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Assessing the Impact of the Economic and COVID-19 Crises in Lebanon (Round 2)



World Food
Programme

Monitoring needs of Lebanese and Syrian refugees through web-based surveys

December 2020

Highlights

- Following a web survey assessment conducted in April/May 2020¹, at the onset of the first wave of COVID-19 pandemic, WFP launched a second round of web survey in the aftermath of the Beirut port explosion in Aug 2020. This allowed for an update on the overall needs in Lebanon after multiple crises. Both rounds targeted Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees², providing an opportunity for comparisons of results between both rounds.
- Beirut's port explosion severely damaged peoples' homes and livelihoods, especially in neighborhoods of proximity. While most respondents who experienced damages to their homes are Lebanese, Syrian refugees were not spared by the devastation. Nearly one-third of Syrian families were found to be hosting at least one person affected by the explosion – which may overstretch the already limited resources of these refugee households.
- Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees have been faced with multiple shocks in 2019/2020 which have taken a toll on the livelihoods and income of households. In the first round of surveys, one in ten Lebanese and Syrian households reported having completely lost their income. In round two, this figure doubled to one in every five households from both populations.
- In addition, a significant increase in the proportions of both Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees falling into debt was observed. Almost three-quarters of Syrian refugees reported having borrowed money, compared to 61 percent earlier. Nearly half of Lebanese are also in debt, a five-percentage point increase from April/May 2020. Gender disaggregated data shows that one in every five Syrian women-headed households are living off debt, compared to one in every seven Syrian refugee households headed by men.
- While the food security situation of Lebanese citizens and Syrian refugees had slightly improved between the two survey rounds, increased reliance on livelihood coping strategies was observed for both populations. This may have allowed them to stay afloat. However, negative consequences for families in the medium and long-term could be expected, as their resilience to further shocks in Lebanon's dynamic situation would reduce.
- Access to healthcare services in Beirut has sharply deteriorated following the explosion. The proportion of Lebanese respondents reporting facing difficulties in accessing healthcare has nearly doubled between rounds (from 16% to 30%). On a similar note, access to medicine was found to be more difficult for Syrian refugees, with 43 percent reporting not being able to afford essential medicines – an increase of 11-percentage points compared to the previous round.
- With high economic and political uncertainties taking over Lebanon, three in four Syrian refugee and Lebanese respondents reported feeling unsafe in the country for different reasons. While Lebanese respondents are more concerned with continued public unrest, Syrian refugees have strong concerns over violence in communities and discrimination.
- When asked about their most unmet needs, Syrian refugees referred to food, education and shelter. Meanwhile, Lebanese reported the need for respect, dignity, psychological support and safety. Nonetheless concerns over having enough food to eat was reported by 42 percent of Syrians and 24 percent of Lebanese, representing a significant proportion of the population.
- One-third of Syrian refugee households were found to be multi-dimensionally deprived in at least two sectors (safety, health, shelter and food) compared to 16 percent of Lebanese with a slight decrease from the first round. Sectors with apparent deprivations are mainly food, health and safety access where there is a necessity for continued multi-sectoral interventions (especially in the supply of health services to Syrians) to ensure the provision of essential needs for both refugees and Lebanese populations.

¹ <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000116784/download/>

² During the first round Palestinian Refugees were also targeted for the interviews.

Background and Objectives

Over a decade ago, Lebanon successfully survived the 2008 global recession due to improved security and increased investments after years of civil war and instability. Nevertheless, the onset of the 2011 conflict in neighbouring Syria had an important spill over into the country. With its geographical proximity to Syria, Lebanon witnessed substantial drops in foreign direct investments and tourism, as the two economies are inextricably linked. Further, the arrival of Syrian refugees into the country made Lebanon the host of the highest number of refugees per capita in the world, with a quarter of its population being refugees.³

Currently, Lebanon has one of the highest debts to gross domestic product (GDP) in the world. Backtracking to 2018, the financial crisis emerged in Lebanon as the debt to GDP ratio exceeded 150 percent. Country-wide demonstrations started in October 2019 due to the deterioration of the socio-economic situation. According to the Government of Lebanon (GoL), the country entered a recession in the last quarter of 2019, with a 10 percent contraction of GDP in that quarter. As of early 2020, the worsening economic and socio-political situation in Lebanon had led the country to default on its foreign debt for the very first time in history. The current economic crisis in Lebanon is at the intersection between the collapse of a rentier system, dependent on foreign funds, and the legitimization crisis of the existing political leadership.⁴ Further deterioration is expected if Lebanon's Central Bank lifts subsidies on basic materials and essential goods including food in the upcoming months.

The global pandemic has compounded the existing devastating situation. COVID-19 containment measures placed additional pressure on an already collapsing economy and had overburdened national social safety nets and the healthcare system. Although the country managed to flatten the contagion curve during the first wave of the pandemic, it failed to do so in the second wave.

On 4 August 2020, a large explosion hit the capital, resulting in over 200 deaths and over 6,500 injuries.⁵ The second of the two blasts that originated from Beirut's seaport rocked its capital at a 10 km radius, which was equivalent to a 4.5 magnitude earthquake. The shock wave of this enormous explosion was felt as far away as Cyprus, about 200 km from Beirut⁶.

This explosion affected several areas of Greater Beirut, including poor and vulnerable urban populations. It is estimated that up to 300,000 people may have lost their homes.⁷ Using satellite imagery, it was assessed that 363,200 people were directly impacted through structural damages at various levels, mostly in Achrafieh, Beirut Central District, and Marfaa areas of Beirut (see map 1).

In April 2020, WFP established a monitoring system for the food security and livelihood in the country through web-surveys. The first round of the web-survey took place between April and May 2020, while the second round took place between August and September 2020. The overall aim of this second round was to understand the changes in the socioeconomic situation in Lebanon following the multiple crises affecting the country. More specifically the survey objectives were to:

1. Monitor the food security situation of the Lebanese population and Syrian refugees;
2. Assess the ability of the Lebanese population and Syrian refugees to meet the essential needs;
3. Define the most vulnerable and most affected population groups to help inform targeting and prioritization decisions and adjustments.

³ For population figures, please see https://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_732567/lang--en/index.htm and <https://www.un.org.lb/lcrp2017-2020>.

⁴ Mozzucotelli, F. (2020). Fragments of Lebanon: Sectarianism and the Financial Crisis. *IL POLITICO*, 24-42.

⁵ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/lebanon-fire-brigades-union-joins-call-for-full-investigation-into-beirut-explosion/>

⁶ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53656220>

⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/24/beiruts-homeless-after-the-deadly-port-blast#:~:text=Beirut%2C%20Lebanon%20%E2%80%93%20Ahmad%20Darwish%2C,deadly%20blast%20on%20August%204.>

Survey methodology

The web-survey methodology was used in both rounds of surveys to interview Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees.⁸ Samples for both population groups were determined to ensure representative results at the national level, and in the Beirut province where the explosion occurred to allow for more disaggregated analysis. The survey collected both quantitative and qualitative questions, mainly covering the impacts of Beirut port blast, COVID-19, and the economic crisis on people's livelihoods, their food security situation, their ability to access health care and medicine, and their main unmet needs. During round one, a total of 2,834 completed surveys were collected (between 20 April to 18 May 2020). In round two, a total of 2,167 completed surveys were collected between 21 August and 16 September 2020; this allows for comparison between both rounds of surveys. Table 1 shows the disaggregation of the sample by population group and strata for both rounds of surveys.

Unlike conventional face to face survey methodology, web surveys come with some limitations. They are accessible only to people who are literate and have access to the internet, hence they do not allow for representativity of the entire population. In Lebanon, the percentage of internet users within the population reaches 78 percent, while 95 percent of the population is literate. In this context, web surveys are a viable tool to collect information rapidly from the population at a lower cost. However, the results represent a relatively better-off population group. The web-survey also comes with the limitation of over-representation of some population groups (e.g. young male respondents). To mitigate against this, a weighting system was implemented at the analysis stage based on administrative level data, disaggregated by sex and age for both population groups – Lebanese and Syrian refugees.

In all cases, the limitations of web-surveys are consistent in the two rounds and the comparison between the survey rounds represents the changes in the targeted indicators for these population groups.

		Round 1			Round 2		
		Actual no of respondents	Confidence level	Margin of error	Actual no of respondents	Confidence level	Margin of error
Lebanese	Beirut	242	95%	6.4%	524	95%	5.5%
	All other gov	1,705	95%	2.5%	1,173	95%	3%
	National level	1,947	95%	2.5%	1,697	99%	2.5%
Syrians	Beirut	379	95%	5%	186	95%	7%
	All other gov	508	95%	4.5%	284	95%	6%
	National level	887	95%	3.5%	470	95%	4.5%

Profile of survey respondents


For the purpose of this survey, only individuals above 14 years of age were allowed to participate. The profile of the Lebanese respondents illustrates that 41 percent of them were above 35 years of age. In the actual Lebanese population, population above 35 years represents around 60 percent of the population. For Syrian refugees, around 29 percent of the respondents were above 35 and in reality, they represent 38 percent of the overall population. It should be noted that Syrian population structure is younger compared to the Lebanese which explains the differences in the responses on the age groups.

In terms of gender of respondents, both for Lebanese and Syrians, males were more present in the survey (more than 50%). This is not surprising as younger population as well as males have tendency to be more internet savvy. Nevertheless, the survey reached and captured the voices of all sex and age groups, and sample weights were introduced to compensate for any bias to reflect the actual population distribution.

The survey was also able to catch a considerable number of women-headed households both for Lebanese and Syrian refugees. Out of Lebanese households, 22 percent were headed by women and 23 percent for Syrian refugee households.

⁸ The first round also included Palestinian Refugees.

Figure 1: Sex and age distribution of survey respondents – by population groups




Shelter

The results of the web-survey showed that both Lebanese respondents and Syrian refugees living in Beirut experienced damages to their homes. Lebanese in Beirut were more impacted by the direct destruction of the explosion than Syrian families, where 58 percent of the surveyed Lebanese and 41 percent of the surveyed Syrians in Beirut reported damage to their homes due to the explosion.

People who have experienced serious damages found refuge with other families in Beirut or in other parts of the country. Indirect effects of the blast extended beyond Beirut, as 23 percent of respondents in governorates outside Beirut, reported hosting someone impacted by the explosion. While Lebanese in Beirut were more impacted by the direct destruction of the explosion, Syrian families in the capital city were more affected by the secondary impact of the explosion: about 30 percent of Syrian families were hosting at least one affected person compared to 20 percent of Lebanese respondents in the country. On average, Syrians hosted four affected individuals, while Lebanese respondents reported hosting three persons.

Chart 1: Dwelling structural status reported by populations in Beirut



Livelihoods

The devaluation of the Lebanese lira and hyperinflation had a huge impact on the import-dependant country's economy as well as the purchasing power of local populations. It is estimated that the lira had lost around 80 percent of its value between October 2019 and September 2020, which caused most salaries to decrease around the same amount in dollar terms.⁹ The impact on livelihoods has been severe in various ways, given that many

⁹ Karam, Z. (2020, September 29). Dark days ahead for Lebanon as crisis bites. *AP News*. Retrieved from <https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-iran-lebanon-beirut-archive-0ceaf36ed349004fa82ee8c16791884b>

households have undergone changes such as job losses, decreased income, and dependency on debts. Consequently, sharply weakening their purchasing power.

Main household income source

Given their residency status, Lebanese nationals tend to have a more stable income compared to Syrian refugees. The income sources of Lebanese and Syrians did not change between the survey rounds. In the latest round of surveys, more than a quarter of Lebanese households were found to have salaried work. Syrian refugees tend to depend more on casual and daily labour (22%) often in the informal sector which has been hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 containment measures. Syrian families also became less dependent on debts as their main income source compared to the first round (living off of debts reduced from 23% to 16%) which could be explained by the partial revival of the casual labour sector where most Syrians earn their income. While dependency on debts stayed at the same level for Lebanese population (8% in round 1 compared to 6% in round 2). Additionally, 13 percent of Syrian refugees rely on support from NGO/UN agencies as a primary source of income.

Comparisons of income source by sex of household heads revealed that one in every five Syrian women-headed households are living off of debt and the same pattern was observed in the first round of data collection. Eight percent of Lebanese and Syrian women-headed households stated that they have to rely on support from their family/friends for their main source of income – this number stands at around four percent for men-headed households in the Lebanese and Syrian refugee populations.

Chart 2: Main income for Lebanese households (round 2)






Chart 3: Main income for Syrian refugee households (round 2)



Household income changes

When households were asked if they had faced any income changes compared to one year ago, almost two-thirds of both Lebanese and Syrian households stated that their incomes had either ceased or diminished in round two compared to three quarters in the first round. Although this may seem like an improvement, the percentage of Lebanese and Syrians who completely lost income doubled in the second round compared to the first round. Currently, one in five households completely lost their income in both populations. The loss of jobs could be attributed to the long-lasting effect of the economic crisis and containment measures, where more people are losing jobs overtime.


Chart 4: Change in household income compared to one year ago by population group



Although the change in income was similar in both populations, Lebanese and Syrians linked their change in income to different events. Nearly half of Lebanese households reported public unrest, which started in late 2019, as the main trigger for household income losses. While at least half of Syrian refugee households associated the impact on their household income to the COVID-19 containment measures. The latter can be explained by the fact that Syrians tend to rely more on informal daily work, which are jobs that have been hit particularly hard by the containment measures, compared to salaried/regular jobs which were mainly hit by the economic crisis that started before COVID-19.

Few respondents related their change in income with the blast in Beirut, where 12 percent of Lebanese and 16 percent of Syrian respondents relating their income change to this event. Of those who had a localized impact, 80 percent of Lebanese and 53 percent of Syrian households had some damage in their shelter due to the explosion.


Chart 5: Comparisons of major events that triggered change in household income by zone and population group



Debt

While households cope with economic stress, debt is one of the most recurring ways to cope. Following the worsening economic conditions in Lebanon, more Lebanese and Syrian refugee households borrowed or took money on credit. Comparisons between the first and second rounds of data collection show that there has been an increase in the percentage of households who borrowed money within the previous month of the survey. The percentage of Lebanese respondents reporting falling into debt had increased from 42 to 47 percent between the two rounds. This was found to be

Chart 6: Percentage of households borrowed money/took credit in the last 30 days




more severe for Syrian households with an increase of 11 percentage points (from 61% to 72%). In round two, in Beirut only, 55 percent of Lebanese respondents reported taking debt compared to 46 percent of Lebanese living in other governorates, demonstrating the secondary effects of the explosion in the capital city.

Both respondent populations who reported falling into debt have attributed their need to borrow for shelter and food expenses. However, more Lebanese households had to borrow money to cover medical expenses compared to Syrians in the second round of data collection (17% and 6% respectively). In addition, in Beirut, six percent of Lebanese households reported borrowing cash to buy construction materials, presumably to repair structural damages to their homes/businesses. This finding converges with the multi-sector needs assessment conducted on more than 5,300 apartments listed as damaged, indicating that 28 percent of the households have repaired their apartments using their own means.¹⁰

Livelihood coping strategies

Comparisons of livelihood coping applied by Lebanese respondents between the two rounds of data collection showed that results have stabilized for Lebanese households but deteriorated for Syrian refugees, as they relied more on emergency coping compared to months prior. The change in coping was not found to be major in most governorates. Though, in Beirut, the percentage of Lebanese respondents who have had to rely on their savings and selling domestic assets had increased.

Despite controlled and limited bank withdrawals in Lebanon, comparisons between the two rounds of data collection showed that more Lebanese respondents have resorted to spending their savings after the port explosion took place. Noteworthy, many Lebanese have already withdrawn portions of their banks' savings since the onset of demonstrations in 2019 and many have been safekeeping their cash at home since then.¹¹ This could explain the remaining capacity to spend savings which may be at the brink of exhaustion.



Spending less on food was the most commonly used coping strategy by both groups. Chart 9 and chart 10 illustrate how the use of this coping strategy has increased between both rounds of surveys. Emergency coping strategies continued to be applied, with a noticeable increase for Syrian refugees compared to the first round of data collection. One of the emergency coping strategies, sending children to work, was more frequently applied among Syrian refugees in the second round, as the percentage doubled from seven to 14 percent.

¹⁰ <https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-beirut-port-explosions-situation-report-no-14-9-november-2020>

¹¹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-crisis-luxurygoods-idUSKBN1ZPOHJ>

Chart 9: Comparisons of livelihood coping strategies applied by Lebanese, overtime





Chart 10: Comparisons of livelihood coping strategies applied by Syrian refugees, overtime



Food security situation

Concerns over food

The proportion of respondents reporting concerns over not having enough food to eat slightly decreased compared to results recorded in the first round of data collection. The blast damaged a grain facility that stores 85 percent of the country’s cereals as well as nearby flour mills. It was estimated that 15,000 mt of grain were lost. Nevertheless, the impact of the port explosion may not have been felt immediately in food markets as the country is increasingly relying on the port of Tripoli. Several underlying factors may have also contributed to this steadiness of food availability and concerns about food access, including the ease of COVID-19 containment measures in the summer, as well as gifts and support received by the worse-off families during both Eid holidays.

Chart 11: Concerns over having enough food to eat – Lebanese respondents





Chart 12: Concerns over having enough food to eat – Syrian refugees



However, it is anticipated that the Central Bank of Lebanon (Banque du Liban) may remove subsidies on the price of wheat, fuel, and medicine in the upcoming months, which might influence people’s concerns about access of food. Indeed, the Central Bank Governor recently announced that subsidies can continue for only two more months.¹² Current Reserves stand at nearly USD 17.9 billion, leaving only USD 800 million for the subsidization of basic commodities¹³. The International Monetary Fund is encouraging GoL to design and

¹² <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2020/Dec-02/514923-lebanon-central-bank-can-keep-subsidies-for-only-two-more-months-salameh.ashx>

¹³ <https://www.reuters.com/article/lebanon-crisis-reserves-idUSL1N2IB0SL>


implement a subsidy targeting system, to reach the most vulnerable population, while allowing the country to better utilize their foreign currencies¹⁴.

Food consumption

Respondents from different population groups in Lebanon were asked about the number of meals consumed in the previous day. Results were then compared to those from the first round of data collection, prior to the start of the fasting month, Ramadan.

Overall, the proportions of populations consuming one meal in the previous day had reduced, with increases in those who consumed two or three meals. Responses from the second round of data collection revealed a slight change in the proportion of Lebanese respondents who had more meals in the previous day. However, a noticeable improvement for Syrian refugees was apparent, as the percentage of those who consumed one meal in the second round had reduced by 15 percentage points.

Chart 13: Comparisons of number of meals consumed in the previous day, overtime




This positive change could be linked to the ease of containment measures in Lebanon, between June and August, which may have allowed Syrian refugees to resume their economic activities in various sectors that had been strongly impacted by the pandemic and generate income.

Food-based coping

Population groups were asked to describe their food situation in the last seven days by selecting the main food-based coping that accurately represents this situation. Almost two thirds of Lebanese respondents reported having to rely on at least one of the coping strategies as shown in chart 14, which is a slight increase when compared to the first round of web surveys. The percentage of Syrian refugees relying on any of the negative food coping strategies remained the same (78% overall).

Chart 14: Comparisons of applied food-based coping by population groups, overtime



Remote CARI

The previously covered food security indicators were aggregated to form the remote-CARI which is an approach used to report on population's overall food security status using remote surveys. This composite indicator is used to determine the number of food insecure people through assessing two dimensions, the current food consumption status of households and current coping capacity of households to meet future needs (incl. economic capacity and livelihood coping).


¹⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-crisis-imf-idUSKBN27419D>

Significant proportions of Lebanese and Syrian population are food insecure, namely 16 percent of Lebanese and 38 percent of Syrian refugees.

Between the two rounds, the overall food security slightly improved for Lebanese and Syrian refugees. The improvement for Syrians (3 points) was a combination of an improvement of food consumption (15 points improvement in households eating more than one meal) and a deterioration of livelihood coping strategies (13 points increase in the households applying crisis and emergency strategies). The increased reliance of households on livelihood coping will influence the stabilization in food security in the longer term. Food security for Syrians will not be sustainable in the future as households will exhaust these coping strategies and would have no option but to rely on severe coping strategies.

For Lebanese there was a 5-point improvement in food security between the two rounds. However, the positive change in food security came at the expense of an increase in the percentage of household relying on debts (5 points).

Chart 15: Food security classification of Lebanese and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, overtime



Who are currently most food insecure among Lebanese?


The food insecure are households who are unable to meet their dietary needs due to livelihood related impacts of the country’s financial collapse, COVID-19 and port explosion, which have been compromising people’s ability to cope and be resilient. Although vulnerability to food insecurity is defined by a large dimension of aspects, key demographic characteristics of respondents provided variations of food security statuses.

Disaggregation of remote-CARI results by income sources of Lebanese families, revealed clear differences between types of income sources, especially for those who depend on informal income sources or ever more sporadic income (i.e. support or debt). Results showed that two-thirds of households that rely on support from relatives and friends are food insecure, which is nearly ten times worse than the food security situation of those who depend on salaried work. Furthermore, Lebanese families involved in the casual labour sector are five times more likely to be food insecure than their counterparts who have salaried income.

Families with household heads who are not working tend to be more food insecure than others. This is very apparent in chart 16, with an 11-percentage point difference between working and not working heads of households. Furthermore, Lebanese women-headed households tend to be more food insecure compared to families with breadwinners who are men.

When disaggregating results by other demographic characteristics, it was apparent that the larger the size of the family, the more food insecure they are. Out of large Lebanese families, more than a quarter are either moderately or severely food insecure. Large families tend to compromise their consumption and essential needs, to provide the young family members, with less resource shares to go around compared to smaller families.

Chart 16: rCARI by sex, income source and household size of Lebanese respondents



Healthcare

The results of the second round showed that health services were harder to access after the port explosion. Undamaged hospitals and healthcare centres in the capital exceeded the capacity due to physical injuries, while intensive care units have reached a critical capacity of 82 percent due to both COVID-19 infections and serious injuries from blast.¹⁵

For overall Lebanese respondents, the percentage of people who could access healthcare decreased from 47 to 40 percent. For Lebanese living in Beirut, 30 percent of respondents said that services have deteriorated after the explosion, compared to 16 percent in the previous round of surveys.

While 40 percent of Lebanese had access to healthcare without any issues, only one in four of Syrian refugees had access. There was not an important change for Syrian refugees compared to first round, however, half of Syrian refugees in Beirut mentioned not having access to health in the second round.

When respondents were asked if any household members had faced challenges while accessing essential medicine, similar to healthcare services, more households had issues particularly in the Beirut area. Only six percent of Lebanese households said that pharmacies ran out of medicine in May compared to 24 percent after the explosion in August. While most Syrian refugee households face challenges due to unaffordability of essential medicine compared to Lebanese (43% versus 30% respectively). This rate was 30 percent for Syrian refugees and 18 percent for Lebanese respondents in the first round of data collection.

¹⁵ World Health Organization, as cited in Reuters (2020): <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-lebanon-idUSKBN26Q1XR>

Chart 17: Perception of provision of health services by Lebanese respondents





Chart 18: Perception of provision of health services by Syrian refugees



Safety

The data demonstrates that only one in four individuals feels safe in Lebanon, with no significant difference between population groups. Interestingly, main reasons for feeling unsafe were found to be quite different among Lebanese and Syrian respondents. Lebanese residents reported being highly concerned by protests/riots with 39 percent, against 23 percent of Syrians refugees. On the other hand, violence in the community and discrimination affected more Syrian refugee households compared to Lebanese (28 percent and 30 percent respectively).

When we elaborate these results, there is a higher percentage of female respondents that feel unsafe for both communities. For Lebanese, the percentage is 76 percent for females as opposed to 67 percent for males. On the other hand, for Syrian refugees, the difference is even bigger where 80 percent of female respondents feel unsafe compared to 65 percent of male respondents. Domestic violence still stays a subject of concern which exist in both communities with 5 to 7 percent. When this is disaggregated by sex of household head, women-headed households seem to suffer from domestic violence more with 9 percent in both communities compared to 4 percent of men-headed Lebanese households and 6 percent Syrian men-headed households.

Chart 19: Of those who felt unsafe, what was the main reason? Lebanese




Chart 20: Of those who felt unsafe, what was the main reason? Syrian refugees





Chart 21: Percentage of respondents currently feeling unsafe by sex



Multidimensional Deprivation Index (MDDI)

Based on several indicators including consumption of food, access to health, shelter crowding and safety, the multidimensional deprivation index was computed.¹⁶ It is used to determine measurements of deprivation that provide a more holistic picture of vulnerability beyond the economic vulnerability indicator presented above. It is a composite score of deprivation from different dimensions that can be constructed into a measure to classify households based on single and multiple dimension deprivation.

Results revealed that 21 percent of Lebanese and 41 percent of Syrian refugees are deprived in at least two dimensions.¹⁷ Charts 22 and 23 show that both Lebanese and Syrian refugee households were almost equally deprived with regards to health and safety. However, a much higher share of Syrian households (31%) mentioned that they went a whole day without eating or had to skip meals in the last seven days prior to the survey compared to Lebanese households (16%). The same applies for shelter – Syrian refugee households have a greater tendency to live in more crowded shelters or dwellings.

Chart 22: Deprivations by Dimensions for Lebanese





Chart 23: Deprivations by Dimensions for Syrian Refugees



Looking at deprivation in combination of the MDDI reveals that while 16 percent of Lebanese are multidimensionally deprived in the first round of data collection, currently 13 percent of Lebanese are deprived. Still, a considerable number of Lebanese households are deprived from food and health needs.


Consistent with other results presented throughout this report, comparisons between the two rounds revealed a 6-percentage point decrease in the proportion of multidimensional deprived Syrian refugee households (from 36% to 30%). This again shows that job recovery – particularly for those who worked in the informal sector had a chance to improve their situation.

The analysis of the responses also shows that large families and women-headed households and are more likely to be multidimensionally deprived, where 57 percent of Syrian and 48 percent of Lebanese large households are multidimensionally deprived along with 49 percent of Lebanese women-headed and 65 percent of Syrian women headed households.

¹⁶ The deprivations were calculated based on different measures; 1) Deprived from food: Going one day without eating or skipped meals 2) Deprived from health: Not being able to access to health facilities when needed 3) Deprived from shelter: Crowding index above 3; meaning sharing the same room with more than 3 household members 4) Deprived from safety: Generally feeling unsafe.

¹⁷ This MDDI includes safety as another dimension which is only calculated for the second round and it is different than the MDDI used for comparing both rounds.

Chart 24: Deprivation in different dimensions by Lebanese and Syrian refugees, overtime



Main unmet needs and concerns

When both population groups were asked about their two main unmet needs, results revealed that for Syrian refugees, these were mainly linked to basic needs, including having access to sufficient food and education. For Lebanese, one in three respondents reported safety followed by dignity and psychological support. Around 20 percent of Syrian refugees were also in need of a place to stay as opposed to 6 percent of Lebanese; the need for a place to stay was slightly higher (+3%) for both population groups. In Beirut compared to the other governorates potentially due to the damage caused by the explosion.

Chart 25: The most unmet needs of both population groups




Figure 2: What are you most worried about?



Conclusion

This report provides an overview of the consequences of the triple crisis on populations in Lebanon by comparing two rounds of web-based surveys conducted in April/May and August/September 2020. The report shows that livelihoods of people in the country were first impacted by the economic crisis. Their situation dramatically worsened during the country-wide protests in late 2019 and early 2020. Shortly after, containment measures for COVID-19 had aggravated the weak status of income generating opportunities due to closure of several economic sectors, including services, restaurants and tourism. In the early summer, Lebanon eased the containment measures which allowed for workers to resume work in some economic sectors. The effects of this ease allowed Syrian refugees to recommence work which led to an improvement in their food security.

The unforeseen port explosions shook the country by destroying the homes and livelihoods of many. Although the blasts had directly impacted the main port of Lebanon, results demonstrated that the direct effects have been mainly felt by Beirut residents and workers, so far. Beirut area was more impacted by the explosion, where more people lost jobs and businesses compared to the other governorates in Lebanon.

Respondents, Syrian refugees and Lebanese alike, have been increasingly relying on livelihood coping strategies to keep afloat and provide food and other essentials for their families. More people are also borrowing money to cope with the current economic situation, and to cover their basic needs. Women-headed households and large families were found to be more likely multidimensionally deprived compared to others. It was found that 65 percent of Syrian women-headed households and 49 percent of Lebanese women-headed are multidimensionally deprived. Moreover, 57 percent of large Syrian families and 48 percent of large Lebanese households are classified similarly. Access to healthcare stays as a concern, given that almost half of the population face difficulties in accessing these services when needed.

As one crisis shook Lebanon after another, within a short timeframe, people have become more concerned over their continuous access to essential needs, dignity, and safety. Three out of every four individuals – both Lebanese and Syrian - stated feeling unsafe. This comes as no surprise with high level of political and financial uncertainties, both in-country and the region. Continuous and timely monitoring of the situation would feed into much needed information by WFP and partners, to assist those who are in need through the most appropriate interventions.



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United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)

Lebanon Country Office

Azarieh Bldg, Block 03, 5th Floor
Beirut, Lebanon

Abdallah Alwardat, WFP Country Representative

Email: abdallah.alwardat@wfp.org

Nicolas Oberlin, Deputy Country Director

Email: nicolas.oberlin@wfp.org

Simon Renk, Head of VAM/M&E

Email: simon.renk@wfp.org

Catherine Saïd, VAM Officer

Email: catherine.said@wfp.org

United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)

Headquarters

Via C. G. Viola 68 Parco dei Medici - 00148
Rome, Italy

Mohamed Salem, Senior Food Security Analyst

Email: mohamed.salem@wfp.org

Katrina Frappier, Needs Analyst

Email: katrina.frappier@wfp.org

Isra Wishah, Food Security Data Analyst

Email: isra.wishah@wfp.org

Ilgi Bozdog, Food Security Data Analyst

Email: ilgi.bozdog@wfp.org

