



**WFP EVALUATION**



**World Food Programme**

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# **Evaluation of Afghanistan WFP Country Strategic Plan 2018-2022**

Centralized evaluation report

OEV/2020/024  
Office of Evaluation

**May 2022**

# Acknowledgements

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# Disclaimer

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**This evaluation covers the Afghanistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022) with the data collection conducted in April-May 2021. The findings, conclusions and recommendations were developed before the Taliban consolidated control over Afghanistan in August 2021. Therefore, these recommendations are expected to be implemented in a flexible manner, depending on the evolution of the situation and taking into account prevailing restrictions on building national capacity and systems. The timeframe for addressing some of the recommendations will be revisited as needed. All references to “the Government” in the report relate to the Government in place until early August 2021.**

# Photocredits

Cover photo: WFP/Sadeq Naseri

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# Executive Summary

## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation features

1. The evaluation of the WFP country strategic plan (CSP) for Afghanistan for 2018–2022 covered the period from July 2018 to December 2020. In order to assess the extent of the expected strategic shifts, it also considered WFP operations from 2016 onwards. The evaluation assessed WFP's strategic positioning, contributions to the CSP strategic outcomes, efficiency and factors explaining WFP's performance. The evaluation served the dual purpose of accountability and learning and was originally timed to inform the development of the next CSP. The evaluation was conducted by an independent external team, with fieldwork undertaken from mid-April to early May 2021.
2. The evaluation used a gender-sensitive approach and mixed methods drawing on secondary data; 85 key informant interviews; 20 focus-group discussions, an e-survey and direct observation during site visits to Herat, Mazar, Kandahar and Samangan. The evaluators sought the perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders, including WFP staff in the field, the country office, the regional bureau and headquarters, cooperating partners (CPs), government counterparts, donors and approximately 450 beneficiaries. To mitigate the challenges resulting from travel restrictions imposed in response to the coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the highly constraining security situation, a hybrid approach involving in-country and remote data collection was adopted. Information was triangulated across various sources to validate the findings presented in the report.

### Context









3. In 2020 the Afghan population was estimated at 38.9 million.<sup>1</sup> The country has experienced rapid urbanization, fuelled in part by conflict and climate change. A low-income country, Afghanistan ranked 169<sup>th</sup> of 189 countries in the 2020 Human Development Index.<sup>2</sup>
4. Afghanistan is affected by a long legacy of conflict. The year 2014 was a pivotal one, marking the end of the United Nations authorized International Security Assistance Force operation and the start of the so-called "Transition Decade". The political, socioeconomic, and security landscape has shifted dramatically since 2020. Following the withdrawal of troops of the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most recent leadership transitions in the country are leading to very uncertain times.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> World Bank DataBank. 2020. [Population, total – Afghanistan](#).

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Development Programme. 2020. [Human Development Report 2020. The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene](#).

<sup>3</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2021. [Flash Appeal: Afghanistan Immediate Humanitarian Response Needs \(September–December 2021\)](#).

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	Indicator	Value	Year
	Total population (million)	38.9	2020
	GDP per capita (current USD)	516.8	2020
	Share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP) (%)	27.0	2020
	Human Development Index (score)	0.511	2019
	Multidimensional poverty headcount ratio (% of total population)	49.4	2020
	Height-for-age (stunting – moderate and severe) (% of children ages 0-4)	38.2	2018
	Gender Inequality Index (score)	0.655	2019
	Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) (modelled ILO estimate)	47.1	2020

Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, Human Development Report 2020, United Nations Children’s Fund.

5. Food insecurity remains alarmingly high owing to continuing conflict, widespread unemployment and price hikes, all exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Women are hit the hardest,<sup>4</sup> with their already minimal purchasing power decreasing further and poor shelter leaving them unable to cope with harsh winters.
6. According to the 2020 Global Nutrition Report, 38.2 percent of Afghan children under 5 were stunted in 2018. An estimated 3.7 million children were out of school, of which from 60 percent to 75 percent were girls.
7. Social norms are highly gendered, leading to gender inequality in all spheres of society. The population is exposed to high protection risks, including a high level of violence.
8. Afghanistan continues to be one of the top countries of origin for refugees; most are hosted in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The combination of internal displacement and large-scale return of Afghan refugees in recent years in the context of difficult economic and security conditions continues to pose risks for all affected, including host communities.

#### WFP country strategic plan for Afghanistan


9. The goal of the CSP was to support Afghanistan in its efforts to achieve zero hunger by 2030 in a manner that contributes to a broader long-term transition to peace and development. Mainstreaming the cross-cutting issues of gender equality and women’s empowerment and protection and accountability to affected populations (AAP), the CSP focused on six interrelated strategic outcomes (figure 1).
10. The CSP envisaged three strategic shifts: sustainable solutions in strategic areas, emphasizing emergency response and resilient livelihoods and complementing the treatment of malnutrition with prevention; transformational links in strategic results; and comprehensive nationally led framing of all strategic results.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> REACH Initiative. 2020. [Whole of Afghanistan Assessment \(WoAA\) 2020: Multisectoral and Sectoral Factsheet Booklet – August–September 2020](#).

<sup>5</sup> [“Afghanistan country strategic plan \(2018-2022\)”](#) (WFP/EB.A/2018/8-A/1).



**Figure 1: WFP Afghanistan CSP strategic outcomes and financial resources (as of May 2021)**




\* The needs-based plan budget percentages by strategic outcome have been calculated at the total budget level (USD 1,037.4 million), including direct and indirect support costs. Direct support costs represented 8 percent of the needs-based plan of the fourth CSP revision and 9 percent of the original needs-based plan. Indirect support costs accounted for 6 percent of the needs-based plan of the fourth CSP revision and 6 percent of the original needs-based plan.

\*\* Allocated resources by strategic outcome total less than USD 699 million because they do not include direct support costs (USD 40.9 million), indirect support costs (USD 37.96 million) nor resources allocated to operational costs but not to a specific strategic outcome or activity (USD 2.6 million).

- The CSP had an original budget of USD 717.8 million, which increased to over USD 1.037 billion following four CSP revisions. As of May 2021, the CSP was 67 percent funded, with a funding shortfall of USD 338 million.<sup>6</sup>
- The CSP was implemented in extremely challenging circumstances marked by severe drought, escalating conflict and violence leading to increased displacement, and the COVID-19 pandemic (see figure 2).

<sup>6</sup> Two subsequent CSP revisions were approved in late 2021 and January 2022 to extend the CSP until December 2023 and increase the budget to USD 1.6 billion to address the acute food security crisis. See [Afghanistan Country Strategic Plan \(2018-2023\)](#)

**Figure 2: Timeline of Afghanistan country context and significant WFP interventions**



Source: Particip GmbH (June 2021).

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### To what extent are WFP's strategic position, role and specific contributions based on country priorities, people's needs and WFP's strengths?

#### Relevance and strategic positioning

- Using the zero hunger strategic review for Afghanistan as a basis for consultations with the Government and other key stakeholders, WFP developed a CSP well aligned with the country's national peace and development framework for 2017–2021. WFP support was also aligned with relevant sector-specific policies, notably the Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition (AFSeN) Agenda Strategic Plan for 2019–2023. WFP sought to uphold the principles of national ownership and country-led initiatives, in particular through its support for the AFSeN Agenda, an interministerial body established to lead national efforts to address hunger and malnutrition.

#### Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable people and communities

- Informed by comprehensive needs analyses and stakeholder consultations, the CSP design was relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable, addressing emergency needs while supporting resilience building. Stakeholders recognized that nutrition and school feeding activities were highly relevant. Assessments conducted jointly with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)<sup>7</sup> revealed that there was a need to tailor WFP support to the specific needs of refugees in order to strengthen their self-reliance.
- Vulnerability and food security assessments, including Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analyses carried out regularly with stakeholders, were found to be reliable. Targeting was done at the provincial, community, household and individual levels based on specific vulnerability criteria tailored for each strategic outcome and activity.

<sup>7</sup> 2017 UNHCR/WFP Joint Refugee Survey and August 2018 Joint Assessment Mission. (Unpublished report.)

## **Adaptation**

16. WFP adapted relatively well to changing needs caused by conflict, displacement, natural disasters and COVID-19. In the face of growing needs, however, prioritization of the most vulnerable in the most vulnerable areas became extremely difficult for WFP, as well as for CPs, the Government and community leaders.
17. Through its strong capacity in emergency response, reliable supply chain, extensive presence on the ground and ability to negotiate access, WFP was strategically well positioned to respond fast and at scale to increasing humanitarian needs, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
18. Food assistance for assets (FFA) activities were relevant to the most vulnerable people, but there was no strong evidence of a comprehensive resilience building approach identifying how those activities would enable not only the most vulnerable individuals but also communities to better absorb, adapt to and transform in the face of shocks and stressors. Furthermore, there was no evidence that WFP activities were conceived in complementarity with resilience programmes of other actors. WFP's resilience building efforts were further hindered by limited donor interest in supporting its ambition and by pervasive conflict and increasing fragility.
19. The CSP country capacity strengthening (CCS) activities for each strategic outcome, including one strategic outcome dedicated to the subject, were not informed by a detailed assessment of national and subnational government capacity. This hindered WFP's ability to strategically prioritize areas of engagement and to articulate a phased approach to CCS including clearly defined and achievable goals.

## **Partnerships**

20. WFP contributed to the objectives of the One UN plan for Afghanistan for 2018-2021<sup>8</sup> that support the national peace and development framework for 2017-2021.<sup>9</sup> More specifically, WFP co-led the food security, nutrition and livelihoods thematic area of the One UN plan with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). It collaborated most closely with FAO, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UNHCR in creating and supporting the AFSeN Agenda, and it collaborated with the World Bank and FAO on social protection and resilience systems. WFP also contributed to the Afghanistan humanitarian response plans. WFP and UNICEF were the crisis first responders with the largest responses, and WFP's strong position in terms of access was recognized. Finally, WFP contributed to the achievement of the One UN objectives through the management of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS). While collaboration worked well for joint reporting processes, it was scant on joint programming.

## **What are the extent and quality of WFP's contributions to country strategic plan outcomes in Afghanistan?**

### ***Delivery of outputs and contribution to outcomes***


21. WFP substantially scaled up its activities in response to the growing needs resulting from the 2018 drought and COVID-19. From 4 million people supported in 2018, there were over 9 million people in 2020, 51 percent female (see figure 3). The vast majority of beneficiaries were residents, followed by internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees. Yet, funding constraints prevented WFP from reaching the beneficiary target in 2019-2020. It distributed 75 percent of the planned in-kind food transfers and 50 percent of planned cash transfers (see figure 4). Food rations were reduced in 2020 due to oil and pulses shortages. Cash was used wherever possible, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas (see figure 5). Delayed and insufficient funding and donor earmarking also forced WFP to prioritize emergency response (strategic outcome 1).

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<sup>8</sup> Government of Afghanistan and United Nations. 2018. [One UN for Afghanistan: 1 January 2018 – 31 December 2021](#).


<sup>9</sup> Government of Afghanistan. 2017. [Afghanistan National Peace And Development Framework \(ANPDF\): 2017 to 2021](#).

**Figure 3: CSP beneficiaries (planned and actual) by year and sex (July 2018–December 2020)**




Source: Particip GmbH based on the country office tool for managing effectively (COMET) report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021.

**Figure 4: Quantities of food distributed (planned and actual) by year and strategic outcome (July 2018–December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R014, data extracted in May 2021.

**Figure 5: Amount of cash-based transfers by year and strategic outcome (July 2018–December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R014, data extracted in May 2021.

22. **Strategic outcome 1: Emergency response** – Under the largest strategic outcome, accounting for 56 percent of CSP expenditures, WFP effectively responded to drought and COVID-19 and supported emergency response capacity. WFP provided unconditional food and cash-based transfers to internally displaced persons, communities affected by conflict and natural disasters, returnees, refugees and seasonally food-insecure households. An initial drought response benefitting 500,000 people in five provinces in the summer of 2018 was followed by a major response covering 2.8 million people in 22 provinces. As part of the COVID-19 response, WFP reached 1.2 million people affected by reduced livelihoods, increased food prices and decreased purchasing power in urban areas. Strategic outcome 1 activities contributed to short-term improvement and prevented a further deterioration in the food security situation of targeted households. In addition, WFP supported the development of the national emergency response capacity of the Government.
23. **Strategic outcome 2: Resilience** – Strategic outcome 2 is aimed at building the resilience of vulnerable food-insecure households through asset creation and vocational training. WFP expanded its resilience programme as planned in 2018 and 2019 but had to scale it down by 24 percent (in terms of expenditures) in 2020 because available resources were allocated to strategic outcome 1 given the deteriorating food security situation. COVID-19 also resulted in the suspension of most FFA and food assistance for training (FFT) activities in March–May 2020. As a result, fewer beneficiaries than planned were reached in 2020.
24. Asset creation and vocational training beneficiaries perceived strong and lasting positive effects. More specifically, FFA activities contributed to the rehabilitation or construction of assets selected by communities, including feeder roads, flood prevention structures, irrigation works and stabilized hillsides. FFA beneficiaries reported an improved asset base and better protection from natural disasters. FFT primarily targeted women and focused on developing new skills. Although FFT interventions were carried out on a limited scale, FFT participants’ food consumption improved and their incomes increased. However, in the absence of systematic monitoring of long-term effects, there was no evidence that strategic outcome 2 contributed to resilience beyond the beneficiary level. Under activity 2 efforts were made to target women in order to overcome the effect of social and religious norms preventing them from participating in economic activities, but there was no evidence that gender-transformative livelihoods supported vulnerable people as hoped.
25. **Strategic outcome 3: Nutrition** – In the light of continuing high levels of global acute malnutrition and the magnitude of other aggravating factors, WFP successfully expanded the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) from 6 provinces in 2018 to 30 in 2020. The programme targeted malnourished pregnant and lactating women and children age 6–59 months and was complemented by preventive emergency blanket supplementary feeding.



Although pipeline breaks affected the availability of nutrition products, MAM treatment was effective in terms of recovery, mortality and non-response rates.

26. Funding constraints did not allow WFP to scale up the stunting prevention programme as originally planned. Nevertheless, WFP initiated the development of a social and behaviour change communication (SBCC) strategy and campaign under the school feeding and MAM treatment programmes. This contributed to improving nutrition behaviour and gender equality and women's empowerment. Insufficient funding and limited government commitment to the AFSeN Agenda prevented WFP from fully rolling out SBCC activities. A small-scale school feeding programme in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces showed improvement in school attendance along with a reduction in dropout rates among both girls and boys. However, it remained unclear to what extent school feeding had contributed to this, in the absence of data allowing a comparison with non-assisted schools.
27. **Strategic outcome 4: Food fortification** – WFP's support for wheat flour fortification was successful in terms of production by mills. In addition, WFP support for smallholder farmers in the production of soy flour through training, the provision of agricultural inputs and post-harvest storage and processing, along with its work on consumer awareness and market development, were reported as positive by CPs and government representatives. The activities were generally successful at achieving the strategic outcome 4 goal of increasing the availability of nutritious food and contributing to enhanced food security at the local level, although their scale was insufficient to induce significant change at the national level.
28. **Strategic outcome 5: Capacity strengthening** – WFP supported the establishment of the AFSeN Agenda, a multi-stakeholder mechanism aiming at raising awareness among government and other stakeholders and fostering policy coherence on food security and nutrition. Through WFP's policy engagement, zero hunger was made a development priority under the national peace and development framework for 2021–2025. Other examples of work include research to inform the development of a strategic framework on social protection that would prioritize zero hunger in sectoral policies, support for joint approaches to shock-responsive social safety nets, the roll-out of a social safety net pilot in Badghis province and evidence generation regarding WFP's peace contribution. As mentioned earlier, WFP supported the establishment of the AFSeN-Agenda. However, progress towards its institutionalization as a permanent structure was hindered by a lack of government funding and ownership. WFP corporate indicators do not allow a meaningful measurement of the effectiveness of the range of CCS activities embedded in other strategic outcomes.
29. **Strategic outcome 6: WFP support for the humanitarian community** through UNHAS was highly appreciated as a unique and much needed service. WFP introduced an international airbridge during the COVID-19 pandemic when no commercial services were operating. WFP also expanded access to WFP's digital beneficiary information and transfer management platform (SCOPE) to selected United Nations and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners, thus contributing to data harmonization with due consideration for data protection. It also provided digital mobile radio and supply chain services for humanitarian and development partners.

### **Contribution to cross-cutting aims**

30. **Protection and AAP:** Key protection considerations were included in the CSP design, and WFP's engagement in protection and AAP increased over time. WFP developed and rolled out the "Right Way Guidelines", a set of checklists tailored to each strategic outcome to enable WFP staff, CPs and third-party monitors to ensure protection, AAP, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) and gender-based violence. WFP established complaint and feedback mechanisms; calls were prioritized to ensure timely responses. WFP has also been actively involved in inter-agency AAP initiatives, notably to raise awareness on COVID-19. Other steps include the establishment of friendly spaces, distribution of hygiene kits and management of distribution sites with special care to preserve the safety and dignity of beneficiaries. Some areas for improvement were highlighted, notably ensuring that complaint and feedback mechanisms are fully functional and accessible to all, including people with disabilities, youth and women, as well as exploring options for tracking and addressing PSEA and gender-based violence. Perceptions on the role of WFP in the protection cluster and the AAP working group varied from those seeing WFP as a strong partner to those expecting WFP to do more in line with its growing commitment to and recognition of the centrality of protection.
31. **Humanitarian access:** There was great recognition by partners of WFP's appropriate management of access issues. WFP was actively engaged in the field with CPs, community leaders and other actors to ensure the delivery of food assistance, including in hard-to-reach areas.
32. **Gender equality and women's empowerment:** Significant effort was made to mainstream gender into programming, although this varied across strategic outcomes. Vulnerability criteria were applied to ensure appropriate targeting of women. WFP also developed a gender action plan and put in place gender-sensitive measures such as separate waiting areas. Yet the extent to which activities may have contributed to the empowerment of women was limited. Although specific gender analyses were undertaken, there was no comprehensive gender analysis preceding the design of the CSP.

### **Sustainability of achievements**

33. The likelihood of benefits being continued varied widely across the portfolio. Strategic outcome 1, as short-term relief assistance, was by design not sustainable. The clearest examples of sustainable activities were FFA community engagement activities under strategic outcome 2 proposed by communities, endorsed by local governments and for which handover agreements were in place. The prospects for sustainability were also good for the SBCC element of the school feeding programme (strategic outcome 3). Under strategic outcome 4, further increases in fortified wheat flour production will depend on the enforcement of flour regulations by the Government. Similarly, the commercial future of soya flour remained unclear in the absence of a clear commercial value chain. The sustainability of CCS efforts under strategic outcome 5 depends on a long-term government commitment to providing the necessary resources.

### **Strategic links between humanitarian, development and peace work**

34. WFP's commitment to the triple nexus was evident; however, increased insecurity, political uncertainty and donor earmarking have limited opportunities to operationalizing a nexus approach as envisioned in the CSP. In early 2020, WFP and the Institute of Development Studies conducted an analysis<sup>10</sup> to inform the common country assessment of drivers of vulnerability and common United Nations approaches to the nexus in preparation for the United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework. Greater coordination among WFP and other key partners is required to facilitate strategic links between humanitarian and development interventions and make progress on the nexus.

## **To what extent has WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to country strategic plan outputs and strategic outcomes?**

### **Timeliness and coverage**

35. Overall, most activities were implemented on time, although delays occurred as a result of external (insecurity, access constraints, COVID-19, slow government processes, short-term funding) and

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<sup>10</sup> Adlparvar and others. 2020. *Political Economy Analysis of Areas Relevant to the Triple Nexus in Afghanistan*. (Unpublished report.)


internal factors (delays in planning, selecting new activities and establishing field-level agreements with CPs). Pipeline breaks caused by funding shortfalls and movement restrictions were particularly severe in 2020.

- 36. Since needs were vast and funding limited, WFP prioritized life-saving activities under strategic outcome 1. WFP's advance financing mechanisms allowed the country office to secure funding for the MAM treatment programme under strategic outcome 3 in 2021.
- 37. Individual targeting was reasonably appropriate, fair and transparent and involved WFP, CPs, third-party monitors and local authorities. Instances where local stakeholders attempted to influence targeting were reportedly addressed by WFP. The response to COVID-19 was widely seen as a good example of adaptation to changing emergency needs. SCOPE, which is used for cash transfers and where possible in-kind food distributions, improved the accuracy and transparency of targeting and was made available to other organizations whenever data privacy could be ensured.

**Cost-efficiency in delivery of food assistance**


- 38. Although WFP did not apply corporate tools for measuring cost-efficiency, it carefully managed implementation costs. The introduction of competitive bidding by financial service providers resulted in the reduction of cash-based transfer overhead costs. The establishment of third-party monitors also contributed to cost savings, in addition to broadening monitoring coverage. At the start of the CSP, staffing costs were reduced by replacing international positions with national positions and recruiting highly qualified national staff. On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in additional costs that were beyond WFP's control. Finally, security costs remained high, although some were shared with other organizations.
- 39. The total expenditure per metric ton of food distributed and total expenditure per value of cash transferred are shown below in Figure 22s 6 and 7.

**Figure 6: Total expenditure per metric ton of food distributed (USD)**



Source: CM-R014 for food transfer data, country portfolio budget plan vs actuals report from Integrated Road Map Analytics for transfer expenditure data.

**Figure 7: Total expenditure per one United States dollar of cash transferred (USD)**



Source: CM-R014 for cash transfer data, country portfolio budget plan vs actuals report from Integrated Road Map Analytics for transfer expenditure data.

**Cost-effectiveness**


40. WFP adequately selected delivery modalities according to context, market feasibility and beneficiary preference. The progressive scale-up of cash-based transfers (figure 5) was hampered by weak financial markets and low-quality services. WFP and UNHCR initiated a discussion on the development of a self-reliance strategy for refugees, which would enhance cost-effectiveness.

**What factors explain WFP's performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected under the country strategic plan?**

**Resource mobilization**

41. Although WFP mobilized considerable resources, its ability to allocate funds according to the CSP priorities was significantly affected by donor earmarking and the limited predictability of funding (figure 8). This limited WFP's ability to integrate emergency response and resilience building activities despite the CSP being a useful instrument for supporting a holistic approach and addressing reduced prospects for sustainability. The confirmation of some contributions only during the third and fourth quarters of a given year made it impossible for the country office to make full use of funds during that year.

**Figure 8: Afghanistan country portfolio budget (2018–2022) – directed multilateral contributions by earmarking level**



Source: WFP FACTory – June 2021.

### ***Partnerships and collaboration***

42. The CSP created an enabling environment for strategic partnerships. NGOs facilitated CSP implementation, notably through invaluable access that they were able to facilitate based on longstanding community relationships. Yet a minority of CPs said that there was a need for a national level overarching consultation mechanism to facilitate substantive dialogue with WFP on programme design.
43. WFP's partnership with the Government was affected by institutional turbulence and overall worsening political instability. Despite those constraints, partnerships with key ministries were generally found to be good.
44. Engagement with donors varied from those maintaining a very close relationship with WFP to those mainly providing funding; overall, donors interviewed were generally satisfied with WFP's performance.
45. Over time, WFP made a significant investment in partnerships within the United Nations system. Those with UNHCR, FAO and UNICEF are longstanding and therefore cannot be clearly attributed to the shift to a country portfolio approach.

### ***Flexibility in a dynamic operational context***

46. The CSP allowed for greater flexibility in adapting to evolving circumstances and responding to emergencies. Still, WFP's ability to adapt was affected by donor earmarking, limited multi-year funding and the structuring of the CSP around "focus areas". WFP international staffing levels varied widely in response to funding and surges in need. While funding shortfalls resulted in a reduction of international posts from 46 to 21 in 2016, 19 new positions were created in 2020 to support the response to COVID-19. WFP ensured its ability to continue operations during COVID-19 by creating appropriate healthcare facilities, a good example of adaptation to changing circumstances.

### ***Extent to which WFP has made the strategic shifts expected under the country strategic plan***

47. A few elements were found to pave the way towards the expected strategic shift to "more sustainable solutions in strategic result areas", including WFP's efforts to support resilience building and contribute to peace, but external contextual factors point towards an uncertain future undermining the prospects for sustainability. Regarding the expected shift towards "transformational linkages in strategic result areas", WFP staff reported a more coherent programme approach, and the evaluation noted some synergies across strategic outcomes, for instance between strategic outcomes 1 and 3, with strategic outcome 1 supporting strategic outcome 3 beneficiaries with nutrition-sensitive food, or when wheat flour fortification under strategic outcome 4 resulted in sufficient quantities of fortified cereal to meet needs under strategic outcomes 1 and 2. A theory of change demonstrating strong mutual connection and reinforcement between strategic outcomes and activities would have supported a positive cycle towards transformational change. The expected shift towards "comprehensive national-led framing of all strategic result areas" (strategic outcomes 1-6) has not fully materialized for reasons beyond WFP's control.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

48. **WFP broadly responded to the growing and massive needs of the most vulnerable people by drawing on its comparative advantages despite increasingly fragile governance and extreme insecurity.**
49. At the design stage, the CSP's approach to responding to the emergency needs of the most vulnerable while addressing early recovery activities was fully relevant; some of the initial CSP ambitions became challenging to achieve, however, given the conflict, political instability and severe drought afflicting the country, which together with COVID-19 caused a dramatic increase in need that surpassed the combined response capacity of all humanitarian partners.
50. Operationalizing the triple nexus proved challenging. WFP walked a fine line between working to strengthen government systems while maintaining its operational independence and safeguarding humanitarian principles. Based on an analysis of risks and assumptions, the country office drafted theories of change for some strategic outcomes; they were never completed, however, and there is no evidence that the initial analysis was regularly updated. In-depth analyses are needed to



understand conflict dynamics and set out pathways to the intended strategic outcomes and, where possible, to contribute to stability and peace outcomes.

51. **Some progress was made towards zero hunger through the various strategic outcomes, and WFP's contributions to the CSP strategic outcomes were the strongest in crisis response.**
52. WFP made a significant contribution to ending hunger (strategic outcome 1), enabling vulnerable people to meet their food and nutrition needs during and immediately after emergencies. WFP's comparative advantage in supply chain management and common services enabled a response at scale with far greater access than most other humanitarian actors (strategic outcome 6). This is where donors prioritized funding and were most satisfied with WFP's achievements.
53. In contrast, as crisis response activities expanded resilience building activities were scaled down. Where FFA activities were implemented beneficiaries reported strong and lasting positive effects. As no single activity can effectively build resilience at the community level, it is important for the country office to go beyond single activities and, based on a comprehensive resilience building approach, develop a package of activities that complement the work of other actors. Compared to other actors, WFP's capacity to support the resilience of the most vulnerable at scale and in a sustainable way appeared to be limited.
54. The MAM treatment programme (strategic outcome 3) was effective and substantially expanded. However, the intended stronger focus on stunting prevention to complement malnutrition treatment was constrained by high global acute malnutrition levels and limited resources. Positive results were achieved through SBCC activities under the school feeding programme although they remained limited in scale. Broadening and rolling out the SBCC strategy, which was developed for the school feeding and MAM programmes, would have enhanced WFP's approach to nutrition sensitivity across its portfolio.
55. WFP's contribution to increased access to nutritious foods (strategic outcome 4) was mixed. Wheat fortification was steadily growing, and all WFP needs were sourced from Afghan wheat mills, but the development of the soya crop value chain was not so successful. Support for smallholder food production was valuable at the local level.
56. In the absence of a comprehensive capacity gap assessment, WFP seized opportunities for engaging in CCS (strategic outcome 5) but was not in a position to identify strategic priorities in consultation with the Government. There is a need for a capacity gap assessment and the design of a CCS strategy that prioritizes strategically key areas of engagement and articulates WFP's expectation of success at the outcome level.
57. WFP was on the right track with its demonstrated commitment to gender equality and women's empowerment, inclusion, protection and AAP. It also paved the way for other actors as the first to pursue access negotiations and as a promoter of community-based approaches. Through its presence on the ground, WFP fostered community trust, protection, accountability and ownership. Nonetheless, AAP and protection mechanisms put in place could be further enhanced, notably by ensuring that complaint and feedback mechanisms are fully functional and accessible to all population groups and by exploring options for tracking and addressing gender-based violence and PSEA.
58. An in-depth gender analysis unpacking the diversity of gender relations and gender-based violence across the country and exploring the feasibility of moving from "gender-sensitive" to "gender-transformative programming" within the context of WFP interventions in Afghanistan is essential to inform WFP's ambitions in this area.
59. **In increasingly challenging circumstances, WFP's contribution to strategic outcomes depended on deeper and more long-term partnerships.**
60. The CSP aimed to pave the way for WFP to improve performance through collaboration, and in practice WFP has made significant investments in partnerships with the Government, donors and United Nations and NGO partners. However, various challenges reduced the scope for expanding and strengthening these partnerships, including that funding for multi-year activities was limited. Although challenging at a time of great uncertainty and instability, WFP's three-pronged approach and resilience context analysis would contribute to a deeper understanding of the opportunities for

enhancing livelihoods and strengthening resilience capacities and provide a solid foundation for the design of synergistic multisectoral joint programmes.

61. **WFP was able to adapt its response to COVID-19, notwithstanding some delays and pipeline breaks that were unavoidable.**
62. WFP was perceived as effective and adaptive in responding to COVID-19. While many resilience activities were suspended, WFP massively scaled up its emergency support for 1.2 million vulnerable people in urban areas. Despite school closures, WFP managed to reach students with high-energy biscuits and cash assistance for girls (strategic outcome 3) and supported the launch of a social protection response. The continuation of UNHAS was seen as a lifeline by many stakeholders. The creation of specific health facilities also helped staff to remain optimally engaged.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

63. As data collection took place in April and May of 2021 and the findings, conclusions and recommendations were developed before the Taliban consolidated control over Afghanistan in August 2021, these recommendations are expected to be implemented in a flexible manner, depending on the evolution of the situation and taking into account prevailing restrictions on building national capacity and systems. The timeframe for addressing some of the recommendations will be revisited as needed.

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
1	<p><b>Design the next country strategic plan based on robust context analyses that provide the country office flexibility to adapt its response to changing needs in fluid circumstances, maintaining the focus areas of crisis response, resilience and root causes.</b></p> <p>1.1 Develop a theory of change with risks and assumptions based on an in-depth context analysis, with realistic pathways and mutually reinforcing strategic outcomes for achieving zero hunger and contributing to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.</p> <p>1.2 Invest in a capacity gap assessment as the basis for developing a country capacity strengthening strategy that cuts across strategic outcomes.</p> <p>1.3 Strengthen the monitoring system to measure progress against intended outcomes (including on country capacity strengthening) in continuously changing circumstances.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division (RAM), Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division (PRO)	High	Country strategic plan design (fourth quarter 2022)
2	<p><b>Develop a nutrition strategy that takes into consideration the local context and allows for the scale up of malnutrition prevention.</b></p> <p>2.1 Support the collection of evidence on various forms of malnutrition.</p> <p>2.2 Advocate and contribute to the design of a joint nutrition strategy, informed by recent evidence and local context analysis, that encompasses moderate acute malnutrition treatment and malnutrition prevention.</p> <p>2.3 Advocate and mobilize resources for scaling up malnutrition prevention in collaboration with key nutrition partners.</p> <p>2.4 Finalize and operationalize the WFP social and behaviour change communication strategy across WFP activities, with support from the regional bureau.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Nutrition cluster, UNICEF, FAO, CPs, regional bureau, Nutrition Division	High	Country strategic plan design (first quarter 2023)

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
3	<b>Conduct in-depth gender analysis to inform a clearer articulation of WFP ambitions in relation to gender transformation and social inclusion, taking into consideration the highly constraining environment.</b>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, Gender Office	High	Country strategic plan design (first quarter 2023)
4	<p><b>Enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of resilience building activities and continue to seize opportunities to expand them as conditions allow and where there is a medium-term perspective.</b></p> <p>4.1 Conduct a comprehensive participatory analytical and planning process such as the three-pronged approach bringing together WFP, partners and communities to inform the design of a comprehensive resilience building approach clearly articulating WFP's vision of resilience building in Afghanistan, identifying WFP's comparative strengths and promoting an integrated approach across the country strategic plan as well as with other partners.</p> <p>4.2 Ensure scalable resilience building in the face of limited forecast multi-year funding and the volatile circumstances and engage in resilience building only if there is a medium-term perspective.</p> <p>4.3 Engage with cooperating partners to improve the design, implementation and sustainability of projects.</p> <p>4.4 Develop and implement a strong monitoring and evaluation system to assess the technical quality of assets and value to the community and contribution to resilience in the long term.</p> <p>4.5 Use demonstrated results to advocate additional multi-year unearmarked funding and progressively scale up resilience building programmes.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Donors, CPs, regional bureau, headquarters (PRO, RAM, Public Partnerships and Resourcing Division)	High	Country strategic plan design and ongoing

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
5	<p><b>Strengthen collaboration and coordination with key partners</b></p> <p>5.1 Prioritize dialogue with cooperating partners already identified as strategic partners to develop joint advocacy and fundraising approaches in the face of shrinking development resources.</p> <p>5.2 Develop a realistic assessment of the conditions under which donors may be receptive to funding WFP development-oriented activities.</p> <p>5.3 Increase dialogue with development-oriented United Nations partners to deepen analysis of WFP's potential role and added value, notably in the areas of resilience building and social protection.</p> <p>5.4 Leverage and scale up existing partnerships for greater synergies and resource optimization and accelerate achievement of lasting outcomes.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Donors, development-oriented United Nations partners, CPs	High	2022/2023



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 EVALUATION FEATURES

1. The Evaluation of the Afghanistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022) mandated by the Office of Evaluation (OEV) was conducted between January and August 2021 to provide evaluation evidence and learning on the performance of WFP in Afghanistan, as well as accountability for results to WFP stakeholders (see terms of reference (ToR) in Annex 1).
2. The evaluation covered all activities, including those related to cross-cutting results, undertaken from July 2018 to December 2020 under the CSP. In order to assess the extent to which the expected shift from WFP in the strategic positioning had occurred under the CSP, the evaluation also considered the emergency operations (EMOPs), the protracted relief and rehabilitation operation (PRRO) and special operations implemented between 2016 and mid-2018. The exercise has been guided by the following four evaluation questions (see details in Annex 4): i) assessing the relevance of WFP strategic positioning and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected under the CSP; ii) assessing WFP contributions to the six CSP strategic outcomes, establishing plausible causal relations between the outputs of activities, the implementation process, the operational context and the changes observed at outcome level; iii) assessing the timeliness, cost efficiency and cost effectiveness of WFP operations in Afghanistan; and iv) analysing the partnership strategy of WFP, including the strategic positioning of WFP in complex, dynamic contexts, particularly as it relates to relations with the national Government and the international community.
3. The evaluation also looked at the extent to which the CSP has provided greater flexibility for operations and has mobilized adequate funding. In addition, the evaluation assessed to what extent WFP has been able to keep its CSP relevant and adaptative in the light of contextual changes, including the coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) pandemic.
4. Moreover, it has given attention to assessing adherence to humanitarian principles and protection issues, not only related to political instability but also to other contextual factors. This includes protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) and accountability to affected populations (AAP), capacity strengthening, and gender equality and empowerment of women (GEEW). The extent to which WFP has managed to secure humanitarian access to assist vulnerable people in need based on neutrality, impartiality and independence was also reviewed and, to the extent possible, benchmarked against key WFP policies and guidelines.
5. Fieldwork took place from 11 April to 3 May, 2021. During that time, one international team member and two national evaluators visited projects, performed focus group discussions with beneficiaries and met key informants from the country office, the field offices, government departments and cooperating partners. Remote data collection took place at the same time with a view to hearing the voices of WFP staff and of a large range of international partners, government representatives and coordination bodies. An e-survey was also undertaken to capture additional views from WFP heads of field offices on partnerships and cooperation.
6. There are many stakeholders of the WFP CSP in Afghanistan (see Annex 7). The main stakeholders include the WFP Executive Board, the country office, the regional bureau, area offices, headquarters, the Office of Evaluation, a large range of ministries, United Nations agencies, coordination bodies, donors and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as the private sector.
7. The evaluation was planned so that the evidence and lessons learned would inform the development of the next CSP, to be presented for approval to the Executive Board in June 2022. The main users of this evaluation are the country office, the regional bureau in Bangkok, technical divisions at WFP headquarters and WFP Executive Board.

## 1.2 CONTEXT

### 1.2.1 General overview

8. Afghanistan is situated between Central and South Asia. In 2020, its population was estimated at 38.9 million people,<sup>11</sup> with an annual growth rate of 2.3 percent.<sup>12</sup> The population is relatively young; in 2019, 42 percent of the population was under 15 years of age.<sup>13</sup> Afghanistan is facing a rapid demographic shift towards urbanization, accelerated in part by displacement related to conflict and climate change.

9. A low-income country, Afghanistan currently ranks 169<sup>th</sup> of 189 countries in the Human Development Index.<sup>14</sup> More than four decades of conflict have seriously affected families' abilities to earn a decent livelihood. In 2016, 55 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line. About 49.4 percent of people lived in multidimensional poverty in 2020.<sup>15</sup> The rural poverty rate is considerably higher than the urban rate at 61 percent versus 18 percent; moreover, there are large interregional disparities.<sup>16</sup> The unemployment rate was 11.2 percent of the labour force in 2020.<sup>17</sup> The labour force participation, from age 15, is 47.1, much lower for women, at 21.8 percent against 74.5 for men.<sup>18</sup>

10. In the 2020 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) multi-dimensional framework of fragility, Afghanistan is one of the 13 countries classified as extremely fragile at risk of being left behind from progress on sustainable development and peace. The country shows the most extreme level of fragility in the political and economic dimensions, closely followed by the societal, environmental and security dimensions. It is also one of the nine countries where there is high violence with the second worst score on the terrorism impact indicator. Progress has stagnated or declined on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) related to hunger and gender equality.<sup>19</sup>

11. Afghanistan has not experienced peace since 1978. In December 2001, following the overthrow of the Taliban after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States of America (USA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies began to deploy troops under the United-Nations-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and a massive aid effort was launched to create a new social order. By 2013 there were about 150,000 troops from 47 contributing countries and 60 governmental donors. This led to parallel structures of administration on virtually all levels of government with international advisors, NGOs and contractors ubiquitous.<sup>20</sup> Although this resulted in some positive indicators, especially in health and education, there was also poor governance and uncertain economic growth outside of the aid bubble.

12. The long legacy of multiple conflicts has deeply affected the political economy of Afghanistan, creating entrenched actors and networks with deep links into the Government including related to the large illicit narco-economy.<sup>21</sup> For all these reasons, exacerbated by the large amount of aid that has poured into Afghanistan since 2001,<sup>22</sup> corruption has flourished, and Afghanistan is ranked at 165 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> World Bank, 2020. *Population indicators DataBank*, (accessed on 6 July 2021).

<sup>12</sup> World Bank, 2020. *Population growth – Afghanistan Data*.

<sup>13</sup> World Bank, 2020. *Population age 0-14 – Afghanistan data*, (accessed in July 2021).

<sup>14</sup> UNDP. 2020. *Human Development Report 2020*.

<sup>15</sup> World Bank, 2020. *Multidimensional poverty headcount ratio (% of total population) – Afghanistan*, (accessed in July 2021).

<sup>16</sup> UNICEF, OPHI, University of Oxford. 2019. *Afghanistan. Multidimensional Poverty Index 2016–2017. Report and Analysis*

<sup>17</sup> 14.1 for women, 10.4 for men.

<sup>18</sup> World Bank, 2020. *Labour force participation rate, total, male and female (% of total population ages 15+) (modelled ILO estimate) – Afghanistan*, (accessed in July 2021).

<sup>19</sup> OECD. 2020. *States of Fragility 2020*. Paris, OECD Publishing.

<sup>20</sup> Astri Suhrke Hurst and Co. 2011. *When More is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan*.

<sup>21</sup> Strand et al., 2017. *Afghanistan: A Political Economy Analysis*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> See UNAMA. 2017. *Afghanistan's Fight Against Corruption: the other battlefield*.

<sup>23</sup> Transparency International. 2020. *Afghanistan* <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/afghanistan> (accessed in June 2021).

13. Afghanistan experienced a degree of peace until around 2005, after which the Taliban, the Islamic State (ISIS) and other non-state armed groups increasingly took control. The year 2014 was a pivotal year, marking the end of the 13-year ISAF operation and the start of what became known as “the Transition Decade”. It was also the year of a deeply contested Presidential election that resulted in a US-brokered power-sharing agreement. Since 2015, the emergence of the Islamic State added a new dimension of complexity.

14. Throughout history, governance in Afghanistan has been affected by regional politics and economics.<sup>24</sup> These regional influences tend to consolidate or exacerbate ethnic and religious lines of conflict with Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Russia, India and other Central Asian Republics.

15. The political, social, economic, and security landscape in Afghanistan has shifted dramatically since the start of 2020, with the signing of the US-Taliban Doha Agreement, which contributed to the start of Intra-Afghan peace talks in September 2020. However, while the experience of both civilians and combatants is markedly different across the country,<sup>25</sup> the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 5,183 civilian casualties (1,659 killed and 3,524 injured) in the first half of 2021, which was an increase of 47 percent compared with the first half of 2020.<sup>26</sup>

16. Following the withdrawal of the United States of America and NATO troops and the exodus of the previous Government’s systems and staff, the most recent leadership transitions in the country are leading to very uncertain times for the population and in particular for the most vulnerable.<sup>27</sup>

17. Up to 10 June 2021, the World Health Organization (WHO) has confirmed 85,892 cases and 3,356 deaths of COVID-19.<sup>28</sup> The pandemic leaves millions of Afghans at risk of falling into hunger, faced with unusually high food prices and reduced employment opportunities. It has disrupted the livelihoods of families across the country relying on day labour, small trade or remittances, most of all in the cities where the lockdowns have left them without opportunities to earn money to buy their next meal. Women are often hardest hit, having less access to stable income and, as they are responsible for care tasks, often at higher risk of infection than men.

## 1.2.2 Economy

18. With a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of United States dollar (USD) 517 in 2020,<sup>29</sup> the World Bank (WB) describes Afghanistan’s economy as shaped by fragility and aid dependence. The private sector is extremely narrow, corruption is widespread, infrastructure is inadequate and the illicit economy, which includes opium production,<sup>30</sup> smuggling and illegal mining, accounts for a significant share of production, exports and employment.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> In the South Asian sphere, it is Pakistan and India, strongly influenced by Russia, China and the United States of America (US). In the Gulf, it is affected by rivalry and resource contestation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Central Asia the bordering states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan form a region characterized by lack of cooperation and the rise of Turkey as a regional power (source: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 2017. *Afghanistan: A Political Economy Analysis*).

<sup>25</sup> For instance, those in Taliban-controlled areas are experiencing unexpected peace after the USA largely halted air attacks and the Afghan Government moved to a defensive posture (source: Taliban Opportunism and ANSF. 2020. *Frustration: How the Afghan conflict has changed since the Doha agreement*. Afghanistan Analysts Network).

<sup>26</sup> UNAMA. 2021. *Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*. January-June 2021.

<sup>27</sup> OCHA. 2021. *Flash Appeal Afghanistan Immediate Humanitarian Response Needs* (September-December 2021).

<sup>28</sup> WHO, 2021. *WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard with Vaccination Data*, (accessed in July 2021).

<sup>29</sup> World Bank, 2020. *GDP per capita (current USD) – Afghanistan Data*, (accessed in January 2022).

<sup>30</sup> In 2017 alone, opium generated an estimated USD 4.1 billion and USD 6.6 billion for Afghan farmers, refiners and traffickers, equivalent to 19-32 percent of Afghanistan’s GDP (source: UNODC. 2018. *Afghanistan. Opium Survey 2017: Challenges to sustainable development, peace and security*).


<sup>31</sup> World Bank, 2020. *Afghanistan Overview: Development news, research data*, (accessed in May 2021).

19. The presence of foreign troops and the enormous contracts awarded for security and logistics up to 2014 bolstered annual growth averaging 9.4 percent between 2003 and 2012. However, following the security transition in 2014, in a context of drought, political uncertainty and election violence, annual growth slumped to around 2.5 percent between 2015-2020. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a sharp contraction of the economy with the World Bank estimating an increase of poverty from 54.5 percent to up to 72 percent.<sup>32</sup>

### 1.2.3 Food and nutrition security

20. In the 2020 Global Hunger Index, Afghanistan ranks 99<sup>th</sup> of 107 countries, indicating a serious level of hunger.<sup>33</sup> Food insecurity remains alarmingly high in Afghanistan with continuing conflict, widespread unemployment, and price hikes, all exacerbated by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) rating, in March-May 2021, 25 percent of the population or 9.9 million people were in Phase 3 (food crisis) and 10 percent or 4.2 million people were in Phase 4 (emergency).<sup>34</sup> The situation was expected to slightly improve in the period June to November 2021, as reflected in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Integrated Phase Classification food security map for Afghanistan, current (Mar-May 2021 left) and projected June-Nov 2021 right)**



Source: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (May 2021) – Afghanistan.

21. Malnutrition rates are high in Afghanistan. The prevalence of malnourishment had decreased from almost 50 percent to below 25 percent between 2005 and 2010 but increased again almost continuously after that. According to the 2020 Global Nutrition Report, 38.2 percent of Afghan children under 5 years of age were stunted in 2018 (38.1 percent for girls, 38.3 percent for boys), which was higher than the average for the Asia region (21.8 percent) and classified as high by WHO. Wasting among this same group was of 5.1 percent (6.1 percent for boys, 4.1 percent for girls). As for anaemia, 42.0 percent of women aged from 15 to 49 years were affected in 2016.<sup>35</sup>

### 1.2.4 Agriculture

22. Afghanistan is a mountainous country with an arid to semi-arid climate and a high diversity of ecosystems. The agricultural sector is important to Afghanistan, as the agriculturally dependent population constitutes over 60 percent of the total population and 27 percent of the GDP. Productivity in the

<sup>32</sup> World Bank, 2021. *Afghanistan Overview*, (accessed in July 2021).

<sup>33</sup> *Global Hunger Index*, (accessed in June 2021).

<sup>34</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification. 2021. *Afghanistan: Acute Food insecurity situation*.

<sup>35</sup> Global Nutrition Report. 2020. *Country Nutrition Profiles – Afghanistan*.

agricultural sector remains relatively low.<sup>36</sup> Even although roughly one third of the workers in agriculture are women, the work distribution is gendered, women have less access to resources than men and contribute far less to decision making.<sup>37</sup>

### 1.2.5 Climate change

23. Most farms are small and highly dependant on water availability for their rainfed agriculture and grazing livestock.<sup>38</sup> The agricultural sector, however, is highly challenged by climate change effects such as temperature increases and erratic rainfall. Disputes over land and water have historically been a major cause of local conflict and are exacerbated by the strain on water resources resulting from climate change.

24. Afghanistan is also highly prone to intense and recurring natural hazards such as flooding, earthquakes, snow avalanches, landslides and droughts due to its geographical location and years of environmental degradation.<sup>39</sup> Arable land area is steadily declining, leaving, in 2016, only roughly 12 percent of total land suitable for farming.<sup>40</sup> In 2018, Afghanistan was hit by one of the most severe droughts in recent times, which affected 22 of the 34 provinces.<sup>41</sup>

### 1.2.6 Education

25. Since 2001, the Government has made significant achievements in rebuilding the education system, with support from development partners. The number of children in school has risen by a factor of almost 9 and 38 percent of students are girls.<sup>42</sup> Nonetheless, children's access to schools is also limited due to many reasons, which include conflict, poverty, damaged and inadequate numbers of classrooms, a shortage of teachers (particularly women teachers) and relevant learning and teaching resources, and long distances to schools. In 2018, 46 percent of functioning government schools did not have appropriate premises. Completion rates are therefore low, and lower for girls than boys, increasingly so from primary (40 percent versus 67 percent) through secondary (26 percent versus 49 percent) to the tertiary level (14 percent versus 32 percent). Only 32 percent of young women (15–24 years of age) are literate, against 62 percent of young men.<sup>43</sup>

### 1.2.7 Gender

26. Approximately 3.7 million children are estimated to be out-of-school, with 60–75 percent being girls. In some provinces, up to 85 percent of girls do not attend school. In primary school, the risk of dropping out is almost equal for boys and girls (8.9 versus 9.1 percent), but at lower secondary level, girls start to be more likely to drop out than boys (8.3 versus 4.1 percent).<sup>44</sup> The adult literacy rate in 2018 was noted as 43 percent, but for women it was only 28 percent.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> FAO. 2021. Strengthening Afghanistan institutions' capacity for the assessment of agriculture production and scenario development and World Bank, 2020. *Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (% of GDP) – Afghanistan data*, (accessed in July 2021).

<sup>37</sup> Ganesh, L. 2017. *Women in Agriculture in Afghanistan*. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Issues Paper.

<sup>38</sup> Fewsnet. 2018. Afghanistan Food Security Outlook June 2018 to January 2019.

<sup>39</sup> World Bank, 2021. *Afghanistan overview*, (accessed in June 2021).

<sup>40</sup> Macrotrends, 2021. *Afghanistan Arable Land 1961-2021*, (accessed on June 2021).

<sup>41</sup> FAO. 2019. *Afghanistan Drought Risk Management Strategy*

<sup>42</sup> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Education, General Directorate of Planning and Evaluation Strategic Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate Research and Evaluation Unit. 2018. *Education Sector Review 2018*.

<sup>43</sup> UNFPA, 2021. *Young people*, (accessed in June 2021).

<sup>44</sup> Afghan Ministry of Education. 2018. *Education Sector Review 2018*.

<sup>45</sup> World Bank, 2021. *Literacy rate data*, (accessed in June 2021).



27. With a Gender Inequality Index of 0.655, Afghanistan ranks at 157 out of 162 countries.<sup>46</sup> In 2017, the maternal mortality rate was 638 deaths per 100,000 births and in 2019, the adolescent birth rate was 61.33 per 1,000 women of 15-19 years of age.<sup>47</sup>

28. Gender inequalities are widespread in health, education, access to and control over resources, economic opportunities, power and political voice. Social norms are highly gendered, with the low perceived value of the girl child and the consequentially low position of women in Afghanistan society.<sup>48</sup> Girls and young women are particularly vulnerable due to these prevailing norms and perceptions. They are highly exposed to traumatising effects, are being kept out of school and are more vulnerable to, among other things, child marriage and gender-based violence (GBV) than boys and men. Indeed, among Afghan women, 87.2 percent reported experiencing at least one form of physical, sexual, or psychological violence or forced marriage in their lifetime.<sup>49</sup> Although Afghanistan has a law against domestic violence,<sup>50</sup> corporal punishment is lawful. Child marriage rates for girls are much higher than boys: 35 percent of women (versus only 7 percent for men) in the age group 20–24 years were married before the age of 18 and 9 percent were married before the age of 15.<sup>51</sup> Child marriage is reportedly more prevalent in rural areas (31.9 percent) than in urban areas (18.4 percent).<sup>52</sup> As in other crisis settings, the COVID-19 crisis has led to sharp increases in gender-based violence risks, including intimate partner violence and child marriages, and reduced access to critical services and resources.<sup>53</sup>

## 1.2.8 Refugees and internally displaced persons

29. Afghanistan continues to be one of the top countries of origin for refugees. Since 2002, nearly 5.3 million Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan under the voluntary repatriation programme facilitated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) but the Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan continue to host over 2 million registered Afghan refugees.<sup>54</sup> Internal displacement has grown to an estimated 4.8 million people.<sup>55</sup> The combination of internal displacement and large-scale return within a difficult economic and security context continues to pose risks to welfare for all those affected, including host communities.<sup>56</sup> Additionally, Afghanistan continues to host refugees from Pakistan.

## 1.2.9 Humanitarian protection

30. The population is exposed to high protection risks, including a high level of violence related to the factors of fragility described in the previous sections. In the last decade, there have been continuous violations of humanitarian principles.

31. Many internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain in urban and rural informal settlements.<sup>57</sup> With sub-standard shelters and without access to safe water and sanitation facilities, they are unable to support their own recovery. Their insecure land tenure in informal settlements on private land also limits investment in shelter and infrastructure support, exposing residents to long periods of deprivation and accumulating vulnerabilities.

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<sup>46</sup> UNDP. 2020. *Human Development Report 2020*. The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report. Afghanistan.

<sup>47</sup> World Bank, 2021. *Afghanistan Overview*, (accessed in June 2021).

<sup>48</sup> UNICEF. 2019. *Gender Strategy (2019-2021)* for the Afghanistan country office.

<sup>49</sup> Human Rights Council. 2015. Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences – Mission to Afghanistan.

<sup>50</sup> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Ministry of Justice. 2009. *Law on Elimination of Violence against Women*

<sup>51</sup> UNICEF. 2019. *State of the World's Children 2019*. Children, food and nutrition – Growing well in a changing world.

<sup>52</sup> WFP. 2017. *Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (ALCS 2016–17)*.

<sup>53</sup> See UNWOMEN. 2020. *Gender Alert on COVID-19 in Afghanistan | Issue II: Ensuring Access to Services for Survivors of Violence Against Women and Girls* and UNHCR, 2020. *UNHCR warns second wave of COVID pandemic driving further violence against refugee women and girls*

<sup>54</sup> UNHCR, 2021. *Situation in Afghanistan*, (accessed on June 2021).

<sup>55</sup> IOM. 2020. *Baseline Mobility Assessment Round 10*. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix.

<sup>56</sup> World Bank, 2021. *Afghanistan Overview*, (accessed in June 2021).

<sup>57</sup> IOM. 2020. *Baseline Mobility Data (Round 10)-Afghanistan Humanitarian Needs Overview*.



32. People who have been displaced for a prolonged period or multiple times are acutely vulnerable due to their depleted financial and emotional reserves. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has hit them hardest,<sup>58</sup> decreasing their already minimal purchasing power and leaving them with poor shelter and a lack of winter clothing, vulnerable to disease and unable to cope with Afghanistan's harsh winters.<sup>59</sup>

### 1.2.10 National policies, strategies, and frameworks

33. This section presents a summary of the most relevant national policies, strategies and frameworks, a full list of which is captured in Annex 8. Important frameworks include the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework 2017-2021 (ANPDF), with its focus on peacebuilding, state-building, and market-building, and the Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Strategic Plan (AFSeN 2019- 2023), which is a multisectoral platform, leading national efforts to address hunger and malnutrition in Afghanistan.

34. For the DGs, the country undertook a voluntary national review in 2017 that focused on six key goals, including SDGs 2 and 17. The Afghanistan Zero Hunger Strategic Review (ZHSR) provides a complementary and more comprehensive set of recommendations for SDG 2 that have been endorsed by the Government. The Government has taken action to affirm its commitment to attaining the SDGs and has designated the Ministry of Economy to lead the coordination, monitoring and reporting on achieving the Afghanistan SDGs.

35. In terms of sector-specific policies, the National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority Programme (2017-2021), the National Education Strategic Plan (2017-2021) (NESP III), Afghanistan's Girls' Education Policy (2019-2021), Afghanistan's National Health Policy 2015-2020, the Afghanistan Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Social Protection Strategy (2008-2013), are all relevant for WFP engagement.

36. The Afghan Government has argued strongly for country ownership and leadership in the context of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States in 2011. Donors have annually reaffirmed commitment and the United Nations moved from the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to "One UN"<sup>60</sup> to increase alignment with the Afghan agenda.

37. Under One UN for Afghanistan, WFP supports the Government's development-oriented efforts to achieve the ANPDF targets in: i) food security, nutrition and livelihoods; ii) education priorities of access and inclusion through school feeding; and iii) supporting return and reintegration through implementation of direct and durable solutions related to well-located and serviceable land.

38. In 2017, Afghanistan became a member of the Scaling Up Nutrition Movement (SUN).<sup>61</sup> In March 2019, Afghanistan launched the National Nutrition Strategy<sup>62</sup> as a roadmap for partnership, investment and action in nutrition. A nutrition policy and strategy had already been in place since 2015.<sup>63</sup>

### 1.2.11 International assistance

39. A series of ministerial conferences on Afghanistan have taken place almost annually since 2002, the most recent being a pledging conference in Geneva in November 2020.<sup>64</sup> At the time the participants

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<sup>58</sup> REACH Initiative. 2020. *WoA Assessment*.

<sup>59</sup> The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reports that many returnees face inadequate access to health services and unfavourable conditions, which exposes them to a variety of health risks. Health teams at border crossings have been under pressure due to the high numbers of people returning from Iran and requiring health screening.

<sup>60</sup> In 2016, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) launched the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) to carry the country forward from 2017 to 2021. The United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN agencies, Funds and programmes recognize the ANPDF, and the development planning system that underpins it, as the single coordinating structure for development assistance. This is what the "One UN for Afghanistan" refers to. (source: UN mission website).

<sup>61</sup> Scaling Up Nutrition, 2021. *Afghanistan – SUN*, (accessed in June 2021).

<sup>62</sup> UNICEF, 2019. *Afghanistan takes major steps to address undernutrition*, (accessed on June 2021).


<sup>63</sup> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Health. *National Public Nutrition Policy and Strategy (2015-2020)*

<sup>64</sup> With participants from 66 countries and 32 international organizations.

renewed their long-term commitment to support Afghanistan and committed to reconvene to review progress and pledges at a Senior Officials Meeting in 2021 and in a Ministerial Meeting in 2022.

40. Since 2002, Afghanistan has consistently been among the top recipients of official development assistance (ODA) and was the second highest recipient as recently as 2016-2017.<sup>65</sup> Figure 3 provides an insight into the top nine donors for the period 2018-2019.<sup>66</sup> However, as noted above, international aid has created ample opportunities for corruption, notably through contracts and procurement, and has served to enrich the powerful.<sup>67</sup>


**Figure 3: Top nine donors of gross official development aid for Afghanistan, 2018-2019 average, USD million<sup>68</sup>**



Source: OECD website.

41. Afghanistan received between 73 and 80 percent of the required humanitarian funding between 2013 and 2019. In 2020, this rate fell to 52 percent. Even although the available amount was higher than the year before, the needs were so vast that only half could be met (see Figure 4).<sup>69</sup> This was partly due to funds needed for the COVID-19 crisis. Non-COVID-19 needs were only funded at 50.8 percent.

**Figure 4: Trends in response plan and appeal requirement for Afghanistan (2011-2021) in USD**



Source: OCHA website – financial tracking service (31.05.2021).

<sup>65</sup> The peak was in 2011 at USD 6.866 billion, falling to USD 3.789 billion in 2018 (Source: OECD, 2021. *Afghanistan – Aid at a glance*, [m](#)(accessed in June 2021)).

<sup>66</sup> The top five average ODA funding sources from 2017 to 2018 were USA, Germany, the European Union (EU), United Kingdom (UK) and Japan. Between 2017 and 2019 the main humanitarian donors comprised USA, UK, the EU, Sweden and Japan.

<sup>67</sup> See also UNAMA. 2017. *Afghanistan’s Fight Against Corruption: the other battlefield*.

<sup>68</sup> OECD Stats reports with a two-year lag, hence data for 2020 was not reported.

<sup>69</sup> UNOCHA, 2020. *Afghanistan 2020 – Appeals*, (accessed in June 2021).

## 1.3 SUBJECT BEING EVALUATED

### 1.3.1 The WFP Country Strategic Plan in Afghanistan (2018-2022)

42. The evaluation focuses on the CSP 2018-2022, but also considers its development from preceding operations since 2016.<sup>70</sup> The overarching goal of the current CSP is to support Afghanistan to achieve zero hunger by 2030.<sup>71</sup>

43. The CSP focuses on six closely interrelated strategic outcomes (SO), which are structured around three main strategic dimensions: i) responding to emergencies by providing food or cash to meet immediate food and nutrition needs and work opportunities to improve livelihoods (SO1 and SO2); ii) improving nutrition through preventing and treating malnutrition and providing access to nutritious food, including through strengthening value chains as well as capacities at national and subnational levels to improve policy approach to food security and nutrition (SO3, SO4 and SO5); and iii) strengthening field operations and the Government's and the broader humanitarian and development community's emergency response capacities (SO6).

44. The six strategic outcomes and the respective eight activities are outlined in Table 1. The evaluation team has reconstructed an overall theory of change (ToC) based on the strategic outcomes and the intervention logic depicted in the CSP's logframe and summarized it in the form of a simplified diagram (see Figure 5).<sup>72</sup> The theory of change was validated by the country office during the evaluation inception phase

**Table 1: Overview of strategic outcomes and related activities**

STRATEGIC OUTCOME /ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
<b>SO1:</b> Vulnerable people in Afghanistan are able to meet their food and nutrition needs during and immediately after emergencies through 2022	
<b>Activity 1:</b> Provide unconditional, nutrition-sensitive food assistance to vulnerable people	WFP provides unconditional food or cash-based transfers to affected populations among conflict affected IDPs, natural disaster affected populations, returnees, refugees and seasonally food insecure households
<b>SO2:</b> Vulnerable people in Afghanistan are increasingly able to meet their food and nutrition needs on their own by 2022	
<b>Activity 2:</b> Provide conditional, nutrition-sensitive and gender-transformative livelihood support to vulnerable people	Livelihood of poor people is supported by creating assets to build community resilience against natural disasters and climate change effects, by providing conditional food assistance to participants involved in asset creation projects and vocational skills training
<b>Activity 3:</b> Provide capacity strengthening to emergency preparedness institutions	This activity includes capacity strengthening and training of the Government to be prepared in the case of various forms of emergency.
<b>SO3:</b> Vulnerable people at each stage of the life cycle in target areas have improved nutrition by 2022	
<b>Activity 4:</b> Provide a comprehensive, gender-transformative package for the prevention and treatment of malnutrition, including services, appropriate specialized nutritious foods and social behaviour change and	Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM), prevention of MAM through emergency blanket supplementary feeding for children aged 6–59 month and pregnant and lactating (PLW) women, prevention of stunting through awareness raising and continued technical and financial

<sup>70</sup>This includes: i) the protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 200447); ii) the special operation 200635, capacity development in support of the strategic grain reserve; iii) purchase for progress; iv) two emergency operations (IR-EMOP 201023 and EMOP 201024); and v) special operation 200639, the provision of humanitarian air services in Afghanistan.

<sup>71</sup> In a manner that contributes to the broader, longer-term transition to peace and development, aligned to the strategic direction of the ZHSR.

<sup>72</sup> The assumptions underpinning the CSP intervention logic include: i) absence of deterioration in regional/national stability; ii) no unexpected natural disasters; iii) uninterrupted pipeline and sufficient funding available; iv) markets in cash and voucher areas remain functioning and prices stable; v) coordination structures remain in place; vi) availability and sufficient capacity of cooperating partners; and vii) the existence of adequate and credible government structures that have the required capacity and adequate access to target communities.

communication (SBCC), to targeted individuals and their communities	support to multisectoral initiatives and providing mid-morning snacks or take-home rations for school children
<b>SO4:</b> People throughout the country can have access to a wide range of fortified nutritious food products at affordable prices by 2022	
<b>Activity 5:</b> Provide support to the Government and commercial partners in developing, strengthening and expanding nutritional product value chain.	WFP aims to work on strengthening the wheat and soy value chain, to reduce post-harvest losses and create market linkages, and to support fortification of soy and wheat and starting the in-country production of fortified food supplements
<b>SO5:</b> National and subnational institutions have a strengthened policy approach to food security and nutrition by 2022	
<b>Activity 6:</b> Provide support to government officials and partners in enhancing the coherence of the zero-hunger policy, particularly related to social protection, and the recognition of zero hunger as a development priority	This activity has a focus on policy coherence and includes providing support to the Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Agenda (AFSeN-A), developing the strategic framework on social protection engagement, supporting joint approaches towards shock-responsive social safety nets, emergency response and resilience building, rolling out a social safety net pilot in Badghis Province; and evidence generation on WFP peace contribution based on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus (the triple nexus).
<b>SO6:</b> The humanitarian community has enhanced capacity to respond to needs throughout the country through 2022	
<b>Activity 7:</b> Provide SCOPE, supply chain, information and communication technology (ICT) and information management and provision services to partners	Promote effective field operations and to enable the Government and the broader humanitarian and development community to respond better to the needs of affected populations
<b>Activity 8:</b> Provide humanitarian air services to partners until appropriate alternatives become available	Through the management of the United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS), WFP transports people engaged in humanitarian and development support and cargo throughout Afghanistan.

45. The CSP was based on the Zero Hunger Strategic Review (ZHSR) (see Annex 8). It was also developed reflecting recommendations of the PRRO mid-term evaluation (March 2016), enshrining two strategic opportunities:

- Leveraging its current core activities to take a more transformative approach, using the opportunity: i) to enter more deliberately into the development domain; ii) to make conscious links between and across the humanitarian, development and peace efforts of WFP; and iii) to partner with communities, United Nations agencies, authorities and others in an inclusive, empowering and gender-transformative manner for greater impact.
- Exploring new, potentially strategic areas of engagement that are emerging, making use of: i) the reformulation of the UNDAF into One UN for Afghanistan; ii) the AFSeN and Scaling Up Nutrition initiatives; and iii) the onset of discussions about social protection in the country.

46. As compared to the PRROs preceding the CSP, three strategic shifts were foreseen: i) more sustainable solutions in strategic areas, emphasizing not only emergency response, but also resilient livelihoods, and complementing the treatment of malnutrition with prevention; ii) transformational linkages in strategic results; and iii) comprehensive national-led framing of all strategic results. These strategic shifts should help WFP ensure that the activities are not implemented in isolation, but that the CSP is implemented as a programme that benefits from mutual influences across activities, and where the outcomes would ultimately be of a more long-term nature. The CSP was also meant to allow transformational linkages among strategic areas and a more comprehensive framing of all strategic areas by supporting policy coherence. Thus, WFP expected to be able to better contribute to the country's broader, long-term goals by supporting efforts at the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (the triple nexus).


47. The strategic outcomes are linked through various SDGs to WFP Strategic Result 1 (SR 1) “everyone has access to food”, SR 2 “no one suffers from malnutrition”, SR 4 “food systems are sustainable” and SR 6 “policies to support sustainable development are coherent”. These strategic results one by one would contribute to WFP Strategic Objective 1 (end hunger by protecting access to food), Strategic Objective 2 (improve nutrition), Strategic Objective 3 (achieve food security) and Strategic Objective 4 (support SDG implementation). Through strategic results 1, 2 and 4 and strategic objectives 1, 2 and 3, a contribution

would be made in Afghanistan to WFP Strategic Goal 1 “support countries to achieve zero hunger”. Strategic result 6 and strategic objective 4 contribute to Strategic Goal 2 “partner to support implementation of the SDGs”.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> “Revised Corporate Results Framework (2017-2021)” (WFP/EB.2/2018/5-B/Rev.1).

Figure 5: Reconstructed theory of change for the WFP Afghanistan CSP



Source: Particip GmbH evaluation team (February 2021), drawing from the CSP line of sight and validated by the country office.



### 1.3.2 Cross-cutting issues

48. The CSP was also designed to address cross-cutting issues of GEEW, environment, protection and accountability to affected populations.<sup>74</sup>

49. **GEEW:** The CSP's Gender and Age Marker Design code is 3. Under SO2, WFP pursued a gender-transformative approach by conducting gender analyses and consultations with affected populations for programming conditional food or cash assistance. Under vocational training, the vast majority were women. Under SO3 in a pilot project in two provinces, secondary schoolgirl students receive cash-based assistance every month to help their families cover food needs. Under SO4, WFP piloted enhancing the capacity of women in rural areas through self-help groups and established kitchen gardens for households headed by women. Moreover, WFP supports the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in distributing information on sexual and reproductive health and gender-based violence.

50. **Protection:** In 2019, WFP started rolling out the Right Way Guidelines. These provide guidelines for WFP and cooperating partners' staff on protection, accountability to affected populations, gender and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA). WFP also produced culturally sensitive communications material and raised awareness on the risks faced by marginalized groups, including people with disabilities.

51. **Accountability to affected populations:** WFP has set up a number of complaint and feedback mechanisms (CFM) for beneficiaries, including a hotline that is well used. Printed material is distributed among beneficiaries and WFP staff and partners are trained.

52. **Environment:** WFP intends to contribute to minimizing burning fossil fuels by setting up solar systems in its offices.

### 1.3.3 Engagement modalities

53. For delivering food assistance to beneficiaries (under SO1, SO2 and SO3), WFP has used vouchers, cash assistance and in-kind food assistance. Under PRRO 200447 in 2016 and 2017, food, cash, electronic vouchers and pre-paid cards were used. During 2018-2020, cash and vouchers were distributed (under SO1 and SO2). As for in-kind food, WFP distributed wheat flour, lipid-based nutrient supplements (LNS), wheat-soy blend with sugar (SuperCereal), vegetable oil, split peas iodized salt and high energy biscuits. Since 2018, WFP has purchased fortified wheat flour (the largest single food component) from eight mills and in 2019 received 60,000 metric tons of wheat from the strategic grain reserve to meet the requirement for fortified wheat flour.

54. Capacity strengthening as an engagement modality is central to the CSP. In particular, it is explicit in the framing of Activity 3 (provide capacity strengthening to emergency preparedness institutions) and is stated as the primary modality for achievement of Activity 5 (emphasis on enhancing the country's food systems rather than producing any specific products). At the higher level, it is expressed in SO5 (national and subnational institutions have a strengthened policy approach to food security and nutrition). It is also explicit in SO6 (the humanitarian community has enhanced capacity to respond to needs throughout the country).

55. The CSP notes a wide range of methods and engagement with partners to achieve capacity strengthening. At a strategic level, the current CSP is presented as the first step in capacity strengthening, shifting in the next CSP to emphasis on Afghanistan increasingly managing the approaches itself and then, in the final CSP before 2030, concentration on achievement of SDGs 2 and 17 based on the foundations in social protection and capacity strengthening laid by the previous plans.

56. For UNHAS (SO6), the primary modality is service delivery. WFP provides air transportation to partners to reach people in need in areas of the country where access is difficult because of insecurity, mountainous terrain and inclement weather. Using a combination of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters,

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
<sup>74</sup> Improved GEEW among WFP-assisted populations, affected populations are able to benefit from WFP programmes in a manner that ensures and promotes their safety, dignity and integrity, affected populations are able to hold WFP and partners accountable for meeting their hunger needs in a manner that reflects their views and preferences, targeted communities benefit from WFP programmes in a manner that does not harm the environment.

UNHAS reaches 25 destinations for more than 160 organizations, in close coordination with PACTEC International and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

### 1.3.4 Resource mobilization

57. Over the three years preceding the CSP, WFP Afghanistan had received on average approximately USD 150 million per year.<sup>75</sup> Calculating with a similar expectation for potential resource mobilization, the total budget of the CSP at the time of design was USD 718 million. As shown in Figure 6, the largest share was allocated to SO1, closely followed by SO2. In the design documents, it was foreseen that more resources would be allocated over the course of the CSP to SO2 and SO3, to create more sustainability, and 15 percent of the budget would be allocated to gender (gender mainstreaming and gender-specific activities) under each strategic outcome.

**Figure 6: Afghanistan original budget (USD) by strategic outcome (2018-2022)**



Source: WFP. 2018. CSP document.

58. As of June 2021, the Afghanistan CSP total budget (needs-based plan - NBP) stood at USD 1.037 billion and was 67 percent funded for the whole CSP duration (1 July 2018–30 June, 2022). The shortfall for the entire CSP (until 2022) was of USD 338 million as of May 2021. There were three CSP budget revisions focused on scaling up emergency response, nutrition, and humanitarian air services, in March 2019, April 2020 and September 2020.<sup>76</sup> Two subsequent budget revisions were approved in late 2021 and January 2022 to extend the CSP until December 2023 and increase the budget to USD 6 billion to address the acute food security crisis.

<sup>75</sup> USD 93 million for the PRRO, USD 28 million for the emergency operation and USD 12.9 million for the UNHAS, complemented by a yearly USD 15 million for its trust fund activities.

<sup>76</sup> Revision 1 reflected an expansion of SO1 (emergency response), SO3 (nutrition) and SO6 (UNHAS) for the severe drought, to accommodate for unforeseen increases in the number of people in need and the duration of the support. Revision 2 built on the rationale of the first revision and was aimed at expanding activities under SO1 and SO3 while adjusting food rations to ensure nutrition adequacy and consolidating the gender-transformative resilient livelihoods programming of WFP under SO2 activities. Revision 4 aimed to scale up the WFP emergency response (COVID-impacted people and winterization response under SO1) to meet Afghanistan's increasing food needs; and to enable UNHAS to maintain its essential services in support of the COVID-19 response through continued and reliable domestic services and an international airbridge (SO6).


**Table 2: Afghanistan original and revised budgets (2018-2022) by strategic outcome (USD)**

Strategic outcome	Original country portfolio budget (CPB)	% of original CPB	Budget as of BR01	Budget as of BR02	Budget as of BR04	% of Budget as of BR04
SO1	173,211,465	24.1%	291,346,164	339,181,416	413,859,856	39.9%
SO2	171,240,704	23.9%	162,628,211	174,195,192	175,057,320	16.9%
SO3	144,371,216	20.1%	171,238,066	179,955,829	179,981,501	17.3%
SO4	36,263,248	5.1%	36,263,248	33,438,583	33,438,583	3.2%
SO5	5,699,429	0.8%	5,699,429	5,380,850	5,380,850	0.5%
SO6	75,457,033	10.5%	85,197,361	77,597,516	83,218,635	8.0%
Transfers	522,612,985	72.8%	657,293,527	716,322,685	790,969,529	76.2%
Implementation	83,630,110	11.7%	95,078,952	93,426,702	99,967,216	9.6%
Direct operational costs	606,243,095	84.5%	752,372,479	809,749,387	890,936,745	85.9%
Direct support costs	67,739,046	9.4%	83,488,029	81,540,338	84,193,160	8.1%
Indirect support costs	43,808,839	6.1%	54,330,933	57,933,832	62,276,345	6.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>717,790,980</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>890,191,442</b>	<b>949,223,557</b>	<b>1,037,406,250</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: CSP original document, CSP revision narratives for BR 01, BR 02 and BR 04.

Note: The budgets shown here are for the duration of 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2022.


**Figure 7: Afghanistan CSP (2018-2022) allocated contributions by donor<sup>77</sup> (in million USD)**



Source: WFP Afghanistan CSP Resource Situation, June 2021.

59. Figure 7 shows that the United States of America have been the largest donor over the past three years with almost USD 335 million allocated, while the United Kingdom (UK) has been the second donor with USD 55.8 million. Out of the directed multilateral contributions confirmed against the CSP, Figure 8 shows that 71 percent were earmarked at activity level, and 17 percent at strategic outcome level.

**Figure 8: Afghanistan Country Portfolio Budget (2018-2022) - directed multilateral contributions by earmarking level (in USD)<sup>78</sup>**



Source: WFP FACTory - June 2021.

60. Table 3 shows that, for the period July 2018-May 2021, emergency response covered by SO1 was funded 95.4 percent based on its needs up to the end of June 2022 and used 76.9 percent of the allocated resources. The percentage of allocated resources against needs up to the end of June 2022 was relatively low for Activity 2 (36.3 percent), Activity 5 (35.5 percent), and Activity 7 (8.2 percent). The percentage of

<sup>77</sup> Total funds allocated as of 24 June 2021.

<sup>78</sup> Directed multilateral contributions (also known as earmarked contributions) refer to those funds which donors request WFP to direct to a specific country/ies SO/s, or activity/ies.

expenditures against allocated resources was particularly low for some activities, including 52.0 percent under Activity 3 (SO2), 34.4 percent under Activity 6 (SO5) and 30.1 percent under Activity 6 (SO5).

**Table 3: Afghanistan country portfolio budget cumulative financial overview<sup>79</sup> by activity (USD)**


STRATEGIC OUTCOME	ACTIVITY	NEEDS-BASED PLAN AS PER BR4 (2018-2022) USD	ALLOCATED RESOURCES USD	ALLOTTED RESOURCES / NBP %	EXPENDITURES USD	EXPENDITURES / ALLOCATED RESOURCES %
SO1	Act.1	413,859,856	394,804,713	95.4%	303,716,116	76.9%
Sub-total SO1		413,859,856	394,804,713	95.4%	303,716,116	76.9%
SO2	Act. 2	174,491,324	63,261,289	36.3%	54,770,816	86.6%
	Act. 3	565,996	279,018	49.3%	144,981	52.0%
Sub-total SO2		175,057,320	63,540,307	36.3%	54,915,797	86.4%
SO3	Act. 4	179,981,501	97,842,414	54.4%	64,840,660	66.3%
Sub-total SO3		179,981,501	97,842,414	54.4%	64,840,660	66.3%
SO4	Act. 5	33,438,583	11,868,200	35.5%	7,982,703	67.3%
Sub-total SO4		33,438,583	11,868,200	35.5%	7,982,703	67.3%
SO5	Act. 6	5,380,850	2,616,656	48.6%	899,210	34.4%
Sub-total SO5		5,380,850	2,616,656	48.6%	899,210	34.4%
SO6	Act. 7	15,512,545	1,275,176	8.2%	383,270	30.1%
	Act. 8	67,706,089	45,766,443	67.6%	37,546,558	82.0%
Sub-total SO6		83,218,635	47,041,619	56.5%	37,929,828	80.6%
Total operational costs		890,936,745	620,291,925	69.6%	470,284,315	75.8%
Total direct support costs		84,193,160	40,917,907	48.6%	31,469,238	76.9%
Total indirect support costs		62,276,345	37,962,675	61.0%	37,962,675	100%
Grand total cost		1,037,406,250	699,172,506	67.4%	539,716,227*	77.2%

Source: IRM analytics, data as of 31 May 2021.

\* Please note that the total expenditures include also USD 2,578,017 that do not relate to a specific activity and are not displayed in the table.

<sup>79</sup> The needs-based plan reported here is that as of BR04 and up to 30 June 2022. Allocated resources and expenditures are cumulative figures as of 31 May 2021.

Figure 9: Timeline of significant elements of context and of WFP activities



Source: Particip GmbH (June 2021).



## **1.4 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

### **1.4.1 Methodological approach**

61. The evaluation has worked under a mixed methods approach, included both deductive and inductive reasoning, and utilized a combination of primary and secondary data collection techniques. This included semi-structured interviews with 85 key informants, interviews and group discussions with 450 beneficiaries, three focus group discussions (FGD) with representatives of government departments, two focus group discussions with partners, an e-survey completed by six field office heads, and direct observations during site visits (Herat, Mazar, Kandahar and Samangan). These locations were purposively selected in consultation with the country office, targeting locations with multiple activities and accessible to the evaluation team. In addition, a desk review of various sources of reports was completed and a large set of data, including data from post-distribution monitoring and surveys conducted among various types of beneficiaries, were analysed (see bibliography in Annex 11 and list of people consulted in Annex 2). Information was triangulated across the various sources to validate findings. Table 13 in Annex 3 provides an overview of the main methods/tools that have been used in this evaluation, as well as additional information on the data collection and data analysis process.

62. Initial discussions with different types of stakeholders had been conducted during the inception phase to learn about their interest in the evaluation as well as initial inputs and pointers for refining the scope of the evaluation and informing the evaluation process and methodology. Also, the theory of change as presented in the inception report was validated. During the data collection phase, interviews have focused on a number of key issues within the jurisdiction of each person or group interviewed, according to the stakeholder mapping matrix (see Annex 4).

63. More strategic aspects of the evaluation have been addressed by a series of key informant interviews (KIIs) with partners both in Kabul and at the provincial level (Kandahar, Mazar and Herat), donors, government department representatives, partners and United Nations staff.

64. The evaluation has analysed how and to what extent gender equality and gender-transformative approaches have been included in the design and implementation of the CSP. It has assessed whether the CSP process and partnerships have facilitated further integration of gender considerations, and whether human and financial resources adequately reflected the needs for implementation of gender concerns and priorities, in line with the WFP corporate gender policy. In the desk review and when selecting respondents, the evaluation team has made an effort to consider vulnerable groups to the maximum extent in order to address requirements on inclusiveness.

### **1.4.2 Limitations**

65. Because of COVID-19 restrictions, one international team member travelled to Afghanistan and joined two national team members to conduct the in-country data collection. The number of field site visits was reduced due to COVID-19 as well as the highly constraining security situation. In agreement with the country office, the field mission took place during Ramadan. The relatively short duration of the data collection (15 working days) has been a limitation in the implementation of this evaluation, in view of the vast size of the country portfolio and the large number of stakeholders as potential sources of information. Considering the expectations and importance of the evaluation, the evaluation team focused on strategic parts of the portfolio.

66. The evaluation team has mitigated this risk by conducting simultaneous online interviews with key stakeholders and face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries, partners and WFP staff in Afghanistan. Internet connectivity in Afghanistan was an issue for online interviews, especially in government offices. Some of the interviews had to be rescheduled a couple of times for that reason. However, most of the respondents made themselves available and engaged with the evaluation team. Where various team members needed information from the same stakeholders, two or more team members participated, or when this was not possible, extensive minutes were shared. Information was triangulated across various sources to validate the findings presented in the report. When findings are based on one source of information or on anecdotal evidence, this is explicitly stated in the report.

### 1.4.3 Ethical considerations

67. The Evaluation was aligned with the 2020 United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) ethical guidelines. Particip and the external evaluation team ensured that: i) the informed consent of interviewees was obtained, ii) the privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of interviewees were protected, iii) cultural sensitivity was taken into account, iv) the autonomy of participants was respected, v) there was fair recruitment of participants (including women and socially excluded groups); and vi) the evaluation resulted in no harm to participants or their communities.

68. All evaluation team members were independent from WFP operations in Afghanistan and free from conflict of interest. All interviews conducted have been confidential and used for the sole purpose of this evaluation.<sup>80</sup> All evaluation team members have abided by the UNEG Norms and Standards, Ethical Guidelines and Pledge of Ethical Conduct as well as the principles of “do no harm”. The evaluation team has signed a confidentiality statement.

### 1.4.4 Evaluation matrix

69. The evaluation matrix (see Annex 4) is the result of a thorough examination of the evaluation questions (EQs) provided in the terms of reference, the CSP intervention logic, the stakeholder analysis (see Annex 7), consultations with staff in WFP country office, the regional bureau in Bangkok and headquarters, and a secondary reading undertaken during the inception phase. Annex 9 shows the correspondence between the CSP strategic outcome indicators and the ones used in the evaluation matrix.

70. As detailed in Annex 13, the evaluation questions and sub-questions have been further extrapolated into sub-sub questions within the strategic semi-structured questionnaire (SSQ), completed by semi-structured questions by sector. Both have been used as suitable for the respondent and his/her line of work.

71. Cross-cutting issues such as gender, protection, accountability to affected population and adherence to humanitarian principles and access, have been incorporated into the evaluation matrix as specific lines of inquiry under question 1.2 and 2.2, with their own sub-questions developed in the semi-structured questionnaire. Questions related to gender have been addressed to all types of stakeholders, and fully mainstreamed in the evaluation process. Furthermore, the team has assessed how COVID-19 has changed the needs and the environment in which WFP has been working, and what effect it has had on issues like funding, coverage and effectiveness and sustainability.

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<sup>80</sup> The confidentiality was ensured notably by scheduling individual interviews whenever possible, as well as preventing the participation of any person whose presence might make the interviewee feel uncomfortable or threaten the confidentiality.

## 2 Evaluation findings

### 2.1 EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT WAS WFP'S STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND PEOPLE'S NEEDS AS WELL AS WFP STRENGTHS?

#### 2.1.1 To what extent has the CSP been relevant to national policies, plans, strategies and goals, including achievement of the national Sustainable Development Goals?

The CSP design aligned with national policies and objectives, which are largely grounded on shared frameworks, notably the SDGs and the ANPDF.

72. The WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021) formed the corporate basis of the CSP, which was designed to address WFP priority targets related to SDG 2 (zero hunger) and SDG 17 (partnerships). In preparing the Afghanistan CSP, WFP actively consulted the Government and other stakeholders using the ZHSR as the main avenue for analysing available evidence and defining priorities. Details on relevant government policies are available in Annex 8.

73. The CSP has aligned with the original Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework 2017-2021 (ANPDF), with its focus on peacebuilding, state-building, and market-building, and its successor ANPDF II. WFP support has also aligned with a number of sector-specific policies.<sup>81</sup> The CSP foresaw specific support for the Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Strategic Plan (AFSeN 2019- 2023), which is a multisectoral platform, leading national efforts to address hunger and malnutrition. For the SDGs, the Government undertook a voluntary national review in 2017 that focused on six key goals, including SDGs 2 and 17. The Afghanistan ZHSR provided a complementary and more comprehensive set of recommendations for SDG 2 that were endorsed by the Government and supported by WFP.

74. WFP has sought to incorporate the principle of government ownership in the third strategic shift of the CSP, which concerns national-led framing of all strategic results areas. The mechanisms for coordination of the massive assistance to Afghanistan have long been established under a series of conferences and attempts by donors to meet the demand of the Afghan Government for adherence to the principles of country ownership and leadership in the spirit of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011). This includes use of donor resources to build national capacities and systems. WFP has fully adhered to the principles underpinning these initiatives.

75. As per the CSP goal, zero hunger was made a development priority under ANPDF II (2021-25). Among stakeholders, there is broad appreciation of WFP financial and logistical support as well as general satisfaction over WFP alignment with national priorities at the higher strategic level. Stakeholders at subnational level were primarily focused on practical rather than theoretical objectives.

#### 2.1.2 To what extent did the CSP address the needs of the most vulnerable people in the country to ensure that no one is left behind?

The CSP design was relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable people for emergency and resilience, as well as nutrition and cross-cutting issues. Vulnerability and food security assessments were carried out regularly and were found to be reliable. However, some types of beneficiary needs have been better identified than others.

76. The CSP design was relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable people (especially internally displaced persons and returnees), and was based on in-depth stakeholder consultations, including in relation to the mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues. The formulation of the CSP was based on a

<sup>81</sup> This includes the National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority Programme (2017-2021), the National Education Strategic Plan (2017-2021) (NESP III), Afghanistan's Girls' Education Policy (2019-2021), Afghanistan's National Health Policy (2015-2020), the Afghanistan Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (2011-2015), and the Social Protection Strategy (2008-2013).

comprehensive analysis of needs. For emergency needs, the CSP has been reported in general as very relevant, which has resulted in a tailored response to COVID-19 as well as in earlier drought response and secured assistance in displacement cycles. For resilience, WFP support aimed at developing assets responded well to both the needs of vulnerable households and the community needs.<sup>82</sup> Overall, WFP rightly put increased focus on the need for longer-term, multi-year asset creation. The evaluation has gathered high recognition on the relevance of the school interventions for increased attendance,<sup>83</sup> and targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP), which aimed at treating moderate acute malnutrition within a short period.

77. Needs assessments have been carried out on a fairly regular basis and have followed standard procedures (for example, food security assessments and Integrated Phase Classifications twice per year). Various complementary needs assessments (vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) and assessments reports and more specific food security assessments) have generally been accurate, reliable and frequent and have been carried out in collaboration with relevant stakeholders as Table 4 summarizes. An important challenge that was made explicit from a UNHCR/WFP Joint Refugee Survey in 2017 and a Joint Assessment Mission carried out in August 2018 is the need to tailor the support to the specific needs of refugees and their families in order to transition to activities and modalities that strengthen refugee self-reliance from 2019 onwards.

78. Although WFP targeted in priority all the most vulnerable groups,<sup>84</sup> many interviewees noted that some types of beneficiary needs had been better identified than others. Gender-sensitive targeting, and unconditional support and cash-based transfers (CBTs) to seasonally food-insecure households, were well captured, vulnerability in urban and peri-urban areas was considered and asset selection responded to mixed preferences from beneficiaries, requests from community development councils (CDCs) and community-based participatory planning. However, specific needs of internally displaced persons and single returnees were less captured. For example, most returnees from Iran are single individuals, who do not want a family ration. WFP is aware of this issue and has already taken it as a lesson learned.

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<sup>82</sup> Examples include flood prevention walls, irrigation canals and feeder roads.

<sup>83</sup> Selection of locations for school feeding was based on high rates of out-of-school children, low retention rates and significant gender disparities.

<sup>84</sup> IDPs, natural disaster affected people, returnees and refugees for emergency activities, vulnerable food insecure individuals for resilience activities and children and pregnant and lactating women suffering from malnutrition for nutrition activities (see also EQ 2).

**Table 4: List of key needs assessment in Afghanistan during the CSP period**

ASSESSMENTS	ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED	2016-2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Afghanistan Living Condition Survey (ALCS)	NSIA	x				
Pre-harvest assessment	MAIL, NSIA	x	x	x	x	x
Seasonal food security assessment (SFSA)	WFP-FAO-MAIL-NSIA-UNDP	x	x	x	x	x
Integrated context analysis (ICA)	WFP	x		x		
Pre-Lean Season Assessment	WFP			x	x	
Cost of Diet (CotD) food price data collection	WFP			x		
Price data collection (monthly basis)	WFP	x	x	x	x	x
IPC	MAIL, IPC, FAO, WFP	x	x	x	x	x
Agricultural prospective report	MAIL, NSIA			x		
Emergency food security assessment	MAIL, Food Security Cluster		x			
Early warning reports (monthly basis)	WFP	x	x	x	x	x
Rapid emergency assessments (monthly basis)	WFP	x	x	x	x	x
Macro-financial assessment	WFP			x		

Source: WFP-e-library and adapted by the evaluation team.

79. Targeting was done at different levels - regional, provincial/community, household and individual levels - across the different strategic outcomes. Targeting has been generally reported as fair with joint assessment teams and door-to-door beneficiary selection with the Government, cooperating partners and monitors. Geographical targeting for all CSP activities took place in coordination also with the relevant clusters based on low malnutrition and food security indicators to identify the provinces with the highest hunger problems. Specific targeting criteria varied by activity and considered potential characteristics of vulnerability.<sup>85</sup>

### 2.1.3 To what extent has the strategic positioning of WFP remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP considering changing context, national capacities and needs?

WFP adapted relatively well to the changing context and is strategically well positioned to respond at scale and with speed to increasing humanitarian needs. The CSP included relevant activities to support resilience building but there is no strong evidence that WFP had a comprehensive approach identifying in a holistic manner how WFP activities, complemented with interventions from partners, would enable the most vulnerable people as well as communities to better absorb, adapt and transform in the face of shocks and stressors. WFP resilience building efforts were further hindered by limited donor interest in supporting WFP ambition as well as a challenging context of pervasive conflict and increasing fragility.

80. **Considering the difficulties, WFP has been able to adapt adequately to new and/or changing needs throughout the CSP period** in which the targeting criteria have remained valid, with continued focus on emergency response<sup>86</sup> but with a view to longer-term approaches and activities. Indeed, the evaluation has shown that - in the face of huge needs that have continually increased since 2018 due to conflict, displacement, natural disasters and COVID-19 - prioritization of the most vulnerable people within

<sup>85</sup> "Afghanistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022)" (WFP/EB.A/2018/8-A/1).

<sup>86</sup> The IPC analysis of November 2020 estimated that 16.9 million people (42 percent of the population) faced emergency or crisis levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phases 3 and 4) between November 2020 and March 2021.

the most vulnerable areas becomes extremely difficult not only for WFP, but also for cooperating partners (CPs), the Government, and community leaders.

81. Strong capacity in emergency response gives WFP a significant comparative advantage in adapting to changes in the context at scale and with speed. Various stakeholders highlighted the reliability of the WFP humanitarian supply chain and the strength of its presence on the ground in response to the increasing humanitarian needs during the CSP period. This was exemplified in the response to severe drought and increasing displacement due to conflict, which have often been in remote and hard-to-reach areas. Creation of the Access Unit is an example of WFP strategically positioning itself to strengthen its conflict-sensitivity and ability to negotiate access based on the principle of neutrality, and thereby respond speedily. Most recently, the ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic has further exemplified the unique ability of WFP to respond quickly and at scale.

82. There was no evidence that WFP had developed a comprehensive approach to identifying how WFP activities complemented with interventions from partners would contribute to resilience building beyond the individual level. As the WFP Policy on Building Resilience for Food Security and Nutrition (2015) highlights: “no single activity on its own will effectively build resilience, WFP should ensure that its activities complement the resilience building programmes of other actors”. While the CSP includes resilience building within its strategic outcomes (SO2-SO6) and aims at addressing both the immediate causes of vulnerability, food insecurity and malnutrition at the community level while tackling longer-term systemic issues at the country level, the evaluation could not find strong evidence that WFP had developed a comprehensive approach to identifying in a holistic manner how WFP activities, complemented with interventions from partners, would enable the most vulnerable people as well as communities to better absorb, adapt and transform in the face of shocks and stressors. This echoes the finding of WFP corporate strategic evaluation that, although resilience is at the heart of the WFP strategic response to protracted crises, there is no clear, coherent framework to advance resilience from concept to integrated programming and measurable results.<sup>87</sup> In the context of pervasive conflict and increasing fragility, some donors have been hesitant to fund WFP resilience building interventions.<sup>88</sup> As a result, the WFP financial contribution to resilience in Afghanistan has been small, especially in comparison with the far larger and significantly better funded efforts of government and multiple development partners especially in the rural-oriented national priority projects (NPPs). At a time of huge uncertainty about the future, it becomes even more critical for WFP to define a comprehensive resilience building approach in order to avoid resilience-oriented progress being pushed even further back.

83. The ability of WFP to establish clear strategic positioning on country capacity strengthening (CCS) has been hindered by the absence of detailed assessments of national and subnational government capacity. The CSP embeds country capacity strengthening activities within each strategic outcome. It also has a specific strategic outcome at a high level of ambition in terms of its breadth and depth. However, the evaluation team did not see any capacity needs mapping of stakeholders in relation to the specific results that WFP would like to achieve as recommended in the WFP country capacity strengthening toolkit. In Afghanistan, there are multiple analyses of capacity undertaken by government and development partners, which WFP could have drawn on rather than commission its own. Without a capacity needs mapping, WFP is less able to position itself by fine-tuning and prioritizing specific country capacity strengthening activities against the three levels (individual, organizational and enabling environment) and the five pathways of change identified by the WFP corporate country capacity strengthening framework.

84. A deeper assessment by WFP, with reference to government capacity for delivery of the national priority projects, might have drawn attention to the realism of expectations and the assumption of ownership and sustainability. Among the key informants, one stakeholder saw an overlap with government programmes, particularly in the areas of drought response, where a long-term sustainable development approach can be compromised by short-term humanitarian response. This triangulates with the views of some government stakeholders and cooperating partners who, whilst acknowledging and welcoming WFP expertise in emergency response, were more ambivalent about the relevance of certain short-term resilience programming, such as asset creation, which the Government does not have the capacity to

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<sup>87</sup> WFP. 2019. Strategic Evaluation of WFP Support for Enhanced Resilience.

<sup>88</sup> WFP ability to engage in resilience is wholly dependent on donor support and the funding is far greater for crisis response than for asset creation.



sustain when humanitarian assistance is withdrawn. A detailed capacity needs mapping might also have enabled WFP to articulate the intended phased approach to country capacity strengthening, identify strategic priorities and determine clear benchmarks as opposed to seizing opportunities as they arise in the expectation that future support will place greater emphasis on country capacity strengthening. Without this, and without reporting on country capacity strengthening across the whole CSP portfolio, it is difficult to assess how coherent country capacity strengthening has been and to measure WFP progress against long-term capacity strengthening outcomes.

#### 2.1.4 To what extent is the CSP coherent and aligned with the wider UN and include appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP Afghanistan?

WFP has used well its comparative advantage and strategic collaborations with FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR to support the intent of the One UN for Afghanistan programme.

85. All United Nations agencies are coordinated under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and in accordance with the document One UN for Afghanistan (2018-2021), which replaced the UNDAF. The One UN approach is based on recognition of the ANPDF, and the development planning system that underpins it, as the single coordinating structure for development assistance. This aims to focus all development assistance to Afghanistan around the priorities of the Afghan Government and along the principle of “Afghan owned and led”.

86. WFP co-leads the food security, nutrition, and livelihoods thematic areas with FAO. Consistent with one of its initial purposes, the adoption of the CSP contributed to the One UN framework that supports the ANPDF. WFP has collaborated most closely with FAO, UNICEF and UNHCR such as in the creation of and support to the AFSen-A as a multi-stakeholder platform and with the World Bank and FAO in social protection and resilience systems. WFP and UNICEF are the largest in terms of outreach of the first responders in a crisis and there is acknowledgement of the strong positioning of WFP in terms of access. Collaboration worked well in terms of joint reporting processes but was scant in terms of joint programming.

87. The coordination structure co-led by WFP and FAO sits under two development councils – the High Council on Poverty Reduction, Service Delivery and Citizen Engagement, and the High Economic Council – and relies on two mechanisms – the High-Level Food Security and Nutrition Steering Committee and the Durable Solutions Working Group.

88. WFP complements the ANPDF development-oriented efforts with engagement in the Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) under the coordination of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Humanitarian Response Plan refers specifically to life-saving activities and does not cover people in protracted situations. Combined, the efforts of WFP support the United Nations contribution to achieve the ANPDF targets and SDG 2. The formulation of the CSP reflects this objective well.

89. **WFP also contributes to the achievement of One UN objectives through its management of UNHAS.** In the face of insecure road access to large parts of the country and few alternative commercial flight options, UNHAS has enabled regular and reliable access to a range of hard-to-reach areas. During the COVID-19 pandemic UNHAS was able to run a Kabul-Doha service, which was much appreciated by eligible stakeholders.

90. Although the One UN approach has been demanded by and agreed with the Government, a government stakeholder who received support from three agencies (including WFP) highlighted that a degree of competition among them and the need to agree on roles and inputs with other participating United Nations agencies restrict the ability of all agencies to provide timely technical support.

## 2.2 EQ2 - WHAT HAS BEEN THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP'S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO CSP STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN AFGHANISTAN?

### 2.2.1 To what extent did WFP deliver expected outputs and contribute to the expected CSP strategic outcomes?


WFP substantially scaled up its interventions in response to growing needs resulting from the 2018 drought and COVID-19. Yet, funding constraints prevented WFP to reach the beneficiary target in 2019-2020. Donor earmarking and delayed and insufficient funding forced WFP to prioritize emergency response (SO1). The lack of peace and stability has also seriously limited the ability of WFP to contribute to longer-term zero hunger.

91. No theory of change was included in the CSP, but work has since been done to create theories of change for SO1-SO4. The CSP reflected on institutional, contextual and programmatic risks at its onset as reflected in the document as well as on the key assumptions related to its contribution to the strategic results. However, what remains unclear is the extent to which this analysis was regularly updated.

Overall evolution at output level

92. **Since the start of the CSP, WFP has been able to reach an increasing number of beneficiaries over the years.** Figure 10 displays the number of people assisted by WFP in 2016-2018 (that is, pre-CSP). They were lower than under the CSP and declined over these three years.

**Figure 10: Pre-CSP beneficiaries (planned and actual) by year (2016-2018)<sup>89</sup>**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021. Note: Beneficiary figures for pre-CSP operations may include overlaps.

93. In 2018, 2.4 million beneficiaries were supported under the PRRO, which ended in June 2018, and 4 million under the CSP, which started in July 2018. The combined number of beneficiaries for 2018 was higher compared to previous years.


94. Figure 11 shows that there has been a clear increase in planned and actual beneficiaries during the CSP (see Annex 11 for details on the number of beneficiaries, including by activity and residence status).<sup>90</sup> The increase in 2020 reflects both the growing number of people in need and the WFP strategic decision to

<sup>89</sup> Data for planned beneficiaries were not available for the PRRO in 2016 and 2017, and the EMOP in 2016.

<sup>90</sup> In 2018 the number of men was lower than the number of women, but in 2019 and 2020 this was reversed. However, the differences were not significant.

scale up its activities. Despite the overall increase, the percentage of people reached against planning decreased, influenced partly by WFP funding, which increased less than the scale of needs.

**Figure 11: CSP beneficiaries (planned and actual) by year (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021.

95. Since 2018, the vast majority of targeted beneficiaries under the CSP have been residents (see Table 5 and detailed information in Annex 11).<sup>91</sup> The next most assisted type of beneficiary was internally displaced persons, with an increase in both planned and actual beneficiaries in 2019 and a lower number, but much larger number than planned, reached in 2020. In 2018 and 2019, the number of planned returnees was much higher than the number of planned refugees,<sup>92</sup> but a larger number of refugees than returnees was reached (see Table 5).<sup>93</sup> Overall, the evolution reflects the final assessed numbers and severity of needs of the different categories.

**Table 5: Beneficiaries (planned and actual) by year and residence status (July 2018-December 2020)<sup>94</sup>**

Year	2018		2019		2020	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Residents	1,739,168	3,414,758	4,054,492	4,428,129	9,638,155	8,222,922
IDPs	496,905	493,473	1,158,426	1,036,110	350,000	596,655
Refugees	74,536	82,612	173,764	50,362	70,000	70,290
Returnees	173,917	8,500	405,449	44,814	150,000	134,695

Source: Particip GmbH - WFP monitoring data, ACR 2018, ACR 2019 and ACR 2020.

<sup>91</sup> In 2020, the COVID-19 response reached 1.2 million people with cash-based assistance in urban areas where households were most impacted by the economic effects of COVID-19. The seasonal support programme has increased from 328,000 in 2018 to 5.2 million in 2020 and included many beneficiaries in urban and peri-urban areas. This represents a major increase in life-saving assistance from previous years and responded to the assessment that 5.5 million (14 percent of the population) are in an emergency food security situation (IPC Phase 4).

<sup>92</sup> A refugee is a person, who has official refugee status on return (responsibility of UNHCR) and a returnee is a person with undocumented migrant status (responsibility of IOM).


<sup>93</sup> The large margin between planned and achieved returnees could be explained by the fact that there were not as many returnees as expected.

<sup>94</sup> Data for 2018 displayed in Table 5 only correspond to beneficiaries targeted during the implementation of the CSP, from July 2018.

96. During the CSP period, the distribution of food and cash has increased sharply, but, in most cases, has met less of the planned target each year. As show in Figure 12, under SO1, WFP has distributed 247,354 metric tons (mt) of food in total during the period July 2018 to December 2020. However, in 2020, the amount distributed was significantly lower than the planned quantity, and also slightly lower than the amount distributed in 2019. Cash distributions for SO1 were below the targets but have risen over the three-year period; USD 7.3 million was distributed in 2018 against USD 28.4 million in 2020 (see Figure 13). Over the duration of the CSP, food distributions have met 75 percent of the needs-based plan while cash distributions have reached only 50 percent. This is largely due to the large cash distribution shortfall for SO1 in 2020 due to the limited funding.

97. WFP reported that rations were reduced during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 due to a shortage of oil and pulses. Cash was used wherever possible and particularly in urban and peri-urban areas where markets could absorb the additional cash in circulation without distortions. In cases where only flour could be supplied, the basket was supplemented with cash. Despite delays and some missing products, beneficiaries under all strategic outcomes reported favourably about the quality of the food basket, although there were several occasions when the quality of the flour was poor.<sup>95</sup>


**Figure 12: Quantities of food distributed (planned and actual) by year and strategic outcome (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R014, data extracted in May 2021.

<sup>95</sup> This poor quality was a result of Afghan millers not following WFP procedures. The latter were also not always made aware that the fortified wholemeal flour needed a slightly different procedure to produce good bread.


**Figure 13: Quantities of cash transferred by year and strategic outcome (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R014, data extracted in May 2021.

98. Figure 14 shows a general increase in SO1 allocated resources together with an increase in expenditures.<sup>96</sup> Allocated resources and expenditures also grew for SO3. The figure presents information on the amounts included in the needs-based plan and compares them to the allocated resources. It shows a shortfall of funding for most strategic outcomes in 2019 and 2020, although this shortfall varies across strategic outcomes.<sup>97</sup> Across most strategic outcomes, expenditures fell short of allocated resources, particularly in 2019 and 2020. According to the country office, 45 percent of the contributions received in 2018-2020 were confirmed between September and December, making it impossible to fully utilize the funds within the same calendar year.

**Figure 14: Annual needs-based plan, resources allocated and expenditures by strategic outcome for the period July 2018-December 2020.**



Source: Elaboration by Particip GmbH using WFP Afghanistan annual country reports (2018, 2019 and 2020).

<sup>96</sup> The expenditures in 2020 were more than USD 60 million below the allocated resources.

<sup>97</sup> In particular, SO5 and SO6 did not need substantial funding and received sufficient amounts to implement the foreseen activities.

Note: Figures only include direct operational costs.

### SO1: Overall achievement


In the largest strategic outcome, accounting for 56 percent of the CSP expenditures, WFP effectively responded to drought and COVID-19 and supported emergency response capacity. WFP provided unconditional food or cash-based transfers to internally displaced persons, communities affected by conflict and/or natural disasters, returnees, refugees and seasonally food-insecure households. SO1 contributed to a short-term improvement or prevented a further deterioration in the food security situation of targeted households. In addition, WFP supported the development of national emergency response capacities of the Government.

### SO1: Achievement of outputs

99. Through Activity 1 (SO1),<sup>98</sup> WFP has responded to two major emergencies (drought and COVID-19) and supported emergency response capability. WFP provides unconditional food or cash-based transfers to conflict-affected internally displaced persons, natural disaster-affected populations, returnees, refugees and seasonally food insecure households. An initial drought response<sup>99</sup> was provided to 500,000 people in five provinces in the summer of 2018. It was followed by a major response covering 2.8 million people in 22 provinces on the basis of an emergency food security assessment (EFSA). The support continued into the first half of 2019 before the crisis eased. The COVID-19 response reached 1.2 million people suffering from reduced livelihoods, increased food prices and reduced purchasing power in urban areas in 2020. The combined number of refugees and returnees receiving WFP support gradually increased from 91,000 in 2018 to 207,000 in 2020.

100. Figure 15 below shows that more beneficiaries than planned received in-kind food under SO1 in 2018 and 2020, but the trend was reversed for 2019. In parallel, the number of beneficiaries for cash transfers increased and met the planned targets in 2018 and 2019 (see Figure 16). Actual beneficiary numbers increased in 2020 but were fewer than planned.

**Figure 15: Planned and actual beneficiaries receiving in-kind food under SO1 by year and gender (July 2018-December 2020)**




Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021. Total beneficiaries by SO may include overlaps across different activities.

<sup>98</sup> SO1: Vulnerable people are able to meet their food and nutrition needs during and immediately after emergencies.

<sup>99</sup> In 2018, drought-affected crop production in large parts of the country and 100,000 people were displaced to provincial capitals.

**Figure 16: Planned and actual beneficiaries receiving cash under SO1 by year and gender (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021. Total beneficiaries by SO may include overlaps across different activities.

101. Until 2020, food rations per household per month were based on 46kgs of wheat flour together with oil, pulses and salt, or 3,000 Afghan afghani (AFN).<sup>100</sup> Rations and cash transfers were supplied in full wherever possible but with adjustments to ensure the continuity of lifesaving assistance (See Figure 27 and Figure 28). Due to supply chain disruption in 2020 some rations were reduced when vegetable oil and pulses were not available. Also in 2020, many projects under Activity 4 were shortened, resulting in a reduced actual ration per beneficiary. A good example of partnership between donors, United Nations agencies and the Government was the use of grain from the strategic grain reserve; the government contributed 60,000 mt of grain, while donors supported the milling, processing and transport to drought-affected areas. Mainstreaming nutrition under SO1 was limited to providing these nutrition-sensitive emergency food rations.<sup>101</sup>

102. WFP has supported emergency response capability within the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) and other relevant institutions. Building on the World Bank assessment report on ANDMA, the office developed a multi-year emergency preparedness and response plan (EPR) strategy, which outlines external and internal activities that are respectively in line with the CSP and the corporate emergency preparedness and response plan package. Responding to the emergency preparedness plan and response strategy and to a government request, WFP conducted simulation exercises in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Bamyán in November 2019 to increase capacity of national staff on the emergency preparedness and response plan and on early warning.

#### SO1: Achievement of outcomes

103. In most instances SO1 activities contributed to a short-term improvement in the food security situation of targeted households or the prevention of a further deterioration immediately after the provision of food assistance. The consumption-based coping strategy index, food consumption scores and food expenditure shares were included in the CSP baseline and have been assessed in 2019 and 2020.<sup>102</sup> Targets for the indicators are set to be achieved for the duration of individual emergency responses but may not remain at this level by the end of the CSP. Values for poor food consumption scores are shown in Table 6, showing the reduction or increase in scores following the distributions. The coping strategy index and food expenditure shares follow a similar pattern to food consumption scores.

<sup>100</sup> Afghan currency, equivalent to around 40 USD in 2020.

<sup>101</sup> The in-kind food basket comprises of fortified wheat flour, pulses, oil and salt, as well as medium quality lipid-based nutrient supplement to contribute to the prevention of acute malnutrition among young children.

<sup>102</sup> Logframe Outcome Indicator Checklist – the Office of Evaluation.



**Table 6: Incidence of poor food consumption scores for SO1 activities (July 2018-December 2020)**

YEAR	ACTIVITY/ RESPONSE	LOCATION	MODALITY	BASELINE SCORE	PDM SCORE *
2018	Drought		Cash	41	60
2018	Drought		Food	46	76
2018	Seasonal support - urban poor		Cash	35	22
2019	Drought		Food	60	43
2019	Seasonal support - urban poor		All	35	17
2020	COVID-19		Cash	79	79
2020	All beneficiaries (except social protection)		All	41	35
2020	Social protection	Kunduz	Cash	43	51
2020	Social protection	Kabul	Cash	27	19
2020	Social protection	Jalalabad	Cash	17	20
2020	Social protection	Badghis	Cash	72	64

Source ACR 2018, 2019 and 2020 reported baseline and end of year value. Cells highlighted in green indicate an improvement in the food consumption scores.

104. The food consumption score was worse in the 2018 post-distribution monitoring than the 2018 baseline EFSA.<sup>103</sup> This can be explained by: i) the beneficiary group being more severely affected than the assessed population; ii) the baseline EFSA being carried out shortly after harvest when a greater diversity of food was available; and iii) the situation being aggravated by delayed food deliveries caused by the denial of access by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) for unacceptable bag markings.<sup>104</sup> In 2020, WFP and UNHCR conducted a joint post-distribution monitoring among Pakistani refugees, which revealed high persisting levels of food insecurity, despite having previously received a three-month food basket.<sup>105</sup> The evaluation team could not find reliable evidence in relation to WFP contribution to ANDMA's strengthened emergency response capability.

#### SO2: Overall achievement

WFP expanded SO2 interventions as planned in 2018-2019, but had to scale them down in 2020 as available resources were prioritized to SO1 and most food assistance for assets and food assistance for training (FFA/FFT) activities were temporarily suspended due to COVID-19. Where asset creation and vocational training took place, beneficiaries perceived strong and lasting positive effects. Food assistance for assets activities contributed to the rehabilitation or construction of assets selected by communities. However, in the absence of systematic monitoring of longer-term effects, there was no evidence of SO2 contribution to resilience beyond the beneficiary level.

#### SO2: Achievement of outputs

105. The WFP plan to increase the number of beneficiaries under its resilience programme (SO2)<sup>106</sup> was achieved, but the programme has reduced in scope (less work offered to beneficiaries, which translated into a 24 percent reduction in expenditures) in 2020. Figure 17 shows the emphasis put on food assistance

<sup>103</sup> Source: WFP post-distribution monitoring (PDM) reports and Afghanistan emergency food security assessment (EFSA).


<sup>104</sup> In general, beyond these problems with bag markings, NSAGs perceive WFP as impartial to the conflict and allows the organization access to the targeted areas.

<sup>105</sup> See discussion of this subject in the section on monitoring.

<sup>106</sup> SO2: Vulnerable people in Afghanistan are increasingly able to meet their food and nutrition needs on their own.

for asset (FFA) activities, where more beneficiaries than planned were reached, both under the PRRO and the CSP in 2018 and 2019. Figure 12 and Figure 13 above also show that quantities of food and cash distributed slightly increased under this strategic outcome over the period 2018-2019, and then decreased in 2020. WFP tried to maintain the same number of beneficiaries included in the construction projects, but the decrease in the duration of work entailed a reduction in the rations received. Beneficiaries showed great appreciation of these but would have preferred the original workplan: more work and more rations.

**Figure 17: Planned and actual beneficiaries of resilience activities by year, activity and gender (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021.

**106. SO2 activities have created many assets, but vocational skills training (VST) has been restricted.** Table 7 shows the range and quantities of assets created during the review period. The main categories of assets included are feeder roads, flood prevention structures, irrigation works and environmental measures to protect hillsides, including tree seedling production and planting.<sup>107</sup> Asset creation was fully funded in 2019<sup>108</sup> and has exceeded the plan due to a carry-over of projects started in 2018 (see Figure 17 showing that the number of beneficiaries was over-reached in 2018 and 2019).

107. In 2020, the number of assets created was mostly lower than planned as a result of drastic reduction in funding (from 104 percent in 2019 to 64 percent in 2020), or funding confirmed towards the end of the calendar year, and a suspension of most activities from March until May due to COVID-19. Moreover, not all available funding was spent. Similarly, vocational skills training<sup>109</sup> faced major funding shortfalls in 2019 and 2020 and activities were suspended in 2020 due to COVID-19, except in the south and east of the country. The dropout rates for vocational skills training participants were generally very low although slightly higher for men due to migration or finding other work. The asset monitoring system has been weak, with a focus on inputs rather than assets, despite the global shift in focus of food assistance for asset from food assistance to the assets themselves. Table 7 provides an overview of the key assets created or rehabilitated.

<sup>107</sup> The number of assets created over the period is very substantial with, for example, 1,337 km of feeder roads, 2,023 km of irrigation canals built, improved or rehabilitated and over 600 ha of gardens and nurseries established/supported.

<sup>108</sup> WFP. 2019. Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2019.

<sup>109</sup> The activities included a wide range of craft work and kitchen gardening for women and engineering skills for men.

**Table 7: Selected assets created (July 2018-December 2020)**<sup>110</sup>

	Unit	2018		2019		2020		Total	
		(Jul-Dec)		Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
		Planned	Actual						
Feeder roads built/rehabilitated and maintained	km	183	190	125	157	150	113	458	1,337
Volume of check dams, sand/sub-surface dams and gully rehabilitation structures	m3	615	625	2,000	3,108	40,000	29,338	42,615	33,071
Boundary/flood protection wall/dykes constructed	m	1,700	1,702	200	1,724	9,000	8,215	10,900	15,966
Water harvesting systems created/rehabilitated	m3			100,000	280,000	50,000	40,942	150,000	320,942
Irrigation canals constructed/rehabilitated	km	100	82	40	88	150	112	290	1,038
Irrigation canals rehabilitated/improved	km	37	40	300	392	450	504	787	985
Micro watersheds rehabilitated	ha					300	74	300	519
Drinking water supply line constructed	km	4	4	20	34	20	83	44	127
Small dykes and bunds constructed/rehabilitated	m	200	200	420	200			620	1,250
Tree planting or protected with or without water conservation	ha	821	821			1,000	1,128	1,821	2,618
Nurseries established/supported	ha	3	3		2	35	27	38	42
Gardens created	ha			2		300	538	302	590

Source: WFP. Annual country reports (2018, 2019 and 2020).

## SO2: Achievement of outcomes

**108. Beneficiaries of asset creation and vocational training perceived strong and lasting positive effects.** Beneficiaries mostly reported<sup>111</sup> an improved asset base and an improved protection from natural disasters through the newly created assets, and a better ability to manage assets through trainings. The assets are chosen through a community-based participatory process and beneficiaries confirmed their strong commitment to the assets. It is therefore reasonable to assume that, provided that the assets are not destroyed by natural disaster or conflict, they should continue to provide benefits and positive outcomes for the community for many years. One example observed by the evaluation team was a pistachio plantation in Balkh province. The programme has been running for several years and, despite the low wages received by participants, they were keen to increase their pistachio plantations.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Asset groups with small numbers are not included. Indicators have been merged where definitions vary over the period.

<sup>111</sup> WFP. 2020. mVAM: Post-Distribution Monitoring Report. Asset Creation Ghor and Kandahar. June 2020.

<sup>112</sup> They already collected and marketed wild pistachios so are familiar with the market and have also been planting new pistachio orchards for several years and are therefore also familiar with the maintenance required during the 5-10 years before the first crop is produced.

109. Vocational skills training beneficiaries gained both from improved food consumption and improved income from selling the products made, using their new skills.<sup>113</sup> Following a 2018 pilot programme funded by the private sector, WFP found that mentoring greatly increased the likelihood that graduates from the vocational skills training programme would gain long-lasting income from their skills – 50 percent of graduates were earning money from their skill three months after the training course.<sup>114</sup> A mentoring scheme was introduced in 2019 for carpet weaving to link trainees through commercial companies to markets and was continued in some projects in 2020. Toolkits provided at graduation were also reported to increase the likelihood of graduates being able to find work, but funding was not always available for this.

110. At an outcome level, the corporate asset indicators did not provide good measures of the contribution of assets to the resilience of the community.<sup>115, 116</sup> Without systematic monitoring of the longer-term value of resilience activities, WFP country office did not know whether the resilience programmes were achieving their higher goals. In addition, there was no evidence that the activities under this strategic outcome were nutrition sensitive. Although efforts were made to target women, despite social and religious norms preventing women participating in economic activities, there was no evidence that gender-transformative livelihoods support to vulnerable people, as Activity 2 foresees, was achieved.

### SO3: Overall achievement

Under SO3, WFP successfully expanded the moderate acute malnutrition treatment programme targeting malnourished pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and children aged 6-59 months to address continuing high global acute malnutrition (GAM) levels. Despite pipeline breaks, moderate acute malnutrition treatment was effective. Funding constraints did not allow WFP to scale up the stunting prevention programme. Nevertheless, WFP initiated the development of an SBCC strategy and a campaign under the school feeding and moderate acute malnutrition treatment programmes. This contributed to improve nutrition behaviour and GEEW. Insufficient funding and limited government commitment to the AFSeN-A prevented WFP from fully rolling out SBCC activities. A small-scale school feeding programme in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces worked well.

### SO3: Achievement of outputs

111. WFP scaled up the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition in response to the increased prevalence of global acute malnutrition, reaching far more malnourished children aged 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women than originally planned. The treatment of moderate acute malnutrition as part of the Government's Basic Package of Health Services was implemented pre-CSP in six "high return" districts of Nangarhar Province in 2017; in 2018, 27 provinces with high global acute malnutrition rates were reached; 24 provinces in 2019 and 30 provinces in 2020. Pregnant and lactating women received fortified blended food, while children received specialized nutritious foods (SNF) to recover from acute malnutrition (see Figure 18 and Figure 19).


<sup>113</sup> WFP. mVAM Afghanistan Vocational Skill Training Midline Survey – Herat Province.

<sup>114</sup> ACE. 2018. Data Analysis Report - mVAM Survey VST Graduates and Ongoing Classes. April 2018.

<sup>115</sup> The recent WFP global pilot 'Asset Impact Monitoring System' includes Afghanistan. Satellite imagery can provide an objective measure of achievement and impact for larger projects such as reforestation and agricultural production. This has considerable potential although field visits are still required to allow accurate interpretation of the imagery.


<sup>116</sup> They provide only a guide to the number of assets/beneficiaries rather than the "value" of the asset to beneficiaries and are therefore closer to being indicators of output than outcome.

**Figure 18: Planned and actual children benefitting from malnutrition prevention and treatment activities (Activity 4) by year and gender (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021.

**Figure 19: Planned and actual pregnant and lactating women benefitting from malnutrition prevention and treatment activities (Activity 4) by year (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021.


112. In 2020, under SO3, 63 percent of available resources were spent on nutrition treatment, 16 percent on nutrition prevention and 21 percent on school feeding. Most nutrition-related work was thus done in moderate acute malnutrition treatment, which included nutrition education to participants. Under prevention, shock-affected families were supported with emergency blanket supplementary feeding for children aged 6–59 months.

113. The CSP foresaw putting greater attention on nutrition prevention under SO3, but this has not materialized due to various reasons. WFP started a pilot project aiming at preventing acute malnutrition at the onset of the CSP in 2018 but did not manage to scale it up (see Figure 18). Reasons included the continuing high levels of global acute malnutrition and magnitude of other aggravating factors (morbidity, food insecurity, etc.) that required prioritizing moderate acute malnutrition treatment, combined with the

lack of resources for malnutrition prevention. As WFP was shifting to cash transfer,<sup>117</sup> there may have been impact on nutrition from better cash availability, but less than optimal since cash transfer was not combined with sensitization.<sup>118</sup> WFP had initiated the development of an SBCC strategy and activities. The campaign is deemed beneficial not only in improving nutrition behaviour, but also in improving women empowerment and gender equality in the areas of nutrition. Activities have started under the school feeding and moderate acute malnutrition treatment programmes. A stunting prevention programme has been under development for some time but was not yet initialized due to lack of donor funding.

114. WFP has provided school feeding to increase attendance rates and lower dropout rates. In 2017, pre-CSP, considerable security and access challenges forced WFP to focus on the distribution of take-home rations in targeted geographical areas, where girls' enrolment and attendance were the lowest in the country. They were provided with an in-kind ration of 4.5 kg of fortified vegetable oil per month, conditional upon their attendance to 80 percent of the classes each month, for a duration of eight months. This continued until mid-2018, when the programme stopped due to lack of funding. In 2019, WFP re-introduced school feeding in partnership with the Ministry of Education. This time, primary school girls and boys in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces were provided with daily nutritious snacks of high-energy biscuits (HEB) at schools. In 2020, despite school closures due to COVID-19, the programme was enlarged to include cash incentives to secondary school girls in two districts of Nangarhar and Kandahar (see Figure 20).

**Figure 20: Planned and actual children benefitting from school feeding by year and gender (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted May 2021.

115. **Pipeline breaks seriously hampered availability of specialized nutritious foods and high-energy biscuits.** They caused significant disruption to the moderate acute malnutrition treatment programme in 2019 and high-energy biscuit stocks were severely limited in 2019. Vegetable oil and SuperCereal were also difficult to import during border closures related to COVID-19. Commercial high-energy biscuit production in Jalalabad failed despite long-term support from WFP. In 2019 a new supplier in Herat was successfully contracted to produce high-energy biscuits to meet WFP needs. The country office initially intended to support the local production of wheat-soya blend for malnutrition treatment, but this proved to be complex; it was therefore decided to opt for a gradual introduction.

<sup>117</sup> According to the country office, 8 percent of people were reached with nutrition-sensitive food.

<sup>118</sup> Though cash transfer helps people meet their nutrition needs, it would be more nutrition sensitive if it was conditional (for instance to health services or nutrition-sensitive food production) or combined with social and behaviour change communication (SBCC).

### SO3: Achievement of outcomes

116. The moderate acute malnutrition treatment programmes have been generally successful with positive results in terms of recovery rates. With the exception of 2019, recovery rates have been above the SPHERE standard of >75 (see Table 8). Mortality and non-response rates also met the planned targets across all years. WFP being the main actor supporting moderate acute malnutrition treatment, it can be assumed that its engagement had a strong contribution to this positive outcome. Minimum dietary diversity rates for women in moderate acute malnutrition treatment were considerably lower than target, despite nutrition education. Reasons given for this were the high food insecurity rates in the areas where they live, and the timing of data collection.

117. Given that the stunting prevention programme was not initiated, the evaluation team did not attempt to measure progress in this area.

118. An improvement in school attendance along with a reduction in dropout rate among both girls and boys has been observed in WFP-targeted schools (see Table 8). However, it remains unclear to what extent school feeding has contributed to this, since there is no comparison with non-assisted schools in similar contexts.

119. Reports from local stakeholders state that the SBCC programme related to school feeding was very valuable – especially in remote areas and the social pressure to keep girls at home had been lightened. The SBCC messages are carefully prepared to be consistent with Islamic traditions and teachings.

**Table 8: Outcome related indicators for SO3<sup>119</sup>**

	2017		2018		2019		2020	
	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual	Target	Actual
<b>Indicators for moderate acute malnutrition treatment</b>								
Recovery rate	>75	87	>75	85	>75	73	>75	87.3
Mortality rate	<3	0.11	<3	0.06	<3	0.03	<3	0.1
Non-response rate	<15	0.68	<15	0.21	<15	0.54	<15	0.70
Default rate	<15	5.3	<15	15	<15	26	<15	12
Minimum dietary diversity - women	N.a.	N.a.	>43	19	>43	20	>61	49
<b>Indicators for school feeding</b>								
Attendance rate boys	>80	85	N.a.	N.a.	>85	85	>85	91.6
Attendance rate girls	>80	83	N.a.	N.a.	>85	87	>85	91.3
Dropout rate boys	Not yet included as indicators				<0.7	1.1	<0.7	0
Dropout rate girls	Not yet included as indicators				<0.7	0.06	<0.7	0

Source: WFP - SPR 2017 PRRO 200447, ACR 2018, 2019 and 2020.

120. **Results in terms of nutrition mainstreaming have been mixed.** Under SO1, rations have been reviewed and wheat-soy flour introduced and under SO4, there was support to fortification. Under SO5, WFP support to the AFSeN-A can be seen as helpful to mainstreaming nutrition and stunting prevention, provided sufficient focus is maintained on nutrition and the work can be successfully continued in the coming years. However, a criticism from the Government is that WFP did not provide high quality technical assistance to enable deeper understanding of nutrition, offering little more capacity than already exists. WFP furthermore worked with UNICEF and FAO to ensure that future emergency response projects will be implemented with a nutrition-sensitive lens and supported the World Bank with data sets on food and nutrition insecurity or geographical targeting of the most food- and nutrition-insecure families.

121. Under SO2, nutrition mainstreaming is highly limited, only kitchen gardens may have contributed, but the activity is very small-scale. Regular school feeding could be seen as nutrition sensitive since the biscuits

<sup>119</sup> Green cells indicate targets were achieved.



provided were fortified, but the cash grant for girls was not, as it was not coupled with SBCC activities as foreseen.

122. The main staple is wheat, therefore WFP support to fortification is beneficial. As long as affordability remains an issue, WFP support to fortification (see details on SO4 below) and encouraging households to buy and consume high protein soy flour is seen as valuable, but small-scale. Advocacy and support to policy development may help a gradual scaling up. The Fill the Nutrient Gap analysis that was done in 2020 also identified wheat flour fortification as having an immense potential to improve consumption of micronutrients and reducing the cost of a nutritious diet of households. The situation in Afghanistan may not be conducive yet, however, in order for such fortification to reach an adequate scale. As long as this is the case, WFP providing fortified flour in its food basket may be the second-best option.

#### SO4: Overall achievement

Under SO4, WFP support to wheat flour fortification was successful in terms of production by mills. In addition, WFP support to smallholder farmers to produce soya flour through training and provision of agricultural inputs, post-harvest storage and processing along with WFP work on consumer awareness and market development were reported as positive by cooperating partners and government representatives. The activities were generally successful at achieving the SO4 goal of increasing availability of nutritious food and contributing to enhanced food security at the local level, although their scale was insufficient to induce significant change at the national level.

#### SO4: Achievement of outputs

123. Despite limited funding and the drought that resulted in reduced yields, WFP was able to implement a range of capacity strengthening activities leading to the production of fortified flour to meet WFP needs. In 2018, 32 flour mills were supported in six provinces and WFP purchased fortified wheat flour from eight mills. For drought response, WFP supported milling and fortification of wheat grain donated from the Government's strategic grain reserve (SGR) (linking to SO6 common services and platforms). In 2019 and 2020, WFP expanded its technical assistance from 32 to 39 mills, enabling an increase in annual production and WFP procurement of fortified wheat flour for its operations under SO1 and SO2. Under SO6 and linked with SO4, WFP also provided expertise for the construction of five steel silos and contributed to the strategic grain reserve institutional development, including governance mechanisms and a roadmap.

124. In 2018, WFP linked smallholder soy farmers to local private seed companies across 12 provinces, and linked soy farmer associations to processing factories to facilitate market access. In 2019, WFP continued to provide support to smallholder soy farmer associations and also trained 38 government employees in soy cultivation and soy food culture development with the aim of increasing knowledge among smallholder farmers on proper soy cultivation techniques, raising awareness on nutritional benefits of soy among women and encouraging soy consumption. The major implementation challenges to increasing soy production was the 2018 drought, which caused reduced yields for soya, while the limited availability of multi-year funding for development-oriented activities affected implementation of activities in 2019 to support both the wheat and soya value chains. During 2019 and 2020, WFP contracted a social marketing and communication campaign promoting the consumption of soya products.<sup>120</sup> Yet the soya production was reported to be still at a low level. WFP engagement in the soya value chain has helped harness FAO strength in supporting agriculture research and farmer support.

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<sup>120</sup> Chinar Media and QARA Group. 2021. Nosh-e-Jaan comprehensive evaluation report (draft).

**Table 9: Output results of capacity strengthening activities under SO4**

ACTIVITY	ACTIVITY TAG	INDICATOR	PLANNED / ACTUAL 2018	PLANNED/ ACTUAL 2019	PLANNED/ ACTUAL 2020
Activity 5 - Provide support to government and commercial partners in developing, strengthening and expanding nutritional product value chains	Smallholder agricultural market support activities	Number of direct beneficiaries receiving capacity strengthening support	7,200/7,700 (not disaggregated by sex)	3,793/3,793 (women) 8,345/8,345 (men)	9,300/7,500 (not disaggregated by sex)
	Prevention of micronutrient deficiencies	Number of govt/national partner staff receiving technical assistance & training	n/a	8/38	43/38
	Smallholder agricultural market support activities	Number of training sessions/workshop organized	30/25	4/9	20/27

Source: WFP - 2018, 2019, 2020 ACRs.

125. From 2018-2020, 27,338 (95 percent of planned) smallholder farmers were supported through training and provision of agricultural inputs to improve productivity, post-harvest storage and processing and access to market and all this builds on the work of the former “Purchase for Progress” programme.

#### SO4: Achievement of outcomes

126. WFP support to fortified wheat and soya has a proven potential to address micronutrient deficiencies, even if this is currently not measured. Further increase of production will depend on enforcing flour regulations and establishing a profitable market for soya. The single outcome indicator for SO4 is the “percentage increase in production of high-quality and nutrition-dense foods”. WFP reported in 2020 that it had achieved its CSP target of a 20 percent increase during the year although this only included wheat flour. If this is measured at the national level, wheat flour fortification has a positive effect due to the scale of production – 150,000 mt were produced in 2020, 90,000 mt of which was purchased by WFP. Increasing the use of fortified flour in the national market will require enforcement by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) of the law requiring fortification. The value of the strategic grain reserve was demonstrated in the drought of 2018 as a means of stabilizing the availability of flour, but it did not contribute directly to the indicator. Soya flour is a protein-rich nutritious food, and if it could be made widely available it would certainly contribute to SO4 and the indicator, but production levels are still relatively low. There is no clear commercial value chain operating so, despite the work done by WFP on field production and processing and the more recent work on consumer awareness and market development, the commercial future remains unclear.

127. According to the projects’ final reports<sup>121</sup> and interviews with government representatives, the programmes were generally successful at achieving the SO4 goal of increasing availability of nutritious food. Based on these reports, food availability and food security have probably been improved at the local level, although the scale of the work was not sufficient to induce a significant change at the national level.

#### SO5: Overall achievement

Under SO5, WFP supported the establishment of the AFSen-A, aiming at raising awareness among government and other stakeholders and fostering policy coherence on food security and nutrition. Through WFP policy engagement, zero hunger was made a development priority under ANPDF II (2021-25). There are other positive examples of WFP work to enhance policy coherence on social protection. However, progress towards institutionalizing AFSen-A was hindered by the lack of government funding and ownership. WFP corporate indicators do not allow a meaningful measurement of the effectiveness of the range of country capacity strengthening activities embedded across other strategic outcomes.

<sup>121</sup> ACTED. 2021. Tackling Post-Harvest Losses in Kunar and Laghman provinces, Strengthening food systems in Laghman and Kunar through reduction of post-harvest losses among smallholders and increased market linkages, and Afghanistan. 2021. Wheat value chain project completion report.

## SO5: Achievements of outputs

128. WFP work on the food security and nutrition agenda has raised awareness in government and other stakeholders but further institutionalization is still required. Zero hunger was supported as a development priority under ANPDF II (2021-25). SO5 focused on policy coherence, including providing support to AFSeN-A, developing the strategic framework on social protection engagement, supporting joint approaches towards shock-responsive social safety nets and rolling out a social safety net pilot in Badghis Province. As part of WFP support to strengthening the contribution that social protection can make to addressing food and nutrition security in Afghanistan, WFP funded a study to inform the development of a strategic framework of action for social protection in Afghanistan in 2019.<sup>122</sup> Yet there have been limited opportunities for short-term expansion of government-led safety nets due to a lack of political support. More recently, WFP has also commissioned research on social protection from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) aimed at contributing to the recognition of zero hunger as a "priority in sectoral policies, particularly those related to social protection, and support(ing) the development of national social protection policies and programmes that contribute towards greater coherence in zero hunger policy and implementation and building the triple nexus".<sup>123</sup> Also, WFP supported the Afghanistan COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households (REACH) project, which was led by the World Bank and the Government to address COVID-19-driven food insecurity. Moreover, with WFP support, the Government launched a social protection response for COVID-19 under the Dastarkhwan-e-Meli programme.<sup>124</sup>

129. WFP has succeeded in raising awareness of the food security and nutrition agenda, although AFSeN-A was not yet fully institutionalized. The slow progress of SO5 is partially explained by the fact that AFSeN-A is a multi-stakeholder mechanism and the design is ambitious. The lack of funding from the government prevented institutionalization of AFSeN-A as a permanent structure and hindered the WFP exit strategy. It was also initially difficult to recruit specialized technical assistance to cover social protection issues. Still, WFP supported the launch of a social protection response for COVID-19.

130. In terms of capacity, donors have been supporting countless capacity strengthening measures since 2002 in an intensive and costly manner, but most have not been successful in translating to more state capacity overall.<sup>125</sup> The reasons are many, but much can be ascribed to the profound effect of long-term fragility on institutional capacity, which is a constraint for all development actors in Afghanistan. In order to move forward important agendas, donors and implementing agencies have supported the establishment of various structures that have proved unsustainable without that support. AFSeN-A is a good example with WFP providing essential financial, logistical and moral support, without which coordination on food security and nutrition could not happen. Whilst this may deliver short-term outputs, it is fundamentally unsustainable.

131. An important reason for limited results from capacity strengthening, experienced by WFP field offices in their capacity strengthening role under SO5, is low levels of motivation in government offices. The result is that they find themselves substituting for or adding capacity by doing things on behalf of the Government rather than supporting it to do things itself to achieve agreed outputs. To a large extent, the choice to implement projects through cooperating partners is also capacity substitution but, with low staffing levels in the Government and challenges in access to NSAG-controlled areas, this has been the only realistic option.

132. Although WFP has various capacity strengthening activities across most strategic outcomes, these are not well reported on compared to quantitative outputs. Output and outcome indicators were introduced in 2019. In both years, at the output level, support for national coordination mechanisms was reported while policy engagement strategies were reported in 2019 and tools were developed at the national level with

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<sup>122</sup> WFP. DAI Europe. *Strategic Framework of Action for Social Protection in Afghanistan*. Technical assistance for Linking Humanitarian Action to Social Protection Systems in Fragile and Forced Displacement Contexts. April 2019.

<sup>123</sup> WFP, ODI. 2021. Policy-Oriented Research on Social Protection in the Context of Food Insecurity and Shocks in Afghanistan. 30 March 2021.

<sup>124</sup> This programme provided relief packages through community development committees to 90 percent of the population (those living on less than USD 2/day).

<sup>125</sup> Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2020. *Meta-Review of Evaluations of Development Assistance to Afghanistan, 2008 – 2018*.

WFP support in 2020. The outcome indicator: “number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced as a result of WFP capacity strengthening” was reported as 1 in 2019, 3 in 2020, and with an end of CSP target of 4. As noted by the synthesis of evidence on country capacity strengthening from decentralized evaluations in other countries, this indicator did not allow for a meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of country capacity strengthening activities.<sup>126</sup>


#### SO6: Overall achievement

Under SO6, WFP has supported the humanitarian community through UNHAS, which was highly appreciated as a unique and much-needed service. Through UNHAS, WFP was able to provide an international airbridge during COVID-19, when no commercial services were operating. SO6 has also expanded access to SCOPE, provided digital mobile radio services and supported the supply chains of other humanitarian and development agencies.

#### SO6: Achievements of outputs

133. In a context of conflict, poor road conditions, natural hazards, weak transport and communication infrastructure and limited options for commercial air services, UNHAS has substantially improved access. SO6 focuses on increasing humanitarian capacity through UNHAS and using WFP expertise and tools to promote effective field operations. All respondents acknowledged the comparative advantage and value of WFP in managing UNHAS. The total number of passengers transported per year was 24,800 in 2018; 27,000 in 2019; and 13,000 in 2020 (a lower number due to reduced travel during the COVID-19 pandemic). Figure 21 shows that the vast majority of passengers that benefitted from UNHAS were NGO and United Nations staff.

**Figure 21: Beneficiaries of UNHAS services for the period 2018-2019**



Source: UNHAS. October 2019. Brochure 2018-2019.

134. The percentage of respondents satisfied with UNHAS services surpassed the target (passenger satisfaction survey) and there was an increased number of passengers due to the drought response, although budget restrictions prevented UNHAS from operating all its planned flight routes.

135. Under SO 6 (Activity 7), WFP has granted access to its SCOPE system to UNHCR, the International Rescue Committee, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Shelter Now International to contribute to data harmonization. While extending such access to the Government needs to be carefully considered for data protection reasons, WFP is working with the Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees (MoRR) and Ministry of Public Health to improve their data management. WFP has supported digital mobile radio network services near its regional offices and, through the information and communication technology sub-working group, it works to assist the development of these services for the development and humanitarian communities. During 2020, WFP assisted 922 United Nations agency users and operationalized 19 telecom towers. WFP logistics and supply chain facilities were used in 2018 to support storage and handling of relief items for the

<sup>126</sup> WFP. 2021. Synthesis of evidence and lessons on country capacity strengthening from decentralized evaluations.

International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNICEF and since 2019 WFP has assisted in some deliveries of emergency supplies for the International Rescue Committee.

## Monitoring

136. **Outcome-related monitoring is challenging.** Vulnerability analysis, monitoring and evaluation has merged the assessment and monitoring activities of the country office. Although output monitoring appears to be comprehensive, the more difficult and time-consuming process of outcome monitoring has been implemented sporadically (see the outcome indicators' checklist in Table 19 Annex 9). Interpretation of post-distribution monitoring results is not always straightforward as external factors may influence food security and nutrition outcomes.<sup>127</sup> These include the change in conditions (including normal seasonal changes, change in conflict level, economic conditions, food prices, natural hazards or COVID-19) between the baseline and post-distribution monitoring, which may increase or decrease the level of food security. Moreover, the post-distribution monitoring results provide information on the targeted beneficiaries and cannot be extrapolated to the entire population, since insufficient granular data are available.

### 2.2.2 To what extent has WFP mainstreamed cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender equality and women's empowerment, other equity considerations and inclusion/disability)?

The CSP incorporated protection, accountability to affected population and gender considerations in its design, although there is room for deepening some of the analyses that underpinned its design. At implementation stage, WFP efforts in those areas were well valued by many stakeholders, while noting some opportunities for further enhancement. Although specific gender analyses were undertaken, there was no comprehensive gender analysis preceding the design of the CSP.

137. **Key protection considerations were made when designing the CSP.** The CSP design was informed by on-site support from the regional bureau protection advisor. Examples of protection mainstreaming in the CSP design include: i) enhanced focus on access to meet emergency needs of the various affected populations under SO1; ii) SCOPE registration of targeted households in close partnership with the Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees; and iii) systematization of the use of cash-based transfers wherever possible in line with gender and protection analyses, which suggested that cash-based transfer is the most appropriate modality. Under SO3, WFP intended to adopt a gender-transformative approach to nutrition informed by the "do no harm" principle; the emphasis on keeping girls in secondary school longer was also meant to contribute to delaying marriage and childbirth. Under SO6, a deliberate focus on SCOPE for wider humanitarian responses and national social protection, guided by protection and gender principles was expected. The CSP also commits to "adapt the Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidance on gender equality, protection and accountability to affected populations it to the particular needs of women, men, girls and boys, with consideration of persons with disabilities".

138. There was generally good recognition from stakeholders of WFP efforts to strengthen accountability to affected populations and protection during the CSP implementation. During the life of the CSP, the country office developed, piloted and rolled out the Right Way Guidelines, a set of checklists tailored for each strategic outcome enabling WFP staff, cooperating partners and third-party monitors to ensure protection and accountability to affected populations, as well as protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) and gender-based violence (GBV).<sup>128</sup> The roll-out was accompanied by training for WFP and partners' staff. In line with the WFP Protection and Accountability Policy (2020), WFP has established a hotline that is managed by a dedicated staff and has received many calls;<sup>129</sup> it proved to be very effective particularly in areas where access is constrained. Linkages between the WFP hotline and the inter-agency call centre operated by Awaaz Afghanistan were established. Feedback received from beneficiaries through complaints and feedback mechanisms (CFMs) have been mainly related to the quantity and/or quality of food rations, forced redistribution and issues with government officials. Gender-based violence or PSEA issues have hardly been captured through complaints and feedback mechanisms. Complaints were

<sup>127</sup> WFP PDM reports and annual country reports.

<sup>128</sup> WFP. 2028-2020, annual country reports.

<sup>129</sup> The hotline responded to 4,931 calls in 2020; 1,255 were from women and girl callers and 3,672 from men and boy callers (ACR 2020).

screened and prioritized based on the level of seriousness with some complaints being directly assigned to the relevant unit/focal point to ensure timely response and follow-up actions. The country office has also developed an online dashboard with analytical data on the calls received. Despite these good achievements, there is still limited knowledge among many beneficiary groups about these complaints and feedback mechanisms. Low literacy levels among beneficiaries further compounded communication efforts. In addition, limited mobile phone network coverage further constrained the use of the hotline.

139. Key WFP achievements in protection include: effective measures put in place to protect beneficiary data; the establishment of friendly spaces; basic distribution of hygiene kits; and the management of distribution sites with special care to preserve the safety and dignity of the beneficiaries. In the context of the response to the COVID-19 crisis, WFP reinforced its engagement with community-based approaches and promoted inter-agency accountability to affected population initiatives. For example, WFP has been actively involved in the development of guidance notes for collective messaging on how to prevent infection.

140. **The accountability to affected population and protection mechanisms put in place by WFP could be further strengthened notably to ensure that they are fully functional and accessible to all population groups including people with disabilities, youth and women.** Through the interviews, the evaluation has collated a few aspects where accountability to affected population and protection mechanisms could be further enhanced. While people with disabilities, youth and women require in-depth consultation, access restrictions and the fact that recruiting staff members who are women is difficult or impossible in some highly conservative or insecure areas have made some activities such as focus groups with women difficult. Additional staff – in particular women – are needed to respond to and address the multiple calls. In light of the limited number of complaints related to gender-based violence or PSEA being reported through complaints and feedback mechanisms, alternative options to identify such sensitive issues need to be explored. The accountability to affected populations working group was collaborating with the protection cluster on a pilot project to see if existing community-based protection committees could be used as feedback points. UNHCR has a hotline for protection-related issues, but there is no clear evidence that synergies had been established to ensure that most sensitive protection risks, such as gender-based violence, are systematically referred to the relevant actors beyond WFP and acted upon; discussions have started recently between the two agencies on how to share information on referral cases. A “perception survey” was planned for the end of 2021 to assess beneficiary satisfaction on the complaints and feedback mechanisms as well as seek the views from WFP staff, cooperating partners and third-party monitors (TPM).

141. Perceptions on the role of WFP in the protection cluster and the accountability to affected population working group have been remarkably diverse. WFP co-led the accountability to affected populations working group and was seen as a strong partner; similarly, WFP has been increasingly proactive within the protection cluster. While some stakeholders believed that WFP engagement was adequate, others believed that it should do more in line with its growing commitment and recognition of the centrality of protection. In particular, several stakeholders called for more specific engagement from WFP to work on protection activities *per se*, beyond the reduction of risks against safety and dignity within WFP interventions, but this would require additional internal expertise. In light of the limited evidence, the evaluation was not in a position to clearly conclude on this matter.

142. There was high recognition from WFP staff and partners of good management of access issues through the WFP access unit. Access has clearly been one of the main comparative advantages of WFP in the country. Beyond the use of specific tools such as tracking systems for delivery, WFP has been actively engaged in the field with cooperating partners, community leaders, NSAGs and local government officials to ensure assistance, including in hard-to-reach areas. Stakeholders have unanimously recognized and appreciated the positive contribution of WFP to the overall enabling environment and noted the need for renewed collective efforts to strengthen access negotiation capacity among partners within the humanitarian access group (HAG).

143. WFP has taken key steps to promote GEEW and many of the interviewees reflected that gender often came up as a topic in consultations with WFP. The country office developed a gender action plan to build the foundations for the promotion of GEEW in WFP Afghanistan; it covers technical capacity, political will, resources, organizational culture and accountability. In parallel, it established a gender results network composed of senior staff across various functional areas and responsible for supporting the country office



management in implementing the necessary changes. At the onset of the CSP, gender guidelines were developed and appropriate dedicated staff were in place. Staff were also trained on gender, among other things, through the Transforming Social Norms for Gender Equality training. Furthermore, most proposals for cooperating partners were reviewed on their gender sensitivity.

144. The CSP had a gender and age marker of three but the extent to which gender was mainstreamed varied across strategic outcomes and the effect at community level was less clear. Under SO1, gender-sensitive vulnerability criteria were used to target assistance, and gender-sensitive measures like separate waiting areas. Under SO2, women's empowerment was pursued by targeting women for vocational education. Under SO3, in the school feeding pilot project in Nangarhar Province, secondary school girl students received monthly cash-based assistance to help their families cover food needs. Under SO3, gender mainstreaming in the nutrition-specific activities has not been adequately pursued. The fact that WFP targeted women for the moderate acute malnutrition treatment activities may be seen as appropriate targeting of women and contributing to their health and well-being. However, this is not gender transformative, as it does not contribute to empowerment or improved decision-making of women and is unlikely to do so. Under SO4, WFP engages women as food producers which is laudable given the social and religious barriers to participation of women in any form of economic activity in some areas. Women farmers were included in decision-making, and provided with skills, training, and equipment. Self-help groups were established. While the aim was to empower women beyond this area of work, the extent to which women indeed had the freedom to decide over the resources they earned was not determined. SO5 was perceived as having mainstreamed gender, but the outcome has a broader focus on policy support, without specific gender-related activities. Under SO6, supporting the SCOPE system also had an influence on gender equality, since WFP encouraged women to register as either head of household or alternate recipient in the SCOPE beneficiary platform. Although specific gender analyses were undertaken, there was no larger gender analysis preceding the design of the CSP.

### 2.2.3 To what extent are the achievements of the CSP likely to be sustainable?

The likelihood of the continuation of benefits varied widely across the portfolio. SO1, designed as short-term relief assistance, did not have scope for sustainability, but there are a number of examples of sustainable actions including asset creation, vocational skills, flour fortification and some examples of government capacity strengthening.

145. **The likelihood of continuing the benefits of activities varies widely across the portfolio.** There are good prospects for some elements of asset creation, vocational skills training, the SBCC element of the school feeding programme and some aspects of SO5, but SO2 and SO3 represent only 23 percent of CSP funding (See Table 3).

146. The emergency response activities (SO1), which absorb most of the CSP resources, were not designed to bring continuing benefits and, in the absence of stronger synergies between SO1 and SO2 to enhance resilience of SO1 beneficiaries (see Section 2.2.1 above), they are not likely to do so in the near future. Stakeholders interviewed reported the ongoing needs of vulnerable people following the distributions and a risk of benefit dependency.

147. The assets (SO2 outputs) seen in the field were well designed. They could be expected to last several years, although unusually severe flooding or drought could pose a threat to water structures, agriculture and tree-planting investments. The Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) reported that it has a longer-term timeline for asset creation projects (minimum three years), which would present WFP with an opportunity to strengthen sustainability, since the Ministry could then follow up after WFP activity has finished - which is particularly relevant for agriculture and forestry projects.

148. **The clearest examples of sustainable community engagement were found in asset creation.** Activities are initially proposed by the community and, after review, are endorsed by community leaders and local government. Handover agreements are put in place in an effort to ensure the commitment of local government to maintain the assets in the long term. The reward offered to participants in creation of the assets is low, and thus the main attraction of the assets is their value to the community members. This has contributed to enhancing community ownership.



149. The work on flour fortification support and regulation under SO4 has the potential to become sustainable, but fortified flour is not sold at a premium so it will need enforcement of the regulations to ensure its continuing use. At present WFP pays for the premix, which is unsustainable in the long term.

150. Government capacity strengthening under SO5 includes emergency preparedness and response training, support to the Ministry of Public Health on food fortification regulations and development support to AFSeN-A. While benefits from the activities will remain, they are not enough to create self-sustaining units and policies without increased commitment from the Government. This includes a long-term, consistent commitment by the Government to providing the resources to develop and maintain skills (computer, language, data collection, data analysis and knowledge of humanitarian principles). Following the cancellation of the USD 21.5 million World Bank-supported Strategic Grain Reserve Project for Afghanistan, WFP investment through SO5 in this area is unlikely to be sustainable.

## 2.2.4 To what extent did the CSP facilitate more strategic linkages between and across the humanitarian, development, and peace nexus?

WFP commitment towards the triple nexus was evident; however increased insecurity and political uncertainty, along with donor earmarking, have limited the opportunities for operationalizing the nexus approach as envisioned in the CSP.

151. There is a highly recognized commitment by WFP towards the triple nexus at the policy and inter-agency levels with continued search for livelihoods and community recovery activities, but the politicization of aid in Afghanistan continues to constrain opportunities for building the nexus and poses risks for perceived neutrality and impartiality of WFP.

152. The will and commitment of WFP at the policy level is evident; however, the context of increased insecurity and political uncertainty have limited opportunities to shift towards development activities and operationalization of the triple nexus. Also, donor earmarking did not allow WFP to scale up resilience-oriented work under SO2, SO3 and SO4 that would have contributed to implementing a nexus approach as it was envisioned in the CSP.<sup>130</sup> However, the 2020 annual country report has reported a few important joint efforts. In early 2020, WFP and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) conducted a political and economic analysis<sup>131</sup> to inform the country common assessment (CCA) about drivers of vulnerability and common United Nations approaches towards nexus in preparation for the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), to be aligned with the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Plan II (2021-2025).

153. Linkages between and across programmes have not been perceived much in the field, except that fortified flour has been used for all food distributions (SO1/SO2 with SO4). However, in field interviews with cooperating partners and WFP staff, interviewees believed that there will possibly be secondary effects of community members being less likely to join armed groups if they do not face food insecurity (SO1) and have a more stable life (SO2).

154. Interviews showed that the following other factors could bring more results to the existing WFP commitment to the nexus: i) link emergency work with development more effectively and in strong coordination with the Government, for example, by improving livelihoods in areas where internally displaced persons are able to return; ii) secure development funds; and iii) maximize the potential of Afghanistan for agriculture value chain and reinforce social cohesion through community-based approaches and innovative practices. Although WFP had good intentions, an increase in humanitarian needs that call for WFP to focus on its humanitarian mandate has contributed to limited achievement. As WFP/IDS political and economic analysis accordingly mentions, Afghanistan's economic development prospects are relevant to all three pillars of the triple nexus as well as building resilience with sustainable investments given that "a strong and stable economy reduces the potential for conflict, although there is little evidence of this link in Afghanistan [...]. Humanitarian disasters and conflict can set the economy back by ruining infrastructure, stifling investments and destroying human capital".<sup>132</sup>

<sup>130</sup> This was expressed in comments received during the debriefing session.

<sup>131</sup> WFP. 2021. Political Economy Analysis of Areas Relevant to the Triple Nexus in Afghanistan.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid (page 24).

155. Unfortunately, progress on the nexus has been slowed down because of the deteriorating security situation and consequent donor prioritization of emergency interventions over resilience funding. Withdrawal of US/NATO troops will most probably be accompanied by cuts in development funding. Also, chronic donor fatigue due to poor results and a “wait and see” attitude for future governance have been frequently mentioned points. Nonetheless, rehabilitation of irrigation canals and purchasing locally are promising initiatives that merit further scaling up and study on their contribution to peace. The evaluation considers that WFP cannot / must not stop pursuing livelihoods options and community recovery activities in an emergency protracted crisis. Working with farmers, purchasing their produce and using local transporters are examples of relative successes awarded to WFP in its efforts to bring humanitarian-development and peacebuilding benefits. The WFP Afghanistan 2021 response plan is a clear proof of that, as it prioritizes scaling up resilience building activities, including vocational skills training and food assistance for assets, to sustain assets and support early recovery. However, the politicization of aid in Afghanistan continues to constrain opportunities for building the nexus and poses risks for the WFP humanitarian mandate in as much as it affects perceptions of WFP neutrality and impartiality.

156. **The nexus cannot happen until there is joint engagement between WFP, the Government and development donors.** There is a need for greater coordination and alignment of interventions between humanitarian and development responses to shocks. One cooperating partner went so far as to mention that “WFP and development donors are an ocean apart”. WFP was well regarded by several stakeholders for its proactive participation in discussions on the nexus, however, there was no common opinion on the matter. Whereas some humanitarian stakeholders considered WFP as the main voice on the humanitarian-development nexus with the Government, some government entities (and cooperating partners) claimed they have not been in any conversation with WFP about the nexus.

## 2.3 EQ3 - TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO CSP OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

### 2.3.1 To what extent have outputs been delivered within the intended timeframe?

Overall, most planned activities were delivered on time, although delays occurred in some instances as a result of external factors such as security, access, COVID-19, slow government processes and short-duration funding as well as internal factors notably delays in designing and implementing programmes through cooperating partners.

157. Delays in supplying food and cash on time have occurred throughout the CSP period but, overall, most planned activities were delivered on time, as reported by the Government and beneficiaries. Where there were delays, these were generally due to external factors such as insecurity, restricted or lack of access, slow government approval processes (see paragraph 158), logistics challenges and partners (for example, financial service partners and third-party monitors) not being ready in time for the planned activities.

158. In addition to pipeline breaks caused by funding shortfalls, those resulting from COVID-19 were particularly severe in 2020. For several months it was impossible to move goods from Karachi to Afghanistan, other borders were closed and there were several governments-imposed export bans for food commodities. These were difficult to mitigate as closures were implemented at short notice; partly as a result, the COVID-19 response was implemented as cash-only. No market distortions were expected by WFP or observed by beneficiaries or other stakeholders as all distributions were in urban/peri-urban areas near provincial capitals where strong markets exist.<sup>133</sup>

159. The short contract duration for cooperating partners made it difficult to handle long-duration government processes for approval/endorsement of distributions and asset creation projects. This meant that cooperating partners struggled to complete activities on time. Cooperating partners and beneficiaries stated that late payment for work carried out under food assistance for asset schemes was quite frequent and was particularly demotivating to beneficiaries.

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<sup>133</sup> This could not be verified as no price monitoring data was collected.

160. **The processes involved in planning and contracting new activities with cooperating partners need to be improved.** Cooperating partners reported several factors that affect the timeliness and overall efficiency of activities. Cooperating partners are given a very short period to respond to calls for proposals (CfPs) and are expected to be able to start work within two days of contract signature even although the period between submission and approval is often protracted. This weakens the quality of response by the cooperating partners and increases their costs. Longer periods are allowed for technical and risk assessment of infrastructure projects, but these are still insufficient for proper evaluation. The administrative process of working with WFP involves overly complex processes for agreeing on projects; data sharing is manual rather than electronic, excess discussion over non-critical details and a lack of clarity when email requests are sent rather than calls for proposals. Although the introduction of strategic partnerships has alleviated some of these problems, there remains room for improvement to ensure that activities are planned and contracted in a more efficient manner.

161. **WFP international staffing levels have varied widely in response to funding and surges in needs.** Funding shortages in 2016 resulted in 25 positions being cut (down from 46 to 21). In 2020, 19 new positions were created as a response to COVID-19 taking the total to 40: the number is expected to return to 30 later.<sup>134</sup> This reflects both the negative aspect of funding shortages on ability to deliver but also the flexibility to respond to crises.

162. **WFP has ensured its ability to continue operations by creating appropriate healthcare facilities during COVID-19.** During COVID-19 a clinic with an intensive care unit was set up with UNHCR, to allow stabilisation of WFP staff and their dependents. One international staff member was evacuated, and 14 national staff stayed in the facility until they recovered. WFP reported that lives were saved through setting up the clinic – particularly as the options for immediate evacuation abroad were very limited during COVID-19 and the main United Nations clinic did not open until 2021.

### 2.3.2 To what extent has coverage and targeting of interventions been appropriate and effective?

Targeting was reasonably appropriate, fair and transparent. Instances where local stakeholders attempted to influence targeting were reportedly addressed by WFP. Since needs were vast and funding limited, WFP prioritized life-saving activities under SO1 but coverage was often insufficient to meet the needs despite use of the WFP advance financing facility. SCOPE has aided programme transparency and beneficiary information and transfer management.

163. Geographical targeting and coverage of WFP assistance has been based on integrated phase classification (IPC) mapping carried out under the lead of the food security and agriculture cluster (FSAC). There were tensions in establishing a common view on integrated phase classification for each province in the past, but it now generally works well in combination with the integrated context analysis and other assessments.<sup>135</sup>

164. Individual targeting at the local level has been perceived as appropriate, fair, consistent and transparent and selection normally includes multiple stakeholders, including local authorities, cooperating partners, WFP and third-party monitors. Reporting has been along the standard categories of gender and age (for SO3) but not including people with disabilities specifically. Some challenges arose when stakeholders (particularly provincial line ministries and NSAGs)<sup>136</sup> tried to direct the selection process. These events, where identified, were reported by WFP to have been resolved. At the provincial level, occasional favouritism by community leaders and government departments' efforts to direct targeting were reported. These have led to some discrimination in the selection of beneficiaries, with the result that "not all that are selected are the most vulnerable".<sup>137</sup> Non-state armed groups are willing to allow emergency assistance and require less bureaucracy compared to the heavy government procedures.

165. **Agencies have different perspectives of vulnerability for selecting target groups.** IOM requested a clearer common understanding among agencies of how to define the nature and vulnerabilities of the

<sup>134</sup> WFP. 2021. Data from country office.

<sup>135</sup> Reported by FSAC member.

<sup>136</sup> WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report Afghanistan.

<sup>137</sup> Source: Interview with a United Nations representative.

different groups of targeted beneficiaries, which would facilitate harmonized targeting tools and approaches. As it is now, target groups of partners for natural disasters differ from region to region. UNHCR confirmed the lack of harmonization, vulnerability being defined by WFP principally from a food security perspective, while UNHCR targets individuals based mainly on their residence status and protection situation.

166. Since needs were vast and funding limited, it was impossible to meet all the needs through the CSP and prioritization of life-saving activities has been necessary. “The CSP covers most needy but not all needy”, as illustrated by an interlocutor. Prioritization is a challenge and there is clear recognition of WFP effort to maintain a link between humanitarian response and resilience from the CSP design stage. However, although there is full acceptance of the need to prioritize live-saving activities, the evaluation noted varied opinions on what balance/level of prioritization should be made between emergency response and resilience. Some stakeholders considered that WFP has mostly remained within its humanitarian mandate, placing too much priority on emergency response to the detriment of longer-term resilience actions where WFP has an important responsibility. Others considered that the WFP mandated added value should continue to be in emergency response based on its unique access and presence in most geographical areas, and that it is naive to think that WFP would be able to significantly contribute to creating self-reliance and ultimately bring economic improvement to the country. It was broadly recognized that WFP contributes to enabling resilience when it provides food assistance with job opportunities and social safety nets, but these activities were not really at the scale of enabling the generation of a market stimulation that would allow for job opportunities to have a longer lifespan.

167. **The response to COVID-19 was widely seen as a good example of adaptation to changing emergency needs.** According to a WFP macro analysis of COVID-19,<sup>138</sup> people in urban areas were identified as those in greatest need and SO1 (emergency response) was prioritized over SO2 (resilience), especially in hard-to-reach areas. SO2 projects stopped for three to four months due to access issues and safety. Under SO1, WFP provided seasonal support for COVID-19-affected families and, since 2020, two cash-based transfer projects have been implemented, which covered around 14,000 families. The evaluation noted that the intended strategic positioning of WFP to focus more on longer-term resilience has been therefore confounded by relatively greater funding for emergency response. Despite prioritization of SO1 activities for the response to COVID-19, additional contributions through the advance financing facility allowed WFP to secure funding for the moderate acute malnutrition treatment programme under SO3 for 2021.<sup>139</sup> WFP was able to foresee the economic cost that the response to COVID-19 would entail and developed a business operation continuity plan (BCP) at the beginning of the pandemic restrictions with contributions from the access working group, for security costs (among other costs), and for ensuring access for WFP and its partners to reach people in need. Also, the WFP strategy to support a government-led response to the COVID-19 crisis, such as the Afghanistan COVID-19 Relief Effort for Afghan Communities and Households (REACH) project (also supported by the World Bank) and the government response for COVID-19 under the Dastarkhwan-e-Meli social protection programme contributed to greater coverage.<sup>140</sup>

168. **It was widely agreed that the SCOPE system has improved the accuracy and transparency of targeting since its introduction.** The SCOPE system has been used for all cash transfers since 2020 and where possible, for in-kind assistance. The system uses biometric (fingerprint) and personal data to produce a database which now includes eight million beneficiaries. According to respondents, it has allowed for the removal of many duplicates and has prevented family splitting, therefore reducing double claims. There are, however, several drawbacks to the system namely: i) the system is slow to set up and can be cumbersome to operate at distributions, with multiple checking and cross-checking; ii) the mobile point of sale machines do not always recognize fingerprints – partly due to damage to the fingers of beneficiaries, or they may not operate due to distribution taking place outside the prescribed time window; and iii) NSAGs restrict the use of SCOPE and will not allow the recording of national identification numbers and telephone numbers. The SCOPE system is also made available to other agencies and data may be shared where privacy can be ensured, however, sharing data with government agencies, has not been possible to date.

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<sup>138</sup> WFP. 2020. Macro Analysis of Covid-19 threats to food security and Livelihoods in Asia and the Pacific.

<sup>139</sup> WFP. 2020. Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2020.

<sup>140</sup> This programme provided relief packages through community development committees to 90 percent of the population (those living on less than USD 2/day).

### 2.3.3 To what extent have WFP activities been cost-efficient in their delivery of assistance?


Although WFP is currently not applying corporate tools for measuring cost efficiency, it does carefully manage the costs of programme implementation including supply chain and staffing overheads. The establishment of third-party monitoring also contributed to cost-saving in addition to broadening WFP geographical coverage. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in additional costs which were beyond WFP control. Finally, security remains an unavoidably high cost to the programme.

169. **Cost efficiency is not currently assessed using corporate tools.** The alpha tool was used for comparing the cost efficiency of food versus cash before 2018 but it was stopped by headquarters. A revised system was introduced led by monitoring and evaluation but was also dropped. A new supply chain tool “Optimus” is now being introduced. Corporate benchmarking has also not been widely used, although it was reported<sup>141</sup> that the 8 percent of the WFP global benchmark for cash-based transfer overheads has almost been met following a competitive bidding process that reduced the overhead from 18-20 percent to 9 percent, despite the high security costs in Afghanistan.

170. The total expenditure per metric ton of food distributed (USD) and total expenditure per value of cash transferred (USD) are shown below in Figure 22 and Figure 23. The average cost of food transfers across activities 1, 2 and 4 reduced between 2018 and 2019 but rose again in 2020. The year 2020 includes additional costs related to emergency purchasing and increased transport costs for COVID-19. Activity 2 costs are higher than for Activity 1 due to the complexity of asset creation and vocational skills training activities. Activity 4 costs are the highest as the ration is primarily made of specialized nutrition products; costs further increased due to severe pipeline breaks and prolonged lead times resulting from increased global demand for SuperCereal and supplier problems.

171. Overall cash costs have been reduced from USD 1.28 in 2018 to USD 1.18 in 2020 per USD 1 transferred. This is largely due to the introduction of competitive bidding among financial service providers (FSPs).


**Figure 22: Total expenditure per metric ton of food distributed (USD)**



Source: CM-R014 for food transfer data, CPB plan vs actuals report from IRM analytics for transfer expenditure data.

<sup>141</sup> WFP country office in Kabul - Finance Department.

**Figure 23: Total expenditure per one US dollar of cash transferred (USD)**



Source: CM-R014 for cash transfer data, CPB Plan vs Actuals Report from IRM Analytics for transfer expenditure data.

172. Cost efficiency is a major consideration for procurement and supply chain decision making, but timeliness, security issues, government policy and donor restrictions may also affect the final choice. Headquarters provides options for international commodity suppliers and recommends the cheapest, provided that suppliers provide the same guarantees in terms of quality. Examples of choices include: 1) wheat flour is all purchased from national millers as this encourages the domestic value chain; 2) oil is normally purchased internationally but long lead times mean that it is sometimes necessary to pay higher prices locally to meet immediate needs; 3) within Afghanistan, commodities are transported by commercial carriers in secure areas as it is cheaper than using the WFP fleet. However, in insecure areas, the WFP truck fleet (which was recently augmented) is used as these do not have to pay tax to NSAGs; and 4) the main pipeline for international supplies is through the Karachi port and then by road but this route is often unreliable. Entry from ports in Iran might be more cost efficient but is not permitted for most deliveries. Options for northern entry points have been tested and are used when cost efficient but road and rail routes from Europe are long.

173. **The quality of third party-monitoring (TPM) has improved significantly since the start.** It was introduced in 2017 and doubled in size from 90 monitors under the PRRO to 180 at the time of the evaluation. Third party-monitoring has allowed WFP to access more remote NSAG-controlled areas, which it cannot access itself, and so enabled activities to be set up. It has also resulted in cost savings as travel to insecure areas involves high security costs and many restrictions for United Nations staff. The third party-monitors have also provided coverage in secure areas when WFP staff were not able to cover all the activities within the region.

174. **Security is a major cost to the programme.** The costs of the main Kabul compound are shared with other agencies; WFP also pays the costs of escorts from national police and a share of the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) costs. These costs are difficult to reduce without affecting the safety of staff and continuity of operations.

175. **WFP can rely on a large body of experienced national staff.** At the start of the CSP, 40 new national positions were created and programme staff were reallocated to units directly related to strategic outcomes. The total staffing was 470 personnel at the time of the evaluation. Highly qualified national staff lead the engineering and information technology units. Area offices are now all led by national staff, improving the ability of WFP to function during any future evacuation of international staff and strengthening capacity. The cost of operating area offices has been reduced as security coverage for international staff is higher than for national staff.

176. **COVID-19 has increased the costs of operation.** WFP has included facilities for safe operation during activities – masks, handwashing etc and set up a COVID-19 clinic for staff and families. UNHAS introduced extra flights to Doha when no commercial international flights were available.




### 2.3.4 To what extent have alternative, more cost-effective measures been considered?

WFP has carefully chosen the transfer modality depending on context, market feasibility and beneficiary preference and has progressively increased the cash-based transfer modality particularly under SO1. However, poorly established financial markets and low-quality services in Afghanistan have hampered the process and in-kind food has remained the prevailing modality.

177. **The evaluation shows that in general, WFP transfer modalities have been carefully chosen depending on context and feasibility.** In the CSP document, WFP affirmed that the delivery modality was to be determined by the principles of “effectiveness, efficiency, economy and safety”, but with the objective to increase the cash-based transfer modality until it represents around 30 percent of the portfolio by the end of the CSP period. Figure 24 shows that although in-kind food has remained the prevailing transfer modality for all strategic outcomes (reaching between 76 and 85 percent of the total number of beneficiaries), both the amount of cash-based transfers distributed and the number of cash-based transfer beneficiaries increased between 2018 and 2020. In 2020, cash-based transfer beneficiaries were accounting for 24.3 percent of the total number of beneficiaries (food and cash-based transfer).

**Figure 24: Total amount of food distributed in mt and total of cash distributed in USD under the period 2018-2020 of the CSP.<sup>142</sup>**




Source: WFP Afghanistan - 2018, 2019, 2020 ACRs and COMET report CM-R020, data extracted in May 2021.

<sup>142</sup> Under the following activities (SO1, SO2, SO3): Food assistance for asset, General Distribution, Prevention of acute malnutrition, School feeding, Treatment of moderate acute malnutrition.



178. Figure 24 shows that the overall number of beneficiaries receiving cash-based transfers under the CSP has increased from 614,878 in 2018 to 2,189,725 in 2020 (representing a 256 percent increase). The vast majority of beneficiaries receiving cash-based transfers were found to be under SO1 (85-96 percent), followed by SO2 (4-15 percent) and SO3 (0.4 percent only in 2020). Still, only slightly more than half of the planned beneficiaries could be reached with the cash-based transfer modality that year.

**Figure 25: Actual and planned beneficiaries of cash by year, strategic outcome and activity (July 2018-December 2020)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on COMET report CM-R020, data extracted May 2021.

179. The evaluation can confirm that the use of cash has indeed been prioritized whenever it has been feasible (market/services availability, preferred choice of the beneficiaries, dignity, the population is not put at greater risk compared to other modalities). Nonetheless, field evidence has reported a few occasional issues regarding the choice of the transfer modality, with the modality chosen not always matching the preference of the beneficiaries. For instance: i) some food recipients would have preferred cash for flexibility, whereas there was no clear reason for not using cash as their community was close to functioning markets; or ii) returnees were given 40-50 kg of flour but they had no means to transport it and had to sell it.

180. Cash is conceived by the majority of interviewees as the most appropriate modality to contribute to self-reliance. As a positive measure, WFP and UNHCR initiated a discussion on how to develop a community approach tailored to the refugees' needs. This WFP/UNHCR engagement is ongoing and is considered very necessary and cost-effective if done jointly.

## 2.4 EQ4 - WHAT HAVE BEEN THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED BY THE CSP?

### 2.4.1 To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, predictable and flexible resources to support the CSP?

WFP has been able to mobilize considerable resources but its ability to allocate funds according to the CSP has been significantly affected by donor earmarking, which has limited WFP flexibility and impacted mainly resilience activities.

181. The CSP has been a useful instrument to facilitate a holistic and integrated approach to the design, planning and implementation of both humanitarian and resilience building activities. WFP found the CSP a

useful instrument for clear communication with donors on the major strategic shifts and priority areas within the country portfolio. However, in practice, the evaluation observed that only one of five donors interviewed was familiar enough with the CSP to mention this as a reason for particular funding choices. In addition, while the funds raised for resilience slightly increased between 2018 and 2020, they were insufficient to fully meet the needs.

182. **Resourcing levels have increased between 2018 and 2020 particularly for SO1** (see Figure 14). However, needs increased even more quickly and could not be fully covered in 2019-2020. For SO2 and SO3 funding covered the needs in 2018-2019. In 2020, allocated resources did not cover fully the needs across all strategic outcomes with the exception of SO5. Between 2018 and 2020, a rather consistent gap between the allocated resources and the actual expenditures was observed. One reason given for this is that donor funds are received at the end of a financial year leaving insufficient time to be expended in that year. Other reasons are likely to relate to the agility of WFP planning and financial management systems.

183. The lack of flexibility of some resources due to donor earmarking led to disparities in funding of some strategic outcomes compared to others. The total contributions received in 2020 were higher than in 2019, but donors increasingly earmarked their contributions primarily at activity level (see Figure 8). In some cases, funding was restricted by modality and location, for example the provision of funds for conflict-displaced people but earmarked for one type of displaced persons. This reduced WFP flexibility to allocate resources in line with its CSP requirements, mainly affecting non-emergency activities of vocational skills training, school feeding, and value chains but also affecting the ability of WFP to have a coherent approach in terms of geographical targeting. More generally, many contributions in 2020 and at the beginning of 2021 were earmarked for the COVID-19 response, which required WFP to create a category distinguishing COVID-19 needs from other humanitarian needs. SO1 tended to be better funded despite increased requirements in 2019, following the worst drought in a decade striking in 2018. Under SO2, the availability of flexible, unearmarked contributions, while only 7 percent of total resources received, were sufficient to fully fund asset creation activities except for some gaps in vocational skills training. Strengthening of nutritional product value chains under SO4 was the least funded. A funding gap for UNHAS led to a reduction of flights and other cost-cutting measures in the face of insufficient revenue from passengers to cover the direct operating costs.

184. Predictability of funds was negatively affected by donor priorities to respond to every new emergency rather than contributing multiyear funding. As a result, the availability of unearmarked multiyear funding has been minimal. The overall effect of earmarking and limited predictability was to reduce the scale of resilience activities, hence limiting the ability of WFP to work in a more integrated way; consequently, this has had an effect on sustainability. Cooperating partners also advocated for longer-term funding to enable the design of resilience projects.


185. Donors had a range of considerations in allocating funding but signed up to the principles of good humanitarian donorship and partnership and good practices in donor financing. However, allocation of funds with a high degree of earmarking and a low degree of flexibility reduced the ability of WFP to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises did not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises (Principle 11) and maintained the necessary dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, (Principle 12). The limited longer-term funding coming from only one donor had also compromised the ability of WFP to deliver on its resilience objectives (Principle 13).<sup>143</sup>

186. **WFP positioned its resilience activities as a form of development assistance.** For donors this was challenging because the allocation of humanitarian and development funding is often through different processes and channels. Figure 26 shows the official development assistance and humanitarian allocation of some of the main WFP donors compared with their allocation to WFP.

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<sup>143</sup> Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2021. *Overview*

**Figure 26: Donor gross official development assistance and humanitarian spending compared with contribution to WFP (2018/2019) (million USD)**



Source: Particip GmbH based on Figures 2 and 3 (OECD) and WFP data (from annual country reports).

187. Under longstanding agreements with the Afghan Government, donors have contributed at least 60 percent of their development funding to support implementation of the strategic National Priority Programmes of the Government through the World Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The ARTF relies on multiple development assistance instruments, including technical assistance, budget support linked to policy reforms and project investments in health, education, community development, women's empowerment, job creation and other priority sectors. This means that WFP and One UN participate in complementary multilateral programming which, if it is to be considered development assistance, needs to align carefully with the processes of the National Priority Programmes. For an organization with a predominantly humanitarian mandate and recognized as a humanitarian actor, accessing development funding and operating in the development space is far from straightforward.<sup>144</sup>

#### 2.4.2 To what extent has the CSP led to partnerships and collaborations with other actors that positively influenced performance and results?

The CSP aimed to pave the way for WFP to improve performance through collaborations, and in practice WFP has made significant investments in partnerships with government, donors, United Nations and NGO partners. However, a number of challenges reduced the scope for expanding and strengthening these partnerships. Although challenging at a time of great uncertainty and instability, there may be opportunities to develop synergistic programmes with other partners particularly in areas requiring a multisectoral response.

188. The CSP aims to develop partnerships in a range of areas and this is considered to be critical to its success. In the absence of indicators, there is insufficient evidence to assess whether the purpose of partnerships was achieved. The CSP aims to develop partnerships in the areas of capability, policy and governance, advocacy, knowledge and resources, with the purpose of supporting larger, jointly owned SDG goals. Although achieving this was described as critical to the success of the CSP, the statement implicitly recognized that partnerships were a means to an end and not ends in themselves. For this reason, the results framework had no indicators for measuring either WFP performance in promoting and sustaining partnerships or the results obtained from that effort. The answer to this evaluation question therefore relies heavily on anecdotal evidence from stakeholders about the quality of partnerships and does not repeat evidence about strategic outcome-specific results as presented in EQ1.4 and EQ2.1.

189. The partnership with the Government has been affected at the highest level by institutional turbulence and overall worsening political instability. Despite obstacles to the partnership at the highest

<sup>144</sup> Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, 2021. *Overview*, (accessed in June 2021).

level, partnerships with the key line ministries were generally felt to be good although not without their challenges. The quality of partnerships with the Government at field level was highly variable from province to province, mainly due to local political economy factors and very frequent changes in government personnel.

190. **Cooperating partners were the main partners facilitating the CSP implementation and, from the perspective of the field offices, the most influential partners in terms of outcomes.** The ten interviewed cooperating partners were generally satisfied with their partnerships, although they questioned what was meant by the term “strategic partner”. Field-level agreements are signed on the basis of a call for proposal, in which the outputs were already pre-determined by WFP and projects are normally discussed and agreed at field office level. A minority of cooperating partners highlighted the need for a national-level overarching consultation mechanism to facilitate a substantive dialogue on priorities, geographic scope, beneficiary selection criteria and modality.

191. However, by far the major concern of cooperating partners was that WFP no longer provided multi-year funding, which all considered essential for resilience activities to have a chance at being sustainable, but important also to overcome two operational challenges: i) the long start-up phase related to administrative requirements; ii) retaining qualified staff, including in hard-to-reach and highly insecure areas.

192. WFP field staff acknowledged that the main strength of cooperating partners was their often-excellent access based on longstanding community relationships, which was greater for Afghan NGOs compared with INGOs. However, Afghan cooperating partners have faced greater capacity challenges. Overall, WFP aims to foster closer collaboration and establish effective communication channels; sign agreements for at least one year, if not multi-year agreements to contribute to more sustainable outcomes; reduce scattering by working with fewer cooperating partners on a larger scale; and design a programme of capacity development informed by a detailed capacity assessment. These are good intentions, which are likely to be very challenging to achieve at a time of great uncertainty and instability and corresponding reduced funding. At the same time, there may be opportunities to develop synergistic programmes with those NGOs that have large development programmes funded by other donors particularly in areas requiring a multisectoral response.

193. Donors’ engagement has varied from those maintaining a very close relationship to those mainly providing funding, but, overall, donors interviewed were generally satisfied with WFP performance. Whereas some donors were content with reports, others showed less satisfaction with written reporting, which they found brief and generic.

194. As the agency with the largest footprint and the most operational capacity of the United Nations agencies in Afghanistan, WFP has made a significant investment in partnerships within the United Nations system. Although the CSP has created an enabling environment for strategic partnerships, evidence that these are a consequence of the CSP was thin, as UNHCR, FAO and UNICEF have long been traditional and willing collaborative partners.

195. In terms of improved efficiency under the umbrella of One UN, there was little evidence of change and the particular issue of time efficiency of elaborate coordination mechanisms was a concern. Several stakeholders believe that the transaction costs of participating in coordination are very high and that there is an opportunity cost in terms of engaging in more meaningful partnerships because, for all partners, time is scarce and the barriers to engaging more deeply are high because of security restrictions to advance CSP outcomes.

196. United Nations stakeholders have acknowledged the value of the common approach but highlighted the challenges for agencies with individual mandates to adopt an intersectoral way of working, especially in an environment where there is competition for scarce financial and human resources. This means that the longstanding mechanism of working groups continues to be dominated by information sharing rather than genuine collaboration.

197. WFP considered the World Bank to be a crucial partner for promoting food security with its budget of around USD 400 million and deep analysis of social protection. However, the CSP has referred to it as a collaboration, along with other partners, in expanding nutritional product value chains. Owing to the World Bank’s mandate to partner with governments, its relationship with other international institutions was for the purpose of improving coordination of aid policies and practices. As WFP mainly worked where the

Government had low capacity or no presence, the pathway to developing a strategic collaboration was complex and the relationship has been mainly one of information sharing so far (with a few exceptions such as the collaboration on social protection measures to respond to COVID-19 and shock-responsive safety nets).

198. Partnerships with the private sector beyond farmer cooperatives and purely contractual relationships have not been developed to any significant extent. In part, this was because the private sector in Afghanistan has been extremely narrow (see 1.2.2).

### 2.4.3 To what extent has the CSP provided greater flexibility in dynamic operational contexts and how did it affect results?

The CSP allowed greater flexibility to adapt to evolving context and to respond to emergencies. Still, the ability of WFP to adapt was affected by donor earmarking, limited multi-year funding and the CSP structure around “focus areas”.

199. While maintaining the critically important long-term vision and the balance between humanitarian and development strategies, the CSP implementation has shown to be relatively flexible to adapt to Afghanistan’s evolving context and needs. In particular, there was a unanimous agreement among those interviewed regarding the good adaptation of WFP and its response capacity to COVID-19. It has been characterized mainly by a substantial scale-up of interventions in 2020, particularly under SO1, the reorganization of distribution sites, an increase in international staff from 21 to 40 and the quick establishment of a clinic in the WFP/United Nations compound for staff and dependents. The clinic compensated for the difficult evacuation of patients due to the closing of borders. There was evidence from interviews that lives were saved.

200. The CSP’s flexibility to adapt has been, however, limited by two factors. Firstly, the lack of multi-year funding for resilience activities and donor earmarking towards SO1 have limited the ability of WFP to reallocate resources towards other strategic outcomes, besides SO1. In addition, the structure of the CSP around various focus areas – “crisis response” for SO1 and “resilience building” for SO2, SO3, SO4 and SO5 - was perceived to limit the flexibility and ability of WFP to easily adapt. Indeed, for an effective emergency response, many interviewees have pointed out that more work, efforts and funds were needed for emergency preparedness to ensure good planning, preparedness, capacity and adaptation. This categorization between “crisis response” and “resilience” has not been in line with the logic that to build resilience and contribute to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, it is particularly important to further invest in emergency preparedness (contingency plans, risk analyses, joint needs assessments, advocacy and access efforts). This relates to planning and design and goes beyond earmarking of funding.

### 2.4.4 To what extent has WFP made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?

Due to multiple internal and external constraining factors, WFP has not been able to make the strategic shifts expected by the CSP, but has contributed, with continued efforts, to approach them.

201. Regarding Shift 1 of “more sustainable solutions in strategic result areas” (SO1, SO2, SO3),<sup>145</sup> a few elements were found to pave the way towards Shift 1, but external contextual factors point towards an uncertain future undermining sustainability prospects. External contextual factors point towards an uncertain future, which makes it difficult to ensure sustainability. These factors include: the ongoing protracted conflict and contested governance; a highly centralized government riven with internal conflicts; and uncertainty about the overall political and security situation. In the face of a long drought followed by the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions, WFP has been focused on the delivery of urgent relief assistance and has had neither the time nor the funding to engage in new thinking and activities oriented to improve sustainability. The fact that the SO2 team is small and does not have enough skilled people to advocate for more SO2 actions has been a limiting internal factor. On the other hand, some internal factors are paving the way to Shift 1, including WFP efforts to support resilience building and contribute to peace.

202. Regarding Shift 2 of “transformational linkages in strategic result areas” (SO1, SO2, SO3, SO4), there was no theory of change that demonstrated strong mutual connection and reinforcement between

<sup>145</sup> See Figure 4 for an overview of the strategic shifts.

strategic outcomes and activities that could have supported a positive cycle towards transformational change. The evaluation identified a number of factors hindering the ability of WFP to establish transformational linkages across strategic outcomes and activities, including the country office structure being divided into units (“programmes” and “operations”) and the CSP structure along different focus areas (“crisis response” or “resilience”), combined with donors’ earmarking in favour of SO1. In addition, coverage and targeting requirements make it difficult to closely link SO1 to other strategic outcomes. In-depth context analysis would enable WFP to clearly identify what those transformational linkages would entail in various cross-cutting areas such as gender, capacity strengthening, resilience and nutrition-sensitivity. That said, WFP staff reported a more coherent approach to the whole programme through internal reorganization of staffing by strategic outcome within the programme unit.

203. Shift 3 of “comprehensive national-led framing of all strategic result areas” (SO1-SO6) has not fully materialized for reasons beyond WFP control. Under SO5, WFP advocated to ensure that zero hunger was a government priority in ANPDF II and that the Government prioritized food security as part of the national response to the COVID-19 crisis by enacting new social protection measures. Under SO6, WFP has significantly scaled up the implementation of SCOPE and provided humanitarian air services enabling common services and platforms to support the achievement of all the SDGs. Under SO1, SO2 and SO3, WFP has remained in the driver’s seat and this has contributed to maintaining adherence to humanitarian principles. Finally, under SO4, the nutrition agenda tends to be donor-led in the face of weak or fluctuating political ownership and limited funding.



# 3 Conclusions and recommendations

## 3.1 CONCLUSIONS

204. **Conclusion 1:** Some of the initial ambitions of the CSP became unrealistic as needs grew in a context of increasingly fragile governance and extreme insecurity but WFP has broadly managed to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.

205. **Needs are vast and growing.** The effort by WFP at the CSP design level to respond to the emergency needs of the most vulnerable, while continuing to support early recovery activities, has been evident and fully relevant in Afghanistan. However, needs were already vast in 2018 and have continued to grow across most of the country as a result of conflict, chronic drought, occasional natural disasters, and the COVID-19 global pandemic. The boundless growth of needs is a call for WFP to reduce its ambition and focus increasingly on the specific needs of those individuals who are most at risk among the affected populations.

206. The context is among the world's most fragile, with a mismatch between the risks faced and capacities for coping across political, security, economic, environmental and social dimensions. This fragility, which presents the single biggest barrier to achieving the SDGs and is likely to continue or further increase, is far beyond the capacity of WFP, however well intentioned, to address. The scale and duration of needs surpassed the combined response capacity of all humanitarian partners. As a result, achievement of zero hunger has fallen far short of what was hoped for in the CSP.

207. **The aim of contributing to building the triple nexus is challenging.** This is true in most countries in conflict but, in Afghanistan, there is considerable scepticism about whether it is an appropriate objective given the recent leadership transitions. WFP needs to walk a fine line of strengthening government systems while maintaining its operational independence to ensure the humanitarian principles are adhered to in a context of increased politization of aid.

208. Following the CSP design and its underpinning analysis of risks and assumptions, the country office initiated some draft theories of change for SO1 to SO4. However, these were never completed nor is there any evidence that the initial analysis was regularly updated. Ensuring more in-depth analysis to understand conflict dynamics and conflict sensitivity at local levels would allow WFP to ensure that it avoids doing harm and, where possible, allow it to contribute towards stability and peace outcomes. Crucial political economy and institutional analysis that would explain the pathways to the intended strategic change and the mechanism by which WFP is planning to support achievement of strategic outcomes are also missing. The assumptions underpinning progress from output to the various levels of outcome have not materialized: the security and political situation has become more unstable: there have been unexpected natural disasters; government capacity has been insufficient and many aspects of the context including food security have worsened. As a result, the ability of WFP to meet the scale of need has reduced and the CSP's wide-ranging ambition became challenging to deliver, even although WFP positioning has been broadly in line with its role and comparative advantage.

209. **Conclusion 2:** Some synergies across strategic outcomes have occurred and some progress was made towards zero hunger but with varying degrees of contributions across the various strategic outcomes WFP contribution to CSP strategic outcomes is significantly stronger in crisis response than in resilience, cross-cutting aims and country capacity strengthening.

210. **Some synergies across strategic outcomes have occurred.** Firstly, between SO1 and SO3, where SO1 supports SO3 beneficiaries with nutrition-sensitive food, the activities have been managed together as the number of beneficiaries for emergency SO3 was small. Secondly, the results of the support for fortification of wheat flour under SO4 have resulted in sufficient quantities of fortified cereal to meet the needs of SO1 and SO2. In addition, support to social safety net adaptation for COVID-19 under SO5 has supported achievements under SO1 and SO3. Lastly, WFP has played a crucial role to improve access of the humanitarian community through UNHAS services and supply chain support under SO6. Through the various strategic outcomes, some progress was made toward zero hunger, but not as much as hoped for in the CSP.



211. **WFP has made a significant contribution to ending hunger in the context of SO1.** The WFP comparative advantage in Afghanistan in supply chain management and common services enabled a response at scale with far greater access than most other humanitarian actors. This is where donors choose to invest most funding and are most satisfied with achievements in enabling vulnerable people to meet their food and nutrition needs during and immediately after emergencies (SO1).

212. **In contrast, WFP contribution to resilience (SO2) has been limited in scale.** As the number and scale of crisis response activities have grown, resilience interventions have been scaled down. Where food assistance for asset activities were implemented, beneficiaries perceived strong and lasting positive effects at the individual level. As no single activity can effectively build resilience at the community level, it is important for the country office to go beyond single activities and, based on a comprehensive resilience building approach, develop a package of activities complementary to those of other actors. In the absence of systematic monitoring of longer-term effects, there was no evidence of the SO2 contribution to resilience beyond the beneficiary level. Compared to the large-scale resilience interventions implemented by other actors, the capacity of WFP to contribute at scale to vulnerable people's ability to meet their food and nutrition needs on their own in a meaningful and sustainable way appeared to be limited.

213. Under SO3, the moderate acute malnutrition treatment programme was substantially expanded and was found to be effective. However, malnutrition prevention was not scaled up as foreseen and spreading intended nutrition outcomes across several strategic outcomes has reduced overall coherence. The intended stronger focus on malnutrition prevention to complement malnutrition treatment foreseen in the CSP was constrained by the combination of continuous high needs for treatment and limited resources for prevention. Good results have been achieved through providing nutritious food under SO1, fortification and school feeding although these synergies have remained very limited in scale. Although nutrition outcomes were promising, spreading the nutrition-specific outputs across various areas under several strategic outcomes has obscured the fact that only few CSP activities were nutrition-sensitive (stunting prevention, school feeding and moderate acute malnutrition treatment). The development of a comprehensive SBCC strategy would have enhanced the WFP approach to nutrition sensitivity across all activities and strategic outcomes and increased the likelihood that such activities effectively contribute to an improved nutrition status. However, the SBCC strategy was not covering the whole portfolio and was only partly implemented. Hence, this limited the success of a number of WFP nutrition goals and its ability to work at the interface of nutrition and gender equality. At the policy level, WFP was able to meet the Government's need for considerable logistics support but has not met expectation of high quality and specialized technical advice. In part, the limited achievement of sustainable results in nutrition is a result of limited funding.

214. **The WFP contribution to an increase in access to fortified nutritious foods (SO4) is mixed.** Wheat fortification is steadily growing, and all WFP needs are met from Afghan wheat mills. However, the development of the soya crop value chain has not been so successful despite substantial investment. There is no established commercial processing and value chain or strong market for soya flour. Support for smallholder food production is valuable at the local level but contributes little to national needs.

215. **Achievements in capacity strengthening have been evident at output level only (SO2, SO4 and SO5).** In the absence of a comprehensive capacity gap assessment, WFP seized opportunities for engaging in country capacity strengthening as they arose during the CSP implementation but was not in a position to prioritize strategically key areas of engagement in consultation with the Government nor articulate clear and achievable goals. This, combined with the fact that monitoring indicators for country capacity strengthening are mainly at the output level and entirely quantitative, explains why WFP has not been able to demonstrate sustainable results. It has also limited its ability to draw key lessons and adjust its interventions as required. For country capacity strengthening interventions to be carefully designed and successfully implemented, WFP needs to conduct a capacity gap assessment and design a strategy that prioritizes a key set of activities and articulates WFP expectations of success at the outcome level.

216. Similarly, achievement of cross-cutting aims has been stronger for quantitative output targets than at outcome-level transformation. WFP is not only on the right track with its demonstrated commitment to the cross-cutting aims of gender equality, inclusion and protection, but it has also paved the way for other actors as a precursor in access negotiations and as a promoter of community-based approaches as well as in generating, through its presence on the ground, community trust, protection, accountability and ownership. Nonetheless, accountability to affected population and protection mechanisms put in place could be further enhanced notably ensuring that complaints and feedback mechanisms are fully functional

and accessible to all population groups, including people with disabilities, youth and women as well as exploring alternative options to track and address gender-based violence and PSEA issues.

217. Recognizing that this is a deeply challenging area, an in-depth gender analysis, unpacking the diversity of gender relations and gender-based violence across the country and exploring the feasibility of moving from “gender-sensitive” to “gender-transformative programming” within the context of WFP interventions in Afghanistan, is essential to inform WFP ambitions in this area.

218. **Conclusion 3:** In an increasingly challenging context, the WFP contribution to strategic outcomes will depend on deeper and longer-term partnerships.

219. The CSP has developed partnerships, but a number of challenges reduced opportunities for strengthening or expanding those further. The CSP has led to collaborations with partners and WFP appears sincere in its attempts to work in the spirit of partnership. Yet, this remains a work in progress and there is currently no way of measuring whether these partnerships have positively or negatively influenced performance.

220. Partnerships with cooperating partners have been effective particularly in crisis response but they would need to be grounded on more substantive dialogue and longer timeframes for resilience building interventions. Most of the WFP response is implemented through NGOs and this appears to work reasonably well for crisis response. However, some cooperating partners highlighted the need for greater substantive dialogue on key programmatic issues. Some partners are well placed to contribute to the humanitarian-development nexus either because of the additional technical and financial capacity they bring or because of their deep knowledge of the communities. However, longer timeframes are needed to undertake proper technical and risk assessments in order to inform the design of resilience projects as well as to effectively implement such projects. With limited funding for multi-year activities, and an inability to allocate resources for more than one year, WFP has not yet been in a position to realize the CSP ambition.

221. Operating in a protracted humanitarian crisis, WFP has found it challenging to realize its ambition in resilience and is not yet a recognized actor in the development space. The WFP strategic evaluation concludes that the relevance of enhancing resilience in severely unstable contexts is uncertain and notes that, although the complexity of resilience is acknowledged in WFP policies, it has not been reflected in approaches. The findings of this CSPE echo that point. The CSP may have helped convey the priority of resilience to donors, but this has not resulted in multi-year funding that is significant enough or predictable enough to design and implement any interventions that are of sufficiently long duration to be considered development oriented. Perceptions of the WFP humanitarian mandate and capacity along with the limited evidence for resilience activities in Afghanistan are likely to lie behind the reluctance of donors to significantly fund resilience. The WFP three-pronged approach and a resilience context analysis would support WFP and partners in deepening their understanding of the opportunities for enhancing livelihoods and strengthening resilience capacities as well as designing suitable programmes in consultation with partners at national, subnational and community levels. As they are based on a multi-stakeholder approach, they would likely create opportunities to enhance multisectoral joint programming in support of resilience building.

222. **Conclusion 4:** WFP has been able to adapt its response under the COVID-19 situation, notwithstanding some delays and pipeline breaks that were unavoidable.

223. Related to COVID-19, even if it has led to delays and pipeline breaks and hampered some training and field visit activities, the contribution of WFP was perceived as positive and flexible. The COVID-19 crisis has led to a sharp contraction of the economy where the WFP vulnerable target group was hardest hit and were left at biggest risk. WFP has been able to adapt and scale up its response to COVID-19 based on flexible emergency support under SO1. Although food rations had to be decreased, 1.2 million people in urban areas were reached with cash. On the other hand, under SO2, many activities had to be suspended. Under SO3, despite school closure, WFP managed to reach the pupils with high-energy biscuits and girls with cash assistance. Under SO5, WFP supported the launch of a social protection response for COVID-19. Under SO6, the services of UNHAS continued to a large extent and were seen as a lifeline by many stakeholders. The creation of specific health facilities has also helped international as well as national staff to remain optimally engaged.

## **3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

224. As data collection took place in April-May 2021 and the findings, conclusions and recommendations were developed before the Taliban consolidated control over Afghanistan in August 2021, the recommendations outlined in Table 10 are expected to be implemented in a flexible manner, depending on the evolution of the situation and taking into account prevailing restrictions on building national capacity and systems. The timeframe for addressing some of the recommendations will be revisited as needed.

**Table 10: Recommendations**

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
1	<p><b>Design the next country strategic plan based on robust context analyses that provide the country office flexibility to adapt its response to changing needs in fluid circumstances, maintaining the focus areas of crisis response, resilience and root causes.</b></p> <p>1.4 Develop a theory of change with risks and assumptions based on an in-depth context analysis, with realistic pathways and mutually reinforcing strategic outcomes for achieving zero hunger and contributing to the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.</p> <p>1.5 Invest in a capacity gap assessment as the basis for developing a country capacity strengthening strategy that cuts across strategic outcomes.</p> <p>1.6 Strengthen the monitoring system to measure progress against intended outcomes (including on country capacity strengthening) in continuously changing circumstances.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division (RAM), Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division (PRO)	High	Country strategic plan design (fourth quarter 2022)
2	<p><b>Develop a nutrition strategy that takes into consideration the local context and allows for the scale up of malnutrition prevention.</b></p> <p>2.5 Support the collection of evidence on various forms of malnutrition.</p> <p>2.6 Advocate and contribute to the design of a joint nutrition strategy, informed by recent evidence and local context analysis, that encompasses moderate acute malnutrition treatment and malnutrition prevention.</p> <p>2.7 Advocate and mobilize resources for scaling up malnutrition prevention in collaboration with key nutrition partners.</p> <p>2.8 Finalize and operationalize the WFP social and behaviour change communication strategy across WFP activities, with support from the regional bureau.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Nutrition cluster, UNICEF, FAO, CPs, regional bureau, Nutrition Division	High	Country strategic plan design (first quarter 2023)

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
3	<b>Conduct in-depth gender analysis to inform a clearer articulation of WFP ambitions in relation to gender transformation and social inclusion, taking into consideration the highly constraining environment.</b>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, Gender Office	High	Country strategic plan design (first quarter 2023)
4	<p><b>Enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of resilience building activities and continue to seize opportunities to expand them as conditions allow and where there is a medium-term perspective.</b></p> <p>4.6 Conduct a comprehensive participatory analytical and planning process such as the three-pronged approach bringing together WFP, partners and communities to inform the design of a comprehensive resilience building approach clearly articulating WFP's vision of resilience building in Afghanistan, identifying WFP's comparative strengths and promoting an integrated approach across the country strategic plan as well as with other partners.</p> <p>4.7 Ensure scalable resilience building in the face of limited forecast multi-year funding and the volatile circumstances and engage in resilience building only if there is a medium-term perspective.</p> <p>4.8 Engage with cooperating partners to improve the design, implementation and sustainability of projects.</p> <p>4.9 Develop and implement a strong monitoring and evaluation system to assess the technical quality of assets and value to the community and contribution to resilience in the long term.</p> <p>4.10 Use demonstrated results to advocate additional multi-year unearmarked funding and progressively scale up resilience building programmes.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Donors, CPs, regional bureau, headquarters (PRO, RAM, Public Partnerships and Resourcing Division)	High	Country strategic plan design and ongoing

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
5	<p><b>Strengthen collaboration and coordination with key partners</b></p> <p>5.5 Prioritize dialogue with cooperating partners already identified as strategic partners to develop joint advocacy and fundraising approaches in the face of shrinking development resources.</p> <p>5.6 Develop a realistic assessment of the conditions under which donors may be receptive to funding WFP development-oriented activities.</p> <p>5.7 Increase dialogue with development-oriented United Nations partners to deepen analysis of WFP's potential role and added value, notably in the areas of resilience building and social protection.</p> <p>5.8 Leverage and scale up existing partnerships for greater synergies and resource optimization and accelerate achievement of lasting outcomes.</p>	Strategic	Country office	Donors, development-oriented United Nations partners, CPs	High	2022/2023

# 4 Annexes

## Annex 1. Terms of Reference

### Evaluation of Afghanistan WFP Country Strategic Plan 2018-2022

#### Summary Terms of Reference



Country Strategic Plan Evaluations (CSPEs) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. Their purpose is twofold: 1) to provide evaluation evidence and learning on WFP's performance for country-level strategic decisions, specifically for developing the next Country Strategic Plan and 2) to provide accountability for results to WFP stakeholders.

#### Subject and focus of the evaluation

The overarching goal of the CSP is to support the country to achieve zero hunger by 2030 in a manner that contributes to the broader, longer-term transition to peace and development. WFP would shift to more i) sustainable solutions in strategic result areas, emphasizing not only emergency response (strategic outcome 1- SDGs 2,16) but also resilient livelihoods (strategic outcome 2 – SDGs 2, 8, 11, 13, 16), and the treatment as well as the prevention of malnutrition (strategic outcome 3 -SDGs 2, 5); ii) transformational linkages among strategic result areas, with nutritional product value chains (strategic outcome 4 - SDGs 2, 16), providing fortified products for emergency response, resilient livelihoods and nutrition (strategic outcomes 1, 2 and 3); and iii) comprehensive, national-led framing of all strategic result areas by supporting policy coherence (strategic outcome 5 - SDG 16) and common services and platforms, including UNHAS (strategic outcome 6 - SDG 17). The first revision reflected an expansion of the CSP's Strategic Outcomes 1 (Emergency Response) and 3 (Nutrition) to account for the severe drought which had led to unforeseen increases in the number of people in need and the duration of the support required. The second revision built on the rationale of the first one and was aimed at expanding activities under Strategic Outcome 1 and 3 while adjusting food rations to ensure nutrition adequacy and consolidating WFP's resilient livelihoods programming. The third budget revision aims to: a) scale up WFP's emergency response (COVID-impacted people and winterization response under strategic outcome 1) to meet Afghanistan's increasing food needs; and b) enable WFP's Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) to maintain its essential services in support of the COVID-19 response through continued and reliable domestic services and an international airbridge (strategic outcome 6).

The evaluation will assess WFP contributions to CSP strategic outcomes, establishing plausible causal relations between the outputs of WFP activities, the implementation process, the operational environment and changes observed at the outcome level, including any unintended consequences. It will also focus on adherence to humanitarian principles, gender equality, protection and accountability to affected populations. The evaluation will adopt standard UNEG and OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability as well as connectedness, and coverage.

#### Objectives and stakeholders of the evaluation

WFP evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. The evaluation will seek the views of, and be useful to, a range of WFP's internal and external stakeholders and presents an opportunity for national, regional and corporate learning. The primary user of the evaluation findings and recommendations will be the WFP Country Office and its stakeholders to inform the design of the new Country Strategic Plan.

The evaluation report will be presented at the Executive Board session in EB/A 2022.

#### Key evaluation questions

The evaluation will address the following four key questions:

#### **QUESTION 1: To what extent is WFP's strategic position, role and specific contribution based on country priorities and people's needs as well as WFP's strengths?**

The evaluation will assess the extent to which the CSP is relevant to national policies, plans, strategies and goals, including achievement of the national Sustainable Development Goals. It will further assess the extent to which the CSP addresses the needs of the most vulnerable people in the country to ensure that no one is left behind; whether WFP's strategic positioning has remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP in light of changing context, national capacities and needs; and to what extent the CSP is coherent and aligned with the wider UN cooperation framework and includes appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP in the country.

#### **QUESTION 2: What is the extent and quality of WFP's specific contribution to CSP strategic outcomes in Afghanistan?**



The evaluation will assess the extent to which WFP delivered the expected outputs and contributed to the expected strategic outcomes of the CSP, including the achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender equality and other equity considerations). It will also assess the extent to which the achievements of the CSP are likely to be sustainable; and whether the CSP facilitated more strategic linkages between humanitarian, development and, where appropriate, peace work.

**QUESTION 3: To what extent has WFP's used its resources efficiently in contributing to CSP outputs and strategic outcomes?** The evaluation will assess whether outputs were delivered within the intended timeframe; the appropriateness of coverage and targeting of interventions; cost-efficient delivery of assistance; and whether alternative, more cost-effective measures were considered.

**QUESTION 4: What are the factors that explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?**

The evaluation will assess the extent to which WFP analyzed and used existing evidence on hunger challenges, food security and nutrition issues in the country to develop the CSP. It will also assess the extent to which the CSP led to: the mobilization of adequate, predictable and flexible resources; to the development of appropriate partnerships and collaboration with other actors; greater flexibility in dynamic operational contexts; and how these factors affect results. Finally, the evaluation will seek to identify any other organizational and contextual factors influencing WFP performance and the strategic shift expected by the CSP.

#### Scope, methodology and ethical considerations

The unit of analysis is the Country Strategic Plan, approved by the WFP Executive Board 2016, as well as any subsequent approved budget revisions.

The evaluation covers all WFP activities (including cross-cutting results) from 2016-2020 to better assess the extent to which the strategic shifts envisaged with the introduction of the CSP have taken place.

The evaluation will adopt a mixed methods approach using a mix of methods and a variety of primary and secondary sources, including desk review, key informant interviews, surveys, and focus groups discussions. Systematic triangulation across different sources and methods will be carried out to validate findings and avoid bias in the evaluative judgement.

In light of recent developments related to the COVID19 pandemic, the evaluation will be conducted remotely and in person. The final Learning Workshop will be held remotely or in the Country.

The evaluation conforms to WFP and 2020 UNEG ethical guidelines. This includes, but is not limited to, ensuring informed consent, protecting privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants, ensuring cultural sensitivity, respecting the autonomy of participants, ensuring fair recruitment of participants (including women and socially

excluded groups) and ensuring that the evaluation results in no harm to participants or their communities.

#### Roles and responsibilities

**EVALUATION TEAM:** The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with a mix of relevant expertise related to the Afghanistan CSPE.

**OEV EVALUATION MANAGER:** The evaluation will be managed by Dawit Habtemariam, Evaluation Manager, in the WFP Office of Evaluation. He will be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts, to ensure a smooth implementation process and compliance with OEV quality standards for process and content. Second level quality assurance will be provided by Julie Thoulouzan, Senior Evaluation Officer.

An **Internal Reference Group** of a cross-section of WFP stakeholders from relevant business areas at different WFP levels will be consulted throughout the evaluation process to review and provide feedback on evaluation products.

Anne-Claire Luzot, the Deputy Director of Evaluation will approve the final versions of all evaluation products.

**STAKEHOLDERS:** WFP stakeholders at country, regional and HQ level are expected to engage throughout the evaluation process to ensure a high degree of utility and transparency. External stakeholders, such as beneficiaries, government, donors, implementing partners and other UN agencies will be consulted during the evaluation process.

#### Communication

Preliminary findings will be shared with WFP stakeholders in the Country Office, the Regional Bureau and Headquarters during a debriefing session at the end of the data collection phase. A more in-depth debrief will be organized in May 2021 to inform the new CSP design process. A country learning workshop will be held in June 2021 to ensure a transparent evaluation process and promote ownership of the findings and preliminary recommendations by country stakeholders. Evaluation findings will be actively disseminated and the final evaluation report will be publicly available on WFP's website.

#### Timing and key milestones

**Inception Phase:** February 2021

**Data collection:** March/April 2021

**Debriefing:** May 2021

**Reports:** June-September 2021

**Learning Workshop:** June 2021

**Executive Board:** June 2022

## Annex 2. People Interviewed

225. During the evaluation phase, 85 key informant interviews were carried out. There were also 20 focus group discussions (FGD); 3 with representatives of government departments, 2 with partners and 15 with beneficiaries. A total of 450 beneficiaries participated in the 15 beneficiary focus group discussions. An E-survey completed by six Field Office Heads, direct observation during site visits to project locations (Herat, Mazar, Kandahar and Samangan).

**Table 11: People interviewed during the data collection phase**

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
12.04.2021	Country Director and Representative	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	F
14.03.2021	Deputy Country Director (Programme & Operations)	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	F
12.04.2021	Deputy Country Director (Support Services)	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
15.04.2021	Acting Head of Programme / Senior Regional Programme Adviser	WFP - Country Office / WFP Regional Bureau	Remote	F
12.04.2021	Head of Programme	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	F
19.04.2021	Programme Policy Officer (SO1 Manager) and Deputy Head of Programme	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
14.04.2021	Programme Policy Officer (SO2 Manager)	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
19.04.2021	Programme Policy Officer - Nutrition (SO3 Manager)	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
19.04.2021	Programme Policy Officer - Nutrition	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Programme Policy Officer - Sustainable Food Systems (SO4 Manager)	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
13.04.2021	Head of Vulnerability analysis, monitoring and evaluation	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Head of Human Resources	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	F
14.04.2021	PSEA Coordinator	WFP - Country Office	Remote	F
14.04.2021	Head of Finance and Administration	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
15.04.2021	Deputy Head of Vulnerability analysis, monitoring and evaluation (Programme Policy Officer-VAM)	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
28.04.2021	Head of Partnerships and Communications	WFP - Country Office	Remote	F
25.04.2021	Head of Budget and Programming Unit	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
19.04.2021	Programme Associate Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Cooperatives (COPAC) / Office of the Director of Operations (ODO)	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
02.05.2021	Head of Supply Chain	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
20.04.2021	Programme and Policy Adviser (SO5 Manager)	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
18.04.2021	Programme and Policy Adviser (SDG17)	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Head of Security	WFP - Country Office	Remote	M
20.04.2021	Head of Mazar Area Office	WFP - Mazar Area Office (MAO)	Mazar	M
13.04.2021	Head of Kabul Area Office	WFP - Kabul Area Office (KAO)	Remote	M
13.04.2021	Head of Faizabad Field Office	WFP - Faizabad Sub Office (FSO)	Remote	M
13.04.2021	Head of Jalalabad Sub-Office	WFP - Jalalabad Sub Office (JSO)	Remote	M
28.04.2021	Scope Manager	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
02.05.2021	CBT	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	F
28.04.2021	TPM	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
01.06.2021	CFM Manager	WFP - Country Office	Kabul	M
13.04.2021	Head of Herat Sub-Office	WFP - Herat Sub Office (JSO)	Remote	M
21.04.2021	Head of Kandahar Area Office	WFP - Kandahar Area Office (KanAO)	Kandahar	M
27.04.2021	AAP/Protection	WFP	Remote	M
27.04.2021	Humanitarian Access	WFP	Remote	M
28.04.2021	Gender	WFP	Remote	F
28.04.2021	NGO Partnerships	WFP CO	Remote	M
26.04.2021	Officer in Charge (OIC) head of Area Office	WFP - Kandahar Area Office (KanAO)	Kandahar	M
28.04.2021	Head of Office	WFP - Herat Sub Office (JSO)	Herat	M
19.04.2021	Policy & Planning Director	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation	Remote	M
14.04.2021	Director for the Directorate Coordination & Response to Disaster	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Director for Climate Change	National Environmental Protection Agency	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Technology Transfer Expert/ Climate Change Directorate	National Environmental Protection Agency	Remote	M
20.04.2021	PND Coordinator	Public Nutrition Directorate MoPH	Remote	M

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
15.04.2021	Director of Physical Education & School Health Directorate	Ministry of Education	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Senior Advisor	Ministry of Education	Remote	M
15.04.2021	Deworming Coordinator	Ministry of Education	Remote	F
14.04.2021	Director for Directorate of General Skills Development, National Skills Development Programme (NSDP)	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	Remote	M
14.04.2021	Natural Resource Management (NRM) Director	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock	Remote	M
18.04.2021	Head of Office	OCHA	Remote	M
18.04.2021	Humanitarian Affairs Officer (Head, Strategy and Coordination Unit)	OCHA	Remote	F
21.04.2021	Regional Representative	OCHA	Kandahar	M
21.04.2021	Emergency Response Officer	IOM	Remote	M
21.04.2021	Representative	UNICEF	Remote	M
21.04.2021	Deputy Representative	UNICEF	Remote	F
21.04.2021	Chief Social Policy	UNICEF	Remote	M
21.04.2021	Chief Nutrition	UNICEF	Remote	F
14.04.2021	Representative	UNHCR	Remote	F
14.04.2021	Senior Protection Officer	UNHCR	Remote	F
02.05.2021	Representative Country Director	FAO	Kabul	M
02.05.2021	Deputy Head of FAO in Afghanistan	FAO	Kabul	M
02.05.2021	Representative	UN Women	Remote	F
18.04.2021	Resident Representative	UNDP	Remote	M
20.04.2021	Representative	WHO	Remote	M
19.04.2021	Senior Economist	World Bank	Remote	M
19.04.2021	Senior Economist	World Bank	Remote	M
19.04.2021	Young Professional - Economist	World Bank	Remote	M
19.04.2021	Programme Officer, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance	USAID	Remote	M
16.04.2021	Head of Office	ECHO	Remote	M
23.04.2021	Programme Officer, Embassy of Japan in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	Japan	Remote	M
03.05.2021	FSAC Coordinator	Food Security & Agriculture Cluster	Kabul	M
30.04.2021	Nutrition Cluster Co-Lead	Nutrition Cluster	Remote	M
22.04.2021	Protection Cluster Coordinator	Protection cluster	Remote	F
20.04.2021	GBV Sub-Cluster Coordinator	Gender-Based Violence sub-cluster	Remote	F
19.04.2021	AFSeN-A Secretariat Coordinator	AFSeN-A	Remote	M
25.04.2021	Principal	Nasaji Daman School	Kandahar	M
21.04.2021	KRO Management	KRO	Kandahar	M
26.04.2021	Programme Officer	SHPOUL	Remote	M
26.04.2021	Programme Manager	CRDSA	Remote	M
29.04.2021	Head of Programmes - Afghanistan	WHH	Remote	F
27.04.2021	Operation Officer	SNI	Remote	M

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
29.04.2021	Director	A4T	Remote	F
28.04.2021	Programme Officer	HIA	Remote	M
28.04.2021	Managing Director	ADA	Remote	M
06.05.2021	Senior Programme Manager, Planning and Programmes	AKAH	Remote	M
06.05.2021	Officer	OHA	Remote	M

226. Moreover, in the inception phase, some of the interviews that had taken place were also focused on strategic and technical questions. The respondents in this phase are in the following table.

**Table 12: People interviewed during the inception phase**

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
18.01.2021	Programme Policy Officer (Policy and Programme Division)	WFP	HQ	M
19.01.2021	Programme Officer (Government Partnerships)	WFP	HQ	F
19.01.2021	Programme Officer (School Feeding)	WFP	HQ	F
19.01.2021	Donor Relations Officer (Private Partnerships)	WFP	HQ	M
19.01.2021	Programme Officer (PRO)	WFP	HQ	M
19.01.2021	Programme Officer (PRO)	WFP	HQ	M
19.01.2021	M&E Officer (RMP)	WFP	HQ	F
20.01.2021	Regional Programme Officer	WFP	RBB	M
20.01.2021	Regional Programme Officer	WFP	RBB	M
20.01.2021	Emergency Preparedness & Response Officer (IRG)	WFP	RBB	F
20.01.2021	Senior Regional Adviser	WFP	RBB	M
20.01.2021	Regional School Feeding Officer (IRG)	WFP	RBB	F
20.01.2021	Programme Officer (GEN)	WFP	HQ	F
21.01.2021	Deputy Director (OEV)	WFP	HQ	F
21.01.2021	Director (P4P)	WFP	HQ	M
22.01.2021	Director (RBB)	WFP	HQ	F
22.01.2021	Director (RBB)	WFP	HQ	F
22.01.2021	Chief (PROP)	WFP	HQ	M
22.01.2021	Director (PROP)	WFP	HQ	M
22.01.2021	Protection Programme Policy Officer	WFP	HQ	F
25.01.2021	Country Director	WFP	CO	F
25.01.2021	Deputy Country Director	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Deputy Country Director	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Vulnerability analysis, monitoring and evaluation	WFP	CO	M

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
25.01.2021	Programme Officer	WFP	CO	F
25.01.2021	SO2 Manager	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Programme Officer (SO2)	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Programme Policy Officer (SO3)	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Programme Policy Officer (SO3)	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Programme and Policy Adviser (SO5)	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Programme and Policy Adviser (SO5)	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	SO4 Manager	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Programme Policy Officer (SO4)	WFP	CO	M
25.01.2021	Head of Programmes	WFP	CO	F
26.01.2021	Director	Public Nutrition Directorate MoPH	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	PND Coordinator	Public Nutrition Directorate MoPH	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	IMAM Officer	Public Nutrition Directorate MoPH	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	IMAM Officer	Public Nutrition Directorate MoPH	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	Deputy Minister	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	Programme Policy Officer (Climate Change)	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	SO1	WFP	CO	M
26.01.2021	Emergency Programme Officer (SO1)	WFP	CO	M
26.01.2021	Director for Climate Change	National Environmental Protection Agency	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	Technology Transfer Expert, Climate Change Directorate	National Environmental Protection Agency	Kabul	M
26.01.2021	Director for the Directorate Coordination & Response to Disaster	MRRD	Kabul	M

Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
27.01.2021	Emergency Response Officer	IOM	Kabul	M
27.01.2021	Programme Manager	IOM	Kabul	M
28.01.2021	Director	USAID	Kabul	M
28.01.2021	Programme Officer, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance	USAID	Bangkok	M
28.01.2021	Humanitarian Officer	USAID	Bangkok	M
28.01.2021	Programme Officer	USAID	Kazakhstan	M
28.01.2021	Technical Assistant	ECHO	Kabul	F
28.01.2021	Programme Officer	ECHO	Kabul	M
28.01.2021	Policy & Planning Director	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation	Kabul	M
28.01.2021	Programme Officer, International Humanitarian Assistance and Natural Disaster Response	Government of Canada	Canada	M
29.01.2021	Head of Programme	WFP	Kabul	F
01.02.2021	First Secretary, Australian Embassy Afghanistan Development Section	DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)	Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Assistant Director, Australian Embassy Afghanistan Development Section	DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade)	Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Senior Programme Manager	Australia - DFAT	Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Head of Office	OCHA	Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Humanitarian Affairs Officer (Head, Strategy and Coordination Unit)	OCHA	Kabul	F
01.02.2021	Representative a.i.	UNICEF	Kabul	F
01.02.2021	Deputy Representative	UNICEF	Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Chief Social Policy	UNICEF	Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Chief Nutrition	UNICEF	Kabul	F
01.02.2021	Senior Protection Officer	UNHCR	Afghanistan	F
01.02.2021	Assistant Field Officer	UNHCR	Afghanistan	M
01.02.2021	Protection Officer	UNHCR	Afghanistan	M
01.02.2021	Head of Reintegration	UNHCR	Afghanistan	M
01.02.2021	Representative Country Director	FAO	CO Kabul	M
01.02.2021	Deputy head of FAO in Afghanistan	FAO	CO Kabul	M
02.02.2021	Senior Advisor	Ministry of Education	Afghanistan	M



Interview date	Title/unit of person interviewed	Organization	Location	Gender
02.02.2021	Social Mobilization Officer	Ministry of Education	Afghanistan	M
08.02.2021	Head of Supply Chain	WFP	CO Kabul	M
03.02.2021	Head of Operations	WFP	Afghanistan	F

## Annex 3. Additional Elements on the Methodology Used

227. The field sites were purposely selected in consultation with the country office, considering the following criteria:

- Type of activities available
- Diversity of activities - sites that show multiple activities, implementing partners and types of beneficiaries
- Accessibility and security of sites.

228. This enabled the evaluation team to visit a wide range of activities in a short period. Opportunities to visit activities in remote and Taliban-controlled areas were not possible. Focus group discussions were held with those beneficiaries present at the activity locations at the time of the visits and comprised men and women in proportion to the activity. For some activities, beneficiaries were summoned by the implementing partner and village leaders. The evaluation team met with representatives of implementing partners, local government and other NGOs and United Nations agencies wherever it was possible. The list of stakeholders interviewed in the field and at the national level has also been defined in close consultation with the country office and with the help of a stakeholder mapping realized by the evaluation team in the inception phase. This has allowed the evaluation team to capture the views of the key partners and stakeholders of WFP in Afghanistan.

**Table 13: Overview of the main methods/tools**

METHOD/ TOOL	ELEMENTS
Key Informant interviews	<p>Briefings with relevant WFP staff in the Kabul country office and relevant sub-offices.</p> <p>Key stakeholder interviews identified in close collaboration with WFP staff, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with national, provincial, and local government officials, and representatives and relevant government departments (see stakeholder table)</li> <li>• Interviews with relevant UN agencies and relevant international and local organizations</li> <li>• Interviews with selected cooperating partner agencies staff and management</li> <li>• Interviews with third-party monitoring (TPM) agencies</li> <li>• Interviews with key RBB staff as necessary</li> </ul> <p>Online survey of WFP field office heads</p>
Beneficiary interviews	<p>The evaluation team has only been able to conduct a limited number of field visits and phone interviews pertaining to the relevant programmes i.e. nutrition, food security, cash-based transfers (CBT), food assistance, school feeding, and food assistance for assets (FFA) as a result of COVID-19 and security considerations.</p>
PDM data and beneficiary surveys	<p>To compensate for the lack of access to beneficiaries, the evaluation team has studied post-distribution monitoring (PDM) data and surveys that have been conducted among various types of beneficiaries, such as refugees. Where possible, the team has also looked at feedback from beneficiaries using the hotline.</p>
Document review	<p>Desk review of relevant documentation, incorporating an analysis of gender, AAP and protection issues including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The CSP and its relevant supporting documents</li> <li>• Individual activity log frames and strategic outcome (SO) theories of change</li> <li>• Annual plans and reports (annual country reports (ACRs) and standard project reports)</li> <li>• Assessment reports and baseline survey data</li> <li>• Previous evaluation reports (notably on PRRO)</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E) department reports</li> <li>• Organizational policies on gender and other cross-cutting issues</li> <li>• Other relevant UN/partner agency reports e.g., smart surveys, etc.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cluster/working groups minutes/documents</li> <li>• Other literature related to the evaluation</li> <li>• Satellite imagery data for FFA interventions</li> </ul>
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#### Data collection tools

229. The main data collection tools have been the semi-structured questionnaire (SSQ) for key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions for beneficiaries. There are semi-structured questionnaires for key stakeholders as well as per sector, and guidelines for focus group discussions. The interviews have taken place through online platforms (as per preference of the respondent), by sending the questionnaire by email or conducting it face-to face in Kabul. No WFP staff have been present during the interview (unless in the function of respondent).

230. The semi-structured questionnaire (see Annex 13) format has ensured that the interviewees were informed about the objective of the evaluation, about their anonymity, and about the identity of the evaluation team members. The format also provided general questions, with flexibility to add appropriate questions to each interviewee, based on the interviewee's organization or sector.

231. In terms of accessing programmatic information, as per the workplan, while a considerable share of stakeholder interviews took place online, two national experts and one international expert visited sub-offices in Kandahar, Mazar and Herat as well as the country office in Kabul. The team met beneficiaries receiving support from the livelihood, nutrition, school feeding, and general food/cash distributions. These site visits also incorporated meetings with implementing partners, local authorities and United Nations and other operational partners.

232. Security and field conditions led to an agreement with WFP country office to visit the provinces Kandahar, Mazar and Herat. These locations offered the possibility to study multiple activities that had been implemented for a variety of beneficiaries, mostly active throughout the time period of the evaluation. In an effort to make up for the lack of statistical significance, the evaluation team has also made use of the surveys undertaken by the country office vulnerability analysis, monitoring and evaluation teams.

233. Related to gender, humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations (AAP) and access, detailed sub-questions were incorporated into the semi-structured questionnaires and the group interview format, with space on the form to disaggregate responses by gender. Dedicated sub-questions on mainstreaming nutrition were integrated into the semi-structured questionnaire, in reference to the WFP corporate guidance on nutrition-sensitive programming. Consideration of environmental issues were also included in the semi-structured questionnaire format (cf. sustainability question) and raised primarily for activities related to assets creation, support to smallholder farmers and climate change adaption.

234. Evaluation team members conducting group interviews ensured that specific protocols sensitive to participation, timing, location, family needs and community acceptance shaped the participation of women and men. There were separate groups for men and women and group interviews for women were undertaken by the national evaluator, who is a woman.

#### Data analysis

235. The responses given by key informants and beneficiaries, together with information gathered during data collection of secondary data and information, were triangulated using a thematic analysis approach arising from the different sources of information. The team used a custom excel sheet linking semi-structured questionnaires and the evaluation matrix to record, after cleaning and filtering the information, the relevant evidence from interviewees and the document review into a single document. This has allowed for a quick review of the different answers received to each question, gaps in data or inconsistencies and a good circulation of information among team members.

236. Emerging findings have been shared and discussed during regular team meetings and other forms of communication during the data collection mission. An initial findings session was conducted on 24 May 2021, where thoughts and findings were tested during a participatory feedback session with the WFP country office staff in order to further complement, substantiate or question the evaluation team's initial

impressions. The evaluation matrix was used as the main tool for analysis of data gathered, and team members looked at information responding to the evaluation questions according to the lines of enquiry and indicators laid out in the evaluation matrix.

237. Where possible and feasible, quantitative analysis was conducted, and findings were presented in charts to present the audience with a quick overview. Since no large-scale data collection has been planned, there were no statistically significant findings.

238. The evaluation team has ensured that all information feeding the evaluation process came from credible sources and was triangulated with other primary and/or secondary sources.

#### Gender equality and empowerment of women (GEEW) considerations

239. The evaluation has analysed how and to what extent gender equality and gender transformative approaches have been included in the design and implementation of the CSP, and if these were adequately measured and reported on. It has assessed whether the CSP process and partnerships have facilitated further integration of gender considerations, and whether human and financial resources adequately reflected the needs for implementation of gender concerns and priorities, in line with the WFP corporate gender policy. The team has looked at women empowerment aspects and assessed if WFP had assessed the needs and opportunities of women and girls and adapted their approach to this analysis. It has also considered the gender balance among staff and the consequences thereof. Women and men have been equally consulted at all levels. The evaluation team has applied the Office of Evaluation's technical note for integrating gender in evaluations.

#### Quality assurance

240. WFP has developed a Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System (CEQAS) based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and OECD/DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance (QA) and templates for evaluation products. Particip's quality assurance has ensured compliance with the requirements of the terms of reference and CEQAS. It has been guided by the principles of independence, credibility and utility.

241. The team's internal quality assurance system covered various inter-related dimensions including the organization and timeliness of the process, the quality and utility of deliverables, and the management of relations with the relevant stakeholders. A key dimension of this approach is continuity in quality support and control throughout the entire evaluation process, providing the most appropriate type of quality support according to the phase of the process and the activities taking place. Particip has put emphasis on methodological support in the inception phase while quality assurance has focused on ensuring that results are well substantiated by evidence (and thus credible) in the synthesis phase.

242. The evaluation matrix was an important element to guarantee quality and transparency of the evaluation, which allowed structural recording of information and triangulation, in line with the UNEG transparency principle.

243. Quality assurance has been carried out by the following evaluation team members, covering several layers of control and an effective division of responsibilities:

- The team leader (TL) has ensured general supervision of the work carried out by the other team members. She has paid special attention to the consistency and coherence of the reports and ensured that conclusions and related findings are well substantiated.
- Each evaluation team member has conducted quality assurance in their respective areas of responsibilities and produced high quality contributions to the full evaluation report.
- The quality assurance director has ensured that the evaluation process and its outputs were aligned with the terms of reference and the WFP CEQAS. In addition, he has performed the quality control of this report. The in-house project manager was responsible for the general coordination and support in managing and monitoring the evaluation process and its products. In coordination with the team leader and quality assurance director, she has performed first-level quality assurance (in terms of completeness, structure, language, alignment with the terms of reference and the WFP CEQAS).

244. Each deliverable has been scrutinized at multiple levels. Sufficient time has been built into the work plan for feedback. An internal reference group composed of WFP stakeholders at country office, the regional bureau in Bangkok (RBB) and headquarters (HQ) levels reviewed the draft reports and provided feedback.

245. Furthermore, two internal stakeholder workshops took place to discuss and validate the draft evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations with WFP staff (on 2 August and 3 August 2021). One workshop was also organized with external stakeholders (on 10 August 2021).

## Annex 4. Evaluation Matrix

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>EQ1 – To what extent have WFP's strategic position, role and specific contribution been based on country priorities and people's needs as well as WFP's strengths?</b>					
<b>1.1 To what extent has the CSP been relevant to national policies, plans, strategies and goals, including achievement of the national Sustainable Development Goals?</b>	1.1.1 Alignment, relevance and coherence with national policies and plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent are WFP programme documents and the CSP aligned to national priorities as expressed in national policies and plans? Which government national/sub-national policies, strategies and plans did WFP align its designs and approaches with and how?</li> <li>Has the development of the CSP in 2018 contributed to alignment with national policies and priorities?</li> <li>To what extent has the development of the CSP in 2018 involved the Government (technical units)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSP strategic directions and objectives matching those of government policies and plans</li> <li>Level of participation / ownership of the Government in the CSP design</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and design documentation, incl. budget revisions</li> <li>Zero Hunger Strategic Review</li> <li>WFP Logframes and ToCs</li> <li>Government policies plans and programmes in relevant areas</li> <li>WFP and other UN agencies' evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>Key informant interviews (KIIs)</li> </ul>
	1.1.2 Alignment with WFP strategic plans and Corporate Results Framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent are CSP activities aligned to WFP global strategies and relevant corporate policies and guidelines?</li> <li>To what extent are CSP activities aligned with WFP operational strengths and capacities?</li> <li>How internally coherent are the different strategic outcome areas of the CSP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSP strategic directions and objectives matching global WFP strategies and policies.</li> <li>Degree of thematic, geographic and operational integration between and among the different strategic outcome areas in the CSP design</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP global strategies</li> <li>WFP corporate results framework</li> <li>Specific WFP policies on cross-cutting themes</li> <li>WFP evaluations findings and recommendations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs</li> </ul>
	1.1.3 Alignment to SDGs (SGD 2, SDG 17)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Are strategic outcomes, as outlined in the CSP, expected to generate progress against WFP and Government SDG ambitions?</li> <li>How have integrated agency-led systems informed the design of national programming and tracked progress towards SDG 2?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Degree of alignment of expected outcomes with WFP and government SDG ambitions</li> <li>Availability, comprehensiveness and usage of a joint system to track progress towards SDG 2</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and design documentation</li> <li>WFP annual country reports</li> <li>Zero Hunger Strategic Review</li> <li>WFP Logframes and ToCs</li> <li>Government policies plans and programmes</li> <li>System to track progress towards SDG 2</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>Data analysis (SDG2 tracking progress system)</li> <li>KIIs</li> </ul>

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>1.2 To what extent has the CSP addressed the needs of the most vulnerable people in the country to ensure that no one is left behind?</b>	1.2.1 Relevance of the CSP and related WFP operations to the needs of the most vulnerable people and affected population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was the formulation of the CSP based on a comprehensive analysis of current humanitarian and development needs including resilience challenges in Afghanistan?</li> <li>To what extent do WFP activities, expected outcomes and objectives relate to the identified needs, including the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Availability and usage of national-level detailed vulnerability and resilience challenges assessments</li> <li>Depth of context and risk analysis</li> <li>Logic of ToCs and programmatic frameworks</li> <li>Logic for beneficiary prioritization</li> <li>Availability/ content of gender and protection (do no harm) assessments</li> <li>Availability and content of access strategy</li> <li>PDM report statements on inclusivity of beneficiaries</li> <li>Volume of beneficiaries covered</li> <li>Adaptation of activities to changes in beneficiary needs and in context</li> <li>Level of satisfaction of the beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP</li> <li>WFP Logframes and ToCs</li> <li>WFP project documents</li> <li>WFP context and risk analysis (incl. VAM assessments)</li> <li>WFP annual country reports</li> <li>Documents assessing the overall situation in the country</li> <li>Field assessments</li> <li>Causal analysis documents</li> <li>PDM reports</li> <li>Beneficiary perception questionnaires</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>Data analysis (context, change of needs)</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff, national and local government, members of clusters, donors, (inter) national organizations and NGOs)</li> <li>FGDs or beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
	1.2.2 Relevance to needs specific to COVID-19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was the design of the WFP response proportionate to the needs?</li> <li>In its design, does WFP target mainly beneficiaries who are considered the most vulnerable (targeting approach)?</li> <li>Have gender, protection and access been taken into account in the CSP design?</li> <li>Have any vulnerable groups been excluded in the design?</li> <li>Has the CSP (as compared to the preceding SO/PRRO/EMOPs combination) enabled a more comprehensive response to the identified needs?</li> <li>Was there any data related to COVID-19 that had not been collected previously that has informed WFP?</li> </ul>			
	1.2.3 Are there any changes in the caseload or profile of beneficiaries in response to COVID?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the changes in beneficiary numbers, targeted profile, geographical location and transfer modality as a result of COVID outbreak?</li> </ul>			



Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>1.3 To what extent has WFP's strategic positioning remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP in light of changing context, national capacities and needs?</b>	1.3.1 Political and strategic positioning vis-a-vis the Government at the national and local levels, the international community, and donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent do the Government and the international community consider WFP strategic positioning as relevant and aligned with country priorities?</li> <li>To what extent has the WFP CSP and programmes been in line with WFP donors' agendas/priorities and considered as relevant by them? What have been the key elements and drivers of WFP partnerships with their different donors?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CSP strategic directions and objectives matching those of government policies and plans and donors' priorities</li> <li>Perception of WFP strategic positioning (thematic, geographic) and reputation</li> <li>Evolution of perception of WFP role between 2016 and 2022</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and design documents</li> <li>Zero Hunger Strategic Review</li> <li>WFP Logframes and ToCs</li> <li>Government policies plans and programmes (ANPDF I and II, National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority Programme, National Education Strategic Plan, SUN, etc.)</li> <li>WFP and other UN agencies and inter-agency evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (national and local government and KIIs in international community)</li> </ul>
	1.3.2 Flexibility / capacity to adapt to dynamic contexts (including the COVID-19 outbreak) and risk management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have analysis of the evolution of the situation and needs been regularly conducted? How often?</li> <li>What analysis of government capacity at national and subnational levels has been conducted?</li> <li>How well did WFP adapt its strategy and response to the evolving context of capacities, priorities and needs? To what extent have emerging priorities in Afghanistan been identified and taken into account?</li> <li>Have the CSP format and principles allowed for sufficient flexibility?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Availability and quality of data on the evolution of the situation and needs, and use of these data</li> <li>Availability and quality of early warning information</li> <li>Evidence of flexibility to respond to changing needs and priorities over time</li> <li>Evidence of flexibility in terms of adapting to the changing strategies of operational partners and donors</li> <li>Evidence of emergency preparedness and response capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP</li> <li>WFP Log frames and ToCs</li> <li>WFP project documents</li> <li>WFP projects and CSP annual reports (SPRs)</li> <li>Zero Hunger Strategic Review</li> <li>WFP and others' (UNAMA/UNOCHA) analyses assessing the overall situation in the country</li> <li>WFP risk analyses</li> <li>WFP contingency plans</li> <li>WFP previous evaluations</li> <li>Interviews with key stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at regional, CO and SO level strategic partners/donors)</li> </ul>
	1.3.3. Particular flexibility in response to the COVID-19 pandemic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have any changes in strategic positioning been required by the pandemic and what is the degree of adaptation by WFP</li> </ul>			

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>1.4 To what extent has the CSP been coherent and aligned with the wider UN and include appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP Afghanistan?</b>	1.4.1 Alignment and consistency with the UNDAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How coherent/consistent has the WFP CSP been with UNDAF outcome areas and high-level activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP programmes and CSP strategic directions and objectives matching those of UNDAF/One UN/upcoming UNSDCF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and design documentation</li> <li>WFP Log frames and ToCs</li> <li>WFP project documents</li> <li>UNDAF and UNSDCF related documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff, UN agencies staff)</li> </ul>
	1.4.2 WFP comparative advantage and complementarities in relation to other UN agencies, funds and programmes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How has the move to One UN for Afghanistan affected the approach as described in the CSP?</li> <li>What is the perception of the international community on WFP strengths and comparative advantages in the overall Afghanistan UN landscape?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence and quality of analysis of UN partners' complementarities and WFP comparative advantage</li> <li>Perception of WFP strengths and comparative advantages in the UN landscape</li> <li>Alignment between WFP strategic orientations and expected role/comparative advantages</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP programme documents and reports</li> <li>Joint needs assessments programmes and initiatives</li> <li>Findings on WFP comparative advantages identified in previous evaluations</li> <li>Minutes of clusters and working groups</li> <li>Joint advocacy initiatives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (national counterparts, beneficiaries, international community)</li> </ul>
	1.4.3 WFP partnership strategy with other humanitarian and development actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What strategic partnerships have been established, and were they based on WFP comparative advantages?</li> <li>What is the level of partnerships and synergies / complementarities of WFP with the different humanitarian and development actors (incl. Rome-based agencies (RBAs)?</li> <li>How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners?</li> <li>To what extent is WFP engaging in coordination mechanisms and advancing harmonization of strategies? What is the role of WFP and its engagement with clusters and working groups?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number and type of partnerships / joint actions/initiatives established</li> <li>Number and amount of 'funding' leveraged as a result of WFP partnerships with other actors</li> <li>Effect of partnerships on mainstreaming key priorities/issues in relevant policies and programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stakeholders and partners mapping from inception phase</li> <li>Memorandums of understanding/letters of agreement with partners</li> <li>Partners' strategies</li> <li>Cluster systems and other coordination mechanisms; cluster minutes/ documents</li> <li>Relevant financial data</li> <li>Review of joint actions / initiatives established</li> <li>Findings on WFP comparative advantages and partnership strategy in previous evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (strategic partners, members of clusters, RBA staff)</li> </ul>
	1.4.4 Changes in the wider UN frameworks due to COVID-19 and WFP engagement in these	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Are there changes in the UN framework due to COVID-19 and if so, which ones?</li> <li>What has WFP engagement been in these changes?</li> </ul>			

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>EQ 2 - What has been the extent and quality of WFP's specific contribution to CSP strategic outcomes in Afghanistan?</b>					
<b>2.1 To what extent has WFP delivered expected outputs and contributed to the expected CSP strategic outcomes?</b>	2.1.1 Progress at the level of outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To which extent have planned outputs been achieved?</li> <li>What was the quality of the outputs?</li> <li>Are there areas where the ability to deliver is fully demonstrated, and areas where limitations were imposed (sector, region, population specific)?</li> <li>What implementing challenges have affected delivery (financing, externalities, capacity gaps)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Corporate quantitative data sets including PDMs, asset monitoring, food basket monitoring</li> <li>Qualitative analysis of KII and/or FGD data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Corporate databases, reports including SPRs/ACRs, ad hoc reports e.g. for donors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs</li> </ul>
	2.1.2 Progress at the level of expected strategic outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What progress has been made in each of the SOs at outcome level and how has it been measured over time?</li> <li>What are the synergies between activities?</li> <li>Was the results framework in the CSP document coherent, logical and complete?</li> <li>What was the quality of M&amp;E and reporting? Were the indicators and data collection and analysis tools appropriate for effective monitoring? Did M&amp;E provide timely information for adaptive management?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Degree of progress of outcomes towards intermediate and strategic outcomes</li> <li>Changes in performance over time</li> <li>Effects of challenges including those identified under 2.1.1</li> <li>Unintended results</li> <li>Relevance of the different M&amp;E frameworks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and projects annual reports (ACR, SPRs)</li> <li>Data monitoring systems and other relevant documentation for each SO/activity</li> <li>PDM reports and other outcome assessments</li> <li>Annual actual spending and budgeted spending by activity/outcome/ strategic objectives</li> <li>WFP Afghanistan M&amp;E tool kit</li> <li>WFP evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP senior management and programme staff)</li> </ul>
	2.1.3 Progress as compared to SDG 2 and desired achievements (impact)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the key trends in terms of achieving zero hunger in Afghanistan?</li> <li>What is the WFP Afghanistan ToC (or expected impact pathway) towards the overall impact of achieving zero hunger in Afghanistan?</li> <li>Is the ToC appropriate?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall progress on the ZHSR recommendations</li> <li>Zero Hunger Capacity Scorecard</li> <li>Plausibility and perception of WFP contribution to impact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Data and existing analysis and trends in sectors related to ZHSR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs</li> </ul>
<b>2.2 To what extent has WFP mainstreamed cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, AAP,</b>	2.2.1 Effective mainstreaming of humanitarian principles (HP) /access, protection/ AAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have humanitarian principles, protection, AAP been integrated and applied? How? What issues have arisen?</li> <li>What mechanisms have been put in place for improving AAP?</li> <li>To what extent are systems/ recommendations for protecting beneficiaries' data adopted?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence and quality of a protection/AAP strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP corporate standards (AAP, humanitarian principles &amp; access, protection)</li> <li>WFP CSP and project reports and monitoring data</li> <li>Evidence from beneficiary feedback mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> </ul>

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
gender equality and women's empowerment, other equity considerations and inclusion/disability)?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the CSP design facilitate integration of protection concerns?</li> <li>• Have WFP activities been conducive for protection of human rights?</li> <li>• How have issues of access been managed?</li> <li>• What progress has been made in terms of protection and access during the evaluation period?</li> <li>• To what extent have risk analysis, humanitarian principles, context and legal analysis, data protection, community engagement elements and engagement with CSO, been valuable for enhancing access?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of integration of HP &amp; access/protection/AAP related to (i) context and needs analysis stage, (ii) strategic design, (iii) WFP and implementing partners' capacities, (iv) programme and activity design, and (v) activity implementation</li> <li>• Comparison and divergence with international and corporate standards and adoption of AAP/ protection recommendations</li> <li>• Analysis of complaints/feedback from referral pathways</li> <li>• Proportion of activities for which beneficiary feedback is documented, analysed and integrated</li> <li>• Trends in protection and AAP indicators</li> <li>• Level of awareness of staff</li> <li>• Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme</li> <li>• Proportion of targeted people accessing assistance without protection challenges</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AAP/protection support missions reports and recommendations</li> <li>• Gender &amp; protection action plans and monitoring</li> <li>• Protection cluster minutes</li> <li>• AAP working group minutes</li> <li>• Gender-based violence sub-cluster (GBV S-C) minutes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• KIIs (WFP staff at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels, Government, strategic partners, members protection cluster)</li> <li>• Beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
	2.2.2 Effective mainstreaming of gender	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were gender analyses undertaken? How were they used to shape/influence the design and implementation of activities?</li> <li>• To what extent have gender issues been integrated and applied? What has been the strategy?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence and quality of gender strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP corporate standards / policy on gender</li> <li>• WFP CSP and project reports</li> <li>• Monitoring data</li> <li>• Benchmark progress Gender Transformation Programme (GTP)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> </ul>

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent and how successfully have gender-transformative approaches (GTA) been applied?</li> <li>Did the CSP design facilitate integration of gender concerns?</li> <li>What progress has been made in terms of GEEW during the evaluation period?</li> <li>To what extent has engagement of women groups been valuable for enhancing access?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of integration of gender issues related to: (i) context and needs; (ii) strategic design; (iii) WFP and implementing partners' capacities; (iv) programme and activity design; and (v) activity implementation</li> <li>Comparison with WFP corporate gender policy objectives</li> <li>Level of awareness/ accountability of staff and senior management</li> <li>Budget allocated to gender</li> <li>Perception of beneficiaries, the Government, strategic partners</li> <li>Proportion of households where women, men, or both make decisions in cash assistance and livelihoods activities</li> <li>Perceived change in proportion of decision-making women under the CSP</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels, the Government, strategic partners, UN Women)</li> <li>Beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
	2.2.3 Inclusion of disability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were analyses undertaken on inclusion of people with disabilities?</li> <li>To what extent have the needs of people with disabilities been included?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence and quality of strategy to include people with disabilities</li> <li>Allocated budget</li> <li>Number of people with disabilities included as beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and project reports</li> <li>Monitoring data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels, the Government, strategic partners)</li> <li>Beneficiary interviews</li> </ul>

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
	2.2.3 Effective mainstreaming of nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have nutrition-sensitive actions/approaches been integrated within the CSP programming and then applied? What has been the strategy?</li> <li>To what extent are the recommendations of the 2017 WFP nutrition policy integrated into the CSP in terms of specific and nutrition-sensitive activities?</li> <li>To what extent are the various components of the CSP (food security, resilience, early recovery, AAP) oriented towards the achievement of nutritional objectives/outcomes?</li> <li>Has WFP been engaged in moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) treatment? If yes, how successful was it? Was it aligned with priorities of others?</li> <li>Have sufficient resources / capacities have been allocated to mainstreaming of nutrition?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of integration and coherence of nutrition sensitive approaches in CSP</li> <li>Compliance with WFP 2017 nutrition policy and guidance on nutrition-sensitive programming</li> <li>Degree of integration of nutrition objectives/outcomes and nutrition-sensitive indicators</li> <li>Perception of partners on WFP strategic shift to prevention of malnutrition approach</li> <li>Interlinkage between the different nutrition activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP corporate standards / policy on nutrition</li> <li>WFP CSP and projects reports and monitoring data</li> <li>Reports on malnutrition in Afghanistan</li> <li>Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Plan</li> <li>Nutrition cluster reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels, Government, strategic partners, nutrition cluster, SUN members)</li> </ul>
	2.2.4 Effect of COVID-19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the response to COVID-19 change the degree of contribution in any of the above areas?</li> </ul>			

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>2.3 To what extent are the achievements of the CSP likely to be sustainable?</b>	2.3.1 Sustainability of WFP achievements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent and how are the benefits of the WFP CSP likely to be continuing, in terms of: (i) early recovery/ preparedness / humanitarian assistance capacities; (ii) improved resilience/livelihoods/ assets created; (iii) malnutrition prevention; (iv) partnerships; and (vi) policy changes and government capacities?</li> <li>What activities/efforts have been initiated and have the potential to have sustainable effects in the longer-term?</li> <li>How sustainable are the various funding streams for the next phase of the CSP?</li> <li>To what extent have environmentally friendly measures been integrated and applied across different activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of perceptions of informants about the sustainability of WFP efforts</li> <li>Technical and financial viability of productive assets and community infrastructures enhanced by WFP programmes</li> <li>Proportion of activities for which environmental risks have been screened and mitigation actions identified</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and projects report and monitoring data, SPRs</li> <li>Activity-related annual monitoring</li> <li>Environment-related reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels, the Government, donors, strategic partners, implementing partners)</li> </ul>
	2.3.2 Community engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the level of communities' participation?</li> <li>Were communities included in a participatory approach to asset selection and what is the level of community ownership?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Functioning of community management and multisectoral committees supported by WFP</li> <li>Positive feedback from beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and projects report and monitoring data, SPRs</li> <li>Data from feedback mechanism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
	2.3.3 National capacity strengthening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has WFP undertaken activities to analyse and build on government capacity to ensure the sustainability of support?</li> <li>Have the resources allocated to government capacity strengthening been adequate?</li> <li>What progress has been made on government capacity strengthening and how is this measured?</li> <li>Does the Government have capacity to continue selected WFP CSP activities without external support? Has any handover strategy been developed?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Government capacities to continue selected WFP CSP activities (school feeding, CBTs, etc.) – including financial capacities</li> <li>Resources allocated to government capacity strengthening</li> <li>Handover plans and government organograms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and projects report and monitoring data, SPRs</li> <li>Reports on capacity strengthening of various partners</li> <li>Handover strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at, CO and SO levels, the Government, donors, strategic partners, implementing partners)</li> </ul>



Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>2.4 To what extent has the CSP facilitated more strategic linkages between humanitarian, development and, peace?</b>	2.4.1 Humanitarian-development-peace nexus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How has the WFP portfolio sought to balance its humanitarian approaches with interventions aimed at development while integrating the specificities of the country context?</li> <li>Have WFP activities been conducive for strengthening linkages between and across humanitarian and development work and peacebuilding? Did WFP advocate for that?</li> <li>Has CSP facilitated linkages between humanitarian and development work?</li> <li>What has been the WFP engagement level in community recovery activities? Have they brought humanitarian, development and peacebuilding benefits?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of main shocks &amp; stresses that occurred in the evaluation period</li> <li>Analysis of WFP work in its contribution to strengthening linkage between and across humanitarian and development work and peacebuilding</li> <li>Analysis of community recovery activities conducted</li> <li>Attention towards humanitarian-development nexus and peacebuilding efforts in the CSP and accommodation to evolving humanitarian needs</li> <li>Stakeholder perception of WFP balance between humanitarian and development work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and projects reports and monitoring data, humanitarian, conflict and resilience analysis</li> <li>Afghanistan HRPs, humanitarian/resilience assessments and research work on humanitarian-development nexus and peacebuilding activities</li> <li>WFP and other relevant international guidance on the humanitarian-development nexus and peacebuilding activities</li> <li>Humanitarian-development nexus working group minutes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels, the Government, strategic partners, members of relevant working groups)</li> <li>Beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> <li>Site visits (if possible)</li> </ul>
<b>EQ3 - To what extent has WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to CSP outputs and strategic outcomes?</b>					
<b>3.1 To what extent have outputs been delivered within the intended timeframe?</b>	3.1.1 Timeliness of WFP interventions across all six strategic outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent were planned outputs achieved on time?</li> <li>How timely was the provision of logistics services to support CSP?</li> <li>What / why / where are the bottlenecks / constraints (HR, logistics, funding...) affecting the timeliness of outputs delivery in each geographical area?</li> <li>To what extent was timeliness affected by external and internal factors?</li> <li>What are the mechanisms in place to resolve delays?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of deliverables/ outputs achieved on time</li> <li>Analysis of logistics management indicators</li> <li>Analysis of the number and types of bottlenecks and analysis of mitigation process</li> <li>Results from beneficiary feedback on timeliness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP programmes/ projects and CSP reporting data (SPR, COMET)</li> <li>Review of cooperating partners agreements for timeliness consideration</li> <li>WFP corporate standards on logistics</li> <li>Monitoring data</li> <li>Supply /logistics analysis</li> <li>Past evaluations' findings</li> <li>Logistics cluster reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>Data analysis</li> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at RB, at CO logistics and programme units, local authorities, implementing partners)</li> </ul>

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
	3.1.2 Effect of COVID-19 on the ability of WFP to deliver	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the COVID-19 affected the ability of WFP to deliver?</li> <li>• Have there been consequences on human resource needs and management?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of timeliness improvement due to the implementation of potential recommendations from past evaluations</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
<b>3.2 To what extent has coverage and targeting of interventions been appropriate and effective?</b>	3.2.1 Targeting and coverage analysis of WFP interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have targeting criteria been relevant, and aligned with the operating environment?</li> <li>• Have the criteria led to any delays in implementation?</li> <li>• How have geographic locations been selected?</li> <li>• How has WFP covered areas which are not under government control?</li> <li>• Have targeting criteria been uniformly applied across programmes or adapted flexibly to activities/locations?</li> <li>• Did targeting criteria adequately take into account age, gender and diversity?</li> <li>• To what extent have the different most vulnerable groups in each geographical area been covered? Has there been overlap or duplication between or among various activities?</li> <li>• What has been the experience with SCOPE?</li> <li>• What has been the level of efforts to harmonize intervention targeting criteria with other partners? Any joint targeting strategy?</li> <li>• Have distributions reached beneficiaries as per plan?</li> <li>• What measures have been taken to improve the accuracy of targeting over time?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ratio of planned beneficiaries versus population in need</li> <li>• Comparison of programme data on deliveries and needs.</li> <li>• Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme</li> <li>• Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distributions</li> <li>• Proportion of vulnerable group not covered by assistance in each area compared to initial targeting</li> <li>• Number of beneficiaries reached versus beneficiaries planned</li> <li>• Relative increase of coverage during CSP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vulnerability/FSN needs assessments</li> <li>• WFP programmes/ projects and CSP reports, SPRs, PDM and monitoring data,</li> <li>• WFP targeting strategy, beneficiary selection tool</li> <li>• SCOPE data, list of beneficiaries</li> <li>• Targeting/criteria strategies from partners, FSN clusters, etc.</li> <li>• HQ/regional office guidance on targeting</li> <li>• Findings of previous evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KIIs (WFP M&amp;E staff and M&amp;E staff from partners, clusters' members)</li> <li>• FGDs or beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
	3.2.2 Effect of COVID 19 on targeting and coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have there been changes in coverage and targeting of interventions due to changing needs under COVID-19?</li> <li>• Has WFP adequately adapted?</li> </ul>			

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>3.3 To what extent have WFP's activities been cost-efficient in delivery of assistance?</b>	3.3.1 Cost efficiency analysis of the activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent were the activities and outputs delivered within the budget?</li> <li>How economic was the provision of logistics services taking into consideration the operational context?</li> <li>To what extent were supply sources choices cost-efficient taking into consideration the operational context?</li> <li>What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Physical execution vs financial execution rates</li> <li>Proportion of outputs achieved within budget</li> <li>Cost analysis for the provision of logistics services</li> <li>Unit cost benchmarking: actual costs vs WFP global benchmarks and vs planned costs</li> <li>Cost categories analysis for standard ration delivered by type of modality, geographical areas per recipient</li> <li>Supply source: value, percentage, and quantity of food commodities procured through international, regional, or local channels</li> <li>Measures taken to address any specific findings on efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Annual actual spending and budgeted spending by activity/ outcome/ strategic objectives</li> <li>COMPASS/LESS data</li> <li>WINGS data for cost analysis</li> <li>Supply /logistics analysis</li> <li>GCMF reports and data set (KPI / dashboard)</li> <li>Review of implementing partners' agreements for cost efficiency consideration</li> <li>Findings from past evaluations</li> <li>Logistics cluster reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP regional and CO level, implementing partners)</li> <li>FGDs or beneficiary interviews (if possible) or beneficiary phone calls</li> </ul>
	3.3.2 Additional costs under COVID-19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has WFP incurred additional costs due to necessary COVID-19 protective measures and if so, which ones?</li> </ul>			

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>3.4 To what extent have alternative, more cost-effective measures been considered?</b>	3.4.1 Cost effectiveness of alternative delivery modalities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent were alternative approaches explored for enhanced cost effectiveness – disaggregated by output and strategic outcome?</li> <li>What is the comparative cost effectiveness of the different transfer modalities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of evidence in documentation of the intentional exploration of alternative approaches for enhanced cost effectiveness, for different outputs and strategic outcomes</li> <li>Analysis of effectiveness index /cost for each modality</li> <li>Unit cost benchmarking: actual costs vs WFP global benchmarks</li> <li>Analysis of: (1) transfer mode flexibility to change transfer modalities according to the situations; (2) mix flexibility to change variety of products according to needs; and (3) volume flexibility to change total quantity of food rations according to needs</li> <li>Analysis of shortfalls in results attributable to internal or external factors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP programmes/ projects reports, SPRs, PDM and monitoring data</li> <li>Annual actual spending and budgeted spending by activity/ outcome/ strategic objectives</li> <li>WINGS data for cost analysis</li> <li>Review implementing partners agreements for cost effectiveness consideration</li> <li>Findings from past evaluations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP regional and CO level, M&amp;E staff from WFP and implementing partners)</li> </ul>
<b>EQ4 - What have been the factors that explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?</b>					

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>4.1 To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, predictable and flexible resources to support the CSP?</b>	<p>4.1.1 CSP funding strategy and leveraging effect</p> <p>4.1.2 Adequacy of funds raised and implications for delivering CSP</p> <p>4.2.3 Effects of COVID-19 on needs and available funding</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What has been the WFP fundraising strategy and did the CSP help?</li> <li>• How has change in donors' behaviour (in funding size or allocation to specific topics) affected funding allocations to the different components/activities of the CSP?</li> <li>• Have risks associated with the fundraising strategy been clearly identified?</li> <li>• Has the CSP stimulated funding by the Government (or other partners) for national food security and nutrition systems or for WFP-related activities?</li> <li>• Were there effects of the pandemic on financial needs and on the level of funding of any additional requests?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of a fundraising/advocacy strategy and associated risks</li> <li>• Changes in level of funding of the CSP by SO/ activity</li> <li>• Proof of leverage of additional resource /donors under the CSP</li> <li>• Resources mobilized (USD value) for national food security and nutrition systems as a result of WFP capacity strengthening</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP partnership and fundraising strategy</li> <li>• Advocacy initiatives</li> <li>• Funding sources and allocations</li> <li>• Annual actual spending and budgeted spending by activity/ outcome/ strategic objectives</li> <li>• Review of staffing structure and organogram</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KIIs (WFP staff in charge of fundraising and donor relations)</li> <li>• Donors</li> </ul>
<b>4.2 To what extent has the CSP led to partnerships and collaborations with other actors that positively influenced performance and results?</b>	<p>4.2.1 Type and purpose of partnerships</p> <p>4.2.2 Partnerships for development</p> <p>4.2.3 Changes to partnership needs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the CSP resulted in a new approach to partnerships?</li> <li>• Is there a difference between partnerships for crisis response and those for resilience?</li> <li>• Has the choice of strategic and operational (public/private) partners influenced performance?</li> <li>• Has WFP succeeded in engaging with development partners to support long-term transformational change?</li> <li>• Were there adaptations to partnership needs or additional opportunities arising during the pandemic?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number and type of partnerships / joint actions/initiatives established</li> <li>• Analyses of partnerships strategies</li> <li>• Level of integration of WFP CSP activities within the government plans and programmes</li> <li>• Effect of consultation on CSP's ultimate objectives and activities</li> <li>• Improved alignment with government and partner strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mapping of stakeholders</li> <li>• Cluster reports</li> <li>• Partnership strategy</li> <li>• Memorandums of understanding/letters of agreement with partners</li> <li>• Partners' performance appraisals</li> <li>• Other partners' strategies</li> <li>• Review of joint actions / initiatives</li> <li>• Stakeholders' perceptions on the appropriateness of WFP choice of partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> <li>• KIIs (CO senior management and staff responsible for partnerships, strategic partners incl. UN partners, the Government at national and local levels and operational private partners)</li> </ul>
	4.3.1 Benefits of the CSP / flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the CSP sufficiently flexible to accommodate Afghanistan's evolving priorities, beneficiary needs, and emergency needs under the current highly complex and difficult circumstances?</li> <li>• Has the CSP provided flexibility to conduct an appropriate L2 emergency response?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of data on the evolution of the situation and needs, including emergency picks and conflict analysis, and use of these data</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP CSP, Log frames and ToCs</li> <li>• L2 documentation</li> <li>• Contextual analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desk review</li> </ul>

Sub-questions	Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry	Indicators	Data source (documents)	Data collection technique
<b>4.3 To what extent has the CSP provided greater flexibility in dynamic operational contexts and how did it affect results?</b>	4.3.2 Adaptation of response under COVID-19 and other unexpected challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent did WFP adapt to needs created by the pandemic in:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Balance of humanitarian/development activities</li> <li>- Activity types (general food assistance (GFA); school feeding; resilience; technical assistance and capacity strengthening; nutrition; social protection; disaster risk reduction; and urban programming etc.)</li> <li>- Modalities (CBT vs in-kind)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of flexibility to respond to changing needs and operational priorities over time, (incl. resource management and procedural flexibility)</li> <li>Evidence of flexibility to conduct an L2 response</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documents assessing the overall situation in the country (evolution since 2016)</li> <li>Interviews with key stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KIIs (WFP staff at regional, CO and SO levels, strategic partners/donors, L2 task force members)</li> </ul>
<b>4.4 To what extent has WFP made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?</b>	4.4.1 Strategic shifts in results areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was there a shift to more sustainable solutions?</li> <li>Was there a shift to transformational linkages?</li> <li>Was there a shift to comprehensive national-led framing?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of shifts in all three areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP CSP and programme/ projects documentation / reports, SPRs</li> <li>HQ/RBD support mission reports</li> <li>Interviews with key stakeholders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (WFP informants at HQ, regional, CO and SO levels)</li> </ul>
	4.4.2 Factors supporting or limiting shifts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What external / contextual factors have positively or negatively affected the ability to shift?</li> <li>What internal factors have positively or negatively influenced the strategic shift expected by the CSP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of external factors</li> <li>Evidence of internal factors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documents assessing the overall situation in the country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Desk review</li> <li>KIIs (government and strategic partners)</li> </ul>

## Annex 5. Evaluation Timeline

Phase 1 - Preparation	Responsible	Dates
Draft ToR cleared by Director of Evaluation (DoE)/Depute Director of Evaluation (DDoE) and circulated for comments to country office and to long-term agreement (LTA) firms	DoE/DDoE	4-Sep-20
Comments on draft ToR received	CO	4-Sep-20
Proposal deadline based on the draft ToR	LTA	19-Sep-20
LTA proposal review	Evaluation manager (EM)	26-Sep-20
Final revised ToR sent to WFP stakeholders	EM	26-Nov-20
Contracting evaluation team/firm	EM	30-Nov-20
Phase 2 - Inception		
Team preparation, literature review prior to HQ briefing	Team	11 Jan-15 Jan 21
HQ & RB inception briefing	EM & team	18 Jan-22 Jan 21
Inception briefings	EM + team leader (TL)	25 Jan-29 Jan-21
Submit draft inception report (IR)	TL	14 Feb 21
OEV quality assurance and feedback	EM	19 Feb 21
Submit revised IR	TL	26 Feb 21
IR review and clearance	EM	5 Mar 21
IR clearance	DDoE	19 Mar 21
EM circulates final IR to WFP key stakeholders for information + copy on intranet	EM	20 Mar 21
Phase 3 - Data collection, including fieldwork		
In country / remote data collection	Team	11 April 21
Exit debrief (ppt)	TL	3 May 21
Preliminary findings debrief	Team	26 May 21
Phase 4 - Reporting		
Submit high quality draft ER to OEV (after the company's quality check)	TL	9 June 21
OEV quality feedback sent to TL	EM	21 June 21
Submit revised draft ER to OEV	TL	30 Jun 21
OEV quality check	EM	30 June-6 July 21
Submit revised draft ER to OEV	TL	8 July
Seek clearance prior to circulating the ER to Internal Reference Group (IRG)	DDoE	12-13 July 21
OEV shares draft evaluation report with IRG for feedback	EM/IRG	14 July 21
Learning workshop (in country or remote)		2-3 August and 10 August 21
Consolidate WFP comments and share with evaluation team	EM	29 Jul 21



Submit revised draft ER (draft 3) to OEV based on WFP comments, with team's responses on the matrix of comments	ET	24 Aug 21
Review draft 3	EM	21 Oct 21
Submit final draft ER to OEV	TL	9 Nov 21
Review final draft	EM	16 Nov 21
Seek final approval by DDoE	DDoE	23 Nov 21
Draft summary evaluation report (SER)	EM	Q1-2022
Seek DDoE clearance to send SER	DDoE	Q2-2022
OEV circulates SER to WFP Executive Management for information upon clearance from Deputy Director of Evaluation	DDoE	Aug-22
<b>Phase 5 - Executive Board (EB) and follow-up</b>		
Submit SER/recommendations to CPP for management response + SER to EB Secretariat for editing and translation	EM	Aug-22
Tail-end actions, OEV websites posting, EB round table etc.	EM	
Presentation of summary evaluation report to the EB	DDoE	Nov-22
Presentation of management response to the EB	D/ CPP	Nov-22

## Annex 6. Fieldwork Agenda

Table 14: Agenda field visit in Mazar and Samangan

<b>SUNDAY 18 APRIL</b>	
10:00-10:30	Travel from airport to project site- Hal Habib.
10:30 – 11:30	SO2 asset creation – canal construction – Hal Habib Mazar e sharif district 12. Focus groups discussions with beneficiaries (Male).
11:30-1:200	Travel from Hal Habib to Nahr-i-Shahi DAIL.
12:00 – 13:00	SO1 Seasonal Support – site visit to Nahre Shahi, Balkh scale-up project (SSUP - Food Winterization). Focus groups discussions with beneficiaries (men and women).
13:00- 13:30	From Nahr-i-Shahi DAIL to Ablaye village.
1330-1430	SO2 forestation in Nahre Shahi, Balkh – Ablaye village. Focus groups discussions with beneficiaries (men and women).
<b>MONDAY 19 APRIL</b>	
07:30 – 08:00	Travel from guest house to Mazar-e Sharif DAIL office.
08:00 – 09:00	SO4: Visit with Soya Farmer Association at DAIL Mazar office - focus group discussion.
09:00 – 11:00	Travel from Mazar to Samangan- Aybak with DPS escort.
11:00-12:00	SO4 constructed irrigation canal Aybak- Ishanaha village, Samangan province. Focus groups discussions with beneficiaries (men and women).
12:00- 12:30	Travel from Ishanha village to Aybak
13:30 – 15:30	Travel from Aybak to Mazar
<b>TUESDAY 20 APRIL</b>	
08:00 – 09:00	Meeting with CPs (ASIO, HIA, MAAO, SFL, and BDN) at WFP Mazar AO. Focus group discussion.
09:00 – 09:30	Depart – AO to Mazar Airport

Table 15: Agenda field visit in Kandahar

<b>WEDNESDAY 21 APRIL</b>	
9:00 - 10:00	Flight to Kandahar Airport
10:00 - 10:30	Pick up from airport
10:30 - 10:45	Security briefing in WFP AO/UNAMA
10:45 - 11:00	Meeting with HoAO/OIC

11:00 - 12:00	SO1: CBT seasonal support Kandahar City – NGO- HAPA and beneficiaries FGD with households – Hapa distribution point
<b>THURSDAY 22 APRIL</b>	
09:00 - 10:30	SO1 – IDPs food distribution in HAPA distribution point NGO-HAPA and beneficiaries (households)
10:30 - 12:00	SO1 – CBT seasonal support Kandahar City – NGO OHA and beneficiaries (households) – OHA distribution point
<b>SATURDAY 24 APRIL</b>	
09:00 - 11:00	SO2 FFA protection wall – NGO KRA and beneficiaries (heads of households)
<b>SUNDAY 25 APRIL</b>	
08:00 - 09:30	SO3- School feeding NGO-ALO and beneficiaries – Nasaji School Daman - Kandahar
09:30 - 11:00	SO3- FGD with beneficiaries (PLWG - children) and NGO-BARAN – Mirza Mohamma Khan Clinic PD 9
11:00 - 12:30	SO3 FGD with beneficiaries (PLWG – children) NGO -BARAN - Nazo Ana Clinic
<b>MONDAY 26 APRIL</b>	
08:00 - 09:00	Debriefing to HoAO –
09:00 - 10:00	Departure from WFP to airport (flight cancelled)
<b>TUESDAY 27 APRIL</b>	Departure to Kabul

**Table 16: Agenda field visit in Herat**

<b>THURSDAY 29 APRIL</b>	
8:00 – 8:30	Meeting with Head of Office
8:30 – 9:30	FGD with beneficiaries assisted through COVID-19 response
9:30 – 10:30	FGD with the Government
10-30 12:00	Meeting with IOM and representatives of CPs and Interview with undocumented returnees
13:00 – 14:00	SO1: Discussions with beneficiaries and partners on economic stress (COVID-19) and cash.

## Annex 7. Stakeholder Mapping

Table 17: Stakeholder analysis

STAKEHOLDERS	INVOLVEMENT IN PORTFOLIO
<b>Internal stakeholders</b>	
WFP Executive Board	Executive Board is accountable for approving the new CSP for WFP Afghanistan
WFP headquarters and RBB	Programme and technical support to country office
Country office and sub-offices	Coordinating and overseeing the implementation of the country portfolio
The Office of Evaluation	Commissioned evaluation and responsible for managing the evaluation process and presenting to the Executive Board
<b>External stakeholders</b>	
Government	Partner of WFP operations. Supports and contributes to coordinating and operations including capacity strengthening
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL)	SO1; SO2; SO4; SO6
Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees (MoRR)	SO1; SO2; SO6
ANDMA	SO1; SO2
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD); Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA); Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA); Afghanistan National Water Affairs Authority (ANWARA); National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA)	SO2
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)	SO3; SO4; SO5; SO6
Ministry of Education (MoE)	SO3
Ministry of Trade	SO6
UN agencies	Coordinated planning and action through clusters and other mechanisms; joint and complementary interventions and inputs
OCHA	SO1; SO2
IOM	SO1
UNHCR	SO1; SO6; AAP
UNICEF	SO2; SO3; SO5; SO6
WHO	SO3
FAO	SO1, SO2; SO4; SO5
UNDP; UNEP	SO2
UNFPA; UN Women	Gender equality and partnership to provide information on sexual and reproductive health and gender-based violence in Kabul and Nangarhar provinces
World Bank	SO4, SO5

Donors  Australia, Canada Germany, ECHO, EU, FCDO, Japan, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, UNCERF, Switzerland, UN Funds (non-CERF), USAID	Funding of portfolio and operations; by choice of funding give specific direction to interventions.  Largest contribution to SO1, followed by SO2, SO3 and SO6 in almost equal proportions
Coordination bodies	
Food security & agriculture cluster; inter-cluster coordination team	SO1
Nutrition cluster	SO3
Protection cluster	SO1; Protection/AAP
AAP working group; gender-based violence sub-cluster	Protection/AAP
National Fortification Alliance	SO4
AFSeN-A	SO5
Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development	SO2
International NGOs, national NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and community-based organizations	Cooperating/implementing partners, linking WFP to communities at the field level for most activities.
Various	SO1-SO4
Private sector	Partners in value chain and food provision
Afghanistan Wheat Millers' Association, wheat farmer cooperatives and soya farmer associations	SO4
Suppliers, transporters	SO1, SO2, SO3, SO4
Poor and vulnerable people and communities, IDPs, returnees, refugees, schoolchildren, pregnant and lactating women, children under 5 etc.	All SOs and cross-cutting areas

TYPE OF STAKEHOLDER	CONSULTED DURING INCEPTION	INTEREST IN THE EVALUATION	INTEREST IN THE EVALUATION
Country office	Yes	Primary user of evaluation findings/recommendations.  Direct stake as responsible for country-level planning and operations implementation.  Accountable to beneficiaries and partners for performance and results of the CSP.  Interest in generating evaluation evidence and learning on WFP performance for informing country-level strategic decisions and the next CSP.	Primary stakeholder and key informant of the evaluation.  Participate in briefings, debriefings and stakeholders learning workshop.  Review/provide comments evaluation report and management response.  Facilitate planning / potential logistical arrangements of the evaluation.
Sub-offices	Yes	Primary user of evaluation findings/recommendations.  Responsible for day-to-day implementation and monitoring of WFP operations.  Liaise with stakeholders at decentralized level.  In direct contact with beneficiaries.	Primary stakeholder and key informant of the evaluation.  Participate in briefings, debriefings and stakeholders learning workshop.  Facilitate planning / potential logistical arrangements of the evaluation.

The regional bureau in Bangkok	Yes	User of evaluation findings/recommendation to inform WFP Afghanistan programme support and oversight (incl. direct management responsibilities for the L2 crisis). Interest in independent evaluation of CSP performance for sharing learning from evaluation with the rest of the regional portfolio and informing regional programming.	Primary stakeholder and key informant of the evaluation. Participate in debriefings and meetings as required, and possibly stakeholders learning workshop. Review/Provide comments on ToR, evaluation report and management response. Source of information for regional guidance/initiatives.
The Office of Evaluation	Yes	Provide decision makers and stakeholders with independent accountability for results and with learning to inform policy, strategic and programmatic decisions.	Commissioner of the evaluation. Fully involved in planning and management of the evaluation. Source of information for certain reports of previous and corporate evaluations undertaken by WFP.
Relevant headquarters divisions and technical units	Yes	User of evaluation findings/recommendation to inform wider organizational learning and accountability (with particular interest on lessons learned from the CSP process). Interest as provider of oversight and technical support to the country office and contributors to CSP design according to their mandates. Findings will feed into corporate monitoring.	Participate in briefings and debriefings. Source of information on WFP approaches, standards and corporate approaches/guidelines and previous backstopping missions.
WFP Executive Board	No	Accountability: Assess results against intended CSP outcomes and objectives, including towards gender equity and other cross-cutting corporate results. Lessons learning: Benefit from lessons from the country and about WFP role, strategy and performance.	Results of the evaluation will be presented to the Board, together with the management response to the recommendations
Beneficiaries of WFP operations (men and women)	No	Stake in determining whether WFP assistance is appropriate and effective. Can be affected by evaluation findings/recommendations.	Consultation during field /site visits through various group and individual interviews. Consultations have been done in compliance with WFP humanitarian principles, access and protection of affected populations, as well as gender principles.
Non-beneficiaries of WFP operations (men and women)	No	Could become beneficiaries of WFP operations.	Cannot be consulted due to COVID-19 restrictions.
National Government	Yes	Direct interest in knowing whether WFP CSP is aligned with country priorities. Stake in enhancing collaboration and synergies with WFP, clarifying mandates and roles, and accelerating progress towards capacity development, hand-over and sustainability.	Consultation. Most involved national counterparts will participate in the stakeholders' learning workshop. They will be informed of the evaluation's progress. Source of information on country context, priorities, and perception

			of WFP positioning and partnership.
Local authorities	No	Direct interest in WFP activities in their jurisdiction. Stake in enhancing collaboration and synergies with WFP, clarifying mandates and roles, and accelerating progress towards capacity development, hand-over and sustainability.	Consultation. Source of information on country context, priorities, and perception of WFP positioning and partnership.
Cooperating partners/NGOs and CSOs (national and provincial level)	Yes	WFP partners for their interventions, while also having their own interventions. User of evaluation findings and recommendations to improve their own interventions as well as coordination.	Consultation during field work. Source of information on implementation of interventions, and perception of WFP positioning and partnership
United Nations agencies	Yes (FAO, UNHCR, OCHA, IOM, UNICEF)	Users of the evaluation findings and recommendations for programming decisions and improving collaboration, coordination and synergies within the United Nations system. Involvement in various joint initiatives. Interest in joint evaluation mechanisms/ learning from other evaluation processes with a view to reflect on key issues for preparation of future country strategies and UNSCDF.	Consultation during field work. Most involved United Nations agencies will participate in briefings and in the stakeholders learning workshop. They will be informed of the evaluation's progress. Source of information on country context, lessons learned, joint-initiatives, and perception of WFP positioning and partnership.
Coordination bodies / thematic working groups, clusters, etc.	No	Help to clarify the role and positioning of WFP in the wider development and humanitarian landscape. Used as input to improve coordination and avoid overlaps in the assistance delivered by the various actors.	Most relevant coordination bodies will be invited to participate in the stakeholder workshop. Source of information on country context, who is doing what where, joint initiatives, and perception of WFP positioning and partnership.
Donors	Yes (Government of Canada, FCDO, USAID, ECHO)	Interest in knowing whether funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP work is effective/ accountability. Results will feed into donors' and corporate monitoring.	Source of information on WFP positioning and partnership. Most important donors will be involved in the stakeholder learning workshop.
Private sector partners, market actors	No	Market actors such as food processors working with WFP for WFP operations/market are key partners of WFP activities. Wheat millers and wheat farmer cooperatives and soya farmer associations.	Informant through interviews.



## Annex 8. Policies and Strategies in Afghanistan Relevant to the CSP

246. Under a series of conferences over many years, the Afghan Government has argued strongly for country ownership and leadership in the context of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011). This aimed to change the approach to support countries' transitions from conflict and fragility, and the building of peaceful states and societies. Among the key principles are that the partnership between governments and development partners should be equal and that resources must be used to build local capacities and systems. Donors have annually reaffirmed commitment and the United Nations moved from the former United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) to One UN146 to increase alignment with the Afghan agenda.

247. The **Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF)** has presented the Government's five-year strategic framework for achieving its overarching goal of self-reliance. In November 2020, the "**ANPDF II (2021-2025): Forging our Transformation**" was published. The ANPDF II is focused on three broad objectives: peacebuilding, state-building, and market-building. It aims to continue the eradication of poverty, develop Afghanistan into a self-reliant and productive economy connected to the region and the world, and invest in strong state institutions that are citizen-centred, while also to advance addressing the risks imposed by COVID-19. ANPDF II aims to address food insecurity and contribute towards the achievement of SDG 2. The document highlights the staggering poverty rates and their links with food and nutrition insecurity, which has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. It also recognizes the importance of access to safe and nutritious food for building human capital and sustaining growth, and the commitment towards SDG 2 by Afghanistan on zero hunger. The Government will continue to invest in education, health care, food and nutrition security and safety nets as part of its national priority programmes.

248. A key policy supported by WFP and others is the **Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Strategic Plan (AFSeN 2019-2023)**, a multisectoral platform leading national effort to address hunger and malnutrition in Afghanistan. This derived from the 2017 Zero Hunger Strategic Review (ZHSR), which stated that hunger is a multi-dimensional problem requiring a coordinated, multisectoral response. The ZHSR recommended that Afghanistan should focus on implementing the hunger-specific recommendations but in a manner that is sensitive to and deliberately supports the longer-term transition in the country to peace and development.<sup>147</sup> The recommendations of the ZHSR were also considered for the design of the CSP, in particular the following ones: i) SDG 2 (zero hunger) is a key priority for Afghanistan, because addressing hunger will help create a positive cycle and has long-term, multiplier benefits for peace and development in the country; ii) hunger, being a multi-dimensional problem, requires a coordinated, multisectoral response, including relevant policies and multisectoral, costed plans for all SDG 2 targets.

249. AFSeN-A has eight strategic objectives related to SDG 2 and one related to SDG 17. Under target 17.14 – enhance policy coherence for sustainable development - Objective 9 aims to strengthen food security and nutrition governance. It states that sustained impact and achievement of the targets require strong

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<sup>146</sup> In 2016, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) launched the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) to carry the country forward from 2017 to 2021. The United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN agencies, funds and programmes recognize the ANPDF, and the development planning system that underpins it, as the single coordinating structure for development assistance. This is what the "One UN for Afghanistan" refers to. (source: UN mission website, 2020).

<sup>147</sup> These recommendations are: i) humanitarian responses should be linked with peace and development efforts; ii) interventions should be carried out in a context-sensitive manner that contributes to addressing the key drivers of food insecurity and undernutrition (conflict, climate change and natural disasters, demographic trends, limited job opportunities, gender disparities, and transparency and accountability concerns); iii) the recommendations should benefit all Afghans, regardless of which side of the frontlines they reside; and iv) the efforts to address hunger should be linked to and consider the interactions with other closely related SDGs, including poverty, health and water.

coordination across the objective actions with close alignment of the nutrition-specific interventions (Obj. 3) with the nutrition-sensitive interventions under (Obj. 1,2,4-8).

250. The AFSeN has the goal to improve the food security and nutrition situation of Afghan people and has a strategy that is built on nine pillars. These are: i) ensured economic and physical access to food; ii) ensured reliability of food and nutrition supplies, especially in emergencies; iii) improved diet quality for women, children and vulnerable groups; iv) increased access to nutrition-related quality health access; v) improved water, hygiene, sanitation and education for better nutrition; vi) improved rural infrastructure and strengthened nutritional value chains; (vii) increased domestic production of nutrient-rich foods; viii) increased nutritional and market value of foods; and, overarching, ix) strengthened food security and nutrition governance.

251. Under One UN for Afghanistan, WFP supports the Government's development-oriented efforts to achieve the ANPDF targets in three priority areas. WFP and the UN Organisation for Food and Agriculture (FAO) co-lead work under the food security, nutrition and livelihoods priority and support the Secretariat of the High-Level Food Security and Nutrition Steering Committee and the AFSeN. WFP also provides capacity strengthening for disaster risk reduction; and supports implementation of the National Priority Programmes including Comprehensive Agriculture Development and Citizen's Charter. In collaboration with UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO), WFP supports the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) Directorate of Public Nutrition in technical coordination, development of strategies and guidelines, resource mobilization, facilitation of technical working groups, capacity strengthening and delivery of nutrition programmes.

252. For the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the country undertook a voluntary national review in 2017 that focused on six key goals, including SDGs 2 and 17, with SDG 2 approached from an agricultural perspective. The Afghanistan ZHSR provides a complementary and more comprehensive set of recommendations for SDG 2 that have been endorsed by the Government.

253. The Government has taken action to affirm its commitment to attaining the SDGs and has designated the Ministry of Economy to lead the coordination, monitoring and reporting on achieving the Afghanistan SDGs. The nationalization process is closely coordinated with the High Council of Ministers to ensure the implementation of the SDGs and stronger cooperation with the private sector, civil society and community organizations. While focusing on the basic pillars of sustainable development, which are economic, social and environmental, the plan also integrates additional elements, which are peace, justice and institutions. On SDG 2, Afghanistan's efforts have been focused on building resilience for the poor; mobilizing resources to address poverty in all its forms and developing pro-poor policies that target gender and increase investments in providing opportunities to eradicate poverty.

254. In terms of sector-specific policies, the **National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority Programme (2017-2021)** is a framework for agriculture development, in which the emphasis will shift towards a farmer-centric view from the current institutional view. The strategy includes: i) development of the irrigation infrastructure; ii) increased wheat production; iii) horticulture and the development of value chain; iv) livestock production; v) climate-sensitive natural resource management; vi) food and nutrition security and resilience building; and vii) institutional reform and capacity strengthening.

255. The **National Education Strategic Plan (2017-2021) (NESP III)** aims at addressing barriers to education access and quality and specifies five main reform areas, namely: strengthening the human resources directorate; establishing comprehensive enterprise resource planning; privatizing the printing and distribution of textbooks; implementing school-based management; and strengthening and encouraging private education. **Afghanistan's Girls' Education Policy (2019-2021)** is designed to overcome the challenges and obstacles related to the education of girls.

256. As for the area of nutrition, in 2017, Afghanistan became a member of the Scaling Up Nutrition movement,<sup>148</sup> with the government focal point being the Director General of the Council of Ministers Secretariat. The Scaling Up Nutrition movement rates the coherence of Afghanistan's policy and legal framework around nutrition at 40 percent. In March 2019, Afghanistan launched the **National Nutrition**

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<sup>148</sup> Scaling Up Nutrition, 2021. *Afghanistan – SUN*

**Strategy**<sup>149</sup> as a roadmap for partnership, investment and action in nutrition. A nutrition policy and strategy had already been in place since 2015.<sup>150</sup>

257. **Afghanistan's National Health Policy (2015-2020)** has five policy areas: governance; institutional development; public health; health services; and human resources. Afghanistan also has a **National Health Strategy (2016-2020)**, which focuses on six strategic areas, namely: i) governance; ii) institutional development; iii) public health; iv) health services; v) human resources for health and vi) M&E, health information, learning, and knowledge/evidence-based practices. Furthermore, there is a National Action to Eliminate Child Marriage, where the detrimental effect on girls' health is acknowledged and various approaches are proposed, one of them being "life-skills training to teach girls about health and nutrition".

258. Afghanistan also has a **Social Protection Strategy**, which ran from 2008 to 2013, and needs to be updated. It outlines a number of risks, vulnerable groups and planned activities, but it is not clear to what extent it is or has been implemented.

259. Lastly, in 2020 the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) designed the **Afghanistan Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction**.<sup>151</sup> The interventions in the strategy include institutional strengthening, capacity development and early warning strengthening, along with looking at a shock-responsive approach to climatic shocks and protracted crisis. It also aims at promoting better coordination among the various actors in disaster risk reduction.

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<sup>149</sup> UNICEF, 2019. *Afghanistan takes major steps to address undernutrition*, (accessed on June 2021) .

<sup>150</sup> Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Public Health. 2015. *National Public Nutrition Policy and Strategy (2015–2020)*.

<sup>151</sup> Interview with Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority.

## Annex 9.Details on the WFP Afghanistan Country Strategic Plan

CSP logframe

**Table 18: WFP CSP logframe V1.05 (16)**

	DESCRIPTION	ASSUMPTIONS
Strategic Goal 1	Support countries to achieve zero hunger	
Strategic Objective 1	End hunger by protecting access to food	
Strategic Result 1	Everyone has access to food (SDG Target 2.1)	
Strategic Result National SDG Target	1 2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round 2.1.1 Prevalence of undernourishment 2.1.2 % of food insecure population based on food security indicators	
Strategic Outcome 01	Vulnerable people in Afghanistan are able to meet their food and nutrition needs during and immediately after emergencies through 2022	- No deterioration in regional/national stability - National disaster remain at expected levels - Pipeline uninterrupted and sufficient funding available
Outcome Indicator 1.1.1	Food Consumption Score	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.2.2	Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index (Average)	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.3	Food Expenditure Share	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.60	Economic capacity to meet essential needs (new)	
Activity 01	Provide unconditional, nutrition-sensitive food assistance to vulnerable people	
Output A	Vulnerable people receive nutrition-sensitive food or cash transfers in order to meet their basic food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator A.1	Number of women, men, boys and girls receiving food/cash-based transfers/commodity vouchers/capacity strengthening transfers	
Output Indicator A.2	Quantity of food provided	
Output Indicator A.3	Total amount of cash transferred to targeted beneficiaries	
Output Indicator A.4	Total value of vouchers (expressed in food/cash) distributed to targeted beneficiaries	

Output Indicator A.9	Number of women, men, boys and girls with disabilities receiving food/cash-based transfers/commodity vouchers/capacity strengthening transfers	
Output B	Vulnerable people receive nutrition-sensitive food or cash transfers in order to meet their basic food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator B.1	Quantity of fortified food provided	
Output Indicator B.2	Quantity of specialized nutritious foods provided	
Output E	Vulnerable people receive nutrition-sensitive food or cash transfers in order to meet their basic food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator E.2	Number of people exposed to WFP-supported nutrition messaging	
Output E	Vulnerable people receive nutrition-sensitive food or cash transfers in order to meet their basic food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator E.4	Number of people reached through interpersonal SBCC approaches	
Output Indicator E.5	Number of people reached through SBCC approaches using media	

Strategic Outcome 02	Vulnerable people in Afghanistan are increasingly able to meet their food and nutrition needs on their own by 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No deterioration in regional/national stability</li> <li>- National disasters remain at expected levels</li> <li>- Pipeline uninterrupted and sufficient funding is available</li> <li>- Availability and sufficient capacity of cooperating partners</li> <li>- Markets in C&amp;V areas remain functioning and prices stable</li> <li>- coordination structures remain in place</li> <li>- Adequate and credible government structures have the required capacity adequate access to target communities</li> </ul>
Outcome Indicator 1.1.1	Food Consumption Score	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.18	Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.2.1	Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index (Percentage of households with reduced CSI)	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.37	Graduation rate (new)	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.4	Proportion of the population in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihood asset base	
Outcome Indicator 1.1.60	Economic capacity to meet essential needs (new)	

Activity 02	Provide conditional, nutrition-sensitive and gender-transformative livelihood support to vulnerable people	
Output A	Vulnerable people benefit from nutrition-sensitive livelihood support in order to enhance self-reliance, reduce disaster risk and adapt to climate change, create employment in urban and rural areas	
Output Indicator A.1	Number of women, men, boys and girls receiving food/cash-based transfers/commodity vouchers/capacity strengthening transfers	
Output Indicator A.10	Total value (USD) of capacity strengthening transfers	
Output Indicator A.2	Quantity of food provided	
Output Indicator A.3	Total amount of cash transferred to targeted beneficiaries	
Output Indicator A.4	Total value of vouchers (expressed in food/cash) distributed to targeted beneficiaries	
Output Indicator A.6	Number of institutional sites assisted	
Output Indicator A.9	Number of women, men, boys and girls with disabilities receiving food/cash-based transfers/commodity vouchers/capacity strengthening transfers	
Output D	Vulnerable people benefit from nutrition-sensitive livelihood support in order to enhance self-reliance, reduce disaster risk and adapt to climate change, create employment in urban and rural areas	
Output Indicator D.1	Number of assets built, restored or maintained by targeted households and communities, by type and unit of measure	
Output Indicator D.2	Number of people provided with energy assets, services and technologies	
Output E	Vulnerable people benefit from nutrition-sensitive livelihood support in order to enhance self-reliance, reduce disaster risk and adapt to climate change, create employment in urban and rural areas	
Output Indicator E.2	Number of people exposed to WFP-supported nutrition messaging	
Output E	Vulnerable people benefit from nutrition-sensitive livelihood support in order to enhance self-reliance, reduce disaster risk and adapt to climate change, create employment in urban and rural areas	
Output Indicator E.4	Number of people reached through interpersonal SBCC approaches	
Output Indicator E.5	Number of people reached through SBCC approaches using media	
Activity 03	Provide capacity strengthening to emergency preparedness institutions	

Output C	Vulnerable people benefit from improved emergency preparedness in order to meet their food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator C.2	Number of capacity development activities provided	
Output Indicator C.3	Number of technical support activities provided	
Output Indicator C.4	Number of people engaged in capacity strengthening initiatives facilitated by WFP to enhance national food security and nutrition stakeholder capacities (new)	
Output Indicator C.5	Number of capacity strengthening initiatives facilitated by WFP to enhance national food security and nutrition stakeholder capacities (new)	
Output Indicator C.6	Number of tools or products developed or revised to enhance national food security and nutrition systems as a result of WFP capacity strengthening support (new)	
Output Indicator C.7	Number of national institutions benefitting from embedded or seconded expertise as a result of WFP capacity strengthening support (new)	
Output Indicator C.8	USD value of assets and infrastructure handed over to national stakeholders as a result of WFP capacity strengthening support (new)	

<b>Strategic Objective 2</b>		<b>Improve nutrition</b>	
<b>Strategic Result 2</b>		<b>No one suffers from malnutrition (SDG Target 2.2)</b>	
Strategic Result National SDG Target	2	2.2 By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons 2.1.1 Prevalence of undernourishment 2.2.1 Prevalence of stunting (height for age <-2 standard deviation from the median of the World Health Organization (WHO) Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age 2.2.2 Prevalence of malnutrition (weight for height >+2 or <-2 standard deviation from the median of the WHO Child Growth Standards) among children under 5 years of age, by type (wasting and overweight)	
<b>Strategic Outcome 03</b>		<b>Vulnerable people at each stage of the life cycle in target areas have improved nutrition by 2022</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No deterioration in regional/national stability</li> <li>- National disaster remain at expected levels</li> <li>- Pipeline uninterrupted and sufficient funding available</li> </ul>
Outcome Indicator 2.1.1		Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme (coverage)	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.11		Enrolment rate	



Outcome Indicator 2.1.12	Attendance rate (new)	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.14	Food Consumption Score – nutrition	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.2	Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distributions (adherence)	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.3	Proportion of children 6–23 months of age who receive a minimum acceptable diet	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.4.1	MAM treatment recovery rate	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.4.2	MAM treatment mortality rate	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.4.3	MAM treatment non-response rate	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.43	Retention rate / drop-out rate (new)	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.4.4	MAM treatment default rate	
Outcome Indicator 2.1.5	Minimum dietary diversity – women	
Activity 04	Provide a comprehensive, gender-transformative package for the prevention and treatment of malnutrition, including services, appropriate specialized nutritious foods and SBCC, to targeted individuals and their communities	
Output A	Vulnerable people throughout the lifecycle – children aged 6–59 months, schoolchildren, adolescent girls, and pregnant and lactating women and girls – receive nutrition services and appropriate specialized nutritious foods in order to prevent and treat malnutrition and contribute to gender equality (SDG 5)	
Output Indicator A.1	Number of women, men, boys and girls receiving food/cash-based transfers/commodity vouchers/capacity strengthening transfers	
Output Indicator A.2	Quantity of food provided	
Output Indicator A.3	Total amount of cash transferred to targeted beneficiaries	
Output Indicator A.4	Total value of vouchers (expressed in food/cash) distributed to targeted beneficiaries	
Output Indicator A.6	Number of institutional sites assisted	
Output B	Vulnerable people throughout the lifecycle – children aged 6–59 months, schoolchildren, adolescent girls, and pregnant and lactating women and girls – receive nutrition services and appropriate specialized nutritious foods in order to prevent and treat malnutrition and contribute to gender equality (SDG 5)	
Output Indicator B.1	Quantity of fortified food provided	

Output Indicator B.2	Quantity of specialized nutritious foods provided	
Output Indicator B.3	Percentage of staple commodities distributed that is fortified	
Output E	Vulnerable people and their wider communities receive effective SBCC in order to prevent and treat malnutrition and contribute to gender equality (SDG 5)	
Output Indicator E.2	Number of people exposed to WFP-supported nutrition messaging	
Output E	Vulnerable people and their wider communities receive effective SBCC in order to prevent and treat malnutrition and contribute to gender equality (SDG 5)	
Output Indicator E.4	Number of people reached through interpersonal SBCC approaches	
Output Indicator E.5	Number of people reached through SBCC approaches using media	
Output N	Vulnerable people throughout the lifecycle – children aged 6–59 months, schoolchildren, adolescent girls, and pregnant and lactating women and girls – receive nutrition services and appropriate specialized nutritious foods in order to prevent and treat malnutrition and contribute to gender equality (SDG 5)	
Output Indicator N.1	Feeding days as percentage of total school days	
Output Indicator N.2	Average number of school days per month on which multi-fortified or at least four food groups were provided (nutrition-sensitive indicator)	
Output Indicator N.3	Number of children receiving deworming with WFP support	
Output Indicator N.4	Number of children receiving micronutrient powder or supplements	
Output Indicator N.5	Number of schools with infrastructure rehabilitated or constructed	

<b>Strategic Objective 3</b>	<b>Achieve food security</b>	
<b>Strategic Result 4</b>	<b>Food systems are sustainable (SDG Target 2.4)</b>	
Strategic Result National SDG Target	4 2.4 By 2030, ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural practices that increase productivity and production, that help maintain ecosystems, that strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme weather, drought, flooding and other disasters and that progressively improve land and soil quality 2.4.1 Increase productive horticulture (ha) 2.4.2 Rain-fed areas that come under the irrigation system (ha) 2.4.3 Agricultural area of the country under the irrigation (million ha)	

Strategic Outcome 04	People throughout the country can have access to a wide range of fortified nutritious food products at affordable prices by 2022	.
Outcome Indicator 4.2.22	Percentage increase in production of high-quality and nutrition-dense foods	
Outcome Indicator 4.2.24	Volume of specialized nutritious foods produced by the supported processors	
Activity 05	Provide support to government and commercial partners in developing, strengthening and expanding nutritional product value chains	
Output C	Vulnerable people benefit from the availability of locally produced fortified nutritious food products in order to address their food and nutrition needs	
Output Indicator C.1	Number of people trained	
Output Indicator C.4	Number of people engaged in capacity strengthening initiatives facilitated by WFP to enhance national food security and nutrition stakeholder capacities (new)	
Output C	Vulnerable people in targeted areas benefit from improved government nutritional product value chains involving the strategic grain reserve in order to address their food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator C.2	Number of capacity development activities provided	
Output Indicator C.3	Number of technical support activities provided	
Output Indicator C.5	Number of capacity strengthening initiatives facilitated by WFP to enhance national food security and nutrition stakeholder capacities (new)	
Output Indicator C.7	Number of national coordination mechanisms supported	
Output G	Vulnerable people in targeted areas benefit from improved government nutritional product value chains involving the strategic grain reserve in order to address their food and nutrition needs and support stability	
Output Indicator G.7	Number of tools developed to strengthen national systems for forecast-based early action	
Output Indicator G.8	Number of people provided with direct access to information on climate and weather risks	
Strategic Goal 2	Partner to support implementation of the SDGs	
Strategic Objective 4	Support SDG implementation	
Strategic Result 6	Policies to support sustainable development are coherent (SDG Target 17.14)	

Strategic National SDG Target	Result 6	Number of countries with mechanisms in place to enhance policy coherence of sustainable development	
Strategic Outcome 05		National and subnational institutions have a strengthened policy approach to food security and nutrition by 2022	
Outcome Indicator 6.1.4		Number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced as a result of WFP capacity strengthening (new)	
Activity 06		Provide support to government officials and partners in enhancing the coherence of a zero hunger policy, particularly related to social protection, and the recognition of zero hunger as a development priority	
Output I		Vulnerable people benefit from greater recognition of zero hunger as one of the main development priorities in order to improve their food security and nutrition and support stability	
Output Indicator I.1		Number of tools or products developed or revised to enhance national food security and nutrition systems as a result of WFP capacity strengthening support	
Output J		Vulnerable people benefit from greater recognition of zero hunger as one of the main development priorities in order to improve their food security and nutrition and support stability	
Output Indicator J.1		Number of policy reforms identified/advocated	
Output Indicator J.1		Number of tools or products developed or revised to enhance national food security and nutrition systems as a result of WFP capacity strengthening support	
Output M		Vulnerable people benefit from improved zero hunger policy coherence, including on social protection, in order to improve their food security and nutrition and support stability	
Output Indicator M.1		Number of national coordination mechanisms supported	
Output Indicator M.5		Number of policy engagement strategies developed/implemented	
Strategic Objective 5		Partner for SDG results	
Strategic Result 8		Sharing of knowledge, expertise and technology strengthen global partnership support to country efforts to achieve the SDGs (SDG Target 17.16)	
Strategic National SDG Target	Result 8	Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder development effectiveness monitoring frameworks that support the achievement of the SDGs	

Strategic Outcome 06	The humanitarian community has enhanced capacity to respond to needs throughout the country through 2022	.
Outcome Indicator 8.1.1	User satisfaction rate	
Activity 07	Provide SCOPE, supply chain, ICT, and information management and provision services to partners to promote effective field operations	
Output H	Vulnerable people receive timely and effective assistance thanks to SCOPE, the supply chain, information and communications technology (ICT), facilities and the information management services provided by WFP to its partners	
Output Indicator H.1	Number of shared services provided, by type	
Activity 08	Provide humanitarian air services to partners until appropriate alternatives become available	
Output H	Vulnerable people receive timely and effective assistance thanks to the air services provided by WFP to its partners	
Output Indicator H.4	Total volume of cargo transported	
Output Indicator H.7	Total number of passengers transported	

**Table 19: Afghanistan logframe - outcome indicators' checklist (2018-2020)**

Strategic outcome	Outcome indicator	2018			2019			2020		
		Baseline	Target	Follow-up	Base-line	Target	Follow-up	Base-line	Target	Follow-up
SO1	Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index (Average)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Economic capacity to meet essential needs (new)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
	Food Consumption Score	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Food Expenditure Share	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Livelihood-based Coping Strategy Index (percentage of households using coping strategies)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
SO2	Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index (percentage of households with reduced CSI)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
	Economic capacity to meet essential needs (new)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
	Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
	Food Consumption Score	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓
	Graduation rate (new)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓

Strategic outcome	Outcome indicator	2018			2019			2020		
		Baseline	Target	Follow-up	Base-line	Target	Follow-up	Base-line	Target	Follow-up
	Proportion of the population in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihood asset base	x	x	x	✓	x	x	✓	✓	✓
SO3	Attendance rate (new)	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
	Enrolment rate	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓
	Food Consumption Score - nutrition	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓
	MAM Treatment Default rate	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
	MAM treatment mortality rate	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
	MAM treatment non-response rate	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
	MAM treatment recovery rate	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
	Minimum dietary diversity - women	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Proportion of children 6-23 months of age who receive a minimum acceptable diet	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓
	Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme (coverage)	✓	x	x	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
	Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distribution of adherence)	x	x	x	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓
	Retention rate / drop-out rate (new)	x	x	x	✓	✓	✓	x	✓	✓



Strategic outcome	Outcome indicator	2018			2019			2020		
		Baseline	Target	Follow-up	Base-line	Target	Follow-up	Base-line	Target	Follow-up
SO4	Percentage increase in production of high-quality and nutrition-dense foods	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
	Volume of specialized nutritious foods produced by the supported processors	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
SO5	Number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced as a result of WFP capacity strengthening (new)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓
SO6	User satisfaction rate	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓

Source: COMET Logframe outcome indicator checklist dashboard (data extracted on 14/07/21).

**Table 20: Linkages between WFP Afghanistan CSP strategic outcome indicators and the evaluation question**

CSP LOGICAL FRAMEWORK OUTCOME INDICATORS		CSP STRATEGIC OUTCOME						EQ				
		SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4	SO5	SO6	EQ1	EQ2	EQ3	EQ4	
1a	Food Consumption Score	x	x	x					x			
2	Food Consumption Score (nutrition)			x					x			
3	Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index	x	x						x			
4	Food Expenditure Share	x							x			
5	Economic capacity to meet essential needs	x	x						x			
6	Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index		x						x			
7	Graduation rate		x						x			
8	Proportion of the population in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihood asset base		x						x			
9	Proportion of eligible population that participates in programme (coverage)			x				x		x	x	
10	Enrolment rate			x					x			
11	Attendance rate			x					x			
12	Proportion of target population that participates in an adequate number of distributions (adherence)			x				x		x	x	
13	Proportion of children 6–23 months of age who receive a minimum acceptable diet			x					x			
14	MAM treatment performance: recovery, mortality, default, dropout and non-response rate			x					x			
15	Minimum dietary diversity – women			x					x			
16	Percentage increase in production of high-quality and nutrition-dense foods				x				x			
17	Volume of specialized nutritious foods produced by the supported processors				x				x			
18	Number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced as a result of WFP capacity strengthening					x		x		x	x	
19	User satisfaction rate						x	x		x	x	

## Annex 10. WFP Engagement in Capacity Strengthening

### Capacity strengthening

260. Capacity strengthening is an engagement that is central to the CSP and is included in Activity 3 (provide capacity strengthening to emergency preparedness institutions) and SO6 (the humanitarian community has enhanced capacity to respond to needs throughout the country). One of the specific examples is WFP support to commercial partners in developing, strengthening and expanding nutritional product value chains. WFP Afghanistan builds the capacity of the Government's strategic grain reserve in food quality and safety control, warehouse management and fortification to enable the Government to respond better to emergencies in the future. As part of its large-scale flour fortification programme, WFP supported 32 flour mills that are strategically located across the country. In addition, business partners with soya processing factories are supported, to allow them to better market fortified wheat and soya flour blends to produce commercial naan bread. WFP also provides technical assistance and training to government and national partner staff.<sup>152</sup>

261. WFP also supports and technically assists evidence collection to support or improve activities and approaches. There are regular emergency and seasonal food security assessments and pre-lean season and pre-harvest assessments, an Integrated Context Analysis (2019), and the Afghan Living Condition Survey, and WFP support to the integrated phase classification. There are also smaller surveys that WFP supports, such as trader surveys, community asset score surveys, and a severe acute malnutrition (SAM) coverage survey. WFP also conducts qualitative surveys to monitor gender discrepancies and protection concerns.

262. WFP co-chaired the accountability to affected population working group to strengthen the community engagement efforts of relevant actors in Afghanistan. This group conducted a survey to identify information provision gaps, which included: i) understanding the roles and mandates of different actors; ii) information on long-term programmes; and iii) how to find or increase income-generating opportunities.

263. In the area of nutrition, in 2018, WFP provided technical and financial support to ensure that the Afghanistan Household Survey included relevant nutrition indicators. A Fill the Nutrient Gap (FNG) analysis was conducted in late 2019 with the nationwide collection of food price data. Using this information, the cost of a diet was estimated that either covers energy needs, or covers energy, protein, fat and micronutrient needs. In April, results showed that four out of five households would not be able to purchase a diet that meets all of their nutrient needs required for health, development and growth. This underlined the relevance of supporting food fortification to address malnutrition

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<sup>152</sup> Government's capacity for emergency preparedness and response is annually scored in an annual multi-stakeholder forum during which it scores the Government's emergency institutions across six variables using the Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index. Government staff are also trained in the food security monitoring system. Moreover, the Government is provided with in-kind support such as office equipment.

## Annex 11. Additional Quantitative Analysis in Relation to the Country Strategic Plan Planned versus Actual Outputs

Table 21: CSP beneficiaries by residence status (2018-2020)

CATEGORY BENEFICIARIES	PLANNED 2018	ACTUAL 2018	PLANNED 2019	ACTUAL 2019	PLANNED 2020	ACTUAL 2020
Refugees	74,536	82,612	173,764	50,362	70,000	70,290
IDPs	496,905	493,473	1,158,426	1,036,110	350,000	596,655
Returnees	173,917	8,500	405,449	44,814	150,000	134,695
Residents	1,739,168	3,414,758	4,054,492	4,428,129	9,638,155	8,222,922

Source: WFP monitoring data, ACR 2018, ACR 2019 and ACR 2020.

Table 22: Overall CSP beneficiaries (2018-2020) planned versus actual

Year	Sex	Planned	Actual
2018	Total	2,484,527	3,999,345
	Female	1,302,345	1,698,263
	Male	1,182,182	2,301,082
2019	Total	5,792,132	5,559,416
	Female	2,969,556	2,808,128
	Male	2,822,576	2,751,288
2020	Total	10,208,155	9,024,561
	Female	5,020,875	4,568,608
	Male	5,187,280	4,455,953

Source: ACR 2018, ACR 2019 and ACR 2020.


**Table 23: Actual beneficiaries versus planned June 2018-2020 by year, strategic outcome, activity and sex<sup>153</sup>**

Strategic Outcome			SO1	SO2	SO3	Grand Total	
						M/F	All
2018	Planned beneficiaries	M	1,108,740	45,600	153,890	<b>1,308,230</b>	<b>2,638,463</b>
		F	1,065,260	46,900	218,073	<b>1,330,233</b>	
	Actual beneficiaries	M	2,051,718	135,804	95,896	<b>2,283,418</b>	<b>3,999,342</b>
		F	1,355,484	100,011	260,429	<b>1,715,924</b>	
	Actual as a percent of planned	M	185	298	62	<b>175</b>	<b>152</b>
		F	127	213	119	<b>129</b>	
2019	Planned beneficiaries	M	2,380,116	325,334	388,290	<b>3,093,740</b>	<b>6,348,584</b>
		F	2,286,779	312,576	655,489	<b>3,254,844</b>	
	Actual beneficiaries	M	2,171,160	236,585	343,545	<b>2,751,290</b>	<b>5,559,418</b>
		F	2,086,017	227,307	494,804	<b>2,808,128</b>	
	Actual as a percent of planned	M	91	73	88	<b>89</b>	<b>88</b>
		F	91	73	75	<b>86</b>	
2020	Planned beneficiaries	M	4,213,111	259,154	715,011	<b>5,187,276</b>	<b>10,208,148</b>
		F	4,047,891	248,992	723,989	<b>5,020,872</b>	
	Actual beneficiaries	M	3,713,183	180,584	562,190	<b>4,455,957</b>	<b>9,024,567</b>
		F	3,308,348	173,502	1,086,760	<b>4,568,610</b>	
	Actual as a percent of planned	M	88	70	79	<b>86</b>	<b>88</b>
		F	82	70	150	<b>91</b>	

Source: COMET report CM-R020, data extracted on 08/03/2021. Total beneficiaries by SO may include overlaps across different activities.


<sup>153</sup> Activities 1, 2 and 4, corresponding to SO1, SO2 and SO3 respectively, are the activities directly targeting the affected population.

**Figure 27: Planned versus actual food (kg) per beneficiary (2018-2020)**



Source: COMET report CM-R002b for beneficiaries data, CPB plan vs actuals report from IRM analytics for food transfer data extracted on 31 August 2021.

**Figure 28: Planned versus actual cash-based transfer value (USD) per beneficiary (2018-2020)**



Source: COMET report CM-R002b for beneficiaries data, CPB plan vs actuals report from IRM analytics for CBT transfer value data extracted on 31 August 2021.

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## Annex 13. Data Collection Tools

264. This annex presents the various tools and protocols that have been used for data collection.

265. Related to gender, humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations and access, detailed sub-questions were incorporated into the semi-structured questionnaires and the group interview format, with space on the form to disaggregate responses by gender. Dedicated sub-questions on mainstreaming nutrition were integrated into the semi-structured questionnaire, in reference to the WFP corporate guidance on nutrition-sensitive programming. Consideration of environmental issues were also included in the questionnaire format (cf. sustainability question) and raised primarily for activities related to asset creation, support to smallholder farmers and to activities on climate change adaptation.

266. The evaluation team reviewed the extent to which WFP country office adhered to the humanitarian principles and the process of addressing humanitarian access in providing food assistance to people in need. The evaluation team also reviewed the targeting principles, vulnerability criteria and mechanisms of WFP operations in Afghanistan to understand how they have been designed and implemented, and whether they are in line with the objectives of the CSP and the guiding principles of WFP, such as humanitarian principles, accountability to affected populations, protection and the integration of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the team has looked at how effectively the criteria have been implemented and whether they are uniformly applied. Monitoring and evaluation procedures and activities were reviewed by the evaluation team to ascertain how they are contributing to the achievement of WFP objectives and to measuring the progress in country.

### Strategic semi-structured questionnaire key informants format

The below protocol is proposing strategic/formal questions drawn directly from the evaluation matrix. It was used for all semi-structured interviews. Sub-questions were used for relevant respondents, and selected given the respondent's role, organization, and relationship with WFP. Additional sector-specific questions (see below) were utilised matching relevant respondents, depending on their specificities and involvement in sector-specific WFP activities. In total, it was expected that the interview would not take more than 60 minutes. Therefore, strategic sub-questions and sector-specific questions were selected, prioritized and organized depending on the respondent's profile, and with a view to accommodate the maximum duration of 60 minutes. As per the sector-specific questionnaire, it was not planned that all questions would be asked to all interviewees, but rather that the evaluation team would pick from this list the questions fitting best the person being interviewed and ensure that different points of views were heard, and that information was triangulated. A first level of prioritization is proposed in the table below by stakeholder (1= must be asked, 2= nice to be asked), and by highlighting key questions by dimension of analysis.

267. Efforts were made to engage appropriately and respectfully with participants, upholding the principles of: confidentiality and anonymity; dignity and diversity; human rights; gender equality; and the avoidance of harm, as per UNEG ethics standards.<sup>154</sup>

### Introduction: purpose, process, outcome

Thank you for agreeing to meet with us. We will try not to take more than an hour or so of your time.

My name is ..... (Introduce any other members of the team present)

I/we am/are part of a team recruited by WFP in Rome to look into what progress has been by the Afghanistan WFP office in terms of implementing their 2018-2022 CSP, at the same time looking at the quality of the support provided.

I should emphasise, however, that we do not work for WFP and that we are independent consultants.

We are genuinely interested in what you have to say, and will be taking notes so that we capture your views.

There is no audio recording. The notes will only be seen by our team and will not be shared with anyone else.

All information is confidential, and you will never be quoted in the report/ have your name attached or referenced to any statement.

Is that all ok with you?

Can we start by asking your name and role in your organisation? How long have you been working in that role?

What type of relationship do you/your organisation have with WFP?

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<sup>154</sup>UNEG. 2017. Norms and Standards for Evaluation.

Checklist of formal questions and sub-questions organized by dimension of analysis and relevance to stakeholders

Prioritization of questions by type of stakeholder: 1= must be asked; 2= nice to be asked.

EQ1: To what extent has the CSP been relevant to national policies, plans, strategies and goals, including achievement of the national Sustainable Development Goals?

Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry (sub-questions)	Sub sub-questions	WFP staff	Donors	IPs	Government	UN agencies
1.1.1 Alignment, relevance and coherence with national policies and plans.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent are WFP programme documents and CSP aligned to national priorities as expressed in national policies and plans?</li> <li>Which Govt national/sub-national policies, strategies and plans did WFP align its designs and approaches with and how?</li> <li>Has the development of the CSP in 2018 contributed to alignment with national policies and priorities?</li> <li>To what extent has the development of the CSP in 2018 involved the Govt (technical Units)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In what way do you feel that WFP activities and strategies are aligned with those of the govt?</li> <li>Are WFP activities ever contrary to the Govt's plans/strategies?</li> <li>Do you believe the CSP has contributed towards this?</li> <li>Did you notice any change in terms of contribution of WFP to national policies and plans with the introduction of the CSP in 2018?</li> <li>How could alignment be increased or improved?</li> </ul> <p>For WFP staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are WFP priorities in terms of policy support? Did you notice any change in the policy environment as a result of WFP support?</li> <li>How did WFP ensure that the CSP was aligned to government policies?</li> </ul> <p>For other stakeholders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did your organization contribute towards the design/content of the CSP?</li> <li>How is the Zero Hunger Review process aligned with the WFP CSP and programmes?</li> </ul>	1	2		1	2
1.1.2 Alignment with WFP strategic plans and Corporate Results Framework.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent are CSP activities aligned to WFP global strategies and relevant corporate policies and guidelines.</li> <li>To what extent are CSP activities aligned with WFP operational strengths and capacities.</li> <li>How internally coherent are the different strategic outcome areas of the CSP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What WFP strategies and policies do you think the CSP is clearly aligned to?</li> <li>What do you believe are the strengths of the current WFP programme? Does the CSP make the most of these strengths?</li> <li>What has been the added value of the CSP process? How well are departments communicating / working together? What synergies arise? Are the different CSP's components well integrated?</li> <li>Does the CSP make the most of WFP core strengths?</li> </ul>	1				

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do the needs of different departments/SOs pull the CSP in different directions?</li> <li>• How have the special conditions in Afghanistan led to any divergences from WFP global strategies and relevant corporate policies and guidelines.</li> <li>• Have recommendations from previous evaluations been taken into account in the design of the CSP?</li> </ul>					
1.1.3 Alignment to SDGs (SDG 2,17)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are strategic outcomes, as outlined in the CSP, expected to generate progress against WFP and govt SDG ambitions?</li> <li>• How have integrated agency-led systems informed the design of national programming and tracked progress towards SDG 2?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you feel the govt is making progress with respect to the SDGs and in particular SDG2? How much do you think WFP is contributing towards that? How can they do more?</li> <li>• Is there an effective government (or other) system to measure progress towards SDG 2?</li> <li>• What needs to be done to improve the alignment of the CSP to the SDGs?</li> </ul>	2	2		2	2
1.2.1 Relevance to the needs of the most vulnerable people and affected population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was the formulation of the CSP based on a comprehensive analysis of current humanitarian and development needs including resilience challenges in Afghanistan?</li> <li>• To what extent do WFP activities, expected outcomes and objectives relate to the identified needs, including the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?</li> <li>• Was the design of WFP's response proportionate to the needs?</li> <li>• In its design, does WFP target mainly beneficiaries who are considered the most vulnerable (targeting approach)?</li> <li>• Have gender, protection, and access been taken into account in the CSP design?</li> <li>• Have any vulnerable groups been excluded in the design?</li> <li>• Has the CSP (as compared to the preceding SO/PRRO/EMOPs combination) enabled a more comprehensive response to the identified needs?</li> <li>• Was there any data specific to the COVID-19 response being collected that had not been collected previously?</li> <li>• Any changes in beneficiary/caseload profile in response to COVID-19:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What beneficiary needs do you feel WFP activities meet? What needs did they not meet?</li> <li>• Which considerations do you think WFP is not taking into account (such as gender, protection etc....) during the targeting?</li> <li>• Did you witness any potential discrimination in WFP targeting approach on the basis of ethnicity, gender, resident status?</li> <li>• In what way are activities addressing the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?</li> <li>• Is resilience being built? How? What else is needed?</li> <li>• How do the population needs compare with the size of the operations?</li> <li>• What activities have been carried out in AG controlled areas? With what success/limitations?</li> </ul> <p>For WFP staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What evidence, assessments / evaluations WFP based the design of its CSP and previous WFP's programmes? Quality and usefulness of these assessments?</li> <li>• Are you confident that the CSP is soundly based on evidence?</li> <li>• Can the same be said about subsequent budget revisions?</li> <li>• How have communities been involved in these assessments?</li> <li>• Did you see any change in the targeting strategy/ activity design/ implementations/ partnerships since the new CSP process?</li> </ul> <p>For interviewees in the field (additional):</p>	1	2	1	2	2

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How did the CBPP process work? Who was involved? What are its strengths and weaknesses?</li> <li>• Have WFP field activities significantly changed since 2018?</li> <li>• How does the project deal with insecurity issues?</li> <li>• What gender-specific approaches were taken during design and implementation?</li> <li>• What specific/new data have been collected during COVID-19?</li> <li>• Have there been changes in beneficiary numbers, targeted profile, geographical location, transfer modality or other relevant changes?</li> </ul>					
1.3.1 Political and strategic positioning vis a vis the Government at the national and local levels, the international community and donors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent do Govt and international community consider WFP's strategic positioning as relevant and aligned with country priorities?</li> <li>• To what extent is the WFP CSP and programmes in line with WFP donors' agendas/priorities and considered as relevant by them? What are the key elements and drivers of WFP partnership with their different donors?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How do you perceive the WFP strategic positioning vis-a-vis country's priorities? Has it changed since 2017? And with the new CSP in place since 2018?</li> <li>• How should WFP change its strategy to be better aligned?</li> </ul> <p>For government staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is WFP better aligned with government policies through the CSP? What areas are misaligned and how can it be improved?</li> </ul> <p>For donors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In what way is the WFP shift into a CSP seen as relevant by donors?</li> <li>• How much does the CSP match with their own agendas and priorities? How have the partnerships with donors evolved since 2017?</li> </ul>	1	1	2	1	1
1.3.2 Flexibility / capacity to adapt to dynamic contexts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have analysis of the evolution of the situation and needs been regularly conducted? How often?</li> <li>• What analysis of government capacity at national and subnational levels has been conducted?</li> <li>• How well did WFP adapt its strategy and response to the evolving context of capacities, priorities and needs? To what extent have emerging priorities in Afghanistan been identified and taken into account?</li> <li>• Has the CSP's format and principles allowed for sufficient flexibility?</li> <li>• Has there been a particular response to the COVID-19 pandemic?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How far do you feel WFP has adapted its programmes to new findings, evidence and emerging priorities?</li> </ul> <p>For WFP staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the CSP allowed WFP to seize new windows of opportunities? Introduce new activities? Adapt to the context?</li> <li>• Is the CSP an improvement on the previous programming mechanisms? How? – or why not?</li> <li>• What changes have there been in the CSP since it started – why did they happen? What still needs to change?</li> <li>• Have there been any changes in strategic positioning required by the pandemic and degree of adaptation by WFP, if so, which ones?</li> </ul>	1	2	2	2	2

<p>1.4.1 Alignment and consistency with the UNDAF</p> <p>1.4.2 WFP Comparative advantage and complementarities in relation to other UN agencies, funds and programmes.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How coherent/consistent has the WFP CSP been with UNSDCF/UNDAF outcome areas and high-level activities?</li> <li>• How has the move to One UN for Afghanistan affected the approach as described in the CSP?</li> <li>• What is the perception of the international community on WFP strengths and comparative advantages in the overall Afghanistan UN landscape?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How coherent/consistent has the WFP CSP been with UNSDCF/UNDAF outcome areas and high-level activities?</li> <li>• How well do you think WFP complements the work of the other United Nations actors?</li> <li>• Are WFP CSP and operations making the most of the WFP comparative advantage vis-a-vis the other partner?</li> <li>• How far the new CSP has changed this scenario?</li> </ul>	1	1	2	2	1
<p>1.4.2 WFP partnership strategy with other humanitarian and development actors</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What strategic partnerships have been established, and were they based on the WFP comparative advantages?</li> <li>• What is the level of partnerships and synergies / complementarities of WFP with the different humanitarian and development actors (incl. RBAs)?</li> <li>• How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners?</li> <li>• To what extent is WFP engaging in coordination mechanisms and advancing harmonization of strategies? What is the WFP role and engagement with clusters and working groups?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How would you describe WFP partnerships with other humanitarian and development actors?</li> <li>• How well does WFP support the work of other humanitarian and development actors?</li> <li>• Have these partnerships improved over time? Generated better results?</li> <li>• How well does WFP undertake its role in various clusters/working groups? How can this be improved?</li> <li>• How well does WFP perform its role re coordination and harmonization of actors and in country initiatives and strategies?</li> </ul>	1	2	1	2	2

EQ2: What has been the extent and quality of WFP's specific contribution to CSP strategic outcomes in Afghanistan?

Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry (sub-questions)	Sub sub-questions	WFP Staff	Donors	IPs	Govt	UN Agencies
2.1.1 Progress at the level of outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What progress has been made in each of the SOs at outcome level and how has it been measured over time?</li> <li>What synergies between activities</li> <li>Was the results framework in the CSP document coherent, logical and complete?</li> <li>What was the quality of M&amp;E and reporting? Were the indicators and data collection and analysis tools appropriate for effective monitoring? Did M&amp;E provide timely information for adaptive management?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall, have WFP expected outputs been achieved? What contributed to and/or limited output/outcome results? For WFP staff (in particular M&amp;E and Programme Unit):</li> <li>What is your assessment of WFP M&amp;E capacities at national level? Decentralized level?</li> <li>What have been the strengths and weaknesses of using programme assistance teams (PATs) to carry out 3<sup>rd</sup> party monitoring in insecure or AFG-controlled areas?</li> <li>Did M&amp;E provide timely information for adaptive management?</li> <li>What has been the transaction cost to align to the new CSP framework? How useful is the new M&amp;E framework?</li> </ul>	1	2	2	1	1
2.1.2 Progress at the level of expected strategic outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What progress has been made in each of the SOs at outcome level and how has it been measured over time?</li> <li>What synergies between activities</li> <li>Was the results framework in the CSP document coherent, logical and complete?</li> <li>What was the quality of M&amp;E and reporting? Were the indicators and data collection and analysis tools appropriate for effective monitoring? Did M&amp;E provide timely information for adaptive management?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall, have WFP expected outcomes been achieved? What contributed to and/or limited output/outcome results?</li> <li>What unintended results have you identified within the activities undertaken?</li> <li>With the CSP, do results start to look different?</li> <li>Has the focus/resource allocation on each SO been appropriate to the need/situation?</li> </ul>	1	2	1		2
2.1.3 Progress as compared to SDG 2 and desired achievements (impact)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the key trends in terms of achieving zero hunger in Afghanistan?</li> <li>What is WFP Afghanistan ToC (or expected impact pathway) towards the overall impact of achieving zero hunger in Afghanistan?</li> <li>Is the ToC proving appropriate?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since 2017, in what sectors or focal areas do you think achievements have been made by WFP in terms of the zero hunger target?</li> <li>What overall progress has been made toward zero hunger and what are the key drivers?</li> </ul>	1	2	1		2
2.2.1 Effective mainstreaming of humanitarian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent have humanitarian principles, protection, AAP been integrated and applied? How? What issues have arisen?</li> <li>What mechanisms have been put in place for improving AAP?</li> </ul>	<p>Humanitarian principles/protection</p> <p>For WFP staff</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has WFP analysed or used existing analysis of protection issues?</li> </ul>	1	2	1		2

<p>principles (HP) / protection/AAP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent are systems/recommendations for protecting beneficiaries' data adopted?</li> <li>• Did the CSP design facilitate integration of protection concerns?</li> <li>• Have WFP activities been conducive for protection of human rights?</li> <li>• Which resources/capacities have been allocated to the adoption of humanitarian principles and to protection /AAP?</li> <li>• How have issues of access been managed?</li> <li>• What progress has been made in terms of protection and access during the evaluation period?</li> <li>• Did the response to COVID-19 change the degree of contribution of WFP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the design and implementation of WFP operations consider protection issues properly? How did the CSP process considered protection issues?</li> <li>• Were recommendations from the WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts and/or recent protection unit assessments considered? Applied?</li> <li>• Have systems/recommendations for protecting beneficiaries' data adopted?</li> <li>• Did WFP contribution to AAP change under COVID-19? If so, how?</li> </ul> <p>For UN/Implementing partners/donors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has WFP facilitated improved access to beneficiaries/ vulnerable people (in camp settings and community settings)?</li> <li>• Have WFP activities contributed / been conducive for protection of human rights?</li> <li>• Are beneficiaries of WFP interventions sensitized on protection issues?</li> <li>• Did WFP/partners encounter any access issues /tensions? How have they been managed? (e.g. for the Anglophone crisis)</li> <li>• Did WFP contribution to AAP change under COVID-19? If so, how?</li> </ul> <p>AAP - for WFP staff</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What mechanisms have been put in place for improving AAP (CFM, other referral pathways, etc.)? Is it sufficient?</li> <li>• Has there been specific attention of AAP issues during food distributions?</li> </ul>					
<p>2.2.2 Effective mainstreaming of gender</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Where gender analyses undertaken? How were they used to shape/influence the activities?</li> <li>• To what extent have gender issues been integrated and applied? What has been the strategy?</li> <li>• To what extent and how successfully have gender transformative approaches (GTA) been applied?</li> <li>• Which resources/capacities have been allocated to gender?</li> <li>• Has senior management addressed gender as a strategic priority</li> <li>• Did the CSP design facilitate integration of gender concerns?</li> </ul>	<p>For WFP staff</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has WFP analysed or used existing analysis of GEEW issues? Are analysis sufficiently contextualized?</li> <li>• How have gender issues been integrated in your interventions (FFA, CBTs, nutrition, etc.)? And implemented? Consideration of gender-related indicators?</li> <li>• Were recommendations from the recent gender unit assessment mission considered? Applied?</li> <li>• Do you consider WFP staff is sufficiently aware and accountable for integrating GEEW/transformational issues? Is the gender equality vision / strategy developed for the Afghanistan CO well integrated?</li> </ul>	1	2	1		2



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What progress has been made in terms of GEEW during the evaluation period?</li> <li>• Did the response to COVID-19 change the degree of contribution of WFP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the CSP conducive for gender-substantive transformational action? Did the introduction of gender and age analysis markers contribute to further mainstreaming of gender issues?</li> </ul> <p>For others</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you believe that the new CSP incorporates gender considerations / transformative roles and responsibilities issues in a sufficiently integrated manner?</li> <li>• Do you consider WFP as a key partner for contributing to improved consideration of gender issues and addressing gender issues including GBV? What have been key contributions of WFP so far to this agenda?</li> <li>• Are beneficiaries of WFP interventions sensitized on GEEW issues?</li> <li>• Is there any effect of COVID-19 on WFP contribution to gender and women's equality? If so, what?</li> </ul>					
2.2.3 Effective mainstreaming of nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent have nutrition-sensitive actions/approaches been integrated within the CSP programming and then applied? What has been the strategy? What resources were allocated?</li> <li>• To what extent are the recommendations of the 2017 WFP nutrition policy integrated into the CSP in terms of specific and nutrition-sensitive activities</li> <li>• To what extent are the various components of the CSP (food security, resilience, early recovery, AAP) oriented towards the achievement of nutritional objectives/outcomes?</li> <li>• Has WFP been engaged in MAM treatment? If yes, how successful was it? Was it aligned with priorities of others?</li> <li>• Did the response to COVID-19 change the degree of contribution of WFP?</li> </ul>	<p>For WFP staff (in particular nutrition staff):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you think WFP has taken sufficiently into account the recommendations of the nutrition policy 2017 in terms of integration of specific and nutrition-sensitive activities?</li> <li>• Do you believe that WFP CO departments other than nutrition are sufficiently aware of the importance of the nutrition-sensitive approaches and mainstreamed nutrition in their programming, including the formulation of nutrition outcomes for i.e. FFA, CBT?</li> </ul> <p>For other nutrition stakeholders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you believe that the new CSP incorporates nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive actions in a sufficiently integrated manner?</li> <li>• Has the shift of the approach for treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition initiated by WFP in 2016 been understood and accepted by stakeholders?</li> <li>• Has there been any large consultative process before integrating the new approach into the national guidelines?</li> <li>• Is there any effect of COVID-19 on WFP contribution to nutrition? If so, what?</li> </ul>	1	2	1	2	2
2.3.1 Sustainability of WFP achievements as per design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent are the benefits of WFP CSP likely to be continuing, in terms of: (i) early recovery/ preparedness/ humanitarian assistance capacities; (ii) improved resilience/livelihoods/assets created; (iii) malnutrition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you think activities in your sector will be able to continue once WFP support has stopped?</li> <li>• What processes are in place to ensure that assets created are maintained?</li> </ul>	1	1	2	1	2

	<p>prevention; (iv) partnerships; and (vi) policy changes and government capacities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What activities/efforts have been initiated and have the potential to have sustainable effects in the longer-term</li> <li>• How sustainable are the various funding streams for the next phase of the CSP?</li> <li>• To what extent have environmental-friendly measures been integrated and applied across different activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How have sustainability issues been incorporated into the design and implementation of your activities?</li> </ul> <p>For WFP staff:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which of WFP activities are likely to continue beyond 2020 without further external support by WFP? What support will they need?</li> <li>• Which activities and assets are least likely to be maintained after WFP support ends?</li> <li>• Have environmentally friendly measures been integrated in different WFP activities (e.g. FFA)? How could this be improved?</li> </ul>					
2.3.2 Community engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the level of communities' participation?</li> <li>• Were communities included in a participatory approach to asset selection and what is the level of community ownership?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How and where were community members included?</li> <li>• To what extent was community feedback gathered and included in the selection of assets?</li> </ul>	1		1	1	
2.3.3 Government capacity strengthening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Does the government have capacity to continue selected WFP CSP activities without external support? Has any handover strategy been developed?</li> <li>• Has WFP undertaken activities to analyse and build on govt capacity to ensure the sustainability of support?</li> <li>• Have resources allocated to government capacity strengthening been adequate?</li> <li>• What progress has been made on govt capacity strengthening and how is this measured?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What progress has been made in terms of policy frameworks and government capacities at national and decentralized levels in the domain of FSN as a result of WF support? Is it sustainable?</li> <li>• What capacity strengthening activities for national and local government have been built into the SOs. How successful have they been and will there be any enduring benefit after?</li> <li>• Are there clear and appropriate handover strategies for WFP activities?</li> </ul>					
2.4.1 Humanitarian-development - peace nexus	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How has the WFP portfolio sought to balance its humanitarian approaches with interventions aimed at development?</li> <li>• Have WFP activities been conducive for strengthening linkages between and across humanitarian and development work and peacebuilding? Did WFP advocate for that?</li> <li>• Has CSP facilitated linkages between humanitarian and development work?</li> <li>• What has been WFP engagement level in community recovery activities? Have they brought humanitarian-development and peacebuilding benefits?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has WFP integrated peacebuilding work into their activities?</li> <li>• Has WFP integrated resilience building efforts into their activities? How far the new CSP has changed this scenario?</li> </ul> <p>For WFP staff, donors, IPs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How long are the contracts provided by donors to WFP? By WFP to their IPs? Is this sufficient for development work?</li> </ul>	1	1	1	2	1

EQ3: To what extent has WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to CSP outputs and strategic outcomes?

Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry (sub-questions)	Sub sub-questions	WFP Staff	Donors	IPs	Govt	UN Agencies
3.1.1 Timeliness of WFP interventions across all six strategic outcomes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent were planned outputs achieved on time?</li> <li>How timely was the provision of logistics services to support CSP?</li> <li>What/Why/Where are the bottlenecks / constraints (HR, logistics, funding...) affecting the timeliness of outputs delivery in each geographical area?</li> <li>To what extent was timeliness affected by external and internal factors?</li> <li>What are the mechanisms in place to resolve delays?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How can the timeliness of interventions be improved?</li> <li>What are the main bottlenecks (HR, logistics, funding etc) to efficient programme delivery and how can they be minimized?</li> <li>What actions have already been put in place that can reduce bottlenecks and delays?</li> <li>What external factors have affected timeliness?</li> </ul>	1	2	1	2	
3.2.1 Targeting and coverage analysis of WFP interventions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have targeting criteria been relevant, and aligned with the operating environment?</li> <li>Have the criteria led to any delays in implementation?</li> <li>How have geographic locations been selected?</li> <li>How has WFP covered areas, which are not under government control?</li> <li>Have targeting criteria been uniformly applied across programmes or adapted flexibly to activities/locations?</li> <li>Did targeting criteria adequately take into account age, gender and diversity?</li> <li>To what extent have the different most vulnerable groups in each geographical area been covered? Has there been overlap or duplication between various activities?</li> <li>Are there specificities for IDPs, refugees, returnees?</li> <li>What has been the experience with SCOPE?</li> <li>What has been the level of efforts to harmonize intervention targeting criteria with other partners? Any joint targeting strategy?</li> <li>Have distributions reached beneficiaries as per plan?</li> <li>What measures have been taken to improve the accuracy of targeting over time? What mechanisms were</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How can targeting of activities be improved? Be made more flexible?</li> <li>How has WFP been working with other partners to improve complementarity of targeting strategies?</li> <li>Do we follow up with non-beneficiaries as well as our own beneficiaries to see the differences that ensue?</li> <li>In practice, how can targeting be improved?</li> <li>What factors affect targeting to severely insecure and AG-controlled areas, how are these managed and what need to be done to improve the situation?</li> </ul>	1				1

	<p>used to ensure that affected people were consulted and heard?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What measures have been taken to improve the accuracy of targeting over time?</li> </ul>					
3.3.1 Cost efficiency analysis of the activity and outputs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent were the activities and outputs delivered within the budget?</li> <li>• How economic was the provision of logistics services taking into consideration the operational context?</li> <li>• To what extent were supply sources choices cost efficient taking into consideration the operational context?</li> <li>• What measures have been taken to increase efficiency over time?</li> <li>• Any additional costs incurred regarding COVID-19 protective measures?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What cost savings have been identified recently that have been put in place?</li> <li>• Do operations reach a reasonable balance between cost and quality?</li> <li>• What are the most important factors affecting the cost of operations in Afghanistan?</li> <li>• Does AF/CO measure/monitor the cost efficiency of CSP activities using corporate standards? Does this affect decision-making regarding sources, transfer modalities, delivery systems etc</li> <li>• What were the specific costs related to COVID-19, if any? How high were they?</li> </ul>	1			
3.4.1 Cost effectiveness of alternative delivery modalities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To what extent were alternative approaches explored for enhanced cost effectiveness – disaggregated by output and strategic outcome?</li> <li>• What is the comparative cost effectiveness of the different transfer modalities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Which approaches / different delivery modalities have been explored to enhance cost-effectiveness?</li> <li>• Does AF/CO measure/monitor the cost-effectiveness of CSP activities using corporate standards? Does this affect decision-making regarding sources, transfer modalities, delivery systems etc.?</li> <li>• What are the results of the recent cash vs food cost comparison study?</li> </ul>	1			

EQ4: What have been the factors that explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?

Dimension of analysis	Lines of inquiry (sub-questions)	Sub sub-questions	WFP Staff	Donors	IPs	Govt	UN Agencies
4.1.1 CSP funding strategy and leveraging effect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What has been WFP fundraising strategy and did the CSP help?</li> <li>• How has change in donors' behaviour (in funding size or allocation to specific topics) affected funding allocations to the different components/activities of the CSP?</li> <li>• Have risks associated with the fundraising strategy been clearly identified?</li> <li>• Has the CSP stimulated funding by the Government (or other partners) for national food security and nutrition systems or for WFP-related activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the CSP generate more unearmarked funding as hoped? Or have donors selected particular activities to support?</li> <li>• Have longer term funding sources been made available?</li> <li>• Has the funding strategy been linked with the humanitarian nexus approach?</li> <li>• Has the CSP helped WFP fundraising in relation to the overall donor-funding situation in Afghanistan?</li> <li>• What changes has the CSP brought to the HR situation?</li> </ul>	1	1			
4.2.1 Type and purpose of partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the CSP resulted in a new approach to partnerships?</li> <li>• Is there a difference between partnerships for crisis response and those for resilience?</li> <li>• Has the choice of strategic and operational (public/private) partners influenced performance?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In general, do you think the CSP process has been conducive for enhancing partnerships?</li> <li>• What new partnerships have been developed with which govt depts. since the adoption of the CSP approach?</li> <li>• How much have donors/other United Nations agencies been involved in this process?</li> </ul>	1	1	1	1	1
4.2.2 Partnerships for development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has WFP succeeded in engaging with development partners to support long term transformational change?</li> <li>• Any adaptation to partnership needs or additional opportunities arising during the pandemic?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has the CSP helped to improve internal coherence? Examples?</li> <li>• Where has integration been difficult or impossible to achieve?</li> <li>• What were the adaptations to changed partnership needs?</li> <li>• What additional partnership opportunities have arisen?</li> </ul>	1				
4.3.1 Benefits of the CSP/flexibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the CSP sufficiently flexible to accommodate to Afghanistan's evolving priorities, beneficiary needs, and emergency needs under the current highly complex and difficult circumstances?</li> <li>• Has the CSP provided flexibility to conduct an appropriate L2 emergency response?</li> <li>• How has WFP adapted and responded to the COVID-19 and other unexpected crises and challenges?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What difference has initiating an L2 response actually made to the office in terms of resource availability – both USD and HR?</li> <li>• What is done differently after the CSP approach adoption than was done before?</li> <li>• To what extent did WFP adapt to needs created by the pandemic in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Balance of humanitarian/development activities</li> <li>- Activity types (GFA; school feeding; resilience; technical assistance and capacity strengthening; nutrition; social protection; disaster risk reduction; urban programming etc)</li> <li>- Modalities (CBT vs in-kind)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	1	2			2

4.4.1 Strategic shifts in results areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was there a shift to more sustainable solutions?</li> <li>• Was there a shift to transformational linkages?</li> <li>• Was there a shift to comprehensive national-led framing?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What kind of shift have you seen since the CSP was introduced? How has this materialised?</li> </ul>	1	1		1	1
4.4.2 Factors supporting or limiting shifts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What external/contextual factors have positively or negatively affected ability to shift?</li> <li>• What internal factors have positively or negatively influenced the strategic shift expected by the CSP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What have been the main internal factors that have influenced positively or negatively progress?</li> <li>• What have been the main external factors that have influenced positively or negatively progress?</li> </ul>	1	1	1	1	1

### Sector-specific semi-structured questionnaire formats

The sector-specific sub-questions below were utilized matching relevant respondents, depending on their specificities and involvement in sector-specific WFP activities (such as school feeding, nutrition and livelihood support). This sector-specific semi-structured questionnaire guide should not be seen as a tool in isolation. It was used alongside the strategic semi-structured questionnaire, mixing questions from both tools, with a view to look at issues from all the different angles. It was not planned that all questions would be asked to all interviewees, but rather that the evaluation team would pick from this list the questions fitting best the person being interviewed and ensure that different points of views are heard and that information is triangulated. Context-related questions were meant to kick-off the discussion and to triangulate the information gathered from other data sources such as document review.

### Food security, livelihoods and resilience

Context, strategic approach/relevance and coherence (EQ1 and EQ4)

- Who are the food insecure? Where are they? What are the trends in terms of food insecurity?
- What are the main drivers in terms of food insecurity/malnutrition? Main shocks and stresses people are facing? Emerging priorities?
- Are the food security assessment methods used by WFP (including VAM and WFPs involvement with CH) appropriate and effective?
- Have resilience-related analysis and analysis of shocks/stress and vulnerabilities systematically been conducted? Have they informed programming?
- Is WFP's response in terms of food security and resilience addressing the needs of the people? Addressing root causes of food insecurity/malnutrition? Proportionate to people's needs?
- What is WFP's targeting strategy for livelihood support and resilience related activities? What has been the level of efforts to harmonize intervention targeting criteria internally? With other partners?
- What is the 'resilience' strategy of WFP in the different regions? What is the ToC behind resilience / pathways? How did it evolve? How well did WFP respond to the needs of a country facing a long-term conflict? Has WFP done the right things?
- Is it aligned / contributing Government policies and priorities?
- *Effectiveness (EQ2)*
- What has been the progress made so far in terms of improving food security / resilience? What have been the main successes? Challenges?
- How have cash/ voucher and/or local food production programmes impacted local value chains? Local markets?
- How did asset creation activities contribute to the livelihoods and economic condition of beneficiaries at the household and community level? Were assets appropriate? Sustainable?
- How did it address lack of access to land, including for displaced people?
- Have activities contributed to reduce post-harvest loss? Increase the availability of nutritious food on the markets?
- What is the sustainability of food assistance for assets activities? Has food assistance for assets increased capacity among producers and farmer organisations?
- How is WFP contributing to nutrition-sensitive value chains? Improving market maturity?
- What has been the level of engagement of WFP in community recovery activities?
- How did WFP mitigate challenges of working on resilience with displaced people? Any specific approach to IDPs? Refugees?
- Effective mainstreaming of gender, nutrition, AAP?
- How is improvement in resilience measured?
- Have there been any specific capacity strengthening efforts of the Govt in the food security/ resilience domain? What progress has been made?
- How much did WFP contribute to agriculture/ food security policies?
- What has been the performance of cooperating partners for the implementation of food assistance for assets and resilience related activities?
- Has the CSP facilitated linkages between humanitarian and development work? Specific examples to be shared?

### Efficiency (EQ3)

- Have outputs been delivered on time?
- Where resources allocated to food security/ livelihoods/ /resilience related activities sufficient? Efficiently used?
- What has been the fundraising strategy in particular for resilience components?
- How adequate is WFP staffing structure / capacities for supporting food security/ livelihoods/ /resilience related activities?
- What internal and external factors affected this efficiency?
- *Partnerships (EQ1)*
- With regard to food security, livelihoods and resilience, how did WFP harmonise their activities with those of partners?
- What have been the main joint efforts/initiatives? (With UN, govt, NGOs, etc.). Lessons learned? (
- How is WFP contributing to improving food security/ resilience coordination among different stakeholders?
- What are the donors' expectations vis a vis WFP in terms of resilience building? Did it change with the introduction of the CSP? Are they satisfied with the relationship they have with WFP?

### Nutrition

#### Relevance, coherence (EQ1 and EQ4)

- Was the WFP's CSP programming relevant, at design, regarding the needs of the populations targeted? Existence of an initial diagnostic work conducted by WFP, was it appropriate regarding both, WFP's and national institutions' capacities?
- Has the analysis of the needs been regularly updated? How?
- What is the role and involvement of WFP in global (country) analysis of vulnerabilities for nutrition and food security?
- Have WFP's strategic and operational choices been updated in the light of results of assessments and situation studies?
- Relevance of targeting (geographical, individual).
- Is WFP's response in terms of prevention of malnutrition addressing the needs of the people? And addressing underlying causes of malnutrition and food insecurity?
- Coherence and complementarity of WFP programming with government strategic and policy documents and sectoral policies and programmes.
- Consistency and complementarity with the overall humanitarian guidelines
- Degree of compliance of the CSP design with WFP sectoral policies.
- Existence and progress in joint programming processes.
- Evidence of seeking synergies between CSP's components at the strategic and operational levels

#### Effectiveness/sustainability (EQ2)

- What has been the progresses made so far in terms of improving nutritional status of targeted groups? Challenges?
- SO3: Vulnerable people at each stage of the life cycle in target areas have improved nutrition by 2022
- Activity 4: Provide a comprehensive, gender transformative package for the prevention and treatment of malnutrition, including services, appropriate specialized nutritious foods and SBCC, to targeted individuals and their communities.
- What are the trends in terms of intermediate indicators for SO3? Are indicators appropriate? Has there been improvement on (or deterioration of) malnutrition indicators such as MUAC or others? How do you explain them?
- Are there linkages between nutrition specific and nutrition sensitive activities? Have these been identified / measured?
- Within WFP operation: FFA, CBT, school feeding
- Externally with other actors



- What is the sustainability of:
- The nutrition activities under SO3
- The (positive, unexpected) effects of the nutrition activities under SO3
- Effective mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues (gender, AAP, protection) within activities under SO3
- What has been the performance of cooperating partners for the implementation of Act4?

#### Efficiency, partnerships (EQ1 and EQ3)

- Have outputs related to Act. 4 been delivered on time?
- What internal and external factors affected this efficiency?
- Resources: Where resources allocated to activities under SO3 sufficient? Efficiently used? Do you know of any particular fundraising strategy for nutrition within the CSP?
- Staffing: How adequate is WFP staffing structure and capacities (CO and sub-offices) regarding activities under SO3?
- Partnerships and capacity development: Perception by WFP partners of the quality of WFP's dialogue and technical support to its partners (including national institutions).
- M&E: Is the design of the M&E system for the CSP adequate for monitoring the progress and quality of achievements and measuring performance? How effective is it? Availability of analyses (including baseline), quality control procedures, use of M&E information prospectively and retrospectively? Has there been any effect in your own monitoring mechanisms now WFP reports together all nutrition activities? Was there a consultative / formative process among partners prior to this implementation?
- Reporting: Perception of external actors (regional, national and local institutions, financial partners, implementing partners) of the quality and usefulness of WFP's reporting on the CSP.
- Coordination: Level of WFP involvement in global and sectoral (nutrition) coordination mechanisms. How well WFP performs in coordination and contributing to adjustments (harmonization of practices, adjustment of geographical targeting to avoid duplication and fill gaps...)?

#### School feeding

##### Relevance (EQ1 and EQ4)

- What needs do you believe this programme meets? What analysis is the programme based on?
- What linkages are there between this support and other WFP activities?
- How have particular schools been targeted/selected? What are the selection criteria?
- How involved are communities themselves in designing implementation, and monitoring of programme activities.
- Are the activities undertaken appropriate to target groups' priorities, the local context and operational realities?
- To what extent has the programme been responsive to any changing situations and needs of the targeted populations?
- Do programme components contribute to the long-term developmental needs of the community?
- Are key cross-cutting issues (e.g., gender) built into the project components?

##### Coherence (EQ1)

- Is WFP assistance coherent with relevant stated national and local govt policies?
- To what extent are national authorities (provincial or local level) involved in the response?
- How good are co-ordination, co-operation and information sharing between partners/local authority depts. and on-going operational staff/functions?

##### Efficiency (EQ2)

- To what extent have school feeding activities improved access to education and the retention of pupils at school, particularly for girls?

- What have been the most positive and negative impacts/aspects of the work undertaken? Did any of these surprise you?
- What indicators have been used to monitor programmatic progress? Could these be improved? Amended?
- How effective are any efforts to develop nationally-owned models that are supported by capacity strengthening support from WFP?
- What have been key operational issues that have helped /detracted from successful implementation of the operation?
- How have M&E findings and reviews been incorporated into on-going operations?
- How well have gender considerations been incorporated into operations?

#### Sustainability (EQ2)

- Is there an exit strategy outlining the timing, allocation of responsibilities on handover to the government and/or other agencies?
- To what extent are the project activities and local structures likely to be sustained after the completion of donor funding?
- What are the capacities that WFP believes the government needs to do this transition? (Include technical, human and organizational competencies). Have they been identified and are the appropriate people involved to build these capacities?

#### Factors affecting results (EQ4)

- Internally: To what extent are the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting?
- How has the CO been able to position itself as a partner at various levels?
- To what extent has there been effective cooperation and coordination in the design and implementation of the SF activities between WFP, government, cooperating partners and beneficiary communities?
- Externally: To what extent does the external operating environment influence results - including the funding climate, security, etc.?

## Focus group interviews format

The following format was used for focus group interviews with beneficiaries of WFP interventions, with a view to seek beneficiaries' feedback. Efforts were made to engage appropriately and respectfully with participants, upholding the principles of confidentiality and anonymity; dignity and diversity; human rights; gender equality; and the avoidance of harm, as per UNEG Ethics standards.<sup>155</sup>

Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Location / Community: \_\_\_\_\_ Led by: \_\_\_\_\_

Numbers of participants: Total = \_\_\_\_\_ Men= \_\_\_\_\_ Women = \_\_\_\_\_

*Introduce the reason for the meeting (explain evaluation: want to see what has worked well and less well and ask group to be open and contribute as much as possible). If necessary, FGDs with women and men will be done separately, ideally in a small informal group setting with elderly and disabled persons towards the front. Explain that this is so we can understand the different views of different types of people.*

*When asking yes/no questions please ask participants to raise hands clearly while they are counted. Please explain that it is important for us to know how many people think what.*

### Nutrition

*(May be better to take aside or do separately due to stigma of having malnourished child).*

1. Do your children or yourself (applies for PLW only) receive any supplementary food support?
2. Where do you receive it? At the health centre? In the community?
3. Do you know which criteria was used for selecting you, your child or your family? Had somebody informed you before?
4. Do you know how your child became malnourished?
5. If yes, how did you know? Who did tell you?
6. What type of support did you/they receive?
7. What type of food do you receive?
8. How long was it supposed to last? How long did it last?
9. How many times did you receive it?
10. When attending the health centre for the ration, are you receiving any kind of health, hygiene, WASH, nutrition advice?
11. When attending the health centre for the ration, are you receiving any other product (medicines, vitamins, vaccines...)?
12. If yes, how does it help you and your family?
13. Is the health of your child improving? How do you know?
14. Do the children always complete the treatment?
15. Have you ever had to do the course more than once? IE Has your child returned to a level of malnutrition having already once recovered? Note the number of repeat cases:
16. Why did this happen?
17. Did you ever experience any problems with the distribution of food? E.g., not being available on the right day, not being of good quality?
18. Do you think the staff at the health centre are well qualified?  
Yes= \_\_\_\_\_ No/not fully= \_\_\_\_\_ Reason for no/not fully: \_\_\_\_\_
19. Is this food you receive of a good quality:  
Yes= \_\_\_\_\_ No/not fully= \_\_\_\_\_ Reason for no/not fully: \_\_\_\_\_

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<sup>155</sup> UNEG. 2017. Norms and Standards for Evaluation

### General / relief / food security questions

*(Appropriateness of response / targeting of beneficiaries / beneficiary participation / complaints procedure / timeliness)*

1. When did you settle in this community?
2. What was your greatest need when you arrived? Did anybody ask you this question?
3. What support did you receive from WFP? And from the implementing partners?
4. If it was food, what type of food?
5. How long was it supposed to last? How long did it last?
6. How many times did you receive it?
7. Was the food of good quality?  
Yes=                      No=                      If no, reasons:
8. Which of your food needs were best met? What needs were not met?
9. Was the food delivered quickly? On time?  
Yes=                      No=                      In no, reasons:
10. If it was cash, what have you spent the project cash money on?  
Please list:
11. Which items did u spend most money on?  
Food=                      School Fees                      Medicines=                      others=
12. How did you decide on how to spend the cash? Men? Women? Jointly? Did this cause any disagreements?  
Men=                      Women=                      Jointly=
13. Were there any items you would have liked to buy, but couldn't find the in the market?
14. For how long was the cash/food provided able to meet your household food needs?  
Days\_\_\_\_ Weeks\_\_\_\_ Months\_\_\_\_
15. Have you started up any new businesses or income generating activities as a result of the cash?  
Yes=                      No=                      If yes, what types of business? :
16. Overall, would you have preferred to receive cash or food?  
Cash=                      Food=
17. Why?
18. Is there any part of this process that could be improved?
19. How it was decided what help the community was going to receive and what and HHs needed?  
Community leaders? Men/Women? WFP/IP?
20. Were any groups excluded from these consultations?
21. Did everyone receive this support? How was the selection made? Was this process explained to you?
22. Do you feel some people/types of people have been missed out, or not been included in the programme, that should have been?
23. Do you know who to contact if you think there is as problem? If yes, who? What number?
24. Did anyone actually try to contact this number? Was your complaint resolved?
25. Did anyone ask the women, girls about what assistance you specifically needed? When? Whom did they talk to? Did it lead to any assistance?
26. What was the biggest gap between your needs (especially food security needs) and the assistance?
27. Did this change over time?
28. Did different groups have different gaps (women, aged, disabled etc.)?
29. Did the support meet your needs?  
Fully = /Partially = /Hardly= / Not at all=                      (ask to raise hands). If not, why not?

### Food/in kind distributions

1. How/where did you physically receive the food?
2. Were both women and men included in the process of selecting a safe distribution point?
3. Were food distribution points established as close to your village/camp/displaced location as possible?
4. Were "Safe spaces" created at the distribution points and "safe passage" schedules created for women and children heads of households?
5. What time were distributions made? Were you able to reach home during daylight?

6. Was the weight of food packages manageable and efficient for women?
7. Did you feel safe during the distributions?  
Yes=                      No=                      If no, reasons:
8. Were security and instances of abuse stopped/reported?
9. What could have been done better?

#### Cash distribution

1. Where did you collect the cash? How was this decided?
2. How far did you have to travel to receive your cash?
3. Were there any transport costs involved? If yes, how much?
4. Did you feel safe travelling to and from the cash or distribution collection point? If not, why?  
Yes=                      No=                      If no, reasons:
5. How far is the market where you bought items? (Check travel costs to market as well)
6. Did you face any issues travelling to/from the market with your items? E.g. security, lack of transport, hard to carry items, market only open on certain days of week....  
Yes=                      No=                      If yes, issues:

#### Food assistance for assets

1. How it was decided what help the community and HHs needed? Were any groups excluded from these consultations?
2. Who do you feel in your community benefited the most from the projects?  
Men / Women / Young / Children / Elderly / Leaders / Equally?
3. Did anyone miss out on participating? Who? Why?
4. Were there any options for "light work"? Or options for people who couldn't work to receive unconditional cash (without work)?
5. Were people paid in cash/food to work on these projects?  
Cash=                      Food=
6. Were the wages satisfactory/normal for the work in involved?  
Yes=                      No=
7. Were such projects completed on time?  
Yes=                      No=
8. What have been the benefits of the FFA program? (Short term/long term)
9. Did the projects generate what you expected?  
Yes=                      No=                      If not, why not:
10. Who will maintain these assets in the future?

#### School meals programme

1. Do your children attend school? Do they receive food there?
2. What type of food?
3. Do your kids like the food?  
Yes=                      No=                      In no, reasons:
4. Do you/your child think the food is of good quality?  
Yes=                      No=
5. Why? Or why not?
6. Do you/your child think the food is of sufficient quantity?  
Yes=                      No=
7. Is that take home rations or snacks at the school?
8. Is every child at the school supported?
9. If not, what are the selection criteria?
10. Are there any selection criteria specifically targeted at girls? If so, what are they?
11. If there was no food for them at school would you still send them?  
Yes=                      No=

12. How does this food contribute to your household's food security? Is your household more food secure now than it was before?

Yes better=                      Yes, a little better=                      No not much difference=

13. Do your children eat breakfast before going to school?

Yes=                      No=

14. Does the school snack replace a meal they would normally eat at home? Or is it additional food for them?


15. Are there any problems regarding the school feeding programme?

16. How could implementation of the school feeding programme be improved?

17. Do you know children who are not attending school? Why don't they come? What are they doing instead?

Many thanks for talking to us today – do you have any questions for us?

# Annex 14. WFP Afghanistan Operational Map





## Annex 15. Findings - Conclusions - Recommendations Mapping

Recommendation	Conclusions	Findings (paragraph number)
<p><b>Recommendation 1</b> Design the next country strategic plan based on robust context analyses that provide the country office flexibility to adapt its response to changing needs in fluid circumstances, maintaining the focus areas of crisis response, resilience and root causes.</p>	<p><b>Conclusion 1</b> Some of the initial ambitions of the CSP became unrealistic as needs grew in a context of increasingly fragile governance and extreme insecurity but WFP has broadly managed to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable</p>	<p><b>78</b> “Although WFP targeted in priority all the most vulnerable groups, many interviewees noted that some types of beneficiary needs had been better identified than others.”</p> <p><b>91</b> “WFP substantially scaled-up its interventions in response to growing needs resulting from the 2018 drought and COVID-19. Yet, funding constraints prevented WFP to reach the beneficiary target in 2019-2020. Delayed and insufficient funding and donor earmarking forced WFP to prioritize emergency response (SO1). The lack of peace and stability has also seriously limited the ability of WFP to contribute to longer-term zero hunger.”</p> <p><b>80</b> “WFP adapted relatively well to the changing context and is strategically well positioned to respond at scale and with speed to increasing humanitarian needs. The CSP included relevant activities to support resilience building but there is no strong evidence that WFP had a comprehensive approach identifying in an holistic manner how WFP activities complemented with interventions from partners would enable not only the most vulnerable people, as well as communities to better absorb, adapt, and transform in the face of shocks and stressors and ensuring that WFP’s ambition and a challenging context of pervasive conflict and increasing fragility.”</p> <p><b>83</b> “WFP’s ability to establish clear strategic positioning on Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS) has been hindered by the absence of detailed assessments of national and subnational government capacity.”</p> <p><b>152</b> “The will and commitment of WFP at the policy level is evident; however, the context of increased insecurity, and political uncertainty have limited opportunities to shift towards development activities and operationalization of the triple nexus.”</p> <p><b>154</b> “Interviews showed that the following other factors could bring more results to the existing WFP’s commitment to the nexus: i) link emergency work with development more effectively and in strong coordination with the government, for example, by improving livelihoods in areas where IDPs are able to return; ii) secure development funds; iii) maximize the potential of Afghanistan for agriculture value chain and reinforce social cohesion through community-based approaches and innovative practices.”</p> <p><b>156-155</b> “The nexus cannot happen until there is joint engagement between WFP, the government and development donors.”</p>



<p><b>Recommendation 2</b> Develop a nutrition strategy that takes into consideration the local context and allows for the scale up of malnutrition prevention.</p>	<p><b>Conclusion 2</b> Some synergies across strategic outcomes have occurred and some progress was made towards zero hunger but with varying degrees of contributions across the various strategic outcomes.</p>	<p><b>113</b> "The CSP foresaw putting greater attention on nutrition prevention under SO3, but this has not materialised due to various reasons. WFP started a pilot project aiming at preventing acute malnutrition at the onset of the CSP in 2018 but did not manage to scale it up. Reasons included the continuing high levels of GAM and magnitude of other aggravating factors (morbidity, food insecurity, etc.) that required a prioritization of MAM treatment, combined with the lack of resources for malnutrition prevention."</p> <p><b>111</b> "WFP scaled up the treatment of MAM in response to the increased prevalence of global acute malnutrition (GAM), reaching far more malnourished children 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) than originally planned."</p> <p><b>116</b> "The MAM treatment programmes have been generally successful with positive results in terms of recovery rates."</p> <p><b>118</b> "An improvement in school attendance along with a reduction in dropout rate among both girls and boys has been observed in WFP-targeted schools."</p> <p><b>120</b> "Results in terms of nutrition mainstreaming have been mixed. Under SO1, rations have been reviewed and wheat-soy flour introduced and under SO4, there was support to fortification."</p> <p><b>121</b> "Under SO2, nutrition mainstreaming is highly limited, only kitchen gardens may have contributed, but the activity is very small-scale."</p> <p><b>144</b> "Although specific gender analyses were undertaken, there was no larger gender analysis preceding the design of the CSP ."</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 3</b> Conduct in-depth gender analysis to inform a clearer articulation of WFP ambitions in relation to gender transformation and social inclusion, taking into consideration the highly constraining environment.</p>	<p><b>Conclusion 2</b> The WFP contribution to CSP strategic outcomes is significantly stronger in crisis response than in resilience, cross-cutting aims and country capacity strengthening.</p>	<p><b>140</b> "The AAP and protection mechanisms put in place by WFP could be further strengthened notably to ensure that they are fully functional and accessible to all population groups including people with disabilities, youth and women."</p> <p><b>141</b> "Perceptions on the role of WFP in the protection cluster and the AAP working group have been remarkably diverse."</p> <p><b>143</b> "WFP has taken key steps to promote GEEW and many of the interviewees reflected that gender often came up as a topic in consultations with WFP."</p> <p><b>144-143</b> "The CSP had a gender and age marker of three but the extent to which gender was mainstreamed varies across SOs and the effect at community level was less clear."</p>

<p><b>Recommendation 4</b> Enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of resilience building activities and continue to seize opportunities to expand them as conditions allow and where there is a medium-term perspective.</p>	<p><b>Conclusion 3</b> In an increasingly challenging context, WFP contribution to strategic outcomes will depend on deeper and longer-term partnerships</p>	<p><b>82</b> “There was no evidence that WFP had developed a comprehensive approach identifying how WFP activities complemented with interventions from partners, would contribute to resilience building beyond the individual level.”</p> <p><b>105</b> “ WFP expanded SO2 interventions as planned in 2018-2019, but had to scale it down in 2020 as available resources were prioritized to SO1 and most FFA/FFT were temporarily suspended due to Covid-19. Where asset creation and vocational training took place, beneficiaries perceived strong and lasting positive effects.”</p> <p><b>146</b> “The emergency response activities (SO1), which absorb most of the CSP resources, were not designed to bring continuing benefits and, in the absence of stronger synergies between SO1 and SO2 and enhanced resilience building of SO1 beneficiaries (see section 2.2.1 above), they are not likely to do so in the near future.”</p>
<p><b>Recommendation 5</b> Strengthen collaboration and coordination with key partners</p>	<p><b>Conclusion 3</b> In an increasingly challenging context, WFP contribution to strategic outcomes will depend on deeper and longer-term partnerships</p>	<p><b>183</b> “The lack of flexibility of some resources due to donor earmarking led to disparities in funding of some strategic outcomes compared to others”</p> <p><b>184</b> “The overall effect of earmarking and limited predictability was to reduce the scale of resilience activities, hence limiting WFP’s ability to work in a more integrated way; consequently, this has had an effect on sustainability. CPs also advocated for longer-term funding to enable the design of resilience projects.”</p> <p><b>191</b> “However, by far the major concern of CPs was that WFP no longer provided multi-year funding, which all considered essential for resilience activities to have a chance at being sustainable, but important also to overcome two operational challenges: i) long start-up phase related to administrative requirements; ii) retaining qualified staff, including in hard to reach and highly insecure areas.”</p> <p><b>193</b> “Donors’ engagement has varied from those maintaining a very close relationship to those mainly providing funding, but, overall, donors interviewed were generally satisfied with WFP’s performance”</p> <p><b>196</b> “UN stakeholders have acknowledged the value of the common approach but highlighted the challenges for agencies with individual mandates to adopt an inter-sectoral way of working, especially in an environment where there is competition for scarce financial and human resources.”</p>

## Annex 16. Acronyms

<b>AAP</b>	Accountability to Affected Populations
<b>ACR</b>	Annual Country Report
<b>AFSeN-A</b>	Afghanistan Food Security and Nutrition Agenda
<b>AFN</b>	Afghan Afghani (local currency)
<b>AIMS</b>	Asset Impact Monitoring System
<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
<b>ANDMA</b>	Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
<b>ANPDF</b>	Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework
<b>ANWARA</b>	Afghanistan National Water Affairs Authority
<b>ARTF</b>	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
<b>BCP</b>	Business Continuity Plan
<b>BR</b>	Budget Revision
<b>CBT</b>	Cash-Based Transfers
<b>CCS</b>	Country Capacity Strengthening
<b>CEQAS</b>	Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System
<b>CFM</b>	Complaints and Feedback Mechanism
<b>CFP</b>	Call for Proposals
<b>CO</b>	Country Office
<b>COMET</b>	Core Outcome Measures in Effectiveness Trials
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus 2019 Disease
<b>CPB</b>	Country Portfolio Budget
<b>CRF</b>	Corporate Results Framework
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>CSP</b>	Country Strategic Plan
<b>CSPE</b>	Country Strategic Plan Evaluation
<b>CP</b>	Cooperating Partners
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DoE</b>	Director of Evaluation
<b>DDoE</b>	Deputy Director of Evaluation
<b>EB</b>	Executive Board
<b>ECHO</b>	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
<b>EFSA</b>	Emergency Food Security Assessment
<b>EM</b>	Evaluation Manager
<b>EMOP</b>	Emergency Operation
<b>EPR</b>	Emergency Preparedness Plan
<b>EQ</b>	Evaluation Question
<b>EQAS</b>	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
<b>ER</b>	Evaluation Report
<b>ET</b>	Evaluation Team
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

<b>FCDO</b>	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
<b>FFA</b>	Food Assistance for Assets
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FLA</b>	Field-level Agreement
<b>FNG</b>	Fill the Nutrient Gap
<b>FSAC</b>	Food Security and Agriculture Cluster
<b>FSN</b>	Food Security and Nutrition
<b>FSP</b>	Financial Service Provider
<b>GBV</b>	Gender-Based Violence
<b>GCMF</b>	Global Commodity Management Facility
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GEEW</b>	Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women
<b>GEN</b>	Gender Office
<b>GFA</b>	General Food Assistance
<b>GNI</b>	Gross National Income
<b>GTA</b>	Gender Transformative Approaches
<b>GTP</b>	Gender Transformation Programme
<b>HAG</b>	Humanitarian Access Group
<b>HH</b>	Households
<b>HQ</b>	Headquarters
<b>HR</b>	Human Resources
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan
<b>ICA</b>	Integrated Context Analysis
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IP</b>	Implementing partner
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
<b>IRG</b>	Internal Reference Group
<b>IMAM</b>	Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IPC</b>	Integrated Phase Classification
<b>KII</b>	Key-informant Interviews
<b>KPI</b>	Key Performance Indicator
<b>LNS</b>	Lipid-based Nutrient Supplements
<b>LTA</b>	Long Term Agreement
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>MAM</b>	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
<b>MAIL</b>	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
<b>MoE</b>	Ministry of Education
<b>MoLSA</b>	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
<b>MoPH</b>	Ministry of Public Health
<b>MoRR</b>	Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees
<b>MoRRD</b>	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

<b>MoWA</b>	Ministry of Women Affairs
<b>MUAC</b>	Mid-Upper Arm Circumference
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NBP</b>	Needs-based Plan
<b>NEPA</b>	National Environment Protection Agency
<b>NESP</b>	National Education Strategic Plan
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organization
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council
<b>NPP</b>	National Project Personal
<b>NSIA</b>	National Statistics and Information Authority
<b>NSAG</b>	Non-State Armed Groups
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>OEV</b>	Office of Evaluation
<b>PAT</b>	Programme Assistant Teams
<b>PDM</b>	Post Distribution Monitoring
<b>PLW</b>	Pregnant and Lactating Women
<b>PND</b>	Public Nutrition Directorate
<b>PRO</b>	Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division
<b>PRRO</b>	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
<b>PSEA</b>	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
<b>P4P</b>	Purchase for Progress
<b>QA</b>	Quality Assurance
<b>RAM</b>	Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division
<b>RBAs</b>	Rome Based Agencies
<b>RBB</b>	Regional Bureau Bangkok
<b>RMP</b>	Performance Management and Monitoring division
<b>SAM</b>	Severe Acute Malnutrition
<b>SBCC</b>	Social Behaviour Change and Communication
<b>SCOPE</b>	WFP beneficiary identity and benefit management system
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>SER</b>	Summary Evaluation Report
<b>SF</b>	School feeding
<b>SNF</b>	Specialized Nutritious Foods
<b>SO</b>	Strategic Outcome
<b>SOP</b>	Standard Operating Procedure
<b>SPR</b>	Standard Project Report
<b>SSQ</b>	Semi-structured Questionnaire
<b>SUN</b>	Scaling Up Nutrition Movement
<b>THR</b>	Take-home Ration
<b>TL</b>	Team Leader

<b>TN</b>	Technical note
<b>ToC</b>	Theory of Change
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of Reference
<b>TPM</b>	Third-Party Monitoring
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNAMA</b>	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
<b>UNCERF</b>	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNDSS</b>	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
<b>UNEG</b>	United Nations Evaluation Group
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNHAS</b>	United Nations Humanitarian Air Services
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UNSDCF</b>	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>VAM</b>	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
<b>VST</b>	Vocational Skills Training
<b>WASH</b>	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>WBS</b>	Work Breakdowns Structure
<b>WFP</b>	United Nations World Food Programme
<b>WG</b>	Working Group
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>WINGS</b>	WFP Information Network and Global System
<b>ZH</b>	Zero Hunger
<b>ZHSR</b>	Zero Hunger Strategic Review

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