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Organization of the
United Nations



Hunger Hotspots

FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity

October 2022 to January 2023 Outlook



Global Network
Against Food Crises

Integrated
actions for
lasting solutions

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
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Early warning hunger hotspots October 2022 to January 2023



- Hotspots of highest concern¹
- Hotspots of very high concern²
- Hotspots of high concern³

¹ This category includes hotspots already with populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5), as well as hotspots at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions. At risk are those hotspots where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severe aggravating factors – especially access constraints – that indicate a further deterioration and possible occurrence of Catastrophic conditions in the outlook period. Per definition, this category also includes hotspots with Famine or Risk of Famine.

² These are hotspots with sizeable populations – over 500 000 people – estimated or projected to be in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity or identified as severely food insecure as per WFP’s Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) or remote CARI (rCARI) methodology, or hotspots with more than 10 percent of the analysed population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severely food insecure, and at least 50 percent of the population analysed. In the included countries, life-threatening conditions are expected to further intensify in the outlook period.

³ Other countries, in which acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further during the outlook period, and which were identified as hunger hotspots.

Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2022. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (October 2022 to January 2023)*. **Source of map:** United Nations. 2020. *Map of the World*. Cited 20 September 2022. www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world

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Acronyms

CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
rCARI	remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally displaced person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
NSAG	Non-state armed group
LGA	Local government area
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme



Executive summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further in 19 countries or situations – called hunger hotspots – during the outlook period from October 2022 to January 2023.

Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. According to the recently published Global Report on Food Crisis 2022 Mid-year Update, up to 205 million people are expected to face acute food insecurity and to be in need of urgent assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) in 45 countries. If additional data from latest available analysis of 2021 is included for 8 countries and territories, this number is estimated to reach up to 222 million people in 53 countries/territories covered by the GRFC 2022. This is the highest number recorded in the seven-year history of the report. Around 45 million people in 37 countries are projected to have so little to eat that they will be severely malnourished, at risk of death or already facing starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 4 and above). This includes 970 000 people projected to face Catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022, if no action is taken.

Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen remain at the highest alert level, as they all have populations facing or projected to face starvation (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions as they have already critical food insecurity (Emergency, IPC Phase 4) and are facing severe aggravating factors. These countries require the most urgent attention.

In **Afghanistan**, the severity of food insecurity suggests that significant loss of life may already be occurring in the outlook period, as nearly 6 million people are expected to be in Emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) by November. After this, the risk of extreme food insecurity and significant loss of life will likely grow, as another harsh winter coincides with the lean season. In the last lean season, the IPC reported that 20 000 people faced starvation in central highlands regions – the first time that Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) results were reported since the introduction of IPC in the country.

In **Ethiopia**, while more people have become acute food insecure in Tigray since November 2021, humanitarian access has stalled again due to renewed hostilities. In the absence of updated IPC analysis in Ethiopia, recent WFP assessments have indicated an increase of food insecurity inside Tigray. The situation remains of highest concern as the drivers behind the risk of famine warning issued in 2021 continue to prevail. The Famine Review Committee warned of a Risk of Famine in Tigray through December 2021, driven by limited humanitarian assistance, intense conflict levels and low availability of commercial goods and services. In addition, concerns over severe levels of acute food insecurity in Amhara and Afar remain high due to continued insecurity and conflict, impeding humanitarian access.

In **southern and eastern Ethiopia**, a fifth consecutive failed rainy season will be aggravating the most severe drought in recent history, further compromising the fragile livelihoods of almost 10 million

people already acutely food insecure. Overall, in 2022, 20.4 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance; this included more than 13 million food-insecure people in northern Ethiopia.

Record-high acute food insecurity in **Nigeria**, projected at 19.5 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) up to August, is likely to persist during the outlook period, despite the end of the lean season. Importantly, the vast majority of critically food-insecure people (CH Phase 4) are in conflict-affected states, where access to life-saving assistance remains challenging. Almost half of these people (43 percent) are in communities currently inaccessible to humanitarian groups, in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.^{xxi} In 2022, 1 million people nationally are estimated to be in areas inaccessible to international humanitarian groups.

In **Somalia**, a likely fifth below-average rainy season, combined with high food prices and persistent conflict, is rapidly driving an extreme deprivation of food, with parts of Bay region likely to experience Famine in the context of critical gaps in funding levels to support humanitarian assistance in the last quarter of the year. Several other areas of central and southern Somalia are projected to face an increased Risk of Famine between October and December. Overall, 6.7 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).

In **South Sudan**, a fourth-consecutive year of flooding is a major concern because most people estimated to face starvation (IPC Phase 5) are located in the flood-prone areas, in counties in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity states, and Greater Pibor. Coupled with macroeconomic challenges and impacts of prolonged conflict, new floods are expected to keep food insecurity at extreme levels, outbalancing the beneficial effects of a forthcoming harvesting period.

In **Yemen**, the outlook on food insecurity is expected to be less grim than the 19 million people projected at the beginning of 2022 to reach Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) by the end of the year. Some assumptions for these projections – that conflict would intensify and humanitarian assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding – were disproved while the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine on the international markets had not been fully considered in the analysis. Currently, the IPC analysis is being updated.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic remain of very high concern, as in the previous edition of this report. In this edition, the alert is extended to the **Central African Republic and Pakistan**. All these hotspots have a high number of people facing critical acute food insecurity, coupled with worsening drivers that are expected to further intensify life-threatening conditions in the coming months.

Guatemala, Honduras, and Malawi have been added in the list of hotspot countries, since the June 2022 edition. **Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe and Madagascar** remain hunger hotspots.

Organized violence and conflict remain the primary drivers of acute hunger, with key trends indicating that they both continued to increase in 2022. Moreover, weather extremes such as tropical storms, flooding and drought remain critical drivers in some regions. Of particular concern, the drought in the Horn of Africa, already persisting for two years, is highly likely to further worsen due to a looming unprecedented fifth poor rainy season.

On the economic front, elevated global prices for hydrocarbons and agricultural commodities continue to cause increases in domestic food and energy prices. Monetary-tightening measures enacted by numerous central banks – including major advanced economies – to curb rising inflation rates have enhanced the cost of credit and curbed financial inflows directed towards developing countries. Combined with growing risks of recession, or a significant slowdown in major economies such as the European Union and China, these dynamics are boosting macroeconomic risks for developing economies. This is in turn causing increasing difficulties for several countries in financing the import of essential items and servicing their debt loads, which for many economies have increased rapidly over the last decade. Many governments are compelled to introduce austerity measures that affect households' incomes and purchasing power. As a result, poverty and acute food insecurity rates are on the rise, as well as risks of civil unrest driven by increasing socioeconomic grievances, which are likely to further increase in the upcoming months.

Funding shortfalls and rising operational costs have reduced humanitarian assistance across many of these hunger hotspots. Without additional funding, humanitarian assistance is likely to be further reduced across the board in the outlook period.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 19 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these hotspots – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian actions are critical in preventing further starvation and death. This report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for emergency response, as well as anticipatory action to address existing humanitarian needs and ensure short-term protective interventions before new needs materialize.

Introduction

For the outlook period of October 2022 to January 2023, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are issuing an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in 19 hunger hotspots. These are 17 countries and 2 regional clusters where parts of the population will likely face a significant deterioration of already high levels of acute food insecurity, putting lives and livelihoods at risk.

Identified through forward-looking analysis, these hotspots have the potential for acute food insecurity to rise during the outlook period, under the effects of multiple overlapping drivers, interlinked or mutually reinforcing. These fall under the categories of organized violence and conflict, economic shocks, weather extremes and climate variability, and animal and plant pests and diseases.

Organized violence and armed conflict remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity across regions and in the majority of the hunger hotspots. This reflects a global trend where conflict continues to affect the largest share of people facing acute food insecurity. In 2021, more than 70 percent of people facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 and above) were living in conflict-affected countries,¹ and key trends indicate that conflict levels and violence against civilians have continued to steadily increase in 2022.²

Economic concerns are additionally driving acute food insecurity. The world economy – still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic – has slowed down due to monetary-tightening measures adopted by major economies to curb rising inflation rates, new global supply-chain disruptions, and mounting macroeconomic risks in developing economies. The war in Ukraine has put an upward pressure on already elevated food and energy prices, with major effects on acute food insecurity and operational costs.

Weather extremes such as heavy rains, tropical storms, hurricanes, flooding, drought and increased climate variability remain significant drivers in some countries and regions. Recurrent La Niña conditions since late 2020 are causing crop and livestock losses, particularly in East and West Africa, Central Asia and Central America and the Caribbean.

Acute food insecurity globally continues to escalate. According to the recently published Global Report on Food Crisis 2022 Mid-year Update, up to 205 million people are expected to face acute food insecurity and to be in need of urgent assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) in 45 countries. If additional data from latest available analysis of 2021 is included for 8 countries and territories, this number is estimated to reach up to 222 million people in 53 countries/territories covered by the GRFC 2022.³ This is the highest number recorded in the seven-year history of the report. Acute food insecurity also increased in severity, and almost 45 million people

in 37 countries are projected to have so little to eat that they will be severely malnourished, at risk of death or already facing starvation and death (IPC/CH Phase 4 or above).⁴

This includes 970 000 people projected to face Catastrophic conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022, if no action is taken – 301 000 of them in Somalia, and the remaining in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Yemen.⁵

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in the 19 hunger hotspots. Moreover, in six of these – Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – humanitarian action is critical to prevent starvation and death.

To this end, the present report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for:

- **anticipatory action** – short-term protective interventions to be implemented before new humanitarian needs materialize; and
- **emergency response** – actions to address existing humanitarian needs.

Given a strict set of methodological parameters, the hunger hotspot countries and situations were selected through a consensus-based process, which involved FAO and WFP Rome-based and field-based technical teams, as well as analysts specialized in conflict, economic risks and natural hazards. The parameters used in the forward-looking analysis included:

- Assessed projections of acute food insecurity for the outlook period, based on analysis of:
 - primary and secondary drivers, namely conflict and political violence, economic shocks, adverse climate conditions and weather shocks, and outbreaks of animal and plant pests and diseases; and
 - the socioeconomic parameters of each country based on assessments of macroeconomic stability (including, among others, debt stocks, foreign-exchange reserves and exposure to balance-of-payment crises), and the current rise of international and national food prices (especially for countries importing large shares of their food requirements).
- Absolute numbers of people projected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) and the prevalence of these levels of acute food insecurity in the overall population analysed.
- Presence of natural hazards, conflict and economic risks, that are likely to have a direct impact on acute food insecurity (such as unforeseen weather shocks) or an indirect one (for example, increased internal displacement) over the outlook period.
- Ongoing or planned agricultural activities for the October–January period, and existing or likely disruptions caused by different events or risks.
- Presence of significant operational and humanitarian access constraints.

* The eight countries/territories covered in the GRFC 2022 for which the latest data was produced in 2021, indicating that 17 million people were facing high levels of acute food insecurity, are: Bangladesh, Liberia, Libya, Palestine, Rwanda, the Syrian Arab Republic and Syrian refugee populations in Egypt and Lebanon.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources on Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above). When recent IPC/CH is not available, alternative sources have been considered such as the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI), including its application to remotely collected data (rCARI), or Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs).

FEWS NET and IPC use the same scale although FEWS NET figures may differ as it uses a different approach. Populations that are classified as 'moderately acute food insecure' and 'severely acute food insecure' as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above.

The cut-off date for the analysis and information contained in this report was 12 September 2022.

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises initiative, to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In May 2022, the Global Network, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, released the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises, which highlights the number of people estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above) and the prevalence of these numbers within the population analysed in 2021. The report is available at fightfoodcrises.net and fsinplatform.org.

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. 	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. 	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see p. 24-25 for more details on criteria) https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

The classification of areas in Famine Likely is permitted when all IPC protocols for Famine classification are met, except for the existence of reliable evidence for all three outcomes – food consumption or livelihood change, global acute malnutrition (GAM), and crude death rate. Areas can be classified as Famine Likely if minimally adequate evidence available indicates that a Famine may be occurring or will occur. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe, the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

Upcoming trends of food insecurity drivers

To identify hunger hotspots, FAO and WFP have assessed how key drivers of acute food insecurity are likely to evolve and their potential combined effects across countries in the coming months; the related risks of deteriorations are also assessed. Below is an overview of key findings.

Organized violence and conflict risks

Organized violence and armed conflict are key drivers of acute food insecurity in Haiti, the Central African Republic, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, northern Nigeria, Central Sahel, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

Since the start of the year, the number of global violence incidents has followed a steadily increasing trend month to month, with 12 088 events in July compared to 8 668 in January, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.^{6,7} The impact of violence on acute food insecurity is likely to continue or intensify in these countries in the outlook period, particularly given stretched government capacities in the context of global debt distress and food and fuel price shocks, putting additional strain on their ability to constrain violence. Meanwhile, continuing high food prices, resulting from supply disruptions related to the war in Ukraine, and the resulting aggravation of acute food insecurity, can constitute a reciprocal driver of violence in various arenas, particularly in the form of food riots.⁸

Despite already unprecedentedly high levels of insecurity, violence in **Central Sahel** is likely to deteriorate further, given political instability across the region and the withdrawal of foreign counter-insurgency operations from Mali and Burkina Faso. With violence spreading to new regions within the Sahel, new waves of forced displacements are likely, adding to the nearly 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region, while further reducing humanitarian access.⁹

Northern Nigeria is also impacted by a gradual but continuous intensification of violence, which has already spread to multiple areas across the north and more recently spilled over to the centre and south of the country.¹⁰ Similarly, in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and Ituri of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, a resurgence of non-state armed groups (NSAG) is stretching the ability of humanitarian operations to assist some 160 000 newly displaced persons.¹¹ In the **Central African Republic**, violence is likely to intensify in the outlook period, with NSAGs likely to seek territorial advances following a drastic reduction in the fighting capacity of some of the government's key allies.¹²

In the **Sudan**, interethnic violence, and fighting between rival armed groups, is likely to further worsen, particularly in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, against a backdrop of political deadlock. Intercommunal violence slightly increased recently in **South Sudan**, compared to the first quarter of 2022, mostly in

Unity, Warrap and Jonglei states, and insecurity is poised to further deteriorate following the United States of America's decision to withdraw from the systems that monitor the peace process.¹³

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, a resumption of conflict is possible, with the Government of Türkiye signalling a new military operation against remaining pockets of Syrian Democratic Forces, which would lead to significant new displacements.^{14, 15}

In **Haiti**, gang violence, which has reached unprecedented levels, is likely to further constrain business activities, curtail fuel and food supplies – affecting prices – impact humanitarian operations, and impede people's access to markets and essential services.¹⁶

Conflict continues to disrupt livelihoods in **Somalia**, particularly in central and southern areas. Al-Shabab has been scaling up attacks and this trend is likely to continue in border regions including with Ethiopia.¹⁷ For its part, **Ethiopia** saw an intensification of conflict and interethnic violence in several regions, particularly Oromia and Amhara, where violence is likely to further escalate;¹⁸ in addition, conflict resumed along the border between Tigray and Amhara region after the collapse of the fragile, five-month ceasefire.¹⁹

Conflict is among the main drivers of acute food insecurity in these countries. It also tends to play a key role in contexts with some of the highest – critical or catastrophic – levels of acute food insecurity in the world, including Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen, despite an ongoing truce since April 2022. This highlights the importance of the human-induced factor in pushing hunger crises to their most extreme levels.

Natural-hazard risks

The ongoing La Niña event, which has been recurring since late 2020, is expected, with at least 60 percent chance, to continue through December 2022 before transitioning to El Niño/Southern Oscillation-neutral conditions in early 2023 (January–March). This La Niña event will continue to negatively impact agricultural activities, causing crop and livestock losses in many parts of the world including Afghanistan, Western and Eastern Africa, and the Syrian Arab Republic.

In **Afghanistan**, the ongoing La Niña is likely to result in below-average rainfall during the upcoming September to February period, coinciding with the wheat-planting and mid-growing season. In addition, expected warmer-than-average temperatures and potential low snowpack in winter could reduce water availability for irrigation. This will come on top of two consecutive dry seasons since late 2020.

Catastrophic monsoon floods hit 116 districts of **Pakistan** at the end of August, affecting 33 million people. The government declared 72 districts as calamity-hit, with approximately 6.4 million people severely impacted. Additionally, around 2 million acres of crops/orchards are affected, and there are an estimated 719 000 livestock losses.²⁰

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, the forecast indicates another below-average rainfall season, likely to last throughout the winter cereal season and adversely affect the main cropping areas in the

north and northeast, resulting in reduced yields and crop losses.

In southern and central provinces of **Sri Lanka**, the *Maha* season – accounting for about 60 percent of the national paddy production – is likely to see below-average rainfall during the planting and mid-growing season, which is likely to further reduce yields in some areas.

In **Eastern Africa**, another below-average *Deyr* season (October–December) is considered highly likely by forecasts. This would be an unprecedented fifth-consecutive drought in some areas since late 2020; it would be likely to further worsen the food-security situation, particularly in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya, southern and central areas of Somalia, and southern and eastern Ethiopia (including Oromia, Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region [SNNPR], South West Region and Somali regions), where the last rainy seasons were extremely poor, with rainfall deficits of up to 70-80 percent in the worst-affected areas.

In **South Sudan**, despite some below-average rains recorded in western bimodal areas of the country, the forecast points to an above-average rainfall for the remainder of the season until October in southern and southeastern areas, including Jonglei, with increased chances of flooding. This could be the fifth-consecutive above-average rainy season in some areas, resulting in displacement and crop damages, with southern and eastern areas at highest risk.

In **Western Africa**, the Sahelian countries, including **Burkina Faso**, **Chad**, **Mali**, **Mauritania** and the **Niger**, are expected to see continued above-average rainfall until the end of the season in October. Many of these countries have been experiencing flooding since early July, resulting in the displacement and destruction of cropland and livestock grazing; this is likely to result in reduced yields, and crop and livestock losses. In northern **Nigeria**, above-average rainfall is expected to continue through the end of season, resulting in displacement and reduced yields, and further aggravating the food-security situation of vulnerable households.

In **Southern Africa**, forecasts point to another season of below-average rainfall in southern **Madagascar**, in areas which have already suffered from drought and crop failure in the past two years. Another below-average season could further deteriorate the food-security situation for vulnerable people, particularly in southern and southeastern areas.

In large parts of **Malawi**, the forecast for the upcoming season is also indicating below-average rainfall, which is likely to reduce yields and lead to crop losses. This follows an already erratic and uneven distribution of rainfall during the 2021/22 agricultural season.

The **north Atlantic hurricane season** is entering its peak activity and expected to have a 60 percent chance of being above average through the end of the season in late November; there is an increased chance of hurricanes moving towards the northern and western Caribbean Sea, threatening Haiti, and the Atlantic coast of Central American countries, including Guatemala and Honduras.

In **Haiti**, the tendency is mostly for average to below-average conditions to persist throughout the second and third rainy season;

these are likely to threaten the second maize harvest, as well as delaying planting activities for the third rainy season in many areas.

In **Guatemala** and large parts of **Honduras**, the second (September to November) and third (November to January/February) rainy seasons are expected to see average to above-average rainfall, leading to good prospects for crops, but also increasing the chances of flooding in low-lying areas. Through November, above-average rainfall could be enhanced by heavy rains that could result from hurricane activity, as this period coincides with peak hurricane activity in the Atlantic and Pacific basins; potential floods threaten the main maize harvest, ending in September, and the second maize planting and growing season.

Economic risks

After partially recovering in 2021 from the pandemic-induced contraction of 2020, the global economy has been facing a new slowdown during the first half of 2022, reflecting the combined impacts of the global fallout of the war in Ukraine, rapid monetary tightening to contain rising inflation rates, and renewed supply-chain disruptions due to COVID-19 outbreaks in China. Global growth is expected to remain at a low level throughout 2022 – reaching only 2.9 percent – and 2023.²¹ The mounting risk of recession for several major economies including the European Union, and a risk of prolonged economic slowdown of China, are likely to exacerbate macroeconomic risks for low-income countries.^{22, 23, 24}

Despite softening from the peaks reached in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, global food prices are likely to stay significantly higher than the previous five-year average during the outlook period. The FAO Food Price Index was 138.0 points in August, more than 20 points (13.6 percent) below the record level of 159.7 points in March 2022, but still 10 points (6.2 percent) higher compared to the same month of the previous year.²⁵ However, domestic food-inflation rates have continued to rise around the world in the last months. In 59 economies, year-on-year food inflation surpassed 15 percent in the most recent available figure of 2022.²⁶ At the same time, elevated hydrocarbon prices, while a positive development for hydrocarbon-exporting countries, represent a major burden for households and state budgets of importing countries, adding on energy and transportation bills, boosting national inflation rates and widening current-account deficits. The price of oil saw a 45 percent increase year on year as of August, while the price of natural gas soared by 130 percent.²⁷ While energy prices have entered a slight downturn due to enhanced risks of economic recessions in several major economies, they are expected to remain high over the next months; this will continue to negatively affect inflation and households' purchasing power.²⁸

Economies of low-income countries might additionally be struggling with the heavy monetary-tightening measures introduced by central banks in a number of advanced economies, as they can increase the cost of credit.²⁹ Particularly exposed are countries with large current-account deficits and high indebtedness levels. If foreign-exchange reserves need to be used for debt servicing in

these countries, rising credit cost could lead to their depletion, a destabilized currency and ultimately constrained imports of essential items. Around 60 percent of low-income countries are at high risk of, or already in, debt distress.³⁰ Consequently, several countries have requested external support from multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or bilateral donors.³¹ However, the required austerity measures adopted to stabilize economies are also likely to have an adverse impact on households' incomes. These macroeconomic dynamics have led to a rapid food-security deterioration and political instability.³² Also, as domestic inflation is not yet under control in many countries, additional hikes to interest rates in advanced economies could further destabilize economies.

Increasing food and energy prices in several countries are already having extended effects on political stability across all regions in the form of protests, particularly in Southern Africa, Asia and the Middle East.³³ In several instances, such dynamics add to preexisting political grievances and could exacerbate existing conflicts.

In the **Middle East and North Africa**, the protracted economic impact of COVID-19 and the repercussions of high international food and energy prices have overlapped with socioeconomic damage caused by the ongoing conflicts in **Yemen** and the **Syrian Arab Republic**; this has led to expectations of significant increases in poverty and acute food insecurity. Aggravated by the increase of international commodity prices and the stalemate of the process of political transition, the protracted economic hardship in the **Sudan** is likely to increase acute food insecurity in the outlook period.

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, lagged effects of COVID-19, coupled with climatic disasters, debilitated the fiscal capacity of governments to respond to new shocks. The **Haitian** economy is expected to remain in a state of crisis in the outlook period, reflecting the weak currency and increasing international food prices. In **Guatemala** and **Honduras**, a steep increase in fertilizer prices combined with flooding risks inflationary pressures.

In **Asia**, renewed supply-chain disruptions and emerging macroeconomic difficulties are affecting the economic stability of several countries such as **Sri Lanka**, where debt default and financial collapse have spurred a dramatic political crisis. Similarly, high international commodity prices are putting additional weight on **Pakistan's** import bill and accelerating the country's fiscal and current account deficit. In **Afghanistan**, the economic contraction that followed the Taliban takeover, coupled with the impact of below-average harvests, is increasing levels of hunger across the country.

In nearly all **African countries** flagged in this report, high food and fuel prices are a key driver of acute food insecurity, with the situation expected to worsen during the outlook period. Due to the large fuel and food-import dependencies of many countries, elevated international prices could further destabilize economies. **Ethiopia**, **Kenya** and **Malawi** are already in macroeconomic distress and struggle with the refinancing of high debt levels and/or an instable currency. In **Zimbabwe**, the population is facing triple-digit inflation rates.

Animal and plant pests and diseases

The desert locust situation remained calm during August. Only low numbers of solitarious adults were seen in a few places in southeast Mauritania, Niger and Yemen. The seasonal rains continued in August in the summer breeding areas from Mauritania to Eritrea. Heavy rain fell in southeast Pakistan and in parts of the Red Sea coastal plains in Yemen, as well as in a few places in the Sahel. Vegetation became green from the beginning of August in most places.

Until mid-October, small-scale breeding will occur in the northern Sahel of Mauritania, Mali, the Niger and Chad, and may be in progress and will continue in the summer breeding areas in the interior of the Sudan, and in the interior and Red Sea coastal plains of Yemen. Small-scale breeding will also occur in Pakistan along the border with India. This will cause locust numbers to increase slightly, but remain well below threatening levels.³⁴

Aggravating factor: humanitarian access constraints

Urgent and scaled-up assistance is required in all 19 hunger hotspots, to protect livelihoods and increase access to food. This is essential to avert a further deterioration of acute food insecurity and malnutrition. In countries with highest concerns, the provision of humanitarian assistance is crucial to save lives and prevent starvation, death and the total collapse of livelihoods (Catastrophe/Famine, IPC/CH Phase 5). Humanitarian access is limited in various ways, including through insecurity due to organized violence or conflict, the presence of administrative or bureaucratic impediments, movement restrictions, and physical constraints related to the environment.

Among the hunger hotspots, **Yemen** was identified with a further deterioration in **extreme access constraints as of July 2022** compared to the end of 2021, according to the July 2022 ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview.³⁵ Despite some improvements in critical areas as a result of the adoption of the humanitarian truce in April, movement restrictions continue to constrain humanitarian access, particularly in the north of the country. Ongoing insecurity, interference with humanitarian operations and large distances between humanitarian hubs and affected areas hamper aid delivery.

Ten hotspot countries are classified as having **very high access constraints**, according to the July 2022 ACAPS overview.³⁶ In **Afghanistan**, decreased conflict levels have slightly improved the access of humanitarian organizations to people in need, but the presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war, operational challenges, and poor infrastructure continue to constrain humanitarian access. The July 2022 ACAPS analysis reports a deterioration of humanitarian access in **Chad**, due to insecurity, movement restrictions and challenging bureaucratic procedures for humanitarian organizations. In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, conflict and frequent attacks against humanitarian workers, especially in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces, disrupt the implementation of humanitarian

operations, and humanitarian access constraints are very high due to the increasing use of explosives. In **Ethiopia**, a humanitarian truce enabled access to Tigray in April, but the implementation of humanitarian activities is complicated by insecurity as well as bureaucratic and logistical impediments. Humanitarian access remains highly constrained in **Mali**, due to insecurity, and movement restrictions and blockades in certain areas. In **Nigeria**, persistent insecurity and movement restrictions limit humanitarian access, especially in the northeast, and administrative impediments and scarcity of fuel hamper aid delivery. In **Somalia**, humanitarian access is highly restricted by conflict, interference with humanitarian operations, poor infrastructure in rural areas, and road closures in the southern and central regions. In **South Sudan**, access

of humanitarian agencies to people in need has significantly deteriorated, due to insecurity and violence against humanitarian workers, checkpoints and related taxes, and interferences with humanitarian activities. In the **Sudan**, the military coup of October 2021 has led to a deterioration in humanitarian access, and insecurity and contamination with landmines, as well as interferences leading to high access constraints. In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, humanitarian access continues to be challenging as a result of conflict, the presence of explosive remnants of war, and areas being besieged, while administrative obstacles have hampered the delivery of essential aid to IDPs in the southeast of the country.³⁷

Drought in East Africa

The longest drought in over 40 years is forecast to continue in the Horn of Africa, with another failed rainy season likely. This will bring about an unprecedented worsening of the food crisis by the end of 2022, with up to 26 million people expected to slide into Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) levels of food insecurity in **Somalia**, northern and eastern **Kenya**, and eastern and southern **Ethiopia**.^{38, 39}

Rains in the Horn of Africa have failed for four consecutive seasons. Countries in the Horn of Africa have two rainy seasons: the October–December short secondary season rains and the March–May long main season rains. In 2020, the October–December rainy season was below average, and in 2021 both seasons were equally poor. Then the 2022 March–May season brought the lowest rainfall on record for much of the region. At the same time, the region has endured extremely warm air temperatures – linked to the negative Indian Ocean Dipole.^{40, 41, 42}

Latest forecasts by international climate centres predict a high chance of below-average October–December short rains, making it the fifth-consecutive failed rainy season.⁴³

Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia are the most affected countries, with areas already facing an exceptionally long, multi-season drought amplified by warmer-than-normal temperatures. Other countries in the region are also affected, such as northern Uganda and Djibouti.

In **Kenya**, forecasts indicate not only a more than 60 percent chance of below-average short rains (October–December) in **eastern and northeastern regions**, but the possibility that these will start later than usual. Poor rains are highly likely for large parts of **southern and central regions of Somalia**, with most models indicating about a 65 percent likelihood during the October–December period. In **Ethiopia**, the forecast indicates a moderate-to-high likelihood of below-average rainfall in the agropastoral areas of **southern and eastern regions**, including Oromia and Somali. As a result, drought conditions are expected to persist in southern and southeastern pastoral areas.⁴⁴

There are several implications of another failed rainy season, adding to the cumulative, devastating effects that successive rainfall deficits have had on vulnerable households since late 2020.⁴⁵

First, severe **water scarcity** is observed in most drought-affected areas, forcing pastoralists to move longer distances in search of sustenance, or to resort to unusual outmigration.⁴⁶ Second, in the agricultural areas of eastern and coastal Kenya, southern Somalia and central and eastern Ethiopia, **the recently gathered harvests have been well below average, with crop failures reported** in some areas.⁴⁷ In southern Somalia, the 2022 July Gu harvest, which normally accounts for 60 percent of total annual production, is estimated to be 50 percent below the 1995–2021 average.⁴⁸ This is the fifth-consecutive poor harvest on record.⁴⁹ In southeastern and coastal marginal areas of Kenya, the production of maize, green grams and cowpeas is estimated to be at 78–95 percent below average.⁵⁰ In Ethiopia, the *Belg* harvest gathered in southern Tigray, eastern Amhara, eastern Oromia and northeastern SNNPR had a dismal performance.⁵¹ Third, poor rainfall prevents rangelands recovering from the dry seasons, with grazing resources not regenerated. Lack of pasture, coupled with scarce access to water, leads to **deteriorating livestock body conditions and livestock deaths. At least 8 million heads of livestock have died since the drought started in the area**, while 22 million more are at risk.⁵² As of mid-July, about 3.5 million livestock deaths have been reported in southern and southeastern Ethiopia.⁵³ In Somalia, over 3 million livestock deaths have occurred since mid-2021, while in Kenya around 2.4 million animals have starved.^{54, 55} Moreover, poor livestock conditions push families to distress sales that lower livestock prices, eroding the purchasing power of households and hampering people's access to milk.⁵⁶

Severe shortages of food and water have forced many people to leave their homes. With a peak of over 1.3 million in 2020, large numbers of Somalis are becoming internally displaced due to drought. This year, by mid-September, 857 000 drought-related displacements were recorded, and the number is expected to rise further.⁵⁷

In Ethiopia, drought-related displacements are occurring in Afar, Gambella, Oromia, SNNPR and Somali regions.⁵⁸ As of April 2022, there were 581 952 IDPs as a result of drought, up from 318 992 in April 2021 and 381 426 in April 2020.⁵⁹ With pastoralists moving for longer distances in search of sustenance, and water resources drying out, the **risk of intercommunal violence and resource-based conflict is increasing**.⁶⁰ In Kenya, around 29 000 people had been displaced up to March 2022, following resource-based conflicts.⁶¹

Food prices are increasing in many drought-affected areas, due to the below-average harvests and rising prices on international markets. Increased international food and energy prices are causing high food inflation and fuel shortages across the region.⁶² Additionally, increasing import bills are raising concerns about the capacity of the country to finance imports, despite increasing internal needs. In 2021, Ethiopia applied to the G20-sponsored Common Framework for Debt Treatments, in order to restructure its debt and avoid default. Debt restructuring is under discussion at the creditors' committee.⁶³ Also, Kenya, one of the best-performing countries in the region, has been facing increasing macroeconomic risks due to increased import bills, a heavy debt load and diminishing investment inflows; this is depleting foreign-exchange reserves and causing rapid currency depreciation.⁶⁴ This led to the International Monetary Fund suspending the payment of a USD 2.34 billion package of extended credit and fund facility, while it awaited the introduction of stabilizing measures by the new executive.⁶⁵


Across the region, under the effects of the drought and other shocks, an estimated 18.4 to 19.3 million people were facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) before June 2022.

At least 22 million people are expected to slide into Crisis or worse levels by end of the year, if the October to December rain fails to materialize and humanitarian assistance is not scaled up.⁶⁶ **Malnutrition levels are at an all-time high:** by July, more than 7.1 million children were acutely malnourished across the three countries, including about 2 million who were severely acutely malnourished.⁶⁷

In Kenya, around 4.4 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022, including 1.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).⁶⁸ This represents an 84 percent increase compared to the same time last year. In Ethiopia, already critical food-insecurity levels – 9.9 million people estimated to be facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) due to drought, mainly located in Somali, SNNPR, Oromia and Amhara – are likely to worsen. At the same time, widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) classifications across these areas are emerging, alongside the possibility that some populations are already in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).⁶⁹ In Somalia, 6.7 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).⁷⁰ Furthermore, Famine (IPC Phase 5) is projected among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts and displaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region in southern Somalia, where malnutrition and mortality levels are already at alarming levels. In addition, several areas in central and southern Somalia face an increased Risk of Famine through at least December.

Number of people in acute food insecurity in hotspot countries

In 2022 (most recent projection), in millions



The data presented is most recent projection, data is from 2022 except for Syrian Arab Republic and Zimbabwe (all 2021). For the remaining hotspots, no recent IPC/CH or WFP CARI data is available. ¹HRP 2022 (July 2022). According to the latest IPC analyses, 4.3 million people were in IPC Phase 4 (IPC Dec 2020, January - June 2021, IPC June 2021 for Tigray, May-June 2021) and 0.4 million were in IPC Phase 5 (IPC June 2021 for Tigray, July - September 2021). Refers to the number of People in Need (PIN) of food security and livelihood assistance. ²Most current data reported is non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 19. ³20 000 people are in IPC Phase 5 in the March-May 2022 analysis. ⁴Based on WFP CARI. Data is from 2021. Severely food insecure include 1.8 million people residing in camps who are considered food insecure and in need of full support. ⁵Less than 50 percent of the population covered by IPC/CH. ⁶IPC data is outdated (projection for January to March 2021). In the country narrative, 2022 food security data is reported, which was collected by the government. ⁷Populations that are classified as 'moderately acute food insecure' and 'severely acute food insecure' as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 and above). ⁸Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: ipcinformo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinformo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf.

Rationale for inclusion of anticipatory actions

Anticipatory actions are short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented during the critical time window between an early-warning trigger – the point in time when forecasts show that a hazard is likely to occur in the future – and the actual impact of the forecast hazard on lives and livelihoods. The objective is to protect the most vulnerable people and their livelihoods from the expected impacts of the hazard.

This report features recommendations for anticipatory actions and emergency response actions, tailored to the flagged risks. Anticipatory action recommendations are only included if the risk analysis indicates a **hazard/shock that has yet to materialize**. When a hazard/shock has already affected agricultural livelihoods and/or food security, the window of opportunity for anticipatory action has closed, even if the impacts of the hazard/shock are expected to continue in the present and the future. In such cases, only emergency response recommendations are made in this report.

Highest concern: Hotspots with catastrophic conditions

This category includes: (i) countries with populations already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5); and (ii) countries at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severe aggravating factors – especially access constraints – which indicate the possibility of a further deterioration and possible occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period. By definition, this category also includes countries with Famine or Risk of Famine.

Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen remain hotspots of highest concern for the October 2022 to January 2023 outlook. These countries all have segments of populations identified or projected to experience starvation or death (Catastrophe/Famine, IPC Phase 5), or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions. They require the most urgent attention. No updated IPC analysis is available for Ethiopia, the latest being from May 2021. This lack of information is a major concern.

Afghanistan

Concerns remain at the highest level for Afghanistan, with nearly 6 million people projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) up to November 2022. Continuing drought in many parts of the country is projected to extend into a third-consecutive year – something that has not happened in the last 20 years. In addition, the country is feeling the effects of a deep economic crisis, exacerbated by increasing food, fuel and agricultural input prices, the freeze of Afghan assets and very high levels of accumulated household debt.⁷¹

Importantly, while the current IPC analysis outlook for June–November 2022 shows no population facing starvation or a very high rate of mortality (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5), the scale of critical acute food insecurity suggests that loss of life may already be occurring. The risk of extreme food insecurity and significant loss of life will likely grow from November onwards, as another harsh winter coincides with the lean season which typically starts in February. This will further stretch the already severely reduced capacity of vulnerable families, while access to remote areas will become more complicated or, in some cases, impossible.

In the last lean season, for the first time since its introduction in the country more than a decade ago, the IPC reported that 20 000 people were facing starvation (IPC Phase 5) in Ghor province in Afghanistan's Central Highlands region. The two other provinces in the chronically food-insecure region (Bamyan and Daykundi) – where access constraints are very high – were also classified as Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Despite continuing and unprecedented levels of humanitarian assistance, concerns remain that the situation in these areas could be dire during the approaching winter season.⁷²

Compared to the same period last year, the number of people expected to face acute food insecurity up to November has risen significantly: an additional 4.3 million people are now facing Crisis levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3), while over 2.4 million people more are estimated in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{73,74,75}

From June to November 2022, during the harvest season, 18.9 million people (45 percent of the population) in Afghanistan's 34 provinces are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including nearly 6 million (14 percent) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{76,77}

The 2022 harvest of staple crops, particularly wheat, was estimated to be below average due to the ongoing drought.⁷⁸ Forthcoming crop harvests are similarly expected to be poor, while unfavourable pasture conditions will strain livestock production. Poor rainfall will affect the wheat-sowing and mid-growing period, compounded by forecasted above-average temperatures and low reservoir levels.⁷⁹

On the economic front, labour-market pressures are expected to continue (with the International Labour Organization predicting up to 900 000 jobs lost since August 2021), while real wages have been declining due to inflation.⁸⁰ By May 2022, year-on-year food inflation stood at 23.2 percent, amid rising fuel prices due to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.⁸¹ Food prices are also impacted by ripple effects of the war in Ukraine. Average prices of wheat flour, rice, cooking oil and sugar were between 13 and 52 percent higher in July, compared to last year.⁸²

Ethiopia

While acute food insecurity in the **Tigray region** increased between the end of 2021 and June 2022, the flow of humanitarian supplies continued to be slow – due to insecurity, bureaucracy and lack of essential services, as well as fuel shortages⁸³ despite five months of access improvement during the truce. Since the end of August, the resumption of hostilities in southern parts of Tigray, as well as

in Amhara and Afar regions, has once again stalled humanitarian access.⁸⁴

Without a recent IPC analysis, no information is available on the current number of people in catastrophic conditions – projected at 401 000 between July and September 2021 – and concerns remain very high.⁸⁵ In July 2021, the Famine Review Committee warned of a risk of famine in Tigray through December 2021, driven by limited humanitarian assistance, increasing conflict levels and low availability of commercial goods and services.⁸⁶ The situation remains of highest concern as these drivers behind the risk of famine warning continue to prevail. Up to the end of August, only part of the required assistance had arrived and critically low fuel supplies have limited the scale of the response. Interruptions of communications, electricity and other services have slowed down or stopped operations. Meanwhile, availability of commercial goods and services has remained extremely limited, as has market functionality. In addition, concerns over critical levels of acute food insecurity in Amhara and Afar remain high due to continued insecurity and conflict, impeding humanitarian access.⁸⁷

In 2021, main-season production was at 40 percent of normal, but still amounted to about seven to eight months of the total annual requirements in Tigray, due in part to humanitarian response. This was crucial for food security and livelihoods, considering the high dependence on agriculture. The main agricultural season (*Meher*) harvest, starting in October, will be key and expected to provide some relief in the outlook to rural communities. However, resumption of fighting inside Tigray is likely to have a negative impact.

Scaled-up and sustained food assistance are also required immediately in **southern and eastern areas and pastoral areas**, where a likely fifth-consecutive failed rainy season will aggravate the most severe drought in recent history.^{88, 89} This will further compromise fragile livelihoods, with more livestock deaths and crop losses.⁹⁰ This is atop of limited food stocks in neighbouring cropping areas of eastern Oromia and northeastern SNNPR regions, where the secondary season (*Belg*) harvest was poor due to lack of rain.^{91, 92, 93}

Conflict has intensified in Oromia and Amhara, and is likely to escalate, disrupting humanitarian access and trade, and displacing more people.⁹⁴ Critical acute food-insecurity levels are likely to worsen, with nearly 10 million people already acutely food insecure – mainly located in drought-affected Somali, SNNPR, Oromia and Amhara regions.⁹⁵ Although no IPC analysis is available, compatible analyses show that life-threatening conditions (likely IPC Phase 4 equivalent and worse) are expected to be widespread across these areas, with the possibility that some population are already facing starvation and death (IPC Phase 5) as increasing numbers of people are displaced.⁹⁶

Increasing borrowing costs and elevated international commodity prices are adding to the national import bill.⁹⁷ As a result, depleting foreign-exchange reserves have caused fuel shortages and the depreciation of the currency on the informal market.⁹⁸ In the first half of 2022, year-on-year food inflation was estimated at about 40 percent, with prospects of further rises.⁹⁹

The scale of the deterioration over a year is staggering: an additional 2 million people are estimated as being acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance reaching a new high of more than 20 million people – this includes more than 13 million people in northern Ethiopia.¹⁰⁰

Moreover, food assistance is likely to decrease due to funding shortfalls and rising operational costs. Rations for a large number of refugees, in a country where 85 percent of them are fully dependent on assistance, have been reduced already.¹⁰¹

Nigeria

Extremely high levels of food insecurity – projected at 19.5 million people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 and above) between June and August – are likely to persist in the outlook period, despite the lean season finishing at the end of August.

A key concern is that the vast majority of critically food-insecure people are in conflict-affected states where access to life-saving assistance remains challenging. A total 588 000 people in the northeast and 400 000 people in the northwest are expected to be in Emergency (CH Phase 4) as of August 2022. Among these, around 43 percent (423 900) are in communities that are inaccessible due to insecurity in 16 local government areas (LGA) in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.¹⁰² Areas in Borno state classified as Emergency (CH Phase 4) have been growing, including those that are inaccessible. Across northern Nigeria, conflict and security are expected to deteriorate further in the coming months, as a result of escalating attacks by armed non-state actors, kidnap-for-ransom and intercommunal violence.¹⁰³ Additionally, with the end of the rainy season in September and rural topography becoming more permissive to militant movements, violence is likely to experience a seasonal jump, disrupting food systems, creating new displacements and hampering humanitarian access.¹⁰⁴ According to the 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 1 million people in inaccessible areas, an estimated 733 000 of whom are IDPs. Households in difficult-to-access areas are reported to mainly depend on wild foods.¹⁰⁵

While strong efforts are needed to reach the most vulnerable populations, the response is hampered by the HRP being only 52 percent funded as of August 2022.¹⁰⁶ Without additional funding, the number of people targeted in October–December is likely to be reduced.

While grain prices have increased 30 percent year on year due to rising transport costs and below-average availabilities, food inflation is likely to remain high through 2022 due to global supply disruptions and soaring global commodity prices.^{107, 108} Over 40 percent of households in northeast Nigeria had inadequate food consumption at the start of the recent lean season (May 2022), marking a 10 percent increase from the previous year.¹⁰⁹ The same global supply chain disruptions have also led to increases in the price of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer and fuel. This is likely to significantly reduce farm productivity and limit irrigated food production during dry season cultivation.

Somalia

Between October and December, Famine is most likely to happen in two districts in Bay region, while several areas in central and southern Somalia face a Risk of Famine if humanitarian assistance is not sustained.¹¹⁰ Alarming levels of mortality and malnutrition are already occurring.¹¹¹ Country-wide, admissions for severe and moderate acute malnutrition continue to be at an all-time high compared to the previous three years.¹¹²

The IPC Famine Review Committee confirms that the thresholds for Famine will most likely be breached between October and December among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts and displaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region.¹¹³ Bay was one of the areas in which the last famine in Somalia, in 2011, was declared. Despite recent scaling up of humanitarian assistance, needs far outweigh current funding levels.¹¹⁴ In addition to the contextual drivers of drought, insecurity and high prices, the Risk of Famine is linked to an anticipated funding deficit for aid agencies in the last quarter of 2022. Famine will be prevented only if funding and subsequent assistance are sustained.

Overall, 6.7 million people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). This represents a significant increase in magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity compared to June and September. An exceptionally severe multi-season drought and a likely fifth below-average rainy season, combined with high food prices and persistent conflict, is rapidly driving this extreme deprivation of food, on top of expected funding gaps by the end of the year.¹¹⁵

South Sudan

The April–July lean season showed higher levels of food insecurity, including 87 000 people facing starvation and death (IPC Phase 5), compared to last year.¹¹⁶ A fourth-consecutive year of flooding and macroeconomic challenges, coupled with the lingering impact of the national conflict and heightened intercommunal violence, are expected to keep food insecurity at extreme levels. Moreover, increasing funding shortfalls and rising operational costs have reduced food assistance, likely further diminishing in the coming months.

The seasonal improvement in food security during harvest is expected to be lower than usual. This applies especially to flood-affected areas, where crop and livestock losses due to floods is likely to overshadow the benefits of harvested crops.

Forecasts indicate above-average rains for August to October – particularly in Nile and Jonglei states, which are likely to exacerbate the current flooding.^{117, 118, 119, 120} Flood-prone areas are experiencing the largest floods on record assessed in June 2022, with additional areas affected compared to a year ago; this is especially the case in the southern parts of the Sudd Wetlands.¹²¹

Most people expected to face starvation (IPC Phase 5) are in flood-prone areas, including counties in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity states, and Greater Pibor Administrative area, where up to 80 percent of the population are food insecure. Additionally, Unity and Jonglei states have seen a slight increase in violence compared to the first quarter of 2022.¹²² Insecurity may deteriorate in the coming months, following the United States of America's decision to withdraw from systems that monitor the peace process.¹²³

Insufficient supplies and a difficult macroeconomic situation are driving exceptionally high food prices, which constrain access to food.¹²⁴ Maize and sorghum prices in June were almost 90 percent higher than a year ago. In central and northern areas, where significant cereal-production shortfalls were recorded in 2021 due to floods, food-price increases have been sharper due to a rapid depletion of already meagre stocks.¹²⁵ As the country heavily relies on imports of food and fuel, there is concern that high international prices, linked to the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine, may further constrain households' access to food and increase production costs.¹²⁶

During the April–July lean season, 7.74 million people, almost two-thirds of the total population, were facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 2.89 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 87 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).¹²⁷ This represents an 8 percent increase of the population in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) compared to the 2021 lean season.¹²⁸ Malnutrition remains a major concern, with global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels at or above the 15 percent emergency threshold in six assessed areas. Severe acute malnutrition admissions are also higher than the past three years.^{129, 130} Through December, over 1.3 million children are projected to be acutely malnourished, the majority of whom live in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity and Western Bahr el Ghazal states.¹³¹


While the famine-likely situation that was present in some areas of Pibor country in 2021 was averted by improved coordination of humanitarian assistance, the situation remains of highest concern.

Yemen

Early this year, critical levels of acute food insecurity were estimated as likely to deteriorate severely, starting in June until the end of 2022. In fact, according to IPC analysis released in March 2022, over 19 million people were expected to experience acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and December 2022 – including 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 161 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).¹³² Of greatest concern was a Risk of Famine in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah governorate under a worst-case scenario; also the warning that should a worst-case scenario materialize for a protracted period beyond December, Al Hali and Al Hawak districts in Al Hudaydah governorate could shift into Famine too.¹³³

Acute food insecurity trends in the hotspots of highest and very high concern

2019–2022¹ peak numbers and prevalence



¹ Data for 2022 is considered as expected peak based on information available as of August 2022. For the Syrian Arab Republic and Zimbabwe no peak data is available for 2022 as of August 2022.

² Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

³ Based on Flowminder population data. 2021 and 2022 peaks are based on the same projection (November–March).

⁴ 2022 number is HRP (previous numbers are from IPC analyses). 2021 peak number is a combination of the December 2020 IPC covering entire Ethiopia and the May 2021 IPC covering Tigray, Amhara and Afar. The IPC analysis released in May 2021 is an IPC global product. It is based on the conclusions reached by the Ethiopia IPC analysis team. This report has not been endorsed by the Government of Ethiopia.

⁵ 2019: state of West Darfur was not analysed.

⁶ Geographical coverage varies significantly over time: 2019: Sindh and Balochistan; 2020: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; 2021: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh; 2022: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh.

⁷ Based on CARI.

⁸ 2022 number pertains to IPC analysis released in March 2022. Numbers will change following forthcoming IPC analysis, with publication scheduled after the cut-off date of the present report.

⁹ Arid and semi-arid lands region.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend however comparability issues exist in terms of:

(i) geographical/population coverage for Afghanistan (significant increase of population analysed), Democratic Republic of the Congo (significant increase of population analysed), Ethiopia (significant increase of population analysed), Haiti (significant increase in population covered), Kenya (significant increase of population analysed), Nigeria (only part of the population covered). Significant increase of population analysed between 2020 [16 states + FCT] and 2021 [21 states + FCT]), Pakistan (significant increase of population analysed), Somalia (significant increase of population analysed), the Sudan (significant increase of population analysed), Syrian Arab Republic (significant increase of population analysed) and Yemen (significant increase of population analysed); and

(ii) analysis time periods for Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.

These projections were based on assumptions that humanitarian assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding, conflict would intensify, and domestic economic decline would further deepen. Additionally, the projections did not factor in the effect of the war in Ukraine on food prices and operational costs. Some assumptions were unfounded: the conflict in Yemen eased considerably after parties agreed on a truce from April.¹³⁴ Also, funding for food assistance slightly improved and major cuts in the number of beneficiaries were prevented.

In light of this changing context, the IPC analysis is being updated and the outlook on food-insecurity levels in Yemen is expected to be less grim.

However, Yemen remains a country at the highest concern level. The economic crisis is likely to last, due to continued political instability, lack of external revenues and elevated global commodity prices. These factors compound the depletion of foreign-exchange reserves, which underpins elevated currency volatility – particularly in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government.¹³⁵ Ultimately, this affects the country's capacity to import essential items. The weak currency and globally increased cost of food led to a severe increase in local prices, as Yemen has a high dependency on imports. Annual increases of 74 percent for the minimum food basket, in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government, and 38 percent in areas controlled by Sana'a-based authorities, severely cut households' purchasing power; this was often exacerbated by the absence of regular salaries.¹³⁶

Rising operation costs and protracted funding shortfalls are likely to further reduce food assistance. Moreover, although access has improved in some critical areas, the truce remains fragile. As a result, the ability of humanitarian actors to prevent catastrophic conditions remains at risk.

Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

Several other hunger hotspots need urgent action to avert extreme hunger or death. These are countries with sizeable populations – over 500 000 people – estimated or projected to be facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or identified as severely food insecure as per WFP's CARI or rCARI methodology; or countries with more than 10 percent of the analysed population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severely food insecure, and at least 50 percent of the population analysed.

In the included countries, life-threatening conditions are expected to further intensify in the outlook period. Most of the hotspots with deteriorating critical situations were already highlighted in the last edition of the report: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, the Sahel region, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic.

In this edition, the alert is extended to also include the Central African Republic and Pakistan.

In the **Central African Republic**, 2.2 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from April to August 2022, including 638 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹³⁷ This marks a slight decrease from 2.3 million in the same period in 2021, albeit with a largely stable number for people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), at 633 000.¹³⁸ With insecurity likely increasing, and limited access to nutritious foods, along with high prevalence of infectious diseases, acute malnutrition could further deteriorate in conflict-affected areas.^{139, 140} Humanitarian access constraints remain high as of July 2022, albeit marking a slight improvement from the end of 2021.¹⁴¹ Besides the impact of high fuel prices, armed clashes and direct targeting of humanitarian assets and facilities remain key obstacles, causing frequent restrictions on humanitarian operations.

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, 25.9 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 5.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between January and June 2022.¹⁴² While this would mark a slight improvement from 27.3 million for the same period in 2021, it does not consider the full impact of the deterioration in the eastern provinces and below-average rainfall across the country. This means that the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity could increase, particularly in regions afflicted by conflict and below-average rainfall, such as eastern, northeastern and southeastern provinces.

In **Haiti**, amid worsening macroeconomic conditions, persistent political stalemate, rising insecurity due to gang violence, and reduced agricultural production, food security is highly likely to further deteriorate in the remainder of 2022, surpassing the record-high of 4.5 million people estimated to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in March–June 2022, including 1.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁴³ In addition, reduced access to humanitarian assistance – due to a shortfall in humanitarian funding and increasing costs of delivery of assistance resulting from high prices of fuel and goods as well as access constraints – poses further challenges.^{144, 145}

In **Kenya**, the prolonged drought in eastern and northern areas is highly likely to worsen further, as another below-average rainy season is forecast between October and December.¹⁴⁶ This marks an unprecedented fifth poor rainy season. Around 4.4 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022, including 1.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). This represents an 84 percent increase compared to the same time last year. The nutrition situation remains extremely concerning. GAM prevalence in seven counties with arid and semi-arid lands is above 15 percent, and even exceeds the critical 30 percent threshold in three subcounties in Marsabit and Turkana.¹⁴⁷

In **Pakistan**, the impact of catastrophic floods is likely to compound the rapid deterioration of the macroeconomic situation driving food insecurity. According to preliminary results of IPC acute food insecurity analysis conducted in the first week of July 2022 – prior to flooding – in 17 of the 59 districts subsequently affected by the flood, around 3.5 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above). Of these around 2.5 million people are in Sindh and 1 million in Balochistan. However, these levels are likely to increase substantially in the outlook period as a result of the flooding and the economic vulnerabilities amid rising food and energy prices.

In the **Sahel region** (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger), most of the underlying drivers of the current food crisis – conflict and insecurity, political instability, climate shocks and high food prices – are likely to worsen further and thereby raise food insecurity. During the June–August 2022 period, over 13 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). These figures mark a near 50 percent increase compared to 2021 and are over 120 percent higher than the 5-year average. Eight administrative areas or population groups are classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – some for the first time ever.

In the **Sudan**, economic decline and rising food prices, coupled with tight supplies, increasing intercommunal violence and floods, underpin an alarming food-security situation amid very high and increasing humanitarian access constraints.¹⁴⁸ Between October 2022 and February 2023, 7.7 million people are expected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) – an increase of almost 2 million compared to last year; of this number, 1.5 million are expected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁴⁹ Throughout 2023, food insecurity could worsen compared to levels seen in 2022, when 11.7 million people were expected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and September.

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, despite a substantial cooling down of the conflict over the last two years, the humanitarian crisis has been driven by the deteriorating economic environment, including drought-constrained 2022 agricultural production.¹⁵⁰ The combination of deteriorating economic conditions and abating agricultural production is likely to worsen further the conditions of over 12 million Syrians currently estimated to be food insecure;¹⁵¹ this includes 2.5 million severely food insecure, based on WFP's CARI methodology.¹⁵²

Other countries requiring monitoring

Several other countries or situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include: i) countries or situations where data was insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the discussions on the basis of other evidence, as described below; and ii) countries or situations in protracted crisis with high numbers of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence for a likely food-security deterioration of a level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as hunger hotspots. Such situations of concern include, but are not limited to, the following countries:

The **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** is experiencing persisting economic constraints, exacerbated by the lasting impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Imports have been significantly reduced – including critical agricultural inputs and humanitarian goods – maintaining the population's vulnerability to food insecurity. Overall, despite a lack of recently updated data, available analyses and trends suggest that a large proportion of the population might suffer from low levels of food consumption and poor dietary diversity.

The **Lao People's Democratic Republic** is facing growing risks of a balance-of-payments crisis, as high food and energy prices coupled with a significant external debt load rapidly deplete the country's foreign-exchange reserves. Strong currency depreciation and shortages of essential goods, including fuel and agricultural inputs, are likely to affect food security; they are also likely to increase poverty, particularly as the country has one of the lowest per-capita incomes in Asia. Agricultural production costs have risen significantly: prices of livestock inputs have increased by up to 300 percent, and the cost of rice production more than tripled in July 2022 (year on year). Furthermore, as a result of high prices, fertilizer sales have declined 20 times, which is expected to lead to a drop in production. Although no updated data on food security in the country were collected in 2022, a qualitative assessment conducted in August 2022 points to a deterioration of the situation, which may further worsen during the lean season (August–October).¹⁵³

Myanmar's food-security situation is still of very high concern. The economic crisis is showing signs of continued deterioration, which is reflected by an ongoing sharp devaluation of the currency and increasing inflation.^{154, 155} Compared to one year ago, the average cost of a basic food basket has increased by 34 percent,¹⁵⁶ while fuel prices have more than doubled. Furthermore, the armed conflict, more recently in west (Rakhine) but also in the northwest, north (Kachin) and southeast areas of the country, has been escalating in 2022; it is expected to worsen further. Almost 1 million people have been internally displaced due to conflict and insecurity, since the military takeover last year.¹⁵⁷ Agricultural production is facing serious challenges in

terms of rising costs of inputs – fertilizer prices increased by over 140 percent compared to last year – and disturbance of value chains, resulting in decreased planted areas and a likely significant decline in output. The most recent estimates from May 2022 identified that about 11 million people, or 20 percent of the population, were facing acute food insecurity, based on WFP's rCARI methodology.¹⁵⁸

In the **Republic of Colombia**, concerns remain high about significant levels of food insecurity – as determined in 2022 through WFP's rCARI methodology – with moderate and severe acute food insecurity affecting 19 million and 1.1 million people respectively.¹⁵⁹ Currently, the vulnerability of migrants and IDPs, with high proportions of food insecurity, requires specific attention.¹⁶⁰ Transit migration also remains a key issue, as migrants on the move show significant food-consumption gaps and specific vulnerabilities. The Colombia-Panama border registered an 85 percent increase in the number of migrants in the first half of 2022 compared to 2021, putting further pressure on humanitarian assistance.¹⁶¹ On the economic front, food inflation recorded a 25 percent year-on-year increase in July 2022.¹⁶² It is expected to remain elevated, with high international commodity prices transmitted to local consumer prices, constraining household purchasing power and underpinning ongoing currency depreciation. Overall, no significant deterioration in food security is recorded since the last edition of the report, nor is it anticipated in the outlook period.

In **Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)**, the situation remains of high concern despite the lack of recent comparable data. Available evidence points towards relative stabilization of the economic situation, though inflation remains very high.¹⁶³ Although food is generally available, high prices and low purchasing power hinder access, particularly in a context of elevated global and regional food prices. Food-security interventions plan to reach 2 million people under the 2022–2023 HRP.¹⁶⁴

In **Lebanon**, the food-security situation did not improve during the first half of 2022. Over 1.7 million people were estimated to face acute food insecurity at the end of 2021, based on WFP's rCARI methodology.¹⁶⁵ Although new parliamentary elections took place without major incidents in May, no substantial steps have been carried out for the formation of a new government; neither has there been progress on negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for financial assistance and the introduction of economic reforms aimed at tackling the ongoing crisis.¹⁶⁶ Accordingly, prospects for the improvement of the socioeconomic situation remain weak. Increasing global food prices, and the resulting deterioration of purchasing power, affect in particular vulnerable groups including refugees; food supply-chain shortages may also occur.

The acute food-security situation in southern **Angola** remains of concern, due to the compound effects of consecutive years of dry weather conditions, including in 2022. However, despite the lack of updated data, there are some indications that national cereal production might have increased moderately in 2022 compared to the previous year, evidenced by near-average vegetation conditions in the main cereal-producing central provinces. In addition, given the country's role as an oil exporter, high hydrocarbon prices are likely to result in an increase in foreign-currency reserves and a small rebound in economic growth.¹⁶⁷ The positive terms of trade have already led to a strengthening of the currency, helping to temper inflation amid high global prices.¹⁶⁸ However, inflation remains in double digits, while expected shortfalls in agricultural production in 2022 could exacerbate risks of food-security deterioration.¹⁶⁹

In **Mozambique**, although no updated comparable data is available, the food-security situation is expected to deteriorate due to the combined effects of increased displacement in Cabo Delgado, a rise in food and fuel prices, and localized shortfalls in cereal production in areas affected by extreme weather events.^{170, 171, 172} In addition, a Data in Emergencies monitoring survey by FAO in May 2022 found that about 64 percent of producers faced difficulties in producing their crops, and 54 percent had a decrease in harvest compared to a normal year.¹⁷³ The latest IPC analysis from December 2021 projected that 1.4 million people were facing Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) during April to September 2022.¹⁷⁴

Country narratives

Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, recurring weather shocks, high food and fuel prices

Extremely high levels of acute food insecurity are likely to continue, under the effects of the economic crisis. This has been exacerbated by the freeze of Afghan assets and very high levels of accumulated household debt, as well as the impact of continuing drought. The drought is projected to extend to the main 2022 growing season – unprecedented in the last 20 years.¹⁷⁵

On the economic front, market pressures are expected to continue, while real wages have been declining due to inflation. By May 2022, year-on-year food inflation stood at 23.2 percent amid rising fuel prices.¹⁷⁶ Food prices are feeling the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.¹⁷⁷ The average price of a food basket in August was 26 percent higher than last year.¹⁷⁸ Wheat prices alone increased 44 percent over the same period.¹⁷⁹ Substantial pressure on humanitarian funding for food assistance compounds the negative outlook, as funding is significantly less than that required to assist the people targeted.^{180, 181} Winter and summer crop harvests are expected to be below-average due to recurring drought, while scarce pasture constrains livestock conditions.¹⁸² The ongoing La Niña event is likely to result in below-average rainfall in late 2022 and early 2023, coinciding with the wheat-sowing and mid-growing period.¹⁸³ This, combined with forecasted above-average temperatures and low reservoir levels, is likely to affect the main 2022/23 agricultural season.¹⁸⁴ 2022 has also seen a spike in unseasonal summer flash floods in several provinces.¹⁸⁵ Capacity to respond before the main winter wheat-planting season may be limited.

From June to November 2022, during the harvest season, 34 provinces are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including nearly 6 million (14 percent) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{186, 187} This represents an increase of 4.3 million people in Crisis levels of food insecurity and over 2.4 million in Emergency levels compared to the same period in 2021.¹⁸⁸ A total 4.7 million children and nursing women are expected to be acutely malnourished in 2022.¹⁸⁹

Importantly, while the current IPC projection shows no population facing starvation or a very high rate of mortality (IPC Phase 5), the scale of severe food insecurity suggests that loss of life may already be occurring.

The levels of food insecurity and significant loss of life will likely grow from November, as another harsh winter coincides with the lean season – typically beginning in February. For the first time since its introduction in the country more than a decade ago, the IPC reported that 20 000 people were facing starvation (IPC Phase 5) during the last lean season in Ghor province in Afghanistan's Central Highlands region.¹⁹⁰ Despite continuing and unprecedented levels of humanitarian assistance, concerns remain that the situation in this area could be dire during the approaching winter season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Preposition livelihood and food assistance in locations with the highest levels of food insecurity, that are likely to be rendered inaccessible by winter conditions.
- Monitor the consequences of the global food crisis, rising food prices and security environment on the humanitarian situation; ensure that interventions are adapted to contextual changes.
- Develop and distribute market and agroclimatic bulletins at the national and community levels, to highlight the evolving climate situation/potential dry conditions; provide tailored advice on actions to be taken to protect agricultural livelihoods.
- Distribute agricultural inputs, including stress-tolerant wheat seeds, backyard vegetable-cultivation packages and fertilizers (where possible) for the upcoming winter cereal season.
- Scale up food and cash assistance for asset-creation and livelihoods activities, including the building of vocational skills and improvement of community infrastructure; this should include the creation and/or rehabilitation of infrastructure to improve access to water during drought, such as water catchments, improved water storage, irrigation and *kareez* (underground canal systems). Such programmes also ensure a critical income source to the population.
- Implement cash-for-work activities by building and rehabilitating water storage and water-source infrastructure to provide income sources for the most vulnerable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP called for USD 4.4 billion in 2022. This includes USD 2.66 billion for food security and agricultural livelihoods for people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above), and USD 287.4 million for nutrition-related interventions. As of August, the HRP is funded at just over 40 percent.

- Scale up humanitarian assistance as the winter lean season approaches and hunger and malnutrition rates peak in the next six months. This means ensuring that enough food and nutrition products are prepositioned ahead of snowfall; adjusting cash-based transfer values to compensate for domestic price fluctuations; and scaling up coverage of assistance.
- Scale up prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition as part of an integrated package of food security, health, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services in rural and urban areas through mobile teams and functioning health facilities.
- Provide nutritious school meals that contribute to children's health and nutrition and keep them in school and able to learn.
- Complement and combine food assistance with livelihood and vocational training, where possible, to enable crisis-affected communities to meet their basic food needs while building resilience against recurrent shocks and stressors.
- Engage with humanitarian actors, civil society and authorities to ensure unhindered humanitarian access for implementation and monitoring of emergency assistance programmes.
- Expand the reach and capacities of existing food security and nutrition monitoring and early warning systems, to ensure that early action is triggered ahead of an emerging urgent situation and prevent catastrophe.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, monsoon flooding

The dire economic crisis – exacerbated by elevated costs of food and energy commodities, coupled with the catastrophic impact of monsoon floodings – is set to worsen already critical levels of acute food insecurity in parts of the country.

Pakistan's macroeconomic stability has rapidly deteriorated over the last two years, with the unsustainable expansion of the fiscal and current-account deficit driven by the prolonged impact of COVID-19 and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine.¹⁹¹ Pakistan, traditionally a wheat-exporting country, currently relies heavily on imports from the Russian Federation and Ukraine (importing approximately 75 percent of wheat from the two countries combined).¹⁹² The aim is for the government and traders to bolster supplies, amid high domestic prices driven by the upsurge in international commodity prices and its impact on the import bill. As a result, foreign reserves rapidly declined in the first half of 2022.¹⁹³ The Pakistani currency slid 26 percent, while year-on-year food inflation rose to 28.8 percent in August.^{194, 195} Additionally, spikes in fertilizer and energy prices, combined with drought in early 2022, reduced wheat production by 4 percent.¹⁹⁶

This added upward pressure on food prices, which is likely to remain for the outlook period.

The difficult economic and food-security situation has been aggravated by catastrophic floods which hit 116 districts at the end of August, affecting 33 million people. The government declared 72 districts as being calamity-hit, with approximately 6.4 million people severely impacted. Additionally, around 2 million acres of crops/orchards are affected, and there are an estimated 719 000 livestock (animals/poultry) losses.¹⁹⁷

According to preliminary results of IPC acute food insecurity analysis conducted in the first week of July 2022 – prior to flooding – in 17 of the 59 districts subsequently affected by the flood, around 3.5 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (IPC Phase 3 or above). Of these around 2.5 million people are in Sindh and 1 million in Balochistan.¹⁹⁸ However, the scale of the flood emergency, with ongoing rains and economic vulnerabilities amid rising food and energy prices, means it is highly likely that food insecurity will increase substantially in the outlook period. Acute food insecurity IPC analysis was forthcoming at the time of writing, which will take into account the impact of the floods.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Continue monitoring inflation trends and adapt the value of cash-based assistance as required.
- Distribute inputs for off-season production (e.g. vegetable seeds, herbs, spices) among the most vulnerable farmers.
- Distribute animal feed and supplements to the most vulnerable households.
- Promote and support early destocking through identification of potential markets, coordination and identification of potential buyers, support for the sale of animals (i.e. transport), provision of advice to farmers for opening bank accounts to deposit earnings, and support to farmers to restock during normal period.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Support the use of existing social-protection mechanisms and systems (Benazir Income Support Programme) to transfer cash to flood-affected populations – to meet their immediate food and other essential needs – and provide direct livelihood and food assistance to populations not reached through government programmes.
- Continue to provide food assistance to people displaced by floods and other vulnerable populations heavily impacted by high food prices.
- Support the extension of nutrition services to prevent and treat acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age and pregnant and lactating women in flood-affected districts, especially those areas with high GAM prevalence
- Establish a logistics-augmentation unit to work with the National Disaster Management Authority, to help with storage, management and dispatch of relief items.
- Upon concluding the relief response, support full-recovery activities and the immediate restoration of livelihoods and infrastructure, especially in vulnerable borderland areas, to help communities recover as quickly as possible and contribute towards their resilience against extreme weather events and other shocks and stressors.
- Provide technical assistance to the multisectoral rapid needs assessments in flood-affected districts, specifically those with impeded access, in support of government efforts to enhance targeting of vulnerable populations.
- Enhance advocacy for flexible funding mechanisms, to ensure rapid scale-up to respond to urgent needs.

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, political instability

Due to the ongoing financial collapse, which has initiated the worst economic and food-security crisis since the country's independence in 1948, and persisting political uncertainty delaying a resolution of the economic situation, acute food insecurity is expected to worsen over the outlook period.¹⁹⁹

After defaulting on its debt in May 2022, the country has been facing increasing shortages of essential items, rapid currency depreciation and booming food inflation.²⁰⁰ The Sri Lankan Rupee has lost 44 percent of its value since March, while food inflation amounted to over 90 percent year on year as of July.²⁰¹

The 2022 aggregate paddy production, the country's main staple food, is forecast to contract by at least 40 percent compared with the 2021 level. This is mostly due to a sharp decline in yields, following reduced application rates of chemical fertilizers and pesticides.²⁰²

The reduction resulted from the ban on imports and use of chemical fertilizer and agrochemicals between May and November 2021, creating severe market shortages and high prices.²⁰³

In addition to the increasing economic difficulties, the dramatic

deterioration of living conditions has exacerbated political instability. Daily protests took place over the last months, in some instances transforming into violent confrontations with the security forces.²⁰⁴ The resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July has partially calmed the political situation, although tensions remain high. Mounting political uncertainty has been delaying negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and international donors for financial support, exacerbating the economic crisis.²⁰⁵

According to WFP, as of July 2022, 6.3 million people (corresponding to three in ten households) are moderately acute food insecure, and 66 000 people are severely acute food insecure based on WFP's CARI methodology.²⁰⁶ More serious levels of food insecurity are likely if the crisis persists. An estimated 23 percent of households are using crisis or emergency livelihood-coping strategies that are likely to severely impact their income-generating activities. A total of 2.43 million people are estimated to be in need of malnutrition prevention and treatment services, including at least 56 000 children with severe acute malnutrition.²⁰⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- If feasible, conduct cash-for-work activities to improve paddy storage and community infrastructure to support daily wage earners and labourers.
- Seek multilateral and bilateral aid to import and provide chemical fertilizers and agrochemicals along with locally produced organic fertilizers. This should be coupled with technical support on efficient plant-nutrient management for both growing seasons (*Yala* and *Maha*), and agricultural inputs such as maize and some vegetable seeds for vulnerable smallholder farmers.
- Seek support to produce and supply high-nutrient animal feed, vaccines and veterinary health kits to livestock owners, including those who have cattle and poultry, to mitigate the impacts of the feed shortage due to the economic crisis.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Scale up food assistance, through food, cash and vouchers, to ensure vulnerable groups are able to meet their essential food needs amid the economic crisis.
- Support the continued scale-up and functioning of the national nutrition programme Triphosha, for prevention and treatment of malnutrition, and support the improvement of targeting and accountability for beneficiaries of the programme.
- Assist the government in ensuring school meals programmes continue to function, given their important role as a social safety net in meeting nutrition, education and other needs during the current crisis.
- Continue frequent monitoring of inflation as well as food, fuel and agricultural input prices, in order to ensure that support to affected households remains adequate.
- Engage in the extension of the Humanitarian Needs and Priorities Plan until the end of 2022, providing strategic inputs into strategic objectives 1 and 2 ahead of planning for 2023.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Central America (the Republic of Guatemala and the Republic of Honduras)

Key drivers of food insecurity: high prices, flooding

Elevated food and fertilizer prices, forecasted above-average rainfall and a high likelihood of a third above-average hurricane season affecting crop production are likely to drive acute food insecurity in the outlook period.

The rising cost of agricultural inputs will likely weigh on production prospects in the second and third agricultural seasons.²⁰⁸ The prices of fertilizers hit a record high in March, rising 128 and 88 percent in Guatemala and Honduras respectively, due to high international prices, supply chain bottlenecks and export restrictions.^{209, 210} In both countries, imports of fertilizers in the first five months of 2022 were 15-20 percent lower year on year, which reduced availabilities.²¹¹ Amid soaring production costs, smallholder farmers resorted to organic fertilizers and received government support, which may partially offset restrictions.^{212, 213} However, lower availabilities remain a concern, as its reduced application could result in low yields.

Rising food inflation has strained the purchasing power of low-income households, constraining their access to the main staples. In June, the year-on-year prices of white maize increased by 45 and 70 percent in Guatemala and Honduras respectively.²¹⁴ Similarly, the prices of beans jumped 23 and 32 percent in Guatemala and Honduras on a yearly basis. Spiralling energy prices, which recorded an 11 and 30 percent increase in Guatemala and Honduras respectively, also diminished the purchasing power of vulnerable households.^{215, 216} The inflation rate is expected to remain high during the outlook period, due to the lingering effects of supply shocks and global-markets uncertainty.²¹⁷

Above-average precipitations, intensified by the La Niña phenomenon and an above-average hurricane season, are forecast in the upcoming second cropping season (September–November).^{218, 219} This could bring favourable conditions for crop development. However, it also increases the risks of flooding and localized crop losses in low-lying zones on the western coast of Guatemala and Honduras. If materialized, this is likely to lower market supplies, further exerting upward pressure on prices.

In Guatemala, 3.2 million people (19 percent of the population) are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from October 2022 to February 2023, representing a sharp increase from 2.5 million in the same period last year;²²⁰ 128 000 people are projected to be in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In Honduras, the latest IPC analysis released in January 2022 estimated that 2.6 million people were facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from June to August 2022, including 353 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). These projections did not consider the potential spillover effects from the war in Ukraine. Elevated international food prices and potential localized crop losses, the latter caused by above-average rainfall, are likely to underpin a deterioration of acute food-insecurity outcomes in both countries compared to last year. This applies especially to households still recovering from the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as hurricanes in 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Scale up hurricane preparedness by strategically prepositioning stock to facilitate timely delivery of assistance and protect productive assets before a hurricane makes landfall.
- Provide resources and technical assistance to strengthen seed processing and storage infrastructure of community seed banks, with emphasis on those led by women producer associations.
- Support farming households with inputs and tools to cultivate short-cycle crop varieties and backyard gardening kits for rapid food production.
- Strengthen existing forecasting systems aimed at providing technical recommendations to smallholder farmers on reducing the effects of climate-related events.
- Support the national strategic food reserve at national and local level, through procurement, storage and supply chain services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Provide in-kind livelihoods assistance by distributing seeds, small livestock (laying hens or goats), cuttings, and agricultural inputs and tools.
- Continue monitoring the prices of food, fuel and agricultural inputs (fertilizers), to plan timely support to affected households ahead of the start of the agricultural season. Strengthen market and economic monitoring, to inform any required adjustments to national and partner cash-based transfer programmes.
- Complement government support with cash and food assistance (hot meals) for affected populations in shelters not covered by national programmes, within the first 72 hours.
- Support the national disaster management system throughout capacity strengthening at local level, in order to respond to emergencies and build strong logistic capacities. Support national risk and contingency management.
- Strengthen monitoring of changes in the nutrition situation and anticipate response in the most food-insecure areas.

The Republic of Haiti

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, insecurity and political instability, below-average agricultural production

Worsening macroeconomic conditions, sociopolitical instability and reduced agricultural production are set to exacerbate alarming levels of acute food insecurity.

Households are expected to see their purchasing power further eroded across the outlook period, as the annual inflation rate is expected to register double-digit growth for the seventh-consecutive year.²²¹ Reaching 52 percent higher year on year in April 2022, prices of the basic food basket have been on the rise and are expected to remain so.²²² This is due to several factors including the continuous depreciation of the Haitian Gourde, high levels of insecurity, and elevated international food and fuel prices.

Amid a persistent political stalemate, insecurity due to gang violence is likely to further intensify – further constraining business activities, curtailing fuel and food supplies, affecting prices, and hampering people's access to markets and essential services.²²³ This may further enhance social frustration, which is likely to result in unrest.²²⁴ Insecurity has complicated road access from the capital to southern areas, and recently also to the north, hampering reconstruction efforts in areas affected by the 2021 earthquake, as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance.²²⁵

The agricultural production of 2022 main crops is expected to be below average, due to poor rainfall between March and May, particularly in the key producing areas.²²⁶ The reduced output is expected to lower farmers' ability to purchase agricultural inputs for the second and third cropping seasons in 2022.²²⁷ A forecasted above-average hurricane season would further erode farmers' resilience and affect agricultural production.²²⁸

Food security is highly likely to further deteriorate in the remainder of 2022, surpassing the record-high of 4.5 million people (45 percent of the analysed population) who were estimated to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in March–June 2022, including 1.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²²⁹ In addition, reduced access to humanitarian assistance – due to a shortfall in humanitarian funding and increasing costs of delivery of assistance resulting from high prices of fuel and goods as well as access constraints – poses further threats.^{230, 231}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide high-nutrient animal feed and animal-health treatments to vulnerable livestock herders, to anticipate and mitigate the impact of forecasted above-average rains on animal conditions, while conducting animal-health surveillance activities (with a particular focus on African swine fever).
- Scale up hurricane preparedness by strategically prepositioning stocks throughout the country (urban and rural areas), to facilitate timely delivery of assistance to affected people.
- Provide resources and technical assistance to strengthen seed processing and storage infrastructure of community seed banks, with emphasis on those led by women producer associations.
- Support farming households with inputs and tools to cultivate short-cycle crop varieties and backyard gardening kits for rapid food production.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2021–2022 HRP updated version calls for USD 199 million for food security and nutrition interventions targeting 2 million people – but at only 19.6 percent funded for 2022, the ability of the humanitarian community to meet rising needs is severely constrained.
- Scale up and sustain emergency food and livelihood assistance for people facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), prioritizing populations in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) in the western coastal area of the Sud Department. This includes ensuring an adequate level of assistance through revised transfer values, to compensate for the rapidly rising prices.
 - Reinforce capacities to ensure continued access to populations, including continued barge and expanded air services; maintain negotiation of a humanitarian corridor with the Dominican Republic (both land and sea routes), for faster food procurement in case of a large-scale emergency.
 - Strengthen actor capacities in access negotiation and mapping and adapt emergency-programming approaches for urban context.

West Africa and the Sahel

The Central African Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, high fuel and food prices

With protracted conflict likely to intensify in the outlook period, and high fuel and food prices impacting purchasing power, acute food insecurity is set to worsen further.

Conflict is driving massive displacements, aggravated by direct exactions on civilians. About 1.3 million people, or one-third of the population, were either internally displaced (610 000) or refugees in neighbouring countries (739 000), as of July 2022.²³² The conflict also constrains access to fields and forests to cultivate, gather, fish, herd and hunt. This is partly due to the increasing use of explosive weapons, with the first use of landmines in April 2022.²³³

Violence risks are likely to intensify in the outlook period. NSAGs are likely to seek territorial advances following a drastic reduction of private military contractor personnel in the country, reportedly dropping well below 1 500 from over 2 000 by March 2022.^{234, 235}

Increasing food prices affected affordability in 2022, and they are expected to further rise due to the elevated international prices of cereals and other imported goods.²³⁶ Meanwhile, high fuel prices,

fuel shortages and high agricultural input prices are likely to reduce planted agricultural land and yields, resulting in declining harvests.²³⁷

The latest IPC analysis projected that, in the absence of assistance, some 2.2 million people faced Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from April to August 2022, equal to some 45 percent of the population, including 638 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²³⁸ This marks a slight decrease from 2.3 million in the same period in 2021, albeit with a stable number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), at 633 000.²³⁹ Given increasing insecurity and limited access to nutritious foods, along with a high prevalence of infectious diseases, acute malnutrition could further deteriorate in conflict-affected areas.^{240, 241}

Humanitarian-access constraints remain high as of July 2022, although slightly improving from “very high” at the end of 2021.^{242, 243} High fuel prices, armed clashes and direct targeting of humanitarian assets remain key obstacles which have resulted in frequent restrictions on humanitarian operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute vegetable seeds and early-maturing cassava cuttings to support food production during the off-season, targeting food-insecure IDPs, returnees and host communities in areas experiencing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
- Distribute livestock kits, targeting in particular food-insecure IDPs, returnees and host communities in areas experiencing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
- Preposition food prior to the rainy season, to ensure continuity of WFP assistance when requirements are at their highest and need to be met rapidly.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022 HRP calls for USD 163.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 29.8 million for nutrition interventions.
- Increase coverage of nutrition programmes and prioritize high-risk areas jointly with food security, health, protection and water, WASH partners.
 - Provide and scale up unconditional cash transfers to displaced populations and host communities in the event of new active hostilities, to mitigate the immediate consequences on food security.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic challenges, high food prices, flash floods

Acute food insecurity and malnutrition are likely to remain at critical levels due to lingering conflict and insecurity, macroeconomic challenges, flash floods – especially in Yobe state – and high food prices, despite the end of the lean season in August. A key concern remains the population facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 4), particularly in areas that remain inaccessible to humanitarian operations.²⁴⁴

Conflict remains a key driver of acute food insecurity across northeast and northwest Nigeria, with the security situation continuing its gradual yet steady deterioration since the previous report. It is likely to further deteriorate in the outlook period, due to escalating hostilities between NSAGs, criminality and intercommunal violence.²⁴⁵ There is furthermore a high risk of political violence in the run-up to the February 2023 general elections.²⁴⁶ With the end of the rainy season in September and rural topography becoming more permissive to armed movements, violence is likely to experience a seasonal jump, disrupting food systems, limiting access to markets and creating new rounds of displacements. As of July 2022, 2.5 million people were displaced in northeast Nigeria, up from 2.2 million in December 2021, on top of another 1 million in the northwest and northcentral regions as of March 2022.^{247, 248}

Year-on-year food inflation reached 22 percent in July and is likely to remain elevated through 2022, due to global supply disruptions and high commodity prices.²⁴⁹ Domestic grain prices increased 30 percent year on year, due to rising transport costs and below-average availabilities.²⁵⁰

According to the latest available CH analysis, 19.5 million people were projected to be in Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 and above) between June and August 2022, including 1.2 million in Emergency (CH Phase 4).²⁵¹ The number of people facing acute food insecurity cannot be related to the figure published for the same period in 2021, as it is obtained from a geographically expanded CH analysis.^{252, 253, 254} According to a survey by WFP's mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping project, 28 percent of surveyed households had inadequate food consumption in the recent lean season (July 2022), marking a 1 percentage-point increase from the previous year.²⁵⁵ In the northeast, more than 1.3 million children and 152 000 pregnant and lactating mothers are projected to be acutely malnourished until the end of the year.²⁵⁶ Deteriorating acute malnutrition is also concerning in the northwest, with 16 local government areas (LGA) out of 38 showing GAM prevalence above 10 percent. The situation is especially worrying in Sokoto state, where three LGAs had GAM prevalence above the emergency threshold of 15 percent, reaching 30 percent in Isa LGA.²⁵⁷ Without additional funding, the number of people planned for assistance in October–December is likely to be reduced.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute home-gardening inputs to IDPs and host communities, to support low-mobility agricultural activities (e.g. backyard vegetable gardening) in order to mitigate the impact of further hikes in food prices.
- Support agricultural-based livelihoods activities for the upcoming dry-cropping season, focusing on vegetables, rice and maize, starting in October/November and targeting vulnerable households with access to land and water for cultivation.
- Strengthen government capacity on emergency preparedness and response, with training and simulation for staff (notably on duty in the northwest) from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Mitigation Social Development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 451 million for food security, USD 59 million for livelihood and USD 144 million for nutrition interventions. Funded only at 41.9 percent so far, the ability of humanitarian actors to respond is still constrained.

- Sustain humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas in the northeast, particularly Borno state and the northwest, allowing for the lean-season scale-up.
- Provide cash transfers to displaced populations (especially communities in the northwest and northeast) and host communities, leveraging national systems.
- Undertake a scoping mission in the northwest to have a comprehensive assessment of the nutrition situation and needs.
- Scale up acute-malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes in the northeast and northwest, in coordination with government, nutrition, food security, WASH and health partners.

Sahel (the Republic of Burkina Faso, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Mali, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Republic of the Niger)

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict and insecurity, political instability, climate shocks, high food prices

Despite the countries in the Sahel entering their annual harvest season during the outlook period, most of the underlying drivers of the current food crisis – conflict and insecurity, political instability, climate shocks, high food prices and limited access to agropastoral inputs – are likely to aggravate further and raise acute food insecurity levels. Moreover, without additional funding for the humanitarian response, the number of people receiving food assistance will have to be reduced from October 2022 onwards.

Above-average rainfall and high river levels increase the risk of floods this season, which may destroy crops and affect production.²⁵⁸ However, a risk of severe drought has been identified in some localities in the Niger, which could have a critical impact on livelihoods.²⁵⁹ Driven by regional and international markets, food prices are likely to remain at very high levels – for example, the prices of basic staples in Mali are up to 80 percent above the five-year average. More than 90 percent of markets in the region experience unusually high food prices.²⁶⁰ The region is also facing a major fertilizer deficit due to elevated global prices. Up to 88 percent of fertilizer needs for the 2022 season are not covered, which could significantly affect crop production and further increase food prices.²⁶¹ Some countries strongly depend on food imports, and elevated international prices will likely further drive up domestic inflation – for instance, Mauritania has a cereal-import dependency of more than 80 percent, of which around 50 percent was imported from Ukraine or the Russian Federation in 2021.²⁶² Supply of cereal markets in Chad remains in atypical decline due to

the increase in transportation costs and the drop in production, with an upward trend in reported prices due to pressure on grain markets. Rampant inflation limits access to food, particularly for the poorest households and conflict-affected populations.

The security situation is likely to deteriorate further, except in Mauritania, leading to new displacements, market disruptions and disrupted agricultural activities.^{263, 264} Political instability in Burkina Faso and Chad, and a recent string of coordinated attacks by NSAGs in Mali, highlight the precariousness of the security situation.²⁶⁵ Forced displacements are expected to increase further, adding to nearly 3 million IDPs.²⁶⁶ The security situation is also expected to further reduce humanitarian access.²⁶⁷ High to very high access constraints prevail in all countries, except for Mauritania.²⁶⁸

During the June–August 2022 period, around 13 million people were projected to be acutely food insecure, at Crisis level or worse (CH Phase 3 and above), including 1.4 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4). This is a nearly 50 percent increase compared to 2021, and over 120 percent higher than the five-year average. In particular, a 72 percent increase of people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) is observed, compared to the same time in the previous year. Eight administrative areas or population groups are classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4) – some for the first time ever. The prevalence of acute malnutrition remains high, above 10 percent, especially in conflict-affected areas; it exceeds 15 percent in Gao region.²⁶⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Distribute inputs for market gardens to most-vulnerable households, to protect their agropastoral livelihoods.
- Distribute home-gardening inputs to IDPs and host populations, to support low-mobility agricultural activities.
- Rehabilitate/install water-conservation infrastructure, equip market-garden wells with solar energy and rehabilitate/develop harvesting systems for crops and market gardening.
- Raise awareness on commercial destocking, when biomass indicators show a decline in grazing and access to water.
- Promote fodder crops and river-water drainage systems in pastoral areas, to limit transhumance movements and livestock destocking, and strengthen the capacity of herders to produce food supplements for their livestock.
- Strengthen seasonal vaccination programmes for livestock, to limit epizootics.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for:

Burkina Faso: USD 224.9 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 40.3 million for nutrition interventions;
 Chad: USD 216.7 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66.3 million for nutrition interventions;
 Mali: USD 234 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 66 million for nutrition interventions;
 the Niger: USD 173 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 99.7 million for nutrition interventions;
 Mauritania: USD 94.7 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 7.8 million for nutrition interventions.

- Increase coverage of nutrition programmes and prioritize high-risks areas jointly with food security, health, protection and WASH partners.
- Scale up life-saving assistance to meet the vital needs of crisis-affected populations. Prioritize a cash+ strategy to assist vulnerable households facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), to meet their immediate food and livelihood needs.
- Develop and expand nutrition-sensitive social-protection programmes targeting the most-at-risk households.
- Ensure access to a nutritious and affordable diet and to adequate services and practices for pregnant and lactating women, infants and young children, through actions in the food, health, WASH and social-protection systems.
- Distribute livestock feed (including mineral blocks) and vaccinations, establish fodder plots and rehabilitate pastoral wells of agropastoral households affected by the 2021 drought.
- Maintain coverage of acute-malnutrition prevention and treatment programmes, especially in priority areas identified by the regional food security and nutrition hotspot analysis.
- Strengthen capacities of national actors to respond to climate shocks.

East Africa

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought, macroeconomic challenges, conflict and interethnic violence

In southern and eastern areas, the upcoming *Deyr* rains (October–December) are forecast as below average, setting the stage for a fifth-consecutive failed rainy season. Fragile livelihoods will be further compromised by a reduction of yields, crop losses and by more livestock deaths.²⁷⁰ The last rainy season was extremely poor, which is expected to significantly affect harvests in the regions of southern Tigray, eastern Amhara, eastern Oromia, and northeastern Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR).^{271, 272, 273}

Macroeconomic difficulties are likely to worsen, due to the combined effects of increasing borrowing costs and elevated international commodity prices, adding to the national import bill.²⁷⁴ As a result, depleting foreign-exchange reserves have already caused sporadic fuel shortages and the depreciation of the currency on the informal market.²⁷⁵ In the first half of 2022, food inflation was 40 percent higher than last year, with prospects of further rises.²⁷⁶

Conflict and interethnic violence intensified in several regions, particularly Oromia and Amhara where violence is likely to further escalate.^{277, 278} Since the end of August, hostilities have resumed in southern Tigray as well as parts of Amhara and Afar.²⁷⁹

The lack of updated IPC data remains a major concern. The latest-available IPC projections were valid up to September 2021, indicating around 401 000 people in Tigray faced death and starvation.²⁸⁰ More recent information shows deteriorating food security.

In 2022, 20.4 million people are estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance, including more than 13 million food-insecure people in northern Ethiopia – an increase of 2.4 million compared to last year.²⁸¹ WFP assessments show that, inside Tigray, the number of people in acute food insecurity increased from 4.6 million (83 percent), as determined based on WFP's rCARI methodology, to 5.4 million (89 percent), based on WFP's

CARI methodology, over the last seven months; 2.8 million people (47 percent) were severely acute food insecure.^{282, 283} No recent information is available on the number of people in catastrophic conditions, but concerns remain very high.²⁸⁴ In July 2021, the Famine Review Committee warned of a risk of famine in Tigray through December 2021, driven by limited humanitarian assistance, intense conflict, and low availability of commercial goods and services.²⁸⁵ The situation remains of highest concern as the drivers behind the risk of famine warning continue to prevail. In fact, despite access improvements between March and the end of August, the inflow of humanitarian supplies into Tigray was slow and hindered by barriers such as insecurity and bureaucracy.²⁸⁶ Additionally, critically low fuel supplies limited the scale of the response while interruptions of communications and electricity slowed down or stopped operations. Availability of commercial goods and services remains extremely limited due to disruption of trade routes.²⁸⁷ Since 24 August, with hostilities resumed in Tigray and along its borders, humanitarian assistance has stalled.²⁸⁸ In addition, concerns over severe levels of acute food insecurity in Amhara and Afar remain high due to continued insecurity and conflict, impeding humanitarian access.²⁸⁹

With drought conditions forecast to persist, already critical food-insecurity levels are likely to worsen. Overall, 9.9 million people are estimated to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) due to drought, mainly located in Somali, SNNPR, Oromia and Amhara.²⁹⁰ While IPC information is lacking, compatible analyses show life-threatening conditions (Emergency [IPC Phase 4 equivalent] or worse) are expected to be widespread by October, with the possibility that some people are already facing starvation and death (IPC Phase 5).²⁹¹ The number of severely acutely malnourished children admitted for treatment is at record high levels in 2022, compared to the last three years.^{292, 293} Moreover, due to protracted funding shortfalls, food assistance is likely to further reduce in the outlook period.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide support to individuals and communities affected by failed rainfall season, through: early-warning communication; fodder production/rangeland management; prepositioning; livestock treatment and vaccinations; investments for irrigable areas; access to multiple climate risk management support activities, including microinsurance schemes; insurance for pastoralists; savings and lending schemes; financial literacy; and small-scale entrepreneurial training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 1.684 billion for food security and livelihoods, USD 176.8 million for agriculture interventions, and USD 305.4 million for nutrition interventions.

- Prioritize and support drought and conflict-affected populations through life-sustaining food and nutrition assistance, including unconditional cash in areas where monitoring shows that markets are functional.
- Provide emergency crop and livestock support to agricultural households affected by conflict, drought and other hazards, in order to increase crop and livestock production, provide access to seeds and tools, and protect livestock health.
- Provide water-trucking interventions for domestic and livestock use, with distribution of water-storage tanks in drought-affected areas.
- Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, continue to implement the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme, and reinforce integration with WASH and health partners.
- Continue coordinated efforts on humanitarian access and leverage every opportunity to scale up food and nutrition assistance to people in worst-affected areas.
- Advocate for government commitments to allow relief agencies to acquire the goods and services necessary for humanitarian operations in the Tigray region.
- Advocate for and negotiate humanitarian access in cross-line, conflict-affected areas.

The Republic of Kenya

Key drivers of food insecurity: prolonged drought, rising food prices

The prolonged drought in eastern and northern Kenya is likely to further worsen, with another below-average rainy season forecast between October and December.²⁹⁴ This marks an unprecedented fifth poor rainy season, with cumulative effects from the previous four poor seasons.

The last March–May rainy season in the arid and semi-arid lands performed extremely poorly. As of late July, the drought affected between 25 and 85-plus percent of grassland,²⁹⁵ as pasture regeneration was impaired by the poor rainfall conditions. Livestock body conditions are currently poor due to limited pasture and water, while herd sizes have significantly declined as 2.4 million animals starved, and households have engaged in distress sales.²⁹⁶ In southeastern and coastal marginal areas, as of mid-July, up to 78-95 percent of cropland was affected by drought, rendering the prospects for cereal harvest unfavourable.²⁹⁷ For example, the production of maize, green grams and cowpeas is estimated to be 78-95 percent below the long-term average.²⁹⁸ Resource-based conflicts are also on the rise.²⁹⁹ Rising food prices are compounded

by increasing international commodity prices, as the country imports nearly 50 percent of its cereal requirements.³⁰⁰ Food inflation has been increasing steadily since March, reaching 15.3 percent year on year as of August.³⁰¹ Prices have increased even more in some areas. For example, in southeastern cluster and especially in Meru North and Embu counties, maize prices increased 80-90 percent compared to last year.³⁰²

Around 3.5 million people are estimated to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between July and September 2022, including around 785 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁰³ Between October and December 2022, food insecurity is expected to worsen, with 4.4 million people projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 1.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁰⁴ This represents an 84 percent increase compared to the same time last year. The GAM prevalence in seven counties with arid and semi-arid lands is above 15 percent; it exceeds the critical 30 percent threshold in three subcounties of Marsabit and Turkana counties.³⁰⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate early-warning information and advisories on risk-management actions, to lessen the impact of an anticipated fifth-consecutive failed rainfall season.
- Scale up availability and access to nutritious and diversified food.
- Scale up availability and access to water and livestock feeds.
- Resource mobilization needed to enhance capacity for effective restoration of livelihoods.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Scale up life-saving food and nutrition interventions (including cash-based assistance) to meet the immediate food needs of populations at high risk, and protect the livelihoods of those affected by the drought.
- Safeguard the livelihoods of farmers, pastoralists and agropastoralists, and support the quick recovery of seasonal food production and their self-reliance. Context-specific livelihood packages should be provided, consisting of cash, productive inputs and subsidies for basic productive services (e.g. tractor and irrigation hours).
- Support infrastructure rehabilitation, including water points and feeder roads.
- Support national social-protection systems, including Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme, to respond to the impacts of the drought on the most vulnerable categories of the population.
- Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce integration with WASH interventions and with health partners.
- Implement acute malnutrition prevention activities, especially in counties with high GAM prevalence (over 15 percent).

The Federal Republic of Somalia

Key drivers of food insecurity: severe and prolonged droughts, conflict, rising food prices

A further intensifying drought due to a likely fifth-consecutive poor rainy season, combined with high food prices and persistent conflict, is rapidly driving an extreme deprivation of food, with parts of Bay region likely to experience Famine and several other areas of central and southern Somalia projected to face an increased Risk of Famine between October and December, if humanitarian assistance is not sustained.

The current drought, already exceptionally prolonged as seasonal rains have been consecutively poor since late 2020,^{306,307} is likely to worsen in the coming months given a high probability of another below-average October–December *Deyr* season.³⁰⁸ This would amplify the dramatic effects of the previous poor rainy seasons. For example, the poor March–June 2022 *Gu*^{309,310,311,312} reduced cereal harvests by an estimated 50 percent compared to the 1995–2021 average in southern Somalia. Poor pasture conditions and water scarcity also led to over 3 million livestock deaths since mid-2021.^{313,314} Reduced availability of food, water and pasture has also triggered the displacement of 857 000 people this year alone.³¹⁵ Consecutive failed local harvests and reduced supply from neighbouring countries due to the regional nature of the drought compound the effects of the sharp increase in global food and fuel prices, as the country imports over 90 percent of its cereal requirements. This has resulted in sorghum, maize and wheat prices reaching near-record to record levels in July, beyond the reach of most poor households who depend heavily on market purchases to access food.^{316,317} Conflict and insecurity also continue to disrupt market access and functionality, and impede access to livelihoods and humanitarian assistance, particularly in central and southern areas where food insecurity is spiking.^{318,319,320}

Some 6.7 million people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between October and December 2022, including 2.2 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and at least 300 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).³²¹

The IPC Famine Review Committee confirms that the thresholds for Famine will most likely be breached between October and December among rural residents in Baidoa and Burhakaba districts and displaced people in Baidoa town of Bay region.³²² Several other areas in central and southern Somalia also face a Risk of Famine should the performance of the next rainy season be worse than currently forecast and humanitarian assistance does not reach the most vulnerable populations.

Country-wide, admissions for severe and moderate acute malnutrition continue to be at an all-time high compared to the previous three years.³²³ The recent post-*Gu* assessment found that the majority of surveyed population groups had a GAM prevalence exceeding 15 percent, with the highest rates amongst Mogadishu IDPs (26.6 percent), Baidoa IDPs (28.6 percent), and in agropastoral areas of Baidoa and Burhakaba districts (24.9 percent). Crude death rates and/or death rates for children under 5 years of age met emergency thresholds for several groups in Bay region, as well as amongst Shabelle riverine and agropastoral groups.³²⁴ A failed rainfall season in late 2022 would leave no prospects for recovery until at least the start of the next rainfall season in April 2023. Consequently humanitarian needs are expected to remain high well into 2023.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Enhance the expansion of the national social safety net (Baxnaano), to protect more vulnerable people from further livelihood losses, food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement. Expansion of the safety net to cover both rural and urban populations. This is in anticipation of a potential fifth-consecutive failed rainfall season that will exacerbate the current drought situation.
- Support social protection and humanitarian programming to avert loss of livelihoods and asset depletion through sustainable long-term livelihood programming.
- Build social cohesion to reduce tension over access to dwindling common resources such as water (for human and livestock) and pasture.
- Negotiate for increasing access in hard-to-reach areas through an enhanced access strategy and strategic partnership with humanitarian actors and key stakeholders.
- Scale up gender and nutrition sensitive programming.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 624.4 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 178.8 million for nutrition interventions. In response to years of back-to-back drought, an interagency June–December 2022 Somalia Drought Response and Famine Prevention Plan calls for an additional USD 610 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 60 million for nutrition interventions. The System Wide Scaling Up protocol was activated mid-August 2022.

- Scale up integrated lifesaving emergency food, cash+ emergency livelihoods, health, WASH and nutrition services through more proactive approaches, including mobile health and nutrition services in hotspot districts. Vulnerable rural communities whose livelihoods have been devastated by the drought and facing a water crisis should also be targeted to stem the increasing levels of drought-induced displacement.
- Expand delivery of life-saving food and nutrition assistance to populations living in hard-to-reach areas and areas that have remained inaccessible so far, through implementation of rapid response mechanism.
- Continue scaling up life-saving emergency responses through unconditional food and cash-based transfers to vulnerable populations, prioritizing assistance in areas that have experienced significant influxes of newly displaced populations to avoid large-scale loss of life, and populations exhibiting acute food insecurity and who are at risk of Emergency or Catastrophe levels of food insecurity (IPC Phases 4 and 5) with focus on marginalized populations and minority groups.
- Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce integration with WASH interventions and with health partners.
- Support the Government of Somalia, through the Ministry of Labour and Social and Affairs in scaling up its shock response efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the affected people. This involves leveraging the shock-response delivery systems of the Safety Net for Human Capital Development Project, for the delivery of cash-based humanitarian assistance.
- Augment logistics coordination and services, and in particular, the transportation capacity of government and partners to deliver urgent humanitarian assistance into and within Somalia, especially to rural areas.
- Maintain and scale up school meals programmes to keep children in schools, improve girls' enrolment and learning outcomes, improve health and nutritional status and provide a safety net for vulnerable households and mitigate the worst impacts of the drought.

The Republic of South Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: flooding, macroeconomic challenges, subnational conflict

Four consecutive years of flooding, macroeconomic challenges and prolonged conflict drive extreme acute food insecurity. Intercommunal and subnational violence have increased slightly compared to the first quarter of 2022, mostly in Upper Nile, Unity, Warrap and Jonglei states. The total IDP population has reached around 2.2 million people, up from 1.71 million in August 2021.^{325, 326, 327} The compromise between parties to the peace agreement to extend the transitional period by 24 months reduces the threat of widescale conflict. However, insecurity may deteriorate following the United States of America's decision to withdraw from the peace process.³²⁸

Food prices remain very high and volatile, severely constraining food access.³²⁹ Nationally, June prices of maize and sorghum were almost 90 percent higher than a year ago.³³⁰ Contributing factors include insufficient cereal supplies, low foreign-currency reserves, a weak national currency and high fuel prices.³³¹ As the country heavily relies on food and fuel imports, high international prices may further constrain food access and increase production costs.³³²

In the southern bimodal areas of western, central and eastern Equatoria, the first season (March–June) rains were slightly below average.^{333, 334} As of early August, rainfall has generally been below average in the central and northern areas of Unity, Warrap and Lakes states, causing crop-water stress.³³⁵ Forecasts indicate above-average rains for the remainder of the season

(August–October), particularly in Nile and Jonglei states, which may improve crop conditions but could also increase flooding.^{336, 337, 338}

Recent flooding in South Sudan was assessed in late June 2022 as the worst on record.³³⁹

From April to July, 7.74 million people, almost two-thirds of the total population, faced Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above), including 2.89 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 87 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).³⁴⁰ This represents an 8 percent increase in the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) compared to a year ago.³⁴¹ Malnutrition remains a concern, as GAM levels were recently found to be at or above the 15 percent emergency threshold in six assessed areas. Severe acute malnutrition admissions since January are also higher than the past three years.^{342, 343}

Seasonal improvement in food security during the harvest period is expected to be lower than usual, especially in flood-affected areas. Below-average rains in several areas are also likely to affect crop yields and reduce harvests.³⁴⁴ In parallel, increasing funding shortfalls and rising operational costs have reduced food assistance.

Humanitarian access constraints remain very high.³⁴⁵ Access to people in need has deteriorated due to interferences, insecurity and the presence of checkpoints.³⁴⁶ The highest number of aid workers killed globally in the first half of 2022 was in South Sudan.³⁴⁷

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate last-mile, tailored early-warning information and advisories on how to protect lives and livelihoods ahead of a flood.
- Distribute flood-proof storage systems to protect valuables and agricultural assets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 650 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 230 million for nutrition interventions.

- Scale up unconditional food and cash transfers and emergency livelihood assistance to vulnerable populations, returnees and IDPs, particularly women and children, in areas with populations in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phases 4 and 5).
- Scale up nutrition assistance to women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, and reinforce integration with WASH, health and protection partners (including prevention of gender-based violence).
- Scale up multisector humanitarian assistance in all locations in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phases 4 and 5), complemented by effective nutrition, WASH and health services.
- Advocate for, and negotiate, humanitarian access in conflict-affected areas; this should include unimpeded supply corridors for the movement of essential goods and personnel, allowing civilians to receive humanitarian assistance and services, and aid agencies to operate freely and safely.

Southern Africa

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, below-average rainfall

The ongoing deterioration of the security situation in the eastern provinces is likely to drive new displacements in the outlook period, with impacts on acute food insecurity. This is likely to compound rainfall deficits during the 2022 March–June season in northeastern provinces, while a below-average rainfall is forecast for the upcoming September–March season in the southeast.^{348, 349}

The conflict in North Kivu and Ituri provinces has further intensified. This is due to NSAGs operations in Rutshuru and Beni territories in North Kivu, and Djugu and Irumu in Ituri, which have stretched the capacity of humanitarian operations due to increased needs, including 160 000 newly displaced persons on top of 6 million existing IDPs.^{350, 351, 352} Meanwhile, large offensives by the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regional militaries have failed to curtail NSAGs attacks, pushing fighters into new areas as they avoid showdowns.^{353, 354, 355} This has resulted in new displacements. Moreover, the region suffers from very high access constraints, due to the proliferation of explosives and frequent attacks on humanitarian workers.³⁵⁶

In northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which accounts for about 18 percent of national maize production, rainfall deficits of

up to 30 percent in March–June led to lower harvests in June–July.³⁵⁷ The forecast for the September–December season also indicates below-average rainfall. In unimodal areas of southern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Katanga, which accounts for up to 21 percent of national maize production, below-average rainfall is expected in September–March.³⁵⁸

The latest IPC analysis, from September 2021, projected that 25.9 million people – 25 percent of the population analysed – faced Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) from January to June 2022, including 5.4 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁵⁹ While this marks a slight improvement from 27.3 million for the same period in 2021, it does not fully consider the impact of conflict and below-average rainfall, which is likely to increase acute food insecurity in eastern, northeastern and southeastern provinces.

A negative outlook is also likely for acute malnutrition, especially in conflict-affected areas. GAM prevalence exceeds 10 percent in several zones of Kwango, Tshuapa, Sud Kivu and Ituri.³⁶⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Preposition agricultural stocks in strategic locations, to provide rapid support to households impacted by new episodes of conflict.
- Provide cash+ livelihoods assistance to vulnerable, rural households in conflict-affected regions, as a means of mitigating a potential deterioration in food security.
- Prepare a prioritization plan to respond to acute food insecurity, following preliminary IPC results which indicate that the food-insecurity situation in the country remains same as the prior period.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo Emergency Response Plan 2022 calls for USD 764.8 million for food security, and USD 258.6 million for nutrition interventions. At 33 percent funded as of mid-August, organizations are unable to deliver the level of coverage required to ease and mitigate hunger and malnutrition.
- Sustain and adapt conflict-sensitive approaches, to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance that can save the lives and livelihoods of people projected to face acute food insecurity in 2022.
 - Scale up agriculture-based emergency livelihood activities targeting the most vulnerable, food-insecure households.
 - Scale up nutritional-support interventions, including treatment of acute malnutrition and malnutrition prevention.
 - Maintain wasting treatment and scale up wasting-prevention activities, especially in the most food-insecure areas.

The Republic of Madagascar

Key drivers of food insecurity: drought and cyclones, low food supplies, high food prices

Low food supplies, due to consecutive droughts and cyclones, and high food prices continue to drive acute food insecurity in the outlook period.

Multiple, consecutive years of drought have cumulated in a very tight food supply for rural households in the Grand Sud, and curbed incomes from crops. The impact of successive cyclones and tropical storms, which predominantly affected eastern and southeastern areas, also caused extensive losses and damage to food and cash crops. There are serious concerns that rural households will exhaust their own production supplies earlier than normal in affected areas, and adopt negative coping strategies to meet consumption needs in the outlook period. In addition, forecasts point to another below-average rainfall season in 2022/23 (November–March) in southern areas, risking a fourth-successive poor harvest.

Moreover, food prices are expected to increase seasonally by the end of 2022 – trends that are likely to be amplified by elevated global commodity prices and a depreciation of the currency in mid-2022.

Furthermore, elevated global energy prices are likely to amplify inflationary pressure. Consequently, and amid existing high rates of poverty, households' access to food is expected to be severely constrained by the end of year, and a key driver of an anticipated deterioration in acute food insecurity.

According to the latest IPC figures, an estimated 1.94 million people are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in Grand Sud and southeast regions between September and November 2022.³⁶¹ This number is projected at 2.1 million people between December 2022 and March 2023. The number of people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), in the Grand Sud, is projected to decline; this reflects the results of humanitarian assistance and support to farming households which is expected to have contributed to keeping agricultural production in 2022 at near-average levels in the targeted areas.³⁶² Concurrently, some improvements can be seen in the malnutrition rates. Malnutrition screening results of the second trimester showed a proxy GAM of 7.7 percent, lower than the rates in the same period last year, with no district in emergency.³⁶³

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Increase the number of water points and improve the management of permanent water points, for the installation of market gardening as well as irrigated crops and seed-production plots.
- Support farming households with inputs and tools to cultivate short-cycle and drought-tolerant crop varieties and market gardening kits for rapid food production. This can mitigate the impact on food insecurity of rainfall deficits during the main agricultural season and of expected increases in food prices.
- Provide livestock keepers with animal-health support to reduce drought-induced mortality and morbidity, such as vaccination kits and treatments. Disseminate early-warning information for drought-risk awareness, and strengthen coordination and technology for a strong early-warning system for drought areas. Provide rations for children's nutrient products (nutrition/prevention).
- Preposition food and adapted seeds in strategic locations in the southern and southeast regions, to provide rapid responses to populations affected by drought and cyclones/flooding.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Increase unconditional cash transfers for vulnerable individuals, as a short-term income supplement to meet their immediate food, nutrition and other needs, while protecting and supporting livelihood early recovery.
- Provide nutritional support to prevent acute malnutrition prevention among pregnant and lactating women and children under 5 years of age, and to manage cases of moderate acute malnutrition among children.

The Republic of Malawi

Key drivers of food insecurity: low food stocks, currency depreciation, below-average rainfall, food and fuel inflation, rising input costs, projected economic slowdown

Acute food insecurity – mainly driven by rising food, fuel and fertilizer prices, and low household food stocks – is expected to worsen significantly in the outlook period, which coincides with the lean season.

Malawi's headline inflation rate has been steadily increasing since 2021; in June, it surpassed 20 percent, the second highest in the region.³⁶⁴ Food inflation is rising due to the devaluation of the local currency.³⁶⁵ The national average price of maize has doubled in the 12 months to June 2022, underpinned by reduced output in 2022.³⁶⁶ In May, the price of the food basket increased, year on year, by 55 percent, while fuel prices increased year on year by almost 50 percent.³⁶⁷ In May, fertilizer prices were already 130-160 percent higher than in 2020.³⁶⁸

In the southern region, where food stocks already ran out in August, rather than the usual October, farming households already rely on markets to access food.³⁶⁹ High fertilizer prices are likely to influence planting decisions. Combined with forecasted below-average rains, this could result in smaller planted areas, lower demand

for agricultural labour and a reduction in cereal production in the upcoming agricultural season (October 2022–March 2023).³⁷⁰

Irrigated production is expected to be below average, owing to the possible decrease in residual moisture and low uptake of agricultural inputs due to their high cost. This will increase the production cost of irrigated crops during the next agricultural season and might reduce productivity. The recent outbreak of the new serotype O of foot and mouth disease is likely to further reduce livestock-related income.³⁷¹ Together with a projected slowdown in economic growth, these factors are expected to deplete coping mechanisms and worsen households' ability to purchase staple foods; this in turn could trigger a rapid deterioration of household food security conditions.³⁷²

Between October 2022 and March 2023, 3.8 million people are expected to face Crisis levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3) – an increase from 9 to 20 percent of the total population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), compared to last year.³⁷³

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Strengthen the productive capacity of farming households for the main agricultural season, through provision of inputs and extension support, particularly in areas where an increased risk of high prices or scarcity of inputs and climatic hazards could affect rural agricultural livelihoods.
- Facilitate operational support for the functioning of the different surveillance systems in place.
- Provide livestock support to mitigate disease-induced mortality and morbidity (foot and mouth disease and other prevalent animal diseases), such as vaccination kits and treatments.
- Increase water harvesting and storage, and set up new micro-irrigation systems, to support the most vulnerable farmers in cultivating crops during periods when dry spells occur.
- Mount campaigns to promote dietary diversification among communities, to improve poor food-consumption patterns.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Prioritize humanitarian response to the upcoming 2022/23 lean season with a focus on cash transfers and in-kind support for urban and rural households facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
- Urgently advocate for resources to provide unconditional transfers to refugees impacted by rising food prices.
- Work with other social protection stakeholders to decide on vertical expansion (top-ups) in areas with the ongoing government-led Social Cash Transfer Programme, to reduce vulnerability; this should be in addition to adding new caseloads (horizontal expansion).
- Provision of livelihoods support in the areas most affected by food insecurity, providing complementary input packages to those provided by the Government of Malawi through the Agriculture Input Programme.

The Republic of Zimbabwe

Key drivers of food insecurity: food inflation, macroeconomic challenges, localized dry conditions

Persistent economic challenges, high food and fuel prices, and the impact of localized dry conditions on 2022 crop production are expected to worsen acute food insecurity conditions during the outlook period.

Continued currency depreciation has contributed to a steep rise in annual inflation rates, significantly eroding households' purchasing power and constraining their economic access to food. Furthermore, elevated global prices of essential commodities including cereals and fuel – which were pushed sharply higher by the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine – have both amplified inflationary pressures and increased the country's import bill; this is straining the finances of a country in debt distress. In July, the annual food-inflation rate exceeded 300 percent.³⁷⁴ In response, the central bank increased the benchmark interest rate to 200 percent – the highest in the world – and reintroduced US dollars as a legal tender and gold coins as a store of value.³⁷⁵ Macroeconomic challenges also remain a risk to households' incomes and livelihoods. The sharp depreciation of

the currency, combined with increased interest rates, could make it more costly for businesses to operate, impacting investment and consumption prospects.³⁷⁶

Below-average rainfall during the 2021/22 agricultural season resulted in a decline in cereal production, reducing farming households' own food supplies and their incomes.³⁷⁷ Production prospects for the forthcoming 2022/23 season are being constrained by elevated prices of agricultural inputs. Coupled with fertilizer shortages, this could result in a reduced planted area and lower crop yields.³⁷⁸

During the upcoming peak lean season (January–March 2023), an estimated 3.8 million people are projected to face acute food insecurity, based on the government's assessment – a deterioration of 29.8 percent compared to last year.³⁷⁹ This figure is likely to rise further, due to the abrupt decrease in the value of the national currency and persistent macroeconomic challenges.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Protect agricultural livelihoods from forecasted dry periods, through the installation or rehabilitation of water-harvesting systems. Set up temporary water points for livestock.
- Promote drought-tolerant crops and drought-sensitive farming practices.
- Support the provision of key agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizers) to smallholder farmers, in preparation for the 2022/23 cropping season.
- Increase supplemental feeding stock, for improved nutrition.
- Preposition food commodities in hard-to-reach, remote districts and close to flood-prone areas, to facilitate timely delivery of unconditional assistance.
- Promote communities' access to early-warning and climate information through enhanced collaboration with national and subnational government departments and active participation in existing coordination structures.
- Scale up training and awareness on conservation agriculture (*Pfumvudza*) practices, in order to minimize crop losses during dry spells in the upcoming season.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance for people facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above).
- Maintain and bolster analysis and monitoring systems to track price fluctuations and other indicators of economic instability, in order to inform both preventative action and response programming.
- Sustain and scale up livelihood, food and nutrition assistance, both in rural and urban areas.
- Sustain and support analysis and monitoring systems to track price fluctuations and other indicators of economic instability, to inform anticipatory action as well as response programming.
- Strengthen interventions to minimize post-harvest losses and conserve the potentially reduced harvest.

Near East, North Africa and Europe

The Republic of the Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: inflation, conflict and intercommunal violence, floods

Economic decline and rising food prices, coupled with tight supplies, increasing intercommunal violence and conflict as well as floods, are driving a significant deterioration in acute food insecurity, amid very high and increasing humanitarian access constraints.³⁸⁰

The economic situation is expected to further worsen, amid political instability and the suspension of international financial assistance, which has exacerbated shortages of foreign-exchange reserves. The local currency has plummeted by 22 percent since January 2022, and rising fuel and food shortages have boosted inflation. By June 2022, year-on-year prices of cereals had nearly tripled, and ripple effects of the war in Ukraine had contributed to increasing fuel and already-rising fertilizer prices.^{381, 382}

As forecasted, the June–September rains have been above average, benefiting crop yields. However, the abundant rains triggered floods that affected 146 000 people; these were mainly in the Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan regions and in River Nile, White Nile and Khartoum states, resulting in localized crop losses. Macroeconomic challenges and high production costs are likely to affect yields and keep food prices 400-500 percent above the five-year average through the beginning of 2023.³⁸³

Conflict or intercommunal violence is likely to further worsen, mainly in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, amid political deadlock.^{384, 385, 386, 387} The number of IDPs, estimated at 3.2 million, is expected to increase.³⁸⁸

Between October 2022 and February 2023 – coinciding with the post-harvest period – 7.7 million people are expected to be facing Crisis or worse levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above); an increase of almost 2 million people compared to last year.³⁸⁹ Beyond the outlook period, numbers are likely to further increase significantly as the lean season approaches. Throughout 2023, food insecurity could worsen compared to 2022 when 11.7 million people were expected to be in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and September.^{390, 391}

Without additional funding for the humanitarian response, the number of people targeted for food assistance will likely reduce from October onwards.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Scale up cash-for-work activities (including rehabilitation of dykes and flood barriers, and clearing of canals) and the distribution of unconditional cash for the most vulnerable households at high risk of flooding, especially in low-lying and riverine areas alongside the River Nile and its tributaries.
- To protect agricultural assets and valuables, distribute flood-proof storage systems to the most vulnerable, including IDPs and refugees. If an early-warning threshold has been surpassed, share early-warning messages, including agricultural advice ahead of a likely flood event.
- Disseminate flood early-warning information before subsequent flooding events.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2022 HRP calls for USD 708.3 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 160 million for nutrition interventions.

- Continue life-saving support to the most vulnerable population as identified by relevant food-security assessments.
- Provide host communities with inputs to boost their agricultural livelihoods and food assistance, through in-kind cash and cash transfers.
- Sustain life-saving assistance to IDPs and refugees who have fled into the Sudan from Ethiopia's Tigray and Benishangul-Gumuz regions.
- Provide comprehensive food security and nutrition programming in vulnerable areas, especially in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where humanitarian access is possible for the first time in ten years.
- Provide unconditional cash to farmers affected by the below-average March 2022 wheat harvest, ensuring they have the capacity to continue agricultural activities in the next season.
- Provide livestock supply and services to vulnerable pastoralists and agropastoralists from October to December.
- Provide comprehensive food security and nutrition programming in vulnerable areas, in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, where humanitarian access is possible for the first time in ten years.
- Implement the newly started the Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Project with the provision of cash and food transfers to more than 2 million people, including IDPs and residents, across the Sudan.

The Syrian Arab Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: protracted economic crisis, erratic rainfall patterns, decreased agricultural production, conflict

Despite a substantial cooling of the conflict, over the last two years the humanitarian crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic has been driven by the deteriorating economic environment, including weather anomalies and drought-like conditions which constrained 2022 agricultural production.^{392, 393} Such factors are exacerbated over the outlook period by further diminishing domestic agricultural production caused by structural lack of inputs and forecast rainfall deficits, particularly towards the end of the outlook period.

Already feeble macroeconomic conditions have deteriorated at an accelerated pace since the start of the war in Ukraine and are likely to deteriorate further over the outlook period. The Syrian pound has lost 20 percent of its value since February.³⁹⁴ Currency depreciation, coupled with increased international food and energy prices, has boosted inflation of essential items, with food recording a 93 percent increase year on year in June.³⁹⁵

In the 2021/22 season, the Syrian Arab Republic had low rainfall and dry spells, which constrained crop yields for the second consecutive season, amid expensive inputs including fuel to operate irrigation pumps. This resulted in a further decline of cereal harvest, which was completed in late July.³⁹⁶

The large fuel deficit increased production and transportation costs. Long-term weather forecasts for the 2022 growing season – winter cereals to be planted from November onwards – indicate additional rainfall deficits.

Risks of humanitarian disruption are particularly acute in northern Syrian Arab Republic, where the United Nations mandate for cross-border aid from Türkiye has been reduced to six months by the Security Council.³⁹⁷ A resumption of conflict in northern Syrian Arab Republic is possible, which would lead to significant new population displacements.^{398, 399}

In the face of dramatically increasing humanitarian needs, funding has been stagnating, impairing humanitarian organizations' ability to increase the number of beneficiaries.⁴⁰⁰ At the same time, humanitarian access is highly constrained.⁴⁰¹ Without additional funding, the number of people targeted for food assistance will likely reduce from October onwards. As a result, deteriorating economic conditions, coupled with diminishing agricultural production, are likely to worsen the conditions of over 12 million Syrians estimated to be food insecure in late 2021, as determined based on WFP's CARI methodology.⁴⁰²

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide vulnerable and affected farmers (particularly those affected by two consecutive drought-like seasons) with agricultural-production inputs (certified wheat seeds and fertilizers).
- Provide farmers with cash assistance to prepare their fields for planting and other operational costs (irrigation, harvesting, labour and transportation).
- Provide special training on climate-smart agriculture and the sustainable use of natural resources.
- Rehabilitate irrigation systems and wells in strategic agriculture locations, and introduce solar panels especially for collective irrigation, to guarantee power where fuel is expensive or unavailable.
- Provide rainwater-harvesting systems and the development of the use of non-conventional water (treated water), coupled with improved soil management and crop management through improved selection of crop species and planting dates.
- Support the maintenance of agricultural drainage systems in public irrigation areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- The 2022–2023 HRP calls for USD 1.7 billion for food security and agriculture, USD 247.6 million for early recovery and agriculture, and USD 124.1 million for nutrition interventions.
- Continue the provision of in-kind food assistance to food-insecure families across the country and increase hybrid cash assistance to the most vulnerable among them, to support their eroded purchasing power.
 - Increase crossline food delivery into the northwest, to complement cross-border modalities.
 - Provide animal feed, concentrated feed, animal fodder seeds, artificial insemination for the re-establishment of herds, and veterinary services against parasites and viral and transboundary diseases, combined with capacity building on good rearing and livestock production practices to support already-vulnerable livestock owners facing harsh, drought-like conditions.
 - Provide timely multipurpose cash assistance to enhance agricultural production, with productive inputs and assets like poultry, small animals or seeds to quickly restore household food production.
 - Support agriculture-based livelihoods, as well as food processing, in order to enhance food stocks and food security for rural households.

The Republic of Yemen

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic crisis, conflict

Although the food security outlook in Yemen is unlikely to be as grim as previously projected, acute food insecurity remains at critical levels. The economic crisis persists, while improvements in access might be reversed as the ongoing truce remains fragile.

The economic crisis is likely to last due to continued political instability, lack of external revenues, and elevated global commodity prices. These factors compound the depletion of foreign-exchange reserves, which underpins elevated currency volatility – particularly in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government.⁴⁰³ Ultimately this affects the country's capacity to import essential items. The weak currency and global increases of the cost of food led to a severe increase in local prices, as Yemen has a high dependency on imports. Annual increases of 74 percent for the minimum food basket, in areas controlled by the Internationally Recognized Government, and 38 percent in areas controlled by Sana'a-based authorities, severely cut households' purchasing power; this was often exacerbated by the absence of regular salaries.

Early this year, critical levels of acute food insecurity were estimated as likely to deteriorate severely from June until the end of 2022. In fact, according to IPC analysis released in March 2022, over 19 million people were expected to experience acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) between June and December 2022 – including 7.1 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 161 000 in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).⁴⁰⁴

Of greatest concern were 161 000 people expected to reach Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) between June and December 2022, and a Risk of Famine in the districts of Abs and Hayran in Hajjah governorate, under a worst-case scenario.⁴⁰⁵

These projections were based on assumptions that humanitarian assistance would significantly reduce due to insufficient funding, conflict would intensify and domestic economic decline would deepen. Some assumptions were disproven: the conflict in Yemen eased considerably after parties agreed on a truce from April, which was extended until October.⁴⁰⁶ At the same time, funding for food assistance slightly improved and major cuts in the number of beneficiaries were prevented. In light of this changing context, the IPC analysis is being updated and the outlook on food-insecurity levels is expected to be less grim.

Even as the truce is likely to further mitigate conflict, expected economic repercussions at the household level – including increased availability of fuel, improved human capital mobility and better access to goods and services – are yet to manifest fully.⁴⁰⁷ Moreover, access constraints were extreme as of July 2022. Access has improved in some critical areas but the truce is fragile; the ability of humanitarian actors to prevent catastrophic conditions remains at risk.⁴⁰⁸ Finally, the rising cost of operations, and protracted funding shortfalls, might reduce current levels of food assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Provide seeds and agricultural inputs to vulnerable smallholder farmers ahead of the wheat planting season in December to mitigate the impact of constrained import of wheat.
- Provide conditional cash and/or food assistance to vulnerable households affected by the economic crisis to help jumpstart income-generating activities and mitigate the impact of increasing food and fuel prices.
- Provide actionable timely information to humanitarian stakeholders and governmental institutions by monitoring climatic shocks through flood and drought forecasts (erratic rain patterns).
- Provide crop and livestock inputs to support sustainable intensification of production systems and contribute to reducing the risks of rural population in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) sliding into Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Yemen HRP calls for USD 2.1 billion for food security and agriculture sector and USD 442.9 million for the nutrition sector. A total USD 888.3 million was received for agriculture (42 percent of appeal) and USD 97 million for nutrition (22 percent).

- Provide unconditional food and cash transfers and implement cash-for-work activities to mitigate the impact of food-price inflation on the most vulnerable people.
- Expand nutrition interventions for children under 5 years of age, pregnant and lactating women, and schoolchildren in areas where prevalence of acute malnutrition is a major concern (GAM prevalence above 10 percent).
- Improve access to livelihood opportunities and rehabilitate food security assets and infrastructure in areas with high levels of food insecurity.
- Continue to provide fuel to health centres and local WASH facilities through the Bilateral Service Provision activity.
- Provide key farming inputs to the most food-insecure farmers, including crop and vegetable seeds, agricultural tools, and irrigation equipment such as solar water pumps, drip irrigation and water tanks to overcome the high cost and scarcity of fuel.
- Increase resilience of livestock owners by providing animal feed, fodder seeds and feeding equipment to increase animal production and productivity and cash value.
- Provide conditional and season-specific cash transfers (adopting cash-for-work methodology) to rehabilitate community water assets and infrastructure.
- Support livelihood assets restoration and assistance to help establish microbusinesses, and support skills training to enhancing employability.
- Conduct a countrywide beneficiary retargeting, registration and prioritization exercise, to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches the most vulnerable amid limited funding.

Glossary

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration. The IPC Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five Phases of severity, ranging from IPC Phase 1, corresponding to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene.

Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food security refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption required for an active and healthy life.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

(For further details, please see http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Factsheet_2020.pdf.)

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multi-dimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

(For further details, please see <http://ecoagris.cilss.int/index.php/analyse-cadre-harmonise/>.)

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households either have large food-consumption gaps – which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or are able to mitigate large food-consumption gaps by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Households face critical levels of acute food insecurity/critical acute food insecurity. Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death.

Catastrophe – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households face an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. Urgent, immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC Phase 5).

Famine – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity scale. Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households has, or is most likely to have, an extreme deprivation of food and face starvation, death, destitution. Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition (at least 30 percent of children malnourished) and significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (at least 1 person for every 5 000 dies each day), are occurring. Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Famine Likely – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine Likely is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale (Phase 5), used to classify situations when Famine is likely occurring. If there is insufficient data for Famine classification, usually because either nutrition or mortality data are lacking, but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the Famine classification is called Famine Likely. Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe; the only difference is the amount of reliable evidence available to support the statement.

Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most-likely scenario, it is a worst-case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being; and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

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Within the Global Network's approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

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