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Evaluation of Humanitarian Response Facilities Network in Pakistan from January 2014 to September 2020

Decentralized Evaluation Report

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Executive Summary

This independent evaluation assesses the Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRF) network constructed by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Pakistan to determine its effect on capacities for emergency preparedness and response, and the degree of integration with national disaster management systems. The evaluation was commissioned by the WFP Pakistan Country Office.

The purpose of this decentralized evaluation was to:

- Measure WFP's contribution to emergency preparedness and response in Pakistan through the HRF network and provide accountability for results as a capacity development partner to the Government of Pakistan
- Identify key enabling factors for capacity development initiatives
- Provide evaluation evidence, learning and recommendations to guide WFP's programming and to support the uptake of HRFs within existing disaster management systems
- Provide a more comprehensive understanding of how the HRF network has been integrated within the local government system.

This evaluation covers the period from January 2014 to September 2020 in the provinces and regions of Pakistan where the intervention took place: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). It covers the technical assistance to the Government of Pakistan in the form of HRFs and associated support for effective supply chain management and commodities handling.

The primary internal users of the evaluation are the WFP Pakistan Country Office, the Regional Bureau in Bangkok and HQ divisions and the WFP Executive Board. External users include the Government of Pakistan, affected populations, WFP's partners in Pakistan and relevant NGO/INGOs.

Context

Pakistan is a lower-middle income country that ranks 154th out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index. Natural disaster management is led by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), with provincial and district efforts carried out by Provincial/State Disaster Management Authorities (P/SDMAs) and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs).

Recent events with significant humanitarian consequences have informed WFP's work in Pakistan. These include: extreme snowfall with avalanches; a locust outbreak and heavy monsoon rains; rapid urbanization and population growth coupled with the influx of 100,000 temporarily displaced persons; 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan in 2020; effects of climate change; and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Government of Pakistan faces a shifting humanitarian landscape as traditional humanitarian donors transition from direct humanitarian assistance to technical assistance and capacity strengthening.

Subject of the evaluation

The Government of Pakistan requested WFP's support to build a network of warehouses at strategic locations to improve disaster risk management, preparedness, and response capacity. Over the past decade, WFP constructed eight HRFs to provide rapid, coordinated, and cost-effective emergency response and relief. After HRF construction and capacity strengthening activities, the HRFs were handed over to PDMA. There was no available data on numbers of beneficiaries served by the HRFs; 15,542 community members (10,832 male; 4,710 female) participated in training delivered as part of the project. Very little data was available on financials related to the overall HRF intervention. USD 642,000 out of the total budget of USD 9,666,690 was expended by end of 2016 (some of the underspending was due to delays in construction of two HRFs, see Table 1.1); financial data for the 2017-2020 period was not available.

Methodology

The evaluation was guided by an evaluation matrix outlining the evaluation questions (on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability), data sources and methods of analysis.

- EQ1 – Relevance: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals?
- EQ2 – Effectiveness: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response?
- EQ3: Efficiency: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilized optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity?
- EQ4: Coherence: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity?
- EQ5: Sustainability: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity?

Data was collected from September to November 2021 through i) desk review of available documentation, ii) 81 stakeholder consultations in the form of 76 key informant interviews (62 male, 12 female, 2 mixed) and five focus-group discussions (3 male and 2 female), and iii) site visits to HRFs in four provinces. Key informant interviews were conducted remotely in two regions (Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir). Consulted stakeholders represented diverse perspectives to the extent possible, and were assured that their individual responses would remain confidential.

The evaluation team used several techniques for data analysis, including descriptive analysis, content analysis, efficiency analysis, effectiveness analysis, comparative analysis, and gender analysis. NVivo software was used to code qualitative data. Data from various sources was triangulated to ensure reliability of information and to increase the validity of findings and conclusions.

The main limitations to the evaluation were: Covid-19 restrictions which did not allow for international travel (thus assignment of field data collection to national consultants); challenges in arranging interviews with government and WFP stakeholders, which nearly doubled the timeline for data collection; lack of data to assess the cost-efficiency of HRFs; and difficulties identifying women respondents and providing opportunities for their participation in the evaluation.

Summary of Findings

Finding 1. The HRF project is aligned with the Government of Pakistan's priorities and the sustainable development goals, and aims to fulfil critical emergency response capacity needs in relation to pre-positioning and storage, operational capacity, and institutional capacity of the government. HRFs were relevant to, and utilized for, relief operations for several emergencies, including Pakistan's response to COVID-19. (EQ1.1)

Finding 2. The HRF project's focus on strengthening the Government of Pakistan's capacity was aligned with the shift in WFP's strategic engagement towards building community resilience and strengthening institutional capacity, as outlined in its Country Strategic Plan. In designing the project, WFP coordinated with relevant government actors, but placed less emphasis on engaging other humanitarian actors in the country. (EQ1.2 and 1.4)

Finding 3. The HRF project has been relevant to the general needs of affected populations. However, its design did not incorporate considerations related to GEEW, prevention of sexual exploitation, centrality of protection accountability to affected populations, or the needs of persons with disabilities (M/F). (EQ 1.3, 1.5, 1.6)

Finding 4. The HRF project improved the timeliness and effectiveness of P/SDMA disaster response, albeit with variations by province, through its contributions to increased P/SDMA capacity in supply chain management and through strengthened warehousing and stockpiling systems for critical emergency relief items and search and rescue equipment. (EQ2.1)

Finding 5. Through the HRF project, WFP has pursued policies, institutional accountability, strategic planning and financing as pathways for country capacity strengthening. However, the project did not entail significant activities aimed at strengthening country capacities in programme M&E, or strengthening the participation of communities, civil society and the private sector. (EQ 2.1)

Finding 6. The HRFs have supported PDMA's ability to reach affected populations (M/F) following emergencies in a timely manner. However, PDMA's are not yet in a position to have the required reach to meet the needs of the affected population (M/F) in all areas. (EQ2.1)

Finding 7. The COVID-19 pandemic presented opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of the HRFs in enhancing PDMA's capacity to respond to different types of emergencies, including health emergencies. (EQ2.1)

Finding 8. The HRF project did not address gender, protection or other cross-cutting dimensions, and this challenged WFP's ability to achieve cross-cutting aims via the project. There have been recent efforts in some provinces to establish Gender and Child Cells, and to dedicate staffing with specialized expertise in gender and protection. However, these have not yet been introduced in all provinces. (EQ2.2, EQ2.3)

Finding 9. The majority of HRFs were constructed and handed over to the Government of Pakistan within their intended timeframes. Available evidence indicates that WFP's activities in the delivery of the HRFs were cost-efficient overall, though the utilization of the cold storage space was not optimal in HRFs visited. (EQ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)

Finding 10. Persistent limitations in communication, coordination and knowledge-sharing within and between the provinces constitute challenges for coherent supply chain management (EQ4).

Finding 11. The HRFs have reportedly improved PDMA's supply chain management capacities to varying extents across all HRFs, with an expansion of HRFs at the divisional and district level (EQ4.2).

Finding 12. The HRF project involved some partnerships and coordination, mainly with government actors (e.g. ministry departments). (EQ4.1).

Finding 13. The HRF project has fulfilled a basic need for improved capacities in sustainable disaster preparedness. However, further support and investment is required to ensure further strengthening of technical and managerial capacities for emergency preparedness and response (EQ 5.1 and 5.2).

Finding 14. While some provinces have dedicated financial resources to the HRFs from their budgets, these resources have been insufficient for the maintenance of the HRFs. Challenges in the timeliness of disbursement of funds may in turn limit the timeliness of emergency response (EQ 5.1 and 5.2).

Conclusions

Conclusion 1. The HRF project has been relevant to the Government of Pakistan's national priorities and capacity strengthening needs and to the needs of affected populations. Since their handover, HRFs have been successfully and rapidly utilized during relief operations for several emergencies, including Pakistan's response to COVID-19.

Conclusion 2. Through the HRF project, WFP served as an effective capacity strengthening partner to the Government of Pakistan. Whilst notable progress has been made, considerable needs remain in relation to relevant capacity, resources, and coordination, both within the government and among other humanitarian actors, and the vision of an integrated national network for emergency preparedness and response has yet to be achieved.

Conclusion 3. The design and implementation of the HRF project did not consider gender, protection, diversity and inclusion.

Conclusion 4. Insufficient financial and human capacities in most provinces pose risks to the continued maintenance and operations of most HRFs.

Recommendations

The evaluation's recommendations consider WFP's shift in its strategic engagement, away from food distribution, and are formulated with a view to WFP playing an important role as a capacity strengthening partner for the Government of Pakistan moving forward. The strategic recommendations are intended to inform the overall direction of WFP's support for emergency preparedness and response in Pakistan, and the operational recommendations to inform future improvements to the HRF network and emergency preparedness operations. The recommendations are prioritized based on the evaluation team's assessment of their urgency and relevance.

Strategic Recommendations

1 WFP Pakistan should provide overall system support in the area of disaster risk reduction and transition from direct construction; in terms of HRFs, further assistance should focus on technical support to disaster management authorities. This should align with and be part of other supply-chain related interventions (related findings: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13,14).

Priority: High

2 The WFP CO should contribute to further enhancing Government of Pakistan coordination frameworks and mechanisms for emergency preparedness and response among humanitarian actors in Pakistan, with a view to consolidating the vision of an effective and integrated national network for emergency preparedness and response (related findings: 2, 5, 10, 11, 12).

Priority: High

2.1 WFP could engage in actions of relatively low-cost to make the case to the Government of Pakistan to enhance interlinkages among HRFs, among PDMAs, and across levels of government (e.g. NDMA, PDMAs, SDMA, and DDMA).

Priority: High

2.2 WFP and Government of Pakistan partners could consider establishing a forum that includes all humanitarian actors to engage in regular strategic discussions aimed at coordinating the use of storage space in the HRFs and coordinating emergency preparedness and response efforts across participating agencies more broadly.

Priority: Medium

Operational Recommendations

3 The WFP CO should prioritize GEEW, protection, and accountability to affected populations (AAP) more systematically in interventions related to emergency preparedness and response, in alignment with the organization's Gender Policy and with the commitments of the Government of Pakistan (related findings: 3, 6, 8).

Priority: High

3.1 WFP could provide tools and guidance for PDMAs to conduct gender and vulnerability analyses and consult communities assisted by the HRFs to ensure cross-cutting dimensions are factored into standard operating procedures for pre-positioned stocks.

WFP could provide technical capacity to government officials to undertake standardized and gender-related vulnerabilities assessments and post-shock assessments (data collection, processing and analysis).

Priority: High

3.2 WFP could provide technical support for PDMAs to incorporate the collection of data that is disaggregated by sex, age and (dis)ability in the context of:

- Monitoring deliveries of relief items to affected populations

- Reporting against results frameworks that include cross-cutting aims related to gender, AAP and protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA)
- Monitoring numbers of participants in capacity strengthening activities.

Priority: High

4 WFP should make the case for the Government of Pakistan to consider providing further capacity strengthening in HRF operations and maintenance, and emergency preparedness and response more broadly, aimed at reinforcing the training that was previously delivered under the HRF project (related findings: 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 14, 14).

Priority: Medium

4.1 WFP should encourage the Government of Pakistan to deliver additional capacity strengthening activities to government actors, including HRF, PDMA and DDMA staff.

Priority: High

1. Introduction

1.1. EVALUATION FEATURES

Rationale

1. This independent evaluation assesses the Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRF) network constructed by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Pakistan to determine its effect on capacities for emergency preparedness, and the degree of integration with national disaster management systems. This is the first such evaluation to be conducted. This evaluation was commissioned by the WFP Pakistan Country Office.
2. The purpose of this decentralized evaluation (DE) is to:
 - Measure WFP's contribution to emergency preparedness and response in Pakistan through the HRF network and provide accountability for results as a capacity development partner to the Government of Pakistan
 - Identify key enabling factors for capacity development initiatives
 - Provide evaluation evidence, learning and recommendations to guide WFP's programming and to support the uptake of HRFs within existing disaster management systems
 - Provide a more comprehensive understanding of how the HRF network has been integrated within the local government system.
3. The evaluation is timely, given the lack of evaluations to date and the need for the Government of Pakistan to respond strategically to the shifting humanitarian landscape with the phasing out of traditional humanitarian donors and transitioning away from direct humanitarian assistance to technical assistance and capacity strengthening, as stipulated in the Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022). The evaluation is also relevant in responding to the Government of Pakistan's interest in constructing more HRFs and informing its decision-making. The timing of the evaluation is critical as Pakistan continues to face ongoing emergencies such as COVID-19 and recurrent natural disasters.

Objectives & Scope

4. The evaluation serves WFP's dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning, with an emphasis on accountability.¹
 - **Accountability** – Assess and report if the evolving role of WFP as a capacity development partner in disaster management (preparedness, mitigation, and response) is enabling the government to augment its capacities to better respond in emergencies.
 - **Learning** – Understand how and why WFP capacity development has been able to meet the emergency response needs of different categories of affected populations (M/F) and what can be learned for the future implementation of this activity.
5. The specific objectives of this evaluation are to:
 - **Generate evidence** of positive and negative, intended and unintended results of WFP's support to the disaster management authorities by constructing these HRFs, and subsequent relevant technical support for their effective utilization and integration with the rest of government disaster management systems. This evaluation could also provide elements for the CSPE.

¹ The emphasis on accountability is in line with the notion that the evaluation will primarily assess and inform WFP's role as capacity strengthening partner for the Government of Pakistan in emergency preparedness and response, and focuses less on generating learning for future implementation of HRF projects.

- **Improve the effectiveness** of WFP interventions by determining the reasons observed for success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that will allow the WFP Country Office to make informed decisions about specific interventions that should be undertaken to promote such technical assistance in a cost-effective, focused and systematic way.

6. This evaluation covers the period from January 2014 to September 2020 in all provinces and regions of Pakistan where the intervention took place, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). It covers the technical assistance to the Government of Pakistan in the form of HRFs and associated support for effective supply chain management and commodities handling. Section 1.4 of this report (Evaluation Methodology, Limitations & Ethical Considerations) further clarifies the scope of work. The direct beneficiaries of the HRFs are the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and participants of capacity strengthening activities. The ultimate beneficiaries are the populations affected by natural disasters in the provinces where HRFs were constructed.

Intended Users and Main Stakeholders

7. The primary intended internal users of the evaluation are the WFP Pakistan Country Office (CO), the Regional Bureau in Bangkok (RBB) and HQ divisions, particularly the WFP Engineering Section in the Management Service. This DE is managed by an Evaluation Manager from the M&E Section of the Pakistan CO (Touseef Ahmed), with the RBB providing guidance, insight and support. The WFP Executive Board (EB) has an interest in the evaluation results as they relate to the effectiveness of WFP programmes.

8. The primary external users will be the Government of Pakistan and affected populations. The perspectives of the target beneficiary groups of HRFs were captured by the evaluation team during the data collection phase, with special attention to the perspectives of women, girls, and other vulnerable population groups to reflect and assess attention given to diversity and gender-responsiveness. Stakeholders from key government agencies, including the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs), the State Disaster Management Authority (SDMA), and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs), were closely involved throughout the evaluation. Additional external users include WFP's international and national partners in Pakistan, in particular the UN Country Team, as well as relevant NGO/INGOs.

Evaluation Team and Timing/Duration of Field Work

9. The evaluation team is composed of Christine Ouellette (Team Leader), George Fenton (Disaster Preparedness and Response Specialist/internal QA), Meaghan Shevell (Evaluator), Zachariah Su (Evaluator), Maria Fustic (Evaluation Analyst), Shahnaz Kapadia-Rahat (Senior National Evaluator), and Ghulam Muhi ud Din (National Logistics Specialist).

10. Field work was carried out from 30 September to 10 November 2021 in four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan), with remote key informant interviews conducted in two regions (Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir).

1.2. CONTEXT

Pakistan Context

11. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a South Asian country that shares borders with Afghanistan, China, India and Iran. It is the world's sixth most populous country, with a population of 216 million in 2019 (estimated to reach 244 million by 2030).² Disaggregated population data from 2017 indicated that there were approximately 101,325,000 females, 106,439,000 males, and 10,000 identifying as transgender.³ The

² WFP. 2018. "Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (2018–2022)" (WFP/EB.1/2018/6-A/1*).

³ Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 2019. *Compendium on Gender Statistics of Pakistan 2019*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

country is a lower-middle income country with an average annual GDP growth rate of 4.5 per cent between 2015 and 2019.⁴

12. Pakistan's National Development Plan "Vision 2025", reports Pakistan as ranking 76th out of 107 countries on the Global Food Security Index, with current water availability at less than 1,100 cubic meters per person and water storage capacity limited to 30 days.⁵ Additionally, over a third (37 per cent) of the total population is reported as food-insecure, despite Pakistan being a food surplus country and a major producer of wheat.⁶ Provincial disparities in different areas of nutrition are also significant; for instance, the prevalence of stunting among children is higher than the national average (40.2%) in Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Gilgit-Baltistan.⁷ Related trends in Pakistan include demographic shifts with a youth bulge and a rapidly expanding urban population (from 32 per cent of the population in 1998 to 40 per cent today) with continued migration to cities.⁸ A gender prism reflects a similar pattern of urbanization for both males and females. The Bureau of Statistics Pakistan reports the sex composition and sex ratio by area from 1998-2017 as 93 females per hundred males in urban areas as of 2017, compared to 96 in rural areas, and a sex ratio of 107 in urban areas compared to 104 in rural areas.⁹

13. According to UNDP's multidimensional (health, education, income, inequality) Human Development Index (HDI), Pakistan ranks 154th out of 189 countries. The UNDP's Socio-Economic Impact Assessment and Response Plan in Pakistan notes that Covid-19 has further exacerbated long-standing socio-economic issues in the country and negatively affected progress that had been made towards poverty reduction; the impacts on economic growth and the already-fragile public health system are particularly pronounced.¹⁰ HDI indicators on gender and inequality,¹¹ the most recent HDI reports Pakistan's Gender Inequality Index (GII) as 0.538 when comparing the achievements of women and men, and a Gender Development Index (ratio of female to male HDI values) rating of 0.745.¹² According to a recent World Economic Forum report (2021), Pakistan also ranks 153 out of 156 on the global gender parity index.¹³ Additionally, when comparing the HDI of women and men, there is a clear discrepancy with preference for males (0.612) as compared to females (0.456). Gender equality and the empowerment of women (GEEW) is critically linked with food security, as evidenced in the Gender Equality for Food Security (GE4FS)¹⁴ instrument, which measures the interconnectedness between (dis)empowerment and food (in)security.¹⁵

14. Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic with powers shared between the federal government and the provinces. There are four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), one federally administered district (Islamabad Capital Territory) and two autonomous territories (Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir). Government efforts in natural disaster management are led by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) at the federal level, with provincial efforts carried out by the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and district-level efforts by District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs).

⁴ World Bank. 2020. GDP Growth (annual %)—Pakistan.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=PK> [All website hyperlinks included in this report were last retrieved in December 2021]

⁵ Government of Pakistan. 2014. *Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

⁶ Government of Pakistan & UNICEF. 2018. *National Nutrition Survey 2018—Key Findings Report*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

⁷ Government of Pakistan & UNICEF. 2018. *National Nutrition Survey 2018—Key Findings Report*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

⁸ Government of Pakistan. 2014. *Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

⁹ Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. 2019. *Compendium on Gender Statistics of Pakistan 2019*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

¹⁰ UNDP. 2020. *Covid-19 Pakistan Socio-Economic Impact Assessment and Response Plan*.

file:///C:/Users/mfustic/Downloads/Pakistan%20-%20COVID-19%20Socio-economic%20Impact%20Assessment%20and%20Response%20Plan%201%20May%202020.pdf

¹¹ UNDP. 2020b. Human Development Report—Gender Inequality Index (GII)

<http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/68606>

¹² UNDP. 2020a. Human Development Indicators—Pakistan. <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PAK>

¹³ World Economic Forum. 2021. *Global Gender Gap Report*. Geneva, World Economic Forum.

¹⁴ The GE4FS combines the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) with a specific gender equality component containing a subset of 18 questions that explore five dimensions of empowerment.

¹⁵ WFP. 2020b. *The Power of Gender Equality for Food Security*. Rome, WFP.

15. Several events in the past couple of years had significant humanitarian consequences that have informed WFP's work in Pakistan. These include:

- Extreme snowfall with avalanches in January 2020, resulting in significant damage and displacement; the UN assessment estimated 1.76 million people affected and 401,000 in need of immediate food assistance.¹⁶
- A locust outbreak and heavy monsoon rains in September 2020, resulting in flooding that severely compromised agricultural production in all provinces, with a significant decrease in crop production, leaving 1.2 million people highly vulnerable.¹⁷
- Rapid urbanization and population growth coupled with the influx of roughly 100,000 temporarily displaced persons (TDPs)¹⁸ from tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province, with 62 per cent reportedly in continued need of food assistance.¹⁹
- A large influx of refugees from Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, with more than 1.5 million Afghan refugees entering Pakistan in 2020 alone; the Government of Pakistan has now stopped accepting Afghan refugees.²⁰
- Effects of climate change are compounding the intensity and frequency of disasters in Pakistan, demanding the need for increased adaptation capacity and improved disaster resilience.
- The COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating disasters in terms of health, economic, social, and psychological impacts, as well as related operational challenges in delivering assistance.

16. Humanitarian crises such as those cited above are known to have different impacts on women, men, girls, and boys, often disrupting gender roles and relations and shifting gender norms and power dynamics (e.g. changes in head of household). Also, women and men have different needs, priorities and coping responses in crises. These differences have implications for food security and the prepositioning of non-food items, especially as women and girls are less likely to access key response services and more likely to suffer from food insecurity in emergency settings. Levels of food security are reported as closely linked with gender-based violence (GBV), with, for example, women and girls being more susceptible to intimate partner violence and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) as negative coping strategies to insecure food distribution. Available data on the prevalence of violence against women in Pakistan from 2017 indicates that 14.5 per cent of ever-married women aged 15-49 years experienced intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence in the last 12 months and 24.5 per cent at least once in their lifetime.²¹

17. In addition to WFP support and assistance, other UN agencies and international organizations also provide humanitarian and/or development assistance, co-led with the Government of Pakistan. For example, UNICEF has constructed storage facilities and offered government capacity building for polio vaccines, while the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has been working in partnership with the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) to deliver trainings and simulation exercises for various governmental, academic, and humanitarian actors. The World Bank is carrying out a Disaster and Climate Resilience Project (DCRP) to restore flood protection infrastructure and strengthen government capacity to manage disasters and climate variability.

¹⁶ WFP. 2020a. Pakistan Annual Country Report 2020. Rome, WFP.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ It has been noted that as per the advice of the Foreign Office, all agencies and departments were asked to refer to IDPs as TDPs (Temporarily Dislocated Persons) in response to a change in nomenclature in 2014. However, there is a need to further validate this term, as it has been used interchangeably with temporarily displaced *people*, and temporarily *dislocated* people.

¹⁹ WFP. 2020a. Pakistan Annual Country Report 2020. Rome, WFP.

²⁰ BBC News Visual Journalism Team. 2021. Afghanistan: How Many Refugees are There and Where Will They Go? BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58283177>

²¹ UN Women. 2021. Global Database on Violence against Women - Pakistan. <https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en/countries/asia/pakistan?formofviolence=fac5fe48636e4d3882bbd2ebbf29bd60>

WFP in Pakistan

18. Of particular relevance to this evaluation are WFP's Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022) Strategic Outcome 4 "Communities in disaster prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022 (SDG 2.4)", and more specifically Activity 7 "Strengthen the government and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction". Activity 7 involves assessing the capacities of disaster management authorities and equipping the government and communities with tools for better emergency preparedness and response, such as through the development of multidimensional early warning systems, strengthening supply chain networks, and constructing humanitarian response and emergency relief facilities. This activity also includes the provision of continued support from WFP to the government's Multi-Hazard Vulnerability Risk Assessment (MHVRA) as well as other relevant methodologies that allow the government to identify the districts most vulnerable to shock and food insecurity. WFP envisions the path towards the achievement of strategic objectives of the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) as highly dependent on the ability to address the needs, vulnerabilities and priorities of all groups of women, men, girls, and boys, and integrates GEEW into all areas of its work and activities.

19. WFP's work in Pakistan is anchored on the following strategies, policies and frameworks which can serve as benchmarks for performance. At a national level, WFP presence in Pakistan is framed under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction²² (2015-2020), which was preceded by the Hyogo Framework for Action²³ (2005-2015). At the global level, WFP has developed a WFP Gender Policy (2015-2020) and Strategic Plan (2017-2021) and a dedicated Gender, Protection and Disability (GP&D) Inclusion Strategy (2020-2022) for Country Offices, including one for the Pakistan CO.²⁴ WFP is also committed to the following in supporting gender mainstreaming: Gender Transformation Programme (GTP), [Gender and Age Marker \(GaM\)](#), UN System-Wide Action Plan (UN SWAP),²⁵ [Country Strategic Plans & Corporate Results Framework](#) (with [Gender Results Network](#) focal points), a [Gender Office](#), and capacity-building with a [gender toolkit](#), [gender learning channel](#) (with e-courses+), and an online [gender community](#).

20. To build institutional capacities and community resilience in response to the increasing vulnerabilities to disaster in Pakistan and the broader region, WFP has had a presence in Pakistan since 1969 with significant investment in capacity-strengthening and technical assistance for the Government of Pakistan to enhance food security. WFP's work in Pakistan is in alignment with the CSP (2018-2022) and with Pakistan's National Development Plan "Vision 2025". This has involved collaboration with the Government of Pakistan to develop policies and strategies for capacity-strengthening at national, provincial and district levels. Based on extensive strategic review and dialogue with the government, the current CSP outlines WFP's contribution to government priority actions in achieving the SDGs and identifies synergies and key partnerships to support the government in achieving its priorities.²⁶

21. The need for WFP support in disaster management was identified after years of challenges faced by the Government of Pakistan because of weak logistical infrastructure to manage disasters. A shift by the government from a response-based approach to proactive disaster management began with the adoption of the 2007 National Disaster Management Ordinance, now known as the National Disaster Management Act 2010.²⁷ The urgency of the issue became particularly evident first during the 2005 earthquake and then during the 2010 floods, when relief efforts were hampered by a lack of central warehousing infrastructure at the provincial level for the pre-positioning of contingency stocks. In this context, the NDMA, with provision of the National Disaster Management Act 2010, developed the National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP)²⁸ 2012-2022, aimed at strengthening the country's capacity to respond to, and be prepared

²² UNDRR. 2015. *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030)*. Sendai, Japan, UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction.

²³ UNDRR. 2005. *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (A/CONF.206/6)*. Hyogo, Japan, UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction.

²⁴ WFP. 2015b. "WFP Gender Policy (2015-2020)" (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-A).

²⁵ UN Women. 2012. *Promoting UN Accountability (UN-SWAP and UNCT-SWAP)*.

²⁶ WFP. 2018. "Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022)" (WFP/EB.1/2018/6-A/1*).

²⁷ Government of Pakistan. 2010. *National Disaster Management Act, 2010 (Act No. XXIV of 2010)*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

²⁸ Government of Pakistan. 2012. *National Disaster Management Plan—Executive Summary*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

for, natural disasters through defining necessary measures and identifying key roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in disaster management. The NDMP contains 10 key areas of intervention; Intervention 9 “Establish a national emergency response system” identifies the establishment of a network of warehouse structures for emergency response and preparedness as a central goal. Interventions 3 and 4 of the NDMP warrant execution of Multi Hazard Vulnerability and Risk Assessments (MHVRA) in the country, on which WFP is also providing support. The HRF project contributes to SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) through establishing and strengthening warehousing for storing food and NFI, which allows for effective emergency response that encompasses food security considerations. It also contributes to SDG 17 by strengthening WFP’s partnership with the GoP.

1.3. SUBJECT BEING EVALUATED

Subject Evaluated

22. In line with the NDMP, the Government of Pakistan requested WFP’s support to build a network of warehouses at strategic locations across the country to improve disaster risk management, preparedness, and response capacity. Over the past decade, WFP has constructed a total of eight HRFs in four provinces and two regions²⁹ designed in close collaboration³⁰ with the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and the Provincial/State Disaster Management Authorities (PDMA/SDMA). The HRFs were handed over to PDMA’s after construction with the purpose of strengthening local capacities to respond effectively, efficiently, and in a timely manner to natural disasters and to better meet the needs of beneficiaries (M/F), including vulnerable segments of society by decentralizing relief support and response across provinces. Since conception, the HRFs have been constructed to provide strategically located logistic hubs for consolidating and pre-positioning primarily non-food items and food items to reduce vulnerabilities of disaster-prone communities, and provide rapid, coordinated, and cost-effective emergency response and relief. Coordination and collaboration with implementing partners varies in extent and nature across HRF locations; partners include international NGOs (e.g. Islamic Relief) and national NGOs (e.g. Hands, Centre of Excellence for Rural Development, Foundation for Rural Development, Sahad Rural Support Programme, Taraqee Foundation, and the Water, Environment and Sanitation Society). The locations of the HRFs were selected in collaboration with the Government of Pakistan, based on available evidence on previous natural disasters and population centres

23. In terms of evaluation type, this evaluation focuses on activities that were implemented in relation to the construction of Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRFs) and WFP’s provision of technical support and capacity strengthening of the Government of Pakistan in supply chain management and emergency disaster preparedness and response, that were operationalized through two projects -- Special Operation (SO) 200181 and SO 200707:

- **SO 200181 (13 August to 12 November 2010):**³¹ The construction of HRFs was originally initiated under SO 200181, whereby WFP mobilized over USD 17 million from a group of key donors to cover the planned construction for the first five HRFs (i.e. Muzaffargarh, Quetta, Lahore, Hyderabad, and Peshawar) and the equipment cost for all eight HRFs.
- **SO 200707 (1 July 2014 to 30 June 2016):**³² Following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between WFP and the Government of Pakistan in 2014, SO 200707 was initiated (project start date of 1 July 2014 and project end date of 30 June 2016) at a total cost of USD 9.67 million, which also covers the final stages of completing the construction and handover of the remaining HRFs (i.e. Sukkur, Gilgit, and Muzaffarabad). This Special Operation was developed in alignment with Objectives 1, 2 and 3 of WFP’s global Strategic Plan (2014-2017), with the aim of addressing one of the primary causes of food insecurity in Pakistan: vulnerability and lack of

²⁹ HRFs are located in four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)) and two regions (Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)).

³⁰ The project was led by the WFP Pakistan Supply Chain unit, supported by WFP Engineering for the design and construction of HRFs.

³¹ WFP. 2010. Logistics and Telecommunications Augmentation, Aviation Services and Coordination in Support of the humanitarian community’s Response to the Monsoon Floods in Pakistan (SO 200181).

³² WFP. 2011. Logistics Capacity Development Support of the National Disaster Management Authority in Pakistan (SO 200707).

resilience to disasters. Additionally, SO 200707 supported the ongoing assistance provided under the Pakistan Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200867.³³ The Gilgit and Muzaffarabad HRFs were constructed under CSP (2018-2022) under Strategic Outcome 4, Activity 7 and partially funded by SO200707.

24. For a breakdown of the HRFs and the Special Operation by Phase, as well as an overview of descriptive information on the HRFs, please see Table 1.1 below. There was no available data on numbers of beneficiaries served by the HRFs. A total of 15,542 community members (10,832 male; 4,710 female) participated in training delivered as part of the HRF project.

³³ PRRO 200867 was developed with the objective to streamline emergency response capacity at all levels and address logistical gaps. Completing the HRFs comprises a central element of this project's capacity enhancement work with NDMAs, PDMAs and DDMAAs.

Table 1.1 HRF Details

| HRF (location) | Construction Start Date | Delays | Date of Handover | Capacity | Facility Area | Cost of construction | Key information |
|--|-------------------------|------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--|
| Phase I³⁴ – Fully funded under SO 200181 | | | | | | | |
| Muzaffargarh (Punjab) | 11 April 2013 | | 20 February 2014 | 3,200 mt ³⁵ | 6.6 Acres | USD 3 million | Has provided relief for severe drought in the Barani area of Punjab province. Represents the first HRF constructed by WFP Pakistan. |
| Quetta (Balochistan) | 11 April 2013 | 4.5 months | 10 June 2014 | 4,400 mt | 15 Acres | USD 4 million | Constructed after a 7.7 magnitude earthquake in Balochistan region in 2013 caused death and displacement. Construction activities were stopped due to harsh cold weather, and overall completion was delayed due to a delay in the delivery of pumps. |
| Lahore (Punjab) | 26 December 2013 | 6 months | 7 May 2015 | 4,400 mt | 8.55 Acres | USD 3 million | Lahore was affected by heavy monsoon rain and significant flooding in 2013. Consists of four main warehouses (1000 sq-m each) and two temperature-controlled warehouses (200 sq-m each). The site works were delayed due to collapse of steel structure. |
| Phase II – Tendering and design of HRFs funded under SO 200181; Construction and capacity strengthening activities funded under SO 200707 | | | | | | | |
| Hyderabad (Sindh) | 15 July 2014 | | 15 April 2015 | Total size of 1,000 mt and 2,160 mt | 7 Acres | USD 2.5 million | Consists of five emergency storage facilities. The Hyderabad area of Sindh province has a “High” Multi-Hazard Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (MHVRA) rating. |
| Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) | 15 July 2014 | | 19 May 2015 | 4,400 mt | 7.1 Acres | USD 3.5 million | Peshawar province has in the past been affected by heavy monsoon rain and floods. |
| Phase III – Fully funded under SO 200707 | | | | | | | |

³⁴ ‘Phases’ of construction of HRFs, as noted in project document for SO 200707, p.3.

³⁵ Metric tonne (1000 kg)

| HRF (location) | Construction Start Date | Delays | Date of Handover | Capacity | Facility Area | Cost of construction | Key information |
|--|-------------------------|---------|-------------------|--|---------------|----------------------|---|
| Sukkur (Sindh) | 2 November 2015 | 49 days | 12 September 2016 | 3,200 mt | 10 Acres | USD 3.5 million | The Sukkur area of Sindh province was severely affected by the floods of 2010 and 2011. An extension of 49 days was awarded to the contractor. |
| Gilgit (Gilgit-Baltistan) | N/A | | 14 November 2018 | 960 mt with open storage space up to 10,000 mt | 1.4 Acres | N/A | Gilgit-Baltistan is one of the most disaster-prone areas of Pakistan. The region experienced a 7.5 magnitude earthquake and landslide in 2015 that forced displacement. |
| Muzaffarabad (Azad Jammu and Kashmir) | N/A | | 28 July 2020 | 960 mt covered storage capacity and open storage capacity up to 10,000mt | N/A | N/A | The Muzaffarabad area has a "Very High" MHVRA rating. |

Reconstructed Theory of Change (ToC) for the HRFs


25. The majority of the HRFs were constructed prior to Pakistan's current WFP Country Strategic Plan (CSP) 2018-2022. Five out of eight HRFs (Muzaffargarh, Quetta, Lahore, Hyderabad, Peshawar) were constructed under WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) and were not originally designed with an explicit Theory of Change (ToC).³⁶ WFP has since consolidated its operations under its CSP, with the HRFs in Gilgit and Muzaffarabad integrated under Strategic Outcome 4, Activity 7 of the plan.³⁷ Also, beginning in 2016, the WFP Pakistan CO has engaged in efforts to develop Results Stories (Theories of Change) for the HRFs aimed at identifying milestones towards the achievement of objectives of its technical assistance activities in supply chain management and disaster preparedness.³⁸ Based on these Results Stories and available documentation, the evaluation team has reconstructed the ToC diagram below (Figure 1.1), in order to conceptualize the pathways of change between the outputs of the HRFs and the intended objectives. The ToC diagram is included in Annex 10.

³⁶ The remaining three HRFs were initiated under WFP special operation SO 200707 "Logistics Capacity Development Support of the National Disaster Management Authority in Pakistan".

³⁷ Strategic Outcome 4: Communities in disaster prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022 (SDG 2.4); Activity 7: Strengthen the governments and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction

³⁸ WFP. 2021. Terms of Reference: Evaluation of Humanitarian Response Facilities Network in Pakistan from January 2014 to September 2020. Islamabad, WFP Country Office.

Figure 1.1 Reconstructed Theory of Change of WFP's HRF Network



1.4. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Methodological Approach

26. This evaluation used a mixed-methods approach that incorporated qualitative and quantitative (where possible) data collection and analysis tools to guarantee inclusion, accuracy, credibility, and the triangulation of data from a diverse range of data sources and processes, such as KIIs and FGDs, returning to key informants if and when the need for supplementary information emerged (e.g., to compensate data gaps on beneficiaries, budget, and M&E). This approach enabled the evaluation to reach evidence-based findings leading to logical conclusions and targeted recommendations.

27. To this end, the evaluation team utilized a range of qualitative and quantitative³⁹ data collection and analysis tools to address all evaluation questions, sub-questions, lines of inquiry, and indicators. The analysis drew on both primary data collected by the evaluation team, and on secondary sources provided by WFP, its partners and other key stakeholders, and other sources identified through our own research.

28. The evaluation team's overall approach was participatory in that it engaged with stakeholders at various levels of the WFP (Pakistan CO, RBB, HQ), especially the commissioning unit, reference groups, and with external stakeholders (e.g. donors, government officials, affected populations, etc.) during the evaluation process. The evaluation team presented preliminary findings to the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) in a debrief session after data collection to elicit different points of view and engage in dialogue.

Guiding Frameworks

29. This evaluation was guided by principles of participation, inclusion, equality, and non-discrimination as directed by the UNEG Guidance and UNEG Handbook on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation. The evaluation ensured that, whenever feasible and available, sex- and age-disaggregated data was collected and analysed, and used gender analysis. This included careful attention to ensuring that evaluation questions, indicators, means of verification and sources were gender sensitive.

30. The evaluation analysed if GEEW objectives and GEEW mainstreaming principles were included in the intervention design, and whether the objective has been guided by WFP and system- wide objectives on GEEW. GEEW dimensions were integrated into all evaluation criteria as appropriate.

31. In evaluating the capacity-strengthening component of HRFs, findings were framed by WFP's Country Capacity-Strengthening (CCS) framework and classified according to the following five critical pathways to reveal critical gaps: Policies and legislation; institutional accountability; strategic planning and financing; national programme design and delivery; engagement and participation of non-state actors.⁴⁰

32. The evaluation matrix (EM) forms the basis of the overall evaluation and serves as the fundamental tool to ensure that the evaluation is responding to the TOR and to WFP's needs and objectives. The ToC (Figure 1.1) both informed and is reflected in the matrix. The EM breaks down the evaluation questions and expands them into specific lines of inquiry and indicators (with associated data sources and analysis methods), with details on gender dimensions. The content and coverage of the EM was informed by scoping interviews, document review (specifically of information provided by the CO) and analysis of available qualitative and quantitative data. The full EM can be found in Annex 4.

Evaluation Questions

33. The evaluation questions were based on the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability established under the OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation (EvalNet). The principles for their use were adapted to the HRF initiative and stakeholders to support a high quality, useful evaluation and served as the basis upon which evaluative judgements were made. The evaluation questions and sub questions are listed in Table 1.2.

³⁹ For quantitative data collection, this can include quantifying qualitative data.

⁴⁰ WFP. N.D. Country Capacity Strengthening. <https://www.wfp.org/country-capacity-strengthening>

Table 1.2 Evaluation Questions and Sub Questions

| | |
|--|---|
| EQ1 – RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | |
| 1.1 | To what extent has the HRF project enhanced emergency response capacities, such as emergency operation centres, civil defence and urban search and rescue teams in major cities? |
| 1.2 | To what extent are the HRFs relevant and able to address synergies and interlinkages with other similar interventions carried out under the current WFP CSP, to strengthen supply chain networks in preparation for responding to natural disasters and shocks? |
| 1.3 | How relevant was the HRF initiative to the different needs of men and women, and other groups who had unmet needs? To what extent was the programme responsive to the needs and interests of diverse stakeholders, and achieved through participatory gender processes? |
| 1.4 | To what extent was WFP support, in the form of HRF construction and provision of technical supply chain management assistance, relevant to the affected population, institutional needs, policies, and priorities? |
| 1.5 | Are male and female stakeholders benefitting from capacity-strengthening activities under the HRF initiative? |
| 1.6 | To what extent has the HRF network advanced gender equality goals of GoP/NDMA/PDMA/WFP? |
| EQ2 – EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response? | |
| 2.1 | To what extent has the HRF network project enabled provincial disaster management authorities (PDMAs) to respond effectively to different emergencies? |
| 2.2 | To what extent did WFP contribute via the HRF network project to achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender, and other equity considerations)? |
| 2.3 | To what extent was a gender lens applied to the programme's design, objectives, strategy, implementation, including activities, outputs and results? |
| EQ3: EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilized optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity? | |
| 3.1 | To what extent were HRF outputs delivered within the intended timeframe? |
| 3.2 | To what extent were WFP's activities cost-efficient in the delivery of HRFs? |
| 3.3 | To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered? |
| EQ4: COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity? | |
| 4.1 | To what extent did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that positively influenced warehouse utilization? |
| 4.2 | To what extent did the HRF project provide for greater supply chain management capacity in disaster operation contexts? |
| EQ5: SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity? | |
| 5.1 | To what extent did the government appreciate the relevance and results of WFP's support for HRFs, to sustain them or continue construction of such facilities on their own? |
| 5.2 | To what extent are the achievements of the HRF network project likely to be sustained? |

Data Collection Methods

34. The evaluation team utilized various methods of data collection, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: i) desk review of available documentation, ii) stakeholder interviews, and iii) site visits. Overall data collection was conducted between mid-September and early November 2021.

Desk Review

35. Document and literature review was conducted as part of the evaluation (for a full bibliography, see Annex 9). The objective of this review was for the team to familiarize itself with the subject of the evaluation and dig deeper into findings which arose out of stakeholder consultations and site visits. Topics covered in the desk review included Pakistan's disaster and humanitarian context, international frameworks, WFP corporate policies and strategies, country operation documentation, and Government of Pakistan plans (e.g. Vision 2025) and protocols.

Stakeholder Consultations

36. The evaluation team conducted 81 stakeholder consultations in the form of 76 key informant interviews (KIIs) (62 male, 12 female, 2 mixed) and five focus-group discussions (FGDs) (3 male, 2 female). The male FGDs comprised 11 individual participants while the female FGDs comprised 14. A list of stakeholders consulted is provided in Annex 8.

37. Key informant interviews: KIIs allow interviews to be more exploratory or in-depth, filling information gaps identified in documents available as part of the desk review. KIIs were conducted primarily in-person by national consultants in Pakistan, with national and international consultants conducting select KIIs remotely (via a web-based platform such as Microsoft Teams, Zoom, or Skype, depending on the preference of interviewees).

38. Focus-group discussions: When and where possible, the team conducted focus-group discussions with small groups of affected populations (M/F) (e.g. beneficiaries and community members) in the districts where the HRFs are located. While a strong effort was made to access particularly vulnerable groups such as women, persons with disabilities, and the extremely poor, this proved difficult, particularly in terms of identifying members of these groups with adequate knowledge of the HRFs and emergency response. Ultimately, five FGDs were conducted: 3 male in KP, Punjab, and Quetta, and 2 female in Quetta and Punjab.

Site Visits/Direct Observation

39. To evaluate the accuracy of the information presented in the return on investment (ROI) analysis,⁴¹ make an informed judgement on the outcomes of the HRF initiative and provide recommendations on the evolution of the HRF network, the national evaluation team (ET) conducted visits to four facilities plus the WFP Office in Islamabad. The sample of HRFs visited was decided according to the following key criteria: i) areas most prone to natural shocks, ii) recent response to an emergency; response efficiency, iii) management performance, iv) supply chain network, v) size / inventory, vi) cold storage facilities, vii) multipurpose use of facilities. Details on these criteria are provided in Annex 3.

40. The HRF site visits allowed the evaluation team to ask questions that otherwise would not have been posed, and thus to collect insightful data. The national consultants were able to assess the quality of buildings (construction materials, maintenance, suitability of layout, air temperature, lighting, equipment, etc.) for the storage of items, as well as access roads and surrounding infrastructure, security, stock management approach, etc. In addition, site visits were an opportunity to support the assessment with pictures and similar visuals. The protocol for direct observation is provided in Annex 5.

41. The following HRFs were visited during the field mission: Lahore (Punjab), Sukkur (Sindh), Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Quetta (Balochistan).

⁴¹ WFP. 2018e. ROI Report – Pakistan: Humanitarian response Facilities Development Project. Islamabad, WFP Country Office. Internal document, unpublished

- *Lahore* (Punjab) is regarded as an important HRF as the province was affected by heavy monsoon rain and significant flooding in 2013, and continues to be at high risk, highlighting the need to maintain access to prepositioned relief items. The HRF consists of four main warehouses (1000 square metres each) and two temperature-controlled warehouses (200 square metres each), as well as a control room that is unique to the HRF in Lahore. Additionally, the PDMA office is based in Lahore, which provided an opportunity to obtain their views following site visits.
- *Sukkur* (Sindh province) is central and borders Balochistan. Multiple districts have experienced repeated flooding and many districts can be supported from the HRF. Sindh is the only PDMA that has successfully replicated its storage network approach at divisional level.
- *Peshawar* (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) is significant because it has been used as the main supply hub for several operations (refugee and TDP operations) and for responding to natural hazards and shocks.
- *Quetta* (Balochistan) is significant as it provided an opportunity for the ET to visit surrounding areas to meet with communities that have benefitted from HRF support once NOC (No-Objection-Certificate) clearance had been obtained. Quetta was also of interest to the ET to specifically assess issues of gender and diversity.

Data Analysis

42. The evaluation team used several techniques for data analysis, including descriptive analysis, content analysis, efficiency analysis, effectiveness analysis, comparative analysis, and gender analysis. NVivo software was used to code all qualitative data (including KIIs, FGDs, and Direct Observation) into themes and to identify overarching patterns. NVivo was helpful to identify emerging themes, coupled with the use of traditional processes to collate and analyse interview data.

43. Triangulation was used to ensure the reliability of information and to increase the quality, integrity and credibility of the evaluation findings and conclusions. For more details on data analysis, please see Annex 3.

Limitations

44. Ensuring that relevant government and WFP stakeholders would be available for interviews was a major challenge throughout the field work. Getting confirmation and commitment from interviewees was difficult, making it challenging for the field team to schedule back-to-back appointments. Personal contacts and connections had to be used frequently to gain access to stakeholders. These difficulties led to significant delays, nearly doubling the timeline for data collection.

45. During the field visits the evaluation team realized that another WFP evaluation was taking place simultaneously, and both evaluation teams were engaging with similar stakeholders. The other team had already been to Quetta and Lahore before our team, leading to confusion regarding the difference between the two evaluations as well 'evaluation fatigue' amongst some stakeholders. In certain locations, relevant stakeholders were unaware of our evaluation, which raises a concern that stakeholders had not been sufficiently informed on its purpose. To mitigate this issue, the national consultants made sure to clearly explain the reason for the evaluation when identifying interviewees, as well as repeat that information at the start of each interview.

46. There was limited availability of monitoring data beyond the completion of construction and handover of the HRFs. As was noted in the evaluability assessment in the Inception report, intended outcomes of the HRFs were based largely on the handover to PDMAs, and as such neither data collection provisions, nor outcome baselines, appear to have been set in terms of HRF utilization, capacity strengthening or future accountability to affected populations in the design of the project. There was limited data on numbers of staff trained and numbers and scope of training completed, and there was an overall absence of monitoring data on levels of capacities of PDMAs, HRF network or local organizations and institutions, or about the development of core DDR and supply chain management competencies, from available project reporting. To address these challenges, the evaluation relied on interviews with a variety of stakeholders to provide a historical and technical perspective on the HRF initiative and utilization of the

HRFs, and gathered anecdotal information on the perceived performance of HRFs via focus group discussions with previously disaster-affected communities. The evaluation team also periodically sought assistance from the CO to retrieve any relevant project reporting documents or other official historical data to the extent possible.

47. There was a lack of information to inform an assessment of the cost-efficiency of HRFs. The evaluation did not have access to details of expenditures for the HRFs and related capacity strengthening activities from COMET or SCOPE databases. Furthermore, the most recent Standard Project Report for SO 200707 was for the 2016 calendar year, and as such the evaluation did not have more detailed information on financial expenditures related to the HRFs for 2016 onwards. The ROI report on the HRFs provides information on economic benefits of the facilities in terms of costs savings and times savings but does not cover the HRFs in Muzaffarabad and Gilgit. In light of this, the evaluation's assessment of the cost-efficiency of HRFs drew largely upon stakeholder perceptions gleaned from interviews, and on the evaluation team's direct observations of the HRFs. To fill this data gap, the evaluation relied on KIIs and FGDs.

48. Identifying and accessing women respondents and providing opportunities for their participation in the evaluation proved extremely challenging. Female labour force participation (FLFP) in Pakistan is among the lowest in the world at 10 per cent, as rigid cultural norms restrict most women to household work. When women do engage in formal work, they are often placed in extremely low wage positions which offer little to no authoritative power. Thus, there were very few opportunities in this evaluation to identify women in Pakistan working in relation to the WFP HRFs. Nevertheless, the evaluation team was able to conduct two female FGDs (14 individual females in total), and 14 key informant interviews (12 female, 2 mixed) across all major stakeholder groups: affected community/beneficiaries, Government of Pakistan employees, and WFP employees.

49. Data collection was limited by the ongoing COVID-19 situation, such that the international team could not travel for data collection. Instead, the evaluation relied on national consultants. This also increased the need to further triangulate and verify the interpretation of information collected in the field.

Ethical Issues and Related Safeguards

50. WFP decentralized evaluations must conform to the 2020 United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Ethical Guidelines. Accordingly, Universalia was responsible for safeguarding and ensuring ethics at all stages of the evaluation cycle. This included, but was not limited to, ensuring informed consent, protecting privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants, ensuring cultural sensitivity, respecting the autonomy of participants, ensuring fair identification of participants (including women and socially excluded groups) and ensuring that the evaluation resulted in no harm to participants or their communities. Our team members signed an ethics pledge and confidentiality agreement.

51. The evaluation team ensured that the stakeholders consulted during the evaluation represented diverse perspectives based on gender, ethnicity, geographic locations, and roles or organizational affiliations, to the extent possible. During all evaluation data collection activities, evaluation team members stated to all participants that their individual responses would remain confidential and that reporting of stakeholder consultations would only be done in aggregated form. To the extent possible, the evaluation team consulted stakeholders in a modality most accessible and comfortable for them (e.g. for remote consultations, choice of video call, phone conversation or email consultation). During data collection, and to the extent possible, data was recorded in a disaggregated manner (e.g. by sex/gender, age, and other variables as relevant) and a gender analysis was conducted to determine any relevant gender-related insights.

52. Evaluation team members strived to conduct data collection in ways that respected principles of 'do-no-harm', and that were sensitive and appropriate to geographic and cultural backgrounds and prevailing sociocultural and gender norms.

53. Furthermore, all data (data provided by the WFP and data collected by the evaluation) has been archived on Universalia's in-house secure server which has been granted secret security status by the Government of Canada. Its access is restricted to a limited number of staff within the firm. The server has a double back-up system so that information can always be retrieved if lost or deleted accidentally.

54. National consultants were primarily responsible for on the ground data collection, including HRF site visits, and international consultants were responsible for remote KIIs, data analysis and the preparation and drafting of reports.

Quality Assurance

55. The Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (DEQAS) was applied during this evaluation. Quality assurance (QA) has two layers. First, the Team Leader ensured that processes, tasks, and outputs were clearly assigned and well executed while responding to the requirements and objectives of the evaluation. Second, the Disaster Preparedness and Response Specialist/Internal QA team member ensured that all deliverables met the highest standards of quality, relevance, and usefulness.

56. The evaluation also considered power dynamics and the potential for stakeholder positive bias. It was understood that the political situation in Pakistan is complex, and this assignment may be perceived to have implications in terms of providing additional support to different levels of governments in Pakistan. In such circumstances, the potential for stakeholder positive bias (i.e. portraying the situation as better than it may be) was likely.

57. The evaluation team relied on the WFP CO to identify key informants for interviews who had a higher degree of independence, neutrality and knowledge about the situation and the subject of the evaluation.

2. Evaluation findings

58. This section presents the evaluation’s findings and is organized by the main evaluation questions that focus on the following evaluation criteria: (i) Relevance, (ii) Effectiveness, (iii) Efficiency, (iv) Coherence, and (v) Sustainability. The findings draw upon evidence from document review, interviews, focus group discussions and direct observation of HRFs as part of site visits. Overall, the evidence base deriving from available data allowed for adequate triangulation of data sources; where this was not the case, the report indicates this.

2.1. EVALUATION QUESTION 1: RELEVANCE

Finding 1. The HRF project is aligned with the Government of Pakistan’s priorities and the SDGs, and aims to fulfil critical emergency response capacity needs in relation to pre-positioning and storage, operational capacity, and institutional capacity of the government. HRFs were relevant to, and utilized for, relief operations for several emergencies, including Pakistan’s response to COVID-19. (EQ1.1)

59. As noted in Section 1.3, the eight HRFs were designed in collaboration with Pakistan’s NDMA and PDMA/SDMA, and their locations were selected jointly by WFP and the Government of Pakistan. The project was developed in line with the NDMA’s NDMP and came at the request for WFP to expand the scope and coverage of the country’s strategic warehouse network. The project’s alignment with the NDMP was highlighted by a number of stakeholders interviewed (including representatives of WFP, NDMA, PDMA, and donors) who noted the project’s focus on disaster response, risk-reduction, enhancing national stockpiling and pre-positioning capacity, and on strengthening the government’s capacity in emergency response management. The HRF project was aligned with the SDGs, notably SDG 2 and SDG 17,⁴² and these were noted in the project documents of the HRFs and were also highlighted by several WFP and PDMA stakeholders from the provinces in which HRFs were constructed. Table 2.1 outlines the alignment of the HRF project with national plans.

Table 2.1 Alignment of HRF project with national plans

| National Plan | HRF project’s alignment with national plans |
|--------------------|---|
| NDMP 2012 | <p>The plan includes nine core interventions to be implemented over the period (2012-2022), one of which is to establish a national emergency response system (intervention 9).</p> <p>The HRF project is aligned with the following priority actions within the intervention:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establishing and strengthening a warehouse for storing food, medicine, relief supplies and rescue equipment at strategic locations • Enhance emergency response capacities, such as emergency operation centres, civil defence and urban search and rescue teams in major cities • Establish a robust communication system that can be used during emergency situations and an efficient transport and logistics mechanism to be used during emergency situations • Develop and implement emergency response plans in relevant ministries and departments at federal, provincial and district levels. |
| Vision 2025 | <p>Vision 2025 covers a wide range of national priorities aimed at developing Pakistan’s human and social capital, and includes a focus on addressing the country’s vulnerability to frequent, large-scale natural disasters.⁴³</p> |

⁴² SDG 2: Zero Hunger; SDG 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

⁴³ Mentioned in WFP. 2015a. *Transition: Towards Resilient and Food Secure Pakistan* (PRRO 200867). and Government of Pakistan (Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform). 2014. *Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision*. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan.

| National Plan | HRF project's alignment with national plans |
|---------------|---|
| | While the HRFs are not mentioned specifically in Vision 2025, the project is aligned with the plan in that it responds to one of the plan's foci, in terms of addressing Pakistan's vulnerability to natural disasters. |

60. Overall, the HRFs were designed to address a critical, long-term need in Pakistan's strategic storage capacity as part of emergency response. The selection of HRF locations took into account the level of disaster risks at locations, needs for support in pre-positioned emergency stocks among PDMA, and strategic positioning of facilities for transportation and logistics (of note, four HRFs are located close to the Indus River). Several stakeholders interviewed from WFP, government (both PDMA and NDMA), as well as focus group participants from assisted communities highlighted their experiences during the 2005 earthquakes and 2010 floods as times in which national warehouse storage capacity was limited overall, and the extent to which the HRFs have since contributed towards the enhanced ability for relief operations in the provinces where they have been constructed.

61. Available data indicates that the HRF project has been relevant in the following ways:

- **Responded to needs for increased storage capacity and pre-positioning of stocks:** The HRFs addressed the limited warehouse capacity specifically designated for storage of emergency stocks in the provinces. WFP, NDMA and P/SDMA stakeholders noted that the aim of the HRFs to store not only food, but also non-food items, including specialized equipment and vehicles, was a critical aspect of the HRF's approach towards ensuring the relevance of its stocks for the needs of affected populations.
- **Joint Government of Pakistan-WFP identification of operational capacity needs:** The capacity strengthening activities in the HRF project, notably its training of government staff on the management of pre-positioning stocks, were noted by NDMA and PDMA stakeholders interviewed as in line with their needs; available project documentation notes that the capacity building components of the project were identified by the Government of Pakistan.⁴⁴ PDMA staff highlighted the relevance of the HRF project in its orientation towards enhancing linkages in the supply chain between pre-positioned stocks and provincial civil defence and search and rescue teams.⁴⁵
- **Aligned with enabling environment:** The HRF project was also noted as having been relevant within a broader enabling environment characterized by a high level of national commitment and buy-in to emergency preparedness from the Government of Pakistan. The allocation of funding within national and provincial budgets for planned procurement and replenishment of pre-positioned stocks was highlighted by WFP and NDMA stakeholders as a milestone since the introduction of the HRFs, and also as an indication of the project's alignment with the country context.

62. Overall, the HRFs and associated capacity development activities have strengthened the ability to meet the needs of several emergency response operations; interviewed stakeholders highlighted the benefits of the HRFs in responding to droughts, earthquakes, flooding and a snow emergency. Available evidence suggests that the HRFs have also been relevant during COVID-19 and were adapted to be utilized as part of the national response to the pandemic, in particular, for the storage of essential items such as medication in cold storage units.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ WFP. 2014. Logistics Capacity Development Support of the National Disaster Management Authority in Pakistan (SO 200707).

⁴⁵ This was highlighted by two stakeholders who noted that the HRFs are aimed to serve as a platform through which the PDMA can collaborate with civil defence, rescue 1122 and firefighting departments in the province.

⁴⁶ Available documents did not indicate which HRFs specifically contained cold storage units. However, all four of the HRFs visited by the evaluation team were found to have such units. While interviewees noted the usage of these units during the COVID-19 response, the evaluation team found that the units were not operational in HRFs visited.

Finding 2. The HRF project's focus on strengthening the Government of Pakistan's capacity was aligned with the shift in WFP's strategic engagement towards building community resilience and strengthening institutional capacity, as outlined in its CSP. In designing the project, WFP coordinated with relevant government actors, but placed less emphasis on engaging other humanitarian actors in the country. (EQ1.2 and 1.4)

63. The HRF project entailed a strong focus on coordination between the WFP and the government (both NDMA and the PDMA/SDMA) in its planning and when constructing facilities. Handing over the HRFs to be managed by the Government of Pakistan is consistent with WFP's approach to country capacity strengthening, in particular its principles of ownership and engaging in partnerships with national actors.⁴⁷ Interviewees noted that WFP played an active role in coordinating the HRFs construction activities with NDMA and PDMA/SDMA, and established lines of communications with relevant line departments of the government related to the supply and usage of HRFs. Several WFP staff underlined the importance of the government taking principal responsibility for the management of the HRFs and requesting additional technical support from WFP following the handover of the facilities.

64. The HRF project's objectives and activities aimed at capacity strengthening of NDMA and PDMA/SDMA in the management and distribution of pre-positioned emergency stocks was aligned with WFP's strategic shift towards increased engagement in building community resilience and in strengthening the institutional capacity of the government, as per strategic outcome 4 in the country's most recent CSP.⁴⁸ Interviewees commented in particular that the HRF project cut across disaster risk reduction and resilience. While they did not mention specific links between the HRF intervention and other activities or strategic outcomes of the CSP, interviewees noted an adequate level of coherence between HRF-related activities and other CSP activities, highlighting the absence of duplication of efforts on the part of WFP in the country.

65. Overall, decision-making processes on the construction of HRFs and the project's capacity strengthening activities did not entail substantial consultation or coordination with other UN organizations or other humanitarian actors, such as donors or NGOs. The project document for SO 200707 noted that the coordination of project implementation was to be led by the NDMA, with key stakeholders including PDMA, other UN agencies and donors. SO 200181 involved enhancing the existing Logistics Cluster coordination cell in the country through the involvement of the NDMA and WFP. However, neither its project document nor stakeholders interviewed provided any indication that the cluster was involved in processes related to the planning of construction of the HRFs or current HRF activities.

Finding 3. The HRF project has been relevant to the general needs of affected populations. However, its design did not incorporate considerations related to GEEW, prevention of sexual exploitation, centrality of protection accountability to affected populations, or the needs of persons with disabilities (M/F). (EQ 1.3, 1.5, 1.6)

66. While vulnerable communities were not consulted during the planning phase for the construction of HRFs, the construction and subsequent utilization of the HRFs was intended to support the delivery of relief items to disaster-affected populations. FGD participants from assisted communities indicated that the HRFs have contributed to the delivery of disaster and emergency relief in a timely manner, and noted improvements in the speed of disaster response to emergency situations they have experienced, following the construction of HRFs in their provinces (see Finding 6 for further discussion).

67. Though the HRF project has been relevant to the general needs of affected populations, its design did not incorporate considerations of several cross-cutting dimensions. Overall, as some stakeholders framed it, the construction of the HRFs was considered purely as an infrastructure project. Furthermore, consulted stakeholders held the perception that vulnerability is a greater consideration in resilience activities than in disaster response, as during a response all affected populations (M/F) are targeted equally. Also, it should be noted that when the project was designed, the NDMA had not developed policies related to cross-cutting dimensions in emergency preparedness and response, PDMA were newly established and

⁴⁷ WFP. 2017. Corporate Approach to Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS).

⁴⁸ WFP. 2018a. "Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022)." More specifically, the construction of HRFs and its aims to enhance the GoP's ability to manage pre-positioned stocks is included under Activity 7 (Strengthen the government and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction) of Strategic Outcome 4 (Communities in disaster prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022).

did not develop guidelines or strategies related to the incorporation of cross-cutting dimensions in their operations. WFP did not retroactively include measures in the HRF project design to incorporate cross-cutting measures following construction and the handover process which places responsibility for HRF operations at the Government of Pakistan. As such, the HRF project design had several gaps related to considering the needs of women/girls and vulnerable population groups. These were:

- **Lack of consultation of vulnerable communities:** Available project documents did not indicate that the design of the HRF project entailed consultations with vulnerable communities (M/F), and this was corroborated by key interviewees and FGD participants from assisted communities (M/F).
- **Design was not informed by gender and vulnerability analyses:** Consulted stakeholders confirmed that differential needs of women, men, boys and girls and vulnerable groups (M/F) for pre-positioned stocks were not considered in the planning of the project and that gender and vulnerability analyses were not conducted at the time to inform the design or operations of the facilities or to identify stocks and services. However, stakeholders from AJK, Balochistan and Sindh noted the introduction of dignity kits to stocks stored in HRFs, which were donated by UNICEF and UNFPA.
- **Sex-disaggregated data was not systematically collected** across indicators on the delivery of training within the initiative. Gender was not an explicit component of developing human resource capacities within the HRFs. Based on limited data available to the evaluation team on trainings offered, the exact extent of female participation is unknown due to inconsistent sex-disaggregation of data. However, stakeholders consulted shared that participants were mostly male, with trainings reportedly lacking a dedicated focus on gender and protection dimensions. See also Finding 8 for discussion of challenges faced in collecting sex-disaggregated data.
- **The HRF project was not designed to respond to the needs of persons with disabilities.** Based on available data, Peshawar and Muzaffarabad HRFs have been used to store wheelchairs and walking sticks. However, there is no indication that consideration was given in the design of the HRFs for the storage of items that catered to the needs of persons with disabilities. While some PDMA interviewees noted that HRFs were accessible to persons with disabilities in general, they did not indicate how this accessibility was factored into the construction of the facilities.
- **HRFs were not designed with a focus on accountability to affected populations (AAP).** Available data indicates that the project lacked effective complaint and feedback mechanisms and standard operating procedures for protection of beneficiaries from sexual exploitation and abuse. The project document for SO 200707 does not include any information to indicate that it was designed or adapted to include mechanisms aimed at AAP and PSEA.
- **The HRF project did not include provisions to identify women-owned businesses** for local field agreements as suppliers of stocks. The identification of women-owned businesses as suppliers of stocks is significant to the gender dimensions of supply chains in emergency response; their absence may have contributed to the overall lack of attention to the gender-responsiveness of pre-positioned stocks.

68. The project's lack of gender analysis, consultations with vulnerable populations, collection of sex-disaggregated data and focus on the gender-responsiveness of stocks and capacity strengthening was not reflective of the WFP's Gender Policy (2015-2020) objective to provide assistance adapted to different needs.⁴⁹ It should be noted, however, that the projects within which the various phases of HRF construction were undertaken, largely predate the period which the Gender Policy covers.⁵⁰ Furthermore, while the gender and inclusion dimensions of the HRFs are currently being guided by WFP Pakistan's Gender, Protection and Disability Inclusion (GP&D) Strategy and Gender Action Plan (GAP) (2020-2022)—which

⁴⁹ More specifically, objective 1 of the Gender Policy underlines the importance of sex-disaggregated data and gender and age analyses for the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes, policies and strategies, to ensure they reflect an awareness of GEEW as a key determining factor for food security and nutrition. (See WFP. 2015b. "WFP Gender Policy (2015–2020)" (WFP/EB.A/2015/5-A))

⁵⁰ Time periods covered by the projects were: SO 200181 (13 August to 12 November 2010) and SO 200707 (1 July 2014 to 30 June 2016)

builds on the previous gender and protection strategy and gender action plan developed by the CO in 2017—this is outside the timeframe (September 2014 to January 2020) of the evaluation with the exception of a short period in 2020.

2.2. EVALUATION QUESTION 2: EFFECTIVENESS

Finding 4. The HRF project improved the timeliness and effectiveness of P/SDMA disaster response, albeit with variations by province, through its contributions to increased P/SDMA capacity in supply chain management and through strengthened warehousing and stockpiling systems for critical emergency relief items and search and rescue equipment. (EQ2.1)

69. During the handover processes of each HRF, WFP conducted a series of training sessions and ‘on-the-job learning’ initiatives for HRF management staff in emergency response, logistics coordination, procurement, warehouse stock management (e.g. temporary and permanent storage, stock inventory management and commodity tracking, stock maintenance and stock replenishment), transportation, quality and food safety, and facility management (including what to do in the event of a disaster at the warehouse such as fire or flooding). Furthermore, WFP assisted NIDM⁵¹ (established by NDMA in 2010) to design and conduct supply chain management courses. See Table 2.2 for numbers of individuals trained as part of HRF-related capacity strengthening.

Table 2.2 Numbers of individuals trained as part of HRF-related capacity strengthening

| Indicator | Total |
|---|---|
| PDMA staff trained by WFP in Warehouse Management | 342 PDMA Staff ⁵² (no sex-disaggregated data available) |
| Number of training sessions on Emergency Response Activities | 13 training sessions (408 individuals total; no sex-disaggregated data available) |
| | 1 emergency response simulation exercise (41 NDMA, PDMA, ⁵³ DDMA total; no sex-disaggregated data available) ⁵⁴ |
| Number of people trained as part of ‘Cadre of Master Trainers’ and community members | 233 community trainers (174 male; 59 female) |
| | 15,542 community members (10,832 male; 4,710 female) |
| | 98 WFP and partnering professionals (85 male; 13 female) |
| Number of WFP training sessions on humanitarian and emergency logistics | 33 training sessions (725 individuals total; no sex-disaggregated data available) ⁵⁵ |

70. Overall, the HRF project has strengthened PDMA/SDMA and DDMA’s capacities to raise emergency preparedness levels and respond effectively to different emergencies that have occurred since the construction of the HRFs. Stakeholders interviewed compared emergency responses before and after the establishment of HRFs and noted the palpable difference in the effectiveness of emergency response, with PDMA’s more confident in their ability to effectively respond and provide relief items to affected populations (M/F), and divisional administrations and the Chief Secretary (e.g. in AJK) recognizing the important role of HRFs in emergency response. Stakeholders consulted stated that since the construction of the HRFs, PDMA’s capacity to respond to different emergencies has increased substantially; PDMA’s are now the first responders in any disaster, with disasters affecting 5,000-50,000 people (M/F) managed

⁵¹ Stakeholders from NIDM were consulted by the evaluation team, as advised by the Evaluation Manager

⁵² WFP. 2018b. Return on Investment (ROI)—Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRF): Pakistan (Factsheet). Islamabad, WFP Country Office. Internal document, unpublished.

⁵³ It is not clear whether this also included SDMA’s.

⁵⁴ WFP. 2014. Operation Evaluation: Pakistan Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200250 “Enhancing Food and Nutrition Security and Rebuilding Social Cohesion (January 2013 to August 2014). Evaluation Report (Report Number: OE/2014/09).

⁵⁵ WFP. 2016. *Transition: Towards Resilient and Food Secure Pakistan* (PRRO 200867 Standard Project Report 2016). Islamabad, WFP Country Office.

exclusively by PDMAs. The NDMA supports PDMAs during large-scale emergencies. Prior to HRF construction, the Government of Pakistan would have called on the army to respond.

71. Interviewed respondents across HRF locations consistently expressed that the HRFs greatly enabled a timelier response and confirmed that HRFs have improved supply chain capacities, thereby positively impacting the PDMA's ability to manage emergencies and disasters. The HRF project has positioned the PDMAs with a lead role in responding to emergencies, with all support provided during emergencies concentrated through the HRFs and the district-level Flosspans.

72. The concept of warehousing as part of emergency preparedness has evolved since HRF inception in 2010, with stakeholders interviewed highlighting a stronger logistical focus within government on effective disaster response. For example, it was noted that the project helped the SDMA improve their understanding of supply chain and logistics management. The general awareness levels of disaster response and resilience also increased among GDMAs in Gilgit and encouraged the development of the 2017 GDMA Act. Stakeholders also noted that DDMA (e.g. Balochistan, KP) have improved their capacities through collaboration with PDMAs, such as for annual contingency planning, and worked together to conduct needs assessments. DDMA stakeholders reported that supplies were quickly received when disaster struck and were more organized during response operations, which was not possible prior to the establishment of the HRFs. While PDMA response capacities have gradually improved, there was less visibility of such progress in Sindh, and the NDMA seems to play a larger role in disaster management in this area.

73. The effectiveness of the HRFs has been tested in real time through multiple emergencies that have occurred across provinces since the establishment of the HRF. This was directly observed during field visits, when a 5.9 earthquake struck Quetta and surrounding areas, and national consultants could observe PDMA response vehicles being immediately dispatched to the affected area of Harnai. This was further evidenced in PDMA Balochistan's effective response to other recent emergencies (e.g. snow emergency, cyclone Gulab in Karachi's coastal area, COVID-19 pandemic), demonstrating an improved handling of disaster response thanks to the pre-positioning of resources for rescue and relief operations in HRFs. In AJK, it was noted that since its construction the HRF substantially increased SDMA's capacities to respond to two disasters in Mirpur and Neelum, and the HRF was able to dispatch food and non-food items (NFI) to affected populations (M/F).

74. Additionally, there was evidence that various vendor agreements signed with suppliers along the supply chain in a few provinces (e.g. KP, Sindh, Punjab) further enabled an effective and timely response. This included transportation agreements in Punjab, Sukkur and KP, annual agreements with vendors (Karachi and KP), and other standardized contracts for labour outsourcing (Punjab). These agreements allowed HRFs to receive items quicker and at better units costs when compared to those that initiated procurement during an emergency when the costs of goods and transportation are raised and face delays in delivery

Finding 5. Through the HRF project, WFP has pursued policies, institutional accountability, strategic planning and financing as pathways for country capacity strengthening. However, the project did not entail significant activities aimed at strengthening country capacities in programme M&E, or strengthening the participation of communities, civil society and the private sector. (EQ 2.1)

75. Table 2.3 outlines the five pathways of WFP's corporate approach to country capacity strengthening and the evaluation's assessment of the extent to which WFP support, through the HRF project, has pursued each pathway. Overall, WFP support has contributed to the Government of Pakistan's achievements as outlined in its existing policies (notably the NDMP), focused on enhancing institutional effectiveness across NDMA and PDMAs/SDMA, and has increased government capacity in contingency planning, via training and technical support on supply chain management and emergency preparedness.

Table 2.3 The HRF project and the Five Pathways of WFP's Corporate Approach to Country Capacity Strengthening

| WFP pathways for country capacity strengthening | Assessment | WFP support for capacity strengthening through the HRF project |
|---|------------|---|
| Policies and legislation | | The HRF project provided capacity strengthening support aimed at facilitating achievement of objectives outlined in Pakistan's NDMP, in terms of addressing a critical lack of storage capacity for pre-positioned emergency stocks at the provincial level and contributing to capacities related to defining necessary measures and stakeholder roles and responsibilities in disaster management. |
| Institutional effectiveness and accountability | | The HRF project has enhanced the capacity of PDMA through the provision of physical infrastructure and operational capacity that was not present prior to the project. Through this, the project has helped improve national systems for accountability and coordination, particularly in relation to linkages between the NDMA and PDMA in the utilization of the HRFs. However, in effect coordination and information-sharing between NDMA, PDMA and DDMA is insufficient (see Finding 12). |
| Strategic planning and financing | | <p>The HRF project improved to some extent stakeholders' operational capacity in emergency preparedness, which included for instance training and technical support on best practices in planning, procurement, and utilization of storage space, and in supply chain management.</p> <p>Following the handover of HRFs, provincial governments in Balochistan, AJK and Sindh allocated funding within their budgets towards the operations and maintenance of the HRFs, though the amounts to cover maintenance costs are insufficient according to stakeholders interviewed (see Finding 14).</p> |
| Stakeholder programme design, delivery, and M&E | | The HRF project aimed to adapt existing WFP commodity tracking systems that can monitor supplies of stocks and movement of cargo. As noted in Finding 10, however, the commodity tracking software has not been used consistently across all HRFs, and HRFs lack an IT system that can provide timely information on levels and locations of stocks. |
| Engagement and participation of communities, civil society, and private sector | | <p>The HRF project trained community members, as well as community trainers, to increase communities' capacity to participate in disaster preparedness and response.</p> <p>However, the delivery of HRF-related capacity strengthening did not involve significant coordination with other humanitarian actors, such as other UN agencies, donors, or NGOs. Stakeholders consulted mentioned training conducted in Sindh in September 2020 by WFP in collaboration with UNICEF for individuals from the health department, NGOs and other WFP cooperating partners. However, the evaluation team did not have access to any documents related to this training that might provide more detailed information on its focus, and numbers of participants disaggregated by sex.⁵⁶</p> |

Legend for colour shading: Green = the pathway was consistently pursued across provinces where HRFs were constructed; Yellow = the pathway was pursued, but with variation among provinces

⁵⁶ Interviewees noted that this training was attended by 93 participants in total (no data on numbers of participants by stakeholder category).

Finding 6. The HRFs have supported PDMA's ability to reach affected populations (M/F) following emergencies in a timely manner. However, PDMA's are not yet in a position to have the required reach to meet the needs of the affected population (M/F) in all areas. (EQ2.1)

76. According to WFP Pakistan's return on investment (ROI) analysis of HRFs, provincial disaster management authorities have been able to assist an increased number of disaster-affected people more

quickly with the right amount and type of assistance.⁵⁷ During the evaluation review period, the HRF project brought about improvements in reaching affected populations (reaching more people in a shorter amount of time) and contributed to a shift in mind set around the importance of disaster preparedness (see textbox below).

77. However, several limitations to the HRFs' effectiveness remain, in particular related to the coverage and reach of the HRFs constructed to date. For example, PDMA stakeholders in Sindh reported that the established HRFs are not yet sufficient to cover all of Sindh given its huge population and coverage area. Similar challenges exist in Balochistan and AJK, with the latter facing additional challenges due to its rough topography. Consulted stakeholders indicated that during an emergency, there is a drastic rise in the price for transporting goods and many private trucking companies often refuse to work in disaster areas. HRFs without agreements with vendors and transportation are limited in their ability to reach targeted areas during emergencies from the one HRF located in Quetta.

78. WFP has also supported the NDMA in constructing Flosspans for prepositioning of emergency stocks in districts that were especially difficult to access. While the Flosspans can bolster the level of emergency preparedness in vulnerable districts, they have not been constructed in all provinces.⁵⁸

Case Study: Reaching Affected Populations at the 'Last Mile' of the Supply Chain

Reaching affected populations (M/F) is the 'last mile' and most crucial stage of the supply chain; it is the delivery of relief from the storage point to the beneficiaries affected by disaster.⁵⁹ The last mile is also a major source of bottlenecks for humanitarian actors, as they have to respond to a natural or manmade disaster while also navigating rough terrain, unreliable transportation routes, poor infrastructure, societal norms/barriers, and other challenges which make it difficult to reach the most vulnerable groups of society.⁶⁰

Overall, HRFs have allowed for the prepositioning of goods, which means that when disaster strikes, relief and response can reach more hard-to-reach populations in a shorter amount of time. Affected communities commended both the quality and quick provision of relief items such as food, which has allowed them to feed and support themselves, their families, and their livestock in times of need. In Lahore (Punjab), the disbursement of supplies through centralized locations such as schools has been particularly useful in simplifying access to relief in the latest flood and locust emergencies in the region. FGD participants noted that in Quetta during the recent snow emergency in 2020, food, water, and shelter rapidly reached people (M/F) in the worst situations and that the disbursement/delivery of relief items was done in a more organized manner than in pre-HRF years. The rescue teams also directly sought the assistance of the community to guide them towards the poorest and most vulnerable persons (M/F), ensuring that the community members in need of the most support were adequately served. Beneficiaries (M/F) noticed that the PDMA and DDMA were more equipped and that first responders were better trained and prepared.

"We can say that now the disaster response is a hundred times better than previous disaster response. We never saw such quick response before that. We have faced so many disasters in the past and we were getting the relief in weeks, but now it reached us within hours. We think that HRF activation really changed history..." (Male FGD participant, Quetta)

The presence of HRFs has also resulted in a mind-set shift in which the Government of Pakistan and communities have internalized disaster preparedness and translated it into actions beyond storage/stocking. In Lahore (Punjab), there are now annual community flood response drills and trainings for disaster preparedness. In Quetta (Balochistan), there are school programmes that train girls, boys, men, and women, in disaster preparedness. Even community members that have not been formally trained but have been more exposed to the concept of disaster preparedness through the presence of the HRFs—and through their own experiences with recent disasters—are taking pre-emptive actions to prepare for disasters. They are repairing their homes, preparing plastic sheets to prevent water leaks, storing dry meat, stocking coal and logs, among other actions. In Balochistan, Punjab, and KP there are radio/mobile warning systems and emergency telephone numbers operated at the provincial level; the use of social media has also been helpful in spreading information about disaster preparedness and response.

Despite improvements, affected communities/beneficiaries (M/F) also noted certain gaps that should be addressed to carry out the 'last mile' more adequately. They highlighted a lack of consultations/surveys to identify their unmet needs, which include, for example, more supplies and larger tents for big families, sanitary napkins for women, and powdered milk for infants. Affected communities have shared that their needs should be identified at the beginning of

⁵⁷ WFP. 2018e. ROI Report—Pakistan: Humanitarian Response Facilities Development Project (HRF). Islamabad, WFP Country Office. Internal document, unpublished.

⁵⁹ Balcik, B., Beamon, B., Smilowitz, K. 2008. Last Mile Distribution in Humanitarian Relief. *Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems Technology Planning and Operations*, 1818(2).

⁶⁰ USAID. 2018. The Last Mile of Food Aid Distribution: Insights Gained Through FAQR'S Field Studies in Malawi, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone. *Food Aid Quality Review*.

or ahead of emergency response, but also after disasters strike, in order to identify lessons learned/areas for improvement.⁶¹

Finding 7. The COVID-19 pandemic presented opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of the HRFs in enhancing PDMA's capacity to respond to different types of emergencies, including health emergencies. (EQ2.1)

Interviewees on the HRFs and their utilization during COVID-19

"During the drought emergency response, we offered the HRF to several other NGOs, such as Muslim Hand, Taraqee Foundation, IRC. The health department uses our warehouse facility extensively. When required, we also use the storage facility available with district administration. We have done so during COVID response." – PDMA officials from Balochistan

"The idea is not for the HRFs to provide only food storage. During COVID, the HRFs provided support to the health departments for refrigeration and provision of medicines in cold store... WFP bridged line departments to respond to an emergency – coordinated through Chief Secretary Office and P&D – because at the end of the day HRFs should not be only for the use of the PDMA's and remain underutilized – line departments must co-share for the purpose of disaster preparedness and response." – WFP CO staff

"During COVID, we took care of 27000 pilgrims. We picked them up from the border, set up tents and containers to cater to their boarding needs, fed them and took care of all their needs for nearly three weeks, and then dropped them to their respective districts once they were COVID negative. The HRF has been used well by PDMA, and in the past 3-4 years, PDMA has handled emergency relief activities from there, including the COVID relief."

"All the districts of the Punjab are parallel equipped with relief items, boats, water pumps and other machines to challenge any disaster and emergency. HRF Punjab became a big activity hub during COVID relief operation, where food was packed, COVID material was distributed to all the hospitals of Punjab and food was delivered door to door to target community in all over the Punjab." – PDMA officials from Punjab

79. Even though the HRFs were not originally designed for health emergencies and were considered more effective for responses to natural disasters, their presence enhanced the capacities of provinces for the COVID-response (see textbox below). Interviews and direct observation evidenced three innovations and adaptations within the HRF project to respond effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic. These included the NDMA and PDMA's use of HRFs for isolation and quarantine spaces, for the storage of personal protective equipment (PPE),⁶² oxygen tanks, and other donations received from various countries and for the cold storage of vaccines received from China, which were distributed across Pakistan. This also included the provision of more than 300 containers that were shipped to Taftan (Balochistan) as isolation and quarantine centres to meet the needs of over 27,000 TDPs returning from Iran. In the context of the COVID response, PDMA's have coordinated with various line ministries. WFP also provided sections of their warehouses to stockpile items anticipated for the quarantine of COVID patients, as well as two Mobile Support Units (MSUs) in Sukkur and Jamshoro.

Finding 8. The HRF project did not address gender, protection or other cross-cutting dimensions, and this challenged WFP's ability to achieve cross-cutting aims via the project. There have been recent efforts in some provinces to establish Gender and Child Cells, and to dedicate staffing with specialized expertise in gender and protection. However, these have not yet been introduced in all provinces. (EQ2.2, EQ2.3)

80. Overall, the HRF project was gender-blind, in that its design, objectives, strategy, implementation and monitoring were not informed by gender, protection or other cross-cutting dimensions. Gender mainstreaming was not integrated in any of the phases of the project cycle as, according to most key informants, the HRF was considered an infrastructure project. Stakeholders consulted also perceived that supply chain-related initiatives do not have it within their mandate to engage or consult with vulnerable communities or consider cross-cutting dimensions. The HRFs have depended largely on other agencies (e.g. UN Women and UNICEF) to assist with these considerations. FGD participants also noted that the HRFs, in addition to enabling timely response, need to better consider how the response can reach and best meet

⁶⁰USAID. 2018. The Last Mile of Food Aid Distribution: Insights Gained Through FAQR'S Field Studies in Malawi, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone. *Food Aid Quality Review*.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² For example, the HRF in Punjab was used to pack and deliver food to the target community, distribute PPE materials to all the hospitals across the province.

the needs of the most vulnerable, including women, girls, children (M/F), the elderly (M/F), and persons with disabilities (M/F).

81. WFP did not contribute to the achievement of cross-cutting aims via the HRF project, and this was seen by stakeholders as a missed opportunity. Available evidence points to several factors:

- **Items stocked in HRFs did not take into account cross-cutting issues:** Gender dimensions were not consistently reflected in the types of items stocked following the construction of HRFs. Since the handover of HRFs, PDMA stakeholders consulted stated that HRFs have stocked a few gender-specific items in basic feminine hygiene kits (e.g. sanitary pads). It is not clear from available evidence whether the HRFs have pre-positioned items for vulnerable segments of the affected population (M/F). While the Peshawar and Muzaffarabad HRFs have been used to store wheelchairs and walking sticks,⁶³ other HRFs do not appear to be stocking these items. Nevertheless, interviewees noted that this has not constituted a package of relief items within HRFs that cater to the needs of persons with disabilities.
- **Lack of gender and/or vulnerability assessments conducted following handover:** As noted in Finding 3, gender and/or vulnerability assessments were not implemented a priori to inform the design of the HRFs, nor were vulnerable communities consulted when setting up the HRFs. Since the handover of HRFs, while post-handover monitoring reports are being generated, cross-cutting aims such as gender and protection have not been mainstreamed to determine the gendered implications of the HRF project. More generalized needs assessments are now starting to be undertaken by various line departments at the district level before a request for resources is sent to PDMA, though there is no indication that these assessments include a gender lens. Due to limitations in data available and a lack of monitoring and reporting on gender- and protection-specific dimensions, the evaluation team could not assess the extent of the effect of the exclusion of a gender lens.
- **Challenges in collecting sex-disaggregated data:** There were challenges with the collection of information for effective planning to achieve cross-cutting aims; data was either outdated, not sex-disaggregated or lacking altogether.⁶⁴ The observation that sex-disaggregated data was not collected systematically was corroborated by several interviewees who noted that performance monitoring systems did not factor in the collection of such data. Interviewees also noted that sex-disaggregated data is not collected on the delivery of stocks to affected populations and that the prevailing practice in emergency situations is to collect data on numbers of families served; data is collected only on heads of households – but not disaggregated by sex or age – and therefore does not provide information on the percentage of households headed by women or minors or the number of women, men, girls and boys in individual households, and whether the needs of different groups were met.
- **Lack of adequate technical expertise on gender and protection at PDMA:** Government stakeholders at various levels shared the perception that PDMA lack adequate technical expertise in gender and protection and the underlying expectation that PDMA rely on other technical partners to provide specialized support to fill this gap. Evidence also points to a lack of clarity on which level of governmental disaster authority (e.g. PDMA/SDMA, DDMA) is mandated or best positioned to engage directly with communities. However, as noted below, some provinces have made efforts towards having dedicated staff with expertise in gender and protection.

82. There is some evidence of recent efforts made by the Government of Pakistan to contribute to addressing cross-cutting dimensions. These are initial efforts, however, and have yet to be introduced across all provinces where HRFs were constructed:

⁶³ This was mentioned by one stakeholder and one PDMA stakeholder interviewed. Furthermore, an HRF rapid assessment spreadsheet provided by WFP indicates that wheelchairs and walking sticks were among the NFI stocks in the Peshawar HRF. Information on the stocks of other HRFs, however, did not include these items.

⁶⁴ For example, while sex-disaggregated data was available for the number of community members and community trainers that participated in training aimed at establishing a 'Cadre of Master Trainers' at the community level, data on PDMA staff trained by WFP (in warehouse management, emergency response activities and on humanitarian and emergency logistics) was not disaggregated by sex (see Table 2.2 in Finding 4).

- **Gender and Child Cells (GCCs)**⁶⁵ were established within the PDMA of KP and Balochistan and are noted by interviewees as increasing PDMA's ability to reflect gender and child-care aspects in disaster response plans. Most recently, the GCC in Balochistan has received support from the GCC in Islamabad, whose gender specialists have reviewed key documents (e.g. Five-Year Road Map for Disaster Management) for quality assurance before being submitted for approval. In KP, WFP staff noted that there is a more explicit effort to consider the needs of different groups based on gender, (dis)ability (M/F), and age (M/F). While the level of funding for the Balochistan GCC decreased between 2016 and 2019, whereby the funding of the positions was discontinued, it was reinstated in 2019 with support received from GCC Islamabad. There are no GCCs in Punjab, Sindh or AJK.
- **Dedicated staffing with specialized expertise in certain PDMA:** In PDMA Balochistan there is now a permanent dedicated position with a focus on gender and child protection. In Sindh, stakeholders reported one staff member charged with the responsibility of gender mainstreaming. In KP, a newly established department of Gender and Child Protection has developed a code of conduct which must be signed by all humanitarian actors who are responsible for implementing cross-cutting aims.
- **Recent initiative that includes a Multi-Hazard Vulnerability & Risk Assessment (MHVRA):** A new project is underway involving Sindh PDMA and the World Bank entitled "Sindh Resilience Project" (SRP) which requires a MHVRA baseline study for every Union Council in every district of Sindh. These studies will identify key vulnerabilities and threats specific to each district and how best to build resilience at the community and institutional levels to respond to disasters. However, evidence reviewed does not confirm whether or to what extent the baseline study will address gender and other cross-cutting dimensions.

83. In terms of accountability to affected populations (AAP), consulted external stakeholders indicated that accountability to beneficiaries is lacking within the HRF project and that greater attention is needed to ensure that beneficiaries are not abused or harassed and that their dignity is respected. These perspectives underscored the need for strengthened efforts to inform beneficiaries (M/F) of their rights, and to provide opportunities for beneficiaries (M/F) to voice their needs and concerns. Evidence pointed towards an ineffective complaint management system, with insufficient protocols or standard operating procedures (SOPs) in place.

2.3. EVALUATION QUESTION 3: EFFICIENCY

Finding 9. The majority of HRFs were constructed and handed over to the Government of Pakistan within their intended timeframes. Available evidence indicates that WFP's activities in the delivery of the HRFs were cost-efficient overall, though the utilization of the cold storage space was not optimal in HRFs visited. (EQ 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)

84. With the exception of HRFs in Gilgit and Muzaffarabad, the HRFs were constructed and handed over within their intended timeframes.⁶⁶ Interviewees highlighted the development of a risk mitigation plan for the project as an enabling factor for the timely construction of the facilities; the plan outlined mitigation measures for risks related to the timely acquisition of land, contracting of construction companies, procurement and delivery of stocks. The HRF project document includes a risk assessment matrix.⁶⁷ Significant delays in the construction of the Gilgit and Muzaffarabad HRFs were largely due to shortfalls in funding for the 2016-2018 PRRO, which in turn resulted in lack of adequate resources for construction.

⁶⁵ The GCCs were established with the support of UN Women and UNICEF, who provided technical resource staff (two and one staff, respectively) as part of a tripartite agreement between PDMA, UNHCR, UNICEF and UN Women, with the latter three agencies providing technical assistance related to child protection and gender.

⁶⁶ Project documents for SO 200707 and SO 200181 do not provide the intended timeframes or deadlines for completion for the specific HRFs. Hand over certificates reviewed also did not provide any information on the intended timeframe of HRF completion. Nevertheless, with the exceptions of Gilgit and Muzaffarabad, stakeholder interviews indicated these facilities were completed on time, and within the overall timeframes of 2014-2016.

⁶⁷ The matrix identifies several mitigation measures for risks related to the timely completion of HRF construction, as well as the risk likelihood, degree of consequence and the responsible entities for mitigation measures. The evaluation was provided with completed risk assessment matrices for Quetta, Muzaffargarh, Lahore, Peshawar and Hyderabad.

Interviewees from Gilgit and Muzaffarabad also highlighted delays in the process of acquiring land that would meet WFP requirements for HRF site locations.⁶⁸

85. A review of available documentation suggests that there have been minimal discrepancies between target or planned achievement rates and budget implementation:

- The 2018 Pakistan Annual Country Report of the 2018-2022 Country CSP review of indicators for Strategic Result 4 (food systems are sustainable), Strategic Outcome 04,⁶⁹ Activity 07⁷⁰ reports a 100 per cent achievement rate between the target achievement and actual achievement of four unspecified HRFs.
- The 2016 Standard Project Report for SO 200707 reports a 100 per cent achievement rate (actual vs. planned), establishing the one logistic hub as planned as part of Special Operation 200707.
- While there were some challenges and delays in delivering the HRF Muzaffarabad, a recent report on WFP Monitoring of HRF Construction,⁷¹ which measured planned versus achieved progress, concluded that the achievement of key milestones was nearly identical to those planned, with some discrepancies in the areas of ancillary building and traffic pavement.⁷²

86. **Response and delivery of relief items:** Available project progress reports and ROI reports did not indicate delays in the utilization of HRFs and did not report on the timeliness of response and delivery of relief items to disaster-affected populations. Interviewees also did not comment on any significant delays in the delivery of HRF-stocked relief items. Rather, interviewees from Balochistan and Sindh noted that their annual contingency plans enabled the timeliness of their emergency response. These plans include timeframes and roles of PDMA, DDMA and government line departments during emergency response, and take into account the use of the HRFs and transportation of emergency stocks.

87. **Capacity strengthening:** Available documents did not report on the timeliness of the delivery of capacity strengthening activities under the HRF project. Stakeholders interviewed did not indicate any delays in the delivery of such activities, but commented that capacity strengthening activities, namely training, were too short. The ROI reports do not provide any information on the delivery of HRF construction activities, or HRF-related capacity strengthening activities, according to their intended timeframes.

88. **Cost efficiency:** Stakeholder consultations and the evaluation team's direct observations indicate that while the materials for the HRFs were of higher cost than for other storage facilities, the higher quality of these materials, as well as innovations undertaken in the structure of the HRFs, are likely to result in cost-efficiency benefits in the longer term. For example, the inclusion of solar energy systems, construction of sloped roofs that allow for skylight to enter facilities, and the intentionally high ceilings of HRFs aimed at optimizing storage space through multi-storey stacking, were highlighted as factors that increase efficiency in use of storage space and reduced electricity costs for lighting. These innovations and higher cost materials for HRF construction

Stakeholder views on cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the HRFs

"The construction was possibly more expensive in that the best technical experts were brought in to guide the water proofing, ventilation, making of the pavement, creating loading stations (where 6-7 trucks can be loaded at one time). Value for money was ensured, and quality was not compromised anywhere. I don't think there were too many other alternative storage measures of this calibre that could be considered." – PDMA interviewee
"The storage space that was created within available resources, both in terms of open and covered [areas] was cost effective. Also, the open space was such that it was later used to set up vick halls and rub halls (in Quetta and Sukkur) which has literally doubled the available space at the HRF. The PDMA no longer rent various spaces for their storage, which is a cost saving. Also, the facility has been built with exceptionally high-quality material." –

⁶⁸ More specific reasons for the delays (e.g. WFP requirements that were not met) were not specified in available documents or by interviewees. Available documents also suggest that additional work on constructing an extension for the Muzaffarabad HRF has faced delays, "due to non-availability of members of review panel and further unusual delays have been faced during the reviewing process." (Source: WFP. 2020c. "Engineering Unit – Monthly Progress Brief: October – November 2020")

⁶⁹ "Communities in disaster-prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022".

⁷⁰ "Strengthen the governments and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction".

⁷¹ See Table 1 "Summary of Progress", WFP Monitoring of HRF Construction (Muzaffarabad) 22-24 Jan 2020.

⁷² WFP Pakistan: Special Operation SO200707 - HRFs

were intended to save money in the longer term – though specific historical data was difficult to collect. However, in the HRFs visited, the evaluation team noted the electricity channelled through solar panels was not sufficient to power the cold storage systems in the facilities, nor were government-provided power and generators able to provide sufficient electricity to run the cold storage. As such, none of the HRFs visited had operational cold storage units at that time and the units were not being used for their intended purpose. In the Sukkur HRF, for example, the cold storage unit contained items such as damaged vehicles and solar panels, rather than items that would require refrigeration.

89. Respondents indicated that WFP engineers were part of the HRF project and that their cost was covered by other WFP budgets, rather than by the HRF project budget. This was considered to be a cost saving, also contributing WFP's expertise, particularly in relation to construction. However, available project reporting did not allow the evaluation team to confirm this information as the reports do not provide substantial information on the expenditures or cost-efficiency of the HRFs. Furthermore, the evaluation did not have access to details on expenditures for the HRFs and related capacity strengthening activities from COMET or SCOPE databases. Other challenges in obtaining information to inform an assessment of cost-efficiency of HRFs include:

- **Lack of detailed information on financial expenditures for 2016-2020:** The most recent Standard Project Report for SO 200707 was for the 2016 calendar year, which reported that a cumulative amount of USD 642,000 out of the total budget of USD 9,666,690 was expended by end of 2016. The reason for under-spending was related to delays in construction of the Gilgit and Muzaffarabad HRFs. Detailed information on financial expenditures related to the HRFs for the 2016-2020 period was not available. While the Standard Project Report for PRRO 200867 in 2017 mentioned the HRFs, the report's financial reporting section did not provide any details on expenditures specifically related to the HRFs.
- **Estimations for cost and time savings from HRF did not include Muzaffarabad and Gilgit:** The ROI report on the HRFs indicated economic benefits of the facilities in terms of costs savings (USD 0.05 for every dollar invested for a 20-year period) and time savings (reduction of time required for delivery of NFIs to affected populations by 3.6 days). There was no subsequent reporting, however, to indicate if these costs savings were realized for the HRFs in Muzaffarabad and Gilgit, which had not yet been constructed at the time of the ROI study.⁷³

90. There was a lack of available data on the extent to which alternative, more cost-effective measures were considered by WFP in the construction of the HRFs. The ROI report provides estimations of the cost and time savings through an analysis of scenarios in which the HRFs were constructed, and where they were not constructed.

2.4. EVALUATION QUESTION 4: COHERENCE

Finding 10. Persistent limitations in communication, coordination and knowledge-sharing within and between the provinces constitute challenges for coherent supply chain management (EQ4).


91. The evaluation revealed that communication, coordination and knowledge-sharing between actors were key factors affecting HRF performance and coherence in supply chain management (EQ4). Here, supply chain management as part of humanitarian logistics refers to the flow and storage of goods and materials from the point of origin to the point of consumption, with the ultimate goal of alleviating the suffering of affected populations. The interdependence of the supply chain flow is presented below in Figure 2.1, illustrating that a disruption or 'break in the chain' at any level has implications for the other levels; the key to appropriate disaster preparedness and response is combining all supply chain flows into an effective execution plan.⁷⁴ There is increasing recognition of the importance of cross-cutting issues in

⁷³ WFP. 2018e. ROI Report—Pakistan: Humanitarian Response Facilities Development Project (HRF). Islamabad, WFP Country Office. Internal document, unpublished.

⁷⁴ Effective supply chain management includes preparedness, planning, procurement, transportation, warehousing, tracking and tracing, delivery, and can also include the management of vehicles (modes of transport).

achieving successful supply chain management, such as: the environment (i.e. sustainable procurement), protection, gender, safeguarding, and cash/market-based assistance.

Figure 2.1 Interconnected Supply Chain Flows



92. In examining the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence in supply chain management, a majority of stakeholders consulted cited the lack of visibility of stocks available as undermining the readiness and thereby effectiveness of disaster response. Several stakeholders mentioned the need for an IT system to actively monitor stocks, in order to determine what resources are already available at nearby HRFs that can be immediately dispatched (i.e. circumventing the delays involved in procurement) in the event of an emergency. However, there appears to be some reluctance from PDMA actors to make information available in a timely manner on what is in stock where, emphasizing the related security concerns.

93. Some stakeholders stated that software had been developed for NDMA and PDMA to track the types and categories of goods in the various warehouses in a way that is visible to all, allowing for more effective and efficient utilization and planning of the HRFs. However, those consulted noted that this software was not consistently used for tracking. Some have also reportedly explored the possibility of utilizing this software to monitor space available to sublease the space to other actors as a means of generating additional revenue and reinvesting the funds into building additional assets.

Finding 11. The HRFs have reportedly improved PDMA's supply chain management capacities to varying extents across all HRFs, with an expansion of HRFs at the divisional and district level (EQ4.2).

94. In assessing the extent to which the HRF project provided greater supply chain management capacities in disaster operation contexts (EQ 4.2), there is evidence that the HRF project improved capacities in supply chain management and in the prepositioning of key relief and search and rescue items (such as boats, water pumps, generators etc.) for emergency response across provinces. This includes agreements with vendors and linkages with institutions for accessing machinery, transportation and equipment at short notice during an emergency. For example, in Balochistan the HRFs represent a “first of its kind” project and a critical breakthrough in supply chain management for disaster operations. In Gilgit, GDMA's are reported to be better equipped since the HRF was constructed, as they are now pre-positioning strategic stocks for the first time and maintaining a minimum level of strategic stocks through their own procurement process. The HRF in Punjab reports using 90 per cent of capacity for relief goods, with more relief items in the procurement pipeline.

95. In general, PDMA's/SDMA report being more prepared to respond to emergencies, with the HRFs allowing for a more coherent approach with emergency relief items and equipment stored in a single place; PDMA stakeholders reported that since the handover of HRFs from WFP, they have gradually built up the necessary capacities to manage transportation, ambulances, and establish camps, among others. PDMA's have reportedly added and further complemented the HRF facilities. PDMA's stated that they have acquired

multiple capacities in supply chain management through the HRF project, such as how to: manage large quantities of goods, procure goods and services, articulate requests with certain specifications, work with vendors (e.g. transportation), manage emergency communication, and adhere to government regulations. Consulted external stakeholders corroborate this finding and assert that the construction of HRFs set the stage for quicker and more reliable supply chain management in a disaster operation context.

96. In an effort to replicate HRF models, stakeholders described warehousing facilities that are in the process of expanding at the divisional and district levels, often through provincial government budgets. Several stakeholders attested to the challenges they have faced in reaching vulnerable districts during an emergency, with road access blocked (e.g. due to flooding, landslide, snow). Consequently, 'mini HRFs' were said to have been established in strategic areas at the district and divisional levels to increase timeliness of relief interventions, reach and access during emergencies.⁷⁵

97. The 2007 flood which affected 23 districts highlighted the need for a coherent district-level response network. In 2010, NDMA requested additional coverage of the HRFs in 50 districts. In response, according to stakeholders consulted, WFP supported the NDMA in constructing Flospans in 58 districts. In Quetta, snow emergency relief centres were set up at the district level.

98. At the divisional level in Sindh, PDMA stakeholders report the addition of four HRFs/storage facilities in Karachi, Larkana, Mir Pur Khas, and Shaheed Benazirabad, as well as plans for their own trucking fleet to mitigate issues with inflated transportation costs and delays with private transport and to address coverage issues. Similarly, Balochistan PDMA has developed their own fleet of trucks and containers in response to challenges they faced previously in securing goods and getting transportation companies to access high-risk areas.⁷⁶ In AJK, the SDMA is now setting up Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs) in ten districts, which are to include training and appropriate equipment.

99. The recent snow emergency of 2020 in Balochistan revealed critical gaps in the current HRF setup, particularly with regard to extreme temperatures and lack of appropriate gear. In an effort to improve supply chain management capacities for responding to future snow emergencies, the PDMA has recently built three snow emergency relief centres to complement the HRFs.

100. Stakeholders also noted, however, that there is still a need for more facilities at district centres, and for warehousing facilities at the union council and tehsil level. In Quetta, for example, the PDMA's capacities to respond to a recent disaster in the coastal belt (i.e. cyclone Gulab on 2 October 2021) was limited due to road access being blocked and goods could not be transported to reach the affected population; in response, PDMA has requested funding from the government to build six small divisional HRFs.

Finding 12. The HRF project involved some partnerships and coordination, mainly with government actors (e.g. ministry departments). (EQ4.1).

Partnerships & Warehouse Utilization

101. An examination of partnerships and coordination with other actors and how these influenced warehouse utilization (EQ 4.1) revealed that the HRF project has involved some partnerships but limited coordination with other humanitarian actors, such as NGOs. Based on documents reviewed, key partners within civil society have included the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) which consists of 43 international aid organizations, the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM), and the National Centre for Rural Development (NCRD). The construction of the HRFs was completed in partnership with private contractors (e.g. NESPAK and Meinhardt, Zoom, UCC, Astral and Dinsons); other key partners have involved members of the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC).

102. Stakeholders consulted described some partnerships with line ministries, UN agencies, and civil society organizations in implementing the HRF project. These included partnerships with various government departments, such as education, health, food, social welfare, the Benazir Income Support Programme within the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, among others. Partnerships between

⁷⁵ According to stakeholders, some of this expansion has been supported through World Bank and ADB funds.

⁷⁶ Stakeholders added that this was particularly advantageous in allowed them to respond to the recent locust emergency, and the COVID pandemic.

the PDMAs were reported with health departments in leading the COVID response (see Finding 7). During the locust attack in 2019, PDMAs provided supply chain and logistical support to the Department of Agriculture and built credibility with line departments in part due to the increased capacities afforded by the HRF project.

103. Where sufficient coordination was present, stakeholders reported that the HRFs enabled an improved utilization of warehouses by other actors and contributed to enhanced awareness of the importance of warehousing as part of disaster preparedness and response. In some locations, internal stakeholders reported that local NGOs and INGOs (e.g. Islamic Relief and Muslim Hands) used the HRFs through collaboration with the PDMA, for example in Quetta during the recent snow emergency. However, these appeared to be exceptions, rather than the norm.

104. While HRFs can be used and leveraged by other humanitarian actors at the time of emergency response, as per the MoUs, the evaluation team observed that in practice this has not been fully implemented beyond the exceptional examples presented above. There does not appear to be a systematic coordination mechanism for HRF usage and the point of co-sharing to mitigate underutilization of the HRFs was reportedly raised at multiple forums on disaster preparedness. In several instances, despite the need for secure storage space among DM and DRR actors, PDMAs did not share information on space or stocks available within the HRFs or clarify the criteria for HRF utilization. Instead, space required was coordinated through UN agencies (e.g. WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF), or obtained through commercial companies.

105. Interviewees highlighted the need for improved working relations between WFP and PDMA in some areas. The evaluation team detected a lack of clarity between WFP and PDMA stakeholders on the roles and responsibilities of each, and which resources were to be used for what and by whom. In Punjab, WFP closed its Provincial Office in Lahore, which may have contributed to a gap in communication between PDMA and WFP. There appeared to be some trust issues between the different levels of government and NGOs, and a lack of support structure within the districts.

106. The evaluation also identified issues with collaboration between key actors with regard to monitoring, data collection and knowledge-sharing. For example, the WFP CO requested PDMAs to call on DDMA to collect information on the most vulnerable in their districts through a WFP-devised questionnaire, and to share data for WFP to analyse. However, the WFP CO reported that the questionnaires were never completed or returned, reflecting broader challenges in collaborating with PDMAs.

Inter-Governmental Collaboration

107. From 2009 until 2015, the NDMA played a leading role in national disaster policy and planning, with important links and coordination with PDMAs, as established in 2012 with the National Disaster Management Plan. However, after the 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan and devolution, PDMAs became self-directed independent entities. Although the NDMA is the key agency for disaster management at the national level, after an HRF is constructed, it is handed over to the respective PDMA which assumes full responsibility for its operation, management, and maintenance.⁷⁷ While DDMA are largely inactive in normal circumstances, they are immediately activated during disasters as first responders, with the goal of reaching the most affected and vulnerable populations. In most cases, disaster response is managed at the PDMA and DDMA levels; however when a crisis affects the whole country or several provinces, the NDMA is involved.

108. The evaluation found some evidence of inter-governmental collaboration; while this is not systematic between all levels of government, it is particularly evident at the district level. Stakeholders reported that in some instances, DDMA work together with local NGOs to determine needs on the ground and communicate these to PDMAs to inform planning. For example, this was occurring in nearly all districts in Sindh, which were utilizing committees and WhatsApp groups to get information in areas where they did not have a physical presence. Some stakeholders reported that contingency plans were being prepared at the district level and then submitted to the PDMAs/DDMA to consolidate needs identified across the various districts to inform the development of a provincial/state-level plan. Nevertheless, multiple stakeholders

⁷⁷ WFP. 2019. Humanitarian Response Facilities. Rome, WFP.

consulted noted the lack of a PDMA focal point at the district level that could allow for more coherent interlinkages.

109. With devolution, there appears to be a lack of alignment among PDMA's under a coherent strategic direction; clear parameters on who steps in, when, how, and using which resources have not been established or communicated. Evidence reviewed reveals limited coordination between the various levels of government, particularly in linking the PDMA's with the district, divisional and tehsil level, and stakeholders noted the absence of coordination mechanisms. There was no indication of the existence of a coordination forum for humanitarian actors at the provincial level.

110. There appears to be reluctance to share information or make stocks visible to other offices among PDMA's or between PDMA's and NDMA's. During the flooding in Karachi in December 2020-January 2021, for example, NDMA unnecessarily reached out to WFP to provide speed boats for flood response without knowing that speed boats were already available at a nearby facility. This is just one example of insufficient coordination between NDMA's and PDMA's on who is responsible for what in coordinating responses at national and provincial levels.

2.5. EVALUATION QUESTION 5: SUSTAINABILITY

Finding 13. The HRF project has fulfilled a basic need for improved capacities in sustainable disaster preparedness. However, further support and investment is required to ensure further strengthening of technical and managerial capacities for emergency preparedness and response (EQ 5.1 and 5.2).

111. Overall, since the HRF project was established, PDMA's have gradually built capacities and are now able to manage and respond to small-scale emergencies (affecting 5,000-50,000 people) without the need to call on additional international support. According to stakeholders consulted, capacity strengthening and trainings provided by WFP prior to the handover of the HRFs contributed to establishing a foundation for warehouse management. WFP training was perceived as useful and practical for supply chain management in comparison with training received from other actors. Participants shared that they acquired tangible skills that enhanced their capacities and improved disaster response, and commended WFP's technical expertise in warehousing and supply chain management which they see as a strength of the HRF project and a source of its credibility.

112. The sustainability of the achievements of the HRF project is likely to be further bolstered by increases in government awareness and commitment to disaster preparedness and supply chain management. Various groups reported that PDMA's are increasingly becoming known for their expertise in supply chain management, Provincial governments noted the difference in their abilities and are confident in the PDMA's abilities to respond to disasters in large part thanks to the HRFs.

113. Evidence, however, indicates the continued need for further capacity strengthening of district-level actors in disaster preparedness, including:

- Training for staff of the recently established district level facilities (e.g. in Balochistan, Sindh, and AJK) as they did not receive the initial WFP training as part of the HRF project. The extent to which provinces have engaged in capacity strengthening of district governments in disaster preparedness varied, with Punjab leading in this area with the establishment of the District Emergency Operation Centres with support of the World Bank. DDMA stakeholders stated that they did not feel equipped with the necessary technical expertise or capacities to respond to certain emergencies, highlighting their limited resources to achieve the anticipated coverage. For example, a train emergency in Ghotki demanded cutters and machines to be brought in from Sukkur and Hyderabad, resulting in the loss of human lives.
- The lack of a coherent support structure within districts to ensure they are equipped to manage small emergencies at district-level may limit sustained outcomes of the HRF project. Stakeholders highlighted a critical missing link in the HRF supply chain network, especially the lack of a Divisional Relief Hub, as well as Divisional and District focal points in most areas.

- DDMA face challenges in their organizational structure and resources. DDMA stakeholders noted the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities within their organizational setup, and indicated that they are not sufficiently involved in provincial planning processes prior to a disaster, or given regular information or included in trainings or regular meetings. At the ground level, stakeholders noted that there is little distinction between what is within the parameters of PDMA and DDMA.

114. High turnover of staff over the course of the HRF project led to a loss of the expertise and knowledge gained through initial trainings. Also, one-off trainings of short duration provided at the earlier stages of the project were insufficient to provide the depth of learning needed. Government stakeholders interviewed highlighted the need to develop a cadre of supply chain specialists within each province at PDMA and DDMA who can deliver regular refresher training sessions for existing and newly appointed staff on supply chain management and to ensure the proper operation and maintenance of the HRFs.

Finding 14. While some provinces have dedicated financial resources to the HRFs from their budgets, these resources have been insufficient for the maintenance of the HRFs. Challenges in the timeliness of disbursement of funds may in turn limit the timeliness of emergency response (EQ 5.1 and 5.2).

115. MoUs for the HRFs stipulate that PDMA are responsible for the costs of operation, including staffing and maintenance of the HRFs, as a condition of handover.⁷⁸ There is some evidence of increases in funding for the HRFs, with provincial governments attracting support from various agencies (e.g. World Bank)⁷⁹ and donors to strengthen and sustain the HRFs.

116. Increased government ownership of the HRFs, through the allocation of resources for existing and additional to support the creation of additional decentralized HRFs is encouraged.⁸⁰ Stakeholders interviewed had the impression that some PDMA (particularly in KP⁸¹) did not have a dedicated or sufficient budget allocated for the HRFs. In Balochistan, AJK and Sindh, however, provincial governments have approved the construction of additional HRFs with their own funds. Balochistan is reportedly taking a lead in this area, with PDMA Balochistan resources growing considerably in the past five years to include a fleet of trucks, state-of-the-art ambulances, and mobile offices among others. In Sindh, stakeholders reported that dedicated budgets are allocated for the HRF's operational and maintenance costs and human resources, but access to these funds is slow and arduous, ultimately undermining a timely and effective response during emergencies.⁸² Funds allocated from the provincial government is said to be

Direct Observation of HRFs through Site Visits

As part of data collection, national consultants conducted site visits to four HRFs, which allowed for important observations on the condition of the HRFs and the extent of HRF operations and maintenance. While there were differences across provinces, the consultants noted the following:

Several health and safety risks were identified, including fire hazards, structural damage (e.g. holes in roof) and barriers for firefighters. Fire hydrants and smoke detectors were expired or not functional and fire hoses were not in working condition. Stacking was poorly arranged, placed directly on the ground without safe distances maintained for walkways. Some security issues (e.g. theft) were also reported, compromising the safety of staff and stocks. Relief items are not standardized at some HRFs (e.g. KP). Out-of-date stock. Some contents of hygiene kits were expired, including feminine sanitary napkins.

Key equipment (such as generators, IT and solar panels) were not being maintained or regularly monitored, with inconsistent record keeping. Solar panels were not maintained, with batteries expired and unable to be replaced or removed altogether after handover. Critical areas, such as the generator room and cold storage, were not being utilized for their intended purposes, and instead used to store unwanted materials haphazardly (including waste and unserviceable vehicles).

⁷⁸ The evaluation team did not have access to the MoUs to verify the exact amount or reporting on the extent provinces were able to allocate the estimated costs of maintaining and running the HRFs per year (according to the ROI Study). As such, the evaluation team could not evaluate whether in fact the provincial government is allocating these estimates.

⁷⁹ Stakeholders referred to a few WB supported initiatives, including the WB DCRIP in AJK and WB SRP in Sukkur.

⁸⁰ However, it was noted that expanding coverage and reach might also come at the cost of spreading resources too thin, raising questions around quality vs. quantity.

⁸¹ For example, stakeholders in KP evidenced a lack of substantial budget for the procurement of relief items at the district level.

⁸² According to stakeholders consulted, their policy stipulates the provision of 1.5% of the total provincial budget for natural disasters. Another stakeholder detailed a PC-1 as being recently approved for funding, whereby more HRFs will be established at the divisional level.

slow to reach the Tehsil level and is reportedly not sufficient to respond to emergencies. Stakeholders expressed concerns on whether a lack of regular maintenance will compromise expensive investments in the facility and its equipment. The issue of maintenance was further evidenced in the direct observation of HRF site visits, described in the text box.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1. The HRF project has been relevant to the Government of Pakistan's national priorities and capacity strengthening needs and to the needs of affected populations. Since their handover, HRFs have been successfully and rapidly utilized during relief operations for several emergencies, including Pakistan's response to COVID-19. (Criteria addressed: Relevance)

117. Overall, the HRF project has served as a catalyst for increased commitment to emergency preparedness at different levels of the government. The HRF project developed physical infrastructure and operational capabilities in emergency preparedness and response that were previously either minimal or non-existent in provinces. From the outset, the HRF project adopted an intentional approach to ensure Government of Pakistan leadership of utilization of HRFs following their handover; this approach has served as a key turning point which has fostered ownership and leadership for pre-positioning of emergency stocks.

118. This approach also prompted NDMA and PDMA to adopt practices that were not undertaken previously, such as conducting annual contingency planning, needs assessments, and establishing contract agreements with suppliers along the emergency preparedness and response value chain (e.g. annual transportation and vendor agreements). These practices indicate the active engagement of the Government of Pakistan in establishing institutional processes and systems for emergency preparedness and response more broadly.

119. The HRF project has contributed to an increase in PDMA/SDMA confidence in their ability to independently manage response in a variety of emergency situations. HRFs have already been relevant and successfully and quickly utilized as part of relief operations for several emergencies, including Pakistan's response to COVID-19. The pandemic introduced unexpected opportunities to demonstrate HRF effectiveness in enhancing PDMA's capacity to respond to emergencies and were relevant to the needs of affected populations. Overall, the HRF project has contributed to a shift in mind set on the importance of institutional processes for emergency preparedness, and to operational capacity that has demonstrably enhanced the Government of Pakistan's track record in leading emergency responses.

Conclusion 2. Through the HRF project, WFP served as an effective capacity strengthening partner to the Government of Pakistan. Whilst notable progress has been made, considerable needs remain in relation to relevant capacity, resources, and coordination, both within the government and among other humanitarian actors, and the vision of an integrated national network for emergency preparedness and response has yet to be achieved. (Criteria addressed: Effectiveness)

120. The HRF project contributed to enhancing government capacity in three of the five dimensions outlined in WFP's corporate approach to country capacity strengthening: policies and legislation, institutional effectiveness and accountability, and strategic planning and financing. The project has helped increase supply chain management capacity to varying degrees across the targeted provinces. While the existing HRFs have supported PDMA to reach affected populations following emergencies, not all HRFs have yet the required reach to meet all needs, as seen in Sindh, Balochistan, AJK and Quetta. Following handover of HRFs, some provincial governments (Balochistan, AJK and Sindh) have allocated funding towards their operation, but the amounts do not yet fully cover maintenance costs.

121. The project made no clear contributions to the country capacity strengthening dimensions of (i) stakeholder programme design, delivery, and M&E; and (ii) engagement and participation of communities, civil society, and the private sector. This reflects the fact that the HRF project was designed with a focus on supporting the Government of Pakistan in taking on the management of the HRFs following their handover. This approach was in line with WFP's corporate focus on maximizing country ownership and self-sufficient delivery of emergency preparedness and response but did not address WFP's equally relevant

focus on ensuring coordination with other humanitarian actors, including other UN agencies, donors, and NGOs.

122. The evaluation found few examples of coordination between the various levels of government and, overall, noted a lack of systematic cross-departmental collaboration and information exchange on, for instance, the inventory of the HRFs. This indicates that the HRFs do not yet constitute a national network of facilities that coordinate and collaborate during an emergency response. Challenges faced in the interlinkages between NDMA, PDMAs, DDMA, through to the Tehsil level, such as the lack of open communication or information-sharing among PDMAs or between PDMAs and NDMA, point to a need to refine existing frameworks or mechanisms for coordination, and to define the roles and responsibilities of the different management authorities involved in emergency preparedness and response, especially considering the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.

Conclusion 3. The design and implementation of the HRF project did not consider gender, protection, diversity and inclusion. (Criteria addressed: Relevance and effectiveness)

123. Gender equality and women's empowerment, equity and wider inclusion dimensions are considered relevant and cross-cutting for disaster and emergency preparedness and response, with less support usually available for women as compared to men and challenges in securing female participation in interventions.⁸³ The evaluation did not find any specific efforts to mainstream gender and protection considerations in different aspects of the HRF project, including design, objectives, strategy, implementation, training, and monitoring.

124. Gender and vulnerability analyses were not conducted to identify gender-related issues and dimensions specific to the HRFs, nor were vulnerable communities consulted to inform HRF design or implementation. Minimal attention was given to pre-positioning gender-responsive items (beyond the provision of basic menstrual hygiene kits), nor were efforts made to involve women vendors or suppliers in procurement processes. It was consistently reported that gender and protection dimensions were more of an 'add-on' done haphazardly than integral dimensions given due consideration.

125. HRFs were generally positioned as an infrastructure-driven project, with a focus on structural engineering and supply chain needs. This narrow perspective failed to consider the implications of gender and protection dimensions in disaster preparedness and response, including related to warehousing, stockpiling and supply chain management. This has led to 'blind spots' in the HRF project, which has not specifically addressed the needs of most affected and vulnerable women, girls, men, boys, the elderly (M/F), and persons with disabilities (M/F).

Conclusion 4. Insufficient financial and human capacities in most provinces pose risks to the continued maintenance and operations of most HRFs. (Criteria addressed: Sustainability)

126. Evaluation findings reveal significant provincial variations in resource allocation to the operational costs of the HRFs, with some evidence of improved dedicated budgets in select provinces and some provincial governments attracting support from various agencies and donors to strengthen and sustain the facilities. However, the stated level of financial and human capacities in most provinces limited the ability of HRFs to be maintained at optimal level, especially maintenance for top-of-the-line tools and technology, and for operating costs to be covered independently. This poses a significant risk to the medium- and long-term sustainability of the HRFs.

127. Replicating HRFs at the divisional and district levels to better meet the needs of affected areas has the potential to increase reach and overcome some of the constraints faced when attempting to deliver relief items to affected populations during emergencies, especially in more remote areas. Some additional warehousing facilities have already been constructed by provincial governments, yet there is still an unmet demand. Government commitment to sustainability and future development of the HRF network has been partly addressed through these provincial investments to build additional facilities. However, more remains to be done and, as reported in WFP's 2018 ROI study, there are potential opportunities for PDMAs/SDMA to mobilize resources from other agencies and donors to further improve emergency preparedness and

⁸³WFP. 2014. Operation Evaluation: Pakistan Protracted Relief Operation 200250 Enhancing Food and Nutrition Security and Rebuilding Social Cohesion (OEV/2014/09).

response, with WFP focussing more on its strategic policy and institutional strengthening objectives, including those related to emergency preparedness and response.

128. Respondents expressed that the HRFs significantly enabled timelier responses to emergencies and helped to improve supply chain capacities, thereby increasing the PDMA's ability to prepare for and respond to emergencies and disasters. For example, the Balochistan PDMA response to the October 2021 earthquake and other recent emergencies. While relatively expensive high-quality materials were used for HRF construction, and innovations such as solar panels, were installed with the aim to reduce operating costs and carbon footprint in the longer term. It was however observed in at least one location that electricity channelled through solar panels was not sufficient to power the cold storage systems in the facilities.

3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

129. The evaluation's recommendations, presented in Table 3.1 below, address the overall objectives of the evaluation and as such are aimed at informing: (i) WFP's support to the disaster management authorities and subsequent relevant technical support for their effective utilization and integration with the rest of government disaster management systems, based on evidence found of positive and negative, intended and unintended, results of the HRF project; and (ii) future actions to improve the effectiveness of WFP interventions that will allow the WFP Country Office to make informed decisions about specific interventions that should be undertaken to promote such technical assistance in a cost-effective, focused and systematic way.

130. The recommendations are prioritized based on the evaluation team's assessment of their urgency and relevance, and are presented in two groups: (i) strategic recommendations, which focus on informing overall direction of WFP's support for emergency preparedness and response in Pakistan; and (ii) operational recommendations, which focus on informing future improvements to the HRF network and emergency preparedness operations in Pakistan.

131. The lead entity for most of the evaluation's recommendations is the WFP Country Office. The recommendations consider the shift in focus of WFP's strategic engagement in Pakistan towards building community resilience and institutional capacity strengthening, and away from food distribution. As such, the recommendations are formulated with a view to WFP playing an important role as a capacity strengthening partner for the Government of Pakistan in emergency preparedness and response moving forward.

132. The evaluation's recommendations were derived from the evaluation's findings and conclusions. See Annex 7 for a mapping of evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Table 3.1 Recommendations

| # | Recommendation | Responsibility (one lead office/entity) | Other contributing entities (if applicable) | Priority: High/medium | By when |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------------------|------------------------|
| Strategic Recommendations | | | | | |
| 1 | <p>WFP Pakistan should provide overall system support in the area of disaster risk reduction and transition from direct construction; in terms of HRFs, further assistance should focus on technical support to disaster management authorities. This should align with and be part of other supply-chain related interventions. Its support should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Translate existing supply chain (SC) policies (e.g. SC Management Policies) into effective practice • Support sustainable management of HRFs, including aspects of long-term agreements with vendors (procurement of food commodities, transportation, storage), and funding • Define financial resource plans and mechanisms for fund utilization during emergencies to overcome and streamline bureaucratic hurdles. This includes a potential pre-positioning of food in hard-to-reach areas • Provide technical assistance at the policy level to enhance government-led efforts to update as needed the NDMP to refine the roles and responsibilities of the NDMA, PDMA and DDMA in alignment with the devolution of government responsibilities • Identify, and advocate for, specific objectives, activity areas in which the use and management of existing HRFs should be included within future iterations of the NDMP or other national and provincial policies and plans for emergency preparedness and response • Provide assistance to the Government of Pakistan to formulate a financial strategy aimed at enhancing national disaster preparedness and response capacities, with the HRFs as a key link in the supply chain • Integrate where possible, activities aimed at strengthening the Government of Pakistan’s capacities in HRF utilization and management with other WFP interventions related to emergency preparedness and response. | WFP CO | | High | 2022 to end of new CSP |
| 2 | <p>The WFP CO should contribute to further enhancing Government of Pakistan coordination frameworks and mechanisms for emergency preparedness and response among humanitarian actors in Pakistan, with a view to consolidating the vision of an effective and integrated national network for emergency preparedness and response.</p> | WFP CO – Programme Unit, SO4 | WFP CO staff involved in emergency coordination | High | |

| # | Recommendation | Responsibility (one lead office/entity) | Other contributing entities (if applicable) | Priority: High/medium | By when |
|------------------------------------|--|--|---|--------------------------|---------|
| 2.1 | <p>WFP could engage in actions of relatively low-cost to make the case to the Government of Pakistan to enhance interlinkages among HRFs, among PDMA, and across levels of government (e.g. NDMA, PDMA, SDMA, and DDMA). In this regard, WFP could:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advocate for the Government of Pakistan to revisit and refine, as needed, existing frameworks, including roles and responsibilities for coordination of disaster management that includes the different levels of government, according to the type and extent of an emergency, and SOPs for emergency preparedness and response to be better aligned with the current division of responsibilities across all levels of government following devolution⁸⁴ • Among Government of Pakistan actors, emphasize the importance of integrating the utilization and ongoing maintenance of the HRFs within the rest of government disaster management systems • Make the case for the establishment of federal-provincial dialogue mechanisms, including DDMA as well as PDMA, that are aimed at reinforcing continuous information exchange across all levels of government on status and coordinated delivery of pre-positioned stocks within HRFs and other warehousing facilities, including those at the constructed district level • Provide opportunities for learning exchange among PDMA, particularly allowing for PDMA with better capacity, structures and fundraising experience to share their models and practices with those that have less. | WFP CO – Programme Unit, SO4 | WFP CO staff involved in emergency coordination WFP CO – Supply Chain Unit NDMA, PDMA, SDMA and DDMA | High | Q3 2022 |
| 2.2 | <p>WFP and Government of Pakistan partners could consider establishing a forum that includes all humanitarian actors to engage in regular strategic discussions aimed at coordinating the use of storage space in the HRFs and coordinating emergency preparedness and response efforts across participating agencies more broadly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for the development of a long-term vision and strategy for an effective and integrated national network for emergency preparedness and response and for ensuring effective supply chain management • Support of an NDMA/PDMA-led coordination and discussion forum for a joint understanding of risks and vulnerabilities that might need preparedness or humanitarian response • Digitalization of food and non-food commodity stocks in country to be administered by NDMA and PDMA. | Government of Pakistan | WFP CO staff involved in emergency coordination Other UN agencies, donors, international financial institutions and NGOs active in humanitarian response | Medium | Q3 2022 |
| Operational Recommendations | | | | | |

⁸⁴ For instance, adapting to a national context the classification of the IASC levels of response – local, provincial, national level emergencies

| # | Recommendation | Responsibility (one lead office/entity) | Other contributing entities (if applicable) | Priority: High/medium | By when |
|-----|---|---|---|--------------------------|------------------------|
| 3 | The WFP CO should prioritize GEEW, protection, and AAP more systematically in interventions related to emergency preparedness and response, in alignment with the organization's Gender Policy, Protection and Accountability Policy and with the commitments of the Government of Pakistan. | WFP CO | | High | |
| 3.1 | <p>WFP could provide technical support (e.g. tools and guidance) for PDMA to conduct gender and vulnerability analyses and consult communities assisted by the HRFs to ensure cross-cutting dimensions are factored into SOPs for pre-positioned stocks, and the collection of data that is disaggregated by sex, age and (dis)ability in the context of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Monitoring deliveries of relief items to affected populations Reporting against results frameworks that include cross-cutting aims related to gender, AAP and PSEA Monitoring numbers of participants in capacity strengthening activities. <p>WFP could provide technical capacity to government officials to undertake standardized and gender-related vulnerabilities assessments and post-shock assessments (data collection, processing and analysis).</p> | WFP CO – Programme Unit, SO4 and Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) | WFP CO staff with thematic expertise in cross-cutting issues (e.g. Gender and/or Protection Officers) WFP CO M&E staff | High | Q2 2022 |
| 4 | WFP should make the case for the Government of Pakistan to consider providing further capacity strengthening in HRF operations and maintenance, and emergency preparedness and response more broadly, aimed at reinforcing the training that was previously delivered under the HRF project. | WFP CO | | Medium | |
| 4.1 | <p>WFP should encourage the Government of Pakistan to deliver additional capacity strengthening activities to government actors, including HRF, PDMA and DDMA staff. Such training could include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Additional training to HRF staff on operations and maintenance that builds on the capacity strengthening activities delivered by WFP under the HRF project Training and technical assistance to PDMA and DDMA in strategic planning and budgeting, and emergency preparedness and response more broadly Delivering HRF-related capacity strengthening to district-level warehouse facilities, including mini-HRFs that have been established and whose staff did not participate in capacity strengthening activities delivered under the HRF project Providing resources for and training on the use of IT systems and software packages for commodity tracking in HRFs where this has not yet been introduced. | WFP CO | | High | 2022 to end of new CSP |

4. Annexes

Annex 1 Summary TOR

Decentralized evaluation for
evidence-based decision making

WFP Office of Evaluation



Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (DEQAS)

Terms of Reference

EVALUATION of

Humanitarian Response Facilities Network in Pakistan from January 2014 to September 2020
WFP Country Office Pakistan

1. Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the decentralized evaluation of the Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRFs) network constructed by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Pakistan as part of its capacity strengthening initiative in the four provinces namely Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan and the regions of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). This is a capacity development and augmentation activity focusing on the establishment of a network of strategic HRFs to support the Government of Pakistan (GoP) under the 'National Disaster Management Plan'. Eight HRFs have been constructed and handed over to the provincial governments. The return on investment (ROI) study commissioned by WFP in 2018 on the first six HRFs suggests that the HRFs can assist 1.8 million additional people with food in the first 30 days of emergency. This is an activity evaluation commissioned by WFP Pakistan and will cover the period from January 2014 to September 2020.

2. These TOR were prepared by the WFP monitoring and evaluation team based upon an initial document review and consultation with key stakeholders and following a standard template. The evaluation is expected to take place from April to December 2021. The purpose of the TOR is twofold. Firstly, it provides key information to the evaluation team and helps guide them throughout the evaluation process; and secondly, it provides key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.

2. Reasons for the Evaluation

3. The reasons for the evaluation being commissioned are presented below.

2.1 Rationale

4. Despite WFP's internal assessments, including a return on investment study and the information shared by WFP's post-distribution monitoring (PDMs) from time to time, as of to date, there is no third-party assessment or evaluation to rightly assess to what extent the intervention has contributed to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities in Pakistan and to what extent those have been integrated with the rest of the national disaster management system to make sure those are sustainable and have enhanced the overall government capacity to better respond in case of an emergency.

5. Since these HRFs directly contribute to the efforts of the government to strengthen the warehouse capacity of the GoP, it is felt necessary by WFP to assess such aspects through an independent evaluation.

The findings of the evaluation will also be used to measure the results of WFP's contribution to augment the overall capacity of GoP for its emergency preparedness and response. The findings will help to identify the factors that led to such capacity development efforts and provide programmatic recommendations to guide if such facilities are required at the sub-national level, particularly in disaster-prone districts. The findings will also provide a good basis for discussion with donors and the GoP for capacity development initiatives, particularly when WFP is transitioning from direct humanitarian assistance to capacity enhancement as per commitment under its Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022) and when some traditional humanitarian donors are phasing out from Pakistan. More specifically, the findings will also help to understand how such facilities have been integrated into the overall government system, if they are sustainable in the current set-up and whether any such investments by GoP itself will have a lasting impact on its overall disaster management capacity.

6. The timing of this evaluation is also very critical when GoP is confronted with new challenges like COVID-19, flood in Sindh, and locust emergency and is trying to respond to the situation thus requiring such logistical storage facilities available to store essential items for a longer period and on a more strategic basis. Likewise, considering that the winter season would be ongoing by the time the evaluation will be undertaken, the findings of the evaluation will also help to understand how such facilities were considered or utilized as a part of the GoP's contingency plan or actual response if required⁸⁵.

7. So far as the internal utility of the evaluation is concerned, the findings will help to assess if such facilities have augmented the capacities of Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and what factors should be taken into account at the time of any such commitment in the future.

2.1 Objectives

8. Evaluations will serve WFP the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning.

- **Accountability** – Assess and report if the evolving role of WFP as a capacity development partner in disaster management (preparedness, mitigation, and response) is enabling the government to augment its capacities to better respond in emergencies.
- **Learning** – Understand how and why WFP capacity development has been able to meet the emergency response needs of different categories of the affected people and what can be learned for the future implementation of this activity.

9. The specific objectives for this evaluation are to:

- **Generate evidence** of positive and negative, intended and unintended, results of WFP's support to the disaster management authorities by constructing these HRFs, and subsequent relevant technical support for their effective utilization and integration with the rest of government disaster management systems.
- **Improve the effectiveness** of WFP interventions by determining the reasons observed for success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings that will allow the WFP Country Office (CO) to make informed decisions about specific interventions that should be undertaken to promote such technical assistance in a cost-effective, focused and systematic way.

10. The lessons learnt from this evaluation will be further utilized to refine and improve the implementation of similar activities in near future or during the provision of technical assistance to relevant disaster management authorities for the construction of such facilities on their own.

11. The intervention had no specific objective regarding Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (GEEW) or human rights. However, through this evaluation, WFP Pakistan aims to understand whether the initiative helped equally both men and women and whether it had any unintended effects on GEEW or human rights Stakeholders and Users.

⁸⁵ In the beginning of 2020, there was heavy snow in parts of Balochistan and AJK. WFP provided relief assistance to snow affected population based on provincial government requests.

12. Several stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and some of these will be actively engaged in this evaluation process. Please see Table i.1 below for a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which may be expanded by the evaluation team as part of the inception phase.

13. Accountability to the affected populations is tied to WFP's commitments to better respond to the affected population through direct implementation or by providing technical assistance to relevant departments. All interventions of WFP are expected to be designed and implemented in a protection-sensitive manner, identifying protection risks faced by the targeted population, especially the vulnerable population, by designing and implementing strategies and measures to reduce and prevent those protection risks, and evaluating the impact of those measures, in cooperation with key stakeholders (equitably representing the diverse women and men).

14. Furthermore, WFP works in line with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and commit to render humanitarian action inclusive of persons with disabilities, by lifting barriers persons with disabilities are facing in accessing relief, protection, and recovery support and ensuring their participation in the development, planning, and implementation of humanitarian programmes.

15. Equally, WFP is also committed to ensuring gender equality and women's empowerment (GEEW) in the evaluation process, with the participation and consultation in the evaluation by women, men, boys and girls from different groups. At the GoP level, recognizing specific needs and vulnerability of women and children, the Gender and Child Cell (GCC) was established in 2010 under the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). This cell is responsible for integrating the understanding of the needs of women, children and other vulnerable segments of the population during the humanitarian response, emergency management and disaster risk reduction (DRR).

16. Some policy guidelines, standards and tools have been developed to be adopted in emergency response including National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters (2014), Minimum Standards for Protective Spaces for Children (2013), and Guidelines for Minimum Standards of Relief in Camp (2017). In this context, the findings of the evaluation will also help to understand how such aspects can be better integrated right at the start of such capacity enhancement initiatives or if such facilities have any direct relation with such commitments.

Table i.1 Preliminary Stakeholders' Analysis

| Stakeholders | Interest in the evaluation and likely uses of the evaluation report for the stakeholders |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Internal Stakeholders | |
| Country Office (CO) Pakistan | Responsible for the planning and implementation of WFP interventions at the country level. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to the affected population and partners for the performance and results of its programmes. |
| Regional Bureau (RBB) Bangkok | Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RBB management has an interest in an independent/impartial account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices. The Regional Evaluation Officer support CO/RBB management to ensure quality, credible and useful decentralized evaluations. |
| WFP Headquarters (HQ) | WFP HQ technical units are responsible for issuing and overseeing the rollout of normative guidance on corporate programme themes, activities and modalities, as well as of overarching corporate policies and strategies. They also have an interest in the lessons that emerge from evaluations, as many may have relevance beyond the geographical area of focus. Relevant HQ units, particularly the WFP Engineering section in the Management Service Division should be consulted from the planning phase to ensure that key policy, strategic and programmatic considerations are understood from the onset of the evaluation. |
| Office of Evaluation (OEV) | OEV has a stake in ensuring that decentralized evaluations deliver quality, credible and useful evaluations respecting provisions for impartiality as well. |
| | as roles and accountabilities of various decentralized evaluation stakeholders as identified in the evaluation policy. |

| Stakeholders | Interest in the evaluation and likely uses of the evaluation report for the stakeholders |
|--|--|
| WFP Executive Board (EB) | The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP programmes. This evaluation will not be presented to the WFP Executive Board, but its findings may feed into thematic and/or regional syntheses and corporate learning processes. |
| External Stakeholders | |
| Affected population | As the ultimate beneficiaries, the affected population has a stake in WFP determining whether its programmes interventions are appropriate and effective. Although, the level of participation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups in the evaluation will be limited in this evaluation, however, where possible their perspectives will be sought, particularly in areas where they directly benefited from this intervention. |
| Government | As a key stakeholder in this intervention, the Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest. Respective Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) will not only be actively participating in this evaluation, but they will also be direct beneficiaries of the findings of this evaluation. Similarly, at the federal level, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) will also be keen to see some of the findings of this exercise for replication of the same model in other areas. |
| UN Country Team | UNCT's harmonised action should contribute to the realisation of the government's developmental objectives. It has, therefore, an interest in ensuring that WFP programmes are effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. Various agencies are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity levels. |
| NGOs | Various local, national and international NGOs have been instrumental in providing aid and humanitarian services. Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF), representing 43 international aid organizations, has been active since 2003 to address humanitarian and development needs for vulnerable populations in Pakistan. Some of these NGOs are partners of WFP and the government for the implementation of the humanitarian response activities. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships. In this regard, these NGOs will be particularly interested to note how such activities will enable them for their response in partnership with PDMAs. National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) and National Centre for Rural Development (NCRD) have partnered with WFP and the government to provide trainings for HRFs. |
| Donors [Governments and People of Japan, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, the Netherland, Denmark and the United States of America] | WFP operations are voluntarily funded by several donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes. Some of the donors have specifically funded these interventions to develop capacities of PDMAs as part of their overall capacity augmentation efforts. They will be particularly interested to find out how these facilities with some of the other soft components have enabled the PDMAs to better respond in case of emergencies. The findings of the evaluation will also help them to report back into their internal systems. |
| Private Sector | All these facilities were developed by involving private contractors who have now gained considerable experience in designing and construction of these facilities and can provide such services to any other organization. They will be particularly interested to share their experiences for working on such initiative and how experience gained under these initiatives is helping to offer such services through other platforms. Private sector stakeholders who have partnered in the Construction of the HRFs include: Consultants like NESPAK and Meinhardt, Contractors including Zoom, UCC, Astral and Dinsons. |

3. Context and subject of the Evaluation

3.1 Context

17. Pakistan is one of the most disaster-prone countries in South Asia, having suffered an estimated US\$18 billion in damages and losses during the past decade as a result of natural hazards (World Bank, 2017). Different parts of the country are exposed to various disasters of varying extent; coastal areas are prone to swell waves and cyclones, the low-lying plains of the Indus River are increasingly prone to flooding, and the northern regions are highly vulnerable to landslides, snowstorms, avalanches and earthquakes (Ullah & Takaaki, 2016). Most damaging events in the past have been cyclones, droughts, floods, and landslides; 75 per cent of all disasters between 1980 and 2013 have been the result of hydrometeorological hazards (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery [GFDRR], 2019; Ullah & Takaaki, 2016). In 2011, following the flash floods in Pakistan, of the communities surveyed, 52 per cent reported that the privacy and safety of women and girls was a key concern⁸⁶. Women, elderly people, minority groups, persons with disabilities and children were among those hit the hardest. Therefore, any humanitarian support will need to support the country's attempt to fulfil its legal obligations in protecting fundamental rights as articulated in the Constitution, aligned with international conventions and treaties on the rights of children, women and marginalized populations. Pakistan has also been ranked highly in the Climate Vulnerability Index of 2019 - ranking 5th spot on the list of countries, which remained most affected by climate change during the past two decades. According to the Global Climate Risk Index annual report for 2020, which is released by think tank Germanwatch, Pakistan lost 9,989 lives, suffered economic losses worth \$3.8 billion and witnessed 152 extreme weather events from 1999 to 2018. These events occur regularly and at all scales, thus creating cycles of poverty as they erode the resilience of the most vulnerable inhabiting highly exposed areas.

18. While the poverty rate declined by 40 per cent over the last two decades to 24.3 per cent in 2015, the IMF projects a sharp reversal, with up to 40 per cent of Pakistanis living below the poverty line in COVID-19's viral wake. An additional 2.45 million people—beyond an existing 40 million—now suffer food insecurity⁸⁷. The coronavirus crisis has deepened social inequalities in Pakistan, disproportionately impacting vulnerable groups such as women and children. Women working in the informal sector are most impacted by an increase in domestic violence and loss of jobs during the pandemic. However, gender differences in processes generating poverty and economic outcomes in every aspect of a development initiative, remained unaddressed.

19. In this context, UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) partners assist the GoP in the implementation of humanitarian programmes including emergency/disaster responses. However, it has been noted that the Government possesses weak logistics structures within its system as till date this function is not fully embedded within the Government structure, particularly beyond the provincial level. This includes insufficient resources, i.e. untrained staff, immature systems/Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), lack of warehousing infrastructure and equipment etc. Likewise, during big emergencies, notably during the 2010 floods, relief efforts were seriously hampered by the disruption of the supply chain, increased market demand and damages to public infrastructures, despite generous donor support. The Government did not have an adequate logistic system in place to provide timely response to the affected population. The biggest challenge consisted of a lack of central warehousing infrastructure at the provincial level for the pre-positioning of contingency stocks.

20. To overcome these issues and in an effort to enhance disaster management (preparedness, mitigation and response) capacities of GoP and the Disaster Management Authorities, WFP has been constructing Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRF) in close coordination and collaboration with the relevant government authorities. The basic purpose of these facilities is to enhance the capacity of PDMAs to respond to disasters in an effective, efficient and timely manner. The locations for HRFs are selected strategically in consultation with all the stakeholders and based on a statistical analysis of historical disaster frequency/population density in Pakistan. As of now, eight dedicated facilities have been handed over to the respective disaster management authorities. who have been using them for different purposes, including storage of necessary search and rescue equipment and storage of relief items, etc.

⁸⁶ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2015. Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Action: Reducing risk, promoting resilience and aiding recovery. https://gbvguidelines.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/2015-IASC-Gender-based-Violence-Guidelines_lo-res.pdf.

⁸⁷ UNDP, 2020. COVID-19 – Pakistan Socio-economic Impact Assessment & Response Plan (Ver. 1, May 2020).

21. The average cost of these facilities is US\$3.5 million. The detailed break-up of the cost of each facility will be shared with the selected evaluation firm. In addition to the construction of HRFs, WFP also provided training to 1,068 government staff for effective disaster management and response. These facilities were very effective during different emergencies including different floods, droughts, heatwaves, monsoon, cyclone and cold waves etc.

22. An internal WFP Return on Investment (ROI) study was conducted in early 2018 that shows that these HRFs increase the Government storage capacity by more than three times and directly improved the emergency response capacity and coverage by positioning logistics hubs in strategic locations within disaster-prone areas. The increased storage capacity not only allowed to store an additional quantity of relief items but also the voluminous type of items such as rescue boats etc. All this enabled the authorities to respond on time with the right support to a larger population throughout the country, including areas located far from the current logistics or commercial hubs.

23. This investment has brought a paradigm shift in the PDMA's approach to disaster risk management. It triggered the Government to dedicate a specific budget for pre-positioning items and to develop new initiatives. Notably, the Government is willing to invest further in expanding the storage network and, in the recent past, has sought WFP's technical support for the construction of a big warehouse in Karachi. In Punjab, the authorities are thinking about expanding the HRF and create a similar structure for health facilities.

24. Construction of the HRFs also impacts the local economy as the workforce and equipment come from the local market.

25. Recognizing the scope of humanitarian and development challenges, in particular the risk and impact of natural disasters, GoP / NDMA, informed by the 2012 Disaster Risk Management Report, developed a 10-year National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP), which serves as official national-level guidelines for comprehensive disaster risk reduction and management in Pakistan. Under this plan, the GoP identified initiatives for its effective implementation and requested WFP's support in the development of a network of warehouses at strategic locations in the country to enable preparedness and timely response in the disaster-prone regions, aiming to help reduce the economic, social and environmental burden of disasters, and the inevitable human suffering which accompanies it. The independent evaluation of the HRFs will allow for an objective assessment of how WFP has contributed to the objectives of the NDMP, and how the government has utilized the facilities established to date.

26. The GoP disaster management efforts are led by the NDMA. The NDMA's goal to build a network of warehouse structures for emergency response call for having medium to largescale storage facilities in all provinces and small warehouses with capacities of up to 300 mt in the 50 most disaster-prone districts for emergency response. Embedded in the NDMA's National Disaster Management Plan is the establishment of a national emergency response system, which calls for the government to:

- Establish and strengthen warehouse or stockpiling system for storing food, medicine, relief supplies and rescue equipment at strategic locations.
- Enhance emergency response capacities, such as emergency operation centres, civil defence and urban search and rescue teams in major cities.
- Establish a robust communication system and an efficient transport and logistics mechanism to be used during emergencies.
- Develop and implement emergency response plans in relevant ministries and departments at federal, provincial and district levels.
- Establish a National Disaster Management Fund to enable the federal government to organize emergency and response effectively.

27. In addition to WFP logistics-related support, other UN organizations are also providing logistics-related support. In this regard, notably, UNICEF has built storage facilities /cold stores for polio for GoP and assisting in the capacity building of government institutes. Similarly, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has been helping the National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) to conduct

trainings and simulation exercises for the government departments and academia and other humanitarian agencies. This evaluation will be an open resource for future initiatives by the humanitarian organizations, allowing them to not only learn lessons but also prevent duplication of efforts, if any.

3.2 The subject of the evaluation

28. The HRFs constructed along with the provision of technical support are aimed at making Pakistan's disaster management authorities capable of storing, handling and consolidating humanitarian cargo during humanitarian crises in an effective and efficient manner. The HRFs are aimed to: i) improve the availability of relief items and food; ii) minimize the potential risk of supply disruptions; iv) reduce operational costs; and v) improve the capacity of all humanitarian actors and the Government to respond to emergencies in a timely and more cost-effective manner through pre-positioning of strategic stocks, eliminating long lead times needed for the mobilization of relief items in case of an emergency. It was also envisioned that these HRFs will also help to deliver long-term contributions to Pakistan's food security by ensuring an efficient emergency response that is consistent with the GoP and NDMA/PDMAs priorities for improving logistics infrastructure. The network of HRFs also supports the government's devolution framework by decentralized relief support and response to the provinces.

29. Construction of a total of 8 HRFs spanned over the last 10 years (2010-2020) and those were constructed under different ongoing operations primarily focusing on protracted relief and recovery support. However, the construction of the last three HRFs was initiated under a special operation (SO 200707). WFP Pakistan has since consolidated all its operations under a Country Strategic Plan (CSP); the construction of HRF in Muzaffarabad was managed under the ongoing CSP under its Activity 7 against Strategic Outcome 4.

30. WFP worked with four private companies for the construction of these HRFs. As part of the preparation process for this evaluation, the CO has initiated a rapid assessment to ascertain their current condition, what food or non-food items are being stored and what type of response has been handled from these HRFs. In addition, WFP provided technical assistance to the GoP for effective management of commodities and conducting disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response planning training and simulation exercises for enhancing its overall capacities. All such details along with the construction costs and other financial information will be made available to the selected evaluation team at the time of preparation of the inception report.

31. Most of these facilities were constructed before the inception of current CSP when WFP was still implementing different activities under protracted relief and recovery operations and as such no formal theory of change was developed for such interventions. However back in 2016, CO made some efforts to develop Result Stories (Theory of Change) for all such technical assistance activities so that it could identify different milestones that would help to achieve the overall objectives of such technical assistance in a certain timeframe. These results stories relating to HRF and effective supply chain management for disaster preparedness are attached at Annex 2.

32. An internal Return on Investment (ROI) study was conducted in early 2018 which found that the intervention increased the GoP storage capacity by more than three times and directly improved the emergency response capacity and coverage by positioning logistics hubs in strategic locations within disaster-prone areas. The findings of this study will also be made available to the evaluation team. For further details on this please refer to paragraph 19.

33. Similarly, no separate assessment has been conducted to ascertain if WFP provided technical support has enabled GoP to better respond to the needs of different segments of the society and no GEEW analysis has been undertaken for the implications on GEEW. It will, therefore, be part of this evaluation to conduct a GEEW analysis and look into GEEW dimensions of the interventions and whether there are/were any gender-related issues.

34. Considering these, this activity evaluation is being commissioned to determine the overall effectiveness of the HRFs and all related investments in relation to achieving and sustaining the desired objectives.

4. Evaluation Approach

4.1 Scope

35. This evaluation will cover the intervention period from January 2014 to September 2020, in all provinces and regions, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, GB and AJK where the intervention took place. It will cover the technical assistance to the GoP in the form of HRF and associated support for effective supply chain management and commodities handling. The methodology part (Section 4.4) of the TOR further clarifies the scope of work.

36. The intervention components are covered under Activity 7 of ongoing CSP with an objective that the disaster/emergency preparedness and response capacities are enhanced at the district, provincial and national level. Please find further details on the intervention in Section 3.2 "Subject of the Evaluation".

4.2 Evaluation Criteria and Questions

37. Evaluation Criteria: The evaluation will apply the international evaluation criteria of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence and Sustainability.

38. Evaluation Questions Allied to the evaluation criteria: The evaluation will address the key questions presented in Table i.2, which will be further developed and may be adjusted during the inception phase, after validation by the Evaluation Manager and the Evaluation Committee. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons and performance of the HRFs Network, which will inform future strategic and operational decisions.

39. The evaluation should analyse if GEEW objectives and GEEW mainstreaming principles were indirectly included in the intervention design, and whether the objective has been guided by WFP and system- wide objectives on GEEW. The GEEW dimensions should be integrated into all evaluation criteria as appropriate.

Table i.2. Key Evaluation Questions

| Criteria | Evaluation Questions |
|---------------|--|
| Relevance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent the WFP support in the form of construction of HRF and provision of other technical assistance for effective supply chain management is relevant to the affected population, institutional needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so, if circumstances change? To what extent the HRFs have enhanced the emergency response capacities, such as emergency operation centres, civil defence and urban search and rescue teams in major cities? Are the facilities still relevant and address the synergies and interlinkages with other similar interventions, carried out under the current CSP, to strengthen supply chain networks in preparation for responding to natural disasters and shocks? Are men and women staff of various stakeholders benefitted from capacity strengthening activities under these initiatives? To what extent the programme was responsive to the needs and interests of, diverse stakeholders, achieved through participatory gender analysis and processes? How relevant is the initiative to the different needs of men and women (and other groups who have particular, unmet needs), the extent to, and ways in, which the HRF advanced gender equality goals of GoP/NDMA/WFP? |
| Effectiveness | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the facilities effective i.e. the extent to which the intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, considering their relative importance? How did the interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of the relevant disaster management authorities and contributed in a timely response to emergencies? To what extent HRFs have enabled provincial disaster management authorities to respond to different emergencies in a timely manner. To what extent the HRFs and associate supply chain support have strengthened the warehousing or stockpiling system for storing food, medicines, relief supplies and other search and rescue equipment at strategic locations. |

| Criteria | Evaluation Questions |
|----------------|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non- achievement of the desired objectives of the intervention? And what can be improved for similar interventions in the future? • To what extent gender lens applied to a programme's design, objectives, strategy, implementation including activities and outputs and results? |
| Efficiency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are the facilities fully utilized to the optimum level i.e. the extent to which the facilities deliver, or are likely to deliver, resulting in an economic benefit (funds, expertise, financial resources, time, etc.) and in a timely (delivery or response within any intended timeframe) manner? • Are the facilities constructed in the most cost-efficient manner by adopting necessary procedures? • Is there any reduction of costs for emergency response(s) due to improved preparedness and investment in HRFs? • Which among the administrative and funding modalities working well in implementing the project and which is the most cost-efficient after handing over of such facilities and services to the relevant GoP departments? |
| Coherence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are the facilities relevant externally i.e. have complementarity, harmonisation and coordination with other actors, and to what extent the facilities are adding value while avoiding duplication of efforts? • To what extent WFP coordination mechanism is efficient and appropriate with the current government structure for providing necessary technical support, after handing over these facilities, to the respective disaster management authorities? • To what extent HRFs are being utilized to provide support received from other partners, and if existing facilities have sufficient space available to store such commodities and equipment. |
| Sustainability | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent the facilities have capacitated the government? Are the facilities fulfilling the government's present and foreseen needs or not? If yes how, if not why not? • Are the facilities maintained appropriately, as a measure of the emergency preparedness, on the relevant international standards, after handing over, by the government bodies? • Are the HRFs sustainable? Does the government provide enough human and financial resources for operations and maintenance (O&M) of the facilities? • To what extent the government partner appreciate the relevance and results of WFP's support for HRFs, to sustain them or continue construction of such facilities on their own? |

40. During seeking answers to above-mentioned questions, the evaluation team should also consider the disaster risk profiles of the locations where HRFs have been established and see if the facilities are able to withstand and support relevant disasters.

41. The evaluation team will also review provincial and district governments' reparations and stocks in relation to WFP's established HRFs. In case the district/province has a detailed disaster management plan, it should assess whether or not the plan has taken the HRFs into account.

4.3 Data Availability and Limitations

42. Information products such as Annual Country Reports (ACR), previous evaluations of operations under which these facilities were constructed and monitoring reports, will be made available to the evaluation team.

43. In January 2018 WFP conducted a return-on-investment study of these facilities to assess the gains for such investments. The findings of this study will be made available which will help the evaluation team to understand what cost-benefits of such investments are and will also help to determine the cost- efficiency.

44. From time-to-time different operational briefs detailing key features of each HRFs have been developed which also contain information of each HRF and being administered. These briefs will help the evaluation team to understand their current set-up and being administered, ultimately enabling the evaluation team to narrow down its questions to be asked at the time of actual discussion with relevant authorities.

45. As part of evaluation preparation, the CO collected the information about the current condition of these HRFs, what items being stored there and if any emergency has been handled from these facilities most recently. This information will also help the evaluation team to not only prepare the inception report but would also help to narrow down its questions for discussion with the WFP country office team and relevant stakeholders.

46. Since some of these facilities were constructed back in 2011/2012, it might be possible that all information is not readily available regarding their utility in these years. Similarly, it might be possible that relevant counterpart departments are not maintaining any separate record which could clearly show how these facilities were utilized during any emergency. Concerning the quality of data and information, the evaluation team should:

- Assess data availability and reliability as part of the inception phase expanding on the information provided in section 4.3.
- Systematically check the accuracy, consistency and validity of collected data and information and acknowledge any limitations/caveats in drawing conclusions using the data.

4.4 Methodology

47. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. A multi-dimensional approach should be applied for this evaluation. This will include:

- Review of internal information with WFP. These will include information available with relevant sections about how each HRF was planned, designed, approved, constructed and handed over to relevant disaster management authorities. Some project completion reports, studies showing return on investment as well as how these HRFs are currently being utilized will also be made available.
- Review of some of the national policies relating to disaster management and response and discussion with relevant officials at the national level. These include, but not limited to, review of National Disaster Management Plan, Disaster Risk Reduction Status Reports and meetings with relevant officials.
- Linkage will be established with relevant departments who are overseeing the day-to-day management of these HRFs. The relevant departments will also be able to demonstrate how these HRFs are integrated into the overall set-up by approving necessary project documents for the allocation of human and financial resources.
- Review of actual information on how these HRFs are being utilized currently and during any emergency since their construction. This will include, if possible, in the prevailing COVID-19 situation, a visit to the selected HRFs and inspection of the material stored and utilized. For some locations, virtual meetings will also be arranged.
- Attention will be paid to including a diverse range of perspectives of people involved with and impacted by the HRF construction. Where possible, interviews or focus group discussions with the direct beneficiaries of these facilities will be arranged. These will include some civil society organizations, disaster management authorities' staff at the districts level and some members of the community organization or individuals who were directly benefited in the recent past.
- Since some other UN organizations are also directly providing similar support to the relevant disaster management authorities, a meeting will be convened to obtain their point of views on the effectiveness of these HRFs and possible similar capacity strengthening support under joint programmes. Efforts will be made to understand if gender aspects relating to disaster risk reduction have been considered during the execution of different responses from these facilities.
- Similarly, since some international donors who provided financial resources for the construction of these HRFs and have also been providing other technical support to build the overall disaster preparedness and response capacities, will also be interested to participate in this important exercise. For these bilateral meetings will be arranged to obtain their point of view.

48. The evaluation team will be expected to develop a Theory of Change for the intervention and an analytical framework that is based on WFP's corporate Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS) framework (please see Annex 3), taking into consideration the five pathways, three dimensions and self-sufficiency levels outlined in the framework.
49. The methodology should be GEEW-sensitive, developing the GEEW-related indicators, indicating what sampling and data collection methods are employed to seek information on GEEW issues and to ensure the inclusion of women. The methodology should ensure that data collected is disaggregated by sex and an explanation should be provided if this is not possible. Triangulation of data should ensure that diverse perspectives and voices of both men and women are heard and taken into account. The evaluation team should be gender-balanced and one of the team members should have gender expertise.
50. The evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations are expected to be of strategic nature and help WFP Pakistan determine the strategic direction and future for such interventions. They must reflect gender analysis and the report should provide lessons/ challenges/ recommendations for bringing a gender lens into the intervention design and execution in the future.
51. An Evaluation Committee and Evaluation Reference Group will serve as mechanisms to ensure independence and impartiality.
52. The COVID-19 pandemic poses a substantial risk to the data collection phase. In view of the COVID-19 situation, as well as the importance of exploring the local context, it is mandatory that the evaluation firm partners with qualified local consultant/s, equipped with the knowledge of local culture and language, to collect data in-country. If internal travel will not be allowed either or not be advisable for various restrictions, data will need to be collected remotely. In this situation, phone numbers of relevant staff members of partners organizations will be made available, but limitations in remote qualitative data collection and sampling bias would likely limit the scope of the evaluation. Considering these, alternative options for a remote data collection phase should be considered and methodological implications clearly addressed by the evaluation team with the submission of proposals. Therefore, evaluation firms are requested to submit the following two plans:
53. Plan A: In-Country Mission: The GoP has gradually lifted different restrictions related to COVID-19 measures and it is expected that by the time this evaluation is to be conducted, the international travel would be possible. With this assumption, it is possible that subject to completion of other formalities, the evaluation team will be able to visit the field where it can meet with the relevant partners and communities and conduct face to face interviews. Therefore, the evaluation firms are requested to submit a methodology clearly showing how all steps will be undertaken.
54. Plan B: Without In-Country Mission: Considering the prevailing conditions, it might be possible that GoP does not allow international travel or issue visas. However, local travel is still possible for a locally recruited consultant/s. In this situation, the firms should submit a plan of how they would complete all relevant steps without compromising on the overall evaluation criteria or evaluation methodology.
55. Considering both options, the evaluation firms are requested to submit two separate budgets i.e. one involving international and national travel; and the second without involving any international travel but some local travel.
56. In addition to these COVID-19 related restrictions and considerations, the following additional potential risks to the methodology have been identified. These are not exhaustive and need to be refined during the inception phase.
- Limited availability and interest of government partners to participate in the consultation process during a time when the COVID-19 pandemic and some other emergencies require them to focus on emergency response;
 - Constraints in conducting face-to-face and group discussions due to prevailing measures put in place in view of the current pandemic or security-related measures in any particular area;
 - High turn-over of government officials over time who were involved in the intervention, particularly during the construction phase; and

- Lack of GEEW analysis and sufficient data.
57. These risks can be mitigated through:
- A flexible evaluation timeline;
 - Alternative data collection methods such as phone interviews;
 - Including key informants who have left their positions and interview them via phone or online;
 - A detailed data analysis plan laid out by the evaluation team during the inception phase;
 - The consideration of alternative evaluation plans as part of the inception report, in case plan A is compromised due to the ongoing global pandemic; and
 - Regular meetings/calls between the evaluation team and the Evaluation Manager (EM) throughout the evaluation to mitigate any risks or challenges arising while conducting the evaluation.

4.5 Quality Assurance and Quality Assessment

58. WFP's Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (DEQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for Quality Assurance, Templates for evaluation products and Checklists for their review. DEQAS is closely aligned to the WFP's evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) and is based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice.

59. DEQAS will be systematically applied to this evaluation. The WFP Evaluation Manager, an impartial staff member from the M&E Section, who has not been involved with the programme implementation, will be responsible for ensuring that the evaluation progresses as per the DEQAS Process Guide and for conducting rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their finalization.

60. WFP has developed a set of Quality Assurance Checklists for its decentralized evaluations. This includes Checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products. The relevant Checklist will be applied at each stage, to ensure the quality of the evaluation process and outputs.

61. To enhance the quality and credibility of this evaluation, an outsourced quality support (QS) service directly managed by WFP's Office of Evaluation in Headquarter provides a review of the draft inception and evaluation report (in addition to the same provided on draft TOR), and provide:

- systematic feedback from an evaluation perspective, on the quality of the draft inception and evaluation report;
- recommendations on how to improve the quality of the final inception/evaluation report.

62. The Evaluation Manager will review the feedback and recommendations from QS and share it with the team leader, who is expected to use them to finalise the inception/ evaluation report. To ensure transparency and credibility of the process in line with the UNEG norms and standards⁸⁸, a rationale should be provided for any recommendations that the team does not take into account when finalising the report.

63. This quality assurance process as outline above does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team. However, it ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

64. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the designing, data collection, analysis and reporting phases. Where required, the data collection instruments will be translated into the national/regional language and validated by the Evaluation Manager. The evaluation team should be assured of the accessibility of all relevant

⁸⁸ UNEG Norm #7 states "that transparency is an essential element that establishes trust and builds confidence, enhances stakeholder ownership and increases public accountability

documentation within the provisions of the directive on disclosure of information. This is available in WFP's Directive CP2010/001 on Information Disclosure.

65. All final evaluation reports will be subjected to a post hoc quality assessment by an independent entity through a process that is managed by OEV. The overall rating category of the reports will be made public alongside the evaluation reports.

5. Phases and Deliverables

66. The evaluation will proceed through the following phases. The deliverables and deadlines for each phase are as follows:

Figure i.1 Summary Process Map



67. Notes on the deliverables: The inception package and evaluation reports shall be written in English and follow the DEQAS templates. The evaluation team is expected to produce written work that is of a very high standard, evidence-based, and free of errors. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the timeliness and quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level. The evaluation TOR, report, management response and brief will be public and widely shared. The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

68. At the beginning of the evaluation, an inception meeting will be arranged with relevant staff, evaluation committee and evaluation reference group. Based on these discussions the evaluation team will prepare an inception report that will describe the subject of evaluation, country context, provide an operational factsheet and a stakeholder analysis. The Inception Reports will also describe the evaluation methodologies and the approach taken by the team to cultivate ownership and organize debrief sessions and quality assurance systems developed for the evaluation. The Inception Reports will include the use of Evaluation Plan Matrices, and they will outline how the evaluation teams will collect and analyse data to answer all evaluation questions. Finally, they must include an evaluation activity plan and timeline. The evaluation designs and proposed methodologies specified in the Inception Reports must reflect the evaluation plans, budgets and operational environments, and the extent to which methods lead to the collection of reliable data and analysis that provide a basis for reaching valid and reliable judgments. A reconstructed theory of change must be included in the report. Similarly considering that WFP adopted a result-based approach to document and report results, it is expected that the evaluation team will also adopt a methodology to determine if such activities are as per the programme logic and disaster preparedness capacity development is achieving desired results. During the inception phase, the evaluation team is also expected to perform an in-depth evaluability assessment and critically assess data availability, quality and gaps to inform its choice of evaluation methods. This will include an analysis of the results frameworks and related indicators to validate that sufficient information is available that would help during evaluation.

69. As stated somewhere else, no primary data collection is envisaged for this evaluation and most of the information will be collected through desk-based reviews and consultation meetings with relevant stakeholders. However, it is expected that the evaluation team will deploy a systematic approach for the collection of relevant data, its analysis and presentation of results in chronological order that would help to demonstrate how the evaluation team has reached to certain conclusions and recommendations. For the presentation of such findings to external stakeholders, the evaluation team is expected to present its preliminary findings to external stakeholders and obtain their feedback. Pakistan CO and RBB will also

organise a visual thinking validation workshop in order to enhance the ownership and the quality of the evaluation.

70. By the end of the evaluation, the evaluation team will prepare and submit the evaluation report in the following two parts.

- **Draft Report:** This report will outline the evaluation purpose, scope and rationale, and the methodologies applied including the limitations that these may come with. Prior to finalizing the report, the evaluation team should share the report with WFP and stakeholders and facilitate a validation meeting/workshop. The report will also be shared with the evaluation reference group and quality assurance for review as indicated in Section 4.5.
- **Final Report:** The report must provide the answers to all the questions outlines in these TOR. The report should also include the relevant findings and it should follow the UNEG evaluation report guidance. The final report will also go through a quality assurance process and its rating will be internally used to determine the overall quality of evaluation and its product.

71. Since this is a decentralized evaluation to be managed by WFP country office Pakistan only final briefing to WFP regional office Bangkok and CO will be required during which the service provider will present a summary of the conclusions, evaluation findings and recommendation.

72. It is also expected that the evaluation team will prepare a two-pager evaluation brief which summarizes the findings and recommendations using a standard template provided by WFP.

6. Organization of the Evaluation & Ethics

6.1 Evaluation Conduct

73. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation under the direction of its team leader and in close communication with the WFP Evaluation Manager. The CO will hire the evaluation firm based on the long-term agreements already signed by the WFP office of evaluation in its headquarters in Rome. The team will be hired by the respective evaluation firm, which will provide details of this team as part of technical proposal submission.

74. The evaluation team should have not been involved in the design or implementation of the subject of evaluation or have any other conflicts of interest. Further, they will act impartially and respect the code of conduct of the evaluation profession.

6.2 Team Composition and Competencies

75. The evaluation team is expected to include a team leader and an expert on disaster preparedness and response. To the extent possible, the evaluation firm will try to hire a national expert who fully understands the local context, geography and culture and language. At least one team member should have WFP prior experience.

76. The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who have an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge of the relevant fields. Please refer to Annex 4 to view the qualifications and responsibilities of the evaluation team in detail.

77. The team leader should have technical expertise in the areas listed in Annex 4, particularly in implementing and evaluating capacity strengthening approaches, as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools and demonstrated experience in leading similar evaluations. S/he should also have leadership, analytical and communication skills, including a track record of excellent English writing and presentation skills.

78. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology including integrating gender aspects throughout evaluation; ii) guiding and managing the team; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception report, the end of fieldwork (i.e. exit) debriefing presentation and evaluation report in line with DEQAS.

79. The team member will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

80. The team member will: i) contribute to the methodology in its area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct fieldwork; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in its technical area(s).

6.3 Security Considerations

81. Security clearance where required is to be obtained from the WFP Pakistan office

82. The evaluation team must obtain No Objection Certificates (NOC) from the relevant local government authorities to travel to the subject areas. After awarding of the contract, the relevant team will apply for the NOC and will provide copies to WFP.

83. However, to avoid any security incidents, the Evaluation Manager will be requested to ensure that:

- The WFP CO registers the team members with the Security Officer on arrival in the country and arranges a security briefing for them to gain an understanding of the security situation on the ground.
- The team members observe applicable UN security rules and regulations – e.g. curfews etc.
- Due to various security-related measures in different regions and the constantly changing scenario of COVID-19, specific briefings will be arranged at the time of the inception of the assignment and before any travel.

6.4 Ethics

84. WFP's decentralized evaluations must conform to WFP and UNEG ethical standards and norms. The contractors undertaking the evaluations are responsible for safeguarding and ensuring ethics at all stages of the evaluation cycle (preparation and design, data collection, data analysis, reporting and dissemination). This should include, but is not limited to, ensuring informed consent, protecting privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants, ensuring cultural sensitivity, respecting the autonomy of participants, ensuring fair recruitment of participants (including women and socially excluded groups) and ensuring that the evaluation results in no harm to participants or their communities. Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the evaluation team will be expected to carefully consider ethical considerations in close collaboration with WFP, should face-to-face data collection take place.

85. Contractors are responsible for managing any potential ethical risks and issues and must put in place in consultation with the Evaluation Manager, processes and systems to identify, report and resolve any ethical issues that might arise during the implementation of the evaluation. Ethical approvals and reviews by relevant national and institutional review boards must be sought where required.

7. Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders

86. The WFP Country Office Pakistan:

87. The Country Office Pakistan Management (Deputy Country Director, Arnhild Spence) will take responsibility to:

- Assign an Evaluation Manager for the evaluation: Touseef Ahmed
- Compose the internal evaluation committee and the evaluation reference group (see below).
- Approve the final TOR, inception and evaluation report.
- Ensure the independence and impartiality of the evaluation at all stages, including the establishment of an Evaluation Committee and a Reference Group
- Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and the evaluation subject, its performance and results with the Evaluation Manager and the evaluation team
- Organise and participate in two separate debriefings, one internal and one with external stakeholders
- Oversee dissemination and follow-up processes, including the preparation of a Management Response to the evaluation recommendations

88. The Evaluation Manager:
- Manages the evaluation process through all phases including drafting these TOR
 - Ensures quality assurance mechanisms are operational
 - Consolidates and shares comments on draft TOR, inception and evaluation reports with the evaluation team
 - Ensures expected use of quality assurance mechanisms (checklists, quality support)
 - Ensures that the team has access to all documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitates the team's contacts with local stakeholders; sets up meetings, field visits; provides logistic support during the fieldwork; and arranges for interpretation, if required.
 - Organises security briefings for the evaluation team and provides any materials as required
89. An internal Evaluation Committee has been formed as part of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the evaluation. The committee comprises of the Deputy Country Director, Head of Programme, Head of CSP/VAM/M&E Section, Evaluation Manager, Evaluation Advisor in WFP Regional Office for Asia and Pacific (RBB) Programme Policy Officer (M&E), and the CO technical unit in charge of Strategic Outcome 4 and 5. This committee will be involved in the whole evaluation process including reviewing the TOR, inception report and final report. It will also ensure the independence and impartiality of the evaluation. The evaluation committee will also be responsible for preparing management response to the evaluation recommendations and ensure relevant dissemination of evaluation findings to external and internal stakeholders through de-briefing sessions.
90. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) has been formed, as appropriate, with representation from national and provincial disaster management authorities, Economic Affairs Division, the heads of WFP sub-offices in AJK, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan and Sindh, a representative from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and donor agency. The ERG members will review and comment on the draft evaluation products and act as key informants in order to further safeguard against bias and influence. Moreover, the reference group will meet the evaluation team and guide in designing a realistic, useful evaluation. They will also assist in identifying and contacting key stakeholders. Lastly, the reference group will help disseminate evaluation findings to relevant networks.
91. The Regional Bureau: the RBB will take responsibility to:
- Advise the Evaluation Manager and provide support to the evaluation process where appropriate.
 - Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the evaluation subject as required.
 - Provide comments on the draft TOR, Inception and Evaluation reports
 - Support the Management Response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
92. While the Regional Evaluation Officer, Yumiko KANEMITSU, will perform most of the above responsibilities, other RBB relevant technical staff may participate in the evaluation reference group and/or comment on evaluation products as appropriate.
93. Relevant WFP Headquarters divisions will take responsibility to:
- Discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and subject of evaluation.
 - Comment on the evaluation TOR, inception and evaluation reports, as required.
94. The Office of Evaluation (OEV): The OEV, through the Regional Evaluation Officer, will advise the Evaluation Manager and provide support to the evaluation process when required. It is responsible for providing access to the outsourced quality support service reviewing draft TOR, inception and evaluation reports from an evaluation perspective. It also ensures a help desk function upon request.

8. Communication and budget

8.1 Communication

95. To ensure a smooth and efficient process and enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation team should emphasize transparent and open communication with key stakeholders. These will be achieved by ensuring a clear agreement on channels and frequency of communication with and between key stakeholders. The Evaluation Manager and the Evaluation Committee will support the communication of the evaluation team with the concerned stakeholders.

96. A communication/dissemination plan will be developed to ensure that the evaluation findings are disseminated at all levels with relevant stakeholders at the provincial and national levels. This plan will be prepared by the evaluation committee and shared with the Evaluation team.

97. As part of the international standards for evaluation, WFP requires that all evaluations are made publicly available. Following the approval of the final evaluation report, the findings will be shared through the WFP website as well as debriefing sessions at the provincial and federal level with key stakeholders defined above.

98. The Communication and Learning Plan should include a GEEW responsive dissemination strategy, indicating how findings including GEEW will be disseminated and how stakeholders interested or those affected by GEEW issues will be engaged.

8.2 Budget

99. The evaluation will be conducted by an external evaluator firm/supplier selected through the WFP competitive procurement process through open tender therefore the budget will be based on the proposed budget by the selected applicant. However, for the internal review and approval process of these TOR, budget estimates have been prepared following WFP's corporate guidelines. This estimated budget will be used as a basis to determine if the proposed cost estimates by the firms are sufficient to meet the relevant expenses and are also in line with the long-term agreements signed with firms who are participating in this bidding process.

100. Some of the indicative budget line items for Plan A are: i) Evaluation team fees; ii) International travel costs; iii) local travel costs; iv) per diem costs; and v) miscellaneous costs such as the costs of the meeting venue and translations services etc. the Plan B may have the same budget line items except for the international travel cost.

101. The final budget and handling will be determined by the option of contracting that will be used and the rates that will apply at the time of contracting.

102. The evaluation will be sourced by the funds allocated by the CO for decentralized evaluation, as well as through WFP's other internal sources such as Contingency Emergency Fund (CEF) where applicable.

Annex 2 Evaluation Timeline

Table ii.1 Timeline Summary

| Steps | By whom | Key dates ⁸⁹ | Revised dates |
|---|---------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Inception | | | |
| Submit Draft Inception Report (D1) to WFP & DEQAS | TL/DTL | August 13 | August 16 |
| Address DEQAS & WFP CO Pakistan's comments | ET | Week of September 13 | |
| Submit Revised Inception Report to WFP CO (D2) | TL | September 21 | September 21, with edits requested by WFP EM sent on September 29 |
| Data collection | | | |
| In-depth Desk Review | ET | September 20 – October 28 | September 21 – November 5 |
| Interviews and remote consultations conducted by National Team with stakeholders in Islamabad and in HRF sites not visited | ET | September 29 – 30 October 21 - 23 | September 29 – 30 October 25 - 29 |
| Visits to provinces and four HRFs by National Team, including interviews with beneficiaries | ET | October 1 – 20 | October 3 – 29 |
| Remote interviews conducted by International Team | ET | October 1-19 | September 29 - October 29 |
| In-country debriefing | ET | Week of October 25 | December 1 |
| Analysis and Reporting | | | |
| Data triangulation and analysis | ET | October 25 - November 5 | October 25 – November 15 |
| Draft evaluation report | ET | November 22 | December 10 |
| Sharing of draft ER with DE QS, and Quality Assurance of draft ER using the QC | EM | November 29 | December 14 |
| Revise draft ER based on feedback received by DE QS and EM QA | ET | December 13 - 17 | January 7 |
| Circulate draft ER for review and comments to ERG, RBB and other stakeholders and validation with stakeholders through Visual Thinking Workshop | EM | December 20 | January 10 |
| Consolidate comments | EM | December 24 | January 14 |
| Revise draft ER based on stakeholder comments received | ET | By January 10 | January 21 |
| Submission of final revised ER | ET | January 14 | February 4 |
| Submit the final ER to the internal evaluation committee for approval | EM | | |
| Sharing of final evaluation report with key stakeholders for information | EM | January 24 2022 | February 11 |

⁸⁹ Adjustments have been made to reflect delays with the inception report and data collection timelines.

| Steps | By whom | Key dates ⁸⁹ | Revised dates |
|---|---------|-------------------------|---------------|
| Dissemination and follow up | | | |
| Prepare management response | EM | January 31 | |
| Share final evaluation report and management response with Office of Evaluation for publication | EM | February 11 | |
| Final presentation of Evaluation Report to relevant stakeholders | EM | TBD | |

Annex 3 Methodology

Methodological Approach

1. This evaluation used a mixed-methods approach that incorporated qualitative and quantitative (where possible) data collection and analysis tools to guarantee inclusion, accuracy, credibility, and the triangulation of data from a diverse range of data sources and processes. This mixed-methods approach enabled the evaluation to reach evidence-based findings leading to logical conclusions, relevant lessons learned and targeted recommendations.
2. To this end, the evaluation team utilized a range of qualitative and quantitative⁹⁰ data collection and analysis tools to address all evaluation questions, sub-questions, lines of inquiry, and indicators. The analysis drew on both primary data collected by the evaluation team, and on secondary sources provided by WFP, its partners and other key stakeholders, and other sources identified through our own research.
3. The evaluation team's overall approach was participatory in that it engaged with stakeholders at various levels of the WFP (Pakistan CO, RBB, HQ), especially the commissioning unit, reference groups, as well as external stakeholders (e.g. donors, government officials, affected populations, etc.) during the evaluation process. Furthermore, the evaluation team presented preliminary findings to the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) through a debrief session after data collection. These were used to elicit different points of view and engage in dialogue.

Guiding Frameworks

4. This evaluation is guided by principles of participation, inclusion, equality, and non-discrimination. This is directed by the UNEG Guidance Integrating Human rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations and the UNEG Handbook on Integrating Human rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation. The evaluation ensured that, whenever feasible and available, sex- and age-disaggregated data was collected and analysed, as well as the use of a gender analysis. This also included careful attention to ensuring that evaluation questions, indicators, means of verification and sources are gender sensitive.
5. The evaluation also analysed if GEEW objectives and GEEW mainstreaming principles were included in the intervention design, and whether the objective has been guided by WFP and system-wide objectives on GEEW. The GEEW dimensions were integrated into all evaluation criteria as appropriate.
6. In evaluating the capacity-strengthening component of HRFs, findings are framed by WFP's Country Capacity-Strengthening (CCS) framework and classified according to the following five critical pathways to reveal critical gaps: Policies and legislation; institutional accountability; strategic planning and financing; national programme design and delivery; engagement and participation of non-state actors.⁹¹
7. The evaluation matrix (EM) forms the basis of the overall evaluation and serves as the fundamental tool to ensure that the evaluation is responding to the TOR and to WFP's needs and objectives. The ToC (Figure 1.1) both informed and is reflected in the matrix. The EM breaks down the evaluation questions and expands them into specific lines of inquiry and indicators (with associated data sources and analysis methods), as well as further details on gender dimensions. The content and coverage of the EM was informed by scoping interviews, document review (specifically a review of information provided by the Country Office) and analysis of available qualitative and quantitative data. The full EM can be found in Annex 4.

Evaluation Questions

8. The evaluation questions were based on the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability established under the OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation (EvalNet). The principles for their use have been adapted to the HRF initiative and stakeholders

⁹⁰ For quantitative data collection, this can include quantifying qualitative data.

⁹¹ WFP. N.D. Country Capacity Strengthening. <https://www.wfp.org/country-capacity-strengthening>

to support a high quality, useful evaluation and serve as the basis upon which evaluative judgements will be made.

9. The evaluation questions and sub questions are listed in the table below.

| EQ1 – RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | |
|--|---|
| 1.1 | To what extent has the HRF project enhanced emergency response capacities, such as emergency operation centres, civil defence and urban search and rescue teams in major cities? |
| 1.2 | To what extent are the HRFs relevant and able to address synergies and interlinkages with other similar interventions carried out under the current WFP CSP, to strengthen supply chain networks in preparation for responding to natural disasters and shocks? |
| 1.3 | How relevant was the HRF initiative to the different needs of men and women, and other groups who had unmet needs? To what extent was the programme responsive to the needs and interests of diverse stakeholders, and achieved through participatory gender processes? |
| 1.4 | To what extent was WFP support, in the form of HRF construction and provision of technical supply chain management assistance, relevant to the affected population, institutional needs, policies, and priorities? |
| 1.5 | Are male and female stakeholders benefitting from capacity-strengthening activities under the HRF initiative? |
| 1.6 | To what extent has the HRF network advanced gender equality goals of GoP/NDMA/PDMA/WFP? |
| EQ2 – EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response? | |
| 2.1 | To what extent has the HRF network project enabled provincial disaster management authorities (PDMAs) to respond effectively to different emergencies? |
| 2.2 | To what extent did WFP contribute via the HRF network project to achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender, and other equity considerations)? |
| 2.3 | To what extent was a gender lens applied to the programme’s design, objectives, strategy, implementation, including activities, outputs and results? |
| EQ3: EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity? | |
| 3.1 | To what extent were HRF outputs delivered within the intended timeframe? |
| 3.2 | To what extent were WFP’s activities cost-efficient in the delivery of HRFs? |
| 3.3 | To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered? |
| EQ4: COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity? | |
| 4.1 | To what extent did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that positively influenced warehouse utilisation? |
| 4.2 | To what extent did the HRF project provide for greater supply chain management capacity in disaster operation contexts? |
| EQ5: SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government’s present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity? | |
| 5.1 | To what extent did the government appreciate the relevance and results of WFP’s support for HRFs, to sustain them or continue construction of such facilities on their own? |
| 5.2 | To what extent are the achievements of the HRF network project likely to be sustained? |

Data Collection Methods

10. The evaluation team utilized various methods of data collection, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches: i) desk review of available documentation; ii) stakeholder interviews; and iii) site visits. Overall data collection was conducted between mid-September and early-November 2021.

Desk Review

11. Document and literature review was conducted as part of the evaluation (for a full bibliography, see Annex 9). The objective of this review was for the team to familiarise itself with the subject of the evaluation and dig deeper into findings which arose out of stakeholder consultations and site visits. Topics covered in the desk review include Pakistan's disaster and humanitarian context, international frameworks, WFP corporate policies and strategies, country operation documentation, and GoP plans (e.g. Vision 2025) and protocols.

Stakeholder Consultations

12. The evaluation conducted a total of 81 stakeholder consultations in the form of 76 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) (62 male, 12 female, 2 mixed) and 5 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) (3 male, 2 female). The male FGDs comprised a total of 11 individual participants while the female FGDs comprised a total of 14. A detailed overview of stakeholders consulted is provided in Annex 8.

13. Key informant interviews (KIIs): KIIs allow interviews to be more exploratory or in-depth, filling information gaps identified in documents available as part of the desk review. KIIs were primarily conducted in-person by national consultants in Pakistan, with national and international consultants conducting select KIIs remotely (via a web-based platform such as Microsoft Teams, Zoom, or Skype, depending on the preference of interviewees).

- WFP sub-offices provided lists of relevant staff names and positions to facilitate the scheduling of KIIs. Key informants interviewed for the evaluation included staff who were involved in the HRF network located at WFP country offices (e.g. operations staff who have been in position for a longer period, logistics personnel, M&E specialists, gender specialists etc.), the WFP regional bureau (e.g. RBB), WFP HQ divisions, key governmental authorities such as the NDMA and PDMA/SDMAs, international NGOs (e.g. Islamic Relief) and national NGOs (e.g. Hands, Centre of Excellence for Rural Development, Foundation for Rural Development, Sahad Rural Support Programme, Taraquee Foundation, and the Water, Environment and Sanitation Society), beneficiaries of the HRFs, as well as donors where possible. While only four of the HRFs were the focus of the site visits for direct observation, KIIs were conducted with stakeholders from all eight HRFs. KIIs with international and HQ level stakeholders provided a global view on how the HRF network is guided by overarching frameworks, policies and donor priorities, illustrating links with key cross-cutting issues and dimensions (e.g. gender and inclusion). National level and local stakeholders offered a nuanced perspective on the design and implementation of the HRFs. In an effort to achieve a gender-balance in sampling, the evaluation team identified both female and male stakeholders to speak to where possible.
- Semi-structured interviews were conducted using interview protocols and guides designed to address sub-questions and lines of inquiry. Where appropriate, KIIs were conducted with more than one interviewee of the same stakeholder group. Interview protocols (See Annex 5) were adapted to each stakeholder group consulted (i.e. WFP staff, government partners, direct beneficiaries, donors); these were translated into relevant local languages as needed.

14. **Focus-group discussions (FGDs):** When and where possible, the team conducted focus-group discussions with small groups of affected populations (M/F) (e.g. beneficiaries and community members) in the districts where the HRFs are located. While a strong effort was made to access particularly vulnerable groups such as women, persons with disabilities, and the extremely poor, this proved difficult, particularly in terms of identifying members of these groups with adequate knowledge of the HRFs. Ultimately a total of 5 FGDs were conducted: 3 male in KP, Punjab, and Quetta, and 2 female in Quetta and Punjab.

Site Visits/Direct Observation

15. To evaluate the accuracy of the information presented through the ROI analysis, make an informed judgement on the outcomes of the HRF initiative and provide recommendations on the evolution of the HRF network, the national evaluation team (ET) conducted visits to four facilities plus the WFP Office in Islamabad. The sample of HRFs visited were decided upon by following key criteria:

- a. **Areas most prone to natural shocks** – flooding (including that caused by monsoon rains as well as snowfall or glacial flooding), earthquake, drought, etc. One HRF for each likely hazard type / zone should be visited during the field mission.
 - b. **Recent response to an emergency** – Facilities that have been used for an emergency response within the past two years should if possible be visited, as well as one that has been used at an earlier date. Those that have been used to assist the largest number of affected people could be prioritised.
 - c. **Response efficiency** – How fast was a response⁹² to need and over what period was support provided? Facilities that have responded quickly (within the target of 12 hours), and those that have been slower to respond, could be determined. Field mission visits could be to an HRF that typically responds quickly and to one that responds more slowly.
 - d. **Management performance** – There have been differences in how, and how effectively, the facilities have been used. The ET will seek advice from the CO as to which HRFs have been observed as performing well, and at which there is scope for development. For example, overall management, linkages with other government departments, good practices that could be replicated elsewhere and practices that could be avoided.
 - e. **Supply chain network** – HRFs / PDMAs that have expanded and strengthened their pre-positioning networks beyond the main provincial logistics hub should, if possible, be included in the field mission schedule.
 - f. **Size / inventory** – HRFs can be sampled based on the size of facilities, large and small, and the area that their supply network is intended to cover.
 - g. **Cold storage facilities** – Further, it would be useful to visit at least one facility that includes cold storage capacity.
 - h. **Multipurpose use of facilities** – The extent to which HRFs have been used by other stakeholders was considered when planning visits.

16. The HRF site visits allowed the evaluation team to ask questions that otherwise would not have been posed, and thus the collection of insightful data. The national consultants were able to assess the quality of buildings (construction materials, maintenance, suitability of layout, air temperature, lighting, equipment etc.) for the storage of commodities, as well as access roads and surrounding infrastructure, security, stock management approach, etc. In addition, site visits were an opportunity to support the assessment with pictures and similar visuals. For an overview of the protocol for direct observation, please see Annex 5.

17. The following HRFs were visited during the field mission: Lahore (Punjab), Sukkur (Sindh), Peshawar (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Quetta (Balochistan).

- *Lahore* (Punjab) is regarded as an important HRF as the province was affected by heavy monsoon rain and significant flooding in 2013, and continues to be at high risk, highlighting the need to maintain access to prepositioned relief items. The HRF consists of four main warehouses (1000 square metres each) and two temperature-controlled warehouses (200 square metres each), as well as a control room that is unique to the HRF in Lahore. Additionally, the PDMA office is based in Lahore, which provided an opportunity to obtain their views following site visits.
- Sukkur (Sindh province) is central and borders Balochistan. There have been multiple districts that have repeatedly experienced flooding. Many districts can be supported from the HRF. Sindh is the only PDMA that has successfully replicated its storage network approach at divisional level.
- *Peshawar* (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) is significant because it has been used as the main supply hub for several operations (refugee and TDP operations) and for responding to natural hazards and shocks.

⁹² The ROI study claimed that the HRFs have reduced response times and brought greater efficiency, as well as quality of response operations.

- Quetta (Balochistan) is significant as it provided an opportunity for the ET to visit surrounding areas to meet with communities that have benefitted from HRF support once NOC (No-Objection-Certificate) clearance had been obtained. Quetta was also of interest to the ET to specifically assess issues of gender and diversity.

Data Analysis

18. To maximize the quality of data and mitigate the risks and constraints inherent in each individual data collection tool, the evaluation team used several processes to check and clean the data. These included: (i) during interviews, the evaluator recorded the interview (provided the interviewee gave permission to do so) and reviewed written interview notes immediately after the conversation to identify areas requiring clarification or follow up; (ii) document/desk study data was excerpted directly from the sources as much as possible to ensure accuracy; (iii) data aggregation was guided by clear questions and criteria and was quality controlled by senior team members.
19. The evaluation team gathered at regular intervals for joint data analysis sessions (via videoconference, WhatsApp, and/or email) to discuss and cross-reference the results of each line of inquiry, identifying patterns and outliers, and start drafting emerging summary findings in response to the evaluation questions and sub-questions. These sessions included both international and national consultants.
20. To analyse data, the evaluation team employed several analytical techniques, including descriptive analysis, content analysis, efficiency analysis, effectiveness analysis, comparative analysis, and gender analysis. NVivo software was used to code all of the qualitative data (including KIIs, FGDs, and Direct Observation) into themes and to identify overarching patterns. NVivo was structured according to a coding tree based on emerging themes and the evaluation criteria, and was used to classify demographic data (e.g. gender, stakeholder group, location) to identify patterns. To ensure interviewer rating reliability (IRR), consultants working on data analysis examined the same 3 pilot data sources, meeting to compare and discuss to reach agreement and refine as needed. ET members met regularly throughout data analysis to exchange, ask questions, and discuss whether adjustments are needed.
21. Due to limited data (including planned compared to actuals), no further quantitative analysis was possible. However, using NVivo software, qualitative data from KIIs and FGDs (i.e. transcriptions) were coded into quantitative measures. This produced visual representations of data which were used in the analysis. NVivo was helpful to identify emerging themes, coupled with the use of traditional processes to collate and analyse interview data.
22. **Triangulation** was used to ensure the reliability of information and to increase the quality, integrity and credibility of the evaluation findings and conclusions. The evaluation team attempted – to the greatest extent possible – to base individual findings on several lines of inquiry and data sources. The evaluation report explicitly indicates cases where triangulation has not been possible.
23. This evaluation report presents key data and findings for each evaluation question. Where appropriate, the evaluation report utilizes visual tools, such as graphics and diagrams to enhance clarity and readability (to be included in the next draft of the evaluation report).
24. Data analysis and reporting has been enriched by feedback provided by stakeholders during the in-country debrief and the presentation of preliminary findings debrief. The evaluation team presented the results to the EM, WFP CO and RBB as part of the exit debriefing at the end of the data collection phase to validate the data collected and identify any inconsistencies, gaps, or areas of particular interest to explore further. A Visual Thinking Validation Workshop is also to be organized by the Regional Bureau in Bangkok. The aim of these debriefs is to inform subsequent data analysis and further nuance findings in a way that is relevant to stakeholders, and to confirm the validity, relevance, and usefulness.
25. **Last Mile case study:** Based on information and analysis derived from all five FGDs with affected populations (M/F), the last mile case study assesses the ‘last mile’ of the supply chain: the delivery of supplies from HRFs to final distribution points. This case study allows a deeper insight into the perspective of communities that have benefited from the delivery of supplies and provides an opportunity to assess the impact that the HRF network has had, and can have, on disaster response. It aims to answer the question:

what difference did the HRF make to an emergency response – if possible, in comparison to emergencies in the past when there was no HRF?

Annex 4 Evaluation Matrix

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
|---|--|--|--|---|
| Evaluation Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | | | | Criteria |
| 1.1 To what extent has the HRF project enhanced emergency response capacities, such as emergency operation centres, civil defence and urban search and rescue teams (male/female) in major cities? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the rationale behind the choice of the HRF project objectives? • To what extent have HRF outcomes and proposed activities outlined in the project been relevant to national disaster management priorities? • Which government stakeholders (M/F) at national, provincial and district level were consulted on WFP's proposed approach and were their views and concerns given due consideration. • To what extent were gender considerations taken into account in the design/implementation of the project? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Degree of matching between project intervention and outcomes, and national objectives outlined in government national disaster response plan (2019), policies, strategies, and other plans • Extent of engagement of senior government officials (M/F) in the preparation and design of the HRF network project. • Perception of senior government officials (M/F) in operation centres, civil defence, and urban search and rescue teams (M/F) on the degree of alignment of WFP objectives and interventions with policies, strategies, and plans. • Degree of donor concurrence with WFP's directions as set out in the HRF project. • Gender considerations reflected in project documents/gender strategy or action plan. | <p>WFP CSP and consecutive budget revision documents</p> <p>Zero Hunger Strategic Review (ZHRSR)</p> <p>Published government policies, plans and programmes</p> <p>SDGs (2 and 17)</p> <p>Senior government officials, senior management at WFP CO and RBB, and programme managers in CO in place at time of HRF project preparation and approval, and during early implementation</p> <p>Perspectives of donors, UNCT and other selected stakeholders</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data</p> <p>Systematic disaggregation of data by sex (M/F) wherever feasible</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have strategic outcomes outlined in the HRF plan been aligned with government 'Vision 2025' and SDG goals and targets (a. at the time of HRF design; and b. at the time of later adjustments through budget revisions)? Do strategic outcomes reflect gender considerations? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of matching between CSP strategic outcomes and national SDG goals and targets, including as it relates to gender equality and women's empowerment. Stakeholder perspectives (M/F) on degree of alignment of HRF objectives and activity sets with relevant national priorities, including as it relates to GEEW. | <p>WFP CSP and consecutive budget revision documents; annual country reports</p> <p>National Vision 2025 and SDG framework (Goals #2, 5, 17)</p> <p>Senior government officials and senior management and programme managers at CO both during HRF preparation and in early implementation</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-Structured Interviews</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data</p> <p>Systematic disaggregation by sex (M/F), wherever feasible</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the CO need to adjust HRF project plans while also considering the deterioration in the economic situation due to the impact of COVID-19 and need to mitigate risks to partners and staff and to minimize disruptions and delays? Were adaptations to the project appropriate as a response to changes in the prevailing situation? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of ability of WFP to plan and adapt its work in a dynamic and shifting environment. Evidence of WFP's ability to assess the threat of COVID to beneficiary populations (M/F), CO and Area Office staff and implementers, and to adopt appropriate risk mitigation strategies, while maintaining programming as much as possible. | <p>WFP CSP and consecutive budget revision documents</p> <p>Annual plans; reports of programming sectors</p> <p>Interviews with government officials (M/F) at Federal and provincial / State levels, WFP CO and RBB staff, donor representatives, NGOs and informed observers (M/F), and selected donor representatives</p> <p>Interviews with HRF implementers (M/F) and representatives of beneficiary communities (M/F)</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and small groups, as appropriate</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data</p> <p>Systematic disaggregation by sex (M/F), wherever feasible</p> |
| <p>1.2 To what extent are the HRFs relevant and able to address synergies and interlinkages with other similar interventions carried out under the current WFP CSP, to strengthen supply chain networks in preparation for responding to natural disasters and shocks?</p> | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has there been demonstrated responsiveness of the HRF project in adapting to government requests for supply chain support, increased budget, and new food and NFI | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of revisions to the CSP in the face of new and legitimate demands for further assistance and shifting priorities. | <p>CSP documentation and budget revisions: ACRs; SPRs, records of CO management meetings; and communications between WFP and the Government of Pakistan</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Records concerning inter-organizational cooperation</p> <p>Semi-Structured interviews</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis, if data available</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <p>– including gender-responsive NFI - storage services or activities in the face of emergent challenges?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was WFP able to adapt to provide CCS support in areas and forms not anticipated at the time of HRF project approval, but which were critical to the ability of GoP / NDMA / PDMAs at all levels as well as local communities to address supply chain network challenges? How well did WFP coordinate its HRF network planning and programme delivery patterns with government, UNCT and other partners and international organisations, as well as donors, to improve performance of the HRF network project. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that in the implementation of the HRF project, WFP had built in appropriate and sensitive risk assessment and risk mitigation measures, along with provision for regular monitoring and updating. Evidence of appropriate and well-informed planning by WFP as it sought to adjust and adapt to COVID-19. Evidence of comprehensive and appropriate analysis of risk and design of risk mitigation measures. | <p>Review of other evaluation reports, with a focus on adaptation to COVID-19</p> <p>Interviews with senior managers (M/F) at the CO and RBB (i) during the period of CSP planning (re: risk). (ii) during implementation, and (iii) at the outset and during the various phases of COVID-19</p> <p>Interviews with government officials (M/F) and informed observers (M/F), including donor representatives, interviews with cooperating partners</p> | <p>Meetings with partner representatives</p> | <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations.</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| 1.3 How relevant was the HRF initiative to the different needs of men and women, and other groups who had unmet needs? ⁹³ | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the HRF project design and implementation plans demonstrate an appropriate treatment of, and approach to, gender equality and a commitment to mainstreaming gender equality consistent with WFP Gender Policy and in ways that advanced gender equality goals of the GoP/NDMA? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Verification of alignment of the project with the WFP Pakistan CSP and with WFP Gender Policy Assessment of the project for inclusion of gender-responsive provisions in design, outputs and activities, determination of beneficiaries, indicators and plans for collection of data | <p>WFP Gender Policy and guidance</p> <p>Other guidance on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (GEEW)</p> <p>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)</p> <p>National Policy Guidelines on Gender, on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters (2014), Minimum</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-Structured interviews and focus-group sessions with staff</p> <p>Interviews with staff of UNCT</p> <p>Interviews with GE advisors at WFP RBB; stakeholders in Pakistan</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations</p> <p>Systematic disaggregation by sex (M/F), wherever feasible</p> |

93 Note: This question also addresses questions 1.5 and 1.6 from the Evaluation Questions included the Terms of Reference.

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Was the project built on, and informed by, a timely and comprehensive gender and vulnerability analysis? Did the project seek to enhance the equality of women and men and girls and boys? Did the project reflect a commitment to gender, diversity, and inclusion mainstreaming? Have, and to what extent, have male and female staff of project stakeholders benefitted from capacity strengthening activities under the HRF initiatives? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> disaggregated by sex, and appropriate utilization of gender markers. Assessment of presence or absence of gender mainstreaming and evidence for integration of gender transformation. Evidence of engagement in project design and implementation plans of gender equality experts and others knowledgeable about the situation of women in the provinces and districts of Pakistan. | <p>Standards for Protective Spaces for Children (2013), and Guidelines for Minimum Standards of Relief in Camps (2017)</p> <p>CSP documents; SPRs, ACRs; Log frames</p> <p>Information on beneficiary selection criteria and monitoring reports</p> <p>Interviews with managers and staff who were involved at time of HRF project development</p> <p>Separate focus groups with female staff members (national and international) present in CO at time of HRF preparation and initial implementation</p> <p>Interviews with selected donor representatives involved at the time of HRF project preparation and approval</p> <p>Interviews with UNCT, INGOs and other informed observers</p> <p>Meetings and interviews with Pakistan women's organizations</p> | <p>Interviews with NDMA/PDMA Gender and Child Cell (GCC) on specific needs and vulnerability of women and children</p> <p>Focus group discussions (FGDs) with female and male beneficiaries</p> <p>Interviews with informed observers</p> | <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| <p>1.4 To what extent was WFP support, in the form of HRF construction and provision of technical supply chain management assistance, relevant to the affected population (M/F), institutional needs, policies, and priorities</p> | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the HRFs been relevant, complementary, harmonised and in coordination with other actors, and to what extent have the facilities added value while avoiding duplication of efforts? Have WFP's coordination mechanisms been efficient and appropriate to government | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of practical cooperation with government and partners, reflecting WFP comparative advantage and partnerships. Evidence of absence of duplication of inputs and complementarity of WFP approach to supply chain | <p>CSP and budget revisions; SPRs, ACRs; UNCT documents</p> <p>Interviews with CO, RBB principals during the design and implementation periods; Information from stakeholders (M/F), including UNCT, Rome-based agencies (RBAs), donors, INGOs, NGOs and informed observers (M/F)</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and small group discussions</p> <p>Document review and interviews; small group meetings</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations</p> <p>Systematic disaggregation by sex (M/F), wherever feasible</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <p>structures for providing technical support, after hand-over of the HRFs to the respective disaster management authorities?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have the HRFs been utilized by partners, and did the facilities have sufficient space available to store commodities and equipment for responding to the needs of disaster affected populations M/F)? • Were gender-responsive needs and related items identified and stored? | <p>support, gender equality, environment & accountability to affected populations (AAP), with those adopted by other UN agencies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which WFP harmonized strategic supply chain management support through the UNCT, sector / cluster and working groups. • Level of HRF project complementarity to the strategies of the GoP and main donors. | <p>CSP & budget revisions; UNCDF, planning documents and reports of (selected) other agencies</p> <p>Coordination forum, sectors /clusters & cash group reports and meeting minutes</p> <p>Information from stakeholders (M/F), including government staff, and staff of WFP & other UN agencies</p> | | <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| <p>Evaluation Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response?</p> | | | | |
| <p>2.1 To what extent has the HRF network project enabled provincial disaster management authorities (PDMAs) to respond effectively to different emergencies?</p> | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent has the HRF network supported PDMAs to achieve their anticipated coverage of numbers of beneficiaries (M/F) and delivered the required quantity of food and NFIs? • To what extent have HRFs and associated supply chain network(s) strengthened the warehousing or stockpiling system for storing food, medicines, relief supplies (including gender-responsive items) and other search and rescue equipment at strategic locations? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparison of achievement against targets. • Evidence of stakeholder (M/F) views on scope, coverage and quality of supply chain support provided, and on selection of modalities for supply chain network assistance. • Evidence of stakeholder (M/F) perspectives on the extent to which the HRF outputs accomplished to date have met expectations in line with project objectives. • Evidence on national, provincial and district level stakeholder perceptions (M/F) of | <p>Review of documents, including CSP, SPRs, ACRs, monitoring reports, including outcome monitoring.</p> <p>Donor reporting.</p> <p>Coordination forum, sectors /clusters & cash group reports and meeting minutes.</p> <p>SCOPE, COMPAS & LESS reports / Data Queries.</p> <p>WFP staff interviews and focus groups (CO and provincial offices).</p> <p>Interviews with RBB staff.</p> <p>Interviews with implementing partners, UN and other international agencies.</p> | <p>Document review; data analysis</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews (M/F), focus groups and small group discussions (M/F).</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations.</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent was the HRF supply chain network appropriate and effective in the delivery of food and NFI assistance? Were efforts employed to include women-owned suppliers in the supply chain? To what extent were the HRF project objectives achieved, or are expected to be achieved, considering their relative importance? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non- achievement of the HRF objectives and what can be improved for similar supply chain support interventions in the future? | <p>effectiveness and value of supply chain network strengthening.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comparison of training enrolment (M/F) and completion data against targets; assessment of adequacy of training activities. Evidence that there has been measurable progress towards the achievement of HRF outcomes. Review of treatment of gender, diversity, and inclusion in the supply chain. Review of responses to unexpected challenges. Review of effectiveness of protocols, procedures, and SOPs in addressing issues impacting supply chain / transportation services. | <p>Interviews with government officials (M/F), PDMAs, DDMA, authorities at Tehsil level.</p> <p>Small group sessions/focus groups with beneficiaries (M/F), community representatives, including women (M/F), and TDPs (M/F)⁹⁴</p> <p>Partner capacity assessments / reviews and partner feedback.</p> <p>M&E Reports. Meeting notes & technical briefs.</p> <p>WFP situation reports. CO supply chain reports, plus programme & budget pipeline information.</p> <p>Information available from local traders (M/F).</p> <p>Risk management tools and processes. Miscellaneous reports on cost efficiency and effectiveness of HRF operations.</p> <p>UN, NGO, and other stakeholder plans and reports specifically for emergency preparedness and response, logistics and supply chain operations.</p> | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How were NDMA / country capacity strengthening (CCS) needs identified? Were the different capacity strengthening needs of men and women identified? How so? How were CCS needs identified for the SDMA (AJK)? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of numbers and focus of activities and their duration and continuation over time. Evidence of quality of performance. Evidence of CO undertaking supply chain / warehouse | <p>CSP & budget revisions; SPRs, ACRs.</p> <p>Partner and other capacity assessment reports</p> <p>Information from relevant WFP CO managers and staff and implementers, government officials at all levels, and beneficiary and</p> | <p>Document review.</p> <p>Structured and semi-structured Interviews and focus groups</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> |

⁹⁴To ensure women are able to freely express themselves, separate FGDs will be organized for women.

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> How were civil society and private sector supply chain support needs mapped and by whom? To what extent has a holistic approach been adopted in designing supply chain management activities and specifying outputs. To what extent has a CCS planning and approach recognised the role of the private sector, civil society, and local communities as well as government? | <p>capacity gap analysis and identification</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appraisal of evidence of capacity strengthened. Evidence of engagement of the private sector, civil society, and local communities in HRF planning and activities in support of a whole-sector approach. Evidence of approaches taken to assess whether to support the privatization of supply chain, transport operations / management / vehicle maintenance services. | <p>trainer feedback; civil society and private sector interviews.</p> | | <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent have appropriate NDMA staff (M/F) (provincial, district, and national level) been available to participate in HRF planning, and the same individuals took part throughout the HRF project? To what extent have decisions on the selection of training participants reflected gender considerations? To what extent have NDMA officials, trained through HRF activities, remained in posts during the subsequent 6 and 12-month periods where they utilized newly acquired skills and knowledge? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that GoP / NDMA has sought WFP support for storage / prepositioning / supply chain (SC) capacity strengthening and that government has cooperated with WFP (or WFP and partners) in capacity gap analysis. Evidence of a positive response from GoP when WFP in building national SC capacities and systems based on unmet needs and gaps identified while planning. Evidence of GoP support for cooperation with WFP in CCS / SC programming at system and individual levels. Evidence of utilization of sound and equitable selection criteria. | <p>Review of SPRs, ACRs, log-frames and CCS / SC activity reports, and agreements between WFP and implementors with NDMA / PDMA / DDMA and agencies. Review of monitoring reports and other-follow-up reporting on effectiveness of activities. Review of external governance and political economy reports on Pakistan.</p> <p>Interviews with senior government managers (M/F), current or past, involved in discussions and formulation of agreements with WFP on CCS / SC.</p> <p>Interviews with CO managers (M/F) and staff (M/F), including those who were in place in earlier years of CSP / pre CSP.</p> | <p>Document and data review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and focus groups</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that CCS / SC support provided is valued by government ministries and agencies and by participants (M/F), and that “graduates” (M/F) are able to employ new skills. | <p>Interviews with government managers (M/F) and supervisors (M/F), and with government managers (M/F) and officials (M/F) who took part in CCS activities.</p> <p>Interviews with implementors (M/F) and trainers (M/F) or advisors (M/F) who took part in designing and implementing SC support.</p> | | |
| 2.2 To what extent did WFP contribute via the HRF network project to achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender, and other equity considerations)? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent has WFP ensured in its planning, implementation, indicator selection and data collection and analysis, that cross-cutting issues were given priority? Did a gender and vulnerability analysis inform the design, implementation and monitoring of the project? Did targets for cross-cutting issues contribute directly to achievement of HRF outputs? To what extent did the HRF network implementers recognise the importance of and adherence to humanitarian and protection principles in the supply chain? What was the extent of participation of women and girls and other vulnerable groups in decision-making and consultation concerning | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that cross-cutting issues (humanitarian and protection principles, AAP, gender equality and other equity concerns) are, embedded and addressed throughout the HRF network. Evidence that the importance of cross-cutting issues was reflected in decisions on adjustments to HRF implementation plans. Evidence of participation of women/girls and other vulnerable groups in decision-making and consultation concerning planning and implementation of SC activities Evidence that (disaggregated) data from beneficiary feedback mechanisms are analysed and utilized in decision-making. Evidence that HRF staff and implementers (disaggregated by sex) were trained in the | <p>WFP and GoP policy and guidance documents</p> <p>WFP Gender Policy and guidance</p> <p>Other guidance on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (GEEW)</p> <p>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)</p> <p>National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters (2014), Minimum Standards for Protective Spaces for Children (2013), and Guidelines for Minimum Standards of Relief in Camps (2017)</p> <p>CSP documents and later budget revisions; monitoring reports.</p> <p>Records on beneficiary (M/F) feedback and complaints received and WFP / HRF actions in response.</p> <p>Information from WFP HQ, RBB and CO managers and staff, including those who were involved in HRF design and implementation planning.</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Focus groups and small group discussion.</p> <p>Interviews with NDMA Gender and Child Cell (GCC) on specific needs and vulnerability of women and children.</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| planning and implementation of supply chain activities? | application of humanitarian principles, are comfortable in putting them into practice and capable in doing so. | RBB staff interviewed will include those with special responsibility for cross-cutting issues. Government officials, UNCT staff, NGOs, donors, and implementing partners. Small group sessions and/or FGDs with beneficiary community representatives, including women. ⁹⁵ Universal Logistics Standards (ul-standards.org) | | |
| 2.3 To what extent was gender transformation central in planning and implementation of any outputs and activities? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the level of achievement in gender equality of HRF outputs? • To what extent was the HRF project responsive to the needs and interests of diverse stakeholders, achieved through participatory gender analysis and processes? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of achievement of gender equality results. • Evidence of the embedding of the GE dimension in all CCS / SC planning, implementation, and reporting. • Evidence of gender transformation as an organizing principle in the design and implementation of CCS aspects of the HRF network. • Extent of involvement of gender specialists, and/or staff with experience in giving priority to GE and gender transformation, in SC design and implementation. | <p>Information from CSP, SPRs, ACRs, and log frames.</p> <p>Interviews with CO and HRF managers and staff, and gender specialists at CO and RBB, who were involved during HRF design and early implementation.</p> <p>Interviews with senior officials and gender cells in NDMA/PDMA/SDMA NDMA/PDMA/SDMA gender policy/guidelines/action plan</p> <p>Interviews with current CO and RBB staff (M/F), including gender advisors, plus other stakeholders (M/F).</p> <p>WFP Gender Policy and guidance</p> <p>Other guidance on Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women (GEEW)</p> | <p>Document review and content analysis.</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and small group discussions</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |

95 To ensure women are able to freely express themselves, separate FGDs will be organized for women.

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| | | Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) | | |
| 2.6 To what extent was a gender lens applied to the programme's design, objectives, strategy, implementation, with activities, outputs and results? | | | | |
| Evaluation Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity? | | | | |
| 3.1 To what extent were HRF outputs delivered within the intended timeframe? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were WFP's HRF construction activities delivered on schedule according to budget revisions and annual plans? To what extent were HRFs and associated tertiary warehouses (flosspans erected by WFP) optimally utilized in a timely manner (delivery or response within any intended timeframe)? What was the extent of the impact of COVID-19 and other unforeseen events and did these have a detrimental effect on planned HRF handover schedules? To what extent have risk mitigation strategies assisted in reducing any impact on late handover of HRFs? To what extent were capacity strengthening activities delivered within intended timeframes? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of Reported delivery against targets Evidence of realistic target-setting for delivery Evidence that any adjustments in the timeframe are fully justified because of major changes in the context Evidence on consistency of on-time performance over the period of the HRF project. Evidence of complete explanations for continuing deviance from schedule for delivery. Evidence that budgetary resources were made available on time. Evidence of level of utilization of assigned budget by budget line. Perceptions of stakeholders (M/F). | <p>CSP documents and annual reports; budget reports; monitoring reports and data on timing of delivery to PDMAs over time; supply chain data; complaints and feedback data</p> <p>Interviews and meetings with responsible CO staff, implementers, government officials; beneficiary representatives and other stakeholders; FGDs with beneficiaries</p> <p>Donor representatives.</p> | <p>Document review.</p> <p>Data analysis</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and focus groups.</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| 3.2 To what extent were WFP's activities cost-efficient in the delivery of HRFs? | | | | |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were there substantial additional costs to completing and handing over any of the HRFs to the GoP? To what extent the facilities delivered, or are likely to deliver, results in terms of economic benefit (expertise, financial resources, etc.)? Was there any reduction in costs for emergency response(s) due to improved preparedness and investment in HRFs? To what extent were HRF construction plans / schedules able to follow guidelines or standards for cost efficiency? What factors may have contributed to, or reduced, HRF utilisation prospects and performance in terms of cost efficiency? To what extent did administrative and funding modalities work well, or not work well, in project implementation in terms of cost-efficiency (post HRF hand over)? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Observation of changes in cost efficiency and cost effectiveness over time. Evidence that the CO developed and employed measures for cost effectiveness under each set of activities for each output and objective Evidence that strategies for achieving greater costs efficiency were considered and that WFP developed benchmarks and guidelines for support HRF hand over. Evidence that cost effectiveness analysis was included in the HRF project design. Evidence from analysis of selected unit costs (e.g.: cost per construction operation / location; operation and activity costs per recipient; changes in underlying cost drivers). Process analysis of decision-making, drawing on documentary record and stakeholder recollections. | <p>WFP budget data, SPRs, ACRs, monitoring reports, log frames</p> <p>Interviews with senior management (M/F) and managers (M/F) at CO and RBB</p> <p>Interviews with donors</p> <p>Interviews with government officials (M/F) and other stakeholders (M/F)</p> <p>UNCT and other stakeholder (M/F) perceptions of WFP focus on cost effectiveness and drivers of cost efficiency.</p> <p>Assessment of administrative costs and overheads as a percentage of overall project delivery costs and variation across components, as well as year-to-year.</p> | <p>Review of quantitative data and analysis of qualitative data.</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews.</p> | <p>Content analysis of reports and interview data</p> <p>Analysis of budget and financial data, and of cost analysis conducted by CO.</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| 3.3 To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent was consideration given (by WFP with PDMAAs, DDMAAs and other partners) to using alternative | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that considerations of cost effectiveness were included in the agenda for discussions with GoP of | <p>CSP documents, budget revisions, budget reports and data, ACRs, SPRs, and funding overviews</p> | <p>Document review and data analysis</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews.</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <p>forms of emergency preparedness and response storage, and was cost effectiveness part of the criteria used?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the HRFs constructed in the most cost-efficient manner by adopting appropriate procedures? • To what extent has there been a reduction in costs for emergency response(s) due to improved preparedness and investment in HRFs? • To what extent has the cost efficiency of HRF activities been monitored and reported on a regular basis? • Extent to which WFP confronted circumstances where trade-offs were made between timeliness and cost efficiency. • How was information on costs factored into decision making on emergency responses? • What measures have been taken to increase HRF network efficiency over time? | <p>alternative options for storage intervention or subsequent adjustment.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that cost-efficiency factors were considered in decision-making on partnerships and the contracting of contractors and suppliers. • Evidence that cost efficiency was a driver in adjustments to construction plans and operational modalities during the period of HRF project implementation. • Evidence that situations arose, particularly in emergency response where the requirement for urgency of response outweighed concerns for cost efficiency. | <p>Interviews with CO managers and staff, including finance and budget officers.</p> <p>Interviews with government officials and contractors.</p> <p>Interviews with donors (& reports), UNCT and other stakeholders.</p> <p>WFP Supply Chain Optimization Guideline 2018.</p> <p>Logistics cluster strategy 2016–2018.</p> <p>WFP Ethical Standards for procurement and contracting in SC functions.</p> <p>Materials available from government authorities.</p> <p>UN, NGO, and other stakeholder plans and reports specifically for preparedness and response, logistics and supply chain operations.</p> <p>WFP situation reports.</p> <p>CO supply chain reports plus Programme & Budget pipeline information.</p> <p>SCOPE data and reports.</p> <p>COMPAS & LESS Reports / Data Queries.</p> <p>Information available from local traders. M&E reports.</p> | | |
| <p>Evaluation Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | | | | |
| <p>4.2 To what extent did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that positively influenced warehouse utilisation?</p> | | | | |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did WFP seek and use partnerships to further the utilisation the HRF network? • To what extent have the facilities been viewed among external stakeholders (M/F) as being complementarity, harmonised and in coordination with other actors? • To what extent have the facilities added value while avoiding duplication of efforts? • To what extent were WFP coordination mechanisms appropriate to government structures for providing technical support after HRF hand-over to disaster management authorities? • To what extent have HRFs been used to provide support from other partners, and did existing facilities have sufficient space available to store such commodities and equipment? • Did exchanges with donor and funding conditions consider gender dimensions of the HRFs? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of importance of partnerships in CSP implementation • Evidence of which partnerships might be described as strategic, and why. • Evidence of coordinated activities with partners and GoP in pursuit of HRF outputs and outcomes. • Evidence of benefits obtained from partnership in terms of results accomplished or in progress made. • Evidence that HRFs have been used by partners to prepare for a respond to emergencies. | <p>CSP documents and budget revisions</p> <p>Formal partnership agreements and joint reports.</p> <p>SPRs, ACRs</p> <p>Interviews with CO, RBB and partner managers and staff</p> <p>Interviews with donors, UNCT, NGOs and other stakeholders.</p> <p>Interviews with logistics working group members.</p> <p>Interviews with government officials and implementing partners.</p> <p>Donors</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| 4.3 To what extent did the HRF project provide for greater supply chain management capacity in disaster operation contexts? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent was WFP Pakistan prepared and been equipped technically by HQ for implementing the HRF project? To what extent was there adequate staffing (M/F) by WFP and GoP (including Provincial and State governments) of the HRF project in relation to technical requirements? To what degree has WFP and GoP (including Provincial and State) been successful in maintaining continuity of staff (M/F), minimizing turnover and in effective recruitment of staff (M/F) members with requisite supply chain management skills and experience? What has been the extent of oversight and quality of support provided by WFP? To what extent has the quality and scope of data gathered and analysed been adequate to support management of and decision making on HRF network planning? Was relevant sex-disaggregated data collected and analysed systematically? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence on whether sufficient and appropriate human resources were available for delivering the HRF project. Evidence on whether CO and NDMA, PDMA & SDMA organizational structures and procedures, along with leadership, have proved flexible and adaptable in terms of changing human resource requirements in responding to needs and challenges. The degree to which budget performance adequately supported effective HRF activities. Evidence that data (including sex-disaggregated data) and subsequent analysis (including with a gender and vulnerability lens, where relevant) has been adequate to support HRF network management. | <p>CSP documents and budget revisions; corporate documents on organizational matters, including WFP Strategic Plan and Mid-Term Review.</p> <p>SPRs, ACRs and monitoring reports</p> <p>Donor reports</p> <p>Interviews with HQ, RBB and CO managers (M/F) and staff (M/F) in place at time of HRF design and early inception.</p> <p>Interviews with government officials (M/F)</p> <p>Interviews with donors, UNCT, NGOs and other stakeholders (M/F).</p> <p>Interviews with logistics working group members (M/F).</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| Evaluation Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity? | | | | |
| 5.1 To what extent did the government appreciate the relevance and results of WFP's support for HRFs, to sustain them or continue construction of such facilities on their own? | | | | |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have the HRFs been maintained appropriately, as a measure of emergency preparedness, to relevant international standards, after hand-over? To what extent has the government provided sufficient human (M/F) and financial resources to sustain the operation and maintenance of the facilities or continue construction of other facilities with their own resources? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence that HRF project design reflected the joint government-WFP analysis of national, provincial and district supply chain network needs and that the design systematically responded to the specific needs of vulnerable populations (M/F). Evidence of appropriate registration of risks and specification of parallel risk mitigation measures. Evidence of a systematic link between M&E data, needs assessment and supply chain planning. Quality and coverage of M&E systems | <p>Zero Hunger Strategic Review (ZHSR) and other needs assessments and reports used at HRF design stage CSP and budget revisions. SPRs and ACRs</p> <p>Relevant international warehouse management guidelines, evaluation reports and reviews</p> <p>Interviews with: WFP CO managers (M/F) and staff (M/F) who were involved in the HRF design process</p> <p>Government officials (M/F), UNCT, and donors, as well as other stakeholders (M/F)</p> | <p>Document review and data analysis</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews and focus groups (segregated by sex)</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluations, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |
| 5.2 To what extent are the achievements of the HRF network project likely to be sustained? | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent was there consistency and coherence in NDMA, PDMA and SDMA planning and institutional objectives for sustainability of the HRF network? What has been the degree of ownership by government institutions and commitment to reforms, new measures and supply chain management approaches introduced at national, provincial and district levels? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduction of relevant new policies (including as it relates to GEEW and protection), regulations and/or policies by NDMA/PDMA/SDMA, reflecting prior collaboration with WFP and the HRF objectives. References to transition planning in HRF network and subsequent budget revisions. Evidence of HRF engagement with government institutions as implementers are informed by a capacity assessment that was utilized in preparing a supply | <p>CSP, SPRs, ACRs, press reports and government / NDMA publications and formal statements.</p> <p>Professional and academic analysis.</p> <p>National budget data</p> <p>Interviews with government officials (M/F), including senior levels, at provincial, district, and tehsil levels.</p> <p>Senior managers (M/F) and staff (M/F) at RBB and CO</p> <p>Interviews with donors, UNCT, NGOs and other stakeholders (M/F)</p> <p>Interviews with logistics working group members (M/F)</p> | <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Focus groups and small group discussions, where feasible (CO staff), private sector and civil society representatives)</p> | <p>Content analysis</p> <p>Gender analysis</p> <p>Systematic coding of interview data and findings from other evaluation, disaggregated by sex wherever feasible</p> <p>Triangulation across data collection methods and sources</p> |

| Sub questions | Indicators | Data sources | Data collection methods | Data analysis method / triangulation |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent did WFP devise transition plans jointly with the NDMA, PDMA & SDMA to facilitate a phased-in takeover of responsibilities and withdrawal of WFP, or reduction and adjustment in its role? • To what extent has GoP (including Provincial and State governments) moved towards taking financial responsibility by transferring HRF network costs to government budgets? • To what extent have private sector and civil society actors acted, or are planning to act, to maintain supply chain innovations introduced or emphasized under the HRF project? • What has been the decision-making process with the private sector (transport companies, millers, NFI suppliers etc.), government, partners and donors concerning the sustainability of the HRF network / supply chain interventions? | <p>chain capacity strengthening plan.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence of progress towards government institutions taking on greater responsibility for the HRF network. • Evidence obtained from stakeholders (M/F) and informed observers (M/F) perceptions of visible advance in government commitment and ownership. • Evidence of concrete steps taken by the private sector and/or civil society organizations at provincial, district or tehsil level to maintain and build on HRF results and innovations. • Analysis of perceptions of qualified observers (M/F) about how sustainable WFP-supported SC systems and capacity are likely to be, and why | <p>Informed observers (M/F) Representatives of the private sector and civil society (M/F)</p> | | |

Annex 5 Data Collection Tools

1. This annex includes interview protocols for various categories of stakeholders to be consulted by the evaluation.
2. Below is a draft guide for key informant interviews and focus group discussions. It is not to be considered exhaustive or final and should not limit the questions which the HRF network evaluation can ask. This tool is to be further refined following document review; the evaluation team will take an iterative approach to interview questions – adding or removing questions as a result of information gathered, in order to triangulate information and test hypotheses during the data collection process.

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| Internal (WFP) stakeholders | Key Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which government stakeholders at national, provincial, and district levels were consulted on the proposed approach? Were their views given due consideration? • At the outset of the HRF initiative, how were storage needs identified and what work on emergency preparedness planning was conducted? Did a gender and vulnerability analysis inform the design of the project? Were gender responsive needs and related items identified and stored? • What were the main objectives for WFP, and did it have the necessary capacity to meet these? • How well did WFP adapt to the HRF project as a response to changes in the prevailing situation such as the COVID crisis? • What mechanisms were used to ensure that vulnerable communities were consulted? • How were supply chain capacity strengthening (CCS) needs identified? • Were, and if so how, gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and gender transformation needs assessed? • How were HRF construction risks monitored, analysed, communicated, and managed? |
| | Key Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How has the HRF network project enabled DMAs to respond effectively to different emergencies? • Have donor priorities influenced WFP decision-making during the HRF project? • Has the anticipated coverage of the HRF network been achieved, or what still needs to be achieved in terms of supply chain capacity for disaster response? • How appropriate and effective have been the modalities selected, such as warehouse personnel training, for strengthening supply chain capacity? Were efforts made to include women-owned suppliers in the supply chain? |
| | Key Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How closely did HRF operations match planning timeframes? • Were WFP's activities cost-efficient in the delivery of HRFs and were any alternative storage measures considered? |

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| | efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In your view, have the outputs met the expectations of the HRF objectives? • Has WFP helped in any way to maximize synergies, and impact, between government entities to avoid siloed DRR and resilience activities? • How effective was the WFP at resourcing the HRF activities? |
| | Key Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that influenced warehouse utilisation? • Did the HRF project generate greater supply chain management capacity for disaster operation contexts? • Are you confident that the HRF network will evolve and are priorities being met? • Did WFP deploy an adequate mix of capabilities to address supply chain management requirements for DRR? • When delays were encountered, how quickly were they addressed and resolved? • Has sufficient priority been attached to identifying opportunities for building the connection from emergency response to resilience? • How useful have your monitoring systems been? Have they led to improved delivery of outputs and outcomes? Was relevant sex-disaggregated data collected and analyzed systematically? • What strengths and weaknesses have you noticed in the HRF project? • Did donor funding conditions consider gender dimensions of the HRF project? |
| | Key Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have the HR facilities been used and maintained appropriately after hand-over? • Has the government provided sufficient human and financial resources to sustain the operation and maintenance of the facilities? • What new measures and supply chain management approaches has WFP been able to introduce at national, provincial and district levels? • Did WFP make adequate transition plans with the NDMA, PDMAs & SDMA to facilitate a phased-in handover of HRF responsibilities? |
| Vulnerable communities | Key Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have there been environmental risks and natural hazards to you and has there been access the most vulnerable people in the community? How was this done? • If your community has been affected by crises, have you seen an improvement in the speed and quality of disaster response since [date of HRF activation]? Have your expectations of disaster response support been met? • Do you feel that you have been adequately consulted about community disaster resilience? |

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| | <p>Key Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do you think that all the agencies in your district work well together to prepare for and respond to emergencies? Do you have opportunities to discuss in general how the delivery of relief supplies might be improved? With whom do you discuss this, and how often? Has the existence [of the HRF] improved your ability to deal with emergencies and seasonal supply shortages? In the last three years have you experienced any improvements in the way you are able to respond to needs? Do you think that the HRFs has adequately engaged with women-owned suppliers? |
| | <p>Key Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFP aims to contribute towards making communities stronger in facing hardships. Do you think that this has happened? How? If there is an emergency, are there any major gaps in terms of non-food related needs that have not been filled? In the last two years have you noticed any changes in the way the Government has responded to your needs? |
| | <p>Key Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the last three years, have you been consulted about your needs and asked how services can best be delivered to you? Have there been any delays and how quickly were they addressed and resolved? Have WFP and its partners returned to the communities after giving assistance to check on how well the commodities were delivered? |
| | <p>Key Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has the government consistently been able to quickly provide sufficient resources to support your community when there is a crisis over the past [x years] and has this improved over time? What new measures in supply management approaches have you noticed? |
| <p>Government at all levels</p> | <p>Key Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Were you consulted on the proposed approach? Were your views given due consideration? At the outset of the HRF initiative, how were storage needs identified and what work on emergency preparedness planning was conducted? Did a gender and vulnerability analysis inform the design of the project? Were gender-responsive needs and related items identified and stored? What were the main objectives for your department, and did it have the necessary capacity to meet these? Did you work with WFP to identify supply chain capacity strengthening needs? Were, and if so how, gender equality, gender mainstreaming, and gender transformation needs assessed? |

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| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the planning stage for the HRF project, did WFP consult with you over any changes they were making to the project? Did you agree with these changes and were they aligned with government priorities? • In your view, and apart from the actual construction of the HRFs, what was the main contribution WFP made towards supply chain management capacity strengthening? • Has WFP contributed towards government emergency preparedness supply planning? |
| | <p>Key Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How has the HRF network project enabled DMAs to respond effectively to different emergencies? • Has the anticipated coverage of the HRF network been achieved, or what still needs to be achieved in terms of supply chain capacity for disaster response? • How appropriate and effective have been the modalities selected, such as warehouse personnel training, for strengthening supply chain capacity? Have efforts been made to include women-owned suppliers? • To what extent do you think that [your department] achieved the anticipated coverage of numbers of beneficiaries / areas, and transferred the expected quantity of resources? • Has WFP been good at communicating and coordinating its activities with you and with other actors? • In terms of preparedness and response, do you see any significant improvements in the way WFP has worked over the last ten years? • How has supply chain planning improved by having these HRFs? |
| | <p>Key Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How closely did HRF operations match your planning timeframes? • In your view, were WFP's activities cost-efficient in the delivery of HRFs and were any alternative storage measures considered? • In your view, have the outputs met the expectations of the HRF objectives? • Has WFP helped in any way to maximize synergies, and impact, between government entities to avoid siloed DRR and resilience activities? • After HRFs were handed over, was [government] more able to respond to crises quickly? |
| | <p>Key Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that influenced warehouse utilisation? • Did the HRF project generate greater supply chain management capacity for disaster operation contexts? • Are you confident that the HRF network will evolve and are priorities being met and is there any linkage to the warehousing operations of other agencies, private sector, and local governmental bodies in terms of 'preparedness and response'? • As a result of the HRF project, has [your department] been more able to deploy an adequate mix of capabilities to address supply chain management requirements for DRR? |

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| | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has sufficient priority been attached to identifying opportunities for building the connection from emergency response to resilience? • How useful have your monitoring systems been? Have they led to improved delivery of outputs and outcomes? Was relevant sex-disaggregated data collected and analyzed systematically? • What strengths and weaknesses have you noticed in the HRF project? • Have you been able to effectively monitor the HRF deliveries and outcomes based on what WFP has done? |
| | Key Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In your view, have the HR facilities been used and maintained appropriately after hand-over? • Has [the government] provided sufficient human and financial resources to sustain the operation and maintenance of the facilities? • What new measures and supply chain management approaches has [your department] been able to introduce at [national, provincial and district] levels? • Did WFP make adequate transition plans with the [NDMA, PDMA & SDMA] to facilitate a phased-in handover of HRF responsibilities? • Do you have sufficient budget to cover the operation and maintenance of [the HRF]? How does this compare to the situation prior to the HRF handover? • Have you considered outsourcing any management or operational functions to the private sector? |
| UN Country Team, key donors and IFIs | Key Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the outset of the HRF initiative, how were storage needs identified and what work on emergency preparedness planning was conducted? • What were the main objectives for the UNCT and donors? • How well did WFP adapt to the HRF project as a response to changes in the prevailing situation such as the COVID crisis? • To what extent has the UNCT been involved in identifying supply chain capacity strengthening needs? • How relevant has the HRF project been for the UNCT and donors? |
| | Key Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have donor priorities influenced UNCT decision-making during the HRF project? • Has the anticipated coverage of the HRF network been achieved, or what still needs to be achieved in terms of supply chain capacity for disaster response? • How appropriate and effective have been the modalities selected for strengthening supply chain capacity to support DRR and resilience? |
| | Key Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How closely did HRF operations match UNCT planning timeframes? • Were any alternative storage measures adequately considered? • In your view, have the outputs met the expectations of the HRF objectives? |

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| | efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has WFP helped in any way to maximize synergies, and impact, between government and UN entities to avoid siloed DRR and resilience activities? • How effective was the WFP at resourcing the HRF activities? |
| | Key Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that influenced warehouse utilisation? • Did the HRF project generate greater supply chain management capacity for disaster operation contexts? • Are you confident that the HRF network will evolve and are priorities being met? • Did WFP deploy an adequate mix of capabilities to address supply chain management requirements for DRR? • Has sufficient priority been attached to identifying opportunities for building the connection from emergency response to resilience? • What strengths and weaknesses have you noticed in the HRF project? |
| | Key Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have the HR facilities been used appropriately after hand-over? • In your view, has the government provided sufficient human and financial resources to sustain the operation and maintenance of the facilities? • What new measures and supply chain management approaches has WFP / UNCT been able to introduce at national, provincial and district levels? • Did WFP make adequate transition plans with the NDMA, PDMA's & SDMA to facilitate a phased-in handover of HRF responsibilities? |
| Cooperating partners and networks | Key Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the outset of the HRF initiative, how were storage needs identified and what work on emergency preparedness planning was conducted? Did a gender and vulnerability analysis inform the design of the project? Were gender responsive needs and related items identified and stored? • What were the main objectives for your organisation? • How well did WFP adapt to the HRF project as a response to changes in the prevailing situation such as the COVID crisis? • To what extent have you been involved in identifying supply chain capacity strengthening needs? • How relevant has the HRF project been for your organisation? • Do the HRFs identify and respond quickly and adequately to supply needs as they arise? • Do the changes supported via the HRF project herald a 'new era' in DRR from a supply chain network perspective? |

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| | <p>Key Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the anticipated coverage of the HRF network been achieved, or in your view what still needs to be achieved in terms of supply chain capacity for disaster response? • How appropriate and effective have been the modalities selected for strengthening supply chain capacity to support DRR and resilience? Have you been involved in any joint decision making and/or consultations initiated by WFP? • Does WFP share its findings and learning with you and other agencies, and how useful has this been? |
| | <p>Key Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As far as you are aware, were any alternative storage measures adequately considered? • In your view, have the outputs met the expectations of the HRF objectives? • Has WFP helped in any way to maximize synergies, and impact, between government and other entities to avoid siloed DRR and resilience activities? • Did WFP make a significant impact on the capacity of the government to respond more quickly to needs as they arise through the HRF project? |
| | <p>Key Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the HRF project lead to partnerships and coordination with other actors that influenced warehouse utilisation? • Did the HRF project generate greater supply chain management capacity for disaster operation contexts? • Are you confident that the HRF network will evolve and are priorities being met? • Did WFP deploy an adequate mix of capabilities to address supply chain management requirements for DRR? • Has sufficient priority been attached to identifying opportunities for building the connection from emergency response to resilience? • What strengths and weaknesses have you noticed in the HRF project? • What have been the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of WFP objectives with respect to DRR from a supply chain perspective? |
| | <p>Key Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have the HR facilities been used appropriately after hand-over? • In your view, has the government provided sufficient human and financial resources to sustain the operation and maintenance of the facilities? • What new measures and supply chain management approaches has the government been able to introduce at national, provincial and district levels? • In your view, what modalities could be considered to support the sustainability of the HRF network? |

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| Private sector | <p>Key Question 1 - RELEVANCE: To what extent was the HRF project relevant to national disaster management policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of Vision 2025 and national Sustainable Development Goals?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the outset of the HRF initiative, how were storage needs identified and what work on emergency preparedness planning was conducted? Did a gender and vulnerability analysis inform the design of the project? Were gender responsive needs and related items identified and stored? • To what extent have you been involved in identifying supply chain capacity strengthening needs? • How relevant has the HRF project been for your business? • Do the HRFs identify and respond quickly and adequately to supply needs as they arise? • Do the changes supported via the HRF project herald a 'new era' in DRR from a supply chain network perspective? • How, and in what capacity have you worked with WFP and its partners? • Is there an important contribution the private sector can bring to addressing supply chain management needs to for preparedness and response to crises? • Were you involved in identifying needs prior to implementation of your work with WFP? • Have you been involved in communicating findings and learning from your work with WFP? |
| | <p>Key Question 2 - EFFECTIVENESS: How did HRF interventions contribute to the overall capacity enhancement of disaster management authorities and to timely emergency response?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In your view what still needs to be achieved in terms of supply chain capacity for disaster response? • Have you been involved in any joint decision making and/or consultations initiated by WFP? • Does WFP share its findings and learning with you and other agencies, and how useful has this been? • To what extent has your work with WFP been coordinated with other agencies working on the ground? • Have adequate preparedness and response linkages been developed between different business stakeholders? |
| | <p>Key Question 3 - EFFICIENCY: To what extent have the humanitarian response facilities delivered benefits efficiently, and were utilised optimally, in contributing to country disaster management capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As far as you are aware, were any alternative storage measures adequately considered? • In your view, from a business perspective, have the outputs met the expectations of the HRF objectives? • Has WFP helped in any way to maximize synergies, and impact, between government and business to avoid siloed DRR and resilience activities? • Did WFP make a significant impact on the capacity of the government to respond more quickly to needs as they arise through the HRF project? • Have there been any major gaps or duplication in your work? • Have you been involved in strengthening government capacities for disaster preparedness and response and how effective has this been? • How closely did operations match planning timeframes? |

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| | <p>Key Question 4 - COHERENCE: What are the factors that explain HRF performance and coherence, and the extent to which they have improved government disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the HRF project lead to private sector partnerships and coordination with other actors that influenced warehouse utilisation? • Did the HRF project generate greater supply chain management capacity for disaster operation contexts? • Are you confident that the HRF network will evolve and are priorities being met? • What strengths and weaknesses have you noticed in the HRF project? • What have been the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of WFP objectives with respect to DRR from a supply chain perspective? |
| | <p>Key Question 5 - SUSTAINABILITY: To what extent have the HRFs fulfilled (or not fulfilled) the government's present and foreseen needs for sustainable disaster preparedness and response capacity?</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have the HR facilities been used appropriately after hand-over? • In your view, has the government provided sufficient human and financial resources to sustain the operation and maintenance of the facilities? • What new measures and supply chain management approaches has the government been able to introduce at national, provincial and district levels? • In your view, what modalities could be considered to support the sustainability of the HRF network – for example, public / private partnerships? |

Direct Observation Protocol: HRF Site Visits – Evaluation of Humanitarian Response Facilities Network in Pakistan (January 2014 to September 2020)

3. During HRF visits, the evaluation team will consider the following points in their observations and interviews with key personnel to determine the extent to which the facility accomplished its expected functions and contributed to the best use of WFP/PDMA resources:

- Suitability of the location (area prone to flooding or other natural hazards), size of the facility and its proximity to demand, i.e. tertiary / 'flospan' warehouses or final distribution points. Did the HRF act as a transit hub for tertiary warehouses?
- Accessibility to transportation, labour and equipment required for its operation. Can vehicles easily manoeuvre, and could the facility become isolated due to transport disruption? Is there potential for negative impact on the surrounding neighbourhood (additional traffic, noise or security threats, etc)?
- Is the storage facility positioned⁹⁶ to remain resilient to natural hazards, for example floods, road deterioration, etc.? Have there been occasions where operations have been disrupted?
- Is the HRF site safe and properly secured with fencing or walls, grilles on windows etc.? Have adequate staff health and fire safety measures been considered, taking into consideration recognised standards and interaction with handling equipment (forklift trucks etc.)?
- Is the facility well-constructed and does it include adequate conditions for storing goods – for example, ventilation/insulation,⁹⁷ ceiling height, a level floor strong enough to sustain the load of expected goods?
- Is the facility layout designed to maximise space utilisation with the minimum necessary handling effort to provide the safe and accessible management of goods? (Could also consider accessibility for staff with disabilities).
- Are storage solutions such as shelving, pallets, racking etc. used and are these adequate⁹⁸?
- What percentage of warehouse space is occupied and are there records of past space utilisation⁹⁹?
- Have different types of goods (food, non-food, medical) been physically separated, and are there separate workspace areas for administration, kitting, picking and packing, reception and dispatch, and a dedicated space for damaged goods and materials to be disposed of?
- Are there adequate facilities for staff of each gender and is there access to water to meet basic sanitary and hygiene standards?
- Environmental considerations include:
 - Is the area around the HRF clear of rubbish – to avoid attracting rodents or any possible contamination?
 - What is the distance to the main sources of commodities and to delivery points (to minimise distances driven and fuel consumed)?
 - Have materials (pallets, cardboard, packaging) been re-used when possible?

⁹⁶ Is building orientation suitable to avoid direct sunlight on commodities and to keep heating/cooling requirements low?

⁹⁷ If feasible, humidity levels should remain below 70%, and the temperature inside the warehouse should be maintained at between 0 and 30 degrees (Celsius).

⁹⁸ Goods should not be placed directly on the floor or against the walls. Shelves/pallets should be placed 50cm from walls (for maintenance access, cleaning, air circulation). In case of limited space, the required minimum is 30cm. The space between rows of shelves or pallets must be at least 1m.

⁹⁹ Ideally, space occupation ratio should not be lower than 75% (under-utilised storage space) nor higher than 90% (over utilised storage space) to allow efficient operation and in safe conditions.

- Has solar power, sustainable (LED) lighting systems and energy-efficient cooling solutions been used when needed and possible?

Annex 6 Data Collection Schedules

Table vi. 1 Plan for Interviews and Site Visits for National Consultants

| Target HRF | Dates | Details | Team Member |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---------------------|
| WFP Islamabad Office | September 29 th September 30 th | Pre-Visit Meetings | Combined team visit |
| HRF, Quetta | October 3 rd | Travel from Islamabad to Quetta | Combined team visit |
| | October 4 th | Meeting with PDMA Officials and WFP staff | |
| | October 5 th | Meeting with the HRF staff | |
| | October 6 th | Meeting with assisted communities in Killah Saifullah | |
| | October 7 th | Travel back to Islamabad | |
| HRF, Sukkur | October 10 th | Travel to Sukkur through Multan Motorway (by road) | Second team member |
| | October 11 th | Travel to Karachi (by air) | First team member |
| | October 11 th | Meeting with PDMA officials in Karachi | First team member |
| | October 11 th | Meeting with HRF Staff in Sukkur and meeting with communities | Second team member |
| | October 12 th | Travel from Sukkur to Islamabad (by road) | Second team member |
| | October 13 th | Travel from Karachi to Islamabad (by air) | First team member |
| HRF, Peshawar | October 18 th | Travel to Peshawar and Meeting with WFP staff | Combined team visit |
| | October 19 th | Meeting with PDMA Officials and visit to HRF facility | |
| | October 20 th | Travel to Bannu for meeting with the TDPs | |
| | October 21 st | Travel from Bannu to Islamabad | |
| HRF, Lahore | November 1 st November 2 nd | Travel to Lahore (By Road) Meeting with PDMA officials in Lahore and visit to HRF | Combined team visit |
| | November 3 rd | Meeting with communities | |
| | November 4 th | Travel to Islamabad | |

Annex 7 Mapping of Evaluation Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

| Recommendation | Related conclusions | Related findings |
|---|---------------------|--|
| Strategic recommendations | | |
| Recommendation 1: WFP provided important logistics and technical assistance to support the construction and operation of the HRFs, but future capacity strengthening support – preferably in alignment with and as part of other CO supply chain related interventions – would be appropriate before considering any further investment in the provision / construction of additional HRFs | Conclusions 1 and 2 | Findings 1 and 2 Findings 4 – 7 Findings 13 and 14 |
| Recommendation 2: Contribute to further enhancing GoP coordination frameworks and mechanisms for emergency preparedness and response among humanitarian actors in Pakistan, with a view of consolidating the vision of an effective and integrated national network for emergency preparedness and response | Conclusion 2 | Finding 2 Finding 5 Findings 10 – 12 |
| Operational recommendations | | |
| Recommendation 3: WFP CO to prioritize GEEW, protection, and AAP, more systematically in interventions related to emergency preparedness and response, in alignment with the organization's Gender Policy and with the commitments of the GoP. | Conclusion 3 | Findings 3, 6 and 8 |
| Recommendation 4: WFP to make the case for the GoP to consider providing further capacity strengthening in HRF operations and maintenance, and emergency preparedness and response more broadly, aimed at reinforcing the training that was previously delivered under the HRF project | Conclusions 2 and 4 | Findings 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 |

Annex 8 Stakeholders Interviewed

| Name | Organization | Position/Role |
|------------------|-----------------|--|
| WFP | | |
| Jennifer MCKAY | Former WFP | Former WFP Civ-Mil Liaison |
| Peter HOLTSBERG | WFP | Head of Programme |
| Touseef AHMED | WFP | Monitoring & Evaluation Officer (Evaluation Manager) |
| Khawar MAHMOOD | WFP | Programme Officer (M&E Technical) |
| Manuela REINFELD | WFP | Head of SO4 |
| Arshad JADOON | WFP | Programme Policy Officer (CSP/SDGs/VAM and M&E) |
| Shaheen ASHRAF | WFP | Programme Policy Officer (Gender & Protection) |
| Yumiko KANEMITSU | WFP | Regional Evaluation Advisor |
| Stuart COUPE | WFP | Regional Evaluation Officer |
| Khalid ZAHEER | WFP | Head of Engineering |
| Yasir HALEEM | WFP | Head of Logistics |
| Sultan MEHMOOD | WFP | Programme Policy Officer (Disaster Risk Management) |
| Hassan RAZA | WFP | Programme Policy Officer (Emergency Response) |
| Naeem GUL | WFP | Emergency Response Team |
| Dr. Faaria AHSAN | WFP Balochistan | Head, WFP Quetta |
| Nasibullah | WFP Balochistan | M&E Officer |
| Rana IQBAL | WFP Balochistan | Business Support & Supply Chain Assistant |
| Hayatullah | WFP Balochistan | Logistics |
| Sheraz GHAZI | WFP Sindh | |
| Kanwal FATIMA | WFP Sindh | M&E and Gender |
| Louise SOWE | WFP KP | Head of Programme Office, KP |
| Khurram ATTA | WFP KP | M&E Officer |
| Maria Dawood | WFP KP | Sr. Programme Associate |
| Farida Zahid | WFP KP | Nutrition Officer |
| Muhammad Aamer | WFP KP | Head Supply Chain |
| Khalid Rasool | WFP KP | Engineering Team |
| Khalid ZAHEER | WFP Islamabad | Head of Engineering |
| Shaheen ASHRAF | WFP Islamabad | Programme Policy Officer (Gender & Protection) |
| Amin AHSEN | WFP Islamabad | Finance Officer |
| Sultan MEHMOOD | WFP Islamabad | Programme Policy Officer |
| Arif ALI | WFP Islamabad | Supply Chain Officer |

| Name | Organization | Position/Role |
|--|--|--|
| Touseef AHMED | WFP Islamabad | Monitoring & Evaluation Officer (Evaluation Manager) |
| Khawar MAHMOOD | WFP Islamabad | Programme Officer (M&E Technical) |
| Arshad MAHMOOD | WFP Islamabad | |
| Awab SIBTAIN | WFP Islamabad | |
| Abdullah Zaman | WFP Islamabad | Logistics Officer |
| NDMA | | |
| Raza IQBAL | NDMA | Director of Implementation |
| Waseem AHMED | NIDM | Capacity Building Specialist |
| Wasim AHMED | NIDM | Capacity Development Specialist |
| Idrees MAHSUD | NDMA | Member, NDMA |
| Government | | |
| Lt. Gen. (r) Nadeem AHMED | Former NDMA | ex-Chairman NDMA |
| International Agencies | | |
| Farida Rehmat GILANI | Canadian High Commission | |
| Saad SULTAN | Australian High Commission | Program Manager |
| Masooma QAZILBASH | UNICEF | |
| Rehana KHILJI | UNRCO | UN Resident Office Coordinator |
| Imran Khan LAGHARI | UNRCO | UN Resident Office Coordinator |
| Fazla IMRAN | FAO | Water Resource Specialist |
| Basharat KHAN | Project WB - Disaster and Climate Resilience Project | Project Manager |
| PDMA | | |
| Atta Ullah MENGAL | PDMA Balochistan | Director, Relief & Admin |
| Ghafoor AGHA | PDMA Balochistan | Director, Planning and M&E |
| Irfan KHAN | PDMA Balochistan | Computer Operator, HRF |
| Rizwanullah KHAN | PDMA Balochistan | Junior Clerk, HRF |
| Sana ARZAK | PDMA Balochistan | Gender Cell |
| Visit to Snowfall Emergency and Relief Center, c/o Rasool KHAN | PDMA Balochistan | Admin Assistant |
| Umair AHMAD | PDMA Sindh | Warehouse Supervisor HRF |
| Abdul Rehman | PDMA Sindh | Assistant Director Operations HRF Sukkur |
| Syed Shujaat HUSSAIN | PDMA Sindh | Director, Operations |
| Ajay KUMAR | PDMA Sindh | Assistant Director Operations |
| Kaleem ULLAH | PDMA Sindh | Storekeeper HRF Sukkur |
| Muzzamil QURESHI | PDMA Sindh | Assistant HRF Sukkur |
| Syed Shayan SHAH | PDMA Sindh | Deputy Director, Operations |
| Sharif HUSSAIN | PDMA KP | Director General |

| Name | Organization | Position/Role |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---|
| Yasir NISAR | PDMA KP | Logistics Officer |
| Zeeshan ABDULLAH | PDMA KP | Director, Emergency Wing |
| Ismail Khan | PDMA KP | DRM Specialist |
| Zohra Nigar | PDMA KP | Director, DRM |
| Tabassum | PDMA KP | Director, Relief |
| Mian Adil ZAHOOOR | PDMA KP | Deputy Director, Emergency Wing |
| Saifullah ZAFAR | PDMA KP | Deputy Director, O&R |
| M. Siddique | PDMA KP | M&E Officer Gender |
| Tahir SHAH | PDMA KP | Assistant |
| M. Zeeshan KHATTAK | PDMA KP | Storekeeper |
| Tariq Masood FAROOKA | PDMA Punjab | Additional Director General |
| Imran Khan MUGHAL | PDMA Punjab | SAO/Warehouse In-Charge |
| Hamedullah MALIK | PDMA Punjab | Additional Director General |
| Hafiz Asim HUSSAIN | PDMA Punjab | Warehouse In-Charge |
| Nisar SANI | PDMA Punjab | Director, Operations |
| DDMA | | |
| Shabbir AHMED | DDMA Balochistan | District Commissioner |
| Waseem JOGAZAI | DDMA Balochistan | ADC-Revenue |
| Sheikh NAJIBULLAH | DDMA Balochistan | ADC-General |
| Zafar ABBASSI | DDMA Sindh | ADC (Rev) |
| Waqar AHMAD | DDMA Sindh | Accountant |
| Wasim UDDIN | DDMA Sindh | ADC-1 |
| Zia-ur-Rehman | DDMA KP | District Officer |
| M. Mushtaq ABBAS | DDMA Kasur | Naib Tahsildar |
| Rashid Mahmood | DDMA Kasur | ITA |
| Munir AHMED | DDMA Kasur | Community Member |
| M. ASLAM | DDMA Kasur | Community Member |
| Shahid MEHMOOD | DDMA Kasur | Community Member |
| Sardar Khizer HAYAT | DDMA Kasur | Community Member |
| Akhtar AYOOB | DDMA Neelum Valley (AJK) | In-Charge Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), Neelum Valley |
| SDMA | | |
| Saeed-ur-Rehman QURASHI | SDMA AJK | Director Operations |
| Moazzam ZAFAR | SDMA AJK | Deputy Director Operations |
| Raja Muhammad NOMAN SHAFIQ KHAN | SDMA AJK | Director, Admin |
| GBDMA | | |
| Zaheer Uddin BABAR | GBDMA | Deputy Director, Disaster Management |
| Zubair AHMED | GBDMA | Assistant Director, Disaster Management |

| Name | Organization | Position/Role |
|--|-------------------------|---|
| NGOs | | |
| Pervez IQBAL | WESS | Chief Executive Officer |
| Eisa Khan KAKAR | Taraqi Foundation | Senior Program Manager |
| Essa TAHIR | Islamic Relief | Area Program Manager |
| Ghulam Mustafa ZAHOOR | HANDS | Chief, Services |
| Imran Khan | CERD | Program Manager |
| Azmat Khan | FRD | CEO |
| Syed Asad Qadir | SRSP | Team Leader |
| Focus Group Discussions | | |
| Community Members of UC Kan-Mehtarzai | Kila Saifullah District | FGD c/o Rasool Khan, Admin Assistant |
| Community Members | Pishin District | Women FDG - Government Girls Middle School, Sakizai Area, Khanozai, District Pishin, c/o Khairunnisa, Principal |
| Meeting with Affected Community (Male Members) | Khyber Pahtunkhwa | |

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
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Annex 10 Reconstructed Theory of Change



Annex 11 Acronyms

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| AAP | Accountability to affected populations |
| AJK | Azad Jammu and Kashmir |
| CERD | Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination |
| CO | Country Office |
| CSP | Country Strategic Plan |
| CCS | Country capacity-strengthening |
| COVID-19 | Coronavirus disease 2019 |
| DCRP | Disaster and Climate Resilience Project |
| DDMA | District Disaster Management Authority |
| DE | Decentralized evaluation |
| DEQAS | Decentralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System |
| EM | Evaluation matrix |
| EOC | Emergency Operation Center |
| EQ | Evaluation questions |
| ERG | Evaluation Reference Group |
| ET | Evaluation Team |
| ETC | Emergency Telecommunications Cluster |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations |
| FGD | Focus group discussion |
| FLFP | Female labour force participation |
| FRD | Foundation for Rural Development |
| GaM | Gender and age marker |
| GAP | Gender action plan |
| GBV | Gender-based violence |
| GCC | Gender and child cell |
| GE4FS | Gender Equality for Food Security |
| GEEW | Gender equality and women's empowerment |
| GII | Gender inequality index |
| GoP | Government of Pakistan |
| GTP | Gender transformation programme |
| HDI | Human Development Index |

| | |
|----------------|--|
| HRF | Humanitarian Response Facilities |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| INGO | International non-governmental organization |
| KII | Key informant interview |
| KP | Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province |
| M&E | Monitoring and evaluation |
| M/F | Male/Female |
| MHVRA | Multi-Hazard Vulnerability Risk Assessment |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MSU | Mobile Support Units |
| NCRD | National Centre for Rural Development |
| NDMA | National Disaster Management Authority |
| NDMP | National Disaster Management Plan |
| NFI | Non-food item |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| NIDM | National Institute of Disaster Management |
| NOC | No-objection certificate |
| OEV | Office of Evaluation |
| PDMA | Provincial Disaster Management Authority |
| PHF | Pakistan Humanitarian Forum |
| PPE | Personal protective equipment |
| PRRO | Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation |
| PSEA | Protection against sexual exploitation and abuse |
| QA | Quality assurance |
| RBB | Regional Bureau in Bangkok |
| ROI | Return on investment |
| SDC | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| SDMA | State Disaster Management Authority |
| SEA | Sexual exploitation and abuse |
| SO | Special operation |
| SOP | Standard operating procedure |
| SRP | Sindh Resilience Project |

| | |
|----------------|---|
| SRSP | Sarhad Rural Support Programme |
| TOC | Theory of change |
| TDP | Temporarily displaced person |
| TOR | Terms of reference |
| UN SWAP | UN System-Wide Action Plan |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDRR | United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction |
| UNEG | United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) |
| UNFPA | United Nations Population Fund |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNRCO | UN Resident Office Coordinator |
| VAM | Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping |
| WB | World Bank |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

World Food Programme

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