



**WFP EVALUATION**



# Evaluation of Pakistan WFP Country Strategic Plan 2018-2022

Centralized evaluation report - Volume I

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# Executive summary

## INTRODUCTION

### Evaluation features

1. An evaluation of the Pakistan country strategic plan (CSP) for 2018–2022 was conducted between July 2021 and February 2022 to inform the design of the next CSP. It covered WFP's activities between 2018 and September 2021 and assessed the quality of the CSP design, WFP's strategic positioning, progress towards the strategic changes introduced in the CSP and results. Combining accountability and learning objectives, its main users are the WFP Pakistan country office and internal and external stakeholders, including beneficiaries.
2. It adopted a theory-based mixed-methods approach. Gender was taken into account throughout the process. Because of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the inception phase was conducted remotely, with data collected through remote interviews and an in-country field mission. Findings, conclusions and recommendations were discussed with internal and external stakeholders during two online workshops in March 2022.

### Context

3. Home to 221 million people, Pakistan covers 796,100 km<sup>2</sup> and has six federal units comprising the four provinces of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,<sup>1</sup> Punjab and Sindh; and two territories – Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan, in addition to the federal capital, Islamabad.
4. Pakistan is a lower-middle-income country with a per capita gross national income of USD 1,270 in 2020.<sup>2</sup> Recently, the economy has been weakened by natural disasters and a locust outbreak, which affected agricultural production, the COVID-19 pandemic and political instability. The Gender Gap Index<sup>3</sup> ranks Pakistan 153 of 156 countries.
5. In 2020, 16.4 percent of the population was estimated to be moderately or severely food insecure.<sup>4</sup> A 2018 national nutrition survey reported that four of ten children under 5 were stunted. The double burden of malnutrition is increasingly apparent, with almost one in three children underweight alongside a high prevalence of overweight in the same age group. All malnutrition indicators are worse in rural areas.<sup>5</sup>
6. Pakistan hosts 1.3 million refugees from Afghanistan,<sup>6</sup> and the border region is currently affected by the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, which has been intensifying since August 2021.

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<sup>1</sup> Khyber Pakhtunkhwa includes seven districts that have been recently merged into the province from an earlier arrangement of federally administrated tribal areas.










<sup>2</sup> World Bank. 2021. [GNI per capita, Atlas method \(current US\\$\)](#).

<sup>3</sup> World Economic Forum. 2021. [Global Gender Gap Report 2021](#).

<sup>4</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2021. [Pakistan social and living standards measurement survey \(2019–20\)](#).

<sup>5</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2018. [Pakistan National Nutrition Survey 2018](#).

<sup>6</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2022. [Operational Data Portal: Country View: Pakistan \(Islamic Republic of\)](#)

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	Indicator	Value	Year
	Population total (million) (1)	221	2020
	Human Development Index (rank) (2)	154 (of 188)	2020
	Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (%) (1)	21.9	2018
	Global Hunger Index (score and rank) (3)	Score: 24.7 Rank: 92 (of 116)	2021
	Height-for-age (stunting – moderate and severe), prevalence for <5 (%) (4)	40.2	2018
	Weight-for-height (wasting – moderate and severe), <5 (%) (4)	17.7	2018
	Weight-for-age (overweight – moderate and severe), <5 (%) (4)	9.5	2018
	Prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the total population (%) (5)	16.4	2020
	Gender Gap Index (rank) (6)	153 (of 156)	2021

Sources: (1) World Bank. 2022. [Pakistan country page](#); (2) United Nations Development Programme. 2020. [Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene: Briefing note for countries on the 2020 Human Development Report: Pakistan](#); (3) [Global Hunger Index: Pakistan](#); (4) Government of Pakistan. 2018. [Pakistan National Nutrition Survey 2018](#); (5) Government of Pakistan. 2021. [Pakistan social and living standards measurement survey \(2019–20\)](#); (6) World Economic Forum. 2021. [Global Gender Gap Report 2021](#).


## WFP country strategic plan

7. The CSP for 2018–2022 is founded on two major developments: Pakistan’s improved economic growth and security after a long period of turmoil; and persistent malnutrition, high vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change and declining smallholder productivity, which have led to uneven socioeconomic progress. The CSP comprises five strategic outcomes, eight activities and sixteen outputs (figure 1).

8. The original needs-based plan of USD 447.5 million was revised twice, reaching USD 475.3 million. As of November 2021 the revised needs-based plan was 41 percent funded, with USD 193.8 million (figure 1). Strategic outcome 1, dealing with emergency response, received 46 percent of allocated resources.



**Figure 1: Pakistan country strategic plan (2018–2022) strategic outcomes, budget, funding and expenditures**



\* The needs-based plan budget percentages by strategic outcome have been calculated at the grand total costs level, including direct (USD 35 million) and indirect (USD 29 million) support costs. This data refers to CSP revision 2, approved in August 2021.



\*\* The percentages of allocated resources by strategic outcome do not add up to USD 193.8 million because resources were also allocated to non-activity specific purposes (USD 0.3 million) as well as to direct (USD 15.4 million) and indirect (USD 9.4 million) support costs.

Sources: Country portfolio budget; CSP revision 2; and Integrated Road Map Analytics ACR-1 report.

2.

9. Initially intended to reach 7.7 million beneficiaries, the revised CSP targeted 9.9 million. However, WFP consistently reached fewer beneficiaries than planned. Looking at absolute numbers over the years, the highest number of beneficiaries was for activities under strategic outcome 1 (figure 2).

**Figure 2: Annual actual versus planned beneficiaries by sex (2018–2021)**




\* The numbers in this section could contain overlaps as some beneficiaries might receive both food and CBTs and be assisted under more than one strategic outcome.

Sources: Annual country reports for 2018–2021.

10. The CSP was implemented during a period marked by several shocks, including natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic and political instability (figure 3). These led WFP to increase its engagement in crisis response activities to the detriment of activities with long-term goals.

Figure 3: Country context and WFP operational overview Pakistan (2018–2021)



Source: Evaluation team

## EVALUATION FINDINGS

### To what extent are WFP’s strategic position, role and specific contributions based on country priorities, people’s needs and WFP’s strengths?

#### Relevance and alignment

11. The CSP was well aligned with the Government’s priorities on nutrition, social protection and capacity strengthening. However, it was challenging to ensure alignment between provincial expectations and what WFP intended to or could deliver. Although WFP undertook consultations at the federal and provincial levels, the CSP was not particularly well adapted to the specific needs of provinces nor fully aligned with the process of devolution. The support provided to all provinces was drawn from a single set of sub-activities and was insufficiently tailored to the needs of each province.

## *Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable*

12. WFP's focus on the provinces of Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was appropriate considering the acute problems that populations face in those areas. WFP developed targeting approaches to reach the most vulnerable, which were adapted to the activities under the various strategic outcomes. WFP was most effective when it combined its own assessment tools with those of the Government. For example, under strategic outcome 3 (nutrition), the Stunting Prevention and Rehabilitation Integrated Nutrition Gain (SPRING) programme was implemented in the poorest villages, which were identified through national surveys, while WFP used its own data to identify children under 2 and pregnant and lactating women. Overall, the systems effectively identified those in most need; however, criteria such as age, gender and disability were not systematically used as key parameters in the identification of the most vulnerable.

## *Strategic position and responsiveness to a dynamic context*

13. WFP operations were affected by natural and human-induced shocks during the CSP period, including extreme climate events such as floods, droughts, heavy snow, earthquakes and shocks associated with insecurity in the border areas. The formulation of strategic outcome 1 was sufficiently flexible to enable WFP to respond effectively to these shocks. The CSP also provided for support to temporarily displaced people and a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, although activities related to climate change were planned under strategic outcome 4, available resources and capacity were inadequate to enable a focus on climate change or the adaptation of activities to policy changes such as the adoption of a national water policy in 2018 and the launch of the "Clean Green" programme in 2019.

## *Coherence with the United Nations cooperation framework*

14. The CSP objectives are fully aligned with the United Nations sustainable development framework (UNSDF)<sup>7</sup>. WFP was the largest contributor to the objectives for nutrition, food security and resilience and contributed to achieving the education and social protection objectives. At the provincial level, it is difficult for the United Nations to be perceived as a single actor with multiple areas of competence, and government staff tend to treat each United Nations agency as a single independent partner.

15. The design of the new United Nations sustainable development cooperation framework (UNSDCF), to which WFP substantially contributed, provides an opportunity to overcome some of these challenges. Multiple respondents said that donors influenced coordination between United Nations entities depending on their funding approaches.

## **What are the extent and quality of WFP's specific contribution to the country strategic plan outcomes in Pakistan?**

### *Strategic outcome 1: Affected populations in Pakistan have timely access to adequate food and nutrition during and in the aftermath of natural disasters and shocks*

16. Strategic outcome 1 was pursued through two distinct activities: unconditional food assistance (activity 1) and food assistance for assets (FFA) (activity 2), which both involved in-kind food assistance and cash-based transfers (CBTs). Under activity 1, WFP exceeded its targets for quantities of food distributed, helping to stabilize and improve the food security of temporarily displaced people. The use of CBTs was complicated by Government restrictions and logistical issues, although it expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic.


17. There was some evidence that the dietary diversity and economic standing of FFA beneficiaries improved as a result of activity 2. Moreover, as shown in figure 4, the proportion of beneficiaries with poor food consumption scores decreased and those with acceptable scores increased until 2020. However, the proportion of households whose scores moved from "poor" to "borderline" was greater than the proportion of those moving from "borderline" to "acceptable". The obstacles to reaching "acceptable" need to be better understood if results are to further improve. The indicators also highlight considerable deterioration in

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations Pakistan. 2018. [United Nations Sustainable Development Framework for Pakistan: One United Nations Programme III 2018-2022](#).

food consumption scores in 2021, which suggests that in the face of shocks such as COVID-19 beneficiaries have limited resilience.

**Figure 4: Food security indicators linked to strategic outcome 1, activity 2**



*Strategic outcome 2: The social protection system at the federal and provincial levels provides the populations most in need, especially women, adolescent girls and children, with improved and sustained access to safe, nutritious and sufficient food by 2022*

18. Under activity 3, WFP sought to work upstream, by providing institutional and policy support, and downstream, by supporting catalytic activities. Several pilot projects were developed to support the implementation of *Ehsaas Nashonuma*, a large Government-led social protection programme. For example, WFP provided unconditional cash top-ups to drought-affected households and supported pregnant and lactating women and children age 6–23 months with a comprehensive package of interventions focused on health and nutrition. WFP’s engagement with the *Ehsaas* programme under the CSP shows strategic foresight. Over the last couple of years, WFP focused more on implementing activities than gathering lessons learned to inform the development of sustainable mechanisms for expanding government systems. Several factors explain this: the engagement was relatively new, interaction was infrequent during the COVID-19 pandemic, and expectations on both sides were not fully aligned. For example, in all provinces the Government had high expectations of WFP as an implementing partner that would propose initiatives that were already funded.

19. Under activity 4 WFP provided technical assistance for the development of the Government-led school meals and education support programme and implemented an education pilot project for adolescent girls. However, major funding shortfalls for this activity, COVID-19 and the subsequent closure of schools led WFP to reach far fewer beneficiaries with CBTs compared with its targets.

*Strategic outcome 3: The entire population of Pakistan, especially children under 5, adolescent girls and women of reproductive age, has improved nutrition in line with national targets for 2025*

20. WFP worked with the Government to develop a multisectoral strategy, policy and programme to address malnutrition. WFP was effective in treating acute malnutrition, with all outcome indicators surpassing targets. However, the coverage of moderate acute malnutrition treatment and malnutrition prevention programmes was below targets.

21. Stunting prevention activities were initially affected by limited awareness on the part of donors, WFP staff and the Government of Pakistan of the potential impact of strategic support for stunting

prevention. However, through the implementation of the *Ehsaas Nashonuma* and SPRING programmes, WFP improved its approach and reach.

22. WFP also provided social and behaviour change communication on infant and young child feeding practices and hygiene, although it did not regularly monitor results apart from the number of beneficiaries reached. Cooperating partners noted that targeted households were making nutrition-related decisions in favour of the most disadvantaged family members and allocating a proportion of CBTs to improving nutrition. However, there was a need to address social and behaviour change communication more comprehensively. This could be supported by a comprehensive multisectoral communication strategy with better coordination, particularly between the Ministry of Health, the United Nations Children's Fund, the World Health Organization and WFP.

#### *Strategic outcome 4: Communities in disaster prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022*

23. WFP showcased its experience with small-scale interventions at the community and school levels, seeking to increase emergency response capacity and encourage the Government to scale up activities. Pilot projects were highly localized because of limited funding – they received just 3 percent of total allocated resources between 2018 and 2021 – and their contribution to building community resilience appeared to be marginal.

24. WFP supported the emergency response capacity of the provinces, including through the establishment of humanitarian response facilities that were used in recent emergencies. Other activities in communities and schools were aimed at increasing emergency response capacity. While this type of support has considerable promise, its full impact will only be visible when activities are scaled up.

#### *Strategic objective 5: Federal and provincial systems have strengthened capabilities for providing food security and essential services by 2022*

25. Capacity strengthening work focused on increasing technical and logistical competence in nutrition and stunting, CBTs, social protection and disaster risk reduction. Examples included the training of 35 staff from *Ehsaas Nashonuma* facilitation centres in Balochistan on social mobilization, the use of the Android app, protocols and seasonal calendars; and the restoration of silos to enhance wheat storage capacity in Balochistan.

26. WFP's engagement falls within the "define and design" category of the country capacity strengthening (CCS) framework. While WFP did identify capacity development needs for specific activities, the absence of a comprehensive capacity gap assessment to inform CCS activities was a challenge. Although somewhat fragmented, training was relevant and appropriately targeted and enabled operational change. CCS efforts at the organizational level only started recently, and the results are not yet visible.

#### *Gender, protection and accountability to affected populations*

27. The country office has made progress in integrating gender considerations into its operations. Current activities address women's economic inclusion through FFA and stunting and malnutrition through SPRING and *Ehsaas Nashonuma* in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The country office has signed up to the WFP gender transformation programme, which provides an opportunity to address structural issues. There is also a need to explore ways to foster the participation of key actors, including men, so that they help to strengthen the enabling environment.

28. Protection indicators collected by WFP showed positive results, but field data from the evaluation revealed that cooperating partners struggled to operationalize protection principles because of a lack of awareness of the principles or knowledge of how to apply them. The short-term nature of projects and high turnover among cooperating partner staff suggest that there is a need to further invest in enhancing the protection capacity of cooperating partners and that more analysis of indicators may be needed.

29. Indicators of WFP's accountability to affected populations improved and feedback mechanisms are in place, but the latter do not always work due to cultural and access issues. For example, it was noted that in Pakistani culture, concerns are more easily voiced face to face than by phone or email.

## *Sustainability*

30. The Government values the activities conducted under the CSP and currently drives the implementation of SPRING (under strategic outcome 3) and *Ehsaas Nashonuma* (under strategic outcome 2). As these activities are already part of the provincial and federal government response, they are likely to continue. Although other activities led by WFP are appreciated, there is limited indication that they will be sustained. The support for disaster risk reduction provided under strategic outcome 4 was limited, and data showed that in-kind support was unlikely to be sustained. On the positive side, the humanitarian response facilities are being integrated into Government emergency response structures. It is now for the Government to allocate the resources needed to ensure that they are maintained effectively.

## *Humanitarian–development–peace nexus*

31. WFP is continually, and flexibly, operating in all three areas of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, which often overlap. However, there is limited evidence that WFP has been able to fully capitalize on its role as an active contributor to the three nexus elements. WFP needs to ensure that its efforts are firmly grounded across the nexus and linked with the efforts of others.

## **To what extent has WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to country strategic plan outputs and strategic outcomes?**

### *Timeliness*

32. WFP has generally conducted crisis response operations on time, thanks to its ability to mobilize resources and respond operationally to new crises very efficiently. In some instances support was delayed due to administrative procedures, including limitations imposed by the Government and initial restrictions on the use of CBTs. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic WFP supported the Government in the management of rapid emergency CBT schemes.

33. Support for activities that addressed the root causes of food insecurity and built resilience could not always be provided as expected due to insufficient funding and the earmarking of donations for crisis response; limited in-house competence and a lack of networks through which to conduct planned activities were also constraining factors. In some instances, timeliness was undermined by delays in contracting with cooperating partners.

### *Appropriateness of the coverage*

34. Coverage in terms of total beneficiaries reached by activities under each strategic outcome was consistently lower than planned. The highest number of beneficiaries was for crisis response (strategic outcome 1). Coverage under the other strategic outcomes, although significant, was constrained by limited funding.

35. A number of activities were extremely small scale, in many instances limited to a single village or school or small group of beneficiaries, and there were no clear plans for drawing key lessons to inform their replication or scale-up by the Government.

### *Cost efficiency*

36. Overall, the CSP design was cost-efficient. A large percentage of the operational budgets was delivered to beneficiaries as either in-kind food or CBTs, with an average of 78 percent for in-kind food and 91 percent for CBTs. The use of resources was efficient across all activities. The COVID-19 pandemic halted and limited some CCS activities, and resources were not fully utilized as intended. Direct support costs as a proportion of total costs therefore increased over time, reducing overall cost efficiency.

### *Alternative cost-effectiveness measures*

37. There is limited evidence of WFP seeking to identify more cost-effective alternatives. The choice of transfer modality (CBTs, food or vouchers) was driven by regulatory and logistical feasibility considerations rather than cost-effectiveness.

## What factors explain WFP's performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected under the country strategic plan?

### Evidence-based programming

38. The CSP was informed by nutrition and food security analysis. Although basic monitoring requirements were met, there was limited evidence that the data collected were used to monitor progress for all outcomes or inform strategic decision making.

### Adequate, predictable and flexible resources

39. Since 2013, with the progressive transition towards resilience building and CCS, the budget for WFP activities in Pakistan has been falling. Funding levels have followed a similar pattern, falling from over 85 percent under the protracted relief and recovery operation (2013–2015) to 41 percent under the CSP (2018–2022) as of November 2021 (table 2).

TABLE 2: PRE-CSP AND CSP FINANCIAL SITUATION						
Period	Years	Programme	Recipients	Budget (USD)	Funding (USD)	% budget funded
Pre-CSP	January 2013–December 2015	<u>Protracted relief and recovery operation 200250</u> : Enhancing Food and Nutrition Security and Rebuilding Social Cohesion	Pakistan	676 125 674	578 361 292	85.54
	July 2014–June 2016	<u>Special operation 200707</u> : Logistics Capacity Development in Support of the National Disaster Management Authority	Pakistan	9 666 690	642 000	6.64
	January 2016–December 2017	<u>Protracted relief and recovery operation 200867</u> : Transition Towards Resilience and Food Security in Pakistan	Pakistan	349 705 324	222 867 739	63.73
CSP	January 2018–December 2022	Pakistan country strategic plan	Pakistan	475 334 050	193 850 711	40.78

Source: WFP operations database (standard project reports and resource situation report for pre-CSP programmes, and CSP document and resource situation report for the CSP).


40. During CSP implementation most donors earmarked their funding at the activity level for crisis response,<sup>8</sup> thereby reducing WFP's flexibility. Figure 5 shows that although the CSP was clearly focused on root causes (as seen in the needs-based plan for each focus area), allocations were concentrated on crisis response. Resilience building activities were the least funded, at 19.9 percent of needs. The data also suggests that WFP was slightly better equipped to utilize resources in the crisis response focus area, where the rate of expenditure was 93 percent compared with 75 percent for resilience building and 78 percent for

<sup>8</sup> This earmarked funding accounted for 83 percent of all funding.



root causes. Clearly, different tasks require different forms of investment, and crisis response includes activities that are far more cost-intensive than training, for example.

**Figure 5 Comparative funding distribution – needs-based plan compared with allocated resources and expenditures by focus area, 2018–2021**



Sources: Pakistan CSP (PK01) revision 3; revision 1 budget plan; 2018–2021 cumulative financial overview on 4/11/21. Figures for 2021 are provisional and not validated by WFP headquarters.

41. Overall, the donor pool has been stable, making funding relatively predictable; Pakistan and the United States of America have consistently been the biggest donors, while others have steadily decreased their contributions.

42. The challenges experienced in securing resources for some of the activities suggest that even though the CSP was drafted in close consultation with the national Government its implications were not fully embraced at the national and provincial levels. This suggests that engagement at the central and provincial levels during CSP design and continued engagement during implementation are critical to ensuring a common vision of how the CSP should be put into practice.

### Partnerships

43. The CSP set the stage for a broader partnership framework and for strengthening partnership primarily with the Government but also with international and local actors. While strong collaboration existed at the operational level, strategic engagement was more limited.

44. The diversity of partners increased, in particular to include more international NGOs. This reduced the risks associated with investing in just one type of partner and allowed WFP to benefit from varied knowledge sets. By and large, cooperating partners operated as implementers of activities despite many of them having partnered with WFP for ten years or more. This suggests that there are opportunities to share lessons with cooperating partners with the aim of jointly developing innovative programmes.

### Flexibility of the CSP

45. WFP is to be commended for its flexibility and responsiveness to emerging needs, notably during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, despite a greater focus on work to build resilience and root causes, WFP has consistently used a crisis response management approach, including short implementation timeframes, for all activities, which has curbed the effectiveness of some interventions. Addressing root causes and building resilience require consistent long-term support with multi-year funding.

## *Other factors that explain WFP performance and its strategic shift*

46. Two elements that might have facilitated the operationalization of the strategic shifts envisaged by the CSP appeared to be missing: a partnership strategy clarifying WFP's strategic niche in relation to other partners such as the Government and other United Nations entities; and an assessment of WFP's internal capacity and the expertise required to implement the CSP.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

47. **The CSP was well positioned with regard to national policies and was aligned with the UNSDF.** The intention to move towards more strategic support, including a focus on capacity strengthening, resilience building and the root causes of food insecurity, fit well within the Government's policy priorities.

48. The CSP remained highly relevant despite changes in circumstance including natural and human-induced shocks and an evolving policy landscape. During the COVID-19 pandemic WFP demonstrated its ability to adjust its programmes and scale up social protection responses to address new and emerging needs. However, the support it provided was relatively small in scale, and WFP was not able to build on its COVID-19 response to take on the role of systems enabler that, in partnership with the Government, could address more medium-term food insecurity and nutrition challenges in social protection beyond providing support for cash-based transfers. WFP support was in line with what could be reasonably expected, however, given the resources at its disposal.

49. Although the CSP was aligned with the UNSDF, inter-agency engagement was limited. This is largely because United Nations entities do not follow a unified or holistic approach. In addition, because each United Nations entity tends to take a siloed approach, Government entities – particularly at the provincial level – tend to consider each entity to be a distinct independent partner. This is compounded by the fact that several United Nations entities have a narrow view of WFP's work. The participation of WFP in the design of the UNSDCF for 2023–2027 provides an opportunity to overcome some of these challenges.

50. **WFP has made progress in several areas but progress has been uneven across the strategic outcomes.** Under strategic outcome 1 unconditional food transfers helped stabilize and improve the food security of temporarily displaced people. There were challenges in CBT delivery because of Government restrictions and logistical issues but CBT use was expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic. Under strategic outcome 2, several social protection pilots were developed, but WFP engagement remained largely operational. Under strategic outcome 3, WFP supported the Government in moving from short-term emergency treatment of moderate acute malnutrition to multisectoral integrated programming, which is positive given the aim of preventing stunting and addressing nutrition in a more holistic and sustainable way. Although activities under strategic outcome 3 sought to improve the nutrition of the entire population, the programme focused on providing nutritious food through relatively small-scale projects. The treatment of moderate acute malnutrition received more resources than planned and was effective. Under strategic outcome 4, multiple small-scale efforts were conducted to achieve resilient food systems, but these require upscaling to lead to broader results. Under strategic outcome 5 the support provided in training and infrastructure handover was relevant and well received, but a comprehensive plan for strengthening the capacity of national institutions was lacking.

51. The CSP focused on supporting women and girls as more vulnerable people within larger target groups. However, this alone is not a demonstration of a gendered approach. A deeper analysis of the underlying causes of vulnerability is necessary to promote gender equality. The country office has signed up to the gender transformation programme, which is a step in the right direction

52. **The partnership with the Government has been more operational than strategic.** The CSP signalled a shift away from implementation to strategic support. The partnership with the Government was more focused on operations (the implementation of initiatives as they are) rather than strategic shifts seeking to adapt and improve system-wide responses to known challenges. However, WFP did support the development of support studies or assessments that played, or could continue to play, an important role in the development and design of interventions in the nutrition sector.

53. There are also opportunities for more strategic partnerships with civil society organizations, which have largely served as implementing service providers rather than partners who can share lessons learned and contribute to the joint development of innovative programmes.

54. **The CSP envisioned a move away from crisis response towards a greater focus on resilience and root causes.** WFP was an effective emergency response agent but was less adept at demonstrating its comparative advantage in the resilience and root causes focus areas. This was due to three factors. First, WFP is better known by the Government as a humanitarian agency, which hampered its ability to present long-term approaches that can be scaled up and sustained by the Government. One exception to this was in the area of nutrition, where WFP has a more visible and established reputation as a partner that can contribute strategically to activities that can be sustained by a government. Second, WFP was not successful in highlighting the value of its strategic role to donors. Third, a shortage of staff with the skills required to meet the demands of the CSP was also a challenge.

55. The process of decentralization and considerable variation between and within provinces requires WFP to tailor its support to ensure that it meets local needs. The process of devolution in Pakistan means that, while they have equal responsibilities, provinces' needs, institutional structures and local capacities vary considerably. Activities therefore need to be tailored to the needs of the provinces, and in some cases to the needs of various groups within the provinces. This requires consistent and in-depth engagement between WFP and the central and provincial governments. The country office has already embarked on this type of engagement in designing the CSP for 2023–2027.

56. When used, the nuanced beneficiary targeting approach that combined Government and WFP targeting mechanisms served to ensure that the most vulnerable were reached. In cases where WFP relied solely on Government targeting mechanisms, however, there were questions regarding the accuracy of targeting and whether the most vulnerable were identified.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
1	<b>WFP should ensure that the next country strategic plan primarily focuses on supporting the Government in developing strategies to enhance food and nutrition security while maintaining the ability to respond to crises.<sup>9</sup> Country capacity strengthening needs should be jointly identified with the Government taking into consideration the decentralized nature of the government system in Pakistan and clearly distinguishing efforts that must be addressed at the national level from those that must be addressed at the provincial level. In addition, it will be important to ensure that the country strategic plan reflects the fact that Pakistan is a very diverse country whose provinces have diverse set of needs and capacities and that different provinces will therefore require different types of support. This approach should be embedded in the following steps:</b>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, headquarters Partnerships and Advocacy Department	High	December 2023
	1.1 Carry out an in-depth and iterative consultation process with the Government at the central and provincial levels (taking into account the process of devolution and regional diversity) to identify needs and existing capacities at both levels and design national and provincial country capacity strengthening interventions accordingly.					December 2023
	1.2 Develop a detailed theory of change that outlines the change pathways and strengthened linkages and synergies between focus areas, strategic outcomes and activities and how these can be achieved. Integrate country capacity strengthening into the various					December 2023

<sup>9</sup> While the CSP evaluation was being finalized, WFP was engaging in a consultative process to identify specific needs at the federal and provincial levels as part of the development of the new CSP.

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
	<p>strategic outcomes so that it organically supports specific thematic areas. The country office could use the strategic outcomes as the starting point and develop a storyline that allows the goals to be reached. Depending on the complexity of the strategic outcomes under the next country strategic plan, the country office could develop a single overarching theory of change or multiple ones.</p>					
	<p>1.3 Embed WFP interventions within government systems and structures to ensure that effective interventions can be scaled up and sustained. This work includes strengthening emergency response capacity and leveraging collaboration with the Government of Pakistan at the policy and strategy levels in areas including stunting prevention and the consolidation and expansion of nutrition support as part of <i>Ehsaas Nashonuma</i> and resilience building.</p>					December 2023
	<p>1.4 WFP should develop an operational plan for the next country strategic plan focused on its core areas of competence. This requires the identification of a clear implementation road map that facilitates the shift required to implement activities and deliver the country strategic plan strategic outcomes. A key activity for this recommendation is a self-assessment or staffing review to ensure that staff have the capacity and expertise needed to implement the country strategic plan effectively.</p>					March 2023
<b>2</b>	<p><b>The country office should review its fundraising, partnerships and advocacy plan with a view to exploring new funding sources and further leveraging domestic financing. This may entail identifying new financing mechanisms with support from headquarters.</b></p>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau and headquarters	High	December 2023
	<p>2.1 Position WFP as a key development actor (beyond the humanitarian sphere) and ensure clear and coherent messaging on WFP's comparative advantages and value propositions. This will entail communicating the impact of upstream capacity strengthening work and promoting a shift from "implementing" to</p>					December 2023

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
	"enabling", working to become a catalyst and the go-to partner for development priorities.					
	2.2 Contribute to and inform the engagement between the Government and international financial institutions by leveraging data, analysis and other tools; convening dialogue; and subsequently, where appropriate, playing a role in assisting with the implementation of government-led projects financed by international financial institutions.					December 2023
	2.3 Work with for-profit organizations and the Government to explore opportunities for technical partnerships with the private sector in selected programmes, with a particular focus on the development of nutritious foods. The country office should also explore the Scaling Up Nutrition Business Network as a key platform for private sector engagement.					December 2023
<b>3</b>	<b>Deepen WFP's strategic and operational partnership with government partners and civil society organizations.</b>	Operational	Country office	Regional bureau	Medium	December 2023
	3.1 It is important to introduce regular strategic interaction with government partners, at the national and provincial levels, to exchange ideas and information on opportunities, country strategic plan plans, gaps, country capacity strengthening needs and future expectations. This will serve to ensure effective and continual communication. WFP should select entities to engage with based on their capacities and the activities to be conducted. In some instances, particularly at the provincial level, multiple government partners may need to be engaged to support single initiatives.					December 2023
	3.2 WFP should more actively engage with civil society organizations to benefit from their field knowledge. This should go beyond the collection of monitoring data and include learning through dialogue, which may be used by WFP to inform its strategic objectives and improve its understanding of field realities. Specific					December 2023

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
	areas where focused attention is needed are social protection, identification of the most vulnerable groups and gender transformation.					
4	<b>WFP should increase its efforts to promote gender equality, accountability to affected populations and protection.</b>	Operational	Country office	Regional bureau	Medium	December 2023
	4.1 WFP should explore ways to contribute to shifts in gender construction and reducing gender inequality. This must go beyond the inclusion of women or gender minorities in activities, and WFP should engage with partners who focus on gender equality to ensure that its activities are based on the most current knowledge and practice.					December 2023
	4.2 WFP should continue its efforts to achieve greater gender balance among its staff, noting the structural challenges					December 2023
	4.3 To promote their effective implementation, WFP should ensure that accountability to affected populations and protection mechanisms are aligned with local cultural traditions and norms and are fully understood by cooperating partners.					December 2023

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 EVALUATION FEATURES

1. This evaluation focuses on the Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for 2018–2022. The evaluation was commissioned by WFP Office of Evaluation from TANA Copenhagen. The evaluation was conducted by a team of six evaluation consultants, between July 2021 and February 2022.

2. The WFP CSP Policy outlines a new approach for strategic and programmatic planning at country level.<sup>10</sup> This evaluation has a dual purpose of accountability and learning, ensuring that: i) evaluative evidence and learning on WFP performance to support country-level strategic decisions, specifically for developing future WFP engagement in Pakistan, is provided; and ii) accountability for results to WFP stakeholders is secured.<sup>11</sup> The assignment covers activities that took place between 2018 and Q3 2021 and was timed to ensure that inputs can be used to inform the design of the new CSP (2023–2027). The evaluation also sought to understand and assess the efforts made, and mechanisms used, during the development of the CSP in the year prior to its implementation, and any internal and external changes that have affected the implementation of the CSP since.

3. The evaluation is relevant to a range of internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include the WFP country office (CO) in Pakistan, the Regional Bureau Bangkok (RBB), the Office of Evaluation and other relevant headquarter divisions, and the Executive Board. External stakeholders include the Government of Pakistan, the main WFP donor in Pakistan, and other actors such as the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Alliance 15, Scaling Up Nutrition Civil Society Alliance (SUN CSA), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

4. The evaluation followed a theory-based, mixed methods approach (see details on the methodology in Annex III). The inception phase was conducted entirely remotely. An in-depth review of documents, interviews with selected stakeholders, a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, and the reconstruction of a Theory of Change (ToC) for the CSP allowed the Evaluation Team to fine-tune the evaluation scope in close consultation with the country office and Office of Evaluation. An evaluation matrix was prepared (Annex IV) around four standard evaluation questions (EQ) which include a series of sub-questions, lines of inquiry, indicators, data sources, and data collection techniques. A ToC workshop with the country office was conducted to ensure an accurate point of departure.

5. The data collection phase included remote, in-person and hybrid (remote participation during in-person) meetings. The evaluation included an in-depth review of documents, field observations and three online surveys. The latter focused exclusively on partnerships and Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS).

6. An interactive process was maintained with the country office and Office of Evaluation throughout the evaluation. A field data collection exit debrief was conducted remotely with the country office and Office of Evaluation on 3 November 2021, preliminary findings were presented on 19 November 2021, and a learning workshop was conducted on 24-25 March 2022.

7. This evaluation was aligned with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) principles, norms, and standards.<sup>12</sup> In alignment with WFP’s commitment to gender equality and empowerment, a gendered lens guides the examination of contextual factors, data collection, data analysis, the identification of findings and their presentation. Similarly, in alignment with WFP’s triple nexus (humanitarian-development-peace) approach, the examination of contextual factors, including engagement with partners and other members

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<sup>10</sup> Policy on Country Strategic Plans (WFP: WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1).

<sup>11</sup> See Annex I

<sup>12</sup> WFP. 2021. *Technical note: Principles, Norms and Standards for Evaluations*



of the United Nations family, data collection, data analysis and the identification and presentation of findings, included a nexus perspective.

8. The evaluation faced some limitations and challenges: some data, including specific indicators, were not available for part or all of the review period. There was almost no detail regarding the type of CCS activities conducted, therefore the principal findings are derived from Key Informant Interviews (KII) and survey data collected during the assignment.

## 1.2 CONTEXT

### 1.2.1 General overview

9. With 221 million people, Pakistan is the world's fifth most populous country and has the second-largest Muslim population. Its territory covers 796,100 km<sup>2</sup> and it is characterized by diverse agro-ecological conditions.<sup>13</sup> Pakistan shares borders with Afghanistan, Iran, China, and India.<sup>14</sup> Nearly 60 percent of the country has mountainous or undulating terrain with arid or semi-arid climate conditions.<sup>15</sup> Urdu and English, are the two official languages. Some 74 regional languages are also spoken, reflecting the country's ethnic diversity.<sup>16</sup>

10. Pakistan has a growth rate of 2.1 percent,<sup>17</sup> and the fifth-largest youth population in the world comprising those aged 15–29 years<sup>18</sup> (Figure 2), equal to 28 percent of the population.<sup>19</sup> The youth population in Pakistan is expected to continue to increase until at least 2050.<sup>20</sup> Life expectancy at birth is 66 years for men and 68 years for women.<sup>21</sup> The average fertility rate has been declining since 1960 and is currently 3.45.<sup>22</sup> The population is 49 percent female and 51 percent male.<sup>23</sup> Approximately 63 percent live in rural areas and 37 percent in urban and semi-urban areas.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> World data. Pakistan. [Pakistan | Data \(worldbank.org\)](https://data.worldbank.org/)

<sup>14</sup> Britannica. Indo-Gangetic Plain.

<sup>15</sup> Britannica. Pakistan.

<sup>16</sup> Ethnologue. PK status.

<sup>17</sup> World Bank. Pakistan.

<sup>18</sup> UNFPA. Pakistan.

<sup>19</sup> UNDP. 2017. *Pakistan National Human Development Report – Unleashing the Potential of a Young Pakistan*.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.


<sup>21</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2018. *National Nutrition Survey: Key Findings Report*.

<sup>22</sup> World Bank. *Fertility rate, total (birth per women) – Pakistan*.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2018. *National Population Census 2017*.

**Figure 2: Pakistan population pyramid 2020**



Source: United Nations. 2019. World Population Prospects 2019 (accessed on 15 August 2021).

11. In addition to the federal capital, Islamabad, Pakistan has six federal units comprising four provinces – Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP),<sup>25</sup> Punjab, and Sindh – and two territories – Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The Government is organized in a three-tier system, which includes: federal government and respective ministries which report at a central level and are accountable to government ministers; provincial departments which report to provincial authorities; and district offices which are relatively decentralized but report to provincial authorities. The 18th Constitutional Amendment passed in 2010 guided the devolution of government and removed previously existing reporting lines between federal and provincial departments, but not policy linkages in several domains (including water, agriculture, and industry, for example). The provinces are expected to develop their own strategies for sustainable management of multiple sectors. Sectoral departments provide services through their district setups (for example, health, education, agriculture, disaster management, environment, and so on). They have their policy offices and headquarters at provincial level, implying that provincial level authorities are in charge of reaching out to the districts to publicize provincial-level strategies and corresponding plans.

12. Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has experienced several political events that have threatened its stability. The overall security situation improved during the last decade but remains fragile in some border areas. The fragile state index ranking improved from 9th most fragile state in 2008 to currently 29th. In the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Pakistan's score for "transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector" improved from 2.5 (2005-2014) to 3 in 2015 (on a scale of 1 [low] to 6 [high]) and has remained at 3 since.<sup>26</sup>

13. Pakistan has been a lower middle income country since 2008 with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of USD 1,270 in 2020.<sup>27</sup> It is estimated that its real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has declined from 1.9 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2019 to minus 1.5 percent in FY2020 and then up to 3.94 percent in FY2021.<sup>28</sup> Pakistan's performance was below the South Asia regional average and mostly below the average for all lower middle income countries. The economy was negatively affected by natural disasters (earthquakes, droughts, floods) since 2005,<sup>29</sup> and a locust outbreak,<sup>30</sup> all of which have impacted

<sup>25</sup> KP includes seven districts which have recently merged into the province from an earlier status of federally administrated tribal entities.

<sup>26</sup> World Bank. CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1=low to 6=high).

<sup>27</sup> World Bank. GNI per capita, Atlas method (current USD).

<sup>28</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2021. Economic Survey.

<sup>29</sup> FAO. 2017. *How close are we to #ZeroHunger?*

<sup>30</sup> FAO. (nd). *Desert Locust Situation in Pakistan*.

agricultural production. The global financial crisis of 2007–2008, the COVID-19 pandemic,<sup>31</sup> and recent political instability in the country<sup>32</sup> have also impacted the economy. In 2019, Pakistan entered a 39-month, USD 6 billion arrangement for economic reform with the International Monetary Fund due to severe balance of payments difficulties.<sup>33</sup>

14. Internal and external remittances play a critical role in Pakistan's economy, accounting for nearly 9.9 percent of GDP in 2020.<sup>34</sup> Overall, 64 percent of Pakistani youth live in urban, and 36 percent live in rural areas. According to a 2017 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study, Pakistan needs to generate an average of 1.3 million jobs annually for the next five years to absorb the current unemployed population and youth attaining working age.<sup>35</sup> Technical and vocational education and training is an important area for development interventions by the Government and informal sector, especially given the increasing numbers of youth.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, Pakistan's rural, non-farming economy (mining and quarrying, manufacturing, businesses, services, etc.) is becoming increasingly important for household income due to more uncertainty in the agriculture sector because of climate change and land fragmentation. The main income sources for rural households include: wages and salaries (32 percent of total incomes); crops and livestock (30 percent); and remittances (13 percent).<sup>37</sup>

15. In 2015, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement was signed for USD 46 billion, and it was worth USD 62 billion in 2017 (approximately 20 percent of Pakistan's GDP). Major areas of investment include the transportation networks, energy, and special economic zones, particularly in south Balochistan.

## 1.2.2 Poverty and inequality

16. Multidimensional poverty<sup>38</sup> decreased since 2004/05 from 55.2 percent to 38.3 percent in 2018. The analysis available from 2015 shows stark urban/rural disparities in poverty (9.4 percent urban and 54.6 percent rural). There is disparity between provinces, (ranging from 31.4 percent in Punjab with 48.4 percent deprivation, to 71.2 percent in Balochistan with 55.3 percent deprivation). Between 2004/5 and 2014/15 the prevalence of deprivation nationwide, however, decreased slightly from 52.9 percent to 50.9 percent.<sup>39</sup> The analysis of the population living below the national poverty line also shows a reduction from 93.9 million (64.3 percent) in 2001 to 43.7 million (21.9 percent in 2018).

**Table 2: Population living below the national poverty line in Pakistan**

Year	2001	2010	2015	2018
Population living below the poverty line	93.9	66	48.5	43.7
Poverty head count ratio (%) - national poverty line	64.3	36.8	24.3	21.9

Source: World Bank. World Development Indicators (accessed on 18 May 2022).

<sup>31</sup>WFP and FAO. 2020. *Rapid Assessment: Possible Impact of COVID-19 on Livelihoods, Food Security, Nutrition and Agricultural Supply Chain in Pakistan*.

<sup>32</sup>USIP. 2021. *Pakistan's Shifting Political and Economic Wind*; and Jamal, U. 2021. *Pakistan's TLP Emerges Stronger from Protests*.

<sup>33</sup>International Monetary Fund. 2019. *IMF Executive Board Approves US\$6 billion 39-Month EFF Arrangement for Pakistan*.

<sup>34</sup>World Bank. Personal remittances, received (percentage of GDP).

<sup>35</sup>UNDP. 2017. *National Human Development Report. Unleashing the potential of youth in Pakistan*.

<sup>36</sup>Nizami, A. 2020. *Potential for jobs in tourism sector*.

<sup>37</sup>Government of Pakistan. 2021. *Economic Survey*.

<sup>38</sup>Developed by Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative and UNDP, 2010. Multi-dimensional poverty uses health, education, and standard of living indicators to determine the incidence and intensity of poverty experienced by a population.

<sup>39</sup>Government of Pakistan and UNDP. 2016. *Multidimensional poverty in Pakistan*.

17. Despite a general poverty reduction trend and increase in GNI per capita, inequality has widened. This is reflected in the increase of the Gini coefficient from 28.8 in 2010 to 29.6 in 2018.<sup>40</sup> Pakistan's Human Development Index (HDI) rating (154/188 countries in 2020) declined slightly within the category of low HDI countries.<sup>41</sup> The value (0.557) is notably below the average of 0.631 for countries in the medium human development group, and below the average of 0.641 for countries in South Asia.<sup>42</sup>

### 1.2.3 COVID-19 pandemic

18. According to the Inform COVID Risk Index, Pakistan is classified as "high risk".<sup>43</sup> As of 7 November 2021, there were 1,272,240 confirmed cases and 28,518 deaths,<sup>44</sup> with 19.9 percent of the population fully vaccinated, and an equal proportion partially vaccinated. Approximately 47 million schoolchildren have been affected by school closures. Food insecurity, malnutrition and poverty levels have worsened by the increased costs of living and loss of wages (unemployment) caused by the pandemic.<sup>45</sup>

### 1.2.4 National policies and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

19. Both the national and provincial governments have strong policy development track records. The 2008 *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II* underscored the important role of the agricultural and rural non-farm sector in terms of employment generation. Pakistan Vision 2025 (One Nation – One Vision)<sup>46</sup> aims to halve poverty and transform Pakistan into an upper middle income country. Policy frameworks of relevance to the agricultural and rural sectors include the National Climate Change Policy (2012),<sup>47</sup> the National Water Policy (2018)<sup>48</sup> and the National Food Security Policy (2019).<sup>49</sup>

20. In 2016, Pakistan adopted the SDGs as its own national development agenda in a unanimous National Assembly resolution. The country achieved a 57.7 percent completion rate in 2021.<sup>50</sup> In relation to SDG 1 (end poverty in all its forms everywhere) several developments can be observed, including the launch of the national poverty graduation initiative under the Government's social protection initiative, and several development projects, also supported by bilateral or multi-lateral partners, with a focus on poverty alleviation.

21. Pakistan claims one of the largest social protection programmes in the world. The National Social Protection Strategy (2007)<sup>51</sup> introduced the "poverty scorecard" as a main targeting tool for the Government's largest social protection scheme – the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) a cash transfer programme, as well as for other programmes. BISP is now housed under a larger social protection programme called Ehsaas, with strong devolution from federal Government to the provinces. Ehsaas has multiple initiatives including Kafalat (support to female-headed households with no income source), Waseela e Taleem (education) and Nashonuma (nutrition). WFP has significant engagement with the Government of Pakistan on Ehsaas Nashonuma.

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<sup>40</sup>World Bank. Gini Index.

<sup>41</sup> UNDP. 2020. *Human Development Report*. [Pakistan Human Development Report](#)

<sup>42</sup> The Tribune. 2020. *Pakistan ranks 154th on UN's Human Development Index*.

<sup>43</sup> UNDOC. 2021. COVID-19 Data Portal.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> FAO & WFP. 2020. *Rapid Assessment: Possible Impact of COVID-19 on Livelihoods, Food Security and Agricultural Supply Chain in Pakistan*.

<sup>46</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2015. *Pakistan Vision 2025: One Nation – One Vision*.

<sup>47</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2012. *National Climate Change Policy*.

<sup>48</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2018. *National Water Policy*.

<sup>49</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2014. *National Water Food Security Policy*.

<sup>50</sup> Sustainable Development Report, 2021. Interactive map.


<sup>51</sup> World Bank. 2013. *Pakistan – Towards an Integrated National Safety Net System*.

## 1.2.5 Food and nutrition security

22. The 2018 national nutrition survey reported that four out of ten children under five were stunted (40.9 percent among boys and 39.4 percent among girls), with 17.7 percent suffering from wasting. The double burden of malnutrition is increasingly apparent, with almost one in three children underweight (29.3 percent boys, 28.4 percent girls) alongside a high prevalence of overweight (9.7 percent boys and 9.2 percent girls) in the same age group. All the indicators are higher in rural areas.<sup>52</sup> Young children and women of reproductive age in both urban and rural areas are affected with micronutrient deficiencies.

23. Pakistan is facing difficulty in meeting the food security and nutrition targets of SDG 2 by 2030. In the 2021 Global Hunger Index, Pakistan ranks 92 out of 116 countries with a score classified as “serious” in the index’s severity scale.<sup>53</sup> In 2020, 16.4 percent of households were estimated to be either moderately or severely food insecure with 1.8 percent severely food insecure (the highest being in Balochistan).<sup>54</sup> Rural food insecurity (26.3 percent) is greater than urban food insecurity (18.9 percent).<sup>55</sup> The impact of climate change is shown in Figure 3, which highlights Sindh and Balochistan provinces as vulnerable to acute food insecurity due to recurring droughts.

**Figure 3: Vulnerability to food insecurity based on Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES) in Pakistan, as of December 2021**



Source: WFP Pakistan VAM Unit.

<sup>52</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2018. National Nutrition Survey.

<sup>53</sup> Global Hunger Index. 2021. Global Hunger Index.

<sup>54</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2021. *Pakistan social and living standards measurement survey (2019-20)*.

<sup>55</sup> FAO. 2021. *The state of Food and Nutrition in the World*.

## 1.2.6 Agriculture

24. Agriculture contributes 20 percent of GDP and employs 38.5 percent of the labour force (nearly half of them women working mostly as unpaid family labour).<sup>56</sup> Though no longer the backbone of the economy, agriculture remains an important tool for rural poverty reduction.<sup>57</sup> Wheat production uses 40 percent of the total area, including irrigated and rainfed areas. Within irrigated parts of the total agricultural area, the three largest crops include cotton (14 percent and increasing), rice (12 percent and increasing) and sugarcane (11 percent and decreasing). Most of these crops are cultivated in Punjab, which is the hub of commercial and irrigated agriculture.

25. Agriculture is constrained by droughts, erratic rainfall, and lack of access to markets and advisory services.<sup>58</sup> Poorer farmers with little or no irrigation choose to grow cereal crops for their food subsistence. Rainfed agriculture supports 30 million people,<sup>59</sup> representing 38 percent of the total population associated with agriculture (mostly subsistence).

26. The livestock sector's contribution to agricultural GDP is over 60 percent and is a source of income for 8 million rural families (women comprise 48 percent of people directly managing livestock). The fishery sub-sector contribution to the national economy is insignificant.<sup>60</sup>

## 1.2.7 Climate change and vulnerability

27. Pakistan encompasses considerable geographic, topographic, and environmental diversity. The environment and natural resources are increasingly under stress due to the fast-growing population and climate change. Much of the vulnerability to climate change is linked to the high dependence on a single river system, the dominance of four main crops (wheat, cotton, rice, and sugarcane), and the largely arid to semi-arid climate. Heavy reliance on climate-sensitive sectors (such as agriculture and livestock rearing), the limited non-agricultural employment opportunities, and increasing climate and seismic hazards are leading to worsening disasters.<sup>61</sup> This triggered rural-urban migration, adding to environmental problems, overcrowding and pollution in the cities. Natural disasters due to hydro-meteorological variability over the last two decades have required considerable humanitarian responses (Table 3) and current predictions forecast further threats to come. Sindh and southern Balochistan provinces particularly are subject to multi-hazards, including: severe conditions of frequent drought, leading to food and water insecurity; and floods, leading to displacement and loss of livelihoods and food security (Table 3).<sup>62</sup> Food insecurity is also high in newly merged districts (e.g. Mohmand) and other parts of KP (e.g. Lower Dir) and parts of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (e.g. Binber) (see Figure 4 Disaster-prone districts in Pakistan). In Pakistan, women, children and the elderly are more vulnerable to these types of events because they have specific nutritional needs which are not met, often have lower education and less access to public spaces.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2021. *Economic Survey*.

<sup>57</sup> FAO. 2020. *Accelerating progress towards SDG 2*.

<sup>58</sup> Khan, R.S., Nawaz, K., Steenbergen, F. & Nizami, A. 2015. *The dry side of the Indus – exploring spate irrigation in Pakistan*.

<sup>59</sup> Baig, M., Shahid A. & Straquadine, G. 2013. Making Rainfed Agriculture Sustainable Through Environmentally Friendly Technologies in Pakistan: A Review. *International Soil and Water Conservation Research*, 1(2): 36-52.

<sup>60</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2021. *Economic Survey*. (0.4 percent of GDP, 2.12 percent of agricultural GDP, almost 1 percent of national employment in 2017).

<sup>61</sup> WFP. 2017. *Integrated Context Analysis*.

<sup>62</sup> CFE-DM. 2021. *Pakistan Disaster Management Reference Handbook*.


<sup>63</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2007. *National Disaster Risk Management Framework Pakistan*.

**Table 3: Contextual events during the period under evaluation (2000–present)**

Year	Disaster	Persons affected	Fatalities
2000	Drought	1.2 million	100
2005	Earthquake (Himalayas–Hindu Kush)	3.3 million	73,000
2007	Cyclone Yemyin (India, Pakistan)	1.5 million	730
2010	Hunza Ata Abad Lake disaster	20,000	20
2010	Superfloods	Over 6 million	1,600
2015	Chitral floods	300,000	146
2016-2017	Sindh, Balochistan floods	Over 2 million	190
2018-2019	Drought	5 million	-
2019	Earthquake, floods and landslide	8,600 households	260
2020	Heavy snow, floods and landslide	Over 3 million	Over 500

Source: Relief Web. Pakistan top 19 natural disasters (accessed on 1 November 2021).

**Figure 4: Disaster-prone districts in Pakistan**




Source: WFP Pakistan VAM Unit.

## 1.2.8 Education

28. In 2020, the literacy rate for ages 10 and older was 62.3 percent (51.8 percent for females). The gender gap features in all provinces, particularly in Balochistan. The literacy rate is higher in urban areas (76.6 percent) than in rural areas (53.5 percent) (Figure 5).<sup>64</sup>

29. An estimated 32 percent of children (those aged 5-16) are not enrolled in school (24 percent male, 40 percent female). The highest rates of out-of-school children are in Balochistan (47 percent), followed by Sindh (44 percent), KP, excluding merged districts (30 percent) and Punjab (24 percent).<sup>65</sup>

**Figure 5: Adult literacy rate per province and by gender in Pakistan in 2019**



Source: Government of Pakistan. 2021. Economic Survey.

## 1.2.9 Gender

30. Pakistan is ranked 153 out of 156 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index,<sup>66</sup> despite having adopted various international, national and local commitments to gender equality and women's human rights.<sup>67</sup> Currently only 20 percent of parliamentary seats are held by women.<sup>68</sup> In 2019, only 22 percent of the waged labour force was female.<sup>69</sup> Gaps are evident in nearly every sector, but are particularly wide for economic participation, education and health.<sup>70</sup> Women's position compared to men is embedded in patriarchal norms across classes, regions, and the rural/urban divide. In Pakistan, men are generally expected to be breadwinners and women are generally expected to stay home. This leads to higher demand for school for sons than for daughters, and an extra burden on women who are expected to give birth to sons. Although efforts to promote gender equality are apparent within Pakistan's Vision 2025, gaps

<sup>64</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2021. Economic Survey.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> World Economic Forum. 2021. *Global Gender Gap Report 2021*.

<sup>67</sup> The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Sustainable Development Goals.

<sup>68</sup> World Bank. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (percentage).

<sup>69</sup> World Bank. Labor force participation rate, female (percentage of female population ages 15+) (modelled International Labour Organization estimate).

<sup>70</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2019. *Compendium on Gender Statistics of Pakistan*.




in the fulfilment of women’s reproductive rights as well as the widespread prevalence of gender-based violence are at the forefront of gender inequality.<sup>71</sup>

### 1.2.10 Migration, refugees, and internally displaced people

31. Until 2018, when it was surpassed by Turkey,<sup>72</sup> Pakistan was reportedly home to the largest refugee population in the world.<sup>73</sup> Pakistan currently hosts 1.3 million refugees from Afghanistan.<sup>74</sup> KP province hosts the largest proportion of refugees (Figure 6). The Pakistan–Afghanistan border region is currently affected by the change of leadership that took place in Afghanistan in August 2021. It is estimated that, since January 2021, 78,497 individuals have arrived in Pakistan from Afghanistan.<sup>75</sup>

**Figure 6: Overview of Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan**



Source: UNHCR. Operational Data Portal: Refugee Situations (accessed on 15 August 2021. Last updated August 2021).

32. In 2009, Pakistan suffered one of the worst displacement crises in recorded history when nearly 3 million people from Swat and parts of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas left their homes in the face of increased conflict between the military and militants. At the end of 2020, 98,898 people remain internally displaced.<sup>76</sup>

### 1.2.11 Humanitarian protection

33. Several Humanitarian Response Plans have been launched by the United Nations system over the years: to face natural disasters, to counter polio, to aid conflict-displaced persons and, more recently, to cope with COVID-19 (Figure 7).<sup>77</sup> The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) appeal, launched in 2021, amounted to USD 332 million of which USD 101 million (30 percent)

<sup>71</sup> UNFPA. *What we do: Gender Equality*.

<sup>72</sup> World Economic Forum. This is the global refugee situation, in numbers.

<sup>73</sup> The Tribune. 2018. *Pakistan world's largest host of refugees: UNHCR*.

<sup>74</sup> UNHCR. 2022. Pakistan. [Country - Pakistan \(Islamic Republic of\) \(unhcr.org\)](https://www.unhcr.org/country/pakistan)


<sup>75</sup> UNHCR. 2021. UNHCR Pakistan: New Arrivals from Afghanistan Update (27 December 2021). (The overview is not an outline of the overall flow of border movements and does not purport to estimate the total number of arrivals to Pakistan during the reporting period).

<sup>76</sup> UNHCR. 2022. Situation Reports.

<sup>77</sup> Relief Web. 2022. Humanitarian Response Plans.

was funded.<sup>78</sup> Figure 7 shows different appeals over the years, including the funding requirements, funds received, and the percentage funded.

**Figure 7: Funding against response plan and appeal (2017-2021)**



Source: OCHA-FTS (accessed on 01 June 2022).

34. Response to humanitarian emergencies is coordinated by the National Disaster Management Authority (established in 2007) and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities.<sup>79</sup> These Authorities coordinate with the districts, where one of the revenue officers is additionally designated as District Disaster Management Officer. Overall, capacity of district set-ups is very limited. The humanitarian response plan drawn up by the Pakistan United Nations Protection Cluster focuses on acute protection needs, especially child protection, prevention of and response to gender-based violence (GBV), civil documentation, mine action, housing, land rights and rule of law and justice. Separated or unaccompanied children, women, older persons, and persons with disabilities are particularly exposed to risk during displacement due to physical impediments to accessing basic supplies. For women and children, vulnerability to trafficking and GBV increases in the event of displacement.<sup>80</sup> UNICEF reported a rise in child protection risks and GBV in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>81</sup>

### 1.2.12 International development assistance

35. The top five Official Development Assistance funding sources to Pakistan between 2015–2019 were the World Bank, followed by United States of America, United Kingdom, the Asian Development Bank and Japan. Other top donors included Germany, EU, France, Italy, and Sweden. In 2019, Pakistan’s total international assistance was 0.8 percent of the GNI.<sup>82</sup> Pakistan was the fourth-largest recipient of Official

<sup>78</sup> OCHA-FTS. 2021. *Pakistan Transition Plan: Humanitarian Component 2018*.

<sup>79</sup> Provincial Disaster Management Authorities: Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Balochistan, Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan.

<sup>80</sup> Protection Cluster & UNHCR. 2017. *Pakistan: Protection Cluster Strategy, 2017-2019; From displacement to sustainable return*.

<sup>81</sup> UNICEF. 2021. *Humanitarian Action for Children 2021 – Pakistan – Revision 1 (July 2021)*.

<sup>82</sup> OECD, 2021. *Official Development Assistance*.

Development Assistance in 2019.<sup>83</sup> In recent years, non-OECD donors have also been active in Pakistan, especially for humanitarian and recovery funding. These include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and various philanthropists such as the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and the Malala Fund.<sup>84</sup>

### 1.2.13 United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF)

36. In 2006, the Government of Pakistan volunteered to become a Delivering as One pilot country. It is currently on its third UNSDF/Pakistan One United Nations Programme III (2018–2022) – also known as OPIII. The UNSDF/OPIII is aligned with national strategic development plans enshrined in the Pakistan Vision 2025<sup>85</sup> and identified ten outcomes as the foundation of the strategic framework for United Nations cooperation. An evaluation of the UNSDF/OPIII was taking place at the time of writing.

## 1.3 SUBJECT BEING EVALUATED

37. This section presents an overview of the events that framed the development and implementation of the CSP, and the main components of the CSP. The assumptions that underpinned the development of the CSP are included in the ToC presented in Figure 9.

### 1.3.1 Timeline framing the implementation of the CSP

38. The principal events that have affected the implementation of the CSP are presented in Figure 8.<sup>86</sup> As delineated in the context section of this report, Pakistan is susceptible to instability and shocks caused by natural disasters and political instability. These events have made the need for crisis response more present and have re-emphasized the engagement of WFP in crisis response activities, to the detriment of other, more long-term efforts.

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
<sup>83</sup> OECD. 2019. *Development Aid at A Glance – Developing Countries*.

<sup>84</sup> The Tribune. 2018. *Pakistan 12th largest beneficiary of international charities worldwide, discloses OECD*.

<sup>85</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2015. *Pakistan Vision 2025: One Nation-One Vision*.

<sup>86</sup> Source: Compiled by the Evaluation Team.

Figure 8: Pakistan timeline



### 1.3.2 The Pakistan Country Strategic Plan

39. The WFP Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022) aims to support the Government of Pakistan in achieving its national and international commitments through five strategic outcomes (SOs):

- a. **Strategic outcome 1:** Affected populations in Pakistan have timely access to adequate food and nutrition during and in the aftermath of natural disasters and shocks (SDG 2.1).
- b. **Strategic outcome 2:** The social protection system at federal and provincial levels provides the populations most in need, especially women, adolescent girls, and children, with improved and sustained access to safe, nutritious, and sufficient food by 2022 (SDG 2.1).
- c. **Strategic outcome 3:** The entire population, especially children under five, adolescent girls and women of reproductive age, has improved nutrition in line with national targets for 2025 (SDG 2.2).
- d. **Strategic outcome 4:** Communities in disaster-prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022 (SDG 2.4).
- e. **Strategic outcome 5:** Federal and provincial systems have strengthened capabilities for providing food security and essential services by 2022 (SDG 17.9).

40. This is the first CSP for WFP in Pakistan. The CSP focused on supporting all three WFP focus areas: crisis response; resilience building; and addressing root causes. The focus areas and corresponding SOs are reflective of strategic-level assumptions made at the time the CSP was developed.

41. The CSP is founded on two major developments: 1) Pakistan's improved economic growth and security after a long period of turmoil following the attacks in New York on 11 September 2001; and 2) persistent malnutrition, high vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change, and declining smallholder productivity leading to disparity in socioeconomic progress. The lynchpins of the CSP therefore include access to food and nutrition in the aftermath of shocks, social protection, nutrition, and resilient food systems and disaster risk reduction and strengthening capacity in a strongly gender-equitable manner, leading Pakistan to continue with economic growth and prosperity.

42. The CSP, through SO1, 2 and 3, was intended to support the shift from humanitarian assistance to development; the support provided focused on safeguarding development activities against natural hazards to contribute to addressing immediate emergency and root causes. This shift in focus assumed that Pakistan's emergency response needs would diminish because: a) as a middle income country Pakistan would be able to respond to the emergency needs of communities affected by shocks; and b) the emergency needs of temporarily displaced people (TDP) who fled their homes following a large-scale security operation launched in 2017 would diminish because they would return to their area of origin.

43. The CSP also aims to support a gradual shift from direct implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes to provision of support to the Government, building Pakistan's domestic capacity to deal with emergencies and unpredictable contexts (SOs 4 and 5, building resilience). These efforts were intended to respond to the type of contextual challenges that Pakistan faces (see Figure 8).

44. An overarching feature of the CSP is the strengthening of national capacities, particularly for tackling persistent malnutrition. Specifically, WFP planned to reduce food and nutrition assistance, and invest more in strengthening the capacity of responsible institutions concerned with achieving nutrition targets such as the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning Commission, Provincial Department of Health and Food Departments and Food Authorities, National Disaster Management Authority and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities. This is essentially a shift in approach and programme tools in response to a changing context, particularly in post-crisis/non-emergency situations. These shifts were projected under certain assumptions – for instance, that the security situation will improve, displaced populations will return home, government will act as a first responder and thus emergency needs will taper off in favour of SOs related to root causes and resilience.

45. The CSP was underpinned by the understanding that WFP has opportunities to make significant contributions to government plans and priorities based on the organization's experience and relationships established with partners in Pakistan (CSP, page 8, Section 2.2). The CSP suggests that the unique position

of WFP is advantageous – being at the nexus<sup>87</sup> of humanitarian assistance and development, involving all levels of government and community, and the public and private sectors.

46. The need for enhanced inter-institutional coordination (between the Government, United Nations agencies and other actors) is highlighted throughout the CSP. The CSP uses indicative terms such as “synergies among partners”, “public–private partnerships”, “sustainable development” (for instance, on sustaining access to food security) while retaining WFP emergency response capacity (page 9, section 2.2). The CSP also aims for WFP to partner with public and private entities on scaling up production and commercialization of specialized foods to address undernutrition in the general population, and develop specialized nutritious foods tailored to adolescent girls in a cost-effective manner. This supports the CSP’s aims to strengthen government capacity to prevent malnutrition, improve disaster risk reduction (DRR) and be effective in emergency response.

47. Importantly, this CSP is underpinned by the assumption that donors would support WFP’s shift away from emergency response towards a stronger focus on root causes and resilience building. It was conceived at a time when a global pandemic was not considered an imminent threat.

48. Within the five SOs, the CSP includes eight activities and 16 outputs. The CSP aimed to reach 7,687,000 beneficiaries, which was revised to 9,884,257, mostly in SOs 1 and 2, with an increase of 6 percent in overall planned budget (from USD 447.5 million to USD 475.3 million) through two subsequent budget revisions. The SOs, activities, modalities, target groups, locations and planned budget are summarized in Table 4.

49. The reconstructed ToC (Figure 9) aims to show the strategic thinking that led to the development of the CSP. This ToC is based on the line of sight, existing logframes, as well as discussions with country office staff, which clarified the underlying assumptions. The figure includes the overarching contextual and implementation assumptions which guided the CSP design.

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<sup>87</sup> WFP. 2018. *WFP and the Humanitarian, Development and Peace Nexus*.

**Table 4: Overview of focus areas, outcomes, activities, modalities, target groups, locations and Needs Based Plan (BR02)**

Focus Area	Strategic Outcome	Activity	Modalities	Target Group	Location	Planned Country Portfolio Budget* (2018–2022) – Needs Based Plan	
						By activity	By Strategic Outcome
Crisis Response	SO1: Affected populations in Pakistan have timely access to adequate food and nutrition during and in the aftermath of natural disasters and shocks and in the aftermath of man-made or natural disasters.	Activity 1: Provide humanitarian assistance to meet the basic food and nutrition needs of the populations that are affected or are likely to be affected by natural disasters and shocks. (category 1; modality: Food, Cash Based Transfers)	Food Cash-based transfers Capacity strengthening (General distribution)	All beneficiaries IDPs, Returnees	Azad Kashmir Baluchistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sindh	70,161,535 USD	155,259,259 USD
		Activity 2: Support affected populations during the early recovery phase to address food insecurity and rebuild livelihoods. (category 2; modality: Food, Cash Based Transfers) insecurity and rebuild livelihoods.	Food Cash-based transfers (Food assistance for asset)	All beneficiaries FFA beneficiaries	Federally Administered Tribal Areas Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	85,097,723 USD	
Root causes	SO2: The social protection system at the federal and provincial levels provides the populations most in need, especially women, adolescent girls and children, with improved and sustained access to safe, nutritious and sufficient food by 2022 (SDG 2.1).	Activity 3: Augment Government of Pakistan social protection mechanisms like Benazir Income Support Programme to support food and nutrition insecure urban and rural poor people. (category 8; modality: Food, Cash Based Transfers, Capacity Strengthening)	Food Cash-based transfers Capacity strengthening (Institutional capacity strengthening) (Prevent acute malnutrition) (General distribution)	All beneficiaries Children	Baluchistan Punjab Sindh	9,126,214 USD	65,541,602 USD
		Activity 4: Provide technical assistance on school meals to provincial governments and implement school meals programmes as appropriate. (category 4; modality: Food, Cash Based Transfers, Capacity Strengthening)	Food Cash-based transfers Capacity strengthening (School feeding take-home rations)	Students (secondary schools)	Federally Administered Tribal Areas	56,415,388 USD	
Root causes	SO3: The entire population of Pakistan, especially children under 5, adolescent girls and women of reproductive age, has improved nutrition in line with national targets for 2025 (SDG 2.2).	Activity 5: Assist the government in achieving SDG 2.2 through improved governance, quality implementation, evidence generation and innovation. (category 6; modality: Food, Capacity Strengthening)	Food Cash-based transfers Capacity strengthening (Treatment of moderate to acute malnutrition) (Prevention of stunting) (Treatment of acute malnutrition)	Children Pregnant or lactating women	Azad Kashmir Baluchistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas Gilgit-Baltistan Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Punjab Sindh	127,890,117 USD	127,890,117 USD
Resilience	SO4: Communities in disaster-prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022.	Activity 6: Support all levels of the government and communities in adopting and operationalizing an integrated climate risk management system. (category 3; modality: Cash Based Transfers, Capacity Strengthening)	Cash-based transfers Capacity strengthening	-	-	20,490,117 USD	51,351,757 USD
		Activity 7: Strengthen the government's and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction. (category 11; modality: Capacity Strengthening)	Capacity strengthening	All beneficiaries	Pakistan	30,861,640 USD	
Root causes	SO5: Federal and provincial systems have strengthened capabilities for providing food security and essential services by 2022 (SDG 17.9).	Activity 8: Strengthen government and partner capabilities to provide food security and essential services. (category 8; modality: Capacity Strengthening)	Capacity strengthening	-	-	11,236,834 USD	11,236,834 USD
<b>Direct Support Costs</b>						<b>35,043,383 USD</b>	
<b>Indirect Support Costs</b>						<b>29,010,998 USD</b>	
<b>TOTAL WFP BUDGET</b>						<b>475,334,051 USD</b>	

Source: Country portfolio budget 2018-2022 after budget revision #2. COMET report R010b 2018, 2019 and 2020, and WFP. 2018. Pakistan Country Strategic Plan (2018-2022).

Figure 9: Reconstructed Theory of Change





### 1.3.3 The operationalization of the CSP

50. This section provides an overview of the studies that informed the CSP development as well as the operationalization of the CSP, including the number, types and geographical distribution of the eight activities and related sub-activities.

51. The country office was engaged in several provincial-level needs assessments and situation assessments focused on the conditions and experiences of the different provinces; for example, needs assessments and drought assessments, impact of COVID-19 on food security, as well as feasibility studies. In addition, the Government of Pakistan engaged in market monitoring on a regular basis throughout the CSP period.

52. Evaluations and reviews have been an important tool for the country office to inform the design and implementation of the CSP. The most noteworthy recommendations from previous evaluations and studies included:<sup>88</sup>


- a. **Consolidation and focusing on areas where WFP has a comparative advantage:** the 2018-2022 Mid-Term Review of the CSP noted the need to consolidate strategic outcomes to: 1) crises response; 2) social Protection- Nutrition and Education; and 3) food systems.
- b. **Improving the Government's technical capacity:** For partners and the Government to recognize the added value of partnering with WFP, it was suggested that WFP share/build local capacity based on its technical competence, especially around its core competences (nutrition and disaster risk reduction).
- c. **Decentralization of the administrative authority:** WFP should decentralize administrative authority to its provincial offices for an effective response mechanism and offer contextualized, tailor-made solutions to the government's needs in various geographical locations.
- d. **Improve inter-agency coordination:** WFP should continue to expand integrated programming through the existing government system and ensure uniform coverage within districts. Efforts should be made to ensure clear integration and articulation with other United Nations agencies and the World Bank; and that WFP move away from direct implementation to supporting/enabling the implementation of activities.
- e. **Gender:** It was recommended that gender mainstreaming in WFP programmes be prioritized. This implied recruiting a full-time gender adviser, focusing on addressing gender gaps in relation to beneficiaries. It was also recommended that WFP should increase its support to women beneficiaries of Food Assistance for Assets.

53. At the planning stage, Activity 5 was expected to reach the largest number of beneficiaries (over 3 million), followed by Activities 2, 1, 4, 3 and 6 respectively. However, the percentage of beneficiaries reached varies greatly between activities. The actual number of beneficiaries under Activity 5 was similar to those under Activity 2. Activity 6 did not reach any beneficiaries, according to WFP data. This was due to the nature of the pilot (very small scale) and the type of activity conducted (Figure 10).

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<sup>88</sup> Sources: WFP. 2015. *Pakistan PRRO 200250 Enhancing Food and Nutrition Security and Rebuilding Social Cohesion: An Operation Evaluation*; WFP. 2021. *Mid Term Review of the WFP Pakistan Strategic Plan Updated 2018-2022*; WFP. 2018. *Decentralized evaluation of the results of WFP's food assistance to temporarily dislocated persons in Pakistan from 2015-2017*; WFP. 2017. *Operation Evaluation Series, Regional Synthesis 2013-2017: Asia and the Pacific Region. Evaluation Report: Volume I.*


**Figure 10: Planned vs actual beneficiaries per strategic outcomes and activities (2018-2021)**



Source: COMET report CM-A003 and CM-P013. Actuals until September 2021. Figures have been adjusted to take into account double counting of beneficiaries (i.e., if a beneficiary received WFP support in more than one month under a given activity, it will be counted as one unique beneficiary for this activity).


54. As to food transfer achievements, Activity 1 outperformed all other activities, followed by Activity 2 and 5. Activities 3 and 4 had very low achievement against planned targets in terms of food transfers (Figure 11). In terms of cash-based transfers (CBTs), Activities 3 and 4 performed better in terms of food transfers, but their achievement was still low (14 percent each) against planned. Activity 2 had the best CBT achievement against planned targets (44 percent), followed by Activity 1 (29 percent). CBTs under Activity 6 were 0 percent against planned targets (Figure 12).

**Figure 11: Planned vs actual food transfers (2018-2021) \***



Source: COMET report CM-P006. Actuals until October 2021.

**Figure 12: Planned vs actual cash-based transfers (CBTs) (2018–2021)**



Source: COMET report CM-P006. Actuals until October 2021.

55. Data analysis also shows that, in absolute numbers, activities were inclined towards women at both the planning and implementation stage. The highest percentage of women reached was 72 percent and 68 percent in 2018 and 2020 respectively. In 2019 the percentage of planned male beneficiaries reached was almost the same as the percentage of planned women reached. The difference was more marked in 2021 (9 percentage points) (Figure 3 in Annex XI).

56. WFP targeted men and women aged between 18 and 59 years old. Although age is not disaggregated further, the targeting approach used prioritized lactating mothers, adolescent girls, and children (see Section 2. Evaluation findings in this volume, and Figure 4 in Annex XI). The targeting of women was due to the design of some activities, which implied a natural focus on women (e.g., nutrition activities), and the fact that women were found to be more vulnerable.

57. The CSP Needs-Based Plan (NBP) was the subject of two budget revisions (Table 5). In 2020, the first budget revision increased the NBP by 6.15 percent; in 2021, the second budget revision increased it by a further 0.19 percent. The budget requirements for Activities 1 and 2 (SO1) increased with each budget revision, while the budget for SO2 and SO4 decreased.

58. As of November 2021, the NBP 2018–2022 (as per BR3) was 40.78 percent funded with USD 193.8 million in allocated resources. However, if only the first four years of CSP implementation (2018-2021) are considered, the funding level was 46.37 percent.

59. The largest share of NBP was for root causes (43 percent), and the largest share of allocated resources went to crisis response (46 percent, SO1). This was followed by root causes (38 percent SO2, SO3 and SO5) and 3 percent to resilience building (SO4). The remaining 13 percent of allocated resources went to direct and indirect support costs (Table 5).

60. Actual expenditures correspond to 87 percent of the allocated resources (Table 5). The highest rate of expenditure per strategic outcome (SO) is found for SO1 (53.72 percent), followed by SO3 (38.82 percent), SO5 at 16.63 percent, SO4 at 9.66 percent and SO2 at 8.60 percent (Table 5).

Table 5: Cumulative financial overview WFP CSP Pakistan

Focus Area	Strategic Outcome	Activity	2018-2022						2018-2021						
			Original NBP	Revised NBP as of November 2020	Needs Based Plan		NBP for 2018 to November 4th 2021	% of Total	Allocated Resources			Expenditures			
					NBP (2018-2022) as per the latest BR USD (\$)	% of Total			Allocated resources for 2018 to 2021 in USD (\$)	% Total	% NBP funded for 2018 to 2021	% NBP funded for 2018 to 2022	Expenditures In USD (\$)	% Expenditures over NBP for 2018-2022	% Expenditures over allocated resources for 2018 to 2021
Crisis Response	SO.1	Activity 1	41,765,891	41,886,487	70,161,535	14.76%	70,152,836	16.78%	45,143,809	23%	64.35%	64.34%	44,824,220	63.89%	99.29%
		Activity 2	62,703,478	63,069,243	85,097,723	17.90%	85,028,595	20.34%	44,202,574	23%	51.99%	51.94%	38,584,782	45.34%	87.29%
	<b>Total SO1</b>	<b>104,469,368</b>	<b>104,955,730</b>	<b>155,259,258</b>	<b>32.66%</b>	<b>155,181,431</b>	<b>37.12%</b>	<b>89,346,383</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>57.58%</b>	<b>57.55%</b>	<b>83,409,003</b>	<b>53.72%</b>	<b>93.35%</b>	
Root Causes	SO.2	Activity 3	9,467,651	9,871,363	9,126,214	1.92%	7,480,252	1.79%	4,005,167	2%	53.54%	43.89%	4,002,026	43.85%	99.92%
		Activity 4	62,945,774	62,477,148	56,415,388	11.87%	46,942,345	11.23%	2,018,089	1%	4.30%	3.58%	1,634,926	2.90%	81.01%
	<b>Total SO2</b>	<b>72,413,425</b>	<b>72,348,511</b>	<b>65,541,602</b>	<b>13.79%</b>	<b>54,422,598</b>	<b>13.02%</b>	<b>6,023,256</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>11.07%</b>	<b>9.19%</b>	<b>5,636,952</b>	<b>8.60%</b>	<b>93.59%</b>	
Root Causes	SO.3	Activity 5	128,038,293	127,890,117	127,890,117	26.91%	111,812,699	26.75%	63,848,012	33%	57.10%	49.92%	49,644,792	38.82%	77.75%
	<b>Total SO3</b>	<b>128,038,293</b>	<b>127,890,117</b>	<b>127,890,117</b>	<b>26.91%</b>	<b>111,812,699</b>	<b>26.75%</b>	<b>63,848,012</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>57.10%</b>	<b>49.92%</b>	<b>49,644,792</b>	<b>38.82%</b>	<b>77.75%</b>	
Resilience Building	SO.4	Activity 6	28,457,006	28,160,871	20,490,117	4.31%	12,482,724	2.99%	1,846,047	1%	14.79%	9.01%	1,176,291	5.74%	63.72%
		Activity 7	39,999,070	40,025,513	30,861,640	6.49%	20,660,508	4.94%	4,750,401	2%	22.99%	15.39%	3,782,522	12.26%	79.63%
	<b>Total SO4</b>	<b>68,456,075</b>	<b>68,186,383</b>	<b>51,351,757</b>	<b>10.80%</b>	<b>33,143,232</b>	<b>7.93%</b>	<b>6,596,448</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>19.90%</b>	<b>12.85%</b>	<b>4,958,813</b>	<b>9.66%</b>	<b>75.17%</b>	
Root Causes	SO.5	Activity 8	10,556,029	10,562,640	11,236,834	2.36%	10,108,842	2.42%	2,961,967	2%	29.30%	26.36%	1,868,633	16.63%	63.09%
	<b>Total SO5</b>	<b>10,556,029</b>	<b>10,562,640</b>	<b>11,236,834</b>	<b>2.36%</b>	<b>10,108,842</b>	<b>2.42%</b>	<b>2,961,967</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>29.30%</b>	<b>26.36%</b>	<b>1,868,633</b>	<b>16.63%</b>	<b>63.09%</b>	
Non Activity Specific			-	-	-	-	-	-	299,180	0%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total Transfer &amp; Implementatio</b>			<b>383,933,190</b>	<b>383,943,381</b>	<b>411,279,568</b>	<b>86.52%</b>	<b>364,668,802</b>	<b>87.24%</b>	<b>169,075,247</b>	<b>87%</b>	<b>46.36%</b>	<b>41.11%</b>	<b>145,518,193</b>	<b>35.38%</b>	<b>86.07%</b>
Direct Support Costs			36,243,402	35,693,484	35,043,484	7.37%	27,840,425	6.66%	15,368,188	8%	55.20%	43.85%	14,379,037	41.03%	93.56%
Indirect Support Costs			27,311,478	27,276,396	29,010,998	6.10%	25,513,100	6.10%	9,407,276	5%	36.87%	32.43%	9,407,276	32.43%	100.00%
<b>Total WFP</b>			<b>447,488,070</b>	<b>446,913,261</b>	<b>475,334,050</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>418,022,327</b>	<b>87.94%</b>	<b>193,850,711</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>46.37%</b>	<b>40.78%</b>	<b>169,304,506</b>	<b>35.62%</b>	<b>87.34%</b>

Source: Pakistan CSP(PK01) BR3, 5 August 2021;<sup>89</sup> Pakistan BR01 Budget Plan; 2018-2021 Cumulative financial overview as at 4 November 2021. Expenditure figures for 2021 are provisional and not validated by headquarters. The discrepancy between figures in Table 4 and Table 21 (percentage of NBP funded for 2018-22) relates to inclusion of advances in Table 21.

<sup>89</sup> While the source is named BR3, this is the second budget revision from August 2021.

## 1.4 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

61. This sub-section outlines the methodology used during the evaluation, as well as its limitations and ethical issues.

### 1.4.1 Methodology

62. This evaluation examines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, sustainability, connectedness and, where applicable, coverage of the CSP. The evaluation responds to the predefined evaluation questions (EQ), and sub-questions, on a strategic level. An analysis of activities and results achieved formed an important foundation for exploring wider-ranging, strategic questions. Our analysis intended to examine the implementation of various efforts, moving from the broad change pathways identified in the reconstructed ToC (see Figure 9) to more specific ones that are reflected in a Theory in Use (TiU) (see Annex X). The lack of a clear initial ToC made an outcome-focused exploration difficult. Therefore, the evaluation focused on each element of the TiU and aimed to understand the why/how of each different stage. The evaluation matrix in Annex IV shows how each question was explored.


63. The evaluation's temporal scope covers most of the CSP's timing (2018-2022) with the exception of the last year of implementation. Since the CSP was still ongoing, the data included in this report represents the most recent data made available to the team at the end of the field data collection which took place between 7-27 October 2021. It also examined the year preceding the CSP (i.e., 2017) to assess the extent of the envisaged strategic shift since the previous Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO). A gender-responsive methodology was applied, including a gender-balanced data collection team, an effort to engage an equal number of male and female respondents, and particular consideration to the inclusion of female beneficiaries. The need to deliberately include female voices was important because, in Pakistan, women tend not to have an equal opportunity to share their experiences and be heard.

64. Following preliminary discussions with the country office, two cross-cutting themes were identified as most relevant and important to inform the development of the next CSP. These were: **partnerships** and the **triple nexus**. Specifically, the role played by partners and partnerships, as well as how the contribution made by WFP strengthens the linkages between humanitarian, development, and peace (triple nexus) have been explored. Those themes were woven into the different lines of inquiry.

65. A theory-based, timeline, mixed-methods approach underpinned this evaluation. Specifically, the team aimed to use the ToC and an outcome-harvesting approach to respond to the evaluation questions. Since a ToC was not available, interviews with key stakeholders supported the reconstruction of a ToC and a TiU which is reflective of the actual CSP implementation experience (See Annex X). However, one of the principal challenges with using an outcomes-based approach and developing a TiU was identified early in the data collection process when it became apparent that the country office had not envisaged its work in relation to outcomes, but rather focused more on activities and outputs. This meant that, within the country office team, there was limited (if any) reflection about whether activities and outputs are the best mechanism to measure intermediary and CSP strategic outcomes (SOs) in the real world. This initial challenge also shed light on the CSP's alignment with WFP's current way of thinking, which tends to be shorter term and less strategic.

66. The team conducted 72 interviews with 230 interviewees. Figure 13 presents the percentage of interviewees the Evaluation Team met per stakeholder group. For more information about interviewees, please see Annex VIII.

**Figure 13: Interviewees per stakeholder groups**




Source: Evaluation Team.

67. A **purposive sampling approach** was used, aimed at identifying those informants who could provide the most salient data relative to the questions, while also permitting the triangulation of original data. The sampling aimed to ensure that all relevant stakeholder categories were included (government officials, partners, and direct beneficiaries, including young girls), and geographically represented. A balance was sought between national and international staff from WFP and partner organizations and, where possible, included a gender and age balance. It is important to highlight, however, that gender representation was not prioritized over the quality of responses.

The field data collection focused on work conducted across three provinces where WFP has centred most of its investment (KP, Balochistan and Sindh). Within the provinces, districts were selected to ensure the collection of representative data. As demonstrated in Figure 14, the districts selected were spread across the provinces; this was done deliberately to account for contextual differences within a province (e.g., south, and north Balochistan, upper and lower Sindh, central and south KP). In addition, WFP staff and cooperating partners played a central role in identifying beneficiaries that met the selection criteria and ensuring that activities associated with different SOs were fairly represented across the different locations visited.

Figure 14: Sampling Strategy Map



*Disclaimer: This map was created by the evaluation team to represent the sampling strategy. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Food Programme (WFP) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its frontiers or boundaries. The border between India and Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir represents the approximate Line of Control agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.*

68. Data was reviewed and coded systematically to enable a robust triangulation process (see Annex III). All findings and observations made in this report are derived from either documents, interviews or the surveys conducted. All findings which from interviews were derived from a minimum of three respondents, most often from multiple categories. Since interviewees were granted anonymity, respondents are not referenced. Respondents' categories have been disclosed only where it was possible to safeguard their anonymity. Findings were validated through: preliminary findings debriefings with country office staff; debriefing with country office staff and government counterparts; and a stakeholder workshop.

### 1.4.2 Limitations

69. This evaluation contended with several evaluability concerns. Those that influenced the analytical approach are included here (a full list of issues can be found in Table 1, Annex III). Importantly, these challenges have not compromised the overall validity of the evaluation findings.

70. **Indicators:** For many indicators there is no available data (Tables 9-22, Annex XII). Achievement of an indicator (or lack of achievement) does not necessarily mean failure to meet any or all the objectives. However, there is a degree of correlation, since activities with more funding were better monitored (see EQ 4.1).<sup>90</sup> The Evaluation Team used qualitative data to explain the indicator results found, and better understand what was achieved by activities where little or no indicator data was collected.

71. **CCS:** An overview of the available data demonstrates that assessing WFP's contribution to CCS is challenging: several outcome/output indicators have not been reported on, indicating limited funding for these activities and limited progress (see EQ 2.1 and 4.1). Existing data focuses on the number of training activities and/or the number of people trained. Data are incomplete and not consolidated in a way that permits systematic assessment.<sup>91</sup> A survey of key stakeholders was conducted to fill the data gap (see Annex XIII), but the limited focus on documenting efforts and lack of clarity among respondents on what type of training they participated in makes it impossible to fully assess progress made at SO level, or if alternative approaches would have been more valuable.

72. **Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus:** From the documentation received, linkages are not well represented in the available quantitative or qualitative data. Interviews with key stakeholders and partner organizations have been used to assess how the CSP implementation included the nexus perspective.

73. **Cost efficiency and cost effectiveness:** Linking resources and expenditure to results is a challenge for WFP, as there are no corporate result indicators for cost efficiency and cost effectiveness. Plans made for exploring cost effectiveness identified at the inception stage have proved problematic. Exploring cost by beneficiary presented some important challenges: start-up costs led to incorrect conclusions about actual costs; there were no clear datasets that could help shed light on cost discrepancy by area; and the costs of activities and the value of activities are not necessarily proportional. Therefore, this evaluation explores the important dynamics that affect cost effectiveness and cost efficiency, and identifies potential avenues to enhance these to inform the next CSP. Some calculations regarding relative costs of activities are included.

74. **Access:** The travel restrictions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic limited international team's to respondents; this had clear implications for data collection. Having only part of the team on the ground has constrained the team's ability to interact in real-time, their engagement with each other during data collection to discuss their impressions and perspectives, and their ability to jointly co-identify areas requiring 'deep dives'. To mitigate these challenges, the team used a hybrid/in-person and remote data collection and used virtual platforms to engage with in-country team members as often as possible. The remote team also reviewed notes and recordings of sessions and presented questions to the in-country team based on the listening-in experience.

75. **Security:** The field team adhered to a **security protocol**, which aligned with the country office's expectations, and national security guidelines.

### 1.4.3 Ethical considerations

76. The evaluation conformed to the 2020 United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) ethical guidelines.<sup>92</sup> Accordingly, the global consultancy, Tana Copenhagen, was responsible for safeguarding and ensuring ethics at all stages of the evaluation cycle. This included, but was not limited to, ensuring informed consent, protecting privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity of participants, ensuring cultural sensitivity, respecting the autonomy of participants, ensuring fair recruitment of participants (including women and socially excluded groups) and ensuring that the evaluation results do no harm to participants or their communities. A list of specific ethical issues identified and how these were addressed can be found in Annex III.

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<sup>90</sup> It is worth noting that there are no indicators, or data collected for activities which were not able to secure funding.

<sup>91</sup> Lists of training participants exist in original hand-written format.

<sup>92</sup> UNEG. 2020. Ethical guidelines. Available at; <http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/102>



## 2. Evaluation findings

### 2.1 EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION OF WFP BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND PEOPLE'S NEEDS AS WELL AS WFP STRENGTHS?

#### EQ1.1 To what extent is the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) relevant to national policies, plans, strategies, and goals, including achievement of the national Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?

##### Finding 1.1

The CSP strategic outcomes and activities across the three focus areas, are well aligned with the Government's priorities on nutrition, social protection and Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS). However, at a more granular level, there were challenges with ensuring operational alignment between provincial-level expectations and what WFP intended/could deliver (alignment with the practicalities of devolution).

77. The CSP objectives are in line with Government of Pakistan's Vision 2025<sup>93</sup> and the National Disaster Management Framework,<sup>94</sup> which aim to deal with emergencies and recovery, elements of which are addressed by Strategic Objective 1 (SO1). These documents also address rehabilitation challenges, and mitigation of disaster risks with better preparedness. The latter two objectives are supported by SO4 activities (Table 6).

78. The data collected in the field and the documents reviewed – including the Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Strategy 2018–2025,<sup>95</sup> the National Zero Hunger Programme, the National Food Security Policy 2018,<sup>96</sup> and the SDG-1 and SDG-2 Zero Hunger Challenge<sup>97</sup> – underline that the Government focused substantial attention on issues such as resilience building, which gained considerable attention following the super flood experience of 2010.<sup>98</sup> These objectives are supported by SO4 and SO5. Nutrition has garnered particular focus since 2018, as well as social protection, which is evidenced by the focus on the Ehsaas programme.<sup>99</sup> These Government priorities have been supported by SO2, SO3 and SO5.

79. In addition, the development of the CSP, according to WFP respondents, resulted from in-depth consultations with the federal and provincial governments. This consultative process intended to make sure the CSP was relevant to needs and aligned to national priority focus areas, and ensure the Government's ownership of the strategic objectives. These consultative efforts appear to have not deliberated on the details of CCS needs and identification of areas where government programmes did not have adequate implementation capacities.

80. Data collected during this evaluation showed that, despite these initial consultations, the CSP was not particularly well adapted to provincial specific needs, nor fully aligned at an operational level with the process of devolution. Interviews with provincial government and WFP staff revealed the need to discuss the CSP and adapt its implementation to provincial needs. Although willing, the WFP's capacity and understanding of how to do so was not well articulated (by Government and the WFP).

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<sup>93</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2015. *Pakistan Vision 2025: One Nation-One Vision*.

<sup>94</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2007. *National Disaster Risk Management Framework Pakistan*.

<sup>95</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2018. *National Nutrition Survey 2018: Key Findings Report*.

<sup>96</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2014. *National Food Security Policy*.

<sup>97</sup> Government of Pakistan. 2019. *Pakistan's Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

<sup>98</sup> OCHA. 2011. *Pakistan: UN launches response to help millions affected by monsoon floods*.

<sup>99</sup> Government of Pakistan. *Ehsaas Emergency Cash Programme*.

**Table 6: CSP alignment with national policy and vision**

National Vision and Policy	Alignment to CSP
<b>Vision 2025: Pillar IV, Goal 16</b> - Protect the most food-insecure segments of the population through effective relief measures, including long-term arrangements and adaptation mechanisms.	Strategic Outcome 1
<b>Vision 2025: Pillar IV, Goal 16</b> - Improving access to food for poor households.  <b>Vision 2025: Pillar I, Goal 1 and 3</b> - Increase primary school enrolment and completion rate to 100% & literacy rate to 90%; Improve Primary and Secondary Gender Parity Index to 1, and increase female workforce participation rate from 24% to 45%.  <b>Vision 2025: Pillar II, Goal 9</b> - Reduce poverty level by half.	Strategic Outcome 2
<b>Vision 2025: Pillar IV, Goal 16</b> - Strengthening nutritional education for high-risk groups such as pregnant and lactating women, young children, the elderly and disabled.	Strategic Outcome 3
<b>National Climate Change Policy Framework for Implementation:</b> Build climate change resilience into Pakistan’s agricultural system and increase awareness of climate-change related natural disaster’s impact and our capacity to respond.  <b>National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy and National Disaster Management Plan (2012-2022):</b> Prepare disaster management plans at all levels; mainstream disaster risk reduction into development.	Strategic Outcome 4
<b>Vision 2025: Pillar II, Goal 9</b> - Reduce poverty level by half.	Strategic Outcome 5

Source: WFP. 2018. Pakistan Country Strategic Plan.

**EQ1.2 To what extent did the CSP address the needs of the most vulnerable people in Pakistan to ensure that no one is left behind?**

**Finding 1.2.a**

WFP’s focus on Balochistan, Sindh and KP provinces was appropriate considering the more acute problems that populations face in those areas. However, the CSP did not sufficiently tailor its programmatic strategy and targeting approach to the specific needs within each province. Understanding and effectively addressing these distinctions at regional and sub-regional level is an essential element of ensuring that the needs of the most vulnerable are effectively addressed from the start (plan)

81. Despite degrees of hardship nation-wide, the social development and poverty indicators confirm Balochistan, Sindh and KP as provinces with the more acute problems (performance lower than national averages) (see Section 1.2 Context). Therefore, WFP’s focus on these provinces was aligned with Pakistan’s needs.

82. However, Pakistan is very diverse, and challenges experienced in one area of the country, or even within a single province, are not the same as those experienced in another, and likewise nor are the solutions that can be used to resolve local challenges.

83. Despite this diversity, the CSP did not highlight regional distinctions, nor the need for regionally driven targeting at SO level. Overall, the support provided to all provinces was drawn from a single set of sub-activities. At a broad level this can work, however, the field data collection suggested that a more granular approach that paid closer attention to regional and sub-regional differentiation would have been valuable. This would mean the type of sub-activity selected, and also how these are implemented and combined with each other (complementarity found and capitalized on).

84. National and regional government staff, partners, other United Nations agencies and WFP staff highlighted that working with a regional focus is important, and is demanded by the decentralization process that is detailed in Constitutional Amendment 18. They also pointed out that different regions have

different levels of capacity and resources. Therefore, the needs of provinces are different based on their unique experiences, and they also require different forms of support, depending on what resources they may have access to. For example, Balochistan, which accounts for 42 percent of the geographical area of the country and 6 percent of the country's population, is composed of districts that cover large areas and have scattered populations with diverse needs. There is a need for combining infrastructure development with soft skills on disaster risk prevention and preparedness at the district level rather than at the province level, since needs and experiences are not shared across all districts. Drought mitigation and quick access to communications are challenges in Balochistan. In Sindh, where drought mitigation is also a challenge, the province needs support on early warning systems for coastal, flash floods and droughts.

### Finding 1.2.b

WFP developed a range of targeting approaches to reach the most vulnerable adapted to the various objectives of the CSP. Instances when WFP combined its own assessment tools with those of the Government, as was the case for SO1 and SO3, were most effective in identifying vulnerable groups which were overlooked by Government approaches.

85. WFP's support aimed to reach the most vulnerable among specific target groups using a wide range of tools, including data from Vulnerability Analysis Mapping (VAM) assessments, demographic and health surveys, and other studies by partners and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, as well as the National Socio-Economic Registry and, specifically, the poverty scorecard which is used for unconditional cash transfers and social protection activities.

86. **SO1:** Beneficiaries were identified in one of two ways. For Activities 1 and 2, which targeted vulnerable populations affected by a natural disaster, beneficiaries were identified by assessing the needs of the affected populations and identifying those in need of immediate assistance. The data collected in-country suggests that, overall, the use of VAM assessments to target these beneficiaries was appropriate and allowed WFP to identify target populations which may have been otherwise overlooked – for example the 30 or more transgender people who were identified for support by WFP. Although, in this particular instance, a small number of people were identified, it was consistently used by WFP staff as an example of how the system allows for the identification of even small, and/or marginalized groups. The Evaluation Team is not in a position to assess the degree to which the example cited is exceptional or reflective of the broader experience. Furthermore, the use of an early forecast-based identification system that could help trigger early responses could be a valuable addition and help to ensure that the risk of food insecurity is addressed before the situation becomes critical.

87. The support to temporarily displaced people (TDP), however, was generally not vulnerability based. Instead, WFP had to align its beneficiary identification with the Government's criteria to be able to provide the support requested – specifically, food and non-food items to TDPs living in camps and living with the host communities for a period of two years. The support provided was not subject to any further vulnerability assessment (i.e., some camp dwellers were in greater need than others). However, in 2020, the country office conducted a vulnerability assessment of TDPs who were living inside the camps, and those living with host communities. This assessment and funding shortfalls led to a gradual phasing out of support to TDPs living in the host communities and in the camps. It was presumed that individuals living with host communities had family or friends to house and support them, and the Government decided to initiate cash assistance for the TDPs living in the camps. For this SO, the efforts to identify beneficiaries included government and WFP approaches.

88. **SO2:** For Activity 4, specific geographical areas that had a history of conflict and were prone to disasters were pre-selected. Within these areas, schools were identified by the local government based on enrolment levels and dropout rates, with an aim to target schools that faced the greatest challenges. According to interview respondents from government, WFP staff, and beneficiaries, the approach taken was appropriate since it aimed to address the needs of the most disadvantaged, (particularly girls), and improved the enrolment ratio. Although, the evaluation did not compare results with areas where the programme was not implemented, the data collected suggests that the criteria identified the correct

beneficiaries – both in relation to their vulnerability and to their ability to benefit from the support provided.

89. **SO3:** For Activity 5, targeting was primarily based on place of residence. The Stunting Prevention Rehabilitation Integrated Nutrition Gain (SPRING)<sup>100</sup> activities were established in the poorest union councils,<sup>101</sup> and all residents of the area were potential beneficiaries. The government targeting relied on the National Nutrition Surveys and the Demographic Health Surveys to identify the villages in the most vulnerable situations. The approach yielded good results. WFP used their own datasets to identify children aged under 2 years, and pregnant and lactating women. However, it was noted by interview respondents (local and provincial staff engaged in these activities) that, in rural KP, the system only works when combined with strong social mobilization. Here too, the identification of beneficiaries combined government mechanisms with WFP's own.

90. **SO4:** For Activity 6, through the provision of technical experts, WFP supported the development and implementation of the Government's Multi-Hazard Vulnerability and Risk Assessment. According to interview respondents, this support will be an integral part of improving beneficiary targeting in future.

91. Activity 7 focused on the provision of support to communities, schools or other groups who lived in risk-prone locations. These areas were identified by province based on VAM analysis conducted by WFP and provincial authorities.

92. **SO5:** CCS support was provided to government and civil society organization (CSO) cooperating partners based on their area of competence and theme/area of work. The assumption, according to interview respondents, is that those selected would benefit from the training and be better able to respond to the needs of their own beneficiaries.

93. Overall, targeting using WFP and government tools focused on vulnerability (socioeconomic status). However, interviews and discussions with those engaged in beneficiary selection showed that issues such as age, gender, and disability have not been systematically used as parameters in the identification of the most vulnerable. Moreover, all three provinces visited have populations that are diverse in terms of cultural practices and language. The evidence collected shows that the influence that culture and language can have on the identification of beneficiaries was not systematically considered. Different cultural practices may influence how communities process information and, in turn, this can influence whether they are selected or not. Similarly, linguistic minorities can be more easily overlooked because materials, for example, may not be in a language they speak or read. Also, aside from sub-activities that specifically targeted women, it is unclear how systematic the inclusion of gender as a vulnerability marker was. Although the above issue is worth attention, there is no evidence of purposeful exclusion of any of these groups.

94. Other than the limitations noted above, the systems effectively identified those in most need for support. None of the respondents questioned this, however, some felt that having a more granular approach to identifying those most vulnerable within different geographical areas may be important. Specifically, they noted that there may be vulnerable groups who are not aware of the support available, or who fail to meet criteria.

### **EQ1.3 To what extent has WFP's strategic positioning remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP considering changing context, national capacities and needs and, in particular, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?**

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<sup>100</sup> SPRING intends to sustainably improve the nutritional status of children under 2 years of age, pregnant and lactating women and adolescent girls in the four most vulnerable districts of KP. Specific activities include the distribution of food supplements, along with nutrition awareness and behaviour change communication for the targeted individuals, along with training health workers.

<sup>101</sup> Union Councils in Pakistan, also known as *sherwan*, are elected local government bodies. They are the lowest level of government in the country and their structure and responsibilities differ between provinces and territories.

### Finding 1.3

The CSP was able to adapt to a considerable number of shocks and changes in context, including natural disasters, extended support to TDP and (to a degree) the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, capacities and resources were insufficient to adapt the CSP to changes in the government climate change related policies.

95. The CSP remained highly relevant for the country and the intended target groups despite changes faced during the implementation period, including natural and man-made shocks, and an evolving policy context.
96. Natural and man-made shocks during the CSP period included extreme climate events such as floods, droughts, heavy snow, earthquakes.<sup>102</sup> Shocks associated with insecurity in the border areas also had an impact on WFP's work. The formulation of SO1 was sufficiently flexible to enable WFP to effectively respond to these shocks. Examples of the type of responses provided are noted below.
97. During the 2018-2019 monsoon season, Pakistan experienced a 24 percent rainfall reduction, with Sindh and Balochistan experiencing a 70 percent and 45 percent reduction respectively. The drought that affected Sindh (8 districts) and Balochistan (18 districts) had severe consequences for an estimated 4.8 million people.<sup>103</sup> Most of the affected districts also already had high prevalence of acute malnutrition and stunting prior to the drought. WFP assisted drought-affected populations through SO1 (Activities 1 and 2) and provided further support through SO2 (Ehsaas) and SO3 to address the high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition.
98. In addition, Sindh experienced flooding and Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) faced the impact of flash floods and heavy snowfall during the CSP period. In response to these shocks, WFP was able to support affected populations with food and winterization assistance (SO1), and later with community-based disaster risk preparedness activities (SO4: Activities 6 and 7).
99. WFP's support to TDP through SO1 was expected to phase out earlier, with TDPs returning to their homes. However, in view of the continuous needs, WFP extended its support of food and non-food assistance until mid-2021, which was far greater than initially anticipated.
100. WFP was also able to respond to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. In collaboration with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), WFP carried out a rapid assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on food security in April 2020, and identified a number of immediate actions.<sup>104</sup> WFP was not able to address the economic shocks to low-income families, indicators showed further deterioration of nutrition and food security in districts where WFP did not already work. However, cash-based transfers (CBTs) were introduced through Ehsaas to help economically affected communities in areas where support had been ongoing. In addition, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was delivered to schools where work was ongoing. Also, female students (and their families) who received support prior to the pandemic received CBT support to encourage their continued school attendance following the lockdowns. It is clear that the CSP's implementation was negatively affected by the pandemic-induced lockdowns (e.g., the school meal programme was suspended, and field projects slowed down).
101. Other shifts in the policy context also had implications for the implementation of the CSP, specifically SO2 and SO3. In particular, the Ehsaas programme, launched in 2019 by the new Government, found in WFP a highly relevant implementation partner in priority districts.
102. Although SO4 was designed to engage in activities relevant for climate change, available resources and capacities were inadequate to enable a climate change focus and to adapt activities to policy changes, such

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<sup>102</sup> During the period of CSP implementation, Pakistan was also affected by a locust outbreak. However, affected communities did not receive WFP support. This was not due to a lack of resources, or capacity, but rather the recognition that the area affected was limited in size and that, technically, FAO was better positioned to provide the needed support.

<sup>103</sup> OCHA. 2019. *Pakistan: Drought Fact sheet – Balochistan and Sindh*.

<sup>104</sup> WFP and FAO. 2020. *Rapid Assessment: Possible Impact of COVID-19 on Livelihoods, Food Security, Nutrition and Agricultural Supply Chain in Pakistan*.

as the National Water Policy (2018), launching of the Clean Green Programme (2019) and other climate change related policies.

**EQ1.4 To what extent is the CSP coherent and aligned with the wider United Nations and does it include appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP in the country?**

**Finding 1.4**

There is a clear alignment between the CSP and the UNSDF/OPIII, and several examples of WFP collaboration with other agencies were found to be productive. However, the articulation between the work of different agencies is inconsistent and there is room for improvement within the UN system. This is not specific to WFP and requires a collective commitment at UNCT level.

103. The CSP objectives are fully aligned with those of the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF)/Pakistan One United Nations Programme III (OPIII) framing the engagement of the United Nations agencies and programmes for the period 2018 to 2022 (Table 7). WFP is the largest contributor to the objectives set for nutrition, food security and resilience, and is also contributing to the objectives for education and social protection.

104. The UNSDF/OPIII framework is clear. However, at provincial level, it is noteworthy that government staff did not understand that there was an effort by United Nations agencies to work together, and did not see the different agencies as part of an overarching effort. Rather, they identified each United Nations agency as a single independent partner. This is not specific to WFP, but can be attributed to the United Nation's own inability to present itself as a single actor with multiple areas of competence.

105. In theory, all United Nations agencies and programmes should work together under a single umbrella and with a common voice under the UNSDF/OPIII. However, in practice this does not always happen. Some United Nations agency respondents consulted by the Evaluation Team understood WFP's role as only focused on the delivery of emergency food assistance, without recognizing WFP's mandate to improve nutrition and build resilience through engagement with communities, despite it being clearly spelled out in the UNSDF/OPIII. In emergency food assistance (crisis response), the overlaps are few and the need for inter-agency articulation is limited. In the area of nutrition and resilience, the need for close inter-agency articulation becomes critical to avoid overlaps.

106. Most respondents also noted that WFP was an important and relevant player in the country, and that collaboration with WFP was productive. They consistently attributed their relationship to WFP (and indeed all agencies) as directly contingent on personnel and specifically senior management, as well as on the ability of the resident coordinator to effectively organize activities. Some respondents noted that agencies were unduly reliant on the resident coordinator role without having a clear and robust framework to support collaboration. It was noted that the number of focus areas was too diverse and that their use as collaboration platforms was inconsistent. The development of the new UNSDF – which WFP was an active contributor to – potentially provides an opportunity to overcome some of these challenges. However, multiple respondents highlighted that donors played an important role in supporting or hampering coordination between different United Nations agencies depending on their funding approaches.

**Table 7: Strategic outcomes informed by UNSDF/OPIII Pakistan 2018-2022**

UNSD/OP III (2018-2022)	WFP CSP SO
<b>Outcome #5:</b> By 2022, the people of Pakistan, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized populations, have improved availability of, access to, and consumption of safe, nutritious and sufficient food, while promoting sustainable agriculture to achieve zero hunger.	Strategic Outcome 1
<b>Outcome #5:</b> By 2022, the people of Pakistan, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized populations, have improved availability of, access to, and consumption of safe, nutritious and sufficient food, while promoting sustainable agriculture to achieve zero hunger. <b>Outcome #10:</b> By 2022, improved and effective social protection systems will be available for all, particularly for the most vulnerable and marginalized populations.	Strategic Outcome 2
<b>Outcome #4:</b> By 2022, children, adolescent girls and boys, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly and persons with disabilities have improved dietary intake, feeding and care practices, resulting in improved nutritional status, while reducing stunting and other forms of undernutrition.	Strategic Outcome 3
<b>Outcome #6:</b> By 2022, the resilience of vulnerable populations is increased by addressing and mitigating natural and human induced disasters, including climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, and sustainable management of natural resources.	Strategic Outcome 4
<b>Outcome #10:</b> By 2022, the people in Pakistan, especially the most vulnerable and marginalized, benefit from effective social protection systems.	Strategic Outcome 5

Source: WFP. 2018. Pakistan Country Strategic Plan.

107. There were some examples with diffused details of collaborative work with FAO and UNICEF (food security, Water Sanitation and Hygiene in Chitral, KP), and World Bank (disaster risk preparedness Sindh). In Nushki district (Balochistan) WFP collaborated with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on environment and food security. UNICEF and WFP have collaborated in Sindh on an Open Defecation Free (ODF) – an initiative to eradicate open defecation – in areas where SO1 activities are being implemented, and FAO and WFP implemented an assets rehabilitation project in Killah Abdullah Balochistan. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and WFP also collaborate on supporting displaced families, especially in former Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Interviewees highlighted collaborations centred on efforts where each agency focused on a specific segment of the activity rather than working jointly on single activities.

108. In the field of social protection, several United Nations agencies have experience and expertise, including WFP, which has a strong engagement with the Government’s social protection initiatives. However, there was no evidence of different agencies working closely together to jointly support the Government, rather different agencies engaged with the Government independently of each other.

## **2.2 EQ2: WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF THE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION OF WFP TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN PAKISTAN?**

### **EQ2.1 To what extent did WFP deliver expected outputs and contribute to the expected CSP strategic outcomes?**

- SO1: WFP was able to exceed the targets for the quantities of food distributed and unconditional food transfers contributed to stabilized and improved food security of TDPs. CBT faced some challenges associated with government restrictions and logistical issues, but its use was expanded during COVID-19. While Food for Assets (FFA) activities enabled diet diversification and improved general economic standing, it was not sufficient to the type and nature of shocks faced during the CSP period.

- SO2: A number of pilot efforts were developed and implemented, and WFP played an important role supporting the Government's social protection programme (Ehsaas). However, engagement remained largely operational, unlike the original intention of the CSP. The effects on improved and sustained access to safe and nutritious foods have not been monitored comprehensively.
- SO3: Through its support of policy development, WFP worked with the Government to develop a multisectoral strategy, policy and programme to address malnutrition with evidence-based intervention. WFP was effective in the treatment of acute malnutrition. However, coverage of the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and prevention of malnutrition was below the expected targets, and support to school meals was affected by COVID-19 and subsequent school closures.
- SO4: WFP supported various provinces' emergency response capacity, notably through the Humanitarian Response Facilities (HRF). While this type of support has considerable promise, projects were highly localized and the real effects will only be visible when upscaled.
- SO5: The support provided in training and infrastructure handover have been relevant and well received, but the absence of an overall capacity assessment led to some degree of fragmentation, and CCS has not been well documented. However, many CCS efforts only started recently and results are not yet visible for all activities.

**SO1: Affected populations in Pakistan have timely access to adequate food and nutrition during and in the aftermath of natural disasters and shocks**

**Finding 2.1.a**

WFP supported crisis-affected communities through unconditional food/cash assistance and FFA. Assistance through food transfers consistently reached more beneficiaries than assistance through CBT. While government restrictions on the use of CBT and logistical challenges initially limited the extent to which WFP could provide CBT, WFP surpassed its target in terms of quantities of food distributed.

When delivered on time and with an appropriate ration size, unconditional food assistance (Activity 1) contributed to stabilize or improve the food security of TDPs. FFA beneficiaries (Activity 2) noted that WFP support had enabled their diet diversification as well as improved their general economic standing. However, WFP's overarching efforts to address food insecurity and enhance livelihoods were hampered by external shocks such as inflation, COVID-19, and environmental challenges. In the face of multiple shocks, food security gains and progress towards resilience can be difficult to maintain.

109. SO1 focuses on crisis response and was pursued through two distinct activities: unconditional food assistance (Activity 1); and FFA (Activity 2), using both in-kind food and CBTs. These and the sub-activities pursued across different provinces are highlighted in Table 8.<sup>105</sup>

110. Overall, achievement rates in terms of number of beneficiaries reached under SO1 ranged between 68 percent in 2018 and 77 percent in 2020 (Figure 2 in Annex XI). These achievement rates were broadly the same for male and female beneficiaries. The lack of funding is among the factors that prevented WFP from reaching all beneficiaries planned (Figure 16).

111. When looking at the transfer modality for SO1, although there is some fluctuation between years, the total number of beneficiaries was consistently higher for food transfers than CBT until 2021. Between 2018 and 2020, the proportion of beneficiaries who received food ranged between 53 and 65 percent, while CBT beneficiaries were between 35 and 47 percent (Figure 15). The main reason for this was attributed to Government restrictions on, and logistical challenges implementing, the use of CBT.<sup>106</sup> However, this changed in 2021, and was likely due to COVID-19 with 69 percent of beneficiaries receiving CBT and 31 percent receiving food transfers. WFP focused its attention on training Cooperating Partners on the


<sup>105</sup> The tables in this chapter focus on providing examples of activities in the provinces visited by the Evaluation Team. This is deliberate as it allows for the examples to be more specific than similar activities in locations not visited.

<sup>106</sup> CBT is considered by the Government of Pakistan as potentially risky because it could enable the use of funds for illegal activities. CBT also faces logistical challenges associated with facilities, such as banks and cash points, to make withdrawals.



implementation of CBT<sup>107</sup> as part of its CCS efforts. Interview and survey respondents were positive about the training received and COVID-19 presented some opportunities to widen its use.

**Figure 15: Annual SO1 beneficiaries receiving food and CBT as a percentage of total beneficiaries**




Source: COMET CM-R002b report 2018-2021.

<sup>107</sup> 8 percent of the CCS beneficiaries surveyed during this evaluation noted that they had received training on the conduct of CBT delivery. See Annex X for general findings.

**Table 8: SO1 sub-activities implemented by province**

Activities	Sub-Activities	Province	Description
<p><u>Activity 1:</u> Provide humanitarian assistance to meet the basic food and nutrition needs of the populations that are affected or are likely to be affected by natural disasters and shocks.</p>	<p>Unconditional resource transfers to support access to food <b>(URT)</b></p>	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monthly relief food assistance to displaced and disaster-affected persons in different districts, at different times.</li> <li>Monthly food relief assistance to families in TDP camp (Bannu, Bakka Khel)</li> <li>Food assistance in areas affected by multiple shocks</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General food and cash distribution to flood-affected population</li> <li>Food assistance in areas affected by multiple shocks</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General food distribution (limited in time and scale) in North Balochistan: Heavy snowfall, earthquake &amp; floods</li> <li>Food assistance in areas affected by multiple shocks</li> </ul>
		AJK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relief assistance in AJK in snow emergency</li> </ul>
<p><u>Activity 2:</u> Support affected populations during the early recovery phase to address food insecurity and rebuild livelihoods.</p>	<p>Asset creation and livelihood support activities <b>(ACL)</b></p>	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food for Assets (FFA) focused on four districts (check dams, water ponds rehab, washing pads, cemented road, handicrafts making and carpet weaving, kitchen gardening and retaining walls etc.). Limited scale, limited duration, implemented through NGOs, no government engagement</li> <li>FFA project in Chitral in areas affected by Glacial Lake Outburst Flood phenomena; focusing on rehabilitation of irrigation system damaged by flash flood.</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FFA implemented in a couple of districts affected by floods and other shocks; craft making, pond; limited in scale and duration; no market link. Limited funding did not allow for the completion of all tasks (for example pond)</li> <li>FFA in drought-affected areas focusing on rehabilitation ponds and other harvesting infrastructure</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Early 2021 Balochistan drought. The livelihood interventions, though small in scale and conducted with an internal reallocation of funds, included FFA / asset restoration activities FFA project in areas affected by multiple shocks</li> </ul>

Figure 16: Beneficiaries for Activities 1 and 2, by year and sex



Note: Beneficiaries for 2021 are until October 2021 on 10 November 2021 and are provisional and not validated by headquarters.

Source: COMET reports CM-R020 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 on 10 November 2021.

112. In terms of quantities of food distributed during the period 2018-2021, WFP surpassed its expected target for food transfers under Activity 1 (108 percent) and reached over half of the target for Activity 2 (53 percent) (Figure 11). For CBT transfers, only 29 percent of the target for Activity 1 and 44 percent for Activity 2 were achieved (Figure 12).<sup>108</sup>

113. More specifically, as part of Activity 1, WFP supported TDPs from the time they were displaced (2018) until 2021. The implementation of SO1 experienced several challenges: food assistance to TDP camps was extended beyond the planned timeframe; there were several additional shocks that required support (see EQ1.3), and WFP faced restrictions regarding what type of support it was able to provide to beneficiaries. In addition to the support provided in camps, TDPs also received support once they returned to their home, including conditional food transfers as part of FFA activities. This support was based on a recognition that their pre-displacement vulnerability was only made worse by the years of displacement.

114. Figure 17 shows<sup>109</sup> the evolution of the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) among TDP and people affected by disasters (Activity 1). While the percentage of households with acceptable FCS and CSI was slightly below the target in 2018, it reached the targets in 2019 and 2020, but again fell below target in 2021. The evidence collected in the field suggests that the 2018 results are a direct result of delays in delivering support which were caused by government restrictions (restricted movement and access to beneficiaries). Likewise, the results for more recent years are mainly due to the provision of on-time support and, in certain instances, increasing the size of food baskets to meet the needs of larger families (especially for TDPs) as per data shared by the TDP secretariat which highlighted that most TDP families were far larger than the average family size in Pakistan, which was the measure used by WFP.<sup>110</sup> The data collected in the field showed that WFP does not have direct feedback from the field or mechanisms to identify lessons learned in real time, and therefore important feedback may be overlooked. For example, the information provided by the TDP secretariat was reported as having come after a number of years of lower-than-needed support. Delays with feedback on the appropriateness of the size of the food basket affected the provision of adequate support for some time.


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<sup>108</sup> It is important to underline that the expected beneficiaries for emergency assistance activities are determined based on a projection of the number of people that may be affected by a natural or man-made disaster, therefore their attainment is directly linked to actual needs rather than a result of WFP's abilities.

<sup>109</sup> For a definition of all indicators from Figures 13 to 22, please refer to Annex XII.

<sup>110</sup> The evaluation recognizes the complexity associated with providing support that is aligned with actual family size. WFP highlighted that having reliable data on family size was difficult and, in pre-CSP years, had led to both increase and decrease in food provision with support unable to fully align with actual needs.

**Figure 17: Strategic outcome 1, Activity 1, Food Consumption Score and Consumption-based Coping Strategy Index<sup>111</sup>**



Source: COMET reports CM-R010b for 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022) and Annual Country Reports (ACRs) 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

115. Under Activity 2, FFA was implemented to ease the transition from relief to recovery, specifically focusing on restoring the livelihoods and securing food consumption of populations living in the tribal districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the drought-stricken districts in Sindh and Balochistan. In addition, efforts to support returnees were intended to complement the Government’s efforts to stabilize the conflict-affected areas and contribute to economic growth and peace in the region. In the short term, these interventions aimed to prevent the deterioration of the food security and nutrition status of vulnerable people. In the longer term, FFA activities aimed to support the rehabilitation of critical assets at individual and community levels. FFA activities focused on supporting communities with quick cash generation and skills that could facilitate income generation. FFA activities included supporting women with


<sup>111</sup> This figure reflects outcome monitoring data collected among households who received in-kind food.

skills and materials to make traditional handicrafts (e.g., rugs and carpet weaving, decorative items, dress embroidery) that could be sold, and supporting men through the provision of cash for work opportunities (such as digging and constructing water ponds, bridle paths, erosion control structures, tree plantation and so on). The restoration of community infrastructure such as access to water resources was also supported through FFA.

116. Beneficiaries consulted during data collection noted that the support had enabled them to diversify their diet, facilitated the continuous participation of girls in school, and enabled them to buy uniforms and shoes for children attending school. A limited number of beneficiaries interviewed also noted that the funds they were able to secure through the skills they had learned through FFA activities enabled them to pay for school transport for their children. Communities that benefited from rehabilitation of local roads through FFA noted that the roads could now be used to access the market where their produce could be sold. The roads could also be used to more easily access schools and hospitals in nearby towns. Communities that benefited from dam rehabilitation noted that the support they received enabled them to reclaim land that had been affected by flash floods.

117. Indicators for the 2018-2021 period show that the proportion of beneficiaries with a poor food consumption score decreased and those with acceptable food consumption score increased until 2020. However, the proportion of households that shifted from a poor food consumption score to a borderline food consumption score was greater than those who shifted from a borderline to an acceptable food consumption score (Figure 18). The challenges involved in enabling this shift need to be better understood for overall results to further improve. The increase in food expenditure share reflected in the data suggest that, in 2018, the targeted population had access to a greater proportion of self-produced food than they did in later years. In 2019-2020, access to self-generated food (farming) was affected by inflation, COVID-19 restrictions, and environmental challenges. Efforts to reduce food expenditure share included FFA, but these were insufficient to counter the shocks experienced, and hence the target was not reached. The indicators further show an important change in 2021 where the food consumption score worsened considerably. This suggests that, in face of shocks (e.g., COVID-19), the population's resilience is limited. The data suggest that the cumulative impact of hardship in 2020 led to a deterioration in relation to nutrition by 2021.

Figure 18: Strategic outcome 1, Activity 2 food security indicators




Source: COMET reports CM-R010b for 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022) and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

118. According to WFP monitoring data, 61 to 76 percent of the surveyed households within disaster-affected communities reported benefiting from Activity 2. In 2019-2020, the targets for activities aiming to restore livelihood-based coping strategies were reached (Figure 19). For 2018, the data is either incomplete or does not reach expected results. The inability to reach expected targets in 2018 is due to two main factors:

- a. **Implementation delays:** Government delays in approving permits for entry due to security concerns delayed the start of the interventions. Although these issues were resolved in the latter half of 2018, district-level curfews and access restrictions caused more continued and longer-term delays with implementation.
- b. **Time required for results:** These types of activities require considerable time to generate results.

119. In 2020, the CSI remained above target, but the proportion of communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihood asset base reduced. These shifts are reportedly due to COVID-19 related hardship and reduction in population supported.

**Figure 19: Strategic outcome 1, Activity 2 livelihood indicators**



Source: COMET reports CM-R010b for 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022), and ACR 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

**SO2: The social protection system at national and sub-national levels provides the most vulnerable and marginalized populations with improved and sustained access to safe, nutritious, and sufficient food by 2022 (SDG 2.1)**

**Finding 2.1.b**

WFP was an important implementor for the Government’s social protection system (Ehsaas). However, as the Government prioritized the expansion of the programme, WFP’s contribution to the programme design was not as strategic as the CSP originally intended and WFP could only influence targeting criteria to some extent. Emphasis was put on CCS but, in effect, WFP played a more operational role. The scale of WFP’s planned direct food/CBT assistance was modest, although COVID-19 provided an opportunity for increased use of CBT. The effects on improved and sustained access to safe, nutritious foods have not been monitored comprehensively. As for the technical and operational assistance to school meals, WFP developed a number of pilot projects, but COVID-19 and the subsequent closure of schools led to some challenges, and the initiated projects have not been rolled out or upscaled by the Government.

120. SO2 includes Activity 3 which focused on “augmenting Government of Pakistan social protection mechanisms to support food and nutrition-insecure urban and rural poor people” and Activity 4 which focused on “providing technical assistance to provincial governments to develop school meal programmes and implementing school meal programmes as appropriate”.

The main sub-activities pursued across different provinces visited are highlighted in Table 9.



**Table 9: SO2 sub-activities implemented by province <sup>112</sup>**

Activities	Sub-Activities	Province	Description
<b>Activity 3:</b> Augment Government of Pakistan social protection mechanisms like the Benazir Income Support Programme to support food and nutrition insecure urban and rural poor people.	Institutional capacity-strengthening activities <b>(CSI)</b>	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBT during COVID-19 on behalf of <u>Ehsaas</u></li> <li>• <u>Ehsaas Nashonuma</u> programme is implemented by WFP</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Humanitarian CBT &amp; Integrated <u>Community</u>-based Management of Acute Malnutrition [CMAM] (limited scale, size, and duration)</li> <li>• Top-up cash assistance to Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) beneficiaries (from 2018 to 2020)</li> </ul>
		<u>Balochistan</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Ehsaas Nashonuma</u> programme is implemented by WFP</li> <li>• Top-up cash assistance to BISP beneficiaries (2020)</li> </ul>
		Punjab	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research project in Rahim Yar Khan focusing on children 6-23 months supported with cash and specialized nutritious products</li> </ul>
<b>Activity 4:</b> Provide technical assistance on school meals to provincial governments and implement school meals programmes as appropriate.	School meals activities <b>(SMP)</b>	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• School feeding programme (joint effort with the department of education)</li> <li>• Technical support provided to provincial governments for initiating school feeding programme</li> </ul>


121. Given the emphasis on CCS, the scale of the planned direct food/CBT assistance under SO2 was very limited compared to SO1. Yet the achievement rates under SO2 in terms of quantities of food and CBT transferred were considerably lower than those under SO1. Only 0.8 percent of the planned food transfers for Activity 3 were implemented and none were implemented under Activity 4 (Figure 10). The level of implementation of CBT was somewhat higher but still well below target (14 percent) for both Activities 3 and 4. Activity 4 was designed at a time when WFP expected to receive funding from a main donor. However, the funding for implementing school meal programmes did not materialize.

122. When looking at achievement rates in terms of number of beneficiaries, WFP reached 94 percent of the planned targeted for Activity 3 but only 7 percent for Activity 4 (Figure 10). Very few beneficiaries received in-kind food under Activity 3 and none under Activity 4. Direct assistance under SO3 mostly consisted of CBT. CBT conducted as part of Activity 3 far exceeded its beneficiary targets in 2018 (Figure 19). It is worth noting that the planned CBT beneficiaries for Activity 3 were modest for both 2018 (1,000 female and 1,000 male) and 2019. The number of people reached in both years was considerably greater (e.g. in 2018 181,610 female and 186,031 male), which explains why the percentile of beneficiaries reached is so high. The planned and actual number of CBT beneficiaries under Activity 3 were much higher in 2020 than

<sup>112</sup> At national level, Ehsaas Nashonuma project is part of social safety-net intervention. However, within WFP it is a nutrition/stunting prevention intervention.

in any other year. The number of beneficiaries benefiting from CBT under Activity 4 was far more modest than those reached through Activity 3.

Figure 20: Beneficiaries reached for Activities 3 and 4 by gender, year, and food and CBT<sup>113</sup>



Note: Beneficiaries for 2021 are until October 2021, on 10 November 2021. Beneficiaries' figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters.

Source: COMET reports CM-R020 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 on 10 November 2021.

<sup>113</sup> In 2019 funding used to conduct CBT was categorized as CCS; therefore the number of beneficiaries reported under Activity 3 in 2019 are not reported in the Annual Country Reports (ACRs).

123. As discussed below, the way the SO was framed and understood by key parties played an important role in the attainment of results.

124. Under SO2, Activity 3, WFP partnered with the Government to support implementation of the Ehsaas (See Box 1) in certain areas. Through these efforts, WFP sought to improve access to safe, nutritious, and sufficient food by providing unconditional cash top-ups to drought-affected Ehsaas beneficiary households in Sindh and Balochistan, as well as comprehensive nutrition through cash and in-kind food to pregnant women and mothers. Supplementary food assistance to adolescent girls could not be implemented due to COVID-related school closures. In March 2021, children aged under 2 years old were included as beneficiaries with the inception of the stunting prevention programmes.

125. After the onset of COVID-19, WFP also provided unconditional CBT to low-income female students in KP's tribal districts to improve their nutrition and to encourage continued participation in schooling once schools reopened (albeit intermittently). The implementation of activities was expected to serve to demonstrate to Government counterparts how successful CBT could complement or replace school meal programmes in times of need (see paragraph on Activity 4 below).


126. Of the two evaluable outcome indicators for Activity 3, one surpassed the targets set by WFP (Figure 21). This aligns well with the proportion of reached versus planned beneficiaries for this activity (94.24 percent) (Figure 10). This activity focused on WFP working as an implementor through the Ehsaas programme. Importantly, while 94.24 percent of beneficiaries were reached, the support was short-lived because it started late and the amounts disbursed were lower than expected because they were subject to Ehsaas

**Box 1: Ehsaas**

Ehsaas is a large-scale social protection programme to support disadvantaged segments of the population through the development of: safety nets; job creation; livelihood support; and the development of human capital. Ehsaas responds to federal-provincial leadership, and supports institution strengthening, transparency, and good governance principles. Ehsaas currently responds to the demands of 134 policies, is multisectoral, and as such is implemented by 34 federal government agencies.

disbursement limitations. The late delivery of support may explain why the second outcome indicator does not show positive results for 2019. In 2020, the second indicator was not collected, while neither indicator was collected in 2021 (Figure 21).

**Figure 21: Outcome 2, Activity 3, CBT through social protection<sup>114</sup> children 6-23 months of age receiving a minimum acceptable diet<sup>115</sup>**



Source: COMET reports CM-R010b for 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022) and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

127. It is noted that data on other indicators which focus on the enhancement of government capacities and generation of policies was not collected. The CSP specifically intended to work in two main ways: upstream by providing institutional and policy support; and downstream by supporting catalytic activities. However, during the most recent period, the focus remained disproportionately on implementing activities on behalf of the Government, for example, through the Ehsaas Nashonuma programme. There are some indications of WFP capitalizing on its knowledge base to modify support provided (e.g., provision of specialized foods in the Ehsaas programme to reduce stunting), but WFP's support to Ehsaas was largely operational rather than focused on finding ways to integrate WFP experiences into existing systems and support the development of sustainable mechanisms to ensure the expansion of government systems. Interviews conducted suggest that WFP's engagement with the Ehsaas programme shows strategic foresight on WFP's behalf. Beyond securing the partnership, a critical and important step, the emphasis on WFP's operational role during the period under review was due to a number of issues: since the engagement was relatively new, the engagement suffered from a lack of frequent interaction due to COVID-19 restrictions, and the expectations on both sides were not aligned. The government in all the provinces had high expectations towards WFP as a critical implementing partner with existing, funded initiatives.

128. Interviews conducted with WFP and government representatives consistently showed that the partnership faced some limitations. WFP was regarded, by government officials, primarily as an implementor of activities rather than a strategic partner to support the development/refinement of government programme. Government staff stressed that the programme did not require further development or refinement, but that it sometimes lacked implementing arms. WFP is well positioned to fill this role, as a principal government fund recipient. For their part, WFP staff in field offices noted that they had limited skills to engage in a strategic discussion with government counterparts. Overall, this means that while the government was content with the support received, it was not as far reaching as the goals of the CSP. According to some respondents, including WFP staff, this presented a missed opportunity.

129. The government did not consider these activities as opportunities to expand ways of addressing pressing problems, but rather expected WFP to carry out activities to scale. These different perspectives emerge from a fundamentally different understanding about the role of WFP in Pakistan and the need to

<sup>114</sup> The results highlighted in this figure reflect CBT channelled through the national social protection systems. The beneficiaries from this activity appear in the ACRs under Activity 3, and can be found in Table 8, Annex XII.

<sup>115</sup> This information was not reported in 2021.

ensure that the perspectives of the WFP and the relevant central and provincial government actors are better aligned. This type of challenge can be attributed, at least in part, to challenges with navigating a relationship where the government is also the main donor to the CSP. In the case of federal programmes where implementation is anchored at the provincial level, these are not always accompanied with adequate funds and human resources. Therefore, provincial governments have an expectation that WFP will be able to implement longer-term programmes and provide the funds to do so.

130. Activity 4 focused on technical assistance to federal and provincial education departments for: the development of government-led school meals and education support programme; and the implementation of an education pilot project for adolescent girls, under the overall umbrella of social protection. WFP initiated the pilot with the Elementary and Secondary Education Department of KP. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the pilot project provided income support to families of adolescent girls in tribal districts to encourage them to send and maintain their female children in school (see Activity 3). The effort aimed to improve gender parity in education as well as increase awareness on nutrition, basic health and hygiene practices among schoolchildren, mothers and their respective communities. This intervention suffered implementation delays due to difficulties faced in accessing eligible girls or their families while the schools were closed. For this reason, the number of beneficiaries for CBT fell short of targets (see Figure 20). Due to school closures, indicators related to education (retention and enrolment rates) were only reported in 2021. In addition to implementing this pilot, WFP continued to provide policy advice and technical support to relevant federal and provincial government departments to support the design and implementation of government-led school meals programmes. For instance, WFP assisted the Planning Commission of Pakistan with the design of a school health and nutrition programme in six food-insecure and poverty-prone districts of southern Balochistan. The programme will be piloted for three years, starting from the fiscal year 2021/22. Activity 4 was not well funded, which hindered implementation and results.

**SO3: The entire population of Pakistan, especially children under five, adolescent girls and women of reproductive age, have improved nutrition in line with national targets by 2025.**

#### Finding 2.1.c


WFP worked with the Government to develop a multisectoral strategy, policy and programme to address malnutrition with evidence-based interventions. WFP support has been effective in the treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM). However coverage of the treatment of MAM and prevention of malnutrition has been below targets set for international standards that would allow for the SO to be met.

131. SO3 was implemented through Activity 5, “Assist the government to achieving SDG2.2 through improved governance, quality implementation, evidence generation and innovation”. The activity included the following main components: stunting prevention; community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM); policy; governance; and evidence-generation including support to food fortification (see also Table 10).

**Table 10: SO3 Activity 5 – sub-activities implemented by province**

Activities	Sub-Activities	Province	Description of support given
Activity 5: Assist the government in achieving SDG 2.2 through improved governance, quality implementation, evidence-generation and innovation.	Prevention of stunting	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KP-SPRING stunting prevention specifically targeting adolescent girls with iron and food supplements (start 2019)</li> <li>Ehsaas Nashonuma programme</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sindh accelerated action programme for stunting prevention and reduced malnutrition</li> <li>Ehsaas Nashonuma programme</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stunting prevention</li> <li>Ehsaas Nashonuma programme</li> </ul>
Activity 5: Assist the government in achieving SDG 2.2 through improved governance, quality implementation, evidence-generation and innovation.	CMAM	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CMAM intervention</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CMAM intervention with 'Surge Approach' to make health systems more resilient to sudden emergencies</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CMAM intervention</li> </ul>
Activity 5: Assist the government in achieving SDG 2.2 through improved governance, quality implementation, evidence-generation and innovation.	Policy and Governance and Evidence-generation	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>KP-SPRING stunting prevention</li> <li>Financial and technical support to Provincial Fortification Alliance</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Presence in variety of projects (Targeted Supplementary Feeding Programme [TSFP] and Scaling Up Nutrition [SUN] movement etc.) to improve the nutrition of the population of Sindh</li> <li>Financial and technical support to Provincial Fortification Alliance</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening capacity of new Food Authority</li> <li>SUN movement</li> <li>Financial and technical support to Provincial Fortification Alliance</li> </ul>
		National level / Islamabad/ Punjab and Rawalpindi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sun Movement in Pakistan (since 2013). Leading the SUN UN Network and supporting the SUN Business Network SUN Secretariat, SUN Academia Network).</li> <li>Financial and technical support to National and Provincial Fortification Alliance in Punjab (since 2014)</li> <li>Implemented the Chakki (small-scale mill) wheat flour fortification programme in Islamabad and Rawalpindi (start 2019)</li> </ul>
		Policies and studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Pakistan Multi-sectoral Nutrition Strategy (PMNS, 2018-2025) and a related National Action Plan.</li> <li>National and provincial fortification strategies</li> <li>Policy document for the commercialization of locally developed and produced SNF (2021)</li> <li>COVID-19 safety guidelines for CMAM programme implementation</li> <li>the Pakistan Overview of Food Security and Nutrition (2019)</li> <li>Cost-effective &amp; sector-specific recommendations for improving nutrition outcomes in Pakistan (2019)</li> </ul>

**Figure 22: Beneficiaries reached vs planned for Activity 5 by year and gender**



Note: Beneficiaries for 2021 are until October 2021 and not validated by headquarters.

Source: COMET reports CM-R020 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

132. The **stunting prevention** programme provided specialized nutritious foods to children aged 6-59 months, and to pregnant and lactating women. The activity had intended to also include the provision of micronutrient powder for children aged 2-5 years but, due to lack of funding, this support was not provided. WFP's (pre-) CSP work on stunting prevention supported the government to develop the Ehsaas Nashonuma programme (see also SO2, Activity 3).

133. The number of beneficiaries reached with the prevention of stunting activities fluctuated considerably over the years, varying between 3,207 and 206,124 over the CSP period (Table 11). The ACRs and field data show that stunting prevention received limited attention in the first years of the CSP. Stunting prevention programming was negatively impacted by limited awareness and interest from donors, WFP staff and the Government of Pakistan on the potential impact of more strategic support to prevent stunting. This is attributed to, at least in part, WFP's traditional focus on addressing emergencies, which in turn led to resource challenges. WFP was able to increase its reach in stunting prevention by playing an important role in the implementation of Ehsaas Nashonuma and Stunting Prevention Rehabilitation Integrated Nutrition Gain (SPRING) programme.

134. **Community-based management of acute malnutrition (CMAM)** focuses on treating moderate acute malnutrition (wasting) among children aged 6-59 months, and pregnant and lactating women. Beneficiaries were identified through the government's health system. The treatment consisted of the provision of lipid-based locally developed nutrient supplements for children, pregnant and lactating women.<sup>116</sup> The number of actual beneficiaries reached fluctuated between 204,705 and 435,489 (Table 11). In recent years, the number of beneficiaries reached was higher than planned. The initial estimate of beneficiary numbers was predicated on a plan to hand over the programme to the government; however, as most resources received by WFP were earmarked for CMAM, they continued to deliver the programme and by doing so reached a greater than planned number of beneficiaries.

135. Under stunting prevention and CMAM programmes, WFP provided social and behaviour change communication (SBCC) on feeding practices and hygiene for infants and young children. Targets for people

<sup>116</sup> Both products are locally developed, but composed of different ingredients. The products are nutrient dense and can be eaten directly from the package, requiring no dilution, mixing or cooking.



reached through interpersonal SBCC approaches were not reported in 2018. In 2019, SBCC accounted for only a small fraction of the number of people who received stunting prevention and CMAM interventions. However, the number increased considerably in 2021.

**Table 11: Beneficiaries reached vs planned for Activity 5 by intervention**

Years	Activity Tag	Prevention of stunting	Treatment of moderate and acute malnutrition	SBCC
2018	Planned	229,400	314,000	850
	Actual	129,750	323,462	NA
	% reached	56,56%	103,01%	NA
2019	Planned	408,700	169,000	852
	Actual	3,207	256,004	836
	% reached	0,78%	151,48%	98,12%
2020	Planned	191,500	264,000	2,945
	Actual	14,973	435,489	2,945
	% reached	7,82%	164,96%	100,00%
2021	Planned	124,500	290,100	124,500
	Actual	206,124	204,705	103,722
	% reached	165,56%	70,56%	83,31%


Source: COMET reports CM-R020 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

136. The outcome indicators for the **prevention of stunting** programme showed that the proportion of women with an adequately diverse diet was above target in 2019 and 2020 but fell considerably in 2021 (Figure 23). The country office explained that this was due to cultural reasons, and the start of a new project. However, this is unclear and raises questions about whether the indicator properly measures the contribution to expected outcome.

137. In 2021, 26.7 percent of children aged 6-23 months had a minimum acceptable diet. This was below the CSP target of more than 70 percent.<sup>117</sup> However, the respondents are positive about the outcome (see SBCC below).

<sup>117</sup> WFP. 2022. ACR 2021.


Figure 23: Strategic outcome 3, Activity 5, malnutrition indicator



Source: COMET reports CM-R010b for 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022) and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.


138. The **MAM treatment** was effective and the outcome targets which are based on the minimum sphere standards<sup>118</sup> were met (Figure 24). The recovery rate, default rate, non-response rate and mortality rate were well above sphere standards. However, the coverage rate, which aims to reach 50 percent (sphere standard) of individuals suffering from acute malnutrition was below the target in 2020 and 2021 respectively (47 and 66 percent, see 21). This low coverage is explained by a high rate of malnutrition prevalence, lack of resources, and COVID-19. The CMAM surge programme in Sindh showed improvement in the nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women and children aged under 5 years, through increased breastfeeding rates, and iron and folic acid intake.<sup>119</sup> Respondents cited the CMAM support as a good example of WFP core contributions to the Government's effort to address acute malnutrition.

Figure 24: Strategic outcome 3, Activity 5, malnutrition indicators



<sup>118</sup> The Sphere Minimum Standards for food security and nutrition are a practical expression of the right to adequate food in humanitarian contexts. The standards are grounded in the beliefs, principles, duties and rights declared in the Humanitarian Charter.

<sup>119</sup> WFP- 2022. ACR 2021.



■ Baseline   ■ Annual follow-up reached   ■ Annual follow-up not reached   ■ Target

Source: COMET reports CM-R010b for 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022) and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

139. For **SBCC**, no regular monitoring of effects took place; the only indicator that was regularly monitored was the number of beneficiaries reached. Interviewees highlighted that a comprehensive multisectoral communication strategy, with improved coordination between WFP and other main stakeholders (e.g. Ministry of Health, UNICEF and WHO), is needed. Non-WFP respondents (e.g., from the Scaling Up Nutrition network), perceive that the initiatives conducted have been successful in changing behaviour in Ehsaas-supported households. Representatives from cooperating partners noted that targeted households currently make nutrition-relevant decisions in favour of the most disadvantaged members of the family and allocate a proportion of CBT to nutrition improvements. They noted that data suggested that there was a reduction in the prevalence of MAM among children in the targeted districts, and increased awareness about stunting prevention for children under two years of age among the target beneficiaries.

140. **Capacity strengthening** focused on programme implementation and increased capacity among the public health department staff on aspects of malnutrition identification and treatment. In addition, examples of localized efforts to support capacity focused on small-scale mills (chakli) projects, the development of a flour fortification strategy, and the handover of a large flour fortification programme in AJK. Government officials across all three provinces visited noted that the technical support received from WFP had been valuable to them. The survey revealed high levels of satisfaction among cooperating partner staff about the technical trainings they received from WFP (See Annex XII).

**Policy and governance support** are mainly provided through the Scaling Up Nutrition network and the Food Fortification Alliance. WFP supported various studies which informed the further development of a number of strategies, policies and guidelines for national, provincial level. Respondents noted that greater

Government participation in these studies might have made them more useful. During the CSP, WFP and government efforts to address malnutrition in a multisectoral approach were made through the development of the Pakistan Multi-sectoral Nutrition Strategy (2018-2025), the related National Action Plan, the Ehsaas Nashonuma programme, the KP Food Security Policy 2021, and the Stunting Prevention Rehabilitation Integrated Nutrition Gain (SPRING).

**SO4: Communities in disaster-prone districts have more resilient food systems and development gains are better protected by disaster risk management systems at all levels by 2022.**

**Finding 2.1.d**

WFP showcased its experience with small-scale interventions at community and school levels aimed at increasing emergency response capacity and encouraging the Government to upscale the activities. Pilot projects were highly localized and their contribution to enhanced resilience-building at community level appeared to be marginal. WFP supported the provinces' emergency response capacity in various ways, for example, establishing Humanitarian Response Facilities, which were used in recent emergencies. While this type of support has considerable promise, the real impact of these CCS efforts will only be visible when upscaled.

141. SO4 focuses on disaster risk preparedness through: Activity 6 which aimed at supporting the implementation of an integrated climate risk management approach at all levels of government and down to the community level; and Activity 7 which sought to strengthen both government and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction.

142. The challenges faced under SO4 are similar to those faced under SO2 in relation to having a common understanding of the respective roles and expectations of WFP and the Government. The WFP saw itself as the tester of new pilot limited-scale activities, which the Government could then roll out at greater scale. However, the Government envisioned WFP more as the implementor of large-scale activities and valued the inputs from these pilots without necessarily seeing them as replication opportunities.

143. This SO pursued several sub-activities across the different provinces, listed in Table 12. Overall, the activities conducted under Activity 6 were extremely limited in scale because of the very limited funding secured – only 1 percent of total allocated resources between 2018 and 2021, corresponding to 15 percent of the Needs-Based Plan (NBP) for Activity 6 for the same period. No household benefited from direct food/cash assistance under Activity 6 because the limited funds available were allocated to activities aimed at strengthening communities' capacity to respond to disaster risks.<sup>120</sup> In addition, WFP supported the Government's COVID-19 response by providing personal protective equipment to government workers and distributing information, education, and communication materials to the public. Handwashing facilities were placed in schools (KP and Sindh), in an effort to increase sanitation.

144. Activity 7 was intended to focus on strengthening disaster risk reduction (DRR) capacity at government and community levels. Under this activity, WFP extended DRR training to communities in KP. A small number of CCS survey respondents (3 percent) reported having been trained on DRR.<sup>121</sup> This effort included the teachers' training for school-based DRR and KP district staff training on seasonal planning, which overlaps with SO5. Strengthening DRR capacity is a positive step. However, it remains unclear if this training will enable change if materials to respond to crisis are not consistently provided – for example, the provision of first aid and rescue kits was minimal. A further 13 percent of survey respondents indicated receiving FFA livelihood restoration training. But again, without a mechanism to make use of training, its outcome is unclear.

<sup>120</sup> WFP. *Annual Country Report*, 2018, 2019, 2020.

<sup>121</sup> See findings in Annex X.

**Table 12: SO4 sub-activities implemented by province**

Activities	Sub-Activities	Province	Description
<p><u>Activity 6:</u> Support all levels of the government and communities in adopting and operationalizing an integrated climate risk management system.</p>	<p>Climate adaptation and risk management activities <b>(CAR)</b></p>	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community-based DRM (Disaster Risk Management) in two districts</li> <li>Exhibitions in Peshawar University on DRM</li> <li>First Aid / Search and Rescue training for communities and disaster management resource centre for communities</li> <li>Critical Corporate Initiative (CCI): focusing on five livelihood zones in three provinces</li> <li>Integrated Context Analysis</li> <li>Seasonal Livelihood Programming (SLP)</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) and School Safety Programme were implemented in Sindh with very limited scale (22 schools in one district)</li> <li>Integrated Context Analysis</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Integrated Context Analysis</li> <li>Urban Seasonal Livelihood Programme Calendar for Quetta</li> </ul>
<p><u>Activity 7:</u> Strengthen the <u>government's</u> and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction.</p>	<p>Emergency preparedness activities <b>(EPA)</b></p>	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Temporary time-limited human resource support for PDMA (Provincial Disaster Management Authorities)</li> <li>Support was provided by building and handing over the warehousing and storage facilities as Humanitarian Response Facilities</li> <li>Selected district staff training seasonal disaster preparedness and contingency planning</li> <li>Search and Rescue Training in Dera Ismail Khan</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extra human resource for PDMA for temporary period</li> <li>Building and handing over the warehousing and storage facilities as Humanitarian Response Facilities</li> <li>Human resource for Accountability to Affected Populations for nutrition</li> <li>Supported PDMA and Education department Sindh with innovative web-based coordination system as well as online learning module for school children and teachers</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Piloted the Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index (EPCI)</li> <li>IR-PREP (the Immediate Response Account for Special Preparedness Activity) for Drought - To strengthen the capacity of Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) Balochistan for effective drought preparedness and response</li> <li>Building and handing over the warehousing and storage facilities as Humanitarian Response Facilities</li> </ul>
		Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Construction of Humanitarian Response Facilities</li> </ul>

145. Given the low level of implementation and the absence of outcome monitoring data, evidence to assess the CSP contribution to SO4 is extremely limited.<sup>122</sup> The field data collection revealed that these

<sup>122</sup> As none of the SO4 outcome indicators were evaluable, an indicator-wide analysis could not be provided.

inroads made in relation to resilience building at the community level are extremely marginal. Specific examples of activities implemented in pursuit of this outcome include livelihood support (mainly FFA) in newly merged districts, mainly through traditional carpet weaving and the forestry sector in close collaboration with the provincial forest department. These activities were highly localized, in contrast to similar activities conducted by other actors.<sup>123</sup>

146. In addition, through this activity, state-of-the-art response HRF to store goods and coordinate logistics at short notice were provided in all provinces where WFP operates. These facilities have served their purpose. Recently, for example, they were used to coordinate the response to the earthquake in Balochistan, flood in Sindh and the COVID-19 pandemic. Additional staff positions within the Government were also supported (financially), and a monitoring system was put in place, which can be activated to track emergencies and corresponding responses. The system was adapted to provincial needs. This type of support has considerable promise, but it is not fully clear if and how these systems will be maintained by the Government or further augmented (skills and financial assets/commitments).

**SO5: Government systems at national and provincial levels have strengthened capabilities to ensure food security and provide essential services to the people of Pakistan by 2022.**

**Finding 2.1.e**

The absence of a comprehensive capacity gap assessment that covered all relevant areas and could comprehensively inform CCS activities proved to be a challenge. Even though somewhat fragmented, training provided was relevant, appropriately targeted and enabled changes at operational level. CCS efforts at organizational level only started recently and results are not yet visible.

147. SO5 focused mainly on CCS, specifically on “strengthening government and partner capabilities to provide food security and essential services in time”. The CCS support provided to Pakistan was not based on a comprehensive capacity gap assessment, which may explain why the various CCS initiatives implemented appear to be fragmented. A list of sub-activities conducted is in Table 13.

148. Among those, WFP planned to provide technical assistance to the provincial government of Balochistan to restore old wheat storage silos and build new ones. This effort is intended to enable the provincial government to maintain a consistent supply of wheat to respond to eventual shortages. This activity was noted as very relevant by all those interviewed within WFP, government officials and cooperating partners. At the time of this evaluation, the activity was in its preparatory stages and hence results were not yet visible. A feasibility study was conducted and provincial-level efforts were made to secure a combination of provincial and external funds.

149. Although there is no systematic documentation of the progress made towards SO5, WFP’s engagement in several activities which can be categorized as falling within the “Define and Design” category of the CCS framework in the beginning of the CSP implementation, and specifically focused on validation of demands and baselines, partnerships and resourcing and intervention design, are reported. For specific activities WFP did identify capacity development needs, including training needs and also the need for grain storage silos. However, the report for the data collected in 2018 was finalized in 2020. Progress was only reflected in output indicators. No outcomes indicators have been reported.

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<sup>123</sup> For example, the Chail Valley project financed by SDC (previously implemented by Helvetas).

**Table 13: SO 5 sub-activities implemented by province**

Activities	Sub-Activities	Province	Description
<b>Activity 8:</b> Strengthen government and partner capabilities to provide food security and essential services.	Institutional capacity strengthening activities (CSI)	Khyber - Pakhtunkhwa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Needs-based training for government and partners on a wide range of issues identified by end users</li> <li>Training on warehouse management during (2016-18) from Food Department KP, Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) and the Fata Disaster Management Authority (FDMA)</li> <li>Technical surveys/assessment, detail engineering design and tendering completed for the construction of a model wheat storage facility in Malakand</li> </ul>
		Sindh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Needs-based training for government and partners on a wide range of issues identified by end users</li> <li>Training on warehouse management during (2016-18) from Food Department and PDMA</li> <li>Feasibility studies for the food departments on the overall supply chain and storage infrastructure</li> <li>Supply chain assessment of the Nutrition Program of the Health Department of Sindh</li> </ul>
		Balochistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restoring grains storage silos by WFP to enhance overall storage by 40% of the requirement. Training provided government staff with the skill set to use resources</li> <li>Needs-based training for government and partners on a wide range of issues identified by end users</li> <li>Training on warehouse management during (2016-18) from Food Department, PDMA</li> <li>Feasibility studies for the food departments on the overall supply chain and storage infrastructure</li> </ul>

150. The number of training sessions undertaken was limited, as was their reach. Also, the majority took place in 2020 and therefore their impact is not yet clearly visible (see Annex XIII). In addition, field data collection found that there is overlap between SO5 and other SOs. Also, in certain instances, training that could have been reported under this outcome was reported elsewhere, and this also contributed to the lack of monitoring. This illustrates how different SOs intertwine, and also how WFP tended to see activities as only covering individual SOs, with subsequent reporting following this pattern.

151. CCS focused on increasing technical and logistical competence and/or better understanding of how to use or navigate an existing system in the areas of nutrition and stunting, cash-based transfers, and social protection. For example:

- a. To improve their service effectiveness, 35 staff members of Ehsaas Nashonuma facilitation centres were trained in Balochistan on social mobilization, use of Android apps, protocols, and seasonal calendars.
- b. WFP supported the restoration of 40 percent of defunct wheat storage silos, which are expected to enhance provincial capacity of wheat storage by 30-40 percent in Balochistan.
- c. WFP supported the district administration and relevant technical departments to prepare seasonal risk preparation and contingency planning in KP.
- d. Education Department staff and teachers from 22 schools were trained on the school safety framework and preparing disaster risk management plans for schools in Sindh.

152. In addition to training as part of this SO, there was also specific training focused on end-to-end supply chain management to wheat provision in the event of grain shortage in the market. According to all respondents engaged from WFP and the Government, the handover of silos will be of considerable value.

153. The number of survey respondents and the content of their responses do not allow the assessment of results disaggregated by training activity and SO. Specifically, participants do not provide sufficient detail to be able to note with certainty what SO their training belonged to. Also, WFP did not have the type of data required to facilitate such an analysis. However, the information does provide valuable insights regarding training as a tool for CCS more broadly. Specifically, the survey shows that most of the training was conducted in 2021, and more than 75 percent of participants used knowledge gained during training on a daily basis. The survey also showed that, in 78 percent of cases, training led to a change in practices in the way the individual trainee worked. In over 80 percent of cases, it had an influence in the practice, policy or strategy of the organization represented in the training. In over 31 percent of cases, this type of influence was categorized as considerable (see Annex XIII).

154. In the absence of a clearly documented assessment of what type of capacity could be needed and used, the country office did not work with the Government to develop a long-term CCS strategy that would prioritize potential areas of support, in consultation with government staff.

**EQ2.2 To what extent did WFP contribute to achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender equality and other equity considerations)? Did the response to COVID-19 change the degree of contribution in any of these areas?**

**Finding 2.2**

Efforts, and some progress, have been made in integrating gender considerations in a meaningful way, but there is considerably more work to be done. For other cross-cutting issues, such as protection and accountability to affected populations, there are systems in place, but challenges in operationalizing them.

155. The Pakistan CSP aimed to establish gender equality as a strategic imperative as well as incorporate protection and accountability to affected populations (q2) into its interventions. A review of the cross-cutting indicators measured by the country office suggests that the inclusion of these cross-cutting issues was inconsistent. Cooperating partners have benefited from orientation sessions, but those appear to be insufficient to provide them with the skills required to effectively ensure adherence to these cross-cutting issues.


156. In relation to **protection**, a review of WFP documentation and interviews with country office staff show that WFP staff have a very strong knowledge base and understand the operational implications of WFP's commitment to adhere to humanitarian principles. However, interviews showed that cooperating partners are not consistently aware of the principles they must apply, or how to do so. This is problematic, given that cooperating partners are often the closest entity to beneficiaries. However, it is also understandable since most partners are small, local civil society organizations with limited resources and few mechanisms to manage their staff and oversee staff actions on the ground. For example, in KP, partners suggested that



operationalizing protection principles was challenging in KP's post-conflict context and non-governmental organization (NGO) staff needed to have proper tools and methods that can be applied locally, which is not feasible due to the short-term nature of projects and high staff turnover. This suggests that there is a need for WFP to invest in enhancing the protection capacity of its cooperating partners.

157. The indicators that WFP collected to measure progress on this cross-cutting aim (Figure 25) suggest that results are very positive, even though the drop among beneficiaries who reported that WFP programmes are dignified is marginally below target. However, given the data collected in the field noted earlier, these figures should be examined with care, and efforts made to ensure that the positive experience reflects all WFP beneficiaries.

**Figure 25: Protection cross-cutting indicators**




Source: COMET reports CM-R009b 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022), and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

158. In relation to **AAP**, the country office established grievance redressal and feedback systems. WFP uses an email and a hotline that are checked regularly, for use by anyone wishing to voice a grievance. The system is intended to ensure that WFP and its partners are consistently accountable to beneficiaries. The data collected shows that feedback did not always work. Beneficiaries had limited awareness of these

systems and of their right to voice concerns about the delivery of support they had received. WFP reported placing increasing attention on ensuring that accountability mechanisms are operationalized, meaning that beneficiaries are consistently informed about systems and can use them. How this will materialize in the future is not yet clear. Interview respondents also noted that the culture in Pakistan is one that does not lend itself to voicing grievances by phone or email. Rather, it would be more culturally acceptable for people to voice concerns face to face. In addition, it was highlighted by multiple respondents that access to phone and internet is limited. Therefore, relying on these tools is restrictive.

159. Furthermore, WFP collected two types of data (Figure 26) and both suggest that, while there was some progress reported in 2021, there are opportunities to improve the information provided to beneficiaries as well as its use. This is confirmed by field data collection findings, which were noted earlier.

**Figure 26: CSP Accountability cross-cutting indicators**




Source: COMET reports CM-R009b 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022), and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

160. **Gender:** The gender issue needs to be explored on two levels: 1) internal to WFP; and 2) as it relates to beneficiaries.

161. **Gender within WFP:** The country office recently recruited a gender and protection officer. Since 2020, the country office was engaged in WFP corporate Gender Transformation Programme. The programme aims to support country offices to integrate gender equality and women's empowerment into all of WFP work and activities to ensure that it addresses the different food security and nutrition needs of women, men, girls and boys. The process includes a self-assessment based on predefined indicators and the development and implementation of a practical improvement plan as well as a final assessment where achievement of 39 benchmarks are validated.

162. The WFP staff distribution across genders shows considerable disparity, with men representing a large majority of the country office staff (Figure 27). The proportion of women is higher among international staff, but this means little in absolute numbers given that proportionally most staff are national. The data also shows that the increase in women employees was minimal among national staff; among internationals, it reduced over the CSP period. An important step forward, noted by respondents, would be the deliberate recruitment of women for senior roles.

Figure 27: Gender balance among country office staff by year (2018-2021)



Source: Master National Staff List, December 2018, 2019, 2020 and November 2021; International Staff List 2018-2021.


**163. Gender in relation to beneficiaries:** The portfolio focused specific attention on children and female beneficiaries, including young girls. Specifically, some activities were aimed at securing stronger education opportunities for girls, engaging women in FFA activities and priming women as target beneficiaries of SO2 and SO3. The CSP emphasized reducing gender and demographic gaps. The disempowerment of women in the broader spheres of society call for WFP (according to WFP staff themselves) to take a firmer and deeper view on gender equality and its promotion, within, but also outside the office. Multiple respondents agree that the gender context in Pakistan is complex and that women are at a considerable disadvantage; women are vulnerable due to their income, status, location where they live, and so on.

164. WFP is well placed to play a role in supporting efforts to shift gender perspectives locally and contribute to the efforts of development initiatives in Pakistan to transform gender roles. However, this is a slow and steady process and cannot be addressed through short-term actions. A consistent long-term approach is needed. Specifically, this means that activities must go beyond helping women to supporting structural changes in how women are engaged by and in society. There are a few efforts that have aimed to tackle gender issues: overall, the portfolio focused on supporting women as beneficiaries because they have been considered more vulnerable. The support was well received, but, as can be expected in such contexts, further efforts are needed to address the underlying causes of the vulnerability they experience. Examples from the current initiatives include: their economic inclusion through FFA activities; and addressing stunting and malnutrition through KP SPRING and Ehsaas. The impact of such actions can be further enhanced to achieve long-lasting changes by, for instance, extending promising FFA activities to achieve and sustain greater resilience, and kicking off new initiatives with a strong gendered focus. Such efforts would also need to explore ways to include the participation of key actors, including men, so that they facilitate the development/strengthening of an enabling environment – for example, making the health system function in favour of women and children so that the CSP's objective to reduce gender gaps is achieved more effectively and sustainably.

165. To measure progress on gender as a cross-cutting issue, WFP collected data on five indicators. Three of these are included in Figure 27, the others can be found in Annex XII. The indicators listed in Figure 28 show that the number of households where women played an important decision-making role was far above the expected target in 2017 when the baseline was conducted, and in 2018 and 2019, and dropped drastically in 2020. In 2020, the number of male decision makers rose, as did the number of households where decisions were taken jointly – from 41 percent to 55 percent. On review of this data and of the context in the provinces visited, the increase can be explained by the high proportion of men who, to secure an income, are absent from the home for long days, or overnight (they live in a quasi-regular basis away from their family). The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic meant that many men returned home because they lost their jobs, or due to lockdowns. So, while the data is interesting and shows some overall improvement in

joint decision making, the important fluctuations would require a more in-depth analysis from the country office. While it is understood that the aim was to improve joint decision making, it is also not clear why targets for decision making by women were set below the men's targets, considering that the baseline for women's decision making was slightly higher at the outset. The two other indicators (see Annex XII), are not very helpful in determining WFP's gendered approach, as they measured elements which WFP had limited, or no, control over (i.e., third-party organizational management) or targeted female beneficiaries, which is not a demonstration of a gendered approach on its own.

**Figure 28: Gender cross-cutting indicators**



Source: COMET reports CM-R009b 2018, 2019, 2020 (on 9 August 2021) and 2021 (on 1 June 2022), and ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.

### EQ2.3 To what extent are the achievements of the CSP likely to be sustainable?

#### Finding 2.3

The Government values the activities conducted under the CSP and currently drives the implementation of SPRING (SO3) and Ehsaas (SO2). These efforts are likely to continue. Although other activities led by WFP are appreciated and recognized as valuable, there is limited indication that these will be sustained.

166. The findings show that WFP-initiated activities that were driven by the Government and are already part of the provincial and federal governments' responses are more likely to be sustainable, such as KP SPRING.<sup>124</sup>

167. **SO1:** These activities are conceived as short term and mostly entail rapid response/recovery which are not intended to be sustainable.

168. **SO2:** Activities included: support that was integrated into Ehsaas programmes and therefore fit well within an existing government structure and could be sustained; the school meal programme which was an activity designed and implemented by WFP. Although the latter activity was welcomed and considered successful by interviewed government representatives, there were few indications that the government would absorb and finance this activity into their regular operations.

169. **SO3:** As with Ehsaas, SPRING and Accelerated Action Plan have high potential for sustainability due to the joint nature of the activities and the considerable Government ownership. Therefore, it is likely that the Government will absorb these efforts into their regular support structures/mechanisms.

170. **SO4:** The support provided under this SO was limited. Interviews conducted with government representatives suggested that in-kind support (additional human resources) was unlikely to be sustained, or at least that there were no plans to engage additional personnel to fulfil these roles. The HRF, however, are being integrated into the government structure/system for emergency response. Questions remain about the degree to which the Government will allocate the resources needed to ensure that these facilities will be effectively maintained and ready to be used when needed.

171. **SO5:** It is not possible to determine, at this stage, how sustainable the knowledge generated through training will be. Some respondents raised concerns regarding staff turnover, particularly at the provincial government level. In relation to the wheat siloes that WFP planned to restore, at the time of data collection, it was not yet clear if the Government had the capacity (financing for maintenance, manpower or skill set) to manage, maintain and effectively use the silos in the long term.

172. Aside from this, it was also found that there are some activities that should consider a transfer to the Government before the SO is achieved. Essentially, for the long-term sustainability of the SO to be achieved, it may be preferable for the Government to take over earlier in the process. This specific dynamic is depicted using a purple line in the Theory in Use (see Annex X).

173. In relation to the availability of technical capacity in Pakistan, the distinction between activities is also visible. This is mainly the case for activities such as CBTs, and provision of school meals, which are programmes that were fully implemented by WFP, and where the Government has no current capacity. Likewise, the management and maintenance of the HRF and wheat storage siloes may also face challenges in relation to available technical capacity and the financial resources needed to ensure their long-term upkeep.

174. Despite these shortcomings, it is important to underline that interviews with government staff, at both provincial and central levels, consistently highlighted the relevance and importance of the activity. This sense of ownership was not, however, coupled by a clear commitment or ability to allocate resources to the continuation of activities independent of WFP.

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<sup>124</sup> The country office also noted that there are activities, for example, in the climate change field, that are currently under development, and which are likely to be sustainable. However, these have not yet started and therefore are not included in this report.

175. Lastly, in relation to transitioning resources or capacity to the Government, the HRF (SO4) and food siloes (SO5) are the only activities where WFP envisioned a clear transition of assets from WFP to the Government.

#### **EQ2.4 To what extent did the CSP facilitate more strategic linkages between humanitarian, development and, where appropriate, peace work?**

##### **Finding 2.4**

Although there are multiple opportunities for linkages between SOs, the CO implemented them in relatively rigid silos. Moreover, although WFP's own work traverses nexus elements there is little evidence of efforts to articulate WFP work with that of other actors across the nexus elements.

176. The Pakistani context is complex and volatile. Often simple implementation issues arising from how emergency response or development activities are delivered can quickly build into disputes and conflicts. From this perspective most often the security situation and political fragility of the country mean that many activities that WFP carries out oscillate between humanitarian, resilience-building, development, and contribution to peace. In many instances the degree to which any activity conducted is humanitarian, resilience-building or developmental has more to do with how the activity is planned and executed than the potential role of the activity.

177. Pakistan experiences shocks (natural or man-made) that interrupt development efforts plunging these into settings requiring crisis response on a quasi-regular basis. These crises can easily disrupt security and transform seemingly peaceful settings into conflictual or conflict prone ones. Some provinces experience this dynamic more often than others; for example, Balochistan is well recognized by the Government and cooperation partners, as well as WFP staff, for its unpredictability. This requires remaining flexible in the way development (root causes and resilience) activities are implemented and be continuously ready to respond in a humanitarian or development focused manner. WFP can support peace work by providing food to very vulnerable groups and thereby reducing the possibility of violence related to lack of resources. Likewise, engaging local NGO cooperating partners in newly merged areas supports conflict sensitive programming since these partners are aware of local dynamics, speak the language, and have a wider social acceptance to reach out to women and other beneficiaries when compared to organizations that are not based locally.

178. What the above means is that WFP is constantly operating in the realm of all three areas of work, and often there is considerable overlap between those. However, the data collected in the three provinces visited, shows that, so far, WFP was not able to fully capitalize on its own role as an active contributor to the three nexus elements nor to systematically articulate its own work with that of others to ensure that its efforts are firmly grounded across the nexus /alongside efforts of others.

179. At a broader level the question is about general articulation and coherence across United Nations activities, not just nexus. The findings show that broader articulation is needed to ensure that all agencies capitalize on their respective areas of competence. Likewise, stronger articulation between WFP activities would also be beneficial.

### **2.3 EQ3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?**

#### **EQ3.1 To what extent were outputs delivered within the intended timeframe?**

##### **Finding 3.1**

Emergency response efforts, and support to COVID-19 activities were responsive. When it comes to resilience building and addressing root causes, activities were not/could not be implemented as planned due to limited funding, limited networks and skills available. Implementation was affected by administrative procedures including limitations imposed by the Government (i.e. security).

180. According to the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities and cooperating partners, WFP has generally been able to deliver crisis response support. In some instances, support was delayed due to administrative procedures (i.e. Government permit restrictions and delays). Respondents noted that support was consistent across provinces. However, CBT was more restricted and somewhat slower than food transfers. This evaluation identified several factors that contributed to on-time delivery of crisis response activities: a consistent ability to mobilize resources for crisis response; staff who are very well qualified to manage crisis response operations; and infrastructure that supports administration and management of crisis response efforts.

181. During the COVID-19 pandemic, WFP took a number of steps to ensure continuous programme implementation. It supported its cooperating partners with basic health and safety equipment. In addition, WFP skill and expertise in CBT was used during COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021 to support the Government on how to conduct rapid emergency CBT schemes. WFP was reportedly the only organization with the right skills and systems to handle CBT, and hence WFP resources were activated to distribute funds from the Government.

182. The CSP focused considerable attention on addressing root causes and resilience building, but WFP was not able to deliver as expected. Although activities were relevant (e.g. aligned with contextual needs and responded to specific and recognized challenges) many could not be implemented as planned. This was due to two main factors: funding was not as readily available as it was earmarked for SO1; and the in-house competences and relevant networks to deliver the planned activities were not available.

183. Aside from these issues, there were some important administrative concerns. During data collection it was noted that cooperating partners, specifically CSOs, routinely experienced delays with contracting and fund disbursements, which led to considerable delays. There were also delays linked to issuance of 'no objection certificates' by the state agencies, and therefore it was hard for the partners to organize themselves with the right human and physical resources to furnish quality support within the contract's specified timeframe. This meant that plans often did not materialize and activities were not delivered as planned in quality or in quantity. Moreover, although there were constraints tied to the onset of COVID-19, there was a general sense that the end of 2019/early 2020 saw increased and focused attention on deliverables, and operations gained some additional momentum.

### 3.2 To what extent was coverage and targeting of interventions appropriate?

#### Finding 3.2

The highest coverage in terms of absolute numbers was for crisis response activities (SO1), which suggests that WFP was able to mobilize resources and respond operationally to new crises in a very efficient way. Although well regarded and relevant, activities under the other SOs were small in scale, and these were not rolled out by the Government as WFP had expected. Insufficient resources and earmarking in favour of SO1 were among the key reasons for reduced coverage under the resilience-building and root causes focus areas.

184. The data collected suggests that coverage, in terms of total beneficiaries reached by each SO, was consistently lower than planned. Looking at absolute numbers over the years, the highest number of beneficiaries was consistently for SO1, which focused on crisis response. Overall, the data clearly show that proportionally the focus was on SO1, and that SO2 (Activity 4), SO3 and SO4 were less able to reach the target beneficiaries over the CSP duration (see Table 14). WFP was governed by available resources; interviews conducted suggest they were not able to effectively use unearmarked funding to support activities that were underfunded, and unable to secure the resources needed to implement their activities.

185. Comparing planned versus actual number of beneficiaries reached across activities shows some variations (Table 14). For Activity 1, the number of planned beneficiaries increased over the years, while planned beneficiaries decreased for Activity 2. Activity 3 experienced a far greater than expected beneficiary reach in 2018 and 2019 (3732.50 percent and 1964.04 percent respectively). This high number of beneficiaries reached can be explained by the collaboration between WFP and BISP under Activity 3 which supported people who were experiencing food insecurity having been affected by the drought in the

provinces of Balochistan and Sindh in 2018 and 2019.<sup>125</sup> Activity 4 was considerably underfunded (4.30 percent funded, see financial overview in Table 5) and, unsurprisingly, less than 50 percent of planned beneficiaries were reached. Activity 5 presents variable results, while for Activity 6, no beneficiaries were reached as a result of low funding. Despite the challenges faced due to COVID-19 in 2020, WFP was able to reach more than 75 percent in 2020 and 69 percent in 2021 of its planned beneficiaries for Activities 1, 2 and 3. This suggests that, while it faced more clear challenges in other focus areas, WFP is able to mobilize resources and respond operationally to new crises in very efficient ways.

**Table 14: Planned vs actual beneficiaries per activity and per year between 2018 and 2021<sup>126</sup>**

Strategic Outcomes		Strategic Outcome 1		Strategic Outcome 2		Strategic Outcome 3	Strategic Outcome 4
Activities		Activity 1	Activity 2	Activity 3	Activity 4	Activity 5	Activity 6
Year	Beneficiaries	Food Transfers and CBT	Food Transfers and CBT	Food Transfers and CBT	Food Transfers and CBT	Food Transfers	CBT
2018	Planned	390,000	900,000	9,850	441,000	734,150	15,000
	Actual	159,666	723,521	367,651	0	453,212	0
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>40.94%</b>	<b>80.39%</b>	<b>3732.50%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>61.73%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
2019	Planned	300,000	900,000	9,850	323,000	917,900	42,000
	Actual	118,873	753,065	193,458	0	259,211	0
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>39.62%</b>	<b>83.67%</b>	<b>1964.04%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>28.24%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
2020	Planned	918,784	324,026	570,719	346,000	796,900	156,000
	Actual	689,406	272,225	561,104	32,619	450,462	0
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>75.03%</b>	<b>84.01%</b>	<b>98.32%</b>	<b>9.43%</b>	<b>56.53%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
2021	Planned	466,290	240,500	22,750	325,000	759,100	
	Actual	422,950	105,386	15,899	105,359	233,987	
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>90.71%</b>	<b>43.82%</b>	<b>69.89%</b>	<b>32.42%</b>	<b>30.82%</b>	

Source: ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and COMET report CM-P006 (accessed on 12 November 2021). Beneficiary figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters. In Activity 6 in 2021, there were no planned or implemented food or CBT transfers.

186. Table 15 shows that WFP distributed fewer CBT and commodity volumes than planned across 2018 to 2021. This correlates with data that show that not all planned beneficiaries were reached, except for Activity 3 in 2018 and 2019, (explained earlier as a result of the partnership with Ehsaas). Furthermore, achievement rates in terms of quantities of food/CBT transferred, in-kind food fared better than CBT and vouchers for the years 2018-2020, but not for 2021. This shift can be attributed to the Government's reticence to permitting the use of CBT, and the advantages that CBT presented during COVID-19.

<sup>125</sup> WFP. *Annual Country Report*, 2018, 2019, 2020.

<sup>126</sup> The 193,458 beneficiaries under Activity 3 in 2019 are not reported in ACR 2019 as the resources used to support these beneficiaries were programmed as capacity strengthening.



**Table 15: Planned vs actual CBT and food transfers (2018-2021)**

Year	Planned and actual	Cash and Commodity Vouchers (USD)	Commodity Volume (MT)
2018	Planned	20,463,586	56,254
	Actual	6,356,035	35,385
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>31.06%</b>	<b>62.90%</b>
2019	Planned	20,107,264	48,784
	Actual	4,514,128	32,447
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>22.45%</b>	<b>66.51%</b>
2020	Planned	22,557,826	40,458
	Actual	7,614,476	29,546
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>33.76%</b>	<b>73.03%</b>
2021	Planned	14,302,903	16,549
	Actual	7,381,916	6,565
	<b>% reached</b>	<b>51.61%</b>	<b>39.67%</b>

Source: ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and COMET report CM-P006 2021 on 12 November 2021. Expenditure figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters.

187. An important challenge in Pakistan was scale. Multiple activities were extremely small-scale – in many instances at village or single school level, or targeting a small group of beneficiaries. In some instances, scale was negatively affected by delays in contracting cooperating partners (e.g. two months lost out of six) who then had difficulties reaching beneficiaries in the time allocated for activities (four months or less out of six). Scale remained a challenge and there were no clear plans to draw lessons to inform a potential roll-out by the Government. Some senior members of the Government suggested that, rather than thinly spreading their resources, WFP should concentrate them and offer support at scale. This view underlines the Government’s perception of WFP. However, there are opportunities to shift WFP’s role to one that is more aligned with its own vision (to be a strategic partner providing institutional and policy support and working on pilot catalytic interventions). WFP is in a privileged position by being able to interact with the Government at central and provincial levels. In the future, it will be important for WFP to better assess how it can support the Government to scale up pilot activities in a sustainable way.

188. In relation to targeting, the data suggest that WFP was able to reach a considerable number of the most vulnerable. However, as discussed in EQ1.2, there are some important shortcomings to the targeting approaches currently used, and this may have meant that some vulnerable groups were not systematically reached.

**EQ3.3 To what extent were WFP activities cost-efficient in delivery of its assistance?**

**Finding 3.3**

The design of the CSP bears all the hallmarks of a cost-efficient effort, with a large percentage of the transfer costs for in-kind food distributions and CBT being delivered into the hands of beneficiaries, and an overall good usage of allocated resources across all activities. However, due to COVID-19, Activities 6, 7 and 8 focusing on CCS were halted and limited, therefore resources could not be fully utilized as intended. This negatively affected cost effectiveness.

189. WFP is well established for crisis response and knows how to secure and administer supplies in a manner that is cost-effective. It was also noted that WFP managed to lease out their unused space to other organizations, which suggests a good way (albeit limited in impact) of reducing overhead costs when resources are dormant.

190. WFP relied on several NGOs to implement activities on the ground. This is a good approach for ensuring outreach to less accessible areas, and strengthening institutional capacity of local NGOs. Interviews conducted with WFP and cooperating partners noted that the cost of the service provided is the determining factor in relation to cost efficiency. However, due to permissions to operate, particularly in former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (the newly merged districts), there are constraints on which operating agencies can be engaged. This means that there is no competition, and that WFP has limited choice on the quality of the service provider, a concern the organization voiced on occasion. Some respondents noted that, in some instances, organizations that are permitted to work locally do not have the right expertise to do so. Several initiatives have been taken by the country office to address issues related to field-level agreements and partner selection issues.

191. More specifically in relation to cost efficiency, a large percentage of the operational budgets for in-kind food distributions and CBT was delivered into the hands of beneficiaries, averaging 78 percent for in-kind food and 91 percent for CBT. Table 16 highlights some variations across activities and years, although those are minimal.

Table 16: Food and CBT value as a percentage of total food and CBT costs (food or CBT value + transfer costs) by NBP and actuals per year and activities<sup>127</sup>

Activity	Modality	2018		2019		2020		2021		Cumulative	
		NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual
Activity 1	Food	80.43%	84.03%	80.61%	70.39%	77.14%	72.65%	65.76%	53.84%	77.42%	74.25%
	CBT	91.79%		91.79%		90.91%	88.39%	90.50%	92.60%	91.18%	91.16%
Activity 2	Food	65.77%	71.61%	65.87%	65.71%		0.00%	63.03%	72.87%	65.59%	69.32%
	CBT	91.79%	91.61%	91.79%	92.41%	88.12%	90.74%	87.72%	85.44%	90.32%	90.72%
Activity 3	Food	87.29%	87.89%	87.38%	86.67%	86.37%				87.07%	87.67%
	CBT	91.79%		92.98%		96.21%		87.34%	97.50%	93.73%	97.50%
Activity 4	Food	74.79%		74.83%		72.25%		29.11%		70.31%	
	CBT	87.45%		88.57%		88.44%	88.59%	78.06%	95.80%	87.29%	95.02%
Activity 5	Food	86.25%	87.94%	86.35%	90.86%	85.06%	86.30%	84.82%	76.56%	85.68%	86.52%
Activity 6	CBT	91.79%		91.48%		91.54%				91.54%	
TOTAL	Food	78.08%	80.51%	78.58%	78.30%	79.65%	79.02%	74.79%	68.74%	78.08%	78.24%
	CBT	91.48%	91.61%	91.53%	92.41%	90.19%	90.03%	88.42%	90.78%	90.54%	91.02%

Source: Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) Plan vs Actuals Report v2.1 on 4 November 2021. Figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters.

192. The cost of distributing one metric ton of food was generally lower than planned for all activities where food was actually distributed, except for Activity 3 where actual costs were much higher than planned (Table 17).<sup>128</sup> This suggests that WFP found ways to contain costs despite a global context of rising food prices. A review of the cost of delivering CBT also reveals that the average cost of delivering 1 USD through CBT was equal to, or lower than, expected (Table 18).

<sup>127</sup> Shaded cells indicate that no data was reported in the source files, therefore no analysis could be conducted.

<sup>128</sup> The reason for higher costs under Activity 3 was that the food tonnage and its associated costing was only a small fraction of this activity, which was principally focused on a study on stunting prevention undertaken by the Government through the Benazir Income Support Programme.

Table 17: Total expenditure per metric ton of food distributed (USD) by original and revised NBP and actuals per activity<sup>129</sup>

Activity	2018-2021		
	Original NBP	Revised NBP	Actual
Activity 1	\$627	\$610	\$449
Activity 2	\$645	\$646	\$556
Activity 3	\$2,750	\$2,734	\$15,787
Activity 4	\$1,259	\$1,282	N/A*
Activity 5	\$2,979	\$3,088	\$2,814
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,244</b>	<b>\$1,146</b>	<b>\$717</b>

Source: COMET reports CM-C002, CM-A002 and CPB Plan vs Actuals Report on 4 November 2021. \* No in-kind food was distributed.

Table 18: Total expenditure per 1 USD value of cash transferred (USD) by NBP and actual per year and activity

Activity	2018		2019		2020		2021		Cumulative	
	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual	NBP	Actual
Activity 1	\$0.09		\$0.09		\$0.10	\$0.13	\$0.10	\$0.08	\$0.10	\$0.10
Activity 2	\$0.09	\$0.09	\$0.09	\$0.08	\$0.13	\$0.10	\$0.14	\$0.17	\$0.11	\$0.10
Activity 3	\$0.09		\$0.08		\$0.04		\$0.15	\$0.03	\$0.07	\$0.03
Activity 4	\$0.14		\$0.13		\$0.13	\$0.13	\$0.28	\$0.04	\$0.15	\$0.05
Activity 6	\$0.09		\$0.09		\$0.09				\$0.09	
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$0.09</b>	<b>\$0.09</b>	<b>\$0.09</b>	<b>\$0.08</b>	<b>\$0.11</b>	<b>\$0.11</b>	<b>\$0.13</b>	<b>\$0.10</b>	<b>\$0.10</b>	<b>\$0.10</b>

Source: CPB-Plan vs Actuals Report v2.1 on 4 November 2021.

<sup>129</sup> Average planned/actual cost of distributing 1 mt of food were calculated by dividing the total planned/actual transfer expenditures by the total planned/actual quantity of food distributed over the CSP period (2018-2021).

193. Table 19 shows that the usage of allocated resources across most activities was generally good. The percentage of allocated resources spent ranged between 63.09 and 99.92 percent. Due to COVID-19, Activities 6, 7 and 8 focusing on CCS were halted and limited, therefore resources could not be utilized as intended.

**Table 19: CSP Pakistan expenditure between 2018 and 2021**

CSP Pakistan Activities		Allocated Resources (USD)	Expenditure to date (USD)	Percentage of allocated resources spent	Available balance (USD)
Strategic Outcome 1	<b>Activity 1: Provide humanitarian and recovery assistance to meet the basic food and nutrition needs of the most vulnerable population affected by a man-made or natural disaster.</b>	45,143,809	44,824,220	<b>99.29%</b>	319,588
	<b>Activity 2: Support affected populations during early recovery phase to address food insecurity and rebuild livelihoods.</b>	44,202,574	38,584,782	<b>87.29%</b>	5,617,792
Strategic Outcome 2	<b>Activity 3: Augment Government of Pakistan social protection mechanisms like the Benazir Income Support Programme to support food and nutrition insecure urban and rural poor people.</b>	4,005,167	4,002,026	<b>99.92%</b>	3,141
	<b>Activity 4: Provide technical assistance on school meals to provincial governments and implement school meals programmes as appropriate.</b>	2,018,089	1,634,926	<b>81.01%</b>	383,163
Strategic Outcome 3	<b>Activity 5: Assist the Government in achieving SDG 2.2 through improved governance, quality implementation, evidence generation and innovation.</b>	63,848,012	49,644,792	<b>77.75%</b>	14,203,220
Strategic Outcome 4	<b>Activity 6: Support all levels of the Government and communities in adopting and operationalizing and integrated climate risk management system.</b>	1,846,047	1,176,291	<b>63.72%</b>	669,757
	<b>Activity 7: Strengthen the Government's and communities' capacity for disaster risk reduction.</b>	4,750,401	3,782,522	<b>79.63%</b>	967,879
Strategic Outcome 5	<b>Activity 8: Strengthen Government and partner capabilities to provide food security and essential services.</b>	2,961,967	1,868,633	<b>63.09%</b>	1,093,334

Source: ACRs 2018, 2019, 2020 and Cumulative Financial Overview on 4 November 2021. Expenditure figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters.

194. Table 20 shows the decrease in cost effectiveness over time. Indeed, direct support cost (DSC) as a proportion of total cost increased as the overall budget reduced, and is higher than the planned DSC. This shows that a reduction in overall support does not lead to a proportional decrease in costs of delivering the support, as some DSC costs are incompressible regardless of the scale of the programme. This suggests that the greater the size of the support, the lower the share of DSC. This also needs to be understood in

relation to the nature of the activities provided. For example, providing support to CCS may not require higher costs.

**Table 20: Direct support cost (DSC) as a share of total costs<sup>130</sup>**

Year	Planned			Actual		
	Direct Support Costs (DSC) (USD)	Total Costs (USD)	DSC share of Total Costs	Direct Support Costs (DSC) (USD)	Total Costs (USD)	DSC share of Total Costs
2018	6,997,752	122,904,890	5.69%	3,367,060	50,698,079	6.64%
2019	7,015,219	117,395,425	5.98%	3,511,747	42,576,030	8.25%
2020	6,997,856	106,897,961	6.55%	4,077,784	46,756,458	8.72%
2021	6,829,598	70,824,050	9.64%	3,468,312	29,273,939	11.85%

Source: CPB Plan vs Actuals Report; FACTory report ACR-5 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 annual financial overview on 4 November 21. Expenditure figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters.

**EQ3.4 To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered?**

**Finding 3.4**

While there is no evidence that WFP focused attention on the identification of more cost-effective alternatives, its effort to become a trusted and reliable strategic partner to the Government are key to ensure long-term cost effectiveness. Also, the choice of activity and transfer modality tends to be driven more by general feasibility than cost-effectiveness considerations.

195. The evaluation did not find evidence that WFP focused attention on the identification of more cost-effective alternatives. NGO cooperating partners were not aware of any cost-effective measures they should implement, or that WFP had implemented. The Government, at the central level, noted that WFP was a very important cost-effective partner for them. This perspective is not surprising since, for the Government, WFP has a “matching funds” role. The Government contributes considerably to WFP, and as WFP is also able to generate considerable funding from other sources (see Table 22), WFP sees its own investment multiplied.

196. However, the emphasis for WFP was on how to best achieve sustainable results. From this perspective, the efforts to become a strategic partner of the Government must be recognized as an important element of cost effectiveness, where the focus was on delivering services and identifying areas where external assistance is needed to augment Government capacities.

197. Efforts to determine the most appropriate transfer modality (CBT, food or voucher) or activity appear to have not been driven by cost-effectiveness considerations, but rather by general feasibility questions (i.e. government support, and regulatory environment). For example, CBT was not favoured by the Government and therefore it was used sparingly and only when alternatives were not available. This meant that WFP was not able to reasonably consider cost effectiveness as a determinant when identifying transfer modalities or activities.

<sup>130</sup> The total costs include cost of commodities/CBT, ocean transport and related costs, landside, transport, storage and handling, and other operational costs, DSC (any costs that cannot be directly attributed to any activity such as staff, office rent, vehicles and maintenance costs, and communications, computer and security equipment) as well as indirect support costs.

## 2.4 EQ4: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED BY THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

### EQ4.1 To what extent did WFP analyse, or use, existing evidence on the hunger challenges, food security and nutrition issues in Pakistan to develop the CSP?

#### Finding 4.1

The documentary evidence suggests that the development of the CSP was informed by available analysis on nutrition and food security. Although basic monitoring requirements were met, there was limited evidence that the data collected allowed for effective measurement of progress for all outcomes and informed strategic decision making.

198. The materials listed below were used as foundations for the development of the CSP:

- a. The Strategic Review of Food Security and Nutrition, conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute and Aga Khan University under the Ministry of Finance and the United Nations Resident Coordinator's chairmanship.
- b. Pakistan 2025 Vision which highlights seven priorities for the country: People First, Growth, Governance, Security, Entrepreneurship, Knowledge Economy and Connectivity.
- c. Pakistan Climate Change Policy, complementing the National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy and Management Plan.
- d. Mid-term evaluation of the Protected Relief and Recovery (PRRO) (2013-2015) which recommended that stunting prevention should be aligned with other interventions.
- e. The 2016 annual monitoring report of WFP Pakistan's Zero Hunger Country Capacity Strengthening interventions.
- f. The United Nations Sustainable Development Framework for Pakistan 2018-2022.

199. Despite being able to document the above, understanding the degree to which evidence was effectively used to inform the implementation of the CSP was a challenge. The documentation on the SDGs focusing on zero hunger, the national nutrition surveys, the integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) data, and demographic and health surveys were specifically referenced, but how they were used, and to what extent, is unclear.

200. Based on the interviews and how data were provided to the Evaluation Team, the basic requirements of the monitoring system have been fulfilled. However, not all outcome indicators used by WFP to measure progress were tracked, partly due to funding constraints.<sup>131</sup> In some instances, notably for CCS, WFP corporate indicators did not allow for the effective measurement of progress against the intended outcomes. Moreover, at the field level, there was limited evidence that monitoring data collected was actively and continually used to examine activities and how these may be improved, if needed. The approach appears to focus largely on the use of tried and tested mechanisms whereby data collection on indicators was largely focused on documenting outputs (performance), rather than learning. Indeed, there is no consistent real-time feedback mechanism that ensures that the beneficiary experiences are documented, and any concerns addressed. This does not mean that there are no examples of monitoring leading to field programmatic changes, but rather that these examples are not the norm.

201. Interviewees noted that other documents, mainly evaluations, have been used to inform the implementation of activities, but they were unable to provide specific examples.

### EQ4.2 To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, predictable, and flexible resources to finance the CSP?

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<sup>131</sup> See Section 1.4 and Annex III on evaluation methodology.

## Finding 4.2

As at November 2021, the CSP was still 41 percent funded, with the majority of the resources going to emergency response (SO1) followed by root causes, while resilience was hardly funded. With the CSP, the Government of Pakistan has become the main contributor to WFP. Funding is largely earmarked at activity level which is challenging, but WFP also experienced challenges in using the limited available unearmarked resources in a timely manner.

202. The ability of WFP to mobilize adequate, predictable, flexible resources was assessed in terms of overall funding available; level of earmarking and diversity of donor base.

203. **Overall funding available:** When comparing the pre-CSP and the CSP period, WFP operational requirements were substantially higher during the 2013-2017 period than those under the CSP period (2018-2022) (Table 21). A stark funding decline is observed over time: The 2013-2015 PRRO was funded at 85.5 percent; the 2016-2017 PRRO secured 63.73 percent of its requirements and the CSP had only secured 40.78 percent of its NBP as of November 2021. This shows that, since 2013, available resources, and the percentage funded, substantially reduced.

**Table 21: Pre-CSP and CSP financial situation**

Period	Years	Programme	Recipients	Budget	Funding	% budget funded
Special Operation	June 2014 - 2016	<u>Special Operation SO 200707:</u> Logistics Capacity Development in Support of the National Disaster Management Authority	Pakistan	\$9,666,690.00	\$642,000	6.64%
Pre-CSP	Jan 2013 - Dec 2015	<u>PRRO 200250:</u> Enhancing Food and Nutrition Security and Rebuilding Social Cohesion	Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan	\$676,125,674	\$578,361,292	85.54%
	Jan 2016 - Dec 2018	<u>PRRO 200867:</u> Transition Towards Resilience and Food Secure in Pakistan	Pakistan	\$349,705,324	\$222,867,739	63.73%
CSP	Jan 2018 - Dec 2022	Pakistan Country Strategic Plan	Pakistan	\$475,334,051	\$208,613,304	43.89%

Source: WFP operations database (Standard Project Reports and Resource Situation Report for pre-CSP programmes, and CSP document and Resource Situation Report for the CSP).

204. **Earmarking level:** During the CSP, most donors provided funding earmarked at activity level (83 percent) (Figure 29), with a bias towards crisis response, thereby reducing WFP's flexibility in terms of implementation. Figure 30 shows that the focus of the CSP on root causes (see NBP for each focus area) was clear, but available resources were concentrated in crisis response. Resilience-building was the least funded (19.9 percent). The data also suggest that WFP in Pakistan was slightly better equipped to utilize resources in the crisis response focus area, with a rate of expenditure of 93 percent against 75 percent for resilience building, and 78 percent for root causes.<sup>132</sup> Clearly, different tasks require different forms of investment, and crisis response includes activities that are far more cost-intensive than training, for example. Still, the trend in funding and expenditure is a valuable yardstick to examine where donors feel their funds are most useful and WFP best equipped to act.


205. Interviews conducted with Government officials, WFP staff, donors and representatives of other United Nations agencies consistently noted that the ease with which WFP can secure emergency response funding, and comparative difficulty found in securing funds for other focus areas was directly tied to how donors see WFP's advantage. WFP corporate CSP architecture along three distinct focus areas allows donors to earmark their contributions to a given focus area, which contributes to a siloed implementation of the CSP.

<sup>132</sup> Data valid until 4 November 2021.




206. However, the evaluation also found that there were unearmarked resources (from a single donor) which were not used during the timeframe expected by the donor. This is highly problematic because it suggests that, even when funds are unearmarked and WFP has full flexibility on how to invest them, it is not consistently able to allocate and spend funds on schedule.

**Figure 29: Pakistan Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) (2018-2022) directed multilateral earmarked contributions by level of earmarking**



Source: Direct multilateral contributions by earmarking level (WFP the Factory) on 22 September 2021

**Figure 30: Comparative funding distribution – NBP vs allocated resources vs expenditures by focus area 2018-2021**



Source: Pakistan CSP(PK01) BR3<sup>133</sup>; Pakistan BR 01 Budget Plan; 2018-2021 Cumulative financial overview on 4 November 2021. Figures for 2021 are provisional and not validated by headquarters.

**207. Diversity of donor base:** Over time, Pakistan and the USA have consistently funded most WFP activities in Pakistan. The USA funded 33.48 percent and 25.63 percent of the PRROs for the 2013-2015 and 2016-2018 periods, while the Government funded 27.88 and 21.67 percent over the same two PRRO periods.<sup>134</sup> Table 22 shows that Pakistan is the primary donor of the CSP (29.63 percent of the total

<sup>133</sup> While the source is named BR3\_05\_Aug 2021\_0, this is the second budget revision from August 2021.

<sup>134</sup> WFP resource situation documents for respective PRROs.

contributions). The proportional increase in Pakistan's own funding is also noted. In 2020 and 2021 (up to Q3) Pakistan had made the largest contributions, with funds amounting to USD 13.6 million and USD 14.9 million respectively.<sup>135</sup> Although over recent years there was some decline in USA funding, their contribution to the overall CSP remains the second most important (26.42 percent).

208. This means that together these two donors are central to determining the degree to which CSP activities are implemented as planned. Ensuring that these two donors understand the added value, and intended direction of WFP in Pakistan, is therefore critical to ensuring WFP's ability to secure the required resources and implement the CSP as planned. This would also require some flexibility regarding how donors fund WFP, moving away from providing funding earmarked for a specific focus areas or activity to a more flexible funding approach.

209. It is also worth noting that the overall donor pool was quite stable over time, which also supports predictability in funding. Canada, the European Commission, Saudi Arabia and Australia have all supported WFP annually since 2017, as has the United Kingdom, (except in 2019) and Switzerland in 2020. However, most donors have steadily decreased their contribution. Also notable is that the proportion of funds by private donors is limited, but increased from USD 178,000 in 2017 to almost USD 293,000 in 2020.<sup>136</sup>

210. The challenges that WFP experienced securing resources for some of the activities suggests that, even though the CSP was drafted in close consultation with the Government, its implications were not fully embraced. A review of documentation and interviews failed to shed light on how or why this occurred, but it does suggest that, while a CSP is an important platform for discussion and general guidance, continued engagement during implementation is equally important to ensure a common vision of how the plan is put into practice. The original data collected from the field underscored the importance, and value, of ongoing Government engagement at national and provincial levels. This engagement needs to be the cornerstone of future support as it is central to ensuring that joint efforts are adapted to changes and continue to be relevant, valued and well understood by all those involved. In the case of Pakistan, having both central and provincial government engagement and endorsement was critical.

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<sup>135</sup> Annual historical overview WFP the Factory, on 11 January 2022.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

Table 22: Proportion of funding by donors<sup>137</sup>

NEEDS-BASED PLAN IN USD			
475,334,051			
Donor	Allocated contributions (in US\$)	Share of Needs-Based Plan (%)	Share of allocated contributions (%)
Pakistan	61,806,902	13.00%	29.63%
USA	55,113,580	11.59%	26.42%
United Kingdom	18,491,991	3.89%	8.86%
Australia	12,158,928	2.56%	5.83%
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN CERF)	11,253,007	2.37%	5.39%
Canada	9,694,768	2.04%	4.65%
Flexible funding	8,669,932	1.82%	4.16%
Resource transfer	5,822,432	1.22%	2.79%
Miscellaneous income	5,627,385	1.18%	2.70%
European commission	4,630,127	0.97%	2.22%
Japan	4,074,007	0.86%	1.95%
Regional or Trust Fund allocations	3,156,348	0.66%	1.51%
Emerging Donor Matching Fund (EDMF)	2,000,000	0.42%	0.96%
Switzerland	1,494,575	0.31%	0.72%
UN country based pooled funds	1,408,138	0.30%	0.67%
Private donors	1,133,973	0.24%	0.54%
Saudi Arabia	804,065	0.17%	0.39%
UN other funds and agencies (excl. CERF)	696,983	0.15%	0.33%
Norway	245,126	0.05%	0.12%
Republic of Korea	198,020	0.04%	0.09%
China	133,017	0.03%	0.06%
<b>Total</b>	<b>208,613,304</b>	<b>43.89%</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
<b>Needs-Based Plan funded:</b>	<b>208,613,304</b>		
<b>% Needs-Based Plan funded:</b>	<b>43.89%</b>		
<b>Shortfall (of Needs-Based Plan):</b>	<b>266,720,747</b>		

Source: 2018-2022 resource situation report on 11 November 2021. The discrepancy between figures in Tables 4 and 20 and Table 21 (percentage of NBP funded for 2018-22) is related to the inclusion of advances in Table 21.

**EQ4.3 To what extent did the CSP lead to partnerships and collaborations with other actors that positively influenced performance and results?**

**Finding 4.3**

The CSP set the stage for the development of a broader partnership framework and for strengthening WFP partnerships, primarily with the Government but also with international and local actors. While strong collaboration existed at operational levels, strategic engagement remained constrained. Opportunities for collaborative engagement were not consistently capitalized on.

<sup>137</sup> Until 4 November 2021. Figures for 2021 were provisional and not validated by headquarters.


211. The principal partner for WFP in Pakistan was, and is likely to continue to be, the Government of Pakistan, both at the central and provincial levels. Therefore, engaging directly with the Government is important, as it is through this engagement that WFP can support meaningful and sustainable change.

212. There are several important instances where WFP partnerships have led to expected results and these partnerships have enhanced the chances of sustaining those results. For example, the HRF built and handed over by WFP to the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities in their respective provinces. WFP and the Government worked together through a successful partnership and delivered improved institutional capacity, which has the potential to be sustainable (see Section 2.3). The same applies to the transfer of grain silos to the Government, which is at the planning stage. The Ehsaas Nashonuma programme and SPRING are instances where WFP collaborated with the Federal Government. This partnership clearly indicates the goodwill and rapport established by WFP with the Government. Lastly, WFP is regarded as an important crisis response partner that has the experience and expertise to deliver quickly and effectively. The findings show, however, that there is room for increasing strategic engagement between WFP and the Government. According to Government and WFP respondents, the limited capacity within WFP to engage strategically and, at times, limited interest within Government to engage in strategic discussions with partners, including with WFP, hampered strategic dialogue. The Government was operating under acute pressure to quickly deliver public and social goods during these years and was less accessible for strategic changes in their programmes.

213. The partnership with the Government also faced some challenges and missed some opportunities. First, the intention of WFP engagement in the social protection sector was to provide institutional and policy support for updating the social protection system by extending social protection to food-insecure populations and support the design of food security and nutrition sensitive social protection policies. However, this intent did not materialize consistently. Interview respondents from WFP and the Government noted that, in social protection, WFP worked through cooperating partners as an implementor of activities. WFP's role did not delve into the design of activities, even though the CSP was envisioned as an opportunity for WFP to work with the central and provincial governments to ensure it is better equipped to respond to its own challenges.

214. Second, government, WFP and CSO respondents noted that there were also valuable opportunities for strategic, operational, and programmatic partnerships with CSOs. However, cooperating partners operated as implementors of activities. This is particularly notable since a little over half of the survey respondents (11 of 20) have been WFP partners for ten years or more, suggesting that, throughout their joint history, they served as an implementing service provider, rather than a partner who can share lessons learned, experiences and contribute to the joint development of innovative programmes. Figure 31 shows that almost all CSO partners felt that, above all, their engagement was as an implementor. Nonetheless, 75 percent of respondents shared that they were greatly or moderately involved in decision making with WFP.


**Figure 31: Partner perception of engagement with WFP**



Source: Evaluation Team online survey among WFP cooperating partners.

215. In relation to engagement between WFP and cooperating partners locally, a limited analysis of contracts by the Evaluation Team shows that the proportional diversity of partners during CSP increased, which reduced the risk of investing in one type of partner only (e.g. NGOs) and allowed WFP to benefit from different knowledge sets. The assessment reveals that, in 2018, there were 67 percent NGO partners and 51 percent in 2021. This shift is predominantly in favour of contracts with International NGOs. The number of contracts with Government agencies varies between 2018 and 2021 from 24 in 2018, 35 in 2019, 30 in 2020 and 7 till June 2021. These numbers confirm that WFP's engagement with the sub-national government remained important. This engagement, however, is more at implementation level through contracts to implement activities than at decision-making levels within sub-national governments. More engagement at the implementation level, however, is a door opener for stronger relationships at a higher level, exchange of knowledge, and crafting of new ideas for future programming in the provinces.

**Figure 32: Partners WFP has engaged with over the CSP period by type**



Source: WFP Field Level Agreements SO1 and SO3 2018-2021.

216. A third opportunity for partnership is between United Nations agencies. There are some examples of engagement at programme level, but respondents consistently noted that these partnerships are dependent on individuals and therefore not consistent, nor necessarily the most strategic. Here, too, the role played by donors was highlighted – specifically, some interviewees from United Nations agencies noted that donors themselves do not actively pursue or encourage inter-agency work. Rather, they seem to prefer single agency efforts as these are more easily manageable, and focused on securing results. The same respondents noted that some United Nations agencies are willing to engage in activities that fall outside their area of principal competence to attract additional funding,<sup>138</sup> even though the roles of the different agencies are well defined.

217. There is also the opportunity to engage with alternative funding sources, such as international financial institutions and the private sector. Some respondents noted that these are important opportunities that could be critical to finding ways to close the shortfall caused by the departure of more traditional donors that supported WFP and focused on crisis response. Thus far the only example of joint work is with the World Bank on disaster risk preparedness in Sindh.

**EQ4.4 To what extent did the CSP provide greater flexibility in dynamic operational contexts and how did it affect results, in particular regarding adaptation and response to COVID-19 and other unexpected crises and challenges?**

**Finding 4.4**

The country office demonstrated flexibility and responsiveness to emerging needs. However, despite a move towards emphasizing resilience and root causes, a crisis response management approach was consistently used for all types of activities conducted, affecting the effectiveness of WFP interventions. Addressing root causes and building resilience are efforts that require consistent support over longer periods of time.

218. The review of the experiences across the three provinces visited (KP, Balochistan and Sindh) showcased WFP's willingness to be flexible, a feature that central Government, (a main partner), also commended.

219. WFP provided unconditional relief assistance to households affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, droughts, and floods, as well as the recent wave of snow and flood emergencies. In KP, the school meal programme was halted due to the onset of COVID-19. However, the effort to support girls' school attendance was moved to KP where a CBT school-promoting model was used. During the pandemic, WFP focused on the provision of hand sanitizers, gloves, masks, and other equipment to programme partners.

220. This type of flexibility during the pandemic was valuable and is commended. WFP's general comfort when working in crisis response, and its strong and superior ability to do so, was clearly valued and welcomed. However, it also led to a missed opportunity to explore more carefully what the implications of the pandemic were for root causes of malnutrition and food insecurity. Questions such as how the pandemic affected education attendance and impacted malnutrition, and a consideration of the value of the poverty scorecard as a targeting mechanism to address malnutrition are important issues that could have been given attention to differentiate pre- and post-COVID-19 approaches.

221. Data collected in the field also suggests that the use of a crisis response management approach for all types of activities affected WFP effectiveness. For example, the timeframes for all activities, regardless of their focus, were short. This suggests a critical structural misunderstanding about how to best address resilience and root causes. Chief among them is that addressing root causes and building resilience are efforts that require time and consistency, and cannot be addressed in short-lived, and limited-scale activities. This shortcoming is at odds with WFP's long experience in Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO)<sup>139</sup> that shows that WFP has considerable experience with delivering consistently and over longer periods of time, as opposed to the short and fragmented approach taken under the CSP.

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<sup>138</sup> This evaluation did not include a survey of funding and collaborations and donor objectives in relation to funding United Nations agencies. The finding is based on multiple responses during interviews.

<sup>139</sup> <https://www.wfp.org/publications/protracted-relief-and-recovery-operation-1>

#### **EQ4.5 What are the other factors that can explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?**

##### **Finding 4.5**

WFP has not been able to fully operationalize the strategic shifts envisaged by the CSP, which has had clear consequences in relation to access to resources (funds and competence), the articulation of activities (across focus areas), and ensuring the sustainability of results.

222. First, the CSP was not accompanied by a clear plan on how important organizational strategic shifts would materialize, and specifically how WFP would redefine its strategic niche/comparative advantage. This is an important step that can ensure WFP's articulation with the work of partners, such as the Government and other United Nations agencies.

223. Second, the development of the CSP was not accompanied by a clear assessment of the capacity base that would be required to effectively implement it. According to senior and middle management, WFP country office did not have sufficient capacity (including at the provincial level) to demonstrate that its areas of competence are far broader than what have traditionally been understood, and where WFP focus was prior to this CSP. These observations are confirmed by interviews with Government representatives, cooperating partners, representatives of other United Nations agencies, and donors who consistently describe WFP as a humanitarian agency, rather than one that has a far broader skill set and can play a wider strategic role.

224. In addition, staff at provincial level also noted specific instances where activities could not be implemented as planned because they were new and staff had limited experience implementing such activities.

225. Third, WFP established a solid partnership with the Government, a key player if WFP is to support the development of long-term sustainable efforts. Likewise, it also identified work areas that are relevant to the Government. However, due to the current approach (short-term funding for small/limited-scale activity categories) the results are limited, and the activities do not allow for a large-scale showcasing of what is possible. Still, there are important examples of activities that could be, or will be, taken on by Government and could expand (see examples in EQ2 and EQ3).

226. The design of the three focus areas led to siloes (e.g. separation between SOs with similar objectives – e.g., SO2 and SO3), as well as how activities have been designed and implemented (e.g., separation between activities with similar objectives – such as Activities 3 and 5 or Activities 2 and 6). In addition, the nexus categorization of emergency/development/peace work does not recognize that, in Pakistan (as in other contexts) there is considerable overlap between different areas, which is important and necessary to ensure lasting results. According to interview respondents within WFP and among cooperating partners, this was principally due to earmarking of funds, but also to how staff within WFP see the activities they engage with, and how cooperating partners are engaged.

# 3. Conclusions and recommendations

## 3.1 CONCLUSIONS

227. **Conclusion 1: Overall, the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) positioning was relevant to national policies and aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework/Pakistan One United Nations Programme III (UNSDF/OPIII).** The thematic focus of the CSP was well aligned with Pakistan's strategic priorities. The intention to move towards a more strategic support, including a focus on Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS) as a priority to achieve sustainable results and increase the country's capacity to respond to emergencies, support the development of improved resilience and address root causes are all themes that are well nested within Government policy priorities.

228. The CSP remained highly relevant, despite contextual changes faced during the implementation period, including natural and man-made shocks, and an evolving policy context. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, WFP demonstrated its ability to adjust its programmes and put in place some of the immediate actions identified in the WFP/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) rapid assessment of the impact of COVID-19, notably scaling up social protection responses to address new and emerging needs. While the school meal programme was interrupted, WFP showcased the valuable role that cash-based transfers (CBTs) can play in supporting food-insecure households during crisis. These examples, however, remained relatively small-scale. WFP did not build on the COVID-19 response to extend its role from that of a supporting entity within the humanitarian architecture to that of a systems enabler that, in partnership with the Government, addresses more medium-term food insecurity and nutrition challenges in social protection beyond support for CBTs. This may have constituted a missed opportunity. Simultaneously, it is recognized that, given the resources WFP had, the support provided was aligned with what could be reasonably expected.

229. The CSP was reasonably well aligned with UNSDF/OPIII. However, its implementation shows that inter-agency engagement was limited, and few opportunities for joint work with other United Nations agencies were capitalized on. This is largely due to the fact that United Nations agencies, as a whole, do not present a unified and holistic approach. In addition, due to the more siloed approach that some individual agencies take, Government agencies have a tendency, particularly at the provincial level, to consider each United Nations agency as a distinct independent partner, rather than as part of an overarching effort. This is compounded by the fact that several United Nations agencies had a narrow view of WFP's work, which further limited the opportunities for collaboration. The active participation of WFP in the design of the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2023-2027) indicates a step in the right direction.

230. **Conclusion 2: The partnership with the Government was more widespread at operational than at strategic level.** The CSP signalled an important shift in the way WFP envisioned its engagement in Pakistan. It was underpinned by a shift away from implementation to strategic-level support. While the initial dialogue with the Government during the development of the CSP suggests a well-articulated understanding about the CSP's embedded aspirations, the partnership with the Government was, for most of the CSP implementation period, more focused and operational (implementation of initiatives as they are) rather than strategic-level shifts focused on adapting and improving system-wide responses to known challenges. This is largely a result of the Government's focus on WFP's extensive and credible competence to support implementation of activities, and specifically focus on crisis response. It is important to note, however, that WFP did engage and support the conduct of studies and assessments that have played, and can continue to play, an important role in the development and design of interventions in the nutrition sector.

231. **The CSP envisioned a move away from crisis response towards a more concerted focus on resilience and root causes.** Overall WFP effectively embodied its capacity as an emergency response agent but was less adept at demonstrating its comparative advantage in resilience and root causes. This was due to three main factors. First, WFP is better known by the Government as a humanitarian agency, which



hampered its ability to focus attention on providing system-wide support to help build longer-term approaches that can be upscaled and sustained by government agencies. One exception to this is in nutrition, where WFP has a more visible and recognized image as a partner that can contribute strategically to efforts that can be sustained by the Government in the long term. Second, WFP was not successful in highlighting the value of its strategic role to donors. While donors remain interested in WFP engagement, they also have a clear focus on WFP as an implementor in times of crisis. Third, inconsistency in available human resources within the country office to meet the demands of the CSP (human capital to support a strategic shift at the provincial level) was also a challenge. The CSP was not underpinned by a clear assessment of the expertise required within the different offices in Pakistan to support the CSP objectives. This meant that WFP was, at times, not sufficiently equipped to engage in a more strategic role, particularly at provincial level.

232. The **interrelationships between crises response, root causes and resilience could be better articulated at the programming level**. Capitalizing on these interlinkages would have also highlighted a nexus approach (e.g., the relationship between crisis response, development, and peace). Overall, while WFP's engagement touches on multiple nexus elements, implementation was often siloed, which limited its impact and failed to showcase WFP's strategic potential. This further limited the country office's ability to demonstrate its comparative advantage as a strategic partner.

233. **Conclusion 3: The process of decentralization, and the considerable variance between and within provinces at multiple levels, including prevalence of food insecurity and malnutrition, government capacities, vulnerabilities to shocks and security context, calls for much more contextualized support to ensure that WFP activities meet local needs. WFP was largely able to meet the needs of vulnerable groups that may have been otherwise overlooked.**

234. The process of devolution in Pakistan means that, while all provinces have equal responsibilities, their needs, institutional structures, and local capacities to meet their obligations vary considerably. In addition, there is significant variance in size, landscape, population density, and challenges faced by different provinces. Therefore, while responses to specific food security needs might be shared between provinces, the response approach used needs to be tailored to the individual needs of the provinces concerned, and in some instances even within provinces. Such tailored support requires consistent and in-depth engagement between WFP and the Government at both central and provincial levels. It was noted that this type of engagement was initiated by the country office during the design of the next CSP (2023-2027).

235. **When used, the nuanced beneficiary targeting approach, which combined Government and WFP targeting mechanisms, ensured that the most vulnerable were reached.** In other cases where WFP had to rely solely on Government targeting mechanisms there were questions regarding accuracy and whether the most vulnerable were identified.

236. **Pakistan's security context adds a layer of complexity to any intervention. Security-driven restrictions have impacted access to locations and partners that could be engaged and determined types of authorized support, which has affected which beneficiaries are reached, when and how.** Security challenges translated into delays with operational permissions. Some activity types, mainly CBT, were hesitantly accepted by the Government; and only selected cooperating partners were permitted to work in some locations. This means that WFP needs to factor in Governmental security concerns when identifying activities to ensure that: a) these are authorized; b) the WFP local partners authorized to work have the capacity and skills to implement the activity; and c) there is time to secure permissions.

237. **Conclusion 4: WFP has made progress in several areas, although unevenly across the SOs. SO1:** Unconditional food transfers contributed to stabilized and improved food security of temporarily displaced people. CBT faced some challenges associated with Government restrictions and logistical issues but its use was expanded during COVID-19. **SO2:** In terms of social protection, a number of pilot efforts were developed and implemented, and WFP played an important role supporting the Government's efforts, but its engagement remained largely operational. The critical progress here was in establishing the relationship between WFP and Ehsaas. This relationship presents an opportunity for future dialogue on how best to address social protection needs. **SO3:** WFP supported the Government to move from short-term emergency moderate acute malnutrition treatment to multisectoral integrated programming, which is positive given the aim to prevent stunting and address nutrition in a more holistic and sustainable way. WFP supported the development of policy guidance documents and implementation of Government

programmes. The aim of SO3 was to improve the nutrition of the entire population, therefore it raises the expectation of a broad programme addressing the multiple causes of malnutrition. However, the review of documents and respondents describe a programme which was still focused on providing nutritious food through relatively small-scale projects. The treatment of acute malnutrition received more resources than planned and was effective in its treatment. Through the implementation of the Ehsaas Nashonuma and Stunting Prevention Rehabilitation Integrated Nutrition Gain (SPRING) programme, WFP improved its approach and reach in stunting prevention. The Social and Behaviour Change Communications programme lacked ambition in targets and monitoring. To address the demands of SO3, a coordinated approach with UNICEF and the Government would be needed. **SO4:** Multiple small-scale efforts were conducted to achieve resilient food systems, but these require upscaling for them to lead to wider results. **SO5:** The support provided in training and infrastructure handover have been relevant and well received, but the absence of an overall capacity assessment led to some degree of fragmentation, and CCS results have not been well documented. This area is under development and shows considerable potential (see Conclusion 5).

238. **Conclusion 5: A comprehensive plan for strengthening the capacity of national institutions was lacking. While the CSP included a range of activities oriented towards capacity strengthening, it fell short of developing a comprehensive strategy grounded in an in-depth analysis of capacity gaps and contextual factors that could enable or truncate planned efforts. Moreover, the CCS efforts lacked effective monitoring so systematically accounting for progress made proved difficult.** There are some clear CCS successes – such as support with restoration of siloes; warehouse management; and contributions to policy development – but the overall headway made by CCS efforts is unclear. The approach appears to have lacked a clear strategy encompassing the three levels of action outlined in WFP Corporate CCS framework (individual, organizational and enabling environment); it did not respond to well established gaps and lacked a monitoring effort that could effectively and robustly measure progress.

239. Having a capacity-strengthening plan would have allowed WFP to identify and highlight its comparative advantage in important areas and showcase its capacities to support the Government. Being able to demonstrate comparative advantage and progress towards known benchmarks is also critical to demonstrate institutional comparative advantage/competence to donors. This was particularly important as WFP was aiming to shift its approach towards and enhanced focus on capacity strengthening. .

240. **Conclusion 6: The CSP placed specific attention on supporting women and girls as they were more vulnerable within larger target groups. However, this alone is not a demonstration of a gendered approach. A deeper analysis of the underlying causes of vulnerability is necessary to promote gender equality.** The country office signed up to the gender transformation programme, which is a step in the right direction.

241. Nonetheless, the gender indicators used show limited likelihood that WFP was able to influence progress in gender roles among beneficiaries. Rather, the data fluctuations appear more indicative of contextual factors (COVID-19) than of real change.

242. The approach taken thus far by WFP, in relation to beneficiaries, would benefit from going beyond targeting to supporting positive changes for women (for example, in relation to access to goods and services). The contexts vary considerably among provinces depending on cultures, languages, histories and infrastructure, therefore efforts must be contextualized and may require engagement between WFP and partners within civil society and/or the United Nations family.

### 3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
1	<b>WFP should ensure that the next country strategic plan primarily focuses on supporting the Government in developing strategies to enhance food and nutrition security while maintaining the ability to respond to crises.<sup>140</sup> Country capacity strengthening needs should be jointly identified with the Government taking into consideration the decentralized nature of the government system in Pakistan and clearly distinguishing efforts that must be addressed at the national level from those that must be addressed at the provincial level. In addition, it will be important to ensure that the country strategic plan reflects the fact that Pakistan is a very diverse country whose provinces have diverse set of needs and capacities and that different provinces will therefore require different types of support. This approach should be embedded in the following steps:</b>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, headquarters Partnerships and Advocacy Department	High	December 2023
	1.1 Carry out an in-depth and iterative consultation process with the Government at the central and provincial levels (taking into account the process of devolution and regional diversity) to identify needs and existing capacities at both levels and design national and provincial country capacity strengthening interventions accordingly.					December 2023
	1.2 Develop a detailed theory of change that outlines the change pathways and strengthened linkages and synergies between focus areas, strategic outcomes and activities and how these can be achieved. Integrate country capacity strengthening into the various strategic outcomes so that it organically supports specific thematic					December 2023

<sup>140</sup> While the CSP evaluation was being finalized, WFP was engaging in a consultative process to identify specific needs at the federal and provincial levels as part of the development of the new CSP.

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
	areas. The country office could use the strategic outcomes as the starting point and develop a storyline that allows the goals to be reached. Depending on the complexity of the strategic outcomes under the next country strategic plan, the country office could develop a single overarching theory of change or multiple ones.					
	1.3 Embed WFP interventions within government systems and structures to ensure that effective interventions can be scaled up and sustained. This work includes strengthening emergency response capacity and leveraging collaboration with the Government of Pakistan at the policy and strategy levels in areas including stunting prevention and the consolidation and expansion of nutrition support as part of <i>Ehsaas Nashonuma</i> and resilience building.					December 2023
	1.4 WFP should develop an operational plan for the next country strategic plan focused on its core areas of competence. This requires the identification of a clear implementation road map that facilitates the shift required to implement activities and deliver the country strategic plan strategic outcomes. A key activity for this recommendation is a self-assessment or staffing review to ensure that staff have the capacity and expertise needed to implement the country strategic plan effectively.					March 2023
2	<b>The country office should review its fundraising, partnerships and advocacy plan with a view to exploring new funding sources and further leveraging domestic financing. This may entail identifying new financing mechanisms with support from headquarters.</b>	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau and headquarters	High	December 2023
	2.1 Position WFP as a key development actor (beyond the humanitarian sphere) and ensure clear and coherent messaging on WFP's comparative advantages and value propositions. This will entail communicating the impact of upstream capacity strengthening work and promoting a shift from "implementing" to					December 2023

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
	"enabling", working to become a catalyst and the go-to partner for development priorities.					
	2.2 Contribute to and inform the engagement between the Government and international financial institutions by leveraging data, analysis and other tools; convening dialogue; and subsequently, where appropriate, playing a role in assisting with the implementation of government-led projects financed by international financial institutions.					December 2023
	2.3 Work with for-profit organizations and the Government to explore opportunities for technical partnerships with the private sector in selected programmes, with a particular focus on the development of nutritious foods. The country office should also explore the Scaling Up Nutrition Business Network as a key platform for private sector engagement.					December 2023
<b>3</b>	<b>Deepen WFP's strategic and operational partnership with government partners and civil society organizations.</b>	Operational	Country office	Regional bureau	Medium	December 2023
	3.1 It is important to introduce regular strategic interaction with government partners, at the national and provincial levels, to exchange ideas and information on opportunities, country strategic plan plans, gaps, country capacity strengthening needs and future expectations. This will serve to ensure effective and continual communication. WFP should select entities to engage with based on their capacities and the activities to be conducted. In some instances, particularly at the provincial level, multiple government partners may need to be engaged to support single initiatives.					December 2023
	3.2 WFP should more actively engage with civil society organizations to benefit from their field knowledge. This should go beyond the collection of monitoring data and include learning through dialogue, which may be used by WFP to inform its strategic					December 2023

#	Recommendation	Level/nature	Responsibility	Other contributing entities	Priority	Action deadline
	objectives and improve its understanding of field realities. Specific areas where focused attention is needed are social protection, identification of the most vulnerable groups and gender transformation.					
4	<b>WFP should increase its efforts to promote gender equality, accountability to affected populations and protection.</b>	Operational	Country office	Regional bureau	Medium	December 2023
	4.1 WFP should explore ways to contribute to shifts in gender construction and reducing gender inequality. This must go beyond the inclusion of women or gender minorities in activities, and WFP should engage with partners who focus on gender equality to ensure that its activities are based on the most current knowledge and practice.					December 2023
	4.2 WFP should continue its efforts to achieve greater gender balance among its staff, noting the structural challenges					December 2023
	4.3 To promote their effective implementation, WFP should ensure that accountability to affected populations and protection mechanisms are aligned with local cultural traditions and norms and are fully understood by cooperating partners.					December 2023

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