Acknowledgements

The evaluation team is particularly grateful to the 2,155 individuals from Burkina Faso, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq who took the time to share their insights into how the World Food Programme (WFP) contributes to peace and conflict, and to those who participated in workshops to make sense of the survey results.

Putting this central piece of evidence together would not have been possible without the dedicated teams of researchers of our partners, the Innovative Hub for Research in Africa (IHfRA) in Burkina Faso, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) in Colombia, Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Statistics Organization for Society Support (SOSS) in Iraq. Thank you for making this work against the odds of an ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, long distances travelled in at times delicate security situations and of remote internet connections with the evaluation team.

Our appreciation also goes to interview partners for taking the time to share their reflections, to the Office of Evaluation for their guidance and cooperation, to the WFP employees who provided documents, facilitated country visits and remote workshops and to the members of the internal and external reference group for their written feedback.

The evaluation team would also like to thank the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) team members who provided additional research or communications inputs: Henrike Ilka, Katharina Nachbar, Sonya Sugrobova, Constantin Treisch and Marcus Woodcock.

The Office of Evaluation would also like to acknowledge the constructive engagement, practice-driven insights and support the late Silvia Biondi, former Head of Conflict and Peace Team, contributed during the early phase of this policy evaluation.

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the Evaluation Team, and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Food Programme. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designation employed and the presentation of material in maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or maritime area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Photocredits

Photo cover: WFP/Daniel Torres
Key personnel for the evaluation

OFFICE OF EVALUATION
Director of Evaluation – Andrea Cook
Evaluation Manager – Francesca Bonino
Second Level Quality Assurance – Deborah McWhinney
Evaluation Analyst – Sameera Ashraf

EXTERNAL EVALUATION TEAM
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi): Julia Steets (team leader), Claudia Meier, Alexander Gaus, Sarah Bressan, Inji El Bakry
University of Konstanz: Steffen Eckhart, Jan Kemper, Elena Leuschner

EXTERNAL ADVISORY GROUP
Anita Ernstorfer – Owner and Principal of Untangle (LLC) and Senior Associate with Interpeace
Hur Hassnain – Senior Evaluation Advisor, European Commission DG INTPA, Evaluation Support Service, and Principal Evaluator at i4D Consulting Ltd.
Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou – Director of Programme, Politics and Governance, Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Cheyanne Scharbatke-Church – Executive Director, Besa Global
# Contents

Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... i

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Evaluation Features ............................................................................................................... 1
   1.2 Context ............................................................................................................................... 2
   1.3 The Policy on WFP's Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings .................................... 4
   1.4 Methodology, Limitations and Ethical Considerations ......................................................... 8

2. Evaluation Findings ..................................................................................................................... 13
   2.1 Quality of the Policy .......................................................................................................... 13
   2.2. Policy Implementation ....................................................................................................... 18
   2.3 Results of the Policy: WFP Analysis Practice at Country Level, Programme Adaptations, and Conflict and Peace Outcomes ....................................................................... 26
   2.4. Enabling and Hindering Factors ......................................................................................... 50

3. Conclusions and Recommendations .......................................................................................... 57

Annexes
Annex 1. Summary TOR ............................................................................................................. 64
Annex 2. Evaluation timeline ...................................................................................................... 64
Annex 3. Methodology .................................................................................................................. 68
Annex 4. Evaluation matrix .......................................................................................................... 80
Annex 5. Data collection tools .................................................................................................... 85
Annex 6. Fieldwork agenda ......................................................................................................... 101
Annex 7. Theory of change ......................................................................................................... 102
Annex 8. Analytical framework ................................................................................................ 104
Annex 10. List of people interviewed ......................................................................................... 109
Annex 11. Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 119
Annex 12. Acronyms .................................................................................................................. 126
Annex 13. Conflict-Affected People Survey and Workshops ...................................................... 128
List of figures and tables

Figure 1: Theory of change.......................................................... 7
Table 1: Main evaluation methods and data collection activities .......................................................... 9
Figure 2: Interviewee breakdown by organization type, sex, WFP staff category and location (data collection phase) .......................................................... 11
Figure 3: Survey participants by sex and age.......................................................... 12
Table 2: Conformity to standards on policy formulation .......................................................... 13
Table 3: Conformity to standards on policy uptake .......................................................... 16
Table 4: Summary of policy content for benchmarked organisations .......................................................... 17
Figure 4: Policy implementation steps .......................................................... 20
Table 5: Risk analysis practices at WFP .......................................................... 23
Figure 5: Word frequencies in standard project reports and annual country reports 2012–2020 .......................................................... 31
Figure 6 and Figure 7: Word frequencies on conflict awareness and conflict-sensitive programming in annual country reports 2012–2020 .......................................................... 32
Figure 8: Who decided who would receive WFP support in your community and who would not? (multiple responses possible) .......................................................... 35
Figure 9: Perceived WFP contribution to decreasing tensions among those who see a decrease in tension .......................................................... 40
Figure 10: Perceived WFP contribution to increasing tensions among those who see an increase of tension .......................................................... 41
Figure 11: WFP contribution to decreasing tensions .......................................................... 41
Figure 12: Overview of evidence on different ways to contribute to decreasing tensions .......................................................... 42
Figure 13: Who should have received assistance but did not? (Multiple responses possible, leaving the type of assistance open) .......................................................... 44
Figure 14: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community? .......................................................... 45
Figure 15: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community? (Recipients versus non-recipients) .......................................................... 45
Figure 16: Are the people who have gained money contributing to the armed conflict? .......................................................... 47
Figure 17: Does WFP help one side to win in any ongoing armed conflict here? .......................................................... 48
Figure 18: How has the involvement of authorities in assistance changed the way people in this area generally think about the government? .......................................................... 48
Figure 19: Peacebuilding Fund grants over time .......................................................... 55
Table 6: Document analysis sources .......................................................... 71
Table 7: Dictionary .......................................................... 74
Figure 20: Reconstructed theory of change .......................................................... 103
Table 8: List of people interviewed during the inception phase .......................................................... 109
Table 9: List of people interviewed during the data collection phase .......................................................... 111
Figure 1: Gender of survey participants .......................................................... 129
Figure 2: Age of survey participants .......................................................... 129
Figure 3: Have you received assistance from WFP in this area in the past three years? .......................................................... 130
Figure 4a: Burkina Faso – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible) .......................................................... 130
Figure 4b: Colombia – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible) .......................................................... 131
Figure 4c: Democratic Republic of Congo – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible) .......................................................... 131
Figure 4d: Iraq – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible) .......................................................... 131
Figure 5a: Burkina Faso – Development of tensions before versus after WFP assistance; gender breakdown .......................................................... 133
Figure 5b: Colombia – Development of tensions before versus after WFP assistance .......................................................... 133
Figure 5c: Democratic Republic of Congo – Development of tensions before versus after WFP assistance .......................................................... 134
Figure 5d: Iraq – Development of tensions before versus after WFP assistance .......................................................... 134
Figure 6a: Respondents who indicate WFP did or did not contribute to a reported increase in tensions .......................................................... 135
Figure 6b: Respondents who indicate WFP did or did not contribute to a reported decrease in tensions .......................................................... 135
Figure 7: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community? .......................................................... 138

¹ Numbering of figures restart at 1 again for the survey annex.
Figure 8: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community? (Recipients versus non-recipients) ................................................................................................................................. 138
Figure 9: Is there anyone who should have received assistance in your community but was left out? ........... 139
Figure 10: Who should have received assistance but did not? (multiple responses possible) ....................... 140
Figure 11: Who received most assistance in your community? (multiple responses possible) ...................... 141
Figure 12a: Burkina Faso – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not? ........................................................................................................................................ 142
Figure 12b: Democratic Republic of Congo – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not? ............................................................................................................. 142
Figure 12c: Colombia – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not? ........................................................................................................................................ 143
Figure 12d: Iraq – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not? ....... 143
Figure 13: If acceptance – What helped you find a resolution? ................................................................. 144
Figure 14: Who decided who would receive WFP support in your community and who would not? (multiple responses possible) ............................................................................................................ 145
Figure 15: Do some people in your community have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities here (for reasons other than receiving WFP aid as beneficiaries)? ........................................................... 146
Figure 16a: Burkina Faso – Gender differences in responses to whether some people have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities .................................................................................... 147
Figure 16b: Colombia – Gender differences in responses to whether some people have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities .................................................................................... 147
Figure 16c: DRC – Gender differences in responses to whether some people have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities .................................................................................... 148
Figure 16d: Iraq – Gender differences in responses to whether some people have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities .................................................................................... 148
Figure 17: How did the people who have more money as a result of WFP activities get it? (multiple responses possible) ...................................................................................................................... 149
Figure 18: Are the people who have gained money contributing to the armed conflict? ............................. 150
Figure 19: Have authorities been involved in selecting who would receive, organize, or distribute assistance? 150
Figure 20: How has the involvement of authorities in assistance changed the way people in this area generally think about the government? .................................................................................. 151
Figure 21a: Does WFP engage with people who are fighting in this area to make them stop fighting? ........ 153
Figure 21b: Burkina Faso – Gender differences in responses to whether WFP engages with people who are fighting in a given area to make them stop fighting? .............................................................. 153
Figure 22: If respondent mentions WFP talking about peace advocacy (previous question), are WFP the right people to do this? ............................................................................................................. 153
Figure 23: Does WFP help one side to win in any ongoing armed conflict here? ........................................ 154
Figure 24: Is WFP against anyone? ........................................................................................................ 154
Table 10: Benchmarking overview ........................................................................................................ 159
Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

Evaluation features

1. Approved in 2013, the evaluation of the policy on WFP’s role in peacebuilding in transition settings (hereafter referred to as the “peacebuilding policy”) asked three main evaluation questions:
   - How good is the policy?
   - What are the results of the policy?
   - What accounts for the results that have been observed and the results that were not achieved?

2. The primary intended audience of the evaluation is WFP senior management, together with Executive Board members, the Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division, which comprises the Emergencies and Transitions Unit as policy owner and various thematic units and divisions responsible for vulnerability analyses, procurement and partnerships, the regional bureaux and country offices.

3. The evaluation covered the period from 2012 to 2022. The overall approach and timeline were adjusted in light of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Primary and secondary data collection and analysis activities took place between September 2021 and April 2022 at the global, regional and country levels, and included:
   - retrospective construction of the theory of change underlying the policy;
   - document and literature review;
   - in-depth analysis, drawing from field missions, including a survey of crisis-affected people in Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq covering 2,155 individuals (more than half of whom were women and girls);
   - desk reviews “plus”, combining document reviews and selected interviews and carried out at country offices in Ethiopia, Libya, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic;
   - key informant interviews with WFP employees based in Rome, experts from academia, members of the evaluation internal reference group and the external advisory group and employees of other United Nations entities;
   - semi-automated document analysis of the more than 11,000 country planning and reporting documents issued from 2012 to 2021; and
   - a review of comparable organizations: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Oxfam International.

3. Consideration of gender and diversity was incorporated into the evaluation. First, data was collected to uncover the differences in how women and men, and the members of other population groups relevant to the local setting, perceived the effects of WFP interventions on local conflict and peace dynamics. Then the evaluation featured a disaggregated analysis of interview and survey data by sex, nationality and employee category and by other relevant categories. Thematically, the evaluation also assessed the consistency and complementarity of the peacebuilding policy in relation to the gender policy and explored the extent to which gender considerations relevant to local conflict and peace dynamics are reflected in WFP’s work and whether programmes fostering social cohesion and peace include both women and men.

4. Ethical considerations and safeguards were designed to ensure informed consent, confidentiality and data protection; cultural sensitivity and the fair identification of participants, including women and socially excluded population groups; and adherence to the “do no harm” principle in relation to participants, their communities and WFP’s work.

5. Some of the evaluation limitations were linked to COVID-19-related access issues and the exclusion of an initially foreseen ninth country of study (Afghanistan) following the events of August 2021.
mitigation, online interactions increased, including interviews with employees with experience in the Asia and the Pacific region. Some evaluability limitations were also encountered, including a limited institutional memory of the early phases of policy implementation, the absence of a theory of change to guide the analysis of the intended pathway towards the policy objectives, and a lack of existing evidence on the societal effects of WFP interventions. Expanded triangulation was thus required, and greater use was made of survey data from affected people in order to uncover issues relating to their direct experience of how WFP's presence and assistance affected conflict and peace dynamics.

1.2 Context

6. Food security and conflict intersect in several ways. Conflict has long been recognized as one of the main drivers of malnourishment, hunger and starvation. Food insecurity can also be, or be used as, an important driver of conflict. In addition, large-scale humanitarian or development interventions can have both positive and negative effects on local peace and conflict dynamics. Delivering assistance in a conflict-sensitive way is therefore key to ensuring that WFP does no harm and works in a people-centred way. This is particularly important as WFP has been increasing its focus on changing lives as alongside saving lives, which entails more engagement with national and local authorities, requiring careful balancing between neutrality and impartiality.

7. WFP has long operated in environments characterized by conflict, fragility and violence. In 2020, 33 of the countries in which WFP operated had a Global Peace Index score of over 2.3, indicating a high level of conflict or conflict risk, and there were 12 United Nations peacekeeping missions around the world. Several factors have recently resulted in greater attention being directed to understanding WFP's contribution to peace. During the evaluation period the humanitarian assistance discourse increasingly emphasized the connections among humanitarian, development and peace work – the “triple nexus”. An evolving international agenda, including various United Nations-led initiatives, represents a strong call for development and humanitarian actors to seek a more active role in addressing the root causes of conflicts.

8. WFP's receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020 was an acknowledgement of the organization's efforts to combat hunger, contribute to improved conditions for peace and prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war. Internally, the institutional set-up and capacity for WFP's work on conflict and peace have changed, and aspects related to the peacebuilding policy are featured in the WFP strategic plan for 2022–2025. The current WFP Executive Director has also positioned WFP prominently through active involvement in peace advocacy in conflict settings such as those in Ethiopia, South Sudan and Yemen.

9. Overall, these factors have led WFP to increase its focus on and contribution to peace alongside its mandate of saving lives and changing lives.

1.3 Subject

10. Prior to the 2013 peacebuilding policy, WFP had developed an approach centred on the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and operational independence. The peacebuilding policy introduced eight general principles for working in conflict settings and three policy directions that guide WFP's work in transition settings and set the parameters for the organization's engagement in peacebuilding activities (table 1).

---


| General principles | 1. Understand the context.  
2. Maintain a hunger focus.  
3. At a minimum avoid doing harm.  
4. Support national priorities where possible, but follow humanitarian principles where conflict continues.  
6. Be responsive to a dynamic environment.  
7. Ensure inclusivity and equity.  
8. Be realistic. |
|---|---|
| Policy directions | • Conducting conflict and risk analyses in transition settings as an inclusive process encompassing conflict and political economy analysis.  
• Using conflict-sensitive programming.  
• Working with peacebuilding partners, encompassing strong two-way communication with affected populations, partnerships with peace and reconciliation specialist organizations and cooperation with other United Nations entities. |

11. The policy is silent on implementation and resourcing requirements, and a policy implementation strategy was not developed. However, various steps were taken to implement the policy, focusing on:  
  ➢ *capacity building*, including training, guidance and a recently established community of practice for peace and conflict experts;  
  ➢ *support for country offices*, for instance, in conducting conflict analyses or conflict sensitivity assessments;  
  ➢ a *broadening of the evidence base* for a better understanding and improved measurement of WFP's contribution to peace, including through a partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; and  
  ➢ *process adaptations* in the areas of staffing, partner management and supply chains.  

12. An explicit theory of change is not featured in the policy. The evaluation team constructed one (figure 1), starting by narrowing the broad definitions of “peace” and “conflict” used in the policy by focusing on concrete ways for WFP to avoid exacerbating conflict or to make contributions to peace, mainly through efforts aimed at reducing food insecurity as a driver of conflict, but also, for example, by avoiding any increase in tension by ensuring impartiality and strengthening social cohesion.  

13. The theory of change is intended to show that WFP can contribute to the desired outcomes if policy implementation measures enable country offices – individually or in partnership – to conduct better analysis of contexts, conflict dynamics and related risks and to use the results of that analysis to adapt programmes, processes and systems. In addition, the theory of change highlights the overlaps with those expected change pathways for other cross-cutting issues that emphasize the importance of context analysis in, for example, supporting access negotiations, enhancing the understanding of and response to protection concerns, increasing accountability to affected populations and strengthening the integration of gender perspectives.
Figure 1: Theory of change

**Peace/conflict outcomes**
- Stabilization/less violence/no increase in violence
- More social cohesion, inclusion, equity/no increase in social tensions

Avoids exacerbating conflict and makes contributions to peace

WFP country offices individually and/or through partnerships conduct better analysis of conflicts and risks and adapt programmes, processes and systems

**Adapt:**
- Planning
- Targeting
- Community engagement
- Procurement
- Hiring
- Interactions governments/local authorities
- Interactions partners (cooperating partner, peacebuilding)
- Monitoring and evaluation

In order to:
- Reduce food insecurity as a driver of conflict
- Avoid increasing tensions by ensuring impartiality, explaining selection criteria and strengthening community-based programming
- Avoid contributing to armed actor profits
- Strengthen social cohesion through inclusion of and dialogue with conflicting groups
- Strengthen trust between citizens and the state

Guide and enable

WFP develops and adopts a policy on peacebuilding

Leads to/triggers

WFP takes measures to implement the policy

For example:
- Guidance
- Training
- Staff
- Incentives
- Partnerships with peacebuilding actors

**Assumptions**
- Resources and capacity for policy implementation exist
- The policy and policy implementation measures address key factors that affect the ability of country offices to conduct analysis, establish partnerships and adapt programmes, processes and systems
- WFP interventions support and complement the peacebuilding efforts of others
- Country offices have the capacity and flexibility to adapt programmes, processes and systems

Source: Evaluation team.
EVALUATION FINDINGS

14. This section provides the key evaluation findings for the three evaluation questions asked.

2.1 How good is the policy?

Analysis of policy quality

15. Measured against established benchmarks, the peacebuilding policy is of relatively high quality, except for the aspects concerning policy implementation and uptake. Specifically, the evaluation noted:

➢ significant evidence of policy coherence with, and support for, strategic objectives, external coherence, reference to gap analysis, a well-defined scope and prioritized actions, and consistent use of terminology;

➢ partial evidence of a policy vision, which is outlined but lacks a theory of change, and selective use of evidence to underpin the policy principles – the policy content is largely in line with other WFP policies but does not sufficiently take into account internal coherence or gender considerations; and

➢ policy quality shortcomings that include the absence of adequate institutional frameworks, guidance, accountability arrangements and financial and human resources, and insufficient integration of monitoring, evaluation and reporting on policy implementation.

16. Overall, the policy remains relevant and valid in 2022. It is similar to more recent, comparable policies from other humanitarian organizations. Aspects where relatively minor changes could be made include broadening the scope for policy application, including an explicit theory of change, strengthening the links to gender, protection and other cross-cutting issues, and reflecting on recent changes in the external context.

17. The evaluation noted that more systematic policy implementation occurred only after WFP provided dedicated resources in late 2017. However, the policy remains little known throughout WFP, and implementation gaps remain. The main issues that affect policy uptake include:

➢ limited investment in training;

➢ policy implementation guidance developed, but little known;

➢ a promising, but only nascent, community of practice for conflict advisers;

➢ efforts to strengthen conflict analysis being hampered by the existence of organizational silos;

➢ efforts to broaden the evidence base that are too recent to allow the observation of results; and

➢ only ad hoc processes for programme adaptation (in relation to human resources, cooperating partner management and supply chains).

18. Nonetheless, evaluation interview data uncovered positive aspects. Interviewees highlighted that the policy is clearly phrased and that it defines in realistic and balanced terms WFP’s role and ambition when working in contexts in or at risk of conflict through the three policy directions of conducting conflict and risk analyses; using conflict-sensitive programming; and working with peacebuilding partners (see table 1). Interviewees also felt the policy’s emphasis on partnerships and cooperation with other organizations remains a relevant guiding principle for WFP.

Support to policy implementation

19. The evaluation traced policy implementation measures up until April 2022. At headquarters, support for policy implementation has been unsteady, with few dedicated individuals supporting the policy agenda in the years following adoption. Starting in late 2017, WFP incrementally increased its workforce capacity in support of the peacebuilding policy. However, most positions are dependent on temporary external funding. In recent years, increased capacity facilitated the expansion of policy implementation throughout the organization and brought a notable increase in outputs from, or initiated by, the peace and conflict team in the Emergencies and Transitions Unit, among other WFP offices and units. In 2020, there was an acceleration of efforts, including the development of a COVID-19 and conflict-sensitive rapid
operational conflict risk and prevention tool and the drafting of WFP minimum standards for conflict-sensitive programming.

20. The most recent restructuring of the Emergencies and Transitions Unit, in 2022, pursues a vision of policy implementation aimed at overcoming the silos that separate various cross-cutting issues and increasing synergies so as to offer more effective and holistic support to country operations. However, the restructuring has created some uncertainty and it is too early to tell whether it will succeed in its ambition.

21. At the regional and country levels, some dedicated capacity has been established and has played a key role in supporting policy implementation, including by providing analysis capacity for conducting conflict sensitivity assessments, advising on emergency preparedness, supporting applications to the Peacebuilding Fund, and providing surge capacity if needed. However, many positions are dependent on the availability of funding, which is limited.

**Policy implementation steps**

22. Policy implementation has included capacity building, the provision of practical operational support, a broadening of the evidence base for WFP’s contribution to peace, and process adaptations within the organization. Overall, implementation has been hindered by the limited investments made in capacity building. For example, despite demand, training on conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity or nexus programming is not broadly available, although some modules are currently being finalized; guidance documents exist and address critical gaps but are little known; and the community of practice for conflict advisers is promising but only nascent.

23. The effectiveness of various efforts to strengthen conflict analysis depends on the buy-in of WFP country-level management and is limited by the existence of organizational silos and a focus on the risks to WFP and its activities. The role of the Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division in providing conflict analysis is limited. Other WFP divisions provide analyses of conflict dynamics, but focus mainly on the risk exposure of WFP.

24. The support provided to country offices for conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity has only recently increased.

25. In 2018, WFP entered into a knowledge partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute aimed at generating evidence on whether and how WFP programming can improve the prospects for peace and at understanding conflict-related risks. Investments have also been made in a process for strengthening the measurement of WFP’s contribution to peace. However, most of the steps in broadening the evidence base for that contribution have been carried out too recently to allow the observation of results.

26. Promising conflict-sensitive adaptations to key processes have been developed through a bottom-up process in certain situations, but most potential adaptations have not been systematically considered. Examples of conflict-sensitive approaches to employee management have been noted, but there are challenges related to local hiring practices, especially in conflict settings.

27. Adaptations to procurement processes are also rare, and the evaluation found no systematic efforts to strengthen conflict sensitivity in WFP’s interactions with its cooperating partners. However, the evaluation identified several good practice examples that can serve as a basis for the development of corporate solutions to those issues. The examples include:

- training, workshops and structured interactions between WFP country offices and cooperating partners on conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution (Iraq and the Sudan);
- the inclusion of conflict sensitivity in partner proposals and related discussions (Iraq and the Sudan);
- the sharing of responsibilities for targeting and implementation among cooperating partners so as to avoid a perception of favouritism in project implementation (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya); and
- the discontinuation of partner contracts in cases of clearly expressed political allegiance (Colombia).
2.2 What are the results of the policy?

28. The results of the policy have been assessed at three levels: the practice of peace and conflict analysis, the use of analysis results to inform programme and process adaptations, and the broader effects of the policy on conflict and peace dynamics.

i) WFP conflict analysis practice at the country level

29. Despite investments, conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity at the country level are inconsistent and constrained. For example, two of the country offices covered by the evaluation have established systematic, structured and inclusive processes for the discussion of conflict dynamics and conflict sensitivity. In the other country case studies, however, most discussions of conflict sensitivity are carried out on an ad hoc basis and risk being siloed into small groups of specific employee profiles, and often take place without cooperating or peacebuilding partners and the input of communities or their representatives.

30. Some country offices have prepared conflict analyses, but these are only known to a few employees in each country and it is unclear how they influence programming. The role of partners in context analysis is also unclear, and country offices do not seem to benefit systematically from partners’ contributions. Moreover, the possible role of inter-agency forums in conflict analysis has not emerged significantly.

31. WFP employees and partners at the country level are highly aware of the importance of “doing no harm” and tend to focus on the risks inherent to the allocation and targeting of assistance and the contribution to peace through reduced food insecurity. Reflections on other linkages between WFP’s work and conflict or peace were largely missing. However, WFP employees working on resilience, conflict sensitivity, gender and protection shared more nuanced reflections on the practical implications for WFP’s work.

32. WFP pays limited attention to how its presence and assistance may interact with conflict and peace dynamics. Three issues arose as blind spots in several countries, and were echoed in interviews with external partners:

- the influence of WFP assistance on power relations;
- the interaction between WFP and host governments, especially when a government is a party in a conflict; and
- the intersection of the affiliations and backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners with the conflict setting.

33. From a corporate perspective, the current WFP strategic plan for 2022–2025 emphasizes the conflict-sensitive and principled approach of WFP, refers to “taking steps to develop peace outcomes” and states that “WFP will engage in humanitarian diplomacy and peace advocacy”. The plan thus leaves room for interpretation and does not resolve the question of how to prioritize conflict sensitivity and the contribution to peace or define the level of WFP’s ambition for peace.

34. From a global perspective, the evaluation analysed all the WFP country planning and reporting documents issued from 2012 to 2022, showing that conflict awareness has increased only slightly since 2013 and important analytical blind spots remain. The reflection of conflict sensitivity in annual planning and reporting documents remains at a low level, but consideration of the “do no harm” principle has increased slightly over time.

ii) Programme adaptations

35. Most efforts to adapt programmes and processes in order to avoid contributing to tensions aim to strengthen impartiality and programme quality. The adaptations most frequently cited include improved communication on beneficiary selection criteria, adjusted targeting, the establishment of complaints and feedback mechanisms, and enhanced community-based planning.

36. Adaptation measures such as the facilitation of local dialogue and the inclusion of conflict resolution mechanisms in programme design are rare and applied selectively. Where implemented, most of these measures include both women and men.
➢ In Iraq, in the context of internal displacement, one programme included regular community meetings focusing on mutual acceptance, and a dedicated conflict resolution mechanism.

➢ In Burkina Faso, WFP made school feeding conditional on the communities in conflict agreeing to protect the school feeding together.

37. In a few instances, WFP has also engaged in high-level peace advocacy. This has attracted controversy, but the extent of such engagement is limited in practice. WFP maintains contact with various parties to a conflict primarily for the purposes of negotiating humanitarian access. There is, however, an emerging consensus among the partners interviewed that future peace advocacy efforts should take place within the following parameters:

➢ To safeguard against any potential negative consequences, the activities of WFP headquarters and leadership should be clearly communicated to country offices in advance and be coordinated and in line with the strategy pursued by the WFP country office concerned.

➢ WFP country office management should be involved in broader United Nations and political discussions relating to peace negotiations or processes so as to determine when or how WFP might support those processes and to ensure that WFP does not undermine other efforts by “going it alone”.

➢ Any form of engagement should ensure that WFP’s neutrality and independence are safeguarded, for example, by focusing on only those negotiation elements that have an immediate bearing on humanitarian access.

38. Adaptation measures such as WFP's coordination with peacebuilding actors are rare but promising. Peacebuilding partners, and also donors, external observers and a range of internal stakeholders, underscored that WFP's potential to increase its contribution to peace lies mainly in contributing through its core mandate and sharing its expertise in addressing food insecurity and strengthening local food production by building local markets as part of broader stabilization or peacebuilding initiatives. Examples include:

➢ entering joint programming with organizations that can cover peace components, including with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund (the Democratic Republic of the Congo); and

➢ rehabilitating, jointly with a non-partisan peace institution, infrastructure such as a market in a contested region as a way of potentially bridging community divisions (Libya).

iii) Plausible (un-)intended effects on conflict and peace outcomes

39. Although evidence is limited, the evaluation established several plausible effects of WFP's work on conflict and peace dynamics. At the whole-of-society level, there is little evidence of outcomes that can be traced to WFP. Nevertheless, evaluation survey data show that perceptions of changes in the level of social tension before and after WFP interventions diverge, partly by gender and between recipients and non-recipients of assistance. Among those who see a general change (positive or negative) in the level of tension, a majority believe that WFP contributed to that change, at least in part. This is significant given the many factors that affect conflict dynamics, and it confirms that conflict-affected people see a strong potential for WFP's actions to contribute to affecting conflict and peace dynamics. Generally, in all the countries included in the evaluation, a greater share of people who received assistance said that WFP contributed to decreasing tension than of those who did not receive assistance.

40. The evaluation explored several ways in which WFP can potentially contribute to reducing conflict and tensions. These are discussed in the remainder of the section and outlined in table 2.
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE ON POSSIBLE WFP's WAYS OF CONTRIBUTING TO DECREASING TENSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways of decreasing tensions</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced tensions linked to improved individual well-being resulting from food assistance.</td>
<td>Perceived by affected people and WFP employees as being the most important WFP contribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended effects on cooperation between members of different groups through meetings at distribution sites and the sharing of assistance.</td>
<td>Frequent examples given by affected people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional integration of social cohesion aspects into assistance programmes.</td>
<td>Several examples of anecdotal evidence of positive effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes seeking to address other drivers of conflict besides food insecurity.</td>
<td>Little evidence of effects available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions that strengthen state capacities and citizen–state trust.</td>
<td>Evidence of effects of assistance on citizen–state trust is mixed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Evaluation team’s analysis.*

41. The main mechanisms through which WFP contributes to reduced conflict and tensions are by increasing food availability and bringing together conflicting groups through programming. The perception shared by conflict-affected people and WFP employees in all the countries included in the evaluation is that the direct benefits of food assistance to individual well-being and social cohesion is WFP’s primary contribution to peace. Evidence of positive effects of programmes addressing the drivers of conflict other than food insecurity is rare.

42. The evaluation noted positive side-effects when WFP programmes provide a space where population groups who are in conflict can interact. The (perceived) exclusion from assistance, and quality issues in the delivery of assistance emerged as the main factors contributing to conflict and tension.

43. Evaluation findings further reinforce the evidence from studies by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and previous WFP evaluations confirming the importance of targeting in strengthening conflict-sensitive assistance.

44. The extent to which targeting practices contribute to tensions depends to a large extent on people’s perceptions of the fairness of the assistance. The perceived unfair exclusion of certain population groups from assistance is the primary driver of tensions, as confirmed by previous studies and WFP evaluations. Migrants and displaced people were the only groups defined in relation to conflict dynamics who were perceived as being unfairly included or excluded.

45. Little and mixed evidence exists on WFP’s potential unintended contribution to the profits of armed actors, and thus to the war economy. WFP enjoys a strong reputation as a neutral actor, and a clear majority of the evaluation survey respondents saw WFP as neutral.

46. Evidence on strengthening citizens’ trust in the state is mixed. Perceptions of involvement in WFP assistance can affect citizen–state trust, positively or negatively. In all the survey countries, when the authorities were seen to be involved in the planning or distribution of WFP assistance, the majority of respondents viewed that involvement as improving the authorities’ reputation. A significant minority, however, conveyed that it negatively affected the authorities’ reputation, signalling a strong preference for the administration of humanitarian assistance by neutral bodies such as WFP and a perception of close government involvement in assistance as increasing the risk of diversion, favouritism or the use of assistance for political ends.
47. In the four survey countries, the evaluation did not find examples of WFP's choice of cash-based or in-kind assistance being made with the goal of improving social cohesion or a similar documented effect. However, secondary analysis of previous evaluation results showed that the choice of cash-based or in-kind modalities can have important positive or negative effects on local peace and conflict dynamics. Kenya is a noteworthy example where reductions in tensions in refugee camps and settlements were noted after a switch to cash-based transfers for nearly all assistance and the substitution of a cereal ration with cash. At the same time, however, the evaluation also found that cash recipients were discriminated against when redeeming their cash assistance, based on their ethnicity.\(^5\)

2.3 What accounts for the results observed?

48. The evaluation identified and assessed factors that have plausibly contributed to or hindered the results derived from policy implementation.

i) Management buy-in and incentives

49. Management buy-in is a critical lever for anchoring both conflict sensitivity considerations and attention to peacebuilding within WFP, but it is constrained by mixed messages about the organization's position with regard to its contribution to peace. Global communications emphasize “contributing to peace” but do not provide clear guidance that defines WFP's ambition in that regard. Employees lack concrete expectations or action points for their work and see country-level management buy-in as the main enabler or hindering factor.

50. In addition, the recent focus on the contribution to peace is seen by a broad range of WFP employees and external stakeholders as having shifted attention away from efforts to avoid exacerbating tensions or conflict.

51. Evaluation interview data highlighted the hesitation of some WFP employees to raise “critical” issues that would impinge on conflict sensitivity. Implementation measures such as the inclusion of conflict sensitivity in training for senior managers are only starting to address this concern.

ii) Staffing

52. Dedicated positions at the country and regional levels are key to supporting conflict sensitivity, but the limited role of national employees limits progress in many settings. Dedicated employees play an important role in translating commitments to conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding to the programme level, enabling deeper conflict analysis by convening discussions and training on conflict sensitivity, internally or with cooperating partners, coordinating conflict sensitivity across objectives and programmatic areas, optimizing the contribution to peace of resilience projects and liaising with analytical and peacebuilding partners. However, most positions are temporary because they depend on the availability of specific funding. National employees are key to conflict awareness but are often not involved in strategic discussions.

53. WFP efforts to hire additional expert employees, strengthen training on conflict sensitivity and build a community of practice for employees involved in conflict sensitivity analysis are among the measures aimed at addressing this major factor.

iii) Emergency focus and culture

54. Strong awareness of humanitarian principles supports impartiality and neutrality, which are key to conflict sensitivity. Several WFP employees pointed to the humanitarian principles as the main element in guiding their approach to conflict sensitivity.

55. The large size of WFP's presence and emergency programmes has the potential to enable impartiality and the addressing of food insecurity as a driver of conflict, but also increases the risk of inadvertently contributing to tensions or conflict.

\(^5\) WFP. 2018. *An evaluation of the effects and a cost benefit analysis of the GFD Cash Modality scale up (Cash Based Transfers for PRRO 200737) for refugees and host communities in Kenya, August 2015–November 2017*, p. 27.
While WFP’s focus on delivery contributes positively to its general reputation, its “emergency mindset” also influences three aspects of conflict sensitivity negatively.

First, the urgency culture and the speed at which WFP operates limit the focus on context analysis. Its emergency mindset and the size of its operations mean that WFP has a tendency to focus on its own programming modalities when implementing programmes (even though the role of WFP as a systems enabler for humanitarian response is strongly recognized).

Second, the evaluation found very few examples of WFP focusing on understanding and supporting existing peacebuilding efforts rather than working on its own intended contribution to peace as a standalone effort. Neither internal nor external interviewees mentioned overarching United Nations processes such as the United Nations common country analysis or the United Nations cooperation framework as relevant instruments for forging a more common approach in this respect.

Third, the short-term programming horizon noted in many WFP evaluations makes it difficult to find good partners for social cohesion work in some countries. Contributing to peace requires time to develop sufficient understanding of local dynamics and for relationships of trust to emerge. The shift to multi-year country strategic plans potentially supports WFP’s ability to attract multi-year funding and conduct long-term planning. However, contracts with cooperating and peacebuilding partners are for short periods, some as brief as six months.

iv) Relationships with cooperating partners

The central role of cooperating partners is affected by competition and a focus on price. The critical role that cooperating partners play in conflict sensitivity is not acknowledged.

The competitive contracting environment makes some partners reluctant to share concerns about conflict sensitivity or negative experiences. Current implementation measures at the global level do not address this factor, but several country offices have taken important steps in addressing conflict sensitivity with their cooperating partners. Those steps include, for example, the systematic involvement of conflict advisers in reviewing proposals with partners, and the provision of training on conflict sensitivity, both of which create opportunities to discuss problems more openly.

v) Donor and host government influence

Donors play an important but at times ambivalent role in conflict sensitivity. Their funding can enable the establishment of dedicated positions that drive programming, but the earmarking of funding hinders WFP’s flexibility to adapt programmes.

Resources from the Peacebuilding Fund have encouraged a greater focus on conflict analysis and the contribution to peace, but the overall volume received by WFP remains small compared with the amounts received by FAO and UNICEF. Figure 2 shows that after a peak in 2019, Peacebuilding Fund resources for WFP decreased in 2020 and 2021.
Figure 2: Volume of peacebuilding fund grants, 2007–2021


64. Host governments' positions regarding the involvement of external actors in issues related to conflict and peace can be another critical factor. In some countries, the stance of the government may constrain WFP's ability to contribute to peacebuilding efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

65. The evaluation concluded that the policy is well formulated and remains relevant. WFP's main contribution to peace continues to be its work on food insecurity, resilience building and livelihoods, but remaining gaps in conflict-sensitive programming require a renewed effort to use existing analytical insights into how WFP's presence and assistance may affect peace and conflict dynamics, and to adapt programmes and processes accordingly.

How good is the policy?

66. The peacebuilding policy aimed to clarify expectations regarding WFP's role in (post-)conflict and transition settings. It defined guiding principles for ensuring that WFP does not inadvertently contribute to conflict but leverages opportunities to contribute to peace, when appropriate. Nine years on, the evaluation concluded that the policy remains relevant and coherent, internally and externally, setting realistic directions in guiding the organization's approach to conflict sensitivity and contributions to peace, as reflected in the strategic plan for 2022–2025. There is therefore no need to update the policy, and limited interest in doing so. The evaluation underscored how the absence of a policy implementation and resourcing plan has hindered systematic policy uptake until recently. It is also unclear how the recent restructuring of the Emergencies and Transitions Unit will affect policy implementation in the future.
What are the results of the policy?

67. The evaluation noted that it is through reductions in food insecurity that WFP makes its main contribution to peace by minimizing the potential drivers of, or pretexts for, conflict within and between groups and avoiding inadvertently adding to tensions and conflicts.

68. That conclusion points primarily to a need to prioritize measures for strengthening the conflict sensitivity of WFP and its cooperating partners. As WFP gradually shifts to providing more long-term assistance aimed at strengthening livelihoods and resilience, it is already on a path to making its contribution to peace more sustainable.

69. Reducing food insecurity and malnutrition impartially and based on needs is the core mandate of WFP. The potential contribution to peace is not what drives decisions about food security interventions – nor should it. The evaluation concluded that WFP should not redirect its attention and resources towards efforts to reduce conflict drivers other than food insecurity, nor should WFP generate more evidence to substantiate what its contribution to peace is. Rather, there is additional potential to contribute to existing peacebuilding initiatives and partnerships to which WFP can bring its core strengths in reducing food insecurity and supporting local food production systems as part of broader coordinated efforts to prevent conflict and support peace.

What accounts for the results?

70. Since the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020, more strategic attention has been directed towards WFP's potential and efforts to contribute to peace than towards addressing the foundational concern that WFP programming should avoid contributing to tensions and be conflict-sensitive. The evaluation indicated that some rebalancing is required, with greater emphasis on ensuring that existing expertise and analytical insights translate better into programme and process adaptations, with particular attention to targeting, feedback mechanisms and ensuring the quality of assistance, not only within WFP, but also in its work with cooperating partners.

71. The evaluation identified the following specific measures with a strong potential to improve existing efforts:

- Enhance the engagement with cooperating partners in a way that is commensurate to the key roles that they play.
- Strengthen the practice of context and, as appropriate, conflict analysis in order to address some of the analytical blind spots related to local power relations, relations with host governments that are party to a conflict and the ways in which the affiliations and backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners intersect with the conflict setting.
- Take steps towards more robust, action-oriented processes of reflection on risks and opportunities at the country level, meeting minimum standards in various settings.
- Reflect further on how to address the structural drivers, such as WFP's emergency culture, management buy-in and incentives and workforce issues, that can limit policy uptake and results both within WFP and with cooperating partners. A clear message from the top, incentives for country directors and the taking of steps to adapt organizational culture can be important in this regard.

72. If WFP can make progress on these priority issues, it can become a more conflict-sensitive organization because it already holds the other keys to making that shift work: first, the peacebuilding policy remains relevant and provides an adequate and sufficient framework for orienting WFP's role in (post-)conflict and transition settings; second, the country-based conflict advisers who have recently joined the organization have the necessary expertise, although sufficient capacity to effectively support the uptake of the peacebuilding policy is needed in the regional bureaux and at headquarters; and third, guidance documents, training and relevant partnership arrangements exist and need only to reach the right people within WFP and among cooperating partners.
## Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsibility and deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Recommendation 1:** Strengthen the practice of actionable, country-level analysis of how the presence and programmes of WFP and its partners influence conflict dynamics. | Lead: Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division (PRO)  
Deadline: December 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 1.1:** WFP should set out how it plans to institutionalize regular, practically oriented and inclusive processes of reflection on the risks and opportunities related to conflict dynamics in all country operations facing conflict risks.  
As a minimum, the following elements should be considered:  
- The reflection processes should take place annually and – as a minimum – inform the formulation and revision of second-generation country strategic plans so as to ensure that they are fully conflict-sensitive.  
- Country offices should prioritize the conduct of such reflection processes over the production of stand-alone, written context or conflict sensitivity analyses. Regional or global advisers should facilitate the process; cooperating partners should join the reflection.  
- The processes should include a discussion of relevant monitoring results (see sub-recommendation 2.2) and how to adapt WFP’s programmes and presence based on those results.  
- Risks relevant to WFP’s operation and programmes should be included in the risk registry.  
- Any regional implications of the analysis should be tabled for discussion at the periodic regional meetings of WFP country directors. The analysis should also inform WFP’s engagement in the United Nations common country analysis and discussions with development and peacebuilding partners (see sub-recommendation 3.1). | Lead: Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)  
Support: Country offices; regional bureaux; Programme Cycle Management Unit (PRO-M); Risk Management Division  
Deadline: February 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 1.2:** Carry out workforce planning aimed at ensuring that sufficient capacity exists at the headquarters and regional levels for implementing the policy, supporting country offices and strengthening the accountability of country directors for improving conflict sensitivity and strengthening synergies with other cross-cutting functions such as protection, access, gender, disability and inclusion, and accountability to affected populations, and to other divisions and departments, including those of human resources, supply chain and emergency operations. This capacity can involve either dedicated peace and conflict capacity, at headquarters and in the regional bureaux, cooperating closely with other teams, or functional support teams integrating significant expertise on conflict and peace and reflecting that expertise in their terms of reference. | Lead: PRO-P  
Support: Regional bureaux; country offices; Programme and Policy Development Department (PD); Human Resources Division (HRM); Supply Chain and Emergencies Department (SE).  
Deadline: December 2024 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsibility and deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Sub-recommendation 1.3:** Include guidance on the analysis processes and other conflict sensitivity issues in the revised Programme Guidance Manual and ensure that relevant guidance is available in key languages, such as Arabic, English, French and Spanish. This should ensure the following:  
  - The available guiding questions for protection and conflict sensitivity assessments should serve as a starting point because they synthesize various elements of context analysis in relation to gender, protection, accountability to affected populations and conflict sensitivity.  
  - The ongoing process of developing a conflict sensitivity mainstreaming strategy should include overarching and coherent guidance comprising all the context analysis requirements derived from policies, including those on gender, accountability to affected populations, protection and conflict sensitivity.  
  - The resulting guidance should include the guiding questions mentioned above and be shared with employees as part of regular country-level reflection processes, along with online training. | Lead: PRO-P  
Support: PD  
Deadline: February 2024 |
| **Recommendation 2:** Create incentives for, and take steps in, adapting the organizational culture to make conflict sensitivity more central: communicate expectations clearly, integrate conflict sensitivity into standard monitoring tools and enhance incentives for country directors. | Lead: PRO  
Deadline: December 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 2.1:** Communicate the expectations in terms of the minimum standards for conflict sensitivity and the steps to be taken, as outlined in these recommendations, through an Executive Director’s circular or similar corporate communication, rather than revising the peacebuilding policy, which remains adequate and sufficient. The communication should:  
  - clarify the mandatory steps for country offices, including, for example, the holding of an annual, inclusive process of reflection on context dynamics and conflict-sensitive issues and discussion of conflict sensitivity considerations with cooperating partners, for informing the design, review and evaluation of country strategic plans; and  
  - include a general message about the level of priority given to conflict-sensitive programming, clarifying that conflict sensitivity and “doing no harm” can be more important than the speed and quantity of delivery. | Lead: PRO-P  
Support: PD; PRO-M; regional bureaux.  
Deadline: December 2023 |
| **Sub-recommendation 2.2:** Include in standard monitoring mechanisms basic indicators that track the interventions of WFP and cooperating partners and the effects of those interventions on the conflict setting. Building on existing good practice, the indicators should, at a minimum, include questions that explore whether affected people perceive increases or decreases in tensions; whether they think that current targeting practices create tensions and what other features of the assistance do; and who they perceive as being unfairly included in or excluded from assistance. Consideration of these questions should be mandatory for all country offices. Country offices that cannot use the questions because of protection or security concerns should explain why and propose alternative ways of gaining relevant insights. | Lead: PRO-P  
Support: Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division; relevant policy/ programme areas within PD  
Deadline: December 2024 |
**Recommendation**

**Sub-recommendation 2.3:** Ensure that country directors make conflict sensitivity a priority by including it as a standard core competency used in their appraisals and in promotion and rotation decisions.

Necessary steps should include:

- ensuring that conflict sensitivity is reflected in country director job profiles;
- establishing that the performance of country directors in conflict sensitivity – including in ensuring that the reflection process outlined in recommendation 1 takes place – becomes a standard indicator in the appraisal supporting the annual Executive Director’s assurance statement;
- giving central consideration to prior experience and performance in conflict sensitivity, particularly for placements in contexts with high levels or high risk of conflict;
- including a module on conflict sensitivity in the induction programme for country directors and deputy country directors and in the training programme for heads of field offices; and
- establishing, as a requirement for all country directors, an in-depth briefing from reputable institutions and academics with specialized knowledge of conflict analysis and local contexts prior to the directors’ assumption of their new positions.

**Lead:** HRM  
**Support:** PRO; PRO-P; Performance Strengthening Branch; Emergency Operations Division.  
**Deadline:** February 2024

**Recommendation 3: Strengthen the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in WFP programmes and processes with partners and contractors. Increase the focus on conflict sensitivity in work with cooperating partners, and check the backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners.**

**Sub-recommendation 3.1:** WFP should set out how it plans to enhance the conflict sensitivity of cooperating partners.

Steps should include the following:

- Encourage the open sharing of conflict-related issues through training, during the formulation of partnership agreements and in reports.
- Amend partnership applications, field-level agreements and reporting templates to incorporate the request that cooperating partners include reflections on context dynamics and conflict sensitivity and to ensure sufficient resources to enable partners to deliver conflict-sensitive programmes.
- Train and support country-level programme staff to ensure that they discuss context dynamics and conflict sensitivity when providing feedback to cooperating partners.
- Request that processes for strengthening conflict sensitivity at the global level are included on the agenda of the annual partnership meeting until the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity is complete.

**Lead:** PRO-P  
**Support:** Regional bureaux; country offices; NGO Partnerships Unit  
**Deadline:** December 2023
### Recommendation

**Sub-recommendation 3.2:** WFP should set out the steps it plans to take to ensure a thorough review of the political and identity-based issues that it needs to explore in order to understand how the backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners intersect with the conflict setting and may affect conflict dynamics and stakeholders' perceptions.

The steps should include the following:

- Review due diligence and selection processes to ensure that such affiliations are explored during the hiring, partnering and contracting of employees, contractors and cooperating partners.
- Include a mechanism to ensure that any concerns regarding the political affiliations of contractors or employees are passed up to the country director or the appropriate management level above that.
- Use proactive outreach to increase the pool of applicants from underrepresented groups.

| Lead | HRM |
| Support | PRO-P, NGO Partnerships Unit, SE |
| Deadline | February 2024 |

### Recommendation 4: Alleviating food insecurity is and should remain the most important WFP contribution to peace. WFP should focus its contribution to peace on supporting existing peacebuilding processes by implementing activities jointly with other actors, drawing on its core mandate strengths and focusing on humanitarian access to alleviate food insecurity.

| Lead | PD; SE |
| Deadline | February 2024 |

### Sub-recommendation 4.1: WFP should confirm that it will design all of its specific peace-promoting activities jointly with other actors and not on its own. In doing so, WFP should focus on its core mandate strengths such as, for example, food security and livelihoods or resilience building interventions targeting areas at high risk of conflict or with ongoing peace agreements and reintegration efforts, local purchase and market-building activities, country capacity strengthening or access negotiations:

- WFP should engage with development and peacebuilding partners to identify how it can best contribute to efforts to address conflict drivers without undermining its own neutrality, impartiality and independence.
- Such engagement should take place regularly – at a minimum when WFP develops, revises or evaluates a country strategic plan, or when there are important changes in the situation, or in light of the forthcoming conflict sensitivity strategy.
- Headquarters and regional bureaux should provide guidance and support for country offices in this effort, enhancing the relevant frameworks of accountability and responsibilities (including of country directors) for holding discussions with other actors and further strengthening partnerships with actors relevant to peacebuilding at the global and regional levels.

| Lead | PRO-P |
| Support | Country offices; regional bureaux; Partnerships and Advocacy Department |
| Deadline | February 2024 |

### Sub-recommendation 4.2: WFP should set out how it plans to leverage its global weight in humanitarian diplomacy to increase humanitarian access, in close coordination with other humanitarian, development and United Nations actors; for example, in system-wide negotiations with government actors or peace processes, WFP should ensure that country offices maintain the strategic lead in efforts involving various levels of the organization in order to safeguard against potential negative consequences.

| Lead | Deputy Executive Director, SE |
| Support | SE; PRO-P; regional bureaux; country directors |
| Deadline | February 2024 |
1. Introduction

1. The Office of Evaluation of the World Food Programme (WFP) contracted the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in April 2021 to independently evaluate the policy on the WFP Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings6 (hereafter “peacebuilding policy”) approved by the Executive Board (EB) in November 2013. The evaluation is mandated by the WFP policy of evaluating its corporate policies within four to six years of approval and of the start of implementation.7

2. This introductory chapter provides a summary of the evaluation’s main features, including the objectives and scope of the evaluation. It describes the context of the policy, the policy itself and the specific aspects evaluated. The introduction ends with an overview of the evaluation methodology alongside a discussion of limitations and ethical considerations.

1.1 Evaluation Features

3. Objectives: The evaluation of the 2013 peacebuilding policy and its update from 20148 serves two objectives: accountability and learning. The evaluation assesses the quality of the policy and its implementation measures, as well as the extent to which WFP programmes and actions achieved results, in line with the provisions of the peacebuilding policy (accountability).9 Furthermore, the evaluation analysis outlines the factors explaining the results related to the policy and provides recommendations to improve policy implementation (learning).

4. Scope: The scope of the evaluation is global, covering policy implementation and WFP performance relating to specific aspects of conflict sensitivity and of contributions to peace throughout the entire organization. The evaluation covers the period from the adoption of the policy in 2013 to April 2022. Due to limited documentation and little institutional memory of the early years, the evaluation focuses on policy implementation over the past three to five years.

5. Intended users: The evaluation informs a variety of stakeholders across all WFP divisions and units at headquarters, regional bureaux, country offices and field offices,10 as well as members of the Executive Board and donors. The primary audience for this evaluation is WFP senior management, together with Executive Board members, as the evaluation provides evidence for results of the peacebuilding policy, as well as recommendations for improving policy implementation and advancing WFP conflict sensitivity and contributions to peace. On a more technical level, the evaluation findings will inform the policy owner, in this case the Peace and Conflict Team within the Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P), about factors influencing WFP practices related to conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, and about how to further strengthen these practices. Other functional areas, such as those responsible for vulnerability analyses, procurement or partnerships, as well as regional bureaux and country offices, should also benefit from insights into how they could improve conflict-sensitive practices and support the WFP contribution to peace. Secondary users include WFP (cooperating) partners, United Nations country teams, other organizations that are investing in mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into their own programmes and peace researchers and evaluation specialists.

6. Timing and duration of field work: The data gathering for the evaluation was conducted between September 2021 and April 2022 by a core team of five evaluators from GPPi with support from the University of Konstanz and local research partners in the four case study countries involving surveys with

---

6 WFP. 2013. WFP’s Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1).
9 The way the objective on accountability is framed is a reflection of the shift from a narrow focus on “peacebuilding” set out by the policy towards a broader focus on “contributions to peace”, which takes the changed (global and WFP internal) discourse on building peace into account.
10 One member of each regional bureau and a cross-section of headquarters divisions covering policy/programme and technical areas where conflict sensitivity plays a relevant role are represented in the internal reference group.
affected individuals. The evaluation team conducted eight country case studies overall: Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria. Four of in-depth country case studies – Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq – were supported by the aforementioned local research partners and included surveys among conflict-affected persons and interviews with partner organizations. The evaluation team visited two of the in-depth case study countries (Colombia and Iraq) in person, while the other two case study countries (Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) were conducted remotely due to security considerations and COVID-19 travel restrictions (see limitations below for further details). The other four cases were designed as desk review case studies with remote interviews of WFP employees only.

1.2 CONTEXT

7. Food security and conflict intersect in several ways. First, conflict has long been recognized as one of the main drivers of malnourishment, hunger and starvation. Secondly, food insecurity can be – or can be used as – an important driver of conflict. Thirdly, large-scale humanitarian or development interventions can have both positive and negative effects on local peace and conflict dynamics. Delivering assistance in a conflict-sensitive way is therefore key to ensuring that WFP does no harm and works in a people-centred way. This emerged as particularly important as WFP has been increasing its focus on “changing lives” in addition to “saving lives”, which entails more engagement with national and local authorities, requiring a careful balancing with neutrality and impartiality.

8. It is against this backdrop that the Executive Board approved the WFP peacebuilding policy in 2013 to enable WFP to strengthen its work in conflict environments and to shape its approach to risk analysis, conflict-sensitive programming and engagement with peacebuilding partners.

9. The definitions of peace and conflict are subject to ongoing debates. This evaluation uses WFP’s internal definitions. The organization defines conflict as a “system of competitive interactions between two or more parties (e.g. individuals, groups, states) who pursue mutually incompatible goals, or compete for the same “goal” that “can be pursued violently (e.g. war, terrorist attacks), or non-violently (litigation)”; and contributions to peace as the “positive impact of deliberate efforts to address the causes or drivers of conflict and to support peace at the local, national, regional or international levels.” These definitions are still quite broad for the purpose of an evaluation. During the inception phase, drawing on interviews, the WFP 2021 Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment Guidance Note, and the metatheories of change developed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the evaluation team therefore proposed to focus on concrete ways for WFP to avoid exacerbating conflict or make contributions to peace:

- Efforts to avoid causing tensions between different groups, e.g. through improved targeting

---


16 Op.cit. (see FN 12); see recommendation to “Focus conflict analysis on ensuring that targeting assistance does not run the risk of increasing exclusion.”
• Efforts to avoid contributing to profits of armed actors
• Efforts to reduce food insecurity as a driver of conflict
• Efforts to advocate with other institutions to address other structural drivers of conflict, such as power-relations between different groups
• Attempts to strengthen social cohesion (i.e. the shared value basis that enables cooperation towards the common good) by strengthening inclusion of and supporting dialogue among conflicting groups
• Attempts to strengthen trust between citizens and the state.

10. WFP has long operated in environments characterized by conflict, fragility and violence. In 2020, 33 of the countries in which WFP operated had a Global Peace Index score of over 2.3, indicating a high level of conflict or conflict risk,17 and there were 12 United Nations peacekeeping missions.18 Several factors have more recently placed greater attention to the way WFP can avoid exacerbating conflict and make a contribution to peace, and also shifted the context in which WFP does so:

• A changed humanitarian assistance discourse: The global discourse on the connections among humanitarian, development and peace work – the “triple nexus” – intensified after the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016. Humanitarian assistance is no longer clearly “firewalled” from the objectives of contributing to peace. Organizations are increasingly expected to secure coherence among humanitarian, development and peace work, to be aware of their impact on peace where they operate, and to use their influence and community-level engagement to promote peace.19

• An evolving international agenda: Although the core mandate of the United Nations has always been to foster peace, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has sought to improve the ability of the United Nations system to build peace. His “Sustaining Peace Agenda” calls on United Nations agencies, including WFP, to jointly engage in conflict prevention and activities to sustain peace.20 The Sustainable Development Goals also support stronger engagement on peace, with goal 16 calling for the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.

In May 2018, the United Nations Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 2417 (2018) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which condemns the use of starvation as a weapon of war and calls for better humanitarian access. WFP plays a key role in contributing to the reports for Resolution 2417. This is an important shift in the international agenda, especially amid increasing clarity that starvation is used as a weapon of war in many contexts21.

The UN Call to Action for Human Rights 2020 further developed the peace agenda by focusing on rights in times of crises. Although different in nature, these United Nations-led initiatives represent a strong call for development and humanitarian actors to seek a more active role in addressing the root causes of conflicts. The debates in civil society-led peacebuilding, too, have shifted over the past years. The role of local ownership in peacebuilding, for example, has gained prominence.22

• The Nobel Peace Prize: Awarded to WFP in October 2020, the Nobel Peace Prize is the most internationally recognized acknowledgement of WFP efforts to combat hunger, its contribution to improve conditions for peace and its efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war. The

---

Nobel Peace Prize has become an important tool for WFP advocacy, but has also shifted expectations both within and outside of WFP for demonstrating its contributions to peace.

11. These developments characterize the evolving context in which WFP has operated since the EB approved the peacebuilding policy in 2013. Critically, they have led WFP to commit much more publicly to contributing to peace, in addition to its original mandate of saving lives and changing lives. For example, WFP signed up to the Peace Promise at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and declared its formal adherence to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)–Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus on 24 September 2020. Both commit – with different degrees of formality – WFP to conflict-sensitive programming.

12. Beyond a changing external environment, important aspects of the internal context for the peacebuilding policy have also changed over recent years. On the one hand, the institutional set-up and capacity for WFP work on conflict and peace has changed. The changes are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.2. On the other hand, aspects related to the peacebuilding policy have been incorporated in the latest Strategic Plan (2022–2025) that calls for a better mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in WFP work and references the organization’s new minimum standards on conflict sensitivity. Finally, since taking office in April 2017, the current WFP Executive Director David Beasley has also positioned WFP prominently through active and publicly recognized involvement in peace advocacy in some conflicts that receive a lot of international attention, such as Ethiopia, South Sudan and Yemen. He has also advocated for WFP to address different root causes of food insecurity, including conflict.

1.3 THE POLICY ON WFP’S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING IN TRANSITION SETTINGS

13. About the policy: The peacebuilding policy adopted in 2013 responded both to particular developments in the United Nations and the multilateral system and to the operational realities WFP had been encountering for years. Operating in many contexts affected by conflict, WFP had developed an approach to working in such situations prior to the adoption of the peacebuilding policy that centred around the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and operational independence. It had, however, not articulated any corporate standards or overarching objectives related to its potential contribution to peace. The peacebuilding policy addressed this gap by introducing eight general principles for working in conflicts, as well as three concrete policy directions to guide WFP work and to “set parameters for WFP’s engagement in peacebuilding activities”:

**General principles**
- Understand the context
- Maintain a hunger focus
- At a minimum avoid doing harm
- Support national priorities where possible, but follow humanitarian principles where conflict continues
- Support United Nations coherence
- Be responsive to a dynamic environment
- Ensure inclusivity and equity
- Be realistic

---

Policy directions

- Conducting conflict and risk analyses in transition settings. This dynamic, iterative and inclusive process should cover conflict and political economy analysis on the direct and indirect linkages with food insecurity, as well as risks that could impact WFP’s ability to implement programmes.
- Using conflict-sensitive programming in transition settings. Depending on the context, this can involve strategies to avoid to doing harm, to support peacebuilding at the local level and to support peacebuilding at the national level.
- Working with peacebuilding partners in transition settings. This includes effective two-way communication with affected populations, new partnerships with organizations experienced in peace and reconciliation and close cooperation with other UN agencies and departments.

14. The peacebuilding policy further specified implementation measures for each of the three policy directions, including improved risk analysis utilizing the knowledge and processes of different WFP divisions and units; a dedicated headquarters-based support structure, together with advisors based in regional bureaux to support country offices; an increase in policy-specific training opportunities; and stronger partnerships with partners engaged in peacebuilding across all levels of the organization. The peacebuilding policy does not mention the resources that may be required to implement these measures and the 2014 update to the policy stated that costs were expected to be “incremental rather than substantial”28.

15. Summary of implementation measures: While no explicit policy implementation strategy was developed, WFP took different steps to implement the broad policy directions established by the peacebuilding policy and to generally strengthen its ability to contribute to peace. The evaluation team categorized these different implementation steps as: (1) capacity building – which includes training for WFP employees, guidance and the recent establishment of a community of practice of peacebuilding experts within the organization; (2) practical operations support from headquarters and regional bureaux to country offices, for instance, to conduct conflict analyses or conflict-sensitivity assessments; (3) a broadening of the evidence base through increased efforts to understand the WFP contribution to peace and to develop related measurement tools; and (4) process adaptations focusing on hiring and staffing processes, WFP interactions with cooperating partners and changes to its supply chain management. Many of these measures have only been adopted recently and several have not yet been systematically implemented. Chapter 2.2 provides a more detailed assessment of these implementation measures.

16. Theory of change: The peacebuilding policy does not feature an explicit theory of change outlining how the different implementation measures are connected to the overarching outcomes of improved conditions for peace and less violence as a driver of food insecurity. During the inception phase, the evaluation team therefore constructed a draft theory of change using different sources and evidence29 and slightly adapted it based on the evaluation findings (Figure 1).30 The theory of change shows how WFP currently envisages the policy and its implementation measures to lead to expected actions and how these, in turn, are expected to contribute to outcomes relating to conflict and peace. The policy and related policy implementation measures are anticipated to support an improved analysis of conflicts and risks in country offices, which in turn are intended to lead to a range of adaptations in WFP programmes, processes and systems. These efforts to avoid exacerbating conflict and to make a contribution to peace are expected to support peace outcomes, such as stabilization and less violence, more social cohesion, inclusion and equity and more citizen-state trust. Institutional factors that affect how the theory of change works in practice

---

30 For details on how the theory of change was adapted based on evaluation findings, please see Annex 7.
intervene at each level of the theory of change. The theory of change also makes key assumptions explicit, for example that resources and capacity for policy implementation exist and that country offices have the necessary flexibility to adapt programmes, processes and systems.

17. Gender and other diversity considerations are relevant at various junctures in this theory of change, for example whether guidance and training related to the peacebuilding policy cover relevant gender dimensions; whether partnerships with peacebuilding actors include partnerships with organizations focusing on gender, disability or other relevant characteristics, such as displacement; whether conflict analyses explore how relevant gender is for the conflict dynamics; and whether WFP planning and implementation processes take the results of this analysis into account. There are also clear overlaps between the theory of change of the peacebuilding policy and the theories of change for other cross-cutting issues in WFP. Other policies on cross-cutting issues also emphasize the importance of context analysis, for example to support access negotiations, to enhance the understanding of and response to protection concerns, to strengthen the integration of gender perspectives and to increase accountability to affected people.
**Figure 1: Theory of change**

**Peace/conflict outcomes**
- Stabilization/less violence/no increase in violence
- More social cohesion, inclusion, equity/no increase in social tensions

**Avoids exacerbating conflict and makes contributions to peace**

**WFP country offices individually and/or through partnerships conduct better analysis of conflicts and risks and adapt programmes, processes and systems**
- Planning
- Targeting
- Community engagement
- Procurement
- Hiring
- Interactions governments/local authorities
- Interactions partners (cooperating partner, peacebuilding)
- Monitoring and evaluation

In order to:
- Reduce food insecurity as a driver of conflict
- Avoid increasing tensions by ensuring impartiality, explaining selection criteria and strengthening community-based programming
- Avoid contributing to armed actor profits
- Strengthen social cohesion through inclusion of and dialogue with conflicting groups
- Strengthen trust between citizens and the state

**Guide and enable**

**WFP develops and adopts a policy on peacebuilding**

**WFP takes measures to implement the policy**
- For example:
  - Guidance
  - Training
  - Staff
  - Incentives
  - Partnerships with peacebuilding actors

**Assumptions**
- Resources and capacity for policy implementation exist
- The policy and policy implementation measures address key factors that affect the ability of country offices to conduct analysis, establish partnerships and adapt programmes, processes and systems
- WFP interventions support and complement the peacebuilding efforts of others
- Country offices have the capacity and flexibility to adapt programmes, processes and systems

**Source:** Evaluation team, drawing on the peacebuilding policy, guidance, SIPRI research reports and evaluation findings.

---

1.4 METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

18. The evaluation is based on the theory of change introduced above and covers policy quality, results and factors influencing the results. It uses a mixed methods approach.

19. **Evaluation questions:** The evaluation is guided by the following main evaluation questions and subquestions. (See Annex 4 for the full evaluation matrix.)

**Evaluation Question 1:** How good is the policy?
- Is the policy relevant, clear, evidence-based and coherent with other WFP policies?
- How does the policy compare to similar policies of other organizations and system-wide frameworks?
- To what extent has policy implementation been supported by relevant, coherent and adequately resourced measures?
- What need and interest is there to update the policy and to redefine the WFP contribution to peace?

**Evaluation Question 2:** What are the results of the policy?
- What level of analysis of peace and conflict dynamics and opportunities for contributing to peace is contained in the standard planning and reporting documents of WFP country offices?
- How well do the planning and reporting documents of WFP reflect a country office’s actual level of analysis of conflict dynamics and opportunities for contributing to peace?
- To what extent has the analysis informed WFP programmes and WFP processes and systems adaptations?
- How do conflict-affected people and other key stakeholders perceive WFP programmes and its presence?

**Evaluation Question 3:** What accounts for the results that have been observed and for those that were not achieved?
- What have been the main internal and external factors enabling and hindering the ability of WFP to avoid exacerbating conflict and to contribute to peace?
- To what extent do current policy implementation measures address key internal enabling or hindering factors and how could remaining impeding factors be addressed?

20. **Evaluation criteria:** The evaluation follows the standardized WFP approach for policy evaluations and covers different evaluation criteria with each of the three main evaluation questions. EQ1 *(How good is the policy?)* is focused on the appropriateness, relevance and coherence of the policy. Policy quality is assessed against WFP indicators for policy quality and also based on a comparison of the peacebuilding policy with the policies and related implementation steps of other organizations. EQ2 *(What are the results of the policy?)* centres on the effectiveness and impact of the different implementation measures and also, more generally, on the WFP contribution to peace. The evaluation hereby focused on establishing the effects of WFP interventions bottom-up by collecting the perceptions and insights of affected people. EQ3 *(What accounts for the results that have been observed and results that were not achieved?)* also focused on effectiveness and on the sustainability of the different measures. It assesses structural and procedural aspects to determine how results occurred and what impacted the uptake of the peacebuilding policy. The evaluation again reflects on lessons learned from comparator organizations.

21. **Evaluation methods:** The evaluation used a theory-based, mixed-methods evaluation design to collect and analyse a broad range of qualitative and quantitative evidence to answer the evaluation questions. The main sources of information were documents, interviews, surveys and focus group discussions among affected people, as well as sense-making workshops to collect further nuances on emerging findings (Table 1). Country cases studies supplemented the information provided by headquarters. Please see Annex 5 for a more detailed discussion of the methodology and the data collection instruments.

22. **Analysis and triangulation:** The team analysed the evidence in a structured way and triangulated it to enable robust conclusions. Data analyses processes involving the different components of the evaluation team took place iteratively to enable a fine-tuning of the data collection process. For example, results of interviews conducted early on at headquarters and the first iterations of the document analysis informed data collection at country level. The evaluation team triangulated data collected through different data
collection methods (e.g. interviews, surveys and document analysis) and from different stakeholders (e.g. WFP employees at different levels in the organisation, partners and affected people). The evaluation team organized workshops to include both affected people and WFP employees in the data analysis and interpretation process.

Table 1: Main evaluation methods and data collection activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Information</th>
<th>Data Collection Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Document analysis</td>
<td>Qualitative review of internal documents: policies, guidance, conflict analyses, monitoring data and project reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative review of 47 centralized and decentralized WFP and inter-agency evaluations and evaluation syntheses (2014–2021) (See Annex 11 for the list of evaluation reviewed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qualitative review of external documents: policies and guidance of comparator organizations, academic literature, news reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative review (semi-automated) of more than 1,500 WFP country planning and reporting documents from 2012 to 2021 (See Annex 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informant interviews</td>
<td>156 interview partners in total: 71 women, 85 men (see breakdown in Figure 2 below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34 interviews during the inception phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews with WFP employees at headquarters, regional bureaux and in 8 countries (Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, Suda and Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews with partners in Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, including 22 local partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interviews conducted in English, French, Spanish and Arabic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected population survey</td>
<td>The survey was conducted in Arabic, French, Kurdish and Spanish in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso (505 respondents): Centre Nord, Est</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia (571): La Guajira, Nariño</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (496): South Kivu (areas between Mwenga – Walungu and Kabare – Kalehe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq (583): Duhok, Ninewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,155 respondents, of which 59.2 percent have received assistance from WFP and 40.8 percent have not. Of the total, 52.71 percent were female, 47.24 percent male, and 0.05 percent “other”. (See Annex 13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops with affected people</td>
<td>21 workshops across Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia and Iraq with 259 participants (132 women, 127 men), conducted in Arabic, French, Kurdish and Spanish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
<td>Comparison of the WFP peacebuilding policy and related implementation steps with similar policies and implementation measures of three comparator organizations: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Oxfam and UNICEF. (See Annex 14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. **Case selection:** The evaluation selected eight country cases during the inception phase. The sample covers different ways and activities through which WFP aims to be conflict-sensitive, prevent conflict escalation and support dialogue, social cohesion and peace. It includes countries with different levels and phases of conflict. When selecting the sample, the evaluation team sought to avoid overlap with the
countries selected for the then ongoing WFP-SIPRI Phase II studies, to ensure geographic variation across WFP regions and to exclude small WFP offices and activities in low-conflict contexts.

24. **Limitations:** The evaluation faced limitations which affected how it was conducted, resulting in deviations from the original plan outlined in the inception report. The evaluation team was unable to conduct two of the four in-depth country case studies in person due to COVID-19-related logistical challenges (for the Democratic Republic of the Congo case study) and due to an elevated security risk at the time of the planned country visit (Burkina Faso). The evaluation team mitigated the lack of in-person meetings through online briefings for the country offices. The local research partners conducted the sense-making workshops autonomously following extensive briefings by the evaluation team. Overall, the evaluation had fewer in-person interactions with informants than foreseen but mitigated this through increased online interactions. A ninth case study – foreseen in the inception report as another desk review case study – did not take place due to limited capacity in the Afghanistan country office to respond to the requests from the evaluation team following the deterioration of the political and humanitarian situation from August 2021 onwards. As a result, the evaluation has not included insights and perceptions from the Asia/Pacific region, except for interviewed employees based at headquarters and regional bureaux with experience in the Asia/Pacific region.

25. Beyond practical limitations affecting the foreseen implementation of the evaluation, the latter faced general evaluability challenges. This included limited institutional memory of policy implementation measures that immediately followed the publication of the peacebuilding policy, the absence of baseline and monitoring data on conflict sensitivity and peace contributions, the absence of a theory of change to guide the inquiry into aspects critical for achieving assumed policy objectives and a case study selection constrained by varying circumstances. In addition, as a result of the lack of other existing evidence on societal-level effects of WFP interventions, the evaluation evidence on evaluation question 2 relies heavily on the affected people survey. As a result, this evidence is skewed towards issues that conflict-affected people can speak to (see paragraphs 89-90), i.e. their direct experiences with WFP’s presence, the assistance provided and its effects on conflict and peace dynamics. The evaluation was less able to analyse the effects of higher-level WFP interventions, for example to what extent WFP efforts to strengthen the capacities of governments to address food insecurity have an effect on conflict and peace dynamics. The evaluation has been partially able to address these evaluability challenges by triangulating historical information to the extent possible, and by making limited robustness in data explicit in the evaluation report. It did so by collecting primary data at field level to counter the limited baseline data and by constructing a theory of change as part of the inception phase. While the evaluation is therefore not able to present findings on all relevant aspects of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding (with gaps for example on the effects of higher-level interventions on the ground), the applied mitigation measures did allow it to assess the majority of relevant questions. All findings and conclusions presented in this report are based on solid, triangulated evidence.

26. **Ethical considerations and safeguards:** The evaluation was designed to: (1) ensure informed consent and protect the privacy and confidentiality of participants; (2) ensure cultural sensitivity, respect for the autonomy of participants and for fair identification of participants (including women and socially excluded groups); and (3) make certain that the evaluation did not harm participants or their communities or put WFP work at risk. To ensure confidentiality, all interviewees and survey participants were informed about the purpose of the interview or survey and that their answers would not be attributed to them. Data protection measures included storing digital interview notes on encrypted hardware and separating interviewee names from interview content. The evaluation team decontextualized sensitive information if it

---

32 Case studies conducted by SIPRI during phase II include Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Lebanon, Nigeria and South Sudan.

33 The groups that are potentially socially excluded depends on context. In most case study countries, this focused on displaced people or migrants, as well as groups from different ethnic backgrounds.
could potentially put WFP and specific operations at risk, and respected rare requests to not reference select pieces of information in the evaluation report.

27. **Consideration of gender and diversity:** The evaluation has incorporated gender and other diversity considerations throughout its design. Primarily, it has collected data in a way that enabled differences to be determined in how women and men, as well as members of other groups relevant in local contexts, such as displaced people or people with different ethnic backgrounds, have perceived the effects of WFP interventions on a local conflict and peace dynamics. Of all survey respondents, 52.71 percent were female (Figure 3). The evaluation also sought to establish a gender balance of interviewees to the extent possible, with 71 female and 85 male participants (Figure 2). The evaluation team conducted a disaggregated analysis of interview and survey data by sex, national and international workforce category and by other relevant categories. For interview data, there were no gender-based patterns where views on evaluation questions differed, but a few between national and international employees (explained in the relevant findings). The disaggregated analysis of the survey data yielded interesting insights on differences across gender categories, each explained in the findings and in detail in Annex 13. Thematically, the evaluation assessed to what extent the peacebuilding policy is consistent and complementary with the gender policy, and to what extent possible synergies in policy implementation measures are used. It also explored the extent to which gender considerations relevant to local conflict and peace dynamics are reflected in WFP work and whether programmes fostering social cohesion and peace include both women and men. Related results are reported across the different chapters detailing evaluation findings.

**Figure 2: Interviewee breakdown by organization type, sex, WFP workforce category and location (data collection phase)**
Figure 3: Survey participants by sex and age

Survey participants by sex
- Female: 52.7%
- Male: 47.2%
- Other: 0.1%
(n = 2155)

Survey participants by age
- 18-25: 14.7%
- 26-35: 20.9%
- 36-45: 22.0%
- 46-55: 13.7%
- 56-65: 19.2%
- >65: 9.0%
(n = 2155)
2. Evaluation Findings

2.1 QUALITY OF THE POLICY

Summary: How good is the peacebuilding policy? To answer this evaluation question, the evaluation assesses the peacebuilding policy against existing indicators of policy quality, discusses the perceptions of WFP employees and compares the policy to those of other organizations.

Overall, the WFP peacebuilding policy can be considered to be well-formulated with realistic and practical principles that are able to guide the organization in its approach to conflict sensitivity and its contribution to peace. The peacebuilding policy scores well against WFP benchmarks of policy quality; contains principles that are still relevant in 2022, as evidenced by the similarity to newer comparable policies from other humanitarian organizations; and receives good marks from employees who are aware of it. The policy’s main limitations are not its content but the lack of financial and human resources foreseen to implement it, which until recently delayed a systematic uptake of the policy.

Finding 1: The Peacebuilding Policy scores comparatively well against WFP benchmarks for policy formulation, but poorly against standards for policy implementation and uptake.

28. WFP has a range of benchmarks to assess policy quality, both in terms of policy formulation and aspects related to ensuring future policy implementation based on different reviews of policy quality and factors that support or hinder policy uptake. Three indicators of policy quality linked to policy formulation derive from WFP policy formulation guidance34 from 2011, before the adoption of the peacebuilding policy. Other indicators relating to both policy formulation and policy implementation and uptake derive from a shorter note on policy quality based on policy evaluation findings from 201835 and a synthesis of evidence and lessons from WFP’s policy evaluations published in 202036 – both established after the adoption of the peacebuilding policy.

29. The evaluation finds that the peacebuilding policy meets five standards on policy formulation fully and three partially. The evaluation could not collect enough evidence on the level of consultations prior to the adoption of the peacebuilding policy (Table 2). This is better than the score reached by 10 other WFP corporate policies analysed by the Office of Evaluation in a similar way.37

Table 2: Conformity to standards on policy formulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy quality criteria and source</th>
<th>Assessment of PB policy</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The policy supports WFP strategic objectives. 2011 Policy Formulation Guidance</td>
<td>Standard met</td>
<td>The peacebuilding (PB) policy was adopted in the context of a specific strategic objective related to the WFP approach in post-conflict and transition situations. The WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013 included the objective to “restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations.”38 Although the peacebuilding policy does not refer explicitly to the WFP Strategic Plan 2008–2013, the policy clearly discusses how WFP provides assistance in transition settings and fragile states.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37 Ibid.
The policy is based on a gap analysis to determine the need for a dedicated policy (new or updated). **2011 Policy Formulation Guidance**  

| Standard met | A gap existed that the peacebuilding policy aimed to close. The policy itself mentions that previous corporate policies touch upon conflict contexts, but do not explicitly address the WFP role in supporting transitions to peace. In addition, the peacebuilding policy mentions “an independent study to assess the potential contributions to peace of food assistance and other non-food-based WFP interventions” and a WFP-sponsored workshop as measures to better understand a potential gap and to assess the relevance of a dedicated peacebuilding policy. |

The policy defines its scope and prioritizes. **2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality**  

| Standard met | The peacebuilding policy is specific in scope and outlines clear priorities. The peacebuilding policy defines its scope as developing “parameters for WFP's engagement in peacebuilding activities as part of larger United Nations efforts to transition towards peace in countries emerging from conflict.” It outlines three specific priorities for WFP: i) investing in institutional capacity in conflict and risk analysis; ii) using conflict-sensitive programming; and iii) engaging with peacebuilding partners. |

The policy ensures external coherence. **2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality**  

| Standard met | The policy is anchored in relevant debates, ensuring external coherence. The peacebuilding policy references numerous peacebuilding developments relevant at the time of its development in a section called “Global policy discourse and architecture.” Regarding the United Nations, the policy briefly reflects on integrated mission planning within UN peacekeeping operations and on the work of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Referencing multilateral actions, the peacebuilding policy highlights the “New Deal on Fragile States” and the “World Bank World Development Report,” which were both highly influential in shaping debates on peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the time of the policy's development. Overall, the peacebuilding policy clearly positions itself within broader thinking and thus ensures external coherence. |

The policy uses a clear and consistent terminology. **2022 Synthesis of Evidence and Lessons from WFP's Policy Evaluations**  

| Standard met | The policy uses a clear and consistent terminology. The peacebuilding policy introduces the complex subject of contributing to peace by providing clear definitions on different elements, such as conflict, transition, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. Overall, the policy is clear on this subject and does not create definitional ambiguities that would have affected policy uptake. Terms are also consistently used. |

The policy develops a vision and a theory of change. **2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality**  

| Partially met | The policy implicitly develops a vision but lacks an explicit theory of change. Interviewees suggested the peacebuilding policy was intended as a vision document to change the overall approach of WFP to working in transition environments and conflict settings. The policy outlines eight principles of what it calls its “transitions policy framework.” Taken together, these principles articulate a vision of how WFP’s engagement in contexts affected by conflict can be strengthened and seek to reinforce good practices viewed as critical for work in transition settings. However, the policy does not include more specific guidance on how these eight principles can be applied. |

---

40 WFP. 2013. WFP’s Role in Peacebuilding In Transition Settings (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1, § 15).  
41 WFP. 2013. WFP’s Role in Peacebuilding In Transition Settings (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1, § 16).  
should be implemented. The policy also does not specify how implementing the principles will make WFP activities more conflict sensitive, or enable it to make greater contributions to peace and social cohesion. The lack of an explicit theory of change has recently motivated WFP to develop so-called meta theories of change through its partnership with SIPRI.\(^{43}\)

| The policy ensures internal and strategic coherence and integrates gender.  
2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality | Partially met | In terms of content, the policy is largely in line with other policies and therefore de facto meets the criterion of internal coherence. However, the policy document includes few explicit reflections on internal coherence and gender. The peacebuilding policy appears to be a standalone document, rather than a policy integrated into a broader policy framework or connected to adjacent corporate policies. The peacebuilding policy does not elaborate much on aspects of coherence and integration with other policy areas. Regarding gender, for example, it only mentions the need for context analyses to cover variations in vulnerabilities related to age, gender and diversity. It does not reflect on other aspects of gender relevant to working in transition contexts, despite a long-standing focus within the UN on gender, security and peacebuilding, with a critical milestone being the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 (2000). Nevertheless, the policy's substance largely aligns with the provisions of other policies. Thus, for example, the peacebuilding policy, the gender policy and the protection policy all require the organization to strengthen its contextual understanding. Similarly, the humanitarian principles and approaches to strengthen accountability to affected populations are important ingredients for conflict sensitivity. |
| --- | --- | --- |

The policy is evidence-based.  
2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality | Partially met | The policy reflects selectively on supportive evidence. The policy substantiates an expanded argument that conflict is generally a driver of food insecurity. In preparation of the policy, four country case studies were also conducted.\(^{44}\) However, the policy does not explicitly cite evidence that shows that the proposed eight principles, besides the more specific policy directions for conflict analysis, “do no harm” and partnerships, will reduce violence, enhance peace and thus improve food security. |
| Policy development is based on consultation both within WFP (involving headquarters and country offices) and with external experts and partners.  
2011 Policy Formulation Guidance | Insufficient evidence | The evaluation team was not able to collect enough evidence on the final marker of policy quality related to policy formulation – the use of consultations as the basis for policy development – to credibly assess the extent, quality and impact of such consultations. Interviewees with a historical institutional memory suggested a fairly small group of people drove the topic within the organization and drafted the peacebuilding policy based on their own experience and knowledge. On the other hand, a |

\(^{45}\) This indicator is similar to the one later identified in the “Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality in WFP” to “validate and create ownership through internal consultation”.

---

**January 2023 | OEV/2021/001**
workshop reportedly took place as part of the policy development process.

30. Next to the different benchmarks related to policy formulation, the evaluation finds that the peacebuilding policy does not meet the three additional indicators related to policy uptake (Table 3):

**Table 3: Conformity to standards on policy uptake**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy quality criteria and source</th>
<th>Assessment of PB policy</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The policy outlines investment in effective institutional frameworks, systems, guidance and accountability arrangements. <em>2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality</em></td>
<td>Not met</td>
<td>The policy provides little guidance on institutional arrangements and accountabilities for its implementation. Both the peacebuilding policy and the 2014 update are largely mute on this. The only reference is made to regional advisors and a “small specialist team based in the Humanitarian Crises and Transitions Unit at Headquarters”, but without further details on when this team should be operational and its suggested tasks other than providing “day-to-day support”. The policy does not have an action or implementation plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The policy identifies the financial and human resources required for its implementation. <em>2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality</em></td>
<td>Not met</td>
<td>The policy does not identify the financial and human resources required for its implementation. The peacebuilding policy does not specify the resources required to implement the provisions of the policy. The policy only speaks of “marginal investments” in institutional capacities and structures and does not further detail what type of investments are meant. The 2014 update partially remedies this by pointing out that financial resources are necessary and specifies that WFP needs to mobilize the required funds while at the same time cautiously explaining that “these investments are expected to entail incremental rather than substantial increases in costs.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The policy integrates monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems. <em>2018 Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality</em></td>
<td>Not met</td>
<td>The policy does not create a results framework or a specific monitoring and reporting framework. The peacebuilding policy and the 2014 update only outline activities WFP should engage in. They do not specify what results are expected and by what means they are to be achieved. Nor do they make reference to any monitoring and reporting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Finding 2: The WFP Peacebuilding Policy is similar to comparable policy frameworks on peacebuilding from other organizations.**

31. The evaluation team compared the peacebuilding policy with the policy frameworks – and subsequent implementation measures – of FAO, UNICEF and Oxfam International to capture lessons learned on policy design and implementation measures (see Annex 14 for further details). The benchmarking found that the policy frameworks of these three organizations contain similar elements to the WFP peacebuilding policy (Table 4). While each organization designed its policy framework for its specific needs and operational context, the comparison shows that FAO, UNICEF and Oxfam also largely focus on robust context or conflict analysis, emphasize “do no harm” as a guiding principle and require their organizations to integrate conflict sensitivity in programme design.46 Newer policy frameworks, such as those from FAO and Oxfam, are closely aligned with the policy principles specified by the WFP peacebuilding policy. This shows the general timelessness and continued relevance of these policy principles.

Since the policy was not widely known among interviewees (see section 2.4.3.), Interviewees also felt the policy's emphasis on partnerships and cooperation with other organizations remains a relevant guiding principle for WFP – a position strongly supported by this evaluation (see section 2.4.3.). Similarly, interviewees lauded the policy’s emphasis on conflict sensitivity and its non-linear understanding of conflict dynamics.

### Table 4: Summary of policy content for benchmarked organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAO</th>
<th>UNICEF</th>
<th>OXFAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In 2018, the FAO adopted its “Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of the 2030 Agenda.” The framework describes five deliverables for implementation:  
(1) Integrating concepts, indicators and lesson learned on contributing to sustainable peace across all five Strategic Objectives of the FAO.  
(2) Creating a robust, flexibly financed global portfolio of engagements in supporting sustainable peace with measurable results.  
(3) Generating an improved evidence base and strengthened gender- and age-disaggregated monitoring systems that focus on the linkages between food security, nutrition and peace, and on the effectiveness of various approaches.  
(4) Developing new coalitions, partnerships, and leadership roles at country level and globally on supporting sustainable peace.  
(5) Ensuring effective capacity and commitment to sustainable peace of all personnel to work on, in, and through conflicts to improve food security and nutrition and to foster agricultural development and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction for men and women. | UNICEF does not have a single, distinct policy on peacebuilding, but has relied on a combination of practical programmes and guidance (e.g. on social cohesion and conflict sensitivity) to define its approach.  
In 2012, UNICEF issued a Technical Note on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding (2012), which identified three broad directions for the organization when working in conflict-affected countries:  
(1) All UNICEF strategies and programmes in these countries should be informed by a robust conflict analysis.  
(2) All UNICEF strategies and programmes in these countries should be conflict sensitive.  
(3) UNICEF should take a more explicit and systematic approach to peacebuilding, where appropriate.  
The main focus of UNICEF within peacebuilding was initially centred on strengthening community-level social cohesion. | Until 2021, Oxfam’s peacebuilding standards – the closest equivalent to the policies and directives of the WFP, the FAO and UNICEF – relied mainly on safe programming standards that included “do no harm” requirements and protection principles.  
In 2021, after two years of internal consultations, Oxfam’s briefing paper, “Programming across the triple nexus,” outlined principles such that its programming “upholds the highest standards of ‘do no harm’, safe programming and conflict sensitivity.”  
The paper specifies that Oxfam will “ensure that all programming in a particular country is informed by a common analysis of the structural causes of conflict, connectors, dividers and conflict triggers, to ensure improved conflict-sensitive approaches across operations and programming areas.”  
Oxfam’s humanitarian mandate also includes advocating for ceasefires and offering a platform for local peacebuilders. |

**Finding 3: Stakeholders, who know the peacebuilding policy, believe that it remains an adequate framework for WFP engagement in conflict settings.**

32. The evaluation team collected WFP employee perceptions of the quality and relevance of the policy. Since the policy was not widely known among interviewees (see chapter 2.2. on limits to policy dissemination), it was not possible to capture perceptions in a structured way across all employee interviews. However, the majority of internal interviewees, who were aware of the peacebuilding policy, as well as the external interviewees, who had read the policy, felt it was a well-developed policy that outlined clear principles on “do no harm,” context analysis and conflict sensitivity that remain relevant. Regarding positive aspects of the policy, interviewees highlighted that it is clearly phrased and that it defines in realistic and balanced terms the WFP role and ambition when working in contexts in conflict or at risk of conflict. Interviewees also felt the policy’s emphasis on partnerships and cooperation with other organizations remains a relevant guiding principle for WFP – a position strongly supported by this evaluation (see section 2.4.3.). Similarly, interviewees lauded the policy’s emphasis on conflict sensitivity and its non-linear understanding of conflict dynamics.
Finding 4: Key gaps in the policy are the lack of implementation support mechanisms.

33. Clear omissions that the peacebuilding policy shares with other corporate policies – based on a synthesis of policy quality of these policies by the Office of Evaluation – is a lack of attention to implementation support mechanisms. The policy does not identify financial and human resource requirements to implement the policy directions. The policy adopted in 2013 only speaks of “marginal investments in WFP’s existing institutional capacities and structures” necessary to implement the policy and emphasizes that “the establishment of entire new units or processes” will not be required. The policy update from 2014 is equally ambiguous stating that WFP needs to dedicate resources to peacebuilding, but that these resources are expected to entail only incremental costs. It calls on WFP to mobilize the necessary funds, but again without giving any further details on expected financial volume, funding sources, or a distribution among the different parts of the organization. The overall impression the policy and the policy update provide is that only very limited resources are required to implement the policy directions. With hindsight, this has been a critical flaw in the policy, since implementation has only occurred in a systematic and structured manner after WFP provided dedicated resources.

34. Another important gap is that the peacebuilding policy does not specify the level of results to be achieved and how its objectives should be monitored and reported. The policy does not have a built-in accountability framework to measure implementation progress or to report related results – again omitting a critical element for successful policy implementation.

2.2. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

**Summary:** To what extent has policy implementation been supported by relevant, coherent and adequately resourced measures? The evaluation finds examples of policy implementation, ranging from strengthened support structures particularly at headquarters, capacity-building activities, practical operational support, process adaptations and broadening the evidence base for the WFP contribution to peace, to a more general mainstreaming of peacebuilding within the organization. This chapter first discusses findings relating to support structures, and subsequently findings relating to concrete policy implementation steps.

The evaluation finds that there has been a significant delay between adoption and systematic implementation of the policy. Some critical measures were taken in the wake of the policy’s adoption. For example, the corporate emergency programming framework of 2013 identified peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity as a priority. Support missions to country operations and drafting guidance also started in subsequent years. On the whole, however, policy implementation was initially cautious and situation-specific and only became more systematic several years later. At the time of the evaluation, policy implementation measures included promising, but limited investments in capacity-building; increasing support to country offices and efforts to strengthen conflict analysis; steps to broaden the evidence base for the WFP contribution to peace; and conflict sensitivity adaptations to key processes in some situations.

There is little evidence that potential synergies with implementation measures for related policies like gender, protection and accountability to affected populations (AAP) were used. This in turn has translated into limited results in terms of improved conflict analysis, more conflict-sensitive programming and increased partnerships with peacebuilding organizations (see section 2.3 for further details on results). The recent restructuring of PRO-P seeks to address these issues, but has created some uncertainty and doubts about future policy implementation.

---

2.2.1 Structures Supporting Policy Implementation

Finding 5: Employees’ capacity and structural support for policy implementation at headquarters have been unsteady.

35. **Structural support for policy implementation was initially lacking.** While implementing the provisions of the policy is a responsibility of the entire organization, the peacebuilding policy explicitly places responsibility for “day-to-day support for the new programming approaches” on WFP “Regional Programme Advisors, backed by a small specialist team based in the Humanitarian Crises and Transitions Unit at Headquarters.” The lack of institutional memory prevented the evaluation team from tracing the role played by regional programme advisors in the initial years after the adoption of the policy. While interviewees acknowledge that dedicated individuals supported policy implementation from the beginning, the evaluation finds that WFP lacked a “policy owner” unit and structural support between 2013 and 2017.

36. **From late 2017 onwards, WFP slowly and incrementally increased employees’ capacity in support of the peacebuilding policy.** Following the appointment of WFP Executive Director, David Beasley, in 2017 and internal deliberations about a general reorganization of responsibilities within the organization, WFP increased the responsibility of its “Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division”, which is part of the Programme and Policy Development Department, for investments in programme strategy, quality control and policy development. This included the task of advancing the WFP position on the nexus, which led to a strengthening of the Emergencies and Transitions Unit (OSZPH, now referred to as PRO-P). The unit went through different internal reorganizations and delineations of responsibilities for different subsets of issues, for instance on AAP, access, humanitarian principles, protection, as well as peace and conflict.

37. **As part of this reorganization, the number of employees focusing specifically on peace and conflict also increased.** According to interviewees, however, this staff increase was the result of individual agency in lobbying and securing mainly external funding for the additional positions, rather than an institutional strategy. This resulted in most positions remaining dependent on temporary external funding.

38. **The increase in positions dedicated to peace and conflict issues enabled WFP to start implementing the directions of the peacebuilding policy more strategically and with greater reach throughout the organization.** The increase of outputs from or initiated by the Peace and Conflict team within OSZPH from 2020 onwards is notable. This includes, for example, internal advocacy around peace and conflict and communications following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to WFP in 2020 and on the humanitarian, development and peace nexus more generally; the development of guidance documents; support missions to country offices; the knowledge partnership with SIPRI; a process to strengthen the measurement of the WFP contribution to peace; and steps towards more targeted capacity-building. However, employees in WFP country operations also noted the fragmentation of efforts to implement policies on different cross-cutting issues. They requested for example more coherent and holistic guidance and support on context analysis – a point that other policy evaluations have also stressed.

39. **The most recent restructuring pursues a different vision of policy implementation, and this has created some uncertainty.** While the evaluation was being conducted, PRO-P was in the midst of restructuring. As part of this, most positions dedicated to conflict and peace were discontinued and the team was starting to be reorganized along functional lines, focusing for example on policy, on knowledge management and learning and on field support. In the short term, this reorganization and the discontinuation of most employees’ positions dedicated to conflict and peace has created uncertainty and doubts about continued policy implementation among staff. The benchmarking with other organizations shows that dedicated staff capacity at FAO and UNICEF headquarters has been an important factor for more consistent implementation and professionalization of conflict-sensitive practices across these UN...

---

organizations. It is too early to tell whether the restructuring in WFP will succeed in its ambition to overcome silos between different cross-cutting issues, increase synergies among them and offer more effective and holistic support to country operations.

**Finding 6: Dedicated employees capacity created in some Regional Bureaux and in selected country operations plays a key role, but many of these positions are vulnerable.**

40. In addition to headquarters providing policy implementation support, positions located in regional bureaux and country offices have also supported the implementation of different policy elements. On a regional level, WFP either has humanitarian affairs advisors, who provide general support on cross-cutting issues and thus also cover different aspects of the peacebuilding policy, and also dedicated peacebuilding advisors – for example in Bangkok, Cairo and Dakar. The role of dedicated peacebuilding advisors is to support country offices with additional analysis capacity, to conduct conflict sensitivity assessments and advise on emergency preparedness, to support applications to the Peacebuilding Fund and to provide surge capacity if needed. Interviewed WFP employees at country level appreciated the support provided from the regional level, and emphasized that this support was particularly important for countries that did not have a dedicated conflict or conflict-sensitivity advisor.

41. On a country level, the evaluation team found examples of country offices with dedicated conflict advisors (e.g. in Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Mali and South Sudan) who advise country offices and train country office employees, review cooperating partner proposals and train partners on conflict sensitivity, build local networks, and lead on implementing policy provisions on conflict analysis, conflict-sensitive programming and partnerships. Some country offices also hired external consultants for locally-specific conflict analysis. While these examples point to flexible arrangements in support of the peacebuilding policy, interviewees mentioned that only some of these positions are funded through the WFP core budget – usually those located in the regional bureaux – and that country offices usually need to fundraise for these expert positions separately. Dedicated employees’ capacity at the country level is therefore not just a function of need and a strategic decision, but also dependent on donors willing to fund these additional positions.

**2.2.2 Policy Implementation Steps**

42. Steps to implement the peacebuilding policy include capacity-building activities, practical operational support, a broadening of the evidence-base for the WFP contribution to peace and process adaptations within the organization (Figure 4). The evaluation finds that investments in capacity-building are promising, but have been limited. Support to country offices has been increasing and various efforts to strengthen conflict analysis have been made. The effectiveness of the latter, however, depends on the buy-in of WFP country-level management, and is limited because of organizational silos across those providing analyses resulting in overlaps, gaps and limited exchange of analytical knowledge and the fact that many analyses processes focus on the risks conflict dynamics entail for WFP and its work, rather than on how WFP might influence those dynamics. Most steps to broaden the evidence base for the WFP contribution to peace are too recent to observe results. Potential conflict-sensitivity adoptions to key processes like hiring practices, interactions with cooperation partners and procurement have developed from the bottom-up in some situations, but have not been systematically considered.
Finding 7: Policy implementation has been hindered by limited investments in capacity-building.

43. Despite demand, training on conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity or nexus programming is not broadly available, although some training sessions are currently being finalized. The peacebuilding policy mentions specific training for country office leadership as a key policy implementation step. The evaluation only finds limited evidence for existing training, and interviewees frequently mentioned the continuing need for such training. Data on the effects of trainings are, unfortunately, not available. WFP did develop a conflict-sensitivity component to be part of the WFP “Programme Learning Journey”, a capacity development programme launched in 2014 that particularly targets senior staff in the field. On average, the Programme Learning Journey reached 50 mid-level and senior managers per year until 2017. However, the module within the Programme Learning Journey (now Programme and Policy Foundations Course) is quite short as it is part of a more general chapter on cross-cutting issues that also covers gender, protection, AAP, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA), disability and the environment. As one interviewee noted, “The training therefore only touches lightly upon conflict sensitivity”.

44. In addition, the evaluation finds several examples of recent training for field staff and cooperating partners initiated by country offices, as well as explainer material prepared by PRO-P for individual countries (e.g. Bangladesh, Cameroon, Lebanon and Libya) and material on the Peacebuilding Fund. The few WFP staff or cooperating partners interviewed for this evaluation, who had participated in such training, appreciated it. Since 2020, WFP has been developing online conflict-sensitivity training targeting all employees, which is currently being finalized with a total budget of USD 50,000. Once new funding is available, PRO-P also foresees developing advanced training. The training meets a key demand as interviewees stressed the importance of dedicated and practical training on conflict sensitivity at all employee levels, particularly for national employees and partners who are essential for programme implementation.

45. Opportunities for external training on peace and conflict-related issues exist. The evaluation interviews, however, yielded no insights on the quality and usefulness of these opportunities. In 2020 and 2021, for example, 257 WFP employees went through three different courses from the United Nations Systems Staff College related to conflict and peace and focusing on engaging armed groups, on climate and peace and on conflict analysis. WFP country directors were able to take a School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) course on strategic conflict analysis and on “do no harm”. The evaluation could not identify any data on how many – if any – country directors took the course. In the meantime, the course has been discontinued.

46. Guidance documents exist and address critical gaps, but they are little known. WFP recently issued a range of guidance materials on peacebuilding. This ranges from short “10 minutes to learn” notes

---

to an overview of WFP Minimum Standards for Conflict-Sensitive Programming, explicitly operationalizing commitments to conduct conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity risk assessments and implementing conflict-sensitive programming set out in the peacebuilding policy. These standards were further operationalized through a detailed guidance note on Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment, published in January 2021. The latter guidance note makes a first step to address a critical gap by outlining what similarities, differences and overlaps exist between conflict or conflict-sensitivity analyses and analyses done by protection, AAP, gender, security, access and emergency teams. The guidance note also includes a section explaining how gender perspectives should be integrated into these types of analyses and includes gender advisors among the functions that should participate in related analyses processes. Unified instructions on context analysis, bringing together the requirements of the different subject areas and outlining when and how often such analyses need to happen, however, have not been developed.

47. While this is an important milestone for standardizing the practices and procedures required for conflict-sensitive programming across WFP, it came seven years after the adoption of the peacebuilding policy. Draft guidance on conflict sensitivity from 2016 was never finalized. Moreover, besides conflict advisers themselves, WFP employees interviewed at country level were generally not aware of the different guidance materials recently developed. Interviewees oftentimes explicitly mentioned the need for the type of guidance materials on conflict sensitivity that already exist. This indicates that guidance is not (yet) communicated or disseminated in a way that reaches field employees. A lack of guidance documents in French and Spanish was also noted.

48. The nascent community of practice among conflict advisors is promising. WFP established a community of practice for WFP employees with an interest or expertise in peace and conflict and conflict-sensitive programming within WFP. The recently launched Peace and Conflict Advisory Network (PCAN) is still nascent. Those employees interviewed at country level who participated in network exchanges found them useful as a space to exchange good practices among peers. Similar networks have also proven valuable in a comparator organization.

Finding 8: The effectiveness of various efforts to strengthen conflict analysis is limited by organizational silos and a focus on risks to WFP and its activities.

49. The role of Research, Assessment and Monitoring in providing conflict analysis is limited. Investments in institutional capacity to support or conduct risk and conflict analyses are a key implementation step foreseen in the peacebuilding policy. The policy suggests integrating conflict analysis into WFP assessment methodologies and developing and rolling out supportive tools for such analyses to country offices. The Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping unit – now Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division (RAM) – is given a lead role. The evaluation finds no evidence that the initial provisions of the peacebuilding policy around risk and conflict analyses through the RAM unit were implemented as intended, or that relevant indicators were systematically integrated into WFP monitoring tools. Some employees interviewed acknowledged that RAM provides context analyses covering the root causes of food insecurity that inform resilience programming in some country offices. However, they also noted that RAM still focuses heavily on household information and on context dynamics in so far as they affect food security. Some noted that conflict-sensitivity analyses transcend what can be covered in structured surveys, and that certain questions relevant to conflict sensitivity are taboo in some contexts. This echoes an internal review of WFP evaluations that found that “seven of the eight evaluations that discuss conflict analysis find it absent or lacking.”

---

51 WFP. 2020. 10 minutes to learn about conflict sensitivity; WFP. 2020. 10 minutes to learn about social cohesion; WFP 2020. 10 minutes to learn about “WFP’s role in peacebuilding in transition settings” policy; WFP. 2020. WFP Minimum Standards for Conflict Sensitive Programming.


50. **Other divisions provide analyses of conflict dynamics, but focus on the risk exposure of WFP.**

Over recent years, the Security, Emergencies Operations and Enterprise Risk Management Divisions in WFP have provided different forms of support to country offices on risk analysis. Their assessments can touch on conflict dynamics. Their primary intention is not to inform conflict-sensitive programming as intended by the peacebuilding policy, but to understand and reduce WFP exposure to risks that could endanger employees, assets and operations, and to foresee where needs might increase related to conflicts. Table 5 provides an overview of these risk analysis practices.

*Table 5: Risk analysis practices at WFP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Security Division | The WFP security division provides conflict-related information which many interviewees in country offices credited as an important source for understanding local conflict dynamics. The security branch, however, has narrowly defined terms of reference with a responsibility for analysing risks related to the safety and security of WFP employees, assets and operations through a formalized process (e.g. repeated security risk management assessments at country and subnational levels).

While these assessments can describe local conflict dynamics and conflict drivers, it is not the mandate of security to provide conflict-sensitivity analyses or advice to programming on addressing root causes of conflict. Security analysts are also not trained in conflict sensitivity, which is based on a standardized approach to providing a more operationally-focused conflict analysis. A key reason mentioned by one interviewee is that conflict sensitivity is part of the portfolio of other divisions, which in turn is perceived as limiting the space for the WFP security branch to assume a more active role. |
| Emergencies Operations Division | The Emergencies Operations Division has, with its headquarters-based Analysis and Early Warning Unit (AEW), a dedicated unit providing foresight on potential crises in countries of operation and reviewing different crisis triggers, including economics, natural hazards and conflict dynamics. The unit has dedicated conflict analysts covering different world regions to identify emerging or intensifying conflict risks that may create additional humanitarian needs. Based on this, the unit then updates other parts of the institution through a corporate alert system.

The AEW also conducts support missions to regional bureaux and country offices upon request in order to conduct various types of contextual risk analysis. This includes regional scenarios for cross-border crises, scenarios for elections to inform contingency planning and analyses of non-state armed actors. However, interviewees noted an uneven utilization of AEW analysis by country offices. One country office has for instance refused to use these analyses due to their perceived politically sensitive nature and concerns about the ability of WFP to keep internal information confidential. |
| Enterprise Risk Management | WFP has an elaborate Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) system based on an ERM policy adopted in 2005 and updated in 2015 and 2018 that requires country offices to establish and regularly update risk registers. The potential for conflict at country level is included as a potential strategic risk that may impact WFP activities. At country level, WFP has a risk officer function (if requested by the country office) responsible for the risk register and for supporting programme staff, as well as sub-offices on risks analysis and risk management. Regional bureaux have “risk and compliance advisors” supporting country offices. The overall purpose is to have a clear understanding of what risks WFP may experience and how to mitigate them effectively. |
| Climate and Disaster Risks Reduction Programmes Unit | In addition to the standardized procedures assessing risk for the organization, WFP has recently introduced Environmental and Social Safeguards (ESS) for individual projects that also commit WFP to assessing risks related to conflict and to establishing sensible mitigation measures. While these safeguards are relatively new and WFP has only provided very limited resources to support their roll-out on a country level, they have the potential to significantly change the scale of conflict sensitivity of WFP, as more donors require adherence to these standards and make funding contingent on them. Standard 7 on conflict sensitivity, which was largely developed by PRO-P, already covers the most relevant aspects of conflict sensitivity and... |
51. Overall, the evaluation finds a diversity of organizational processes and capacities in place that are designed to contribute to a better understanding of conflict. The caveat is that these analyses are largely designed to understand risks to WFP activities and not to inform programming about opportunities or challenges to conflict-sensitive programming, or to adjust activities to better address the root causes of conflict. Moreover, the different analysis practices are largely “silofed” with limited interaction among the different units and branches. As a result, WFP currently lacks a coordinated and holistic approach to context and conflict analysis. Nevertheless, various WFP country offices reported positive examples, with for example gender or protection advisers and security staff making valuable contributions to conflict-sensitivity analyses and discussions.

Finding 9: Support to country offices for conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity has only recently increased.

52. As with other policy implementation measures, the evaluation finds that country support missions and headquarters-supported conflict sensitivity assessments to support country offices have also increased recently. Examples include conflict analyses to inform the development of country strategic plans (e.g. for Cameroon and Sri Lanka), conflict-sensitivity assessments that include recommendations on how to improve conflict sensitivity (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Libya), and research and support more broadly linked to advancing the WFP contribution to peace (e.g. in El Salvador, Mali, the Gambia, Mozambique and South Sudan). Support for individual countries was at times extensive, with PRO-P employees spending weeks or months in country offices to assist with or conduct conflict-sensitivity assessments. While such missions enable in-depth assessments and facilitate peer learning, it is important to acknowledge that they also bind substantial resources. At the time the evaluation was conducted, it was still unclear what effects the ongoing restructuring of PRO-P will have on support to country offices regarding conflict sensitivity or broader context analyses.

53. Efforts to increase the integration of conflict sensitivity and peace in country strategic plans constitute another important form of support to country offices. To this end, PRO-P has started to systematically review draft country strategic plans. Since this is a relatively recent activity, it is too early to assess its effects. However, the quantitative analysis of country planning and reporting documents shows that the presence of conflict sensitivity in these documents has been uneven in the past (see Finding 13 below and Annex 3 for more details). This suggests that a more systematic effort to ensure key planning documents consider risks and opportunities relating to peace and conflict is necessary.

Finding 10: Most steps to broaden the evidence base for the WFP contribution to peace are too recent to observe results.

54. Both internal and external stakeholders stressed the importance of generating more evidence and developing a more rigorous way of measuring WFP performance on conflict sensitivity and its contribution to peace. The evaluation found that WFP very recently initiated a number of steps on knowledge partnerships and on measuring their contribution to peace.

55. WFP entered into knowledge partnerships related to WFP’s contribution to peace and to better understand conflict-related risks. A significant investment of WFP has been the partnership with SIPRI, signed in February 2018, with the objective of “building evidence, defining WFP’s contributions to peace, and informing advocacy, policy and practice.” SIPRI conducted various country case studies (Colombia, El Salvador, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan and Mali). A summary report identifies ways in which WFP contributes to peace – so-called meta theories of change – and highlights existing practices and recurring weaknesses that affect the WFP contribution to peace. Interviewees saw the main value of the partnership with SIPRI in providing

the first structured attempt to capture the different WFP contributions to peace. Interviewees also felt that the studies had helped increase awareness about the WFP role in peacebuilding. In some cases, they reported follow-up measures based on SIPRI's recommendations, but many of the recommendations were seen as too broad to be actionable.

56. WFP also recently established a partnership with the International Crisis Group (ICG). Formalized in May 2021, the partnership aims to give WFP access to ICG's analytical expertise through briefings for country directors or country management teams. The goal is to identify, better understand and minimize conflict risks in WFP areas of work. In addition, several WFP country offices (e.g. Colombia, Iraq and Nigeria) entered into partnerships with local research organizations to conduct conflict or context analyses.

57. Investments were made in a process to strengthen the measurement of the WFP contribution to peace. With the help of dedicated donor funding, WFP started to invest in better ways to measure its contribution to peace at the end of 2020. Related processes, such as the definition of indicators and pilot projects to assess the contribution to peace, were ongoing at the time data for this evaluation was collected and it was too early to assess results. Interviewees across WFP felt it critical for WFP to have better data on how and to what extent its interventions contribute to peace, not least to enable WFP to better access different sources of funding. Over time, the focus of the project changed from creating a measurement framework for the WFP contribution to peace to developing a toolbox of approaches that help capture risks for affected populations and to identify ways WFP could mitigate these risks. While WFP was awaiting the results of this process, some country offices have taken initial steps to strengthen the monitoring of conflict and peace dynamics. In Burkina Faso, RAM has included a question on social cohesion in beneficiary feedback surveys covering resilience programmes. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, a relevant question was added to post-distribution monitoring surveys. In Ethiopia, a recent draft of a post-distribution monitoring survey asks questions around whether WFP's assistance and targeting creates tensions or conflict. In Iraq, reflections were ongoing on how conflict and peace dynamics could be better covered in existing monitoring processes. However, these efforts have not advanced far and some interviewees mentioned that their ability to include conflict and peace aspects in regular monitoring tools is constrained. As a result, WFP remains unable to systematically, and on a corporate level, measure its contribution to peace and to assess whether specific approaches (e.g. use of different modalities, targeting strategies) yield a greater impact than others.

Finding 11: Promising conflict sensitivity adaptations to key processes have developed bottom-up in some situations, but most have not been systematically considered.

58. Some consideration has been given to staffing management positions in a conflict-sensitive way, but issues relating to local hiring practices remain. The evaluation notes examples where WFP emphasized the hiring of employees with prior conflict experience in country offices facing structural violence, conflicts or war. Capitalizing on the lived experiences of employees – particularly of senior management such as country directors, heads of programme, or heads of suboffices – was repeatedly highlighted in interviews as a key factor advancing the WFP peacebuilding agenda and ensuring conflict-sensitive practices. Importantly, this is not limited to hiring international employees, but also includes the promotion of experienced national employees to more senior positions to capitalize on their contextual knowledge. Conversely, senior management at country level with no prior experience of working in conflict settings can hamper the ability of WFP to respond to the specific conditions posed by conflict environments.

59. The evaluation team finds a number of challenging issues related to the hiring of national employees. The default hiring practice for national employees is based on skill and in line with the principle of competency-based recruitment. This, however, may not represent a conflict-sensitive hiring process if segments of society are marginalized and therefore less likely to demonstrate the required skills. A

---

resulting underrepresentation of certain groups within a country office can lead to a perception that WFP is biased towards the dominant group in a conflict. One country office mentioned advancing a balanced hiring process that also took the ethnic and cultural background of employees into account to demonstrate its neutrality and impartiality. Although this was an isolated example, it suggests that it is possible to approach hiring processes more flexibly to take local circumstances into account, without succumbing to potential pressures from the authorities to hire certain groups over others.

60. The evaluation also notes the example of a country office establishing work procedures that reduced the presence of female employees in parts of the operation and restricted their local travel. Although this may be seen as running against principles of equality in treating employees, it reduced employee exposure to potential harm. The approach was also credited with being conflict sensitive because it did not give local militias a pretext for attacks.

61. **Good practice examples of strengthening conflict sensitivity in interactions with cooperating partners start to emerge in different case study countries.** As further discussed in chapter 2.4, cooperating partners play a central role for the conflict sensitivity of WFP activities. The evaluation finds no central efforts to strengthen conflict sensitivity in WFP interactions with its cooperating partners. However, it identified interesting examples of good practice in a number of country offices, which can serve as a basis for developing corporate solutions to these issues. Examples of good practice include training, workshops and structured interactions between WFP country offices and cooperating partners on conflict sensitivity and/or conflict resolution (e.g. in Iraq and Sudan); the inclusion of conflict sensitivity in partner proposals and related discussions (e.g. in Iraq and Sudan); the splitting of responsibilities for targeting and implementation between different cooperating partners to avoid a perception of favouritism in project implementation (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya); and the discontinuation of partner contracts in a case of clearly expressed political allegiance (e.g. in Colombia).

62. **Adaptations to procurement processes are rare.** Procurement processes in WFP follow strict central rules and regulations that focus mainly on the price and quality of goods, and on UN black lists or other sanction lists vendors may be on. Although this helps to ensure that decisions are based on objective criteria, it can result in situations in which individuals or groups holding power and who are party to a conflict benefit from WFP contracts if no further checks are applied. Country offices handle procurement decisions below USD 200,000 autonomously. The evaluation did not find any examples where country offices had systematic processes in place to analyse the political affiliations and backgrounds of potential suppliers. In one case, however, WFP switched transporters along territorial lines to ensure that both sides of a conflict benefited from the economic opportunity of transporting good for WFP or to avoid security risks. Procurement decisions above USD 200,000 involve WFP headquarters. One interviewee claimed that this was a reflection on who owns the company and the political implications of this ownership. The evaluation could not, however, verify this claim independently. General due diligence processes for suppliers are thus far less extensive than those used for private sector partnerships. In the latter case, due diligence processes explore whether the potential private sector partners are involved in conflict contexts and any cases that raise questions are brought up to the level of the deputy executive director.

### 2.3 RESULTS OF THE POLICY: WFP ANALYSIS PRACTICE AT COUNTRY LEVEL, PROGRAMME ADAPTATIONS AND CONFLICT AND PEACE OUTCOMES

63. **Overview:** This chapter presents evidence for the current performance of WFP in conflict sensitivity and in its contribution to peace, covering findings on the conflict analysis practice of WFP and its cooperating partners at country level (2.2.1), the programme and process adaptations WFP and its partners have undertaken in the countries covered (2.2.2), and plausible intended and unintended effects on conflict and peace outcomes on the ground (2.2.3). As described in the methods chapter (1.4), the evaluation team collected evidence relating to the different levels of the theory of change, rather than on the causal links among the different levels. That is to say, the team analysed to what extent WFP programmes and processes were adapted in a conflict-sensitive way, rather than trying to prove whether these adaptations were triggered by the policy and the policy implementation measures. Similarly, the evaluation team
collected evidence on the effects of a WFP presence and of WFP programmes on conflict and peace outcomes, rather than trying to prove that any specific programme or process adaptation triggered this effect.

### 2.3.1. WFP Conflict Analysis Practice at Country Level

**Summary:** This evaluation sought to understand the quality of context-analysis practice in WFP country offices (EQs 2.1 and 2.2). This included an assessment of the processes used to analyse conflict dynamics and risks, the level of conflict analysis and conflict-sensitivity considerations evident in planning and reporting documents, and the resulting understanding of peace- and conflict-dynamics, as well as how WFP activities might contribute to them, among WFP employees and partner organizations. The assessment is based on interviews with internal and external stakeholders, qualitative document analysis and a structured, quantitative analysis of country office planning and reporting documents (see chapter 1.4).

The evaluation team found that only two of the eight countries studied had systematic, structured and inclusive processes to discuss conflict dynamics and conflict-sensitivity considerations. Written context analyses (e.g. as part of an access strategy or as part of regular security updates) existed in more than those two offices. For the most part, however, it was unclear how they influenced programming and how well they were known among employees and partners. With some exceptions, annual reports and planning documents of WFP country offices include relatively little discussion of conflict dynamics and conflict sensitivity. Over time and on average, only reflections concerning “do no harm” increased slightly. Both WFP employees and cooperating partners in the assessed countries reflected mainly on the reduction of food insecurity as the WFP contribution to peace. They were generally highly aware of the importance of doing no harm. Reflections on what that principle means in practice tended to focus on the allocation and targeting of assistance. On the whole, efforts to strengthen the analysis practice of WFP are visible, but not systematic, and important blind spots remain.

Several existing centralized and decentralized evaluation reports present a mixed picture of WFP conflict analysis practice at country level. Of the 47 analysed evaluation reports, 20 contained findings related to conflict-, risk- or threat assessments. Country Strategic Plan Evaluations, for example, include a specific subquestion on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Evaluations pointing to examples where analysis was conducted lack detail on the quality of these analyses. The country portfolio evaluation for the Central African Republic, for example, notes that “[i]n every programme document […] there was evidence that the country office performed analytical work on the political situation.” Of the 20 evaluation reports, 9 conclude that conflict analysis was insufficient or not conducted at all. A synthesis of country portfolio evaluations in Africa, for example, states that “[t]he eight country offices [analysed] applied food security and nutrition analysis to inform strategic choices. However, conflict, fragility or capacity analysis was insufficiently conducted or applied.”

---

57 See Annex 11 (bibliography), Part B “Evaluations Reviewed” for the sources used.
**Finding 12: Despite investments, conflict-sensitivity analysis at country level remains inconsistent and constrained.**

65. Two of the country offices covered by the evaluation have created systematic, structured and inclusive processes to discuss conflict dynamics and conflict sensitivity. In the other country case studies, most discussions of conflict sensitivity remain ad-hoc, risk being siloed in small groups restricted to specific employee profiles, and often take place without cooperating or peacebuilding partners and without the input of communities or their representatives. Inter-agency fora do not play a significant role in conflict analysis. Although informal conversations about context developments reportedly happen regularly among employees who work together on specific activities, or at sub-office level, the practice of more collaborative and systematic conflict analysis processes varies greatly across countries. Most WFP employees interviewed at country level stated that the expectations for such collaborative processes are not clear to them. In one example, a recent Protection Strategy and Action Plan defines clear expectations (see text box), but does not specify a concrete process beyond ensuring that WFP and cooperating partner employees are trained. Only a few interviewees – in advisor positions – knew of related guidance documents (see para. 46).

- The Libya country office set up an internal conflict sensitivity discussion forum in 2020. The group meets every two weeks to discuss context developments and conflict sensitivity measures for planned and ongoing programmes. It includes a growing number of programme staff, with efforts underway to include other units. Several WFP employees find the forum useful, especially to progressively deepen understanding of conflict sensitivity among employees. This assessment correlates with the document analysis, which finds that planning documents for Libya had the greatest reflection of conflict awareness, and annual reports for Libya had the steepest increase in the use of “do no harm” terminology (see Figure 13 in Annex 3). Some employees interviewed, however, voiced concern that the forum might not continue if the conflict adviser position was not made permanent.

- In Colombia, the country team organizes retreats that involve employees across the WFP office and management that include discussions about conflict and peace dynamics. Together with external participants, which have included economists and staff from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the team discusses context developments in Colombia. Again, this practice correlates with an above average reflection of conflict-sensitivity considerations in annual reports.

- In all other evaluation countries, context analysis discussions across different teams remain rare. Where they take place, they are organized on an ad hoc basis by either security officers, conflict-sensitivity advisers, gender and protection advisers, or resilience staff focusing on social cohesion. These discussion organizers share their analysis primarily with a restricted group of senior managers. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, efforts are underway to coordinate context analysis discussions more effectively among different employee profiles. In Iraq, the conflict sensitivity officer organized training and discussions with employees and partners and convened workshops to discuss the results and implications of commissioned conflict analyses.

- Although national employees are important contributors to the contextual understanding of WFP, they are excluded from context analysis processes in some other countries. This is variously explained through a desire to protect them from political pressure, or a lack of trust in handling sensitive information confidentially. Several WFP employees interviewed in the concerned countries question this approach and suggest it is based on prejudice and bias, and find it deplorable that important sources of knowledge are not used. Field monitors, for example, who
have insights from interactions with affected people, typically do not play an active role in office-wide analysis processes.

- In Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Sudan, internal WFP context analysis focuses mainly on security questions and risks for the organization's assets, personnel and access. According to employees interviewed in the three countries, analysing the effect of context dynamics on WFP processes and programmes does not receive enough attention. Annual reports for the three countries also show little reflection of the terms related to conflict awareness in the quantitative document analysis.

- In Burkina Faso, several WFP employees were part of a system-wide context analysis in mid-2020, through which members of different agencies produced joint analyses for operational planning. This is the only example of an inter-agency effort mentioned by interview partners.

- None of the employees and partner organizations interviewed across the eight countries perceived that the food security cluster or inter-agency security groups were or should be playing an important role in conflict-sensitivity analysis.

66. **More country offices have written conflict analysis products, but these are only known to a few interviewed employees in each country and it is unclear how they influence programming.** In four of the eight case study countries, WFP country offices recently initiated written context analyses for different purposes. Most of these analyses cover the effects of conflict dynamics on gender issues, particularly on gender-based violence. However, they usually do not comment on different gender perspectives regarding the drivers and root causes of conflict and aspects dividing or potentially connecting different groups.

67. **Conflict sensitivity assessments – which review conflict-related risks, operational practices and what conflict-sensitive programming would mean for WFP processes and programmes – were recently conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Libya:**

- In 2021, the WFP Libya country office commissioned a peacebuilding analysis organization to conduct a conflict-sensitivity assessment of its humanitarian portfolio. It asked what the country office should do to “minimize the risk of contributing to conflict” and “maximize the positive impacts on peace,” including suggestions for process improvements. WFP employees interviewed found the assessment useful because it started discussions in the office and shifted attention, which usually focuses on resilience programmes, to the conflict sensitivity of humanitarian programmes. The country office is starting to implement the suggested changes. The assessment was driven by the conflict-sensitivity adviser in the country office – with support from senior management – and was also informed by a headquarters support mission to Libya.

- In 2021, PRO-P supported the Ethiopia country office to conduct an integrated protection and conflict sensitivity assessment, following a donor request. The assessment covered a variety of themes related to protection, accountability to affected populations and conflict sensitivity, and looked at the context and internal WFP processes, such as staffing and targeting. The assessment recommended a range of detailed short- and medium-term risk mitigation measures. Immediate follow-up has been reportedly limited, as staff capacity was absorbed by the immediate response – which, according to some employees interviewed, made it difficult to improve programme quality – and due to the sensitive nature of some recommendations.

- In 2020, the Democratic Republic of the Congo country office completed a conflict-sensitivity analysis. The report included a detailed analysis of the context and conflict dynamics in two parts of the country, and an analysis of how they related to WFP work and to internal WFP processes, which led to concrete recommendations. Employees interviewed for this evaluation, who were not involved in the report's preparation, did not know about its existence. A possible explanation is that no French translation of the document is available. Employees interviewed, who did know

---


about the analysis, found the final report informative, but emphasized that the quality of the analysis was limited because travel restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic had limited opportunities for the collection of primary data. No concrete follow-up measures to the recommendations were reported.

68. In Iraq, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya, WFP also commissioned or prepared more general but detailed analyses of conflict dynamics and/or root causes in specific areas. Interestingly, the countries that have conducted both a conflict-sensitivity assessment and detailed context analyses – the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Libya – are also those with higher than average use of conflict awareness terms in annual reports and planning documents. The other positive outliers were Angola, Mali and the Philippines. When asked about changes made to WFP programmes or processes as a result of such analyses, however, only some WFP employees interviewed provided concrete examples.

Thus, resilience programmes in southern Iraq increased their focus on land rehabilitation, water supply and asset management in order to address identified drivers of conflict. In other country offices, interviewed employees gave several reasons for the lack of follow-up: first, they explained that the analysis is either too broad or too fine-grained to adapt standard WFP activities accordingly. In one example, the report provided a nuanced analysis of the dynamics among different ethnic groups in a very specific area of the country. WFP activities, however, had already been planned and interview partners felt the dynamics identified were not relevant to the programme itself.

Secondly, some interviewed employees explained that it was unclear who was ultimately responsible for larger decisions over programme or process adaptation. Thirdly, some employees explained that discussions based on the analysis focused on how existing programmes related to the identified conflict drivers, rather than on necessary changes. The analysis of existing evaluations does not provide insights into how and why or why not conflict analyses were taken up in practice.

The country strategic plan evaluation for Cameroon, for example, notes that WFP used a conflict analysis assessment in the target group strategy and sensitization efforts, but does not provide evidence for this and states that “[m]ainstreaming conflict sensitivity into operations was considered a strategic priority but has not fully been translated into action.”

69. The role of partners in context analysis is unclear and not systematically benefitted from. Project-specific, written context analysis is standard practice for resilience programmes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where partners must conduct a conflict scan before project initiation. Most interviewees among WFP employees and cooperating partners found this analysis relevant. Similarly, cooperating partners in Iraq have to complete a section on conflict analysis in any proposals for resilience programmes and these aspects and their implications are used in discussions between WFP and its partners.

Beyond these examples, however, cooperating partners are not involved in analysis processes, or inadvertently discouraged to share their knowledge on conflict dynamics and its implications for a conflict-sensitive approach to programming. Written analyses from WFP are also not systematically shared with partners. In two countries, cooperating partners explained that they send reports on context developments to WFP – weekly in one case – but this does not lead to any discussions.

Finding 13: Conflict awareness in WFP planning and reporting documents has only increased slightly and important analytical blind-spots remain.

70. The reflection of conflict sensitivity in annual reports and planning documents remains at a comparatively low level, but reflection of “do no harm” considerations increases slightly over time. Compared to other key terms, concepts related to conflict and peace play only a marginal role in WFP reporting and planning documents (see Figure 5).
In annual reports, the use of terms related to conflict awareness has not increased systematically since the adoption of the policy. The use of terms related to conflict-sensitive programming has recently increased slightly, mainly driven by do-no-harm terms. Country offices in high-conflict contexts (those with a high Global Peace Index [GPI] rank; see GPI rank 3, highlighted pink in Figure 6 and Figure 7) use relatively more conflict-awareness terminology than countries with lower levels of conflict. The increase in reporting on conflict-sensitive programming and do-no-harm, however, increased most markedly in low-conflict contexts (GPI rank 1, highlighted blue). See separate technical note for a detailed discussion of findings from the quantitative document analysis.

72. The eight country case studies show striking differences in word frequencies on conflict-awareness and conflict-sensitive programming unrelated to the conflict context. While it is a general pattern that more conflict-awareness terminology is used across country offices in high-conflict contexts, the in-depth review of the eight country case studies also points to outliers. Colombia for instance is a country where conflict awareness is discussed particularly frequently across its reporting documents despite the political sensitivities relating to conflict. By contrast, the use of conflict-awareness terminology is low in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The evaluation also finds a surprisingly low level of conflict awareness reporting for Syria, despite ongoing conflict in the country, which interviewees explain with reference to the political sensitivities linked to writing too openly about the conflict. The pattern on conflict-sensitive programming is slightly different: while Colombia is again an outlier in terms of reporting comparatively extensively on conflict-sensitive programming, the other case study countries are largely mute on this aspect – in particular when compared to other countries such as Egypt, Guinea or Malawi (Figure 7) that are much less affected by conflict. Reports from the country offices from Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Syria make almost no mention of conflict-sensitive programming over the eight year period the document analysis covers despite those countries being affected by conflict. While one cannot infer from words used in reporting documents as to actual practices, the document analysis confirms what the key informant interview captured across these case studies: a generally limited attention to conflict-sensitive programming across WFP’s programmes in these countries. Figures 6 and 7 show the percentage of terms used for conflict awareness and conflict-sensitive programming in annual reports per year. Each dot refers to one report.
Figure 6 and Figure 7: Word frequencies on conflict awareness and conflict-sensitive programming in annual country reports 2012–2020

Data source: Evaluation team/quantitative document analysis

73. **WFP Employees and partners at country level are highly aware of the importance of “do no harm” and tend to focus on the risks inherent in allocating and targeting assistance, as well as the contribution to peace of reduced food insecurity, but reflections on other linkages between WFP’s work and conflict or peace were largely missing.** Country-level interview partners across all categories – national and international WFP employees and cooperating partners – regularly pointed to the importance “do no harm” as a key principle for WFP conflict sensitivity. WFP employees working on resilience, conflict sensitivity, gender and protection shared more nuanced reflections on the principle's practical implications for WFP work. Most other interview partners tended to focus on the risk of increasing tensions by providing assistance to certain groups, such as displaced people. Explanations of possible WFP contributions to peace primarily focused on very direct theories of change, namely that any effort to reduce food insecurity amounts to an effort to prevent conflict or build peace. A high number of interview partners see any type of resilience work or any capacity-building for government entities as an automatic contribution to peace. Only some employees and partners delve deeper, for example, into underlying links between better livelihoods and a reduced likelihood of recruitment into armed groups, or into how involvement of different groups in programme-related processes may increase social cohesion. While the dominant narratives among employees match what affected people report as a relevant contribution from WFP (see para. 94 below), they provide little space for more nuanced programme adaptations. The more fine-grained theories of change that the SIPRI-WFP partnership carries out research on, for example, were not frequently mentioned at country level, but arose more in global-level interviews.

74. **WFP pays particularly limited attention to how its presence and assistance may interact with conflict and peace dynamics when it comes to power relations, host government attempts to influence the WFP presence during armed conflict and affiliations of employees, contractors or partners.** WFP employees and documents demonstrate a good understanding of basic context situations on the whole. However, reflections on the bigger picture of WFP positioning or potential ways the WFP presence and activities could interact with the political economy of conflict contexts are limited. Three issues arose as blind spots across several countries, including in interviews with external partners:

- **The influence of WFP assistance on power relations.** While WFP often analyses the impact of its interventions on local markets and prices, there is little knowledge of its influence on the political economy of a place. Two existing evaluations reach the same conclusions. The evaluation, *WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts* (2018), finds that “no country office visited for this evaluation had conducted structured analyses of the political economy of aid...
in the given context."\textsuperscript{63} The Strategic Evaluation of WFP Support for Enhanced Resilience (2019) notes that "staff had an impressive understanding of causal chains that result in food insecurity, although limited reference to potential systemic connections between them [...] or how these could lead to the overexploitation of an ecosystem, to migration and, potentially, to a natural disaster or conflicts."\textsuperscript{64} Affected people consulted for this evaluation were quick in several contexts to point out how local leaders can use WFP assistance processes to bolster their power or to benefit economically. These issues, however, rarely arose in interviews with WFP employees.

- \textit{The interaction between WFP and host governments, especially when governments are party to a conflict.} WFP activities can either reduce or bolster the legitimacy of those who hold political power in government entities. Knowledge of such dynamics is important for WFP, to understand effects on peace and conflict dynamics. External interview partners in two contexts said this was a blind spot in WFP analysis. In addition, host governments that are party to a conflict may attempt to use the WFP presence or activities as part of their war strategy.

This issue was raised by very few WFP employees interviewed. However, WFP-internal and external interview partners in several countries gave examples of host governments involved in armed conflict trying to manipulate WFP assistance to support their constituents at the expense of others. This could be a host government seeking to restrict WFP focus on the conflict-related needs of certain internally displaced people; attempts to influence targeting so that WFP would prioritize family members of communities supportive to the government’s cause, or exclude families belonging to groups from opposing forces; or attempts to influence the timing of assistance in line with war tactics.

While none of these examples could be triangulated by other methods, the examples and evidence from existing evaluations strongly suggest this as a potential issue that WFP should attend to in its analysis. The \textit{Evaluation of the WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy} (2018) emphasizes that close collaboration with government has limited WFP capacity to realize independent protection risk analysis.\textsuperscript{65}

The country strategic plan evaluation for Cameroon (2020) describes difficulties in preserving a neutral perception for the Northwest/Southwest crisis.\textsuperscript{66} The country strategic plan evaluation for Bangladesh (2021) describes similar difficulties.\textsuperscript{67} The country portfolio evaluation for South Sudan (2016) found no evidence that WFP allowed the authorities or militias to manipulate the use of its resources.\textsuperscript{68}

- \textit{The intersection of affiliations and backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners with the conflict context.} It is standard procedure for WFP country offices to check potential contractors and cooperating partners against the UN sanctions list ("terrorist list") and the list of ineligible suppliers ("black list"). Other criteria that may be relevant to the conflict context, however, are only discussed and considered in exceptional cases.

This includes, for example, the ethnic and/or religious background of employees, partners and contractors; their membership of or links to influential families or clans; or their political affiliations. While the current process protects WFP against attempts to influence its selection of employees, contractors and partners, it also prevents the organization from understanding and, where necessary, addressing imbalances or links that may affect local conflict dynamics.

\textsuperscript{64} WFP. 2019. Strategic Evaluation of WFP Support for Enhanced Resilience, 16.
2.3.2. Adaptation of WFP Programmes

**Summary:** Most existing conflict-sensitivity adaptations are linked to general programme quality, with unused potential to do more. This evaluation sought to understand the extent to which WFP adapted programmes at the country level, following analysis of peace and conflict drivers (EQ 2.3). This section elaborates on adaptation examples found through document analysis, interviews, and, to a lesser extent, through the survey of affected people. The evaluation team found few adaptation examples in each country that were specific to conflict sensitivity.

Rather, most adaptations relevant for conflict sensitivity were part of broader efforts towards principled, good quality and accountable assistance, in line with the WFP mandate. Similarly, examples of adaptations made to strengthen the WFP contribution to peace or to social cohesion were part of broader efforts to tackle food insecurity as a driver of conflict, as a source of tension or as part of efforts to strengthen resilience. Examples do exist of programme adaptations that aimed to make a distinct contribution to peace, but they are relatively rare.

This section therefore also explores programme blind spots: process and system adaptations which the evaluation team found to be missing. These result primarily from two dynamics. First, the limited understanding of certain dynamics because of analytical blind spots – discussed in section 2.2.1 – means that possibilities for adaptation are unknown. Secondly, where detailed analysis is available, some interview partners described a standardized approach as a hindrance to adaptations.

Efforts to adopt an impartial stance are the most frequent adaptation to avoid contributing to tensions. Efforts to include local dialogue or conflict-resolution components in programmes are important, but ad hoc, while WFP’s engagement in high-level peace advocacy is contested. Both programmes seeking to address conflict drivers, other than food insecurity and activities derived from coordination with peacebuilding actors, are rare.

**Finding 14:** WFP’s most frequent efforts to avoid contributing to tensions relate to impartiality and take different forms.

75. **Efforts to strengthen impartiality and enhance communication on beneficiary selection criteria are the most important form of adaptation to avoid adding to conflicts within and among different groups.** First, WFP employees and partner organizations in all countries covered emphasize that efforts to communicate the organization’s impartiality and explain selection criteria and assistance processes are key to preventing or reducing tensions related to perceptions of exclusion. This includes mechanisms like community-based review committees, formal complaints channels and the use of local radio broadcasts. In one country, however, survey workshop participants pointed out that formal suggestion boxes did not lead to follow-up, and nobody mentioned the existing complaints hotlines.69 Across the four survey countries, affected people’s most frequent recommendations included suggestions to better explain selection criteria and to create complaints mechanisms. This shows both that the emphasis of WFP on communicating with affected communities is appropriate and that significant room for improvement remains, which requires a more nuanced understanding of how communication is received.

76. Secondly, interviewees in six out of eight countries mention community-based programming as a way to avoid intra-community conflict, among other things. In one example, WFP uses community-based planning in areas controlled by non-state armed groups to avoid contributing to the conflict. In another, it relies on local committees to ensure targeting is not dominated by influential persons that aim to give their constituency preferential access to assistance. Most of the evaluation’s community-based programming examples are linked to resilience programmes. Although many WFP employees interviewed described community-based programming as also standard practice for humanitarian programmes, the survey data suggests it is not widespread: in the four survey countries, respondents feel that community committees

---

play a negligible role in deciding how assistance is distributed in their community (Figure 8). This survey result is particularly clear because the survey’s geographical coverage in each country included different types of WFP activities. In addition, community members participating in workshops discussed the role of local leaders and local committees controversially. In one country, community members saw community leaders as very helpful in organizing assistance in some areas, whereas they reported preferential treatment of certain people and requests for payments for information in other areas. In another country, community members criticized local humanitarian and health committees as problematic, because beneficiary selection was seen as unjust, and because they were in some cases potentially involved in the diversion of aid (see paragraph 202).

**Figure 8: Who decided who would receive WFP support in your community and who would not? (multiple responses possible)**

---

77. Thirdly, interviewees in five of the eight case countries explain that WFP went one step further and adapted the targeting of criteria to avoid contributing to tensions:

- In Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq and Sudan, WFP changed targeting to provide at least some assistance to host communities and to displaced people in order to reduce tensions. The Country Strategic Plan Evaluations for Lebanon and Jordan found similar adaptations. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, WFP also changed the distribution location to avoid tensions between Muslim refugees from the Central African Republic and Christian camp residents.

- In Libya, WFP advocated repeatedly with donors to highlight the risk of donor funding focusing exclusively on migrants creating tensions with host populations. The country office did not pursue potential funding opportunities that would have exclusively targeted migrants.

---

70 Recent evaluations of the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for Lebanon and Jordan provide further examples of the importance of targeting in contributing to minimise possible tensions (e.g. between refugees and host communities). See WFP-OEV. 2021. Evaluation of the Country Strategic Plan for Lebanon (2018–2021) and WFP-OEV. 2021. Evaluation of the Country Strategic Plan for Jordan (2020–2022).

• In Iraq, WFP pushed for programming in less conflict-affected parts of the country to address grievances over a skewed focus on one part of the country.

78. Targeting had already been identified by the SIPRI report in 2020 as a key driver of tensions; this evaluation confirms that (see also para 114). The adaptation examples found with this evaluation, however, were primarily based on a generic reading of possible tensions between host communities and displaced people, or a broad geographic imbalance. The effect of specific targeting practices, however, can vary a lot depending on specific local conditions. Survey results in Colombia, for example, show strong differences in how people react to a perceived exclusion from assistance, depending on the local context: while some communities share the assistance received and report increased social cohesion as a result, other communities report tensions and open fights. Adapting targeting practices in a more detailed way, or to the specific conditions in individual communities, would therefore require a more nuanced and micro-level understanding of community relations.

Finding 15: Other programme adaptations are less systematic or rare and some are internally contested.

79. Efforts to include local dialogue or conflict-resolution mechanisms in the design of assistance programmes are another important, but much more selectively applied, form of adaptation to reduce tensions or to strengthen local social cohesion. While the evaluation team did not try to establish whether these measures were a direct consequence of the policy and its implementation measures, it did find several examples of activities in case study countries whereby WFP created opportunities for different groups to engage with each other within ongoing assistance programmes. In some cases, WFP also designed programmes to include conflict-resolution mechanisms. Most of these efforts include both women and men:

• In Iraq, WFP offered training programmes for youth to members of different groups. Once WFP and its partners realized that joint training could increase social cohesion among participants, they included this objective more consciously in the programme design. This involved, for example, consciously creating working groups involving people from different groups; choosing a training location accessible to both Sunni and Shia even though the location was more difficult to access for WFP employees, based on a suggestion from the partner organization; enabling discussions of the conflict and sensitizing trainers to this task; and enabling interaction when developing the online training used during the COVID-19 pandemic.

• Also in Iraq, WFP brought together representatives of two conflicting tribes to agree on the design and implementation of an irrigation project, as part of a cash-for-work programme. This facilitation enabled programme implementation and reduced tensions through cooperation.

• In Burkina Faso, WFP made school feeding conditional on the communities in conflict agreeing to protect the stock together.

• In Colombia, WFP supports government efforts to strengthen the socio-economic development of municipalities affected by violence and to strengthen the state presence in territories where it has been historically limited. Skill-building and technical assistance programmes include both ex-combatants and surrounding communities to support reintegration and social cohesion.

• In Iraq, one programme included regular community meetings about the importance of mutual acceptance and of dedicated conflict-resolution, where tensions between two groups in an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp emerged.

• In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, several programmes included conflict-resolution components. In Tanganyika, for example, WFP has funded the Search for Common Ground. This organizes community dialogue in areas targeted for Purchase for Progress (P4P) programmes in

---

72 Delgado, C. et al. 2019. *The World Food Programme's Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace*. See note 12, the recommendation to “focus conflict analysis on ensuring that targeting assistance does not run the risk of increasing exclusion.”
order to understand and address potential tensions triggered by the programme between the Twa and Bantu communities.

80. **In a few instances, WFP also engaged in high-level peace advocacy and, being a contested issue internally, interview partners suggested several parameters for future efforts.** The WFP role in peace advocacy has attracted controversy, but the extent of this engagement is rather limited in practice. WFP primarily maintains contact with various parties to conflict for humanitarian access negotiations. In Ethiopia and Sudan, for example, this also involved meetings between the WFP Executive Director and high-level representatives of parties to the conflict. Since conflict is a key driver of food insecurity, these meetings can involve broader elements of peace advocacy.

81. In Sudan in 2019, the Executive Director facilitated UN access with the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N), a non-state armed group controlling parts of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile State, in coordination with other UN agencies. Subsequently, the Executive Director also facilitated direct talks between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM-N, which resulted in a signed political agreement in March 2021. Some WFP-internal interviewees perceived the organization's role as positive, because it increased access. It appears that the Executive Director also attempted to play a role as a mediator following the Sudanese coup d'état in October 2021. This was criticized in a recent Foreign Policy article as potentially undermining existing UN and US efforts.

82. In Ethiopia, public comments by the Executive Director following a meeting with the prime minister strained the WFP relationship with the government. The few consulted stakeholders that were able and willing to comment also worried that some public statements were not in line with WFP neutrality.

83. External and internal key informants who commented on high-level peace advocacy efforts in more general terms were split. Some see it as beneficial for WFP to use its leverage to support resolving conflict as it is a primary cause of food insecurity. Others fear that this kind of engagement could undermine the WFP stance as a neutral and impartial humanitarian actor, and therefore potentially undermine its ability to deliver humanitarian assistance. These two stances were present across all stakeholder groups, including WFP partners, donors and Executive Board members, and WFP employees and management at country, regional and global levels. There is, however, an emerging consensus among interview partners that future peace advocacy efforts would need to take place within the following parameters:

- Activities of WFP headquarters and leadership are closely communicated in advance, coordinated and in line with the strategy pursued by WFP country offices in order to safeguard against any potential negative consequences.
- WFP country office management is involved in broader UN or political discussions relating to peace negotiations or processes so that it can determine when or how it might support those processes and to ensure WFP does not undermine other efforts by “going it alone.”
- Any form of engagement is careful to safeguard WFP neutrality and independence, for example by focusing on negotiation elements that have an immediate focus on humanitarian access.

84. **The aim of addressing conflict drivers other than food insecurity rarely motivates programme adaptations.** Food insecurity can be an important driver of conflict. Many WFP employees and partner organizations therefore see any effort to reduce food insecurity as contributing to peace or reducing

---

73 The South Sudan country portfolio evaluation, for example, stresses WFP's positive role in negotiating humanitarian access.
tensions. While this effect exists – see chapter 2.3.3 on effects – the potential peace contribution of food security programmes is evidently not what drives decisions about those programmes alone. Similarly, the gradual shift from providing short-term food aid to long-term food assistance – which includes efforts to strengthen livelihoods and resilience – mainly aims to achieve more sustainable food security solutions. Highlighting this effect can open additional opportunities for fundraising for WFP, for example from the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

85. In addition, the evaluation team identified a small number of programme adaptations that aimed to address other conflict drivers:

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, several programmes focused on smallholder farmers to address conflict over natural resources.
- In Southern Iraq, based on a conflict analysis, WFP focused on water management, land rehabilitation, and youth, and included components relating to asset management by women and youth in order to address conflict drivers. Interviewees, however, questioned the potential impact because of the limited funding.
- In Libya, WFP contributed to youth programming that aimed to reduce the recruitment of youths into armed groups, with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund and in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). A Programme Quality Review conducted by PRO-P and several interviewees, however, questioned whether the analysis was sufficiently detailed to enable targeting potential recruits. Programmes providing vocational training for youth affected by violence in El Salvador were praised as relevant, but their impact was seen as limited due to the small scale of the programme.

86. Considering these challenges and the importance of the WFP contribution to addressing food insecurity as a driver of conflict, interviewees agreed that WFP should continue to focus on food insecurity and closely related issues, rather than invest in tackling conflict drivers that are beyond its core mandate. Some suggested, for example, that WFP should invest more in understanding conflict over resources linked to food production – land rights and access to land and water – to ensure its interventions are conflict-sensitive and to explore whether it can complement related peacebuilding initiatives based on its core mandate and strengths.

87. **WFP programmes coordinated with peacebuilding actors are rare but promising.** This evaluation found four possible modalities for WFP to contribute to existing peacebuilding efforts, each with advantages and disadvantages according to internal and external interview partners. Peacebuilding partners in particular, but also donors, external observers and a range of internal stakeholders in WFP believe that WFP’s most promising potential to increase its contribution to peace lies in these kinds of activities: WFP contributing its core mandate and expertise in addressing food insecurity and strengthening local food production by building local markets as part of broader stabilization or peacebuilding initiatives.

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, WFP provides funding to peacebuilding actors for their own programmes linked to WFP activities. The organization set up collaboration with Search for Common Ground (see paragraph 79 above) and national NGOs for specific peacebuilding projects related to food security interventions. The peacebuilding actors provided conflict analysis and organized social cohesion projects.
- In Colombia, WFP matched its programming to the overall peace process. It did so by supporting the implementation of agreed-upon measures aimed at reducing inequality and supporting the resilience of people living in the areas where fighting had taken place. WFP tried to use local food purchasing to foster livelihoods programmes for ex-combatants. However, because the products did not meet WFP quality standards, this effort was discontinued. Also in Colombia, WFP

---

implements a variety of capacity-strengthening activities with the government to contribute to the wider peace process and to stabilization.\(^78\)

- In Libya, a peace dialogue run by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) identified a joint market as a key to potentially bridging community divisions in the Ubari region. WFP and USIP began a strategic partnership to rehabilitate a market that opposing groups had previously used, with WFP also adding its core expertise to an existing peace process.\(^79\)

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, WFP collaborates with others in joint programmes where different organizations cover humanitarian and peace components, at times with funding from the Peacebuilding Fund. In a long-term resilience project with FAO and UNICEF, FAO runs social cohesion clubs (Dimitra Clubs) to bring people together across societal divides.

### 2.3.3. Plausible Intended and Unintended Effects on Conflict and Peace Outcomes

**Summary:** The evaluation team explored the plausible intended and unintended effects WFP had on conflict and peace outcomes in the four case study countries covered (EQ 2.4). It did so by studying the effects independently of programme adaptations, since the evaluation scope was too broad to bridge the attribution gap between specific programme adaptations and observed results. The theory of change developed for this evaluation (see chapter 1.3) identifies several pathways through which WFP seeks to affect conflict and peace outcomes. This includes measures to avoid increasing tensions within and among communities; to avoid contributing to armed actor profits; to reduce food insecurity as a driver of conflict; to strengthen social cohesion through inclusion of and dialogue with conflicting groups; and to strengthen trust between citizens and the state.

Although other evidence as to the effects of WFP’s presence and interventions on societal-level outcomes is rare, the evaluation’s survey of conflict-affected people finds that WFP actions can have positive and negative effects on tensions in communities. The evaluation’s evidence confirms that WFP makes a plausible contribution to reducing conflict and tensions by increasing the availability of food and bringing conflict groups together through programming. It also shows, however, that WFP interventions can increase conflict and tensions where people feel unjustly excluded from assistance, although patterns of perceived exclusion do not usually concern groups defined along conflict lines, and where aspects of programming are of poor quality. There is mixed or inconclusive evidence for a potential WFP contribution to the profits of armed actors and for the strengthening of trust of citizens in the state. Available secondary evidence suggests the type of assistance modality, particularly the shift to cash-based programming, can have an important effect on social cohesion and tensions.

**Finding 16:** Although existing evidence is limited, the evaluation established several clear plausible effects of WFP on conflict and peace dynamics.

88. **Little WFP evidence for effects of activities on societal-level outcomes exists.** The evaluation found very little secondary data on the WFP contribution to conflict and peace, beyond employee perceptions or anecdotes shared in key informant interviews. This confirms the already identified gap in the capacity of WFP to know about the societal-level effects of its presence and interventions (see chapter 2.2 above). The evaluation survey and sense-making workshops with affected people are therefore the primary data source the team used to assess effects. In addition, the team drew on substantiated findings on effects from the SIPRI case studies and also

---


from the limited triangulated evidence of effects on conflict and peace dynamics included in other WFP evaluations.

89. Fourteen of the 47 previous evaluation reports assessed for this evaluation highlight the positive effects on social cohesion. Of these 14, only 5 also substantiate these statements through sources besides interviews with WFP and partner staff, such as surveys, focus group discussions or RAM reports. Other evaluations do not substantiate statements about positive effects. The country portfolio evaluation for Sri Lanka (2017), for example, highlights that the “focus on displaced persons and returnees was an important contribution to the peacebuilding process,” but does not explain the evidence behind the statement. The country portfolio evaluation for the Central African Republic (2018) states that “emergency school meals were perceived as contributing to a sense of normalcy and social cohesion,” but does not discuss the evidence further.

90. As a result, the evidence discussed below is skewed towards issues that conflict-affected people can speak to. Possible contributions to peace or conflict at the macro level that are not visible to affected people do not appear. This includes, for example, higher level impacts on the war economy or the effects of government capacity-strengthening on stability and citizen-state trust.

91. **Perceptions of changes in the level of societal tensions before and after WFP interventions diverge and partly differ by gender and between recipients and non-recipients of assistance.** If survey respondents lived in their community before WFP started providing assistance, they were asked to indicate the level of tensions and fighting in their area before and after the WFP intervention. Across all countries, and including majorities in Burkina Faso, Colombia and Iraq, 42.7 percent of respondents reported no change in tensions; 17.3 percent reported an increase and 40 percent reported a decrease in tensions (n=1460). There were some differences regarding overall impressions across countries (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). In Burkina Faso, a higher share of women than men believed that WFP contributed to decreasing tensions. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the reverse was the case. Across all four mission countries, people who received assistance from WFP and perceived a decrease in tensions were more likely to say WFP contributed to decreasing tensions, compared with non-recipients who perceived a decrease in tensions.

92. **Among those who see a general change in the level of tensions (positive or negative), a majority believe that WFP contributed to this change.** Survey respondents who saw a change in the level of tensions were asked whether they think WFP contributed to the rise or decline they perceived. The majority of people across countries, who pointed to a change in tensions, also attributed this change to WFP, at least in part. Of those who say tensions decreased (n=445), 92.8 percent linked the change to WFP (Figure 9); and of those who said tensions increased, 80.4 percent (n=107) linked the change to WFP (Figure 10). This is significant, given how many different factors affect conflict dynamics, and confirms that conflict-affected people see a strong potential of WFP's actions to contribute positively or negatively to conflict and to the peace dynamics (see more details in paragraph 99 and in the following Figures 9, 10 and 11).

**Figure 9: Perceived WFP contribution to decreasing tensions among those who see a decrease in tension**

---

80 These are country strategic plan evaluations for Bangladesh (2021) and Cameroon (2020), an inter-agency humanitarian evaluation for Ethiopia (2019), a corporate emergency evaluation of the regional response to the Syria crisis (2018) and a decentralized evaluation for Kenya (2018).

Affected people living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and people who received WFP assistance have a particularly positive perception of WFP’s contribution to a decrease in tensions. Not only had an unusually large number of respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo perceived a decrease in tensions (69.4 percent), but an overwhelming majority of respondents also believed WFP made a positive contribution to this change (96 percent of those who perceived a decrease in tensions).

Finding 17: The main mechanisms through which WFP contributes to reduced conflict and tensions are increasing the availability of food and bringing conflict groups together through programming.

According to conflict-affected people, the effect of food assistance on individual well-being is the primary reason for declining tensions. The evaluation team explored several ways in which WFP can potentially contribute to reduced conflict and tensions (Figure 12). Across the four case study countries, most survey respondents, who explained how WFP contributed to declining tensions, suggested that providing assistance, fighting hunger and strengthening resilience at the individual level helped to reduce tensions. Some respondents specified that assistance directly affected interpersonal relations by alleviating or preventing aggression. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, workshop participants also pointed out...
the more indirect positive effects of assistance. They felt the assistance delivered by WFP lowered market prices for food, which positively affected the entire community and thereby reduced tensions.

**Figure 12: Overview of evidence on different ways to contribute to decreasing tensions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ways to decrease tensions</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reduced tensions linked to improved individual well-being through food assistance</td>
<td>• Most important contribution as seen by affected people and WFP employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended effects on cooperation among members of different groups through meetings at distribution sites and sharing of assistance</td>
<td>• Frequent examples given by affected people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional integration of social cohesion aspects in assistance programmes</td>
<td>• Several examples with anecdotal evidence of positive effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmes seeking to address other drivers of conflict besides food insecurity</td>
<td>• Little evidence of effects available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions strengthening state capacities and citizen-state trust</td>
<td>• Evidence on the effects of assistance on citizen-state trust is mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95. WFP employees in all case study countries share this view. They perceive the direct effects of food assistance on individual well-being and social cohesion as the primary WFP contribution to peace. In most cases, employees did not elaborate on exactly how assistance reduced tensions. Those who did provided different explanations. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, several WFP employees felt that the increased food assistance in one area reduced raids on farmers’ fields to steal food. Other explanations included statements that better food security and better livelihood perspectives reduced the ability of armed groups to recruit fighters and provided alternatives to contributing to illicit economies; that better food security enabled communities to remain on their land and prevented tensions related to displacement; and that improving livelihoods supported peace processes by delivering a “peace dividend.”

96. **Some positive side-effects exist where WFP programmes are a space where groups, whose members are at conflict, interact.** This is an unintended side-effect of assistance in the most frequent examples from affected people. In Burkina Faso, affected people explained in workshops that people meeting and interacting at distribution sites and the ability to share assistance, enabled cooperation, including between IDPs and the host community. In Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, workshop participants specified that sharing in-kind assistance with those who had not received assistance fostered cooperation within communities. In the survey, many respondents indicated that assistance was shared when some people received assistance, but others did not (10 percent of respondents in Burkina Faso; 17 percent in Colombia; 9 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and 16 percent in Iraq).82

97. In another set of examples, WFP programmes included more explicit components intended to bring members of different groups or communities together. There is some evidence that this has positive effects on social cohesion. In the Tanganyika province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, community mechanisms, established in a joint project with Search for Common Ground, helped to defuse inter-ethnic tensions, according to interviewed employees and the 2020 interim country strategic plan evaluation.83 There is anecdotal evidence from Iraq that joint WFP training offered to Sunni and Shia in

---

82 Since several respondents received different types of WFP assistance, it was not possible to disaggregate data to know what type of assistance was shared.

Baghdad led to a mixed marriage, and to everyone contributing money to cover the cancer treatment of one training participant. Given this evidence, WFP adaptations to create connection points among communities (discussed above in para. 76) appear to be a good investment in fostering social cohesion.

98. Evidence is rare of the positive effects of programmes addressing drivers of conflict besides food insecurity. As discussed above (chapter 2.3.2), in a few cases, WFP programmes sought to address other drivers of conflict, such as climate change, water scarcity, youth unemployment, or asset ownership and management. The evaluation was unable to find evidence of the effects of such programmes, with the exception of one example in Iraq: affected people in workshops explained that WFP support to extend water networks as part of cash-for-work and resilience projects helped to reduce water scarcity, which in turn reduced tensions between families and villages competing for water.

Finding 18: The (perceived) exclusion from assistance and the poor quality aspects of programming emerged as the main factors contributing to conflict and tension.

99. The perceived unfair exclusion of certain groups from assistance is the primary driver of tensions, as confirmed by the SIPRI studies and previous WFP evaluations. Across all survey countries, most respondents, who openly explained how WFP contributed to rising tensions, pointed to targeting and distribution of assistance they perceived as unequal or unfair. In Burkina Faso and some areas of Colombia, some respondents cited open disagreements or fighting between people or groups as a consequence. In Iraq, some mentioned dissatisfaction over the selection of recipients of food assistance for assets programmes, and many criticized the unclear communication of selection criteria.

In two countries covered in this evaluation, several interviewees pointed to government pressure on cooperating partners to assist certain families before others. Workshop participants in several countries felt local partners, community leaders and camp managers favoured certain people when allocating assistance. In Burkina Faso, the perception of discrimination created by the targeting criteria, especially among those who do not receive mobile cash, arose frequently in the survey.

100. Displaced people were the only group defined in relation to conflict dynamics who were perceived to be unfairly included or excluded. There was no perception among any of the stakeholder groups consulted that WFP gave preferential treatment to one side in a conflict over another. Although a majority of survey respondents felt certain groups of people were left out (Figure 13), this primarily concerned people of specific diversity and age profiles, or the poorest people. The category of migrants and displaced people was the only group perceived to be favoured or left out and defined in relation to a conflict. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, participants in several workshops shared a perception that IDPs were favoured by local authorities involved in WFP programmes and that this led to inter-community tensions.

In Colombia, workshop participants also expressed dissatisfaction about migrants receiving significantly more assistance than Colombian communities. They provided examples of where this led to tensions, for example, between parents of children involved in school meal programmes in which all migrant children received assistance, but Colombian children only received assistance if they met the targeting criteria. Interviewed WFP employees explained that donor contributions were often earmarked for a specific group of recipients and that this imposed limitations on their ability to adjust targeting, even if they tried to advocate with donors for a change in their allocation criteria.

Similar issues were observed in the regional response to the Syria crisis, where the corporate emergency evaluation found that the provision of cash assistance to refugees (but not host communities) exacerbated

---

84 National school feeding programmes in Colombia do not have universal coverage. WFP's complementary funding for school feeding for a caseload of migrant children and up to 10 percent Colombian children helps the government increase the coverage of school feeding programmes. A government entity is responsible for targeting the assistance. WFP also implemented an initiative trying to prevent discrimination and xenophobia in 50 schools in Colombia.
existing social tensions between those two groups, whereas the inclusion of host communities in resilience activities helped to reduce tensions.  

Figure 13: Who should have received assistance but did not? (Multiple responses possible, leaving the type of assistance open)

![Figure 13: Who should have received assistance but did not?](image)

101. The extent to which targeting practices contribute to tensions very much depends on people’s perceived fairness of the assistance. Workshop participants in several countries emphasized that understanding why some people receive assistance and others do not is key to avoiding tensions. Among survey participants, a clear majority see the way WFP provides assistance as fair (66.3 percent), but a significant minority in all countries does not. The highest proportion of respondents who think assistance was unfair was in Burkina Faso (30 percent) and Iraq (29 percent). There are notable gender differences in Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a higher share of women (39.2 percent) than men (29.8 percent) think assistance was not allocated in a fair manner, while in Colombia a higher share of men (44.5 percent) than women (35.7 percent) think the allocation was not fair. There were also notable differences in perceptions between individual communities, particularly in Colombia, where the share of respondents that see assistance as fair ranged from 44 percent to over 96 percent and the share of respondents that see assistance as unfair ranged from 0 percent to 48 percent, depending on the community consulted.

102. Unsurprisingly, perceived fairness is greater among aid recipients than non-recipients. However, a substantial number of people received WFP assistance and still find the allocation of assistance unfair. This gives cause for thought and confirms that WFP efforts to improve targeting as a measure to strengthen conflict sensitivity and programming quality need to be continued and reinforced.

Figure 15: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community? (Recipients versus non-recipients)

103. Evidence from SIPRI studies and previous WFP evaluations confirms the importance of targeting for conflict-sensitive assistance. Examples relating to targeting were the only substantiated negative effects on conflict provided in the WFP evaluations studied.

- The synthesis report of the first phase of the SIPRI-WFP Knowledge Partnership concludes that improving targeting is a key way to improve WFP conflict sensitivity. This is based on findings from
different country case studies with examples of inclusion and exclusion errors. Tensions related to targeting also emerged as central in the 2022 Ethiopia country case study from the same project, which focuses on the effects of climate change adaptation on peace.\footnote{Hegazi, F., Murugani, V., Pacillo, G. & Läderach, P. 2022. The World Food Programme’s Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace. Preliminary Report. SIPRI, 18ff.} Tensions related to targeting also emerged as central in the 2022 Ethiopia country case study from the same project, which focuses on the effects of climate change adaptation on peace. Tensions related to targeting also emerged as central in the 2022 Ethiopia country case study from the same project, which focuses on the effects of climate change adaptation on peace.\footnote{Hegazi, F., Murugani, V., Pacillo, G. & Läderach, P. 2022. The World Food Programme’s Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace in Ethiopia, 17, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/wfp_country_report_ethiopia_0.pdf.} \footnote{Office of Evaluation. 2018. Corporate Emergency Evaluation of the WFP Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis.}

- The Operation Evaluations Series for the MENA region (2017) notes that the exclusion of host communities from a food-for-assets programme in Sudan led to tensions between different groups.

- In contrast, the Corporate Emergency Evaluation of the WFP Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (2018) provides evidence, triangulated through focus group discussions with affected people, that the inclusion of host communities in refugee assistance reduced tensions in Lebanon.\footnote{Delgado, C., Jang, S., Milante, G. & Smith, D. 2019. The World Food Programme’s Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace. Preliminary Report. SIPRI, 18ff.}

104. Quality issues in the delivery of assistance provides other identified examples in which WFP interventions increase tensions or conflict. Issues with the planning and implementation of WFP programmes were the second most frequent explanation affected people and other stakeholders gave for how WFP had contributed to conflict or tensions. Workshop participants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, provided examples indicating that in specific situations inexperienced partners, the influence of local authorities and the commercialization of assistance by distributors or staff in health facilities led to fights over assistance. In Burkina Faso, incidents of violence and harassment at in-kind distribution points, particularly for women and elderly persons, and the inability of wives in polygamous families to receive aid, triggered disagreements. In Colombia, participants reported tensions and occasional fights in long queues at distribution points, especially when stocks ran out before everyone was served. In Iraq, participants mentioned an example of stocks being looted because local communities did not know what the stocks were going to be used for. Similarly, WFP cooperating partners provided examples where late payments by WFP and a lack of clarity about these delays – for example, for pay outs in cash-for-work programmes – created tensions in communities that partners had to manage.

105. Evidence for the effects of targeting and programme quality on conflict dynamics confirms that WFP should reinforce its focus on both as key adaptation measures (described in para. 74-77), particularly in situations of displacement.

**Finding 19: Evidence for a potential WFP contribution to the profits of armed actors is inconclusive and WFP enjoys a strong reputation as a neutral actor.**

106. Little and mixed evidence exists on the potential unintended WFP contribution to the profits of armed actors, and thus the war economy: a small number of survey respondents see those who gained money through WFP as contributing to the armed conflict. As described above in paragraph 74, a detailed understanding of how the WFP presence contributes to war economies is an important blind spot in the organization’s analysis and adaptation efforts. The few examples of negative impacts were each always contributed by only one interview partner, and could not be triangulated.

107. To generate evidence on the perceived economic effects of WFP on armed actors, the evaluation survey asked affected people “who benefits from the WFP presence”, rather than from the assistance provided, and whether those actors are linked to any groups involved in the armed conflict. Overall, few people were able to speak to this question, and most respondents who felt that some people had gained money said that those people did not contribute to the armed conflict. However, a small number of respondents did say that those who benefited beyond receiving assistance contributed to the armed conflict (Figure 16). Even though they are few respondents in absolute terms, it is critical for WFP to acknowledge the potential contribution to a war economy and review applicable safeguards, considering
how sensitive this question is and how many respondents indicated that they did not know or preferred not to respond.

**Figure 16: Are the people who have gained money contributing to the armed conflict?**

![Figure 16: Are the people who have gained money contributing to the armed conflict?](image)

108. **A clear majority of respondents see WFP as neutral.** Another important indicator of potentially contributing to conflict is to what extent WFP is considered a neutral actor. When asked whether they think WFP helps any side to win in an ongoing local armed conflict, a large majority across countries thinks WFP does not help any one side. A significant minority of respondents do not know if WFP helps one side to win, with respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo split between “no” and “don’t know”. In Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, women perceive WFP as more neutral than men. This result is very different from an earlier *Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts* (2018), when 46 percent of surveyed phone respondents believed that “WFP is working to help one side in the conflict to win.”

---

Finding 20: Evidence on strengthening the trust of citizens in the state is mixed.

109. Perceptions of being involved in WFP assistance can affect citizen-state trust both positively and negatively. The evaluation sought to find out whether WFP contributes to peace by improving the relationship between the state and citizens. Important efforts in this regard aim to increase government capacity, for example, to track the food security situation, deliver school meals, or respond to local emergencies. In Colombia, for example, this forms a key component of the WFP country strategic plan. Affected people, however, are not normally aware of such higher-level efforts and can therefore not be expected to reflect on the extent to which this initiative did or did not improve relations between them and the government authorities. Instead, the evaluation survey focused on the more immediate role authorities play in the planning or distribution of WFP assistance and on the effect that has on trust. People were asked if the authorities were involved in selecting who would receive assistance and in organizing or distributing assistance. When the authorities were seen to be involved, respondents were asked how this impacted their perception of the government. Across the survey countries, the majority of respondents who thought the authorities were involved said that this had improved their reputation. A significant minority, however, also think it has negatively impacted the authorities’ reputation. This is most pronounced in Colombia (negative 22 percent; positive 39 percent) and Iraq (negative 23 percent; positive 61 percent). Affected people in Colombia and Iraq explained in workshops that they strongly preferred humanitarian assistance to be administered by neutral and independent external bodies like WFP and that the closer involvement of government authorities would risk more diversion, favouritism or use of assistance for political aims. The evidence that the stronger involvement of government authorities in the planning and implementation of assistance strengthens citizen-state trust is therefore mixed and limited. Given the potential downsides of a heavy reliance on government authorities (described in paragraph 74), WFP should approach this area with caution.

110. In contexts like Colombia, WFP also works with government entities to strengthen their capacities to respond to food insecurity. The affected people consulted for this evaluation in four countries, however, were not aware (and could hardly be expected to be aware) of such capacity-strengthening initiatives. They were therefore not in a position to indicate whether or not this had strengthened their trust in the government.
Figure 18: How has the involvement of the authorities in assistance changed the way people in this area generally think about the government?

111. There are documented positive and negative effects of the choice of cash or in-kind modalities on tensions and violence at community level. In the country case studies, the evaluation team did not find examples where WFP chose cash or in-kind assistance with the goal of improving social cohesion, or a similar documented effect. In addition, given that many survey respondents received different types of assistance at once, the results could not be disaggregated by type of assistance. Three examples from other countries, however, are among the most carefully substantiated findings from previous evaluations, and therefore provide a robust indication that the choice of modality can have an important positive or negative effect on local peace and conflict dynamics:

- In the Decentralized Evaluation for Kenya on the cash modality set-up (2018), survey respondents reported reduced tensions in the camp since the switch to nearly full cash-based transfer in Kalobeyei (17 percent of respondents) and the substitution of a cereal ration with cash in Kakuma (49 percent). The evaluation attributes the variation to the fact that Kalobeyei is a newer settlement where community relations are yet to be built. At the same time, however, the evaluation also found that cash recipients were discriminated against based on ethnicity when redeeming their cash assistance.

- The Country Strategic Plan Evaluation for Cameroon (2020) found that shifting to a combination of cash-based transfers and in-kind feed for animals had the unintended effect of increasing social cohesion between refugee and host communities. This can be attributed to the change in modalities for people who participated in the programme.

---

90 WFP. 2018. An evaluation of the effects and a cost benefit analysis of the GFD Cash Modality scale up (Cash Based Transfer for PRRO 200737) for refugees and host communities in Kenya, August 2015-November 2019, pp. 20, 21 and 126.
91 WFP. 2018. An Evaluation of the Effects and a Cost Benefit Analysis of the GFD Cash Modality Scale Up (Cash Based Transfer for PRRO 200737) for Refugees and Host Communities in Kenya, August 2015–November 2019, p. 27.
The Corporate Emergency Evaluation of the WFP Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (2018) cited evidence from 15 out of 20 focus groups where recipients of cash-based transfers reported being harassed “while waiting in line at ATMs to withdraw their WFP assistance.”

The forthcoming phase 2 reports from the SIPRI-WFP knowledge partnership, which focus on the contribution to peace of cash-based assistance, among other thematic issues, are expected to generate more evidence on cash.

2.4. ENABLING AND HINDERING FACTORS

**Summary:** The evaluation sought to understand which internal and external factors enable and hinder WFP efforts to avoid exacerbating conflict and to strengthen its contribution to peace (EQ 3.1). Factors affect all levels of the theory of change, including the effectiveness of the policy implementation measures, the analysis and awareness of conflict sensitivity issues, the programme and process adaptations and the observed positive and negative effects on peace and conflict.

The evaluation team assessed whether or not current policy implementation measures – such as policy dissemination, training, guidance and partnerships with peacebuilding actors – address the enabling and hindering factors (EQ 3.2). Most factors that explain the current performance of WFP in conflict sensitivity are internal. They relate to management buy-in and incentives, staffing, and the emergency focus and culture of WFP. Important external factors are the relationship with cooperating partners, donor influence and the relationship with host governments.

2.4.1. Management Buy-In and Incentives

**Finding 21:** Management buy-in is a critical lever for anchoring both conflict-sensitivity considerations and attention to peacebuilding within the organization, but is constrained by mixed messages about WFP’s position on contributing to peace.

113. WFP employees see country-level management buy-in – or the lack thereof – as the main enabler or hindering factor. The level of management buy-in and signalling is a key factor that drives attention to conflict sensitivity and making a contribution to peace. WFP employees in all countries assessed most often mentioned their country director’s commitment – or the lack thereof – to conflict sensitivity and to contributing to peace as the primary driver explaining how strongly WFP employees and cooperating partners integrate these issues in their analysis and programmes. In addition to generally signalling that it should be a priority, country directors who champion the issue are more likely to prioritize related investments, for example, securing funding for conflict advisers, or making time for country-wide analysis. In countries where WFP employees felt conflict sensitivity was not a priority for management, they pointed to available analysis not being used in decisions. The 2018 Evaluation of the WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy also points to the importance of senior management at country level (see text box).

114. Global communications emphasize contributing to peace but provide no clear guidance on defining WFP’s ambition in this regard. The top leadership of WFP has consistently communicated conflict and peace as a key priority. Messages have focused on how WFP can contribute to peace, especially after WFP was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020. This evaluation did not find similar global communications stressing the importance of WFP efforts to avoid contributing to conflict. Although the buy-in of top management to the peace contribution agenda is important, employees still lacked concrete

---

expectations or action points for their work to follow this signal. This is because WFP has no internal consensus on how to prioritize its contribution to peace and how far its actions should go. The new WFP Strategic Plan (2022–2025) emphasizes the conflict-sensitive and principled approach of WFP, referring to “taking steps to develop peace outcomes,” and states that “WFP will engage in humanitarian diplomacy and peace advocacy.”93 The plan thus leaves room for interpretation and does not resolve the question of prioritization for conflict sensitivity and contributing to peace or define WFP’s level of ambition for peace. An “ambitions paper” that proposed options for how WFP should define its contribution to peace84 prepared by PRO-P was not discussed among senior management. In addition, interviewed WFP headquarters employees and management, as well as board members, expressed diverging opinions on this issue.

115. **The recent focus on the peace contribution is seen as a distraction from efforts to avoid exacerbating tensions or conflict.** In addition, a broad range of WFP employees and external stakeholders interviewed felt that the global focus on the peace contribution and the publicity of the Nobel Peace Prize have been distracting WFP managers at different levels from the aspects conflict-sensitive programming that seek to identify and minimize the risks of exacerbating tensions or conflicts. The drive to mobilize more resources from peacebuilding and development sources, paired with communication following the Nobel Peace Prize, also create pressure to demonstrate the WFP contribution to peace. At the global level, this is reflected, for example, in the level of attention to a project aiming at developing a measure of the WFP contribution to peace as part of the policy implementation.

116. **Some WFP employees hesitate to raise “critical” issues that would support conflict sensitivity.** The policy ambition to avoid contributing to conflict through WFP programming requires detailed attention to ways this might occur. This discussion is only possible when employees feel comfortable bringing such issues to decision-makers. In interviews in several country offices, however, WFP employees – national employees in particular – felt that open, critical thinking about the potential negative consequences of WFP’s work was not encouraged, especially if it could be read as a criticism of management, and they refrained from doing so in fear that their career progression would be held back. Cooperating partners raised similar concerns (see below).

117. WFP implementation measures are only starting to address this key factor. Aspects of conflict sensitivity have been included in “the programme learning journey” and in key training for senior managers. In addition, WFP has developed guidance on conflict sensitivity so as to more strongly emphasize WFP responsibility to do no harm in conflict contexts.

### 2.4.2. Staffing

**Finding 22: Dedicated employees helps to enhance conflict sensitivity, but the limited role of national employees reduces it in many contexts.**

118. **Dedicated positions at country/regional level are key to supporting conflict sensitivity.** Having WFP employees at country or regional level, whose portfolios include conflict sensitivity or social cohesion, is a strong positive factor contributing to the ability of WFP to be conflict sensitive. They play an important role in translating what the commitments to conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding mean at the programme level; enabling deeper conflict analysis by convening discussions and training on conflict sensitivity internally or with cooperating partners; coordinating conflict sensitivity across different objectives and programmatic areas; optimizing the peace contribution of resilience projects; and liaising with analytical and peacebuilding partners.

119. In the countries studied, employees playing this role either have positions dedicated to conflict or conflict sensitivity, or assume the function within a related thematic portfolio. Most dedicated positions, however, are temporary because they depend on specific funding. In some cases, WFP did not clearly

---

articulate the terms of reference and expectations for those positions. Without dedicated positions, it was mostly individual employees who identified the need for conflict analysis and proposed its inclusion in their terms of reference, rather than an institutional decision. Individual employee motivation to pursue conflict sensitivity analysis and programming was therefore an additional important factor.

120. Two prior global evaluations confirm the value of dedicated analysis employees. The 2020 Strategic Evaluation of WFP’s Capacity to Respond to Emergencies notes that “[i]nterviews at all levels highlighted the need for more capacity in terms of human resources for better analysis and in particular better conflict and cross-border analysis”95. The 2018 Evaluation of the WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy reaches a similar conclusion.96

121. National employees are key to conflict awareness, but often not involved in strategic discussions. Interviewed employees — international WFP employees in particular — across all eight countries pointed to the key role of national WFP employees in supporting context and conflict awareness. Different issues, however, limit their contribution. First, as in paragraph 73, in countries without an office-wide analysis process, national employees are often not involved in the restricted inner circles that conduct more detailed context analysis related to strategic decisions. Secondly, international WFP employees at times simplistically assume that having lived through conflict automatically makes national employees experts on conflict-sensitive programming. WFP national employees in particular say the lack of investment in explicit training is a factor hindering their potential. Thirdly, some analysis or guidance documents are only available in English, making them less accessible or inaccessible to national employees in countries where the working language is French or Spanish. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, context analysis prepared in 2020 was yet to be translated into French at the time of this evaluation. In Colombia, several WFP employees asked for a Spanish translation of policy documents.

122. WFP efforts to hire additional expert employees, strengthen training on conflict sensitivity and build a community of practice among employees involved in conflict-sensitivity analysis are all implementation measures that attempt to address this key factor.

2.4.3. Emergency Focus and Culture

Finding 23: WFP’s commitment to the humanitarian principles strengthens conflict sensitivity; its emergency mindset reduces it.

123. Strong awareness of humanitarian principles supports impartiality and neutrality, which are key to conflict sensitivity. The perceptions of affected people captured in the evaluation survey and workshops demonstrate that impartiality and perceived neutrality are key to the ability of WFP to be conflict sensitive. Both humanitarian principles are widely known and referred to by employees. Several WFP employees pointed to the humanitarian principles as the main element guiding their approach to conflict sensitivity. While some of that understanding was not very nuanced – some WFP employees equated principled assistance and conflict-sensitive assistance – the strong awareness of humanitarian principles clearly enables a key component of WFP conflict sensitivity.

124. The large size of the WFP presence and emergency programmes has the potential to enable impartiality and addressing food insecurity as a driver of conflict, but also increases the risk of contributing to tensions or conflict. The large size of WFP humanitarian programmes enables broad coverage and therefore a perception that WFP does not favour one community over another. However, the risk of inadvertently influencing conflict dynamics and conflict economies increases with scale. Since WFP is often the only food assistance actor in a given place, its influence is key. Size also matters in the different ways WFP contributes to peace. Contributions addressing food insecurity as a driver of conflict are plausible

---

95 WFP. 2020. Strategic Evaluation of WFP’s Capacity to Respond to Emergencies, 32.
in many contexts. WFP resilience programmes have also been growing in size in several contexts.\textsuperscript{97} However, since the resources required for creating resilience and addressing root causes of instability and conflict are so large, WFP programmes are unlikely to influence other conflict drivers on their own.

125. The “emergency mindset” of WFP, overall, primarily affects its conflict sensitivity negatively. While the WFP focus on delivery contributes positively to its general reputation, its “emergency mindset” also influences three aspects of conflict sensitivity negatively. First, the urgency culture and the speed at which WFP operates limit the focus on context analysis. This leads to a mindset where analysis for emergency programming is deprioritized.\textsuperscript{98} Several WFP employees interviewed across the different countries – among them senior managers – rejected the very idea that conflict dynamics and potential negative effects of a WFP presence can be analysed for emergency programming. This partly explains analytical blind spots. The 2018 \textit{Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts} also notes that the “perceived urgency of food needs, combined with a strong institutional pride in the ability to move large quantities of commodities, overcome obstacles and deliver quickly, means that delivery in the short-term is usually given strong weight compared to longer-term considerations.”\textsuperscript{99} The 2022 \textit{Evaluation of the WFP Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic} states that WFP recognized the medium-term implications of the pandemic relatively early, but cautions that this was not always in harmony with the contexts in its country offices.\textsuperscript{100}

126. Secondly, its emergency mindset and the size of its operations mean that WFP has a tendency to focus on its own programming modalities when it comes to implementing programmes (even though WFP plays a strongly recognized role as systems enabler for humanitarian response).\textsuperscript{101} The evaluation found only very few examples where WFP focused on understanding and supporting existing peacebuilding efforts, rather than focusing on its own contribution to peace as a standalone effort. Neither internal nor external interviewees mentioned overarching UN processes, like the United Nations Common Country Analysis or the United Nations Cooperation Framework, as relevant instruments for forging a more common approach in this respect.

127. Thirdly, the short-term programming logic makes it difficult to find good partners for social cohesion work in some countries. A contribution to peace requires time to enable a good understanding of the local dynamics, and for relationships of trust to emerge. The shift to multi-year country strategic plans supports the ability of WFP to attract multi-year funding and conduct longer-term planning. However, contracts with cooperating partners and peacebuilding partners are only short term, some as brief as six months.

128. Current implementation measures do not address aspects of institutional culture that impact WFP conflict sensitivity.

\textit{2.4.4. Relationships with Cooperating Partners}

\textbf{Finding 24: The central role of cooperating partners is affected by competition and a focus on price.}

129. The critical role cooperating partners play in conflict sensitivity is not acknowledged. The national cooperating partners of WFP are often locally anchored, bring established relationships with both power holders and communities, and need to understand the context and conflict dynamics to operate. Cooperating partners also have the most regular contact with affected people and often explain targeting

\textsuperscript{97} Amounting to 8 percent of the WFP country portfolio budget for the Democratic Republic of Congo (2021-2024), 35 percent in Colombia (2021-2024), 64 percent in Iraq (2020-2024) and 71 percent in Burkina Faso (2019-2023, based on the CSP developed before the recent outbreak of violence).

\textsuperscript{98} WFP’s focus on estimating needs and adjusting these estimates based on evidence, by contrast, have been recognized for example in one of the evidence summaries that are part of the evaluation to the COVID-19 pandemic response.


\textsuperscript{100} WFP. 2022. Evaluation of the WFP Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{101} See, for example, WFP. 2022. Evaluation of the WFP Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, p. 61.
criteria – an aspect affected communities highlighted as key to avoiding contributing to tensions (see chapter 2.3.2). Partners are thus central to WFP’s ability to operate in a conflict-sensitive way. Only few WFP interviewees, however, mentioned cooperating partners when asked about enabling and hindering factors, or acknowledged how much conflict sensitivity depended on partners. Most of the 18 cooperating partner staff interviewed were very positive about their overall relationship with WFP. However, several partners in different countries pointed to two factors that prevent the full use of their potential: competition and focus on price.

130. **Competitive dynamics hinder openness on things that might go wrong.** The competitive contracting environment makes some partners reluctant to share their concerns about conflict sensitivity or negative experiences. Two national cooperating partner organizations shared concrete examples. In the first, a partner refrained from telling WFP that armed groups had broken into a storage facility, but rather built a reinforced wall to prevent future break-ins from their own funds. The partner did not relay this potentially critical information to WFP because they feared losing the contract. In another example, a cooperating partner observed that a WFP activity, which they were not involved in, only reached members of the dominant sociopolitical group – an issue they felt would raise tensions in the community. The cooperating partner refrained from raising this because they felt it would be seen as competitive behaviour towards the organizations involved.

131. **The focus on price leaves less room for quality, but WFP listens to partners.** Several cooperating partners mentioned the strong focus on price for their selection and during implementation. They felt that the pressure to deliver assistance at the lowest price possible leaves little room to focus on aspects of quality, such as having enough employees for community consultation and analysis, or having the flexibility to change programming. The evaluation team, however, also found examples where WFP was open to suggestions from partners, for example, to include a community consultation mechanism in the budget.

132. Current implementation measures at the global level do not address this factor, but several country offices have taken important steps to address conflict sensitivity with their cooperating partners. This includes, for example, the systematic involvement of conflict advisers in reviewing proposals with partners, and training on conflict sensitivity, which create opportunities to discuss problems more openly.

### 2.4.5. Donor and Host Government Influence

**Finding 25: Donors play an important but ambivalent role in conflict sensitivity.**

133. The influence of donors on WFP priorities is an important factor explaining the organization’s position and performance in conflict sensitivity and its contribution to peace. In the countries studied for this evaluation donor influence was both an enabling and a hindering factor.

134. **Donor funding priorities drive programming.** As a voluntarily funded organization, WFP is heavily dependent on donor contributions. Several WFP employees interviewed noted that WFP is more likely to work on social cohesion where it is a priority for large donors. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the fact the German Government made small farmer resilience and social cohesion a priority also enabled a joint multi-year project between UNICEF, FAO and WFP. The *Country Strategic Plan Evaluation for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2020)* found that donor support towards peacebuilding was indeed critical to WFP engagement. In Colombia, by contrast, a number of donors focused primarily on the migration crisis, even though some major donors considered different vulnerability factors. Overall, funding for WFP work in conflict-affected communities is limited and the concentration of assistance for migrants has created tensions between migrants and host communities. WFP efforts to advocate for more flexible or differently earmarked funding have been successful with donors in some cases, with donors for example

---

102 Several evaluations reach similar conclusions. WFP. 2020. *Strategic Evaluation of Funding WFP’s Work*, for example, concludes that WFP still operates based on short-term funding, with little room for internal prioritization. WFP. 2020. *Evaluation of Zimbabwe WFP Country Strategic Plan* found that heavily earmarked donor funding led to a loss of programmatic flexibility and an inability to implement several activities.

allowing a share of resources to reach host communities in Colombia. Similarly, donors’ predominant focus on areas in northern Iraq formerly controlled by ISIS created some tensions with communities in southern Iraq experiencing high levels of need. WFP efforts to mobilize resources for programmes in the south had limited success. In one country, interviewed employees reported that WFP rejected donor funding when it was not able to convince the donor to also dedicate resources to host communities and feared that an exclusive focus on migrants would create tensions.

135. The availability of the Peacebuilding Fund has a similar effect of encouraging more focus on conflict analysis and identifying WFP’s contribution to peace, however with a comparatively limited impact on WFP funding. The grant volume has been increasing since 2018 again after a first wave in 2010-2011. (Figure 19)

136. Even the peak amount in 2019 (USD 6 million) however, only represented 0.07 percent of WFP’s annual USD 8 billion budget that year and the total funding volume received by the Peacebuilding Fund remains small compared to other organizations like FAO and UNICEF.104 It has since decreased again in 2020 and 2021.105

Figure 19: Peacebuilding Fund grants over time

Source: evaluation team, based on data obtained from https://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/PB000

137. **Donor funding enables dedicated positions of employees.** Whether or not donors prioritize conflict sensitivity is also a key factor in establishing dedicated positions on conflict or conflict sensitivity, as they are not part of WFP core funding. Thus, most positions dedicated to conflict and peace in WFP headquarters were temporary and funded by specific donor contributions. In Libya, the nexus coordinator position – a split between an inter-agency role and WFP – was enabled by a standby partner deployment from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The conflict adviser position in Iraq is funded temporarily by a WFP internal fund. Beyond funding, questions and pressure from donors have, in one context, also triggered a conflict-sensitivity assessment.

138. **Earmarking hinders WFP flexibility to adapt programmes.** This evaluation only found few examples where WFP changed already existing programmes due to insight from a context or conflict analysis. When asked why adaptation was or was not possible, most WFP employees interviewed said the lack of flexibility in existing donor funding was a key factor. For example, donors defined the area of intervention at a very fine-grained level, or only wanted assistance to go to migrants, not to host

---


105 See, for example, WFP. 2022. Annual performance report for 2021.
communities. This suggests earmarking is still rigid in many cases, despite contrary commitments made in the Grand Bargain process.\textsuperscript{106}

139. As this factor is largely external, the ability of WFP to address it through specific implementation measures is limited, other than by continuing to try to build trust with donors to enable more delegated authority, to advocate for more flexible funding and by providing more data and examples demonstrating how tight earmarking can limit conflict sensitivity. Where WFP does not succeed in convincing donors to adjust conditions that limit the conflict sensitivity of the intervention, it should be ready to reject donor funding.

140. Host government positions regarding the involvement of external actors on issues related to conflict and peace is another critical factor. In some countries, the stance of government may constrain WFP's ability to contribute to peacebuilding efforts.

\textsuperscript{106}The Grand Bargain is a reform process for the humanitarian system in which key donors and humanitarian organisations made commitments to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action. One of the commitments is “to reduce the earmarking of donor contributions”,
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/grand_bargain_final_22_may_final-2_0.pdf
3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1. CONCLUSIONS

141. This evaluation set out to assess the WFP peacebuilding policy and its results. It concludes that the policy is well formulated and remains relevant. WFP’s main contribution to peace continues to be its work to reduce food insecurity and to strengthen resilience and livelihoods. However, remaining gaps in conflict-sensitive programming require a renewed effort to use existing analytical insights on local drivers of peace and conflict to adapt programmes and processes, including in WFP’s work with cooperating partners.

Policy quality: The policy is well-formulated and remains relevant

142. In 2013, the peacebuilding policy aimed to set explicit expectations for the WFP role in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It defined principles to ensure that the organization does not inadvertently contribute to conflict, and that it can leverage opportunities to contribute to peace. Nine years on, this evaluation concludes that the WFP peacebuilding policy is well-formulated and contains realistic and practical principles that remain relevant and appropriate for guiding the organization in its approach to conflict sensitivity and its contributions to peace – aspects that are strongly reflected in the organization’s new Strategic Plan. 107

However, a lack of an implementation plan and related financial and human resources hindered the systematic implementation and uptake of the policy until quite recently, and potential synergies with other policies like gender, protection, AAP and access remained underexplored. It is also unclear how the recent restructuring of relevant capacity in PRO-P will affect policy implementation in the future (Recommendation 3.1).

Policy results: While conflict-sensitivity requires more attention, WFP’s core mandate on food security delivers important contributions to peace

143. Conclusions on the results of the policy primarily point to a need to shift attention to key priorities for improving the conflict sensitivity of WFP and its cooperating partners. Conflict-affected people consulted for this evaluation confirm the broadly held conviction among WFP employees and partners that WFP makes its main contribution to peace by reducing food insecurity, and thereby minimizing a potential driver or pretext for tensions or conflict within and between groups. As WFP gradually shifts to providing more long-term assistance that seeks to strengthen livelihoods and resilience, it is already on a path to making this contribution more sustainable. Reducing food insecurity impartially and based on need is the core mandate of WFP.

Their potential peace contribution is not what drives decisions about food security interventions – nor should it. This evaluation concludes that WFP should not refocus its attention and resources on efforts to reduce conflict drivers other than food security, nor on generating more evidence to substantiate what the WFP peace contribution is. Rather, there is additional potential to contribute to already existing peacebuilding initiatives and partnerships through WFP can bring its core strengths in reducing food insecurity and supporting local food systems and markets within broader efforts to prevent conflict and support peace (Recommendation 4).

144. Efforts to avoid contributing to tensions and to ensure conflict-sensitive programming have recently received less strategic attention within WFP than the positive contribution to peace, especially after the award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2020. A birds-eye view of the evidence collected through this evaluation suggests that WFP should rebalance that prioritization and focus its energy on ensuring that existing expertise and analytical insights translate better into programme and process adaptations, not only within WFP itself, but also in its work with cooperating partners. The following central findings call for this shift:

- The main ways through which WFP inadvertently contributes to tensions are related to targeting and the quality of assistance. This is not a new insight; several earlier evaluations and the WFP-SIPRI research partnership arrive at similar conclusions. WFP already focuses most of its efforts to adapt to conflict environments on the basis of principled and good quality assistance. These efforts, however, do not adequately engage cooperating partners in a way that is commensurate to the key role they play, echoing the findings from the 2022 audit on the management of cooperating partners. The evaluation identifies specific aspects of WFP and cooperating partner processes and activities that have a strong potential to improve existing efforts (Recommendation 3).

- However, WFP currently faces some analytical blind-spots and has more insight on general conflict dynamics than on how its own presence and programmes, as well as those of cooperating partners, intersect with conflict dynamics: for example, how the WFP presence and activities impact local power relations, the implications of relations with host governments who are party to a conflict, and how affiliations and backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners intersect with the conflict context. Incomplete analysis and reflection mean that necessary adaptations to programmes and processes are not always made. A more robust, action-oriented reflection process on risks and opportunities at country level meeting minimum standards across different contexts can help remedy this (Recommendation 1).

145. Where WFP already has a better understanding of interactions between its presence and the conflict context – from in-depth conflict sensitivity analyses, for example – important factors limit how much these are taken up in programmes, processes and interactions with cooperating partners. These include, for example, management buy-in and incentives, staffing issues, as well as the strong WFP emergency focus and culture. Addressing these factors will require a clear message from the top, incentives for country directors and other steps to adapt the organizational culture (Recommendation 2).

146. If WFP can make progress on these priority issues, it can become a more conflict-sensitive organization because it already holds the other keys to making the shift work: the peacebuilding policy itself is still relevant and provides an adequate and sufficient framework for developing more specific measures to strengthen the role WFP plays in conflict and post-conflict settings. The conflict and context advisers, who recently joined the organization at country level, have the necessary expertise to provide the required support, although WFP will also need to ensure sufficient capacity in its regional bureaux and headquarters to effectively support the implementation of the peacebuilding policy. Guidance documents, trainings and relevant partnership arrangements exist; they only need to reach the right people within WFP and among cooperating partners (Recommendations 1 and 3).

---

### 3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

147. The evaluation team makes four main recommendations, each with several subrecommendations. The evaluation team has focused on identifying and conveying high-priority recommendations, which are presented by order of priority. Differences in the context conditions of the WFP country operations will need to be taken into account when implementing many of the recommendations. Where this is the case, the recommendations articulate minimum standards that should be met by all country operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsibility and deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Recommendation 1:** Strengthen the practice of actionable, country-level analysis of how the presence and programmes of WFP and its partners influence conflict dynamics. | **Lead:** Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division (PRO)  
**Deadline:** December 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 1.1:** WFP should set out how it plans to institutionalize regular, practically oriented and inclusive processes of reflection on the risks and opportunities related to conflict dynamics in all country operations facing conflict risks. | **Lead:** Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)  
**Support:** Country offices; regional bureaux; Programme Cycle Management Unit (PRO-M); Risk Management Division  
**Deadline:** February 2024 |
| As a minimum, the following elements should be considered:  
- The reflection processes should take place annually and – as a minimum – inform the formulation and revision of second-generation country strategic plans so as to ensure that they are fully conflict-sensitive.  
- Country offices should prioritize the conduct of such reflection processes over the production of stand-alone, written context or conflict sensitivity analyses. Regional or global advisers should facilitate the process; cooperating partners should join the reflection.  
- The processes should include a discussion of relevant monitoring results (see sub-recommendation 2.2) and how to adapt WFP's programmes and presence based on those results.  
- Risks relevant to WFP's operation and programmes should be included in the risk registry.  
- Any regional implications of the analysis should be tabled for discussion at the periodic regional meetings of WFP country directors. The analysis should also inform WFP's engagement in the United Nations common country analysis and discussions with development and peacebuilding partners (see sub-recommendation 3.1). | **Lead:** PR-O-P  
**Support:** Regional bureaux; country offices; Programme and Policy Development Department (PD); Human Resources Division (HRM); Supply Chain and Emergencies Department (SE).  
**Deadline:** December 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 1.2:** Carry out workforce planning aimed at ensuring that sufficient capacity exists at the headquarters and regional levels for implementing the policy, supporting country offices and strengthening the accountability of country directors for improving conflict sensitivity and strengthening synergies with other cross-cutting functions such as protection, access, gender, disability and inclusion, and accountability to affected populations, and to other divisions and departments, including those of human resources, supply chain and emergency operations. This capacity can involve either dedicated peace and conflict capacity, at headquarters and in the regional bureaux, cooperating closely with other teams, or functional support teams integrating significant expertise on conflict and peace and reflecting that expertise in their terms of reference. | **Lead:** PRO-P  
**Support:** Regional bureaux; country offices; Programme and Policy Development Department (PD); Human Resources Division (HRM); Supply Chain and Emergencies Department (SE).  
**Deadline:** December 2024 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsibility and deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Sub-recommendation 1.3:** Include guidance on the analysis processes and other conflict sensitivity issues in the revised Programme Guidance Manual and ensure that relevant guidance is available in key languages, such as Arabic, English, French and Spanish. This should ensure the following:  
  - The available guiding questions for protection and conflict sensitivity assessments should serve as a starting point because they synthetize various elements of context analysis in relation to gender, protection, accountability to affected populations and conflict sensitivity.  
  - The ongoing process of developing a conflict sensitivity mainstreaming strategy should include overarching and coherent guidance comprising all the context analysis requirements derived from policies, including those on gender, accountability to affected populations, protection and conflict sensitivity.  
  - The resulting guidance should include the guiding questions mentioned above and be shared with employees as part of regular country-level reflection processes, along with online training. | **Lead:** PRO-P  
**Support:** PD  
**Deadline:** February 2024 |
| **Recommendation 2: Create incentives for, and take steps in, adapting the organizational culture to make conflict sensitivity more central:** communicate expectations clearly, integrate conflict sensitivity into standard monitoring tools and enhance incentives for country directors. | **Lead:** PRO  
**Deadline:** December 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 2.1:** Communicate the expectations in terms of the minimum standards for conflict sensitivity and the steps to be taken, as outlined in these recommendations, through an Executive Director’s circular or similar corporate communication, rather than revising the peacebuilding policy, which remains adequate and sufficient. The communication should:  
  - clarify the mandatory steps for country offices, including, for example, the holding of an annual, inclusive process of reflection on context dynamics and conflict-sensitive issues and discussion of conflict sensitivity considerations with cooperating partners, for informing the design, review and evaluation of country strategic plans; and  
  - include a general message about the level of priority given to conflict-sensitive programming, clarifying that conflict sensitivity and “doing no harm” can be more important than the speed and quantity of delivery. | **Lead:** PRO-P  
**Support:** PD; PRO-M; regional bureaux.  
**Deadline:** December 2023 |
| **Sub-recommendation 2.2:** Include in standard monitoring mechanisms basic indicators that track the interventions of WFP and cooperating partners and the effects of those interventions on the conflict setting. Building on existing good practice, the indicators should, at a minimum, include questions that explore whether affected people perceive increases or decreases in tensions; whether they think that current targeting practices create tensions and what other features of the assistance do; and who they perceive as being unfairly included in or excluded from assistance. Consideration of these questions should be mandatory for all country offices. Country offices that cannot use the | **Lead:** PRO-P  
**Support:** Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division; relevant policy/programme areas within PD  
**Deadline:** December 2024 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsibility and deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| questions because of protection or security concerns should explain why and propose alternative ways of gaining relevant insights. | Lead: HRM  Support: PRO; PRO-P; Performance Strengthening Branch; Emergency Operations Division.  
Deadline: February 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 2.3:** Ensure that country directors make conflict sensitivity a priority by including it as a standard core competency used in their appraisals and in promotion and rotation decisions. Necessary steps should include:  
- ensuring that conflict sensitivity is reflected in country director job profiles;  
- establishing that the performance of country directors in conflict sensitivity – including in ensuring that the reflection process outlined in recommendation 1 takes place – becomes a standard indicator in the appraisal supporting the annual Executive Director's assurance statement;  
- giving central consideration to prior experience and performance in conflict sensitivity, particularly for placements in contexts with high levels or high risk of conflict;  
- including a module on conflict sensitivity in the induction programme for country directors and deputy country directors and in the training programme for heads of field offices; and  
- establishing, as a requirement for all country directors, an in-depth briefing from reputable institutions and academics with specialized knowledge of conflict analysis and local contexts prior to the directors' assumption of their new positions. | Lead: PRO-P  
Support: Regional bureaux; country offices; NGO Partnerships Unit  
Deadline: December 2023 |
| **Recommendation 3:** Strengthen the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in WFP programmes and processes with partners and contractors. Increase the focus on conflict sensitivity in work with cooperating partners, and check the backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners. | Lead: PRO-P  
Deadline: February 2024 |
| **Sub-recommendation 3.1:** WFP should set out how it plans to enhance the conflict sensitivity of cooperating partners. Steps should include the following:  
- Encourage the open sharing of conflict-related issues through training, during the formulation of partnership agreements and in reports.  
- Amend partnership applications, field-level agreements and reporting templates to incorporate the request that cooperating partners include reflections on context dynamics and conflict sensitivity and to ensure sufficient resources to enable partners to deliver conflict-sensitive programmes.  
- Train and support country-level programme staff to ensure that they discuss context dynamics and conflict sensitivity when providing feedback to cooperating partners.  
- Request that processes for strengthening conflict sensitivity at the global level are included on the agenda of the annual partnership meeting until the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity is complete. | Lead: PRO-P  
Support: Regional bureaux; country offices; NGO Partnerships Unit  
Deadline: December 2023 |
### Recommendation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Sub-recommendation 3.2:</strong> WFP should set out the steps it plans to take to ensure a thorough review of the political and identity-based issues that it needs to explore in order to understand how the backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners intersect with the conflict setting and may affect conflict dynamics and stakeholders’ perceptions. The steps should include the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Review due diligence and selection processes to ensure that such affiliations are explored during the hiring, partnering and contracting of employees, contractors and cooperating partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Include a mechanism to ensure that any concerns regarding the political affiliations of contractors or employees are passed up to the country director or the appropriate management level above that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use proactive outreach to increase the pool of applicants from underrepresented groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Responsibility and deadline**

- **Lead**: HRM
- **Support**: PRO-P, NGO Partnerships Unit, SE
- **Deadline**: February 2024

### Recommendation 4: Alleviating food insecurity is and should remain the most important WFP contribution to peace. WFP should focus its contribution to peace on supporting existing peacebuilding processes by implementing activities jointly with other actors, drawing on its core mandate strengths and focusing on humanitarian access to alleviate food insecurity.

**Responsibility and deadline**

- **Lead**: PD; SE
- **Deadline**: February 2024

### Sub-recommendation 4.1: WFP should confirm that it will design all of its specific peace-promoting activities jointly with other actors and not on its own. In doing so, WFP should focus on its core mandate strengths such as, for example, food security and livelihoods or resilience building interventions targeting areas at high risk of conflict or with ongoing peace agreements and reintegration efforts, local purchase and market-building activities, country capacity strengthening or access negotiations:

- WFP should engage with development and peacebuilding partners to identify how it can best contribute to efforts to address conflict drivers without undermining its own neutrality, impartiality and independence.
- Such engagement should take place regularly – at a minimum when WFP develops, revises or evaluates a country strategic plan, or when there are important changes in the situation, or in light of the forthcoming conflict sensitivity strategy.
- Headquarters and regional bureaux should provide guidance and support for country offices in this effort, enhancing the relevant frameworks of accountability and responsibilities (including of country directors) for holding discussions with other actors and further strengthening partnerships with actors relevant to peacebuilding at the global and regional levels.

**Responsibility and deadline**

- **Lead**: PRO-P
- **Support**: Country offices; regional bureaux; Partnerships and Advocacy Department
- **Deadline**: February 2024

### Sub-recommendation 4.2: WFP should set out how it plans to leverage its global weight in humanitarian diplomacy to increase humanitarian access, in close coordination with other humanitarian, development and United Nations actors; for example, in system-wide negotiations with government actors or peace processes, WFP should ensure that country

**Responsibility and deadline**

- **Lead**: Deputy Executive Director, SE
- **Support**: SE; PRO-P; regional bureaux; country directors
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsibility and deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>offices maintain the strategic lead in efforts involving various levels of</td>
<td>Deadline: February 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the organization in order to safeguard against potential negative consequences.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 1. Summary TOR

EVALUATION OF THE POLICY ON WFP’S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING IN TRANSITION SETTINGS (2013)

Policy evaluations focus on a WFP policy and the guidance, arrangements, and activities that are in place to implement it. They evaluate the quality of the policy, its results, and seek to explain why and how these results occurred.

Subject and Focus of the Evaluation

WFP engagement in the area of Peacebuilding in Transition Settings predates the related policy that was issued in 2013 and its update in 2014. The policy was developed with the overall objective to set out the parameters for WFP’s engagement in peacebuilding activities as part of larger United Nations (UN) efforts to transition towards peace in countries emerging from conflict.

The policy introduces three main directions of WFP work in peacebuilding in transition settings: (i) investing in institutional capacity for risk analysis (ii) using conflict-sensitive programming and (iii) engaging with peacebuilding partners.

WFP’s implementation of the policy has been pursued through a) analysis, knowledge management and evidence generation including through partnerships; b) supporting country offices (COs) in programme design and implementation; c) articulating various guidance documents for conflict-sensitive programming, conflict analysis; and d) developing learning packages for awareness raising and capacity strengthening.

The 2017-2021 WFP Strategic Plan incorporates elements related to the policy by underscoring the importance of prevention, mitigation, and preparedness for early action. It emphasizes the importance of a coherent approach to sustainably address the root causes of crisis and conflict and integrating humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts.

Objectives and Users of the Evaluation

For the evaluation to meet the twin objectives of accountability and learning, the analysis will focus on four objectives.

I. Assessing the quality of the policy at the time of its development, and its continued relevance in the current context.

II. Covering the policy implementation period from 2013 to June 2021— including the institutional dimensions and different roles of HQ, Regional Bureaux, and COs.

III. Assessing different levels of results – including as feasible at outcome level – that can be plausibly associated with the roll-out of the policy, including guidance, tools, technical capacity support and resourcing as specified in the policy document.

IV. Supporting organizational learning by providing evidence on whether and how WFP work in peacebuilding in transition settings has been contributing to progress against the current Strategic Plan, and WFP’s Strategic Objectives in the context of Agenda 2030.

The target users of the evaluation are: i) the Peace and Conflict Office, part of the Emergencies and Transitions Service and senior management within the Programme Humanitarian & Development Division; ii) WFP senior leadership; iii) policy-makers and programme designers and implementers at HQ, Regional Bureau, and CO-level; iv) Executive Board members; v) other UN agencies; vi) Host governments with their relevant Ministries in countries where WFP operates; vii) global and country-based humanitarian and development actors, academics and networks working on peace-related issues; viii) crisis and conflict-affected people and target beneficiaries of WFP interventions with an expected peace-related orientation.

Key Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will address the following high-level questions:

**Question 1: How good is the policy?** The evaluation will assess the policy on WFP’s role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings against international good practice, the practice of partner organizations as comparators, and other benchmarks in order to understand whether the Policy was designed so as to attain the best results, and whether and how well it is still supporting WFP’s current strategic approach. It also asks whether the objectives and features (including conceptual clarity and scope) are still relevant to support WFP in the current strategic and operating environment.

**Question 2: What were the results of the policy?** The evaluation will collect information and data on results that can plausibly be associated with the policy results statements, including the policy section on “main deliverables” linked to policy implementation, and mechanisms and priorities identified to implement it.

**Question 3: Why has the Policy produced the results that have been observed?** In answering this question, the evaluation will generate insights into the incentives, triggers and factors that led to the observed changes or prevented results achievement. It will examine explanatory factors (e.g. looking at clarity, shared understanding, capacity, human and financial resourcing issues), and other elements (e.g. political dimensions, risks and
Evaluation Terms of Reference – Evaluation of the POLICY ON WFP’S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING IN TRANSITION SETTINGS

assumptions that influence decision-making). The evaluation will also attempt to benchmark against good practice in order to identify pointers for learning.

Scope and Methodology

The evaluation will cover the policy on WFP’s role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings from its approval in 2013 throughout its implementation until June 2021. It also covers the 2014 Policy Update, and will use the evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, coherence, and sustainability.

This policy evaluation is expected to consider in its design the following analytical components and approaches:

- Developing a Theory of Change for WFP engagement in peacebuilding in transition settings.
- Systematic analysis of the results of all Country Strategic Plan Evaluations (CSPEs) that have looked at the linkages between humanitarian, development, and peace work.
- Mapping of country-level planning and reporting documents for all WFP COs to build a picture of the scope and depth of WFP’s adoption of conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis among other elements.
- Undertaking data collection missions for an in-depth analysis of policy implementation and results in selected countries (usually one per region in which WFP operates).
- Undertaking ‘desk review plus’ in selected countries (between four and six) including a desk-based analysis complemented by a (limited) number of interviews to add to the evidence from CSPEs on WFP engagement in peacebuilding in transition settings.
- Conducting key informants’ interviews and focus group discussions to complement the evidence from the desk-based analysis, explore inter-agency, cross-mandate issues, and contextualize the analysis of contribution to results.

Roles and Responsibilities

Evaluation Team: The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent, external consultants with strong capacity in undertaking global evaluations. Overall, the evaluation team members’ skills-set and expertise will cover experience with evaluation of corporate policies, in the areas of post-conflict and transition; humanitarian and development policy, programming frameworks and principles; and in conflict sensitivity. Additionally, the team will have advanced understanding of Humanitarian Principles, Interplay between conflict, food security and peace, country level coordination frameworks, UN policies and reform processes across the three pillars of UN work, as well as key inter-Agency Standing Committee policies and positions.

OEV Evaluation Management: The evaluation is managed by WFP Office of Evaluation with Francesca Bonino as evaluation manager and Sameera Ashraf providing research and data analysis support. Second-level quality assurance will be provided

by Deborah McWhinney, Senior Evaluation Officer, while the Director of Evaluation, Andrea Cook, will approve the final evaluation products and present the Summary Evaluation Report to the WFP Executive Board for consideration.

Stakeholders: WFP stakeholders at country, regional and headquarters levels are expected to engage with the evaluation process to ensure a high degree of utility and transparency. An Internal Reference Group (IRG) has been established to facilitate this engagement, drawing from members of various technical units within WFP. A selected number of external stakeholders having well established expertise will be invited to join an External Advisory Group (EAG) specifically established to support this evaluation. The members of the advisory groups will be requested to be available to meet with the evaluation team and review and comment on all the draft evaluation deliverables.

Communications

The Evaluation Manager will ensure consultation with stakeholders during each of the key evaluation phases. The ToR and relevant evaluation tools will be summarized to better inform stakeholders about the process of the evaluation and what is expected of them. In all cases, the stakeholders’ role is advisory. Briefings, de-briefings, and feedback on draft evaluation deliverables will include participants from HQ Divisions and Units, Regional Bureaux and Country Offices.

Throughout the evaluation, options for remote participation will be actively sought and facilitated as feasible, whenever face-to-face meetings and missions are not possible due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The Summary Evaluation Report together with Management Response will be presented to WFP’s Executive Board in all official WFP languages in February 2023. OEV will ensure dissemination of lessons through the annual evaluation report, presentations in relevant meetings, WFP internal and external web links.

Timing and Key Milestones

Remote Inception phase: mid-April 2021 – July 2021
Evaluation data collection phase: August 2021 – Feb. 2022
Analysis and reporting: March 2022 – July 2022
EB session: EB1/2023 (February)

Findings will be actively disseminated, and the final evaluation report will be publicly available on WFP’s website.

Full Terms of Reference are available at http://wepgo.wfp.org/topics/evaluation.

For more information please contact the WFP Office of Evaluation at: WFP.evaluation@wfp.org.
### Annex 2. Evaluation timeline

#### Phase 3 Submission of the Inception Report onward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase D0</th>
<th>Submission of draft Inception Report (IR) to OEV</th>
<th>June–September 2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First round of review on IR D0 followed by TL revisions</td>
<td>24 June (1 week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QA2 review followed by any TL adjustments</td>
<td>30 June–6 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR D1</td>
<td>Revised draft IR (D1) submitted to Director OEV</td>
<td>7 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revisions to address DoE’s comments followed</td>
<td>15–19 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DoE clearance to circulate revised draft IR for stakeholder comments</td>
<td>20–23 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Reference Group and External Advisory Group comment window.</td>
<td>w-c 9 August (with deadline 25 August) then extended until 1 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM + RA consolidate all comments and share them with TL</td>
<td>2 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revised IR (D2)</td>
<td>8 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM+RA check whether all IRG comments have been adequately addressed, followed by any TL revisions as needed</td>
<td>13 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QA2 review on draft final IR followed by any TL revisions as needed</td>
<td>16 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR D2</td>
<td>EM seeks DoE clearance on the final IR</td>
<td>20–24 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final IR (FYI) to WFP Stakeholders; copy on intranet.</td>
<td>24 Sept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Phase 4 Evaluation data collection phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>End Sept 2021–Feb 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affected-people survey set-up, data collection and preliminary analysis</td>
<td>27 Sept–21 Dec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative policy quality analysis</td>
<td>27 Sept–20 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-automated document analysis</td>
<td>Initial analysis: 15 Aug–15 Sept; Final analysis: by 30 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote interviews COs and RBx</td>
<td>15 Sept–29 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research on priority enablers and constraints</td>
<td>1–30 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-week visits to four case study countries for participatory analysis workshops with affected people and briefings/workshops with WFP country offices</td>
<td>3 Jan–28 Feb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews with EB members, in consultation with EB Secretariat</td>
<td>29 Jan–4 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall debriefing with HQ, RB and COs (ppt) – online</td>
<td>22 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-round of senior level interviews with external stakeholders and partners [Additional activity discussed and agreed with DoE in April 2022]</td>
<td>4–23 April</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Phase 5 Reporting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>June 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ER Draft 0</td>
<td>Submit draft Evaluation Report (ER) to OEV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM+RA review of Draft 0 (QA1 level review)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET revision to address QA1 comment round</td>
<td>12–17 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA2 review window</td>
<td>18–24 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL adjustments to address QA2 comments</td>
<td>31 May–3 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA2 and EM check that all QA2 comments have been adequately addressed</td>
<td>6–9 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft 1</td>
<td>DoE review window on the ER (D1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eval Team revisions to address DoE comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM/QA2 check to ensure changes made adequately respond to DoE comments and final revisions are made by TL as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER Draft 2</td>
<td>DoE final review to give clearance to circulate draft for stakeholder comments and any final TL adjustments before sharing the draft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders’ workshop with IRG participation</td>
<td>Stakeholders’ workshop with IRG +AEG participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM consolidates all WFP comments (in a matrix) and shares them with TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER D3</td>
<td>Submits revised draft ER (D3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM+RA check whether all IRG +EAG comments have been adequately addressed, followed by TL revisions as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QA2 review on the ER (D3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TL revision as needed before submitting to DoE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>EM starts preparing the Summary Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev D3</td>
<td>DoE comment window on the revised ER (D3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Depending on the ER quality, EM will ask DoE approval to send ER D3 for editing – while working on SER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER D4</td>
<td>TL submits final draft ER to OEV reflecting DoE comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D0</td>
<td>EM submits draft 0 SER for QA2 comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D0</td>
<td>QA2 review of draft SER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER and SER D1</td>
<td>EM reviews the final draft ER for consistency with draft ER before submitting D1 SER to DoE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D1</td>
<td>EM review of SER to reflect QA2 comments received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D1</td>
<td>DoE comment window on the D1 SER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D2</td>
<td>EM changes to draft SER to address DoE comments and QA2 check on the revisions made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D2</td>
<td>EM seeks DoE clearance to send draft SER to Executive Management/OPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D2</td>
<td>WFP Executive Management/ OPC comment on SER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER D3</td>
<td>EM discusses OPC comments received with QA2, and revise and finalise SER accordingly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER and SER</td>
<td>Final consistency check between ER and SER – and any final TL adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seek final approval by DoE on final SER and ER. Clarify last points as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final SER</td>
<td>Submission of final SER and final ER meeting deadline for EB1.2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5 Executive Board (EB) and follow-up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Submit SER to CPP for MR + SER for editing + translation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dissemination, OEV website posting, EB Round Table, among other activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presentation of Summary Evaluation Report to the EB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presentation of management response to the EB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 3. Methodology

148. The evaluation uses a mixed methods approach to collect and triangulate data and information by combining key informant interviews with surveys of affected people, sense-making workshops, qualitative document reviews and a semi-automated quantitative document analysis.

149. This annex provides more detailed information on: 1) confidential key-informant interviews; 2) in-person surveys and analysis workshops with crisis-affected persons; 3) qualitative document reviews, including a structured evaluation analysis; and 4) the semi-automated document analysis of country office planning and reporting documents.

CONFIDENTIAL KEY-INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

150. Based on a stakeholder analysis conducted during the inception phase and suggestions from WFP, the evaluation team identified key informants for subsequent semi-structured key informant interviews. The initial list of informants was continuously supplemented through a snowballing technique where selected interviewees were asked for further recommendations. Annex 10 lists all interviews conducted with the evaluation team members.

151. The evaluation team took gender and diversity considerations into account when selecting WFP interviewees based on the principle that when two employees were expected to provide similar insights on a particular subject, the team then conducted the interview with the employee of the underrepresented gender among the interviewees. The evaluation team also periodically reviewed the list of conducted interviews to ensure that interviewees were from different organizational units and that different genders, ages and employee categories (national/international) were adequately represented.

152. All interviews were conducted on the principle of confidentiality. The interviews were semi-structured and followed distinct interview guides depending on the background/function of each interviewee (see Annex 5). Notes from the interviews were stored securely and followed data protection measures outlined in the inception report (para 53a).

IN-PERSON SURVEYS AND ANALYSIS WORKSHOPS WITH CRISIS-AFFECTED PEOPLE

153. GPPi ran in-person surveys of people affected by conflict or conflict risk between October and December 2021, in partnership with experienced local research institutes (hereafter “research partners”) in the four case study countries (Burkina Faso, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq). The aim was to understand affected people's perceptions of relevant outcomes, such as conflict sensitivity and the level of influence on social cohesion and peace of WFP activities. The survey questionnaire can be found in Annex 5.

154. Target areas: The evaluation team collected survey data in two subnational areas within the four case study countries where WFP had at least one ongoing or very recent programme. Areas were selected in close coordination with research partners and WFP country offices, based on a review of planning and programme documents and interviews with WFP country-level employees, using the following criteria:

- Balance across types of WFP activities and contexts to cover different types of programmes and conditions across regions in the four countries. As a result, not all types of programmes were represented in every country. Criteria that informed the location selection aimed to cover every feature in at least one of the eight selected regions:
  - Type of operation/assistance: emergency food distribution; general food distribution; recent scale-up of emergency operations; resilience programming focused on social cohesion/citizen-state trust-building; and reversal from development to emergency programming.
Recipients: internally displaced people (in and outside camps); refugees/migrants; host community; and ex-combatants.

Conflict stage/type: presence of armed groups in conflict; communal inter-group tensions; climate pressures; and post-conflict.

- Timeliness. The team considered programmes completed six months before the survey started at the earliest to avoid a situation in which too many people targeted by a programme had left the area; or programmes that started at least six months ago to avoid a scenario in which no effects were yet visible.

- Access. While aiming to cover areas with ongoing conflict, the team selected areas where the team and research partners considered the risk for respondents and enumerators to be manageable and that were logistically accessible in the given timeframe.

155. The evaluation team consulted WFP country offices on which areas to select for survey implementation and qualitative analysis workshops. Research partners and survey enumerators received detailed information about WFP programmes in each area. Before deciding on the final target areas, the team considered the following process-related concerns the country office could raise: (1) specific security concerns for people affected by conflict, enumerators, WFP- or implementing partner employees; (2) specific concerns as to whether the survey could impact ongoing WFP activities, such as whether it might interfere with sensitive ongoing access negotiations in the area; (3) specific concerns that the survey could negatively influence local conflict dynamics; and (4) specific situations in which any other large scale survey was ongoing or recently completed, such that additional data collection could suffer from respondent fatigue.

156. In each of the two areas of active programming per country, the research partners administered the survey in approximately 10 municipalities/districts to minimize location-specific biases.

157. **Selection of respondents**: The research partners surveyed between 496 and 571 adults (aged 18 and above) per country: approximately 250 persons per area; 25 persons per municipality/district. Although WFP programmes vary in how many people they cover, the sample size remained constant because we aimed to capture a diversity of opinions and to avoid municipality-specific biases. Children under 18 years were not surveyed out of ethical concerns. The sample was purposive aiming to cover different gender and age groups, people who had received WFP assistance and people who had not. The sample was not stratified or statistically representative because official population statistics are inaccurate in many WFP operating locations, due to displacement for example.

We randomly selected interviewees in each municipality/district to avoid bias. Enumerators approached individuals in every n<sup>th</sup> accommodation, depending on location, starting from the municipal building, until they reached the target numbers. “n” was determined based on the size of the municipality/district and the layout of each location based on an initial conversation with the mayor (or equivalent), to reach an unbiased, representative and feasible selection. In each municipality/district, the evaluation administered the survey to the following people:

- At least 13 women and 12 men.
- At least 5 individuals (ideally as evenly distributed as possible between women and men) from each of the following age groups: 18–35; 36–55; 56 years and above.
- At least 7 people whose families have received WFP assistance in the past three years; and 7 people who have not.
- Individuals with different ethnic, religious or political backgrounds and affiliations and/or displacement status, depending on the local conflict dynamics and the population composition of the municipality. In some countries, these questions were either taboo or not allowed in surveys. In

---

109 See detailed survey respondent profile in section 2.1
such cases, enumerators who were familiar with the conflict dynamics, maintained a balance where affiliations could be guessed based on appearance or location.

158. **Organization of the survey and finalization of survey design:** The evaluation team conducted background research on potential research partners to ensure they were independent from WFP, not politically affiliated with any actor in the conflict, and had a good record for conducting high-quality surveys. Partnerships were finalized at the beginning of the data collection phase. The team then worked with partners to identify and train enumerators who conducted the survey interviews. The team developed the final questionnaire in cooperation with research partners to ensure their ownership and to receive context-specific input. The questionnaire was peer reviewed at a global level and tested by the research partners before implementation.

The number of enumerators was based on travel constraints to cover the identified municipalities/districts. The research partners selected gender-balanced enumerator teams for each area. The evaluation used the KoBo Toolbox for data collection on tablets, using the version hosted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This was faster and more cost-effective than paper-based methods, and reduced the risk of human error as no manual data entry was required. The OCHA-based KoBo server stores the data until it is deleted, and the privacy policy commits to the data not being otherwise used, shared or sold. As an additional precaution, the evaluation did not record any personally identifiable information, and the team will delete the data from the server after submitting the final evaluation report.

159. **Quality assurance:** The evaluation team collaborated closely with the research lead in the partner institution to ensure survey quality. The team trained enumerators on the survey approach, ethics, protection, gender sensitivity, and the use of KoBo Toolbox. During implementation, the evaluation team collected location verification – geolocation stamps via messaging apps or pictures – to check the survey was indeed conducted in the agreed-upon areas. The evaluation team closely monitored the survey entries as enumerators uploaded them to the KoBo system in order to verify sampling accuracy in real time. In addition, enumerators provided the phone number of the research lead to every person interviewed, so they could report any issues. No issues were reported during survey implementation.

160. **Qualitative analysis workshops:** After survey completion and data cleaning, the evaluation team conducted a descriptive statistical analysis of the survey results. The team then organized four or five qualitative participatory analysis workshops per country (two in each of the two areas covered in the survey per country). The research partner invited 12–20 crisis-affected people to each workshop, depending on local COVID-19 conditions. The discussions with affected people enabled a stronger, context-specific analysis of results, and aligned with the GPPi commitment to deepen affected people’s involvement in evaluations. Together with the research partners, GPPi analysed the conflict dynamics in the workshop locations and devised a workshop methodology to avoid inadvertently fuelling tensions through the discussions. To do so, the team considered the following factors:

- **Workshop location:** The team excluded areas where tension among community members was particularly high. Focusing on locations with less heated conflict enabled the team to engage people in a nuanced and constructive analysis of the results, while still anchoring the analysis in the local reality. The selection of workshop locations was informed by the analysis of survey results, selecting locations where results pointed towards dynamics related to the evaluation questions for the purpose of triangulation.

- **Participants:** Each workshop had a diverse composition and included people who had and had not received WFP assistance, as well as people from different gender and age groups and socio-economic backgrounds. The research partner identified participants with the same approach as for survey respondents, by approaching each nth housing in the selected locations until the target distribution of demographics was reached. Workshop participation was voluntary. Depending on the local conflict dynamics and gender considerations, the team created separate discussion groups.
This was the case in Iraq, where refugees and host communities held discussions separately. The team used facilitation methods that ensured all participants were heard. Each workshop included persons who had and had not received WFP assistance in the past three years; a mix of gender, age and socioeconomic groups; and persons of different backgrounds with regard to the local conflict dynamics in each area.

- The team factored in enough time to explain the workshop to ensure that everybody understood the objective and procedures. At the beginning of the workshop, the team established clear ground rules that the workshops were listening events for participants to voice their opinions on survey findings, and were not meant for broader discussions on the conflict. Facilitators were instructed to remain neutral throughout the workshops and to close discussions on the conflict that were unrelated to the survey results. Participants were asked to refrain from attributing any things that were said to specific individuals.

- Depending on the survey results and the analysis of local context dynamics, the team excluded topics from the discussion that risked creating or exacerbating tensions.

- The results of in-person workshops are included in this annex alongside the survey results when they add to the understanding of the survey results in light of the evaluation questions.

**QUALITATIVE DOCUMENT ANALYSIS**

161. The evaluation team reviewed documents extensively to collect information on each of the evaluation questions and to verify and triangulate information received from interviews. A focus was placed on the following documents, but to varying degrees that depended on their availability (Table 6). Document analysis followed a two-stage process with an initial scan for relevancy for the specific theme under review. Relevant documents covering the same theme were then grouped and information was extracted, ordered and put into context with other data sources.

**Table 6: Document analysis sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Type of documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| WFP country-level documents (in the nine data collection countries) | - Planning documents (including internal documents like Concepts of Operation (CONOPs))  
- Context and conflict analyses, situation reports and conflict-sensitivity tools (including those produced under a different “heading”, e.g. protection or gender analyses)  
- Post-distribution monitoring reports, feedback and complaints data from affected people and WFP responses, relevant country-specific training materials  
- Budgets and budget planning showing (intended) expenses for policy implementation measures  
- Contractual documents and agreements with cooperating partners and service providers  
- Food security cluster documents. |
| External documents (in the four evaluation mission countries) | - (Internal) context analyses prepared by UN or peacebuilding organizations  
- Publicly available academic literature/grey literature on country context and conflict dynamics. |
| Documents relevant for understanding the global context, policy quality and policy implementation measures | - Policies and preparatory analysis documents, e.g. case studies  
- Guidance documents, including those on adjacent policy areas (e.g. protection, access).  
- Training documents  
- Strategy documents and funding proposals  
- Decisions by the Strategic Resource Allocation Committees and Oversight and Policy Committee as they relate to peacebuilding |
162. Beyond a structured review of relevant documents, the evaluation team also conducted a systematic review of evaluations commissioned by WFP and of adjacent evaluations that were thematically relevant and also touching on WFP activities. In total, the evaluation analysis included 47 documents (see Annex 11, section (b) for the full list of evaluations reviewed) with a varying scope and thematic focus covering the period from 2014 to 2021:

- 6 Annual Evaluation Reports
- 10 Operation Evaluation Syntheses
- 3 Strategic Evaluations
- 5 Policy Evaluations
- 3 Corporate Emergency Response Evaluations (CERE)
- 8 Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE)
- 5 Country Strategic Plan Evaluations (CSPE)
- 3 Evaluation Syntheses
- 3 Decentralized Evaluations
- 1 Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE)

163. The analytical framework for reviewing the evaluations were the three evaluation questions guiding this evaluation. Each document was systematically reviewed for information providing details on each of the three questions. Findings were then systematically grouped along different sub-themes. Results of the evaluation analysis were reviewed internally.

**SEMI-AUTOMATED DOCUMENT ANALYSIS**

164. The semi-automated document analysis assessed the presence and scope of activities relating to the three policy directions of the PB policy. In particular, it assessed whether and to what extent country-level planning and reporting documents demonstrated the following attributes: a) an adequate understanding of conflict risks/conflict dynamics/peace opportunities; b) an adequate reflection of this understanding in programme planning and implementation; and c) adequate partnerships with peacebuilding organizations and conflict /peace research organizations.

165. The following elements have defined the semi-automated document analysis and outline scope and approach:

- **Document/ text processing**: A total of 1,882 reports were processed using computational methods of text cleaning with the statistical open-source software R. In order to extract and render the text content of the PDF reporting documents into machine readable text, every PDF was converted using the package “pdftools”. In a next step the converted PDF text was cleaned to remove excess line breaks, spaces, numbers and web links. Numerical units, such as “$“, “&” or “%” were replaced with text (“dollar”, “and”, “percent”). As the content analysis employed a bag-of-words approach, every body of text per report was split into tokens (single units of words) using the package “tidytext”. Statistical filtering of the resulting text corpus enabled excluding extremely rare words that often resulted from corrupted machine readable text. The processed corpus of text was reassembled into whole reports and stored in csv-format to make the generated data accessible to various computer software programmes (e.g. Excel, Stata, R and Python).

- **Methodology**: The main method of text analysis was a semi-automated supervised content analysis. With this method, a text corpus is searched for predefined terms contained in a

---

dictionary (see below). Reports per country-year dyads are the unit of analysis. Reports are represented as the bag of their words, disregarding grammar and word order but maintaining multiplicity. To deal with the problem of multiple documents per country/year dyad, the analysis will be normalized with annual word numbers for each country as reference category. For the semi-automated content analysis, the bag of word representing each country/year dyad was searched for the terms contained in the dictionary. Resulting word frequencies were interpreted as the prevalence of a concept, in this case activities linked to the three policy directions of the WFP PB policy.

• **Complementary experimental methods:** To complement the supervised content analysis, unsupervised content analysis (also known as topic modelling) was employed. For that method, an algorithm identifies text features (words or combinations of words) based on their frequent co-occurrence in the text. The unsupervised content analysis allowed one to identify whether distinctive topics associated with the three thematic areas identified above emerged over time and how prevalent they were in different countries.

• **Dictionary:** The dictionary was developed to capture two dimensions of the WFP peacebuilding policy: (1) conflict awareness; and (2) conflict-sensitive programming. For both dimensions, the evaluation team defined a minimal set of terms, expressions and words that are used in the context to capture one of the dimensions.

The evaluation team established dictionary terms in two steps. First, it assembled a list of terms based on a qualitative analysis of a set of selected documents and the theoretical framework of the policy. During the inception phase of the evaluation, the evaluation team built a preliminary dictionary based on a manual reading of key documents. On one hand, it identified key aspects of the peacebuilding policy from nine key policy documents. On the other hand, it identified terms describing peace-related activities from a manual coding of 28 selected country reports.

The evaluation team further expanded the dictionary using a thesaurus for synonyms of key terms identified from the manual coding. This resulted in the following dictionary structure:

- To capture whether “an understanding of conflict risks/conflict dynamics/peace opportunities” prevails, the evaluation team identified terms associated with three sub-areas: (1) terms associated with descriptions of the background of a conflict; (2) terms associated with typical conflict-related groups or people; and (3) terms associated with the conduct of conflict analysis.
- To capture whether “a reflection of this understanding in programme planning and implementation” prevails, the evaluation team identified terms associated with two sub-areas. These sub-areas follow the peacebuilding policy, which identifies distinctive peacebuilding activities and provides examples. The dictionary hence captures terms associated with (1) “do-no-harm”; and (2) activities that seek to make a positive contribution to peace.

---

111 The WFP Peacebuilding Policy (2013); its revision (2014); the draft WFP Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitive Programming Guidance Manual (2016); the 2021 guidance note on Conflict Analysis and Conflict Sensitivity Risk Assessment; 10 Minutes to Learn documents on Social Cohesion, Conflict Sensitivity, and on Peacebuilding; a WFP glossary of Conflict Sensitivity, Peacebuilding and HDP Nexus Terms; and WFP Minimum Standards for Conflict-Sensitive Programming.

112 The selection of country documents was based on interview input and document titles. In particular, interviewees mentioned the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an extreme case regarding the application of the peacebuilding policy (six reports across years). The evaluation team considered the operation in Colombia an extreme case because it is the only country with an operation with the word “peace” in the title (six reports across years). Additionally, the evaluation team also included reports from Afghanistan as extreme cases because the country ranks lowest in the Global Peace Index (six reports across years). Furthermore, ten country reports were selected randomly.
In a final step, the evaluation team verified this list with a data-driven approach to assess the relevance of single terms and extend the list of dictionary terms with frequently used expressions. A data-driven verification facilitates the detection of expressions that consist of more than one word but are used interchangeably. For example, the analysis shows that “peacebuilding” and “promoting peace” are similarly used. To find synonyms for these expressions, the evaluation team searched for different combinations of similar words across all reports. The full dictionary is available below in Table 7:

Table 7: Dictionary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Words/terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a)</td>
<td>Conflict awareness</td>
<td>armed, armed_conflict, armed_violence, arms, benefit_equally, benefitted_equally, conflict, conflict_affected, conflict_mitigation, conflict_prevention, conflict_resolution, development_peace, do_no_harm, escalation, ethnic_conflict, ethnic_fighting, ethnic_violence, fight, fighting, firearms, fleeing_from_conflict, fragile, gender_concerns, human_trafficking, humanitarian_corridor, humanitarian_development_nexus, injured, insecure, instability, insurgen* kill*, local_conflicts, local_safety, maiming, militancy, military, mitigation_measures, peace, peace_nexus, peacebuilding_nexus, political_conflict, protection_crises, protection_crisis, rebellion, rebellions, rebelliously, recovering_from_conflict, recruitment_of_armed_group*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the dictionary was further refined during the analysis and took into account word embedding to avoid misinterpreting more general terms such as ‘capacity-building’ as peacebuilding activities (false positives).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.2) Conflict-related people, groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(ex-)combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affected_conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armed_groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belligerent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beneficiary_committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beneficiary_committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combatant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community_conflict*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>confined_populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict_communit*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displaced_people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displaced_person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displacedPersons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gang*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender_violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internally_displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internally_displaced_person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internally_displaced_persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marginalised_groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marginalized_people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population<em>_conflict</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim<em>_of_armed_conflict</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim<em>_of_conflict</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim*_of_gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim*_of_violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim_violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable_community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable_group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable_groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable_people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable_persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a.3) Conduct of analysis terminology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>causal_factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cause<em>_conflict</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caused_by_conflict*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Conflict-sensitive programming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b.1) Do no harm</th>
<th>b.2) Positive contribution to peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>armed_actor_profits</td>
<td>build_resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit_equally</td>
<td>built_resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefitted_equally</td>
<td>confidence_building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict_prevention</td>
<td>conflict_assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict_sensitive</td>
<td>conflict_management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict_sensitivity</td>
<td>conflict.mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distribution</td>
<td>conflict_prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do_no_harm</td>
<td>conflict_resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic_benefits</td>
<td>conflict_response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation_measures</td>
<td>conflict_sensitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peace_nexus</td>
<td>conflict_sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peacebuilding_nexus</td>
<td>contribution.to.reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent*.conflict</td>
<td>ddr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent*.tensions</td>
<td>demobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prevent*.violence</td>
<td>demobilisation_and_reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risk_capacity</td>
<td>disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social_risks</td>
<td>durable_solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sustainable_impact</td>
<td>dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sustainable_peace</td>
<td>dialogue.inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unintended_consequences</td>
<td>development_peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unintended_impact</td>
<td>disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unintended_impacts</td>
<td>durable_solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Partner for peacebuilding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.2) International NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency for Peacebuilding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berghof Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin Center for Integrative Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conciliation Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concordis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducive Space for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Progress Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Centre for Electoral Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrand-Hermès Foundation for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Center for Transitional Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpeace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life &amp; Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation (CMI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Beyond Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nansen Center for Peace and Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent Peaceforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pax Christi International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

empower
encouraging_reconciliation
end_conflict
equitable
equitable_empowerment
equity
food_and_nutrition_security_strategies
food_and_nutrition_security_strategy
government_capacity_building
government_programme_for_displaced_populations
human_rights
humanitarian_corridor
humanitarian_development_nexus
institution_building
ipv
mediation
negotiation
peace_building
peace_nexus
peacebuilding
post_conflict
promoting_peace
rebuild_resilience
reconciliation
recruitment_armeed_groups
reintegration
resilience_building
risk_capacity
risk_mitigation
social_cohesion
social_risks
stabilization
sustainable_impact
sustainable_peace
trust_and_confidence
167. **Data analysis and visualization**: Based on the text processing, comparative analyses were realized. On the one hand, the comparative analysis captured developments over time for the 2012–2020 period. This provides an indication on how the prevalence of the three policy directions of the PB policy in country-level planning and reporting documents has evolved since the introduction of the policy in 2013. On the other hand, the policy specifies different peacebuilding activities for different situations. In countries with a high-intensity conflict, there is often little space for distinctive peacebuilding activities, but the need for a do-no-harm approach exists. In countries with mid-intensity conflict, a space for peacebuilding may prevail at the local and/or national level.

But there are also more peaceful countries without need for peacebuilding efforts at all. To assess these differences, the analysis included additional data on the country context drawn from the Global Peace Index by the Institute for Economics and Peace (2020). The Global Peace Index indicates the state of peace per country per year. Peace is defined as the absence of violence or fear of violence (also known as negative peace). To capture both dimensions, the indicator is constructed by aggregating 23 measures along three dimensions: 1) ongoing domestic and international conflict; 2) societal safety and security; and 3) militarization.

Measures are weighted based on the assessed importance of each measure for the state of peace in a country. This indicator has an encompassing country and year coverage and includes information on conflict-risk countries. In 2020, the Global Peace Index ranged from 1 (most peaceful) to 3.6 (least peaceful). Figure 4 provides an example showing how the indicator varies across years and four selected countries that are included in the E-library of WFP. For visualization purposes, the index is inverted so that high values signify most peaceful observations.

---

Figure 4: Example of the Global Peace Index for four countries on which WFP has reporting documents included in the E-library
## Annex 4. Evaluation matrix

### Evaluation Question 1: How good is the policy?  
**Evaluation criteria: Appropriateness, relevance, coherence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality of policy design and content</th>
<th>Data collection methods and sources of information</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
<th>Data availability and expected reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **1.1** Is the policy relevant, clear, evidence-based and coherent with other WFP policies?  
**1.2** How does the policy compare to similar policies of other organizations and system-wide frameworks? | Document analysis: WFP peacebuilding policy; policy update; preparatory documents; other WFP policies; and policies of other organizations. Interviews: WFP employees involved in policy development and implementation; cooperating partners; and employees familiar with the policy document. | Qualitative document analysis. Comparative document analysis. Qualitative content analysis of interview data. | Strong data availability: Relevant documents have been made available to the evaluation team; the identity of WFP employees involved in policy development and implementation is known and their willingness to participate in interviews is high. Strong reliability: Triangulation between interview data and document analysis is possible. |

### Policy implementation

| 1.3 To what extent has policy implementation been supported by relevant, coherent and adequately resourced measures? | Document analysis: Policy documents and administrative documents describing implementation measures and resources for peacebuilding policy and related WFP policies. Documents produced as part of institutional partnerships, e.g. the SIPRI partnership. | Interview questions on key insights from the document analysis. Qualitative content analysis of interview data. Qualitative document analysis | Strong data availability: We expect that most relevant documents will be accessible to the evaluation team and that interviewees at country, regional and headquarters level will be able to comment on implementation measures. Strong reliability: Triangulation between interview data and document analysis is possible. |
Extent to which WFP used synergies with related policies for implementation.
Suggestions for additional support or implementation measures (by sex and national and international staff category).

| Interviews: WFP employees in HQ, RBx and 9 case countries and cooperating partner staff in those case countries. Evaluation analysis: Synthesis of policy evaluations and individual evaluations of related policies | for evaluation analysis. | possible. |

**Continued policy relevance**

1.4 What need and interest is there to update the policy and to redefine WFP’s contribution on peace?

| Degree of change in WFP internal and external contextual conditions. Convergence or divergence of stakeholder positions on policy update, WFP current practice and the level of ambition of WFP (by sex and national and international staff category). | Document analysis: UN resolutions; OECD-DAC recommendations; speeches by WFP leadership and board members; and media reports. Interviews: WFP employees at HQ, RBx and in 9 case countries; board members; and partners in four mission countries. | Qualitative document analysis. Qualitative interview analysis (disaggregated by sex). | Medium or strong data availability: We expect relevant documents to be accessible, a high level of availability for interviews among WFP employees and a medium level of availability for interviews among partners and board members. Medium reliability: Stakeholder positions may be subjective and may diverge within stakeholder groups. |

**Evaluation question 2: What are the results of the policy?**

**Evaluation criteria: Effectiveness, impact**

**Analysis practice**

**Adaptation of WFP programmes, processes and systems**

Plausible intended and unintended effects on conflict and peace outcomes

2.1 What level of analysis of peace and conflict dynamics and opportunities for contributing to peace is contained in the standard planning and reporting documents of WFP country offices? (This would include changes over time and variation between contexts.)

2.2 How well do the planning and reporting documents of WFP reflect a country office’s actual level of analysis of conflict dynamics and opportunities for contributing to peace?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Data collection methods and sources of information</th>
<th>Data analysis methods</th>
<th>Data availability and reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency and trends of terms reflecting conflict</td>
<td>Document analysis:</td>
<td>Quantitative document</td>
<td>Strong data availability: All documents have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and analysis of opportunities for contributing to peace.</td>
<td>Country strategic plans 2017–2020 (all); Annual country reports 2017–2020 (all); Standard project reports EMOP, PRRO, DEV 2012–2020 (all countries with complete record).</td>
<td>Analysis (supervised automated document analysis).</td>
<td>Been made available to the evaluation team. Strong reliability: Complete coverage of available documents and quantitative analysis of trends and patterns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of coherence, internal – external documents. Level of coherence, documents – contextual awareness of interviewees.</td>
<td>Document analysis: Official planning and reporting documents and internal analysis of documents in 9 case countries (e.g. CONOPs, SitReps, other internal context or conflict analysis documents). Interviews: WFP employees in 9 case countries; partners in four mission countries; and cooperating partner staff in 9 case countries.</td>
<td>Qualitative document analysis. Comparative document analysis, assessing the evolution of context analyses over time and their reflection in planning and reporting documents. Qualitative interview analysis (disaggregated by sex).</td>
<td>Medium data availability: Some documents have been made available to the evaluation team, but there may be some hesitancy to share internal documents. We expect a high level of availability for interviews among WFP employees. High reliability: Triangulation between document analysis, interviews with WFP employees and interviews with partners is possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Adaptation of WFP programmes, processes and systems**

**Plausible intended and unintended effects on conflict and peace outcomes**

**2.3 To what extent has the analysis informed WFP programmes and WFP processes and systems adaptations?**

Examples of programme, process and system adaptations based on analysis.

Examples of missing programme, process and system adaptation.

Level of reflection in interactions with cooperating partners and in the food security cluster.

Examples of programme, process and system adaptations based on analysis.

Examples of missing programme, process and system adaptation.

Level of reflection in interactions with cooperating partners and in the food security cluster.
### Plausible intended and unintended effects on conflict and peace outcomes

#### 2.4 How do conflict-affected people and other key stakeholders, perceive WFP’s programmes and presence?

| Share of women and men affected by or at risk of conflict reporting negative or positive effects of WFP presence, programmes and interventions on local conflict and peace dynamics (disaggregated by sex and age). | In-person surveys: People affected by or at risk of conflict in four mission countries. Interviews: WFP employees and cooperating partners in four mission countries. Focus group discussions: People affected by or at risk of conflict in four mission countries. | Quantitative analysis of close-ended survey questions. Qualitative analysis of open-ended survey questions. Qualitative interview analysis. Focus group discussions for joint interpretation and participatory analysis of survey and interview results. Qualitative interview analysis. Qualitative document analysis. Descriptive statistical analysis of trend data (if available). | Uncertain data availability: The surveys will be conducted in volatile contexts likely to generate unexpected obstacles for conducting in-person surveys (see section on limitations for proposed mitigation measures). The availability of partners and peacebuilding organizations for interviews is also uncertain. High reliability: The analysis relies on the direct experience of affected people and involves affected people in data interpretation and participatory analysis. In addition, results can be triangulated with the observations of WFP employees and partners. On the analysis of unintended effects: Medium or strong data availability: We expect availability for interviews to be strong among WFP employees at all levels and medium among partners. The level of availability of statistics on access, security and funding are not yet known. Medium reliability: Perception data are adequate for assessing credibility. Some opportunities for triangulating interview data with statistical trend analyses are expected. |

Perceptions of WFP and cooperating partner staff, partners and external observers (by sex and national and international staff category). Number and type of stakeholders perceiving WFP efforts of contributing to peace positively or negatively. Level of evidence on effects on dialogue and social cohesion between groups, economic factors influencing conflict dynamics, and chances for reaching agreements between conflicting parties. Perceptions of WFP and cooperating partner staff, as well as external observers working in different contexts, of effects on WFP’s credibility and ability to operate. Trends in key indicators on ability to operate (access, security and funding).
**Evaluation Question 3: What accounts for the results that have been observed and results that were not achieved?**

**Evaluation criteria:** Effectiveness, Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enabling and hindering factors</th>
<th><strong>3.1 What have been the main internal and external factors enabling and hindering WFP's ability to avoid exacerbating conflict and contribute to peace?</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicators</strong></td>
<td>Frequency of stakeholders mentioning enabling and hindering factors (by sex and national and international staff category). Importance stakeholders ascribe to different factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data collection methods and sources of information</strong></td>
<td>Interviews: WFP and cooperating partner staff in 9 countries, RBx and HQ; partners in four mission countries and at HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data analysis methods</strong></td>
<td>Qualitative interview analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data availability and reliability</strong></td>
<td>Strong data availability: High level of availability for interviews expected. Strong reliability: Triangulation between different stakeholders and contexts will be possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Effectiveness of existing and potential for future policy implementation measures (including partnerships with peacebuilding actors)**

**3.2 To what extent do current policy implementation measures (such as policy dissemination, training, guidance and partnerships with peacebuilding actors) address key internal enabling or hindering factors, and how could remaining hindering factors be addressed?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions of relevance and effectiveness of policy implementation measures and of adequacy of partnerships with peacebuilding actors (by sex and national and international staff category)</th>
<th>Interviews: WFP and cooperating partner staff in 9 countries, RBx and HQ; partners in four mission countries and at HQ. Evaluation analysis Comparative analysis between identified factors and existing policy implementation measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Findings of other evaluations regarding the factors enabling and hindering effective policy implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of stakeholders mentioning factors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance stakeholders ascribe to different factors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data analysis methods</strong></td>
<td>Qualitative interview analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data availability and reliability</strong></td>
<td>Strong data availability: High level of availability for interviews expected. Strong reliability: Triangulation between evaluation analysis, different stakeholders and contexts will be possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5. Data collection tools

All interview guides and the survey questionnaire are provided in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview guide – WFP employees (headquarters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction (same for all)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>This interview is part of an evaluation of WFP’s 2013 policy on its Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings. The evaluation focuses on WFP efforts to avoid contributing to conflict dynamics and to promote peace. It examines what measures WFP has taken to enable its staff to do this well, what the WFP practice is and what results are seen at the level of the societies WFP supports.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The interview will be on the record but not for attribution. Your name and position will be included in the list of interviewees that is part of the evaluation report. Interview notes will remain confidential to the evaluation team.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Background of the interviewee (gender, position, responsibilities, length of employment with WFP [in this context, which other contexts]).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy implementation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) What have been key milestones implementing the PB policy and what changes with regard to conflict analyses and conflict-sensitive programming followed these milestones?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) What approaches to analyse conflict dynamics/risks are used in your area of work? Who (e.g. units, offices, external partners) is involved and how?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. How thorough do you find the WFP level of analysis when it comes to conflict dynamics in your area of work? Is there anything you feel the organization is not adequately covering? What/why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. (If conflict analyses are limited/do not exist) What are the reasons for limited or no conflict analyses in your area of work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. What are key lessons learned with regard to WFP’s approach to analysing conflict dynamics/risks in your area of work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) What other measures beyond conflict analyses and conflict-sensitive programming, but related to peacebuilding, have been introduced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) To what extent is the PB policy coherent with other corporate policies? If not coherent, what are key issues that inhibit greater coherence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal and external factors affecting policy implementation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) What were key factors affecting policy implementation (<em>Prompts on the known policy implementation measures</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Policy or guidance documents: Do you use the policy (or other policies)? Is it clear? What guidance do you use and how useful is it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Management support: Do you receive adequate management support?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Technical support: Who do you call on for advice? Do you contact PRO-P? Is their support useful? Why/why not?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Training: Have you received any internal or external training on this issue? How useful has it been?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Institutional structures: Are WFP’s structures supporting or inhibiting policy implementation? If so, how and why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) What supports the ability of WFP to analyse conflict and enable conflict-sensitive programming? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Effects of the policy/status quo contributing to peace**

8) What concrete effects does conflict analyses and conflict-sensitive programming have? What evidence do you have on these effects?
   a. Prompt on avoiding causing tensions and contributing to the profits of armed actors (do no harm)
   b. Prompt on political economy questions; social cohesion between groups; agreements between conflict parties; state-citizen-relations.

9) Have you observed any unintended consequences following the implementation of the PB policy? If so what were they?
   a. Prompt on consequences/changes linked to internal/institutional/organizational aspects
   b. Prompt on consequences/changes linked to WFP's ability to deliver assistance at country level

10) If unintended consequences following the implementation of the PB policy emerged, how were they addressed or mitigated?

11) Have you observed greater active peace advocacy by WFP in conflict situations? If yes: how has this influenced your work? Has it had any other effects on WFP?

**Recommendations**

12) What are the two to three key investments WFP should make to become more conflict sensitive and promote peace on both a strategic and operational level?

13) What changes would be particularly beneficial to you and your line of work to strengthen WFP's approach to peacebuilding and actively contribute to peace?

14) Would you consider it a good investment to update the policy and to redefine the WFP level of ambition on peace? If so, what should such an update prioritize?

---

**Interview guide – WFP employees (country level)**

**Introduction (same for all)**

*This interview is part of an evaluation of WFP’s 2013 policy on its Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings. The evaluation focuses on WFP efforts to avoid contributing to conflict dynamics and to promote peace. It looks at what measures WFP has taken to enable its staff to do this well, what WFP practice is and what results we see at the level of the societies WFP supports.*

*The interview will be on the record but not for attribution. Your name and position will be included in the list of interviewees that is part of the evaluation report. Interview notes will remain confidential to the evaluation team.*

**Background**

1) Background of the interviewee (gender, position, responsibilities, length of employment with WFP [in this context, which other contexts]).

**Status quo conflict sensitivity**

*Note: The team will conduct a comprehensive analysis of existing documents ahead of the interview, meaning that the questions to establish WFP activities will no longer be needed as it will be replaced by prompts based on the document analysis.*

2) What is your process to analyse conflict dynamics/risks in this office? Who is involved and what do you do?
   a. In which documents is this analysis reflected?
   b. What do you do with that analysis? How often is it revisited?
   c. Other prompts.
3) Do you engage with peacebuilding and peace/conflict research organizations to inform this analysis? If yes, how useful is that? If not, why not?

4) What are the five most crucial conflict dynamics WFP needs to pay attention to at the moment in this context?
   a. Prompt on political economy questions of WFP presence (e.g. profit of armed actors, elite capture).
   b. Prompt on social cohesion between groups and gender relations.
   c. Prompt on state-citizen relations.

5) How thorough do you find the WFP level of analysis when it comes to conflict dynamics? Is there anything you feel the organization is not paying attention to? What/why?

6) Have you adapted your programmes, processes, systems as a result of the analysis? If so, how? If not, why not? (Prompts based on prior analysis of documents/evaluations).
   - Prompt on M&E, work with cooperating partners, role as food security cluster (co-)chair

Status quo contributing to peace

7) Do you have activities aiming to prevent the escalation of tensions linked to food insecurity, increasing social cohesion in this context or addressing other key drivers of conflict? (Prompts based on prior analysis of documents/evaluations).
   a. If yes: how has it influenced your work, and WFP's credibility and ability to operate? Has it had any other effects on WFP?
   b. If not, why not? Have you considered and discarded the option?

8) Has WFP tried to influence agreements between conflicting parties?
   a. If yes: how has it influenced your work, and WFP's credibility and ability to operate? Has it had any other effects on WFP?
   b. If not, why not? Have you considered and discarded the option?

Effects (survey countries only)

9) What concrete effects do the presence and programmes of WFP currently have on conflict and peace in this country? What evidence do you have on these effects?
   a. Prompt on political economy questions.
   b. Prompt on social cohesion between groups and gender relations.
   c. Prompts on agreements between conflict parties.
   d. Prompt on state-citizen relations.

Measures to strengthen the conflict sensitivity and peace contribution of WFP

10) What is particularly helpful to you personally if you want to ensure that WFP and its partners do not inadvertently fuel conflict? Any good practice examples?

11) What is particularly helpful to you as you develop and implement programmes that make a contribution to peace (if different)?
   - Prompts on the known policy implementation measures and support from RB/HQ:
     - Policy or guidance documents: Do you use the policy (or other policies)? Is it clear? What guidance do you use and how useful is it? What kind of guidance was available during planning and analysis and how helpful are those?
     - Management support: Do you receive adequate management support?
     - Advisors: Who do you call on for advice? Do you contact the regional advisors at all? Global-level advisors? Is this support useful?
     - Training: Have you received any internal or external training on this issue? How useful has it been?
12) What supports the ability of WFP to analyse conflict in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

13) What supports the ability of WFP to avoid fuelling conflict in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

14) What supports the ability of WFP to make a contribution to peace in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

15) What are the two to three other key investments WFP should make to become more conflict sensitive and promote peace?

16) (If the issue has not come up). Would you consider it a good investment to update the policy and to redefine the WFP level of ambition on peace?
6) Can you provide examples of activities to prevent the escalation of tensions linked to food insecurity, increasing social cohesion or addressing other key drivers of conflict across your region? How do you evaluate their success and what influences positive outcomes?

7) What concrete effects do the presence and programmes of WFP currently have on conflict and peace in your region? What evidence do you have on these effects?
   a. Prompt on political economy questions.
   b. Prompt on social cohesion between groups.
   c. Prompts on agreements between conflict parties.
   d. Prompt on state-citizen-relations.

8) Has WFP tried to influence agreements between conflicting parties in your region? 
   a. If yes: how has it influenced the work, credibility, and ability to operate of the country office? Has it had any other effects on WFP?
   b. If not, why not? Have country offices considered but discarded the option?

Internal and external factors and recommendations

9) What supports the ability of WFP to analyse conflict in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

10) What supports the ability of WFP to avoid fuelling conflict in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

11) What supports the ability of WFP to make a contribution to peace in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

12) What are the two to three other key investments WFP should make to become more conflict sensitive and promote peace?

13) (If the issue has not come up). Would you consider it a good investment to update the policy and to redefine the WFP level of ambition on peace?

Interview guide – Cooperating partners (country level)

Introduction (same for all)

This interview is part of an evaluation of WFP’s 2013 policy on its Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings. The evaluation focuses on WFP efforts to avoid contributing to conflict dynamics and promote peace. It looks at what measures WFP has taken to enable its staff to do this well, what WFP practice is and what results we see at the level of the societies WFP supports.

The interview will be on the record but not for attribution. Your name and position will be included in the list of interviewees that is part of the evaluation report. Interview notes will remain confidential to the evaluation team. Your answers have no repercussions on your relationship with WFP, and you are free not to answer some of them.

Background

1) Background of the interviewee (gender, position, responsibilities, type of partnership with WFP)

Status quo conflict sensitivity

2) What is your process to analyse conflict dynamics/risks with WFP for programmes you collaborate together? Who is involved and what do you do?

3) From what sources do you obtain the information to do this analysis? (Prompt re: peace/conflict research organizations and organizations with gender or disability expertise).

4) What are the five most crucial conflict dynamics WFP needs to pay attention to at the moment in this context? (Prompts, if need be: political economy questions of WFP presence; social cohesion between groups and gender relations; state-citizen relations).
5) How thorough do you find the WFP level of analysis when it comes to conflict dynamics? Is there anything you feel the organization is not paying attention to? What/why?

6) Have you adapted your programmes with WFP as a result of the analysis? If so, how? If not, why not? (Prompts based on prior analysis of documents/evaluations).

Intended and unintended effects

7) (Survey countries only) What concrete positive or negative effects do the presence and programmes of WFP currently have on conflict and peace in this country? What evidence do you have on these effects?
   a. Prompt on political economy questions.
   b. Prompt on social cohesion between groups and gender relations.
   c. Prompts on agreements between conflict parties.
   d. Prompt on state-citizen-relations.

8) [For programmes aiming to prevent the escalation of tensions linked to food insecurity and/or increasing social cohesion]: How do these influence your organization's credibility and ability to operate? How do these influence WFP's credibility and ability to operate? Are there any other effects?

9) [If WFP tried to influence agreements between conflicting parties]: How do these influence your organization's credibility and ability to operate? How do these influence WFP's credibility and ability to operate? Are there any other effects?

Measures with cooperating partners to strengthen their conflict sensitivity and peace contribution

10) What is particularly helpful to you personally if you want to ensure that the programmes you run with WFP do not inadvertently fuel conflict?

11) As you implement programmes with WFP, what contributory factor to peace is particularly helpful to you personally (if different)?
   - Prompts on the known policy implementation measures:
     - Policy or guidance documents: Has WFP shared the policy or guidance with you? If yes, is it clear?
     - Training: Have you received any WFP training on this issue? How useful has it been? Have you received any other conflict-sensitivity training and was that useful?

Internal and external factors and recommendations

12) What supports the ability of WFP to avoid fuelling conflict in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

13) What supports the ability of WFP to make a contribution to peace in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?

14) Is there anything WFP could learn from others to do better? What are the two to three other key investments WFP should make to become more conflict-sensitive and to promote peace?

---

**Interview guide – Conflict analysts and external partners (country level)**

**Introduction (same for all)**

This interview is part of an evaluation of WFP's 2013 policy on its Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings. The evaluation focuses on WFP efforts to avoid contributing to conflict dynamics and promote peace. It looks at what measures WFP has taken to enable its staff to do this well, what WFP practice is and what results we see at the level of the societies WFP supports.

The interview will be on the record but not for attribution. Your name and position will be included in the list of interviewees that is part of the evaluation report. Interview notes will remain confidential to the evaluation process.
team. Your answers have no repercussions on your relationship with WFP, and you are free not to answer some of them.

**Background**

1) Background of the interviewee (gender, position, responsibilities)

**Status quo conflict sensitivity**

2) Is your organization engaging with WFP on conflict and context analysis? If yes, how?
3) What are the five most crucial conflict dynamics WFP needs to pay attention to at the moment in this context? (Prompts, if need be: political economy questions of WFP presence; social cohesion between groups and gender relations; state-citizen relations).
4) How thorough do you find the WFP level of analysis when it comes to conflict dynamics? Is there anything you feel the organization is not paying attention to? What/why?

**Intended and unintended effects**

5) *(Survey countries only)* What concrete positive or negative effects do the presence and programmes of WFP currently have on conflict and peace in this country? (And specifically: in the areas targeted for the survey).
   a. Prompt on political economy questions.
   b. Prompt on social cohesion between groups and gender relations.
   c. Prompts on agreements between conflict parties.
   d. Prompt on state-citizen-relations.
6) What credibility does WFP have among the population in X and Y (the areas targeted for the survey)?
7) [For programmes aiming to prevent the escalation of tensions linked to food insecurity and/or increasing social cohesion]: How do these influence WFP’s credibility and ability to operate? Are there any other effects?
8) [If WFP tried to influence agreements between conflicting parties]: How do these influence WFP’s credibility and ability to operate? Are there any other effects?

**Internal and external factors, and recommendations**

9) What factors help WFP to avoid fuelling conflict in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?
10) What factors help WFP to make a contribution to peace in this context? What stands in the way of doing better? What would need to change to address the current obstacles?
11) Which other organizations are doing particularly well to avoid fuelling conflict in this context? How does WFP compare to them, is it faring better or worse? What could WFP learn from others to do better?

---

**Interview guide – Benchmarking/comparator organizations**

**Introduction (same for all)**

*This interview is part of an evaluation of WFP’s 2013 policy on its Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings. The evaluation focuses on WFP efforts to avoid contributing to conflict dynamics and promote peace. It looks at what measures WFP has taken to enable its staff to do this well, what WFP practice is and what results we see at the level of the societies WFP supports.*

*The interview will be on the record but not for attribution. Your name and position will be included in the list of interviewees that is part of the evaluation report. Interview notes will remain confidential to the evaluation team.*

**Background**
Background of the interviewee (gender, position, responsibilities, length of employment with comparator organization [in this context, which other contexts]).

Timeframe and policy content
2) What specific policy or policies guide your organization's approach to peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive programming?
   a. When was this policy/these policies issued and what influenced the initial development of this policy/these policies?
   b. Which issues and topics are covered by this policy/these policies (incl. prompt on gender)?
   c. What has influenced the specific direction of your organization's policy/policies?
   d. What was the environment with regard to donors and their policy priorities?
   e. Are there any further guidance and/or supplementary documents to support policy implementation in this field?

3) What are policy goals and objectives and what is the relationship of these goals/objectives to the overall mandate of the organization?

Implementation steps
4) What have been the key implementation milestones both at HQ and field level following the adoption of the policy/policies?
5) Can you provide examples of new approaches to peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity your organization introduced following the adoption of the policy/policies?
6) Which measures were taken by your organization to support policy implementation with regard to:
   a. Internal dissemination through different channels (including senior management)?
   b. Knowledge management and staff trainings?
   c. Restructurings (e.g. new organizational units, coordination mechanisms)?
   d. Human resources/recruitment of specialized staff and consultants?
   e. Providing additional financial resources?
   f. Clarifying connection to other policies and/or ambiguities of the policy?
   g. Specific approaches to monitor and evaluate policy implementation?

7) To what extent is the policy anchored in your organization's strategy/strategic directions? Has this changed over time and if so, a) why and b) how?
8) To what extent has your organization engaged in high-level public advocacy around advancing and sustaining peace? How has this influenced your organization's way of working around peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity?

Lessons learned
9) Which factors have influenced policy implementation?
   a. What issues/factors inhibited policy implementation?
   b. Which factors supported policy implementation?
10) What are the two to three key investments your organization has made to become more conflict sensitive and promote peace?
11) What has negatively impacted your organization's ability to be conflict sensitive and promote peace, and which lessons learned can be drawn from that?

Interview guide – Executive Director and ED office (preliminary)

The interview guide for the Executive Director and members of the Executive Director's office is only preliminary and will be adapted, expanded and finalized as the Evaluation Team (ET) collects further information during the data collection phase on the role of the ED and his office in supporting the implementation of the PB policy.
As of now, the ET suggests covering three broad lines of inquiry (peace advocacy, opportunities and risks and future directions) when interviewing the ED and members of the ED’s office:

**Policy implementation**
1) How do you view WFP’s current role in peacebuilding? What positive but also more challenging developments have you observed over the past years with regard to WFP’s engagement in peacebuilding?
2) Do you view the steps WFP has taken to implement the PB policy as sufficient? If not, what is missing and should have been emphasized more?
3) What informed your decision to engage in peace advocacy in specific conflict situations? What outcomes did this generate?
4) To what extent were your efforts coordinated with and supported by different WFP units/offices?
5) Have you experienced any obstacles or reservations when engaging in peace advocacy (e.g. from within WFP, donors, other UN agencies)? How were they addressed?

**Opportunities and risks (related to WFP’s engagement in peacebuilding in general and peace advocacy in particular)**
6) What would you regard as the key benefits of WFP’s dedicated peacebuilding policy?
7) Have you observed any unintended consequences related to: a) the implementation of the PB policy; and b) your own efforts around peace advocacy?
8) If such unintended consequences emerged, how were they addressed or mitigated?

**Future directions**
9) What is your vision for how WFP should engage in peacebuilding in the future?
10) What are key investments WFP should make to put this vision into practice both on a strategic and operational level?
11) What are obstacles (internally and with regard to WFP’s donors) to further advancing WFP’s role in peacebuilding?

---

**Interview guide – Executive Board members and donors (preliminary)**

*The interview guide for Executive Board members and donors is only preliminary and will be adapted, expanded and finalized as the ET collects further information during the data collection phase on the role of the Executive Board members and donors guiding and giving WFP support in its engagement in peacebuilding. As of now, the ET suggests covering two broad lines of inquiry (policy implementation and future directions) when interviewing Executive Board members and donors:*

**Implementation of the PB policy**
1) How do you view WFP’s current role in peacebuilding? What positive but also more challenging developments have you observed over the past years with regard to WFP’s engagement in peacebuilding?
2) Do you view the steps WFP has taken to implement the PB policy as sufficient? If not, what is missing and should have been emphasized more?
3) Are WFP’s actions in the area of peacebuilding within the scope of the PB policy? If not, in which areas has WFP gone beyond the PB policy? Is this problematic? If so, why?
4) Did you observe any unintended consequences following the adoption of the PB policy in 2013?

**Future directions**
5) What is your vision for how WFP should engage in peacebuilding in the future? Is this vision shared by other members of the Executive Board? Are there diverging views?
6) What are key investments WFP should make to put this vision into practice both on a strategic and operational level?
7) How should WFP address conflicting visions/demands expressed by members of the Executive Board?

Affected people survey questionnaire

Notes for the enumerator on ethical research:

- Always be respectful towards the people you speak to (even if they are not respectful to you). Participants may have strong feelings about the topic of the interview – your role is to listen, not to strengthen these emotions. Offer participants a break or give them the option to stop the interview if you feel like it is becoming overwhelming for them.
- Give people the leaflet with the phone number for complaints and explain the purpose of the research.
- Remember that participation is voluntary; no one will be forced to participate in the survey.
- Ensure that the interview remains confidential and anonymous. Conduct the interview in a location where no one can listen to your conversation. Always lock your phone or tablet, do not write down the names, ID numbers or phone numbers of the participants.
- When asking questions, make sure the participant does not feel pressured to answer in a certain way.

Introduction and Consent

[To be adapted to each context, for example with an explanation of the programme conducted in each specific area (incl. specifying implementing partners to ensure that people refer to the WFP programme), and using location-specific expressions to describe conflict]

Hello, my name is [name of the surveyor] ________, and I am part of an independent team of researchers. We are evaluating whether food assistance has brought people closer together, or whether it has led to tensions, conflicts or other negative consequences. We are interested in talking to people from different parts of the country, both those who have and have not received assistance. [Explain the WFP programme in detail to see whether they’re aware, show WFP logo]. Our aim is to learn what the World Food Programme can improve. Your answers will not influence whether or not you will receive aid in the future. You will not get any compensation for this interview.

The survey takes about 40 minutes. We will not write down your name, and we will not share what you told us with anyone here. In the report we write, we will only say what people in general – and not individually – have told us. Please feel free to speak openly. If there are any questions you do not want to answer, you do not have to.

If you find anything wrong with my behaviour, you can call the number on the leaflet (check literacy – if the participant cannot read numbers, offer to type it into their phone).

Would you like to participate?

| c Yes | c No |

Do you have any questions before we start? If you have any complaints about the way I conduct this interview, you can contact my supervisor on the number on this card [give leaflet].

Demographic Characteristics

Name of municipality: ______________________

Sex of the person interviewed: c Male c Female c Other
### Age of the person interviewed:
- c 18–25
- c 26–35
- c 36–45
- c 46–55
- c 56–65
- c >65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Did you receive assistance from WFP in this area in the past three years? [explain exact programme, show logo of WFP] | c Yes  
c No  |
| 2. (If yes) What type of assistance did your household (/family) receive here? | c Food  
c Cash  
c Vouchers  
c Seeds/fertilizer/animal feed  
c Other livelihoods support  
c School feeding  
c [Complement based on document review of ongoing programmes in the areas targeted]  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond  |
| 2.b) *(If other) What type of assistance did your family receive? | Open ended  |
| 3. (If no) Were you aware of the WFP programmes in this area before I explained them to you? [Assure yourself that the respondent knows which aid intervention(s) you are talking about. If they do not know the activities of WFP, do not continue with this interview!] | c Yes  
c No  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food insecurity as a conflict driver</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 4. Were you living in this community before WFP started providing assistance here? | c Yes  
c No  |
| 5. (If yes) On a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 means no tensions and 5 is the highest level, what was the level of tensions and fighting in your area before WFP provided assistance? | 1-5 scale (1=no tensions, 5=highest level of tensions)  |
| 6. (If yes) On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means no tensions and 5 is the highest level, what was the level of tensions and fighting in your community after WFP provided assistance? | 1-5 scale (1=no tensions, 5=highest level of tensions)  |
| 7. (If tensions not the same level in Q5 and Q6) Did WFP assistance have an influence on the increase/decrease of tensions within your community? [If tensions remained the same, choose the first answer option (tensions did not change)] | c Tensions did not change  
c Increase: yes, WFP contributed to rising tensions  
c Increase: no (WFP did not contribute to rising tensions)  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 8. (If yes, rise) Please explain how WFP’s assistance has contributed to rising tensions. | [c] Decrease: yes, WFP contributed to declining tensions  
[c] Decrease: no (WFP did not contribute to declining tensions)  
[c] I don’t know  
[c] I prefer not to respond |
| 8b. (If yes, decline) Please explain how WFP’s assistance has contributed to declining tensions. | Open ended                                                                                   |
| **Targeting**                                                           |                                                                                             |
| 9. In your opinion, was WFP support provided in a fair way in this community? Instruction for the enumerator: reconfirm that they understand it is about WFP programmes, not aid in general – remind them about this] | [c] Yes  
[c] No  
[c] I don’t know  
[c] I prefer not to respond |
| 10. Who received the most WFP support in this community?                | [c] The poorest and those hardest hit by the emergency  
[c] People belonging to a specific socio-political group involved in an armed conflict*  
[c] People who are better off / richer  
[c] People belonging to the political elite  
[c] Other*  
[c] I don’t know  
[c] I prefer not to respond |
| 10b. (If sociopolitical:) Which sociopolitical group involved in an armed conflict did they belong to? | Open ended                                                                                   |
| 10c. (If other:) Which other people are they?                          | Open ended                                                                                   |
| 11. Was there anybody who should have received WFP support in this community, but was left out? | [c] Yes  
[c] No  
[c] I don’t know  
[c] I prefer not to respond |
| 12. (If yes) Who?                                                      | [c] People belonging to a specific sociopolitical group involved in an armed conflict*  
[c] The poorest people  
[c] People with disabilities  
[c] Children  
[c] Elderly people |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12b. (If sociopolitical group) Which sociopolitical group involved in an armed conflict?</td>
<td>Open ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12c. (If other) Which other persons?</td>
<td>Open ended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 13. What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not? | c Disagreements  
   c Dissatisfaction (without open disagreement)  
   c Acceptance  
   c Assistance was shared  
   c I don't know  
   c I prefer not to respond |
| 15. (If acceptance): What helped you find an agreement?                 | c WFP explained the reasons for distribution well  
   c A joint committee decided who would get assistance  
   c We accepted because we knew we could not change it  
   c One person or the authority decided  
   c Other*  
   c I don't know  
   c I prefer not to respond |
| 15b. (If other:) What has helped you to find an agreement?              | Open ended                                                             |
| Participation                                                           |                                                                         |
| 16. Who decided who would receive WFP support in your community and who would not? | c A mixed community committee (representing opposing groups, e.g. groups between whom there are tensions)  
   c A diverse community committee (representing diverse groups e.g. women, people with disability, minorities)  
   c WFP or its partners  
   c The mayor |
### Economic implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16b. (If other) Who decided who would receive WFP aid and who would not receive any in your community?</td>
<td>Open ended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 17. (If community committee of opposing groups) What happened to the relationship between the groups after WFP provided their support? | c It got better  
c It got worse  
c It remained the same  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
| 18. Why?                                                                 | Open ended                                   |
| 19. Do some people in your community have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP's activities here? (For reasons other than receiving WFP aid as beneficiaries) | Instruction for the enumerator: reconfirm that they understand it is about WFP programmes, not aid in general.  
c Some people have more money  
c Some people have less money  
c Both: some have more, some have less money  
c No, nobody has more or less money than before WFP's activities  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
| 20. (If more money or both) How did the people who have more money as a result of WFP's activities get it? | c Selling food on behalf of WFP as vendors  
c Leasing land  
c Transporting goods  
c Stealing food  
c Selling the food they did not need  
c Other*  
c I don't know |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20b. (If other) How did the people who have gained more money obtain it?</td>
<td>Open ended</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 21. (If yes) Are the people who have gained money contributing to the armed conflict? [Remind the respondent that they are free to not respond to this question!] | c Yes  
c No  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
| **State-citizen relationships**                                          |                                                 |
| 22. Have the authorities been involved in selecting who would receive support, organizing or distributing assistance? | c Yes  
c No  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
| 23. (If yes): Has their involvement in assistance changed the way people in this area generally think about the government? | c Yes – positively  
c Yes – negatively  
c No  
c (If there were different authorities involved): Some more positively, some more negatively.  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
| **Advocacy engagement and positioning**                                  |                                                 |
| 24. Does WFP engage with people who are fighting in this area to make them stop fighting? | c Yes, with all or some of them  
c No, with none of them  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
| 25. (If yes:) How does WFP act or what does WFP talk about with those people, if you know? | Open ended                                      |
| 26. (If respondent talks about peace advocacy in previous question) Are WFP the right people to do this? | c Yes  
c No  
c I don't know  
c I prefer not to respond |
<p>| 27. Why (not)?                                                           | Open ended                                      |
| 28. Does WFP help one side to win in any ongoing armed conflict here?    | c Yes                                           |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 29. (If yes). Who does WFP help?                                       | c No  
  c I don't know  
  c I prefer not to respond |
| 30. Is WFP against anyone?                                             | c Yes  
  c No  
  c I don't know  
  c I prefer not to respond |
| 31. (If yes) Who is WFP against?                                       | Open ended |

**Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 32. What should WFP do to contribute to less violence and tensions?    | 1. ___________  
  2. ___________  
  3. ___________ |

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
Annex 6. Fieldwork agenda

168. Interviews in the eight case study countries were conducted remotely between 15 September and 31 March. The interview schedule was agreed with the country offices, taking into account their priorities and workload.

169. Country visits to two (Colombia and Iraq) of the four case study countries took place in February and March 2022. They were conducted by the evaluation team leader with the aim of analyzing emerging results based on the survey results, interviews and the document analysis. The analysis was done together with affected people and WFP country office employees oriented along the following schedule:

**Day 1 Capital city or regional hub:**
- Check-in with the office director and focal points about the schedule of the week
- Security briefing
- Travel to field location 1

**Day 2 Field location 1:**
- Two workshops (1.5 hours each) with crisis-affected people (sex-disaggregated where needed)
- Debriefing with on-site WFP team

**Day 3 Field location 2:**
- Travel to field location 2.
- Two workshops (1.5 hours each) with crisis-affected people (sex-disaggregated where needed)
- Debriefing with on-site WFP team

**Day 4 Capital city or regional hub:**
- Travel to capital city or regional hub
- Individual briefings with senior management (as requested)

**Day 5 Capital city or regional hub:**
- Two-hour analysis workshop with WFP employees (and cooperating partners TBC)
- Travel back

170. Planned visits by the evaluation team to Burkina Faso and DRC had to be cancelled at short notice due to a deteriorating security situation limiting international travel (Burkina Faso) and due to COVID-19 restrictions (DRC). The local research partners in Burkina Faso and DRC facilitated the participatory analysis workshops on behalf of the evaluation team following extensive briefings. The evaluation team debriefed the country offices of Burkina Faso and DRC virtually.
Annex 7. Theory of change

171. **Theory of change:** The peacebuilding policy does not feature an explicit theory of change outlining how the different implementation measures are connected to the overarching outcomes of improved conditions for peace and less violence as a driver of food insecurity. During the inception phase, the evaluation team therefore constructed a draft theory of change using different sources and evidence and slightly adapted it based on evaluation findings (Figure 20 below). The theory of change shows how WFP currently envisages the policy and its implementation measures to lead to expected actions and how these, in turn, are expected to contribute to outcomes relating to conflict and peace.

172. The bottom part of the theory of change covers the development and adoption of the policy itself, as well as measures taken to implement the policy. The evaluation finds that very few WFP employees at local or country level had been aware of the peacebuilding policy before they were contacted by the evaluation team. The revised theory of change therefore does not assume a direct link between the development and adoption of the policy and the activities of WFP country offices. The policy itself triggered few policy implementation measures in the initial years after it was adopted. The link between the policy and policy implementation measures is therefore dotted. The related evidence is discussed in chapter 2.2.

173. The middle part of the theory of change covers anticipated changes in country operations in areas related to the policy: an improved analysis of conflicts and risks is intended to lead to a range of adaptations in WFP programmes, processes and systems. The list of adaptations is largely unchanged from the draft version of the theory of change, except for the fact that clusters no longer feature since most interviewees did not believe that the clusters currently are or should be playing an important role in strengthening conflict sensitivity. The adaptations pursue a series of direct objectives, which are listed on the right-hand side. That list is also largely the same as in the draft version, except that it starts with the reduction of food insecurity as a driver of conflict to show how central this mechanism is to the WFP role in peacebuilding. On the other hand, the evaluation findings do not confirm that WFP seeks to play a role in advocating with others to address drivers of conflict. This element included in the draft version of the theory of change is therefore no longer featured in the revised version. The related evidence is discussed in chapter 2.3.2.

174. The top part of the theory of change relates to the effects on peace and conflict in the countries concerned. No changes were made here. Since the evaluation covers the full breadth of WFP conflict-sensitivity efforts, the theory of change could not explore the details of individual areas of intervention. WFP has elaborated these elsewhere (e.g. on stabilization and other topics in the second phase of the knowledge partnership with SIPRI). Related evidence is covered in chapter 2.3.3.

175. Data collection confirmed that the institutional factors that affect how the theory of change works in practice intervene at each level of the theory of change. For example, different factors affect how effective the policy implementation measures are, to what extent programmes, processes and systems are adapted to conflict dynamics and risks, and how strongly this affects conflict and peace dynamics on the ground. Related evidence is covered in chapter 2.4. Data collection also confirmed that the assumptions on which the theory of change is based are valid. Important shortcomings in policy implementation, for example, are at least partly explained by the initial lack of resources and capacity. Related evidence is covered in chapters 2.2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.

176. Gender and other diversity considerations are relevant at various junctures in this theory of change, for example whether guidance and training related to the peacebuilding policy cover relevant gender

---

dimensions; whether partnerships with peacebuilding actors include partnerships with organizations focusing on gender, disability or other relevant characteristics such as displacement; whether conflict analyses explore how relevant gender is for conflict dynamics; and whether WFP planning and implementation processes take the results of this analysis into account.

Figure 20: Reconstructed theory of change

Source: Evaluation team, drawing on the peacebuilding policy, guidance, SIPRI research reports and evaluation findings.

Annex 8. Analytical framework

The data analysis framework for this evaluation consisted of the following elements:

177. A consecutive triangulation strategy: GPPI sequenced different data-collection and analysis phases to enable findings to build on each other and to triangulate information from different sources. The evaluation team synthesized diverse perspectives when checking hypotheses, explicitly explored alternative explanations for perceived phenomena and results and reduced reliance on single sources as much as possible. Due to the approach building on existing findings, some analysis elements built on each other. Enablers and constraints identified through the document analysis, for example, were further explored in interviews. The team sought to rely on data collected through at least two different methods to respond to the different evaluation (sub-)question (see evaluation matrix). The main data collection steps were staged as follows:

- Initial results from the semi-automated documented analysis were used to probe interesting insights during interviews with WFP employees in the nine countries of focus. In turn, the insights from the interviews informed the finalization of the semi-automated document analysis.
- The policy quality analysis, the document analysis of implementation measures and the review of existing evaluations were largely completed by the time interviews at the country level began. This allowed for targeted follow-up questions during interviews.
- First country-level stakeholder interviews in the four case study countries were conducted ahead of the finalization of the affected people survey questionnaire with research partners. This allowed the team to reflect on first insights from the affected people survey.
- The majority of WFP interviews at the country level were completed before interviews with regional and global WFP employees.
- In December 2021, the evaluation team conducted an internal workshop to systematically review all available data and analyses for every evaluation sub-question and to triangulate across methods.
- The participatory elements (see below) served as important triangulation and validation points.

178. Controlling for individual and group bias: To control for biases, the evaluation team took explicit account of the stance, background and viewpoint of information sources to guard against premature conclusions. We also systematically assessed the quality of the sources consulted, by checking reports and literature against quality criteria, such as transparency of research, rigour, validity and reliability. At the end of the data collection phase and ahead of any deliverable, the entire evaluation team conducted analysis workshops to compare and contrast findings from data based on different methods and sources. The customization of survey instruments and the analysis of results, together with research teams from the countries where the surveys were conducted, was also an important way to control for potential biases.

179. Relying on participatory analysis: The evaluation used a variety of online and offline workshops and briefing formats (above) to engage relevant stakeholders both a HQ and country level to understand and validate evaluation findings. Beyond enabling participatory analysis, these briefings also allowed the evaluation team to refine recommendations so that they were realistic and actionable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Conclusions (paragraph numbers)</th>
<th>Findings (paragraph numbers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Strengthen the practice of actionable, country-level analysis of how the presence and programmes of WFP and its partners influence conflict dynamics</strong></td>
<td>144, 146</td>
<td>43-45 (training), 51 (written analysis), 65-69 (analysis practice), 73 (awareness), 74 (blind spots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 WFP should set out how it will institutionalize regular, practically oriented and inclusive reflection processes concerning risks and opportunities related to conflict dynamics in all country operation facing conflict risks. As a minimum, the following elements should be considered:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• These reflection processes should take place annually and – as a minimum – inform the formulation and revision of 2nd generation Country Strategic Plans to ensure they are fully conflict-sensitive.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Country offices should prioritize implementing such reflection processes over producing stand-alone, written context- or conflict-sensitivity analyses. Regional or global advisers should facilitate the process; cooperating partners should join in the reflection.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The process should include a discussion of relevant monitoring results (see rec. 2.2) and how to adapt WFP’s programmes and presence on their basis.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relevant risks of the WFP operation and programmes should be included in the risk registry.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Any regional implications of the analysis should be tabled for discussion at the periodic regional meetings of WFP Country Directors. The analysis should also help inform WFP’s engagement in the UN’s Common Country Analysis and also in discussions with development and peacebuilding partners (see rec. 3.1).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Do workforce planning to ensure that sufficient capacity exists at headquarters and regional level to implement the policy, to support country offices and to strengthen the accountability of country directors for improving conflict sensitivity and strengthen synergies with other cross-cutting functions, such as protection, access, gender, disability and inclusion and AAP, as well as with other divisions and departments, including human resources, supply chain and emergency operations. This can either involve dedicated peace and conflict capacity at HQ and in the Regional Bureaux, cooperating closely with other teams, or functional support teams integrating significant expertise on conflict and peace and reflecting that expertise in their terms of reference.</td>
<td>48-50 (support structure), 73 (awareness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.3 Include guidance on the described analysis processes and other conflict sensitivity issues in the revised Programme Guidance Manual and ensure relevant guidance is available in other key languages, such as Arabic, French and Spanish.

This should ensure that:
- The available guiding questions for protection and conflict-sensitivity assessments serve as a starting point as they synthesize different elements of context analysis on gender, protection, AAP and conflict sensitivity.
- The ongoing process to develop conflict-sensitivity mainstreaming strategy includes overarching and coherent guidance comprising all context analysis requirements derived from different policies, including gender, AAP, protection and conflict sensitivity.
- The resulting guidance includes the guiding questions mentioned above and be shared with employees as part of regular country-level reflection processes, along with online training.

2 Create incentives and take steps to adapt the organizational culture to make conflict sensitivity more central: Clearly communicate expectations, integrate conflict sensitivity into standard monitoring tools and enhance incentives for Country Directors

2.1 Communicate expectations of minimum standards on conflict sensitivity and steps to be taken as outlined in these recommendations through an Executive Director circular or similar corporate communication, rather than revising a policy that remains adequate and sufficient. This communication should:
- Clarify mandatory steps for country offices, including, for example, an annual, inclusive process to reflect on context dynamics and conflict-sensitive issues and to discuss conflict-sensitivity considerations with cooperating partners to feed into CSP design, review and evaluation.
- Include a general message about the level of priority given to conflict-sensitive programming and clarify that conflict sensitivity and “do no harm” can trump speed and quantity of delivery.

2.2 Include basic indicators to track WFP and cooperating partner interventions and their effects on the conflict context in standard monitoring mechanisms. Building on existing good practice, these indicators should, at a minimum, include questions exploring whether affected people perceive increases or decreases in tensions; whether they think that current targeting practices create tensions or what other features of the assistance do; and who is perceived to be unfairly included in or excluded from assistance. This should be mandatory for all country offices. Country offices who cannot use these questions because of protection or security concerns should explain why and propose alternative ways to gain relevant insights.

2.3 Ensure country directors make conflict sensitivity a priority by including it as a standard core competency that is used in their appraisals and in promotion and rotation decisions. Necessary steps should include:
- Ensuring that conflict sensitivity is reflected in country director job profiles.
- Establishing that the performance of country directors on conflict sensitivity – including ensuring that the reflection process outlined in Recommendation 1 takes place – becomes a standard indicator in the annual ED Assurance Statement appraisal.
- Giving central consideration to prior experience in and performance on conflict sensitivity, particularly for placements in contexts with high levels or high risks of conflict.
- Including a module on conflict-sensitivity in the induction programme for country directors and deputy country directors, as well as in the training programme for heads of field offices.
- Establishing as a requirement for all country directors to receive an in-depth briefing from the reputable institutions and academia with specialized knowledge in conflict analysis and localized contexts prior to assuming new positions.

### 3 Strengthen the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity in WFP programmes and processes with partners and contractors: Increase the focus on conflict sensitivity in the work with cooperating partners and check the backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners

#### 3.1 WFP should set out how it will enhance the conflict sensitivity of cooperating partners.
Steps should include:
- Encourage open sharing of their conflict-related issues through training, during applications and reports.
- Amend application templates, field level agreements and reporting templates to request cooperating partners to include reflections on context dynamics and conflict sensitivity and to give them sufficient resources to deliver conflict-sensitive programmes.
- Train and support country-level programme staff to ensure they discuss context dynamics and conflict sensitivity with partners when providing feedback to cooperating partners.
- Request that at global level, processes for strengthening conflict sensitivity are included in the agenda of the Annual Partnership Meeting until the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity is complete.

#### 3.2 WFP should set out the steps it will take to ensure a thorough review of political and identity-based issues that WFP needs to explore in order to understand how backgrounds of employees, contractors and cooperating partners intersect with the conflict context and may affect conflict dynamics and the perception of WFP.
This should include:
- Review due diligence and selection processes to ensure they explore such affiliations when hiring, partnering and contracting.
- Including a mechanism to ensure that any concerns with political affiliations of contractors or employees are escalated to the country director or the right level above.
- Using proactive outreach to increase the pool of applicants from underrepresented groups.
4 Alleviating food insecurity is and should remain the most important WFP contribution to peace. WFP should focus its contribution to peace to support existing peacebuilding processes: implementing activities jointly with other actors, drawing on WFP’s core mandate strengths and focus on humanitarian access to alleviate food insecurity.

4.1 WFP should confirm that all its specific peace-promoting activities will be designed jointly with other actors and not on its own. In doing so, WFP should focus on its core mandate strengths, for example, food security and livelihoods or resilience interventions targeted at areas at high risk of conflict, or with peace agreements and re-integration efforts, local purchase and market-building activities, country capacity strengthening or access negotiations.

To this end:

- WFP should engage with development and peacebuilding partners to identify how WFP can best contribute to efforts to address conflict drivers without undermining its neutrality, impartiality and independence.

- Such engagement should take place regularly – at a minimum when WFP develops, revises or evaluates its country strategy, and/or when there are important changes to the situation, or in light of the forthcoming conflict sensitivity strategy.

- HQ and Regional Bureaux should provide guidance and support Country Offices in this effort, enhance the relevant frameworks of accountability and responsibilities (including of Country Directors) for holding these discussions, and further strengthen partnerships with other actors relevant for peacebuilding at global and regional levels.

4.2 WFP should set out how it will leverage the global weight of WFP in humanitarian diplomacy to advance humanitarian access, in close coordination with other humanitarian, development and UN actors, for example in system-wide negotiations with government actors or peace processes, ensuring that WFP country offices maintain the strategic lead in efforts involving different levels of the organization, to safeguard against potential negative consequences.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Alleviating food insecurity is and should remain the most important WFP contribution to peace. WFP should focus its contribution to peace to support existing peacebuilding processes: implementing activities jointly with other actors, drawing on WFP’s core mandate strengths and focus on humanitarian access to alleviate food insecurity.</strong></td>
<td><strong>140</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.1 WFP should confirm that all its specific peace-promoting activities will be designed jointly with other actors and not on its own. In doing so, WFP should focus on its core mandate strengths, for example, food security and livelihoods or resilience interventions targeted at areas at high risk of conflict, or with peace agreements and re-integration efforts, local purchase and market-building activities, country capacity strengthening or access negotiations.</strong></td>
<td><strong>79, 84 (adaptations), 87 (peacebuilding actors), 87-111 (effects)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To this end:</strong></td>
<td><strong>80-83 (peace advocacy)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- WFP should engage with development and peacebuilding partners to identify how WFP can best contribute to efforts to address conflict drivers without undermining its neutrality, impartiality and independence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Such engagement should take place regularly – at a minimum when WFP develops, revises or evaluates its country strategy, and/or when there are important changes to the situation, or in light of the forthcoming conflict sensitivity strategy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- HQ and Regional Bureaux should provide guidance and support Country Offices in this effort, enhance the relevant frameworks of accountability and responsibilities (including of Country Directors) for holding these discussions, and further strengthen partnerships with other actors relevant for peacebuilding at global and regional levels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Annex 10. List of people interviewed

Table 8: List of people interviewed during the inception phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>HQ/RB/CO/External</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brian Lander</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Division (EME)</td>
<td>Deputy Director EME</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Emery Brusset</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Peace Measurement specialist</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gresham Barrett</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Office of the Executive Director</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jennifer Stuttle</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Corporate Planning &amp; Performance Division (CPP)</td>
<td>Monitoring Advisor</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jesse Wood</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Access and Protection</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Natasha Nadazdin</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Corporate Planning &amp; Performance Division (CPP)</td>
<td>Chief, RMPM</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Peter Allen</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rachel Goldwyn</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Senior Peacebuilding and Conflict Sensitivity Advisor</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Rebecca Richards</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Chief, Peace &amp; Conflict Office</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Ronan McNamara</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Conflict &amp; Peace Officer (Country Coordination); Desk RBC/RBB</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Samir Wanmali</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Policy and Programme Division</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shannon Howard</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership Division</td>
<td>Senior Strategic Partnerships Officer,</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Silvia Blondi</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Head, Peace &amp; Conflict Team</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Stanlake Samkange</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership Division</td>
<td>Senior Director</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tom Metcalfe</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit (PRO-P)</td>
<td>Head of Humanitarian Access Team</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ute Klamert</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Partnerships &amp; Governance</td>
<td>Assistant Executive Director</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Valerie Guarnieri</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Programme &amp; Policy Development Department</td>
<td>Assistant Executive Director</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Deborah McWhinney</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Senior Evaluation Officer</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dan Smith</td>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Designation</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Henk-Jan Brinkman</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>PSO/Department of Political and Peacebuilding</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support Office</td>
<td></td>
<td>Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Anita Ernstorfer</td>
<td>Interpeace/</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>External Advisory Group</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Untangle LLC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Alexandre Lecuziat</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Srn. Regional Emergency Preparedness and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Response Adviser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Jimi Richardson</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for the Middle East, North</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Africa (MENA), Central Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Advisor (Middle East, North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Central Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kimberly Deni</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Asia &amp; the Pacific</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Programme Officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Matthew Mcilvenna</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for the East and Central Africa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Programme Advisor, Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tigest Sendaba</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Southern Africa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer – Humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Veljko Mikelic</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau for Latin America and the</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian Policy Advisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Fawad Raza</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Miranda Sende</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Outman Badaoui</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Head of Monitoring &amp; Evaluation /</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vulnerability analysis and Mapping Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Paul Howe</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Nigeria</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Pierluigi Martinesi</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency Coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Sharon Beijer</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer Conflict Sensitivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Tiwonge R Machiwenyika</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9: List of people interviewed during the data collection phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>HQ/RB/CO/External</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alan Brown</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Private Sector Partnerships</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Alex Marianelli</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Director, WFP Supply Chain Division (SCO)</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Andrew Stanhope</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Deputy Director HRM</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Anne Laure Duval</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>PRO-P</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Arif Husain</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>RAMM</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Brenda Behan</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>PD- GEN</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chiara Pallanch</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Analysis and Early Warning Unit</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Christine Strassmaier</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Analysis and Early Warning Unit</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>David Kaartrud</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Emery Brusset</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Peace Measurement Specialist</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Francesca De Ceglie</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Programme Officer CBT</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Gaia Gozzo</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Conflict-sensitivity Advisor</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Giammichele Demaio</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Snr External Partnership Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Gresham Barrett</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Senior Advisor to the Executive Director</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ilario Rea</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>PRO-C Safeguards Advisor</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Maria Victoria Montalvo</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Field Security Division</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Patrick Foley</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Rachel Evers</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Deputy Director LEG</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Rachel Goldwyn</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Senior Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Advisor</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Rebecca Richards</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Chief, Peace &amp; Conflict Office</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Samir Wannmali</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Deputy Director, PRO</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Shelleyanne Easton</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Head of Critical Skills Development</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ute Klamert</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Assistant Executive Director</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Valerie Guarnieri</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Assistant Executive Director</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Corinne Fleischer</td>
<td>RD Cairo</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Michael Dunford</td>
<td>RD Nairobi</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Jonas Klange</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer - EPR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country level</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Abraham Abatneh</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Sudan</td>
<td>Head of Emergencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Adelina Manuela Bernardo Tomas</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Procurement Officer P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Adriana Marcela Bello Barrantes</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Colombia</td>
<td>Monitoring Officer Evaluation and Reporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Adriana Rozo Marino</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Colombia</td>
<td>Capacity-Building Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Alain Ouedraogo</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Head of Sub-Office (Region Est, Centre Est)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Ally Raza Qureshi</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Andres Romero Buitrago</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Colombia</td>
<td>Humanitarian Strategy Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Anne Valand</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Syria</td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Antoine Renard</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Ashraf Baloch</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Ethiopia</td>
<td>Head of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Aurore Bagur</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Protection and Gender Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Aymen Elamin</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Syria</td>
<td>Head of Partnerships and Emergency Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Aysha Marie Jessica Twose</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>VAM Officer P3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Azzurra Chiarini</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer P4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Baker Mukerre</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Sudan</td>
<td>Acting Head of Area Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Bina Azeez</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>PPO - Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name and Title</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Carlo Scaramella, Country Director, WFP Country Office Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Carmen Lucia del Castillo Quintero, Senior Field Monitoring Officer, WFP Country Office Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Craig Browne, Activity Manager-International, WFP Country Office Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Damian Pachon Andrade, Resilience and Livelihoods Programme Officer, WFP Country Office Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>David Bullman, Former CD Burkina Faso, WFP Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Diana Cecilia Tamayo Velez, Gender and Protection Programme Officer, WFP Country Office Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Denis Sidyane, Head of Procurement, WFP Country Office Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Elin Andersson, Programme officer, WFP Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Elliot Vhurumuku, Head of Area Office, WFP Country Office Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Enrico Pausilli, Head of Programme, WFP Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Esther Kabaire, Head of VAM/MEAL, WFP Country Office Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Fawad Raza, (S03) Vulnerability Assessment &amp; Mapping - M&amp;E, WFP Country Office Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Francis Alain Bere, Head of Field Office P4, WFP Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Frederic Verjus, Head of Sub-Office, WFP Country Office Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Gisele Mabuya Molea, Monitoring SC G, WFP Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Janne Suvanto, Head of Gaziantep Office, WFP Country Office Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Jean Carlos Lazcano Lubo, Emergency and Migrations Flows Programme Officer, WFP Country Office Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Jennifer Bitonde, Deputy Country Director (Programme), WFP Country Office Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Joel Siku, National Programme Officer/VAM, WFP Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Kaori Ura</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Ethiopia</td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Kareen George</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>Monitoring Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Kazheen Dana</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>Field Monitor - Duhok (Prog)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Lawand Bro</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>(501) PPO - ER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Luca Martin</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Libya</td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer for Nexus/Conflict Sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Luisa Fernanda Castro Penagos</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Libya</td>
<td>Procurement Officer (CBT/Retail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Marc Zihalirwa Bismwa</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Programme Policy Officer NOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Maria Rodriguez Schaap</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Syria</td>
<td>Security Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Melissa David Obando</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Colombia</td>
<td>Head of Field Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Mohamed AL-Obaide</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>Security Officer – Erbil Area Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Mohammed Eshikal</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Libya</td>
<td>Activity Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Monica Matarazzo</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Syria</td>
<td>Head of Protection, AAP and Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Moses Otjoita</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Ethiopia</td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Moussa Dicko</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Access Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Nathaniel Paul Edouard Buffenoir</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Consultant Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Peter Jovi Musoko</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Country Director D2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Ramasio Tiller Ipuana</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Colombia</td>
<td>Head of Field Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Rawad Halabi</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Libya</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Ruben Bernardo Melo Merchann</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Colombia</td>
<td>Security Operations Support Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Samantha Chatteraj</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Syria</td>
<td>Head of South Area office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Sean O’Brien</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Syria</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Seokjin Han</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Sudan</td>
<td>Head of VAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Sharon Beijer</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>PPO – Conflict Sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Tichaona Chitosinde</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Ethiopia</td>
<td>Risk and Compliance Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Tiwonge Machiwenyika</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>Veerle Triquet</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office D.R. Congo</td>
<td>Protection and Gender Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Wael Arafa</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Iraq</td>
<td>(SO2) PPO – Head of Resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Yawa Rana</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Sudan</td>
<td>Head of Area Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Yukinori Hibi</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Libya</td>
<td>Head of Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Denis Sidyane</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office Sudan</td>
<td>Head of Procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>External</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Aaso Ameen Shwan</td>
<td>Social Inquiry</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Abdulhadi Soliman</td>
<td>Fezzan Libya</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Adriana Guerra</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>ELC Coordinator Narino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Ali Dawood</td>
<td>Sanad</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Alpha Ousmane Dao</td>
<td>Service Rural d'Apprровisonnement et de Commercialisation</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Ana Maria Romero Hernandez</td>
<td>Universidad Nacional</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Project Formulation University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Andrew Clark</td>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Andrew Wyllie</td>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Chief, Assessment, Planning and Monitoring Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Anna Azaryeva Valente</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global Lead, Conflict Prevention, Fragility and Peacebuilding – Programme Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Anna Schmauder</td>
<td>Clingendael</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Research Fellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Anne Kristine Raunkjær-Jensen</td>
<td>Peaceful Change Initiative</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Bernard Hangi</td>
<td>Centre d'Appui au Développent Rural et à la Sécurité</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>President du Conseil d'Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Bettie Atyam</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis and Conflict-Sensitive Programming Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Brou Arsene Assande</td>
<td>UN RCO</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Carolina González</td>
<td>The alliance of Bioversity</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Scientist Lider - Foresight and Applied Economics for Impact Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Cesar Serrano</td>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>UN Mission Coordinator Nariño</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Chantal Azzam</td>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Christian Zihindula</td>
<td>APPUI AUX FEMMES DEMUNIES ET</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Come de Nanteuil</td>
<td>IOM Iraq</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Elie Abouaoun</td>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Eva Svoboda</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Deputy Director of International Law and Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Francesca Piccin</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Head of Office Pasto (Nariño)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>Haider Al-Ibrahim</td>
<td>Peace Paradigm Organization</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>Hamzeh Alshadeedi</td>
<td>IRIS</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Idrissa Sakande</td>
<td>CARE International</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>Jacqueline Parry</td>
<td>No org.</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Jean-Philippe Le Loch</td>
<td>Action contre la Faim</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Directeur Pays Adjoint aux Programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Joan Sebastián Díaz Parra</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Protection Cluster Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Juan Fernando Lucio</td>
<td>Paso Colombia / oneearthfuture</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Juliana Correa</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Peace and Development Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Julie Desloges</td>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>Julius Jackson</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Head of Conflict and Peace Unit</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>Kouacou Koffy</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Emergency and resilience coordinator</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>Kristen Knutson</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Head of Office</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>Lahib Higel</td>
<td>Crisis Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>Luz Adriana Jimenez</td>
<td>The alliance of Bioversity International and CIAT</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>Marc-André Franche</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UNDP Representative Libya</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>Marco Kalbusch</td>
<td>UN RCO</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>Maren Steller</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Advisor</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>Marlou den Hollander</td>
<td>SFCG</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>Martin Bisoka Mbanda</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Conflict Advisor</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135</td>
<td>Michel Ngongo Luhembwe</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136</td>
<td>Mohamed Alzuhairi</td>
<td>Al-Mortaqa Group</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137</td>
<td>Mohamed Fadil</td>
<td>Mercy Hands</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Mostafa Ahmed</td>
<td>Mercy Hands</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>Nadia Siddiqui</td>
<td>Social Inquiry</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>Nadine Flache</td>
<td>Rebuild Iraq recruitment Program</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>Nancy Belhocine</td>
<td>Global Affairs Canada</td>
<td>Senior Development Officer</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>Natalia Jiménez</td>
<td>Somos Capazes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>Nicole Peter</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>Onesphore Sematumba</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>Pascal Bushiri</td>
<td>Christian Aid</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>Paul Absalon</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>Regev Ben Jacob</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding &amp; Fragility Specialist</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>Robert Boneschansker</td>
<td>ZOA</td>
<td>Programme Manager Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>Sandra Cortés</td>
<td>Fundalianza</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>Sandra Rivera Herrera</td>
<td>Fundacion Guajira Naciente</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>Sonia Christelle Mantoro</td>
<td>Interpeace</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>Susanne Jasperrs</td>
<td>LSE</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153</td>
<td>Tito Nestor Tiehi</td>
<td>CIERA-PTCI</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>Vijaya Thakur</td>
<td>RESOLVE</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>D.R. Congo</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>Vittorio Infante</td>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>Yandi Lompo</td>
<td>Association pour le Développement des Communautés Villageoises</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Youssef Mhanna</td>
<td>World Vision Iraq</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>Zsuzsanna Kacso</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Written input</td>
<td>Hang K. Nguyen</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies in Rome</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Written input</td>
<td>Ramon Lohmar</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Permanent Representation of Germany in Rome</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 11. Bibliography

The following list references all sources cited in the evaluation report (A), as well as the references of all evaluations reviewed for the evaluation analysis (B). The evaluation team reviewed additional documents provided by the Office of Evaluation in preparation of the evaluation report.

**A) GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY**


De Waal, Alex. 2022. How Not to End Mass Starvation, accessed from https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2022/05/24/how-not-to-end-mass-starvation/


FAO. 2018. A corporate framework to support sustainable peace in the context of the Agenda 2030.


Makoond, A. 2020. How is peace measured? A qualitative systematic review of instruments used to assess the peacefulness of societies.


WFP. 2012. Assistance to Congolese Refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Likouala Province of the Republic of the Congo. SPR/PRRO. DRC.

WFP. 2012. Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Other Highly Food-Insecure Groups Affected by Violence. SPR/PRRO. Colombia.


WFP. 2012. Relief Food Assistance to Tackle Food Security Challenges. SPR/PRRO. Afghanistan.


WFP. 2013. Assistance to Address Food Insecurity and Undernutrition. SPR/PRRO. Afghanistan.

WFP. 2013. WFP's Role In Peacebuilding In Transition Settings (WFP/EB.2/2013/4-A/Rev.1).

WFP. 2014. Relief Food Assistance to Tackle Food Security Challenges. SPR/PRRO. Afghanistan.

WFP. 2014. Supporting peace efforts in Colombia: food assistance for people affected by and recovering from conflict. SPR/PRRO. Colombia.


WFP. 2015. Food assistance for flood affected population in the mid-western region. SPR/EMOP. DRC.

WFP. 2015. Integrated Approach to Address Food Insecurity among Highly Vulnerable Households Affected by Displacement and Violence in Colombia. SPR/PRRO. Colombia.
WFP. 2015. Supporting peace efforts in Colombia: food assistance for people affected by and recovering from conflict. SPR/PRRO. Colombia.


WFP. 2016. Food and nutrition assistance to vulnerable returnees and refugees in Eastern Afghanistan and people displaced by conflict. SPR/EMOP. Afghanistan.


WFP. 2017. Internal Audit of Beneficiary Management.


WFP. 2017. Targeted Food Assistance to Victims of Armed Conflicts and other Vulnerable Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. SPR/PRRO. DRC.


WFP. 2018. Concept Note - Phase 1 of the WFP/SiPRI Knowledge Partnership: Defining WFP’s contributions to improving the prospects for peace. Internal document, unpublished.


WFP. 2019. WFP Executive Director in breakthrough visit to Yabus in the Blue Nile State following decade of inaccessibility. Press Release.
WFP. 2020. 10 minutes to learn about conflict sensitivity. Internal document, unpublished.
WFP. 2020. 10 minutes to learn about social cohesion. Internal document, unpublished.
WFP. 2020. 10 minutes to learn about “WFP's role in peacebuilding in transition settings” policy. Internal document, unpublished.
WFP. 2020. 2020-1 UNSSC WFP Pax lists_18Dec2020 (internal list).
WFP. 2020. Concept Note: Measuring the Contribution to Peace.
WFP. 2021. The Round Table Document Measuring Peace Performance Round Table (6 April 2021, accessed from https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000126610) also elaborates on understandings of peace as a process, the importance of context, and the multi-level nature of peace.


WFP. 2022. The Ubari Market: WFP Rehabilitated Market Centre Strengthens Food Systems and Contributes to Peace in Libya.


B) EVALUATIONS REVIEWED


Annex 12. Acronyms

AAP, Accountability to Affected Populations
ACR, Annual Country Report
AEW, Analysis and Early Warning Unit
ALNAP, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
APC, Action pour la paix et la concorde
CEQAS, Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance System
CNC, Centro Nacional de Consult Oria
CO, Country Office
CONOP, Concept of Operations
COVID-19, Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPP, Corporate Planning & Performance Division
CRF, Corporate Results Framework
CSP, Country Strategic Plan
CSPE, Country Strategic Plan Evaluation
DAC, Development Assistance Committee
DDoE, Deputy Director of Evaluation
DEV, Development Project
DoE, Director of Evaluation
DRC, Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAG, External Advisory Group
EB, Executive Board
EBS, Executive Board Secretariat
ED, Executive Director
EM, Evaluation manager
EMOP, Emergency Operation
EPLO, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EQ, Evaluation Question
ERM, Enterprise Risk Management
ESS, Environmental and Social Safeguards
EU, European Union
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization
FASTER, Functional and Support Training for Emergency Response
FYI, For your information
GBV, Gender-Based Violence
GPI, Global Peace Index
GPPI, Global Public Policy Institute
HDP, Humanitarian-Development-Peace (nexus)
HQ, Headquarters
ICG, International Crisis Group
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSP, Interim Country Strategic Plan
ID, Identification/identifier
IDP, Internally Displaced Person
IHfRA, Innovative Hub for Research in Africa
INGO, International Non-Governmental Organization
IR, Inception Report
IRG, Internal Reference Group
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRM</td>
<td>Integrated Road Map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEV</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Oversight and Policy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZSPH</td>
<td>Emergency Programme and Policy Unit/Emergencies and Transitions Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4P</td>
<td>Purchase for Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Performance and Competency Enhancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAN</td>
<td>Peace and Conflict Advisory Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td>PowerPoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO-P</td>
<td>Emergencies and Transitions Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA</td>
<td>Quality Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>Research, Assessment and Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SER</td>
<td>Summary Evaluation Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOAS</td>
<td>School of Oriental and African Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOSS</td>
<td>Statistics Organization for Society Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM-N</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Movement – North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPR</td>
<td>Standard Project Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 13. Conflict-Affected People Survey and Workshops

1. RESPONDENT PROFILE

1.1 Survey Respondent Profile

180. The methodology of the survey can be found in Annex 3. The team administered the survey in selected municipalities in the following areas:

- Burkina Faso (505 respondents): Centre Nord, Est.
- Colombia (571 respondents): La Guajira, Nariño.
- Iraq (583 respondents): Duhok, Ninewa.

181. Enumerators ensured the final sample only included respondents who know WFP and its programmes in their community. Any divergences from 100 percent in the results and figures presented in this annex are the result of rounding, which means that percentages may not precisely reflect the absolute figures.

182. **Disaggregation of results, including gender:** Figures 1–3 show the representation of gender, age groups, and type of assistance received respectively. The team ran a disaggregated analysis by gender, location, age and type of assistance received. Disaggregated analysis is included below for each question for which results show significant differences and for which these differences are of interest to the evaluation questions. If not otherwise indicated, the results showed small differences between groups or low response numbers for individual questions.

183. **Type of assistance:** It is important to note that the sample contains a relatively small share of respondents who participated in resilience programmes (see Figures 4a–4d). This is due to the sampling method within municipalities and the overall higher share of people who received emergency assistance, compared to other types, in the areas surveyed. Singling out resilience programming participants before the fact to increase their representation would not have been compatible with the sampling method, which was chosen to reduce bias. In addition, a large share of respondents who participated in resilience programmes also lived in households that received emergency assistance in the past three years, which does not allow to isolate the effects of resilience programming to be distinguished those of from emergency food.
Figure 1: Gender of survey participants

Figure 2: Age of survey participants\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{117} Due to rounding, the sum of percentages per figure may not precisely reflect the absolute figures and slightly diverge from 100 percent.
Figure 3: Have you received assistance from WFP in this area in the past three years?

Figure 4a: Burkina Faso – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible)

* FEFA: Nutritional aid to children affected by severe acute malnutrition and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
* FFA: Food Assistance (cash, voucher or food) for assets (contribution to the building or rehabilitating of assets to improve long-term food security and resilience)
Figure 4b: Colombia – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible)

* FEFA: Nutritional aid to children affected by severe acute malnutrition and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
* FFA: Food Assistance (cash, voucher or food) for assets (contribution to the building or rehabilitating of assets to improve long-term food security and resilience).

Figure 4c: Democratic Republic of the Congo – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible)

* FEFA: Nutritional aid to children affected by severe acute malnutrition and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
* FFA: Food Assistance (cash, voucher or food) for assets (contribution to the building or rehabilitating of assets to improve long-term food security and resilience).
**Figure 4d: Iraq – What type of assistance did your household/family receive? (multiple answers possible)**

* FEFA: Nutritional aid to children affected by severe acute malnutrition and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
* FFA: Food Assistance (cash, voucher or food) for assets (contribution to the building or rehabilitating of assets to improve long-term food security and resilience)

### 1.2 WORKSHOP PARTICIPANT PROFILE

184. The workshops with affected people that served to triangulate survey results took place in selected municipalities with a selection of voluntary participants (see methodology in section 1). Workshop participation was independent of survey participation.

- In Burkina Faso, 55 people participated in the four workshops (30 men and 25 women).
- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 62 people participated in the four workshops (35 men and 27 women).
- In Colombia, 50 people participated in the four workshops (35 women and 15 men).
- In Iraq, 92 people participated in the five workshops (45 women and 47 men).

### 2. SURVEY AND WORKSHOP RESULTS

#### 2.1 Food insecurity as a conflict driver

**2.1.1 Level of tensions**

185. If respondents lived in their community before WFP started providing assistance, they were asked to indicate the level of tensions and fighting in their area before and after WFP provided assistance.

186. Across all countries, 42.7 percent of respondents (and the majority in Burkina Faso, Colombia and Iraq) reported no change in tensions. In total, 17.3 percent reported an increase in tensions, and 40 percent a decrease.

187. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, more than two-thirds (69.4 percent) reported a decrease in tensions (Figures 5a-5d).
188. For Burkina Faso, there are notable gender differences. Most people report no change in tensions, but a higher share of women (60.9 percent) than men (47.8 percent) indicate no change, whereas proportionately more men (39 percent) than women (27.5 percent) report decreased tensions.

189. In Colombia, a greater share of people who had not received WFP assistance report increased levels of tensions (non-recipients 25.5 percent; recipients 11 percent), while a greater share of recipients report no change in tensions (recipients 57.1 percent; non-recipients 46.1 percent).

190. In Iraq, a greater share of recipients report a decrease (recipients 22.7 percent; non-recipients 10.5 percent) or increase in tensions (recipients 22.7 percent; non-recipients 17.1 percent), while a greater share of non-recipients say tensions are unchanged (non-recipients 72.4 percent; recipients 54.6 percent).

Figure 5a: Burkina Faso – Development of tensions before versus after WFP assistance by gender breakdown

Figure 5b: Colombia – Development of tensions before versus after WFP assistance
191. After sharing whether or not they perceive a change in tensions, people were asked whether they think WFP contributed to a rise or decline in tensions. Overall, the majority of people across all four countries who indicate a change in tensions also attribute this change, at least in part, to WFP; that is, 92.8 percent of those who say tensions decreased (n=445) and 80.4 percent of those who say tensions increased (n=107) said WFP contributed to this. In Burkina Faso, the share of women who say tensions decreased and think WFP contributed to decreased tensions is lower than the share of men (20.9 percent of women, 36.8 percent of men). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this relationship is inversed: a higher share of women (78.6 percent) than men (58.2 percent) report declining tensions and a WFP contribution to declining tensions.

192. Across all four countries, people who received assistance from WFP and perceive a decrease in tensions were more likely to say WFP contributed to decreasing tensions, compared with non-recipients who perceive a decrease in tensions. The difference is greatest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
(75.1 percent of recipients, 56.7 percent of non-recipients), followed by Iraq (22.1 percent of recipients, 7.5 percent of non-recipients), Burkina Faso (37.6 percent; 22.1 percent) and Colombia (29.3 percent; 23.4 percent). In Colombia, a greater share of non-recipients that perceive an increase in tensions say WFP contributed to increasing tensions (non-recipients 16.1 percent; recipients 3.9 percent). This difference was smaller in Burkina Faso (non-recipients 13.7 percent; recipients 6 percent) and negligible in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq.

**Figure 6a: Respondents who indicate WFP did or did not contribute to a reported **increase** in tensions**

![Figure 6a](image1)

**Figure 6b: Respondents who indicate WFP did or did not contribute to a reported decrease in tensions**

![Figure 6b](image2)
2.1.2 Reasons for Changes in Tensions

193. In the survey and in-person workshops, people who indicated a WFP contribution to rising or declining tensions were asked to explain how WFP did this.

Declining tensions:

- **Survey:**
  - Most survey respondents suggested providing assistance and addressing hunger at the individual level helps reduce tensions.
  - In all countries, some respondents specified that assistance affects interpersonal relations by alleviating aggression.
  - In all countries, some people explained that assistance facilitates cooperation and cohesion in communities.
  - In Iraq, resilience programming activities like the creation of irrigation systems were also named, without further explanation of causal pathways.
  - In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, some people explained that assistance led to lower market prices benefiting the entire community.

- **In-person workshops:** Anecdotal evidence from affected people clarified some pathways through which WFP may have contributed to declining tensions:
  - In Burkina Faso, people interacting at distribution sites and their ability to share aid enables cooperation, including between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the host community.
  - In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, workshop participants confirmed that assistance helped lower market prices, positively impacting the entire community. They also felt that reselling assistance impacted social cohesion positively, and that the ability to share assistance and help each other with in-kind assistance fostered cooperation within communities.
  - In Colombia, workshop participants discussed three different ways assistance can help reduce tensions: first and foremost, receiving assistance alleviates individual stress and therefore reduces overall tensions in communities. Secondly, food assistance was shared among community members, increasing social cohesion. Thirdly, resilience or livelihood programmes related to the peace process initially increased cohesion between different types of groups as participation was mixed and the programmes provided a hope for the future. Over time, however, training was not linked with follow-up projects and workshop participants reported disillusionment.
  - In Iraq, extending water networks reduced water scarcity and tensions between families and villages competing for water. Participants also mentioned that the creation of bakeries shared between several families created a feeling of cooperation.

Increasing tensions:

- **Survey:**
  - Most survey respondents who gave open explanations for how WFP contributed to rising tensions across countries suggested that this was due to unequal or unfair targeting and distribution of assistance (including in DRC).
  - In Burkina Faso and Colombia, some people also mentioned fights or open disagreement between people or groups as a consequence, and some explained that the general scarcity of assistance caused dissatisfaction.
  - In Iraq, some people mentioned dissatisfaction or conflicts over the selection of food for asset recipients.

- **In-person workshops:**
  - In Burkina Faso, workshop participants explained that the quality of assistance delivery created tensions, mainly at the individual level, rather than between groups. This includes the perception of discrimination or lack of understanding about targeting criteria,
especially for those who do not receive mobile cash; problems of registration; accessibility of distribution points; duplication of assistance by WFP and other organizations targeting the same recipients; incidents of violence and harassment at in-kind distribution points, particularly for women and elderly persons; and the inability of wives in polygamous families to receive aid.

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, participants also said the quality of assistance delivery creates tensions, due to inexperienced distributors, the influence of local authorities on distribution, the commercialization of assistance by distributors or staff at health facilities, and partners who illegitimately sell assistance vouchers. Some local communities also perceive IDPs to be favoured by local authorities.

- In Colombia, participants mainly pointed to the technical delivery of aid, and the different treatment of migrants/refugees compared with host communities. They cited examples of tensions at distribution points due to long queues and insufficient stocks (they also reported that these processes improved significantly over time); suspected diversion by intermediaries; rent-seeking by contracted vendors; and tensions related due to aid distributions predominantly targeting migrants and refugees, despite perceived similar levels of need among the host community. In particular, parents reported that tensions and sometime fights among parents resulted from Venezuelan children being treated differently in school feeding processes.

- In Iraq, participants reported tensions created from selecting some community members over others to participate in food-for-work programmes. In one example, community members selected for food-for-work programmes offered to work less, so that more people could have the opportunity to work. This was rejected by the implementing partners, causing more tension. Tension also arose from perceptions of unfair aid distribution and unclear communication of selection criteria.

2.2 Targeting and Disputes

194. To find out whether the distribution of assistance sparked any disagreements and conflict, and how these were resolved, people were initially asked whether WFP support is provided in a fair way in their community, which groups received most assistance, and who, if anyone, was forgotten.

195. Across all four countries, the majority of respondents think assistance was provided in a fair manner (66.3 percent). The highest share of people who think provision is not fair is in Burkina Faso (30 percent) and Iraq (29 percent) (figure 7).

196. Perceived unfairness is greater among those who have not received WFP assistance than those who have. In all countries, a greater share of recipients than non-recipients say distribution was fair (Burkina Faso, 71.4 percent of recipients vs 51.1 percent of non-recipients; Colombia, 81.6 percent vs 56.9 percent; the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 78.7 percent vs 51.4 percent; Iraq, 75.2 percent vs 41.4 percent). With the exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the difference is negligible, a greater share of non-recipients than recipients think assistance was distributed in an unfair manner (Burkina Faso, 33.9 percent of non-recipients vs 25.5 percent of recipients; Colombia, 31.6 percent vs 14.5 percent; Iraq, 45.2 percent vs 20.2 percent).
Figure 7: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community?

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents who think WFP assistance was provided fairly in different countries.]

Figure 8: In your opinion, was WFP assistance provided in a fair way in this community? (Recipients versus non-recipients)

![Bar chart showing the number of respondents who think someone should have received assistance but did not, by recipient status.]

197. Across all four countries, 50 percent of respondents think someone should have received assistance but did not (Figure 9). This view is most prevalent in Burkina Faso (78.9 percent). When asked who should have received assistance but did not, most people across all four countries mention the poorest (48.1%...
percent) or specific vulnerable groups such as elderly persons, widow(er)s, and persons with disabilities (Figure 10). In Burkina Faso, 58.2 percent of respondents say IDPs or refugees were forgotten.¹¹⁸

**Figure 9: Is there anyone who should have received assistance in your community but was left out?**

In Iraq, 60.1 percent of recipients say nobody was forgotten and only 23.7 percent say somebody was forgotten, while non-recipient responses are split between “yes” (38.1 percent), “no” (37.1 percent), and “don’t know” (24.3 percent). In Colombia and to a lesser extent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, recipients are also slightly more likely to say nobody was forgotten (Colombia, recipients 49.4 percent vs non-recipients 25.8 percent; Democratic Republic of Congo, 38 percent vs 29.4 percent), while non-recipients tend more to say somebody was forgotten (Colombia, non-recipients 55.6 percent vs recipients 34 percent; Democratic Republic of the Congo, 58.8 percent vs 51.3 percent). In Burkina Faso, both groups tend to agree that somebody was forgotten (“yes:” non-recipients 81.6 percent; recipients 76.4 percent; “no:” non-recipients 11.7 percent and recipients 16.2 percent).

¹¹⁸ In some countries, there are notable gender differences for this questions, but respondent numbers are too low in some cases to be meaningful. For example, 23 men and 7 women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo said migrants/displaced people/refugees were forgotten.
199. When asked who received most assistance (Figure 11)\textsuperscript{119}, the most frequent answer across all four countries is the poorest or those hardest hit by emergencies. Some people also say refugees (especially in Colombia) or IDPs (especially in Burkina Faso, less frequently in Iraq) receive most assistance. In Iraq, a significant minority report that rich people, the elite and those who work for camp management or WFP receive most support. In Colombia, some people say association members, rich people, or those belonging to the elite receive most support. In Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this question revealed no evidence of any groups involved in armed conflict benefitting from assistance. A few respondents in Iraq (2 persons) and Colombia (3 persons) say that people belonging to a specific socioeconomic group involved in armed conflict received most support.

\textsuperscript{119} This paragraph includes both results for the question “Who received most assistance in your community?” (Figure 10) and the follow-up question “If ‘other’ – which people are they?”.
200. Respondents were asked what happened when some people in the community received assistance and others did not (Figures 12a–12d), and - in cases of acceptance - what helped them find an agreement that led to this acceptance (Figure 13). The highest share of open disagreements (29 percent) are reported in Colombia. In Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the majority report dissatisfaction without open disagreements, and in Burkina Faso the majority of people accepted the situation.

201. When asked what helped find an agreement in case of acceptance, the majority report resignation, while a significant minority say WFP and its partners explained targeting well. A higher share of recipients than non-recipients reported that WFP explained targeting well in Colombia (33.3 percent of recipients; 18.8 percent of non-recipients), Iraq (47.3 percent; 33.3 percent), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (39.1 percent; 16.7 percent), but explanations clearly also reached non-recipients. In Iraq, a significant number of people said committees helped resolve issues (Figure 13).120

---

120 Response numbers are simply too low here to infer any patterns.
Figure 12a: Burkina Faso – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not?

Figure 12b: Democratic Republic of the Congo – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not?
Figure 12c: Colombia – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not?

Figure 12d: Iraq – What happened when some people received WFP support, but other people did not?
202. In-person workshop participants made the following suggestions regarding resolution of assistance-related disputes:

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, sharing assistance is a key conflict-resolution mechanism. Participants had diverging opinions about the quality of explanations WFP and partners provided to explain targeting. Suggestion boxes for improvements were perceived as not leading to any follow-up, and nobody mentioned complaints hotlines as a known possibility for raising concerns. Local humanitarian and health committees were not seen as helpful, but rather problematic, and in some cases potentially involved in the diversion of aid.
- In Colombia, participants predominantly suggested changing the targeting system so that aid is distributed more evenly to migrants and host communities. They also suggested stronger and more direct involvement of international WFP employees in the selection of beneficiaries; more information on who is supposed to receive what and why; and better complaints systems.
- In Iraq, the most frequent request from workshop participants was for better information on selected criteria. Participants in the workshop for refugees also requested that up to date information be used to select beneficiaries.

### 3. PARTICIPATION

203. To learn more about the potential effect of mixed community committees that bring together people from opposing groups on the distribution of assistance, people were asked who decided on distribution in their community (Figure 14). A large majority in Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iraq say WFP or its partners decided, while a significant proportion of respondents – and the majority in Colombia – say they do not know. In Iraq, a large share of respondents think the mayor decided.

204. If respondents answered “committee of diverse groups”, they were asked what happened to the relations between groups. In the areas surveyed in all countries, only very few such committees were in place and the sample of answers is too low to draw any conclusions.
Figure 14: Who decided who would receive WFP support in your community and who would not? (multiple responses possible)

205. Asking who decided on community distribution provided insights into related tensions, which were also mentioned in workshops. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, workshop participants related stories about distributors who allegedly illegitimately sold vouchers or otherwise failed to ensure principled distribution, which led to great dissatisfaction with intermediaries and calls for the more direct presence of WFP employees. Similarly, in Colombia workshop participants provided various examples of intermediaries allegedly enriching themselves, either by increasing the prices for goods included in voucher programmes or by diverting parts of the assistance provided. None of these examples, however, was detailed enough to allow for an independent verification.
4. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

206. To understand the effect of the WFP presence on the local economy and potential links to conflict dynamics, we asked respondents about the WFP influence on the distribution of wealth. The goal was to explore whether certain sides of a conflict disproportionally benefit from the WFP presence and its activities and whether those who benefit are involved in any active armed conflict.

207. Survey participants were asked whether some people in their community have more or less money than before as a result of WFP activities, for reasons other than receiving assistance (Figure 15). In Burkina Faso, Colombia and Iraq most people say nobody has less or more money than before; the next most frequent answer is "I don't know". This result is clearest for Colombia, with smaller differences in Burkina Faso and Iraq. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the majority “don't know”, followed by those who say nobody has less or more than before, with a significant minority saying some people have more money. In Iraq, significant minorities say some people have more and both that some have less and some have more; while in Burkina Faso a significant minority say some have less than before.

208. Notable gender differences exist in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a higher share of men (29 percent) than women (17 percent) think some people gained; while in Iraq, a higher share of men (47.1 percent) than women (32 percent) think nobody has less or more. In Burkina Faso, a higher share of women (46.2 percent) than men (30 percent) think nobody has less or more; while a much higher share of men (48.5 percent) than women (25.8 percent) say they do not know.

Figure 15: Do some people in your community have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities here (for reasons other than receiving WFP aid as beneficiaries)?
Figure 16a: Burkina Faso – Gender differences in responses to whether some people have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities

![Bar chart showing gender differences in responses to whether some people have more or less money due to WFP activities in Burkina Faso.](chart16a)

- **Female**: 51, 120, 67, 2, 0
- **Male**: 32, 7, 12, 0, 1
- **Other**: 115

Legend:
- Green: Some people have more money
- Red: Some people have less money
- Yellow: Both: some have more, some have less money
- Orange: No, nobody has more or less money than before WFP's activities
- Purple: I don't know
- Gray: I prefer not to respond

Figure 16b: Colombia – Gender differences in responses to whether some people have either more money or less money than before as a result of WFP activities

![Bar chart showing gender differences in responses to whether some people have more or less money due to WFP activities in Colombia.](chart16b)

- **Female**: 22, 12, 5, 6, 0
- **Male**: 17, 5, 12, 0, 2
- **Other**: 170

Legend:
- Green: Some people have more money
- Red: Some people have less money
- Yellow: Both: some have more, some have less money
- Orange: No, nobody has more or less money than before WFP's activities
- Purple: I don't know
- Gray: I prefer not to respond
A follow-up question to respondents saying either some people have more money or that some people have more and others less money was how they thought those who gained money from WFP activities, besides assistance, had done so (Figure 17).
210. In Iraq, these respondents most frequently say people sold food they did not need; the next most frequent answers are selling food on behalf of WFP as vendors, leasing land to WFP for operations and transporting goods. In Colombia, only a few people mention people selling food they did not need, and there are very few reports of other activities. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, people who thought that some had benefitted financially from WFP's presence most frequently indicated that they believed they generated income by working as contractors for WFP (selling food on behalf of WFP as vendors), followed by mentions of selling excess food, stealing food, transporting goods and leasing land. In Burkina Faso, fewer respondents mention selling excess food, transporting goods, stealing food and leasing land, or selling food on behalf of WFP as vendors. In the category “other”, most respondents across all four countries say people manage to invest in revenue-generating or revenue-increasing activities (14 respondents in Burkina Faso), such as opening shops and starting a business (14 in Iraq; 5 in Colombia), cultivating land after a WFP project (6 in Iraq); selling agricultural products and taking advantage of WFP skills training (13 in Colombia). A few respondents spoke of alleged wrongdoings surrounding assistance delivery that enriched some people in Burkina Faso (6) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2).

211. Although response numbers are low, this question also shows considerable gender differences, which are inconsistent across the four countries. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a higher share of men (35.1 percent) than women (16.4 percent) say people who gained have sold excess food they did not need; whereas in Colombia more women (29.6 percent) than men (10.3 percent) say people gained by selling excess assistance. The greatest notable gender differences exist in reports of people having gained through stealing assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (men 32.5 percent; women 8.2 percent).

Figure 17: How did the people who have more money as a result of WFP activities get it? (multiple responses possible)
212. Results indicate little concern over illegitimate economic gains from the WFP presence or links to groups involved in armed conflict (Figure 18). During the in-person workshops, participants did not provide any examples of situations in which economic gains derived from WFP activities were used to finance an armed group or armed conflict.

213. In Burkina Faso, more women (32.4 percent) than men (11.4 percent) say they don't know if those who make illegitimate gains contribute to armed conflict. This difference is reflected to a lesser extent in Iraq (women 27 percent; men 14.3 percent) while the majority of men and women in both countries say such people do not contribute to armed conflict (Burkina Faso, women 57.8 percent; men 81.8 percent; Iraq, 64.4 percent; 77 percent). In Colombia, gender differences are small and men are similarly more confident that those who gain economically from the WFP presence do not contribute to conflict. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a slightly higher share of women (64.4 percent) than men (58.4 percent) report that winners do not contribute to armed conflict, while a greater share of men than women say they prefer not to answer (10.4 percent; 1.4 percent).

Figure 18: Are the people who have gained money contributing to the armed conflict?

5. STATE-CITIZEN RELATIONSHIPS

214. The survey sought to find out whether WFP contributes to peace by improving the relationship between the state and citizens. People were asked if authorities were involved in selecting who would receive, organize, or distribute assistance and, in case they were involved, which impact this had on people's perception of the government.

215. Results differ between countries (Figure 19). A majority of respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo say the authorities were involved, while the majority in Colombia and Iraq say the authorities were not involved. In Burkina Faso, almost half of respondents say the authorities were not involved, but a significant minority think they were.
216. In each country, the majority of respondents who think authorities were involved say this has improved their reputation (59.3 percent across all four countries) (Figure 20). A significant minority in each country think it has impacted authorities' reputation negatively (14.9 percent); this is most pronounced in Colombia (21.6 percent) and Iraq (22.7 percent).

217. Notable gender differences exist in Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but they point in different directions. In Burkina Faso, a significantly greater share of women (49 percent) than men (0 percent) report that government involvement did not influence its reputation, while most men (65.1 percent) and a significant share of women (37 percent) think government involvement influenced its image positively, and some men (22.1 percent) and very few women (3 percent) say it had a negative impact. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, most people say government involvement has had a positive impact on the government's image and that share is even higher among women (74.6 percent) than men (62.8 percent), while 10.3 percent of women and 14.9 percent of women said it had a negative influence.
Figure 20: How has the involvement of authorities in assistance changed the way people in this area generally think about the government?

6. Advocacy Engagement and Positioning

218. To understand the potential role of WFP as a mediator, we first asked people if they think WFP engages with those who fight in local armed conflicts to make them stop fighting, and what WFP talks about with those groups (open-ended question). Those who talked about peacebuilding in their answers were asked if WFP is the right organization to engage in this way.

219. The majority of respondents either think WFP does not engage with armed groups – most respondents in Colombia (59.8 percent) and Iraq (62 percent) – or don’t know: most respondents in Burkina Faso (53.2 percent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (48.5 percent) (Figure 21a).

220. Burkina Faso is an outlier with a greater share of women (48.9 percent) than men (28.3 percent) who say WFP does not intervene, while a greater share of men (63.7 percent) than women (43.5 percent) say they do not know. In Colombia more men (63.1 percent) than women (56.8 percent) say WFP does not intervene; 22.8 percent men and 29.3 percent women “don’t know”. In Iraq, a small but slightly higher share of men (64 percent) than women (60 percent) say WFP does not intervene; 29.5 percent of men and 34.7 percent women in Iraq “don’t know”. And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 40.4 percent men and 38 percent women say WFP does not intervene; 46.1 percent men and 50.6 percent women “don’t know”.

221. The number of responses for whether WFP is the right actor to engage in peacebuilding is low, but most people who mention the topic think WFP is indeed the right actor to engage with armed actors for peace (Figure 22).

121 Sequence of questions: “Does WFP engage with people who are fighting in this area to make them stop fighting?”; “If ‘yes’, how does WFP act or what does WFP talk about with those people, if you know?”; “(If respondent talks about peace advocacy in previous question), Are WFP the right people to do this?”
Figure 21a: Does WFP engage with people who are fighting in this area to make them stop fighting?

Figure 21b: Burkina Faso – Gender differences in responses to whether WFP engages with people who are fighting in a given area to make them stop fighting
222. To understand perceptions of WFP positioning, we also asked respondents whether they think WFP helps any side to win in an ongoing local armed conflict or if WFP is against anyone.

223. The majority of respondents (67.6 percent) think WFP does not help any one side win, but there is a significant minority who does not know if they do (27.9 percent): respondents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are split between “no” and “don’t know” (Figure 23). Meanwhile, a large majority across all four countries thinks WFP is not against anyone (88 percent) (Figure 24).

224. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a greater share of women (91.6 percent) than men (80.3 percent) say WFP is not against any side, while women are less sure if WFP helps anyone win (50.2 percent answer “don’t know”) than men (38.6 percent). In Burkina Faso, the gender difference is smaller but similar: 95.4 percent of women and 86.5 percent of men say WFP is not against any side, while slightly more men (11.4 percent) than women (2.3 percent) are unsure.

Figure 22: If respondent mentions WFP talking about peace advocacy (previous question), are WFP the right people to do this?

Figure 23: Does WFP help one side to win in any ongoing armed conflict here?
7. RECOMMENDATIONS

225. Survey and workshop participants made recommendations for what WFP should do to contribute to peace in their community.

226. An overwhelming majority of survey respondent recommendations simply asked for more assistance. Beyond this, a large share of recommendations referred to activities outside of the WFP mandate, like housing for IDPs in Burkina Faso or other types of development or medical assistance.

227. Of the recommendations relevant to this evaluation, most related to conflict sensitivity rather than dedicated peacebuilding activities, but some did refer to peacebuilding. The most relevant topics per country are as follows:

228. Burkina Faso:
- More/continued or different types of assistance (majority of responses)
- Distribution issues (very often, but including many individual issues not directly related to conflict)
- Better monitoring and follow-up surveys (very often)
- Better communication with recipients, sensitization, and explanations (very often)
- More presence of WFP employees instead of partners and intermediaries (very often)
- Cooperation with local committees or authorities (often, yet mixed: some say WFP should rely more on local committees; some say less)
- Impartiality (some, mostly saying WFP should be present and not work with politicians)
- Help IDPs and returnees rebuild their homes (some)
- Peacebuilding (few, mostly related to sensitizing the population to the necessity of peace, helping to improve security and end terrorism, and helping the population or authorities build peace)
- Aid host communities and not only IDPs (few)
- **Recommendations from workshops** in Burkina Faso include the desire for WFP to negotiate with attackers and help restore peace, to help IDPs return and to better explain targeting and why some people do not receive assistance.

229. Colombia:
• Increase talks, training, and dialogue in communities (very often), often with a peacebuilding aspect to promote social cohesion
• Improve targeting, and conduct more household studies (very often)
• Proximity to recipients and distribution supervision (very often)
• Remain neutral and impartial, particularly in hiring people on behalf of WFP (often)
• Peacebuilding (often, with explicit mention of mediating conflict, reducing tensions and uniting communities)
• Provide support to host and indigenous communities (often)
• Provide programmes for employment (often)
• Conduct post distribution monitoring and evaluation (few)
• Communicate selection criteria and increase awareness of the programmes (few)
• Focus on youth programmes to avoid future conflict (few)
• Increase security in the area, and for recipients (few)
• Know the context, for example the problems of the area, in which you operate (few)
• **Recommendations from workshops** include improving needs assessments by international employees; providing cash instead of in-kind food or vouchers to cut out intermediaries; more information; a hotline for complaints; not involving the government in the distribution of aid; strengthening the WFP presence during distributions; monitoring by WFP and a direct presence; more assistance for host and indigenous communities and youth; and a focus on employment opportunities.

230. Democratic Republic of the Congo:

• More/continued or different types of assistance (majority of responses)
• Help IDPs return (very often)
• More presence of WFP instead of intermediaries or partners (very often)
• Cooperation with authorities and local committees (often; most say WFP should not rely on them, while very few said they should cooperate more)
• Better monitoring and follow-up surveys (often)
• Peacebuilding (few; suggestions include assisting with local conflict resolution, helping youth find employment to avoid armed rebellion and trauma therapy for conflict-affected people)
• **Recommendations from workshops** in the Democratic Republic of the Congo include more investment into local agriculture; the identification of needs to avoid tensions; more direct supervision of intermediaries by WFP; fewer intermediaries and – if so – only trustworthy individuals; and accountability and thorough legal steps from WFP against perpetrators of diversion.

231. Iraq:

• Provide training and employment programmes, especially for youth (very often)
• Remove intermediaries/deal directly with recipients (often)
• Aid in the return process for IDPs (few)
• Provide support for host communities, not only (IDP/refugee) camp recipients (few)
• Peacebuilding (almost none; it is possible to interpret support in the return process for IDPs, back to sometimes hostile communities, as peacebuilding)
• **Recommendations from workshops** include better explanation of targeting and selection criteria, and more frequent needs assessments. IDPs want more direct discussions and host communities desire more training and resilience programmes.
Annex 14. Benchmarking

232. The evaluation compared the WFP peacebuilding policy and implementation plan with three comparator organizations – the FAO, UNICEF, and Oxfam – to answer the EQ1 sub-question, “How does the WFP policy compare to that of other humanitarian organizations?”

233. The benchmarking (1) provides information on the level of detail with which the three comparator organizations contribute to peace in their work; (2) analyses the steps and institutional changes with which the organizations have applied their guidelines or policies, and what factors influenced implementation; and (3) clarifies lessons the organizations have learned through their respective approaches. The benchmarking does not score or rank the WFP peacebuilding policy against the comparator organization policies.

234. The evaluation team selected the FAO, UNICEF and Oxfam due to close alignment with the following WFP criteria: (1) implementing food security activities in conflict or transition environments; (2) a dual mandate that covers humanitarian and development assistance; (3) either a dedicated policy on peacebuilding, or on supporting peace in transition environments, or having undertaken internal deliberations to define the organization's approach in this field; and (4) having undertaken evaluations or reviews of their respective peacebuilding efforts, implementation steps and lessons learned.

235. The FAO has a dedicated policy on contributing to local peace (“A corporate framework to support sustainable peace in the context of the 2030 Agenda”) (2018) and guidance documents on conflict sensitivity and conflict analysis, and recently evaluated its work across the HDP nexus (FAO 2021). UNICEF is a suitable comparator due to extensive experience with peacebuilding in its programming. UNICEF was comparatively early in adopting a policy on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding (2016) and has been evaluated multiple times (UNICEF 2015, 2021). Oxfam, an international NGO with extensive experience of humanitarian assistance in conflict zones, does not have a dedicated policy on peacebuilding, but recently undertook to internally – among its confederation – define its peacebuilding ambitions and reflect on related challenges and trade-offs (Oxfam 2020, 2021). Each comparator organization provides different but valuable lessons for WFP.

236. The benchmarking reveals distinctions among the comparator organizations, including their timeframes for adopting dedicated policies; the content of policies and supportive materials; how and what the organizations prioritized in implementation; and the lessons they learned (see Table 10 for details):

- The UNICEF approach to peacebuilding was driven by standardization – as early as 2012 – of its different approaches to conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive programming. UNICEF staff view the development of its peacebuilding policy as a bottom-up exercise that has gradually expanded and gained relevance. The anchoring of conflict-sensitive practices has, for instance, moved from different guidance documents to more formal – and binding – instruments, such as a corporate directive (2019) and integration into the UNICEF Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action: a core UNICEF policy and framework for humanitarian action (2020). For policy implementation, UNICEF has relied on guidance, advisors in regional bureaux, capacity development measures for country offices, a targeted review of country planning documents, and a very recent special fragility and conflict prevention team that reports to UNICEF senior management. A lesson learned is that connecting senior management commitment on the issue with practical guidance, support structures and procedural changes is critical for corporate-wide acceptance. Nonetheless, a recent evaluation also found blind spots in the UNICEF approach, notably in the lack of skills and capacities for conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding across country offices (UNICEF 2021, 84).

- The FAO developed its own policy framework following the United Nations Secretary-General “Agenda for Peace” in 2016 and the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on peacebuilding that called on United Nations organizations to mainstream sustaining peace. Subsequently, in 2018 the FAO adopted its “Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in
the context of the 2030 Agenda” and issued specific guidance on ensuring conflict-sensitive practices in programme design, as well as on context analysis to inform conflict-sensitive design of interventions (FAO 2018, 2019). To support the framework's implementation, the FAO established a small team of topic specialists at headquarters, and sub-regional conflict-sensitive programming specialists to advise and train country offices on conflict-sensitive and peace-responsive practices. A key feature of the FAO approach is the participatory review of planned operations at the project design phase to integrate conflict-sensitive practices based on a step-by-step process designed with Interpeace, a global peacebuilding NGO. According to interviewees, this has resulted in over 20 conflict sensitivity Programme Clinics to assess and redesign FAO programmes, as well as more general support to more than 30 country operations. Interviewees view the partnership with Interpeace as particularly valuable to the FAO. They also noted the main challenges as limited awareness across the FAO of its approach to sustainable peace and conflict-sensitive practices, and differing views as to whether working on peace is compatible with the FAO mandate. One key lesson is that a corporate policy roll-out and clear positioning from senior leadership would have been important steps in anchoring the FAO policy framework more broadly and in finding organization-wide acceptance. This assessment is echoed by a recent internal evaluation, Evaluation of FAO’s contribution to the humanitarian–development–peace nexus 2014–2020, which noted “insufficient recognition among FAO senior managers that the HDP nexus is a corporate dimension” (FAO 2021, 70).

- Oxfam, as a confederation of national Oxfam affiliates, is organized upon different principles to United Nations organizations. As a principle, affiliates operate with relative independence and can thus be more or less advanced on specific thematic policies or practices, including peacebuilding. Although this relative independence defines the organization, in 2020 Oxfam launched a new strategic plan to guide the entire confederation on overarching issues (Oxfam 2020). The plan includes a much stronger stance on peacebuilding and on addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility as part of humanitarian programming. Oxfam issued a briefing paper – also describes as a “policy” – to support this recent change, which highlights the challenges, tensions, and dilemmas of nexus programming and commits Oxfam to conflict-sensitive programming, but without defining conflict sensitivity standards. Other support structures are peacebuilding advisors within some affiliates, a community of practice on conflict and fragility, and a small conflict sensitivity support fund to which ten Oxfam country offices from fragile countries can apply. Lessons interviewees highlighted were the importance of capturing critical insights on good programming in fragile states to guide the new strategic plan, and the bottom-up nature of defining Oxfam’s position on peacebuilding by reacting to demands from country offices, which contributes better to long-term change and addressing the root causes of humanitarian needs. A critical point raised by interviewees was the silos within Oxfam country offices that hinder much closer interaction between those responsible for humanitarian assistance and those implementing longer-term projects that could more easily integrate a peacebuilding component.
**Table 10: Benchmarking overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FAO</th>
<th>UNICEF</th>
<th>OXFAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeframe and policy content</strong></td>
<td>The policy development followed the United Nations Secretary-General “Agenda for Peace” in 2016 and the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions on peacebuilding that called on UN organizations to mainstream sustaining peace.</td>
<td>In 2012, UNICEF initiated the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) with a USD 150 million grant from the Government of the Netherlands. This four year programme (2012–2015) was a key start for UNICEF to systematically integrate peacebuilding and education policies and programmes.</td>
<td>In 2019, Oxfam issued a discussion paper on the triple nexus, followed in 2020 by a new strategic plan for the entire organization that prioritized contributing to peace as part of its programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy development followed new donor priorities and independent evaluations (e.g. on the FAO in crisis and transition settings from 2015) that emphasized the need for a dedicated policy framework on contributing to peace.</td>
<td>The programme consolidated different peacebuilding practices within UNICEF and also developed specific theories of change and to better reporting on the UNICEF contribution to peace.</td>
<td>Oxfam also launched an internal “listening project” to collect insights on best practice in fragile states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The FAO compiled a background document on its experience and comparative advantages in contributing to sustainable peace to guide the policy framework’s development.</td>
<td>Policy content:</td>
<td><strong>Policy content:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The FAO was also compelled to develop its own position on contributing to peace by the fact the WFP had a dedicated peacebuilding policy.</td>
<td>UNICEF does not have a single, distinct policy on peacebuilding but has relied on a combination of practical programmes and guidance (e.g. on social cohesion and conflict sensitivity) to define its approach.</td>
<td>Until 2021, Oxfam’s peacebuilding standards – the closest equivalent to the policies and directives of the WFP, the FAO and UNICEF – relied mainly on safe programming standards that include “do no harm” requirements and protection principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy content:</td>
<td>In 2018, the FAO adopted its “Corporate Framework to support sustainable peace in the context of the 2030 Agenda.” The framework describes five deliverables for implementation: (1) The integration of concepts, indicators, and lesson-learning on contributing to sustainable peace (reflecting the central importance of gender and age) across all five Strategic Objectives of the FAO and across HQ, regional, and country offices (programmatic innovations and organizational management). (2) A robust, flexibly financed global portfolio of engagements in supporting sustainable peace</td>
<td>In 2012, UNICEF issued a Technical Note on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding (2012), which identified three broad directions for the organization when working in conflict-affected countries: (1) All UNICEF strategies and programmes in these countries should be informed by a robust conflict analysis. (2) All UNICEF strategies and programmes in these countries should be conflict sensitive. (3) UNICEF should take a more explicit and systematic approach to peacebuilding, where appropriate.</td>
<td>Oxfam's humanitarian mandate also includes advocating for ceasefires and offering a platform for local peacebuilders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• In 2021, after two years of internal consultations, Oxfam's briefing paper, “Programming across the triple nexus,” outlined principles such that its programming “upholds the highest standards of do no harm, safe programming and conflict sensitivity.”</td>
<td>• The paper specifies that Oxfam will “ensure that all programming in a particular country is informed by a common analysis of the structural causes of conflict, connectors, dividers and conflict triggers, to ensure improved conflict-sensitive approaches across operations and programming areas.”</td>
<td>• Oxfam's humanitarian mandate also includes advocating for ceasefires and offering a platform for local peacebuilders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with measurable results (programmatic innovations).
(3) An improved evidence base and strengthened, gender- and age-disaggregated monitoring systems that focus on the linkages between food security, nutrition and peace, and on the effectiveness of various approaches (analysis and monitoring).
(4) New coalitions, partnerships and leadership roles at country level and globally on supporting sustainable peace (partnerships and convening role).
(5) Demonstrably effective capacity and commitment to sustainable peace of all personnel to work on, in and through conflicts to improve food security and nutrition and foster agricultural development and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction for men and women (organizational management).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation steps</th>
<th>Internal dissemination:</th>
<th>Internal dissemination:</th>
<th>Internal dissemination:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The main focus of UNICEF within peacebuilding was initially centred on strengthening community-level social cohesion.</td>
<td>Peacebuilding has been integrated into different policy documents through gradual evolution, starting with guidance on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding (2012). The 2013–2017 strategic plan mirrored the commitment to peacebuilding with indicators and goals for youth and peacebuilding. In 2016, UNICEF published a “Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Guide.” In 2019, UNICEF issued a corporate directive on conflict-sensitive programming to anchor peacebuilding practice in the organization. In 2020, UNICEF released its Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, the main UNICEF policy framework for humanitarian action. The core commitments emphasize risk-informed programming with the intention to contribute to social cohesion and peace, if relevant and feasible.</td>
<td>Dissemination of strategic plan and additional briefing paper. Oxfam has an informal community of practice on conflict and fragility. Support structure with technical advisors going to different country operations providing trainings and by default informing about Oxfam’s principles and priorities related peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organizational support and capacity development:**
- The main focus of UNICEF within peacebuilding was initially centred on strengthening community-level social cohesion.
- Peacebuilding has been integrated into different policy documents through gradual evolution, starting with guidance on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding (2012).
- The 2013–2017 strategic plan mirrored the commitment to peacebuilding with indicators and goals for youth and peacebuilding.
- In 2016, UNICEF published a “Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding Guide.”
- In 2019, UNICEF issued a corporate directive on conflict-sensitive programming to anchor peacebuilding practice in the organization.
- In 2020, UNICEF released its Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, the main UNICEF policy framework for humanitarian action. The core commitments emphasize risk-informed programming with the intention to contribute to social cohesion and peace, if relevant and feasible.

**Internal dissemination:**
- The FAO has only invested little in a corporate roll-out of the policy. It has relied on a voluntary approach to implementation.
- A dedicated Conflict and Peace Unit (CPU) at headquarters updates to FAO senior management on monthly activity.

**Organizational support and capacity development:**
- To supplement the corporate framework, the FAO issued additional guidance on: (1) context analysis; and (2) conflict-sensitive programming, developed with Interpeace.
- The FAO established the Conflict and Peace Unit at headquarters and posted three conflict-sensitive programming specialists to sub-regional offices. The main task of the CPU and the regional specialists is to support country offices in conflict-sensitive and peace-responsive programming.

**Internal dissemination:**
- The FAO has only invested little in a corporate roll-out of the policy. It has relied on a voluntary approach to implementation.
- A dedicated Conflict and Peace Unit (CPU) at headquarters updates to FAO senior management on monthly activity.

**Organizational support and capacity development:**
- To supplement the corporate framework, the FAO issued additional guidance on: (1) context analysis; and (2) conflict-sensitive programming, developed with Interpeace.
- The FAO established the Conflict and Peace Unit at headquarters and posted three conflict-sensitive programming specialists to sub-regional offices. The main task of the CPU and the regional specialists is to support country offices in conflict-sensitive and peace-responsive programming.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lessons learned</th>
<th>Factors influencing policy implementation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• There is limited awareness-raising within the FAO about its new directions on the nexus and contributing to local peace. This has resulted in limited reach of the corporate framework and its directives across FAO staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The partnership with Interpeace gave FAO access to practical expertise and facilitated the development of guidance materials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Relying only on guidance documents is not sufficient for widespread policy uptake. Key steps to mainstreaming the FAO corporate framework were conflict sensitivity programming guidance materials alongside decentralized and dedicated conflict-sensitive programming specialists to support country offices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other challenges and lessons learned:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The outcome evaluation of the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA) found it would be important to articulate a clearer vision for UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational support and capacity development:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• At headquarters, UNICEF has a small Conflict Prevention, Fragility and Peacebuilding Team linked to the UNICEF Programme Group, which sets programmatic direction for the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• UNICEF has peacebuilding advisors at the regional level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• In addition to guidance documents, UNICEF developed a capacity development portfolio for country offices, which is jointly rolled-out by headquarters and regional offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• All country planning documents are quality-controlled internally to ensure risk-informed approaches.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors influencing policy implementation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• UNICEF has invested in different evaluations and learning exercises to better understand its role in peacebuilding and to improve its structures and processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Leadership matters; engagement on peacebuilding is critically linked to senior management positions, specifically those of the UNICEF Executive Director.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Matching interest and commitment in the topic with guidance and support is important for corporate-wide acceptance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors influencing policy implementation:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Oxfam's strategic direction and principles on peacebuilding were based on two years of extensive consultations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oxfam country offices decide how to prioritize peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oxfam has expanded partnerships and gained knowledge by engaging external conflict sensitivity actors, for example, the “Conflict sensitivity community hub” in West Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other challenges and lessons learned:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Context matters: It is important to acknowledge that a component on peacebuilding within a humanitarian assistance programme is not always possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partnerships with and support to local organizations are critical because they have more...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflict-sensitive, peace-responsive and nexus programming requires constant internal advocacy because some FAO staff do not see it as a core mandate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Timing support to country offices is critical. Project formulation is the entry point for conflict sensitivity, when the FAO encourages conflict sensitivity indicators in project logframes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Country-level capacity is critical, because not all FAO country offices have designated staff to work with subregional specialists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work in peacebuilding and to integrate this vision into strategies at corporate and country levels (UNICEF 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• UNICEF continues to be challenged by uncertainty and a lack of consensus about its role in peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opportunities than Oxfam to engage in peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>