



WFP EVALUATION



**World Food
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Evaluation of Egypt WFP Country Strategic Plan 2018-2023

Centralized evaluation report – Volume I

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Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

EVALUATION FEATURES

1. The country strategic plan (CSP) evaluation was timed to provide evidence and lessons to inform the development of the next WFP CSP for Egypt.
2. The evaluation covered all activities implemented between January 2018 and March 2022 under the transitional interim CSP (T-ICSP) covering January–June 2018 and the CSP for July 2018–December 2023. It assessed WFP's strategic positioning and the extent to which the organization made the shifts expected under the CSP, WFP's effectiveness in contributing to strategic outcomes, the efficiency with which the CSP was implemented, the appropriateness of the operational modalities used to respond to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and factors explaining WFP's performance.
3. The evaluation was conducted by an independent evaluation team through a mixed-methods approach: qualitative data from key informants were supplemented with quantitative secondary data. Data collection was undertaken through an electronic survey and a combination of remote and face-to-face interviews with a total of 391 persons comprising 300 beneficiaries and 91 other stakeholders; the latter included WFP staff from headquarters, the Regional Bureau for the Middle East, Northern Africa and Eastern Europe and the country office, the Government, donors, other United Nations entities and non-governmental organization cooperating partners. Through the triangulation of information the methodology ensured the mitigation of evaluability limitations.
4. Gender and social inclusion were fully integrated into the evaluation's methodological approach. Ethical standards were applied to ensure the dignity and confidentiality of the individuals involved in the evaluation.

CONTEXT

5. In 2022 Egypt's population was estimated at 108.8 million people.¹ In 2019, the country's score on the Human Development Index was 0.707 (an increase of 29 percent from 1990), ranking it 116th of 189 countries.² Between 1990 and 2019 life expectancy at birth increased by 7.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 3.9 years and expected years of schooling increased by 3.5 years.³ Poverty rates decreased to 29.7 percent in 2019–2020, from 32.5 percent in 2017–2018.⁴ However, 6.1 percent of the population is vulnerable to multidimensional poverty and 0.6 percent is in severe multidimensional poverty.⁵ Unemployment among young people declined steadily from 34.7 percent in 2015 to 21 percent in 2019 but increased to 34.1 percent between 2019 and 2021.⁶ In 2021 Egypt ranked 129th of 146 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index, the highest ranking the country has recorded in the past ten years.⁷

¹ Countrymeters. 2022. [Egypt Population](#).

² United Nations Development Programme. 2020. [Human Development Report 2020. The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene](#).

³ World Bank. 2022. [Life expectancy at birth, total \(years\) – Egypt, Arab Rep.](#)










⁴ United Nations Development Programme. 2021. [Egypt's Human Development Report 2021](#).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ World Bank. 2022. [Unemployment, youth total \(% of total labor force ages 15–24\) \(modeled ILO estimate\) – Egypt, Arab Rep.](#)

⁷ World Economic Forum. 2022. [Global Gender Gap Report 2022](#).

6. The percentage of undernourished people increased from 4.4 percent in 2015 to 5.1 percent in 2020,⁸ but the prevalence of severe food insecurity decreased from 8.7 percent in 2016 to 7.1 percent in 2020.⁹ Between 2014 and 2021 the prevalence of stunting among children under 5 decreased from 21.4 to 12.8 percent and wasting from 8 to 3 percent, while anaemia increased from 27.2 to 43 percent.¹⁰
7. The agriculture sector provides livelihoods for 57 percent of the population.¹¹ Agricultural communities in Upper Egypt, in particular smallholder farmers, are subject to food insecurity, water scarcity, climate variability and unsustainable livelihoods.¹² Egypt is at high risk from natural hazards and very vulnerable to climate change impacts.¹³ The 2021 Global Climate Risk Index ranked Egypt 120th of 180 countries.¹⁴

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	Indicator	Value	Year
	Population total (million) (1)	108.8	2022
	Human Development Index (score) (2)	0.707	2019
	Gross domestic product growth (3)	3.3 percent	2021
	Gini coefficient (3)	32	2017
	Unemployment among young people (% of total labour force 15–24 years of age) (3)	21 percent	2019
	Life expectancy at birth (3)	72 years	2020
	Global Hunger Index (score) (4)	57	2022
	Prevalence of stunting in children under 5 (5)	12.8	2021
	Climate Risk Index rank (6)	120	2021

Source: (1) [Countrymeters](#). 2022. [Egypt Population](#); (2) United Nations Development Programme. 2021. [Egypt's Human Development Report 2021](#); (3) World Bank. 2022. [Egypt, Arab Rep.](#); (4) Global Hunger Index. 2022. [Egypt](#); (5) Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. 2022. [Egypt Family Health Survey 2021](#); (6) GermanWatch. 2021. [Global Climate Risk Index 2021](#).

⁸ FAOSTAT. 2022. [Prevalence of undernourishment \(percent\) Egypt](#).

⁹ World Bank. 2022. [Prevalence of severe food insecurity in the population \(%\) – Egypt, Arab. Rep.](#)

¹⁰ Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. 2022. [Egypt Family Health Survey 2021](#) (in Arabic).

¹¹ International Fund for Agricultural Development. 2022. [Egypt country page](#).

¹² International Journal of Food and Agricultural Economics. 2020. [The Socio-Economic Assessment to Evaluate the Potentiality of Developing the Rural Community in Upper Egypt](#).


¹³ World Bank. 2021. [Climate Risk Country Profile: Egypt](#).

¹⁴ GermanWatch. 2021. [Global Climate Risk Index 2021](#).

WFP COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN

8. WFP has provided support in Egypt since 1968. As noted above, a T-ICSP covered the first six months of 2018 and was followed by a CSP covering the period from mid-2018 to the end of 2023. The T-ICSP aimed to support the shift in WFP’s focus towards the strengthening of national capacity to address the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition and the strengthening of resilience among food-insecure and malnourished populations, and it included a response to general vulnerability and shocks. The CSP added a focus on South-South cooperation and technological support. Figure 1 illustrates the major events affecting the country context, United Nations development assistance frameworks and WFP interventions.

Figure 1: Country context and WFP operational overview of Egypt




Abbreviations: PRRO = protracted relief and recovery operation.

Source: Office of Evaluation based on the full report on the evaluation of the T-ICSP and CSP.

9. The original needs-based plan for the CSP was USD 454 million (figure 2). By April 2022 that amount had risen to USD 586.4 million, reflecting four CSP revisions. Actual expenditure as a percentage of allocated resources averaged 84 percent across activities and strategic outcomes.

Figure 2: Egypt country strategic plan resource overview, 2018–2023



* The needs-based plan budget percentages by strategic outcome have been calculated at the level of total direct costs, including direct support costs (USD 16.3 million) and excluding indirect support costs.


** Allocated resources and expenditure data do not include indirect support costs because the data was extracted at mid-year.

Abbreviation: SO = strategic outcome.

Source: Country portfolio budget resource overview report, data extracted on 7 April 2022 (not available online).

10. WFP provides various types of support in all 27 of Egypt's governorates, with only one programme implemented nationally (the nutrition programme). The CSP initially aimed to reach 1,473,000 beneficiaries, which was revised to 2,111,000. In the second half of 2018 (the first six months of CSP implementation) and over the period from January 2020 through the first quarter of 2022, the beneficiaries reached were consistently fewer than planned. Only in 2019 did the number of beneficiaries reached exceed the number planned.

Figure 3: CSP beneficiaries (planned and actual) by year and sex, 2018–2022



Sources: Annual country reports: T-ICSP 2018, CSP 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Actual data for the first quarter of 2022 provided by the country office.

EVALUATION FINDINGS

TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WFP'S STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES, PEOPLE'S NEEDS AND WFP'S STRENGTHS?

Relevance to national policies, plans and strategies

- The CSP was relevant to government frameworks, policies and strategies and aligned with Egypt's Vision 2030. The CSP strategic outcomes were aligned with various national programmes, including social protection programmes such as *Takaful* and *Karama*, the First 1,000 Days programme and *Haya Karima*. Egypt's constitutional commitment to nutrition reflects the objectives detailed under strategic outcomes 2 (hunger) and 4 (education). Through the provision of food transfers, cash-based transfers (CBTs) and a range of awareness-raising activities, strategic outcomes 1, 2, 3 and 5 promoted the objectives of Egypt's 2017 national food and nutrition policy. Strategic outcome 4 aimed to support the country's 2017 sustainable agriculture strategy.
- Beneficiary targeting for all activities, apart from those for refugees and displaced persons, was conducted through government systems. This approach was appropriate given the integration of most CSP activities into the Government's social protection structures. On the other hand, there is no evidence that WFP validated the beneficiary lists received from the Government or conducted post-distribution monitoring to ascertain whether the most vulnerable people were actually reached. Some targeting gaps existed with regard to young people and persons with disabilities. In the Bedouin community beneficiaries were identified by community leaders using their own criteria, but there was no clear evidence to confirm that the most vulnerable households were those targeted.
- The CSP remained highly relevant to the country's circumstances and the intended target groups over the period covered by the evaluation. The breadth of activities and a wide range of sub-activities provided the flexibility needed to respond to changes, mainly in the number and coverage of refugees,

and shocks, mainly related to COVID-19. In the response to COVID-19 a shift from conditional to unconditional support was made under strategic outcome 1 (school feeding) and strategic outcomes 2 and 3 (nutrition counselling for pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls) to enable the continuation of support during the pandemic while seeking to reduce potential infection and, through school closures, rates of infection. In addition activity 9, which expanded the provision of food assistance to crisis-affected populations during and in the aftermath of the crisis, was added.

14. The CSP was well aligned with the United Nations partnership development framework for 2018–2022, and WFP engaged in important partnerships with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Collaboration with other entities such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), was more ad hoc and hence less strategic. WFP used its comparative advantage in food security, its in-depth knowledge of the country and its strong relationships with government agencies. It also partnered with private sector actors (for example, on nutrition messaging with Carrefour) and non-governmental organizations.

Delivery of outputs and contribution to strategic outcomes

15. Strategic outcome 1: Food-insecure and most vulnerable children and families in targeted areas of Egypt have access to adequate food all year round. The school feeding programme, take-home rations and conditional CBTs were successful and supported the attainment of strategic outcome 1. School feeding supported positive school attendance and retention outcomes, and take-home rations and CBTs enabled households to cope better under the conditions imposed by COVID-19. WFP’s efforts to increase women’s participation through the microloan programme, seed funds and business development workshops helped some women to increase their incomes, although the pandemic had an adverse effect and made loan repayment more difficult. WFP promoted gender equality awareness in schools and provided lawyers with capacity strengthening on providing support for gender-based violence victims. However, there is no clear evidence of the degree to which activities such as microloans, community hubs and youth capacity development have delivered, or will deliver, on the strategic outcome. In some cases there was a similar lack of clarity with regard to which complementary activities should be implemented to ensure that WFP’s engagement leads to the desired results in areas such as infrastructure support for schools and the training of government teachers.
16. Strategic outcome 2: Food-insecure refugees, displaced populations and host communities in Egypt have access to adequate food all year round. General food distribution through cash vouchers improved the nutrition status of beneficiaries, although a cap on CBTs restricting them to five members per household constrained their effectiveness. Social and behaviour change communication also contributed to improved nutrition, although in some cases targeting should have been broadened to include all the household members engaged in nutrition-related decision-making and not only pregnant and breastfeeding women. The outcomes of resilience building and the integration of refugees into host communities were not systematically assessed by WFP, but most participants in resilience building activities successfully completed livelihood training and received monthly household assistance, with the potential to improve their nutrition. Despite the lack of a systematic assessment, beneficiaries considered the food assistance provided as part of the COVID-19 response to be an important positive contribution to their food and nutrition security.
17. **Strategic outcome 3: Targeted populations in Egypt have improved nutritional status by 2030.** WFP’s assistance supported a number of important national social protection programmes, strategies and initiatives. It played a key role in the Government’s First 1,000 Days programme via the development of nutrition counselling materials, nutrition messaging through social media platforms and the fostering of policy dialogue through, for instance, the organization of high-level ministerial conferences. The programme improved the nutrition status of beneficiaries. WFP became the strategic partner for key national programmes, including the Presidential “100 million Healthy Lives” initiative, under which screening for anaemia, obesity and stunting are carried out; the national nutrition strategy and action plan; and the *Haya Karima* social protection programme, for which WFP developed a nutrition component. COVID-19, however, severely affected the outcomes of some activities, such as the development of curricula and social and behaviour change communications under the First 1,000 Days programme.

18. Strategic outcome 4: Vulnerable smallholder farmer and Bedouin communities in targeted governorates of Egypt have resilient livelihoods by 2030. Support for communities in Upper Egypt in adapting to climate change and shocks – through capacity strengthening (with regard to, for instance, improvement of irrigation canals and use of solar-powered irrigation), income diversification through in-kind animal loans and technological advancement and agroprocessing practices – showed clear indications of improving resilience in the long term. WFP’s support for Bedouin communities through food assistance for assets was useful in creating infrastructure (such as irrigation mechanisms) and led to increased production. However, the support lacked key elements that would enable resilience building; for instance, farmers could not make use of irrigation systems due to the lack of a sustainable system for meeting the recurring seasonal need for seeds and seedlings without continuous support from WFP or other actors.
19. Strategic outcome 5: The Government of Egypt has enhanced capacity to target and assist vulnerable populations and share its experience with selected countries to achieve zero hunger by 2030. WFP’s support for the development of a geospatial platform strengthened the capacity of government staff to undertake geographical analysis of statistical data on social protection to inform policymaking. The platform also helped the Government to facilitate the monitoring of the supply chain for wheat. Other activities under strategic outcome 5, such as partnerships and the establishment of the Luxor Centre for Knowledge Sharing and Innovation, have the potential to contribute effectively to knowledge sharing and innovation, but more time is required to assess their effect.

Contribution to cross-cutting aims

20. **Humanitarian principles, protection and accountability to affected populations.** Most of the protection concerns of beneficiaries were addressed by WFP, but there were concerns that the processes for securing benefits (CBTs or vouchers) were cumbersome for beneficiaries and that beneficiary dignity was not consistently upheld. Results were mixed with regard to the provision of information to, and consultation of, beneficiaries at the programme design stage. Consultations determined the focus of support (for example, which community members should benefit and how) but did not serve to modify the type of support provided or to ensure that support was comprehensive (for example, that business development training was coupled with microloans). Overall, beneficiaries were well aware of WFP’s complaint and feedback mechanism, as evidenced by the increase in the number of calls over the years of CSP implementation.
21. **Gender.** The country office participated in WFP’s gender transformation programme, which led to an improved focus on support for women, in the form of CBTs and capacity strengthening enabling them to supplement their incomes; in addition, gender-transformative messages were incorporated into the work conducted. However, limited in-house gender capacity could impair the office’s ability to ensure effective gender mainstreaming and delivery of relevant results. The gender action plan supported both internal and programmatic gender elements and was reviewed periodically to assess progress. The country office maintained a good gender balance in staffing, and a high proportion of senior roles are held by women.
22. **Environment.** Although WFP did not collect data related to its standard indicators on climate change, efforts to address climate concerns were considered, particularly under strategic outcome 4 where WFP activities supported climate-responsive irrigation practices, household crop and animal choices and harvest management practices, particularly in Upper Egypt. A second phase of those activities will focus on promoting positive environmental and social benefits under all activities while avoiding adverse environmental and social risks and impacts. In addition, country capacity strengthening activities (strategic outcome 5) aimed to address environmental issues, specifically by increasing resilience and government responsiveness, using digital platforms and knowledge exchange.

Sustainability of achievements

23. Knowledge building activities (such as social and behaviour change communication and activities for improving literacy) through which beneficiaries could make use of the knowledge gained without additional support were the most sustainable. The sustainability of other activities varied, particularly for those that included the provision of tangible assets. For instance, the provision of microloans and the distribution of small ruminants were likely to be more sustainable than the distribution of seeds, which were provided without fertilizer. The sustainability of institutional capacity development activities varied, depending on the Government’s ability to allocate the resources needed for further uptake.

Support for refugees and asylum seekers fell into the emergency response category and hence was intended to be short-lived and not expected to be sustainable.

Strategic links between humanitarian, development and peace work

24. The CSP does not identify how WFP planned to facilitate strategic linkages at the humanitarian–development–peace nexus, and the concept of the peace element has not been explicitly applied. However, some of WFP’s work has the potential to contribute to the nexus. For instance, under the “one refugee programme”, WFP’s engagement with host communities has the aim of supporting the integration of refugees and asylum seekers into local communities and strengthening social cohesion. WFP’s efforts to support young people’s employment has the potential to strengthen the nexus by providing economic opportunities for young people and helping to prevent social conflict.

TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

Timeliness of delivery

25. Support was generally provided on time and beneficiaries felt that they received benefits when they expected them. However, a few challenges affected timeliness. First, the availability of resources constrained service delivery, especially as the needs-based plan was only 51 percent funded by the end of 2021. Second, government administrative processes caused some delays, for example, in beneficiary selection and the access authorizations required for some groups of beneficiaries. Third, owing to COVID-19-related restrictions certain activities had to be halted completely (for example, the provision of social and behaviour change communication at health facilities and school feeding) or replaced by others, which required operational adaptations that were time-consuming.

Coverage

26. Targeting systems, which were based on government and UNHCR identification systems, captured the most vulnerable individuals, households and communities, although some groups were overlooked, such as persons with disabilities. While performance varied among strategic outcomes, funding played a vital role in determining reach. Certain other factors, including government requests that all schools in the country be covered by WFP’s school feeding support, in addition to the planned community schools, led to wider reach, and some potential beneficiaries were not captured owing to government databases not being updated. Generally, post-pandemic delays caused reduced reach of food distributions while the reach of CBT distributions under strategic outcome 2 was satisfactory. By and large, activities conducted to support responses to climate change (strategic outcome 4) reached their planned coverage targets. However, in Bedouin communities, where support is no longer provided owing to a lack of funding (other than for COVID-19-related support), the need for continued support, such as the provision of seedlings beyond the CSP period, remains pressing.

Cost-efficiency

27. Cost-efficiency was mediated by national requirements. For example, the required use of government procurement mechanisms may have had some cost implications owing to the choice of suppliers. However, for CBT programmes, efficiency (cost-to-transfer) rates were within international standards.¹⁵ Direct support cost challenges included increases in commodity prices during CSP implementation, increased fuel prices causing increases in operational costs and low levels of funding reducing the scale of operations.

¹⁵ Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. 2022. [Cash transfers Factsheet](#).

TABLE 2: PLANNED COST-TRANSFER RATIO FOR CASH-BASED TRANSFER ACTIVITIES				
	Activity 2	Activity 3	Activity 9	Activity 4
Transfer value of CBTs support (USD)	7 350 539	177 849 359	26 519 969	72 112 107
Total costs (USD)	8 813 417	208 528 478	30 148 478	84 088 315
Cost-transfer ratio (85.5% international standard) (%)	83.40	85.29	87.96	85.76

Source: Country portfolio budget as per CSP revision 4 budget.

Alternative cost-efficient measures

28. Efforts to improve the cost-efficiency of activities included digitization, such as for enhanced beneficiary validation and beneficiary authentication technologies to optimize operation time and reduce the risk of fraud. In addition, an online marketing platform for women entrepreneurs was introduced, and there was a shift from paper-based to online processes wherever possible. The shift from food transfers to CBTs was mainly in response to COVID-19 limitations rather than reasons of cost-efficiency in operations. There were disparities in the costs of distributing food in governorates across Egypt, and while past data on such costs existed they were not used in determining the choice of transfer modality or the most efficient way to deliver food or CBTs.

WHAT FACTORS EXPLAIN WFP'S PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED UNDER THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

Use of existing evidence

29. Evidence to inform the implementation of the CSP was derived from three key types of activity: targeted studies and assessments aimed at informing specific areas of work, ad hoc real-time assessments conducted by country office staff, and systematic monitoring and evaluation conducted using robust tools and standard WFP indicators. While the first two informed practice on the ground, a lack of monitoring staff limited WFP's ability to assess all of its activities continually. In addition, although corporate indicators were collected the evaluation team did not observe their use to inform WFP's decision-making.

Resource mobilization

30. WFP faced challenges in securing funding and was critically reliant on very few donors, making it vulnerable to changes in the policies of those donors. Evidence suggests that there was also some funding fatigue. The CSP was only 56.28 percent funded at the time of the evaluation, and more than 62 percent of the available resources were earmarked at the activity level, with the majority of funding destined for crisis response; this constrained WFP operations considerably. In response to this challenge WFP focused on diversifying its donor base, such as by engaging the private sector and securing support from the Government through debt-swap programmes and a programme with the Central Bank of Egypt.

Partnerships

31. WFP's principal partnership in Egypt was with the Government, in which it played an important role as a strategic partner, designer of programmes and implementer. WFP fostered collaboration with various other United Nations entities, including UNHCR, UNICEF and UN-Women. While those collaboration agreements generally produced positive results they were intended for specific activities, and WFP did not act on all opportunities for long-term collaboration. Partnerships with civil society organizations were limited and largely operational, although WFP expected such organizations to play a significant

role in sustaining the results of its activities. All partnerships were in overall alignment with the CSP objectives.

Flexibility of country strategic plan implementation

32. When faced with changing circumstances and shocks, WFP was able to exercise considerable flexibility and responsiveness; this was facilitated by the wide range of support areas under the CSP. For example, as part of changes in its approach to working with refugees, WFP was able to expand its activities to cover a broader beneficiary base. In response to COVID-19 WFP was able to switch from food-based assistance to CBTs, reallocate its remaining high-energy biscuits to orphanages when schools closed and expand its portfolio of activities to other beneficiaries, such as through the addition of activity 9.

Other factors that explain WFP performance and its strategic shift

33. Two strategic shifts envisioned under the CSP were the shifts in focus to innovation and country capacity strengthening. WFP put in place a range of innovative digital solutions and focused on country capacity strengthening. Overall, WFP made initial progress in taking on an auxiliary role in relation to government systems, but the ad hoc nature of those efforts and a lack of reliable donor commitments limited performance and potential sustainability. Despite these challenges, WFP's support, including its support for digital solutions and country capacity strengthening, contributed to the Government's efforts to achieve its Sustainable Development Goal objectives. However, gaps in the monitoring and evaluation system make it difficult to assess the extent of the strategic shift made by the country office.

CONCLUSIONS

34. WFP is on track to achieving the planned CSP results, albeit with some exceptions. Under strategic outcome 1 (school feeding), take-home rations and conditional CBTs were successful in reducing food insecurity, vulnerability and educational gaps. WFP made clear efforts to increase women's participation through the microloan programme, seed funds and business development workshops. Activities under strategic outcome 2 led to enhanced food security, increased breastfeeding and more nutritious beneficiary diets. WFP's work on the First 1,000 Days programme under strategic outcome 3 provided critical knowledge on nutrition through social and behaviour change communication and policy engagement efforts with the Government. The resilience of smallholder farmers was increased under strategic outcome 4, although the results were less than expected among Bedouins. Support for national partnerships, South-South cooperation and the Luxor centre under strategic outcome 5 enhanced WFP's profile.

35. A fragmented approach to the formulation and delivery of its interventions risks limiting the CSP's overall performance: some activities and sub-activities clearly supported the attainment of strategic outcomes while others appeared to be ad hoc in their implementation and overly broad, as reflected in the lack of complementary activities required to ensure the desired results (see paragraph 15). Donors expressed their preference for certain interventions based on their own needs or their assessment of the sustainability of those interventions. In addition, some of the interventions that are part of mainstream government programmes show greater potential for sustainability, while others show less promise owing to design limitations. A holistic approach to the selection of interventions would have allowed a focus on fewer, more coherent interventions.

36. WFP supported the Government's response to several pressing challenges. In particular, WFP's work in the sectors of child and maternal nutrition, the food security of refugees, the response to climate change and the inclusion of technology and innovation was notable. Thus far the Government has worked with WFP to find innovative funding modalities such as debt swaps, but the degree to which the Government will allocate the necessary resources to ensure that benefits are sustained is less clear.

37. WFP's work was well-aligned with the United Nations partnership development framework and the organization engaged in joint efforts with other United Nations entities. However, WFP did not capitalize on long-term opportunities. WFP's own work in communities where multiple forms of support were provided demonstrated that addressing challenges in a multifaceted way can generate results that are greater than the sum of their parts. At the same time, WFP demonstrated the ability to respond to emergencies and to adapt to changing needs, for example in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

38. Using existing national systems to identify beneficiaries was an important element in ensuring the long-term sustainability of the results of WFP's activities. However, it also resulted in some targeting gaps; for instance, some of the most vulnerable population groups, such as persons with disabilities, were not consistently targeted, and WFP's competence in identifying the most vulnerable people, households and communities was not used to support the robustness of government selection systems.
39. The ability of the country office to effectively monitor activities, use monitoring data and ensure that gender was mainstreamed effectively and that all aspects of accountability to affected populations were effectively included in implementation was hampered by a lack of staff with the right skills. Corporate monitoring data were collected but were not always used, and there were not enough monitoring and evaluation staff to support all operational activities effectively.
40. WFP successfully supported the Government in the digitization of systems for supporting improved food security and played an important role in supporting country capacity strengthening more broadly through training and technical advice. However, a capacity gap assessment that would have enabled the complete handover of those digital tools or the improved targeting relevant to other country capacity activities was not conducted during the CSP design stage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

#.	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1	WFP should review the interventions it engages in, including capacity strengthening activities, from strategic and operational perspectives with a view to streamlining and consolidating the number of interventions that are included in the next country strategic plan while ensuring alignment with government needs and priorities.					
1.1	WFP should engage in capacity strengthening activities that are based on a solid capacity gap assessment and that have clearly identified outputs, outcomes and progress indicators. Such activities should be clearly coordinated with other activities and be aligned with the following sub-recommendations.	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, and headquarters divisions including the Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division, the Programme and Policy Development Department, the Gender Equality Office and the country capacity strengthening team	High	2023
1.2	WFP should identify the interventions where it has a unique capacity (comparative advantage) in the Egypt context. Within this set of interventions, WFP should identify and prioritize those for which there is a conducive enabling environment and that can realistically be implemented within the timeframe of the next country strategic plan.					
1.3	WFP should articulate a clear and comprehensive theory of change that lays out how the various interventions collectively are able to contribute to the attainment of the country strategic plan outcomes.					

#.	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
2	WFP should support the Government in the continued refinement of its beneficiary identification mechanisms and consult the Government where gaps are identified, including with regard to known vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities.					
2.1	Actions to implement this recommendation could include a periodic review of a sample of the beneficiaries of individual activities, and a review of the mechanisms for transferring data between government offices with a view to ensuring accurate and complete data transfer. The tools for each assessment would depend on the government tool used, but WFP should endeavour to explore whether the beneficiaries targeted meet the basic eligibility criteria and whether all beneficiaries are equally included in programmes. This type of process could serve to strengthen existing systems if gaps are identified. It will also serve to ensure that WFP can achieve its objective of targeting the most vulnerable.	Operational	Country office	Regional bureau	High	2023–2028
3	WFP should review its partnerships (including with other United Nations entities and private sector entities) for their strategic potential under the new country strategic plan, seeking to expand engagement with a view to the collective achievement of expected results.					
3.1	WFP should engage more closely with other United Nations entities, and with a more strategic intent, identifying at the design stage those areas where joint programming could serve mutual benefit. Such areas in the new country strategic plan could include gender programming with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, climate change, agriculture, food security and alternative income-generating activities with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, and improved education and nutrition with the United Nations Children's Fund.	Strategic	Country office	Headquarters Partnerships and Advocacy Department	High	2023
3.2	WFP should foster engagement with the private sector for technical partnerships in selected programmes, with a particular focus on food fortification and the building of					

#.	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	resilience with regard to climate change. The overall aim should be to secure flexible multi-year donor funding.					
3.3	The country office should assess its fundraising and advocacy plan with a view to expanding funding sources and further leveraging domestic financing. This may entail identifying new financing mechanisms with support from headquarters and engaging with the Government to expand the use of tools that have proved valuable, such as debt swaps.					
3.4	WFP should contribute to and inform the engagement between the Government and its other partners by leveraging data, analysis and other tools, convening dialogue and subsequently, where appropriate, assisting in the implementation of government-led projects financed by donors.					
4	For the new country strategic plan WFP should ensure that it has capacity to monitor and follow up on WFP-supported interventions effectively, including through the consistent measurement of progress in its support for country capacity strengthening					
4.1	Based on interventions to be undertaken under the new country strategic plan, WFP should ensure the appropriate level of in-house monitoring capacity. This will also ensure that it has the capacity to undertake recommendation 2.	Strategic	Country office	Headquarters Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division	High	2023
4.2	Where possible, specific indicators for monitoring progress under the country strategic plan should be developed, including in areas such as policy engagement, gender and capacity strengthening.					
4.3	WFP should ensure that feedback loops are in place to ensure that monitoring data is fed back into programmatic decision-making and that programming adjustments are evidence-based.					

#.	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
5	WFP must ensure that it has the capacity and ability to mainstream gender into WFP-supported interventions					
5.1	WFP should assess the level of gender capacity required for the effective mainstreaming of gender into interventions in a way that supports gender-transformative results. WFP must ensure that it has at all levels the capacity to undertake robust gender analysis and design.	Operational	Country office	Headquarters Gender Equality Office	Medium	2023
5.2	WFP should ensure that the design of the new country strategic plan is informed by a sound analysis of the gender-relevant aspects of the Egypt context and that programme designs include appropriate gender-related aims and objectives.					

1. Introduction

1. This evaluation focuses on Egypt's Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan (T-ICSP) and Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for 2018–2023. The evaluation was commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) from Tana Copenhagen. The evaluation was conducted by a team of six evaluators between November 2021 and November 2022.

1.1 EVALUATION FEATURES

2. The WFP CSP policy outlines a new approach for strategic and programmatic planning at country level.¹⁶ This evaluation has the dual function of accountability and learning, ensuring that: i) it provides evaluative evidence and learning on WFP performance to support country-level strategic decisions, specifically for developing future WFP engagement in Egypt; and ii) that accountability to WFP stakeholders for results is secured.¹⁷ The evaluation covers all activities from January 2018 and until March 2022, when the data collection took place. It includes both the T-ICSP that covered the first half of 2018, and the CSP, which covers the period July 2018 until June 2023.

3. The evaluation is relevant to a range of internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include the WFP country office (CO) in Egypt, the Regional Bureau Cairo (RBC), OEV, other relevant headquarter divisions and the Executive Board. External stakeholders include the Government of Egypt, the main WFP donors in Egypt, but more broadly also other donors, namely United Nations (UN) agencies, cooperating partners, the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Egypt, as well as the communities that WFP serves.

4. The conduct of this evaluation has been aligned with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) principles, norms and standards.¹⁸ In alignment with WFP's commitment to gender equality and empowerment, a gendered lens guided the examination of contextual factors, data collection, data analysis, the identification of findings and their presentation. Similarly, in accordance with WFP's triple nexus, the humanitarian–development–peace approach, the examination of contextual factors, including engagement with partners and other members of the UN family, data collection, data analysis and the identification and presentation of findings, has included attention to the triple nexus.

1.2 CONTEXT

1.2.1 General overview

5. As of January 2022, the population of Egypt was estimated to be 105,838,455 (49.8 percent female; 50.2 percent male).¹⁹ Life expectancy at birth is 72 years (2020),²⁰ the adolescent birth rate is 51.8 percent,²¹ and the fertility rate is 3.28.²² Ethnic Egyptians make up by far the largest group in a population that includes Copts, Nubians and Bedouins.

6. Egypt is a unitary state²³ and Article 175 of Egypt's 2014 constitution embraced the decentralization of the administration. The 1977 presidential decree no. 475 divided Egypt into seven economic regions: Cairo; Alexandria; Delta; Suez Canal; Northern Upper Egypt; Assiut; and Southern Upper Egypt.²⁴ In reality decentralization means that local government serves as an administrative function only, without any real

¹⁶ WFP. 2016. "Policy on Country Strategic Plans" (WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1*).

¹⁷ See Annex 1 Terms of Reference of this evaluation.

¹⁸ WFP. 2021. *Technical Note. Principles, Norms and Standards for Evaluations*.

¹⁹ Country meters, 2022. *Egypt Population*.

²⁰ World Bank, 2022. *Life expectancy at birth (total) – Egypt*.

²¹ World Health Organization (WHO). 2021. *Global Health Observatory Data Repository, Adolescent birth rate*.

²² United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 2022. *Population Dashboard*.

²³ European Committee of the Regions, 2016. *Division of Powers*.

²⁴ Arab Republic of Egypt. 2021. State Information Service.

involvement in the policy decision-making process.²⁵ Therefore, in relation to the CSP, the critical decision-making, power and inputs are at the central level (see EQ1.1), but decisions on targeting and beneficiary identification are shared between the central government and local authorities (see EQ1.2).

7. After a period of steady economic growth, Egypt suffered a series of shocks, starting with the January 2011 revolution. Egypt recovered from these shocks and experienced steady growth since 2011 reaching a 5.6 percent growth by 2019. The economy suffered during the pandemic leading to a GDP decline to 3.3 percent in 2021.²⁶

8. In 2019 Egypt's Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.707²⁷ (an increase of 29 percent from 1990), ranking Egypt 116 out of 189 countries. Between 1990 and 2019, life expectancy at birth increased by 7.4 years, mean years of schooling increased by 3.9 years and expected years of schooling increased by 3.5 years.²⁸ Egypt's Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was USD3,000 in 2020.²⁹ The Gini coefficient was 31.7 in 2017, a notable progress from 28.3 in 2012.³⁰ Poverty rates decreased to 29.7 percent in 2019/2020 from 32.5 percent in 2017/2018.³¹ Still, around 6.1 percent of the population is vulnerable to multidimensional poverty, 0.6 percent lives in severe multidimensional poverty.³²

9. Rural Upper Egypt accounts for only 25 percent of the population, however, it is home to 40 percent of the poor population of the country. Egyptian youth face considerable challenges.³³ A 2016 Brookings report concluded that a key factor driving protests in 2011 (Arab Spring) was youth unemployment and its linkages to low quality education.³⁴ International Labour Organization (ILO) data shows a steady decline in youth unemployment from 34.7 percent in 2015 to 21 percent in 2019, but the numbers are still considerable and increased to 34.1 percent between 2019 and 2021.³⁵

10. Most recently, the crisis in Ukraine has had a considerable impact on Egypt's food supply. Although not among the worst affected, Egypt is experiencing increased prices of staple foods and there is concern that the country will not be able to meet the demands of its social protection programmes.³⁶ In April 2022, inflation increased to 14.9 percent as compared to 10 percent in February 2022 (before the Ukraine crisis) and 4.4 percent in April 2021. Inflation in food prices increased to 24.6 in May 2022 as measured by the consumer price index as compared to 20.7 percent in February 2022, driven by an increase in prices of vegetables, oils and fats, sweets and wheat.³⁷ Some of the measures to mitigate the impacts of the economic crisis included an increase in the number of beneficiaries of the Government's social cash transfers programme to 4.1 million low-income families, and the approval of Egyptian Pound (EGP)1,000/ardab (140kg) as the cost of purchase of locally produced wheat from farmers.³⁸

1.2.2 National policies and SDGs

11. Egypt launched its first sustainable development strategy, Egypt Vision 2030, in February 2016. The document is aligned with the 17 SDGs and with the African Union's Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want.³⁹ Egypt has established the 'National Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of the Sustainable

²⁵ Choudhry, S. & Bass, K. 2014. Constitutional Courts after the Arab Spring: Appointment Mechanisms and Relative Judicial Independence.

²⁶ World Bank, 2022. *GDP growth (annual percentage)*.

²⁷ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2021. Egypt Human Development Report.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ World Bank, 2022. *GNI per capita, Atlas Method (current US\$) - Egypt*.

³⁰ World Bank, 2022. *Gini Index - Egypt*.

³¹ UNDP. 2021. *Egypt Human Development Report*.

³² Ibid.

³³ Armanious, Dina M. 2020. Accelerating global actions for a world without poverty: Egypt experiences.

³⁴ Ghafar, Adel Abdel. 2016. Educated but Unemployed: The challenge facing Egypt's youth. *Washington: Brookings Institute*.

³⁵ World Bank, 2022. Unemployment, youth total (percentage of total labour force 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate).

³⁶ WFP. 2022. War in Ukraine Drives Global Food Crisis.

³⁷ WFP. April 2022. Macroeconomic and Market Updates.

³⁸ WFP. September 2022. Additional measures by the Government of Egypt to Mitigate Impact of Current Global Economic Crisis.

³⁹ UNDP. 2021. *Egypt Human Development Report*.

Development Goals', which ensures the integration of the SDGs into Egypt's sustainable development strategies.⁴⁰ In 2021, Egypt engaged in a Voluntary National Review. More recent strategies launched in 2022 include the Egypt National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS) 2050;⁴¹ Egypt also has several additional strategies, policies and plans which align with the SDGs; these focus on nutrition, agriculture and education specifically (see EQ 1.1).

1.2.3 Food and nutrition security

12. In 2022, Egypt ranked 57 out of the 121 countries on the Global Hunger Index (GHI). Egypt's level of hunger is categorized as moderate.⁴² Between 2009 and 2018, expenditure on food declined at a moderate rate shrinking from 44.6 percent in 2009 to the 33.26 percent in 2018.⁴³ For Bedouin communities, however, the remoteness of their locations affects the cost of accessing food and water, due to the high transportation costs. Frequent seasonal shortages of food due to drought and sandstorms worsens the state of food security. Consequently, in this region households spend more than 50 percent of their monthly expenditures on food.⁴⁴

13. The percentage of undernourished people increased from 4.4 percent in 2015 to 5.1 percent in 2020.⁴⁵ Between 2014 and 2021, for children under 5 years, the prevalence of stunting decreased from 21.4 to 12.8 percent⁴⁶, anaemia increased from 27.2 to 43⁴⁷ and wasting decreased from 8 to 3 percent.⁴⁸ The prevalence of severe food insecurity decreased from 8.7 percent in 2015–2017 (8 million people) to 6.7 percent in 2018–2020 (6.8 million people).⁴⁹ The national food self-sufficiency ratio for Egypt is 88 percent.⁵⁰ Prevalence of obesity and overweight among adults and children has been rising: 44.7 percent of women and 25.9 percent of men aged 18 years and over are obese, while 71.2 percent of women and 59.3 percent of men aged 18 years and over are overweight⁵¹. Similarly, obesity among children and adolescents aged 5–19 increased between 2015 to 2019 from 19.1 percent to 21 percent for girls and 15.7 percent to 17.2 percent for boys.⁵²

1.2.4 Agriculture

14. The agriculture sector accounts for 20 percent of Egypt's export revenue, employs 26 percent of the labour force and provides for the livelihoods of 57 percent of the population.⁵³ In Upper Egypt, 55 percent of employment is agriculture related.⁵⁴ Government initiatives to boost domestic production and a focus on sustainable and green farming are factors driving the agriculture market. Still, lack of efficient irrigation facilities, small farm landholdings and poor infrastructure contribute to restricting market growth.⁵⁵ Agricultural communities in the rural regions of Upper Egypt, and particularly small holding farmers, are subject to food insecurity, water scarcity, climate variability and unsustainable livelihoods.⁵⁶

15. The Government prioritizes food security and maintains one of the world's largest food subsidy systems with approximately 79 million people, or about two-thirds of Egypt's population, beneficiaries of the country's bread subsidy programme.⁵⁷ Egypt only produces about 9 million tons of wheat annually

⁴⁰ Ministry of International Cooperation. 2022. *Ministry of International Cooperation*.

⁴¹ Ministry of Environment. 2022. *Egypt National Climate Change Strategy 2050*.

⁴² Global Hunger Index, 2022. *Hunger and Food Systems in Conflict Settings*.

⁴³ World Data Atlas, 2022. *Land Use, Egypt*.

⁴⁴ WFP. 2016. *Operation Evaluation of Egypt CP 200238*.

⁴⁵ FAOSTAT. 2022. *Prevalence of undernourishment (percent) Egypt*.

⁴⁶ CAPMAS. 2022. *Egypt Family Health Survey 2021*.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). 2022. *Egypt Family Health Survey 2021*.

⁴⁹ FAO Statistics (FAOSTAT), 2022. *Crops and Livestock Products*.

⁵⁰ Statista, 2020. *Agriculture in Egypt – statistics & facts*.

⁵¹ Global Nutrition Report. 2021. *Egypt*.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2022. *Egypt*.

⁵⁴ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ). 2021. *Egypt*.

⁵⁵ Donley, A. 2022. *Optimizing Egypt's Wheat Import Process*.

⁵⁶ Walid, S. and Ahmed, O. 2020. *The socioeconomic assessment to evaluate the potentiality of developing the rural community in Upper Egypt*.

⁵⁷ UNDP. 2021. *Egypt Human Development Report*. It is noted that this subsidy also includes other types of food items.

because of land and water scarcity.⁵⁸ Therefore, it is highly dependent on wheat imports to run the bread subsidy programme,⁵⁹ ranking as the world's top wheat importer with an annual intake of around 12.5 million tons. The crisis in Ukraine has impacted Egypt's wheat supply; the price of wheat flour is undergoing steep inflation (increased by 26 percent between February 2022 and April 2022⁶⁰), leading to wheat imports being predicted to double from USD3 billion to USD5.7 billion. This threatens Egypt's Baladi bread subsidy programme. The price of the minimum food expenditure basket for Syrian Refugees, supported by WFP, increased by 10 percent.⁶¹

16. In 2017, the Government developed its Sustainable Agricultural Development Strategy towards 2030 (SADS), whose aim is to increase the agricultural contribution to GDP to 12 percent by 2024, in addition to increasing agricultural production by 30 percent by 2024.⁶² Agriculture in Egypt is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.2 percent during the forecast period, 2020–2025.⁶³

1.2.5 Climate change and vulnerability

17. The 2021 Global Climate Risk Index ranked Egypt 120 out of 180 countries.⁶⁴ Egypt has a high degree of risk of natural hazards and is very vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.⁶⁵ High dependence on the River Nile is a key reason for this vulnerability.⁶⁶ The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is expected to reduce the amount of water Egypt receives from the River Nile (currently 55.5 billion cubic metres per annum).⁶⁷ Rising sea levels, water scarcity and deficits, an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, sand and dust storms, flash floods, rockslides and heavy rains, also contribute to the country's vulnerability.⁶⁸ Compared to a no-climate change scenario, food crop yields are projected to decline by 10 percent on average by 2050 due to heat stress (4.9 percent), water stress (4.1 percent) and salinity (1.6 percent).⁶⁹

18. Egypt submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and Third National Communication (NC3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2016 in support of its efforts to realize its development and economic goals and increase its adaptive capacity to climate change.⁷⁰ Key areas of focus include the sustainability of the environment, water resources, energy, sustainable land management, agriculture and health. Most recently, in 2022, Egypt launched the NCCS 2050.⁷¹

1.2.6 Education

19. Egypt's adult literacy rate (15 years and older) is 89 and 87 percent for men and women respectively.⁷² Between 2008 and 2018, Egypt's K-12 education system⁷³ grew by 32 percent. In 2018, net enrolment in primary and secondary stages was well above the global average at 89 percent and 66 percent respectively.⁷⁴

⁵⁸ Statista, 2021. Annual Wheat Production in Egypt 2010-2021.

⁵⁹ A. Donley, 2022. *Optimizing Egypt's Wheat Import Process*.

⁶⁰ WFP. 2022. Macroeconomic and Market Updates – May 2022.

⁶¹ WFP. July 2022. Potential Impacts of the Ukraine War on Refugees Food Security in Egypt.

⁶² Egypt Today, 2021. *Egypt targets to increase agricultural production by 30 percent in 2024*.

⁶³ Mordor Intelligence, 2021. *Agriculture in Egypt – Growth, Trends, COVID-19 Impact and Forecast (2022-2027)*.

⁶⁴ German Watch. 2021. *Global Climate Risk Index*.

⁶⁵ World Bank. 2021. *Egypt: Climate Risk Country Profile*.

⁶⁶ German Watch. 2021. *op.cit.*

⁶⁷ Dakkak, A. 2020. *Egypt's Water Crisis - Recipe for Disaster*.

⁶⁸ World Bank. 2021. *Egypt: Climate Risk Country Profile*.

⁶⁹ Perez, N., Kassim, Y., Ringler, C., Thomas, S., & El Didi, H. 2021. *Climate change and Egypt's agriculture*.

⁷⁰ World Bank. 2021. *Egypt: Climate Risk Country Profile*.

⁷¹ Ministry of Environment. 2022. *Egypt National Climate Change Strategy 2050*.

⁷² UNICEF. 2019. *The State of World's Children*.

⁷³ K-12 includes preschool, primary and secondary education.

⁷⁴ Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). 2019. *Understanding Middle East Education, Egypt Country Profile, PwC Education and Skills Practice*.

20. Average years of schooling across the adult population (aged 15 and older) rose from 4.4 years in 1990 to an average of 7.4 in 2019 (women 6.8 years and men 8.1 in 2019).⁷⁵ In 2019-2020, net primary enrolment reached around 100 percent, lower secondary enrolment reached 57.9 percent and upper secondary 25 percent with gross secondary enrolment rates quite similar. The gross enrolment rate in higher education increased from 26.4 percent in 2010-2011 to 37.1 percent in 2019-2020.⁷⁶

21. Quality education in Egypt remains a challenge. In 2017, the Ministry of Education (MoE) launched an education reform agenda to expand access to quality early childhood education; to improve student assessment systems; to increase the quality of instruction through professional development activities for educators and administrators; and to incorporate technology into the classroom.⁷⁷ Despite efforts to meet the demands of the reform, inequalities, further aggravated by geography, gender and socioeconomic status, persist. The community school model has played an important role in enhancing access to quality basic education, especially for young girls in remote rural areas.⁷⁸

1.2.7 Gender

22. There have been substantial improvements in female literacy rates, enrolment rates, labour force participation and employment. According to the gender inequality index (GII) Egypt scores 0.443 in 2021 ranking it 109 out of 191 countries.⁷⁹ In 2021 Egypt ranked 129 out of 146 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index, the highest ranking the country has achieved in the past 10 years.⁸⁰ National agencies promoting gender equality include the National Council for Women (NCW). In 2017, the Government launched the National Strategy for the Empowerment of Women 2030.⁸¹

23. Annually around 7.8 million women (representing 15 percent of the female population and about 7 percent of the total population) suffer from different forms of violence.⁸² Egypt reports higher rates of food insecurity for women than men with 27.7 percent of adult females being food insecure against 24.5 percent of adult males in 2020.⁸³ Prevailing discriminatory gender norms are both causes and consequences of poverty and of food and nutrition insecurity, and higher levels of gender inequality are associated with greater levels of acute and chronic undernutrition. In many social groups, men and boys are given priority when meals are served, and food taboos, specifically for pregnant and lactating women, may predispose women to poor nutritional outcomes.⁸⁴

1.2.8 Persons with disabilities

24. According to the 2017 census, 13.3 percent of the population have some form of disability. The employment rate among people with disabilities declined from 47 percent in 2012 to 44 percent in 2018. Among women with disabilities, the employment rate is 17 percent. Illiteracy rates among children with disabilities stand at 61 percent for boys and 70 percent for girls.⁸⁵

25. The Government's 2017 Strategy on the Protection, Rehabilitation and Empowerment of People with Disabilities sets out goals related to the following: legislation and policy reform; programmes to generate income and increase standards of living; increased access to social security; and public awareness-raising campaigns. The 2018 Law 10 on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (PWDs) enshrines non-discrimination against them in employment. Nevertheless, in practice, PWDs face significant challenges

⁷⁵ UNDP. 2020. *The Next Frontier: Human Development and Anthropocene Egypt*.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2022. *Education*.

⁷⁸ A. Fahmy. 2021. *Egypt Network for Integrated Development. Project Evaluation Report*.

⁷⁹ UNDP. 2022. *HDR 2021/2022 composite indices tables – Gender Inequality Index*.

⁸⁰ Global Gender Gap. 2022. *Global Gender Gap Report*.

⁸¹ National Council for Women. 2022. *Historical Background*; National Council for Women. 2022. *Law No.30 of 2018*; R. Al Mashat, 2020. 'Closing Gender Gap Accelerator'; National Council for Women. 2017. *2030 Women's Strategy*.

⁸² UNFPA. 2022. *Gender-based violence*.

⁸³ UN WOMEN. 2022. *Egypt. "social"*.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Borgen Project. 2021. *Disability and Poverty in Egypt*.

in accessing jobs, including discriminatory attitudes among employers, both during the recruitment process and in the workplace, as well as more limited access to education.⁸⁶

1.2.9 Migration and refugees

26. Egypt hosts some 285,949 asylum seekers and refugees from 65 different countries (including 142,411 from Syria).⁸⁷ The other half are from Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan.⁸⁸

27. Syrian refugees in Egypt are viewed favourably by the Government of Egypt and live in urban areas, often residing in overcrowded neighbourhoods where the host community also struggles with substandard living conditions and high unemployment rates. As such, these refugees also benefit from subsidized services, including electricity and transport, and may also have access to public education and health services similar to the Egyptian population living in the same areas. All refugees and asylum seekers registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are allowed to regularize their residency through six-month, renewable residence permits, which gives them access to the public health and education systems. However, refugees experience considerable challenges securing the goods and services they are entitled to^{89, 90}. According to UNHCR, 84 percent of refugees live below the Egyptian national poverty line.⁹¹

1.2.10 Humanitarian protection

28. Specific groups among refugees and asylum seekers may face greater economic and protection challenges, particularly unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), women generally, and women-headed households, the elderly and PWD.⁹² During COVID-19 pandemic, the Government imposed a partial lockdown, which had serious impacts on the refugee community. Many of them became unable to provide for themselves or their families (food and lodgings). The pandemic also worsened the stigmatization and discrimination suffered by refugees, especially those of sub-Saharan origin.⁹³

29. In addressing the needs of the refugees and asylum-seekers, the Government of Egypt and international community's efforts have had a strong focus on protection (including child protection), public health, education, food security, basic needs and livelihoods. COVID-19 led to the re-allocation of international and Government of Egypt humanitarian funds towards pandemic-related protection measures (USD21.6 million in 2020).⁹⁴

1.2.11 Social protection

30. Economic and social reforms introduced in 2014 aimed at reducing poverty, addressing historical regional and socioeconomic disparities and mitigating the impacts of structural reforms on lower-income groups.⁹⁵ The 2016 introduction of the Social Insurance Law (Law No. 148 of 2019) and the Comprehensive Health Insurance Law (Law No. 2 of 2018)⁹⁶ have changed the social protection landscape, inter alia, through the steps outlined below.

31. Currently, there are three types of social protection programme in Egypt:⁹⁷

⁸⁶ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2021. *Profile on economic inclusion for people with disabilities and older workers: Egypt*.

⁸⁷ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR). 2022. *Monthly Statistical Report as of 31 May 2022*.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Fares, H. and Puig-Junoy, J. 2021. Inequity and benefit incidence analysis in health-care use among Syrian refugees in Egypt. *Confl Health* 15, 78.

⁹⁰ UN Egypt. 2022. *Common Situational Analysis Education and Health Services for Migrants and Refugees in Egypt*

⁹¹ European Commission, 2022 *Egypt fact Sheet*.

⁹² UNHCR. 2020. *Egypt: 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis (2020/2021)*.

⁹³ European Commission, 2022. *Egypt fact Sheet*.

⁹⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service (OCHA – FTS). 2022. *Humanitarian aid contributions*.

⁹⁵ UNICEF. 2020. *Reform of social protection in Egypt. Takaful and Karama Programme (TKP)*.

⁹⁶ UNDP. 2021. *Egypt Human Development Report. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development*.

⁹⁷ Food subsidies are not considered part of social protection mechanisms.

- a. Programmes not based on beneficiary contributions, such as social safety nets Takaful and Karama; Haya Karima (see Annex XV); Alternative Family System; the 100 million health initiative; the Sakan Karim Programme [dignified housing]; and the Development of Informal Settlements Programme).⁹⁸
- b. Programmes based on beneficiary and employer contributions, such as social and health insurance. These programmes also benefit from government contributions/participation.
- c. Active labour market programmes. These include social security and social and health insurance. These include providing job opportunities for the poorest and unemployed groups as a mean to decreased reliance on social safety nets.⁹⁹


1.2.12 International development assistance

32. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) support to Egypt dates to the 1974 open door policy,¹⁰⁰ which aimed to increase economic growth. In recent years, the majority of ODA has been bilateral (70 percent in 2020). In 2021, the OECD and Egypt inaugurated a three-year programme that aims, through ODA support, to facilitate Egypt’s ability to meet key objectives in the areas of: a) inclusive and sustainable economic growth; b) innovation and digital transformation; c) governance and anticorruption; d) statistics and e) sustainable development.¹⁰¹

33. Egypt’s agreements with bilateral and multilateral donors in 2021 totalled USD10,274 million, including USD1,569 million directed to private sector development (Table 6 in Annex XI).¹⁰²

34. Figure 1 shows that between 2017-2020 net ODA received initially increased, but then decreased. The largest proportion of ODA comes from the EU, Kuwait, Japan, Germany and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD).

Figure 1. Net ODA and its donors in Egypt, 2018 and 2020.



Source: World Bank. 2022. Net ODA received by Egypt; OECD-DAC. 2022. Aid at glance, Egypt.

⁹⁸ UN-Habitat. 2020. *Informal Settlements in the Arab Region*.

⁹⁹ Arab NGO Network for Development. 2021. *Arab NGO Network for Development*.

¹⁰⁰ Elakkad Rasha M. and Hussein, Asmaa, M. 2018. 'The Effect of Official Development Assistance on Domestic Savings and Economic Growth in Egypt', *International Journal of Economics and Finance*, Vol 13, No. 12 (2021).

¹⁰¹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2021. *OECD and Arab Republic of Egypt inaugurate three-year programme to support key reforms*; Elakkad and Hussein, 'The Effect of Official Development Assistance on Domestic Savings and Economic Growth in Egypt'.

¹⁰² Ministry of International Cooperation, 2021. *Annual Report*.

1.2.13 United Nations Partnership Development Framework

35. The United Nations Partnership Development Framework (UNPDF) 2018–2022¹⁰³ supports the achievement of national development goals as outlined in the Sustainable Development Strategy: Egypt Vision 2030. The UNPDF has four outcomes: 1) inclusive economic development; 2) social justice; 3) environmental sustainability and natural resource management; and 4) women's empowerment.

36. The UNPDF 2018–2022 is currently being evaluated. The 2023–2027 United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF or Cooperation Framework) is currently being drawn up.


1.3 SUBJECT BEING EVALUATED

1.3.1 Timeline framing the implementation of the CSP

37. Egypt has experienced several political and economic shocks and natural events which have affected the implementation of the CSP, most significantly COVID-19 and recently the repercussions of the conflict in Ukraine on food and fuel prices (Figure 2). In addition, Egypt has been affected by political shifts and natural disasters in the years preceding and during the implementation of the CSP. Section 2 explores how these events have impacted the development and implementation of the T-ICSP and CSP.

¹⁰³ UNPDF. 2018. *United Nations Partnership Development Framework 2018-2022 – United for a Sustainable Future*.

Figure 2. Egypt timeline



1.3.2 The Egypt Country Strategic Plan

38. A T-ICSP, which covered the first six months of 2018, was followed by the CSP which came into effect mid-2018 and will guide WFP's efforts until 2023. Both documents have aimed to support the strengthening of national capacities to enable an effective and sustained response to the root causes of food insecurity and malnutrition and the strengthening of resilience among food-insecure/malnourished populations. This has included a response to general vulnerability and to shocks. While there is clear alignment between both documents, and both have included five strategic outcomes, the CSP was not a simple continuation of the T-ICSP (see Annex XI).

39. The T-ICSP was intended to support the smooth transition from WFP food security and nutrition interventions towards more cohesive and coordinated activities, which are well established in Egypt's Vision 2030 and the SDG pillars (see EQ 1.1). The main tenets introduced in the T-ICSP were maintained in the CSP; however, the CSP expanded the number of activities generally, and added a focus on South-South cooperation and technological support. As a response to COVID-19, one of the budget revisions to the CSP included COVID-19 specific activities (see further details in annex XI).

40. In the T-ICSP, the SOs were to be implemented through 6 activity areas and 13 outputs. The T-ICSP had an approved budget of USD38,666,191, which, through a budget revision (BR), decreased marginally to USD38,633,567. The T-ICSP reached 2,799,353 beneficiaries against the 1,590,460 initially planned. The budget revision led to the inclusion of capacity strengthening as a transfer modality, and a reduction in the number of planned beneficiaries for cash-based transfer (CBT) assistance (Activity 4) (all part of SO3) (see Table 7 in Annex XI). The CSP constituted a significant expansion in scope, budget and ambition.¹⁰⁴

41. The Theory in Use (TiU) (See Annex X) shows the wide range of subactivities conducted under each activity and the linkages expected between these and outputs and outcomes.

1.3.3 The operationalization of the CSP


This section provides an overview of the key parameters related to the implementation of the CSP.

42. The CSP comprises five Strategic Outcomes (SOs) pursued through nine activity areas. The country portfolio budget originally approved by the EB at USD 454,040,947, increased to USD586,444,281 through four BRs (further details in Annex XI).

43. WFP provides different support across all 27 governorates. The only activity supported nationwide is the 1000 Days programme (see SO3). The governorates that have received the widest range of support are concentrated in Upper Egypt, namely Assiut, Aswan, Luxor, Qena and Sohag. Aswan, Luxor and Qena are the only governorates where all types of support are provided (see Figure 3).

¹⁰⁴ A detailed overview of the T-ICSP, CSP and the corresponding activities and budgetary allocations can be found in Annex XI.


Figure 3. Type of activities implemented per governorate



Source: WFP Country Office Egypt. Updated April 2022.


44. Beneficiaries reached versus planned varied considerably over the years. During the first half of 2018 (T-ICSP) and again in 2019, the beneficiaries reached far exceeded those planned. However, during the second half of 2018 (the first 6 months of CSP implementation), as well as for the period 2020 to Q1 2022, the beneficiaries reached were consistently less than planned (see Figure 4). Across all T-ICSP and CSP implementation years, neither the MT of food nor amount of CBT distributed targets were met (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). There are a number of factors behind these results: as a result of COVID-19 and funding gaps, no food was distributed from April 2020 onwards; during COVID-19 food transfers were replaced by CBT (e.g. activity 1, 2, and 4); there was a misestimation on the higher side of planned beneficiaries of SO3 (see section 2.2). Also, in instances where more beneficiaries than planned were reached without an increase of resources, interview respondents noted that a larger number of beneficiaries received a smaller amount of support. In some instances, a larger number of beneficiaries could be reached with less resources because the costs of reaching certain beneficiaries was considerably less than reaching others. For example, school feeding programme costs were lower for non-community schools than for community schools. Thus, while the number of schools increased, the costs did not increase proportionally (see also Annex XI).

Figure 4. Beneficiaries reached between 2018 and Q1 2022




Source: ACR T-ICSP 2018, ACR CSP 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Actual Q1 2022 provided by the CO.

Figure 5. Quantities of food distributed from 2018 to Q1 2022 (MT)



Source: ACR T-ICSP 2018, ACR CSP 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Actual Q1 2022 provided by the CO.

Figure 6. Amount of CBT distributed from 2018 to Q1 2022 (USD)



Source: ACR T-ICSP 2018, ACR CSP 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Actual Q1, 2022 provided by the CO.

45. Table 1 shows the cumulative financial overview. The bulk of funding was allocated to Activity 3 in SO2. As of March 2022, the expenditure relative to allocated resources was roughly 83.5 percent. All, except for activities 6 and 7, have expenditure rates ranging from 57 to 100 percent. Activities 2, 6, 7 are not implemented continuously during the year, which means that available resources may be kept for expenditure later in 2022 and therefore financial records may show lower expenditure rates earlier on in the year. The column (2018-2021) on the far right of the table demonstrates expenditure data analysed up to the financial closing of the previous year and then the expenditure level was fairly high, with only two activities registering expenditures below 50 percent.

Table 1. CSP Cumulative financial overview (July 2018 – March 2022)

Focus Area	Strategic Outcomes	Activities	Needs Based Plan 2018 - 2023			Allocated Resources until December 2022			Expenditures 2018 - Q1 2022			Expenditure 2018 –2021
			Original approved NBP in USD	NBP (2018-2023) as per the latest BR04 in USD	% of Total	Allocated Resources	% Total	% NBP funded	Expenditures	% Expenditures over NBP	% Expenditure over allocated resources	% Expenditure over allocated resources
Root Causes	01 School meal activities	01 School meals activities	\$153,882,009	\$153,931,974	27.94%	\$33,707,170	14.67%	21.90%	\$30,219,478	19.63%	89.65%	86.00%
		02 Livelihood support and capacity strengthening	\$8,013,970	\$8,013,967	1.45%	\$2,101,680	0.91%	26.23%	\$1,200,870	14.98%	57.14%	54.11%
	Total Strategic Outcome 1		\$161,895,978	\$161,945,941	29.40%	\$35,808,850	15.59%	22.11%	\$31,420,348	19.40%	87.74%	84.39%
Crisis Response	02 Assistance to refugees	03 Food assistance for refugees	\$99,270,982	\$189,653,104	34.43%	\$142,259,515	61.92%	75.01%	\$123,171,258	64.95%	86.58%	85.07%
		09 Crisis assistance to local people	-	\$27,584,664	5.01%	\$7,044,785	3.07%	25.54%	\$7,044,785	25.54%	100.00%	100.00%
	Total Strategic Outcome 2		\$99,270,982	\$217,237,768	39.43%	\$149,304,300	64.98%	68.73%	\$130,216,043	59.94%	87.22%	85.81%
Root Causes	03 Nutritional activities	04 Nutritional activities	\$76,462,743	\$76,444,714	13.88%	\$9,569,204	4.16%	12.52%	\$6,239,002	8.16%	65.20%	75.17%
		Total Strategic Outcome 3		\$76,462,743	\$76,444,714	13.88%	\$9,569,204	4.16%	12.52%	\$6,239,002	8.16%	65.20%
Resilience Building	04 Livelihood - climate change adaptation	05 Improve resilience and livelihoods	\$60,081,534	\$61,692,950	11.20%	\$17,022,325	7.41%	27.59%	\$10,753,203	17.43%	63.17%	45.45%
		Total Strategic Outcome 4		\$60,081,534	\$61,692,950	11.20%	\$17,022,325	7.41%	27.59%	\$10,753,203	17.43%	63.17%
Root Causes	05 Partnership and assistance to Government	06 Partnership assistance to Government	\$8,071,258	\$8,071,258	1.47%	\$1,336,727	0.58%	16.56%	\$410,627	5.09%	30.72%	31.86%
		07 Institutional capacity strengthening	\$4,292,590	\$4,292,590	0.78%	\$697,810	0.30%	16.26%	\$230,342	5.37%	33.01%	100.00%
		08 Provide engineering services		\$3,958,115	0.72%	\$4,065,281	1.77%	102.71%	\$4,065,281	102.71%	100.00%	100.00%
	Total Strategic Outcome 5		\$12,363,848	\$16,321,963	2.96%	\$6,099,818	2.65%	37.37%	\$4,706,250	28.83%	77.15%	86.29%
Total Transfer and Implementation			\$410,075,085	\$533,643,336	96.87%	\$217,804,496	94.80%	40.81%	\$183,334,846	34.36%	84.17%	80.95%
Direct Support Costs (DSC)			\$16,254,442	\$17,258,940	3.13%	\$11,957,105	5.20%	69.28%	\$8,519,514	49.36%	71.25%	72.58%
Total CSP Egypt (excluding ISC)			\$426,329,527	\$550,902,277	100.00%	\$229,761,601	100.00%	41.71%	\$191,854,360	34.83%	83.50%	79.92%

Source: CPB Resources Overview Report, data extracted on 07 April 2022.

1.4 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.4.1 Evaluation methodology

46. This evaluation examines the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, sustainability and connectedness of the CSP (July 2018–2023), and where applicable of the T-ICSP (January–June 2018). The evaluation responds to the predefined evaluation questions (EQ) and subquestions on a strategic level. To do this, an analysis of activities undertaken, and results achieved has been an important foundation for exploring wider-ranging, strategic questions. The analysis has examined the implementation of various interventions and the change pathways these interventions pursued. How each question that was explored is delineated in the evaluation matrix (see Annex IV).

47. The data included in this report represents the most recent data made available to the evaluation team at the end of the field data collection (March 2022). The financial and performance data included in this report reflects information spanning the period from January 2018 until 30 March 2022.


48. A gender-responsive methodology, including a gender-balanced data collection team, an effort to engage an equal number of female and male respondents, and particular attention to the inclusion of women beneficiaries, was applied.

49. A theory-based, mixed methods approach has underpinned this evaluation. Specifically, the evaluation team used the ToC and an outcome-harvesting inspired approach to respond to the evaluation questions. Interviews with key stakeholders served to support the development of the TiU.

50. The evaluation is based on the analysis of documentation, survey data (583 people), key informant interviews (35 one-person interviews, 11 interviews with more than one respondent (multi-person) and 30 group interviews with end-beneficiaries) (see Bibliography, and Annex III, IV and V for more details on methodology and tools). In total 391 people were interviewed, including 23 remote interviewees, and 59.6 percent of interviewees were women. The distribution of interviews and group discussion by category is depicted in Figure 7, while the geographical distribution of respondents is depicted in Figure 8.


51. A complete list of field schedule and people interviewed are found in Annex VI and Annex VIII respectively.

Figure 7. Interviewees per stakeholder groups (percentage of total interviewees)



Source: Evaluation team.

Figure 8. Evaluation – face-to-face consultations map ¹⁰⁵



N.B: This map does not include remote interviews.

Source: Evaluation team. The map was created by the evaluation team to represent where the interviews took place. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP.

52. A **purposive sampling approach** was used, aimed at identifying those informants who could provide the most salient data relative to the questions, while also permitting the triangulation of original data. The sampling aimed to ensure that all relevant stakeholder categories were included (government officials, partners and direct beneficiaries, including women and girls), and that they were geographically represented. A gendered approach to respondent identification was applied. A balance between national and international staff, both from WFP and from partner organizations, was sought and, where possible, included a gender and age balance.

53. The field data collection focused on work conducted across four governorates, as well as Cairo, which are where WFP has centred most of its investment (Assiut, Beheira, Luxor and Matrouh). Within these governorates, the locations and beneficiaries were identified, with WFP and Government support, based on the selection criteria developed by the evaluation team. The activities associated with different SOs were fairly represented across the different locations visited.

54. The electronic **survey** developed by the evaluation team was sent to persons identified by SO managers as individuals who had participated in specific CCS events.

¹⁰⁵ Group discussion refers to group interviews with end-beneficiaries.

55. Data was reviewed and coded systematically to enable, where possible, a robust triangulation process (see Annex III). All findings and observations made in this report are derived from documents, interviews and/or the surveys conducted. Wherever possible, findings which resulted from interviews were derived from a minimum of three respondents, most often from multiple categories. Since interviewees were granted anonymity, respondents are not referenced. In instances where disclosing the category of respondents has been possible while safeguarding their anonymity, this has been done. In addition, findings were validated through several events, including preliminary finding debriefings with CO staff, debriefing with CO staff and government counterparts on the main findings and a stakeholder workshop (upcoming).

56. The **presentation of findings** is guided by the EQs. Responses to specific EQs particular to this CSPE have been integrated into relevant subsections throughout the report. When this has been done, a footnote, which includes the question found in the ToR, has been added.

1.4.2 Limitations

57. A summary of the limitations which have impacted the analytical approach is included here, while a more extensive discussion is found in Annex 3 and includes mitigation measures taken by the evaluation team. Only validated findings are presented in the report.

Summary of limitations	Main mitigation measures
Lack of monitoring data was a limiting factor. Of 35 outcome indicators, complete data (data for all relevant years) was available for only 9 indicators, partial data (data for some but not all years) was available for 14 and no data was available for 12. Of the 94 output indicators, complete data was available for 14, partial data for 29 and no data for 51. Lastly, out of the 11 cross-cutting indicators, 3 had complete data, 6 had partial data and there was no data for 2. Challenges to collect data during COVID-19, for example school closures, the pausing or halting of WFP activities due to COVID-19 and challenges with implementing certain activities due to funding shortfalls, are all factors which affected the collection of indicator data.	An outcome harvesting inspired interview approach, which aimed to identify, through discussion with respondents, linkages between activities conducted and visible results (outcomes), was used to mitigate this challenge.
No specific CCS outcome indicators, and where there were other indicators related to activities which included CCS (e.g. number of policies enhanced), these did not measure meaningful elements of CCS activities.	The evaluation team also used an online survey to fill the CCS gap. The survey provided some insights but is not statistically representative owing to a low response rate (5.8 percent).
The length of implementation may have affected recall from respondents, as concerns both omissions and ability to link observations to specific activities.	Interviews sought as precise information as possible, and, where possible, documented reporting was used to triangulate responses.
Some beneficiary communities (refugees) and informants could not be met.	This limited, in certain instances, the opportunities to triangulate information. Instances where results have been affected by this limitation are noted in the text. Notably, the evaluation team's engagement with beneficiaries was focused on locations that showcased the experience with WFP, and as such the findings can be deemed as appropriate and

	reliable examples, although they may not be statistically representative of all WFP beneficiaries.
In instances where operational details were only known to a very limited number of individuals and where only a limited number of documents (if any) discussed the issue in question, triangulation was not possible.	In such instances, this has been noted.

1.4.3 Ethical considerations

58. The evaluation has conformed to the [2020 United Nations Evaluation Group \(UNEG\) ethical guidelines](#). Accordingly, Tana Copenhagen has been responsible for safeguarding and ensuring ethics at all stages of the evaluation cycle. This has included, but not been limited to the following: ensuring informed consent, protecting privacy, confidentiality and anonymity of participants, ensuring cultural sensitivity, respecting the autonomy of participants, ensuring fair recruitment of participants (including women and socially excluded groups) and ensuring that the evaluation results do no harm to participants or their communities. A list of specific risks and their respective mitigation can be found in Annex III.

2. Evaluation findings

2.1 EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT IS WFP'S STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES, PEOPLE'S NEEDS AND WFP'S STRENGTHS?

59. The findings section is systematically organized around the evaluation matrix and shares the responses to each of the subevaluation questions. For each subquestion, a set of lines of inquired were tested and are discussed. The evaluation presents a summary of findings per subevaluation question.

EQ1.1: To what extent is the CSP relevant to national policies, plans, strategies and goals, including achievement of the national SDGs?

Summary

The T-ICSP and CSP are well embedded within existing national policy and strategy frameworks, which reflects WFP's effort to ensure that its support is aligned with Egyptian priorities. Across all SOs the support provided consistently meets a strategy, policy or government plan to address key areas of concern, including nutrition, education, agriculture, climate change and capacity challenges.

The CSP remains aligned with Egypt's needs and priorities. Although WFP has engaged in a consultative process throughout the CSP design, in relation to CCS specifically, there is no evidence that an overarching CCS assessment was conducted.

60. Both the T-ICSP and the CSP are well aligned within the Egyptian Government frameworks, policies and strategies. Egypt's Vision 2030 details a comprehensive approach to secure the country's development and meet the demands of the SDGs through highlighting ten pillars, of which knowledge innovation (pillar 3), social justice, health, education and training (pillars 5, 6 and 7) are particularly relevant to WFP's efforts as part of the T-ICSP and CSP.

61. Egypt's constitutional commitment to nutrition coincides with the objectives detailed by SO2 (hunger) and SO 4 (education) which means that, at a more foundational level, WFP's work is very much embedded within both what the Egyptian Government understands as its responsibility towards its citizens (the Constitution) and how it intends to support and achieve development (the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development).

62. The Government's social protection programmes which include Takaful and Karama, the 1,000 Days programme which was integrated into the Takaful programme in 2019, and Haya Karima are designed in a way that have or can absorb WFP initiatives. Specifically, aspects of SO 1, SO 3, SO 4 and SO 5 fall within elements of Haya Karima such as the focus on upgrading of infrastructure, support for/establishment of microenterprises, vocational training and handicrafts, enhancing roles of cooperatives; and SO 3 also fulfils the provision of CBT obligations outlined in the 1000 Days programme.

63. Further, the National Food and Nutrition Policy (2017), guarantees universal availability and accessibility to adequate, high quality, safe food and promotes healthy dietary practices for prevention and control of nutritional disorders. These objectives are pursued by WFP through SO 1, SO2, SO 3 and SO 5 through both the provision of food transfers, CBT and a range of awareness-raising activities.

64. The Sustainable Agriculture Strategy 2017 aims to improve nutritional standards and dietary patterns through the improvement of agricultural practices, specifically post-harvest losses, which SO 4 has aimed to address through the provision of new technologies (post-harvest), resilient crops (drought resistant) and improved knowledge. The strategy also calls for in-kind food support, which could be interpreted as being addressed through activities carried out as part of SOs 1, 3 and 4, which have included the provision of small animals, food transfers and CBT; and specifically addressed nutrient deficiencies,

which WFP focuses on as part of activities conducted through SO 1 (school meals) and SO 3 (PLW and children under 24 months).

65. In 2018, Egypt launched an education reform plan (Education 2.0) which provides a road map for school infrastructure improvement and the introduction of technology into educational facilities.¹⁰⁶ These objectives are pursued by SOs 1 and 4.¹⁰⁷

66. The development of the CSP was largely based on the 2017 Synthesis Report on Egypt's Road Map Towards Achieving SDG 2 which, according to the CO, was drafted by WFP in close coordination with the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) and based on a review of available documents and consultations with government agencies.¹⁰⁸ The Synthesis Report made several recommendations that informed the current CSP, including complementing and strengthening the Government's social protection system, supporting and strengthening capacity for implementing nutrition-related strategies and programmes; strengthening the capacities of smallholder farmers and Bedouin communities; focusing on the empowerment of women, adolescent girls and boys, and PWD through livelihood support; South-South cooperation; and utilizing WFP technical expertise to support analysis of the underlying causes of food and nutrition insecurity and vulnerability to facilitate the formulation of evidence-based policy.

67. The Synthesis Report's findings were discussed with the MoSS, CAPMAS, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR), MoE, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of International Cooperation, Ministry of Labour Force, the NCW, Information and Decision Support Council and Climate Change Council during a workshop conducted on 5 April 2017. This workshop was a key step taken to ensure Government engagement.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, as per multiple WFP staff, consultations with the Government were carried out during the CSP formulation process, (although this could not be corroborated by relevant Government respondents, which the evaluation team attributes to a recall/time lapse challenge on the part of respondents, or that the Government representatives interviewed were different from the ones sent by their organizations at the time in 2017-2018).

68. In relation to CCS specifically, while no capacity gap assessment seems to have been conducted at the time of the CSP design to inform identification of the CCS activities required to achieve the objectives, the CCS activities were primarily developed to strengthen the implementation of nutrition-related aspects of the CSP. As a result, the identified activities are coherent with the broader framework of objectives defined in the government's strategies and policies, for example, the 1000 Days initiative as part of the Takaful programme.

69. In relation to SO2, which focuses on support to refugees, the CSP was aligned with Egypt's regional and international commitments to support refugees and host communities. This includes Egypt's commitment to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocols and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. More recently, WFP's engagement has also been aligned with the One Refugee Approach, a policy that permits WFP support to be provided to all refugees in Egypt regardless of their nationality, and not to Syrian refugees only. Likewise, the CSP was aligned with the 3RP response plan.¹¹⁰

70. The continued relevance of the CSP is underscored by Egypt's 2021 Voluntary National Review which suggests that areas of CSP focus, such as prevalence of stunting, wasting and anemia, are improving. The review report makes specific mention of the 1000 Days Programme (See EQ 2.1 SO 3) as a considerable contribution to progress achieved. The report also notes that agricultural production has improved, as has education, including the introduction of digital technology, and in supporting Egypt's leadership (South - South cooperation) on the continent. It is unclear from the report the degree to which WFP has contributed to the success, but the alignment with WFP engagement is visible and the outcomes of WFP's work contributing to the aforementioned results are well documented (see section 2.1).

¹⁰⁶ Moustafa, N., Elghamrawy, E., King, K & Hao, Y. 2022. 'Education 2.0: A Vision for Educational Transformation in Egypt'.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ WFP & Ministry of Social Solidarity. 2017. Synthesis Report on Egypt's Road Map Towards Achieving SDG 2.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Related to AQ.4 in Annex IV: How well is the CSP aligned with the coordinated refugee response –3RP?

EQ1.2: To what extent did the CSP address the needs of the most vulnerable people in Egypt to ensure that no one is left behind?

Summary

For all work except targeting of refugees, WFP relied exclusively on the Government's own systems and criteria for targeting beneficiaries, which was appropriate given the integration of most activities into the Government social protection structure.

The evaluation showed that some targeting gaps may exist as it was not clear how WFP ensured that youth and PWDs were targeted. No evidence is available to show that WFP validated the beneficiary lists received from the Government, or conducted post-distribution monitoring or analysis in order to ascertain whether the most vulnerable were indeed reached.

71. Beneficiary targeting for all activities, except for refugees and displaced persons, was conducted through government systems which included census data, monitoring data and ad-hoc consultation processes with the Government. In all instances, government systems determined the beneficiary targets. While the beneficiary lists were validated by relevant ministries, there is no evidence demonstrating that WFP corroborated the data. In the case of refugees, the beneficiaries were initially identified by an inter-agency effort and subsequently verified by WFP.

72. **SO1, Activity 1:** The governorates selected for public schools' school feeding were based on poverty data and followed the CSP geographical prioritization which was vulnerability-based. Community schools (See Annex XI – Community School Model) are established in the most vulnerable locations, and more recently, schools in villages, which meet the Haya Karima criteria, have been selected (see Annex XI: Haya Karima Targeting). According to the CO, the lists of schools that are supported was provided to WFP by the MoE, and WFP did not engage in the selection process or in any effort to determine its veracity.

73. **SO1, Activity 2:** The activity prioritized youth and local stakeholders. The selection criteria aimed to ensure that the most vulnerable individuals and their families were targeted. However, the data collected in Egypt by the evaluation team highlighted some areas of concern. First, the selection of beneficiaries within villages was not clearly defined which meant that decision-making has not systematically made use of WFP selection criteria. Secondly, while according to WFP, activities were designed and planned in coordination with the Ministry of Manpower (MoM), and beneficiaries were selected from Haya Karima Villages and PWDs were included in targeting, the field data collection revealed that at least some youths were selected through an open application call, which was not vulnerability-focused. Some programme participants were repeat beneficiaries, and others held or were in the process of securing university degrees. There was no evidence that those interviewed were among the most vulnerable within their respective communities. Moreover, while PWDs can be included in the Takaful programme, it was not clear from interviews conducted for this evaluation how, if at all, PWDs were particularly targeted in WFP activities.

74. **SO2, Activity 3:** Between 2016 and 2018, targeting focused on food security and socioeconomic indicators through an inter-agency Egypt Vulnerability Assessment for Refugees which identified the most vulnerable individuals/families among the target population (refugees). In 2019, WFP started using proxy means testing to identify the most vulnerable individuals. The profile of each refugee and asylum seeker was compared against that of other refugees and asylum-seekers and those who demonstrated the highest levels of vulnerability were targeted.

75. **SO2, Activity 9:** Targeting was three-pronged. One set of beneficiaries were vulnerable casual labourers who were most impacted by COVID-19. These beneficiaries were selected by the MoM which registered and validated the data prior to submitting it to WFP. A second set of beneficiaries were agricultural labourers who were impacted by COVID-19. These beneficiaries were registered by the Ministry of Local Development which cleaned and validated the data before providing it to WFP. A third group of beneficiaries were vulnerable women who were considered most impacted negatively by COVID-19. These beneficiaries were identified by the MoSS, which then provided the information to WFP.

76. **SO3, Activity 4:** Beneficiaries were selected by the MoSS from among those registered for the Takaful and Karama programme (see Annex XI). This system permits the systematic identification of all mothers who meet vulnerability criteria and have a child under 24 months. The initial reporting of pregnant and lactating women (PLW) is based on self-reporting to the Ministry of Health, which then shares the data, though a manual transfer, with the MoSS. According to the CO, WFP did not independently assess the completeness of the source data.

77. **SO4, Activity 5:** WFP used a two-step approach to select the villages targeted. The preliminary identification was done based on two criteria, namely the village's poverty ranking (according to government data and more recently according to Haya Karima criteria) and the existence of community schools, this data was sourced from the Government. The latter facilitated the delivery of integrated services through community hubs.¹¹¹ Once the pool of communities that met the basic criteria was identified, field visits were conducted in coordination with representatives from the directorates of the Agriculture and Social Solidary. These visits aimed to verify and fine tune the selection of villages that were ultimately supported. The criteria explored during these visits included:

- a) Agriculture-based livelihoods.
- b) Existence of a CDA that could be identified as a partner agency.
- c) Favourable security conditions within the village.

78. WFP then examined whether pre-selected villages met other critical criteria (e.g. existence of other WFP activities, such as community schools) which could help capitalize on synergies between different activities and increase the impact of activities at the village level.

79. In instances where the support did not target the whole community but specific families within the villages, beneficiary households that met the following criteria were selected:

- a) Small agricultural plots (less than 1 acre).
- b) Woman-headed households are prioritized for microloans.

80. The field data collection showed that in Bedouin communities, target families were identified by the community leadership according to their own criteria. The evaluation team was not able to confirm if these families are those most vulnerable. In Upper Egypt, the field data collection revealed that the selection of microloan recipients was not standardized.

81. **SO5, Activity 6:** The identification of beneficiaries was conducted through close interaction with several relevant ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Local Development, MoM, MALR, the Executive Agency for Comprehensive Development Projects and the Information, the Decision Support Centre, and the MoE, which are engaged in CCS programmes. Each agency plays a critical role identifying beneficiaries based on how training them can further the implementation of the digital transformation strategy. Beneficiary selection is the result of a nomination process led by the Government or key partner involved.

82. **SO5, Activity 7:** Beneficiaries for capacity strengthening activities were identified based on their technical background and on their ability to: a) represent different countries; and b) benefit from the experience in Egypt.

83. **SO5, Activity 8:** Villages selected had community schools and other activities, and also established community hubs which are expected to catalyse community development. In addition, this activity included the rehabilitation of schools undertaken with UNICEF.

84. Whether the beneficiaries identified for activities 6 and 7 support the overarching objective of responding to the needs of the most vulnerable is not known. The documentation available does not permit this type of assessment and interviews could not provide the level of substantiation to ensure this

¹¹¹ The 'Community Hubs' is a flagship initiative which includes the upgrading of community schools to promote digital learning for students and teachers, while also serving as a shared community platform to support awareness-raising and community engagements.

was the case. Villages selected as part of activity 8 met the government criteria for a high level of vulnerability.

EQ1.3: To what extent has WFP's strategic positioning remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP considering changing context, national capacities and needs and, in particular, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?

Summary

The CSP provided a sufficiently broad framework, which enabled WFP, through BRs, to adapt to changes in context and to respond to shocks such as COVID-19. Despite its adaptability, WFP faced funding constraints which prevented it from achieving all expected results.

85. The CSP remained highly relevant for the country and the intended target groups. The broadness of the activities and wide range of subactivities provided the flexibility needed to respond to changes in scope, mainly the number and coverage of refugees, and shocks, mainly COVID-19.

86. Syrian and non-Syrian Refugees: The key changes included an unexpected increase of refugees and the inclusion of non-Syrian refugees as beneficiaries (the One Refugee Approach).¹¹² These demands are reflected in BR 3, which expanded the beneficiary target by 55,000 and included a 90 percent budget increase in SO 2 activity 3 (see Table 5). Despite these efforts, WFP faced financial challenges responding to the needs of the beneficiaries that it was committed to support. According to multiple respondents from different organizations, as well as beneficiaries, in some instances support had to be halted, or the amount of support reduced.

87. COVID-19: According to the ACRs and interviews with WFP staff, government representatives and beneficiaries¹¹³, there were two main changes prompted by the pandemic. First, a shift from conditional to unconditional support for SO1 (school meals), and SO2 and SO3 (nutrition counselling for PLW) to enable support during the pandemic while reducing potential infection and amid school closures, reducing rates of infection. Secondly, activity 9 was added as a response to COVID-19 through BR4.

88. The above changes demonstrate WFP's ability, through BR and changes in activity modality, to respond to changes in context/circumstance. However, WFP's ability to deliver was constrained by lack of timely access to funding (see EQ 3.1).

EQ1.4: To what extent is the CSP coherent and aligned with the wider United Nations and does it include appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP in Egypt?

Summary

The CSP aligned well with the UNPDF (2018-2022), and WFP engaged in important partnerships, which enabled it to contribute to UNICEF and UNHCR goals. Other collaborations were more ad hoc. Indeed, not all opportunities for more strategic collaborations were exploited. WFP used its comparative advantage in terms of subject area competence (food security), and also in its in-depth knowledge of the country and strong relationship with government agencies. However, engaging in too many activities could inadvertently dilute WFP's strong subject area competence.

¹¹² UNHCR, 2019. *3RP Country Chapter 2019/2020, Egypt – 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan in Response to the Syria Crisis*.

¹¹³ Government representatives and beneficiaries are not familiar with BR or activity names, but are able to explain the shifts they witnessed.

89. Egypt's UNPDF, 2018–2022¹¹⁴ focuses on four specific areas, and the CSP is aligned with each in the following ways:

90. **Inclusive economic development:** Through SO1 and 4 as these pursue, among other things, improved access to employment opportunities for both youth and women. These efforts could have included a consistent engagement with the ILO that could have capitalized on their experience and expertise in this area.

91. **Social justice:** Through SO1 and SO3 which focus on access to education, improvement of maternal and neonatal health and reduction of malnutrition. This could have included a more consistent partnership with UNICEF.

92. **Environmental sustainability and natural resource management:** Through SO4, it focuses attention on agricultural production, on adaptation to climate change and on building resilience. This could have included a more consistent partnership with FAO and UNDP.

93. **Women's empowerment:** WFP attempted to support the capacity-building among women, i.e. literacy (SO5); supported women through skills training, microloans and livestock, to further the improvement of women's livelihoods (SO 1 and 4). WFP targeted female youth with technical and vocational education and training (TVET) (SO1), and provided literacy support to women (SO5). In addition, WFP educated women on nutrition for themselves and their families (SO2 and 3). This could have involved a more consistent partnership with UN Women.

94. WFP cooperates with several UN agencies. Specifically, with UNHCR in the provision of support to refugees and host communities (SO2). The collaboration, according to interviewees from both organizations, includes the selection of respondents and efforts to ensure that between the two agencies all vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers can secure some support. Collaboration with UNICEF centred around the rehabilitation of schools where WFP served as the implementer on the ground and ensured that the UNICEF project materialized (Activity 8). According to WFP respondents and project activity reports, WFP was well positioned to engage in the rehabilitation of schools as they had solid previous experience and an on-the-ground presence (see Box 1). With UN Women, WFP had some limited engagement in relation to gender issues. According to the respondents, these efforts tended to be needs based and ad-hoc and focused on advisory efforts (e.g. WFP requested advice from UN Women for a specific issue).

95. With FAO and ILO, interviews suggested that the collaboration was ad-hoc and limited, mainly, when agencies involved were working in the same area and targeting the same beneficiaries in a complementary way. None of these efforts were large joint programmes, but some UN agency respondents suggested that there were opportunities for more engaged collaborations that could have been explored.

96. WFP also partnered with the private sector. Specifically, WFP received targeted support to execute specific activities, as well as broader activities, such as messaging on nutrition with Carrefour. Interviews with CO staff showed considerable interest within the CO to engage the private sector more widely.

97. According to various categories of respondents, WFP-NGO partnerships had clearly defined roles: WFP provided funding and oversight and NGOs implemented activities. This cooperation worked well.

98. UN agency representatives also noted that different UN agencies sometimes compete for the same funding and that this does not lend itself to strong collaboration. Despite the competition among UN agencies for resources, the respondents also agreed that there were more opportunities to collaborate and ensure that activities by different agencies complemented each other. The role of the Resident Coordinator

Box 1: School Rehabilitation

The activity included refurbishment and installation of sanitary facilities and additions to structures, such as lights and windows. The experience made WFP the only actor in the UN family with school rehabilitation experience in Egypt. This in turn led to a partnership with UNICEF whereby WFP became the implementer of school refurbishment on behalf of UNICEF (specifically focusing on community schools).

¹¹⁴ See UNPDF. 2018. *United Nations Partnership Development Framework 2018 to 2022 – United for a Sustainable Future*.

in promoting inter-agency collaboration was noted as a critical element of ensuring coordination and inter-agency coherence, as was the good will of all agencies working in the country to collaborate.

99. The perception of UN agencies was that WFP had a robust presence in country, that this could be an asset for the UN family as a whole, and also that it gave WFP a comparative advantage over other UN agencies, including both its ability to provide support in the food security sector and in relation to its country knowledge, network of local partners and strong partnership with government agencies in a wide range of initiatives.

100. Interviews also suggested that, while having a wide range of skill sets is very important, it is equally relevant that WFP avoided engaging in too many diverse activities as this risks diluting the degree to which its principal area of competence is known, recognized and appreciated. For example, activities focused on irregular migration, child labour and other activities, which are complex and require responses, are not within the specific WFP competence.

2.2 EQ2: WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP'S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN EGYPT?

EQ2.1: To what extent did WFP deliver expected outputs and contribute to the expected CSP strategic outcomes?

101. In responding to this EQ, the following structure is used. First, a summary overview is provided according to each SO, followed by a brief description of each SO and the key outputs attained under it. This is then followed by a financial overview and a discussion of outcomes. CCS was the specific focus of SO5, but also part of several activities across the CSP. Therefore, CCS is addressed throughout this section where relevant.

102. Review of documents and interviews with multiple respondents from different categories show that overlap between WFP supported activities¹¹⁵ has enabled the provision of coherent and mutually reinforcing support to beneficiary communities. Interviews with beneficiaries, government and UN staff suggest that this type of effort generates results which are greater than the sum of their parts because together activities target and strengthen a wide range of aspects of the community, and in so doing strengthen the community as a whole (e.g. improve the overall context).

103. **SO1: Food-insecure and most vulnerable children and families in targeted areas of Egypt have access to food all year round.**

Summary

The school feeding programme, Take Home Rations and conditional CBT, were successful and supported the attainment of the overall SO. The degree to which activities, such as micro loans, community hubs and youth capacity-development, have delivered or will deliver on the SO objective is less clear, although interviews suggest that microloans helped some women to increase incomes (but the pandemic had an adverse effect and made loan repayment more difficult). WFP made clear efforts to increase women's participation through the microloan programme and to ensure the provision of seed funds and business development workshops. WFP also supported gender equality debates and specific capacity-development support for victims of gender-based violence.

104. The overarching objective of SO1 was to address the root causes of food insecurity that affect children and their families. The SO was implemented through a series of subactivities included in Activities 1 and 2.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Related to A.1 in Annex IV: To what extent was the approach of having geographical overlaps for some of the SOs successful, especially in terms of attaining more efficient use of resources?

¹¹⁶ In WFP documentation subactivities are called 'activity' categories. In this report the term subactivity is used for linguistic ease and to make it clear that these are activities, which are directly related to specific activities (numbered), related to each SO.


105. **Activity 1: aimed to supplement and complement the government’s social protection programmes to ensure food and nutritional needs of school children are met through the conduct of the five sub activities (as mentioned below).**

106. National School Feeding Programme: included nutritious daily in-school provision of fortified date bars to children attending schools and aimed to encourage attendance, reduced short-term hunger and provided each child with 25 percent of their daily nutritional needs, through in-school feeding and take-home rations (see Table 2 and Table 3). 117

107. Over the years, the provision of the support fluctuated as a result of available funding and agreements with the Government. The support was higher in 2018 and 2019 because the programme was fully funded (see Annex XI Table 10 for funding) and decreasing thereafter (see Table 2) because funds were insufficient. According to the CO, the support also fluctuated due to a government request that WFP support non-community schools in 2018 and 2019 to fill gaps that had arisen due to Government funding gaps. Supporting non-community schools was less costly than supporting community schools, which led to more persons being reached with the same quantities of food stocks. In addition, WFP had a surplus derived from the nation-wide, Government mandated, halting of school feeding in 2018. Lastly, during the second half of 2018, the Government agreed to itself support the (increased) beneficiaries that had been covered by WFP during the first part of 2018 (for details see Annex XI), which meant that WFP therefore reached less than planned beneficiaries in that period (see Figure 9).

108. During the first half of 2018 and 2019, the number of children benefiting from this activity far exceeded those planned. From 2020 onwards, due to COVID-19, the support to children and their families shifted from take home rations to CBT. Surplus school date-bars were sent to orphanages and elderly care facilities. In 2021, as schools remained closed, 13,000 MT date bars were not procured as planned.¹¹⁸

Figure 9. National School Feeding Programme beneficiaries (activity 1) receiving food (on-site and take-home rations)



Source: COMET report CM-R020, Q1 actuals provided by CO.

Table 2. National School Feeding Programme food transfers and children supported (on-site rations)

Years	Food Transfers			School Children		
	Planned (MT)	Actual (MT)	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached

¹¹⁷ WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.

¹¹⁸ WFP. 2022. Annual Country Report 2021.

Jan-June 2018	4,092	3,773	92.20%	610,000	2,151,480	352.70%
July-December 2018	3,427	352	10.27%	620,000	74,194	11.97%
2019	6,854	5,255	76.67%	620,000	2,242,875	361.75%
2020	6,854	14	0.20%	500,000	3,650	0.73%
2021	6,854	0	0.00%	620,000	0	0.00%
Q1, 2022	6,854	96	1.40%	620,000	27,385	4.42%

Source: COMET reports CM-R014 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021, and CM-R020. Q1, 2022 actuals provided by CO.

Table 3. National School Feeding Programme food transfers and family members supported (take-home rations)

Years	Food Transfers			Household Members		
	Planned (MT)	Actual (MT)	% reached	Planned	Actual	% reached
Jan-June 2018	7,862	6,703	85.26%	600,000	428,414	71.40%
July-December 2018	3,145	1,068	33.96%	240,000	231,732	96.56%
2019	6,290	4,177	66.41%	240,000	323,667	134.86%
2020	6,289.92	0	0.00%	240,000	0	0.00%
2021	6,289.92	0	0.00%	240,000	0	0.00%
Q1, 2022	6,289.92	0	0.00%	240,000	0	0.00%

Source: COMET reports CM-R014 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021, and CM-R020. Q1, 2022 actuals provided by CO. 1

109. Conditional CBTs to incentivize school attendance and retention: In 2018, this activity aimed to incentivize school attendance and retention and to combat child labour and early marriage. WFP provided monthly take-home entitlements or CBTs to families of school children with a minimum of 80 percent attendance (see Table 4).¹¹⁹ In the first-half of 2018, the planned CBT beneficiaries and CBT distributed were surpassed, but later the number of beneficiaries consistently failed to meet targets (see


110.

111.

112. Figure 10 and Table 10 in Annex XI), with funding proving a particular challenge (expiration of/reduction in funding streams and challenges in raising additional funding for community schools while increasing support to public schools).

Figure 10 National School Feeding Programme beneficiaries (activity 1) receiving CBT

¹¹⁹ WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.



Source: COMET report CM-R020, Q1 actuals provided by CO.

Table 4. CBT distributed as part of the National School Feeding Programme (activity 1)

Years	CBT value planned (USD)	CBT value actual (USD)	% of planned CBT distributed
Jan-June 2018	1,200,000	1,869,024	155.75%
July-December 2018	4,320,000	160,403	3.71%
2019	8,640,000	764,937	8.85%
2020	8,640,000	2,731,243	31.61%
2021	8,640,000	3,270,971	37.86%
Q1, 2022	32,400,000	8,395,638	25.91%

Source: COMET reports CM-R014 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, Q1, 2022 actuals provided by CO.

113. **Education enhancement, which included school rehabilitation:** In 2019, WFP augmented its efforts by promoting interactive learning and using a puppet programme to deliver specific awareness-raising messages. In 2021, the effort expanded to include water access and electrification to community schools in Bedouin communities. In total, 2,373 schools were rehabilitated from a total of 4,500 community schools.

114. **Training of teachers to monitor and combat child labour:** These efforts focused mainly on training of different staff who managed child labour cases or could influence the proliferation of child labour, including training of Child Protection Committee (CPC) members and Protection Units, in collaboration with the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, and the training of teachers (1,433 in total) and case workers (555 in total).¹²⁰ In 2018, a database module for child labour inspection to facilitate data collection and referral of identified cases was developed jointly with ILO and the MoM.

¹²⁰ WFP. 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Annual Country Report. Total schools rehabilitated is based on data provided by the CO.

115. **Community Hubs (Technology-centric learning and monitoring):** in 2018, the first interactive Key Performance Indicator (KPI) platform for the MoE was developed. This collaboration provided a mechanism to monitor attendance and feeding statistics.


116. In the same year, WFP piloted the Community Hub initiative. Community Hubs include the technological upgrade of community schools to enable teachers' trainings, teacher access to the Egyptian knowledge bank, nutrition and hygiene awareness-raising for the community and trainings for women entrepreneurs, for example. Thus far, a total 555 schools have been upgraded.¹²¹ The 2020-2021, COVID-19 experience further solidified the importance of the technological and physical upgrades of these schools.

117. **Microloans to empower women – economic inclusion:** This subactivity included the provision of microloans and loans to enable women to launch their own income-generating initiatives. In addition, in collaboration with local NGOs and the Takaful Foundation, trainings on both enterprise-building and vocational activities were conducted. A review of the 2018-2021 ACRs shows that not all persons receiving microloans necessarily received training on business management, and this was also corroborated by beneficiaries. Although, the beneficiaries noted that in certain instances multiple microloans were given to the same persons, this was part of the activity design, and these follow-up loans were used to expand businesses or to develop additional businesses.

118. The pandemic had a serious impact on the ability of women to maintain their income-generating efforts and also to meet their loan repayment obligations. In 2020, WFP negotiated with loan-managing NGOs for a three-month repayment grace period, effectively reducing accumulated interest payments for 2,000 women-led businesses.¹²² By mid-2020, WFP and the Takaful Foundation resumed livelihood activities in nine governorates through the provision of revolving microloans. In 2021, WFP, the MoSS, and the NCW, jointly implemented a Women's Economic Empowerment programme which focused on the same modality used before (trainings accompanied by microloans). They also introduced a 'Gender Equality Debates Programme', which promoted gender equality awareness among schools, and a capacity-strengthening programme on support for victims of GBV was facilitated for NCW's frontline lawyers. In total, between 2018 and 2021, 4,500 women received training, 5,000 received seed funds and over 20,000 received microloans.¹²³ This activity is linked to efforts to reduce child labour as its aim is to provide families with an alternative form of income.

119. In relation to CCS specifically, the majority of survey respondents (n=403) participated in trainings that focused on strengthening the capacity of government staff (teachers) (see Figure 11). Trainings used a train-the-trainer modality.

Figure 11. Self-reported participation in CCS activities under SO 1



Source: Online survey conducted by the evaluation team.


¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² WFP. 2021. Annual Country Report 2020.

¹²³ WFP. 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Annual Country Report.

120. **Financial overview SO1, Activity1:** A review of the allocated resources and expenditure for activity 1 (see Figure 12) shows that resources were limited. The available resources also broadly explain the inability to meet CBT objectives even though during COVID-19 take home rations were replaced by CBT.


Figure 12. Activity 1 – financial overview¹²⁴



Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are reflected until December 2022.

121. **Outcomes SO1, Activity 1:** The results for this activity varied between subactivities. The outcomes related to school participation, school retention and food consumption (Figure 13 and Figure 14) were consistently above target until 2019, the latest year for which data is available. The data also suggest that the use of CBT as an alternative to school feeding and take-home rations delivered good food security outcomes, and that school feeding supported positive school attendance and retention outcomes.


Figure 13. Outcome indicators for Activity 1 – school participation¹²⁵



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators


¹²⁴ All financial overview graphs for each activity do not include direct and indirect support costs (DSC and ISC).

¹²⁵ Since the schools in Egypt were closed due to COVID-19, data was not collected for either indicator (retention rate or attendance rate) during 2020 and 2021.



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators

Figure 14. Outcome indicators for Activity 1 – food consumption score



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators.

122. Outcomes harvested through beneficiary interviews also echo the above results both in relation to positive nutrition and school attendance. According to beneficiaries, **take-home rations and CBT** enabled households to better respond to emergencies such as COVID-19. Beneficiaries also stressed that the school feeding support received (before COVID-19) was instrumental in ensuring that children were able to attend school as the provision of fortified daily in-school snack encouraged parents to maintain attendance.

123. According to beneficiaries interviewed, **anti-child labour messaging** at school did not result in reducing instances of child labour. In general, respondents, who were parents, noted that children work not because they feel employment is a beneficial alternative to education, but due to economic necessity.

124. No respondents were able to articulate in tangible terms how **infrastructure support** led to the improvement of learning outcomes and/or broader education quality parameters,¹²⁶ nor was there a clear delineation of what complementary activities would be implemented to ensure the WFP engagement would lead to improved education. Some beneficiaries felt that providing infrastructure for electrification of schools in villages which did not have electricity was an unproductive type of support, particularly if the school building itself required other repairs, such as improved roofing or insulation (e.g. in Bedouin communities).

125. **Community hubs**, according to multiple categories of respondents, will provide positive opportunities to share information, and collectivize skill sets and resilience building. However, none of the community hubs visited by the evaluation team had been actively or consistently used. These facilities are relatively young, and thus far there are no documented (reports) or visible (interviews and field visits) demonstrations that expected outcomes will materialize.

126. The outcomes from **trainings for women, microloans and business start-up** resources varied considerably. Beneficiaries who had been able to access microloans (e.g. met the criteria), to receive trainings on how to establish a business and continued to receive support thereafter (in some instances with new loans) felt that their ability to generate income had improved. In some instances, female-led businesses provided remote villages improved access to basic goods (e.g. shops with basic goods), however the income-generating capacity of these businesses is unclear. In addition, some beneficiaries noted that having training without a loan was meaningless, which suggests that delinking of microloans from effective training reduces the possibility of positive outcomes. The wider range of activities conducted alongside micro loans which focused on trainings and information-sharing on gender equality have, according to WFP ACR, served to improve female participation, but in the absence of robust data measuring this has proved elusive.

127. The overall result of **trainings for government staff (teachers)** conducted is unclear. Government staff familiar with the activities underlined that there were limited opportunities to roll out (to scale up from train-the-trainer efforts) because there was no government funding for scaling up the training activities.

128. **Activity 2: Aimed to provide livelihood and capacity-strengthening activities to urban and rural communities.** This could improve employability for both urban and rural community youth.¹²⁷ The initiative was based on a needs assessment conducted by WFP which highlighted employability and skills as a clear determinant for addressing poverty and malnutrition. Between 2019 and 2021, 10,774 beneficiaries participated in training sessions on livelihood-support/agriculture and farming/IGA. This was over double the number planned (5,200). In addition, 663 government/national partner staff received technical assistance training, this was slightly lower than the 715 originally planned.¹²⁸


129. **Financial Overview SO 1, Activity 2:** This activity received limited funding, only 26.23 percent of NBP, and spending was a little over half of received funds. Given the limited resources, the activities conducted were also limited and the CO chose not to measure outcome indicators.

Figure 15. Activity 2 – financial overview

¹²⁶ Tikly, L. 2011. 'Towards a Framework for Researching the Quality of Education in Low-Income Countries', Comparative Education 47(1): 1–23.

¹²⁷ WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.

¹²⁸ COMET report CM-R008 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021.



Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

130. **Outcome SO1, Activity 2:**¹²⁹ While supporting capacity strengthening is a positive way to improve nutrition and food security in the longer term, the evidence collected highlighted some challenges, including, training on issues where there was no known market, leading to lack of job availability after training. Interviewees familiar with the programme indicated that the MoM did an assessment to identify which areas of TVET would be most useful. However, no respondent interviewed was familiar with the results of said study and the evaluation team did not see it either. Therefore, how the offered TVET responds to market gaps is unknown. Moreover, beneficiaries were identified using government selection protocols, which are not always vulnerability focused (See EQ 1.2).

131. **SO2: Food-insecure refugees, displaced populations and host communities in Egypt have access to adequate food all year round.**

Summary

General food distribution through cash vouchers improved the nutritional status of beneficiaries, but the cap put on CBT restricting it to five members per family, regardless of the family size, restricted effective support. SBCC has also contributed to improved nutrition, although in some cases the targets needed to be broader to include all family members who were engaged in nutrition-related decision-making and not PLW alone.

The outcomes of resilience-building and integration of refugees into host communities were not systematically assessed by WFP, but in terms of the former documentation shows that most participants successfully completed livelihood training courses and received monthly household assistance of EGP2,000 which has the potential to improve their nutrition. These results, including any effects on nutrition, could, however, not be triangulated via beneficiary interviews.

WFP's response to the impact of COVID-19 was not systematically assessed, but beneficiaries interviewed considered it an important positive contribution to their food/nutrition security.

132. The objective of SO2 was to improve the food security and integration of refugees with host communities through Activity 3 and, more recently, in response to COVID-19, through activity 9 and a series of corresponding subactivities.

133. **Activity 3 aimed to provide refugees, displaced populations and host communities with food and nutrition assistance and activities that build resilience through the following three subactivities.** When

¹²⁹ There are no evaluable corporate indicators for this activity.


first designed, this activity was intended to focus on Syrian refugees only. However, the One Refugee programme expanded the coverage.

134. **Unrestricted Resource Transfers/General Food Distribution (GFD):** During 2018 and 2019 this subactivity included the provision of a cash voucher that recipients could cash against pre-identified items in pre-selected shops. The objective of this support was twofold: to enable refugees to access quality food and essential items and restore their dignity by facilitating their ability to make choices regarding their purchases.

135. **Nutrition support (and CBT) to PLW:** This form of support was the same as the CBT provided under GFD detailed above, with the notable exception that receiving the voucher was conditional on regular health checks for the women and their children, which was accompanied by nutritional counselling. The counselling was halted in 2020 to reduce the risk of contracting COVID-19 during health post visits. When it was again safe to provide this type of support, in August 2021, an alternative modality (nutrition-awareness sessions) was implemented.

136. Between July 2018 and 2021, the number of female beneficiaries targeted grew consistently from 48,575 in 2018 to 83,840 in 2021, and the proportion of male beneficiaries decreased between 2019 and 2020 from 40,425 to 37,328, but increased in 2021 to 66,160. As the number of targeted beneficiaries increased, so did the proportion of beneficiaries reached (see Figure 17). Proportionally more women were targeted and reached. The discrepancy between less than planned available resources (funded NBP) and the number of beneficiaries targeted was resolved, according to the CO staff, by the provision of a cap on CBT to five persons per family irrespective of the family size. Beneficiaries interviewed noted that their circumstances were precarious and that the support received was insufficient, but important nonetheless. Interviews with WFP and UNHCR suggested that some support is better than no support, and while all agreed that a reduction in support was not positive, it was preferable than not being able to support some beneficiaries at all.


Figure 16. Food transfers and CBT beneficiaries for activity 2 and 3 of the T-ICSP¹³⁰



Source: COMET report CM-R020.

Figure 17. CBT beneficiaries for activity 3 of CSP

¹³⁰ The COMET database registered Food Transfers as part of the planned activities for the T-ICSP. However, discussions with CO staff revealed this inclusion must be an error.




Source: COMET report CM-R020, Q1 actuals provided by CO.

137. **Resilience building:** During 2018 and 2019, WFP provided vocational and job training, accompanied by CBT conditional to attendance to 2,000 individuals, to enhance the skill set among refugees and host community members. In 2020 the support was halted due to the pandemic (See also SO 1).¹³¹

138. In relation to CCS specifically, the majority of evaluation team survey respondents (54.9 percent, n=273) participated in trainings that focused on nutrition awareness (see Figure 18). Survey respondents, who have been trained, themselves served as trainer or implementers of activities and they were also part of nutrition-awareness efforts. They noted that the trainings had been informative and useful, which is also supported by the view of end-beneficiaries (i.e. those receiving the training) who felt that the knowledge imparted to them was valuable.

Figure 18. Self-reported participation in CCS activities under SO 2



Source: Online survey carried by the evaluation team

139. Financial Overview SO 2 activity 3: In 2019, this activity was funded in excess of the NBP at 136.49 percent, allowing WFP to reach more than 100 percent of planned CBT beneficiaries (Figure 17). Following the Government's request (May 2019) to increase the number of beneficiaries receiving GFD as part of the "One Refugee Policy", the budget was increased in BR 3 (See Table 5). According to the CO, the funding timelines (from the USA, Germany and Ireland) were critical to ensuring the continuity of GFD throughout

¹³¹ **Related to AQ.4 in Annex IV:** How well is the CSP aligned with the coordinated refugee response –3RP?


the year, while intermediate funding shortfalls were avoided using WFP’s internal advanced financing mechanism. At the same time, other subactivities, PLW and Food Assistance for Training (FFT), were underfunded hence targets were not reached. Overall, this activity was funded to 75 percent of NBP and had a high expenditure rate of some 87 percent (see Figure 19).

Table 5. Activity 3 budget revisions (without DSC and ISC)

Activities	NBP	NBP BR02 (2019)	NBP BR03 (2020)	% change NBP BR02 - NBP BR03	NBP BR04 (2020)
03 Food assistance for refugees	USD99,270,082	USD99,274,566	USD189,653,104	191.04%	USD189,653,104

Source: CPB Original; CPB Final BR02; CSP BR 03 Budget Plan; EG02 NBP BR04.

Figure 19. Activity 3 – financial overview




Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

140. **Outcomes SO2, Activity 3:** The UNHCR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees from 2018 showed that, among those assisted by WFP, the proportion of the population that is food secure was lower than those unsupported (which can include those less vulnerable). However, there were no severely food insecure persons in those assisted, moreover, the proportion of moderately food insecure persons was also comparatively lower than the non-assisted (See Figure 20).¹³² Beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation indicated this observation is still true – that where their food security situation is generally precarious, the support received has improved the consistency of access to food.

Figure 20. Food security index – WFP assisted and non-assisted refugees (2018)


¹³² UNHCR. 2020. Vulnerability assessment of Syrian Refugees in Egypt 2018.



Source: UNHCR. 2020. Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Egypt 2018.

141. Moreover, the assessment data on Food Consumption Score (FCS) showed more Syrian refugees registered an acceptable FCS (87.4 percent) than non-Syrian and Arabic refugees while among non-Arabic refugees only 57.2 percent reached an acceptable FCS (Figure 21). The report did not discuss the reasons for this variance.

Figure 21. FCS – main groups of refugees (2018)



Source: UNHCR. 2020. Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Egypt 2018.


WFP's data, however, shows that while at the baseline this was true, results among non-Syrian refugees were marginally better than those of Syrian refugees in 2018–2020. However, by 2021, after a year of COVID-19, non-Syrian refugees showed worsening results (see

142. Figure 22 and Figure 23).

143. COMET data, documents reviewed and multiple categories of interviewees attribute the fall in FCS in 2020 and 2021 to the pandemic.¹³³ Not only did the pandemic limit the support provided (SBCC), but it also placed a strain on the economic livelihoods of beneficiaries and reduced their mobility (ability to access and do jobs). The increase in food prices also affected beneficiaries. The findings suggest that Syrian refugees were better able to respond to the crisis. However, the data on this specific point is insufficient to definitively conclude why this was so, and interviews with UN agencies and beneficiaries have not led to a definitive understanding of this dynamic.


¹³³ WFP. 2021. Annual Country Report 2020; WFP. 2022. Annual Country Report 2021.

Figure 22. Activity 3 – Household Food Consumption Score – Syrian refugees



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators

Figure 23. Activity 3 – Household Food Consumption Score – Non-Syrian refugees¹³⁴




Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators. Note: Data for 2020 is not available.

¹³⁴ Data for 2020 was not available.

144. Beneficiaries interviewed stressed that they experienced considerable difficulty in securing food for themselves and their families. They also noted that food expenditure often competed with other needs, such as medical requirements (medicine) of family members. Improved access to food and nutritional knowledge outcomes were harvested from interviews with beneficiaries who benefited from GFD and CBT.


145. Data from WFP's monitoring show that children 6-23 months were, except in 2019, able to meet the WFP targets for minimum acceptable diet (Figure 24) as were the scores for minimum dietary diversity for women (see Figure 25). The drop experienced among children with an acceptable diet in 2019 could not be explained by the CO.

Figure 24. Activity 3 - Children 6-23 months who receive a minimum acceptable diet



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators

Figure 25. Activity 3 - Minimum dietary diversity (women)



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators

146. Respondents largely attributed improved general knowledge on nutrition, including key nutrients and their sources (e.g. iron) to SBCC. Other outcomes attributed to SBCC included improved breast-feeding knowledge (e.g. how and for how long). Self-reporting from beneficiaries suggested that they had exercised practices that were detrimental to their child and their own health prior to the SBCC received. Beneficiaries did not distinguish between individual and collective SBCC (according to WFP, both modalities are considered interpersonal communication mechanisms, which, if effectively used, can provide a good opportunity for two-way communication).¹³⁵

147. Beneficiaries also noted that in some instances SBCC did not include all family members who are engaged in nutrition related decision-making and that this affected the impact of the activity (e.g. mothers-in-law decide who eats what, but were not targeted with SBCC).¹³⁶ While responses from beneficiaries are positive, the outcome of SBCC and their contribution to improved nutrition outcomes could not be systematically measured by WFP.

148. Nutrition counselors reported that trainings received had applied a two-way communication approach. The outcome of this was an improved peer-to-peer learning and the opportunity to contextualize lessons to local experiences.


149. FFT activities were not consistently monitored nor was it possible to engage with beneficiaries to assess results of training (see 1.4.2 Limitations). Although these activities were underfunded, some activities did take place, but these were not consistently monitored and therefore there is no information to assess their results.¹³⁷

150. **Activity 9:** was introduced in 2020 as a response to the COVID pandemic. Its focus was on **providing assistance to crisis-affected populations during and in the aftermath of a crisis**. The support also covered the needs of refugees.

151. Through Activity 9, WFP supported the government by funding CBT through the social protection programme Takaful and Karama. In 2020, WFP aligned the CBT value with government provided support reducing it from USD38 per month to USD6.4 per month. This allowed overachievement on the planned beneficiaries with only 25 percent of the expected funding (see

152. Figure 26 and Figure 27).

Figure 26. CBT beneficiaries for Activity 9



Source: COMET report CM-R020.

153. **Financial Overview SO 2 Activity 9:** BR 3 included funding for this activity to address the challenges imposed by COVID-19. According to CO staff familiar with funding and activity management, the


¹³⁵ WFP. 2019. *Social Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC)*. Guidance Manual for WFP Nutrition.

¹³⁶ Ibid. Provides an exploration into contextual factors and beneficiaries.

¹³⁷ WFP. 2020. Annual Country Report 2019.

funds were intended to be used during a limited time lapse. Unused funds were utilized in 2021 as part of a donor authorized no-cost extension, hence why some beneficiaries were registered in 2021. In addition, as part of the no-cost extension the donor authorized the transfer of resources from SO2 (Activity 9) to SO 3 (Activity 4). Therefore, some beneficiaries registered under Activity 4 in 2021 will have benefited from funding that was allocated to this activity.

Figure 27. Activity 9 – financial overview



Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

154. **Outcomes SO2, Activity 9:** Due to COVID-19, and the restrictions on movement and human interaction it imposed, this activity was not systematically documented by the CO. However, beneficiaries interviewed highlighted that their access to food improved at a time where their food security had worsened due to COVID-19.¹³⁸

155. **SO3: Targeted populations in Egypt have improved nutritional status by 2030.**

Summary

WFP played an important role in the government’s 1000 Days programme via the development of nutrition counselling material, nutrition messaging through social media platforms and fostering policy dialogue, for instance, by organizing a conference on Food and Nutrition Security, where high-level delegates and African ministers participated. The programme improved the nutritional status of beneficiaries and is now part of the Takaful Social Protection system.

WFP became the strategic partner for the Presidential Initiative “100 million Healthy Lives” for screening of anaemia, obesity and stunting. WFP also worked at a strategic level by contributing to the National Nutrition Strategy and Action Plan and the development of the nutrition component of Haya Karima.

COVID-19 severely impacted outcomes of the activities related to the development of curriculum and SBCC which were part of the 1000 Days programme.

156. **SO3 (Activity 4) aimed to address root causes of malnutrition by supporting the improvement of nutrition status of PLW and children under 24 months.** The SO remained unchanged between the T-ICSP

¹³⁸ The ET assumes that CBT recipients from activity 9 are those who noted that they received the support to counter the stress of COVID-19. However, the ET did note some confusion, at times, between beneficiaries and the source of their support.


and CSP and included four subactivities, as outlined below. A nominal number of beneficiaries (15,640) were supported as part of an Acute Malnutrition response during the T-ICSP.

157. **1000 Days programme** focused on chronic malnutrition (micronutrient deficiencies and stunting) in PLW and children under 24 months. Originally, the programme was a conditional support where beneficiaries received a nutritious food basket¹³⁹ that was supplemented by a food voucher (card) with a value of EGP 111 (USD6) per month, and nutrition and health-care services, including counselling. The provision of food and voucher assistance was conditional on women attending awareness sessions in health centres. In 2019, when the programme was integrated into Takaful, the support changed to conditional CBT top-up equal to EGP200 and nutrition and health-care services, including counselling. Since the pandemic the support has been unconditional.

158. The nutrition counselling was based on information, educational and communication (IEC) materials which had been developed jointly by WFP, MoHP and the NNI. The materials focused on infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices, particularly maternal, infant and young child nutrition, which included breastfeeding, complementary feeding and hygiene.¹⁴⁰

159. As Figure 28 shows, SO 3 consistently failed to meet its targets, except during the T-ICSP. During the T-ICSP, CBT was reduced from USD21.9 a month to USD 8.8 a month, allowing WFP to reach more female beneficiaries than planned. According to the CO, inability to reach planned beneficiaries during the CSP is not only a result of underfunding (See Figure 30), but of would-be beneficiaries, specifically pregnant women, not captured by the government databases that would have permitted their inclusion in the programme.

Figure 28. CBT beneficiaries for activity 4 (T-ICSP and CSP)¹⁴¹



Source: COMET report CM-R020, Q1 actuals provided by CO.

160. **Social Behavioural Change Communication (SBCC)** activities, in addition to those which were integrated into the 1000 Days programme mentioned above, included in-person workshops, public messaging and messaging through social media platforms. These were of two subcategories: those which targeted service delivery staff at health posts and community hubs and aimed to enable a multiplication of

¹³⁹ Nutritious food basket items consisting of beans, lentils, molasses, white cheese and milk were redeemed from local retailers, totalling a value of EGP2.9 million (USD162,000) from July-December 2018.

¹⁴⁰ WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.

¹⁴¹ The T-ICSP included 5,000 planned beneficiaries. Given the focus of this activity both the CO staff familiar with the activity and the evaluation team suspect this is an error in the COMET database. Given the number of beneficiaries the impact of this presumed inclusion error is limited.

messaging, and ones which targeted the broader community as one-way information support. The delivery of SBCC was severely impacted by COVID. Restrictions relating to in-person engagement, meant that during the pandemic, the CO had to rely mainly on remote message-sharing.

161. **National nutrition curriculum development:** These activities form part of a compendium of SBCC material which can be reused and which jointly supported a wide range of beneficiary groups. In 2018, in parallel to the 1000 Days programme, WFP and the NNI finalized a national nutrition curriculum, targeting primary schools, which focused on improving nutrition awareness and practices among children and their families.¹⁴² This effort continued in the following year to include adolescents. In order to ensure the effective use of the material generated, WFP in collaboration with NNI and MoE, supported the training of 3,890 public school teachers to deliver nutrition awareness within public schools, focusing on overweight, obesity and anaemia.¹⁴³ In 2021, WFP and NNI jointly developed three digital educational modules on nutrition for PLW, complementary feeding and malnutrition, to be published on the NNI website and on the Egyptian Knowledge Bank.¹⁴⁴

162. **Policy development (CCS):** Since 2018, WFP invested considerably in developing relationships with different government actors on policy development. The integration of the 1000 Days programme into the Takaful Karama programme and the collaboration with NNI and different ministries in the development of curricula and messaging detailed above are examples of such efforts. In addition, WFP actively contributed to policy dialogue. Specifically, in 2019 WFP helped inform nutrition plans and strategies at a conference on Food and Nutrition Security, where high-level delegates and African ministers participated.¹⁴⁵ In 2019, WFP became the strategic partner for the Presidential Initiative '100 million Healthy Lives,' campaign targeting 12 million primary school children (6-12 years) for screening of anaemia, obesity and stunting.¹⁴⁶ WFP also worked at a strategic level with the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MoSIT), MALR and Ministry of Foreign Affairs by contributing to the National Nutrition Strategy and Action Plan and the development of the nutrition component of Haya Karima.¹⁴⁷

163. In relation to CCS specifically, evaluation team survey respondents (n=347) self-reported having received capacity-development training across a wide range of subactivities (see Figure 29). Among those interviewed, the value of training on implementing nutrition programmes was highlighted. Other types of trainings were mentioned by beneficiaries, but interview respondents were unable to clearly articulate where the CCS had provided added value, or what would have occurred in its absence.

¹⁴² WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.

¹⁴³ WFP. 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021. Annual Country Report.


¹⁴⁴ WFP. 2022. Annual Country Report 2021.

¹⁴⁵ WFP. 2020. Annual Country Report 2019.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ WFP. 2022. Annual Country Report 2022.


Figure 29. Self-reported participation in CCS activities as part of SO3



Source: Online survey carried by the Evaluation Team.

164. **Financial overview SO 3, Activity 4:** This SO suffered from underfunding (see Figure 30), but since the targets expected by the government, and planned in the CSP, far exceeded the number of persons registered for the 1000 Day programme (due to misestimation), the impact of the reduction in available resources does not reflect on the achievement of beneficiary targets.

Figure 30. Activity 4 - financial overview



Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

165. **Outcomes SO3, Activity 4:**¹⁴⁸ Improved nutrition knowledge leading to improved nutrition was an outcome harvested from all 1000 Days beneficiary interviewees. Ability to access additional funds for discretionary use was the outcome that beneficiaries attributed to the cash top-ups. Cash, according to beneficiaries, was used to meet basic needs for the children, buying medication for any family members and/or to respond to a sudden emergency. Several beneficiaries noted that the top-up was the only resource they could tap into in case of an emergency without causing further hardship on the family (e.g. sale of already limited assets).

¹⁴⁸ Outcome indicators were only reported for 2018, hence are of limited value. See Annex XI.

166. It is unclear if health workers have the capacity to consistently provide the SBCC support included in this activity due to the need to have their own transport to reach beneficiaries. The challenge of underfunded ministry offices at governorate level was highlighted by government staff, some of whom confirmed that it was not possible to effectively support all beneficiaries with the available resources, while stressing the importance and value of the programme.

167. SBCC activities, including ad-hoc workshops, public messaging and social media, provided a good opportunity to test these approaches. While outcomes have not been assessed by the CO, interview respondents familiar with the campaigns felt these had been useful opportunities to share important messaging, and suggested that conducting similar campaigns in the future would be beneficial. WFP's own guidance on SBCC¹⁴⁹ suggests that these types of efforts need to be designed in a way that either target a specific audience (e.g. youth who use social media), respond to an emergency (e.g. critical message), or are complementary to other interventions (e.g. with school feeding). Interviews and documents reviewed suggest that in Egypt the support provided did not strictly align with the WFP guidance, essentially, SBCC activities were not part of a comprehensive compendium of mutually reinforcing subactivities, as desired in the guidance.¹⁵⁰ The CO also attributed difficulties in ensuring complementarity of SBCC messaging to other interventions, especially to those whose delivery was affected during COVID-19.

168. The outcomes of policy support are less tangible, but WFP's knowledge base was highlighted, by government officials, as an asset with an important contribution to the development of the country, specifically in relation to food security, and of relevant policies and programmes in general.

169. **SO4: Vulnerable smallholder farmer and Bedouin communities in targeted governorates of Egypt have resilient livelihoods by 2030.**

Summary

Support to communities in Upper Egypt show clear indications of improving resilience in the longer term. By contrast WFP FFA support to Bedouin communities has been useful but lacks key elements that would enable resilience-building. While in Upper Egypt income-generating activities have led to tangible results (improved yield, improved management of harvest), the efforts in Bedouin communities (crafts) are insufficient to support resilience-building.

170. SO4 through Activity 5, is intended to **provide support to vulnerable smallholder farmers and Bedouin communities to improve their resilience**. Smallholder farmers in upper Egypt were supported through activities which focused on adaptation to climate changes/shocks through capacity-strengthening (improvement of irrigation, canals and solar powered irrigation); diversification of income through in-kind animal loans; technological advancements; and agro-processing practices.

171. **Adaptation to climate changes/shocks through capacity-strengthening:** WFP supported the improvement of farming practices through the introduction of irrigation and land management practices, including the use of solar panels to drive new irrigation mechanisms.¹⁵¹ In addition, heat tolerant and high yield varieties of staple crops (e.g. wheat, sorghum), as well as the introduction of high value crops (for example, medicinal use plants), was supported. Efforts to support land consolidation to promote the better use of community resources were also undertaken. In 2021, Water User Associations were introduced to further develop community ownership and management of water resources (irrigation) and to capitalize on the use of pumps, some of which have used solar power.

172. **Diversification of income through in-kind animal loans:** Loans were provided for ducks, goats, beehives and chicken. The focus was mainly, but not exclusively, on women to improve their economic independence and to simultaneously provide families with an additional resource that could support their diet and economic opportunities.

¹⁴⁹ WFP. 2019. Social Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC). Guidance Manual for WFP Nutrition.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.

173. **Technological advancements, agro-processing and practices:** This subactivity focused on supporting the development of a weather monitoring system which has allowed both farmers to reduce crop yield losses by adapting their practices to weather changes and the improvement of post-harvest practices by augmenting sun-drying units for small scale processing. The latter were intended to support food preservation and increase income opportunities, particularly for women.¹⁵² The weather system was managed through the local CDA.


174. **Food Assistance for Assets (FFA):** Activities with Bedouin communities were initiated in 2019, once financial resources were available. They included household food entitlements of oil and wheat flour rations upon completion of training modules on agriculture practices, literacy (women), health and nutrition, hygiene, veterinary care and handicrafts which were conducted in 2019.¹⁵³

175. In addition, **livelihood trainings on handicrafts** were mentioned under SO5, but were implemented through SO4 using FFA. These included literacy training and production of handicrafts that are then sold through a local organization.

176. **COVID-19 response activities:** A budget revision prompted by COVID-19 enabled WFP, in partnership with MALR, to provide CBT to both Bedouin and smallholder farmers whose food security had been negatively affected by the pandemic. In addition, a national COVID-awareness campaign focused on increasing public consciousness about protection measures, safe food production and handling among rural communities, was launched with the government and other UN agencies.¹⁵⁴ Lastly, as part of the COVID-19 response, WFP provided technical support to MALR for FFA activities that were led and funded by the Government.¹⁵⁵

177. Transfer modalities to assist beneficiaries varied over time (see Figure 31 and Figure 32). Food transfers were considerable in 2019 and then no longer used. CBT became more prominent during the pandemic. In 2021, WFP surpassed the target of 40,000 family members by more than 400 percent (see Figure 31). This was achieved by reducing the support from CBT USD31.6 a month to USD12 a month. In 2021, resources exceeded those expected and were mainly for smallholder farmers capacity-strengthening activities and not for FFA activities in Bedouin communities. Therefore, no food transfer or CBT beneficiaries could be reached in 2021.

Figure 31. CBT beneficiaries for activity 5



Source: COMET report CM-R020, Q1 actuals provided by CO.


¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Baseline data (valued at zero) was collected for indicator 2 (the proportion of the population in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihoods asset base) in October 2018, in preparation for food-assistance-for-assets activities that took place in 2019 (WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018).

¹⁵⁴ WFP. 2021. Annual Country Report 2020.

¹⁵⁵ WFP. 2022. Annual Country Report 2021.


Figure 32. Food transfers beneficiaries for activity 5



Source: COMET report CM-R020, Q1 actuals provided by CO.

178. In relation to CCS specifically, survey respondents (n=270) received capacity development across a number of subjects that were directly tied with the implementation of SO4 activities (see Figure 33). While the subjects are clearly relevant to the implementation of activities, the available data does not show baseline levels of knowledge and therefore based on this data, interviews conducted and available documents it cannot be reasonably concluded what was the incremental effect of these activities.


Figure 33. Self-reported participation in CCS activities as part of SO 4



Source: Online survey carried by the evaluation team.

179. **Financial overview SO 4, Activity 5:** During the CSP, activity 5 was underfunded (see Figure 34). For the T-ICSP, the SO was funded to 91 percent of NBP but none of the funding was addressed to climate change adaptation and risk management activities in Bedouin communities. This explains why no beneficiaries were reached in 2018 (T-ICSP and CSP). In 2019, 30.24 percent of NBP was funded, however WFP reached more than 308 percent of planned beneficiaries. According to the CO this was possible because WFP reduced household's quarterly wheat flour ration from 100kg to 50kg.

Figure 34. Activity 5 - financial overview




Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

180. **Outcome SO4, Activity 5:** Outcome indicators (see

181. Figure 35) suggest that improved capacity to manage climate shocks did not reach WFP targets and that in 2021 the percentage of population with an enhanced livelihood asset base declined. Discussions with beneficiaries and WFP suggest that these indicators do not accurately represent achievements. The CO explained that the data collection for these indicators does not take into consideration when the support was provided, which means that in some instances data may be collected from communities where activities have just started. Moreover, building resilience and improving people’s asset base may take some time (i.e. depending on the harvest period, animal rearing cycles, etc.). Therefore, the indicators used, coupled with the way the data is collected, do not present an accurate picture of progress. As the following paragraphs explain, the results are more visible and promising than these figures suggest.

Figure 35. Activity 5 – outcome indicators



Source: COMET report CML008b Outcome Indicators.

182. In Upper Egypt, outcomes harvested from interviews with beneficiaries and CDA representatives highlighted improved information exchange between community members, improved crop yield resulting from drought resistant crops, diversified incomes of farmers from in-kind animal loans of beehives and improved breeds of ducks and goats (more tolerant to high weather temperatures). These findings align with those from focus groups conducted by MALR and WFP, which suggest improved resilience.

183. Interviewees with the Bedouin suggested that infrastructure (e.g. irrigation mechanism) resulting from FFA was not as good quality as ones built by externally hired contractors (e.g. government programme). However, beneficiaries, WFP and government staff agreed that it led to improved irrigation and improved harvests.

184. Despite positive outcomes, Bedouin interviewees highlighted their continued dependence on ongoing support. Beneficiaries noted a recurring seasonal need for seeds and seedlings to make use of the irrigation mechanism. This suggests that a sustainable seed system was not introduced as part of the activity.

185. Interventions related to improved literacy among women were considered quite relevant by beneficiary communities because it provided valuable skills, such as the opportunity to safely administer medication (e.g. reading prescription guidelines). The benefit of the handicrafts appeared more limited. Women were taught how to do different crafts, and these were sold by a local organization, but the level of income that can be generated is very limited, and there was no clear opportunity for sustainability or expansion.

186. Among the Bedouin the value of food assets versus CBT varied, with some respondents suggesting any support was valuable, and others suggesting that the food assets were of a greater value than the CBT. This perception could be a result of beneficiary understanding/experience with food costs and access to food.

187. Overall, data suggests that while in Upper Egypt activities were able to collectively support resilience building (multiple activities that reinforce each other), through the introduction of crops that had improved yields, through mechanisms to process the increased harvest and through household animals who can, if slaughtered, provide a protein source, that could be sold or consumed in the household. Among the Bedouin this was not the case. Assets secured through WFP support were important, but respondents were clear that these were not sustainable therefore their resilience had not increased, and they remained dependent on resources/support they received from WFP or other actors.

188. **SO5: The Government of Egypt has enhanced capacity to target and assist vulnerable populations and shares its experience with selected countries to achieve Zero Hunger by 2030.**

Summary

Tangible products, such as geo spatial and supply chain management platforms, enabled the improvement of support to vulnerable populations. The latter through provision of data for decision-making. Other work, such as partnerships and the Luxor Centre, facilitated WFP visibility and may constitute effective mechanisms to share experiences, but more time is required to assess their effect.

189. SO5 was implemented through three distinct activities (6, 7 and 8) and a series of subactivities focused on service provision.

190. **Activity 6 focused on providing institutional capacity-strengthening to the Government and on developing innovative solutions to enhance social protection and resilience- building programmes and systems.** This activity was implemented through the following two subactivities:

191. **Geospatial platform/portal:**¹⁵⁶ Starting in 2018, this subactivity focused on the development of an online tool and mobile application-based platform that provides geographical analysis of various statistical data on social protection and development policies in Egypt, including the Haya Karima programme, and in doing so, strengthened CAPMAS and the MoSS with the integration. As a result of this, in 2020, WFP expanded its partnership to include Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC) regarding the use of demographic and other GIS data for political, economic and social policy decision-making. Further, in 2021, WFP partnered with the MoM, to develop a geospatial platform to update the Ministry's services and projects in vocational training, employment, safety and occupational health. Additionally, WFP


¹⁵⁶ AQ.5.2: To what extent did WFP support the Government in piloting new initiatives to accelerate SDG achievements, especially in light of the emphasis placed on innovation and capacity development by Egypt Vision 2020?

supported MOLD in the use of GIS data to roll out the support provided to Haya Karima villages and MoETE in mapping community school locations nationwide.¹⁵⁷

192. **National partnerships/engagements with a focus on youth and women.** These partnerships included the private sector and focused on a wide range of issues intended to improve the financial opportunities of women and youth through agricultural innovations.

193. **Financial overview SO 5, Activity 6:** A review of financial resources shows that this activity was critically underfunded (16.5 percent of NBP) (see Figure 36). Notably, the implementation of this activity was not continuous and therefore an expenditure rate of 30.7 percent was not necessarily indicative of expenditure delays.

Figure 36. Activity 6 – financial overview



Source CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

194. **Outcome SO5, Activity 6:**¹⁵⁸ Discussions with users of the geospatial software underlined that the support was critically valuable as a step towards improving food security in Egypt and as such meeting SDG 2 at the national level was important as it provided an additional source of data to facilitate analysis for informed policymaking.

195. As regards national partnerships, respondents were not able to articulate the added value of the activities beyond agreeing that continued engagement with different actors and being familiar with the capacities and resources of other agencies was inherently valuable from an information exchange perspective, and that the activities increased WFP's own visibility in the country.

196. **Activity 7 which aimed to facilitate regional and international knowledge and technological exchanges between countries to achieve common development goals** was implemented through the following three subactivities:

197. **Strengthen and improve supply chain management, e.g. of wheat, through South-South cooperation efforts:** WFP supported the strengthening of the national supply chain and specifically the development of a platform to monitor wheat in coordination with the MoSIT. The development of a geospatial platform to facilitate supply chain monitoring was noted in documents and by interviewed respondents as an important asset to the Egyptian government. Over the years the support and engagement with the MoSIT continued and the portal improved. WFP also supported the government's participation in a number of international events where the tool/platform was showcased. In 2021, WFP supported South-South cooperation by sharing their experience working on supply chain and with

¹⁵⁷ WFP. 2022. Annual Country Report 2021.

¹⁵⁸ Indicators collected: Number of national food security and nutrition policies, programmes and system components enhanced as a result of WFP capacity strengthening; and the Partnership Index failed to effectively capture the aim of the activities and therefore were not used in the analysis.


geospatial tools as way to support South-South technical knowledge-sharing. Some government officials and WFP noted that there was considerable interest in continuing to share knowledge using such an approach. This can materialize through the Luxor Centre, or through other efforts where Egyptian experiences can be showcased.

198. **School feeding programme – knowledge exchange between Egypt and Libya:** This was a specific subactivity between the two countries which started in 2018. As a result of the first initiative and exchange of experiences, Libya piloted the initiative starting in 2019 with 20,000 schoolchildren.¹⁵⁹ This process was supported by a Train-the-Trainer programme conducted with 60 Libyan education officials which was intended to enable the piloting of the programme. Available documents detail the existence of the event, but there is no documented follow up of the engagement. The efforts were also not documented in WFP Egypt documents in the public domain.¹⁶⁰ The data collected does not allow for any assessment of the impact of this work.

199. **Luxor Centre for Knowledge-Sharing and Innovation: Starting in 2018,** in partnership with the MALR, and the Luxor Governorate, WFP started to work on the establishment of the “Luxor Coordination Centre for Knowledge-Sharing and Innovation to Promote Resilience in Upper Egypt”. In 2020, the Luxor Centre was more formally established by presidential decree. The Centre is envisioned as a platform to be used for trainings, knowledge-sharing and innovation. The structure is finalized, but the centre itself is not yet fully operational. Staff are not in house, even though a limited number of events have taken place.

200. **Financial Overview SO5, Activity 7:** The activity has been considerably underfunded (see Figure 37), but the CO could not explain why this may have been the case. Moreover, the expenditure rate is considerably low (33 percent), because, according to the CO, activities do not take place regularly and therefore the expenditure rate will not be an accurate yardstick to measure implementation until the end of the CSP period.

Figure 37. Activity 7 – financial overview



Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

201. **Outcomes SO5, Activity 7:**¹⁶¹ Interviewees experienced with the supply chain work noted that it improved efficiency, although they were unable to provide statistical evidence of this claim. However, they reported that being able to monitor resources in the supply chain allowed improved responsiveness and reduced misuse or wastage of assets.

202. The Luxor Centre is a state-of-the-art facility that has no inhouse permanent staff yet. Respondents who have engaged in workshops conducted at the Luxor Centre highlighted that in order to

¹⁵⁹ WFP. 2019. Annual Country Report 2018.

¹⁶⁰ WFP. 2020. Annual Country Report 2019.


¹⁶¹ The indicator number of national programmes enhanced as a result of WFP-facilitated South-South and triangular cooperation support does not provide an effective or accurate way of demonstrating success.

be able to use the knowledge secured during events, more substantive support in the form of financial or in-kind resources would be required. The long-term results of this subactivity were unknown at the time of the evaluation.

203. **Activity 8 focused on the provision of engineering services to partners to rehabilitate school infrastructure as needed.** This activity included the conduct of three subactivities: Structural rehabilitation of community schools, Digital Citizenship and Community Hubs. All subactivities were managed and executed as part of SO 1 and hence are not reported here.

204. **Financial overview SO 5, Activity 8:** The resources used for this activity were transferred to SO1 and applied there. An analysis of available resources demonstrates that the activity was slightly overfunded, and all resources were spent (see Figure 38).


Figure 38. Activity 8 – financial overview



Source: CPB resource overview report, data extracted on 07 April 2022. Allocated resources are until December 2022.

205. In relation to CCS specifically, survey respondents (n=248) received capacity development across a number of subjects that are directly tied with the implementation of SO5 activities (see Figure 39). While the subjects are clearly relevant to the implementation of activities, as was the case with previously reported SOs, the available data does not permit an assessment of progress that can be credited to CCS.

Figure 39. Self-reported participation in CCS activities as part of SO5



Source: Online survey carried by the evaluation team

EQ2.2: To what extent did WFP contribute to the achievement of cross-cutting aims (humanitarian principles, protection, accountability to affected populations, gender equality and other equity considerations)? Did the response to COVID-19 change the degree of contribution to any of these areas?

Summary

- a) Results were mixed with regard to the level of provision of information to, and consultation with, beneficiaries at programme design. Overall, beneficiaries were well-aware of WFP's Complaints and Feedback Mechanism, but the degree to which this was successful varied.
- b) WFP engaged in a GTP effort, but lacked the capacity to effectively streamline gender into all programming.
- c) The environment was been treated as a cross-cutting issue, but was an issue of key relevance for WFP. Indeed, SO 4 focused mainly on addressing environment-related challenges.


206. **Protection:** The indicator data collected by the CO (see Annex XI) suggests that by and large the protection concerns of beneficiaries were effectively addressed by WFP. However, the evaluation team's interviews with beneficiaries revealed that processes to secure their benefits (CBT or vouchers) were often cumbersome. Beneficiaries recounted instances where they did not receive the benefit they expected to receive, or where they felt that the interlocutor they engaged with was being dishonest (i.e. not providing them what was rightfully theirs). Although no beneficiary noted incurring bodily harm as a result, they did note that their dignity was not upheld during these exchanges. These findings do not suggest that the indicator data is wholly incorrect, but that for some beneficiaries' protection remains a concern.

207. **Accountability to affected populations:** Interviews with WFP and those familiar with activities suggest that information provision and, to a lesser degree, consultation was part of programme design.

However, interviews with beneficiaries suggest that the information provision was insufficient to ensure a clear understanding of the support mechanism they were benefiting from and that consultation processes had varied. In some instances, beneficiaries interviewed voiced confusion around issues of eligibility. However, in other instances, consultations seem to have determined the focus of the support (e.g. what aspect of the community; or which community members should benefit) but did not serve to modify what type of support was provided, or to ensure that support was comprehensive (e.g. that business development training was coupled with microloans).

208. Some respondents reported being notified by phone that the funds would be available but being told that they were not when they went to fetch them, and/or receiving notification of available funds inconsistently (not every month). WFP introduced a complaints and feedback mechanism (CFM) through the use of a call centre to address these and other concerns. According to call centre data the majority of calls pertained to problems accessing resources from the cash card or voucher. Multiple respondents from different categories, including beneficiaries, noted that sometimes the helpline referred them to another organization (e.g. UNHCR), or stated that their concern could not be addressed by the call centre. Between 2018 and the end of Q1, 2022 16.7 percent (food vouchers) and 5 percent (cash vouchers) of calls were referred to UNHCR. The data does not allow for an assessment of how many calls pertained to issues which the call centre could not resolve.¹⁶² It is also noted that calls increased substantially over the years (see Figure 40), suggesting that the service was known among beneficiaries and added value. Indeed, beneficiaries interviewed were aware of the system. The degree to which they felt their concerns were resolved varied. In the absence of systematic collection of information on concerns that the call centre cannot address, it was not possible to know the degree to which the call centre failed to provide a resolution.

Figure 40. Call fluctuation over time



Source: Hotline data received from CO

209. **Environment:** Given the susceptibility to climate change and related shocks, this cross-cutting theme is critically important in Egypt. Although the CO did not collect data related to WFP’s standard indicators on climate change, efforts to address these concerns were considered, particularly through SO4 where climate responsive irrigation practices, crop, household animal choices and harvest management practices were supported through direct WFP activities, particularly in Upper Egypt. This is well documented in Annual Country Report (ACR) documents and confirmed by interviews with WFP staff, relevant Government staff and beneficiaries from visited villages (see SO4 in section 2.2). WFP plans to start phase 2 where the focus will be on promoting positive environmental and social benefits of all activities, while adverse environmental and social risks and impacts are avoided or mitigated. In addition,

¹⁶² The data was requested, but is not available.


CCS activities (SO5) also aimed to address environmental issues, specifically by increasing resilience and government responsiveness using digital platforms and knowledge exchange.

210. **Gender:** WFP engaged in the Gender Transformation Programme (GTP) early on in 2019 which brought attention to gender issues. The GTP focus clearly on understanding the gender experience in Egypt and integrating gender across programming (mainstreaming). This has translated into a focus on support to women (providing women with CBT, capacity strengthening to supplement their income and introducing gender transformative messages into the work conducted). WFP also engaged with the NCW to identify key messaging.¹⁶³ However, the limited resources at the CO's disposal (see below) can impair its ability to ensure that gender mainstreaming is effectively undertaken and attained across its activities. The limited capacity may also affect the CO's ability to course correct if it is needed in relation to its activities on women, or its activities that are gender mainstreamed.



211. WFP collected corporate indicator data on decision-making by gender (see Figure 41). Since these indicators are not used by the CO to monitor, plan, or adapt their activities, the data has not been systematically analysed and their collection has not had any visible operational impact.

212. Interviews with beneficiaries suggest that while women did hold some decision-making power, this did not always mean improved gender equality for two main reasons: first, some households were women-led, due to deceased adult males or adult males working far away. Secondly, interviews with some beneficiaries suggested that decision-making often follows traditional norms where mothers-in-law make decisions as head of households, but this segment was not targeted by WFP for nutrition counselling.

Figure 41. Household decision-making on the use of food/cash/vouchers by gender




¹⁶³ The National Council of Women did not grant an interview, noting that their engagement was limited. Therefore, the ET is unable to elaborate on this engagement.



Source: COMET report CM-R009b Cross-cutting indicators

213. The CO maintains a good gender balance in staffing (see Figure 42). In addition, a high proportion of senior roles are held by women. This is also reflected in the GTP, which highlights that staff were given basic gender-awareness training. Moreover, at the time the GTP was completed, a gender action plan was developed which supported both internal and programmatic gender elements. The same was reviewed on a periodic basis to assess progress. However, the evaluation found a very limited gender expert capacity within the CO (available time), which limits the CO’s ability to effectively streamline gender into all its programming.

Figure 42. Gender distribution at WFP Egypt



Source: Country Office

EQ2.3: To what extent are the achievements of the CSP likely to be sustainable?

Summary

Knowledge-building activities, such as those where the individual supported could make use of the knowledge without additional support (SBCC, literacy), were the most sustainable. Yet the sustainability of activities provided to the general population varied from case to case (type of intervention), especially those that included the provision of tangible assets (for instance, the provision of microloans and the distribution of small ruminants was likely to be more sustainable than the distribution of seeds which were provided without fertilizer).

The sustainability of institutional-capacity development activities aimed to support government strengthening varies, and depends on the Government's ability to allocate needed resources for further uptake.

214. Three types of sustainability need to be considered. Sustainability of: a) knowledge-building at the individual, institutional and environment levels; b) activities targeting the general population; and c) activities targeting refugees and asylum seekers and host communities.

215. **Sustainability of CCS:** CCS of **individuals** included a wide range of beneficiaries, including end-beneficiaries (Egyptian community), government staff, community leaders and civil society organization (CSO) staff. Within these target groups, CCS activities can be divided into two subcategories: 1) knowledge that could put to use without additional support and where the enabling environment existed; and 2) activities where supplementary support was needed in order to make use of the knowledge gained. Interviews with multiple respondents across all categories agree that the former have yielded results, e.g. elements of SBCC that pertain to breastfeeding, literacy training for women, farming techniques when seeds/tools and other inputs were available, and were likely to be sustainable. However, the use and sustainability of knowledge that required additional support, or where the enabling environment was not present, could face challenges, for example, nutrition for the whole family when key family members did not share in the nutrition knowledge and had alternative beliefs/traditions to uphold; where government agencies did not have the resources to make use of the skills gained by their staff (e.g. roll out teacher training, or expand the cadre of health workers); or where beneficiaries could not make use of the skills gained (e.g. no seed money to start a business following business administration training or no jobs available following TVET).

216. The sustainability of **organizational CCS** is unclear. On the one hand, all these efforts were integrated into existing government systems (e.g. 1,000 Days into Social Protection, Geospatial and supply chain tools into respective ministries). However, in all instances WFP continued to provide considerable financial support to run activities and or technical support to ensure their continued use. Still these efforts should be fully sustainable and remain in the event of a WFP exit. The sustainability of **infrastructure capacity**, such as improvement of schools, building of dams, etc., will be dependent on resources for maintenance and running costs which at this time appear unavailable, but which could materialize from government sources in the future.

217. The sustainability of supporting **enabling environments** varies. WFP has invested considerably in the establishment of self-sustainable community entities which, through community hubs, can manage the continued maintenance and evolution of farming practices in Upper Egypt. The support provided to communities with community hubs therefore have the hallmarks of sustainability.

218. **Support to Egyptian beneficiaries:** While in some instances the provision of assets (e.g. microloans or small-scale livestock and pigeons) designed to enable growth and promote sustainability succeeded, in others, sustainability has not materialized (e.g. seedlings provided to Bedouin communities). In some instances, low sustainability was a product of design limitations, for example, supporting trainings in business development without providing resources to establish a business; supporting TVET without ensuring that the training is on issues where there is a market; providing seeds without ensuring the delivery of fertilizer; supporting school upgrades where there are no resources to ensure the maintenance of the upgrade.

219. **Support to refugees and asylum seekers** fell under the emergency response category, and hence was intended as short-lived and not sustainable. In Egypt, however, since refugees and asylum seekers are expected to stay in Egypt in the medium- to long-term, WFP engaged in a series of activities with both refugees, asylum seekers and their host communities. TVET and support to create businesses were intended to improve the living conditions of all and expected to be sustainable, but design limitations (as mentioned above) restricted the potential for sustainability, as reflected in the data available.

EQ2.4: To what extent did the CSP facilitate more strategic linkages between humanitarian, development and, where appropriate, peacebuilding work?

Summary

The CSP document does not identify how WFP will facilitate strategic linkages across the nexus and the concept of the peace element has not been explicitly applied. However, two aspects of WFP's work have the potential to contribute to the humanitarian and development aspects, mainly, its work on the One Refugee Programme and on youth employment.

220. Some aspects of WFP's work in Egypt have the potential to contribute to the humanitarian and development aspects of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. For instance, the One Refugee Programme introduced in Egypt aimed to support refugees and asylum seekers moving away from crisis response towards more durable solutions. Specifically, WFP's engagement with host communities aims to support the integration of refugees and asylum seekers into their communities and to support social cohesion.

221. WFP's efforts to support youth employment also have the potential to support the nexus by providing economic opportunities and preventing social conflict. However, the concept of the nexus, in particular the peace element, has not been explicitly applied in the Egypt context during the implementation period. Some of the government representatives interviewed questioned the relevance of this notion in the Egyptian context.

EQ3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

EQ3.1: To what extent were outputs delivered within the intended timeframe?

Summary

Although support was received on time the Government's administrative processes and COVID-19 restrictions affected, at times, the timely delivery of outputs.

222. According to the CO, availability of resources was the principal reason for delays in service delivery. Until the end of 2021, the needs-based plan (NBP) (BR4) was only funded to 51 percent (see Table 1). When activity 2 did receive funding in 2020, it could not deliver due to COVID-19 related restrictions. As per the CO, in an effort to limit the impact of funding shortfall, with donor consent, funds from SOs 1 and 2 were moved to SO3, which had been among the lowest funded activities.

223. Secondly, government administrative processes also played an important role on the timely delivery of outputs. Specifically, according to interviews with multiple sources from various categories, beneficiary selection by government experienced some delays, while in other instances access to beneficiaries required authorizations, which was time consuming.

224. Thirdly, COVID-19 was detrimental to the timely delivery of outputs. Certain forms of support had to be halted completely (e.g. SBCC at health facilities and school meals), while others were substituted (e.g. take home rations for CBT), which required operational adaptations (e.g. changes in how the support was delivered) and therefore consumed time.

225. Overall, with limited exceptions (e.g. delivery of fertilizer as part of SO4 and instances of CBT access), beneficiaries felt that they received outputs when they expected them. In relation to fertilizer, the delay had considerable consequences since their late delivery meant it could not be used for that season's crop. In relation to CBT, late delivery was due to a number of reasons, e.g. beneficiaries no longer meeting selection criteria, technical problems with receiving information, and other. However, the evaluation team noted that in multiple instances beneficiaries did not know when they should expect assistance and therefore could not comment on the timeliness of delivery.

EQ3.2: To what extent were coverage and targeting interventions appropriate?

Summary

Targeting, which was based on the government identification and the UNHCR's identification systems, included some of the most vulnerable groups, although there were some exceptions such as PWDs. The scale of coverage, however, varied among the different SOs (lower than expected for SO3 and higher than expected for SO1), determined by availability of funding.

226. Overall, the data shows considerable fluctuation between SOs with some far exceeding their targets and others not reaching them at all (see Figures 43, 44 and 45). The fluctuations do not show a discernible pattern; however, a few factors need to be considered.

227. Targeting was based on the Government identification mechanism, or on a joint identification mechanism with Government, and in the case of SO2, with UNHCR (see EQ 1.2). This suggests that the most vulnerable were likely to have been reached within key categories.

228. The coverage of beneficiaries by SO shows that food distribution reached fewer than planned beneficiaries, but this can be attributed, in part, to delays and restrictions caused by COVID-19. In relation to CBT the greatest reach was within SO 2. For SO3, the lower than expected number of beneficiaries reached is attributed by the CO to would-be beneficiaries not captured by the government databases that were used to generate the list of beneficiaries.¹⁶⁴ Coverage of all beneficiaries targeted by the government programmes depended on the level of funding available.

229. The School Feeding programme also reached a higher than planned number prior to the pandemic. The CO explained that following a GoE request all schools, not only community schools, were included in the school feeding programme. This increased the coverage during pre-COVID-19 years.

230. Among refugees (SO2), according to UN respondents and beneficiaries, their needs exceeded the amount of support that WFP was able to provide to ensure nutritional needs were covered. However, WFP was not fully tasked with meeting all nutrition needs of refugees. Rather its efforts were complementary to support initiatives of other entities.

231. WFP data shows that by and large activities conducted to support responses to climate change (SO4) reached their planned targets. Although, it is noted that amongst Bedouin communities, where support is no longer provided (except for COVID-19 related support), the need for support remains pressing. This was a view supported by all: beneficiaries, community leadership and government officials.


232. Lastly, there are some clear omissions: first, while PWDs are included in Takaful programme selection, there is no documented evidence that PWDs were particularly targeted or supported in any systematic way by WFP, or that WFP made a specific effort to ensure the targeting of PWDs beyond a single

¹⁶⁴ The identification of Takaful and Karama families who have children under two is not automated within the data base of Takaful and Karama and is not linked with the database of live births to facilitate access of information. Therefore there is an underestimation of the numbers due to underregistration not miscalculation.

mention that they were given priority in the distribution of vouchers.¹⁶⁵ Secondly, there is evidence that the same beneficiaries benefited more than once from the same activity (see EQ2.1 SO 4), which suggests that some vulnerable people were not receiving support equally. Thirdly, SBCC efforts appear to have overlooked key actors (e.g. mothers-in-law) in order to ensure the best possible results.

233. In general, expected and actual beneficiaries differ considerably, and funding played a critical role in delivery of support. Interviews with a range of actor categories suggested that the approach to targeting on the part of WFP was a reaction to government requests rather than proactively aiming to identify ways to ensure that beneficiaries were aligned with WFP objectives and that coverage was best possible given the resources (financial and skills) available.


Figure 43. Planned vs actual MT (cumulative July 2018-Q1, 2022) of food distributed by SO



Source: COMET report CM-014 2018 for TICSP, CM-014 2018, 2020, 2021 for CSP. Q1, 2022 actual data from CO.


Figure 44. Planned vs actual CBT distributed by SO (cumulative July 2018 - Q1 2022)

¹⁶⁵ It was noted that WFP did some monitoring of beneficiaries in relation to disability, but, as the text describes, it made limited concerted efforts to alter support to favour PWDs (see WFP. 2020. *Annual Country Report 2019*. WFP. 2021. *Annual Country Report 2020* and WFP. 2022. *Annual Country Report 2021*).



Source: COMET report CM-014 2018 for TICSP, 2018, 2020, 2021 for CSP. Q1 2022 actual data from CO.

Figure 45. Planned vs actual beneficiaries per SO and year¹⁶⁶



Source: COMET CM-R020 report; Q1 2022 actual data from CO.

¹⁶⁶ SO1 and SO4 might include double counting as it was not possible to gather unique numbers by SO without disaggregating by modality.

EQ3.3: To what extent were WFP activities cost-efficient in delivery of their assistance?

Summary

No cost-efficiency analysis was done, nor efforts within the CO specifically focused on improving cost-efficiency. WFP standard procurement guidelines were used only in instances where the Government did not impose its own procurement mechanisms; the latter may have led to increased costs. At the same time, where standards exist (DG ECHO), the efficiency rate was within expected rates.

234. In terms of cost-efficiency analysis, three elements are explored. First, interviews with CO staff confirm that there were no explicit efforts within the CO towards improving cost-efficiency.

235. Secondly, although WFP has clear procurement guidelines, and these were used when possible, the CO staff also noted that in multiple instances the Government unilaterally determines the supplier that will be used, which has cost implications (e.g. some suppliers, according to interview respondents familiar with operational activities, may not be the least expensive). The MoU with the Government shared with the evaluation team does not establish parameters for the identification of service providers.

236. Thirdly, the cost to transfer (CTR) ratio is mostly aligned with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO¹⁶⁷) standards for large-scale cash programmes of 85 percent except for activity 2.¹⁶⁸ (see Table 6). The CTR was calculated by dividing the transfer value of CBT and CS by the total costs (implementation costs, direct support costs (DSC) and indirect support costs (ISC)). The analysis was only possible for planned numbers and for a combined transfer value of cash and capacity strengthening due to data limitation (reporting of actual total costs does not provide a breakdown of DSC and ISC by transfer modality).

Table 6. Planned cost transfer ratio of CBT activities¹⁶⁹

Activity	Activity 2	Activity 3	Activity 9	Activity 4
Transfer value for CBT and CS	\$7,350,539	\$177,849,359	\$26,519,969	\$72,112,107
Total costs	\$8,813,417	\$208,528,478	\$30,148,478	\$84,088,315
Cost transfer ratio (CTR)	83.40%	85.29%	87.96%	85.76%

Source: Country Portfolio Budget as per BR04 budget sheet

237. Regarding the share of actual food transfer costs (FTC) and CBT transfer costs¹⁷⁰ against food and CBT transfer value respectively across different activities, the data shows that the share of FTC over food transfer value dropped between 2018 and later years for activity 1 and 5 (see Figure 46). According to the CO, for activity 1, this was because the food value increased from USD3.3 million to USD11.4 million between 2018 and 2019 allowing economies of scale. Furthermore, 2018 included a one-off payment contributing to an increase in FTC. Under activity 5, this trend is explained by the phasing out of the food transfer under that activity, and the subsequent staff reduction which led to an FTC reduction.

238. A similar trend is noted for CBT for Activity 1. According to the CO, the change in ratio is explained by the start date and volume of the activity. The implementation of the activity started in November 2018, which meant that while the activity continued throughout 2019, the start-up costs were mainly charged in 2018. Additionally, in 2020, the CBT volume quadrupled due to COVID-19, but the cost of transferring CBT

¹⁶⁷ Critically, these standards only apply to humanitarian activities.


¹⁶⁸ Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. 2022. *Cash Transfers*.

¹⁶⁹ Activity 2, 3 and 4 include CCS costs that could not be differentiated from CBT costs at DSC, ISC and implementation costs level. Furthermore, CBT within each activity was often conditional on CCS activities (e.g. trainings).

¹⁷⁰ Food transfer costs include cooperation partner, supply chain management, storage and other food related costs. CBT transfer costs include delivery, management and cooperating partner costs. It does not include DSC, ISC and implementation costs.


did not increase allowing increased economies of scale. The cost over CBT value increased for activities 9, 4 and 5 (see Figure 47). Regarding activity 9 and 5, the share of transfer costs increased when actual delivery far exceeded planned delivery for CBT (e.g. Activity 5 in 2021 and Activity 9, which were not planned as part of the initial CSP).

Figure 46. Ratio of actual food transfer value over FTC by year and activity



Source: CPB Plan vs Actual


Figure 47. Ratio of actual cash-based transfer value over cash-based transfer cost by year and activity



Source: CPB Plan vs Actual

239. The data also shows that except for oil, which experienced a slight decline in prices, most commodities experienced a price increase during the CSP implementation (see Figure 48). This, and the lower than planned funding (see EQ4.2), negatively affected WFP's ability to reach planned beneficiaries.

Figure 48. Price of commodities procured by MT against MT of food distributed ¹⁷¹



Source: Country Office for costs and COMET report CM-014 2018, 2018, 2020, 2021 for MTs distributed.

240. In terms of the proportion of DSC related to total costs, as shown in Table 7, the share of actual DSC is higher than its planned share, which suggests lower than planned costs efficiency regarding costs, such as for staff, office rent, vehicle and maintenance costs, communications and computer and security equipment. According to the CO, factors which can affect higher DSC vary and cannot be planned for. For example, these can be because of COVID-19 and the higher cost of fuel. The smaller than planned scale of operations may also have had a negative impact on the cost efficiency of the Egypt CSP due to reduced opportunities for economies of scale.

Table 7. DSC as a percentage of total costs ¹⁷²

Year	Planned			Actual		
	Total Costs	Direct Support Costs	DSC share of Total Costs	Total Costs	Direct Support Costs	DSC share of Total Costs
2018 T-ICSP	\$38,633,567	\$1,679,070	4.35%	\$27,989,499	\$968,684	3.46%
2018	\$46,742,201	\$1,483,537	3.17%	\$20,256,001	\$901,337	4.45%
2019	\$98,484,601	\$3,257,136	3.31%	\$53,036,343	\$2,220,145	4.19%
2020	\$146,612,822	\$3,519,695	2.40%	\$60,514,376	\$2,428,182	4.01%
2021	\$117,126,690	\$3,720,249	3.18%	\$57,391,422	\$2,350,911	4.10%

Source: EG02-NBP-BR04 for planned and CPB planned vs actual for actual data.

241. Finally, it is worth highlighting that during the COVID-19 pandemic, in an effort to ensure efficient use of resources, and specifically to prevent food losses, WFP, in collaboration with MoSS, distributed

¹⁷¹ The average price/MT is calculated by the cost of food procured divided by the MT of the same commodity. Here, the ET received the average price/MT from the CO in Egyptian pounds. It was converted to US dollars by using yearly average exchange rate.

¹⁷² The direct support costs (DSC) include any costs incurred by WFP that can be directly linked to the provision of support to the entire CSP portfolio, such as staff, office rent, vehicle and maintenance costs, and communications, computer and security equipment, but that cannot be attributed to a specific activity or to SO. The total costs include cost of commodities, ocean transport and related costs, LTSH and other operational costs, as well as ISC (any costs in staffing and operations that cannot be attributed easily to any programme category or activity) and DSC.

remaining date bar stocks, which could not be used in schools due to COVID-19 school closures, to orphanages and elderly homes.

EQ3.4: To what extent were alternative, most cost-effective, measures considered?


Summary

WFP engaged in a number of activities that were designed to improve efficiency and in the longer-term cost-effectiveness. Most of these included some form of digitization (e.g. more efficient CBT delivery and digitalization of paper processes). COVID-19 influenced the shift from food transfers to CBT. There is no evidence that cost efficiency concerns influenced operational decisions.

242. In relation to food transfers more specifically, an estimated calculation conducted by the CO in 2017/2018 shows that there was considerable disparity in real-world costs of distributing food to different governorates across Egypt. Using the cost estimate of 2017/2018 on quantity of food distributed between 2018 and 2021, this shows that the amount of food distributed to governorates was not correlated to the cost of delivering food to those governorates (see Figure 49).

243. However, since more recent data on average landside transport, storage and handling by governorate was not available, the data presented in Figure 49 should be treated with some caution. There is no evidence that this type of assessment was considered in determining how to best (most efficiently) deliver food or CBT. Further, there is no evidence suggesting that cost-efficiency was a factor considered when modalities were changed. The data presented in Figure 49 illustrates that the CO had opportunities to explore cost-efficiency in relation to transfer modalities ((distribution of food vs CBT), but interviews with WFP staff show that they did not use this type of information to determine if different activities might be better suited to certain areas of the country from a cost-efficiency perspective. COVID-19 did influence decisions on choices regarding transfer modalities.

Figure 49. Planned estimated average landside transport, storage and handling costs (2017/2018) against MT food distributed between 2018 and 2021 per governorate



Source: Egypt Country Office. Note: The food distributed for Qalioubia is 42 MT (not 0 as it appears due to the scale of the axis).

244. Other aspects which contributed to cost-efficiency in the longer term included the enhancement of beneficiary validation and beneficiary authentication technologies to optimize operation time and to reduce the risks of illegitimate redemption of assistance. Specifically, efforts to facilitate the redemption of CBT were included. In addition, an online marketing platform was introduced for women entrepreneurs, as was the shift from paper based to online processes, wherever possible.

2.3 EQ4: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP'S PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED BY THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

EQ4.1: To what extent did WFP analyse, or use, existing evidence on the hunger challenges and food security issues in Egypt to develop the CSP?

Summary

Evidence to inform the implementation of the CSP relied on three key types of activities:

- a) Targeted studies and assessments which have aimed to inform specific areas of work.
- b) Ad-hoc real time assessments conducted by CO staff.
- c) Systematic M&E conducted using robust toolsets and standard WFP indicators.

While the first two types of efforts informed practice on the ground, the lack of monitoring resources (staff) limited WFP's ability to continually assess all of its activities. Moreover, while corporate indicators were collected, these were not used by SO managers to inform their decision-making.

245. WFP prepared, together with the MoSS, a Synthesis Report which was foundational for the development of the CSP (See EQ 1.1).¹⁷³ The data collected in the Synthesis Report was complemented and updated during the implementation of the CSP through several CO-led activities, including:

246. **Targeted studies** such as Rapid Assessment on the Impact of COVID-19 on Agriculture, Food, and Nutrition Security; and the report on the impact of COVID-19 on refugees. These studies were used to adapt activities during the implementation process.

247. **Ad-hoc data collection** on the performance of different activities conducted by the respective SO staff. This data was not available to the evaluation team nor were the protocols used to collect it. This information too, according to SO managers, informed the implementation of activities. However, interviews with respondents familiar with implementation highlighted that monitoring of activities in the field was inconsistent. In certain instances, WFP staff were intimately engaged in monitoring and oversight of activities, whereas in others they had no direct link to beneficiaries and seemed not to be involved at all in the implementation or in the oversight of efforts undertaken. In addition, organizations working with WFP noted during interviews that, in their view, WFP has limited capacity to support the monitoring of activities and that this shortcoming has an impact on delivery of services, mainly that not having a clear picture of performance means that interventions cannot be effectively adapted. The latter two points can be attributed to limited staff capacity of M&E staff (see point made below).

248. **Systematic monitoring and assessment** conducted by the CO's M&E team, which includes the collection of an array of indicators based on corporate guidelines. These efforts faced considerable challenges. First, the CO lacked sufficient in-house M&E capacity (person power) to effectively oversee all activities. Secondly, corporate indicator data collected was not consistently utilized to adapt programming decisions (though WFP staff stated that other, locally collected data, informed decision-making). This was compounded by the fact that the CSP log-frame does not include indicators that would adequately capture many of the activities implemented in the country. Thirdly, the data collected was not necessarily disaggregated to reflect a focus on subsets of beneficiaries within a single activity. For example, SO4, where the measurement of progress was recorded for each activity, but not in terms of progress among different profiles of beneficiaries, such as Upper Egypt and Bedouin communities. The support to these groups has not been equal, and this aspect was not captured by the indicators. These factors mean that the indicator data did not provide a clear picture of what was achieved, nor where or when (how long it may take for a result to emerge). Fourthly, there was no meaningful tracking of what CCS activities accomplished and the

¹⁷³ WFP and Ministry of Social Solidarity. 2017. Synthesis Report on Egypt's Road Map Towards Achieving SDG 2.

related indicators did not measure performance or outcomes of CCS, but rather measured instances of engagement (e.g. number of policies among other factors).

249. **EQ4.2: To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, predictable and flexible resources to finance the CSP?**

Summary

WFP faced challenges securing funding, the organization was critically reliant on very few donors and its efforts to diversify its donor base did not generate the volume needed. The European Commission and the USA committed to support Egypt for a long time, but this makes WFP vulnerable to changes in the policies of these donors.

Moreover, the evidence suggests that donors are experiencing funding fatigue and available resources are focused on other areas which appear more important. Donors to projects in Egypt, therefore focus on very targeted interventions with clearly visible results. As a response to this challenge, the CO focused attention on other donors, such as the private sector, and secured support from the Government through debt swap programmes, as well as a programme with the Central Bank of Egypt.

250. While it is clear that the regional PRROs for 2012–2016 and 2017–2018¹⁷⁴ were not fully funded, it is not possible to know, from available data, what proportion of the regional PRRO funding planned for Egypt was allocated to Egypt (see Table 8). The data does suggest, however that the proportion of funding relative to the NBP fluctuated considerably over the years and that while the T-ICSP was funded to almost 75 percent, the CSP was only funded to 56.28 percent at the time of the evaluation.

Table 8. Pre-CSP, T-ICSP and CSP financial overview


Period	Year	Programme	Recipients	Budget	Funding	% budget funded
Pre -CSP	2012-2016	Regional EMOP (200433) Food assistance to vulnerable Syrian populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt affected by conflict in Syria	Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Middle East and East Europe Bureau, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey	\$3,213,209,658	\$2,158,208,266	67.17%
	2015-2016	EMOP (200835) Assistance to Egyptian Returnees from Libya	Egypt	\$6,004,698	\$1,070,000	17.82%
	2013-2017	Country Programme Egypt (200238)	Egypt	\$168,469,594	\$106,393,430	63.15%
	2017-2018	Regional PRRO (20087) Food assistance to refugees and vulnerable populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt affected in Syria	Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Middle East and East Europe Bureau, Turkey	\$2,004,164,828	\$998,375,553	49.82%
CSP	2018	Egypt Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan (EG01)	Egypt	\$38,633,567	\$28,954,400	74.95%
	2018 - 2023	Country Strategic Plan (EG02)	Egypt	\$550,902,277	\$310,070,060	56.28%

Source: Resource Situation CP 200238; Resource Situation 200835; Ress Update EMOP 200433 – Dec 2017; RS PRRO 200987 as of 15.1.2018; Resource Situation T-ICSP and CSP.

251. Further, over 62 percent of resources were earmarked at the activity level which placed considerable operational constraints on WFP. Other levels of earmarking were less restrictive (see Figure 50).

¹⁷⁴ WFP. 2016. Regional PRRO. Standard Project Report; WFP. 2017.

Figure 50. Egypt CSP-directed multilateral earmarked contributions by level of earmarking July 2018-Q1, 2022



Source: FACTory level of earmarking EG02, extracted on 07.04.2022.


252. The majority of funding was destined for crisis response (SO2), underlining that donors often associate WFP with emergency response, a view also stated by some donors (see Figure 51). At the same time, Activity 9, an emergency response activity, did not garner the support expected. Respondents at the CO were unable to specify what caused these financial shortcomings.

253. Overall, the financial data on the funding situation and interviews with donors suggest that they are experiencing funding fatigue, their resources are focused in other areas which appear more pressing than countries such as Egypt. Therefore, donors to Egypt focus activities where the need is clearly defined and prospects for sustainability are high.

254. In recognition that traditional donors face competing demands for scant resources, the CO aimed to diversify its donor base and include additional donor categories, such as the private sector. Here a different set of challenges emerged. First, the private sector has a clear agenda of its own and may not necessarily be aligned with WFP's objectives. Secondly, the volume of resources available was very limited in comparison to those of traditional donors. Ultimately, while these efforts appear positive, the likelihood that they can generate the funding volume required appears limited. The CO also worked with the Government to secure funding through the debt swap programme. This initiative allows the Government to identify WFP as a recipient and submits WFP's proposal to the donor government. The CO has also started an important engagement with the Central Bank of Egypt. Other efforts have been to include WFP in the debt swap programme¹⁷⁵ that the Egyptian Government leads.

¹⁷⁵ The debt swap programme allows WFP to secure funding from external donors by drafting applications for funding which are forwarded by the Egyptian Government to the relevant donor. In turn the donor agrees to the programme, but does not monitor progress in any detail, and rather expects that the Government of Egypt will engage in monitoring and oversight.

Figure 51. NBP vs allocated resources vs expenditure by focus area 2018–Q1, 2022¹⁷⁶



Source: EG02-NBP-BR04 and ACR-1 EG02, data extracted on 07 April 2022.

255. Examining the donor funding shows that almost two third of the resources for both the T-ICSP and the CSP were sourced from two donors (see Table 9 and Table 10). The European Commission and USA in particular have demonstrated long-term commitment to supporting WFP in Egypt. Reliance on limited donors, however, makes WFP vulnerable to donor objectives.

Table 9. Proportion of funding by donor for T-ICSP¹⁷⁷

T-ICSP needs-based plan		
\$38,633,567		
Donor	Allocated contributions	Share of total funds received (%)
EUROPEAN COMMISSION	\$10,871,136	37.5%
USA	\$9,447,750	32.6%
GERMANY	\$2,526,567	8.7%
FINLAND	\$1,668,222	5.8%
NORWAY	\$1,261,674	4.4%
UN OTHER FUNDS AND AGENCIES (EXCL. CERF)	\$860,826	3.0%
CANANA	\$199,189	0.7%
EGYPT	\$185,970	0.6%
TOTAL	\$28,954,400	100.0%
Needs-based plan funded:	28,954,400	
% Needs-based plan funded	74.95%	
Shortfall (of needs-based plan):	9,679,167	

Source: FACTory EG01 resource situation report, extracted on 23.01.2022.

¹⁷⁶ Does not include DSC and ISC.

¹⁷⁷ Does not include DSC and ISC.


Table 10. Proportion of funding by donor for CSP¹⁷⁸

Needs-based plan		
\$586,444,281		
Donor	Allocated contributions	Share of total funds received (%)
USA	\$80,947,801.98	34.5%
GERMANY	\$71,161,325.00	30.3%
FLEXIBLE FUNDING	\$22,362,745.00	9.5%
EUROPEAN COMMISSION	\$16,578,084.46	7.1%
NETHERLANDS	\$13,494,941.13	5.7%
EGYPT	\$5,974,616.00	2.5%
PRIVATE DONORS	\$5,821,578.00	2.5%
REGIONAL OR TF ALLOCATIONS	\$5,153,257.95	2.2%
CANADA	\$4,385,147.44	1.9%
UN OTHER FUNDS AND AGENCIES (EXCL. CERF)	\$3,124,962.00	1.3%
IRELAND	\$3,488,887.00	1.5%
NORWAY	\$737,315.04	0.3%
JAPAN	\$500,000.00	0.2%
MISCELLANEOUS INCOME	\$433,389.12	0.2%
FINLAND	\$372,260.71	0.2%
AFRICAN UNION	\$240,000.00	0.1%
AUSTRALIA	\$14,878.01	0.0%
TOTAL	\$234,791,188.84	100.0%
Needs-based plan funded:	234,791,189	
% Needs-based plan funded:	40.04%	
Shortfall (of needs-based plan):	351,653,092	

Source: FACTORY EG02 resource situation report, extracted on 07.04.2022.

256. A further issue concerns WFP’s ability to secure private funding from a number of donors, the most notable of these being the National Bank of Egypt (see Figure 52). Although this support only accounted for 2.5 percent of support secured (see Figure 52), it qualified as an innovative way of expanding the funding base. At an overarching level this appears to be a good step forward. Care should be taken, however that the support received enables WFP to fulfil its objectives rather than focus attention on areas of work that are outside its purview.

Figure 52. Share by donors of the 2.5 percent private donors funding of the CSP



Source: Country Office

¹⁷⁸ Does not include DSC and ISC.

EQ4.3: To what extent did the CSP lead to partnerships and collaborations with other actors that positively influenced performance and results?

Summary

WFP's principal partnership in Egypt is with the Government where WFP played an important role as a strategic partner, designer of programmes and implementer. WFP reached out to different UN agencies and fostered collaboration with well-defined roles, although not all opportunities for long-term collaboration were capitalized upon.

257. The principal WFP partner in Egypt has been the Government. All SOs, except SO2, focused on activities which were firmly embedded within broader government programmes (see EQ 2.1). This is well illustrated by how beneficiaries are selected (see EQ 1.2) and by the CCS survey of the evaluation team where 67.7 percent of respondents represented a government entity.

258. WFP is, according to interviewed respondents and as reflected in key documents (e.g. ACRs and MoUs with Government), a critical partner for Government, both in supporting the development of models of work (e.g. 1000 days) and as an implementor (e.g. provider of School Feeding Programme, activities in villages that qualify as Haya Karima, and others).

259. In the implementation of SO2 WFP collaborated with UNHCR and in the rehabilitation of schools under activity 8 (SO5), WFP had a service delivery contract with UNICEF. Specifically, in relation to UNICEF, the relationship appeared to have generated positive results. At the time of the engagement, WFP was the only UN agency with local experience rehabilitating schools, which was a considerable asset to both UNICEF as they needed a service provider, and to WFP as they could use a resource and skill set they had invested in developing. This is a good example of inter-agency collaboration which maximizes the resources available. WFP also collaborated with UN Women and other agencies in 2019 to support gender mainstreaming and in 2021 to support capacity development of lawyers to enable the provision of support on gender-based violence. The results of these efforts were not clearly documented, hence it was not possible to assess their effect.

260. In both instances, the framework for the partnerships were very particularly delineated to specific activities. During interviews respondents at the CO and UN agencies stressed that all partnerships are carefully framed to ensure roles are well defined.

261. The work that WFP carries out with CSOs was limited and largely at the operational level, where CSOs were implementers of WFP activities. However, WFP also had clear expectations of CSOs in terms of sustainability and longer-term results. For instance, CDAs were expected to ensure the sustainability of the efforts initiated with WFP funding beyond the funded period. In this way, for the duration of the activity the CDA was an implementer and in the long-term they are intended to be a "maintainer".

262. The evaluation team's survey-based assessment of partnerships shows that the vast majority of partners have been focused on implementation aspects of the CSP and have become partners over the last five years (292 of 538 respondents); also, there is considerable variation in how WFP engages with partners, ranging from implementation-focused to partnerships where interventions were co-designed. In all instances WFP engaged with partners to deliver on expected results. The nature of the partnerships was dictated by the type of activity and longer-term expected results, while ensuring overall alignment with the CSP objectives.

EQ4.4: To what extent did the CSP provide greater flexibility in dynamic operational contexts and how did it affect results, in particular regarding adaptation and response to COVID-19 and other unexpected crises and challenges?

Summary

WFP was able to exercise considerable flexibility and responsiveness to contextual changes and shocks. This included reallocation of goods and the inclusion of activities (Activity 9) to respond to pending and urgent needs resulting from COVID-19.

263. The CSP covered a wide range of areas of support which facilitated the ability of the CO to adapt to changes in context and shocks. For example, as a response to changes in approach to working with refugees WFP was able to include a broader beneficiary base which was made possible by BR2. In relation to COVID-19, WFP was able to switch from food-based to cash-based transfers (see EQ2.1), reallocate remaining high energy bars to orphanages when schools closed (see EQ3.3), and expand portfolio activities to other beneficiaries, as was done through activity 9 (BR 3) as a response to COVID.

264. The aforementioned suggests that the CO was able to effectively respond to changing needs, a sentiment which was echoed by government representatives. Currently, the effect of the Ukraine crisis will again present clear challenges as the prices of staple goods have increased. However, adaptation to this shock is not included in this evaluation as the timeline falls outside the period being reviewed.

EQ4.5: What are the other factors that can explain WFP performance and the extent to which it had made strategic shift expected by the WFP?

Summary

Two strategic shifts envisioned in the CSP were the focus on innovation and country capacity-strengthening. WFP put in place a range of innovative digital solutions and focused on CCS. However, the results of the expected shift were limited to some extent due to issues related to funding and, in some cases, to the intervention design. The M&E system to inform the strategic shifts was found wanting.

265. The Egypt Vision 2030 highlights the importance of innovation and capacity development. As a result, the strategic shift under the CSP was expected under these two areas. As noted in section 2.1, CCS was a critical element in the implementation of the CSP. The results varied. WFP's efforts to introduce innovative responses to existing challenges through digitization is understood as a CCS effort. These efforts focused on both developing and establishing systems that WFP currently manages (e.g. the call centre), as well as promoting the digitization of the country (i.e. smart boards in schools, soft and hardware used by different government agencies). In addition, WFP engaged in a range of other CCS efforts, including trainings and technical advice.

266. The long-term sustainability of these efforts depends on a range of factors, including who and what the CCS targeted. Overall, WFP made initial progress towards taking on an auxiliary role vis-a-vis government systems, but the ad hoc nature and lack of reliable donor commitments limited performance and potential sustainability. Despite these challenges, WFP's support, including its support on innovation as CCS, contributed to the Government's efforts to achieve its SDG objectives.¹⁷⁹

267. However, one aspect that marred the understanding of the true extent of the strategic shift made by the CO was its M&E system. This is because the monitoring and the analysis a CO produces give it insight into the situation on the ground and help monitor the strategic shift mandated in the CSP. However, this was not the case with the Egypt CSP since the M&E system was found wanting in some respects, as previously discussed.

¹⁷⁹ **Related to A.2 in Annex IV:** To what extent did WFP support the Government in piloting new initiatives to accelerate SDG achievements, especially in light of the emphasis placed on innovation and capacity development by Egypt Vision 2020?

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1 CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: WFP is on track to achieving the Country Strategic Plan results, albeit with some exceptions.

268. Under SO 1, the school feeding programme, Take Home Rations and conditional CBT were successful in improving the nutrition of beneficiaries, and thus in responding to the root causes of food insecurity, vulnerability and inadequate education among underprivileged communities in Egypt. WFP made clear efforts to increase women's participation through the microloan programme, as well as the provision of seed funds and business development workshops, although COVID-19 affected the income-generation capacity of women. Under SO 2, General Food Distribution and CBT demonstrated positive results in terms of enhancing food security, as did Social and Behavioural Change Communication in relation to breast feeding and increased nutrients in diet. WFP's work under the 1000 Days programme as part of SO 3 provided critical knowledge on nutrition through SBCC and through WFP's policy engagement efforts with the Government. The resilience of smallholder farmers under SO 4 was increased through drought-resistant seeds, microloans, improvement of infrastructure, including through food for assets and agro-processing, which also increased production. However, the results were less than expected in terms of building the resilience of Bedouins. Finally, support for national partnerships, South-South collaborations and support for the Luxor Centre under SO 5 provided WFP with good visibility, although the degree to which they supported the attainment of expected outcomes is not yet evident.

Conclusion 2: A fragmented approach to the identification and delivery of its interventions could limit the CSP's overall performance.

269. Under the SOs, WFP engaged in a wide range of interventions manifested in the form of activities and subactivities some of which more clearly supported the attainment of SOs while others appeared to be ad hoc and overly broad. This aspect demonstrates some lack of coherence related to a few activities and subactivities. Further, donors in Egypt expressed their preferences more for certain interventions and less for others based on their own needs or their assessment of the sustainability of an intervention; however, overreliance on a few donors meant that WFP did not have much latitude in this regard. Finally, some interventions have more definite chances for sustainability, especially those which are a part of mainstream government programmes while others had low chances of sustainability because of design limitations. Taken together, these factors suggest that a holistic approach to selection of interventions would have allowed to focus on fewer, coherent interventions where either WFP had more control over the change mechanism, or where an enabling environment to ensure change could take place, was likely.

Conclusion 3: WFP's work in Egypt supported the Government response to several pressing challenges. Thus far the Government has worked with WFP to find innovative funding modalities, such as debt swaps, although the degree to which the Government will allocate the necessary resources to ensure benefits are sustained is less clear.

270. Specifically, WFP's work in the sectors of child and maternal nutrition, food security of refugees, the response to climate change and the inclusion of technology and innovation was notable. Through its support WFP was able to support the development, establishment and testing of support models, such as School Feeding, 1000 days and, more recently, the establishment of microloan systems and community hubs. Through this approach WFP has provided the Government with a support mechanism that can be replicated and upscaled. However, the upscaling of interventions will depend on the degree to which the Government will allocate resources, and this is currently less clear.

Conclusion 4: WFP demonstrated the ability to respond to emergencies and to adapt to changing needs

271. Traditionally, WFP is seen as an emergency response agency. The experience in Egypt was no different. Indeed WFP was able to adapt to changing needs, in view of COVID-19, and to both adapt existing

interventions and to expand interventions to respond to pandemic-born needs. Having this capacity is critical for WFP and partners' effective implementation on the ground. However, this type of capacity needs to exist alongside considerable and robust efforts to address root causes and build resilience. The latter is a key area to reduce the potential for climate-related emergencies in the future.

Conclusion 5: WFP's work was well aligned with UNPDF and it engaged in several joint efforts with other UN agencies. Yet longer term opportunities have not always been capitalized upon.

272. Successful collaboration includes the work with UNICEF on infrastructure and with UNHCR in relation to refugees and displaced persons, as well as shorter more ad hoc projects with ILO, FAO and UN Women, demonstrating opportunities for collaborative joint initiatives. However, the UN family has not fully capitalized on the opportunities for collaboration which could have enabled more robust results. WFP's own work in single communities, where multiple forms of support were provided, demonstrates that addressing challenges in a multifaceted way can generate results that are greater than the sum of their parts. This experience suggests that engaging with other UN agencies in joint programming could generate similar effects.

Conclusion 6: Ensuring the integration of support into government systems was a priority for WFP in Egypt. However, this led to some challenges in identifying and targeting a few of the vulnerable groups.

273. WFP has a clear set of corporate guidelines and expectations that delineate how beneficiaries are identified to ensure that the most vulnerable are targeted. In Egypt these parameters were not always fully aligned with the Government's approach to select beneficiaries, and in most instances the Government's approach was ultimately the one used to identify beneficiaries by WFP. Certainly, ensuring that existing national systems to identify beneficiaries are used is an important element to ensuring the longer-term sustainability of WFP intervention benefits. However, this also meant that some of the most vulnerable groups, such as PWDs, were not consistently targeted, and that WFP skills and competencies to identify the most vulnerable were not used as a way of supporting the robustness of government selection systems. It is worth stressing that refugees were not identified using a government system.

Conclusion 7: Staff strength and expertise related to some key thematic areas, such as gender and operational areas such as M&E, was a notable challenge.

274. The ability of the CO to effectively monitor activities and use monitoring data, as well as ensure that gender was mainstreamed effectively and ensure that all aspects of Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) were effectively included in implementation, was hampered by a lack of staff (numbers and competencies). Corporate monitoring data was collected, but not always used by SO managers and M&E staff was insufficient to effectively support all operational activities with robust and continuous monitoring. Similarly, the insufficient number of gender staff, along with the limited knowledge of gender issues among programme staff, meant that the integration of gender into programmatic activities could not always be done in a systematic manner. Likewise, the implementation of AAP was also hampered and consultation and information provision were limited by lack of staff. While CFM efforts were considerable, these cannot compensate for the mentioned gaps.

Conclusion 8: WFP, as part of its CCS support, has successfully supported the Government in the introduction of innovation and digitization of systems to support improved food security. Likewise, WFP has played an important role in supporting CCS more broadly through trainings and technical advice.

275. Egypt specifically focused on the introduction of digital and innovative responses to existing challenges, and WFP was able to play an important role in supporting these efforts. The support for innovative digital tools has been part of WFP's CCS engagement, but no capacity gap assessment was conducted at the time of the CSP design to enable the complete handover of these digital tools, or to enable improved targeting relevant to other CCS activities. Further, a more systematic attempt to measure their progress and achievement would have helped to inform the CO of the level of effects generated by them.

3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1	WFP should review the interventions it engages in, including capacity strengthening activities, from strategic and operational perspectives with a view to streamlining and consolidating the number of interventions that are included in the next country strategic plan while ensuring alignment with government needs and priorities.					
1.1	WFP should engage in capacity strengthening activities that are based on a solid capacity gap assessment and that have clearly identified outputs, outcomes and progress indicators. Such activities should be clearly coordinated with other activities and be aligned with the following sub-recommendations.	Strategic	Country office	Regional bureau, and headquarters divisions including the Programme – Humanitarian and Development Division, the Programme and Policy Development Department, the Gender Equality Office and the country capacity strengthening team	High	2023
1.2	WFP should identify the interventions where it has a unique capacity (comparative advantage) in the Egypt context. Within this set of interventions, WFP should identify and prioritize those for which there is a conducive enabling environment and that can realistically be implemented within the timeframe of the next country strategic plan.					
1.3	WFP should articulate a clear and comprehensive theory of change that lays out how the various interventions collectively are able to contribute to the attainment of the country strategic plan outcomes.					

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
2	WFP should support the Government in the continued refinement of its beneficiary identification mechanisms and consult the Government where gaps are identified, including with regard to known vulnerable groups such as persons with disabilities.					
2.1	Actions to implement this recommendation could include a periodic review of a sample of the beneficiaries of individual activities, and a review of the mechanisms for transferring data between government offices with a view to ensuring accurate and complete data transfer. The tools for each assessment would depend on the government tool used, but WFP should endeavour to explore whether the beneficiaries targeted meet the basic eligibility criteria and whether all beneficiaries are equally included in programmes. This type of process could serve to strengthen existing systems if gaps are identified. It will also serve to ensure that WFP can achieve its objective of targeting the most vulnerable.	Operational	Country office	Regional bureau	High	2023-2028
3	WFP should review its partnerships (including with other United Nations entities and private sector entities) for their strategic potential under the new country strategic plan, seeking to expand engagement with a view to the collective achievement of expected results.					
3.1	WFP should engage more closely with other United Nations entities, and with a more strategic intent, identifying at the design stage those areas where joint programming could serve mutual benefit. Such areas in the new country strategic plan could include gender programming with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, climate change, agriculture, food security and alternative income-generating activities with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, and improved education and nutrition with the United Nations Children's Fund.	Strategic	Country office	Headquarters Partnerships and Advocacy Department	High	2023
3.2	WFP should foster engagement with the private sector for technical partnerships in selected programmes, with a particular focus on food fortification and the building of resilience with regard to climate change. The overall aim should be to secure flexible multi-year donor funding.					

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
3.3	The country office should assess its fundraising and advocacy plan with a view to expanding funding sources and further leveraging domestic financing. This may entail identifying new financing mechanisms with support from headquarters and engaging with the Government to expand the use of tools that have proved valuable, such as debt swaps.					
3.4	WFP should contribute to and inform the engagement between the Government and its other partners by leveraging data, analysis and other tools, convening dialogue and subsequently, where appropriate, assisting in the implementation of government-led projects financed by donors.					
4	For the new country strategic plan WFP should ensure that it has capacity to monitor and follow up on WFP-supported interventions effectively, including through the consistent measurement of progress in its support for country capacity strengthening					
4.1	Based on interventions to be undertaken under the new country strategic plan, WFP should ensure the appropriate level of in-house monitoring capacity. This will also ensure that it has the capacity to undertake recommendation 2.	Strategic	Country office	Headquarters Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division	High	2023
4.2	Where possible, specific indicators for monitoring progress under the country strategic plan should be developed, including in areas such as policy engagement, gender and capacity strengthening.					
4.3	WFP should ensure that feedback loops are in place to ensure that monitoring data is fed back into programmatic decision-making and that programming adjustments are evidence-based.					

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
5	WFP must ensure that it has the capacity and ability to mainstream gender into WFP-supported interventions					
5.1	WFP should assess the level of gender capacity required for the effective mainstreaming of gender into interventions in a way that supports gender-transformative results. WFP must ensure that it has at all levels the capacity to undertake robust gender analysis and design.	Operational	Country office	Headquarters Gender Equality Office	Medium	2023
5.2	WFP should ensure that the design of the new country strategic plan is informed by a sound analysis of the gender-relevant aspects of the Egypt context and that programme designs include appropriate gender-related aims and objectives.					

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