



WFP EVALUATION



World Food Programme

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Evaluation of Kenya WFP Country Strategic Plan 2018-2023

Centralized evaluation report – Volume I

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Executive Summary

Introduction

EVALUATION FEATURES

1. An evaluation of the Kenya country strategic plan (CSP) for 2018–2023 was conducted between February and December 2022 to generate evidence and learning to inform the next CSP for Kenya.
2. The evaluation covered CSP implementation between January 2018 and June 2022 and assessed WFP's strategic positioning, its effectiveness in contributing to the strategic outcomes, its efficiency and the factors explaining performance.
3. An independent external team conducted the evaluation through mixed methods, drawing on monitoring data, document reviews, field observations, over 230 interviews and beneficiary focus groups in various settings.
4. The evaluation took into account gender, protection, accountability to affected populations and environmental considerations. Ethical standards were applied to safeguard the dignity of the people involved and the confidentiality of the information shared. The emerging evaluation results were discussed during two stakeholder workshops held in Nairobi in October 2022.
5. No major constraints were encountered during the evaluation, although data gaps arising from the restrictions imposed during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic were identified. The intended evaluation users include the WFP Kenya country office, the Regional Bureau for Eastern Africa, technical divisions at headquarters, target programme recipients, the Government of Kenya, partners and donors.

CONTEXT

6. Kenya has a population of 53 million people,¹ with 35.8 percent vulnerable to multidimensional poverty and 12.8 percent in severe multidimensional poverty² despite rapid economic growth. The agriculture sector accounted for 22.4 percent of gross domestic product in 2021 and over 54 percent of the employed population in 2019.³
7. Kenya is highly vulnerable to climate change. The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) zone, covering 89 percent of the country, experienced four consecutive below average rainy seasons, leading to the longest drought in 40 years. In 2022 multiple factors, including drought and increasing commodity prices, helped push 1.1 million people into Integrated Food Security Phase Classification phase 4 (emergency) and 3 million into phase 3 (crisis).⁴
8. In 2021 a 0.575 Human Development Index score situated Kenya above the sub-Saharan average, although with persistent high levels of inequality.⁵ Kenya ranked 57th of 146 countries in the 2022 Global Gender Gap report;⁶ in 2021, the Government unveiled a road map for accelerating progress towards gender equality by 2026.

¹ World Bank. 2022. [Kenya](#).

² Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 2020. [Comprehensive Poverty Report: Children, youth, women, men and the elderly. From national to county level](#).

³ Ibid.










⁴ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. 2022. [Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update March–June 2022](#).

⁵ United Nations Development Programme. 2022. [Human Development Report 2021/2022. Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World](#).

⁶ World Economic Forum. 2022. [Global Gender Gap Report 2022](#).

9. In 2022 the number of persons of concern in Kenya stood at 574,000, comprising 505,000 refugees and 69,000 asylum-seekers, mainly from South Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia.⁷ The Refugees Act, 2021⁸ signalled a policy shift from encampment towards resettlement.

10. The development agenda is anchored to Kenya Vision 2030, which is aimed at transforming Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle-income country, providing a high quality of life for all citizens in a clean and secure environment. Since 2010 a process of devolution has shaped the context in which international and multilateral actors engage in the country.

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	Indicator	Value	Year
	Total population (million) (1)	53	2021
	Human development index (rank and score) (2)	152 of 191 0.575	2021
	Multidimensional poverty ratio (%) (3)	35.8	2020
	Prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (% of under 5s) (4)	24	2022
	Agriculture as share of gross domestic product (%) (1)	22.4	2021
	Employment in agriculture (percentage of total employment) (modelled International Labour Organization estimate) (1)	54	2019
	Refugees (5)	504 485	2022
	Asylum seekers (5)	69 023	2022
	Global Gender Gap Index (rank and score) (6)	57 of 186 0.729	2022

Sources: (1) World Bank. 2022. [Kenya](#); (2) United Nations Development Programme. 2022. [Human Development Report 2021/2022. Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World](#); (3) Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 2020. [Comprehensive Poverty Report: Children, youth, women, men and the elderly. From national to county level](#); (4) Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. 2022. [Kenya: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update March–June 2022](#); (5) Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2023. [Operational Data Portal – Refugee Situations: Kenya](#); (6) World Economic Forum. 2022. [Global Gender Gap Report 2022](#).

WFP COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN

11. The CSP was approved in July 2018 with the aim of accelerating the strategic shift from providing direct assistance to strengthening national systems and capacity. Through the CSP, WFP aimed to strengthen food security and nutrition by supporting the Government in adopting, investing in and managing hunger solutions; reducing the direct provision of relief assistance while investing in national capacity for emergency preparedness and response; broadening the focus on food systems, using livelihood and asset creation to strengthen climate change adaptation in addition to other things; increasing the social and economic integration of refugees and host communities; advocating the establishment of financial

⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2023. [Operational Data Portal – Refugee Situations: Kenya](#).


⁸ Republic of Kenya. 2021. [The Refugees Act, 2021](#).

services to support unrestricted cash transfers for refugees; and promoting a gender-transformative approach to food security and nutrition.

12. The CSP included 10 activities under the four strategic outcomes shown in figure 1, focused on emergency response targeting refugees and other crisis-affected people; smallholder access to markets, livelihoods and resilience; country capacity strengthening (CCS); and supply chains and logistics. The country office implements the CSP through four divisions, each aligned with a strategic outcome and with a dedicated budget; the cross-cutting themes of nutrition and gender equality are covered by separate units. The divisions leading on CCS and supply chains manage dedicated budgets for their activities but also support the wider portfolio.

13. The CSP underwent six revisions,⁹ with the needs-based plan budget increasing from USD 995 million for 2.5 million planned beneficiaries to USD 1,094.6 million for 3.3 million planned beneficiaries in October 2021. As of July 2022, the funding level was 56 percent of the needs-based plan budget. The United States of America is the largest donor, followed by the Republic of Korea and Germany.

Figure 1: Kenya country strategic plan (2018–2023) strategic outcomes, budget, funding and expenditures



Sources: [Country portfolio budget](#), [CSP revision 6](#), [integrated road map analytics](#) and [annual country reports](#).

⁹ A subsequent budget revision (7) increased the budget to USD 1,214,486,928 and covered the period up to June 2023. This revision was approved in April 2023 and was not considered in the evaluation.

Evaluation findings

TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN EVIDENCE-BASED AND STRATEGICALLY FOCUSED TO ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE?

Relevance to national policies and priorities

14. The CSP was informed by extensive consultation with the Government of Kenya and county governments. It places a strong emphasis on Sustainable Development Goal 2, on zero hunger, and Sustainable Development Goal 17, on building partnerships and strengthening collaboration with other entities. It is well aligned with all key national policies on food and nutrition, as well as other related policies, and with priorities relating to strengthening national systems and institutions. Through its promotion of a gender-transformative approach to food security and nutrition, the CSP aligns with the national policy on gender and development, while WFP's COVID-19 response was aligned with the response led by the Ministry of Health. The Government of Kenya endorsed the CSP design and approach to implementation.

Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable

15. WFP activities were appropriately tailored to the needs of the various beneficiaries that they were intended to assist. Activity design and targeting were informed by extensive research and evaluation evidence and extensive community consultation. WFP aligned its activities with the blanket assistance policy of the Government and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in serving refugees, applying common refugee registers and profiling, although some stakeholders said that there was a need to assess vulnerability among the refugee population and prioritize support accordingly. Furthermore, despite the blanket approach, gaps remained in serving older persons and the disabled within the refugee population.

16. During the COVID-19 pandemic WFP expanded its supply chain services and responded effectively to changing needs, including those of poor urban households in Nairobi and Mombasa.

External coherence

17. The CSP is highly coherent with the policies and priorities of other relevant United Nations entities, with evidence of good cross-entity collaboration and coordination. Examples include cooperation with UNHCR in the refugee context, with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on moderate acute malnutrition treatment and with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations on agriculture, livestock and natural resource management.

18. The CSP is coherent with the United Nations development assistance framework for Kenya for 2018–2022, in particular strategic priority 2 regarding a social and cohesive society. WFP is also committed to advancing the "One United Nations" business operations strategy and is recognized by the resident coordinator office for its active engagement within the United Nations country team.

Internal coherence

19. The CSP articulated a clearly intended strategic shift from "delivering" food assistance to "enabling" national systems and capacity to implement food security and nutrition solutions; however, the intention remained at odds with the country portfolio budget, which was strongly weighted towards emergency response. No overarching CSP theory of change was established at the design stage, although individual theories of change for the various strategic outcomes were developed subsequently.

20. The CSP was characterized by strong internal links, such as support for the national school meals programme through strategic outcome 1 (school feeding in refugee communities), strategic outcome 3 (capacity strengthening) and strategic outcome 4 (supply chain); however, distributing the responsibility for supply chain and food systems capacity strengthening across strategic outcomes also created some management and monitoring challenges. Moreover, the absence of a comprehensive CCS strategy may have diluted the impact of this aspect of WFP's work.

WFP's strategic positioning in an evolving context

21. WFP remained alert to changing national priorities throughout the CSP period and adapted to address them so that its strategic positioning remained relevant over time. Examples include:

- actively adapting supply chain services such as humanitarian air services in the face of shocks to support humanitarian response by partners;
- adapting to address the needs created by the COVID-19 pandemic, such as by increasing cash transfers to poor urban households and adjusting food distribution systems;
- expanding the use of cash as a modality, both as an emergency response and to meet the needs of refugees where feasible;
- adapting in response to refugee policy shifts, such as through piloting self-reliance interventions; and
- developing a youth engagement strategy in response to the publication of Kenya's 2019 youth development policy.


WHAT ARE THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP'S CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN KENYA?

Reaching beneficiaries

22. WFP assistance successfully reached large segments of the refugee population. Ration cuts were required, however, due to funding shortfalls and increases in the number of beneficiaries. Those factors affected WFP's coverage of the target population in 2020 and 2021, as shown in figure 2.

23. Overall, general food distributions and cash transfers proved insufficient to meet beneficiaries' needs, increasing the risk that beneficiaries would adopt negative coping strategies.

Figure 2: Beneficiaries per year by sex and residence status



Source: [Annual country reports and country office 2022 data.](#)

Contribution to strategic outcomes

24. This section presents an overview of the main achievements by strategic outcome.
25. Strategic outcome 1 targeted refugees, asylum seekers and populations affected by natural and human-caused disasters to ensure that they had access to food adequate to meet their food and nutrition needs.
26. Evidence shows that, in the early part of the CSP, WFP was successful in improving food consumption and dietary diversity for refugees, asylum seekers and those Kenyans affected by natural disasters. Since 2021, however, household food security has deteriorated due to an increase in the number of beneficiaries and insufficient funding for full rations, resulting in an increased risk of malnutrition. The use of crisis coping strategies among the target population increased by 59 percent, with refugees purchasing food on credit and thus increasing their debt burden.
27. Moderate acute malnutrition treatment achieved mostly positive results. Coverage in some camps fell short, however, and progress in ASAL counties proved challenging due to high demand and persistent acute malnutrition. WFP also performed well against its school-feeding objectives for refugee children in primary school, contributing to improvement in enrolment and attendance rates. Despite their limited scale, activities aimed at improving refugee self-reliance and integration into host communities showed promise.
28. There was limited progress against social and behaviour change communication targets, with funding cuts reducing activity implementation in 2020 in particular, and beneficiaries reporting limited behaviour change as a result of activities.
29. Strategic outcome 2 targeted smallholder producers and food-insecure, vulnerable populations to enable them to benefit from more sustainable, inclusive food systems and increased resilience to climate shocks.
30. Programming under strategic outcome 2 was strategically designed to lay the foundation for increased farmer production and then link producers to markets (e.g., through the Farm to Market Alliance and by adding value through food quality assurance). The success of this phased layering of activities was ensured by a comprehensive support package.
31. Positive changes were observed in community asset creation through livelihood activities linked to irrigation infrastructure and enhanced crop production and yields. Access to food for the most insecure households also remained relatively stable despite funding constraints and difficult circumstances. Moderate progress was also made on increasing access to alternative, more nutritious food, albeit with variation between livelihood zones. Household capacity to respond to shocks did not increase, however, with many households employing negative consumption and livelihood coping strategies to withstand ongoing drought.
32. WFP played a leadership role in providing supply chain expertise to smallholder farmers, linking them to high-quality input providers, buyers and companies, which in turn increased productivity. Indicators for informing the new holistic approach to food systems were not available during the CSP period, however, hampering the country office's ability to monitor and adjust its performance.
33. Strategic outcome 3 focused on strengthening the capacity of national and county institutions and systems to assist food-insecure and nutritionally vulnerable populations by 2023.
34. Country office efforts in the area of partnerships and capacity strengthening were recognized in the development of WFP's corporate CCS policy. The evaluation showed that WFP's partnership with the Government – characterized by shared analysis and decision making – was the key strength in WFP's CCS work. Despite difficulties using WFP's corporate outcome and output indicators as a basis for measuring progress in CCS, WFP made clear contributions to national systems and policies, including instances of handover. Examples include:
 - influencing legislation and policy in nutrition, school meals management, emergency preparedness and response and social protection;
 - contributing to shaping the national social protection policy and developing a single registry for social protection data; and
 - facilitating an effective, sequenced transition of school meals management to government ownership, which the evaluation highlights as a major accomplishment.

35. Nonetheless, the evaluation identified some persistent shortcomings in WFP's CCS engagement, as follows:

- *Systems analysis*: There was an absence of a comprehensive government capacity analysis as a necessary step prior to identifying capacity gaps at the departmental level.
- *Strategic approach*: The absence of a specific CCS strategy affected capacity-related work across all strategic outcomes.
- *Policy-to-implementation gap*: More attention should be paid to extending the scope of CCS support (and related monitoring) beyond the initial adoption of policy or legislation to the actual start of implementation, which is often drawn out in time and impeded by political or financial constraints.
- *Capacity*: There is a mismatch between growing CCS demands and limited WFP human resource capacity in this area.
- *Programme integration*: Integration across the CSP's programming streams was limited, with better links established only recently.
- *Monitoring, analysis and reporting*: There are challenges in using corporate CCS indicators, particularly where the focus is on institutions and national systems, coupled with the challenge of meeting growing demands for more compelling analysis of capacity results (including through qualitative approaches).

36. Strategic outcome 4 focused on government, humanitarian and development partners to ensure that they had access to and benefited from effective and cost-efficient logistics services and improved commodity supply chains.


37. Despite challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic, commodities and supply chain services were delivered on time. The volume of food purchased locally by WFP from smallholder farmers increased, and WFP made valuable contributions in strengthening procurement capacity. WFP Mombasa port and corridor operations maintained a high level of efficiency, supported by a constructive relationship with the Kenya Ports Authority. This contributed to timely food deliveries for activities under strategic outcome 1.

Contribution to cross-cutting aims

38. **Humanitarian principles and inclusion.** Overall, the CSP was implemented with adherence to the humanitarian principles. Most notable were WFP's efforts to reach the most vulnerable and reflect the principles of inclusion and non-discrimination in its programming. The evaluation indicated that continued attention is needed to ensure that due consideration is given to how non-physical barriers (including social stigma) can affect dignified access to assistance for hard-to-reach populations and how to pursue a balanced approach to the humanitarian principles (including independence), particularly given WFP's close partnership with the Government.

39. **Accountability to affected populations.** WFP reporting and evidence from beneficiary consultations show that WFP effectively used community-level communication systems (figure 3) and appropriate feedback mechanisms. Most complaints were satisfactorily resolved, and WFP used feedback to inform programme adjustments.

Figure 3: Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme



Source: [Annual country reports](#).

40. **Protection, including from gender-based violence.** The evaluation showed that protection issues were recognized in CSP implementation and that CSP targets were met or exceeded. Overall, WFP adapted its delivery of assistance to protect beneficiary health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic and communicated changes to beneficiaries. COVID-19 exacerbated existing gender-based violence and WFP partnered with the Government to enhance advocacy and awareness-raising on that and other protection concerns, including in refugee camps.

41. **Gender equality.** Despite challenging circumstances, WFP activities resulted in good progress on gender equality indicators, in line with the corporate gender action plan. WFP mainstreamed gender into activities and programmes and used gender analysis and assessments to inform its activities and targeting. Joint decision-making on the use of food, cash and vouchers in targeted households increased, but gender disparities persist, with wider social changes needed.

42. **Environment and climate change.** The country office considered both the environment and climate change in its activities, such as through the promotion of climate-smart agriculture and the introduction of drought-resistant crops; however, internal capacity for undertaking climate change risk assessments could be strengthened.

43. **Nutrition-sensitive approaches.** Despite efforts on both nutrition-sensitive and nutrition-specific approaches, there is a need for stronger links, improved coordination and social and behaviour change communication focused on nutrition information and dietary diversity. Most of the new or recently launched nutrition-sensitive activities, including the introduction of nutrient-rich crops and post-harvest handling, are promising but still nascent.

44. **Sustainability and the triple nexus.** The evaluation revealed efforts to ensure the sustainability of results. For example, under strategic outcome 1, WFP attempted to promote the sustainability of water harvesting infrastructure, including through training, awareness-raising, community action plans and user management communities.

45. WFP increased the likelihood that CSP outcomes will be sustainable through capacity building and by promoting the self-organization and continued engagement of beneficiaries. The evaluation revealed, however, that the sustainability of the structures created, as well as progress towards objectives, is dependent on government commitment of financial and human resources, which are often limited. For example, county governments were willing to continue to run the food safety and quality laboratories established with WFP but only if WFP continued to fund them.

46. The evaluation showed that sustainability considerations were not well integrated into cash-based transfer activities. In some cases, cash transfers and food assistance for assets activities were seen by some stakeholders as contributing to community dependence on support.

47. Regarding the triple nexus, WFP linked humanitarian and development work by supporting self-reliance, local economic development and host community integration, albeit on a small scale. It also facilitated a modest contribution to maintaining a peaceful environment, through building conflict sensitivity into intervention design and applying conflict-sensitive approaches to reduce local tensions, such as:

- ensuring that targeting included both refugee and host communities;
- ensuring the effective use of complaint and feedback mechanisms;
- involving county steering groups in geographic prioritization of targeting; and
- facilitating the establishment of community committees to act as conflict resolution mechanisms.

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

Timeliness

48. WFP largely delivered the CSP outputs on time, although delivery was affected by factors outside its control (including disruptions caused by COVID-19), particularly for programming under strategic outcomes 1 and 2. WFP expended 88 percent of allocated contributions overall, although expenditure varied considerably by activity.

Coverage

49. Funding constraints impeded full planned implementation, particularly for strategic outcome 1, which was also affected by increases in the number of food-insecure people needing assistance. WFP came close to its planned targets for refugees, but its achievement rate for Kenyan residents fell short. Joint planning and targeting was participatory and designed to ensure inclusion of the most vulnerable, but some populations, such as those affected by drought, may have been inadvertently excluded from coverage.

Cost-efficiency

50. Assistance provided under strategic outcome 1 was largely cost-efficient, supported jointly by UNHCR, WFP and other partners. Food distribution activities were efficient overall, although in-kind food distribution was affected by intentional “under-scooping” at distribution points.¹⁰ The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service maintained a high level of efficiency and was funded on average at 70 percent through cost recovery. Strategic outcome 3 was affected by challenges in efficient resource utilization, including delays resulting from COVID-19 and a lack of coordinated planning across programmes. The risk of reduced funding led to efforts to reduce unit costs in operations.

Cost effectiveness

51. Cost-effective programming choices, such as cash-based transfers for refugees, were hindered by regulations that prevented refugees without identity cards from opening bank or mobile accounts. Retail supply chain interventions helped increase refugee and Kenyan community purchasing power and supported traders’ efforts to lower their costs. The establishment of a regional innovation unit – the first of its kind for WFP – also provided opportunities to pilot cost-effective alternative measures for harnessing synergies with the private sector.

WHAT FACTORS EXPLAIN WFP’S PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED UNDER THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

Financial resources


52. WFP successfully mobilized resources over the CSP period. In 2022, this allowed refugees’ ration size to be increased to 80 percent from an initial 50 percent.¹¹ Although the goal under the CSP was to

¹⁰ Under-scooping is the intentional reduction of each beneficiary’s ration size by a small quantity; the amounts thus held back from beneficiaries are aggregated and diverted to improper uses, in this case sale at local markets in Dadaab.

¹¹ WFP. 2022. Kenya Country Brief, September 2022.

secure long-term, less tightly earmarked funding, the bulk of funding was earmarked at the activity level (figure 4).

Figure 4: Directed multilateral contributions by level of earmarking and year (until June 2022)



Source: WFP FACTory. Data for 2022 is provisional to 19 June 2022.

Monitoring and reporting

53. Internal capacity for monitoring and evaluation (particularly at the strategic outcome level) was recognized as an area of persistent challenge. Constraints arose from:

- COVID-19 restrictions;
- the absence of appropriate corporate indicators for food systems; and
- CSP programming complexity and vast data collection needs, which placed considerable pressure on the monitoring and evaluation team.

54. The evaluation revealed ongoing efforts to enhance capacity, engage in joint monitoring exercises and use monitoring reports to inform decisions, but further investment in strengthening the monitoring function may be necessary.

Partnerships

55. The evaluation showed that WFP's partnerships in Kenya were instrumental in achieving the intended results. The focus on the strategic shift to an enabling role under the CSP brought WFP closer to the centres of national decision-making, making it an actor in aspects of Kenyan governance. It also enhanced WFP's work with ASAL county governments.

56. WFP fostered partnerships with other United Nations entities (in particular UNHCR and UNICEF), research centres, non-profit entities and private sector entities such as the Mastercard Foundation. For example, WFP engaged with the National Disaster Operations Centre of Kenya and the Kenya Law Reform Commission on policy formulation.

Human resources

57. The programme and staffing realignment that followed CSP adoption was prolonged and challenging. The shift from delivering to enabling required an upgrade in specialist technical skills. Lessons from that experience have been learned and current leadership is preparing to roll out a smoother process for the next CSP.

Other factors affecting performance

58. CSP performance was impeded by limited cross-programme coordination, including at the field level, although there have been recent efforts to improve. Following the programme and staffing realignment, WFP is in the process of enhancing staffing at the field office level, increasing the delegation of decision-making and adjusting reporting relationships.

Conclusions

59. **CSP performance and strategic shifts.** The evaluation showed overall that the CSP was highly ambitious in its vision for a strategic shift from “delivering” to “enabling”. Partial progress occurred in most areas of engagement, with limited but promising success in integrating refugees into host communities. There is a need for clearer focus and strategic direction in WFP’s work on food systems. The CSP was appropriately aligned with and relevant to national policies and priorities and focused on addressing the needs of the most vulnerable. WFP used its resources efficiently and responded in a timely and adaptive way to the COVID-19 pandemic. WFP was constrained by challenges in cross-programme integration and a lack of comprehensive strategies for food systems and CCS.

60. **Food assistance and nutrition.** WFP’s approach was relevant and valued by all stakeholders. During the CSP period, beneficiaries were effectively reached but the volume of food distributed fell short due to funding constraints and increasing need. Greater nutrition mainstreaming and better links across strategic outcome activities are needed in county-level programming.

61. **Cross-cutting themes.** WFP made progress in achieving gender equality and inclusion objectives and strove to increase access to hard-to-reach populations. Environment and climate change were also reflected in programming. Humanitarian principles were adhered to, and WFP integrated accountability to affected populations into programming.

62. **Partnership and governance.** WFP fostered close partnerships and working relationships with the central Government and county governments. In its enabling role, through supporting the strengthening of national and local systems, WFP enhanced its role in some aspects of Kenyan governance. Moving forward it will be important to acknowledge this shift in WFP’s approach and areas of engagement while considering the implications of such an approach for its role as an independent United Nations, while maximizing the prospects for effective CSP implementation.

63. **Sustainability.** There is evidence of continuing benefits for both refugees and Kenyan communities in certain livelihoods activities. Except for the school meal management programme, sustainability and handover strategies were constrained by limitations in national capacity and resourcing.

64. **Human resources and organizational effectiveness.** The staffing realignment that followed CSP adoption generated lessons that are now informing preparations for the next CSP. While significant siloing and cross-programme integration issues remain, efforts now under way are beginning to make a difference.

65. **Analysis and reporting.** There are weaknesses in the monitoring, analysis and reporting functions. Improvements are needed, particularly for new priorities, including food systems and capacity strengthening, where producing more compelling reports on the impact of WFP programmes is key.

66. **Donor relations and resourcing.** WFP Kenya’s current strategic direction requires long-term commitments by donors, whose policies and strategies may not be fully aligned with WFP’s vision of a strategic shift. Going forward, resolving this conundrum will be a test of the country office advocacy and ability to adapt.

RECOMMENDATIONS

67. The evaluation made six recommendations, of which five are strategic and one is operational.

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1	Invest more in increasing the self-reliance and resilience of refugees and host communities; enhance efforts to include hard-to-reach populations.	Strategic	Country office (relevant technical lead); Deputy Country Director (operations)	Inputs sought from government counterparts and relevant United Nations country team members	High	June 2024
1.1	Commission an independent lesson learning study to review the effectiveness of interventions on self-reliance, resilience and food systems under strategic outcomes 1 and 2. Dedicated inputs and insights should be sought from external partners, including the Turkana County government, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Refugee Affairs Secretariat, the World Bank Group's International Finance Corporation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund.	Strategic	Country office; monitoring and evaluation unit		High	December 2023
1.2	Develop guidance for appropriate self-reliance programming in the refugee camps and settlements based on the lesson learning study, among other things. Dedicated input and feedback should be sought from the International Labour Organization, other relevant United Nations country team members and the other Rome-based agencies.	Operational	Country office	Monitoring and evaluation unit	Medium	Medium-term (June 2024)
1.3	Develop guidance for future programming on the ownership and handover of infrastructure assets developed or supported through self-reliance and resilience interventions, based on the lesson learning study, among other things. Dedicated input and feedback should be sought from the International Labour Organization, other relevant United Nations country team members and the other Rome-based agencies.	Operational	Country office	Monitoring and evaluation unit	Medium	Medium-term (June 2024)

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1.4	Use the lessons and guidance to inform and refine future programming, partnerships and WFP team capacity.	Operational	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Monitoring and evaluation unit, external relations unit, partnerships unit	Medium	Medium-term (June 2024)
1.5	Determine effective ways to ensure that hard-to-reach populations are reached with programming assistance, ensuring their safety and dignity.	Operational	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Relevant units	High	December 2023
2	Enhance the contribution of the specialized units on nutrition and gender equality	Strategic	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Regional bureau input; inputs sought from government counterparts and relevant United Nations country team members	Medium	Short-term (December 2023) post-CSP programme planning
2.1	<p>Take steps to improve nutrition outcomes for vulnerable households, ensuring key close collaboration with key partners such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Children’s Fund.</p> <p>In dry areas with limited food supply, as a matter of urgency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Develop an alternative approach to nutrition. ➤ Accompany cash-based transfers with efforts to enhance nutrition knowledge. ➤ Address the challenge of micronutrient deficiencies. ➤ Promote nutrition-sensitive activities across the entire food system value chain and, under strategic outcome 2, advocate the allocation of funding and other resources to 	Strategic	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Unit leading on strategic outcome 2, and unit leading on nutrition	High	February 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	nutrition and food safety and quality activities by arid and semi-arid land county governments.					
2.2	Strengthen implementation of the commitment to gender transformation and inclusion through better analysis, design and resourcing. Ensure that activities are designed to address commitments to gender transformation, with resources provided to support them. To that end, invest in deepening and extending the role of gender analysis in planning, monitoring and evaluation and reporting; ensure that the gender equality unit has the necessary capacity to deliver. Dedicated input and feedback should be sought from the United Nations Children’s Fund and the other Rome-based agencies.	Operational	Country Director	Gender equality unit; monitoring and evaluation unit; regional bureau	Medium	February 2024
3	Strengthen organizational cohesion, human resource management, and programme integration. Despite challenges, it is not recommended that major changes to organizational structure be considered at this time. Rather, the following actions are recommended:	Strategic	Country office: senior management	Regional bureau	High	June 2024
3.1	Give priority to strengthening links between strategic outcomes and between sub-offices and field offices and develop procedures for ensuring the involvement of all relevant organizational components in planning and resource allocation decisions while paying attention to mechanisms for improved coordination and integrated planning of operations at the field level.	Strategic	Country office: senior management	Monitoring and evaluation unit; gender equality unit; regional bureau	High	June 2024
3.2	Ensure more effective integration of specialists and specialist units (currently gender equality and nutrition) into the organizational structure and into planning and operational roles and processes and provide adequate resources to support their engagement.	Operational	Country office: senior management	Human resources unit; regional bureau	High	June 2024
3.3	Assign or recruit a senior manager to lead the ongoing process of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of operations through	Operational	Country Director	Human resources unit	High	October 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	innovating and adapting processes and procedures to build on what works.					
3.4	Develop consultatively a plan for managing change to accompany the organizational and human resources alignment, including well-defined opportunities for professional development. The possibility of activities conducted jointly with other United Nations country team members should be explored.	Operational	Country Director; senior management	Human resources unit; regional bureau	High	August 2023
3.5	Strengthen middle management: ensure that all middle managers, including field office heads, are supported in enhancing their capabilities in budgeting and financial management, and human resource matters and in facilitating monitoring and evaluation and documentation work, and gender equality and country capacity strengthening programming. Develop programming, including workshops and peer-to-peer discussions, to support those objectives.	Operational	Senior management	Human resources unit; regional bureau	High	December 2023
4	Strengthen capacity to engage in relevant aspects of governance analysis and strategic planning, enhance the relevant governance-related elements of country capacity strengthening and clarify the country capacity strengthening responsibilities of the strategic outcome 3 unit.	Strategic	Country office: Country Director and senior management	Strategic outcome 3 unit lead, with advice from the regional bureau and headquarters	High	September 2023; however, preparations may start before
4.1	Regarding WFP's enabling role, the following actions are recommended to support the strengthening of national and local systems: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Strengthen Kenya country office capacity for relevant aspects of governance analysis at the strategic and activity-planning levels to ensure that programming and partnerships "do no harm", and to gain an understanding of the overall Kenyan governance capacity situation. ➤ Explore options for building such capacity, either internally in the strategic outcome 3 unit or together with other 	Strategic	Country office: Country Director and senior management		High	September 2023; however, early action on this sub-recommendation may start before

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	<p>United Nations country team entities and/or by accessing external expertise.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Strengthen capacity and assess the expertise available at both the national and local levels to understand the implications of government legislation, policies, strategies and spending decisions for political economy and for vulnerable populations. 					
4.2	<p>To enhance the governance-related elements of country capacity strengthening, the strategic outcome 3 unit should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ expand its focus – in cooperation with the other strategic outcome units, United Nations country team and Rome-based agency partners – to provide capacity strengthening support to core functions relevant to WFP’s mandate within partner ministries and county governments; and ➤ address challenges in government processes that affect service delivery and impede smooth and timely delivery. 	Strategic	Country Director, Deputy Country Director (operations)	Strategic outcome 3 unit	High	December 2023
4.3	<p>To increase organizational cohesion, there is a need to clarify the division of labour on country capacity strengthening, by giving the strategic outcome 3 unit full responsibility for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ institutional strengthening with regard to enabling national and county government systems (with the other strategic outcome units responsible for country capacity strengthening work at the county level, along with other relevant organizations outside Government); and ➤ hands-on training of relevant government officials on implementation of particular programmes. 	Strategic	Country Director; senior management; human resources unit	Strategic outcome 3 unit, strategic outcome unit managers; regional bureau	High	September 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
5	Strengthen the monitoring and evaluation function and the practice of documenting experiences and results to improve learning and reporting.	Strategic	Country Director; senior management; monitoring and evaluation unit	Regional bureau	High	September 2023
5.1	Develop systems to enhance analysis across systems for management decision-making: the analyses should be based on the new documentation work (see recommendation 5.3) and draw from different sources of information – overlaying the information for decision-making. This will also require additional resources in monitoring and evaluation and a review of the monitoring and evaluation unit scope of work.	Strategic	Country Director; senior management; monitoring and evaluation unit		High	September 2023
5.2	Increase resources allocated to the monitoring and evaluation unit and to the strategic outcome 3 unit, to guide and support capacity strengthening for monitoring and evaluation and learning in Government, especially at the county level. This should be done as part of a broader country office country capacity strengthening strategy, with strong engagement by the gender equality unit and in close collaboration with United Nations country team partners.	Strategic	Country Director, senior management; monitoring and evaluation unit	Strategic outcome 3 unit	High	October 2023
5.3	Strengthen documentation practices to improve reporting, learning and advocacy: ensure that qualitative approaches are used to portray WFP's programmes and results in a more compelling manner (e.g., by documenting ways in which WFP programming may have contributed to outcomes and achievements on the road to change or cases in which major barriers to advancing programming have been encountered and have blocked progress). The work should be led by a recruited professional, working in association with the monitoring and evaluation unit, with qualified staff members given an opportunity for involvement.	Strategic	Country Director, senior management, monitoring and evaluation unit	Human resources unit	High	February 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
6	Further strengthen the country office supply chain function, as well as the overall approach to food systems and resilience (strategic outcome 2) through strategic partnerships, including with members of the United Nations country team, the other Rome-based agencies and other development actors that can provide staff with the requisite skills and experience.	Operational	Country Director and Deputy Country Directors	Strategic outcome 3 unit manager; strategic outcome 4 unit manager; human resources unit, regional bureau	High	September 2023
6.1	The new supply chain strategy should be incorporated into the new country strategic plan to articulate clearly how expertise underpins and supports work under all strategic outcomes. It will be necessary to adopt robust performance indicators for supply chain activities, and support and training should be provided to supply chain staff.	Strategic	Country Director and Deputy Country Directors		High	November 2023
6.2	Strengthen the overall approach to food systems and resilience (strategic outcome 2) through strategic partnerships, in close collaboration with United Nations country team members and the other Rome-based agencies and also through strengthening advocacy for private sector investment in the four key elements of Kenya's food system: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ production; ➤ processing; ➤ distribution/transport; and ➤ consumption. 	Operational	Country Director and Deputy Country Directors	Partnerships unit, external relations unit	Medium	November 2023

1. Introduction

1.1. EVALUATION FEATURES

1. In line with the World Food Programme (WFP) Policy on Country Strategic Plans (CSPs) and the WFP Evaluation Policy, the Office of Evaluation (OEV) commissioned a country strategic plan evaluation (CSPE) of WFP CSP in Kenya.¹² The timing will enable the country office to use the CSPE evidence in the design of the new CSP – scheduled for Executive Board (EB) approval in June 2023. The terms of reference (ToR) for this evaluation are presented in Annex 1. The evaluation is designed to:

- provide evaluative evidence and learning on WFP performance for country-level strategic decisions, specifically for developing future WFP engagement in Kenya; and
- provide accountability for results to WFP stakeholders.

2. The evaluation covers all WFP strategies, operations and strategic objectives between January 2018 and June 2022. Thus the temporal scope covers most of the lifetime of the WFP Country Strategic Plan (2018-2023).

3. The evaluation adopted a mixed methods approach to reach evidence-based answers to the evaluation questions, drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data sources and analysis methods. Data were collected from a mix of primary and secondary sources, as described in Annex 3.

4. The evaluation has been conducted in a gender-sensitive manner reflecting the corporate and country-level commitment of WFP to a gender-transformative approach. The evaluation adopted a gender lens in its analysis of the context, data collection, synthesis of findings and formulation of recommendations. Similarly, humanitarian principles; accountability to affected populations (AAP); and protection and environmental considerations are important cross-cutting issues for WFP and are assessed in this evaluation.

5. The primary users of the CSPE are the WFP Kenya country office, the regional bureau in Nairobi (RBN), headquarters (HQ) technical units, the Office of Evaluation (OEV), senior WFP management and the WFP Executive Board (EB). However, it is also hoped that the evaluation will be useful to a broader range of internal and external stakeholders, in particular the Government of Kenya (GoK), cooperating partners (CPs), civil society organizations (CSOs), donors and the United Nations country team (UNCT).

6. The evaluation started in January 2022 with inception briefings conducted with WFP staff and other key stakeholders. In-country and remote data collection was conducted between May and August 2022, and several workshops were held to discuss emerging findings. The evaluation timeline is available in Annex 2.

1.2. CONTEXT

7. Below is an overview of key contextual elements under which WFP operates in Kenya. Annex 1.2 includes a diagrammatic presentation of the evolution of context and WFP interventions between 2015 and 2022.

1.2.1 General Overview

8. Situated in East Africa, Kenya is divided into 47 counties. Arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) cover 89 percent of the country and are inhabited by approximately 38 percent of Kenya's population.¹³ Kenya is bordered by Sudan and Ethiopia to the north, by Somalia to the east, by Tanzania to the south and by Lake Victoria and Uganda to the west. Its south-eastern border meets the Indian Ocean, and the country's most densely populated areas are located to the south and southwest, including the capital, Nairobi.

¹²WFP. 2016. *Policy on Country Strategic Plans. Executive Board Second Regular Session*. Rome (WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1).

¹³GoK. 2022. State Department for Development of the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands.

9. The population is 53,005,614,614,¹⁴ with women and girls representing 50.3 percent and men and boys 49.7 percent. Of the population, 59.9 percent are between the ages of 15 and 65.¹⁵ Life expectancy stands at 67 years, which has been on a rising trend since 2000, and the fertility rate is placed at 3.4 births per woman.¹⁶

10. Kenya's 2021 Human Development Index (HDI) rating of 0.575¹⁷ is above average for sub-Saharan Africa but below the average of countries in the medium human development group, placing it at 152 of 190 countries published.

11. Kenya's Gini index rating was 40.8 in 2015.¹⁸ Inequality varies both across and within regions, with Nairobi and Rift Valley regions experiencing the widest income inequalities. The 2022 report on leaving no one behind indicated four groups particularly at risk of being 'left behind' in Kenya: women and girls, children and youth, ASALs and informal urban settlements.¹⁹

12. The 2022 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report²⁰ indicates 12.8 percent of the population lives in severe multidimensional poverty, while 35.8 percent is vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. However national data present a different poverty picture. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics over a third of Kenyans are "monetary poor", while more than half of the population are multidimensionally poor.²¹

13. In line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the United Nations New Way of Working, WFP has invested in strengthening the capacity of the Government by delivering its food security and nutrition mandate. Its partnership was bolstered by memorandums of understanding (MoU) signed with county governments (CGs), building on county needs assessments in 14 counties where WFP operates. WFP has field-level agreements with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and partners to facilitate implementation of activities in the CSP at the field office (FO) level. Collaboration among the Rome-based agencies, comprising WFP, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), remains strategic to addressing Kenya's food and nutrition security challenges.²²

National policies and the Sustainable Development Goals

14. Kenya's development agenda is anchored to the Kenya Vision 2030, which aims to transform Kenya into an industrializing, middle-income country, providing a high quality of life to all citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment.

15. The Kenya Zero Hunger Strategic Review provides an analysis of agriculture, food and nutrition security in Kenya, within the context of the United Nations SDG 2 to "end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture". The report makes recommendations for achieving SDG 2 by 2030, identifying gaps in current government policy.²³

16. Vision 2030 is to be actualized through five-year medium-term plans (MTPs). The current third medium-term plan (2018-2022), is themed around "transforming lives: advancing socioeconomic development" through the "Big Four Agenda" under four pillars: manufacturing; affordable housing; food security and nutrition; universal health coverage; and improvements in the conduciveness of the business environment. The design of the fourth medium-term plan (2023-2027) is currently underway, with WFP actively participating in the formulation process.

17. The National Information Platform for Food Security and Nutrition aims to strengthen information systems and inform interventions in this area. A review of national policies (Figure 1) was undertaken to

¹⁴ World Bank Databank.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ UNDP. 2022. Human Development Report.

¹⁸ World Bank Databank.

¹⁹ UN Kenya and GoK. 2022. Leave No One Behind Report.

²⁰ UNDP. 2022. Human Development Report.

²¹ KNBS. 2020. Comprehensive Poverty Report.

²² WFP. 2021. Kenya ACR 2020.

²³ GoK. 2018. Zero Hunger Strategic Review Report.

identify gaps in food security and nutrition evidence and refine interventions to improve outcomes. As an outcome of the United Nation’s Food Systems Summit, and a process that WFP has been heavily engaged in, in 2021 Kenya published a national position paper entitled “Kenya’s pathway to sustainable food systems”, which aims to help guide action on food systems in the country.

Figure 1: National policies/strategies on food security and nutrition

- Agricultural Sector Transformation and Growth Strategy 2019-2029
- National School Meals and Nutrition Strategy 2017-2022
- Food security bill 2017
- Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture strategy 2017- 2026
- Kenya Youth Agribusiness Strategy 2018-2022
- Kenya Nutrition Capacity Development Framework 2014-2019
- National Policy on Gender and Development 2019
- Kenya National Nutrition M&E Framework 2018-2022
- The Kenya National Nutrition Action Plan 2018-2022
- Kenya Agri-nutrition implementation strategy 2020- 2025
- National Agriculture Investment Plan 2019-2024
- National Adaptation Plan 2015-2030
- National Climate Change Action Plan 2018-2022
- National Social Protection Policy 2011
- Kenya National Food and Nutrition Policy 2011

18. Kenya undertook voluntary national reviews (VNR) of progress towards all SDGs in 2017 and 2020, reporting that, between 2017 and 2019, progress was made in SDG 1 through poverty reduction measures, SDG 3 health, SDG 4 education, SDG 6 provision of clean water, and SDG 11 on ensuring sustainable cities.

1.2.3 Food and nutrition security


19. In the 2022 Global Hunger Index, Kenya ranks 94th out of 121 countries. With a score of 23.5, Kenya’s level of hunger is “serious”.

20. In February 2022, the Kenya Food Security Steering Group’s (KFSSG) annual short rains assessment reported that 3.1 million people (20 percent of ASALs’ population) were classified as being in Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Phase 3 (Crisis) or above levels of acute food insecurity, a 48 percent increase since August 2021.

21. IPC projections covering March to June 2022 forecast an increase in people facing high levels of acute food insecurity to 4.1 million. This includes 1.1 million in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) and 3 million in IPC Phase 3. Multiple factors have contributed to this escalation, including: i) an intense drought situation; ii) an upsurge in food commodity prices due to depressed crop production; iii) the Ukraine/Russia conflict negatively affecting prices of fuel and food commodities; and iv) resource-based conflicts in Kenya.²⁴

²⁴ IPC. 2022. *Kenya Acute Food Security analysis March–June 2022*.


Figure 2: Integrated Phase Classification projection of acute food insecurity March-June 2022



Source: IPC (June 2022).

22. The latest IPC projections regarding acute malnutrition (AMN) see a continuing trend of deterioration in eight counties.²⁵ The projection stands at 942,000 cases of children aged 6-59 months being acutely malnourished, 76 percent of which are moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) cases, and 24 percent severe acute malnutrition (SAM) cases. In March 2022, Mandera, with a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence of 34.7 percent, was classified as being in an extremely critical situation (IPC AMN Phase 5).

Figure 3: Integrated Phase Classification projection of acute malnutrition March-June 2022



Source: IPC (June 2022)

²⁵ Garissa, Baringo, Samburu, Turkana, Wajir, Isiolo, Mandera, Tana River.

1.2.4 Agriculture

23. Agriculture is key for the economy, accounting for 22.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021 and over 54 percent of the employed population in 2019.²⁶ Livestock raising is the main agricultural activity, followed by crop production, forestry and fisheries. Livestock uses 21,300,000 hectares (ha) of land compared to 5,800,000 ha for arable use.²⁷ The sector is dominated by smallholder production on farms of between 0.2 and 3 hectares, which account for 78 percent of total agricultural production and 70 percent of commercial production.²⁸

24. Most agricultural workers predominantly practice traditional and subsistence farming with low productivity rates.²⁹ Growth and job creation are hindered by underdeveloped value chains, limited post-harvest infrastructure, restricted access to agricultural financing, weather-related shocks and limited use of irrigation.

25. Crop production was significantly affected by late-onset, and cumulatively below average, rainfall during the 2021 short rains. In 2022, the delay of the March-May long rains affected croplands and rangelands and particularly affected the ASALs.³⁰

1.2.5 Climate change and vulnerability

26. Kenya's diverse topography results in a wide range of climate zones. Annual rainfall roughly follows a seasonal pattern with "long rains" and "short rains", varying across the country.

27. Compounding political, geographic and social factors make Kenya highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, ranking 149 out of 182 countries in the 2020 ND-GAIN Index.³¹ Highly exposed to floods and droughts, the ASAL region of Kenya has endured three severe droughts in the last decade (2010-2011, 2016-2017 and 2020-2022). The 2020 to 2022 drought has been the most severe and longest, with widespread losses of livelihood and massive displacement of populations.³² Floods have displaced over 400,000 people.³³ Approximately 4.2 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance,³⁴ and numbers are likely to increase.³⁵

28. In 2019, giant swarms of desert locusts entered Kenya, flattening 175,000 hectares of crop and pastureland, affecting the livelihoods of 164,000 households.³⁶

1.2.6 Education

29. In 2021, Kenya invested 4.8 percent of GDP on education. In 2018, the literacy rate was at 82 percent, lower for women and girls (78 percent) than men and boys (85 percent).³⁷ According to the 2019 census, 4.2 percent of the country's population attended university, 7.6 percent finished a middle level or technical and vocational training and over half were not formally educated beyond primary level.

30. Primary education is a national function, while pre-primary education is devolved to county governments (CGs). The primary education net enrolment rate (NER) stood at 91.4 percent in 2018, while the secondary education net enrolment rate was 53.2 percent. The transition rate from primary to secondary stood at 83.3 percent in 2018.

²⁶ World Bank Databank.

²⁷ World Bank. April 2019. *Kenya Economic Update*.

²⁸ World Bank and CIAT. 2015. *Climate-smart agriculture in Kenya*.

²⁹ GoK. 2018. *Kenya Youth Agribusiness Strategy 2018-2022*.

³⁰ KFSSG. July 2022. *Long Rains Season Assessment Report*.

³¹ Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. 2022.

³² ASAL Humanitarian Network. 2022. *Drought situation in the Kenya ASAL areas now at crisis level*. Joint statement by the AHN. Nairobi, October 5th, 2022.

³³ GoK and UNDP. 2021. *Rising Water Levels in Kenya's Rift Valley Lakes*.

³⁴ UNOCHA Kenya. 2022. *Kenya Drought Flash Appeal 2022*.

³⁵ FEWS Network, NDMA, WFP. 2022. *Kenya Food Security Outlook February – September 2022*. GoK. 2022. NDMA *Monthly drought update September 2022*.

³⁶ World Bank. 2020. *FAQs Kenya Locust Response Project*.

³⁷ World Bank Databank.

1.2.7 Gender equality

31. Kenya ranked 57 out of 146 countries in the 2022 Global Gender Gap report with a score of 0.729 (9 out of 36 countries within sub-Saharan Africa).³⁸ The participation of women in the labour market is 72.1 percent compared to 77.3 percent for men.³⁹ Women make up 80 percent of Kenya's farmers, while men have higher earnings and own more assets.⁴⁰

32. Representation of women in legislative bodies is low, with 21.8 percent of parliamentary seats currently held by women. For every 100,000 live births, 342 women die from pregnancy-related causes; and the adolescent birth rate is 72 births per 1,000.⁴¹

33. The 2010 Constitution of Kenya emphasizes the protection of human rights, equality and justice, and established independent commissions to oversee the protection of particular rights and freedoms, including the National Gender and Equality Commission. In 2019 Kenya adopted a National Policy of Gender and Development towards creating a society free from gender discrimination.

34. Kenya has ratified the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. In 2021, the Government unveiled a roadmap to accelerate progress towards gender equality and ending sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) by 2026. However, SGBV remains widespread, approximately 45 percent of women aged 15-49 have experienced either physical or sexual violence.⁴²

1.2.8 Migration, the refugee situation and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

35. As of December 2022, the population of persons of concern stood at 504,485 persons, comprising 491,675 refugees and 69,023 asylum-seekers. New arrivals have steadily increased, mainly from South Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia.⁴³ Around 55 percent of the refugee population are children, and half are women and girls. In 2021, there were 190,000 internally displaced persons.⁴⁴ Almost half of refugees in Kenya reside in Dadaab, followed by Kakuma and then urban areas.⁴⁵

36. In 2021, the Government of Kenya communicated its intention to close the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in 2022.⁴⁶ Kenya highlighted the need as linked to protecting the country's security after terror attacks by al-Shabaab. The United Nations and aid groups advocated that the closures could be devastating to human rights and difficult to implement.⁴⁷ After much dialogue, the Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) agreed the refugee camps are not a long-term solution to forced displacement and committed to working together to find alternative solutions in line with the responsibility-sharing principles and goals of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).⁴⁸

37. In November 2021, the Refugees Bill, the Foreign Service Bill and the Law of Succession (Amendment) Bill were signed into law. The signing of these three bills consolidated provisions of several international legal instruments and grants refugees access to education, livelihoods and integration opportunities. These bills will establish a new coordinating body and refugee agency, the Department of Refugee Services, replacing the Refugees' Affairs Secretariat, and promoting a whole-of-government approach. Stakeholders have welcomed this legislation's progressive intentions around access to education, economic inclusion and integration,⁴⁹ and potential for greater freedom of movement in hosting areas.⁵⁰ The Refugees Act signalled a shift from a policy of refugee camp closure to a policy of refugee resettlement. A "Marshall Plan" has been

³⁸ World Economic Forum. 2022. *Global Gender Gap Report*.

³⁹ Kenyatta University. 2021. Exploring the Global Gender Gap Index.

⁴⁰ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 2020. Inequality trends and diagnostics in Kenya 2020.

⁴¹ World Bank Databank.

⁴² GoK. 2014. Demographic and Health Survey.

⁴³ UNHCR Operations Data Portal.

⁴⁴ World Bank Databank.

⁴⁵ GoK, UNHCR. 2022. Kenya Statistics Package: Refugees and Asylum Seekers.

⁴⁶ WFP. April 2021. Kenya Country Brief.

⁴⁷ UNHCR. Press Release 9 May 2016.

⁴⁸ UNHCR and GoK. Joint statement 29th April 2021.

⁴⁹ IRC. 2021. Press Release November 2021.

⁵⁰ Graham, J. Miller, S. 2021. From Displacement to Development: How Kenya Can Create Shared Growth by Facilitating Economic Inclusion for Refugees.

developed to oversee this transition. There has yet to be a detailed interpretation of the law, and much of the Government's roadmap has yet to be implemented.

38. In July 2022, Kenya joined the World Bank programme under the "Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework". It is estimated the World Bank programmes (and funding) will begin in three years' time, and will represent a step in addressing refugee and internally displaced person displacement and resettlement. The engagement of the World Bank will have a significant influence on WFP programming.

1.2.9 Persons with disabilities

39. According to the 2019 census, 2.2 percent (0.9 million) of Kenyans live with some form of disability, with a higher prevalence among women than men, and in rural rather than urban areas.⁵¹

40. In 2018, the Government co-hosted the Global Disability Summit. Key commitments made by Kenya at the summit included those to address: stigma and discrimination; inclusive education; economic empowerment; harnessing technology and innovation; and data collection and disaggregation.

1.2.10 Devolution

41. In 2010, Kenyans voted for a new constitution devolving powers to 47 counties. This decentralization represents a major departure from a history of centralized power and minimal citizen participation.

42. Devolution has shaped engagement in Kenya. For example, WFP has signed an agreement with the national Ministry of Devolution to collaborate with county governments (CGs) on policies to achieve food and nutrition security in Kenya.⁵² County governments provide an entry point for locally focused development cooperation and capacity strengthening modalities. Disparities in service provision remain across counties.

1.2.11 Election results

43. General elections were held in August 2022, and William Ruto was elected President. There may be an impact on work with county governments, requiring the building of new relationships since there is a change of decision makers in counties. For WFP, this requires advocacy to ensure the conversation continues with regard to policies - since an implementation framework is needed to guide the county governments. At the Government level, aligning to the new Government's priority areas may also be required. This may bring delays in many aspects of WFP work with government at both levels.

1.3. SUBJECT BEING EVALUATED

1.3.1 The strategic focus of the CSP

44. Prior to the CSP, WFP operated in Kenya through a combination of:

- a protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) for unconditional food and nutrition assistance to refugees in the official camps and settlements (2015-2018) – USD 377m (63 percent funded);
- a PRRO to meet acute food and nutrition needs of residents and build resilience in the ASALs (2015-2018) – USD 295m (72 percent funded);
- a development country programme focusing on school feeding, support to smallholder farmers (SHFs), nutrition services and related institutional capacity strengthening (2014-2018) – USD 129m (62 percent funded); and
- a short-term emergency operation (EMOP) to treat malnutrition during the 2017 drought – USD 1.5m.

45. The Kenya CSP was approved by the Executive Board (EB) in July 2018 with the aim of accelerating the shift of the WFP strategy from direct provision of transfers and services to strengthening national systems and capacities to deliver food and nutrition security, through:

⁵¹ GoK. 2021. *Status Report on Disability Inclusion in Kenya*.

⁵² WFP Kenya. 2019. *Press Release 4 June 2019*.

- supporting the Government to adopt, invest in and manage hunger solutions in collaboration with other partners;
- further reducing the direct provision of relief assistance while investing in national capacities for emergency preparedness and response (EPR);
- broadening the focus on food systems, using livelihood and asset creation activities as platforms for layering new technologies for climate change adaptation;
- attracting youth into agribusiness;
- increasing social and economic integration of refugees and host communities through expanding the Kalobeyei integrated settlement model;
- advocating for the establishment of financial services to support delivery of unrestricted cash transfers for refugees; and
- promoting a gender-transformative approach to food security and nutrition programmes.

46. The CSP has four linked and partially overlapping strategic outcomes (SOs), outlined in Table 2 and described in detail in Annex 1.1.

Table 1: Strategic outcomes and activities

SOs	Activities
SO1: Refugees and asylum seekers living in camps and settlements and populations affected by natural and human-caused disasters have access to adequate food to meet their food and nutrition needs throughout the year.	Activity 1: Provide food assistance & nutrient-rich commodities to refugees, including social behavioural change communication (SBCC) & support to self-reliance activities in the camps & settlement areas
	Activity 2: Provide food assistance and nutrient-rich commodities complemented by SBCC to vulnerable Kenyan populations in order to meet acute food needs.
SO2: Targeted smallholder producers, food-insecure and vulnerable populations benefit from more sustainable, inclusive food systems and increased resilience to climate shocks enabling them to meet	Activity 3: Create assets & transfer knowledge, skills, and climate risk management tools to food-insecure households
	Activity 4: Facilitate access to markets and provide technical expertise in supply chain to smallholder farmers and retailers
SO3: National and county institutions in Kenya have strengthened capacity and systems to assist food-insecure and nutritionally vulnerable populations by 2023.	Activity 5: Engage in the strengthening of capacities of national & county institutions in the areas of disaster risk management, food assistance programmes, nutrition services and social safety nets
SO4: Government, humanitarian and development partners in Kenya have access to and benefit from effective and cost-efficient logistics services, including air transport, common coordination platforms and improved commodity supply chains, when needed.	Activity 6: Provide humanitarian air services for partners
	Activity 7: Provide health supply chain services for partners (Service provision and platforms activities)
	Activity 8: Provision of Humanitarian Air Service in Support of DG-ECHO Funded Projects (BR03, 2020)
	Activity 9: Provide supply chain services for Kenyan Government and partners (BR04, 2020)
	Activity 10: Provide Food Procurement Services for Government of Kenya and partners. (BR06 2021)

47. Major contextual changes in 2020 and 2021, relating to both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Government's intention to close refugee camps, presented challenges to the CSP's strategic focus but reinforced the need to strengthen national capacities as a long-term and sustainable solution to meeting/reducing humanitarian and protection needs. The most significant budget revision (BR) to the CSP was BR04 in September 2020, expanding SO1 support to vulnerable urban populations in line with the Government's COVID-19 response. The WFP strategy was also to transition SO2 assistance out from some semi-arid counties in order to maintain assistance in arid areas. Other budget revisions (BRs 03, 05 and 06, adding activities 8, 9 and 10) were less consequential, made in response to agreements with partners for air, supply chain and procurement services.

1.3.2 Quantitative overview of the CSP


48. The evaluation team (ET) conducted quantitative analysis of the evaluation subject. Data were largely extracted from the WFP country office tool for managing effectively (COMET) and cover: i) budget/funding

data; (ii) transfers (cash-based transfers (CBT)/in-kind); (iii) beneficiaries; (iv) outcome indicators; and v) output indicators. Selected illustration of the analysis is presented in Annex 10. Significant points relating to budget/funding, transfers and beneficiaries are summarized below.

Overview of CSP budget and funding

49. SO1 accounts for the largest share of needs-based plan (NBP) requirements. This increased from 57 percent to 64 percent following BR04, however, the character of assistance also evolved to include vulnerable urban populations. SO2 originally accounted for 37 percent of the needs-based plan, but this declined in gross and percentage (30 percent) terms during 2020 due to underfunding and increased emergency response. SO3 and SO4 have each accounted for 3 percent of the needs-based plan. While these are small proportions of the overall budget, SO3 represents a significant investment in national system building.

Figure 4: Needs-based plan evolution by strategic outcome



Source: CSP and BRs (excludes DSC and ISC).

50. At the activity level, the most significant activity by needs-based plan is Activity 1 with USD 528m/48 percent. This is followed by Activity 3 with USD 258m/24 percent, and Activity 2 with USD 97m/9 percent.

Table 2: CSP cumulative financial overview

SO	Activity	Original NBP: 2018	% of total	BR6: 09/2021	% of total	% funded to date (NBP BR6)	% of resources used to date
		USD		USD			
SO 1	Activity 1	\$ 429,510,685	43%	\$ 528,759,135	48%	59%	88%
	Activity 2	\$ 75,075,711	8%	\$ 97,266,168	9%	55%	93%
SO 2	Activity 3	\$ 289,815,796	29%	\$ 258,047,709	24%	47%	92%
	Activity 4	\$ 36,886,628	4%	\$ 35,409,866	3%	44%	75%
SO 3	Activity 5	\$ 24,279,662	2%	\$ 26,537,910	2%	81%	79%
SO 4	Activity 6	\$ 22,929,450	2%	\$ 22,995,950	2%	55%	85%
	Activity 7	\$ 1,228,490	0%	\$ 1,203,490	0%	36%	100%
	Activity 8		0%	\$ 3,742,253	0%	73%	91%
	Activity 9		0%	\$ 1,045,000	0%	14%	91%
	Activity 10		0%	\$ 209,000	0%	0%	


Source: CSP and BR6 (includes DSC and ISC). ACR1-A_v33 to date 22.06.22.

51. As of July 2022, the CSP is approximately 83 percent completed in terms of time expired. However, based on the cumulative allocated resources, it has only been 56 percent funded against the needs-based plan of BR6. SO1 activities are funded at 59 percent and SO2 is funded at 47 percent. The smaller SO3

activity (5) is the best funded programme activity at 81 percent. Resources are allocated to service provision activities under SO4 in a more ad hoc manner, often in response to partner demands to buy the services offered. Overall SO4 has been funded at 55 percent to date.

52. Resources for the CSP increased from USD 90m in 2018 to USD 147m in 2020 but declined to USD 107m in 2021. The United States of America (USA) is by far the most significant donor to the CSP, with an overall contribution of USD 324m (58 percent of contributions).

Figure 5: Donors to the CSP



Source: Annual Resource Situation (as of 22.06.22).

53. CSPs aim to mobilize longer-term, and less narrowly earmarked funding at the level of results rather than activities. Directed multilateral contributions to the CSP have been predominantly earmarked at activity level (88.8 percent), followed by the strategic outcome level (8.4 percent), and the country level (2.8 percent).⁵³

54. Activities 1 to 3 make direct transfers of food or cash-based transfers to beneficiaries. WFP generally transferred less food in metric tons (mt) than planned across both SO1 and SO2 activities. The percentage of actual food transfers versus planned transfers fell from 77 percent in 2019 to 68 percent in 2021. The shortfalls against plans were more significant in SO1, which includes year-round assistance to refugees (61 percent in 2021) than in SO2, which uses seasonal safety nets⁵⁴ to meet seasonal food gaps in the ASALS (between 80 and 137 percent implemented 2019 to 2021).

55. The volume of cash-based transfers (in USD) increased from 30m in 2019 to 49m in 2020, but fell back to 41m in 2021. This represented 67 percent of planned volumes in 2019, 99 percent in 2020, but only 47 percent in 2021. The shift towards cash appears to have been faster within SO1 than in SO2. However, progress under both strategic outcomes stalled in 2021.

⁵³Distribution Contribution and Forecast Stats 2022-06-19.

⁵⁴WFP. 2022. Mid-Term Evaluation of Outcome 2. Pg 33, 34.

Table 3: Planned and actual food and cash-based transfers

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 (Jan-Sep)
Food - planned (MT)	53,007	96,588	97,136	89,483	68,552
Food - actual (MT)	24,338	74,072	64,894	61,698	56,511
Food % of planned	46%	77%	67%	69%	82%
CBT - planned (USD)	\$23,507,697	\$44,650,026	\$49,634,406	\$86,646,600	\$91,763,900
CBT - actual (USD)	\$11,609,803	\$30,115,855	\$49,254,986	\$40,571,236	\$40,079,121
CBT - % of planned	49%	67%	99%	47%	44%

Source: ACRs. 2022 data is provisional, refers to Jan-Sep. (MODA) (extracted 9/12/22).

Overview of beneficiaries

56. The number of beneficiaries reached by CSP has fluctuated, as shown in Table 4. In each year WFP planned to reach a larger number of females than males. It has consistently done so, but the actual reach of WFP by sex as a percentage of the planned numbers has varied. In 2018 (pre-CSP) and 2019 WFP was more successful in reaching the intended number of females, although the COVID-19 pandemic thwarted efforts to dramatically increase the number of females reached in 2020 and 2021.

Table 4: Planned and actual beneficiaries by year and sex

Year		Female	%	Male	%	Total	%
2018 (Pre CSP)	Planned	1,371,670	98%	1,248,980	95%	2,620,650	99%
	Actual	1,398,930		1,183,790		2,582,720	
2018 (CSP)	Planned	624,930	43%	583,270	47%	1,208,200	45%
	Actual	268,909		271,780		540,689	
2019	Planned	616,306	90%	586,894	77%	1,203,200	84%
	Actual	557,143		449,455		1,006,598	
2020	Planned	1,311,832	56%	882,168	70%	2,194,000	62%
	Actual	733,744		618,789		1,352,533	
2021	Planned	1,350,682	49%	919,320	61%	2,270,002	54%
	Actual	662,620		558,976		1,221,596	
2022	Planned	775,621	101%	654,381	110%	1,430,002	105%
	Actual	786,893		720,277		1,507,169	

Source: ACRs. 2022 data is provisional, refers to Jan-Sep. (MODA) (extracted 9/12/22).

1.4. Evaluation methodology, limitations and ethical considerations

57. A theory of change (ToC) was reconstructed at the evaluation inception stage (see Annex 5). The theory of change was used as a conceptual tool to identify the pathway towards intended change as well as the various assumptions and influencing factors.

58. The country strategic plan evaluation has drawn from 30 evidence generation exercises since 2015 (see Annex 17a) and focuses on linkages, interactions and integrations across the strategic outcomes and thematic groups, as well as the overall strategic positioning and partnerships of WFP in relation to the Government and the international community.

59. The evaluation questions (EQs), detailed in Annex 6, are common for CSPs and broadly cover: relevance (EQ1); effectiveness/sustainability (EQ2); efficiency (EQ3); and factors explaining the performance of WFP and extent to which WFP has made the expected strategic shifts (EQ4).

60. One challenge in the CPSE data collection became apparent only after the inception phase. There was a recognition that there were gaps in data against some indicators, particularly as a consequence of restrictions relating to COVID-19. The evaluation team sought to address these gaps through the collection of primary qualitative data.

2. Evaluation findings

2.1. EQ 1: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE CSP EVIDENCE BASED AND STRATEGICALLY FOCUSED TO ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE?

2.1.1 To what extent was the CSP informed by existing evidence on the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues prevailing in the country to ensure its relevance at design stage?

Finding 1: The CSP was informed by extensive consultation with county governments through the county steering groups (CSGs), ensuring strong alignment with county integrated development plans (CIDPs).

62. Since devolution, WFP used county steering groups as an important forum to engage county government officials from various ministries and other relevant agencies on communities' food security and nutrition issues.

63. Stakeholders confirmed that a collaborative process was used with county governments, with WFP undertaking joint planning to co-create, co-plan, and co-invest in activities under the CSP that were well aligned with county integrated development plans. Community action plans (CAPs), drawn up by county governments and community members, were used to inform the CSP on food security and nutrition challenges and fed into the County Sustainable Food Systems Programme Strategy in 2018.

64. WFP utilized broader assessments undertaken by county governments and the National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) to identify food-insecure host community populations in emergencies. WFP confirmed that the process undertaken at the local level was subject to random quality assurance cross-checks to validate targeting.

65. The evaluation found mixed evidence across different counties regarding the level of county government investment into delivery of in-kind food assistance and nutrition services (such as moderate acute malnutrition (MAM)) to people in need. In some counties, such as Isiolo, there is an allocated nutrition budget, and the county government invests in nutrition advocacy and community nutrition outreach (community demonstrations and media). In most other counties, beyond beneficiary targeting, there was limited county government investment in delivery of food assistance and nutrition services, with the county government's role largely confined to facilitation, identification and provision of health centres, distribution points and security. In many counties, a joint partner initiative (including WFP) with county governments created an advocacy platform used to lobby and advocate for increased county investment in nutrition, and this contributed to county government approvals and recent allocation of nutrition budgets.

Finding 2: The CSP design and targeting strategy was informed by an extensive evidence base, although gaps remained in serving the elderly and the disabled within the refugee population.

66. The vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) major annual and biannual food security monitoring exercises; the comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis and the food security monitoring system are the three primary sources of food security information in the country, key sources for IPC and a guide for WFP geographic targeting.

67. The country office monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit oversees extensive process monitoring to verify the timeliness and quality of delivery by partners. Outcome monitoring is also undertaken to determine the status of programme beneficiaries. The results of outcome monitoring reach headquarters (HQ) and the public as outcome indicators detailed in annual country reports (ACRs).

68. WFP drew on a wealth of research and evaluative work during the design of the CSP, using recommendations⁵⁵ to inform targeting of assistance and delivery modalities. For example, SO2 intervention activities also addressed challenges highlighted in a 2018 food systems country case study.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ WFP. 2014. *Kenya PRRO 200174: An Evaluation of WFP's Operation (2011-2013)*.

⁵⁶ WFP. 2018. *Food System Country Case Study Kenya*.

WFP, with partners, produced the Government's 2020 Short Rains Assessment Report, which looked at food and nutrition security in 23 ASAL counties and the impacts of shocks and hazards on food security.

69. WFP utilized community-based targeting as a reliable way to identify and reach food insecure Kenyan resident households. The targeting of all refugees and asylum seekers in the Kenya refugee camps/settlements of Kakuma, Dadaab and Kalobeyei for general food distribution and nutrition assistance was well aligned with the Government's and United Nations Refugee Agency's (UNHCR's) blanket assistance policy.⁵⁷ In Dadaab, WFP has also appropriately adapted to the refugee registers and profiling conducted by the Government and UNHCR since 2016. Targeting of beneficiaries in need of MAM treatment and prevention activities was appropriate. The targeting process was expanded to include host community mothers and volunteers, appropriately and periodically monitoring nutrition and MAM treatment needs via the family mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) approach.

70. The CSP was appropriately tailored to the needs of different beneficiary profiles, and design of the food assistance and nutrition commodities met the different vulnerability needs of these beneficiaries. Target beneficiary numbers can be found in Annex 10, Table 14. However, refugee beneficiaries targeted by SO1 reported that the dietary and food needs of the elderly (refugees) were not adequately addressed in the design of activities under the CSP. There was mixed evidence regarding the appropriateness of the food distribution points (FDP) design. The SO1 Outcome Monitoring Report 2021,⁵⁸ states that food distribution points suitably addressed the needs of the vulnerable, and priority was given to persons living with disability, by use of special queues. In contrast, SO1 beneficiaries reported that the design of the food distribution points does not adequately factor the access needs of disabled people, and state that this is a shortfall in the design of distribution sites.

71. Overall, stakeholders indicated that the design and delivery approach of the school feeding programme and the programme providing meals to vocational training centres were relevant to refugee/Kenyan needs, and that both programmes promoted attendance rates. However, there were some shortcomings as the programme was not designed to cater for high demand at primary schools where student numbers were significantly higher than those planned, particularly in Kakuma but also in Dadaab, as these schools attract pupils from economic migrant families (that is, from South Sudan).

Finding 3: Stakeholders highlight a need to reassess how the vulnerability of refugees is determined.

72. The policy to provide blanket food and nutrition assistance to all refugees in camps without an assessment of vulnerability criteria is questioned by key stakeholders, who refer to evidence on proxy indicators of economic status among refugees, such as access to smart phones and livestock ownership. However, as highlighted by UNHCR, any reinterpretation of refugee vulnerability can only happen in parallel with a change to national legislation permitting refugee employment, business operations and asset ownership. A joint assessment mission, planned for September 2022, by WFP with UNHCR aims to reassess vulnerability levels in the camps. The WFP Internal Audit of Kenya Operations 2021 outlines this as a priority.⁵⁹

73. To date there are limited data on self-reliance among refugee populations. A joint donor assessment of self-reliance among refugees in Kakuma conducted in 2014 indicated only 6-8 percent levels of self-reliance. A 2019 UNHCR/Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) monitoring report⁶⁰ identified ongoing challenges to self-reliance in Kakuma, including legal restrictions to formal employment and the lack of wider freedoms for refugees, which inhibit self-reliance.

74. Another key question raised by stakeholders is whether the response to refugees residing in the camps long-term, that is up to 30 years, is to be classified as an emergency situation requiring crisis response. For instance, stakeholders in Dadaab say the camp is largely not addressing a crisis or emergency response, but is a "fall back" for the people of Somalia: part of the refugee population migrates to the camp depending on the rains and droughts in Somalia. There is economic migration, where refugees visit the camps temporarily to be present for profiling and biometric events and ensure their status as refugees is maintained. Stakeholders call for the WFP to address this.

⁵⁷ Approx 80,000 refugees live in urban centres. WFP does not target this group.

⁵⁸ WFP. 2021. Outcome 1 Process and output monitoring report, Jan-March 2021. p6, p8.

⁵⁹ WFP. *Internal Audit of WFP Operations in Kenya*. Office of the Inspector General, AR/22/09 May.

⁶⁰ DANIDA, UNHCR. 2019. *Joint Evaluation of The Integrated Solutions Model in and Around Kalobeyei, Turkana, Kenya*.

2.1.2 To what extent is the CSP aligned to national policies and plans and to the SDGs?

Finding 4: The CSP is well aligned to all key national policies on food and nutrition, as well as other related policies.

75. The CSP placed a strong emphasis on SDG 2 - zero hunger and SDG 17 - building partnerships and strengthening collaborations with other agencies. The CSP was also designed to contribute to SDG target 17.9 providing support to national plans in developing countries to enable them to implement all SDGs, as well as contribute to SDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10.⁶¹ The CSP is aligned to Kenya's third medium-term plan (MTP III, 2018-2022), which aims to advance long-term development goals set out in the Kenya Vision 2030 programme.

76. All CSP outcomes are aligned to the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy Implementation Framework 2017-2022,⁶² particularly through the focus on food systems, capacity development and emergency response.⁶³ WFP activities complement the Kenya National Nutrition Action Plan (KNAP) 2018-2022⁶⁴ key result areas and the Kenya Agri-Nutrition Implementation Strategy (2020-2025).⁶⁵ School feeding aims to support the goal of basic education for all children as per the Kenya School Meals Policy⁶⁶ and the National School Meals and Nutrition Strategy.⁶⁷

77. The CSP is aligned to the Agricultural Sector Growth and Transformation Strategy, which sets out three "anchors" to drive sector transformation: increase small-scale farmer, pastoralist and fisherfolk incomes; increase agricultural output and value addition; and boost household food resilience. Special attention is given to the ASALs under the anchor to boost household food resilience. SO2 of the CSP is aligned with the objectives of the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy (KCSAS) to adapt to climate change and build resilience of agricultural systems while minimizing emissions for enhanced food and nutritional security and improved livelihoods.

78. The CSP, through its promotion of a gender-transformative approach to food security and nutrition programmes, is aligned with the National Policy on Gender and Development.⁶⁸ The CSP is also broadly aligned with Kenya's Youth Development Policy 2019⁶⁹ through SO2, supporting the Government's efforts to harness the potential of youth in agriculture. There was deliberate targeting of youth in WFP agricultural activities, for example in Garissa (Kamuthe Youth Group) and Nakuru (Farm to Market Alliance, (FtMA)). The CSP also contributes to the Kenya Youth Agribusiness Strategy (2017-2021).

Finding 5: The third CSP strategic outcome focusing on strengthening national systems and capacities is well-aligned with WFP and SDG strategic results. It also responds to the priority attached by the Government to strengthening national systems and institutions.

79. The Government explicitly prioritizes strengthening the capacity of national and county systems and institutions, as in the Kenyan Constitution of 2010, (in its Fourth Schedule).⁷⁰ It is similarly prioritized in the Government's Vision 2030, as well as in the Zero Hunger Strategic Review.⁷¹

⁶¹ ACRs, CSP, WFP. 2022. *Kenya Country Brief*.

⁶² GoK. 2017. *National food and nutrition policy implementation framework (2017-2022)*.

⁶³ WFP. 2021. *Kenya Country Strategic Plan 2018-2023: Mid-Term Review*.

⁶⁴ GoK. 2018. *Kenya National Nutrition Action Plan 2018-2022*.

⁶⁵ GoK. 2020. *Agri-Nutrition Implementation Strategy*.

⁶⁶ GoK. 2018. *Kenya School Meals Policy (upcoming)*.

⁶⁷ GoK. 2018. *National School Meals and Nutrition Strategy 2017-2022*.

⁶⁸ WFP. 2021. *Kenya Country Strategic Plan 2018-2023: Mid-Term Review*.

⁶⁹ GoK. 2019. *Kenya Youth Development Policy*.

⁷⁰ World Bank. 2022. *Making Devolution Work for Service Delivery*, p.107. GoK. 2018. *Zero Hunger Strategic Review*, p.77.

⁷¹ GoK. 2019. *Vision 2030, Progress Report*. Section 2.5.3. GoK. 2018. *Zero Hunger Strategic Review*. Recommendation 9, p. 77.

Finding 6: The Government’s endorsement of the CSP enabled WFP to serve as a supportive enabler of improvements in national food and nutrition policy implementation.

80. The National Food and Nutrition Policy Implementation Framework (2017-2022) and KNAP (2018-2022) map out the coordination structure for food and nutrition policy implementation. Moreover, the different ministerial technical committees align well with the different strategic outcomes, especially SO1, SO2 and SO3.

81. WFP has also seconded a school meals officer to the Ministry of Education. Interviewees described the valuable support of WFP in establishing intersectoral committees at county government level, and funding inter-ministerial coordination to improve links between health and nutrition and agriculture, education and water.

Finding 7: WFP took steps to effectively prepare to adapt its approach to serving the refugee population in light of the changing national policies and framework.

82. WFP endeavoured to prepare for a new refugee context in Kenya – given the evolving government refugee policy from camp closures to the refugee resettlement policy (Refugee Act and “Marshall Plan”). Most humanitarian agencies are waiting to see how the policy shifts unfold in practice and many hope a strategy will be clearer after the 2022 national elections. Nevertheless, CSP preparedness has been important, and WFP has sought to align with the government policy shifts.

83. The SO1 objective of promoting refugee self-reliance, local economic development and host community integration remains to be fully designed beyond pilots in all camps. The pilot Kalobeyei Integrated Socioeconomic Development Plan (KISEDIP) in Turkana County is the most advanced, given that the development concept of the Kalobeyei settlement⁷² has been the most conducive to promoting self-reliance, settlement and integration of refugees and host communities (see Annex 16). The design of the SO1 component under the KISEDIP pilot, however, remains small scale and is yet to map out the process enabling beneficiaries to transition to self-reliance.⁷³ Performance is similar in Kakuma, where the SO1 strategic design for self-reliance remains experimental, and in Dadaab the strategic design documents for the small-scale self-reliance pilots remain to be fully drafted. To refine the WFP strategic intervention, various agencies have called for lessons to be learned from SO1 in KISEDIP. The overall performance of SO1 was modest in preparing for the shift in the government refugee policy and a scenario where refugees are resettled among Kenyan host communities. While WFP has robustly supported the KISEDIP pilot and its agricultural self-reliance objectives as a valuable entry point, overall, it has not invested sufficiently in self-reliance for refugees.

2.1.3 To what extent is the CSP coherent and aligned with the wider United Nations and does include appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP in the country?

Finding 8: The CSP is highly coherent with other relevant United Nations agency policies and priorities, and there is evidence of good cross-agency collaboration and cooperation.

84. WFP is a member of the UN country team (UNCT) and has formed appropriate strategic partnerships with other UNCT members, including the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), FAO and UNHCR for delivery of work across CSP strategic outcomes. The CSP is coherent with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), particularly Strategic Priority 2. WFP is committed to collaborative working enshrined in the “One United Nations” business operations strategy (BOS), and is recognized by the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) for its commitment to UNCT collaboration

⁷² The Kalobeyei settlement was set up based on principles of refugee self-reliance, integrated delivery of services to refugees and Kenyan host community members, and greater support for livelihood opportunities through evidence-based interventions.

⁷³ WFP Monitoring Reports; Kils; Refugees Studies Centre, University of Oxford. 2019. The Kalobeyei Model: Towards Self-Reliance for Refugees? DANIDA and UNHCR. 2019. Joint Evaluation of the Integrated Solutions Model in and Around Kalobeyei, Turkana, Kenya.

85. The CSP recognizes the UNHCR global mandate to protect refugees and its coordination mandate for refugee camps in Kenya. There is regular collaboration, communication and a strong historic partnership between UNHCR and WFP. The agencies' programme and field officers meet monthly (at joint donor steering meetings) and the agencies also undertake larger joint assessment missions, while also aligning strategies, targets and programming. Key informants stated that the relationship was good. In-person meetings were recently re-established (following COVID-19) and considered valuable for collaborative working.

86. As SO2 partners, WFP and FAO co-lead the global food security cluster. Similarly, via SO1, WFP and FAO are co-chairs of the agriculture, livestock and natural resource management component of KISED. WFP input into KISED was well aligned with FAO and other implementing partner contributions (the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, UNHCR, UNICEF and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme UN-HABITAT).

87. The design of MAM treatment was suitably aligned to UNHCR and UNICEF management of GAM. Some stakeholders question the efficiency and effectiveness of the design and call for further alignment between WFP and UNICEF to use the same therapeutic commodity for both MAM and SAM with different doses prescribed according to a child's weight. WFP states that trials are underway, and that the Government is also guiding the choice of therapeutic commodities to be used in many counties.

88. WFP support for the COVID-19 pandemic response was aligned with the Government's relief response and to the USD 155 million United Nations Socioeconomic Response Plan to COVID-19 for Kenya (UNCT 2020).⁷⁴

89. Strong emphasis was given to the role of strategic partnerships as a means to achieve the objectives of the CSP. The range of partnerships in which WFP engaged, and their effectiveness, is considered in EQ 4.3.

2.1.4 To what extent is the CSP design internally coherent and based on a clear theory of change articulating the role and contributions of the WFP in a realistic manner and based on its comparative advantages as defined in the WFP strategic plan?

Finding 9: The overall strategic shift from service delivery to national system strengthening is clear in the CSP, although at odds with the budget, which is strongly weighted towards addressing key constraints facing food and nutrition in refugee camps/settlements (SO1).

90. An overarching theory of change for the CSP was not established at the design stage by WFP. However, individual theories of change for strategic outcomes were developed during the course of the CSP. The evaluation team reconstructed an overarching theory of change (see Annex 5), drawing on the CSP strategy and other evidence. The overall CSP strategy was ambitious on food systems, gender-transformative programming and the socioeconomic integration of refugees.

91. The CSP SO1 objective (addressing key constraints facing food and nutrition in refugee camps/settlements), appears plausible in theory, and is based on the comparative advantages of WFP. The evaluation finds that the strategy to achieve the objective for SO1 is generally sound, yet the validity of the thinking shaping the SO1 strategy has been challenged by contextual factors, lessening the likelihood of some outputs being achieved as intended (that is, the rollout of the cash-based transfer strategy in refugee camps and the chain of events contributing to self-reliance objectives.)

92. The strategy and intended outcomes of SO2⁷⁵ build on WFP experience in livelihood interventions and agricultural market support, and go beyond the traditional model of asset creation, with a broader focus on food systems. The SO2 theory of change, inferred by the SO2 baseline report, can be found in Annex 19.

93. SO2, Activity 4, aimed to facilitate access to markets and provide technical expertise in supply chain management to smallholder farmers and retailers. To clarify the linkages across supply value chain interventions, food systems and improved nutrition and health outcomes, a theory of change on "food

⁷⁴ COVID-19 Data Portal; WB Socioeconomic Impact of COVID-19 in Kenya on Households January 2021 and June 2021.

⁷⁵ WFP Kenya. 2022. *Food Systems and Resilience-CSPE*, FGD SO2.

systems for healthy diets” (see Annex 18) was developed by WFP during the CSP. The evaluation team noted that this has better positioned supply chain management within the country office.

94. While SO1 addresses nutrition-specific interventions, the contribution of SO2 to nutrition was not clear to some stakeholders, including county governments, WFP staff and beneficiaries. Beneficiaries need to better understand for example, the nutrition-related links between SO2 and SO1, such as how GAM levels can impact on the ability of women and girl caregivers to participate in SO2 activities, due to time spent caring for sick children, and links between food safety in SO2 and SO1.

95. WFP support to the Ministry of Education’s school meals programme was based on strong horizontal linkages across the CSP strategic outcomes. The programme, under SO3 (capacity strengthening), works with SO1 in serving vulnerable populations (for example, school feeding in refugee communities) and with SO4 by supporting schools with food commodity procurement and food storage management. Under SO2, smallholder farmers (SHFs) supply schools with food for the programme.

96. The CSP did not include a clear strategy or theory of change for supply chain management under SO4, a strategic outcome that was positioned as an internal and external service provider. BR5, in April 2021, created a specific activity (9) to cover all the supply chain service provision activities⁷⁶ of WFP Kenya. A key recommendation from the mid-term review was for a supply chain strategy to be adopted to better articulate how expertise underpins and supports the work implemented by other strategic outcomes. Further, to ensure a more comprehensive assessment of progress, key informants suggested that supply chain activities should develop robust performance indicators especially for country capacity strengthening (CCS).

97. Although SO3 was designed to support government institutions to build their capacity and systems, responsibility for supply chain and food systems capacity strengthening was distributed across strategic outcomes. This created management and monitoring challenges that may have diluted potential country capacity strengthening impact, even although SO3 was 100 percent funded in 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, internal assessments indicated that national systems supported by WFP were maintained or strengthened.⁷⁷

Finding 10: SO3 programming is reasonably well-integrated across the strategic outcomes. However, the absence of a comprehensive country capacity strengthening strategy for Kenya has been unhelpful. The deficiency is particularly apparent in the division of labour between SO2 and SO3 in country capacity strengthening, which is unclear and without an explicit rationale spelled out in the CSP or in other strategic documents.

98. While SO3 is dedicated exclusively to country capacity strengthening, there are some activities of this kind that fall under SO1 and SO2, in areas relating to resilience and food systems. SO4 provides the direction for, and technical expertise supporting, engagement in capacity strengthening of the humanitarian supply chain, although the activities are undertaken through SO3. The SO3 nutrition specialist is co-located with the nutrition unit. Interviews confirm the close working relationship between SO1 and SO3 management and staff in programme development and responses to emerging issues. With three staff members “outposted” to national government ministries, SO3 at times represents an access channel to government for other strategic outcomes. In these ways, and others, SO3 work in capacity strengthening is integrated across the strategic outcomes. However, the rationale for the division of labour between SO2 and SO3 is not made clear in the CSP or elsewhere. This has resulted in some difficulties in programme planning and budget attribution, and confusion at field level.⁷⁸

99. There are ongoing plans to develop a comprehensive strategy for country capacity strengthening to inform the new CSP. The lack of a cross-strategic outcome country capacity strengthening strategy was also noted in the mid-term review (MTR) (p.33).

⁷⁶ WFP. 2021. *Kenya Country Strategic Plan Budget Review 5 Narrative*. The estimated value of service delivery under activity 9 was USD1.0 million.

⁷⁷ WFP. 2022. *Kenya Annual Country Report (ACR) 2021*.

⁷⁸ On SO2, CCS, see indicator listing in MTR, pp.152.153.

Finding 11: WFP is a strong responder to emergencies, harnessing its many comparative advantages to good effect.

100. WFP is recognized in Kenya as the major humanitarian actor. Its expertise is recognized in the following areas: food aid distribution; applying humanitarian principles; pipeline/supply chain management; ability to mobilize resources and transparency in financial accountability; robust monitoring systems; and ability to support governments in capacity strengthening.

2.1.5 To what extent has WFP strategic positioning remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP considering changing context, national capacities and needs – in particular in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?

Finding 12: WFP successfully adapted CSP support throughout delivery. There was strong adaptation in line with changing national priorities, although with some shortcomings.

101. Overall, WFP strategic positioning remained relevant. All stakeholders regarded WFP highly for its situational positioning of food assistance, nutritional services, pipeline/supply chain management and infrastructure development.

102. WFP remained alert to changing national government priorities. For example, WFP responded to the finalization of Kenya's Youth Development Policy in 2019 by developing a youth engagement strategy with a strong youth inclusion component in agribusiness development. In food safety and quality, an area of high importance to the Government, WFP responded to an emergent priority by co-developing the Kenya School Meals Food Safety and Quality Guideline with the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education for all stakeholders supporting the school meals programme in Kenya, to coincide with the handing over of programme management to the Government.

103. In relation to the Farm to Market Alliance (FtMA) WFP effectively responded to shifting needs by addressing input and output market access constraints for smallholder farmers, supporting the development of sustainable food systems.

104. With the Government of Kenya banning the registration of new arrivals in Dadaab in 2016, WFP successfully adapted its food assistance delivery to the alternative approach applied by UNHCR and the Government of profiling new arrivals (documenting the refugees using biometrics, while refugees do not gain an ID card). Approximately 35,700 refugees have been profiled.

105. Because of the rising number of refugee beneficiaries, combined with significant WFP funding constraints, WFP has been unable to continually provide beneficiaries with general food distribution (GFD) in accordance with required quantities and quality standards.

106. There was an increase in host community (HC) settlement near refugee camps, particularly in Kakuma, as people heard about the potential availability of development aid under the new government integration and settlement schemes. However, the WFP response (under Activity 2 or under SO2) to the food security needs of the vulnerable in these Kenyan communities is unclear, and seemingly remains unaddressed. Stakeholders call for WFP to address this.

Finding 13: The strong adaptation by WFP of supply chain services supported humanitarian response action by partners.

107. The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) operated throughout the period of the CSP supporting aid sector interventions in the Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps, areas not served by commercial air operators. In 2019, UNHAS Kenya was rated as one of the most efficient global operations, with 98 percent of bookings served.⁷⁹

108. WFP and the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO) signed an agreement in February 2020 for the operational management by UNHAS of the "ECHO Humanitarian Aid Flight (EU-HAF)" in Kenya.⁸⁰ A CSP budget revision⁸¹ created Activity 8 to manage

⁷⁹ WFP. 2022. *Kenya ACR 2021*.

⁸⁰ WFP/UNHAS management of ECHO flight operations was introduced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali.

⁸¹ WFP. 2020. *Kenya Country Strategic Plan Budget Review 3*.

humanitarian air transport services to Dadaab and Kakuma from Nairobi in support of DG-ECHO-funded projects, transporting more than 8,000 passengers and 81 metric tons (mt) of cargo since 2020. To support government and humanitarian actors, and as part of the One United Nations business operations strategy,⁸² WFP expanded delivery of supply chain services to address the changing environment (for example, COVID-19 or other shocks) and to respond to shifts in national government priorities.

Finding 14: WFP successfully adapted its support to address the COVID-19 pandemic response.

109. In response to COVID-19, WFP updated targeting and, with partners, donors and the Government, introduced a cash-transfer programme to support urban poor households in Nairobi and Mombasa as part of the COVID-19 urban response. This was well received by beneficiaries. More broadly, efforts were made to review and adjust all WFP food distribution processes to minimize exposure to health risks, including avoiding “scooping”, with supervision to ensure that all health protocols were observed. WFP extended MAM treatment to at-risk individuals in Nairobi and Mombasa and adjusted the frequency of general food distribution to monthly. WFP used family mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) to monitor nutrition status. Following a review of distribution processes, WFP also took a range of measures to minimize contact and increase safety, such as provision of personal protective equipment, mandatory handwashing and the presence of health officials onsite.

110. UNHAS was vital during COVID-19 restrictions, operating to refugee camps when no other air operators could. Key informant interviews were complementary regarding UNHAS services to transport humanitarian workers, light cargo and critical medical supplies and to support the refugee voluntary repatriation programme flights.⁸³

Finding 15: The strategic focus on cash-based transfer as a modality increased during the CSP period, although there were challenges with rollout.

111. The strategic focus on cash-based transfer as a modality increased during CSP delivery, with two main programmes in operation – Bamba Chakula and Bamba Chapa. Additional cash-based transfer responses were implemented in Nairobi and Mombasa (2020 and 2021), and one-off cash transfers in Isiolo, Samburu and Marsabit in response to locust infestations.

112. In the case of Bamba Chakula, the challenge to the design is the appropriate determination of the cash value based on the ration size of in-kind food assistance and periodic market assessments undertaken by WFP, joint agencies and the Kenya Cash Working Group.⁸⁴ Best practice recommends regular tracking of market prices, inflation and minimum expenditure basket calculations. The SO1 strategy does not sufficiently do this. In the case of Bamba Chapa, there are also challenges around the opening of accounts for refugees without the appropriate identification required by Kenyan Central Bank policy.

113. Some donors reported that WFP continues to prioritize in-kind food assistance and recommended that it focuses on transitioning to cash-based transfers as much as possible, by 2023, to better align with the Government’s new Refugee Act. While donors acknowledge the challenges to roll out cash-based transfers in refugee camps, some agencies have adapted to develop innovative approaches, for example, the UNHCR multi-wallet intervention. Refugee beneficiaries reported a preference for cash-based transfers as it facilitated a choice of food commodities and provided easier access for some groups for example, the elderly and people with disabilities.

⁸² UN reform workstreams working to deliver and build on the proposals envisioned to maximize programmatic gains through efficient and high-quality common back-office operations.

⁸³ The ‘VolRep’ flights transported 270 passengers in 2021.

⁸⁴ A consortium of international partners which coordinates transfer value calculations.

2.2. EQ2: WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP'S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN THE COUNTRY?

2.2.1 To what extent did WFP activities and outputs contribute to the expected outcomes of the CSP and to the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)? Were there any unintended outcomes, positive or negative?

Strategic Outcome 1: Refugees and asylum seekers living in camps and settlements and populations affected by natural and human-caused disasters have access to adequate food to meet their food and nutrition needs throughout the year

Finding 16. WFP Kenya successfully reached large populations of refugees, but its reach of resident targets fell short.

114. WFP Kenya successfully reached large target refugee populations in Kakuma, Dadaab and Kalobeyei. However, Table 5 shows that WFP achievement rates for residents fell short of target, with both stakeholders and data indicating funding constraints and increases in beneficiary numbers as main reasons (see Finding 17).

115. Between 2019 and 2021, food-insecure resident numbers grew, partly due to the high numbers recorded in urban areas. Activity 1 and 2 budget allocations were not aligned with this upward trajectory. Prioritization of Activity 1 funding reflected SO1's focus on refugees when faced by the external challenges of funding shortfalls, in particular in 2018 and 2019.

Table 5: Planned and actual beneficiaries by residence status

Residence Status	2018			2019			2020			2021			2022 (Jan-Sep)		
	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%	Planned	Actual	%
Resident	529,644	54,468	10%	539,098	600,797	111%	1,776,129	927,565	52%	1,852,132	772,045	42%	1,032,132	872,501	85%
Refugees	678,556	486,221	72%	664,102	405,801	61%	417,871	424,969	102%	417,870	449,551	108%	397,870	634,760	160%

Source: CM-R001b_v1.4 22.06.2022. 2022 data is provisional, refers to Jan-Sep. (MODA) (extracted 9/12/22)

116. As illustrated in Table 6, most beneficiaries under Activity 1 were reached by general food distribution activities (food/cash-based transfers/commodity vouchers/capacity strengthening activities) followed by school feeding and prevention of acute malnutrition activities.

Table 6: SO1 - Planned and actual beneficiaries by year and activity tag

Activity	Activity tag	Number of beneficiaries by year								
		2018		2019		2020		2021		2022
		Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned
Act 1	Asset creation and livelihood component	1700								
	Food assistance for training		843	1700	729	1100	1174	1100	1194	1100
	General Distribution	429702	397569	794702	413255	424752	429907	424752	453823	404752
	HIV/TB Care&treatment		1049	2000	1693	1600	1490			
	HIV/TB Mitigation&Safety Nets	2000						1600	1853	1600
	Malnutrition prevention component	48680								
	Nutrition treatment component	9200								
	Prevention of acute malnutrition		13892	45251	32473	44270	41894	44270	49096	44270
	School feeding (on-site)		13610	154100	103058	103000	110864	103000	100223	103000
	School meals component	157000								
Service Delivery General	380000									
Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition		11670	8230	11942	10900	11545	10900	13467	10900	
Act 2	Emergency preparedness activities					500000	374572	500000	222779	500000
	Nutrition treatment component	42400								
	Prevention of acute malnutrition					780000		780000		
	Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition		47510	37100	207050	90000	87205	90000	101229	50000

Source: CM-R020v1.2 22.06.2022. Includes overlap.

Finding 17: Funding shortfalls affected the reach of planned beneficiaries through general food distribution and cash transfers, thereby also increasing the risk of unintended negative impacts.

117. Under SO1, distribution of cash transfers largely exceeded targets between 2019 and 2020, while value voucher distribution fell below targets. In 2018, 74 percent of targeted in-kind food assistance under SO1 was achieved. However, achievement against targets in terms of volumes of food and cash distributed continued to fall from 2019 to 2021, mainly due to funding shortfalls. At the conclusion of the evaluation data collection phase (July 2022), progress against food target was low but set to increase in line with expected incoming donor funds (see Table 7).

Table 7: SO1 Planned and actual distributions by modality

Year	FOOD (MT)			CBT (USD)								
				Cash			Value voucher			Total CBT (Cash + Value Voucher)		
	Planned	Actual	% A vs.P	Planned	Actual	% A vs P	Planned	Actual	% A vs P	Planned	Actual	% A vs P
2018	32,863	24,338	74%	163,800	11,505,442	7024%	13,421,696	-	0%	13,585,496	11,505,442	85%
2019	63,627	42,672	67%	392,925	1,336,639	340%	26,984,815	23,385,972	87%	27,377,740	24,722,611	90%
2020	68,263	41,731	61%	8,454,250	16,064,561	190%	34,988,022	27,709,435	79%	43,442,272	43,773,996	101%
2021	73,249	38,924	53%	24,545,300	10,209,403	42%	47,158,000	24,304,009	52%	71,703,300	34,513,412	48%
2022 (to date 15.07.22)	52,319	18,309	35%	23,968,600	3,432,598	14%	52,852,000	13,483,666	26%	76,820,600	16,916,264	22%

Source: ACRs. CM-R007V1.4 (15.07.22)

118. The evaluation found that WFP did not provide adequate food quantities to provide a family with food for a month as was intended by SO1. Low achievement was also recorded against the percentage of food baskets provided as fortified food, with only 18 percent of the 2021 target achieved, due to a lack of SuperCereal Plus (CSB++).

119. While a positive adjustment to the Bamba Chakula transfer value was made in 2019 (Kenyan shilling (KES) 500 to KES 600) after pipeline breaks to in-kind food assistance, since 2019 there have been no further adjustments, despite reduced food assistance rations and increases in market prices. Beneficiaries gave examples of KES 600 purchasing 2 kg of sorghum, which only lasts an average family three days. Market assessments to inform cash-based transfer values are not happening in practice, with a reliance on other agency assessments,⁸⁵ which were somewhat irregular and limited.

120. While stakeholders held WFP in high esteem for its work and appreciated its fund-raising challenges, all state that the recent shortfalls of general food distribution quantities must be addressed. Stakeholders point to the risk of reputational damage to WFP amidst growing protection concerns, as highlighted in the 2021 UNHCR-WFP funding appeal that stressed how food ration or cash cuts were resulting in negative coping strategies to meet basic food needs.⁸⁶

Finding 18: Food consumption and dietary diversity improved in the early part of the CSP. However, since 2021, evidence collected presents a mixed picture, suggesting increasing risks of food insecurity and malnutrition. WFP made good progress in delivery of MAM treatments to refugees and Kenyan populations.

121. Third party monitoring (UNU-MERIT 2021 Annual Report) reported improvements in food consumption scores across camps. Yet, that report also cautions that performance data was not based on robust sampling and comparative analysis between 2019, 2020 and 2021,⁸⁷ and the average food consumption score has remained fairly constant between 2020 and 2021. Indeed, the WFP 2021 Nutrition Survey⁸⁸ found a deterioration of some nutrition indicators in 2021 against baseline values and 2020 targets across all the refugee camps. The survey also indicated high anaemia levels above the public health emergency threshold of 40 percent, and extremely high levels for children 6-23 months, with low consumption of iron-rich or iron-fortified foods in all the camps.

⁸⁵ Kenya Cash Working Group.

⁸⁶ WFP, UNHCR appeal for funding for over 3 million refugees hit by ration cuts in Eastern Africa. Press release 2 March 2021. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/3/603dec5f4/wfp-unhcr-appeal-funding-3-million-refugees-hit-ration-cuts-eastern-africa.html>.

⁸⁷ COVID-19 restrictions affected quality and quantity of monitoring data as discussed further in Section 2.42.

⁸⁸ Joint UNHCR and WFP Nutrition Survey 2021 mentioned in the Annual Country Report 2021.

122. While WFP nutrition survey data for 2022 is lacking,⁸⁹ stakeholders indicated that in May/June 2022, malnutrition rates continued to rise due to the influx of new arrivals, leading to a joint supplementary feeding response with UNICEF. In July 2022, UNHCR reported anaemia and high micronutrient deficiency among refugee likely due to their inability to trade/purchase a variety of foods due to ration cuts, and Medicines sans Frontieres (MSF) reports a significant number of cases of malnourishment among both children and adults.

123. WFP monitoring data in 2021 revealed an increase in crisis and stress-coping strategies being employed by 59.1 percent of refugees.⁹⁰ Average reduced consumption-based Coping Strategy Index (CSI) value⁹¹ showed moderate improvement in Kalobeyei, some improvement in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, yet decline in Dadaab. Consultations with stakeholders highlighted that many refugees were engaging in livelihood and income-generation activities. There were, however, some host community concerns, with environmental degradation associated with some refugee livelihood activities, such as overgrazing by livestock.

124. Annex 10 details that the target numbers against key indicators were achieved and, average recovery rates are good. UNU-MERIT monitoring reports indicates that progress against the additional MAM treatment indicator fell short of SPHERE standards in 2021 in Kakuma (84 percent) and Kalobeyei (83 percent), while progress was good in Dadaab.⁹² While WFP provided considerable integrated MAM nutrition support in ASAL counties, progress was challenging due to the high demand and persistent acute malnutrition levels in the eight ASAL areas targeted. MAM treatment recovery rates, default rates, mortality rates and non-response rates in 2021 in many counties achieved stable values or slight improvements over time. In Tana River and Marsabit values for pregnant and lactating women and girls (PLWG), and children under five, did not meet recommended targets, and the situation was reported as alarming.⁹³

⁸⁹ No WFP nutrition survey or monitoring study conducted in 2022 to assess effects of ration cuts and low CBT actuals amongst refugees.

⁹⁰ UNU-MERIT. WFP. *SO1 Outcome Monitoring, Annual Report 2021*.

⁹¹ A measure of reliance on negative consumption coping strategies such as skipping meals.

⁹² WFP monitoring data and UNU-MERIT. WFP. *SO1 Outcome Monitoring, Annual Report 2021*.

⁹³ WFP. 2022. Kenya ACR 2021.

Table 8: SO1 Activity 1 outcome indicators

Strategic Outcome	SO 01 - Refugees and asylum seekers living in camps and settlements and populations affected by natural and human-caused disasters have access to adequate food to meet their food and nutrition needs throughout the year.								
Activity	ACT 1: (URT: Provide food assistance & nutrient-rich commodities to refugees, including SBCC & support to self-reliance activities in the camps & settlement areas)								
Outcome Indicator	Location	Baseline (2018 or 2019)	2019		2020		2021		End of CSP target (2023)
			Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	
Percentage of households with Acceptable Food Consumption Score	Dadaab	43.1	> 43.1		> 43.1	89	> 43.1	93.2	> 43.1
	Kakuma	36.5	≥ 36.5		≥ 36.5	66	≥ 36.5	73.47	≥ 36.5
	Kalobeyei	35.1	> 35.1		≥ 35.1	61.1	> 35.1	78.12	≥ 35.1
	Settlement								
	Overall	37.7	= 37.7		> 37.7	70.2	> 37.7	80	> 37.7
Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index (Average)	Dadaab	6.6	= 6.6		= 6.6	10.7	≤ 6.6	16.44	≤ 6.6
	Kakuma	10.1	= 10.1		= 10.1	10.3	≤ 10.1	8.91	≤ 10.1
	Kalobeyei	11.5	= 11.5		= 11.5	9.6	≤ 11.5	8.66	> 11.5
	Settlement								
	Overall	9.6	= 9.6		= 9.6	10.2	≤ 9.6	10.6	≤ 9.6
Percentage of households not using livelihood based coping strategies	Dadaab	33.6	≥ 33.6		≥ 33.6	4.7	≥ 33.6	9.79	≥ 33.6
	Kakuma	21.5	≥ 21.5		≥ 21.5	11.2	≥ 21.5	8.35	≥ 21.5
	Kalobeyei	20.1	≥ 20.1		≥ 20.1	9.7	≥ 20.1	9.79	≥ 20.1
	Settlement								
Percentage of households using crisis coping strategies	Dadaab	24	≤ 24		≤ 24	48.7	≤ 24	52.29	≤ 24
	Kakuma	25.7	≤ 25.7		≤ 25.7	47.5	≤ 25.7	60.8	≤ 25.7
	Kalobeyei	21.8	≤ 21.8		≤ 21.8	46.4	≤ 21.8	61.59	≤ 21.8
	Settlement								
Dietary Diversity Score	Dadaab	4	= 4		= 4	7.9	≥ 4	8.5	> 4
	Kakuma	3	= 3		= 3	6.6	≥ 3	6.5	> 3
	Kalobeyei	3	= 3		= 3	6.2	≥ 3	6.7	≥ 3
	Settlement								
	Overall	3.3	≥ 3.3		≥ 3.3	6.81	≥ 3.3	7.02	≥ 3.3
MAM Treatment Recovery rate	Dadaab	96.45	> 75	94.58	> 75	97.68	> 75	98.82	> 75
	Kakuma	91.6	> 75	90.19	> 75	98.42	> 75	98.17	> 75
	Kalobeyei	3.82	> 75	77.37	> 75	92.91	> 75	95.13	> 75
	Settlement								
MAM Treatment Mortality rate	Dadaab	0	< 3	0	< 3	0	< 3	0	< 3
	Kakuma	0	< 3	0.01	< 3	0	< 3	0	< 3
	Kalobeyei	0.35	< 3	0	< 3	0	< 3	0	< 3
	Settlement								

Source: ACR 2021.

Finding 19: The COVID-19 urban response broadly performed well.

125. Beneficiary consultations in Nairobi indicated cash transfers under the COVID-19 urban response helped the vulnerable meet basic household needs, while some set up small businesses. The SO1 mid-term review found that, while the cash-based transfers did not lead to a consistent picture of amelioration, there was evidence that the cash helped households respond to income shocks, and positively impacted consumption and dietary diversity score indicators in Nairobi and Mombasa.

126. In terms of malnutrition treatment programmes, while recovery rates in Nairobi and Mombasa for children under five met SPHERE-defined targets, the recovery rates for pregnant and lactating women and girls in Mombasa were significantly below targets. Default rates in both locations and for both groups did not meet SPHERE-defined targets.⁹⁴

Finding 20: WFP Kenya has performed well against its objective for refugee children in primary school to receive school meals every day, meeting their food and nutrition needs.⁹⁵

127. The target number of schools assisted was met. Ration quantities were appropriate, although the administration of salt in school meals needs better management.

128. School enrolment rates vary across camps; in 2021, they were below target. Enrolment rates were lower for girls than boys. Lower enrolment rates may be due to disruption to school attendance resulting from COVID-19 restrictions, family migration, school transfer, death and insecurity and early marriage of girls. Despite some targets not being met, (see Table 9) all stakeholders consulted reported school meals help promote enrolment and attendance.

⁹⁴ UNU-MERIT. WFP. SO1 Outcome Monitoring, Annual Report 2021.

⁹⁵ WFP. 2021. WFP Kenya CSP 2018-2023: Mid-Term Review. WFP. 2021. WFP Kenya Outcome 1 Process and Output Monitoring Report January-March 2021.

Table 9: SO1 Activity 1 (school feeding) outcome indicators

Activity Tag		School feeding (on-site)						
Target Group		Refugees and Asylum seekers						
Outcome Indicator		Enrolment rate			Attendance rate (new)			
Location Admin Breakdown		Dadaab	Kakuma	Kalobeyei Settlement	Dadaab	Kakuma	Kalobeyei Settlement	
Baseline (2018 or 2019)	Date	2018-06	2018-06	2019-07	2018-10	2018-10	2019-07	
	Male	8	9	5.4	87	75.41	94	
	Female	11	10	6.3	87	75.41	93.2	
	Overall	9	10	5.7	87	75.41	93.6	
2019	Target	Male		5.4	87	75.41	94	
		Female			6.3	87	75.41	93.2
		Overall		10	5.7	87	75.41	93.6
	Actual	Male	0			73.7	93.6	
		Female	0			91.7	95.4	
		Overall	9	7.1		93	94.5	
2020	Target	Male		5.4	87	75.41	94	
		Female			6.3	87	75.41	93.2
		Overall	9	10	5.7	87	75.41	93.6
	Actual	Male						
		Female						
		Overall						
2021	Target	Male		5.4	87	75.41	94	
		Female			6.3	87	75.41	93.2
		Overall	9	10	5.7	87	75.41	93.6
	Actual	Male	-0.16	1.2	-0.25	97.9	85.8	90.9
		Female	-0.15	0.5	-0.22	97.8	86.6	90.3
		Overall	-0.16	0.89	-0.25	97.8	85.9	90.7
End of CSP target (2023)	Male			5.4	87	75.41	94	
	Female			6.3	87	75.41	93.2	
	Overall	9	10	5.7	87	75.41	93.6	

Source: Annual country reports.

Finding 21: There was limited progress against social behavioural change communication (SBCC) targets.

129. WFP successfully delivered various capacity building interventions to beneficiaries. Training plus radio programmes raised awareness of nutrition, diet diversity, malnutrition symptoms and treatment, food preparation hygiene and cooking recipes. The SO1 mid-term review and evidence from the field, however, found limited progress against planned SBCC targets. For Activities 1 and 2, targets on the number of people trained or reached through interpersonal SBCC approaches and mass-media were not met in 2020, as stakeholders reported funding cuts reduced SBCC activities. Beneficiaries reported limited behavioural change as a result of the SBCC, but some did say the SBCC was useful.

Finding 22: There was an increase in numbers of refugees and Kenyans receiving capacity building, and support towards enhanced self-reliance.

130. Emerging evidence⁹⁶ indicates that WFP supported self-reliance, local economic development and host community integration, with beneficiaries reporting improvements in their income generation through sale of farm produce. Progress was, however, largely restricted to the pilot intervention implemented in Kalobeyei settlement (KISED P) with approximately 300 to 600 beneficiaries and the results fluctuated with the rainy seasons as the intervention was largely dependent on rain-fed agriculture.

131. An impressive total of 357,000 m³ water harvesting capacity has been constructed in Turkana West by WFP. The water harvesting infrastructure serves the KISED P rain-fed farms and Kenyan host communities' livestock interventions in Kakuma. WFP data indicates that in 2020, the dams provided water for most of the year to refugee and Kenyan farms and livestock. Yet in 2021 water was only available for one third of

⁹⁶ Evaluation interview data and WFP. 2021. *WFP Kenya CSP 2018-2023: Mid-Term Review*. WFP. 2021. *WFP Kenya Outcome 1 Process and Output Monitoring Report January-March 2021*.

the year due to drought and erratic rainfall. An increase in beneficiaries is likely to be achieved with the recent development of more water pans and farms.

132. Progress against self-reliance objectives in Dadaab are limited. Some initiatives commenced in 2021, such as beekeeping and poultry activities with Kenyan community groups. The interventions remain small scale and the design and project documents are not yet available.

Strategic Outcome 2: Targeted smallholder producers, food-insecure and vulnerable populations benefit from more sustainable, inclusive food systems and increased resilience to climate shocks enabling them to meet their food and nutrition needs by 2023.

Activity 3: Create assets and transfer knowledge, skills and climate risk management tools to food-insecure households.

Finding 23: Capacity strengthening efforts were significantly impacted by COVID-19.

133. Despite good progress at the start of the CSP, output achievement on capacity strengthening fell dramatically with only two out of the six indicators reaching targets.⁹⁷ Following a downward adjustment to targets in 2021, however, progress improved to 55 percent.

134. While COVID-19 impacted significantly on results, targets for all of the three indicators were achieved in 2021. Activity 4 activities returned to course after the initial slowdown brought about by COVID-19.

Table 10: SO2 Activity 3 climate adaptation and risk management output indicators

Indicator	2019		2020		2021		2022
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned
Number of people benefiting from assets and climate adaptation practices facilitated by WFP's Risk Management activities	No data	No data	84000	48824	13,206	15,088	20623
Number of participants of financial inclusion initiatives promoted by WFP (Female)			9750	1209	15323	19369	15859
Number of participants of financial inclusion initiatives promoted by WFP (Male)			5250	553	5224	6311	6247

Source: Annual country reports.

Finding 24: Access to food for the most insecure households remained relatively stable although there was an escalation in crisis levels due to COVID-19 and drought.

135. There were limited data at the outcome level for Activity 3. This was due to COVID-19 as the household survey had to be undertaken via phone interviews, which limited the number of questions that could be asked. Additionally, the survey targeted the most vulnerable households, as opposed to the cross-sectional survey undertaken during baseline. The overall percentage of households with an acceptable food consumption score showed improvement from a baseline value of 70.35 to 75.3 by 2021, surpassing the CSP target.⁹⁸

136. The SO2 mid-term report⁹⁹ found that, at the outcome level, SO2 programming has not resulted in enhanced consumption of safe, nutritious and diversified foods across all livelihood zones (LHZs).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ WFP Kenya ACRs (2018-2021), COMET data.

⁹⁸ WFP. 2022. Kenya ACR 2021.

⁹⁹ WFP Kenya. 2022. Mid-T Evaluation of Outcome 2.

¹⁰⁰ A livelihood zone is an area within which people share broadly the same pattern of livelihood, including options for obtaining food and income and market opportunities. Livelihood zoning provides geographic orientation of livelihood systems to inform food security analysis and assistance targeting, it provides the basis for identifying geographically relevant food security monitoring indicators, and it provides a sampling frame for future assessments. Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network (2010) *Kenya Livelihood Zones*.

However, in a context of drought and declining food security in the ASAL counties there has been no significant decline in acceptable food consumption scores among SO2 beneficiaries, suggesting that WFP food and cash transfers are helping households to withstand the impacts of drought (see Annex 10 Table 27 for more details).

Table 11: SO2 Activity 3 outcome indicators (by sex)

Outcome indicator	Baseline (2019)		2020 actual		2021 actual			2021 target			End of CSP target	
	M	F	M	F	M	F		M	F		M	F
Percentage of households with Acceptable Food Consumption Score	68.54	71.08	71.9	75.3	76.7	71.3	≥	68.54	71.08	≥	68.54	71.08
Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index: Percentage of households not using livelihood based coping strategies	46.7*		2.9	4.6	1.8	1.8	≥	46.8*		≥	46.8*	
Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index: Percentage of households using crisis coping strategies	12.1*		23.2	16.1	25.5	19.8	≤	12.1*		≤	12.1*	
Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index (Average)	1.43	1.65	No data	No data	No data	No data	≤	1.43	1.65	≤	1.43	1.65
Proportion of the population in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihoods asset base	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	≥	50 *		≥	50 *	
Minimum Dietary Diversity – Women	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	≥		14.87	>		14.87

Source: ACRs. (* indicates overall figures, disaggregation by sex not available).

Finding 25: Moderate progress was made on increasing households’ access to alternative, more nutritious foods.

137. There were multiple interventions to drive improvements in nutrition. For example, WFP trained local communities to produce and consume adequate, safe, diverse and nutritious foods. SBCC reached around 392,000 people, targeting improved nutrition practices through cooking demonstrations and an infant feeding practices tool kit.

138. The consumption of specific nutritious foods showed mixed improvements across livelihood zones. The SO2 mid-term report noted significant improvement in daily consumption of protein-rich foods in livelihood zone 2, but not in livelihood zones 1 and 3. A significant improvement was noted in the daily consumption of iron-rich food in 2021 in livelihood zone 3 (Baringo), but not in livelihood zones 1 and 2. There was no improvement in daily consumption of vitamin A-rich food across all livelihood zones.¹⁰¹

139. Monitoring data showed minimal progress in terms of consumption of nutritious foods. (See Annex 10 Table 27). SO2 performance shortfalls could be explained by funding constraints. Additionally, SO2’s promotion of nutritious crops was small scale in scattered sites across targeted ASALs with coverage unlikely to result in significant or effective change in nutrition-sensitive food systems in target county populations.¹⁰² External factors beyond WFP control were likely to have also played a role in limiting SO2 outcome progress.

Finding 26: Qualitative feedback from stakeholders and the findings of the SO2 mid-term review indicate that progress towards the SO2 outcome objective of increased household resilience to climate shocks remains to be demonstrated and crisis coping mechanisms continue to be applied.

140. The consumption-based coping strategy index moved from 8.41 at baseline to 14.8 in 2020 and 17 in 2021 indicating households needed to increasingly adopt crisis coping mechanisms. The percentage of households using crisis coping mechanisms increased from 12.1 percent at baseline to 24.1 percent by 2021, falling well below the CSP target. The evaluation finds the SO2 baseline was based on a livelihood zone approach from which the recent SO2 approach and monitoring systems seem to have departed.

Finding 27: Targeted communities reported benefits from an enhanced livelihoods asset base

141. While WFP data were limited on enhancements to the livelihood assets base of targeted communities (collection of data for this was waived during COVID-19), stakeholders reported positive feedback on SO2 benefits regarding the use of infrastructure and other assets in community livelihood generation activities,

¹⁰¹ No information was provided for the differences between the livelihood zones.

¹⁰² WFP Kenya. 2022. Mid-Term Evaluation of Outcome 2.

for example, construction/rehabilitation of irrigation canals and schemes, mills, cold storage rooms, fishing nets and tools. Beneficiaries farming under irrigation schemes in selected counties reported increased crop production and yields even during the dry season/drought, plus some cases of diversification of high-nutrition food crops and fishermen reported improved yields, demonstrating potential to contribute to the overall aims of SO2.

142. Limited progress was found in other counties where yields and benefits are less clear. In Garissa, support to irrigation systems was delayed by slow programme set-up, budgetary constraints and COVID-19 interruptions and fell short of target. In other locations, only 50 percent of SO2 activities were implemented. In 2020, there was substantial underperformance in outputs of financial inclusion (FI) initiatives although this changed in 2022. Within this period, 60 village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) against a target of 100, had been formed and trained. These VSLAs had 897 members and had made savings of KES 1.2 million between March and June 2022.¹⁰³ Only 12 VSLAs were performing poorly due to lack of consistent follow up. The other financial inclusion initiative was crop insurance, which faced low uptake, as familiarizing farmers with the concept of crop insurance was a challenge, and the numbers willing to pay a premium without any guaranteed pay-out remained limited. However, 11,612 farmers in south-eastern counties participated in the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4) risk transfer component and were to be paid KES 57,007,557.¹⁰⁴ The payout was based on weather and yield factors where payment was triggered if poor germination occurred due to lack of rains, or farmers did not realize expected yields. Although infrastructure and livelihood assets were highly valued, SO2 stakeholders called for design improvements due to insufficiency of new/rehabilitated canals to deliver sufficient water to farms.

Finding 28: There were shortcomings in reporting on the proportion of targeted communities demonstrating improved capacity to manage climate shocks and risks. There were, however, emerging positive changes in livelihoods of ASAL residents with irrigation as a key driver.

143. There was limited WFP monitoring of the indicator assessing contributions to improved resilience and capacity of community livelihood systems to manage climate shocks and risks. However, the SO2 mid-term review measured resilience to climate extremes and disasters at the household level using self-evaluated resilience score (SERS). In both 2020 and 2021, the mean SERS was above 0.5 across all surveyed livelihood zones, indicating community members felt more resilient.¹⁰⁵ Recent climate shocks have hampered SO2's progress to improve livelihood systems, particularly in rain-fed agricultural systems.

144. Emerging positive changes in the livelihoods of ASAL residents were reported in the mid-term review, with irrigation emerging as a key driver. Livelihood changes included increased human and financial capital of some smallholder farmers. There was some impact on nutrition and on food safety and quality, as well as increased awareness on aflatoxin.

Activity 4: Facilitate access to markets and provide technical expertise in supply chain to smallholder farmers and retailers

Finding 29: Activity 3, focused on asset creation, skills and knowledge transfer for climate risk adaptation, and Activity 4, focused on smallholder farmers' access to market, have been well connected and are complementary in some cases. This was realized through effective sequencing and layering whereby Activity 3 was designed to lay the foundation for Activity 4.

145. The leadership role of WFP within the Farm to Market Alliance (FtMA) has been key to providing supply chain expertise to smallholder farmers. Key informants were complimentary regarding the interventions undertaken by WFP through the FtMA. SO2 and SO4 supply chain team members held regular taskforce meetings with FtMA, helped to run smallholder farmers' training activities and developed local procurement plans. Farmer service centres (FSCs) acted as aggregation hubs and verified food stocks and quality¹⁰⁶ together with SO4 and SO2 teams. Through the FtMA partnership, farmers were able to access information online and get linked to buyers, leading to increased productivity. Since 2017, FtMA delivered services through a network of 839 farmer service centres. Through the farmer service centre model, 168,896

¹⁰³ WFP Kenya. 2022. Mid-Term Evaluation of Outcome 2. Pg 198.

¹⁰⁴ Crop insurance payment analysis, R4, OND,2021.

¹⁰⁵ WFP Kenya. 2022. Mid-Term Evaluation of Outcome 2, para 297.

¹⁰⁶ SO4 worked with FtMA and Universal Labs on food quality, and jointly found a peanut variety resistant to aflatoxin.

farmers have been reached since August 2017 (52 percent women, 48 percent men, of which 20 percent were youths).¹⁰⁷

146. There was some evidence where phased layering of activities was successful, with the integration of Activity 3 and Activity 4 ensuring that beneficiaries received a comprehensive package of support. For example, farmer groups in Isiolo reported that in the past WFP had distributed food every month, but the different approach of SO2 combining distribution of cash transfers (KES 5,000) with improvements in agriculture, business and skills, enabled them to farm, start businesses and purchase goods to meet basic needs, as well as support sustainable resilience building.

Finding 30: Although there is a corporate compendium of output indicators for the different "nodes" or "pillars" of a food system, indicators to inform the relatively new, holistic approach to food system development were not available during the CSP. This hampered the country office's ability to monitor the strategic performance of food system development activities.

147. There was good performance under output indicators for Activity 4, with most targets reached almost throughout the CSP, with some exceptions (see Table 12).

Table 12: SO2 Activity 4 output indicators

Sub-Activity	Output indicator	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022
		Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned
Smallholder agricultural market support activities	Number of retailers participating in cash-based transfer programmes	No data	No data	600	812	850	756	1449	2417	6802
Institutional capacity strengthening activities	Number of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	90	90	180	247	222	355	217	271	386
Smallholder agricultural market support activities	Number of smallholder farmers supported by WFP	No data	No data	37000	82794	69600	84333	120770	44745	36000

148. The integration of supply chain management within CSP activities became highly relevant for the evolutionary approach of WFP to food system development during the CSP SO2 (Activity 4). SO3 and SO4 engaged in a variety of technical and country capacity strengthening activities, such as value chain assessments and training to support county-level school meals programmes, smallholder farmer training on food storage and handling of fresh foods, and the use of hermetic bags to reduce post-harvest losses. However, the programmatic interface with supply chain management was limited by the lack of corporate guidance on the use of suitable indicators needed to monitor wider food system performance. Overall, there was a fragmented approach to the delivery of supply chain management and food system inputs, and a lack of clarity over outputs and outcomes.

149. SO2 and SO4 collaborated primarily on cash transfers and market-based assistance/retail engagement,¹⁰⁸ food safety and quality (FSQ) and procurement from smallholder farmers.

Strategic Outcome 3: National and county institutions in Kenya have strengthened capacity and systems to assist food-insecure and nutritionally vulnerable populations by 2023.

i. Policy, strategy and organization

150. There has been a gap in focusing on the WFP corporate policy and strategy on country capacity strengthening. This gap has been filled with the country capacity strengthening policy update in May 2022.¹⁰⁹ The policy update was also informed by the findings of the recent country capacity strengthening

¹⁰⁷ FtMA Country brief, 2022.

¹⁰⁸SO2 and SO4 jointly facilitated training workshops for WFP partners, value chain actors and developed a retail strategy.

¹⁰⁹ WFP EB, Draft Decision, CCS policy update, May 27, 2022.

synthesis report.¹¹⁰The CSP included neither a definition of country capacity strengthening, nor a strategy to guide it.¹¹¹ The policy update clarifies WFP commitment to country capacity strengthening as a core component of its support to partner countries in the achievement of the SDGs. According to key informant interviews, the Kenya experience has been influential in shaping the new policy framework.

Finding 31: WFP Kenya's country capacity strengthening efforts, primarily through SO3, are consistent with the new corporate policy on country capacity strengthening and, indeed, informed that policy.

151. In the CSP, emphasis is given to enhancing the capabilities and core competencies of national and county governments to assist food insecure and vulnerable populations. Interventions include designing and implementing key systems and processes associated with the establishment of the single national registry for social safety nets, and putting in place the enabling environment for disaster risk management, as well as social protection.¹¹² The country office has been a strong advocate with the Government to ensure devolution and provided strong support to county governments as they put in place infrastructure to embrace their assigned responsibilities.

152. Two of the central principles emphasized in the new corporate country capacity strengthening policy update are partnership and ownership.¹¹³ The policy update (see p.9) showcases the example from Kenya of WFP having built strong partnerships with the Government at the national and county levels and having assisted in formulating policies and relevant national legal frameworks. By convening multi-stakeholder working groups to support policy formulation, WFP Kenya enhanced the likelihood of broad-based policy ownership in the areas of school feeding, social protection and emergency response.

ii. Reviewing outcomes and outputs

Finding 32: There are major difficulties in using WFP corporate outcome and output indicators as a basis for measuring progress in country capacity strengthening. The indexes developed for emergency preparedness and response, and school meals management, have proved to be quite adequate when applied in Kenya. However, this is not the case for social protection or nutrition (nutrition in respect of country capacity strengthening).

153. WFP has not succeeded in developing output indicators that provide a useful measure of progress in country capacity strengthening but it does have solid measures for school feeding and emergency preparedness and response.

154. For the other activity areas, social protection, nutrition and the humanitarian supply chain, the situation is less straightforward. For social protection, the indicator references the number of people integrated into national protection systems as a result of WFP-related country capacity strengthening. This would appear to over-emphasize one limited dimension of WFP work, though the data are countable and collectible. For nutrition, the indicator focuses on the number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced because of WFP capacity strengthening. This does provide a broader picture of accomplishment than in the case of social protection. However, it is not an adequate surrogate for the entire sector of activity. In the annual country reports, only four outcome indicators are listed for SO3. For the supply chain, no indicator is provided. As is apparent in the review of activities in the Annual Country Report 2021, supply chain country capacity strengthening-related activities are tied in with work in other areas, such as emergency preparedness and response and nutrition, and thus contribute to broader results. Overall, there is a lack of consistency in the type of coverage across the indicators, particularly since the kinds of support provided in each activity area are relatively similar, as is illustrated in the SO3 theory of change.

155. A well-prepared county-level consultation process was helpful and effective in assisting the SO3 team in assessing progress in activities, and in supplementing reporting against the official indicators.

¹¹⁰ WFP. 2021. Synthesis of evidence and lessons on country capacity strengthening from decentralized evaluations. (WFP/EB.A/2021/7-C).

¹¹¹ WFP. 2021. CSP 2018-2023: Mid-term review. P30.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ WFP. 2022. *CCS policy update.*, 2022, p.9.

iii. Outcomes, outputs and progress: Limitations of indicators

Table 13: SO3 outcome indicators

Outcome Indicator	Target Group	Baseline	2019		2020		2021		End of CSP target (2023)				
			Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual					
ACT 5: (CSI: Engage in the strengthening of capacities of national & county institutions in the areas of disaster risk management, food assistance programmes, nutrition services and social safety nets)													
SABER School Feeding National Capacity	National and County Governments	2.6	≥	2.6	2.6	≥	2.6	0	≥	2.6	2.6	=	4
Number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced as a result of WFP capacity strengthening (new)	National and nine county governments targeted under SO3	0	≥	0	2	≥	10	7	≥	10	9	≥	10
Number of people assisted by WFP, integrated into national social protection systems as a result of WFP capacity strengthening (new)	Beneficiaries graduated to government support	0	≥	40000		≥	40000		≥	40000	0	≥	40000
Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index	Targeted County Governments	2.22	≥	2.39	2.39	≥	2.39	2.56	≥	2.39	2.93	≥	3.2

Source: Annual country reports.

156. No progress was reported towards the target set out for the social protection outcome. On school feeding (the school meals programme), progress is assessed by annual readings on the Systems Approach to Better Education Results (SABER) Index¹¹⁴ and is at “an emerging stage of development.” For emergency preparedness and response the focus is on the county level, as reported through readings on the Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index (EPCI).¹¹⁵ The end-CSP target is 3.2.¹¹⁶ A more detailed assessment, part of the SO3 Outcome Monitoring Report (2021), noted knowledge, skills and emergency preparedness and response improvements in all counties, with increased financial allocations to emergency preparedness and response by the county governments. In terms of nutrition, the indicator is concerned with the number of national food security and nutrition policies and system components enhanced. The indicator showed steady progress from 2019 to 2021.¹¹⁷

For all five activity areas qualitative reporting on activity results adds to an understanding of what is being accomplished, more than a review of output data. These limitations are also noted in the mid-term review (p.30). The outcome monitoring report includes the presentation of an SO3 theory of change, developed in 2021 by a consulting team and SO3 staff. It includes an informative set of linkages for each activity area, to connect different types and levels of intervention and intermediate outcomes (see Figure 6 below and Annex 15).


¹¹⁴ Annex 14 on SABER Index.

¹¹⁵ Annex 14 on EPCI.

¹¹⁶ WFP. 2022. *Kenya Annual Country Report 2021*. p55.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

Figure 6: SO3 Theory of change – SO3 outcome monitoring report, 2018-2021



157. Several assumptions and risks identified in the SO3 theory of change point to the issue of the limited and uneven capacity of the county governments. This is beyond the influence of WFP, except through the degree of effectiveness of its advocacy with high-level government decision making.¹¹⁸ County governments frequently operate with less-than-optimal resources. This may inhibit the ability of staff to engage in, and county governments to contribute financially to, activities jointly planned with WFP. This serves as a major barrier in pursuit of the logical sequence from investments to results set out in the theory of change.

158. Further, the emphasis in the theory of change on coordination and collaboration between the two levels of government reflects a lesson learned by the SO3 team in designing and implementing programmes in support of county government capacity strengthening in the context of devolution.¹¹⁹ Despite devolution, in practice there are substantial problems of synchronization, budget delays and shifts in government priorities.

159. A limitation on SO3 effectiveness is the lack of integration across the programming streams. This gap is also apparent in the thematic theory of change. In practice, some of these links are now being made. One example is the support provided by the supply chain team to country capacity strengthening work for school meals management with the Ministry of Education, in developing systems to support food supply, food safety and warehouse practices.¹²⁰ However, much more needs to be done to address this deficiency, a key challenge for the next CSP.

Finding 33: Both indicators and the SO3 theory of change give insufficient attention to the importance of the level of difficulty in supporting the passage of legislation and adoption of policies, and also of bridging the gap between adoption of policies or legislation and implementation. This is a challenge to for the future, in terms of performance and measurement.

160. A major problem with the SO3 theory of change, is that the intermediate outcome and strategic outcomes are stated in general terms without providing measures of what success would look like. Output indicators counting the number of policies supported do not do justice to the sophisticated work required to complete the process of policy or legislative development. Considerable progress, however, has been made. In developing performance measurement criteria, WFP needs to specify and measure what capacities national and county-level government institutions are expected to demonstrate by the end of the CSP, while including an assessment of the achievement of milestones to be reached along the way. Current country capacity strengthening outcomes show a direction of travel, but no more than that. (Annex 15 has more details on how SO3 operates in practice.)

Finding 34: The most positive element of the country capacity strengthening assessment process at county government level was the close partnership with government. Its major limitation was the absence of a broader, holistic government capacity analysis to identify capacity gaps at the departmental level.

161. The great strength to the county capacity strengthening process, apart from the sophistication of the assessment methodology, is the partnership with government and the shared character of analysis and decision making at all stages. Its key limitation is the focus from the beginning on joint identification of gaps, rather than starting with a more fundamental and holistic assessment of the overall functioning and operation of the partner institution, its relations with other parts of government, and its preparedness to carry out its assigned roles and responsibilities, as a precursor to the county capacity strengthening assessment.

162. A limitation of reporting on the current programme has been in bridging the gap between adopting a policy or passing a law, and implementation. This is not addressed in the indicators, or the theory of change. Drafting a policy and having it approved is just one step. For the SO3 team, advocacy to act on policy or legislation is as important as advocacy for its prior adoption.

Finding 35: Through the efforts of SO3, WFP has had considerable influence on several areas of legislation and policy, at both national and county levels, in disaster risk management (DRM) social protection and nutrition, as well as in school meals management.

¹¹⁸ World Bank. 2022. Making Devolution Work for Service Delivery in Kenya.

¹¹⁹ FGD with SO3 team, KIs.

¹²⁰ WFP. 2021. *CSP Mid-Term Review*. P119.

163. WFP has had substantial influence on government policy at both national and county levels. It has become the preferred partner in disaster risk management, and a recognized partner and leader on social protection, despite the pre-eminence of UNICEF in that field.¹²¹ The SO3 Outcome Monitoring Report (November 2021) documented the importance of WFP work in building an enabling environment for effective service delivery to vulnerable populations through the strengthening of policy frameworks, planning and budgeting processes and programme design (reflecting the mapping of interventions in the thematic theory of change).

164. In emergency preparedness and response/disaster risk management (EPR/DRM), WFP has supported national and county governments in developing disaster risk reduction policies, action plans and contingency plans. It has also led United Nations efforts to develop a national disaster risk management policy and a draft bill.¹²² It has encouraged counties to prepare dedicated budgets and financing for disaster risk management, and supported the development of policies and legislation to establish an enabling environment for this urgent priority.

165. Constraints to the building of government systems at both national and local levels are rooted in continuing capacity limitations in performance of governance functions and in the line ministries, which are the principal partners of WFP. Coordination across the line ministries, and with core government agencies, is often problematic.

Finding 36: A major accomplishment of SO3 has been the transition of school meals management to government ownership. There is also evidence of significant progress in social protection emergency preparedness and response/disaster risk management and nutrition.

166. WFP demonstrated effectiveness through a carefully sequenced process of capacity strengthening, in transitioning the school meals management programme to government ownership.¹²³ Since 2018, the Government has been fully responsible for the provision of cash or in-kind assistance to beneficiaries. Country office staff report that SO3 is working with the Ministry of Education on a national school meals policy. Also in transition planning, in nutrition, WFP is working to enable the Government to take over implementation of integrated MAM programmes and has worked with county governments to facilitate handover.¹²⁴

167. In social protection, key WFP contributions included support to the shaping of a national social protection policy, and longer-term development of a single registry of social protection data. The registry team is collecting data for 12 counties, as a precursor to bringing in all 47.¹²⁵

Finding 37: Considerable emphasis has been given to management information systems (MIS) and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) as critical components in building government capacity at both national and county levels, but particularly at the county level. Two major challenges for SO3 is the limitation of WFP capacities in this sphere, and growing demand.

168. WFP has a limited number of staff with the necessary expertise to lead work on management information systems and monitoring, evaluation and learning. Interviews and reports on SO1 and SO2 make clear that investment in the strengthening of county governments in this area is essential to progress on all fronts, and not only in SO3. In one county, the WFP business transformation unit was brought in to develop a plan for a management information system. However, this is not the role the unit is intended to fill. In another, for monitoring, evaluation and learning, the field office and the county government turned to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) because of the already-stretched human resources of monitoring and evaluation at the country office. While the evaluation team has been advised that engagement in this sphere is governed by the UNDAF, and involves several other UNCT players, it will be essential for WFP to address these concerns, and to consider its strategy to respond to growing demand. These are areas of engagement where WFP has a strong and deserved reputation. That reputation, and the organization's credibility in this regard, will soon be tested.

¹²¹ WFP. 2021. *CSP Mid-Term Review*. p.31; KIIs.

¹²² *Ibid*.

¹²³ WFP. 2021. *CSP Mid-Term Review*. p.29-31 and Annex 10.

¹²⁴ WFP. 2022. *ACR 2021*. p21.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, p.31, Government interviews.

iv. Effectiveness of reporting and documentation

Finding 38: Reporting and documentation needs to be strengthened especially for strategic outcome 3. This is critical at a time when WFP is called on by donors to explain clearly the value and effectiveness of its work.

169. Overall, WFP Kenya has not been effective in reporting, documenting and explaining the impact that its programming is having in influencing government and improving its capabilities, as it has done in disaster risk management, food assistance programmes, nutrition services (including for schools) and social safety nets.¹²⁶ In the view of the evaluation, annual country reports show clear limitations in presenting the results of WFP work and the steps taken to achieve it. In the case of SO3, the problem is compounded by the inadequacy of indicators for measuring results, which hinders credible reporting on the subject. This weakness is reflected in negative comments by donors on the adequacy of information supplied by WFP. As one donor representative put it: "We need more than page after page of data!"

SO4: Government, humanitarian and development partners in Kenya have access to and benefit from effective and cost-efficient logistics services, including air transport, common coordination platforms and improved commodity supply chains, when needed.

Finding 39: Although relatively low level, there was an upward trend in the volume of food purchased locally by WFP from targeted smallholder farmers, but the country office's value was greater in the area of procurement capacity strengthening.

Table 14: WFP Kenya, smallholder farmer purchases

COMMODITY	YEAR									
	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022	
	QTY (MT)	VALUE (\$)	QTY (MT)	VALUE (\$)	QTY (MT)	VALUE (\$)	QTY (MT)	VALUE (\$)	QTY (MT)	VALUE (\$)
SORGHUM	134	53054	138	45739	591	211797	140	49645	-	-
MAIZE	1596	525535	-	-	73	23260	896	285863	1240	390890
PULSES	1532	878735	361	238896	-	-	3833	3128599	3019	2348225
TOTAL	3262	1457324	499	284634	664	235057	4869	3464107	4259	2739115

Source: WFP Kenya.

170. The country office supply chain team engaged in purchasing food commodities from smallholder farmers and although, for WFP, the settlement procedure is relatively fast, smallholder farmers preferred to sell to product aggregators or other commercial middlemen that can make immediate payments. The added value of WFP was therefore in the provision of training on procurement processes so that vendors could better understand market prices and procedures. This in turn better enabled other buyers to purchase from smallholder farmers.


171. Prior to the CSP, the volume of food imports to Kenya declined significantly and remained at a low level. Foreign ports, such as Berbera and Dar es Salaam, became more competitive and have been used to support humanitarian transport corridors to Ethiopia and South Sudan. Although WFP Mombasa port operations have been well recognized as a key regional asset, its relevance to the Kenya programme has been less clear since the closure of the programme component of the Mombasa sub-office in 2019.

172. Over the six years prior to the start of the CSP, the volume of food received through Mombasa port decreased by 44 percent. This signified the gradual reduction of large-scale in-kind delivery of food aid in Kenya to food assistance and cash-based transfer programmes.¹²⁷ Furthermore, the graduation of beneficiaries in some ASAL counties contributed to a decrease in need for in-kind food assistance.

¹²⁶ WFP. 2021. *CSP Mid-Term Review*. P24.

¹²⁷ WFP Kenya. 2021. *Draft Supply Chain Strategy*.

Figure 7: Food volumes (mt) discharged in Mombasa for Kenya programmes




Source: WFP Kenya.

173. The shift to cash-based transfers has relied on the establishment of effective food systems to support vulnerable people in Kenya and the achievement of Vision 2030 and zero hunger goals. This shift has posed challenges to reducing the hunger gap and improving market supply. The SO4 team identified that some of the reasons for food supply inefficiencies included:

- limited storage capacity at the local level, and poor storage practices;
- weak food quality and safety practices;
- shortage of local transport;
- road access, especially in the rainy season.

174. While Figure 8 indicates an initial increase in food distributions after 2018, the level later declined.

Figure 8: Food distribution - planned and actual (mt) by year



Source: ACR 2022 data: Quarterly Output Performance Snapshot referring to Jan-Sep 2022 (MODA) (extracted 9/12/2022).

Finding 40: Despite numerous challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic, commodities and supply chain services were delivered on time.

175. The SO4 team worked with the Ministry of Health and partners to establish a regional electronic cargo and driver tracking system and helped set up COVID-19 testing centres to reduce transport delays.¹²⁸ WFP adapted operations to fit the changing context to support programme delivery and ensure humanitarian access for partners.

176. According to established performance indicators, supply chain-related activities (6, 7, 8 and 9) all performed well in terms of their timeliness for grant utilization. Activity 4 performed to an acceptable level. Annex 10, Table 33 includes an analysis of the average number of months from grant valid date to first allocation date.

177. WFP Mombasa port and corridor operations maintained a high level of efficiency, in part supported by the special relationship developed with the Kenya Ports Authority.¹²⁹ This contributed to on-time food

¹²⁸ WFP. 2021. *Kenya ACR 2020*.

¹²⁹ WFP Mombasa had a 100 percent storage waiver from Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) for customs clearance whereby they can offload cargo and store it at the port and offered this service to other United Nations agencies.

deliveries under SO1. Transport contracting was performed at the country office level to support the timely delivery of a total of 1.24 million mt of food commodities to WFP operations in the East Africa region.

Table 15: Regional food commodity deliveries through Mombasa Corridor, including Kenya

Year					
2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total MT
316,201	280,836	255,817	245,624	145,444	1,243,922

Source: WFP Kenya. To June 2022.

178. The country office implemented supply chain and logistics service provision more broadly, under Activity 9, to humanitarian actors in other parts of the country in response to increased needs related to flooding,¹³⁰ the locust crisis and COVID-19¹³¹ and as part of the One United Nations business operations strategy.¹³² Findings 13 and 14 relate to the provision of UNHAS.

2.2.2 To what extent did WFP contribute to the achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, AAP, gender, equity and inclusion, environment, climate change and other issues as relevant)?

179. WFP collects annual “outcome-level” data to inform a set of standard cross-cutting indicators. Indicator baseline, target and actual values are presented in Annex 10 Table 28.

Humanitarian principles and the principle of inclusion

Finding 41: Overall, the CSP has been delivered with good adherence to humanitarian principles. Most notable were WFP efforts to reach the most vulnerable and integrate principles of inclusion and non-discrimination into programming. Continued attention is needed to ensure a balanced approach to adhere to humanitarian principles (including independence).

“The services have been offered in a dignified way and it has somehow catered for various needs of the community members including prioritizing the lactating and pregnant mothers, unaccompanied minors, PLWDs” - Male Beneficiary
“Priority is given to PLWDs, pregnant and lactating mothers during distribution.” Female Beneficiary

“We wrote down more than two thousand people from humble backgrounds and it was WFP work to shortlist people for the assistance”. CBT Beneficiary

“We looked for needy people and those who have health conditions like diabetes, high blood pressure, HIV and also widows...” Village Elder

“We do community mobilization, and passage of information to various family sizes ... We work hand in hand with community food advisory committee, block leaders, religious leaders in sharing food distribution plans.” Cooperating partner

180. The evaluation did not identify any major issues that compromised humanitarian principles. For example, the principle of humanity was pursued through: adopting consultative and participatory targeting approaches; maximizing reach and avoiding duplication with other agencies’ work; integrating the principles of inclusion of vulnerable people, especially women, children, youth and pregnant and lactating women and girls. Although tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS patients’ needs were addressed through specific targeting, social stigmatization issues for people living with HIV and AIDS could be better considered.¹³³

181. The design of food distribution points (FDP) addresses the needs of the vulnerable, with monitors from the food committees and other agencies locating unaccompanied children, pregnant women, mothers with small children and the elderly to join separate fast-track queues. Beneficiaries state the food distribution point design does not adequately factor the access needs of disabled people, and state this is a shortfall in the design of distribution sites.

182. Self-reliance activities under SO1 aimed to promote equity and inclusion via interventions targeting both Kenyan and refugee community beneficiaries (KISED irrigation shaded farms; school feeding programmes in refugee camps; MAM; and general food distribution). SO2 activities encouraged youth participation in agriculture interventions. This was done in more commercial elements of food production and

¹³⁰ Ministry of Devolution and ASALs requested (2019) support from WFP in airlifting government prepositioned food supplies and non-food items to communities cut off by road due to flooding.

¹³¹ WFP supported UNOPS and others in distribution of COVID-19 relief items in Eastern / Southern Africa

¹³² UN reform working to maximize programmatic gains through efficient and high-quality common back office operations.

¹³³ FGDs with beneficiaries.

marketing (such as horticulture and poultry), and in related technological services, such as the integration of digital platforms in value chains. Additionally, WFP and the Mastercard Foundation embarked in 2022 on a five-year programme to strengthen food systems to promote employment opportunities for young people in vulnerable communities.¹³⁴

183. Overall, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality appear to have been reflected in delivering assistance and capacity support. Adherence to the principle of independence will require WFP to monitor the scope and implications of its close partnership with the Government and alignment to national priorities.

Accountability to affected populations


Finding 42: WFP kept affected populations informed about the assistance available to them. Good community-level communication systems and practices were in place.

184. The commitment of WFP to accountability to affected populations is founded on two main principles: 1) affected people have a right to be actively involved in the decisions that affect their lives; and 2) engaging affected people in programme decisions makes food assistance more effective. The WFP 2020 Protection and Accountability Policy establishes the integration of protection and accountability across a range of functions to ensure that food assistance is safe, appropriate and received in a dignified manner.¹³⁵

185. Accountability to affected populations outcome indicators showed positive progress. The proportion of refugees and asylum seekers and host communities informed about programmes increased by 19.9 and 32.5 percent respectively. For smallholder producers, food insecure and vulnerable populations, however, there was a slight decrease from the already very high 97.6 percent at baseline to 94 percent in 2021.

186. These positive trends were made possible by WFP and its partners effectively engaging with community partners, ensuring information was passed on to beneficiaries. WFP was effective in keeping partners and camp leaders informed of important developments, such as ration cuts or changes in food baskets, thus minimizing tension.¹³⁶

Figure 9: Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme



Source: Annual country reports.

187. In 2021, WFP adapted to the COVID-19 pandemic by diversifying and increasing its communication methods. FM radio was used for key messages on general food distribution adjustments, schedules and feedback channels. Bulk SMS campaigns targeting 148,000 households were transmitted in relation to the refugee programme, drought and locust response, COVID-19 urban response and resilient livelihoods.

Finding 43: Community feedback mechanisms were launched and utilized. The majority of complaints were reported to be satisfactorily resolved.

¹³⁴ MCF-WFP. August 2022. FACTSHEET.

¹³⁵ WFP. 2020. *Protection and Accountability Policy*.

¹³⁶ Evaluation interview data.

188. WFP employs a range of feedback mechanisms, which function well. Feedback channels are promoted to beneficiaries and consistently used. They also inform the field offices' monthly planning. The evidence indicates that stakeholders rate the service highly and feel that their voices are heard and that issues are addressed in joint partner operation meetings.¹³⁷ The outcome indicator "proportion of project activities for which beneficiary feedback is documented, analysed and integrated into programme improvements", consistently scored 100 percent.

189. The evaluation team analysed complaint and feedback mechanism (CFM) reports between 2018 and 2021 (Annex 12). Helpdesks were the most used as reporting mechanisms. Most cases were resolved in a timely manner and 90 percent of cases were 'closed' within the quarter. Table 16 details the nature of the complaints.

Table 16: Complaint and feedback mechanism complaints (2021 Q1-Q3)

Category	Sub-category	Total cases 2021 Q1 - Q3	% of complaint cases
Complaint	Loss of SIM card	2369	42.09%
	Technical Issues	1592	28.28%
	Distribution Exclusion	1507	26.77%
	Theft of SIM card	123	2.19%
	Others	22	0.39%
	Targeting & Registration	12	0.21%
	Protection	3	0.05%
	Fraud/Corruption	1	0.02%

Source: Complaint and feedback mechanism reports 2021.

Protection

Finding 44: Protection issues are recognized, and protection indicators show strong progress from baseline and have met or exceeded CSP targets.

190. Protection issues are recognized by WFP through its Protection and Accountability Policy (2020).

Table 17: Protection outcome indicators progress

Protection Indicator	Activity and Target Group	Baseline	2020	2021	CSP Target
Proportion of targeted people having unhindered access to WFP programmes	Host Community (Activity 2) Emergency preparedness activities	98.4		99.6	≥ 98.40
	Refugees and asylum seekers (Activity 1) General Distribution	81.2	98.6	99.4	≥ 81.20
	Small holder producers, food insecure and vulnerable populations (Activity 3) Food assistance for asset	80.1		99.6	100
Proportion of targeted people receiving assistance without safety challenges (new)	Host Community (Activity 2) Emergency preparedness activities	99.5		99.2	≥ 99.50
	Refugees and asylum seekers (Activity 1) General Distribution	87.3	99.2	99.3	≥ 87.30
	Small holder producers, food insecure and vulnerable populations (Activity 3) Food assistance for asset	99		100	≥ 90
Proportion of targeted people who report that WFP programmes are dignified (new)	Host Community (Activity 2) Emergency preparedness activities	99.3		99.1	≥ 99.30
	Refugees and asylum seekers (Activity 1) General Distribution	85.2	99.2	99.8	≥ 85.20
	Small holder producers, food insecure and vulnerable populations (Activity 3) Food assistance for asset	99.2		99.4	≥ 90

Source: Annual country reports. Baselines collected 2019.07 or 2020.11.

¹³⁷ Evaluation interview data.

191. The proportion of targeted host communities with unhindered access to WFP programmes (able to access various WFP programmes without safety challenges), increased to 99.6 percent by 2021. Targeting included persons with disabilities

192. Beneficiaries reported that they felt respected and served with dignity - specifically cash transfers facilitated easy access, and there was freedom to use the transfers based on their needs, while transfer modality (mobile money) ensured confidentiality.¹³⁸ General food distribution beneficiaries in refugee camps and those receiving nutrition support also reported feeling safe, as distances to points of service were not far from their households.

193. Overcrowding and congestion at food distribution points and harassment of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) refugees had been reported in the 2019 Gender and Protection assessment study in Kakuma and Kalobeyei.¹³⁹ By 2021, other protection risks became prevalent due to insurgents in north-eastern Kenya, including thefts, robbery and inter-ethnic clashes. Although camp security was generally reported to have improved,¹⁴⁰ the LGBTQI population continued to report physical harassment. WFP 2022 plans prioritized the LGBTQI population as being of concern and arranged that this population group would receive their entitlements in separate lines on selected days. Data were not available on the impact of these efforts.

Finding 45: WFP was responsive to health and safety concerns from COVID-19, adapting delivery of assistance and communicating these changes to beneficiaries.

194. WFP supported awareness-raising on COVID-19 risks among beneficiaries by promoting mitigation actions. The use of biometrics was discontinued to minimize risks of infection. Messages were communicated to beneficiaries on changes in food distribution processes. A well-planned, adapted general food distribution system was established to reduce contact at food distribution points. This led to high satisfaction (90 percent) with how food distributions were conducted in refugee camps.¹⁴¹

Finding 46: COVID-19 exacerbated existing gender-based violence (GBV) issues, and WFP made efforts to step up their response to gender-based violence.

195. Calls to the national gender-based violence hotline increased by 775 percent from March to April 2020,¹⁴² with 3,650 additional cases of gender-based violence reported from March to July.¹⁴³

196. In response, WFP partnered with the Government to enhance advocacy and sensitization on gender-based violence and other protection concerns. WFP implemented training and sensitization of cooperating partners on gender protection. In Kakuma refugee camp and Kalobeyei settlement, WFP and cooperating partners were noted to have improved beneficiary awareness of SGBV and reporting mechanisms.¹⁴⁴

Gender equality

Finding 47: Despite the generally problematic status of gender equality in Kenya, within WFP activities there has been progress, according to gender equality indicators, in integrating gender equality into programme activities.

197. The WFP Gender Policy (2015–2020) expressed gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) as a core organizational objective.¹⁴⁵ In the CSP, WFP planned to reach a larger number of women than men and always reached a greater absolute number of women. This reflects the priority given to pregnant and lactating women and girls, and the fact that households headed by women are often more food insecure than households headed by men.

¹³⁸FGD Urban cash-based transfer beneficiaries.

¹³⁹Otieno. J. 2019. *Protection and Gender Assessment of Food Assistance Modalities in Kakuma Refugee Camp and Kalobeyei*.

¹⁴⁰WFP. 2022. *Kenya Annual Country Report 2021*.

¹⁴¹WFP. 2022. *Kenya Annual Country Report 2021*.

¹⁴²UN Country Team. 2020. *Emergency Appeal Kenya April-September 2020*.

¹⁴³UN OCHA. 2020. *Kenya Situation Report - September 2020*.

¹⁴⁴WFP. 2021. *Gender and Protection Assessment Report, Kakuma Camp and Kalobeyei Settlement*.

¹⁴⁵WFP. 2015. *Gender Policy (2015-2020)*.

198. The mid-term review in 2021 found that, as per the gender action plan, the county office had continued to mainstream gender into its programmes and activities. Nevertheless, monitoring data pointed to some gaps, with some activities not gender-responsive in design.

199. The WFP gender unit has been involved in drought response to guide targeting, and in registration and distribution. In terms of integrating gender into programme activities, good progress was noted despite a slow start for the CSP.

200. The gender unit is reasonably well engaged in activity planning and review with the SO3 team.¹⁴⁶ The SO3 team acknowledged the need to engage with gender equality to better integrate into activities.¹⁴⁷

201. The proportion of women in food assistance decision making entities increased from 35.5 percent at baseline to 38 percent in 2021 for smallholder producers, food insecure and vulnerable populations. Comparable data were not available for refugee and asylum seekers. Progress on this indicator is far from the CSP's end target. Section 1.2.7 has further details.

Table 18: Gender equality outcome indicators

Gender Equality Indicators	Host Community (act 2)			Refugee & Asylum Seekers			Small Holder Producers/Food Insecure Households		
	Baseline (2020)	2021	CSP End target	Baseline (2020)	2021	CSP End target	Baseline (2020)	2021	CSP End target
Proportion of food assistance decision-making entity – committees, boards, teams, etc. – members who are women	-	-	-	50.50%	-	50.50%	35.50%	38%	≥50%
Proportion of households where decisions on the use of food/cash/vouchers, are jointly made by women and men	43.90%	51.80%	≥ 43.90	15.10%	24.90%	≥ 50%	35.70%	51.10%	≥ 35.7%

Source: Annual country reports

202. Table 18 shows that WFP recorded an increase in joint decision making on using food/cash/vouchers in targeted households, from baseline¹⁴⁸ to 2021. The Gender Action Learning Systems (GALS) pilot in Makueni and Taita Taveta counties enhanced the capacity of 12 county and sub-county technical officers in GALS.

203. Women had access and control over use of nutrition commodities. For most adult respondents, their gender roles did not affect their access to WFP assistance, including their ability to collect their entitlements on distribution days.

Environment and climate change

Finding 48: WFP Kenya considered both the environment and climate change in their activities, but internal capacity for undertaking climate change risk assessments has room for improvement.

204. Climate change was considered through implementation of climate smart agriculture, including under FtMA, and WFP worked with county directorates to implement interventions, such as introduction of drought-resistant crops. Farmers in Nakuru reported that, because of the FtMA, they were less dependent on rain-fed agriculture and able to produce crops throughout the year. They stated that yields increased, enabling them to sell surpluses through markets. WFP also supported climate change adaptation through construction of climate-sensitive infrastructures, such as lined irrigation channels and solar powered boreholes.

205. In 2021, in keeping with the WFP environmental policy, WFP conducted screening of projects in compliance with the National Environmental Management Authority requirements. However, field offices noted that environment and climate change are not yet systematically integrated into all intervention designs, due to lack of capacity for climate change risk assessments.

¹⁴⁶ KIIs with SO3 and gender unit, reports on SO3 planning and review meetings and workshops.

¹⁴⁷ SO3 Quarterly Review Meeting Reports, 2022.

¹⁴⁸ 2019 for Activity 1, 2020 for Activities 2 and 3.

Nutrition-sensitive approach

Finding 49: A nutrition-sensitive approach is on track for success. However, continued efforts are required to see projects at infancy stages through to fruition. There are weak linkages across the strategic outcomes, and there was a gap evident in addressing food choice and preparation, as well as evidence of limited social behaviour change implementation.

206. Regarding nutrition, there were poor linkages across the strategic outcomes with WFP acknowledging the need for better coordination. Most of the new nutrition-sensitive activities, including introduction of nutrient-rich crops, post-harvest handling/processing and cold storage, are at infancy stage. Cold storage facilities in Garissa were implemented in partnership with the private sector company Sokofresh, which offered solar-powered cold storage facilities within the irrigation schemes. Other cold facilities observed in Turkana were to support fresh food and fish storage to reduce post-harvest losses.

207. While WFP has supported county governments, stakeholders, and beneficiaries with food safety testing equipment, supplies and training, stakeholders call for county governments to provide a dedicated budget for food safety.

208. WFP did not adequately contribute to the achievement of promoting beneficiary awareness of nutrition sensitivity across the CSP due to funding constraints limiting SBCC implementation. Beneficiaries indicated they received limited SBCC and information on nutrition and dietary diversity. Preparedness for shocks needs to be taken into consideration for WFP nutrition-sensitive activities. The handover of projects to the community requires phased, smooth transitions.

2.2.3 To what extent are the achievements of the CSP likely to be sustainable, in particular from a financial, social, institutional and environmental perspective?

Finding 50: Sustainability of progress towards objectives and sustainability of structures already in place are reliant on government commitment in terms of financial and human resources, which are often limited.

209. There was limited evidence to suggest that the sustainability of the self-reliance initiatives (under SO1) has been achieved. It is however evident that SO1 attempted to promote sustainability of water harvesting infrastructure via various approaches, such as a field guide (2018) for water infrastructure.¹⁴⁹ Moreover via guidelines, training, awareness-raising and community action plans, WFP aimed to promote investment/user charges by the benefiting community members (that is, that KISEDIP farmers contribute stipulated fees for running operations of the farm, and livestock producers contribute funds for management of infrastructure and labour for maintenance).¹⁵⁰ Water user management communities were also set up to promote a community-led governance structure for water use.

210. The exit strategy has faced challenges (such as a reluctance to pay user charges for perceived public goods such as water) and overall limited progress is reported of any handover. Despite some temporary payments by beneficiary farmers to committees for the operation and maintenance of a water pan and a horticultural farm plus employment of security guards, overall community members and county governments have made limited investment or inputs into operation and maintenance. The evaluation finds it is not very clear who owns the assets. Some key informant interviews with WFP state the assets are to be handed over to the community, while other WFP reports indicate the assets will be handed over to county government and then to the community.¹⁵¹

211. Activity 2 seeks to increase the engagement of the Government to facilitate delivery. Evidence shows moderate county government uptake of responsibility beyond beneficiary targeting, identification, provision of facilities and security. Factors such as the unavailability of allocated county budgets and

¹⁴⁹ Republic of Kenya and WFP. 2018. *Water Management for Building Resilient Livelihoods in the Arid Zones, Field Practitioners Guide No.1*.

¹⁵⁰ WFP. Activity Monitoring Report – Self Reliance in Kalobeyei, Site Monitoring For Rain Water Harvesting Structures. 4th to 5th September 2019.

¹⁵¹ WFP. Regional Development and Protection Programme in Kenya: *Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme, Final Narrative Report: 21 July 2016 to 31 October 2019*.

resources mean county governments often cannot operate the services. Nutrition budgets are planned to be available in the near future, which may improve sustainability.

212. CSP interventions were deemed sustainable where structures were in place and providing clear benefits to the Kenyan community and refugees, such as food safety and quality labs in Garissa and Turkana counties. However, their sustainability required commitment by the Government, as several county governments were willing to run labs only if WFP continued funding them.¹⁵² Four out of seven minilabs were not operational due to lack of power supply.

Finding 51: Sustainability considerations were not well integrated into cash-based transfer activities. The effectiveness of cash-based transfers was limited by the availability and accessibility of local food markets, particularly in the dry season. In some cases, cash-based transfers and food assistance for assets were seen as contributing to community dependency on support.

213. In some locations, the presence of accessible local food markets were not sufficiently considered within cash-based transfer activity design. In Turkana, lack of food in the local markets, especially in dry areas, forced cash-based transfer beneficiaries to travel long distances to buy food, costing around half of the cash received.

214. In some areas short-term cash-based transfer interventions were deemed unsustainable by stakeholders. For example, regarding the cash-based transfer programme in Nairobi's informal settlements, the perception of key informant interviews was that communities should not rely heavily on handouts but would benefit from support that focused on empowerment. Interview data underscore that food assistance for assets was praised for enhancing sustainability as the community worked to create assets in exchange for food assistance.

Finding 52: Sustainability of SO2 activities, especially those related to food production, are heavily reliant on availability of water and thus on appropriate solutions that will increase its availability.

215. In Turkana water pans provided by WFP were useful for irrigation and increasing water availability. However, water pans are dependent on rainfall. The need to develop water structures to ensure water supply for the sustainability of activities was emphasized by stakeholders. As one interviewee put it "...because you cannot talk of zero hunger, you cannot talk of agriculture... if there's no water".

Finding 53: The likelihood of sustainability of activities under the CSP has been supported by the capacity building, self-organization and continued engagement of beneficiaries. Structures used to empower farmers (farmer service centres, VSLAs) will continue to be reference points in terms of knowledge and skill transfer, aggregation and marketing sources while VSLAs offer economic empowerment through savings, credit and social cohesion.

216. In Turkana, interventions around the Turkwel irrigation scheme were deemed sustainable¹⁵³ since the canals would remain in place to supply water beyond the CSP. This was also true for irrigation schemes in Garissa, ensuring sufficient waterflow to farms. The organization of farmers in groups ensured that they were able to come up with solutions, for example, when the pump needed repairing.

217. The sustainability of assets created hinges on community ownership: communities identify priority assets through community-based participatory planning (CBPP) with a clear community action.

218. Challenges faced by farmers included the issue of pests and diseases, which led to loss of crops, a lack of knowledge and skills on crop protection, and the low quality/price ratio of pesticides on the market.

219. In Isiolo, beneficiaries stressed that initiatives were likely to continue beyond the capacity building programme, and they had improved their expertise in production, marketing and sales, and enabled knowledge transfer through the farmer service centres.

220. WFP created market linkages between producers and markets (though producers sometimes have challenges selling their produce). For instance, in Nakuru, potato farmers were linked to retail and fast-food

¹⁵² WFP. 2022. Mid-Term Evaluation of Outcome 2, p. 20.

¹⁵³ Evaluation interview data.

chains by Agrico under the FtMA. WFP linked smallholder farmers to private sector actors (input suppliers namely, Syngenta, Ken Agro, and Green Life), which supplied inputs at a lower cost.

2.2.4 To what extent did the CSP facilitate more strategic linkages between humanitarian action, development cooperation and, where appropriate, contributions to peace?

Finding 54: WFP has considered conflict sensitivity in the design of individual interventions.

221. WFP built conflict sensitivity into intervention design and sought to reduce conflict. In targeting, WFP reached out to both host and refugee community beneficiaries. In Kalobeyei, the water committee membership was comprised of half refugees and half Kenyan communities.

222. As discussed in Section 2.2.2, WFP provided feedback platforms that were utilized by beneficiaries, and complaints were responded to. WFP staff are regarded as approachable, maintaining good public relations with beneficiaries and partners. This can be seen in how WFP engages with community leaders to prevent a crisis or when tensions emerge, for example in advance of issuing ration cuts, and when there are changes to the food basket.

Finding 55: The CSP facilitated a modest contribution to peace through strengthening social cohesion and reducing tensions at the local level.

223. In Garissa and Isiolo, WFP facilitated a contribution to conflict resolution through the involvement of county steering groups (CSG) when prioritizing targeting based on geographic location. Investments could only be made in areas where the risk of conflict and insecurity were low. WFP facilitated the community to elect committees, including sub-committees to act on conflict resolution mechanisms.

2.3. EQ3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

To what extent were outputs delivered within the intended timeframe?

Finding 56: There were constraints to the delivery of planned outputs for the CSP due to funding shortfalls; expenditure levels against the allocated resources reached 88 percent but varied considerably by activity.

224. The overall CSP funding level was 55.89 percent (as of 22 June 2022), against the needs-based plan as per BR06, and funding shortfalls forced the country office to redefine implementation plans (IP) with a reduced level of ambition. The most significant reductions to activity budgets were in Activity 10 (an on-demand service), followed by Activities 7, 9, 4, 3 and 6. The Activity 8 budget increased by 35 percent. Overall, resilience-building activities were cut by 37 percent, while crisis response activities were reduced by 30 percent, and root causes activities (Activity 5) increased by 6 percent.

Table 19: Needs-based plan and implementation plan budget by activity

Focus Area	Activity	Activity Number	Needs Based Plan	Implementation Plan	IP as % of NBP
Crisis Response	KE01.01.011.URT1	1	\$ 528,759,135	\$ 359,264,011	68%
Crisis Response	KE01.01.011.URT2	2	\$ 97,266,168	\$ 80,870,242	83%
Resilience Building	KE01.04.021.ACL1	3	\$ 258,047,709	\$ 162,732,542	63%
Resilience Building	KE01.04.021.SMS1	4	\$ 35,409,866	\$ 21,710,991	61%
Root Causes	KE01.05.031.CSI1	5	\$ 26,537,910	\$ 28,120,517	106%
Crisis Response	KE01.08.041.CPA1	6	\$ 22,995,950	\$ 15,507,115	67%
Crisis Response	KE01.08.041.CPA2	7	\$ 1,203,490	\$ 397,963	33%
Crisis Response	KE01.08.041.CPA3	8	\$ 3,742,253	\$ 5,048,692	135%
Crisis Response	KE01.08.041.CPA4	9	\$ 1,045,000	\$ 418,000	40%
Crisis Response	KE01.08.041.CPA5	10	\$ 209,000	\$ -	0%
	KE01.DS	Direct Support Costs	\$ 52,870,794	\$ 40,564,533	77%
	KE01.IN.COR		\$ -	\$ 11,987,062	
Grand Total			\$ 1,028,087,275	\$ 726,621,667	71%

Source: CPB_-_Plan_vs_Actuals_Report_v2.1 (22.06.2022). Total excludes ISC.

225. As Table 20 shows, 88 percent of allocated resources had been spent by June 2022. However, expenditure levels against the allocated resources varied by activity. Activity 4 (smallholder farmer access to markets) reported the lowest level of expenditure levels, followed by activities 5 (country capacity strengthening) and 6 (UNHAS). The activities with the highest expenditure rates against allocated resources were Activity 7 (health supply chain services under COVID-19), followed by activities 2 (emergency food assistance) and 3 (asset creation).

Table 20: Actual expenditure compared to allocated resources by activity

		Allocated Resources	Expenditure to date	Expenditures as % of Allocated Resources
SO1	Activity 1	\$ 312,586,926.24	\$ 275,309,831.84	88%
SO1	Activity 2	\$ 53,173,134.94	\$ 49,272,022.78	93%
	Non activity specific	\$ 654,569.19	\$ -	0%
SO1 Total		\$ 366,414,630.37	\$ 324,581,854.62	89%
SO2	Activity 3	\$ 122,240,510.81	\$ 112,095,568.81	92%
SO2	Activity 4	\$ 15,633,886.63	\$ 11,712,986.33	75%
SO2 Total		\$ 137,874,397.44	\$ 123,808,555.14	90%
SO3	Activity 5	\$ 21,484,239.74	\$ 17,041,166.23	79%
SO4	Activity 6	\$ 12,653,815.52	\$ 10,731,456.71	85%
SO4	Activity 7	\$ 433,600.09	\$ 433,600.09	100%
SO4	Activity 8	\$ 2,746,474.20	\$ 2,489,825.26	91%
SO4	Activity 9	\$ 146,472.74	\$ 133,523.04	91%
SO4	Activity 10	\$ -	\$ -	NA
SO4 Total		\$ 15,980,362.55	\$ 13,788,405.10	86%
Non SO Specific		\$ 4,042,263.50	\$ -	0%
DSC		\$ 34,374,753.43	\$ 26,108,004.92	76%
ISC		\$ 32,336,499.62	\$ 32,336,499.62	100%
Grand Total		\$ 612,507,146.65	\$ 537,664,485.63	88%

Source: ACR1-A_v33 to date (22.06.22).

Finding 57: WFP has largely been able to deliver CSP outputs within the intended timeframe, although some factors outside the control of WFP (including disruptions caused by COVID-19) affected timeliness.

226. Delays that affected SO1 and SO2 included:

- commodity delays in 2018 due to fuel shortage;
- delays to MAM treatment commodities in 2021 and 2022;
- challenges to prepositioning of general food distribution commodities resulting in limited stockpiling;
- Activity 2 experiencing pipeline breaks for commodities in most targeted ASAL counties;
- purchases from regional markets being delayed due to high demand or customs clearance delays;
- project start-up activities in Garissa and Turkana being delayed through prolonged planning and COVID-19; and
- school meals supplies delayed through transportation and weather challenges.

To what extent does the depth and breadth of coverage ensure that the most vulnerable to food insecurity benefit from WFP activities?

Finding 58: Full implementation of SO1 plans was often not feasible due to funding constraints.

227. Assistance provided under SO1 to vulnerable populations had to be reduced due to funding constraints. In March 2022 the food rations for refugees was reduced to 50 percent, the largest reduction in 10 years. However, with emergency support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), rations have recently been increased to 80 percent.¹⁵⁴

228. SO1 Activity 2 did not reach planned vulnerable Kenyan resident targets in numerous years. Between 2019 and 2021, food insecure resident numbers grew, although Activity 2 budget allocations were not aligned with this upward trajectory. Stakeholders consulted indicated funding constraints as the reason.

Finding 59: Joint planning and targeting¹⁵⁵ was consultative, participatory and well designed to ensure inclusion of the most vulnerable. However, coverage may not have been sufficient and inadvertently left out some needy populations.

229. During COVID-19, WFP engaged chiefs, village elders and community health volunteers to recruit beneficiaries into the cash-based transfer programme. This enabled broad inclusion of the most vulnerable, people with disability, those living with HIV/AIDS and non-communicable diseases (NCDs). However, key informant interviews in Turkana and Nairobi reported that the process may not have reached some vulnerable people, for instance those living with HIV and AIDS who did not join the programme for fear of stigmatization. In Garissa, food distributions reached 65,000 beneficiaries, however, there were indications that some county locations, containing severely drought-affected households, were not included in targeting.¹⁵⁶ This was due to the focus of the intervention sites in Garissa being on riverine areas, with other locations considered on a needs basis, but apparently with some exclusions.

To what extent were WFP activities cost-efficient in delivery of its assistance?

Finding 60: Assistance delivery under SO1 was largely cost-efficient.

230. The evaluation found that WFP agreements with partners worked well, and most stakeholders stated that working arrangements were efficient. For example, there was positive regard to the efficiency of the tripartite approach between WFP, UNHCR and implementing partners. Arrangements with other agencies also promoted cost efficiency, such as for the school meals programme, where costs were shared with UNHCR.

231. The evaluation found some cases where partners perceived challenges in working with WFP, such as the need to cover warehouse maintenance costs, or where SO1 interventions had not met expected objectives to prioritize a shift from food assistance to unrestricted cash-based transfers in Kalobeyei and Kakuma. Nevertheless, Key informant interviews reported that food distribution centre activities were efficient, except for challenges related to camp internet connections that affected the efficiency of food allocations.

232. Key stakeholder interviews in Dadaab reported that the in-kind food distribution system is vulnerable to regular and intentional “under-scooping” at food distribution points¹⁵⁷. The issue was also highlighted in more detail in a UNHCR annual participatory assessment¹⁵⁸ focusing on Dadaab. Stakeholders consulted for the evaluation called for the general food distribution scooping system to be redesigned to reduce this risk. Pre-packaging of commodities may be a cost-effective option to consider.

¹⁵⁴ KIIs, WFP. 2022. *Kenya Country Brief September 2022*.

¹⁵⁵ Targeting done by CSGs, including WFP, CGs and NDMA.

¹⁵⁶ KIIs. Locations excluded Dadaab sub-county, parts of Lagdera and Balambala sub-counties, Upper Fafi.

¹⁵⁷ Under-scooping is the intentional reduction of each beneficiary's ration size by a small quantity; the amounts thus held back from beneficiaries are aggregated and diverted to improper uses, in this case sale at local markets in Dadaab.

¹⁵⁸ The evaluation team did not gain access to the annual UNHCR participatory assessment.

Finding 61: SO3 experienced challenges to efficient and effective resource utilization, occasioned by several factors, including delays resulting from COVID-19, and a lack of coordination across strategic outcomes in operational planning. Programme plans for human resource utilization may be further disrupted by potential reductions in donor funding. This has led to efforts to reduce unit costs in operations.

233. COVID-19 impacted all WFP operations but was particularly disruptive for the labour-intensive activities of SO3. The result has been a major, and ongoing, problem in resource utilization and efficiency.

234. For 2022, the needs-based plan was approximately USD 5 million, with an approved implementation budget of USD 8 million, which included a carry-over of USD 6 million from 2021. While additional contributions have been received for the current year, these funds expired at the end of 2022 (though some donors indicated that it is likely that they will renew their commitments). However, with a general decline in donor funding to SO3.

235. while the CSP awaits approval, 2023 may be problematic, unless country office advocacy efforts with donors succeed in enhancing the flow of dedicated funding. In this respect, the country office is extremely active and creative in its efforts to secure additional funds for SO3/county capacity strengthening.¹⁵⁹

236. A WFP-generated problem concerns the competition among the strategic outcome teams in securing a limited number of “slots” in the timetable for cooperation with the county governments and field offices in implementing activities. A lack of coordination and cross-programme integration leads to delays and cancellations. This is particularly problematic for the SO3 team. Discussions are underway to address the problem of more efficient programme integration (SO3 review and meeting reports).

237. A key cost driver for the SO3 programme is the payment of fees for technical experts, or daily subsistence allowance (DSA) for specialists from government institutions. These fees and allowance payments constitute a major portion of planned expenditures. Cancellations and delays have a significant impact on the “burn rate” for expenditures. Internal review reports contain accounts of efforts by SO3 staff to prioritize those expenditures most likely to proceed as planned, along with consideration of ways to reduce unit costs and get more value from a lower overall expenditure on daily subsistence allowances.

Finding 62: UNHAS maintained a high level of efficiency during the CSP, being part-funded through cost recovery.

238. Under SO4, UNHAS maintained a high level of efficiency during the CSP and was funded through partial cost recovery (via ticket sales) and donor contributions. On average the ratio was 70 percent cost-recovery and 30 percent donor contributions – at the start of the CSP there was a slightly greater reliance on donor funding, with a ratio of 60:40. Government restrictions on movement into and out of Nairobi due to COVID-19 initially impacted negatively on the demand for flights, which led to a reduction in cost recovery and an underutilization of funding for the European Union Humanitarian Aid Flight (EU-HAF) services. Government flight approval mechanisms put in place in 2020 remained until 2022 resulting in ongoing administrative inefficiencies.¹⁶⁰

239. Overall, the UNHAS collaboration with ECHO to support the operational management of EU-HAF services in Kenya through sharing one aircraft (Dash-8) under Activity 8 proved to be highly cost-efficient¹⁶¹.

240. Innovative ways to ensure the efficiency of operations, such as the adoption of new mechanized handling techniques, have been implemented in Mombasa port and warehouse operations, leading to better cost efficiency and effectiveness. As a result, the Mombasa to Moyale corridor demonstrated efficiency and capacity to support additional food volumes to Ethiopia.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁹ Based on interviews with country office staff and external stakeholders, and data provided by these sources. See also reports on SO3 Quarterly Review Meetings, April and July 2022.

¹⁶⁰ KIIs and data UNHAS.

¹⁶¹ Prior to establishing cooperation between UNHAS and EU-HAF each entity operated dedicated aircraft. By consolidating operations, cost savings could be made and aircraft utilization maximized.

¹⁶² WFP Mombasa is to be established as a centre of excellence for supply chain operations.

2.3.4 To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered?

Finding 63: Key stakeholders advised that cash-based transfer was a more cost-effective transfer modality and better value for money than in-kind assistance, but challenges to cash-based transfers occurred due to the financial service provider requirement to “know your customer”.

241. The country office and its partners viewed cash-based transfer as a more cost-effective transfer modality and better value for money than in-kind food assistance. Analysis of WFP monitoring data reflected in Table 21 and Table 22, show the associated costs¹⁶³ per modality, which confirms this position.

242. Calculations by the evaluation indicate that the (cumulative) food-associated costs were approximately USD 270 per mt for in-kind food assistance or USD 0.27 per kilogram. Cash-based transfer associated costs were approximately USD 0.03 per USD transferred. At 2022 food ration levels of 4.440 kg per beneficiary, the food transfer associated costs were approximately USD 1.2 per beneficiary, whereas at 2022 cash ration levels of KES 600 per beneficiary, the cash-based transfer associated costs were approximately USD 0.15 per beneficiary.

243. In February 2022, WFP transitioned 28,000 beneficiaries in Wajir county from receiving seasonal in-kind transfers to cash-based transfers. After three cash disbursements, a monitoring report found that the transition has had clear positive effects on livelihoods and the economy in Wajir.¹⁶⁴

Table 21: Food modality – associated costs per mt distributed

Activity	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022		Cumulative	
	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual
1	\$ 341	\$ 101	\$ 342	\$ 263	\$ 314	\$ 271	\$ 303	\$ 298	\$ 321	\$ 482	\$ 353	\$ 271
2	\$ 315	\$ 237	\$ 315	\$ 246	\$ 338	\$ 351	\$ 276	\$ 234	\$ 105	\$ 283	\$ 288	\$ 281
3	\$ 395	\$ 389,053	\$ 430	\$ 276	\$ 481	\$ 375	\$ 866	\$ 276	\$ 954	\$ 249	\$ 621	\$ 343
Overall	\$ 361	\$ 280	\$ 371	\$ 268	\$ 367	\$ 314	\$ 400	\$ 286	\$ 456	\$ 365	\$ 422	\$ 297

Sources: CPB_-_Plan_vs_Actuals_Report_v2.1_22.06.2022, CM-R014 Food and CBT v2.0 03.08.2022.

Table 22: Cash-based transfer modality – associated costs per USD distributed

Activity	2018		2019		2020		2021		2022		Cumulative	
	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual
1	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.05	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.03
2					\$ 0.20	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.05	\$ 0.11	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.07	\$ 0.03
3	\$ 0.19	\$ 5.21	\$ 0.17	\$ 0.07	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.10	\$ 0.10
Overall	\$ 0.11	\$ 0.16	\$ 0.08	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.05	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.04	\$ 0.02	\$ 0.05	\$ 0.04

Sources: Ibid.

244. During the CSP there were, however, a few challenges to cash-based transfers due to the financial service provider requirement to “know your customer”, which meant some trader refugees who lacked identity cards could not qualify to open a bank or mobile phone account and thus could not participate as traders in the SO1 cash-based transfer intervention. In addition, the know your customer concept did not allow households headed by children in Kalobeyei to receive unrestricted cash transfers (they still received 100 percent restricted cash).¹⁶⁵ Also, the Government did not permit unrestricted cash transfers in Dadaab (for fear of injecting cash into local economies and the risk of misappropriation by terror groups).

Finding 64: The pre-packaging of commodities for in-kind food assistance delivery was more appropriate than more traditional methods of scooping and weighing at food distribution centres.

245. Currently SO1 utilizes the system of scooping and weighing at food distribution centres, whereas SO2 (Activity 3) switched in 2020 to pre-packaging according to ration size prior to distribution days, which is

¹⁶³ Operational, financial and administrative transfer costs.

¹⁶⁴ WFP. June 2022. Follow up survey report: Transition from in-kind assistance to cash transfers. Wajir County.

¹⁶⁵ Restricted cash applies restrictions to how beneficiaries can use the assistance they receive (e.g. by using value vouchers – which are only redeemable at selected retailers or for predefined commodities). Cash is unrestricted if beneficiaries can decide what they want to buy, where and when they want to buy it, and how they want to pay for it.

considered more cost efficient and has social benefits.¹⁶⁶ At the food distribution centre, distribution was more streamlined and there was a sharp reduction in the social costs, that is, beneficiary disputes regarding weight of rations and the operational costs associated with handling complaints via the feedback mechanism.

Finding 65: Retail supply chain (market and trader-support) interventions helped to increase refugee and Kenyan community purchasing power and supported traders to lower their costs.

246. WFP has invested in partnerships to co-finance activities, which has helped to reduce the financial burden. For example, WFP successfully advocated for the county government to improve roads and helped to link Kakuma market retailers to local traders from Kitale and Lake Turkana fisheries.¹⁶⁷

247. Time efficiency measures, such as holding workshops jointly for Isiolo and Samburu county authorities, offered an opportunity for cross learning and helped save costs. Similarly, the farmers service centres under FtMA were beneficial: where a single farmer is trained, the knowledge gained by the farmer is shared with fellow farmers.

248. Further supply chain interventions included support for mechanisms to reduce transport rates and improve local procurement opportunities. For example, the SO4 team undertook activities to open new road transport corridors for humanitarian cargo to facilitate trade and humanitarian assistance, such as the route through Moyale to Ethiopia.

Finding 66: The Innovation Unit - as the first regional hub of its kind for WFP - demonstrated several opportunities to localize and harness synergies across the private sector, the Government and WFP operations. Effective support was offered to cooperating partners to help accelerate innovative projects.

249. The WFP Kenya Innovation Unit was restructured during the CSP and has provided internal consultancies across different themes, including important links to food systems and livelihood projects, as well as supply chain management. The aim has been to empower people to innovate. Work has included training to help with mind-set change and a culture of innovation in government-run county innovation centres in ASALs.

250. Several pilot projects have been launched in support of SO1 programming, such as a market-based oil automated teller machine pilot in Dadaab refugee camp in 2021 to optimize food collection, reduce spillage and improve hygiene.¹⁶⁸ The sustainability of such an innovation has still to be determined but the costs were regarded as high and ownership and scalability of the product unclear.

251. Some challenges were evident in dealing with bureaucracy and financing systems related to WFP global innovation accelerator funding. For example, funds in the special account for innovation could only be allocated via headquarters and could not be used to pay cooperating partners (as that is a country office function not a headquarters function). While such technical limitations caused some barriers to launching innovation initiatives, the overall work of the unit was regarded by key informants as very positive.

2.4. EQ4: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED BY THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

2.4.1 To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, timely, predictable and flexible resources to finance the CSP?

Finding 67: WFP was unable to mobilize adequate funds to match targets for implementation during the whole CSP period, and adaptation to the reduced donor funding was modest. However, this is a challenge faced by WFP globally and, to its credit, the Kenya country office has found considerable success in its efforts to secure additional funds beyond 2021.

¹⁶⁶ USAID. 2018. *Food Aid Packaging Challenges and Opportunities*.


¹⁶⁷ WFP. 2022. *Kenya ACR 2021*.

¹⁶⁸ The vegetable oil “automated teller machine” was an innovation to dispense oil that is stored in bulk.

252. The CSP has only been 56 percent funded to date against the needs based-plan of BR6.¹⁶⁹ The findings indicate that WFP was unable to mobilize funds to match the level of need.¹⁷⁰

253. The CSP aimed to secure longer-term, and less narrowly earmarked, funding at the level of results or country level, rather than at activity level. However, there has been no observable trend towards greater funding flexibility within contributions (see Section 1.3.2). In fact, the opposite may be true with less evidence of strategic outcome-level earmarking in recent years (falling from 14 percent of total contributions in 2018, to 6 percent in 2020 and 9 percent in 2021). Country-level earmarking has seen a small increase between 2020 (2 percent) and 2022 (4 percent). Among the 10 biggest donors to the CSP, the most likely to provide result/strategic outcome/country-level funding are Germany, Canada and Sweden. Of the funding from Germany, 92 percent has been at the strategic outcome level, while 98 percent of US funding is earmarked at the activity level.

Figure 10: Directed multilateral contributions by level of earmarking and year



Source: Distribution contribution and forecast stats 2022-06-19. Data for 2022 is provisional to 19.06.2022.

Table 23: Needs-based plan requirements, allocated resources and expenditures

	NBP Requirement to end of 2022	% of total CSP	Allocated Resources	% funded to date	Expenditure to date	% of NBP Implemented to date
Activity 1	\$470,171,829	47%	\$312,586,926	59%	\$275,309,832	52%
Activity 2	\$94,157,343	9%	\$53,173,135	55%	\$49,272,023	51%
SO1 Total	\$564,329,172	57%	\$366,414,630	59%	\$324,581,855	52%
Activity 3	\$239,447,573	24%	\$122,240,511	47%	\$112,095,569	43%
Activity 4	\$31,806,518	3%	\$15,633,887	44%	\$11,712,986	33%
SO2 Total	\$271,254,091	27%	\$137,874,397	47%	\$123,808,555	42%
Activity 5	\$25,038,629	3%	\$21,484,240	81%	\$17,041,166	64%
SO3 Total	\$25,038,629	3%	\$21,484,240	81%	\$17,041,166	64%
Activity 6	\$20,688,403	2%	\$12,653,816	55%	\$10,731,457	47%
Activity 7	\$1,203,490	0%	\$433,600	36%	\$433,600	36%
Activity 8	\$3,742,253	0%	\$2,746,474	73%	\$2,489,825	67%
Activity 9	\$836,000	0%	\$146,473	14%	\$133,523	13%
Activity 10	\$156,000	0%	\$-	0%	\$-	0%
SO4 Total	\$26,626,146	3%	\$15,980,363	55%	\$13,788,405	47%

Sources: BR06, ACRs, Allocated resources to 22.06.2022.

¹⁶⁹ ARS (22.06.22).

¹⁷⁰ It might be noted that this is the situation that has faced many WFP country programmes. Further, the country office has advised that there has been some progress in addressing the funding shortfall because of additional funding obtained after the cut-off date for CPSE data collection.

254. Overall, WFP was successful in mobilizing increased funds from USD 90m in 2018 to USD 147m in 2020 but funding was recorded as declining to USD 107m in 2021. The increase in 2020 was partly due to successful mobilization of funds for the Activity 2 COVID-19 response to vulnerable host community populations in urban areas. The apparent decline in funding for 2021 is somewhat misleading. Funding for 2020 included approximately USD 20 million from USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) for the COVID-19 response that was intended for programming in 2021. Consequently, the average funding across the two years is approximately USD 127m per year, which represents a sustained increase on the USD 90m prior to the CSP and an average across the CSP of USD 117m per year.

255. WFP staff highlighted challenges to mobilizing funds including limited donor support and resources, donor fatigue, severe droughts, COVID-19 and emergencies in Ukraine and elsewhere. The challenges to funding are likely to continue over the next few years.¹⁷¹ In the face of this ongoing struggle, it might be noted that the country office had succeeded in mobilizing nearly USD 80m by mid-year, approximately 75 percent of the total raised for the whole of the previous year - a considerable achievement.

256. In the early part of the CSP period, the performance under SO1 to adapt to the reduced donor funding was modest. The country office responded by stretching its resources and reducing ration sizes, and the size of the SO1 team. The recent increase in the general food distribution ration sizes to 80 percent from 50 percent¹⁷² is one notable recent result of successful resource mobilization, with additional funds to be provided by BHA to respond to the emergency.

257. A key assumption identified by WFP for the SO1 theory of change did not hold true: "adequate resources available for a healthy food and cash pipeline. Partners provide required complementary services and support." There is need for WFP to examine the strength of evidence for its assumptions as part of any future strategic planning and risk management.

258. The stretched resources and reduction in ration sizes resulted in increased risks of malnutrition, anaemia, negative coping mechanisms etc. among refugees. The SO1 team attempted to manage these risks by informing partners and community leaders in advance of ration cuts. WFP also undertook a joint UNHCR Nutrition Survey in 2021 and planned joint agency response to address MAM and rates.

259. Given that 2022 saw large funding and ration cuts, this evaluation finds insufficient SO1 monitoring in 2022 of the associated risks and impacts. In addition, the CSP has focused on strategically engaging the Government and county governments to invest in crisis response and food assistance. Reports were mixed regarding progress. Prospects of future funding for SO1 appear to be modestly hopeful, and there is emerging evidence of new county government nutrition budgets and investment by the Government of Kenya. However, stakeholders state that the situation remains unpredictable.

260. Under SO2, obtaining funding for Activity 4 was challenging, and thus the focus has been on pilot initiatives, rather than going to scale across all ASAL counties. There were, however, commitments and contributions from the MasterCard Foundation and Norad towards Activity 4 (including FtMA), which would substantially increase the funding.

261. For SO3, the scope and ambition of work has been restrained to a significant degree by limited funding and apparent donor reluctance (with some exceptions) to provide the multi-year funding that is essential if sustainable results are to be achieved.

Finding 68: Supply chain (SO4) integration and resourcing has been challenging due to the partly siloed approach to activities. However, UNHAS operations were well resourced at an average of 91 percent, and EU-HAF operations at 100 percent (2021).

262. EU-HAF was fully funded. However, in 2020 COVID-19 restrictions led to low fund utilization.¹⁷³

¹⁷¹ For WFP globally in 2021, total funds received (USD 9.6 billion) comprised just 64 percent% of the total forecast needs. In 2022 the forecast gap is even larger, with an expected USD 11 billion in funding against needs of USD 19bn (57 percent% funded). A Strategic Evaluation of Funding WFP's Work (2020) noted that WFP's funding aspirations/published needs were often "not realistic, and not backed by commensurate efforts to achieve them". p.86.

¹⁷² KIIs, WFP. 2022. *Kenya Country Brief September 2022*.

¹⁷³ UNHAS Kenya data.

Table 24: Breakdown of UNHAS and EU-HAF funding

Year	Funds received (USD)	
	UNHAS	EU-HAF
2018	*174	
2019	4,463,743	
2020	2,857,868	559,102
2021	2,332,650	1,960,916
2022	1,285,289	

Source: UNHAS Kenya.

2.4.2 To what extent were the monitoring and reporting systems useful to track and demonstrate progress towards expected outcomes and to inform management decisions?

Finding 69: Internal capacity for monitoring and evaluation (particularly at the strategic outcome level) was recognized as an area of persisting challenges, with ongoing efforts to improve.

263. The country monitoring and evaluation teams are commendable for managing a large portfolio of monitoring and evaluation interventions. Stakeholders and partner agencies report WFP appropriately conducts periodic joint monitoring missions in order to generate relevant data to inform interventions. Evidence shows that monitoring data informs management decisions. For instance, the joint WFP/UNHCR Nutrition Survey 2021, mobilized a joint agency response to address the high levels of anaemia in camps. Moreover, monitoring of refugee feedback captured in the WFP Annual Report guided the decision to adjust general food distribution to address refugees' struggles to cope with reduced rations and double distributions by reverting to monthly distributions in December 2021.

264. Most stakeholders report that WFP feedback mechanisms work well. Some limitations in the monitoring and feedback systems were, however, highlighted by the WFP Audit 2022, which states that the logs from the customer relationship management system do not properly categorize, review and consolidate all issues reported by monitoring staff and field offices with issues from other sources for trend analysis and to inform programmatic decisions.

265. The country office monitoring and evaluation team has an enormous amount of data to collect – and report – and while capacity enhancement is underway, there may be a need to further invest in the team's capacity to allow for appropriate resourcing for the monitoring function. To support and extend the country office monitoring and evaluation team capacity, the country office commissioned a decentralized evaluation (DE) of SO2, and has procured services for annual monitoring of SO1, SO2 and SO3. These activities generate high quality and reliable performance reports, yet some challenges remain.

266. WFP partners report that the decentralized evaluation and reporting systems have faced several difficulties. COVID-19 restrictions challenged the quality of SO1 and SO2 monitoring. Data aggregation, longitudinal and comparative analyses were sometimes restricted. Key stakeholders report that remote monitoring systems became more important during COVID-19 and that country office facilitation of such systems was not always robust. Views regarding the country office uptake of decentralized evaluation recommendations were mixed.¹⁷⁵

267. An important point raised by partners was that the output and outcome indicators set by headquarters, particularly for SO2, were somewhat ambitious and not always appropriate to the SO2 budget, capacity and resources on the ground within the SO2 country office/field office and country office

¹⁷⁴UNHAS Kenya combined with Somalia operations under the then Special Operations, financial figures were reported cumulatively.

¹⁷⁵ Several actions have been implemented in response to recommendations from the decentralized evaluation reports (evidenced to the evaluation through data extracted from the WFP corporate R2 system tracking recommendations), however the experience of some stakeholders interviewed presented more of a mixed picture.

monitoring and evaluation teams. The complexity of the strategic outcomes and the indicators requires an enhancement in country office monitoring and evaluation skills and expertise.

268. Field offices' report monitoring of SO1 performance may be constrained in Dadaab, with challenges due to insecurity. There is some risk of WFP losing the opportunity to gather real-time data regarding the impact of ration cuts. WFP conducts robust and high-quality nutrition surveys jointly with UNHCR biannually. The last survey was in 2021, and there has been limited monitoring in 2022 to assess the effects of ration cuts. Stakeholders recommend monitoring both quantitative and qualitative impacts among the refugees and host community.

Finding 70: SO4 faced challenges in measuring outputs for food systems as performance monitoring indicators had not been set by WFP headquarters.

269. The absence of corporate food systems performance monitoring indicators proved challenging for the SO4 and SO2 teams due to the siloed approach to supply chain management activities, with supply chain specialist assignments split between strategic outcomes. Some supply chain monitoring inefficiencies were noted in relation to SO2 and SO3, where learning was missed or reporting duplicated. However, several useful supply chain information systems pilot projects were initiated, such as analysis that increased understanding of county-level supply chains.¹⁷⁶ UNHAS has been using well-established performance monitoring tools.

2.4.3 How did the partnerships and collaborations with other actors influence performance and results?

Finding 71: In service of its strategic shift to supporting the strengthening of national systems, WFP worked effectively in building on and expanding its existing partnerships with the Government of Kenya and enhancing those with county governments in the ASALS.

270. WFP formed strategic partnerships with key government institutions including the NDMA, the national ministries of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Trade and Cooperative Development, Health, Education, county governments and the State Department for Development of ASALS (where it has seconded a programme officer).¹⁷⁷ A key complement has been the establishment of partnerships with Kenyan-based public and private sector organizations to provide technical expertise to give professional leadership to programming.

271. With county governments and other development partners, WFP established memorandums of understanding to provide an enabling environment for the implementation of sustainable food systems and to support improvements in critical planning, policy and strategy formulation, financing, coordination, implementation and monitoring processes.¹⁷⁸ Under Activity 1, WFP communicates with the Government and county governments on a regular basis to keep abreast of ongoing developments and issues. It also works closely with relevant government line ministries and the Deputy County Commissioner to implement self-reliance and humanitarian activities.

272. In refugee contexts, WFP works on a tripartite basis through field-level agreements involving UNHCR and cooperating partners. WFP engaged with the National Disaster Operations Centre, the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, and the Kenya Law Reform Commission in the formulation of policies and bills for social protection, school feeding in early childhood development education centres, and disaster risk management.

273. Some challenges to partnership working included shortcomings in the availability of local resources or funding, for example, the county (responsible for managing storage facilities) not making timely payments to staff, resulting in strikes.

274. A "strategic shift" has brought WFP closer to the centres of Government decision making. WFP has thus become an actor supporting some relevant aspects of Kenyan governance, concerning the conduct of public affairs in Kenya at national and local levels, going beyond a focus on effective public

¹⁷⁶ WFP Mombasa developed a valuable monitoring system to track the performance of Freight Forwarders and an information dashboard on stocks and vessel arrivals.

¹⁷⁷ WFP Kenya. 2020. *Partnership Action Plan 2020*.

¹⁷⁸ WFP Kenya. 2020. SO2 AMR.

administration.¹⁷⁹ As both governance and development have a strong political dimension there is a need for political economy analysis, as well as a collaborative functional review of institutions.¹⁸⁰

275. While many country office staff members are well versed in the nuances of Kenyan governance and politics, there has been no systematic effort to build in governance analysis to programme planning, monitoring and review/evaluation.

Finding 72: WFP has supported partnerships that cut across private and public institutions, and these partnerships were instrumental in achieving the intended results.

276. The inclusion of WFP in the county steering group enabled WFP to remain relevant to the needs and priorities of county governments and communities. Through such partnerships, WFP was able to track the progress of activities and address challenges.

277. The Government, non-governmental organizations, research institutions and the private sector were key WFP partners in the delivery of services to smallholder farmers, pastoralists and other value chain actors, living in the ASAL areas. In order to influence food systems, WFP also partnered with the FtMA (AGRA, International Finance Corporation, GrowAfrica, Technoserve), Nutrition International (formerly the Micronutrient Initiative), Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition and financial service providers.

278. WFP nutrition technical capacity at the field level is limited.¹⁸¹ However, WFP benefits technically from cooperating partners with nutrition expertise. WFP is the lead government partner in key matters concerning nutrition, especially management of MAM and school feeding.

279. WFP and UNICEF worked together effectively and appropriately in social protection and child protection, at both policy and programme levels, with UNICEF leading on child protection, reflecting its comparative advantage. A joint programme funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) brings the two together and results have been positive.¹⁸²

280. More generally, examples of cooperation with Rome-based agencies (RBAs) are set out in the mid-term review (Annex 17b) including the Kenya Cereal Enhancement Programme for Climate Resilient Agricultural Livelihoods, a joint programme for the three Rome-based agencies, supporting smallholder farmers. WFP also partners with other United Nations agencies on the Kalobeyei Integrated Social Development Plan in Turkana West, on integrated refugee-host settlement and sustainable livelihoods.

281. The scope of work in food safety and quality (FSQ) includes leveraging partnerships with the National Ministry of Health and University of Nairobi to: (1) enhance the capacity of public health officers in mycotoxin testing in established county mini laboratories; and (2) support county governments to develop food safety and quality strategies.

282. The SO2 team collaborates with ministries as well as the SO3 and SO4 teams in disseminating guidelines and training school officials and traders. The SO2 team is also collaborating with the SO4 team in other innovative processes that touch on food safety and quality and post-harvest losses.

Finding 73: Under supply chain activities, a wide range of partnerships with national and county government departments, research institutions and the private sector have been developed.

283. Through SO2, SO4 and SO3 supply chain activities, the country office developed a wide range of partnerships. It was noted that implementation of county capacity strengthening activities for supply chain

¹⁷⁹ For the purpose of the evaluation, governance is defined as “the use of power, authority and how a country manages its affairs. It concerns the way people mediate their differences, make decisions, and enact policies that affect public life.” Governance for Growth, Stability, and Inclusive Development, DFID (now UK Aid) Position Paper, March 2019.

¹⁸⁰ As the World Bank has noted: “Development happens when political decisions benefit the common good, rather than narrow elite interests and when institutions that deliver public goods and services are accountable to citizens in their spending and delivery”. (World Development Report 2017: Governance and Law). Similarly, all United Nations programmes, built on a rights-based approach, including those dedicated to enabling gender transformation, will inevitably address this dimension. On the importance of politics in Kenya in influencing development trajectories, see *UNCT Kenya, CCA 2021*, Section 1.4.1. For some considerations on ‘what works’, see Merrilee S. Grindle, *Good Enough Governance Revisited, Development Policy Review*, 2011, 29, 199-221; and David Booth, “Governance and Development in Africa: Building on What Works”, *Africa Power and Politics, Policy Brief 01*, April 2011.

¹⁸¹ Field visits, KIIs nutrition staff.

¹⁸² KIIs WFP, UNICEF, the Government, SIDA.

was challenging as this required significant engagement with the Government, which was particularly difficult during COVID-19.

284. Partners in Mombasa highlighted positive experiences in collaborating with WFP. Partners have been able to take advantage of the organization's preferential shipping and transport rates, warehouse capacity, supply chain and market assessment knowledge.¹⁸³

2.4.4 To what extent did the country office have appropriate human resources capacity to deliver on the CSP?

Finding 74: The organizational alignment process, following CSP adoption, was prolonged and disruptive for all. Many lessons have been learned, with the intention to design a smoother process for the second generation CSP.

285. For Kenya, this was the first CSP and, given the shifts towards adopting an enabling role, and “changing lives” (resilience), there was a great deal of change to absorb.¹⁸⁴ The country office went through an organizational alignment process, beginning with an assessment of the adjustments needed in organizational structures, reporting relationships and human resources.

286. With the CSP and its key priorities, there was a need for revised and new skill sets among staff. Because of the emphasis given by the Government to devolution, the role of field offices was enhanced and some positions at the country office were redundant. With a focus on working directly with the Government, the role of implementing agencies in the field was greatly reduced. In capacity strengthening, out-posting of staff to government ministries for what became SO3 (and one in SO2) continued but out-posting of staff to the county governments was discontinued. Many staff members found they had “to apply for their own jobs”. As many had 10-20 years of service, this was highly disruptive. Most were on a continuing cycle of one-year contracts so this caused considerable anxiety, particularly as the whole process took 18 months, twice as long as expected.¹⁸⁵

287. Once CSP implementation began there was initial confusion at country office and field office levels, as everyone began to operate under the new system. However, focused attention has been given to ensure a more transparent and conducive process, including two-way dialogue with staff in preparation for the introduction of the next CSP.

288. During the alignment exercise it became clear that the human resources (HR) pattern should undergo change. The tradition for WFP at country office level has been to rely on generalists to design and deliver activities. As the focus has switched to supporting the Government in building the necessary enabling environment, so the demands on staff have begun to change.¹⁸⁶

289. The country office has performed particularly well in some emergent priority areas, including social protection, where it plays a leadership role, and gender equality. It also has strengths in supply chain management and logistics, and emergency preparedness and response. However, there are structural challenges. As it is no longer primarily a humanitarian assistance organization, WFP Kenya is competing for recognition by government and donor funding with other United Nations agencies, as well as INGOs, which may have more specialist staff, a greater depth of expertise and longer experience.¹⁸⁷ In one area of concern, climate change, WFP finds itself a long way behind FAO or UNICEF in preparing to take on a leadership role. WFP is now giving serious attention to how best to position itself.

290. WFP Kenya has begun to respond to the human resources challenges identified above. Recruitment of additional technical specialists is underway. Several existing positions have been upgraded to ensure that they attract well-qualified staff. A new round of appointments as heads of field offices (HFOs) has been made, resulting in the recruitment of individuals with strong technical expertise.¹⁸⁸ In addition, some experienced generalists at the country office have decided to enrol in further professional development

¹⁸³ A project with the Government, which aims to establish a humanitarian logistics hub in Mombasa.

¹⁸⁴ KIIs with current and former country office staff.

¹⁸⁵ MTR, p.42. See also WFP, Organizational Alignment Report, Kenya, October 2018.

¹⁸⁶ For a discussion of the impact of changing demands on staff at field level, see MTR, pp.45-46.

¹⁸⁷ KIIs with country office, UNCT and donors.

¹⁸⁸ WFP. 2021. *CSP Mid-Term Review*, and WFP Report on a Retreat of Kenya CO Management. 2021 (Internal document).

programmes to ensure that they can adapt and operate more effectively in a changing work environment.¹⁸⁹

291. The next CSP is expected to lead to further adjustments to the human resources profile. However, careful attention to supporting staff in adapting and preparing themselves for transition is essential. Professional development for staff is a major preoccupation of human resource leaders at both country office and headquarters levels. Interviews confirmed that this topic will be highlighted in new human resources strategies for the country office and at corporate level, both currently at the planning stage.

Finding 75: A strategic approach to supply chain management to support food systems development has been difficult to achieve.

292. Under SO4, human resource capacity for UNHAS and EU-HAF has been appropriate to technical requirements and streamlined to suit joint operations between Kenya and Somalia. The shift towards a matrix-managed structure was confusing and procedures had to be created to support changes that matched resources to the line of sight. The siloed approach to supply chain management within the country office also caused challenges to staff skills development.

293. Supply chain teams in Mombasa, Nairobi and at field offices have engaged positively in a variety of county capacity strengthening activities but most outputs have been ad-hoc and technically related, and it has been difficult to identify clear outcomes. Given the experience and skillset of personnel, a more integrated and strategic approach to supply chain management to support food systems development has been difficult to achieve. There are plans to rotate staff in a structured manner to help maximize knowledge should resources be available.

2.4.5 What are the other factors that can explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?

Finding 76: While there are continuing issues with silos and gaps in horizontal coordination, the use of mechanisms for cross-strategic outcome and unit coordination shows some promise. The move to increase the role of specialists to meet the needs of the programme will pose organizational challenges. Problems of coordination have resulted in real problems in managing activities at the field level. Overall, there is a need for strong, informed leadership and guidance, and enhanced cooperation across and within activity groups to address these difficulties.

294. The organizational structure of country offices and field offices is normally reviewed following approval of the CSP to ensure that the structure adopted meets the needs of the programme. There is no blueprint to guide the Country Director, who leads the process.

295. Enhancing staffing levels at the field offices, increasing delegation of decision making to them and adjustments to reporting relationships, are all underway. What seems unique about the current structure is the number of managers and office/department heads reporting directly to the Country Director. For the Country Director, it was essential to maintain close communication with managers, hence the unusual pattern of reporting relations.¹⁹⁰

296. Coordination faced challenges and there are questions concerning appropriate linkages and joint planning. This is complicated by organizing work and engaging with partners and beneficiaries within each activity. However, recently, workshops and informal dialogues to address strains have begun to take place with pairs of strategic outcomes.

297. WFP has been operating in highly unpredictable contexts and has had to adjust to changes on an ongoing basis. Due to the commitment of managers and staff, the organizational structure has worked moderately well under challenging circumstances - although with margins to improve efficiency. It seems unlikely that a shift away from the strategic outcome system at this stage would improve organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Instead, providing continued strong leadership and decision making is essential, as is the need to monitor the effectiveness of current arrangements, and adopt changes where new practices point to better ways of working together. Efforts should continue to explore mechanisms to

¹⁸⁹ Evaluation interview data.

¹⁹⁰ KILs with managers at country offices, and reviews of country office organigrams 2017, 2018 and 2022.

bring cross-strategic outcome teams together and pursue possibilities for joint programming. A further priority will be to integrate specialist units more effectively in programme planning and design processes.

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

The CSP: An overview of performance

299. **Conclusion 1:** Partial progress has been made in most of the areas of engagement related to the aim and objectives of the CSP. However, there have been disappointments, notably in integrating refugees within host communities and ensuring a clearer focus and strategic direction in WFP work on food systems.

300. Resource limitations at the county level and delays by the Government in the passage of legislation, and the adoption of policies or strategies, along with uncertainties about implementation, have held back progress in some areas, and contributed to weaknesses in cross-strategic outcome coordination at the field level. Despite this, there has been forward movement in all activity streams.

Food security and nutrition achievements

301. **Conclusion 2:** For SO1, the strategic approach of WFP to delivering food assistance and nutrition to crisis-affected populations was relevant and highly appreciated by all stakeholders. All planned refugee beneficiaries were reached. However, performance fell significantly short of some SO1 targets, mainly due to funding constraints and the scale of needs encountered. Despite a generally positive performance, not all resident beneficiaries in urgent need of support were reached. High levels of micronutrient deficiencies among children above the acceptable threshold are of much concern, especially in the refugee camps. This results from extreme poverty, deficits in the food basket, poor food choices and preparation methods, and gaps in prescription ready-to-use supplementary food (CSB++).

302. SO2 was informed by evidence of high malnutrition and food insecurity particularly in the ASALs. Assessments emphasized the pressure on natural resources and increasing climate shocks that threatened food systems, as well as inefficiencies in food systems leading to high food prices and the lack of empowerment of women, as constituting barriers to resilient livelihoods. Programme effectiveness was undermined, in some cases, by a scattering of limited resources over too many underfunded initiatives.

303. For SO3, all sectors supported have made progress in establishing policies and legislation to constitute an enabling environment for food and nutrition security. Much work remains to be done in strengthening management information and monitoring, evaluation and learning systems, at both national and county levels, while enhancing community involvement remains a pressing priority. The overall effectiveness and efficiency of county capacity strengthening programming has been affected by the lack of a comprehensive county capacity strengthening strategy, the incompleteness of devolution and uncertain financing of county government.

304. Under SO4 (supply chain and coordination services), UNHAS played a crucial role in supporting aid sector interventions for the refugee camps, and the joint Somalia and Kenya management framework enabled economies of scale through air service asset sharing. UNHAS proved to be invaluable in ensuring continuity of operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Partners' positive experiences in collaborating with the WFP supply chain arose largely from the important effort made under SO4 to develop preferential shipping and transport rates, warehouse capacity, supply chain and market assessment knowledge, which contributed positively to the country office's ability to provide valuable logistics-related services under Activity 9 and as part of services to support the "One United Nations" business operations strategy.

305. **Conclusion 3:** Greater nutrition mainstreaming in WFP initiatives is needed to strengthen nutrition programming at the county level. There were poor linkages across strategic outcome activities, with WFP acknowledging the gaps and the need for coordinated efforts. The relationship between nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive activities needs strengthening. Food safety is a significant aspect of nutrition. The impact of WFP support through SO2 and SO3 was felt at national and county levels, contributing towards food safety strengthening.

Strategic shifts

306. **Conclusion 4:** The CSP makes clear the ambition around the strategic shift from delivering assistance to enabling change, including through national system strengthening. Yet, despite strong and continuing advocacy by the country office with the donor community, the budget continues to be heavily weighted to emergency response. In relation to other programme streams, the leadership role of WFP within FtMA has been partly successful in achieving the objectives around smallholder farmer access to markets, but Activity 4 itself (smallholder access to market) was largely underfunded. This led to a focus on pilot activities rather than full-scale rollout in ASAL counties and a missed opportunity to use existing supply chain expertise more strategically.

307. **Conclusion 5:** Funding constraints may require WFP to revise the targeting approach once the Government facilitates the regulatory environment for resettlement of refugees. Current government plans may result in the most vulnerable being left behind. Beyond refugee populations, Kenyan communities living in dry areas are bound to move in search of water and pasture. They are also at high risk of malnutrition and thus WFP assistance is critical to saving their lives.

Cross-cutting themes and other issues in programme performance

308. **Conclusion 6:** The issues of environment and climate change were considered in the CSP through implementation of climate-smart agriculture under FtMA and partnerships with environmentally focused organizations. WFP is yet to catch up with other UNCT peers on these issues, but it has embraced climate risk management as part of a food systems approach in the Rural Resilience Initiative (R4).

309. **Conclusion 7:** Protection indicators show good progress overall. However, the LGBTQI population continues to report physical harassment. The country office is making efforts to address this, but progress was not evaluable. Continued emphasis needs to be given to addressing issues around access to assistance and protection of hard-to-reach populations (including LGBTQI people), who may also shy away from assistance to avoid harassment.

310. **Conclusion 8:** The contribution of WFP to achieving the cross-cutting aims of gender, equity and inclusion was evident as was the principled orientation in delivering the CSP. Most notable are the inclusive and participatory features of programming aiming to target the most vulnerable in society, reaching persons living with disability, and those in urgent need of nutrition support. However, stigmatization affected the reach to persons living with HIV/AIDs in some areas. In integrating gender into programme activities, good progress was noted. The CSP has initiated the road to gender-transformative programming, having undertaken a pilot in Makueni and Taita Taveta. The next WFP CSP should build substantially on this initiative. The provision of a gender budget was also an important achievement for the gender unit. Staffing for the unit, however, was insufficient.

311. **Conclusion 9:** As cross-cutting themes such as climate change and gender equality are acknowledged as higher priorities and, as barriers separating activities and strategic outcomes break down, new opportunities emerge. It will be imperative for activity and strategic outcome managers to take every opportunity for joint planning and collaborative programming with their colleagues. This should provide openings for enhanced cross-agency cooperation, as is taking place in social protection between SO3 and UNICEF.

Partnership and governance

312. **Conclusion 10:** The CSP is appropriately aligned with relevant national policies and priorities and is strategically focused to address the needs of the most vulnerable. At the local level, interventions were identified jointly with county governments. WFP activities remained relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic by offering lifesaving support to vulnerable populations through cash transfers. The CSP also responded to the changing context, national capacities and needs, including marginalised urban populations in its assistance plans.

313. **Conclusion 11:** For SO3, WFP has made solid progress in building on its partnership with the Government to source the expertise from national government institutions necessary for supporting county capacity strengthening activities at the county government level. There is a need to develop detailed partnership agreements, clearly specifying roles and responsibilities. At the same time, with sustainability in

mind, consideration might be given to developing a strategy jointly with the Government on transitioning to it taking over responsibility for meeting the full costs of such expert engagement.

314. WFP has built an ever-closer working relationship with the Government and county governments and has enhanced its role in supporting some relevant aspects of Kenyan governance. It is vital for WFP to acknowledge this shift in the way it works and to understand the dynamics of governance in order to optimize the focus of programming, to appreciate the implications of its partnerships and to maintain its credibility as an independent agency of the United Nations, while ensuring that it lives up to the maxim “to do no harm”. WFP should incorporate governance/political economy analysis in programme planning, monitoring, risk assessment and review/evaluation and should devote serious attention to this in planning the new CSP.

315. Progress in strengthening government systems at national and local levels is affected by political and institutional challenges and capacity constraints.¹⁹¹ Hence, to build on what it has accomplished, it will be urgent for the Kenya country office to consider, through SO3, and in coordination with the UNCT, how to assist in addressing those issues in future strategy development.

Efficiency

316. **Conclusion 12:** In terms of food and cash assistance, with the exception of disruptions caused by COVID-19, the CSP outputs were largely delivered within the intended timeframe. However, there has been some variation in performance. In some cases, annual expenditures have lagged below targets because of budget and human resource constraints or delays in approvals by the Government.

317. **Conclusion 13:** Generally, WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to CSP outputs and strategic outcomes, but options to enhance cost effectiveness could be better explored. Cash-based transfer was a more cost-effective transfer modality than in-kind food assistance, but there are challenges in its utilization for certain vulnerable groups.

Sustainability

318. **Conclusion 14:** Unconditional cash-based transfers can in some cases increase the risk of dependency of communities on hand-outs. Cash transfer was also not an effective mode of assistance for beneficiaries in dry areas that had limited food supply, leaving beneficiaries to spend more on transport while looking for food. In such cases, a preference for food assistance for asset activities (although not currently in place) was highlighted as it was seen to enhance sustainability.

319. The sustainability of structures already in place with the support of WFP is dependent on government commitment in terms of financial and human resources.

Human resources, organization and country office capacity challenges

320. **Conclusion 15:** The 18 months taken for implementation of the alignment process following Kenya's first CSP caused considerable anxiety among staff and disrupted work routines. The resulting changes to the human resources profile of the organization were substantial as the country office adapted to the shift from “saving lives” to “changing lives”, and to an enabling approach to working with the Government. Lessons have been learned and are being applied to the alignment exercise to accompany the new CSP.

321. While significant issues around ‘silos’ and coordination across strategic outcomes and thematic units remain, there seems to be no obvious benefit to a major restructuring of the organization. Efforts underway to address the issues identified are beginning to make a difference. There is a need for continued leadership and guidance, along with a commitment among middle managers to enhanced cooperation.

322. There were reports of understaffing at field office-level considering the broad range of activities undertaken across strategic outcomes. The need for a review of staffing was suggested. In the meantime, recommendations to strengthen the field offices and delegate greater responsibilities to them are being implemented.

¹⁹¹ See UNCT Kenya, CCA 2021, Section 1.4, Peace.

323. **Conclusion 16:** SO4 staff have found it challenging to work in a more programmatically integrated manner, and the shift to transfer technical expertise to SO2 and SO3 was perceived to fragment internal supply chain management capability. While internal assessments indicated that national systems supported by WFP were maintained or strengthened during the CSP, management and monitoring challenges may have diluted the level of potential impact.

324. While supply chain management has become a highly relevant component of WFP Kenya's evolutionary approach to "food systems" development, the level of understanding among country office team members regarding the meaning and performance measurement of food systems was unclear. The drafting of a supply chain strategy was initiated in 2021, which will begin to address these issues.

Reporting, finance and donor relations

325. **Conclusion 17:** Documentation of activities, accomplishments and challenges is a weak point for WFP Kenya. Donors are dissatisfied with reporting and the limitations of annual country reports in explaining what is going on. What is required is not a public relations exercise. Donors want to know what is happening, as well as how, when, where, with whom and why. Documentation is also important internally in informing lessons learned. This is especially important for new areas of priority, including food systems, climate change and county capacity strengthening.

326. **Conclusion 18:** For SO3, as for SO2's Activity 4, if current directions and priorities are to be sustained, it will be essential to secure commitments by donors for longer-term, multi-year funding. At present, the donor policies and strategies that drive resource allocation are largely out of sync with WFP strategies under the strategic shift. Resolving this conundrum will be a real test of Kenya country office's advocacy and its ability to adapt.

3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

327. The evaluation identifies six recommendations of which five strategic (focusing on specific programme areas as well as on enabling and cross-cutting functions for the Kenya Office) and one operational focusing on the supply function. All the recommendations have been assigned a level of priority with expected timeline. A more comprehensive narrative to accompany and provide a more extensive contextual reference for each recommendation is in Annex 20.¹⁹²

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1	Invest more in increasing the self-reliance and resilience of refugees and host communities; enhance efforts to include hard-to-reach populations.	Strategic	Country office (relevant technical lead); Deputy Country Director (operations)	Inputs sought from government counterparts and relevant United Nations country team members	High	June 2024
1.1	Commission an independent lesson learning study to review the effectiveness of interventions on self-reliance, resilience and food systems under strategic outcomes 1 and 2. Dedicated inputs and insights should be sought from external partners, including the Turkana County government, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Refugee Affairs Secretariat, the World Bank Group's International Finance Corporation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund.	Strategic	Country office; monitoring and evaluation unit		High	December 2023
1.2	Develop guidance for appropriate self-reliance programming in the refugee camps and settlements based on the lesson learning study, among other things. Dedicated input and feedback should be	Operational	Country office	Monitoring and evaluation unit	Medium	Medium-term (June 2024)

¹⁹² To meet the WFP Evaluation Quality Assurance requirements for evaluation reports, due to space limitations, the recommendations' text has been edited and condensed. While all of the items on the original list of recommendations are included here, the full presentation (in Annex 20) provides additional contextual material, to explain the background to, and the rationale for the proposals, and offers initial guidance on their implementation. It is hoped that the more comprehensive version will be of particular assistance to the country office and regional bureau in Nairobi, as well as interested parties at WFP headquarters, in considering how best to move forward in acting on the recommendations.

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	sought from the International Labour Organization, other relevant United Nations country team members and the other Rome-based agencies.					
1.3	Develop guidance for future programming on the ownership and handover of infrastructure assets developed or supported through self-reliance and resilience interventions, based on the lesson learning study, among other things. Dedicated input and feedback should be sought from the International Labour Organization, other relevant United Nations country team members and the other Rome-based agencies.	Operational	Country office	Monitoring and evaluation unit	Medium	Medium-term (June 2024)
1.4	Use the lessons and guidance to inform and refine future programming, partnerships and WFP team capacity.	Operational	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Monitoring and evaluation unit, external relations unit, partnerships unit	Medium	Medium-term (June 2024)
1.5	Determine effective ways to ensure that hard-to-reach populations are reached with programming assistance, ensuring their safety and dignity.	Operational	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Relevant units	High	December 2023
2	Enhance the contribution of the specialized units on nutrition and gender equality	Strategic	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Regional bureau input; inputs sought from government counterparts and relevant United Nations country team members	Medium	Short-term (December 2023) post-CSP programme planning
2.1	Take steps to improve nutrition outcomes for vulnerable households, ensuring key close collaboration with key partners such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Children's Fund.	Strategic	Deputy Country Director (operations)	Unit leading on strategic outcome 2, and unit leading on nutrition	High	February 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	<p>In dry areas with limited food supply, as a matter of urgency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Develop an alternative approach to nutrition. ➤ Accompany cash-based transfers with efforts to enhance nutrition knowledge. ➤ Address the challenge of micronutrient deficiencies. ➤ Promote nutrition-sensitive activities across the entire food system value chain and, under strategic outcome 2, advocate the allocation of funding and other resources to nutrition and food safety and quality activities by arid and semi-arid land county governments. 					
2.2	<p>Strengthen implementation of the commitment to gender transformation and inclusion through better analysis, design and resourcing.</p> <p>Ensure that activities are designed to address commitments to gender transformation, with resources provided to support them. To that end, invest in deepening and extending the role of gender analysis in planning, monitoring and evaluation and reporting: ensure that the gender equality unit has the necessary capacity to deliver. Dedicated input and feedback should be sought from the United Nations Children’s Fund and the other Rome-based agencies.</p>	Operational	Country Director	Gender equality unit; monitoring and evaluation unit; regional bureau	Medium	February 2024
3	<p>Strengthen organizational cohesion, human resource management, and programme integration.</p> <p>Despite challenges, it is not recommended that major changes to organizational structure be considered at this time. Rather, the following actions are recommended:</p>	Strategic	Country office: senior management	Regional bureau	High	June 2024
3.1	<p>Give priority to strengthening links between strategic outcomes and between sub-offices and field offices and develop procedures for ensuring the involvement of all relevant organizational components in planning and resource allocation decisions while paying attention</p>	Strategic	Country office: senior management	Monitoring and evaluation unit;	High	June 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	to mechanisms for improved coordination and integrated planning of operations at the field level.			gender equality unit; regional bureau		
3.2	Ensure more effective integration of specialists and specialist units (currently gender equality and nutrition) into the organizational structure and into planning and operational roles and processes and provide adequate resources to support their engagement.	Operational	Country office: senior management	Human resources unit; regional bureau	High	June 2024
3.3	Assign or recruit a senior manager to lead the ongoing process of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of operations through innovating and adapting processes and procedures to build on what works.	Operational	Country Director	Human resources unit	High	October 2023
3.4	Develop consultatively a plan for managing change to accompany the organizational and human resources alignment, including well-defined opportunities for professional development. The possibility of activities conducted jointly with other United Nations country team members should be explored.	Operational	Country Director; senior management	Human resources unit; regional bureau	High	August 2023
3.5	Strengthen middle management: ensure that all middle managers, including field office heads, are supported in enhancing their capabilities in budgeting and financial management, and human resource matters and in facilitating monitoring and evaluation and documentation work, and gender equality and country capacity strengthening programming. Develop programming, including workshops and peer-to-peer discussions, to support those objectives.	Operational	Senior management	Human resources unit; regional bureau	High	December 2023
4	Strengthen capacity to engage in relevant aspects of governance analysis and strategic planning, enhance the relevant governance-related elements of country capacity strengthening and clarify the country capacity strengthening responsibilities of the strategic outcome 3 unit.	Strategic	Country office: Country Director and senior management	Strategic outcome 3 unit lead, with advice from the regional bureau and headquarters	High	September 2023; however, preparations may start before

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
4.1	<p>Regarding WFP's enabling role, the following actions are recommended to support the strengthening of national and local systems:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Strengthen Kenya country office capacity for relevant aspects of governance analysis at the strategic and activity-planning levels to ensure that programming and partnerships “do no harm”, and to gain an understanding of the overall Kenyan governance capacity situation. ➤ Explore options for building such capacity, either internally in the strategic outcome 3 unit or together with other United Nations country team entities and/or by accessing external expertise. ➤ Strengthen capacity and assess the expertise available at both the national and local levels to understand the implications of government legislation, policies, strategies and spending decisions for political economy and for vulnerable populations. 	Strategic	Country office: Country Director and senior management		High	September 2023; however, early action on this sub-recommendation may start before
4.2	<p>To enhance the governance-related elements of country capacity strengthening, the strategic outcome 3 unit should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ expand its focus – in cooperation with the other strategic outcome units, United Nations country team and Rome-based agency partners – to provide capacity strengthening support to core functions relevant to WFP's mandate within partner ministries and county governments; and ➤ address challenges in government processes that affect service delivery and impede smooth and timely delivery. 	Strategic	Country Director, Deputy Country Director (operations)	Strategic outcome 3 unit	High	December 2023
4.3	<p>To increase organizational cohesion, there is a need to clarify the division of labour on country capacity strengthening, by giving the strategic outcome 3 unit full responsibility for:</p>	Strategic	Country Director; senior management;	Strategic outcome 3 unit, strategic outcome unit	High	September 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ institutional strengthening with regard to enabling national and county government systems (with the other strategic outcome units responsible for country capacity strengthening work at the county level, along with other relevant organizations outside Government); and ➤ hands-on training of relevant government officials on implementation of particular programmes. 		human resources unit	managers; regional bureau		

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
5	Strengthen the monitoring and evaluation function and the practice of documenting experiences and results to improve learning and reporting.	Strategic	Country Director; senior management; monitoring and evaluation unit	Regional bureau	High	September 2023
5.1	Develop systems to enhance analysis across systems for management decision-making: the analyses should be based on the new documentation work (see recommendation 5.3) and draw from different sources of information – overlaying the information for decision-making. This will also require additional resources in monitoring and evaluation and a review of the monitoring and evaluation unit scope of work.	Strategic	Country Director; senior management; monitoring and evaluation unit		High	September 2023
5.2	Increase resources allocated to the monitoring and evaluation unit and to the strategic outcome 3 unit, to guide and support capacity strengthening for monitoring and evaluation and learning in Government, especially at the county level. This should be done as part of a broader country office country capacity strengthening strategy, with strong engagement by the gender equality unit and in close collaboration with United Nations country team partners.	Strategic	Country Director, senior management; monitoring and evaluation unit	Strategic outcome 3 unit	High	October 2023
5.3	Strengthen documentation practices to improve reporting, learning and advocacy: ensure that qualitative approaches are used to portray WFP's programmes and results in a more compelling manner (e.g., by documenting ways in which WFP programming may have contributed to outcomes and achievements on the road to change or cases in which major barriers to advancing programming have been encountered and have blocked progress). The work should be led by a recruited professional, working in association with the monitoring and evaluation unit, with qualified staff members given an opportunity for involvement.	Strategic	Country Director, senior management, monitoring and evaluation unit	Human resources unit	High	February 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
6	Further strengthen the country office supply chain function, as well as the overall approach to food systems and resilience (strategic outcome 2) through strategic partnerships, including with members of the United Nations country team, the other Rome-based agencies and other development actors that can provide staff with the requisite skills and experience.	Operational	Country Director and Deputy Country Directors	Strategic outcome 3 unit manager; strategic outcome 4 unit manager; human resources unit, regional bureau	High	September 2023
6.1	The new supply chain strategy should be incorporated into the new country strategic plan to articulate clearly how expertise underpins and supports work under all strategic outcomes. It will be necessary to adopt robust performance indicators for supply chain activities, and support and training should be provided to supply chain staff.	Strategic	Country Director and Deputy Country Directors		High	November 2023
6.2	Strengthen the overall approach to food systems and resilience (strategic outcome 2) through strategic partnerships, in close collaboration with United Nations country team members and the other Rome-based agencies and also through strengthening advocacy for private sector investment in the four key elements of Kenya's food system: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ production; ➤ processing; ➤ distribution/transport; and ➤ consumption. 	Operational	Country Director and Deputy Country Directors	Partnerships unit, external relations unit	Medium	November 2023

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