential to identify and assist people outside of the programme – whether through social assistance or humanitarian programmes.

In June 2019, the data on other cyclone-affected households was spread between INAS, WFP and WFP partners. INAS needs to have access to that data and time and resources to enrol those households in the programmes. Otherwise the targeting of recovery social assistance will be based on the household

¹⁰ While not part of social protection, support is also planned in the form of joint multi-sector vouchers from WFP and UNICEF for 20,000 households in Dondo and Nhamatanda districts.

¹¹ Research on shock responsive social protection found that 'The greatest adverse effect that vertical expansion of a social protection programme risks creating is that a large percentage of the disaster-affected miss out on support, as they are not enrolled in the programme being scaled up. This may happen if the implementer focuses on the administrative convenience of the top-up (looking at output measures such as speed of response and numbers of households reached) rather than on higher-level impacts. The size of this risk depends on the degree of overlap between beneficiaries and disaster-affected communities, and the extent of any culture of sharing assistance among households' (O'Brien et al., 2018: 17).



data available to INAS (namely pre-existing beneficiaries) rather than needs.¹¹ At the same time, the sharing of such data should not preclude NGOs from directly providing assistance to those they have registered for emergency assistance, particularly given the capacity constraints of INAS. Close coordination will be needed to track which households receive assistance from whom in order to avoid gaps and duplication.

An additional concern is the capacity of INAS delegations to implement a scaled-up PASD-PE. Even before the cyclones, INAS delegations had very limited capacity to make payments to recipients given their lack of resources and the time-intensive process of making payments manually. The PASD-PE has not yet been implemented and was not planned for the affected areas, meaning that it will be new to INAS delegations, who have faced multiple demands in the disaster response and are still responsible for the implementation of regular social assistance programmes. The political will to expand social assistance programmes will need to be accompanied by additional capacity within INAS and complemented by development partners if necessary. Even so, starting large-scale payments in September 2019 is a tall order.

The experience of WFP and HelpAge/APITE in Tete provides some relevant lessons. In particular it highlights the importance of:

- Close coordination, established communication channels and well-defined responsibilities if different entities are involved in the PASD-PE registration, delivery or monitoring.
- Ensuring that different entities' delivery and information management systems can link to one another – and that one organisation's systems do not become another's straight-jacket.
- Not under-estimating the capacity and support required to deliver transfers. The fact that the PASD-PE Gaza pilot has not been implemented three years after its conception underscores the importance of augmenting and complementing INAS capacity support for the PASD-PE cyclone assistance – which is planned to be five times larger than the Gaza pilot.

6. Conclusion

The Tete project broke new ground in Mozambique. It was the first humanitarian assistance to provide unconditional cash transfers and link to social protection by aligning certain design features and involving MGCAS and INAS. The experience shows that separating functions and issuing individual contracts to different partners is feasible, and that views on the operational advantages and disadvantages look different depending on whether the agency's specific role is one of delivery or accountability, as well as where the lines of separation are drawn. A common theme for both separation of functions and linking to social protection is that the added value and trade-offs are not automatic but dependent on how they are done.

For separation of functions, this 'how' includes the extent to which different roles are defined and communicated, the payment or information management systems used, the goodwill of partners to resolve issues, the capacity of partners to perform their tasks, and clear mechanisms to ensure seamless coordination. An MOU between HelpAge and WFP would likely have smoothed some of those issues, but it would not change that the approach was a new type of partnership or that most functions rely on one another to varying degrees. WFP's delivery and information management system also strongly influenced links between registration and delivery. However, systems are not necessarily set in stone, given that SCOPE registration was not an operational necessity for mobile money or paper vouchers. Because organisations often work with and through partners to implement programmes, the arrangement was not entirely new. What changed in this instance was mainly DFID being more proactive in defining those precise roles and the nature of the partnership – one based more on coordination rather than one partner managing another.

In the case of links between social protection and emergency response, much depends on the types of links made. These range from basic coordination of humanitarian programmes with social protection agencies to social protection programmes and systems being primary vehicles for reaching disaster-affected populations – with many options in between. The linkages made by the Tete project were relatively light, with the transfer value and targeting criteria mirroring social assistance, which was not drastically different from what a humanitarian project would have provided. There were some differences that would need to be considered in the future, namely whether a stronger food security lens is needed for targeting, the extent to which transfer values could be adjusted, and how assistance through or aligned with social protection is coordinated with other disaster assistance and recovery efforts. The links with social protection enabled the project to provide unconditional cash transfers to drought-affected households, which may help on-going advocacy efforts to use cash transfers in disaster response.

Cyclone Idai has significantly shifted the operational and policy landscape. A major recovery effort is planned and social protection is foreseen to have a prominent role. Cyclone recovery efforts accelerated attention to shock-responsive social protection and shifted the focus from drought to flood response. The interest of MGCAS and INAS in engaging in recovery efforts has increased substantially, as have the resources for doing so. The use of social assistance for recovery has become a high priority for many actors, including the World Bank.

The planned use of the PASD-PE in the cyclone recovery in particular creates an important opportunity to reach people with unconditional cash transfers at a large-scale. It must be accompanied by adequate capacity-building and support to INAS to ensure that registration and delivery occur in a timely fashion. The government and its partners need to move quickly and not underestimate the resources required for large-scale registration and implementation. Lessons from other contexts have found that expanding social protection programmes to meet emergency needs is complex and often takes longer than anticipated (Beazley et al., 2019; O'Brien, 2018). It is crucial that the post-cyclone recovery efforts not experience the severe delays encountered in piloting the PASD-PE in Gaza. Such delays would either leave people vulnerable at a crucial moment in their recovery or necessitate greater assistance through disaster channels to compensate.

There is also a risk of shock-responsive social protection being advanced in a silo between humanitarian assistance and social protection rather than a bridge joining them:

- If the starting point for the PASD-PE is pre-existing data on who can be reached (i.e. data already with INAS) rather than who is most in need.
- If social assistance recovery programmes are treated as discreet projects and not opportunities for strengthening social protection systems.
- If there is not enough attention to the question of how social assistance links to overall coordination and other relief and recovery efforts (social assistance will be only one piece among many efforts to support livelihoods, basic needs and recovery).
- If there is insufficient focus on the bigger question of how future shock-responsive efforts will be funded and triggered.

6.1 LOOKING AHEAD

The advantages and challenges of linking with social protection and separating functions in the Tete project were inherently tied to how these approaches were taken forward and the dynamic policy and operational context of disaster response and social protection in Mozambique. Government, donors



and aid organisations should consistently consider the added value and trade-offs of different approaches to partnership and linkages to social protection.

When determining the role of social protection systems, they need to explore speed, accountability, the ability to reach disaster-affected people at scale, the provision of assistance appropriate in type and duration, reaching those most in need (and not merely those already part of social assistance programmes) and whether governments systems are strengthened as a result.¹² In the long-term, policy-

makers should consider how to develop predictable triggers, financing and coordination for social protection systems in disaster response and recovery, as part of the bigger picture of strengthening DRM and social protection systems to perform their core roles.

Based on DFID-funded project and planned cyclone recovery efforts, summarises recommendations when disaster assistance implementation functions are separated or social protection systems are used in response and recovery.

¹² See O'Brien et al., 2017 for full discussion on factors to consider

TABLE 7 Recommendations when linking with social protection or separating programme functions

LINKING WITH SOCIAL PROTECTION	SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Identify and mitigate risks of providing disaster or recovery aid through or linked to social protection – notably related to potential delays, inadequate transfer values or exclusion of disaster-affected people not already in social assistance schemes. 2. Closely coordinate assistance provided through or linked to social protection with other assistance provided through DRM and humanitarian channels. 3. Provide adequate capacity-building support to government agencies leading the provision of social assistance emergency/recovery support and complement with support humanitarian and development partners as needed -particularly if government capacity alone cannot ensure timely delivery of assistance. 4. Anticipate and mitigate technical and political challenges of linking disaster response and social protection – including recognising who may benefit or lose resources as a result of working with and through social protection systems. Measures and incentives should be put in place for responsible data-sharing to facilitate for the registration and delivery of assistance to disaster-affected households. 5. Do not exclude social assistance beneficiaries from humanitarian assistance. When emergency and recovery responses are implemented through social protection systems, ensure that affected people not previously benefiting from social assistance are helped too. In the latter scenario, this means ensuring adequate resources and processes to identify and assist people not already part of social assistance. It may take the form of temporarily expanding an emergency social assistance programme to reach new people and/or providing complementary assistance through DRM and humanitarian channels (if, for example, resources through social protection were insufficient or administratively challenging to register/reach new households in the needed timeframe). 6. Ensure that household targeting of lean season responses always includes food security and livelihood related criteria. It 7. Look ahead to how responses linked to social protection will be triggered, financed and coordinated with DRM and humanitarian assistance. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Clearly define responsibilities, coordination and communication channels among partners. This may include developing an MOU delineating roles and coordination, while allowing flexibility to adapt processes given that unforeseen issues may arise. 9. Recognise the inter-dependence of programme functions and how information management and delivery systems influence implementation. All actors involved in implementation and accountability should be cognisant of how their individual systems could impact the arrangement. This includes how the delivery systems may influence registration and vice versa. 10. Ensure a strong feedback loop between accountability functions that raise challenges and operational efforts to resolve them. When accountability is supported through an organisation not directly involved in other aspects of implementation, mechanisms need to be in place for problems raised through their channels to be resolved – otherwise accountability risks becoming delinked from problem-solving. Measures should be outlined in advance how particularly sensitive cases (e.g. related to corruption, sexual exploitation) will be handled. 11. Consider organisations’ added values when establishing their roles and involve them in determining how roles relate to one another. Potential added values include capacities, systems, past experience, government relationships and community presence.

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Annex 1 People consulted

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1	Catriona Clunas	Humanitarian Advisor	Maputo	DFID	Donor
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4	Nicolas Babu	Programme Policy Officer	Maputo	WFP	UN
5	Fatima Suleiman	Programme Policy Officer (CBT)	Maputo	WFP	UN
6	Mattia Polvanesi	Programme Policy Officer	Maputo	WFP	UN
7	Helga Gunnel	Gender and Protection Officer	Maputo	WFP	UN
8	Maria Gloria da Siaca	National Director	Maputo	INAS	Government
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15	Benjamin Zeitlyn	Social Development Advisor	Maputo	DFID	Donor
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26	Feliciano Chamo	Programme Officer	Tete	WFP	UN
27	Hermingarda Ofelia	Programme Officer	Tete	WFP	UN
28	Florencio Alves		Tete	SETSAN	Government
29	Adelso Cassamo		Tete	SETSAN	Government
30	Joaquim Curipa	Provincial Delegate	Tete	INGC	Government
31	INGC technicians	INGC district technicians	Tete	INGC	Government
32	Champion Charles		Tete	APITE	NGO
33	Zeca Chicusse		Tete	APITE	NGO
34	Domingos Cumpeu Jota	Field M&E Officer	Tete	APITE	NGO
35	Carlos Costantino	Delegate of INAS Delegation in Tete	Tete	INAS	Government
36	Patrocinio	Technician of INAS Delegation in Moatize (project FP)	Tete	INAS	Government
37	Jose Mesa	Technician of INAS Delegation in Tete (project FP)	Tete	INAS	Government
38	Rui Miguel	Chief of Social Action Department, Tete Delegation	Tete	INAS	Government
39	Ana Maria Derezoni Marcelino	District Administrator	Cahora Bassa	Distict Government Cahora Bassa	Government
40	Maki Kato	Head of Social Policy	Maputo	UNICEF	UN
41	Chris Cosgrove	Consultant	Maputo	Advisory services to DFID	Donor

Annex 2 Summary of implications of linking with social protection and separation of functions

TABLE 8 Summary of implications of linking with social protection and separation of functions

	LINKING TO SOCIAL PROTECTION	SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS	OTHER INFLUENCING FACTORS
COVERAGE/ TARGETING	<p>Prioritisation of PSSB recipients was controversial, with none outside of project and INAS stating that they should be prioritized and most stating that they should not be included given that their regular benefits</p> <p>The programme had a high proportion of elderly people and is perceived in communities visited as a project helping older people</p> <p>The programme addressed food insecurity but did not include food security criteria in targeting or households dependent on agriculture with labour capacity. This focus could have implications for future lean season assistance.</p>	<p>Because HelpAge was tasked with targeting, they did not have the capacity or positioning to provide an accountability-focused function to the targeting process, since they themselves were conducting it. That may or may not have contributed to inclusion errors that became apparent in the first distribution.</p> <p>SCOPE erroneously excluded some households as the data appears to be duplicative (multiple households had the same identity card number)</p>	<p>Capacity/experience: The limited experience of APITE and HelpAge with large-scale household targeting</p> <p>Coverage: The relatively low coverage of the programme in individual communities (may have exacerbated attitudes about the prioritisation and inclusion of PSSB recipients)</p> <p>Pressure on APITE focal points in some areas on targeting; APITE was not as well-placed to pushback upon as another organization might have been.</p> <p>INAS interest in using its new data systems and also how programme data might be used in future PSSB expansion</p> <p>WFP Tete Sub-Office well-established relationship with District Administrators / government</p> <p>Targeting is always a difficult exercise and some challenges are inevitable due to stakes</p>
TIMELINESS	<p>Approval by MGCAS took about one month. This is much shorter than it usually takes for MGCAS approval, but an emergency project does not face that process</p> <p>INAS participation in registration resulted in some delays (for example, when INAS resources for fieldwork were finished prior to APITE and INAS requested the registration to be put on hold, resulting in a week's delay).</p>	<p>The necessity for APITE/HelpAge to use SCOPE in the voucher registration process resulted in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need for familiarising APITE with SCOPE (training of enumerators) • Some delays when WFP SCOPE Nairobi had not uploaded communities • Some delays from initial trouble-shooting with SCOPE registration in communities. <p>Delivery is dependent on data from registration – with separate contracts the delivering agency does not have control over the registering agency.</p>	<p>See above, on capacity</p> <p>Systems: HelpAge had their own tablets but could not upload WFP SCOPE software for registering. WFP had ICT capacity but more ICT capacity at WFP sub-office in Tete would have facilitated the process.</p> <p>APITE/HelpAge did not have much ICT capacity to support the process and faced a learning curve (both organizations were users of the SCOPE, WFP has ownership and administrative powers over the SCOPE).</p> <p>Use of enumerators with previous SCOPE registration experience facilitated process.</p> <p>While cash transfers are still novel, WFP had done a pilot, has regional framework agreement with Vodacom and had already negotiated an agreement with Vodacom in Mozambique. However, Vodacom experienced shortage of mobile phones and delays on registering beneficiaries.</p> <p>Vouchers require substantial engagement and liaising with traders, who have varying capacities. Some traders required support from WFP to deliver.</p>

EFFICIENCY / MINIMIZING DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS	<p>INAS, INGC and District government all have strong desire for continued engagement (e.g. site visits, monitoring), which could necessitate resources if project decides to financially support such engagement.</p> <p>INAS undertook a simultaneous registration process. This may prove efficient for INAS if that data is used in the future but meant that more project resources were spend to enable INAS involvement in registration (INAS staff, enumerators).</p>	<p>Registration was linked to SCOPE as WFP was using it for voucher cards and delivery, requiring some time on WFP's side to familiarise partners and support registration.</p> <p>WFP undertakes household monitoring and a phone line for its own accountability functions; not duplicative as APITE is not doing PDM but does mean stronger role for WFP in monitoring than implied in the design.</p> <p>WFP has provided capacity building and training for APITE that they did not anticipate.</p> <p>WFP needed to be involved in certain aspects of registration owing to SCOPE.</p>	<p>See "capacity" and "systems"</p>
ACCOUNTABILITY	<p>It is unclear at this stage if linking to SP is affecting accountability. INAS participated in monitoring but to a more limited extent than foreseen owing to using project resources to support their participation in registration.</p>	<p>The independent contracting ensures HelpAge and APITE's independence in their accountability functions.</p> <p>Having HelpAge/APITE and WFP engaged in accountability measures increases likelihood of identifying issues.</p> <p>Need for a strong coordination and prompt feedback loop between HelpAge/APITE monitoring and WFP implementation – not clear that this exists.</p>	<p>Capacity: WFP had a grievance system in place and phone line; APITE did not and is piggy-backing on some of WFP's systems.</p> <p>Much problem solving (on receipt of transfer, etc.) appears to be happening at community-level.</p> <p>APITE has previous experience monitoring social assistance.</p>
GENDER AND PROTECTION	<p>Because PSSB recipients are prioritised, if the PSSB caseload is predominantly men or women, this could affect the inclusion of men and women in the programme. Data however found that the breakdown by sex was similar compared to other programmes.</p>	<p>The presence of multiple actors at the community level (APITE monitors, WFP focal points, assistance committees) increases the likelihood of protection concerns being identified.</p>	<p>WFP has a gender and protection focal point.</p> <p>APITE has previous experience monitoring social assistance.</p> <p>The integration of gender and protection in programming is always dependent on the extent to which aid agencies prioritise these issues and have capacity to meaningfully address them.</p>
APPROPRIATENESS OF TYPE OF SUPPORT	<p>Cash transfers were only an option because of the links to SP, therefore expanding tools available to support populations.</p>	<p>No effects noted</p>	<p>WFP piloting of cash transfers in Tete provided some experience and lessons.</p> <p>INGC becoming more open to cash transfers and the CWG is working with INGC to get government approval to enable their use.</p>
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE TRANSFER VALUE / AMOUNT OF SUPPORT	<p>Linking with social protection systems had a neutral impact on the appropriateness of the transfer value. The transfer value is directly based on the PASD-PE, which itself was informed by guidance from the Food Security Cluster SOPs for IPC 3 (75% of the required kilo calorie needs per individual). Therefore both SP and HA would have used a similar reference point. It does appear that MGCAS/INAS involvement limited the option to vary the transfer amount by household size.</p>	<p>No effects noted</p>	<p>The codification of 2500MZ in the PASD-PE guidance could be inflexible in future responses if prices change. On the other hand, the PASD-PE and its transfer value has not been fixed in any government decree, could make it flexible.</p>
COORDINATION	<p>The programme straddling the social protection and humanitarian worlds has been accompanied by close and necessary engagement with MGCAS and INAS, particularly at the Maputo level, as well as INGC/SETSAN for geographic targeting. Desired for continued involvement by INAS and INGC particularly at Provincial/District levels. More actors involved requires more coordination compared to working only with DRM or SP.</p>	<p>The separation of functions requires more coordination because both of the partners are accountable to DFID rather than one managed by another, and because programming functions are linked (registration informs delivery, monitoring inform changes to implementation, etc.). The implications are most strongly felt by the organization in charge of delivery, which is dependent on data from the organization responsible for registration and accountability / monitoring.</p>	<p>An MOU would have clarified and streamlined some coordination aspects between WFP and HelpAge/APITE, though some of the challenges may not have been anticipated from the beginning.</p> <p>HelpAge had anticipated a permanent person to be based in the APITE office in Tete, which had not occurred as of February 2019, would have streamlined coordination at the Tete level.</p> <p>Mutual respect and good working relationship between WFP and HelpAge/APITE.</p> <p>Long history of APITE with MGCAS/INAS, and WFP Tete with District Government actors.</p>

Acronyms

APITE	Tete Elderly Protection Association
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ILO	International Labour Organization
INAS	National Institute of Social Action
INGC	National Institute of Disaster Management
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
MGCAS	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action
MIS	Management Information System
MZN	Mozambican Metical
PASD	Direct Social Assistance Programme
PASD-PE	Post-Emergency Direct Social Assistance Programme
PASP	Productive Social Action Programme
PSSB	Basic Social Subsidy Programme
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat of Nutrition and Food Security
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

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