



WFP EVALUATION



World Food Programme

**SAVING
LIVES
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Evaluation of Mozambique WFP Country Strategic Plan 2017-2021

Centralized Evaluation Report – Volume I

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Executive summary

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation features

1. Country strategic plan (CSP) evaluations are the primary instrument for accountability and learning in accordance with the expectations of the WFP Executive Board and WFP management. They provide evidence of WFP's strategic positioning and results to inform the design of the next generation of CSPs and potentially to contribute to the design of United Nations sustainable development cooperation frameworks.
2. The evaluation of the Mozambique CSP for 2017–2021 was conducted between January and December 2021. It covered WFP's activities between 2016 and August 2021 and assessed the quality of the design process and progress made towards the strategic changes introduced in the CSP. Its main users are the WFP country office and internal and external stakeholders, including beneficiaries.
3. The evaluation adopted a theory-based mixed-methods approach, drawing on monitoring data, a literature review, semi-structured interviews, beneficiary focus groups and an online survey. Gender was taken into account throughout the process. Because of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, a hybrid evaluation was conducted. Thus the inception phase was conducted remotely, while data collection comprised a mix of remote interviews and an in-country field mission. Findings, conclusions and recommendations were discussed with internal and external stakeholders during two online workshops in September and October 2021.

Context

4. Covering almost 800,000 km², Mozambique is home to an estimated 33.2 million people. Its population is growing at an annual rate of 2.9 percent and is predominantly young, with children under 14 making up 43.8 percent.¹
5. Mozambique is a low-income, food-deficit country,² extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.³ Ranking 181 of 189 countries in the Human Development Index⁴ and with a Gini coefficient of 0.54,⁵ Mozambique is one of the poorest and most unequal countries in the world. Poverty affects women more than men, and there is a direct correlation between disability and poverty.⁶
6. Chronic child malnutrition has remained relatively unchanged for the past 15 years and remains a major challenge, affecting 43 percent of children under 5.⁷
7. Agriculture generates 24.9 percent of gross domestic product and employs 74.6 percent of Mozambicans;⁸ smallholder farmers account for 95 percent of the country's agricultural production,⁹ although their productivity is very low.¹⁰

¹ United Nations Population Fund. [World Population Dashboard: Mozambique](#).

² Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2021. [Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries \(webpage\)](#).

³ Eckstein, D., Künzel, V. and Schäfer, L. 2021. [Global Climate Risk Index 2021](#).

⁴ United Nations Development Programme. [Human Development Report - Mozambique](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *Stiftelsen for industriell og teknisk forskning*. 2009. [Living Conditions among People with Disabilities in Mozambique: A National Representative Study](#).












⁷ United Nations Children's Fund. [Country page: Mozambique](#).

⁸ *Instituto Nacional de Estatística*. 2015. [Relatório Final do Inquérito ao Orçamento Familiar \(IOF\) 2014/15](#).

⁹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. [FAO in Mozambique \(webpage\)](#).

¹⁰ African Development Bank Group. 2020. [African Economic Outlook 2020](#).

8. The COVID-19 pandemic aggravated the challenges facing the country, leading to economic pressure, loss of livelihoods and difficulties in access to health, social and protection services and placing an added burden on women and girls.¹¹

TABLE 1: MOZAMBIQUE SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	Indicator	Value	Year
	Human Development Index (score and rank) (1)	0.456 (181 out of 189)	2020
	Life expectancy at birth (years) (1)	61.0	2020
	Gini coefficient (percent) (1)	54.0	2020
	Population in multidimensional poverty (percent) (1)	72.5	2020
	Population living below the national poverty line (percent) (1)	46.1	2020
	Literacy rate (percent > 15 years) (1)	61.0	2020
	Under-5 chronic malnutrition (percent) (2)	43	2017
	Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) (1)	73.0	2020
	Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) (1)	289	2020
	Population using improved drinking water sources (percent) (2)	16	2017
	Proportion of population using unimproved sanitation facilities (percent)	38	2017

Sources: (1) United Nations Development Programme. [Human Development Report 2020](#); (2) [United Nations Children's Fund Database](#).

¹¹ United Nation Children's Fund. 2020. [Mozambique responds to gender-based violence in the context of COVID-19](#).


WFP country strategic plan

9. WFP has operated in Mozambique since 1977, strengthening government capacity and providing food, nutrition and livelihood assistance to the most vulnerable communities. The 2017–2021 CSP placed particular emphasis on WFP's contribution to national and local capacity strengthening while continuing its lead role in humanitarian response.

10. The CSP for 2017–2021 is structured around seven strategic outcomes, 22 outputs and 12 activities that address the WFP focus areas of resilience building, crisis response and root causes. The intervention modalities include cash-based transfers; food transfers; capacity strengthening; and service delivery. Among its cross-cutting priorities are accountability to affected populations, gender, protection and the environment.

11. The CSP was implemented during a challenging period marked by natural disasters, renewed and escalating violence by unidentified non-state armed groups and the COVID-19 pandemic (figure 1).

Figure 1: Mozambique country context and country strategic plan overview




Abbreviations: EMOP = emergency operation; IDPs = internally displaced persons; PRRO = protracted relief and recovery operation; SO = special operation; UNDAF = United Nations development assistance framework.

Source: Prepared by the Office of Evaluation based on the full report on the evaluation of the Mozambique CSP for 2017–2021.

12. With an original needs-based plan of USD 167.7 million, the CSP was initially intended to reach 932,000 beneficiaries. Since 2017, the CSP has been revised eight times to target 6.4 million people in

need,¹² with the country portfolio budget reaching USD 1.1 billion. As of December 2021, the CSP was 54 percent funded, with strategic outcome 2 (emergency response) accounting for 73.5 percent of allocated resources (figure 2). Overall, 85 percent of allocated resources had been spent by December 2021.

Figure 2: Mozambique CSP (2017–2022)
strategic outcomes, budget, funding and expenditures



* The needs-based plan budget percentages by strategic outcome have been calculated at the transfer and implementation costs level, excluding direct support costs and indirect support costs.

** Allocated resources and expenditures figures are cumulative, covering the period 2017–December 2021.

*** Allocated resources by strategic outcome do not add up to USD 585 million as resources were also allocated to non-strategic outcome purposes, as well as to direct support costs and indirect support costs.


Abbreviation: SO = strategic outcome.

Sources: [IRM analytics](#) first annual country report and [System for Programme Approval \(SPA\) PLUS](#).

13. Beneficiary data reflect the substantial changes in the size and scope of the CSP over the implementation period. WFP reached 81.5 percent of planned beneficiaries in 2017, 51.1 percent in 2018, 69.4 percent in 2019 and 56.1 percent in 2020. As of 31 July 2021, WFP had reached 71.2 percent of planned beneficiaries for the year.

¹² The [eighth revision](#) was approved in November 2021.

Figure 3: Actual versus planned beneficiaries (2017–2021)



Sources: Annual country reports for 2017–2020 and Mozambique country office for 2021 figures.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WFP’S STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES, PEOPLE’S NEEDS AND RIGHTS AND WFP’S STRENGTHS?

Relevance and alignment

14. The CSP is well aligned with the overarching national policy frameworks and sectoral government priorities regarding nutrition, social protection and disaster risk reduction. It is also consistent with national priorities with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 2 (zero hunger). However, a more consistent alignment with SDG 17 (partnerships) could have increased the CSP’s relevance in practice. Similarly, the relevance of the original CSP design could have been enhanced by placing more emphasis on climate change.

Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable

15. The CSP design was well informed by vulnerability assessments, including a participatory zero hunger strategic review.¹³ It addressed the needs of the most vulnerable by focusing on the areas with the highest levels of food insecurity and the regions most prone to natural disasters. However, the scale of WFP’s interventions is small compared to needs.

16. The CSP was also informed by an analysis of gender equality and women’s empowerment, the results of which were useful in mainstreaming equality and empowerment throughout programming and implementation, allowing WFP to learn about and keep focusing on them.

¹³ Carrillho, J., and others. 2016. *Food Security and Nutrition Challenges in Mozambique, Observatório do Meio Rural*.

Strategic position and responsiveness to a dynamic context

17. WFP's response to crises, including its role in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, has positioned the organization as a key player in humanitarian response. Similarly, it is considered an important partner in resilience building. Although climate change was not prominent in the CSP design, WFP's effort to position itself in this area during implementation can be considered a success.

18. On the other hand, the evolving national policy and strategy framework for food and nutrition security could have better informed adjustments during CSP implementation, in particular with regard to the approach to technical assistance and capacity strengthening.

Coherence with the United Nations cooperation framework

19. The country office participates in various technical working groups and multi-stakeholder forums, and during the implementation of the CSP, it was able to establish strong emergency response and humanitarian assistance partnerships with other United Nations entities. However, it has entered into few strategic partnerships to address root causes, leaving room for improved coherence within the wider United Nations system.

WHAT ARE THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP'S CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTCOMES IN MOZAMBIQUE?

20. Table 2 provides a cumulative overview of the achievement rates for outcome indicator targets during the CSP cycle, followed by a qualitative analysis of WFP contributions to each strategic outcome.

Strategic outcome	2017*	2018*	2019	2020	2021
1			4 indicators	8 indicators	6 indicators
				5 indicators	7 indicators
			9 indicators	1 indicator	1 indicator
2			17 indicators	12 indicators	10 indicators
			6 indicators	9 indicators	11 indicators
			1 indicator	2 indicators	3 indicators
3			3 indicators	1 indicator	4 indicators
			1 indicator		
4			1 indicator	2 indicators	1 indicator
					1 indicator
			2 indicators	1 indicator	1 indicator
5			6 indicators	7 indicators	9 indicators
				3 indicators	
			6 indicators	1 indicator	2 indicators
6			1 indicator	1 indicator	1 indicator
7			1 indicator	Not applicable	Not applicable

Legend:

	= Achievement rate at 90 percent or above		= Achievement rate between 50 and 89 percent		= Achievement rate below 50 percent
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* The country office set no targets for 2017 or 2018. It is therefore not possible to calculate an achievement rate.

Strategic outcome 1: Households in food-insecure areas of Mozambique are able to maintain access to adequate and nutritious food throughout the year, including in times of shock

21. WFP capacity strengthening and technical assistance contributed to improving government capacity to monitor food insecurity, manage climate-related risks and respond to shocks. Concrete examples include the establishment of the country's first ever drought early warning system; the adoption of technological innovations for emergency mapping, simulations and search and rescue on the ground; and the introduction of unconditional cash transfers in the government social direct support programme, including support for vulnerable households affected by the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, individual and institutional capacities that were built were not fully internalized, leaving sustainability at risk, the consolidation of installed capacities and the continuity of processes remain a challenge.

Strategic outcome 2: Shock affected people in Mozambique are able to meet their basic food and nutrition needs during and immediately after a crisis

22. Through food assistance for assets, general food distribution, cash transfers, emergency school feeding and moderate acute malnutrition treatment, WFP effectively responded to the emergencies generated by cyclones Idai and Kenneth, to the displacement of nearly 670,000 people from Cabo Delgado due to attacks by non-state armed groups and to the food insecurity generated by three consecutive years of drought. In the latter case, WFP contributed to the establishment of a drought early warning system with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the National Institute of Meteorology. The evaluation also revealed positive results in enhancing women's leadership in food management committees and in decision making on the use of transfers.

23. While cash transfers proved to be effective and WFP managed to provide unconditional cash transfers to vulnerable households affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, challenges remain in targeting, monitoring and adapting to rapidly evolving situations, including in conflict zones. Similarly, coverage of emergency school feeding was limited because take-home rations were not authorized by national institutions during COVID-19 related school closures.

Strategic outcome 3: Children in chronically food-insecure areas have access to nutritious food throughout the year

24. The CSP focused on national and local capacity strengthening for a gradual handover and scale-up of the national school feeding programme funded through a debt swap mechanism with funds managed by WFP. Approximately 60 percent of planned beneficiaries were reached, but many of the capacity strengthening activities at the central level and infrastructure support initiatives have yet to begin or be completed, with delays aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

25. Partnering between WFP and the Government in this programme proved to be challenging due to differing interpretations of the management arrangements, which had an impact on operational coordination.

26. Similarly, there has been limited progress in rolling out the home-grown school feeding component of the programme. Evidence suggests that the envisioned partnerships between local farmers, farmers' organizations and schools have only partially materialized, and procurement regulations at the district level have been cited as a barrier to local purchasing.

27. As of today the national school feeding programme remains small scale compared to needs, and the government funding envisioned in the CSP, essential for handover and effective scale-up, has not yet been secured.

Strategic outcome 4: Targeted people in prioritized areas of Mozambique have improved nutrition status in line with national targets by 2022

28. The CSP focused on capacity strengthening and technical assistance for government entities implementing the national strategy for combatting stunting and micronutrient deficiencies.

29. WFP contributions included the successful delivery of nutrition-sensitive training and social and behavioural change communication campaigns together with the generation of evidence for advocacy and informed decision making. Moreover, nutrition was mainstreamed across all CSP outcomes, and the innovative gender- and nutrition-sensitive approach to stunting prevention introduced by WFP seems promising. WFP also provided food assistance to patients in COVID-19 treatment centres.

30. Despite these achievements, some funding and internal capacity gaps still limit WFP's contributions to improving nutrition. In fact, while available data show progress on minimum dietary diversity for women, progress on the proportion of children with a minimum acceptable diet is modest.

Strategic outcome 5: Targeted smallholder farmers in northern and central Mozambique have enhanced livelihoods by 2022

31. The CSP was intended to provide value chain support that would improve smallholder farmers' access to profitable markets and increase their incomes, as well as improve the knowledge, care practices and diets of vulnerable populations.

32. Available data show some progress in livelihood coping strategies and smallholder farmers' sales, but important challenges remain in terms of food consumption. The geographical dispersion of projects, coupled with a diversity of approaches and the differing dimensions of the problem being addressed by various initiatives, explain the limited effectiveness in this area.

33. Delays in the provision of inputs have occasionally affected the quality of interventions. Moreover, the envisaged collaboration with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Fund for Agricultural Development aimed at maximizing smallholder agriculture market support has not fully materialized. Evidence suggests that it was not actively pursued by any of the three Rome-based agencies.

Strategic outcome 6: Humanitarian and development partners in Mozambique are reliably supported by an efficient and effective supply chain and information and communications technology services and expertise

34. WFP supply chain services are appreciated by humanitarian and development partners and acknowledged as a comparative advantage of the organization. However, communication between supply chain and programme staff within the country office was found to be less than optimal, and some partners experienced challenges in using WFP services. Areas of concern include delayed deliveries, difficulties related to procurement services, warehouse management and degradation or loss of goods.

35. As long as markets are generally functioning well countrywide, the role of WFP supply chain may not be as crucial as in countries where the private sector is not operating. However, while many actors acknowledge the proficiency of the private sector during normal times, they recognize that there is a need for WFP to play a key role in emergencies.

Strategic outcome 7: Government and humanitarian partners in Mozambique have access to effective and reliable services during times of crisis

36. The support provided in the response to cyclones Idai and Kenneth through WFP management of the logistics cluster and provision of telecommunications services is highly appreciated. WFP is positioned as a key partner for emergency response in the eyes of the Government and United Nations partners.

37. WFP support also resulted in on-ground capacity strengthening, particularly of the National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management. However, available evidence also suggests that there were some challenges in harmonizing varying approaches of WFP headquarters and the country office to engaging with the Government, particularly with regard to possible trade-offs between national ownership and capacity strengthening on the one hand and the speed of response on the other. Language barriers between international United Nations staff and local non-governmental organizations have also been identified as a challenge, particularly in the response to the cyclones.

Cross-cutting aims: Humanitarian principles, protection, disability, accountability to affected populations, gender and equity considerations

1. WFP adhered to the humanitarian principles and maintained a neutral and impartial stance in responding to various emergencies. There were some challenges in the domain of protection during the first half of CSP implementation, but WFP managed to address protection concerns, including those regarding the location and timing of distributions. WFP also effectively prioritized and reinforced its prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse controls and defined specific standard procedures for ensuring the safety, dignity and integrity of beneficiaries, including the establishment of a dedicated complaint and feedback hotline. The success of this hotline during the response to cyclones Idai and Kenneth resulted in its adoption by the United Nations country team as the central mechanism for reporting sexual exploitation and abuse. Despite these achievements, the evaluation found that there was still room for improving WFP internal technical capacity in protection.
2. Disability was included as a vulnerability criterion for the identification and selection of beneficiaries of cash or food transfers, although attention to the needs of persons with disability has not yet been mainstreamed. The country office is committed to mainstreaming disability across its portfolio, but there are some internal capacity gaps that could make this challenging.
3. The CSP considered the principles of gender equality and women's empowerment through interventions that ensured the equal presence of women and men beneficiaries (figure 3) and helped increase the number of decisions on the use of assistance provided by WFP made by women.
4. Furthermore, as already noted in this report WFP was responsive and effective in relation to climate change and adaptation, even though these issues were not formally included as cross-cutting areas in the CSP design.

Sustainability

38. In view of very limited domestic resources, national institutions continue to rely on financial support by WFP. Moreover, staff turnover has proven a challenge to capacity strengthening that would require comprehensive strategic frameworks and broad programmatic agreements between WFP and the Government to address. Such frameworks and agreements were lacking during the period observed, when the country office was focused on the implementation of specific activities without a clear strategy or long-term vision for capacity strengthening.

39. In this context, the handover of school feeding to the Government is unlikely to be feasible in the near future. Similarly, despite government capacity to carry out food and nutrition security assessments and WFP contributions to on-the-ground capacity for preparedness and emergency response, support from WFP and other United Nations organizations remains essential in these areas.

Humanitarian-development-peace nexus

40. Within the CSP, the most significant contributions to resilience building have been in Gaza and Tete, the regions most prone to natural disasters, where consistent strategies for assisting vulnerable populations (such as during lean seasons or drought crises) have been well complemented with development-oriented actions aimed at increasing resilience. Another example was found in the Sofala region in the aftermath of the cyclones, where WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund successfully implemented a cash grant for vulnerable households voucher programme to complement humanitarian in-kind assistance.

41. However, the triple nexus approach was not fully articulated in an overarching strategy and was not institutionalized within the broader United Nations system during the period observed. In fact, the United Nations development assistance framework did not acknowledge the significance of the nexus nor define collective outcomes along those lines.

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

Timeliness

42. WFP was able to respond in a timely manner to several emergencies during the CSP period and managed to disburse all funds before the terminal disbursement date. However, the implementation of some activities, particularly those not related to emergency response, suffered some delays. In most cases delays reflected the continual need to adapt to external circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic, or were related to other reasons outside WFP's control, including delays in donor and government funding.

43. In the case of school feeding, the debt swap with the Government of the Russian Federation was meant to provide stable funding for the national programme, but the transfer of funds from WFP to the Government was not as steady as it should have been. This was due to challenges with financial reporting to WFP by the Ministry of Education and Human Development, which is mandatory for the release of disbursements. Anecdotal evidence from field visits suggests that intermittent fund disbursement generated occasional stockouts in schools. On the other hand, school closures during the pandemic and the fact that the Government did not authorize the distribution of take-home rations had a significant impact on continuity in delivering school feeding.

44. Finally, the supply chain has not always functioned smoothly due to challenges in the provision of logistical services by WFP, including delays in delivering or processing stocks. Delays originating at WFP are frequently attributed to the inadequate performance of the supply chain function, and the country office seems to struggle to attract, train and retain technical capacity in this area.

Appropriateness of the coverage and targeting

45. WFP was able to reach the most vulnerable populations with its humanitarian assistance; there were, however, some challenges in the selection and registering of beneficiaries. For example, coverage of the response to Cyclone Idai was found to be broadly adequate, but it could have better considered individual and household specificities.

46. In more development-oriented interventions, there is visible geographical and thematic variation, with negative consequences in terms of economies of scale and the optimization of limited resources.

47. Similarly, targeting of schools for the national school feeding programme was based on full coverage from the outset rather than the originally agreed phased approach to a progressive scale-up. This generated negative trade-offs between the breadth of coverage and its effectiveness and sustainability.

Cost efficiency

48. The transition from food to cash transfers resulted in a significant reduction in transfer costs, although costs were variable across regions. It was also found that supply chain efficiency had been enhanced through frequent use of the Global Commodity Management Facility. Moreover, the introduction of a new method of estimating and negotiating the costs of transport to the North corridor, based on a per kilometre rate, led to savings of between 25 and 60 percent.¹⁴

49. There were significant post-delivery losses in 2018 and 2020, but evidence suggests that measures have been taken to address their causes. These include replacing maize meal with rice where possible, as the latter has a longer shelf life; maintaining regular staff presence at third-party warehouses to ensure that proper management standards and procedures are followed; hiring a fumigation company to reduce loss from infestation and spoilage; and monitoring the movement, storage and best-before dates of stocks on a weekly basis.

50. The country office procures most of its food from national sources. Although this may sometimes be more expensive than imported food (for example, local vegetable oil can cost more than double the import parity price), this option seems justified by the long lead times and pipeline breaks that may occur with international procurement.

Alternative cost-effectiveness measures

51. Cost-effectiveness analysis and alternative measures have been considered in some areas, but not consistently. A cost-effectiveness analysis of the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition initiated in 2021 had not been finalized by the end of the year. The country office also planned to study the cost-effectiveness and viability of using mobile technology to provide market information to smallholder farmers, but no evidence was found that this had been finalized.

¹⁴ WFP. 2021. WFP Country Office Mozambique Annual Performance Plan 2020, End-year Review. (Not available online.).

WHAT FACTORS EXPLAIN WFP PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED UNDER THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

Evidence-based programming

52. A zero hunger strategic review was conducted in preparation for the design of the CSP; however, it was oriented towards agriculture and food security and only marginally integrated gender and climate change considerations. Although various recommendations from past evaluations were considered in the design of the CSP, several important ones were omitted, such as to adopt an integrated territorial approach in order to enhance internal synergies; to strengthen the integrated food and nutrition security planning process at the district level; and to mainstream climate change across the portfolio. These omissions led to gaps in the CSP design.

Adequate, predictable and flexible resources

53. There was a significant shortfall of funding: WFP had secured only 54 percent of the funds called for in the needs-based plan as of December 2021. Emergency response activities were funded at 72.4 percent, but funding for other outcome areas did not go beyond 7.6 percent. Moreover, the predictability and flexibility of funding decreased during the CSP period. In fact, only 10 percent of the funding was flexible, a significant drop compared to the previous programme cycle, when 53 percent of funding was flexible. According to the latest data,¹⁵ more than 70 percent of multilateral directed contributions are earmarked at the activity level. Moreover, most of the funding remains short term, which affects planning and staffing.

54. On the other hand, funding sources became increasingly diversified during the CSP period, comprising 33 donors, although four¹⁶ accounted for almost 60 percent of the total funding. Evidence suggests that country office fundraising efforts and successful implementation have helped maintain donor interest despite the challenging global funding situation. However, there are risks associated with dependence on large donors.

Partnerships

55. Through the CSP, WFP was able to establish partnerships with a variety of government bodies in agriculture, education, social protection, disaster preparedness and health. However, these partnerships were in most cases designed for specific activities and lacked a long-term strategic vision or broad programmatic agreement with the Government.

56. Engagement with civil society organizations has been marginal, with the organizations acting mostly as local service providers. Partnerships with non-governmental organizations could be explored with the aim of increasing the relevance and effectiveness of field interventions.

57. The partnerships established between WFP and other United Nations entities in response to cyclones Idai and Kenneth and the COVID-19 pandemic are good examples of effective collaboration within the United Nations system. However, partnerships for medium- to long-term development interventions have been less prominent, and the full potential for building synergies based on the comparative advantages of each organization was not harnessed.

58. Although the evaluation found a good example of partnership with the University of Reading on the drought early warning system, overall partnering with academia is undeveloped. This limits WFP's ability to generate knowledge and capitalize on its results.

WFP systems

59. WFP monitoring and reporting systems are not yet able to capture and demonstrate WFP's contributions to strengthening national capacities. The information generated is not useful for strategic decision making during implementation because the focus is on quantitative measurement without systematic qualitative analysis of how WFP activities fit into the context in which they are undertaken.

¹⁵ From January 2022.

¹⁶ United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Germany and Mozambique through the Russian Federation debt swap.

60. Human resources systems and approaches are also not conducive to attracting and retaining staff with the skills that WFP needs to perform effectively across the nexus, particularly when it comes to engaging with the Government on policy advocacy and capacity strengthening.

Country context

61. The geography of Mozambique has a major impact on WFP operational costs. Moreover, the need to respond to different crises, some of them recurrent such as climate-related disasters, creates the risk of spreading operations too thinly when addressing emergency and development needs. It also hampers the development and implementation of a long-term territorial approach that could enhance internal and external coherence and ultimately effectiveness and sustainability.

62. The turnover of government officials and technical staff in health centres may also affect continuity and reduce the effectiveness of capacity strengthening activities. By the same token, the limited availability of domestic resources is not conducive to the sustainable handover of programmes to national institutions.

CONCLUSIONS

63. The CSP was relevant to country priorities and people's needs and offered a relatively flexible programmatic framework within which WFP responded promptly and effectively to the various crises that affected Mozambique during the programme cycle, including cyclones and other climate-related shocks, the COVID-19 pandemic and the internal displacement caused by the insurgence of non-state armed groups in the north of the country. In doing so, WFP confirmed its comparative advantage in life-saving interventions during emergencies and is clearly positioned as the lead actor in humanitarian action in Mozambique.

64. Within an overall efficient and effective response to crises, there are a few areas of concern that deserve attention from the country office, particularly regarding delays in delivery, the need to enhance communication between supply chain and programming staff, difficulties concerning procurement services and warehouse management and the degradation or loss of goods.

65. Considering the funding limitations and the complexity of the operating environment, WFP made important contributions to building resilience at the local level. However, a siloed approach to implementation did not allow for more integrated territorial interventions that would have enhanced internal coherence, efficiency and effectiveness across the triple nexus. External coherence also needs to be strengthened, particularly with other United Nations organizations, to better join humanitarian and development interventions.

66. Contributions to national systems for disaster preparedness are also notable, although progress in strengthening national capacities to address root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition is still modest. The intention to shift from delivering to enabling in Mozambique was relevant and well aligned with overarching national priorities. However, the emphasis on country capacity strengthening envisaged in the CSP was somewhat overshadowed by humanitarian crises that required reprioritization of activities.

67. Progress in capacity strengthening was also hindered by insufficient, highly earmarked and short-term funding and by the absence of a clear programmatic framework jointly developed by WFP and the Government. The skillset of country office staff did not fully match the range of thematic areas and roles covered by the CSP. Coupled with staff turnover, these factors reduced effectiveness and sustainability.

68. Gender has received strong attention in implementation, as has beneficiary relationship management. Climate change considerations were not prominent in the design but were well addressed in implementation. Finally, while acknowledging the important progress made in developing and institutionalizing mechanisms for ensuring accountability to affected populations and protection, the evaluation concludes that there is still room for improving country office capacity in these areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

69. The evaluation made five recommendations. The first two relate to the strategic focus of WFP work in Mozambique, the other three to operational issues.

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
1	Maintain the strategic direction of the new country strategic plan in humanitarian assistance alongside development interventions that have a long-term vision, focusing on areas where WFP can better position.	Strategic	Country office	Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (RBJ)	High	June 2022
	1.1 Keep the country strategic plan design (including the line of sight and theory of change) simple by focusing on thematic areas where WFP has a comparative advantage such as food and nutrition security, school feeding, social protection, climate resilience and disaster preparedness and response.					June 2022
	1.2 Mainstream climate resilience, gender equality and women's empowerment across the country strategic plan by defining outputs and activities that include them.					June 2022
	1.3 Define a long-term vision and strategy for strengthening national capacity in the individual, institutional and policy domains that will function as a road map for the country office throughout country strategic plan implementation, considering the strategic nuances required in supporting the Government at the central and decentralized levels.					June 2022
2	Position WFP as capable of driving progress towards and strengthening the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Mozambique.	Strategic	Country office	RBJ and headquarters	High	December 2023
	2.1 Generate evidenced-based knowledge on how to operationalize the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach and push for multi-year agreements with donors and United Nations partners addressing humanitarian, development and peace needs.					June 2023
	2.2 Continue local procurement, ensuring that WFP's supply chain contributes to development through a bottom-up approach.					December 2022

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
	2.3 Advocate greater emphasis on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in the design and implementation of the new United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework and promote thematic meetings and other events to raise awareness of the various stakeholders working in the humanitarian and development areas, including the World Bank.					December 2023
3	Continue to strengthen and diversify strategic partnerships with a range of national and international actors to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the new country strategic plan.	Operational	Country office	Relevant ministries, provincial governments, United Nations entities, academia and civil society	High	December 2022
	3.1 Seek long-term agreements and in place of project-based agreements sign strategic memoranda of understanding with the national government that are coordinated and overseen at the managerial level.					December 2022
	3.2 Seek greater engagement with local authorities through bilateral activity-oriented local agreements and define integrated service packages with a territorial approach at the community level in order to minimize thematic and geographic dispersion.					December 2022
	3.3 Capitalize on recent conversations among the Rome-based agencies and reach an agreement on collaboration within the framework of the new country strategic plan.					December 2022
	3.4 Engage with academia and leverage national and local partnerships to support learning and inform evidence-based advocacy					December 2022

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
4	Enhance organizational readiness to play a more catalytic role in the implementation of the country strategic plan.	Operational	Country office	RBJ, Human Resources Division and Country Capacity Strengthening Unit	High	June 2023
	4.1 Ensure that country office staff have the right skills including adequate technical expertise in climate change, protection, gender, knowledge management, institutional capacity strengthening and policy advocacy.					December 2022
	4.2 Ensure better integration of the country strategic plan by structuring technical teams around thematic areas rather than country strategic plan activities; improving communication between programme and supply chain management personnel; and ensuring that the Head of Programme plays an enhanced coordinating role.					June 2022
	4.3. Further strengthen the monitoring framework by including indicators that enable WFP to track progress in individual, institutional and policy environment capacity strengthening and take the political and institutional context into account when analysing monitoring data to inform strategic decision making.					June 2022
	4.4 Continue to work with institutional partners to establish a transparent beneficiary targeting system and invest in connecting beneficiary databases to one another whenever possible.					December 2022
	4.5 Conduct an independent evaluation of the current agreement for the Russian Federation debt swap, jointly commissioned by WFP and the Government of Mozambique, in order to assess its design, performance and effectiveness and identify any major bottlenecks.					June 2023

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
5	Define a fundraising and advocacy strategy centred on donors and international financial institutions	Operational	Country office	RBJ and headquarters	High	June 2022
	5.1 Define a strategy for drawing donors' attention to the new country strategic plan, organize round table discussions of common priorities and present evidence-based results in appealing formats (brochures, leaflets) to better showcase WFP capacities.					June 2022
	5.2 Enhance the high-level channel of dialogue between WFP and the World Bank at the country level and promote tripartite meetings between the World Bank, the Government of Mozambique and WFP to identify opportunities in the thematic areas of the new country strategic plan.					June 2022

1. Introduction

1.1. EVALUATION FEATURES

5. The World Food Programme (WFP) country strategic plan (CSP) outlines a new approach for strategic and programmatic planning at country level.¹⁷ This evaluation focuses on the Mozambique country strategic plan for 2017-2021 and was commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) to the Institute of Research and Application of Development Methods (IRAM). The evaluation has dual objectives of accountability and learning, ensuring: i) that evidence and lessons from WFP performance are collected and used to inform future engagement and programming; and ii) accountability for results to WFP stakeholders. The terms of reference (ToR) can be found in Annex 1.

6. The evaluation was carried out between January and December 2021¹⁸ and is timed to ensure inputs can be fed into the design of the new country strategic plan (2022-2026), as well as into the upcoming United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) for Mozambique (2022-2026). The evaluation covered WFP activities from 2016 to the second quarter of 2021. By reaching back to before the approval of the current country strategic plan the evaluation sought to better understand and assess the quality of the country strategic plan design process and any changes it brought.

7. The evaluation is relevant to a range of internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include the WFP country office (CO) in Mozambique, the Office of Evaluation, WFP headquarters (HQ) and the WFP Regional Bureau for Southern Africa Region in Johannesburg (RBJ). External stakeholders include the Government of Mozambique (GoM), namely the different ministries, departments and agencies engaged in the country strategic plan implementation at central and decentralized levels, as well as implementing partners, donors, other United Nations (UN) agencies, and other stakeholders (academia, private sector, etc.). The beneficiaries of country strategic plan activities are key stakeholders of this evaluation and of future WFP actions in Mozambique.

8. The evaluation followed a theory based, mixed-methods approach (see details on the methodology in Annex 3). The inception phase was conducted entirely remotely. An in-depth review of documents, interviews with selected stakeholders, a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, and the preparation of a theory of change (ToC) for the country strategic plan allowed the evaluation team (ET) to fine-tune the evaluation scope in close consultation with the country office and the evaluation manager (EM). An evaluation matrix was prepared (Annex 4) around four standard evaluation questions (EQs) which includes a series of subquestions, lines of inquiry, indicators, data sources, and data-collection techniques. An inception workshop with the country office was organized in March 2021 to validate the proposed scope and methodology.¹⁹

9. The data-collection phase included an e-survey, remote interviews and an in-country field mission. The e-survey obtained inputs from WFP staff, government counterparts, donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and implementing partners (including United Nations agencies). It focused on WFP engagement over the country strategic plan period and had an overall response rate of over 38 percent (Annex 5). The e-survey was supplemented by a wide range of individual and group interviews with over 150 key informants (women and men) at country, regional and headquarters levels (Annex 6), and enabled more in-depth information sharing and understanding of perceptions and issues. In addition, during the field phase important additional data and documentation were gathered (Annex 7). Field work covered the provinces of Gaza, Sofala and Tete²⁰ and was conducted in July 2021 over a period of three weeks (Annex 8).

10. An interactive process was maintained with the country office throughout the evaluation. An operational debriefing was conducted with the country office in August 2021, followed by a participatory workshop in September 2021. The latter was also used to feed into the design of the new country strategic plan by presenting the preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to the country office. A

¹⁷ WFP, 2016. "Policy on Country Strategic Plans". Rome: WFP: WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1.

¹⁸ See evaluation timeline in Annex 2.

¹⁹ An inception debriefing with the Director of Evaluation (DoE) and the evaluation manager also took place on February 2021.

²⁰ The plan included visiting the province of Tete in-person, but COVID-19 prevented this. This was agreed following recommendations from the country office and evaluation manager.

learning workshop took place in October 2021 to share the evaluation outputs with both external and internal stakeholders and key issues raised were taken into consideration in the finalization of this report.

11. Evaluation findings were triangulated, both within sources and between different data-collection sources. An internal database of interview notes and additional evidence has been used to identify answers to each of the evaluation questions, the report being structured to provide answers to each of the key questions. The evaluation followed the WFP Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (CEQAS)²¹. Gender considerations, and principles of inclusion, participation and non-discrimination were included in the design, questioning, data collection and reporting. The evaluation was conducted according to the 2020 United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Ethical Guidelines and Code of Conduct and Guidance on Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation. The evaluation team ensured ethics at all stages of the evaluation through detailed protocols for interviews and field visits. Ethical issues, risks and safeguards were identified in the inception report for each phase of the evaluation.

12. The evaluation faced some limitations and challenges. Regarding data availability, the country strategic plan experienced substantial changes in the number and type of indicators which made it difficult to track progress over time. Limited data pre-2019 affected the ability to assess performance for 2017 and 2018 for most indicators. The baseline for most indicators was recorded for the first time only in 2019. COVID-19 and the escalating conflict in the northern region did not allow more programme sites to be visited. To overcome this, the evaluation team prioritized comprehensive interviews with country office staff, all WFP field offices (FO), implementing partners, donors, government counterparts and other local stakeholders. The e-survey received only a limited number of responses from government counterparts. However, this limitation was overcome by increasing the number of interviews with these stakeholders. Another limitation was associated with remote interviews. With important support from the country office and a flexible evaluation team, almost all planned interviews were completed. These limitations were addressed by triangulation to ensure findings were valid, impartial, independent and credible. The evaluation team feels that, overall, the evidence base underpinning the report is adequate.

1.2. CONTEXT

General overview

13. Located on the south-eastern coast of Africa, Mozambique borders Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Eswatini and South Africa. Its 2,700-km long Indian Ocean coastline faces east to Madagascar and the country covers an area of almost 800,000 square kilometres. The official language is Portuguese, along with 20 other local languages. The country is divided into 11 provinces, 154 districts, 53 municipalities,²² 419 administrative posts and 1,052 localities.

14. The total population in 2021 was estimated at 28.8 million²³ (census held in 2017), but more recent projections point to 33.2 million, with an annual growth rate of 2.9 percent.²⁴ Almost half of the population (43.8 percent) are children under 14, while only 2.9 percent are over 65.²⁵ The adolescent birth rate is still very high: the percentage of girls who gave birth before the age of 18 is 40.2 percent.²⁶ Life expectancy at birth has risen substantially over the past two decades (39 years in 2000; 50 years in 2013; 61 years in 2020).²⁷

15. Mozambique is a low income country (LIC) with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of only United States dollars (USD) 460 and has experienced impressive growth of over 7 percent per year for almost two decades. However, this growth has been in reverse since 2015, due to a combination of declining prices for traditional export commodities, persistent drought effects from El Niño, renewed and escalating internal

²¹ WFP, 2021. Country Strategic Plan Evaluations: Guidance for Process and Content. Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System. WFP: Rome, January 2021.

²² These were created in 1997 and have been progressively expanded under the ongoing decentralization process.

²³ INE, 2017. IV Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação – Census 2017 (IV RGPH 2017).

²⁴ UNFPA, World Population Dashboard: Mozambique (www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/MZ), accessed on 13/09/2021.

²⁵ Op. cit.

²⁶ UNFPA, Adolescents and Youth Dashboard: Mozambique (www.unfpa.org/data/world-population/MZ), accessed on 13/09/2021.

²⁷ Human Development Report - Mozambique Country Profile (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MOZ>), accessed on 13/09/2021.

conflict by unidentified non-state armed groups (NSAGs), large decreases in foreign direct investment (FDI) and a large increase in debt. In addition, COVID-19 has led to country economic recession. In 2020, the gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by an estimated 0.5 percent, the first decline in 28 years, after growing 2.2 percent in 2019.²⁸

16. Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 181 in the Human Development Index (HDI) out of 188 countries.²⁹ Inequality (particularly in income) is still a challenge, and the Gini coefficient increased from just under 0.4 in 2000 to 0.54 in 2020.³⁰

17. Poverty affects women more than men, and disability and poverty are intrinsically connected. Disabled people are more disadvantaged economically than the rest of the population, and women and girls with disabilities are at high risk of gender-based violence (GBV).³¹ The prevalence of disability in Mozambique is 2.6 percent, 2 percent down from the previous census.³² These data from 2017 are likely to represent underreporting³³ (due to census techniques not being sensitive to disability issues) and are far below the global average of 15 percent.³⁴ Half of disabled persons are women (49 percent).³⁵

National policies and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)

18. The Sustainable Development Goals are part of a set of strategies and plans and are incorporated into an overarching framework, which is called the Government's Agenda 2025. The Five-Year Government Programme (PQG)³⁶ is the central policy document that guides government intervention across sectors and is implemented through sectoral policies and strategies including: i) the agriculture sector (Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector 2011-2020 (PEDSA),³⁷ the National Agriculture Investment Plan 2014-2018 (PNISA) and the "Sustenta" programme); ii) the health sector (Strategic Plan for the Health Sector 2014-2019, National Strategy for Food Fortification 2016-2020, National Strategic Plan to Fight Against HIV/AIDS); iii) social protection (Social Action Policy, National Basic Social Security Strategy); iv) environment and climate change (Environmental Strategy for the Sustainable Development of Mozambique, National Strategy and Action Plan of Biological Diversity of Mozambique 2015-2035, National Strategy of Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate Change, National Forestry Plan 2019-2035); v) gender (Gender Strategy and Action Plan for Agrarian Sector 2016-2025, Gender Strategy for the Education and Human Development Sector 2016-2020, National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2022); and vi) disaster risk reduction (The Master Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (2017-2030)). The Master Plan defines the government's strategy for disaster risk reduction and the main actions for reducing vulnerability to extreme events in Mozambique. In 2013, the Government of Mozambique approved the National School Feeding Programme (PRONAE), which laid out the institutional foundation for school feeding within the educational system with WFP support.

19. A national voluntary review of the Sustainable Development Goals was carried out in 2020³⁸ concluding that Mozambique has been performing well in responsible consumption and production (SDG 12) and that some progress is also being made regarding climate action (SDG 13), good health and well-being (SDG 3), sustainable cities and communities (SDG 11) and life below water (SDG 14). For all other Sustainable Development Goals, the assessment concludes that Mozambique continues to face challenges in achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) targets. The 2021 Sustainable Development Goal Index ranks Mozambique 140th of the 193 United Nations Member States.³⁹

²⁸ African Development Bank, Mozambique Economic Outlook 2021 (<https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/southern-africa/mozambique/mozambique-economic-outlook>), accessed on 13/09/2021.

²⁹ Human Development Report - Mozambique Country Profile (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MOZ>), accessed on 13/09/2021.

³⁰ Idem.

³¹ SINTEF. Living Conditions among Persons with Disability in Mozambique: National Representative Study. Maputo, 2019.

³² INE, 2017. IV Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação 2017 (IV RGPH 2017).

³³ SINTEF, 2019. Living Conditions among Persons with Disability in Mozambique: National Representative Study.

³⁴ WFP, 2019. PROMOTING INCLUSION: Addressing the Rights and Needs of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action – Concept Note.

³⁵ SINTEF, 2019. Living Conditions among Persons with Disability in Mozambique: National Representative Study.

³⁶ The PQG 2015-2019 was running at the time the CSP was drawn up. The new PQG covers the period 2020-2024.

³⁷ The second generation of PEDSA is currently being developed.

³⁸ Full report available at

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/26313VNR_2020_Mozambique_Report.pdf

³⁹ Further information at <https://dashboards.sdindex.org/rankings>.

Agriculture

20. The agricultural sector accounts for a quarter of gross domestic product (24.9 percent) and is a main pillar of the economy with great potential, but agricultural productivity is still very low.⁴⁰ The sector employs 74.6 percent of Mozambicans,⁴¹ with smallholder farmers accounting for 95 percent of the country's agricultural production.⁴² However, yields are very low due to: i) low use of improved inputs; ii) inadequate agricultural support services, including extension, research and financial services; iii) high reliance on variable rainfall in predominantly rain-fed agriculture; iv) unsustainable land use practices, such as widespread slash-and-burn agriculture; v) limited access to input and output markets; vi) lack of formal land property rights; vii) lack of key rural infrastructure and high post-harvest losses; and viii) fragmentation of institutional arrangements and roles at central and subnational levels.⁴³ Women play a crucial role in agriculture, yet they have little access to or control of productive resources.⁴⁴ Alternative sources of income outside agriculture are few for both women and men and affect options to cope with increasingly frequent shocks.⁴⁵

21. Mozambique is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Over the past decade, Mozambique has been the fifth country most affected by impacts of climate-related events, and in 2019 was top of the list (Global Climate Risk 2021).⁴⁶ The country is at increasing risk of sudden climate-related events as well as spells of drought and flooding. Climate change is increasingly impacting food security, malnutrition, and sustainable incomes. All climate change projections indicate increased heat stress, less water availability, and more frequent extreme weather.⁴⁷ Tropical cyclones will continue, affecting the weak infrastructure and damaging or destroying coastal ecosystems and livelihoods.⁴⁸

Vulnerability, climate change and the humanitarian situation

22. In the period of the country strategic plan, Mozambique suffered prolonged droughts and major cyclones in the north and centre of the country. In 2017, the country was struck by Cyclone Dineo while still suffering from droughts. In addition, 2019 was the first year in recorded history that two strong tropical cyclones hit Mozambique in the same season. In March 2019, Cyclone Idai made landfall near Beira City, Sofala province. It brought torrential rains and winds to Sofala, Zambezia, Manica and Inhambane provinces causing flooding, deaths, and destruction of livelihoods and properties. In April 2019, Cyclone Kenneth, the strongest cyclone ever to hit the African continent arrived in Mozambique when river levels were already high, increasing river flooding. Cyclone Idai left more than 600 people dead and both cyclones combined left 2.2 million people in urgent need of assistance.⁴⁹ A Level-3 emergency was activated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) from March to June 2019 in response to these unprecedented events.

23. Attacks by NSAGs began in late 2017 in Cabo Delgado province and have intensified ever since. The insecurity took on a different dimension when, in June 2019, the Islamic State in Central Africa Province (ISCAP) for the first time claimed responsibility for an attack carried out by the NSAGs, since then claiming responsibility for over 40 attacks.⁵⁰ Almost 2,000 deaths have been recorded (the actual number of deaths remains unknown). Conflict has destroyed and damaged public and community infrastructure (including health posts and schools), and has led to the loss of homes and livelihoods.⁵¹ The insecurity has forced thousands of families to seek refuge in the south of Cabo Delgado and in neighbouring Nampula and

⁴⁰ African Development Bank, 2020. African Economic Outlook 2020.

⁴¹ INE, 2015. Inquérito ao Orçamento Familiar (IOF) 2014/15.

⁴² FAO Mozambique (<http://www.fao.org/mozambique/fao-in-mozambique/mozambique-at-a-glance/en>) accessed on March 2021.

⁴³ World Bank, 2019. Mozambique Agriculture Public Expenditure Review: Assessment and Result-Focused Expenditure Management. World Bank Mozambique, May 2019.

⁴⁴ IFAD: Mozambique country profile (<https://www.ifad.org/web/operations/country/id/mozambique>), accessed on March 2021.

⁴⁵ FEWS NET, 2014. Mozambique Livelihood Zone Descriptions.

⁴⁶ Germanwatch; Global Climate Risk Index 2021.

⁴⁷ WFP, 2021. Food security and livelihoods under a changing climate in Mozambique: Preparing for the Future.

⁴⁸ Mozambique: Climate Vulnerability Profile (<https://www.climatelinks.org/countries/mozambique>), accessed on 13/09/2021.

⁴⁹ OCHA. Cyclones Idai and Kenneth in Mozambique, (<https://www.unocha.org/southern-and-eastern-africa/rosea/cyclones-idai-and-kenneth>), accessed on 13/09/2021.

⁵⁰ WFP Internal Situation Report – Northern Mozambique Displacement Crisis; December 16, 2020.

⁵¹ WFP Mozambique CO, Emergency Option Matrix; December 17 2020.

Niassa. In August 2020, a Level-2 emergency was declared in Mozambique to respond to the additional humanitarian needs resulting from escalating violence. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates there are 877,646 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Cabo Delgado province.⁵²

Food and nutrition security (FNS)

24. The country still faces challenges to meet SDG 2 targets and the global nutrition targets. Mozambique is a low-income food-deficit country⁵³ and ranks 103rd out of the 107 countries on the Global Hunger Index (GHI)⁵⁴. Key constraints include: i) very low spending on health and agriculture (4.7 percent and less than 3.1 percent of public spending, respectively); ii) weak access to improved sanitation facilities and safe drinking water, and limited coverage of health services, which obstructs better nutrition outcomes; iii) limited coverage of social safety nets; and iv) lack of enforcement of laws that give women equal access to agricultural land and that combat discrimination against women.⁵⁵

25. Stunting remains very frequent and the rates are among the highest in the world. Key food and nutrition security indicators and trends are presented in Table 1. Stunting in Mozambique is higher than the average for the Africa region (29.1 percent) affecting 43 percent of children under 5 years of age (CU5). Progress in reducing stunting has slowed since 2008 (Table 1 and Figure 1). Mozambique is on track for targets to reduce wasting, with 4.4 percent of children under 5 years of age affected, which is lower than the average for the Africa region (6.4 percent). According to the Cost of Hunger in Africa (CoHA) study, Mozambique loses 11 percent of its annual gross domestic product to chronic malnutrition, equivalent to a yearly loss of 1.6 billion USD.⁵⁶ The economic costs of undernutrition include direct costs on the health system but also the indirect costs of lost productivity.

Table 1: Food and nutrition security indicators

Indicator	2004	2012	2020
Prevalence of undernourishment in the total population <i>SDG2 2.1.1</i>	33.4	22	31.2
Number of undernourished people in the total population (million) <i>SDG2 2.1.1</i>	6.6	5.3	9.5
Prevalence of severe food insecurity in the total population <i>SDG2 2.1.2</i>	...	40.7	40.5
Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the total population <i>SDG2 2.1.2</i>	...	68.4	68.4
Prevalence of wasting in CU5 <i>SDG2 2.2.2 & Global Nutrition Target</i>	5.4	6.1	4.4
Prevalence of stunting in CU5 <i>SDG2 2.2.1 & Global Nutrition Target</i>	46.9	42.9	42.9
Prevalence of overweight in CU5 <i>SDG2 2.2.2 & Global Nutrition Target</i>	6.3	7.8	6.0
Prevalence of adult obesity	4.4	6.1	7.2
Prevalence of anaemia among women of reproductive age <i>Global Nutrition Target</i>	50.2	50	47.9
Prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding (0-5 months of age) <i>Global Nutrition Target</i>	28.7	40	41
Prevalence of low birthweight <i>Global Nutrition Target</i>	15.7	14.1	13.8

Source: FAOSTAT and SOFI 2021

Figure 1: Prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years of age (percent)


⁵² UNHCR, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/moz>, accessed on September 2021.

⁵³ FAO Country Profile, <http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/lifdc/en>, accessed on March 2021.

⁵⁴ Global Hunger Index 2021.

⁵⁵ Mozambique: Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index 2019.


⁵⁶ República de Moçambique, 2018. Estudo do Custo da Fome em África: Impacto Social e Económico da Desnutrição Infantil no Desenvolvimento a Longo Prazo de Moçambique, p.7.



Sources: 1995 Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS), 2001 (WHO), 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 2008 (MICS), 2011 (DHS), 2015 Family Budget Survey (IOF)

26. As shown in Figure 2, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for October 2020 to September 2021 identified 2.7 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity across the country.⁵⁷ The south-eastern districts of Cabo Delgado province, southern Tete province and most of the districts of Gaza and Inhambane provinces were classified in crisis on the IPC scale (IPC Phase 3). According to the IPC, the key drivers to acute food insecurity are conflict, especially in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Sofala and Manica, drought for the third consecutive year mainly in the south of the country, southern Tete province and parts of Manica and Sofala provinces, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in a significant decline in daily wage opportunities and income of small traders as well as the decline of remittances.

Figure 2: IPC acute food insecurity analysis in Mozambique (October 2020–September 2021)



Mozambique ICP Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, October 2020 – September 2021

Education

27. Mozambique's education system has expanded, but still faces multiple challenges. In the last decade, progress in equitable access has been made with net enrolment in Grade 1 of 6-year-old children increasing from 70 percent to 83.9 percent. Gender parity has similarly improved, with a gender parity index upon Grade 1 entry at a relatively high level of 0.94 in general and 0.97 for the 6-year olds.⁵⁸ Overall education

⁵⁸ World Bank, 2020. Education Service Delivery in Mozambique: A Second Round of the Service Delivery Indicators Survey.

funding from the state budget has stayed at par, with international commitments at 6.5 percent of gross domestic product although it has dropped due to fiscal constraints in recent years.⁵⁹ Although 92 percent of children enrol in school,⁶⁰ most do not complete primary education (only 32 percent complete the primary cycle). Education quality remains a major challenge as only 6 percent of children have basic reading competency at the age of 8 years old.⁶¹ While 94 percent of girls enrol in primary school, more than half drop out by the fifth grade, and only 11 percent continue on to secondary level. Only 14 percent of adult women complete secondary-level education compared to 20 percent of their male counterparts.⁶²

Gender

28. Whilst Mozambique has achieved progress in women's empowerment in some domains, gender inequalities persist in economic and social domains. Mozambique ranks 127th out of 162 countries in the 2018 Gender Inequality Index (GII) and falls in category four (second lowest out of five categories). The country has supported the promotion of women in government; passed laws and regulations for women; launched campaigns to raise awareness of women's rights; and promoted gender parity in education. As a result of these initiatives, the proportion of women in leadership positions has increased to 39.6 percent in parliament, one of the highest figures in Africa (and the 13th highest level in the world).⁶³

29. Socio-cultural factors contribute to the exclusion of women from social, political and economic life. Girls and women are further disadvantaged if poor, disabled, living in a rural area or if they do not speak Portuguese. High levels of illiteracy persist for women, especially in rural areas, where over three quarters of women (compared to 40 percent of men) are not literate. Child marriages, which affect about 14.3 percent of girls under 15 years of age and a high (48.2) percent of girls under 18 years of age, lead to girls dropping out of school and to high levels of pregnancy in adolescence, which increases the risks of maternal, neonatal, infant and child mortality and contributes to an inter-generational cycle of poverty.⁶⁴

COVID-19

30. The first case of COVID-19 was reported in Mozambique on 22 March 2020. The Mozambican authorities declared a state of emergency in response to the pandemic, which remained in place between 30 March and 6 September 2020. In September 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported almost 150,000 confirmed cases and 1,892 deaths due to COVID-19.⁶⁵

31. The United Nations situation analysis in Mozambique points out that the pandemic is impacting external demand for agricultural products produced by smallholder farmers, employment in the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors, producer and consumer prices, and the health of men and women.⁶⁶ The pandemic has led to economic pressure, loss of livelihoods and difficulties accessing health, social and protection services, and placed an added burden on women and girls.⁶⁷ The effects of the pandemic on persons with disability are not well documented but probably substantial.⁶⁸

1.3. THE WFP COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN IN MOZAMBIQUE

32. Mozambique was among the "wave 1b" of pilot countries selected for the development of the new country strategic plan approach, guided by the new WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021) and the Policy on Country Strategic Plans under the Integrated Road Map (IRM). The WFP Country Strategic Plan (2017-2021) builds upon the WFP Corporate Results Framework (CRF) and has seven strategic outcomes (SO), 21

⁵⁹ UNICEF, 2019. Education Sector Budget and Expenditure Brief.

⁶⁰ World Bank, 2020. Education Service Delivery in Mozambique: A Second Round of the Service Delivery Indicators Survey. Maputo.

⁶¹ UNICEF, 2020. Evaluation of the UNICEF Mozambique Accelerated School Readiness Pilot Programme: Final report. UNICEF, Maputo.

⁶² Human Development Report, 2020. The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene *Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report* – Mozambique.

⁶³ CARE, 2019. Rapid Gender Analysis A Commitment to Addressing Gender and Protection Issues in Cyclone and Flood Affected Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

⁶⁴ UNICEF, <https://www.unicef.org/mozambique/en/child-marriage-mozambique>, accessed 28 September 2021.

⁶⁵ WHO Mozambique Country Profile (www.who.int/countries/moz), accessed on 13/09/2021.

⁶⁶ UN, 2020. Unpacking the Potential Socioeconomic Impact of the Coronavirus Pandemic In Mozambique: A United Nations Situation Analysis And Policy Recommendations, March 2020.

⁶⁷ UNICEF, www.unicef.org/mozambique/en/stories/mozambique-responds-gender-based-violence-context-COVID-19.

⁶⁸ WFD, 2019. Towards Inclusive Social, Economic and Political Policies for Persons with Disability in Mozambique.

outputs and 11 activities addressing WFP focus areas of resilience building, crisis response and root causes (see details in Annex 10).

33. The country strategic plan focused on the national zero hunger agenda, prioritizing support and capacity strengthening of government systems and institutions. It reaffirmed the core role of WFP in humanitarian assistance, alongside resilience building and work on the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition.⁶⁹

34. Based on the logical framework, the key assumptions underpinning the country strategic plan can be summarized into two groups. One set of assumptions relate to the capacity strengthening focus, where WFP assumes that the Government translates the acquired knowledge into policy decision-making in order to meet the basic needs of people during times of crisis, including continuous support to scale up and fund home-grown school feeding. The other set of assumptions relates to the capacity of WFP to secure financial resources to adequately respond during the crisis and to support programme implementation, including development interventions.⁷⁰

35. The country strategic plan was informed by a national zero hunger strategic review (ZHSR)⁷¹ and its design drew on recommendations from evaluations of previous WFP interventions. The ZHSR drew on extensive consultations with government and other development partners. A country gender analysis, aligned with the regional gender strategy and the WFP Gender Policy (2015-2020), was also carried out by the country office.

36. The country strategic plan was preceded by a number of WFP programmes and operations: i) the country programme (CP 200286) for the period 2012-2016 focused on improving basic nutrition, scaling up social protection and transitioning towards a home-grown school feeding programme; ii) the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 200355) focused on emergency and early recovery activities targeting disaster-affected households, refugees and asylum seekers, and on government capacity for emergency preparedness and response; iii) the special operation (SO 200814) was designed to strengthen the Institute for Disaster Management-led response; and iv) finally, in response to cyclone Dineo in 2017, the immediate response emergency operation (EMOP 201067) provided support through food assistance for assets (FFA).

37. Modalities of intervention of the country strategic plan include a focus on capacity strengthening, addressed to government at national, subnational and community levels and with priority for the following areas: i) preparedness and response to weather-related shocks; ii) implementation of the school-feeding programme; iii) social protection programmes and the national strategies against stunting and micronutrient deficiencies; and iv) marketing and decision-making capacities of smallholder farmers. It also includes a focus on service delivery to provide supply chain services to humanitarian development partners, including logistics, emergency and telecommunications, air services, and other services to government and development partners. Finally, it includes food and cash-based transfers (CBT) targeting vulnerable households.


38. The country strategic plan has been subject to various revisions over time in response to dynamic changes to the country context (see Figure 3). It has also seen substantial changes (for example, new activities introduced in 2019 under SO 7), while WFP had to deal with new and emerging operational priorities through a significant expansion of the country budget. As a result, the country strategic plan in Mozambique does not follow a linear implementation. The onset of large-scale emergencies had a significant impact on WFP operations in the review period.

⁶⁹ CSP (2017-2021), p.8.

⁷⁰ CSP (2017-2021), Annex I - Logical Framework.

⁷¹ Carrillho J. Abbas, M, Junior, A. Chidassicua, J & Mosca, J: *Food Security and Nutrition Challenges in Mozambique*, Observatorio do Meio Rural.


Figure 3: Mozambique context and WFP interventions



SOURCE: Evaluation team based on documentary review

39. **Funding:** A detailed financial overview is presented in Annex 14. The country strategic plan has grown exponentially during its implementation, with significant budget revisions following the cyclones, growing food shortages and escalating conflict in the north. The total needs for country strategic plan implementation over the period 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2022 are USD 1,087.1 million. Current country strategic plan funding stands at USD 514.32 million (47.3 percent of needs), which means a shortfall of USD 572.75 million.⁷²

Figure 4: Evolution of country strategic plan needs-based plan, USD millions




⁷² WFP Resource Situation Report, 22 August 2021.

Source: CSP MZ01 BR03, BR04, BR05, BR06 and BR07

40. **Beneficiaries:** Beneficiary data (see Annex 15) reflects substantial changes in the size and scope of the country strategic plan over the implementation period. As shown in Figure 5.

41. From 2017 to 2019 the number of planned beneficiaries reported in annual country reports (ACRs) increased in line with total needs declared in needs-based plans (NBPs) and budget revisions. However, as of 2020, annual country reports planned beneficiary numbers were lower than those in the budget revisions, reflecting funding challenges. WFP reached 81.5 percent of planned beneficiaries in 2017, which went down to 51.1 percent in 2018, increased again to 69.4 percent in 2019, and declined to 56.1 percent in 2020. As of 31 July 2021, WFP had reached 71.2 percent of planned beneficiaries for the year. When data is broken down by gender, performance in the first two years of implementation is generally a little better for women and girl beneficiaries. Beneficiary data provided by the country office for 2021 was not broken down by gender.

Figure 5: Actual and planned beneficiaries per year and sex



Source: Annual Country Reports and CO data

42. **WFP gender work:** The country strategic plan states that “all programming will consider gender equality.” A gender-transformative and nutrition-sensitive social and behaviour change communication approach adapted to specific contexts is mainstreamed throughout the country strategic plan, except for Activity 7. The country strategic plan received a gender inclusion rating of 2A. A specific gender transformative and nutrition-sensitive (GTNS) programme was introduced and its approach has been used to reinforce gender equality and women’s empowerment (GEWE) throughout implementation.

2. Evaluation findings

2.1. EQ 1: TO WHAT EXTENT IS WFP STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND PEOPLE'S NEEDS AS WELL AS ON WFP'S STRENGTHS?

EQ 1.1 To what extent is the country strategic plan relevant to national policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of the national Sustainable Development Goals?

43. **Finding 1.1a: The country strategic plan is well aligned with the Government's priorities on social protection and disaster risk reduction. However actual contribution to the health and education sectors' priorities could have merited more attention in the design.**

44. Overall, the country strategic plan strategic outcomes and respective activities are well aligned with the Government's priorities at the macro level, namely Agenda 2025 and the Five-Year Government Programme (PQG). There is also good alignment at sectoral level (see Annex 11). For example, on social protection the country strategic plan contributes to the priorities of the National Strategy for Basic Social Security (2016-2024), particularly under Activity 2 (SO 1), which focuses on technical assistance to social protection programmes, and under Activity 3 (SO 2), which prioritizes the provision of cash-based transfers and food transfers to vulnerable populations affected by crisis. The country strategic plan has also made some progress towards institutionalizing school feeding as a safety net⁷³ within the broader national social protection system, namely through emergency school feeding in districts affected by droughts.⁷⁴ This has been a focus in other countries⁷⁵ and contributes to the Government's social protection priorities.⁷⁶

45. The Master Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (2017-2030) defines the government's disaster risk reduction strategy and the main actions for reducing vulnerability to extreme events in Mozambique. The country strategic plan has been contributing to this strategy within the focus areas of resilience building (SO 1 and SO 6) and crisis response (SO 2 and SO 7).

46. In terms of the health sector, important country strategic plan contributions were not highlighted in the design. For example, the country strategic plan has been enhancing the Government's capacities towards combating stunting and micronutrients deficiencies (Activity 5), which is a priority set in the Strategic Plan for the Health Sector (2014-2019), yet this important sectoral plan was not mentioned in the country strategic plan document, nor is the country strategic plan's actual contribution to it underlined in the reports. Nevertheless, consistent engagement with the Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security (SETSAN) and different line ministries was achieved, suggesting that a multi-sectoral approach was considered for nutrition programming. The same applies to HIV/AIDS, since the National Strategic Plan for Response to HIV/AIDS (2015-2019) is not mentioned in the country strategic plan document, although broad alignment is in evidence through HIV programming. For example, promotion of community HIV/TB services, HIV testing and household referral, the provision of specialized nutritious food to people with HIV and a strong communication component under Activity 5.

47. In the education sector, the country strategic plan design referred only to PRONAE, yet the support to school feeding is actually instrumental in achieving the education sector's goals, including GEWE goals. Country strategic plan relevance could have been enhanced by highlighting its actual contribution to the

⁷³ The seminal study published in 2009 (BUNDY, D. et al. "Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development and the Education Sector." Washington DC: World Bank, 2009) paved the way for school feeding to be considered important not only in terms of benefits for education, but also as a "safety net" during times of crisis, acting in the long term as investments in human capital, in local economies, in reducing hunger and in promoting equity. In 2013 WFP published its revised School Feeding Policy also pointing to this direction.

⁷⁴ For example, emergency school feeding was provided in districts affected by drought in Sofala and Gaza provinces.

⁷⁵ For example, in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, where national school feeding programmes are the largest safety net in many countries and are highly institutionalized as part of broader social protection systems. See, among other examples: WFP, 2015. *Strengthening National Safety Nets. School Feeding: WFP's Evolving Role in Latin America and the Caribbean.*

⁷⁶ This national social protection strategy includes as a priority the provision of food to primary schools, as well as to other vulnerable groups through boarding schools, stressing that school feeding plays an important role in promoting access to and retaining schooling for vulnerable children.

priorities and goals of the Strategic Plan for the Education Sector.⁷⁷ This important plan gives overall policy guidance on education and also, for the first time, places school feeding as a national priority, recognizing that adequate food is essential for learning and proposing that the school environment include access to drinking water, sanitation and a balanced diet. This sectoral plan links school feeding with social protection and stipulates the gradual introduction of a school-feeding programme in districts vulnerable to food insecurity and dropouts.⁷⁸

48. Finding 1.1b: The country strategic plan is aligned with government priorities on food and nutrition security. However, when the country strategic plan was put into operation, it did not sufficiently adapt to evolving national food and nutrition security policy.

49. The country strategic plan contributes to the National Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector 2011-2020 (PEDSA), which aims at contributing to the food security and income of smallholder farmers in a competitive and sustainable manner, guaranteeing social and gender equality. The focus on resilience (SO 1) and root causes (SO 3, SO 4 and SO 5) is aligned with pillar 1 of PEDSA (agricultural productivity⁷⁹), pillar 2 (market access⁸⁰) and to some extent pillar 3 (natural resources). These pillars focus on the construction and rehabilitation of assets. However, a greater alignment with pillar 4 (strong agricultural institutions) could have been included. Pillar 4 is also aligned with the overall priorities set in the Multisectoral Plan of Action for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition 2011-2020 (PAMRDC) and in the National Food and Nutrition Security Strategy 2008-2015 (ESAN). Yet these strategies were reviewed at the very beginning of the country strategic plan (PAMRDC in 2017 and ESAN in 2017/18). Recommendations from these reviews were to strengthen food and nutrition security governance and multi-sectoral coordination, strengthen the implementation of the food and nutrition security policy and legal frameworks, and decentralize actions to the local levels (provinces and districts).⁸¹ Gaps identified in the ZHSR and in the country strategic plan document had already pointed in the same direction.⁸² Nevertheless, the country strategic plan did not adjust its capacity strengthening strategy on the basis of these reviews. Doing so would have better promoted an enabling environment, addressed organizational and policy gaps,⁸³ and focused more on strengthening capacities in the individual domain.

50. Finding 1.1c: The country strategic plan design was informed by a consultative process, but climate change adaptation (CCA) mainstreaming into the country strategic plan design was limited.

51. The country strategic plan was informed by findings from the ZHSR, and the Government, United Nations agencies and donors all confirmed that the design was consultative. But the ZHSR focused excessively on agricultural production and provided limited analysis of underlying causes of malnutrition. Furthermore, Mozambique is highly prone to weather-related shocks, but the ZHSR did not consider important factors that affect livelihoods and nutritional conditions in the country, such as climate change and the high likelihood of crises.⁸⁴ Most likely this explains the relatively little weight given to climate change in the design of country strategic plan-specific activities. For example, strengthening resilience to climate change and national disaster preparedness and management was identified as an opportunity in

⁷⁷ At the time of designing the CSP, the strategic plan that was in effect was the Plano Estratégico da Educação (2012-2016). Since 2020 the Government has had in place a new strategic plan covering the period 2020-2029.

⁷⁸ Ministério da Educação. Plano Estratégico da Educação 2012-2016, p.29-31.

⁷⁹ Pillar 1 refers to increased productivity, production and competitiveness in agriculture contributing to an adequate diet.

⁸⁰ Pillar 2 refers to services and infrastructure for greater market access and a guiding framework conducive to agrarian investment.

⁸¹ Havemann, K. et al, 2018. In-Depth Mid-Term Review of the Multisectoral Action Plan for the Reduction of Chronic Undernutrition – PAMRDC (2011-20120). Mozambique, April 2018.

⁸² For example: i) the implementation of policy and legal frameworks, particularly at subnational level, is challenged by insufficient development of implementation strategies; ii) insufficient capacity in government institutions, limited availability of qualified staff and limited resources affect FNS programmes, particularly at local level; and iii) fragmented multisectoral coordination between government and partners on FNS prevents consistency in programming and limits consideration of regional differences, among others.

⁸³ For example, by focusing its capacity strengthening strategy on some of pillars 1, 2, 3 and 4 set in the ESAN III: i) political commitment, alignment and coherence between national policies, strategies and programmes; ii) institutional consolidation and decentralization; iii) strengthening legal and regulatory frameworks; or iv) financing and resource mobilization.

⁸⁴ Based on ET's analysis of documentation and confirmed during interviews with key informants. Also confirmed by the CSP MTR (2019).

the country strategic plan design.⁸⁵ Although broad alignment was found with the National Strategy of Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate Change, climate change adaptation does not stand out in the country strategic plan design, nor in the country strategic plan's potential (and actual) contribution to the Government's sectoral priorities. By design, this was mostly addressed through SO 1 (Activity 1) in terms of supporting communities and providing technical assistance to government institutions, although throughout implementation climate change adaptation was mainstreamed into programming. Nevertheless, budget revision 6 addressed this gap by increasing requirements under the resilience building and root causes focus areas.

52. Finding 1.1d: The country strategic plan is consistent with national Sustainable Development Goals priorities and targets, particularly within SDG 2 (zero hunger). However, a more consistent alignment within SDG 17 (partnerships) could have enhanced relevance in practice.

53. The approval of the National Sustainable Development Goal Framework post-dated the country strategic plan design, which addresses the WFP SDG 2 and SDG 17 priority targets. The country strategic plan's focus on SDG 2 continued to be aligned with national food and nutrition security priorities (see paragraph 48 on the nutrition challenges that the country still faces), which became even greater with the COVID-19 pandemic. Country strategic plan targets under SDG 2 also match Sustainable Development Goal targets prioritized by the Government.⁸⁶ However, the country strategic plan did not make adjustments to better align with SDG 17 government priority targets. For example, the country strategic plan has contributed to secure additional funding from multiple sources, namely through the debt swap arrangement with the Russian Federation to support the PRONAE, which accounts for a significant budget contribution of over USD 40 million, but the related SDG 17 target has not been included in the country strategic plan.⁸⁷

54. Finding 1.1e: WFP has contributed to other Sustainable Development Goals prioritized by the Government, but the fact that the country strategic plan's contribution have not been reported has cast a shadow over its relevance.

55. The WFP Corporate Results Framework focuses on SDG 2 and SDG 17, but allows country offices to report contributions to other Sustainable Development Goal-related targets and indicators. However, WFP is not reporting on other Sustainable Development Goal targets relevant to the country strategic plan and the Government. For example, resilience building of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reducing their vulnerability to climate-related extreme events (SDG Target 1.5) was identified as a priority in the National Sustainable Development Goal Framework and has been addressed within Activity 1, yet the country strategic plan is not reporting its actual contribution in this area. The same applies to the implementation of nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures to achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable (SDG Target 1.3), which has been addressed through activities 2 and 3, but actual country strategic plan's contribution has not been reported.

EQ 1.2 To what extent did the country strategic plan address the needs of the most vulnerable people in the country to ensure that no one is left behind?

56. Finding 1.2a: The country strategic plan addressed the needs of the most vulnerable through targeting food insecurity and climate disaster-prone areas.

57. The WFP vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) unit has provided regular, comprehensive analysis of the food insecurity situation in Mozambique, in coordination with SETSAN. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)⁸⁸ was introduced in Mozambique in 2013 and since then has been used to define WFP targets and coverage. From 2017 until to date, 14 acute food insecurity analyses have been completed,⁸⁹ supporting appropriate geographic targeting.

⁸⁵ WFP, 2017. Country Strategic Plan 2017-2021, p.7.

⁸⁶ These are targets 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 and are all included within the range of SDG priority targets identified by the Government for SDG 2 (see annex 12).

⁸⁷ This refers to target 17.3 which was included by the Government as a priority in the National SDG Framework, but not in the CSP (see annex 12).

⁸⁸ IPC is an initiative for improving FNS analysis and decision-making to inform emergency responses as well as policy and programming. In Mozambique, IPC activities are integrated in the vulnerability assessment process chaired by SETSAN and supported by FAO, WFP, UNICEF as well as FEWS NET, and NGOs.

⁸⁹ As per information provided at <http://www.ipcinfo.org/>

58. Finding 1.2b: Several gender analyses were carried out and used throughout implementation to inform the country strategic plan.

59. A gender analysis to inform the GTNS project was carried out in 2017. A gender assessment focusing on the food assistance for assets component was conducted in 2018 informed by the corporate food assistance for assets guidelines, the Food Assistance for Assets Gender Toolbox, and consultations with local stakeholders and beneficiaries.⁹⁰ In 2018, before the start of the cash-based transfer programme, a gender analysis was conducted in order to better understand the cultural context, power relations, gender roles and responsibilities and security threats.⁹¹ A protection and gender assessment was conducted in 2019 on the changing of assistance from in-kind food assistance to cash-based transfer.⁹² In 2020, a gender analysis was conducted within the post-harvest loss project.⁹³ A rapid gender analysis (RGA) was conducted within the virtual farmers market (VFM) project. The exercise used the rapid gender analysis tool to understand gender issues in target communities and provide recommendations to better integrate gender approaches, promote GEWE, and to understand the gender issues that need to be considered during the implementation.⁹⁴ A gender action plan was defined in 2019. This analytical work on gender fed into the country strategic plan as recommended by the WFP Gender Policy (2015-2020). The country strategic plan uses sex-disaggregated data for men, boys, women and girls for various indicators.

EQ 1.3 To what extent has WFP strategic positioning remained relevant throughout the implementation of the country strategic plan in light of changing context, national capacities, and needs?

60. Finding 1.3a: In spite of significant changes in the country context, the country strategic plan remained relevant and was able to flexibly navigate across the humanitarian-development nexus.

61. All informants from the Government, United Nations agencies and donors recognized that the WFP response to crises (droughts, cyclones, and conflict in the north) was strong, timely, and effective, and WFP is seen as the key actor in the humanitarian field. Six days after cyclone Idai made landfall in Mozambique, the WFP lead logistics cluster was activated, and two days later the corporate Level 3 emergency response was announced. The WFP Immediate Response Account⁹⁵ allowed the rapid provision of USD 34.5 million to the L3 emergency response. Whilst leading the logistic response to the crisis, WFP continued working jointly with local authorities and especially with the National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (INGD). According to people met in the field, this close collaboration provided strong “on-site” capacity development. WFP expertise was also put to good use leading the emergency telecommunication cluster and co-leading the global food security cluster. All informants from the Government, United Nations agencies and donors, recognized that the strong response by WFP to crises had been critical in attending to the humanitarian response, whilst continuing to address recovery and development actions. Once the response was over, WFP turned to disaster preparedness activities alongside the INGD. By the end of 2018, WFP undertook rapid assessment, planning and implementation of life-saving assistance to internally displaced persons and returnees in Cabo Delgado. In 2019 WFP provided unconditional food transfers to some 33,000 internally displaced persons in the province. In 2020, WFP increased its food assistance to Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa provinces from about 18,500 to almost 510,000 conflict-affected beneficiaries through in-kind and cash-based transfer assistance.⁹⁶

62. Finding 1.3b: The role of WFP on climate resilience has been enhanced and a GEWE approach has been constantly mainstreamed.

63. Although climate change did not have a prominent focus in the country strategic plan design, budget revision 6 addressed this gap and the work WFP has been doing ended up increasing the country strategic plan’s relevance and WFP positioning on climate resilience, particularly through enhancing the evidence

⁹⁰ WFP, 2018. Gender Analysis: Food Assistance for Assets in Mozambique.

⁹¹ WFP, 2018. Gender Analysis of CBT in Tete, December 2018.

⁹² WFP, SEPPA and OIKOS, 2019. Protection and gender assessment for change of food assistance modalities in Quissanga Praia and Mocimboa da Praia, September 2019.

⁹³ WFP, 2020. Post-harvest loss project: gender analysis report, October 2020.

⁹⁴ WFP, 2020. Virtual Farmers Market Project: Rapid Gender Analysis for Nampula, July 2020.

⁹⁵ The Immediate Response Account (IRA) is WFP’s life-saving funding facility, which allows WFP to rapidly respond to emergencies.

⁹⁶ ACRs 2019 & 2020.

base on climate change and adopting a strategic approach to building resilience against weather-related shocks (see paragraph 74). WFP managed to consistently mainstream GEWE throughout programming, with gender and age-sensitive approaches included across activities (see paragraph 127). Furthermore, significant analytical work on gender has been done (see paragraph 59), allowing the country strategic plan to learn and keep the focus to better address women's needs.

64. Finding 1.3c: WFP has taken an active role in the COVID-19 pandemic response.

65. The year 2020 was marked by the COVID-19 pandemic. The WFP assisted through the United Nations Multi-Sector Response and the country strategic plan responded by adopting preventive measures at distribution sites, scaling up its monitoring activities to support the SETSAN and the INGD, providing unconditional cash-based transfers to vulnerable households affected by the pandemic,⁹⁷ and signing an agreement with the Ministry of Health (MISAU) for food assistance to patients in COVID-19 treatment centres once the number of patients in a treatment centre exceeded a certain threshold.⁹⁸

EQ 1.4 To what extent is the country strategic plan coherent and aligned with the wider United Nations and to what extent does it include appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP in the country?

66. Finding 1.4a: There is broad alignment between the country strategic plan and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2017-2020) (UNDAF).

67. References to the UNDAF in the country strategic plan document are limited, but there is broad alignment of Activity 1 with UNDAF Outcome 10 on resilience to climate change and disasters. Activity 2 is aligned with UNDAF Outcome 5, which focuses on strengthening social protection programmes and improving access for the most vulnerable groups. Activities 5 and 6 are aligned with UNDAF Outcome 1 on food security for vulnerable populations. No evidence of alignment with the UNDAF was found for the other strategic outcomes and country strategic plan activities. Annex 13 gives more details on the country strategic plan's alignment with UNDAF.

68. Finding 1.4b: Within the United Nations system, the country strategic plan has facilitated the establishment of good partnerships in emergency and humanitarian assistance. However, partnerships in the area of development have been less prominent.

69. The partnerships established between WFP and other United Nations agencies within the Joint United Nations Humanitarian Response to Cyclones Idai and Kenneth and within the United Nations Joint Response to COVID-19 were mentioned by government and United Nations informants as good examples of collaboration. Regarding the first, the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) found that emergency responses to the major cyclones in 2019 were not marked by inter-agency competition during this response as they were in other disasters.⁹⁹ WFP contributed to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), acting as lead agency for the food security, logistics and emergency telecommunications clusters and was made chair of the HIV in Emergencies Technical Working Group set up by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). The prompt response and coordination through the various clusters allowed a quick mobilization of efforts and resources in both the emergency and reconstruction phases. For example, the reconstruction phase after the cyclones was facilitated by coordination between WFP (food assistance) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (distribution of seeds and agricultural inputs) through the food security cluster in the same regions.

70. Various partnerships have been established by WFP with different United Nations agencies for development interventions, such as: on resilience and food fortification with FAO; on social behaviour change communication (SBCC) with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); on social protection with UNICEF, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank (WB); and on nutrition with UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the WHO. However, government, United Nations agencies, and WFP staff confirmed that WFP has not been very active in seeking broader synergies with FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). For example, within SO 5 the country

⁹⁷ In collaboration with UNICEF, WFP supported INAS to scale up the national shock-responsive social protection programme with unconditional cash transfers to vulnerable households affected by the economic fallout following the COVID-19 pandemic.

⁹⁸ WFP, 2020. Annual Country Report 2020.

⁹⁹ IAHE, 2000. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, p.46.

strategic plan envisioned close collaboration with FAO and IFAD on access to production factors, productivity and value addition and in order to shorten value chains so that farmers can increase their market share.¹⁰⁰ However, the 2018, 2019 and 2020 annual country reports do not mention such synergies. In some cases, such as the Beyond Cotton project, information sharing by WFP was limited and the absence of partnerships with FAO and IFAD were unfortunate in this respect. The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 1c final external evaluation concluded that the coordination mechanisms were not effective to ensure complementarity and synergies among implementing agencies (WFP, FAO, IFAD). It recognizes that the three agencies have expertise and comparative advantages on food and nutrition security, but the potential to build synergies upon the comparative advantages of each agency was not fully developed. The implementation was rather fragmented, with few opportunities put in practice for complementarity and synergies, and for cross-fertilization.¹⁰¹ The recent global evaluation on the collaboration among the Rome-based agencies (RBA) also revealed some barriers that limit more effective collaboration, for example: i) perceived duplication and competition between FAO and WFP; ii) donor support for Rome-based agency collaboration is not as strong in practice; and iii) Rome-based agency leadership expressed a spectrum of support and scepticism about collaboration.¹⁰²

2.2. EQ 2: WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTCOMES IN MOZAMBIQUE?

EQ2.1 To what extent did WFP deliver expected outputs and contribute to the expected country strategic plan outcomes?

SO1: Households in food-insecure areas of Mozambique are able to maintain access to adequate and nutritious food throughout the year, including in times of shock

71. The country strategic plan contribution to this strategic outcome was planned through two interconnected activities: i) Activity 1, capacity strengthening to prepare for, respond to, and recover from weather-related shocks to the Government at the national, subnational and community levels; and ii) Activity 2, technical assistance to the Government in making social protection programmes shock-responsive and hunger-sensitive. Table 2 provides an overview of outcome and output targets achievement (details in Annex 15) as a basis for the subsequent qualitative analysis.

Table 2: SO 1 Outcome and output performance overview

Activities	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 ¹⁰³
Activity 1					
Outcome					
Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	0	0	1/1	1/1	-
Targets met ¹⁰⁴	-	-	1 (100%)	1 (100%)	-
Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	4	3	-
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	3 (75%)	1 (33%)	-
Targets not met (<90% & >50%)	-	-	1 (25%)	1 (33%)	-
Targets not met (<50%)	-	-	0	1 (33%)	-
Activity 2					
Outcome					
Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	0	0	12/32	13/33	-
Targets met	0	0	2 (17%)	6 (46%)	-

¹⁰⁰ WFP, 2017. Country Strategic Plan, p.12.

¹⁰¹ EU, WFP, FAO, IFAD, 2020. Final Evaluation of the Programme "Accelerate Progress Towards Millennium Development Goal 1C (MDG1.C Programme)", January 2020, p.63.

¹⁰² FAO, IFAD, WFP, 2021. Joint evaluation of collaboration among the United Nations Rome-Based Agencies.

¹⁰³ Outcome data is in the process of being collected and analysed for 2021.

¹⁰⁴ Measured at 'overall' level. This considers 2019 and 2020 targets as references rather than the CSP end-target.

Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	3	7	-
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	3 (100%)	3 (43%)	-
Targets not met (<90% & >50%)	-	-	0	1 (14%)	-
Targets not met (<50%)	-	-	0	3 (43%)	-

Source: COMET

72. Finding 2.1a: The country strategic plan has been contributing to strengthening government capacities on food security and disaster preparedness and response but some challenges still remain.

73. As shown in Table 2 at output level, performance regarding capacity strengthening and technical assistance declined between 2019 and 2020.¹⁰⁵ Output indicators under SO 1 have evolved substantially and consequently the assessment of performance is mostly limited to comparing 2019 and 2020. For both activities, reported output values indicate a lower performance in 2020 than the previous year, which was due to the COVID-19 pandemic that led to the cancellation of trainings. At outcome level, support to SETSAN has been recognized by the Government as positive and contributed to some improvements in internal processes and tools to monitor the food insecurity situation. For example, the IPC analysis under SETSAN coordination continued to be used to estimate the seasonal level of food insecurity and acute malnutrition and it has also been used as targeting orientation to inform emergency responses by the Government and United Nations partners. In 2020, SETSAN conducted food security and vulnerability assessments in Cabo Delgado province in order to understand the humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons and host populations.¹⁰⁶ Support to INGD was also valued by the Government in regard to emergency response to cyclones Idai and Kenneth, which included an innovative approach through the use of drones to conduct emergency mapping and simulations, and search and rescue efforts on the ground. The country strategic plan contributed to some improvements in regard to emergency preparedness, logistics, and monitoring.¹⁰⁷ However, high staff turnover in SETSAN and INGD and the lack of financial resources has not yet allowed for a complete takeover of government responsibilities without WFP support. Challenges still remain in terms of planning. The Government's budget commitment to regularly conduct vulnerability and food and nutrition security analysis (through SETSAN), and its technical capacity in the use and analysis of data and in the maintenance of drones (through INGD) is still weak. Country capacity strengthening assessments of SETSAN and INGD were conducted by WFP to identify priority technical support areas, but a lack of resources compromised a more significant technical assistance over the implementation period.

74. Finding 2.1b: The country strategic plan significantly increased the evidence base on climate change and has used this to support its strategic approach to resilience building against weather-related shocks.

75. This included the development of historical climate analysis and climate model projections, which have provided evidence that has fed into programming and new funding proposals.¹⁰⁸ The country strategic plan was also able to leverage innovative tools and approaches to implement a series of integrated interventions focusing on building resilience. This included the development of an integrated climate risk management (ICRM) approach that provided a package of services focusing on conservation agriculture, village savings and loans schemes, climate services, and insurance.¹⁰⁹ Government institutional capacities and systems were improved through the setup of the first ever drought early warning system, yet this system needs time

¹⁰⁵ No 2021 output data was available at the time of writing this report.

¹⁰⁶ WFP, 2020. Annual Country Report.

¹⁰⁷ WFP, 2019. Annual Country Report.

¹⁰⁸ Capitalizing on the evidence-based support and on the innovations leveraged, WFP was able to get additional funds from the Green Climate Fund for its ICRM approach.

¹⁰⁹ The insurance component consists of insurance against the lack of rainfall between 11 November and 28 February of the following year. In case of rainfall shortage, the subscriber receives the Mozambican metical unit of currency (MZN) 7,347 for an MZN 1,085 initial buy-in. The insurance does not cover floods, pests or cyclones. This insurance was subscribed in collaboration with the National Farmers Federation to the South African Hollard Insurance Company. During the first year, WFP paid the insurance for each beneficiary. The idea is that beneficiaries pay for their own insurance in future if they so wish.

to be consolidated. Despite good work on the ICRM interventions, its scale is still limited and the insurance component is not yet well understood by beneficiaries.

76. Finding 2.1c: There is evidence that social protection programmes are becoming more shock responsive.

77. In the area of social protection, the country strategic plan provided continued capacity strengthening support to the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action (MGCAS) and the National Institute of Social Action (INAS), mostly through technical advice on policy making and programme design. WFP engaged well with the Government in response to the lean seasons. Joint work done through cash-based transfers captured the Government’s attention as an effective social protection modality. This led the Government to approve the provision of unconditional cash-based transfers within its Social Direct Support Programme (PASD), including provision to vulnerable households affected by the economic fallout following the COVID-19 pandemic.

SO2: Shock-affected people in Mozambique are able to meet their basic food and nutrition needs during and immediately after a crisis

78. The country strategic plan contribution to this strategic outcome focuses on crisis response and was planned through Activity 3, which seeks to provide food and/or cash-based transfers to vulnerable households affected by drought, cyclone and insecurity and conflict. Emergency food assistance to crisis-affected households has been delivered through food assistance for assets, general food distribution (GFD), emergency school feeding (ESF) and moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) treatment. Table 3 provides an overview of outcome and output targets achievement (details in Annex 15).

Table 3: SO 2 Outcome and output performance overview

Activity 3	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 ¹¹⁰
Outcome					
Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	19/57	19/55	24/70	23/67	-
Targets met	2 (11%)	7 (37%)	16 (67%)	13 (57%)	-
Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	18	26	30
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	14 (78%)	24 (92%)	23 (77%)
Targets met (<90 % & >50%)	-	-	2 (11%)	2 (8%)	6 (20%)
Targets met (<50%)	-	-	2 (11%)	0	1 (3%)

Source: COMET

79. Finding 2.1d: Enhancement of beneficiary’ livelihoods and assets has been moderately successful, even though asset creation has been an important dimension of WFP activities, particularly by gradually moving beneficiaries from humanitarian to development interventions.

80. Activity 3 has been a major focus of WFP interventions, reflecting the intensity and frequency of shocks that have affected Mozambique over the period and therefore the number of beneficiaries fluctuated depending on the different crises to which WFP had to respond. WFP has been able to provide support to a large number of beneficiaries in acute crises. In regard to the response to cyclone Idai in 2019, the IAHE noted that the food assistance component, a major part of which was delivered by WFP, was a “notable achievement” - by 16 April 2019, WFP reported one million people had received food assistance, with 100 per cent of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) target (1.8 million in need) being reached within seven weeks.¹¹¹ As shown in Table 3, as of July 2021, the country strategic plan reported only 30 output indicators against target, 77 percent being met. The COVID-19 pandemic led to a general slowdown of planned activities for the refugees livelihoods programme. At outcome level, emergency responses through general food distribution and food assistance for assets programmes have resulted in an improvement to the Food Expenditure Share (FES), Food Consumption Score (FCS), Livelihood-based Coping Strategies (LCS) the

¹¹⁰ Outcome data is in the process of being collected and analysed for 2021.

¹¹¹ IAHE, 2000. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to Cyclone Idai in Mozambique.

consumption-based coping strategy, and the reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) amongst beneficiary households, yet targets have not been fully met. For example, the percentage of beneficiaries on poor Food Consumption Scores in Gaza province dropped to 5 percent after implementation of the 2018/2019 WFP lean season assistance as compared to the 43 percent baseline, while the number of beneficiaries on emergency Livelihood-based Coping Strategies dropped to 13 percent as compared to the baseline at 47 percent. In 2021, the outcome survey conducted in May showed positive progress for nearly all food security and livelihood outcome indicators.¹¹² In regard to cash-based transfers across different categories of beneficiaries, this has had a positive effect in reducing the extent to which families resort to negative coping strategies and has in most cases contributed to improved Food Consumption Scores for women and girls and men and boy beneficiaries, and has reduced the proportion of income spent on food. On moderate acute malnutrition treatment, monitoring data shows that targets for reducing default rates have improved, and that targets have been reached for boys and girl beneficiaries on recovery rates. For example, recovery rates amongst children were measured at 91 percent after the implementation of moderate acute malnutrition treatment in 2018 while the default rate stood at 6.7 percent.¹¹³ Asset creation has been an important dimension of the activities and focuses on gradually moving beneficiaries from humanitarian to development interventions. However, the focus on “light food assistance for assets” as required by the Government due to concerns about aid dependence, has not been very effective, particularly because donors contributed very little to WFP for asset creation activities.

81. Finding 2.1e: The country strategic plan effectiveness towards strengthening partners’ capacities for crisis response still has some gaps.

82. In crisis response, WFP has worked closely with local partners and has prioritized capacity strengthening, with training sessions for cooperating partners (including on beneficiary registration and by conducting distribution simulations); by the introduction and strengthening of community committees with clear roles and responsibilities in assisted communities; and by improving communication of beneficiary selection criteria to community members particularly considering high illiteracy. However, gaps remain. Field interviews revealed challenges in the capacity of partners, which contributed to issues around identifying beneficiaries and overseeing the creation of assets. As noted in WFP internal reporting, despite the achieved results, support for partners and WFP field staff needs to be strengthened, especially in relation with beneficiary selection and the management of assets creation.

SO 3: Children in chronically food-insecure areas have access to nutritious food throughout the year

83. The country strategic plan contribution to this strategic outcome was planned through Activity 4, which provides support to enhance the capacities of the Ministry of Education and Human Development (MINEDH) to manage the scale-up of PRONAE. WFP sought to gradually decrease school feeding direct management as the Ministry of Education and Human Development assumes greater management responsibility. This strategic outcome addresses the root causes of hunger and aims to ensure that schoolchildren receive a nutritious meal every day and benefit from improved design, finance and implementation capacity of the Government of Mozambique that helps meet their basic nutrition needs and increases school attendance and retention. It also aims to improve knowledge of nutrition, care practices and healthy diets. In parallel with PRONAE - which represents the bulk of the support to school feeding - WFP has also provided support through a number of smaller school feeding initiatives, as in Tete province with Canadian funding, and also as part of the emergency response. Table 4 provides an overview of outcome and output targets achievement (details in Annex 15).

Table 4: SO3 Outcome and output performance overview

Activity 4	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 ¹¹⁴
Outcome					

¹¹² WFP, 2021. Results of WFP Mozambique Outcome Survey May 2021. Endline 2020 2021 Lean Season Response (Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo), L2 Response to IDPs (Cabo Delgado and Nampula), and COVID 19 Response (Tete and Zambezia), July 2021.

¹¹³ WFP, 2019. Mozambique Country Strategic Plan: Mid-Term Review.

¹¹⁴ Outcome data is in the process of being collected and analysed for 2021.

Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	3/9	2/6	4/12	1/3	-
Targets met	1 (33%)	2 (100%)	3 (75%)	1 (100%)	-
Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	17	6	-
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	14 (82%)	5 (83%)	-
Targets not met (<90 % & >50%)	-	-	2 (12%)	1 (17%)	-
Targets not met (<50%)	-	-	1 (6%)	0	-

Source: COMET

84. Finding 2.1f: PRONAE reached approximately two thirds of its intended beneficiaries and reached targets for attendance and pass rates for girls and boys. Yet, targets for enrolment were only partially reached and WFP cannot report on results of capacity strengthening.

85. The PRONAE document foresaw a total of 156,000 beneficiaries, with equal numbers of boys and girls. WFP output monitoring data shows that at output level approximately 60 percent of planned school feeding beneficiaries were reached in 2019 and 2020. In 2020, in response to the nationwide school closures due to COVID-19, WFP rapidly shifted its school feeding programme from on-site to take-home rations, which allowed for food assistance to continue reaching 237,790 students and their family members in rural areas across Tete and Nampula.¹¹⁵ As of July 2021, WFP had reached 64 percent of intended beneficiaries. This represents an improvement compared to previous years. Targets for attendance, and pass rates, were reached in all three years for which data are available, for girls and boys. Conversely, targets for enrolment have been partially achieved.¹¹⁶ The outcome indicators fail to capture capacity strengthening components, as corporate indicators still need to be identified for this area of work. A Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) analysis, which rates capacity at national level in various areas, had been conducted in Mozambique in 2016 and had sought to function as a baseline, but the results were not validated by the Government at the time.¹¹⁷ A follow-up SABER exercise was not done in the course of the country strategic plan as initially foreseen, in light of continued government reluctance.

86. Finding 2.1g: National coordination of a multitude of actors involved in school feeding was re-activated during the country strategic plan period, but remains weak, and capacity strengthening under PRONAE has been limited.

87. At national level the envisioned strengthening of coordination among a large number of school feeding actors has not been pursued in practice. A key activity in this context was to reconvene the national coordination group on school feeding. On the WFP side, there appears to have been limited scope for strengthening engagement with United Nations partners on school feeding, and the engagement of the Brazil Centre of Excellence has not been pursued beyond a few interventions that were funded under a pre-country strategic plan arrangement. At national level, the Government has only very sporadically convened the key actors. As a result, the country continues to see a multitude of different school feeding interventions that follow different approaches. In addition, learning across different initiatives remains very limited. Regarding capacity strengthening, to date the type of training for PRONAE has not been guided by a specific assessment of existing capacity – which was foreseen in the PRONAE document – in light of continued government reluctance. In addition, there have been delays in planned training sessions. There has been no systematic reporting from the Ministry of Education and Human Development against the annual plans. Field visits by the evaluation team highlighted the fact that, while district level capacity procurement has been an area of focus, management of school feeding processes is still difficult in terms of logistics, quality control and accountability, and many schools still lack adequate infrastructure for school feeding.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ WFP, 2020. Annual Country Report.

¹¹⁶ As also reported in Annex 15, enrolment data were first collected in 2019, and was the only indicator collected in 2020 (other indicators could not be collected because of COVID-19).

¹¹⁷ Moçambique Alimentação Escolar – SABER Relatório Nacional (Unpublished).

¹¹⁸ At the time of the evaluation 70 schools were reported to have some kind of infrastructure, and 16 schools were reported not to have adequate/safe water provision.

88. Finding 2.1h: Districts have progressively taken on local procurement. However, the envisioned roll-out of the home-grown school feeding component has only been achieved to a limited extent.

89. A key dimension of the PRONAE design is local procurement through grants made available via the the Ministry of Education and Human Development to district level. In this manner PRONAE sought to build on work that was piloted prior to the country strategic plan and this had seen some success. Over the country strategic plan period, however, there is evidence that the envisioned partnerships that were supposed to facilitate linkages among local farmers, farmers' organizations and schools have been put in place in a limited way, and anecdotal evidence from field visits by the evaluation team suggests that most of the food was procured from commercial traders without specific attention to whether the products were locally produced (that is, in the region where the schools operate). Government procurement regulations at district level (which have strict procurement ceilings) were cited to the evaluation team in field interviews as an important barrier to increasing the number of schools and buying locally. The Government of Mozambique questioned whether the food purchased by WFP for PRONAE was sufficiently focusing on strengthening local farmers and markets and expressed regret at not being involved in the selection of local retailers.

SO 4: Targeted people in prioritized areas of Mozambique have improved nutrition status in line with national targets by 2021

90. This strategic outcome was planned through Activity 5, which sought to provide capacity strengthening and technical assistance to government entities implementing the national strategy to combat stunting and micronutrient deficiencies. This strategic outcome addresses the root causes of hunger and intends to strengthen capacity for evidence-based policy and programme design on nutrition, particularly focusing on stunting and micronutrient deficiencies, as well as improving knowledge, care practices and healthy diets of vulnerable populations. Table 5 provides an overview of outcome and output targets achievement (details in Annex 15).

Table 5: SO 4 Outcome and output performance overview

Activity 5	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 ¹¹⁹
Outcome					
Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	0	0	3/3	3/3	-
Targets met	-	-	0 (0%)	2 (66%)	-
Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	1	6	-
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	1 (100%)	4 (67%)	-
Targets not met (<90 % & >50%)	-	-	0	2 (33%)	-
Targets not met (<50%)	-	-	0		

Source: COMET

91. Finding 2.1i: WFP has been successful in delivering trainings and interpersonal approaches to nutrition and available data show progress on minimum dietary diversity for women (MDD-W), yet progress on the proportion of children receiving a minimum acceptable diet is modest.

92. As shown in Table 5, in 2020 WFP reported a total of six indicators against target values, but it is difficult to assess progress over time because there is only one indicator reported against targets in previous years. Outputs indicators show a relatively good performance in regard to government partners receiving training and technical assistance (106 percent achievement rate). However, the number of training sessions provided was slightly lower than target (17 sessions against 23 planned), which was due to the COVID-19 pandemic that led to the cancellation of trainings. In terms of outcome, SO 4 performance is measured by the country strategic plan's contribution to improved nutritional status. Available data show a positive trend in the MDD-W (86.6 percent achievement rate). Progress has also been confirmed by the outcomes surveys on the lean season response conducted in 2019, 2020 and 2021. Regarding a minimum

¹¹⁹ Outcome data is in the process of being collected and analysed for 2021.

acceptable diet to children, the indicator fell to 8.6 percent in 2020 (compared to 11.6 percent in 2019), and is far from the 30 percent target.

93. In 2020 Mozambique was badly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, limiting SBCC activities from fully taking place or delaying them. The number of people reached through interpersonal SBCC approaches was far surpassed for women (205 percent of target achievement), but fell short of expectations for men (83 percent target achievement). Yet, the strategies adopted and the quality of the messages and materials delivered were highly appreciated by the interviewees and included mass media campaigns disseminated through local radios (radio spots, live radio shows), theatre sessions, posters with key messages placed in strategic places such as retailers' sites, cooking demonstrations, etc., focusing on nutrition, gender, and sexual and reproductive health.¹²⁰ There are no reported data on other indicators, such as the number of people exposed to WFP nutrition messaging.

94. Finding 2.1j: The country strategic plan managed to include a nutrition-sensitive lens across its portfolio.

95. To complement moderate acute malnutrition treatment under Activity 3 (SO 2), the nutrition team supported the Ministry of Health by developing training modules on the Nutrition Rehabilitation Protocol for children and adults, handling and storage of specialized nutritious foods, use of monitoring tools, and counselling techniques. Also under SO 2, the nutrition team supported the nutrition-sensitive food assistance for assets project in the Tete province, which included awareness-raising and nutrition-sensitive activities to improve the dietary diversity of vulnerable groups such as children under 2 and pregnant and lactating women (PLW). Under Activity 4 (SO 3), the nutrition team included nutrition in the school curriculum through a partnership with UNESCO and the Ministry of Education and Human Development¹²¹ and supported the definition of menus through a "nutrition-sensitive school feeding" approach. SBCC was also implemented under Activity 5 (SO 4) aiming to prevent chronic malnutrition through improved infant and young child feeding practices, pregnant and lactating women care and dietary practices, improved food security practices, improved water, sanitation and hygiene practices, and malaria prevention.¹²² As part of Activity 6 (SO 5), a concept note on "post-harvest losses" in crops with high nutritional value was developed.¹²³ In the frame of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic, WFP signed an agreement with the Ministry of Health for food assistance to be provided to patients in COVID-19 treatment centres across the country.

96. Finding 2.1k: The quality of WFP work and its approach on stunting prevention seems promising.

97. The GTNS project¹²⁴ has introduced an integrated approach that includes: i) food diversification (by promoting improved agricultural practices and diverse/balanced diets); ii) food fortification (by increasing demand for fortified foods by raising awareness of nutritional benefits and distributing fortified commodities to households); iii) food processing (by improving food storage and preservation techniques); and iv) cooking demonstrations (linking all three components to provide small groups of men and women with nutritious recipes using post-harvest loss food processing techniques). Despite its limited coverage (only 1,500 households in 49 villages in the Chemba district), this pilot initiative was well received by local authorities and communities. There is still no systematic data on the quantitative results achieved (final evaluation planned for 2021/2022), but interviews with beneficiaries, local authorities and WFP staff revealed a high degree of satisfaction with this initiative. WFP is now planning to incorporate the campaign in all of the general food distribution and food assistance for assets programmes that are implemented through cash-based transfers, and to adapt the campaign for in-kind responses, with a focus on the emergency context in Cabo Delgado province.¹²⁵ In addition, the GTNS project enhanced strategies that

¹²⁰ Idem.

¹²¹ WFP & UNESCO, 2020. Concept Note: Integrating Nutrition Education and School Meals Programmes in Mozambique.

¹²² WFP, 2018. Annual Country Report, p.12.

¹²³ WFP, 2020. Concept Note: Towards a nutrition sensitive agricultural value chain - Improving nutrition through postharvest loss reduction interventions and improved market access in Mozambique.

¹²⁴ The Gender Transformative and Nutrition-sensitive (GTNS) stunting prevention project started in 2019 in the Sofala province, funded by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) with a total amount of USD 3 million. It consists of a complementary package of services, including training and tools for climate resilient agriculture; training and technology to reduce post-harvest loss, FFA, and comprehensive SBCC to promote key messages on nutrition, sexual and reproductive health and positive gender relationships.

¹²⁵ WFP, 2020. Annual Country Report 2020, p.19.

have seen increased decision-making amongst women on the use of in-kind and cash-based transfer assistance, and more women assuming leadership positions in food management committees.

SO 5: Targeted smallholder farmers in northern and central Mozambique have enhanced livelihoods by 2021

98. The country strategic plan contribution to this strategic outcome was planned through Activity 6, which sought to enhance the aggregation, marketing and decision making capacities of smallholder farmers. This strategic outcome addresses the root causes of hunger and intends to provide value chain support in order to improve access to profitable markets and increase smallholder farmers' incomes as well as improve knowledge, care practices and healthy diets of vulnerable populations. Table 6 provides an overview of outcome and output targets achievement (details in Annex 15).

Table 6: SO 5 Outcome and output performance overview

Activity 6	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 ¹²⁶
Outcome					
Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	3/5	2/2	12/28	11/27	-
Targets met	2 (66%)	0	3 (25%)	7 (64%)	-
Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	10	7	-
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	9 (90%)	4 (57%)	-
Targets not met (<90 % & >50%)	-	-	1 (10%)	2 (29%)	-
Targets not met (<50%)	-	-	0	1 (14%)	-

Source: COMET

99. Finding 2.11: There is evidence of progress towards enhancing access to markets and rural livelihoods by smallholder farmers.

100. At output level, performance in supporting smallholder farmers to address market-related challenges was lower in 2020 compared to 2019 (Table 6).¹²⁷ For example: i) training provided to farmer organizations;¹²⁸ ii) training and technical assistance for government;¹²⁹ and iii) equipment distributed to farmers.¹³⁰ This was mainly due to the COVID-19 pandemic that led to the cancellation or postponing of some activities. Despite a slight decrease, the indicator referring to the volume of commodities sold by project beneficiaries was achieved in both 2019 and 2020.¹³¹ In terms of outcome, data show some progress on livelihood coping strategies and on smallholder farmers' sales. SO 5 performance at outcome level is measured by the contribution of the country strategic plan to enhancing smallholder farmers' livelihoods, for which a set of indicators related to Food Consumption Score and Livelihoods-based Coping Strategies indexes, and the value and volume of smallholder farmers' sales were defined. There is no outcome monitoring report available and data collection only started in 2019. More comprehensive data were collected in 2020 showing some positive results when compared to baseline/target values. However, Food Consumption Score targets have not yet been met, although progress was documented. With regard to Livelihoods-based Coping Strategies, targets were either exceeded or are on track. The percentage of smallholder farmers selling through WFP-supported aggregation systems exceeded the target,¹³² although it is still slightly below for women (13 percent against a 21 percent target). COMET data does not show any follow up values beyond the 2019 baseline survey, making it difficult to assess progress over time, which is

¹²⁶ Outcome data is in the process of being collected and analysed for 2021.

¹²⁷ In part this was due to the fact that while in 2019 the ZPHL-related activities covered six districts, in 2020 activities were more focused on the GTNS project, which covered only one district.

¹²⁸ 460 percent target achievement in 2019 and only 49 percent in 2020.

¹²⁹ 100 percent target achievement in 2019 and only 60 percent in 2020.

¹³⁰ 100 percent target achievement in 2019 and only 80 percent in 2020.

¹³¹ 130 percent and 107 target achievement in 2019 and 2020, respectively.

¹³² 36 percent for men and 47 percent overall, against a target of 25 percent and 21 percent, respectively.

an important dimension to measure the success of this outcome. Smallholders exceeded sales targets for both value and volume.

101. Finding 2.1m: The quality of WFP smallholder agriculture market support has improved through attention to key areas such as market access and information, post-harvest losses, and a range of innovations, yet synergies with FAO and IFAD are limited.

102. Within the Millennium Development Goal 1c project, WFP addressed access to markets by smallholder farmers through enhancing market information. The Zero Post-Harvest Loss Initiative (ZPHL) focused on supporting farmers to reduce post-harvest losses at household level and on fostering market integration by facilitating linkages to stable markets, such as schools. The virtual farmers market project – which is a digital solution to connect farmers to markets – can provide an opportunity for smallholder farmers to virtually access markets to sell their produce, buy agricultural inputs and access information on agricultural practices, weather forecast, market price information and nutrition. The post-harvest loss component (PHLC) within Activity 6 promoted the use of improved techniques for food conservation through hermetic technologies for storage of grains and legumes and drying of fruits and vegetables based on solar dryers at smallholder farmers' level. In 2020 WFP managed to approve the Beyond Cotton project in partnership with the Mozambique Institute of Cotton and Oilseeds and facilitated by a South-South and triangular cooperation initiative between Mozambique and Brazil supported by the WFP Centre of Excellence. This project aimed to increase production, local income and food and nutrition security for smallholder farmers. However, the absence of strategic partnerships with FAO and IFAD regarding smallholder agriculture market support was noted by informants as a factor compromising quality and effectiveness (see also paragraph 69).

SO 6: Humanitarian and development partners in Mozambique are reliably supported by an efficient and effective supply chain and information and communications technology services and expertise.

103. The country strategic plan contribution to this strategic outcome was planned through Activity 7, which is to provide supply chain services for humanitarian and development partners. This strategic outcome is framed under the WFP corporate resilience building focus area. Table 7 provides an overview of outcome and output targets achievement (details in Annex 15).

Table 7: SO 6 Outcome and output performance overview

Activity 7	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021 ¹³³
Activity 7					
Outcome					
Indicators reported/Indicator values reported including breakdown	1/1	1/1	1/1	1/1	-
Targets met	0	1 (100%)	0	1 (100%)	-
Output					
Indicators reported against target	0	0	4	6	2
Targets met (>90%)	-	-	4 (100%)	6 (100%)	0
Targets not met (<90 % & >50%)	-	-	0	0	0
Targets not met (<50%)	-	-	0	0	2 (100%)

Source: COMET

104. Finding 2.1n: The country strategic plan performed as planned with regard to the provision of supply chain services for humanitarian and development partners, although some concerns still remain.

105. As shown in Table 7, the country strategic plan performed as planned, though there are some limitations in the information the indicators can capture. At output level, in 2020, WFP transported over 1,000 cubic metres of goods for partners. WFP handled over 3,300 cubic metres through its storage services. Output data on capacity strengthening also show good performance. At outcome level, the only indicator for SO 6 is the user satisfaction rate, which fluctuates between 75 percent and 100 percent each year. Data for 2021 (from the first quarter) shows that none of the capacity strengthening indicators on people trained and tools developed had been met. This is not a sign of bad performance, since ongoing COVID-19 restrictions have led to the postponement of some activities.

106. WFP has provided supply chain services to a wide range of actors, including United Nations agencies, other humanitarian organizations and government institutions including UNICEF, UNFPA, FAO, UNAIDS, the World Bank (WB), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Ministry of Health and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In addition to the logistical services provided, WFP has facilitated a series of training sessions on supply chain for United Nations partners in 2019. By working side-by-side with government partners, WFP contributed to strengthening capacities through formal training and on-site training. This was the case in 2018 and 2019 when WFP procured and delivered 5,600 metric tons of mixed nutrition commodities to health facilities,¹³⁴ which also contributed to the Ministry of Health's capacity strengthening by working closely with their logistic department. In 2020 and 2021, WFP has only provided supply chain services to United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations.

107. Overall, partners benefitting from WFP services recognize that WFP offers some competitive advantages. WFP moves large volumes of cargo and, through contracts with third parties, offers competitive prices for transport and storage. Partners also recognize that WFP has better access and is generally the only option when it comes to last-mile access in areas such as Cabo Delgado. WFP offers services on a cost-recovery basis and quotes are not binding. In this regard, partners are able to choose other options if the prices or conditions are better. Nevertheless, some partners have experienced challenges with the provision of logistical services by WFP. While most partners are generally satisfied with WFP services and the way they are structured, there are cases where WFP performance has been below expectations. Some partners have raised concerns about delays in delivering or processing stocks by WFP. There are also cases where some partners reported experiencing some losses during storage and transportation. Some partners also expressed concerns about visibility when they rely on WFP services, stressing the fact that the image of WFP is put forward instead of theirs when delivering on their behalf.

108. Finding 2.1o: WFP supply chain services remained crucial in response to emergencies.

¹³³ Outcome data is in the process of being collected and analysed for 2021.

¹³⁴ As part of the USAID-World Bank-MISAU PEPFAR tripartite programme.

109. Since the cyclones in 2019 the private sector has been more present in the disaster-prone areas, providing transportation, handling and shelters services, according to the informants met in the field. Sufficient trucks and warehouses are available in most areas. United Nations agencies regularly use the private sector as well as WFP services, depending on price and availability of services. However, whilst many actors acknowledge the proficiency of the private sector during normal times, in emergency contexts WFP continues to play a key role since supply chains need additional services such as air transport, the deployment of isolated warehouses or logistical emergency expertise.

SO 7: Government and humanitarian partners in Mozambique have access to effective and reliable services during times of crisis

110. Under this outcome area, WFP sought to provide humanitarian and development partners with logistics cluster services (Activity 8), emergency telecommunications cluster services (Activity 9), humanitarian air services (Activity 10), and accommodation, transport and other services as required (Activity 11).

111. Finding 2.1p: WFP has provided effective and reliable services to government and humanitarian partners in response to emergencies.

112. Outcome and output data show that activities performed as planned in 2019, but there are no data recorded for 2020 and 2021. There is only one outcome indicator under SO 7 looking at user satisfaction with WFP services provided through the logistics cluster. Data have been collected for 2019 only and show that 97.8 percent of the respondents were satisfied with WFP performance. There are also six output indicators covering all four activities under SO 7. Data for 2019 shows that all outputs were achieved, except for Activity 11, where the volume of cargo transported was slightly below the target (91.4 percent). In 2020, there are data reported against two indicators, but the absence of target values makes it impossible to assess performance. No data are available at this stage for 2021.

113. External evaluations and implementing partners interviewed show satisfaction with the support provided by WFP in crisis response to cyclones through the logistics cluster management, as well as through provision of telecommunication services. Key informants met also emphasized that building robust partnerships between international agencies and the Government of Mozambique has been a significant achievement, and that WFP support resulted in on-ground capacity strengthening, particularly for INGD. It is also clear that WFP is positioned as a primary actor/partner for emergency response in the eyes of the Government of Mozambique and United Nations partners. However, external evaluations also highlighted some challenges, for example: i) around different approaches by headquarters and the country office on engagement with the Government of Mozambique, since headquarters wished to respond quickly to the cyclone whilst the country office tried to engage more with the government authorities;¹³⁵ and ii) language barriers since certain United Nations officials could not communicate in Portuguese.¹³⁶

114. Finding 2.1q: Emergency response was followed by emergency preparedness to help the country in better anticipating similar situations. However, this preparedness exercise has not yet been completed.

115. As part of its exit strategy, and following the Global Logistic Cluster Strategy (2016-2021),¹³⁷ a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed in May 2019 between WFP and INGD to share and transfer WFP knowledge, processes, and tools to INGD in three key areas: emergency preparedness and logistics operations, supply chain planning and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).¹³⁸ That same year, Mozambique was also selected by the logistics cluster community as one of the 24 country candidates for the Global Logistics Cluster's Field-Based Preparedness Project ("the Project").¹³⁹ In November 2019, a

¹³⁵ WFP, 2020. Strategic Evaluation of WFP's Capacity to Respond to Emergencies, p.22.

¹³⁶ IAHE, 2020. Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Response to Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, p.6 and 48.

¹³⁷ Strengthen logistics preparedness of national actors is the first goal the Strategy.

¹³⁸ Memorandum of Understanding between INGC and WFP, May 2019.

¹³⁹ The Project aims primarily to support and empower national actors in strengthening their capacity to prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises. A key objective is to facilitate a coordinated approach towards improving local supply chain resilience and information exchange between the government, national actors and the private sector, to ensure all actors are well prepared for joint humanitarian logistics responses.

logistics cluster preparedness gap-analysis workshop was held in Maputo¹⁴⁰ leading to the establishment of the National Plan of Emergency Preparation (2019-2021).¹⁴¹ However, following the general elections in January 2020, certain people highly involved in the preparedness strategy within the INGD changed function.¹⁴² Those internal changes pushed back the endorsement of the National Plan to June 2020. From December 2020 onwards preparedness activities slowly scaled down as WFP and the INGD shifted their attention to the floods in the Sofala province and the increase of the hostilities in the Cabo Delgado province.

EQ2.2 To what extent did WFP contribute to achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, disability, accountability to affected populations, gender and other equity considerations)?

116. Finding 2.2a: There is evidence that humanitarian principles are being applied in WFP field interventions.

117. Analysis of project documents and progress reports shows that humanitarian principles are being applied, through: respect for the customs and traditions of communities; inclusion and participation of beneficiaries; a growing focus on capacity building of communities and government institutions; and coordination of actions with public institutions and other development partners in the country. This was confirmed by those interviewed, who considered that WFP interventions have been impartial and neutral. For example, it was noted that WFP emergency assistance prevented discrimination among beneficiaries (for example, based on gender, race, ethnicity or religion), and that it has been provided in a neutral way, particularly considering the difficult context of the current non-state armed conflict in the north. This was also confirmed by the e-survey respondents, as around 80 percent of WFP staff consider the WFP appliance of humanitarian principles to be “good” or “above average”; the same opinion was expressed by external stakeholders where 87.7 percent rated the appliance of humanitarian principles by WFP at 3, 4 and 5 (scale 1 to 5) with 62.2 percent considering them to be “good” or “above average”.

118. Finding 2.2b: Country strategic plan contribution to protection was very incipient during the first half of implementation, but several improvements were made from 2019 onwards.

119. The original country strategic plan document makes no reference to protection principles or specific measures to protect affected populations and beneficiaries. The country strategic plan's indicator framework includes ten cross-cutting indicators, of which three relate directly to the protection dimension. However, only one is reported against from 2018¹⁴³ and the other two have only been informed upon since 2019.¹⁴⁴ The country strategic plan mid-term review (MTR) detected these gaps, which were confirmed by interviews with WFP staff for this evaluation. During the first half of implementation, WFP did not do any distribution monitoring, which made it impossible to collect evidence on whether protection-related corporate commitments were being met. From 2019 onwards WFP introduced various improvements. For example, WFP reviewed protection aspects of its food assistance for assets programme with a view of formulating recommendations to safeguard beneficiary protection through reviewing the location and timing of distributions. Most vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and pregnant and lactating women, were prioritized with a focus on shortening waiting times at distribution sites. Field visits found that beneficiaries felt secure, which was also confirmed by WFP surveys (for example, close to 100 percent of both women and men reported feeling secure travelling to and from WFP distribution sites¹⁴⁵). In 2018/2019 WFP also reinforced its prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) controls, including establishment of PSEA focal points, active training of staff and retailers, provision of reporting mechanisms and tools for community engagement (posters and key messages).

¹⁴⁰ The workshop brought together 50 participants from across the Government, humanitarian organisations and the private sector to discuss the logistics gaps and constraints and to bring potential solutions to increase national logistics capacities.

¹⁴¹ INGD, Plano nacional de preparação a Emergência - Área da logística 2019-2021.

¹⁴² This was the case of the director of the INGD who was highly involved in the National Plan before quitting her functions.

¹⁴³ The indicator referring to the “proportion of targeted people accessing assistance without protection challenges”.

¹⁴⁴ These new indicators are: i) “proportion of targeted people having unhindered access to WFP programmes”; and ii) “proportion of targeted people who report that WFP programmes are dignified”.

¹⁴⁵ WFP, 2018. Mozambique Annual Country Report 2018, p.14.

120. In 2019, the country office approved standard operational procedures (SOP) with regard to safe and dignified distributions. Protection considerations were included through the definition of minimum standards for targeting controls; dignified and equitable food assistance distributions; protection of persons with specific needs and extremely vulnerable households; and PSEA.¹⁴⁶ WFP then worked with cooperating partners to better communicate distribution dates using various mechanisms, such as notice boards or community meetings with beneficiaries. Radio broadcast were used by WFP and on an inter-agency basis to raise awareness of the fact that assistance was free and on PSEA. Subsequent distribution monitoring found that almost all beneficiaries were able to access WFP food assistance in a proper manner and did not experience any safety incidents.¹⁴⁷ From 2020, beneficiary protection became a more central part of the WFP response, particularly for internally displaced persons due to the escalation of the NSAG conflict in the north.

121. Finding 2.2c: The country strategic plan has successfully put into practice a set of tools that have positively contributed to accountability to affected populations (AAP).

122. Prior operations to the country strategic plan included limited approaches to mainstreaming data collection on accountability to affected populations. This consisted mainly of meetings or group sessions with beneficiaries¹⁴⁸ and sessions with local administrations and local partners on implementation modalities.¹⁴⁹ No sound accountability to affected populations indicators were included, nor was any proper complaints and feedback mechanism (CFM) set up. However, from the second half of the country strategic plan, significant progress was achieved and several actions were put in place, including messaging for communities and tools for participatory assessments, community consultations and establishment of community committees, and the placement of complaints and feedback boxes at distribution sites and contracted retailer shops. A comprehensive complaints and feedback mechanism was set up and detailed standard operating procedures defined, including specific guidance for cooperating partners.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, WFP strengthened its human resource structure, particularly through the designation of dedicated protection and accountability to affected populations focal points in each field office. These focal points are responsible for timely analysis, referral and verification of complaints and feedback mechanism issues in close coordination with the field office and country office.

123. The complaints and feedback mechanism (*Linha Verde de Resposta a Emergência*) is an inter-agency toll-free hotline, that compliments other WFP complaints and feedback mechanisms (for example, suggestion boxes, committees, helpdesks) and has been a success in addressing and mainstreaming accountability to affected populations in Mozambique. This hotline was launched following Cyclone Idai with the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funding and was then scaled up to serve droughts in the south, cyclone Kenneth and the conflict response in the north. It has been operated by WFP on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). This hotline was also endorsed by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) as the central reporting mechanism for PSEA in Mozambique, with agencies agreeing to an inter-agency cost-sharing approach for its continued operation. Currently WFP covers 60 percent of the operational costs, and UNHCR, UNFPA, UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and FAO contributes the remaining 40 percent.¹⁵¹

124. Finding 2.2d: Disability has been considered a vulnerability criterion for the identification and targeting of beneficiaries.

125. Previous operations and the current country strategic plan make no reference to specifically addressing the needs of disable people. Important tools in use by the WFP to guide the relationship with

¹⁴⁶ WFP, 2019. Standard Operating Procedures to Safe and Dignified Distributions in Mozambique.

¹⁴⁷ WFP, 2019. Mozambique Annual Country Report 2019, p.20. Available data from COMET also show that almost all beneficiaries affirmed that they were able to access WFP assistance without major protection challenges (99.95%), that they had unhindered access to WFP programmes (99.9%), and they also reported that WFP programmes were dignified (98.25%).

¹⁴⁸ WFP, 2015. Country Programme 2012-2015: Standard Project Report, p.15.

¹⁴⁹ WFP, 2015. Assistance to Vulnerable Groups and Disaster Affected Populations in Mozambique: Standard Project Report, p.11.

¹⁵⁰ WFP, 2021. Mozambique Beneficiary Feedback & Complaint Mechanism: Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).

¹⁵¹ WFP, 2020. Annual Country Report 2020, p.26.

beneficiaries¹⁵² as well as to guide data collection¹⁵³ do not mention the disability dimension either. WFP participation in the Disability Working Group under the protection cluster was reported as very limited.¹⁵⁴ Nevertheless, field visits found that households headed by people with a disability have been automatically included as beneficiaries and, depending on the type of disability, were entitled to receive unconditional support. This is in line with corporate guidance and field work confirmed practical implementation for food assistance for assets. Disability-related indicators do not exist in the Corporate Results Framework compendium, and therefore none of the ten cross-cutting indicators of the country strategic plan monitoring and evaluation framework relate to disability. However, WFP has reported on such issues, particularly over recent years, for example: i) the process monitoring report of the Cyclone Idai emergency (2019) reported on the number of beneficiaries that were suffering from disability or chronic illness; ii) the process monitoring report of the lean season response (2020) reported on the percentage of pregnant women with chronic illness or physical or mental disability;¹⁵⁵ and The 2021 outcome survey related to the lean season response, the Level 2 response to internally displaced persons, and the COVID-19 response reported 11 percent of all households interviewed having at least one member who is living with a disability.¹⁵⁶

126. Finding 2.2e: Gender principles have been reflected in the country strategic plan and a GEWE approach has been mainstreamed throughout programming.

127. Country strategic plan interventions have sought to contribute to positive changes in gender roles, power relations and increase opportunities from a GEWE perspective. Within Activity 2, WFP encouraged the registration of women as primary recipients of cash-based transfers and applied a strong gender and SBCC component to guard against possible sexual exploitation and gender-based violence. Within Activity 3, participatory consultations of both men and women were undertaken in order to ensure a better gender balance. Within Activity 4, WFP applied constant awareness, both centrally and locally, drawing attention to challenges of school retention for girls as a result of household demands, high risks of early pregnancies, early marriage and harassment of girls by teachers. Within Activity 5, WFP was able to implement an innovative stunting reduction programme focusing on transforming gender dynamics through nutrition-sensitive resilience building, targeting households with pregnant and lactating women, adolescent girls or children. Within Activity 6, WFP was able to engage vulnerable women as beneficiaries in order to empower them and improve their entrepreneurial skills to act as suppliers of food produce for school feeding. Interviews carried out also concurred with the good performance by WFP on gender. The same opinion was expressed by the e-survey respondents, where only 6.6 percent considered that the WFP performance on GEWE was poor or below average, whilst over 89.3 percent rated it as 3, 4 and 5 on a scale of 1 to 5.

128. Finding 2.2f: In the second half of implementation, environmental aspects were more soundly included in the country strategic plan.

129. During the first two years the country strategic plan environmental issues were insufficiently considered and the country strategic plan mid-term review noted that WFP did not undertake any environmental impact or risk-screening of its activities.¹⁵⁷ Yet, defining cross-cutting indicators and setting up regular environmental impact screenings facilitated mainstreaming environmental issues at a later stage. In 2019, WFP conducted its first environmental screening.¹⁵⁸ Based on this experience, WFP started expanding the environmental screening to other activities, namely within the food assistance for assets interventions as part of emergency response and early recovery. In 2019, WFP also reported the cross-cutting indicator for the first time, referring to the proportion of activities for which environmental risks

¹⁵² For example, the SOP for Safe and Dignified Distributions or the SOP for the CFM.

¹⁵³ For example, the SOP to Conduct Outcome and Process Monitoring.

¹⁵⁴ In addition, the group itself has not yet provided significant guidelines in this regard. For example, the Protection Cluster Strategy notes that the disability approach should be applied in all aspects of emergency response, but no detailed references are given as to how this can be done in practice. The IAHE also found that the Forum for Mozambican Disabled Associations (FAMOD) – an umbrella organization of disabled peoples' organizations – had an advisory role via the Disability Working Group under the protection cluster, but it was basically to provide data since they were not directly involved in design, planning and implementation of interventions, a gap that was even acknowledged by the protection cluster itself.

¹⁵⁵ WFP, 2020. Process Monitoring Report of the Lean Season Response (November 2019–March 2020), p.1.

¹⁵⁶ WFP, 2021. Results of WFP Mozambique Outcome Survey May 2021, p.16.

¹⁵⁷ WFP, 2019. Mozambique Country Strategic Plan: Mid-Term Review, p.61.

¹⁵⁸ WFP, 2019. Mozambique Country Strategic Plan. Annual Report 2019, p.28.

have been screened and on the mitigation actions identified, as required. Available data show a good progress, with 42 percent of activities subject to environmental screening, against a target of 50 percent.¹⁵⁹

EQ 2.3 To what extent are the achievements of the country strategic plan likely to be sustained?

130. Finding 2.3a: Sustainability is compromised due to the Government's limited financial capacity.

131. The Government of Mozambique's public resources are very limited in a restrained fiscal environment. This affects prospects for many WFP activities to continue and suggests that there will be continued reliance on financial resources and technical assistance from WFP. Interviews with government informants confirmed that in general the ministries and other public institutions only have resources for running costs (that is, salaries, management costs such as fuel, communications, etc.), which makes public investment unlikely in the short or medium term. This was also confirmed by the two country capacity strengthening assessments conducted by the country office.¹⁶⁰ For example, the INGD still does not have financial capacity to manage the drone fleet and to carry out adequate maintenance. At the level of SETSAN, vulnerability and food and nutrition security analyses have to be carried out annually, but there is no public financial capacity to do so. With regards to social protection, interviews confirmed the limited public financial resources to cover all potential beneficiaries with social protection measures. Similarly, the Government of Mozambique has not committed public resources to the school feeding programme, calling into question the scaling up of the PRONAE programme with national funds.

132. Finding 2.3b: The Government's ownership is relatively high in most country strategic plan areas, but handover of programmes from WFP to the Government is unlikely to be realized.

133. Evidence of government ownership is illustrated by the high political commitment to nutrition, particularly after the high-level approval of the ESAN III and the setting up of the national council on food and nutrition security (*Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional* - CONSAN) as a government-led multi-stakeholders forum. Nevertheless, government capacity to mobilize resources (human, financial, technical, and logistical) to implement programmes and concerted actions on the ground to address the country's nutrition challenges are still weak. There is also growing interest shown by the Government of Mozambique in disaster preparedness and in the use of drones,¹⁶¹ which was reflected in the comprehensive Master Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (2017-2030). However, continued support, including in terms of technical and financial assistance, is still needed as the Government of Mozambique is not yet able to manage disaster preparedness and response without support from the WFP and other United Nations agencies. Social protection in response to shocks still needs continued support from WFP and other partners as the Government of Mozambique does not have the capacity to address all the needs and respond to the increasing number of beneficiaries. Furthermore, there is still some reluctance from the Government regarding unconditional cash-based transfer modalities, despite openness, as is illustrated by the Government's approval of unconditional cash-based transfers within its PASD programme (see paragraph 77). Several key informants reported that the M-Pesa mobile phone modality to transfer money to beneficiaries still encounters problems in delivering the right amount at the right time to the right people, which suggests weaknesses in the use of this mobile system. There are still several challenges in the capacity strengthening for school feeding and the handover of PRONAE to the Government is unlikely to be feasible in the time-frame of the current country strategic plan.

134. Finding 2.3c: WFP staff costs have increased significantly. This poses concerns about financial sustainability and various areas of the country strategic plan have seen gaps, compromising capacity to engage with the Government appropriately.

135. Total staff costs increased significantly in 2020 compared to 2019, despite a decrease in actual expenditure (Figure 6). The main drivers of staff costs have been Activity 3 (regarding food and cash-based transfers) and staff costs charged as direct support costs (DSC), which have increased since 2019. Partial data indicate that staff costs are likely to increase again in 2021. Considering the funding uncertainty for the coming years (see Annex 14), such costs might not be sustainable. Some concerns have also been raised in relation to the costs associated with the increasing numbers of international staff. However, based on the


¹⁵⁹ COMET. Further details in Annex 15.

¹⁶⁰ CCS conducted by WFP to SETSAN and INGD.

¹⁶¹ For example, besides INGD, other public institutions have already shown interest in using this technology, including for areas outside disaster preparedness and response as it is the case of the National Road Administration (ANE) and the National Fund for Energy (FUNAE).

data available, the overall impact of international positions on the costs structure is not substantial. Furthermore, despite the number of staff increasing, various areas of the country strategic plan have seen gaps. The most critical areas where adequate technical expertise is missing is regarding protection, disaster preparedness, climate change, and supply chain. There is also a perceived lack of capacity in the areas of political economy and governance analysis. This would be critical to understanding the context, providing inputs to policy discussions and being able to engage appropriately at central and decentralized levels.

Figure 6: Staff costs per activity in USD (left) and as share of total costs (right)



Source: CPB plan vs actuals report, 24/08/2021

EQ 2.4 In humanitarian contexts, to what extent did the country strategic plan facilitate more strategic linkages among humanitarian, development, and (where appropriate) peace work?

136. Finding 2.4a: **The humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus is not yet framed as a specific approach to be pursued by WFP.**

137. Linkages between humanitarian action and development cooperation are clear in the country strategic plan since its strategic direction is on maintaining WFP humanitarian assistance capacity while supporting long-term resilience and work to address the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition.¹⁶² However, the humanitarian-development-peace nexus is not yet framed as a specific approach to be pursued by WFP in Mozambique, although some steps are being taken by the country office. For example, in 2021, a conflict analysis was conducted to support conflict-sensitive programming as a first contribution towards integrating peace as part of the nexus approach by making humanitarian assistance in Cabo Delgado more peace-sensitive. As part of a transition into more recovery-oriented programming, WFP has increasingly included into its design of livelihoods activities contributions towards longer term peacebuilding objectives. These projects are currently being started, and it is therefore too early to assess their results. The humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach seeks to sustain peace as a key pillar of sustainable development along with humanitarian and development responses.¹⁶³ Yet, the contribution to the peace concept itself and the approach to pursue it is still under construction within WFP.¹⁶⁴ In recent years WFP has taken steps at the corporate level to deepen the approach and pointed out ways for its practical operationalization, namely through the country strategic plans.¹⁶⁵ WFP has also started collecting

¹⁶² WFP, 2017. Country Strategic Plan 2017-2021, p.8.

¹⁶³ United Nations General Assembly, 2016. One humanity: shared responsibility report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, February 2016.

¹⁶⁴ For example, although the “WFP CSP Policy” refers to the humanitarian-development nexus, the peace component is not yet sufficiently articulated.


¹⁶⁵ WFP, 2018. Side event on the Triple Nexus. Discussion Paper to the WFP Executive Board, June 2018.

evidence in a few countries to gather more insights.¹⁶⁶ It is therefore reasonable that the country strategic plan design did not ascribed significance to the peace component of the triple nexus. At the same time, the reality of the conflict in the north underlines the relevance of this element of the nexus for WFP in Mozambique.

138. Finding 2.4b: WFP has a strong comparative advantage in promoting coherence and coordination across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Mozambique, particularly through supply chain and resilience building areas.

139. All Informants confirmed the leading role of WFP in the rapid response to the cyclones, as well as the crucial role it has been playing in responding to the escalation of the conflict in the north. More than 55 percent of e-survey respondents said that the WFP interventions were crucial to promote greater coherence and coordination across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus; and more than 28 percent recognize WFP efforts, although they believe that there are still limitations (Figure 7). Some of the limitations pointed out were: i) limited coherence within country strategic plan activities and limited ability to establish partnerships; the need to keep the emergency response integrated with interventions focused on food and nutrition security and social welfare through resilience and long-terms approaches; iii) the need to move from short- to long-term interventions; and iv) a need for better coordination under recovery interventions with other United Nations agencies to ensure complementarities. Nevertheless, interviewees suggested that WFP has stepped in ahead of other actors to call attention to the impact of the conflict, and has responded faster while other key humanitarian actors were still hesitating.

Figure 7: E-surveys responses regarding the extent to which WFP interventions promoted coherence and coordination across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus



SOURCE: E-survey

140. The WFP contribution to resilience building is a strong opportunity to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus work. Its work in Gaza and Tete under the country strategic plan (but also before) has allowed combined strategies to rapidly assist vulnerable populations (for example, during lean seasons or drought crises) complemented with development-oriented actions towards increasing resilience in natural disaster-prone regions. In the north, WFP has been assisting vulnerable populations (including internally displaced persons and host populations), not only through humanitarian assistance, but also through contributing to their livelihoods through cash-based transfer strategies and the provision of services (for example, conservation agriculture, village savings and loans schemes, climate services, etc.) that strengthen their resilience to overcome the crisis. Another example was found in Sofala in the aftermath of the cyclones, where WFP and UNICEF successfully managed to implement a cash grant for vulnerable households (through a voucher programme) to complement the humanitarian in-kind assistance. Yet, there are opportunities to strengthen work within the humanitarian-development nexus through the supply chain services. For example, WFP supply chain has not yet incorporated the dual objective of buying, transporting, and storing goods, while at the same time contributing to development by a bottom-up approach, working with small local retailers, suppliers and smallholder farmers. Today, 90 percent of WFP

¹⁶⁶ WFP, 2019. Triple Nexus: WFP's Contributions to Peace. Beyond the Annual Performance, December 2019.

procurement is contracted through four large suppliers, while direct purchase from smaller businesses, cooperatives and smallholder farmers is still very limited.

141. Finding 2.4c: There is potential for WFP to position itself as the booster of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Mozambique.

142. The humanitarian-development-peace nexus is not yet articulated as a specific approach to be pursued within the broad United Nations system in Mozambique. For example, the UNDAF (2017-2020) points out paths for coordinated action for humanitarian assistance; however, the peace dimension is exclusively addressed through strengthening democratic and transparent governance institutions and systems that guarantee peace consolidation, human rights and equitable service. Interviews with United Nations informants confirmed that the concept is still not well known, although they recognize that such a “triple approach” could make sense, particularly given the recent evolution of the conflict in the north. Strong advocacy on humanitarian principles have been made by WFP, particularly in the northern Level 2 response. This suggests that there is room for WFP to position itself and actively contribute to the triple nexus work, namely through the various clusters where it has had a recognized active role. The Mozambique Protection Cluster Strategy (2020), which was designed even after the conflict in the north had escalated, recognizes that a clear nexus between immediate humanitarian response, recovery and development plans must be sought, but does not refer to peace; in addition, it notes that the growing humanitarian needs are not easily addressed due to a lack of qualified staff with experience on conflict sensitivity,¹⁶⁷ which is critical to address the peace dimension of the triple nexus. The same applies to the Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan 2021,¹⁶⁸ which was consolidated by the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team – of which the WFP is a key player – to continue responding to the challenges of the conflict in the north. Alongside with humanitarian assistance, development outcomes are articulated within this plan, namely through enhancing timely and adapted access to essential services, including basic services, livelihoods and assistance. But again, the interconnection with the promotion of peace is not articulated. The same applies to the food security cluster, which was established in Mozambique to coordinate the food security and livelihood responses during humanitarian crises supported by the global food security cluster and is co-lead by WFP and FAO.

2.3. EQ 3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

EQ 3.1 To what extent were outputs delivered within the intended timeframe?

143. Finding 3.1a: The country strategic plan has experienced some delays, although in most cases these were outside WFP control, and budget execution in relation to implementation plans varies significantly across years, reflecting the continuous need to adapt to external circumstances.


144. Most delays were due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the cancellation or postponement of activities, such as training and technical assistance for beneficiaries and government counterparts (SO 1, SO 4, SO 5) and general slowdown of planned activities for the refugees livelihoods programme (SO 2). Figure 8 compares actual spending with annual implementation plans. In interpreting the country strategic plan budget execution, it is important to consider the ‘fluid’ environment of the country strategic plan with multiple and evolving crisis, as illustrated by the number of significant budget revisions (see details in Annex 14). In 2018, actual spending was significantly larger than the implementation plan for several activities. This is explained by the relatively small amount of funding foreseen for some activities (for example, activities 2, 4 and 6) combined with success in fundraising (for example, Activity 3). In 2019, the large scale of emergency responses shifted donor funding trends and impacted the implementation of other activities (for example, Activity 7). In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic also affected delivery of some activities. Lack of funding and delays in the signature of agreements and the arrival of funds also explain some cases of underspending. For example, underspending in Activity 5 in 2019 is explained by the late arrival of grants and the multiyear nature of the grants received, which appear as resources available, but have to be spent over a longer period of time. For Activity 4, the debt swap should have provided a stable

¹⁶⁷ Mozambique Protection Cluster Strategy 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Mozambique Humanitarian Response Plan 2021.

funding for school feeding implementation, but the transfer of funds from WFP to the Government is very inconsistent due to challenges with reporting from the Ministry of Education and Human Development to WFP on the use of funds, which is mandatory in order to release the subsequent disbursements.

Figure 8: Actual spending compared to annual implementation plans per country strategic plan activity (percent)



Source: CPB plans vs actuals report, 24/08/2021

145. Finding 3.1b: Much of the capacity strengthening at central level and infrastructure support to PRONAE remains to be initiated and completed, including key studies, and throughout the country strategic plan school feeding was interrupted for long periods of time.

146. Successive annual plans agreed with the Ministry of Education and Human Development have mentioned targets for training specific government staff and for infrastructure and non-food item (NFI) improvements. Yet, at the time of the evaluation, it appeared that much of the envisioned focus on capacity strengthening work, including in terms of infrastructure creation, remained to be implemented. Key studies planned to inform priority setting were not conducted. The lack of implementation of planned activities was reported to be due to a range of challenges related to the design of the debt swap arrangement, differences in interpretation between WFP and the Ministry of Education and Human Development of the nature of the agreement, and differences in understanding of the hierarchy and accountability between the different partners. This contributed to a strained relationship between WFP and the Ministry of Education and Human Development that produced further delays. At the time of the evaluation, WFP was seeking to re-invigorate the relationship, but on both sides the evaluation still noted considerable differences in understanding about respective responsibilities. In addition, throughout the country strategic plan, school feeding was interrupted for long periods. Between 2018 and 2019 the PRONAE was interrupted for just

under a year¹⁶⁹ as the result of a lengthy investigation led by the Government of Mozambique when reports emerged in the north of the country that WFP had distributed food that was alleged to be expired. An investigation established that the food was not expired but took so long that by the time the results were available the food was no longer fit for consumption and had to be destroyed. In the same year, in selected areas, the cyclone activity interrupted school feeding between March and May for a large number of children. In 2020, for the duration of school closure during the COVID-19 pandemic, children did not receive school feeding as the Government did not authorize the use of take-home rations (THR).¹⁷⁰ In addition, field visits highlighted the fact that delays in the transfers of funds to schools occasioned stock-outs in schools at specific moments.

147. Finding 3.1c: The supply chain has not always functioned smoothly resulting in delays affecting different activities.

148. There is evidence of delays in the delivery of foods and goods.¹⁷¹ Delays originating at WFP are frequently attributed to the inadequate performance of the supply chain function. For example, at some point, the transport unit did not have a single transport contract that could be used for delivery of certain non-food items. Interviewees indicated that the reporting lines of the supply chain structure are not clear and that there is a lack of coordination between different units. One underlying factor that could help explain the challenges in the supply chain function is that the country office seems to struggle to attract, train and retain technical capacity in this domain. In some cases, delays can also be explained by the late submission of requests by programme managers (food release forms), which suggest less than optimal internal communication.

EQ 3.2 To what extent was coverage and targeting of interventions appropriate?

149. Finding 3.2a: Regarding humanitarian assistance WFP was able to reach the most in need, but some challenges in the selection and registering of beneficiaries still remain.

150. During the first months of the response to the Cyclone Idai, WFP interventions were based on a blanket approach. In June, when access and capacities were sufficient, only the most vulnerable were assisted, considering individual and household specificities. In the north, WFP interventions are still based on a blanket approach, considering the displacement status of beneficiaries. Whilst coverage of the cyclone response seems to have been adequate, the response should have better taken into account individual or household specificities. Regarding the cyclone response, the IAHE revealed a lack of transparency and consistency in the targeting process, although this was not specific to WFP intervention. This has been confirmed through interviews, and some informants also raised the issue that the blanket distribution did not consider the size of households. Some beneficiaries reported that the monthly food supplies were barely sufficient for households over five people. Similarly, the IAHE noted that gender and age were not perceived to have significantly influenced the distributions of assistance. Key informants reported tension between the local government and the humanitarian community associated with targeting. They warned of the possibility of beneficiaries not being internally displaced persons, double counting of beneficiaries in two or more distribution sites or internally displaced persons not being registered due to lack of information. A critical issue is that neither WFP, INAS, INGD nor other humanitarian actors are able to verify lists provided by local authorities. Another limitation to the establishment of more transparent beneficiary lists in coordination with WFP is the turnover of district- or community-level personnel, which implies constant negotiations with new interlocutors.

151. Finding 3.2b: Regarding development interventions, there is a visible geographical dispersion, which limits a more appropriate coverage

152. For example, under SO 1, the scale of ICRM interventions is still limited, although the project has expanded geographically to reach more households (from 2,600 to 5,000) in Chokwe and Chibuto districts of Gaza province and Changara district of Tete province. Under SO 3, schools have been selected across the country with the criterion of covering the largest number of provinces as per some pressure by the Ministry of Education and Human Development, despite WFP recommendations for a more targeted/focused

¹⁶⁹ APP 2018, APR 2019.

¹⁷⁰ Take-home rations were only distributed in Tete and Nampula provinces where WFP manages school feeding directly under grants from the Government of Canada and Nacala Logistics respectively (APP, 2020).

¹⁷¹ The team used the e-survey responses to request additional interviews and gather more detailed evidence on the cause of the delays attributable to WFP.

approach. This has led to dispersion and scattered implementation, rather than following a progressive expansion as foreseen in PRONAE. Under SO 4, the GTNS project has a limited coverage (focused on only 49 villages in the Chemba district and covering only 1,500 households). Under SO 5, WFP smallholder agriculture market support has been too dispersed with initiatives implemented in different geographic areas.¹⁷²

153. Finding 3.2c: The PRONAE remains at small scale compared to needs.

154. The PRONAE document foresaw the progressive scale up of the programme. This initial capacity strengthening process would focus on a small number of geographical areas, and be scaled up over time. However, since the start of the programme the Government of Mozambique has been pushing to have PRONAE implemented nationwide in schools in all provinces, and many districts, which complicated the overall management of the programme as its geographical spread is very wide and requires training in a much larger geographical area. This has created challenges to the progressive roll-out and the PRONAE still remains at small scale.

EQ 3.3 To what extent were WFP activities cost-efficient in delivery of its assistance?

155. Finding 3.3a: WFP has increasingly transitioned from food to cash-based transfer and data indicate that this is a more efficient approach.

156. Table 8 contains budget data for food and cash-based transfers broken down per value and transfer costs for the three activities where these modalities are used. It shows that WFP has been transitioning from food to cash-based transfers where possible. A comparison of transfer costs to the value of food or cash-based transfers delivered illustrates that, on average, cash-based transfers and commodity vouchers are more efficient across all activities.¹⁷³ When food delivery is used, transfer costs average 56 percent of food value in Activity 3 and 73 percent in Activity 4. In comparison, the transfer costs of cash-based transfers average 12 percent and 14 percent for the same activities respectively.

157. Finding 3.3b: The geography and context of Mozambique make it an expensive country for WFP to operate in and costs are variable among regions.

158. Delivery and supply chain costs are the main drivers of food transfer costs, as reflected in Table 8. Evidence from the moderate acute malnutrition treatment programme (see EQ 3.4, paragraph 165) also shows that costs are highly variable depending on the region where services are provided, suggesting that in some cases higher transaction costs are justifiable in order to reach the most vulnerable. Since the country strategic plan has been fluid in terms of target populations and regions, it is very difficult to make a more detailed assessment of the efficiency of different modalities. Donors interviewed as part of the evaluation confirmed that Mozambique is an expensive country in which to operate compared to other countries in the region due to access, security issues, theft and diversion risks.

¹⁷² MDG 1c (10 provinces and 73 districts across country); ii) ZPHL project implemented in 3 districts of Tete Province; iii) VFM project implemented in Nampula province; iv) GTNS/PHLC implemented in Sofala; v) Beyond Cotton project implemented in Tete and Manica provinces.

¹⁷³ The team did not have sufficient data to assess what impact CBT had on the ability of beneficiaries to purchase food rations in local markets and compare it with rations distributed by WFP.

Table 8: Food and cash-based transfer/commodity voucher cost analysis


Activity/cost element (USD)	Average 2017–31 July 2021
Activity 2	
Food value	20,553
Food transfer costs	208,995
Food transfer costs vs. value (%)	1017%
CBT/commodity voucher value	3,337,696
CBT/commodity voucher transfer costs	880,016
CBT/commodity voucher transfer costs vs. value (%)	26.4%
Total activity cost	9,434,869
Activity 3	
Food value	103,873,448
Food transfer costs	58,276,370
Food transfer costs vs. value (%)	56%
CBT/commodity voucher value	75,554,211
CBT/commodity voucher transfer costs	8,750,545
CBT/commodity voucher transfer costs vs. value (%)	12%
Total activity cost	287,373,071
Activity 4	
Food value	1,513,652
Food transfer costs	1,108,216
Food transfer costs vs. value (%)	73%
CBT/commodity voucher value	7,971,859
CBT/commodity voucher transfer costs	1,081,495
CBT/commodity voucher transfer costs vs. value (%)	14%
Total activity cost	16,291,013

Source: CPB plan vs actuals report, 24/08/2021

159. Finding 3.3c: Small pipeline breaks were only experienced early in the implementation and then in 2019.

160. Figure 9 below provides an overview of needs-based plan (NBP) requirements and shortfalls experienced over the country strategic plan implementation. Small shortfalls were experienced early in the implementation phase. The shortfall in August 2017 is attributable to Activity 7. Those later in the year are linked to Activities 3 and 4 (October) and Activity 2 (November). More significant shortfalls were experienced in 2019. Activity 7 is again the driver of the shortfall in March 2019. Those experienced later in the year (May, June, July and August) are mostly explained by Activity 3 and some of the logistical activities.

Figure 9: Needs-based plan requirements versus available resources (USD millions at full recovery cost) and shortfall (percent) on monthly basis




SOURCE: Project pipeline management tool (PMT)

161. Finding 3.3d: WFP sources most food from local traders; even if sometimes this is more expensive than imported food, it is justified to mitigate pipeline breaks and long lead times to delivery.

162. Basic foodstuffs are almost entirely procured locally (see Figure 10). International procurement is used mostly for processed products such as canned fish, ready-to-use supplementary food (RUSF), Super Cereal, the supplementary nutrition food Plumpy/Sup, and therapeutic milk. The higher price of the ‘processed’ products explains the higher share of international procurement in value. Out of a total of 69 local purchase orders in the period January 2020 to July 2021,¹⁷⁴ 45 were above the import parity price (IPP).¹⁷⁵ On average, these 45 orders were 33 percent above the import parity price. The impact on overall food costs is significant. The total value of food procured by WFP from January 2020 to July 2021 (USD 25.45 million) is 14 percent higher than the value estimated at import parity price (USD 22.32 million). Local purchase is generally more expensive, but was used to mitigate pipeline breaks and long lead times to delivery. The rationale for the above import parity price purchases was identified through a sample of 12 orders. Those with the highest premium in relation to the import parity price were selected. Out of the 12 operations, only one order does not offer a justification for the excess prices paid in relation to the import parity price. The remaining 11 orders generally argue that incoming pipeline breaks and long lead times for other options make local procurement the only option available. Interviews with WFP staff indicated that customs/import procedures for certain food items (for example, oil) can take a substantial amount of time, essentially ruling out the import of commodities to prevent pipeline breaks. The country office raised the issue with government officials for vegetable oil imports, for which local prices can be more than double the import parity price. During emergencies, simplified procedures were applied by the Government, making it easier to import foodstuff.

Figure 10: Volume (left) and value (right) of food procured by the country office in Mozambique from local and international suppliers



Source: Supply chain import parity system

163. Finding 3.3e: Supply chain efficiency is enhanced through frequent use of the Global Commodity Management Facility (GCMF), yet the country strategic plan has experienced significant post-delivery losses.

164. Throughout the entire country strategic plan 88,400 metric tons (mt) of food were purchased from the GCMF corporate inventory.¹⁷⁶ This accounts for 13 percent of the total purchases made by country offices in the region covered by the regional office in Johannesburg GCMF. Purchases from GCMF account for 45 percent of the total food purchases made by WFP. On average, over the country strategic plan period, the food was received at the handover location 37 days after purchases from GCMF, benefitting from a 60 percent lead time gain in comparison to purchasing directly from supplier (92 days). WFP reported the loss of 323 metric tons in 2018,¹⁷⁷ and 738 metric tons in 2020.¹⁷⁸ Losses in 2018 were due to concerns over the quality of maize used for school feeding, following signs of infestation in February. Inspections and tests by the Government proved that the maize was of good quality, but test results came after shelf-life

¹⁷⁴ IPP data is only available as of January 2020.

¹⁷⁵ Based on the analysis of supply chain import parity system data.

¹⁷⁶ Based on data and reporting facilitated by the WFP Strategic Financing unit (CPPF).

¹⁷⁷ WFP (2019). Report on global losses for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018. WFP, Rome.

¹⁷⁸ WFP (2021). Report on global losses for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2020. WFP, Rome.

expiration.¹⁷⁹ Losses reported in 2020 were mostly due to theft and fires in warehouses (543 metric tons), following attacks by insurgents in Cabo Delgado. A further 195 metric tons of Super Cereal were deemed unfit for human consumption due to high levels of mycotoxins. In both cases, WFP adopted measures to prevent recurrence.

165. Finding 3.3f: Several measures were adopted in different areas to enhance efficiency of operations.

166. Within the monitoring and evaluation unit a tool to track and manage the work of field monitors has been introduced to improve the allocation of work and minimize overlaps. Some initiatives have also been adopted in the area of human resource and administration (for example, asset management or recruitment process), but information is limited. In supply chain, a different method based on distance was introduced for calculating transport rates for the north corridor, leading to a 25 to 60 percent cost reduction. In order to prevent post-delivery losses several measures were undertaken by the country office, such as: i) replacing maize meal with rice where possible, as rice has a longer shelf-life; ii) contracting a food safety and quality technologist as a consultant to work on supplier assessments, capacity strengthening of suppliers and cooperating partners and warehouse management systems; iii) maintaining regular staff presence at third-party warehouses to ensure management standards and procedures are followed; iv) conducting security assessments for all warehouses in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS); v) contracting with a fumigation company to reduce losses resulting from infestation and spoilage; and vi) monitoring the movement, storage and best-before dates of stocks on a weekly basis.

EQ 3.4 To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered?

167. **Finding 3.4a: Cost-effectiveness analysis and alternative measures have been considered in some areas.**

168. **For example, within** the monitoring and evaluation function alternative approaches to outcome monitoring have been considered. The monitoring and evaluation unit has also compared different options to conduct outcome monitoring (internal versus external) concluding that internal monitoring was at least half the price of external providers. Within supply chain and procurement, price comparisons between alternative options are frequently used through the GCFM corporate tool. However, the foreseen analysis of cost-effectiveness of school feeding has not yet been conducted. Within Activity 6 it was planned to conduct research on the cost-effectiveness and viability of using mobile technology to provide market information to smallholder farmers, but no evidence was found that this had been finalized.

169. Finding 3.4b: The cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis for moderate acute malnutrition treatment shows that transport costs explain the observed differences across regions.

170. In 2021, WFP conducted a costing analysis of moderate acute malnutrition treatment comparing the costs per recovered child under 5 (CU5) in different regions. The analysis provides an estimate for the cost-efficiency of moderate acute malnutrition treatment (cost-per-child and pregnant and lactating woman treated). In both cases, the analysis shows important differences across regions, attributed to access and transport costs. For example, Zambezia, which is easy to access, had the most cost-efficient and cost-effective programme.¹⁸⁰ Nampula, where smaller amounts of food are dispatched to distant points, was the least cost-efficient and cost-effective programme.¹⁸¹ Table 9 compares the results of the cost-effectiveness analysis with evidence from other studies and regions. Considering the difficulties of operating in Mozambique, the costs seem reasonable. The moderate acute malnutrition analysis was performed in 2021 and results are yet to be used to influence or guide decisions about implementation or alternative approaches.

¹⁷⁹ USD 500.000 worth of flour destroyed by Government.

¹⁸⁰ USD 27 per treated CU5 and USD 36 per recovered CU5.

¹⁸¹ USD 105 per treated CU5 and USD 122 per recovered CU5.

Table 9: Cost per recovered child under 5, USD

Province/country	Total costs	Food costs only
Cabo Delgado	61	13.35
Zambezia	36	10.3
Tete	66	13.8
Sofala	50	14.86
Nampula	122	46.14
Manica	88	33.17
Average Mozambique	43	-
Timor Leste (2020) ¹⁸²	-	27.7
Kenya (2012) ¹⁸³	56.5	-
Pakistan (2012) ¹⁸⁴	21	-
Sierra Leone (2021) ¹⁸⁵	142-152 depending on supplement	

Source: WFP (2021). Programming to Treat Moderate Acute Malnutrition. Determining the cost of treating MAM in Mozambique based on the MAM costing tool

2.4. EQ 4: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED BY THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

EQ 4.1 To what extent did WFP analyse or use existing evidence on the hunger challenges and on the food security and nutrition issues in the country to develop the country strategic plan?

171. Finding 4.1a: Diverse analytical work prior to its design and during its implementation has informed the development of the country strategic plan.

172. In 2016 a trend analysis on key food and nutrition security indicators¹⁸⁶ was conducted by the vulnerability analysis and mapping unit in order to compare data from previous surveys (2006, 2009, and 2013) and to ascertain whether food insecurity and dietary diversity has improved over that time. In 2017, the country office led a participatory process to conduct an integrated context analysis (ICA) that contributed to the identification of broad national programmatic strategies, including resilience building, disaster risk reduction, and social protection for the most vulnerable and food insecure populations.¹⁸⁷ Country strategic plan targeting and coverage was informed by findings of the integrated context analysis of areas identified with high food insecurity and high exposure to shocks. The COHA study was carried out in Mozambique and endorsed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER) in 2018, providing the Government and partners with key actionable priority recommendations, as well as sound evidence to inform policy dialogue and increase advocacy around the importance of preventing child undernutrition. Also in 2018, SETSAN and WFP presented the Fill the Nutrient Gap (FNG) analysis, which considers key gaps in nutrition and cost options to address them with the aim of making nutritious diets more available and accessible to the most vulnerable.¹⁸⁸ Other examples included the study on the collection of evidence on rehabilitation of wasting leading to increased HIV treatment retention and uptake (2019), the knowledge, attitudes and practices study (2020),¹⁸⁹ and the study on the cost of treating

¹⁸² WFP, 2020. Evaluation of Timor-Leste WFP Country Strategic Plan (2018-2020).

¹⁸³ UNICEF, 2012. Evaluation of Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM): Kenya Country Case Study. Evaluation report. New York: UNICEF Evaluation Office.

¹⁸⁴ UNICEF, 2012. Evaluation of Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) Pakistan Country Case Study. UNICEF Evaluation Office.

¹⁸⁵ Stacy P Griswold et al (2021). "Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of 4 supplementary foods for treating moderate acute malnutrition: results from a cluster-randomized intervention trial in Sierra Leone". *The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Volume 114, Issue 3, September 2021, Pages 973-985.*

¹⁸⁶ Looking at provincial level data and compared findings by gender as well as urban versus rural data.

¹⁸⁷ WFP, 2017. Mozambique: Integrated Context Analysis (ICA).

¹⁸⁸ WFP, 2018. Fill the Nutrient Gap Mozambique.

¹⁸⁹ WFP, 2021. Knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) study: GTNS Stunting Prevention Project in Mozambique (2019-2021).

moderate acute malnutrition (2021).¹⁹⁰ WFP also supported comprehensive climate analysis and projections which have been very influential both to inform programming and for donors (see paragraph 75).

173. Finding 4.1b: Several other analyses have been conducted to inform country strategic plan implementation.

174. These included: i) standardized Monitoring and Assessment for Relief and Transition (SMART) nutrition surveys conducted by SETSAN in Cabo Delgado and Tete provinces (2019); ii) seasonal monitors with the support of the regional bureau in Johannesburg to examine satellite imagery of rainfall and vegetation in order to assess the growing season and how such conditions might impact rural livelihoods; and iii) various market assessments addressing different dimensions for targeting and coverage, for example in preparation for WFP lean season assistance,¹⁹¹ to analyse the feasibility of implementing cash-based transfers,¹⁹² in response to the displacement of population generated by the NSAG conflict in the north¹⁹³ and even as part of the social protection response to the emergency generated by COVID-19.¹⁹⁴ Several gender analyses were carried out and used to inform the country strategic plan implementation (see paragraph 59). Overall, these analyses provided insights to guide and determine the most appropriate targeting and coverage for transfer modalities (food and cash). They were referred to in various interviews and have helped improve the quality of interventions.

EQ 4.2 To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, predictable and flexible resources to finance the country strategic plan?

175. Finding 4.2a: Funding has been an important challenge for the country strategic plan implementation.

There is a significant shortfall of funding (47.3 percent of the needs) and funding was identified by key informant interviews as an important obstacle during country strategic plan implementation. As shown in Figure 11, access to financial resources was considered the most important barrier to country strategic plan implementation, with 57.4 percent of all respondents rating it as having a large or a moderate effect.¹⁹⁵ As shown in Figure 12, funding issues have affected some activities more than others. The country strategic plan received significant contributions in the first three years of implementation, including in 2019, when cyclones hit the country and funding needs increased significantly. However, in 2020 and 2021, the volume of contributions contracted considerably, in line with the challenging global funding situation. The largest shortfalls compared to the needs-based plan affect Activity 1 (42.1 percent), followed by Activity 3 (47.5 percent), Activity 5 (49.1 percent) and Activity 2 (51.6 percent).¹⁹⁶ The best funded activities are Activity 7, with funding covering 87.8 percent of needs, Activity 4 (85.7 percent) and Activity 8 (76 percent). Obtaining regular flows of resources has been challenging and has affected regularity and quality of support to internally displaced persons in the north. WFP received substantial resources in response to appeals after cyclones IDAI and Kenneth. However, for other crises resources have been challenging to obtain. It has proven difficult to have sufficient resources to cover the higher needs across all the implementation cycles and in particular to respond to the deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Cabo Delgado and the increased internally displaced persons influx. In light of limited resources, WFP has had to make adjustments by reducing ration size. These changes have been made in dialogue with partners in order to attempt to harmonize the approach and ensure minimal risk of conflict/violence.

Figure 11: E-survey perceptions on access to financial resources as a hindering factor

¹⁹⁰ WFP, 2021. Programming to Treat Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM): Determining the cost of treating MAM in Mozambique based on the MAM costing tool.

¹⁹¹ For example, the Market and cash feasibility assessment in Maputo province prepared jointly by the VAM-CBT units (2020) and the market and cash feasibility assessment in Tete province (2019).


¹⁹² For example, the market and cash feasibility assessment in Machaze district (2019) or the market and CBT feasibility assessment (2020).

¹⁹³ For example, the market assessment in Montepuez and Balama by the VAM-CBT units (2020).

¹⁹⁴ For example, the market assessment in Tete (2020) or the market assessment in Pemba (2020).


¹⁹⁵ The rating breakdown by type of respondent is 61.2 percent for WFP staff and only 35.2 percent for external stakeholders, since 41 percent of the latter said they don't know.

¹⁹⁶ Activity 11 is not considered here as it never received any funding.



Source: E-survey

Figure 12: Needs-based plan compared to total contributions per year (top) and total contributions received at the activity level (bottom), USD millions



Source: CPB Grant Balance Report, 22/08/2021 & CPB Plan vs Actual Report, 22/08/2021


176. Finding 4.2b: Earmarking seems to have increased in the country strategic plan when compared to previous operations and there is limited flexibility to move funds in order to maximize transfer values.

177. Earmarking and funding flexibility were considered by 56.4 percent of WFP staff as a moderate or a large hindrance (Figure 13).¹⁹⁷ As shown in Figure 14, the majority of the country strategic plan funding is earmarked at activity level (72 percent) and only 10 percent of the funding received is flexible. In the previous country programme, CP 200286, 53 percent of the funding received was flexible. The PRRO 200355 also shows more flexibility than the country strategic plan, although activities in the PRRO were

¹⁹⁷ This E-survey question was posed to WFP staff only.


more narrowly defined and therefore comparison is less meaningful. Earmarking prevents shifting funds across activities, and donors also apply restrictions on moving funds across cost components. For cash-based transfer and food distribution activities it is generally possible to move funds from transfer costs to the transfer value and it is also possible to move direct support costs (DSC) funds to transfer value. However, moving funds in a different direction is generally not possible and requires the approval of the donor. Overall, this increase in earmarking is consistent with trends observed in other countries. A global corporate analysis of WFP funding indicated that 84 percent of directed contributions were earmarked at activity level in 2018 and that this share fell to 71 percent in 2019.¹⁹⁸ The country strategic plan model intended to reduce earmarking, but early in the deployment of the model by WFP it was noted that earmarking increased in countries, as activities were made more visible to donors.¹⁹⁹

Figure 13: WFP staff perceptions on country strategic plan funding flexibility and earmarking



Source: e-survey

Figure 14: Earmarking levels in country strategic plan (left), CP 200286 (centre) and PRRO 200355 (right)



Source: Multilateral directed contribution by earmarking & Pre-CSP Mozambique Distribution Contribution

178. Finding 4.2c: The country strategic plan has increased the number of donors, yet most of funding is provided by a relatively small group of donors, which may entail some risks.

179. Figure 15, the country strategic plan has received funding from 33 different donors,²⁰⁰ against 9 and 14 donors for the CP 200286 and the PRRO 200355 respectively. Despite having increased the donor portfolio, the top ten donors account for 86 percent of country strategic plan funding (Figure 16) and three donors account for 50 percent of the resources. The United States of America (USA) is by far the largest contributor


¹⁹⁸ WFP, 2020. *Strategic Evaluation of Funding WFP's Work*. Evaluation Report Volume I. Rome: WFP Office of Evaluation.

¹⁹⁹ Turners, S. et al, 2018. *Strategic Evaluation of the Pilot Country Strategic Plans*. Evaluation Report. Rome: WFP Office of Evaluation.

²⁰⁰ Please, not that this figure excludes internal transfers and locally generated funds. It also aggregates contributions from private donors.


with 30 percent of the total contributions, followed by the United Kingdom (UK) and Mozambique (through the Russian debt swap). The different crises contributed to the increase in the number of donors. Interviews with donors support the view that fundraising efforts by the country office and successful implementation have contributed to maintain donors' interest, despite the challenging global funding situation. However, risks are associated with dependency on large donors. For example, the United Kingdom's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) announced significant cuts to funding in early 2021, which may affect future funding.

Figure 15: Number of country strategic plan donors per year



Source: CPB Grant Balances Report, 22/08/2021

Figure 16: Top country strategic plan donors, USD millions and percent of total funding



Source: Resource situation report 22/08/2021

180. Finding 4.2d: WFP actively sought additional financial resources and new sources of funding, including a debt swap agreement with the Russian Federation and engagement with international financial institutions (IFIs) to manage funds on behalf of the Government.

181. Additional financial resources resulted in various new projects approved in the lifetime of the country strategic plan, yet in most cases these were small in amount and normally targeted to specific activities. For example: i) WFP and FAO will jointly implement the Pro-Resilience Action (PRO-ACT) project funded by the EU in drought-prone areas of Gaza and Tete provinces; ii) WFP managed to get funds from the Global Climate Fund (GCF) to implement the climate-resilient food security project through integrated risk management; iii) WFP also got funds from the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) to implement the GTNS

project in Sofala province. Nevertheless, there are some examples where fundraising was not successful, which may suggest the need for improving fundraising strategies in this area. For example, the maternal waiting homes project proposal was revised and submitted to the Danish and German Governments, but the proposal did not match well with the WFP mandate. Local production of corn soy blend (CSB) has been submitted in two proposals, neither of which was successful because the proposals did not gain the interest of donors.²⁰¹

182. WFP successfully managed to put forward a debt swap agreement between the Government of Mozambique and the Russian Federation of over USD 40 million to support PRONAE,²⁰² which is one of the few debt swap schemes for WFP.²⁰³ WFP also has some experience implementing funds that were originally provided by the World Bank to the Government. In the context of the Cyclone Idai response, WFP signed an agreement with INAS to conduct capacity strengthening activities and provide cash-based transfers to the households in Sofala with funding from the World Bank. WFP has also received direct funding from the World Bank in the context of the COVID-19 responses to assist the the Ministry of Health with the procurement and distribution of protection equipment. WFP is currently exploring opportunities to implement some aspects of the World Bank's prevention and resilience allocation (PRA), which could unlock up to USD 700 million in funding to prevent the further escalation of conflict and build resilience in Mozambique.²⁰⁴ Although the prevention and resilience allocation is still being negotiated, it is likely that implementation will be entrusted by the Government to the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in order to speed up implementation.²⁰⁵ There are also other potential areas where WFP can collaborate, as with for example, the Northern Crisis Recovery Project (USD 100,000 million)²⁰⁶ which is being implemented by UNOPS, which approached WFP for the implementation of a cash-for-work component.

EQ 4.3 To what extent did the country strategic plan lead to partnerships and collaborations with other actors that positively influenced performance and results?

183. Finding 4.3a: The country strategic plan was able to establish partnerships with United Nations agencies and with government institutions, but the latter lacks long-term agreements at sectoral level that can go beyond specific activities.

184. WFP managed to establish partnerships with a variety of United Nations agencies and government institutions (for example, agriculture, education, social protection, disaster preparedness, and health). However, government partnerships were designed or tailored for specific activities (that is they were activity-oriented), lacking longer-term strategic agreements at sectoral level. Within SO 1, WFP supported SETSAN with the IPC analysis in order to generate and improve evidence on food security and nutrition. A memorandum of understanding was signed with INGD to provide assistance in capacity strengthening in emergency preparedness, the use of drones, logistics, and monitoring. WFP developed an ICRM approach and a drought early warning system together with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and National Meteorology Institute (INAM). Also under SO 1, WFP and UNICEF co-led the assessment and analysis of damages and losses in the social protection sector in the context of the post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) related to Cyclones Idai and Kenneth. Building on the PDNA findings, WFP, together with the World Bank, UNICEF and the International Labour Organization, supported the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action and INAS to develop a joint social protection recovery strategy to ensure a smooth transition between humanitarian assistance and longer-term government-led social assistance.

²⁰¹ WFP, 2018. Annual Performance Plan 2018.

²⁰² The financial contribution to PRONAE is provided through a debt swap arrangement with the Government of Russia, under which part of the Mozambican debt to the Russian Federation is converted to funds that can be used for pre-agreed development priorities. The programme document for support to PRONAE foresaw a five-year process, with equal allocations of 8 million USD per year, and a twin track process of progressively decreasing WFP involvement in management of food and commodities and increasing responsibility to the Government for purchasing, distribution, management and monitoring of school feeding. To achieve the progressive transition, the agreement outlines a strong role for WFP in capacity strengthening at all the levels of the school feeding process. At the end of the five years, completion of the hand-over of the process was envisioned.

²⁰³ For example, WFP has also benefitted from a German debt swap in Egypt, but the amount is smaller (USD 15 million)

²⁰⁴ Further information at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/04/27/world-bank-supports-victims-of-conflict-in-mozambique>

²⁰⁵ As per interviews with key informants.

²⁰⁶ Further information available at <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P176157>

Within SO 2, during the food assistance for cyclone-affected populations and lean season assistance, WFP partnered with the MADER and FAO to provide food assistance to households receiving seeds and tools for the upcoming growing season. Moderate acute malnutrition treatment was also implemented in collaboration with UNICEF with a transition to value vouchers in urban areas affected by Cyclone Idai. Also under this strategic outcome, an inter-agency Livelihoods for Durable Solutions project, funded by the USA Bureau of Population Refugees and Migrants (PRM), coordinated by WFP, continued to pursue improved livelihoods and local integration solutions for the refugees. Implemented in partnership with the Government of Mozambique, UNHCR, FAO and UN-Habitat, the three-year programme aims to enhance the self-reliance of asylum seekers, refugees and host communities in Maratane, while fostering the local integration of refugees in Mozambique. Within SO 3, a tripartite agreement was signed with the Ministry of Education and Human Development, Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the WFP Centre of Excellence to support the implementation of PRONAE and the transfer of responsibilities to the Government. Within SO 4, a project was initiated jointly with IOM to support people living with HIV affected by Cyclone Kenneth in mid-2019 in five districts of Cabo Delgado province through the One UN fund. Within SO 6, WFP provided a range of services to UNICEF, UNFPA, FAO, USAID and the Ministry of Health covering the procurement of specialized nutritious foods, storage and handling, customs clearance, port operations, inventory management, transport and quality control. In addition, on behalf of the One UN procurement committee, WFP completed the contracting process of a clearing and forwarding agency to be used by all United Nations agencies in Mozambique. The service level agreements were expanded in 2020 including FAO, UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNFPA and ICRC.

185. Finding 4.3b: WFP participates in some food and nutrition security technical working groups and multi-stakeholder forums, but this has not resulted in more opportunities for collaboration and effective partnerships, namely in the nutrition area.

186. WFP co-chaired the Nutrition Partners Forum with the Department for International Development (DFID), a joint United Nations/donor network within the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) movement. However, according to key informants, this group has functioned mainly to seek funding opportunities, often resulting in competition for resources, rather than to explore synergies and complementarities among United Nations agencies in the area of nutrition. WFP co-convened the SUN Business Network with the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), but none of the informants reported significant synergies that have resulted from this group. It seems that more effective collaboration opportunities have also been leveraged in the area of HIV/AIDS, namely through the HIV-emergency technical working group co-chaired by WFP and IOM under UNAIDS. For example, a joint action plan was developed that included a strategic area dedicated to the HIV-emergency. With support from UNAIDS, WFP implemented a communication-centred HIV emergency response project in Sofala.

187. Finding 4.3c: Partnerships with academia have been incipient, which limits the ability of WFP to capitalize on its results and generate lessons.

188. There are some examples, such as the case of the partnership with the University of Reading for the drought early warning system that is being built with INAM, but overall partnerships with academia have not been prominent, and have not explored the opportunities of partnering with Mozambican institutions. These partnerships could have included universities and other educational and research institutions that could be helpful to WFP in supporting the systematization of evidence and lessons learned, including as part of the knowledge management strategy that still has gaps (see paragraph 205).

EQ 4.4 To what extent did the country strategic plan provide greater flexibility in dynamic operational contexts and how did it affect results?


189. **Finding 4.4a: The country strategic plan has functioned as a flexible programmatic framework that has allowed WFP to respond to the evolving context in Mozambique.**

190. Over the course of the country strategic plan the country context changed dramatically with large scale humanitarian interventions, including the COVID-19 pandemic response. Recurrent emergencies have resulted in changes in prioritization of work streams, which has put some strain on internal processes and working. Nevertheless, in spite of the country strategic plan being a new structure for WFP work, it provided an appropriate and flexible programmatic framework to review priorities that were essential to allow the organization to respond promptly.

191. **Finding 4.4b: Under the country strategic plan, the staffing of the country office and field offices was appropriately scaled up to allow WFP to respond to the very dynamic context.**

192. The total number of local and international staff has increased significantly between 2016 and 2021, thus allowing the organization to face the growing demands of work, particularly for the humanitarian and emergency responses (Figure 17). When compared to the local staff, international staff has also expanded in relative terms. In 2016, international staff accounted for 11 percent of all WFP staff and has been increasing ever since. Nevertheless, gaps in certain areas remain (see paragraph 135).

Figure 17: Country office staff evolution over time by gender and type of staff, stacked columns for type of staff



Source: CO data

193. **Finding 4.4c: At different levels WFP systems are not adapted to the role of WFP in the context of the country strategic plan and there are still gaps in access to and management of new funding modalities such as debt swap and through international financial institutions.**

194. The country strategic plan envisioned a more important role for WFP in upstream support to Government in developing capacity and systems in various areas (disaster preparedness and response, school feeding, social protection, nutrition, etc.). While this role is recognized in various corporate policies,²⁰⁷ WFP systems, processes and tools at corporate level have still to be adapted to the realities of the direct relationship with Government, particularly towards capacity strengthening. The capacity strengthening framework (including proper indicators) remains inadequate to capture change at different levels.

195. At corporate level, there is an increasing focus on tapping new sources of funding, including for WFP to manage funds on behalf of the Government. Under this country strategic plan the country office has made an effort in accessing resources through these modalities (see Finding 4.2d), but there are still gaps in the country office's flexibility and organizational readiness. These arrangements require continued trilateral

²⁰⁷ For example, WFP School Feeding Policy, WFP Policy on Capacity Development, WFP Nutrition Policy, among others.

dialogue, discussions and negotiations as funds are disbursed to the Government, which has been challenging and demanding for the country office. For example, in relation to international financial institutions, although dialogue between WFP and the World Bank occurred, some proposals have been submitted by WFP to the World Bank on an ad hoc basis, which suggests an unappropriated approach and a need to continue to strengthen mutual engagement at managerial level. In relation to the debt swap modality, there has been several challenges in implementing the agreement,²⁰⁸ as illustrated in Box 1. In addition, effectiveness and quality in implementing the debt swap agreement were also affected by limited support and corporate oversight from headquarters and by the Government of Mozambique's political decision towards expanding the PRONAE nationwide.

Box 1: Factors affecting the implementation of the debt swap agreement

The agreement was based on the assumption of identical financial needs for each year to the transition and expansion of PRONAE, with the total budget of USD 40 million being divided into equal portions of USD 8 million per year. This has been a challenge as the needs are not identical each year for a progressive transition and scaling up process. Interviewees also suggest that the time-frame of five years was very ambitious in light of learning from other countries in the region (for example, Kenya) and the very limited capacity at the start of PRONAE.²⁰⁹ In addition, the lack of a regulatory framework for PRONAE has meant that many issues under the programme remained subject to interpretation and, in the context of an increasingly difficult relationship, this has not facilitated the decision making process.

In practice, the envisioned relationship between the Ministry of Education and Human Development and WFP has been subject to tensions that remained evident at the time of this evaluation. Differences in interpretation of the debt swap agreement and respective roles in decision making and implementation have led to a progressive erosion of a relationship that, prior to the country strategic plan, had been very strong between the Government of Mozambique and WFP. This has affected the quality and effectiveness of the PRONAE roll-out, and in some cases has meant that WFP has not been able to follow its own internal processes of verification. For example, the Ministry of Education and Human Development has not consistently been amenable to monitoring visits by WFP, which has made it difficult at times to obtain up-to-date information on selected areas of implementation. Furthermore, it has not been possible to agree on a joint process for conducting the envisioned evaluation of PRONAE.²¹⁰

For the Government of Mozambique, the debt swap funds, which come from national resources, are seen as internal government funds. The contractual arrangement between the Ministry of Education and Human Development and WFP requires financial reporting from the Ministry of Education and Human Development on funds that are disbursed via WFP (funds that originally come from the Government). As a result, there have been significant tensions around management in general, and reporting requirements by the Ministry of Education and Human Development to WFP with the Government of Mozambique demanding accountability from WFP given its role as service provider. WFP has provided overall annual reports from global level, on the use of funds. However, the Government of Mozambique has expressed limited satisfaction with the level of detail in these reports. Conversely, there have been significant challenges with the reporting from the Ministry of Education and Human Development to WFP on the use of funds. At the time of writing the Ministry of Education and Human Development had an outstanding balance to WFP of 3.5 million USD related to funds advanced in 2018.

²⁰⁸ In Mozambique WFP acts as a service provider to the Government for technical assistance and support, and the debt-swap arrangement is governed by three agreements: i) between the GoM and the Russian Federation, which focuses on the amount of funding to be made available; ii) between WFP and the Ministry of Finance, on arrangements for fund transfer through an account for WFP opened at the Central Bank; and iii) and between WFP and MINEDH, on the nature of technical assistance provision by WFP and the parameters of the transition process.

²⁰⁹ The SABER report assessed Mozambique on key indicators as being latent or emerging (ratings between 1-2). The report was not officially published in light of objections to the findings from the GoM. A follow-up SABER has not taken place.

²¹⁰ This evaluation is now being commissioned directly by the GoM and will follow Government rules for evaluation, rather than those that WFP abides by.

196. **Finding 4.4d: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic WFP was able to use the country strategic plan framework to agree with donors on key adjustments, but negotiation with the Government has been more challenging.**

197. Various adjustments were made to ways of working to allow the country office and field offices to continue functioning under COVID-19 restrictions. For example, a key innovation has been that the country office set up a remote monitoring mechanism, which ensured continuity of programme monitoring during the COVID-19 pandemic. The country strategic plan period also saw WFP engaging with donors to adjust procedures (for example, reporting) and modalities to the reality of the COVID-19 response (for example, use of take-home rations in Tete). However, government reservations on some of the proposed changes ultimately reduced their effectiveness, as was the case when take-home rations were not authorized by the Ministry of Education and Human Development for the PRONAE and government reluctance on food assistance for assets resulted in a light-touch approach.

EQ 4.5 What are the other factors that can explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the country strategic plan?

198. **Finding 4.5a: Internal oversight and management of the country strategic plan has been challenging for parts of the country strategic plan period and has affected performance.**

199. Throughout the country strategic plan's implementation the country office experienced several Country Director (CD), changes and gaps. On the other hand, although the Head of Programme (HoP) position did exist, no dedicated staff member was allocated, and therefore the position was held by the Depute Country Director (DCD) until October 2020. As a result, the Depute Country Director position concentrated an overload of work, tasks and responsibilities. This compromised the oversight of the programme as well as the country office's capacity to ensure coherence between activities. Interviews with WFP staff confirmed that throughout the country strategic plan there has been a lack of dialogue and working across activity areas that seems due to the organizational set-up under the country strategic plan, which is by activity areas. This has contributed to fragmentation, thus hindering an overall vision to promote synergies and complementarities between activities. Informants mentioned that some challenges remain in the coordination between the supply section and programme. On the other hand, management of activities is centred in Maputo (the capital of Mozambique), which hinders a closer collaboration and interaction with provincial and district authorities.

200. **Finding 4.5b: Monitoring and evaluation processes under the country strategic plan were weak for the first half of the implementation period, affecting capacity to use monitoring as a tool for improving performance, but were significantly improved after the country strategic plan mid-term review. .**

201. There were strong gaps in the monitoring and evaluation system during the first half of implementation. Only from 2019 onwards did the country office started collecting data in a systematic way. The mid-term review provided an important and useful assessment of strengths and weaknesses in various areas, including monitoring and evaluation. After that, the monitoring and evaluation function evolved considerably with excellent work including on the definition of various standard operational procedures and significant improvement of internal monitoring and evaluation tools and processes, including the introduction of process monitoring.

202. **Finding 4.5c: Important and timely support was provided by the regional bureau in Johannesburg, but headquarters engagement on some areas has been lacking.**

203. The regional bureau in Johannesburg has provided helpful and timely inputs to the country office to respond to the humanitarian crises. Other examples include support to improving monitoring and evaluation systems, expansion of cash-based transfers, and strengthening the gender approach. However, headquarters engagement and support has been less evident, particularly within the debt swap arrangement where support was needed. A "Debt Swap Working Group" was created at headquarters in 2021 to share information and start supporting countries but post-dates the Mozambique engagement by several years. However, to date, the engagement by headquarters has mainly focused on requests for information from the Mozambique country office, rather than support to the challenging management of the arrangement itself. Furthermore, headquarters was supposed to provide a methodology to monitor the

share of budget going to gender equality activities, but it has not done so.²¹¹ Although country office staff were aware of this commitment, there was no clarity in assigning responsibilities, agreeing a methodology and building the required capacity. The country office is currently discussing how to implement the commitment as part of the development of the new country strategic plan.

204. Finding 4.5d: There are opportunities for learning from other countries and improving knowledge management to inform country strategic plan priorities, but these have not been promoted by the regional bureau in Johannesburg.

205. There are various areas where country office's capacities are weak or need more reinforcing and where more exchange with other countries could have been beneficial.²¹² Namibia is a good example in terms of work on strengthening monitoring and evaluating capacity where WFP and the Government managed to define a clear framework/road map of what they intended to do over five years. In Lesotho there has been interesting work done on better structuring teams with regard to monitoring and evaluation and also in utilizing monitoring data (that is, analysing the data collected) where WFP came up with very short reports that are widely disseminated for every monitoring round. Kenya has considerable experience in handing over processes to its Government and could provide interesting learning for Mozambique in expanding into dimensions of enabling and institutional strengthening. On the other hand, the country office has been very prolific in the production of studies, diagnostic assessments, etc., some of them are of great depth and quality. The monitoring system has significantly improved, allowing for more data and evidence to be collected. However, all this work has not yet been "digested" in the sense of generating lessons and disseminating knowledge. To a large extent, this is due to the lack of staff time (including communications and monitoring and evaluation) due to heavy workloads and the lack of a knowledge management strategy. As a consequence, key achievements and concrete results from the field are not being properly shown and disseminated, which could feed into information sharing, including with donors and international financial institutions.

206. Finding 4.5e: High turnover of government officials following elections, including high-level senior staff, delayed technical assistance and capacity strengthening processes.

207. Staff turnover in the Government is high in Mozambique, but throughout the country strategic plan it was aggravated due to the 2019 general elections. It resulted in the merger of several ministries, the extinction and/or creation of new national directorates, and consequent changes in public administration. High turnover in staff leads to loss of knowledge and to a need for constant training and refreshments, which are time-consuming and expensive. As a result, effectiveness of technical assistance and capacity strengthening processes were compromised, as they rely on government buy-in and on the stability of the agreements in the long term.

208. Finding 4.5f: The ongoing decentralization process and the changes in the administrative structure of provincial governments pose challenges in the implementation of the country strategic plan.

209. Decentralization has been a process underway for some years, but throughout the country strategic plan the country has experienced significant changes in the internal structure of provincial governments, as well as in the increasing financial and administrative autonomy of district governments. This posed challenges to the WFP in terms of institutional relationship and dialogue with local authorities, leading to delays in signing agreements, selecting communities and starting activities on the ground. For example, the direct appointment of provincial Secretaries of State by the President somewhat overshadow the position of the Provincial Governor. This seems to have created confusion and overlapping of internal functions within the provincial governments and has made it more difficult for WFP to enhance dialogue channels and reach agreements at the local level.

²¹¹ Following the WFP policy (2015-2020), 15 percent of funds should be spent on gender equality activities by 2020.

²¹² Based on interviews with RBJ.

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1. CONCLUSIONS

210. The country strategic plan was relevant to country priorities and people's needs and offered a flexible programmatic framework. Overall programme performance was as expected, albeit with some delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which compromised the delivery of some outputs. Despite the recurrent crises and emergencies that affected Mozambique, WFP responded promptly and effectively to the cyclones and other shocks and the country office managed to hold steady and deliver. Nevertheless, progress in capacity strengthening is still modest.

The strategic positioning and role of WFP in Mozambique

211. **C1: The shift from a principal role in the humanitarian area towards a role that also includes development-oriented interventions was relevant to country priorities and people's needs.** The strategic shift towards prioritizing support and capacity strengthening of government systems and institutions was well aligned with country priorities in the area of nutrition, social protection, disaster preparedness and school feeding. By design, climate change adaptation was not mainstreamed across all focus areas and related activities, but throughout implementation. WFP work on climate resilience contributed to increased relevance and enhanced its positioning as a key actor in this area.

212. **C2: WFP strategic positioning remained relevant within the broad United Nations system, particularly in response to crises, but further partnerships in the development area were insufficiently strategic.** The prompt response to the different crises enhanced the position and relevance of WFP as a major actor in the humanitarian sector across the range of government, United Nations, and donor stakeholders. However, despite the wide range of partnerships established in the area of development, more consistent alignment with FAO and IFAD is missing and would be essential to better articulate WFP capacities with the comparative advantages brought by its sister agencies. This is particularly needed in the area of climate resilience and support to smallholder farmers.

Extent and quality of the specific contributions of WFP to country strategic plan strategic outcomes

213. **C3: Implementation of the original country strategic plan focus on development has been somewhat overshadowed by the different crises that the country has faced.** Throughout the country strategic plan, the country was affected by a succession of natural disasters of unexpected size and scale, by the escalation of a conflict in the north, and also by the COVID-19 pandemic. This brought about a significant shift and a much larger priority for humanitarian and emergency assistance than had been originally envisioned. As a result, WFP in Mozambique ended up with a very large and wide-ranging portfolio, which was not always easy to manage.

214. **C4: Progress in capacity strengthening is still modest.** Despite some improvements in strengthening the Government's capacity – namely food and nutrition security analysis under SETSAN's coordination and in regard to disaster preparedness under INGD's coordination – consolidation of the Government's internal capacity strengthening limits the country office's ability to measure and track progress over time.

215. The country strategic plan foresaw a strong focus on capacity strengthening and infrastructure support of Government at central and decentralized levels for gradual take-over of school feeding, but this has not been completed. The debt swap modality that was put in place to enable WFP to manage funds for school feeding on behalf of the Government has been interpreted differently by the partners, and the agreements associated with this modality have been challenging to implement on both sides. This produced considerable tensions between the Government and WFP in the area of school feeding. Overall, the PRONAE programme remains at small scale compared to needs, and the Government of Mozambique has not allocated envisioned funding for school feeding, which is essential for take-over.

216. Important work was achieved in the area of climate resilience and WFP contributed to significantly increase the evidence-base to support its strategic approach to resilience building against weather-related shocks. The ICRM approach and the drought early warning system seem promising in order to provide a package of differentiated services at national and community level, but still need time to be further consolidated and scaled up. The innovative approach introduced by WFP for stunting prevention with a gender and nutrition-sensitive focus across programming allowed WFP to achieve progress on nutrition, particularly for women.

217. Important work was also achieved to link humanitarian work with shock-responsive social protection. WFP has successfully rolled out, consolidated and scaled-up modalities of transfer in response to the needs of populations during and after crises (climate- and conflict-related). A range of in-kind and cash-based transfers have been provided to beneficiaries in need to address the food and nutrition security needs of drought, cyclone and insecurity, as well as for conflict-affected populations. With Cyclone Idai, WFP was able to scale up the cash-based transfers and to work on addressing issues such as market coverage and limitations of financial service providers.

218. C5: WFP was able to provide effective and reliable services to a wide range of actors in responding to emergencies, but there are still a few gaps that need to be addressed within the supply chain. WFP responded promptly and effectively to the various crises including by the provision of a wide range of services to United Nations agencies, other humanitarian organizations and government institutions. The performance of WFP was highly appreciated by partners, confirming the role of the WFP as a key player in the humanitarian field. In supply chain, partners benefitting from services recognize that WFP offers competitive advantages, but there are a few areas of concern that deserve attention from the country office, particularly regarding delays in delivery, the need to enhance communication between supply chain and programming, difficulties concerning procurement services, poor warehouse management, and the degradation or loss of goods.

219. C6: Considering the mix of development opportunities and recurrent crises in the country context, there are opportunities to strengthen work within the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus. Some linkages between humanitarian work and development interventions were considered throughout implementation, notably in the area of resilience building where consistent strategies to assist vulnerable populations (for example, during lean seasons or drought crises) were complemented with development actions towards increasing resilience in the regions most prone to natural disasters. There are also opportunities to strengthen work within the nexus by continuing to enhance a bottom-up approach within the supply chain services. WFP is also well positioned to strengthen the nexus within the United Nations system, building on its strong work and role within the humanitarian country team, advocating for the humanitarian-development-peace agenda and pushing for United Nations collective outcomes in the upcoming United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. However, one of the main challenges to work on the nexus is in the area of funding streams and earmarked funds. This challenge poses constraints for connecting emergency and development interventions.

220. C7: WFP contributed to achieving cross-cutting aims, with sound improvements with regard to protection, gender and accountability to affected populations, but there are still gaps in regard to disability that need to be addressed. WFP adhered to humanitarian principles and maintained a neutral and impartial stance in responding to various emergencies. There were some issues in the domain of protection during the first half of the country strategic plan implementation, but WFP managed to review and improve protection aspects including those regarding location and the timing of distributions. WFP also effectively prioritized and reinforced its PSEA controls and defined specific standard procedures to ensure safety, dignity and integrity of beneficiaries. In tandem with the escalation of the conflict in the north, protection issues have been receiving more attention from the country office, but internal technical capacities still need to improve. WFP managed to put into practice a set of tools that have positively contributed to accountability to affected populations, where a comprehensive complaints and feedback mechanism was set up, whose success resulted in its adoption and shared use within the United Nations system. Disability was not mainstreamed as a cross-cutting aim and there are still many gaps to overcome for which country office capacity is not yet sufficient. Gender issues received strong attention throughout implementation and GEWE was constantly mainstreamed throughout implementation. Environmental issues were insufficiently considered during much of the implementation and regular environmental screenings only started from 2019.

221. **C8: Ensuring sustainability of results has been difficult for both the Government and WFP.** The Government has shown high political commitment in most areas of the country strategic plan, but national capacities to sustain interventions are still limited. Government resources are scarce and therefore the possibility of autonomously taking over and continuing the country strategic plan's interventions is unlikely and the Government still relies on financial resources and technical assistance from WFP and other partners. The Government's capacity to address nutrition challenges through concerted actions on the ground still needs to be enhanced. National institutions, including INGD, are not yet autonomous enough to be able to manage the disaster preparedness and response. Conditions are not yet met for the Government to respond to the increasing number of social protection beneficiaries. The handover of school feeding to the Government is not yet completed and there are still gaps in terms of strengthening national capacities for that to happen in the short term. Sustainability is also compromised due to the lack of long-term strategic agreements with the Government focused on thematic areas, and not just on specific activities or projects. In terms of WFP capacity, the significant increase in staff determined high costs, which may not be sustainable at the current level. There are also internal gaps in staffing, which compromise the ability of WFP to sustain and/or scale-up country strategic plan interventions, as it is the case of protection, disaster preparedness, climate change, supply chain areas and internal capacity to understand and analyse the political economy.

Efficiency in WFP use of resources in contributing to country strategic plan results

222. **C9: Overall programme delivery has been achieved as planned, although marked by some delays in activities, geographical dispersion of development interventions, and high post-delivery losses.** Most delays were caused by the COVID-19 pandemic that determined the cancellation or postponement of several capacity strengthening actions. In school feeding, efficiency was also compromised by a strained relationship between WFP and the Ministry of Education and Human Development that led to a slow programme delivery on the capacity strengthening component, delays in the transfers of funds to schools that occasioned stock-outs, and long periods of interruption of school feeding due to challenges related to cyclones, the COVID-19 pandemic and the delivery of food. In terms of targeting and coverage, systematic vulnerability assessments and diverse analytical work prior to the design and during implementation has allowed WFP to address the needs of the most vulnerable people by focusing on the highest food insecurity and disaster-prone areas. However, the blanket approach to assist internally displaced persons in the north posed some issues with regard to the identification and registration of beneficiaries due to the lack of reliability of the beneficiary lists provided by the local communities and local authorities. In the area of development, there is a visible geographical dispersion of interventions, which limits a more appropriate coverage, even considering the significant underfunding for these related activities, as well as the high level of earmarking funds, which prevents flexibility and more robust work within the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

223. Overall efficiency was also affected by funding problems, including delays in the signature of agreements and late arrival of funds, but also by the large scale of emergency responses that shifted donor funding trends and left development activities even more underfunded. The use of the GCMF to respond to the humanitarian crises enhanced efficiency in the procurement of supply chain food items, but nonetheless in country delivery services experienced delays, mainly due to difficulties in internal coordination. There were significant post-delivery losses (323 metric tons in 2018 and 738 metric tons in 2020) notably due to warehouse management problems.

Factors that explain WFP performance and strategic shift

224. **C10: A flexible programmatic framework has allowed WFP to respond to the evolving context in Mozambique, but flexibility of resourcing expected from the shift to the country strategic plan approach did not materialize.** Implementation was very much affected by the limited visibility and predictability of funding, with the exception for school feeding and climate change activities. Short term funding impacted on planning and staffing. The majority of the country strategic plan funding is earmarked at activity level and earmarking has increased compared to previous operations, resulting in limited flexibility to move funds around activities. WFP managed to diversify the number of donors, but most of country strategic plan funding is highly concentrated in a few donors only.

225. **C11: WFP is seen as a strong actor in emergency response, and has been at the forefront of the response to the key crises, but at different levels WFP systems are not yet adapted to WFP**

development and nexus roles in the context of the country strategic plan. The country strategic plan envisions a progressively more important role for WFP in upstream support to the Government in developing capacity and systems in various areas. While this role is recognized in various corporate policies, WFP systems, processes and tools at corporate level have not yet been adapted to the realities of the direct relationship with the Government, particularly towards capacity strengthening. WFP tools are focused on food and cash, and do not capture technical assistance work.

226. **C12: Monitoring and evaluation systems and procedures were significantly improved.** There were strong gaps in the monitoring and evaluation system during the first half of implementation, but tools, systems and procedures were significantly improved allowing the country strategic plan to use monitoring as a tool for improving performance. Overall, excellent support and oversight was provided by the regional bureau in Johannesburg during the emergency response to cyclones and to selected areas of the development portfolio, but the country office lacked support from the regional bureau in Johannesburg and headquarters regarding the management of the debt swap modality.

227. **C13: The execution of activities in a compartmentalized way led to a lack of overall vision to promote synergies and complementarities between activities.** Internal oversight and management were challenging for parts of the country strategic plan period. This affected performance, particularly due to a lack of dialogue and coordination across activities, which led to “siloes” ways of working that have stood in the way of an integrated response. There has been insufficient focus on ensuring that the activities of the country strategic plan are layered on the same regions and communities.

228. **C14: On the humanitarian side, WFP was able to establish good partnerships with the Government and with United Nations agencies, but partnerships with FAO and IFAD still need to be strengthened.** WFP engaged with a variety of government institutions, but these were in most cases designed for specific activities, lacking broad and longer-term sectoral agreements. Collaboration with provincial and local authorities was sought out, but there was insufficient focus on working alongside the Government’s decentralization process. Partnerships with non-governmental organizations could be further explored to increase the effectiveness of interventions. Partnerships with academia have received only limited attention, and could be critical to the ability of WFP to generate evidence-based knowledge and capitalize on its results. Partnerships with FAO and IFAD were limited, which also stems from a lack of clarity and prioritization at the corporate level.

229. **C15: The country strategic plan managed to implement activities on behalf of the Government, but some challenges remain in accessing funds from international financial institutions and implementing the debt swap agreement.** In regard to international financial institutions, a different approach is needed in order to increase opportunities for funding and reach a more effective trilateral engagement among WFP, the Government and the World Bank. In regard to the debt swap, the different interpretations of the agreement created tensions and compromised the effectiveness of WFP management of funds on behalf of the Government, which impacted the roll-out of PRONAE.

3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
1	Maintain the strategic direction of the new country strategic plan in humanitarian assistance alongside development interventions that have a long-term vision, focusing on areas where WFP can better position.	Strategic	Country office	Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (RBJ)	High	June 2022
	1.1 Keep the country strategic plan design (including the line of sight and theory of change) simple by focusing on thematic areas where WFP has a comparative advantage such as food and nutrition security, school feeding, social protection, climate resilience and disaster preparedness and response.					June 2022
	1.2 Mainstream climate resilience, gender equality and women's empowerment across the country strategic plan by defining outputs and activities that include them.					June 2022
	1.3 Define a long-term vision and strategy for strengthening national capacity in the individual, institutional and policy domains that will function as a road map for the country office throughout country strategic plan implementation, considering the strategic nuances required in supporting the Government at the central and decentralized levels.					June 2022
2	Position WFP as capable of driving progress towards and strengthening the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in Mozambique.	Strategic	Country office	RBJ and headquarters	High	December 2023
	2.1 Generate evidenced-based knowledge on how to operationalize the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach and push for multi-year agreements with donors and United Nations partners addressing humanitarian, development and peace needs.					June 2023
	2.2 Continue local procurement, ensuring that WFP's supply chain contributes to development through a bottom-up approach.					December 2022

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
	2.3 Advocate greater emphasis on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus in the design and implementation of the new United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework and promote thematic meetings and other events to raise awareness of the various stakeholders working in the humanitarian and development areas, including the World Bank.					December 2023
3	Continue to strengthen and diversify strategic partnerships with a range of national and international actors to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the new country strategic plan.	Operational	Country office	Relevant ministries, provincial governments, United Nations entities, academia and civil society	High	December 2022
	3.1 Seek long-term agreements and in place of project-based agreements sign strategic memoranda of understanding with the national government that are coordinated and overseen at the managerial level.					December 2022
	3.2 Seek greater engagement with local authorities through bilateral activity-oriented local agreements and define integrated service packages with a territorial approach at the community level in order to minimize thematic and geographic dispersion.					December 2022
	3.3 Capitalize on recent conversations among the Rome-based agencies and reach an agreement on collaboration within the framework of the new country strategic plan.					December 2022
	3.4 Engage with academia and leverage national and local partnerships to support learning and inform evidence-based advocacy					December 2022

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
4	Enhance organizational readiness to play a more catalytic role in the implementation of the country strategic plan.	Operational	Country office	RBJ, Human Resources Division and Country Capacity Strengthening Unit	High	June 2023
	4.1 Ensure that country office staff have the right skills including adequate technical expertise in climate change, protection, gender, knowledge management, institutional capacity strengthening and policy advocacy.					December 2022
	4.2 Ensure better integration of the country strategic plan by structuring technical teams around thematic areas rather than country strategic plan activities; improving communication between programme and supply chain management personnel; and ensuring that the Head of Programme plays an enhanced coordinating role.					June 2022
	4.3. Further strengthen the monitoring framework by including indicators that enable WFP to track progress in individual, institutional and policy environment capacity strengthening and take the political and institutional context into account when analysing monitoring data to inform strategic decision making.					June 2022
	4.4 Continue to work with institutional partners to establish a transparent beneficiary targeting system and invest in connecting beneficiary databases to one another whenever possible.					December 2022
	4.5 Conduct an independent evaluation of the current agreement for the Russian Federation debt swap, jointly commissioned by WFP and the Government of Mozambique, in order to assess its design, performance and effectiveness and identify any major bottlenecks.					June 2023

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility (lead office/entity)	Other contributing entities	Priority: high/medium	By when
5	Define a fundraising and advocacy strategy centred on donors and international financial institutions	Operational	Country office	RBJ and headquarters	High	June 2022
	5.1 Define a strategy for drawing donors' attention to the new country strategic plan, organize round table discussions of common priorities and present evidence-based results in appealing formats (brochures, leaflets) to better showcase WFP capacities.					June 2022
	5.2 Enhance the high-level channel of dialogue between WFP and the World Bank at the country level and promote tripartite meetings between the World Bank, the Government of Mozambique and WFP to identify opportunities in the thematic areas of the new country strategic plan.					June 2022

Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
ABC	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
ACR	Annual Country Reports
ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ANE	National Road Administration
BR	Budget Revision
CBT	Cash-Based Transfers
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCS	Country Capacity Strengthening
CD	WFP Country Director
CEQAS	Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CFM	Complaints and Feedback Mechanism
CMAM	Community Management of Acute Malnutrition
CNCS	National AIDS Council
CO	WFP Country Office
CoE	Centre of Excellence against Hunger in Brazil
COHA	Cost of Hunger in Africa
COMET	Country Office Monitoring and Evaluation Tool
CONSAN	Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (national council on food and nutrition security)
CP	Country Programme
CPB	Country Portfolio Budget
CPP	Corporate Planning and Performance Division
CRF	Corporate Results Framework
CSB	Corn and Soy Blend
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CSPE	Country Strategic Plan Evaluations
CU5	Child Under Five
D/CPP	Director / WFP Corporate Planning and Performance Division
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCD	Deputy Country Director
DFID	Department for International Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DoE	Director of Evaluation
DSC	Direct Support Costs
EB	Executive Board
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
EM	Evaluation Manager

EMG	Evaluation Management Group
EMOP	Immediate Response Emergency Operation
EQ	Evaluation Question
ER	Evaluation Report
ESAN	Food and Nutrition Security Strategy
ESF	Emergency School Feeding
ET	Evaluation Team
FAMOD	Forum for Mozambican Disabled Associations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FES	Food Expenditure Share
FFA	Food Assistance for Assets
FNG	Fill the Nutrient Gap
FNS	Food and Nutrition Security
FUNAE	National Fund for Energy
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCMF	Global Commodity Management Facility
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GFD	General Food Distribution
GHI	Global Hunger Index
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GNI	Gross National Income
GoM	Government of Mozambique
GTNS	Gender Transformative and Nutrition-Sensitive
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDI	Human Development Index
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HoP	Head of Programme
HQ	WFP Headquarters
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IAHE	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICA	Integrated Context Analysis
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICRM	Integrated Climate Risk Management
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International Financial Institutions

ILO	International Labour Organization
INAM	National Meteorology Institute
INAS	National Institute of Social Action
INE	National Statistics Institute
INFOCOM	Market Information System
INGD	National Institute for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
IOF	Inquérito de Orçamentos Familiares - Family Budget Survey
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IPP	Import Parity Price
IR	Inception Report
IRAM	Institute of Research and Application of Development Methods
IRM	Integrated Road Map
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
ISCAP	Islamic State in Central Africa Province
KM	Knowledge Management
LCSI	Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index
LIC	Low Income Country
LTA	Long Term Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MDD-W	Minimum Dietary Diversity for Women
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MGCAS	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action
MIC	Ministry of Industry and Trade
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MINEDH	Ministry of Education and Human Development
MISAU	Ministry of Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTR	Mid-term Review
MZN/MT	Metical (Mozambique unit of currency)
NBP	Needs-Based Plan
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSAG	Non-State Armed Groups
NWOW	New Way of Working
OCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEV	WFP Office of Evaluation
PAMRDC	Plan of Action and the Multisectoral Plan of Action for the Reduction of Chronic Malnutrition
PASD	Social Direct Support Programme
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PEDSA	Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agricultural Sector

PHL	Post-Harvest Loss
PHLC	Post-Harvest Loss Component
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PNISA	National Agriculture Investment Plan
PPT	PowerPoint Presentation
PQG	Five-Year Government Programme
PRA	Prevention and Resilience Allocation
PRM	USA Bureau of Population Refugees and Migrants
PRO-ACT	Pro-Resilience Action
PRONAE	National School Feeding Programme
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PSEA	Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
RB	Regional Bureau
RBA	Rome-Based Agencies
RBJ	WFP Regional Bureau Johannesburg
rCSI	Reduced Coping Strategy Index
RGA	Rapid Gender Analysis
RUSF	Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food
SABER	Systems Approach for Better Education Results
SBCC	Social Behaviour Change Communication
SDAE	District Services for Economic Activities
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SETSAN	Technical Secretariat for Food and Nutrition Security
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment for Relief and Transition
SO	Strategic Outcomes
SOP	Standard Operational Procedure
SPAE	Provincial Services for Economic Activities
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRAC	Strategic Resource Allocation Committee
SUN	Scaling-Up Nutrition
THR	Take Home Rations
TL	Team Leader
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
VFM	Virtual Farmers Market
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WFP-FO	World Food Programme-Field Office
WHO	World Health Organization
ZHSR	Zero Hunger Strategic Review
ZPHL	Zero Post-Harvest Loss Initiative

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