



WFP EVALUATION



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# Evaluation of the Philippines WFP Country Strategic Plan 2018-2023

Centralized evaluation report – Volume I

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## Disclaimer

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# Executive summary

## Introduction

### EVALUATION FEATURES

1. The evaluation of the country strategic plan (CSP) was timed to provide evidence and lessons to inform the development of the next WFP CSP for the Philippines. It covered the CSP design phase in 2017 and all the activities implemented under the CSP from January 2018<sup>1</sup> to October 2022. Its main users are the WFP Philippines country office and internal and external stakeholders, including the Government of the Philippines and beneficiaries.

2. A mixed-methods approach was used for the evaluation, combining document review, quantitative data analysis, key informant interviews, project site visits that included interviews with stakeholders, observations and focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Data was collected between September and October 2022. Gender analysis was fully integrated into the evaluation's methodological approach, with data disaggregated where relevant. Ethical standards were applied to protect the dignity and confidentiality of the people involved in the evaluation.

### CONTEXT

3. The Philippines is divided into three main groups of islands – Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao – and organized into 17 administrative regions and one autonomous region – the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). In 2021, the population was 111 million people, with equal numbers of men and women.

4. The Philippines is a middle-income country with an estimated gross national income per capita of USD 3,555 in 2020. The employment rate reached 95 percent at the end of 2022.<sup>2</sup> Socioeconomic indicators have been improving, with the Gini Index declining from 44.6 in 2015 to 42.3 in 2018 and the national poverty rate dropping from 22.3 percent to 16.3 percent over the same period.

5. In terms of food security, the 2022 Global Hunger Index classified the Philippines as having a “moderate” level of hunger, ranking it 69th of 121 countries. BARMM reports the highest rates of malnutrition in the country,<sup>3</sup> with stunting affecting 45.2 percent of children under 5 years of age and wasting affecting 8.2 percent, according to the latest available data. Those figures are much higher than the national levels of 27 percent for stunting and 5.5 percent for wasting.<sup>4</sup>

6. The Philippines is particularly sensitive to natural disasters, ranking as the country most at risk of natural hazards and climate change in the world.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The country office operated under an interim CSP from January 2018 until the finalization of the CSP in June 2018. This report refers to “the CSP” even when the data presented includes that from the period between January and June 2018.

<sup>2</sup> Philippine Statistics Authority. 2023. [Unemployment rate](#) (Release date 6 January 2023).

<sup>3</sup> WFP. 2022. [The Philippines Food Security Monitoring: Remote Household Food Security Survey Brief](#).

<sup>4</sup> Food and Nutrition Research Institute. 2022. [Expanded National Nutrition Survey 2021](#).

<sup>5</sup> Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft. 2022. [WorldRiskReport 2022 – Focus: Digitalization](#).

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	Indicator	Value	Year
	Total population (million) (1)	113.8	2021
	Agriculture, forestry and fishing, value-added (% of gross domestic product) (1)	10	2021
	Human Development Index (rank) (2)	116 of 191	2021/2022
	Population in severe multidimensional poverty (% of total population) (2)	1.3	2020
	Global Hunger Index (score and rank) (3)	14.8 69 of 121	2022
	Prevalence of moderate and severe stunting (% of children under 5) (4)	27	2021
	Gender Gap Index (5)	19 of 146	2022
	Literacy rate (% of people age 15 and above) (6)	98.4	2019

Sources: (1) World Bank. 2022. [Population, total – Philippines](#); (2) United Nations Development Programme. [Human Development Data](#); (3) [Global Hunger Index – Philippines](#); (4) [Philippine Statistics Authority](#); (5) World Economic Forum. 2022. [Global Gender Gap Report 2022](#); and (6) [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Institute for Statistics](#).


## COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN

7. The CSP was approved by the Executive Board in May 2018 for a period of six years. It envisioned a shift in WFP's role, from the implementation of interventions to the enabling of those interventions through the provision of technical assistance and the strengthening of government capacities in emergency preparedness and response and in food security and nutrition.

8. The CSP was informed by the 2017 strategic review of food and nutrition security and emphasized collaboration with the Government under the four strategic outcomes visualized in figure 2. Figure 1 illustrates the major events affecting the country, the United Nations development assistance framework and WFP's long engagement in the Philippines.




**Figure 1: Country context and WFP operational overview, 2012–2022**



Source: Elaborated by the evaluation team with support from the Office of Evaluation.  
 Abbreviation: PRRO = protracted relief and recovery operation.

9. Through the CSP, WFP intended to provide technical advice, evidence generation, policy dialogue and advocacy aimed at enhancing country capacity at the national and regional levels. However, challenges arising from the protracted humanitarian crisis in Lanao del Sur, natural disasters such as Typhoon Mangkhut in 2018 and Typhoon Rai in December 2021, and the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic led to an increase in the budget for crisis response. This brought the CSP needs-based plan from its original total of USD 33 million in 2018 to a total of USD 94 million at the end of 2022. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of that funding across the CSP.

**Figure 2: Philippines country strategic plan (2019–2023) strategic outcomes, budget, funding and expenditures**



\* Percentages of allocated resources and expenditures by strategic outcome were calculated at the grand total level and therefore do not add up to 100 because they also include funding or expenses for costs not related to strategic outcomes and for direct support and indirect support costs.

Source: Philippines annual country reports 2018–2022; Philippines country portfolio budget. Data as of December 2022, before data from the ninth budget revision was available.

10. Under the CSP, WFP planned to use a combination of transfer modalities – cash, food and capacity strengthening. During implementation, the country office shifted away from in-kind food transfers towards the use of cash transfers, and by 2020 all food transfers had been halted. However, food transfers resumed in 2022 as part of the emergency response to Typhoon Rai.

# Evaluation findings

## TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WFP'S STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES, PEOPLE'S NEEDS AND WFP'S STRENGTHS?

### ***Relevance to needs and alignment with national priorities***

The CSP was evidence-based and designed to address the gaps in food security and nutrition policy and implementation that had been identified in various assessments, particularly the 2017 strategic review of food and nutrition security<sup>6</sup> conducted in consultation with the Government, the United Nations, civil society and the private sector. The CSP design was predicated on the national agendas and strategies in place in 2017, including the Philippine Development Plan for 2017–2022.<sup>7</sup> The plan supported work towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and had a strong focus on SDGs 1, 2 and 17, which positioned WFP as a strategic partner of the Government. The CSP's focus on peacebuilding in BARMM reflected a crucial government priority.

### ***Coherence with partners***

12. The CSP was aligned with the United Nations partnership framework for sustainable development (and the subsequent socioeconomic partnership framework), which is in turn aligned with the Philippine Development Plan. The focus on Mindanao is coherent with the shift in the focus of the United Nations country team towards peacebuilding following the establishment of BARMM in 2018. WFP's partnerships are based on its comparative advantages, for example its subnational presence, particularly in BARMM; its proven capacities in logistics, assessments and technical assistance in emergency response; its expertise in supply chain and food security policy analysis; and its convening and coordination power.

### ***Programme logic and internal coherence***

13. Although no theory of change was developed when the CSP was designed, a coherent programme logic is clearly visible within the plan. The country office was not always able to create synergy among strategic outcomes, however, which reduced internal coherence and, in some cases, potentially impeded effectiveness. For example, WFP's engagement in social protection was spread over three strategic outcomes and lacked a coherent implementation strategy. Emergency response, preparedness and supply chain activities were also spread over several strategic outcomes with separate implementation plans – a choice that hampered the scale-up of the response to Typhoon Rai in December 2021. In addition, the formulation of work related to nutrition under strategic outcome 2 reflected WFP's commitment to that issue but inhibited the degree to which nutrition sensitivity could be integrated into other strategic outcomes as a cross-cutting theme.

### ***Strategic positioning and adaptability to context***

14. WFP's strategic positioning-responded to changes in circumstances and national needs, such as those that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic and following climate-related shocks. WFP's strategic contributions to country capacity strengthening (CCS) were somewhat affected by the absence of an overarching strategic framework and the lack of application of corporate frameworks and tools for CCS. Although social protection became a corporate priority during the course of the CSP, the lack of emphasis on social protection in the CSP design limited WFP's leverage at the national level. Currently, there is increasing opportunity for WFP to become more engaged in CCS, and stakeholders identified clear potential entry points for WFP to support two of the four pillars in the social protection programme of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

15. The decentralized governance structure in the Philippines, combined with WFP's experience of working at the subnational level, put WFP in a strong position to focus on subnational capacity strengthening. Two approaches were followed: region-specific multisectoral interventions that apply a similar approach to that implemented in BARMM; and the strengthening of local capacities through national systems, which was more common under the previous protracted relief and recovery operations but is also

<sup>6</sup> Brain Trust Inc. 2017. *Strategic review on food security and nutrition in the Philippines*.

<sup>7</sup> The CSP is aligned with the Philippines Plan of Action for Nutrition for 2017–2022 and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan for 2011–2028.

used in the anticipatory action pilot project under strategic outcome 4. Both approaches are highly valued by stakeholders, who expressed interest in WFP expanding its subnational engagement.

### **What are the extent and quality of WFP's contributions to country strategic plan strategic outcomes in the Philippines?**

16. Food distributions and cash transfers under strategic outcome 1 contributed to food security outcomes, as evidenced by improved food consumption scores in WFP-assisted areas<sup>8</sup> compared with national scores,<sup>9</sup> and confirmed by post-distribution monitoring results, which highlight a significant 8 percent increase in the number of people with acceptable food consumption scores in 2020 and similar positive results in 2021 and 2022. In addition, WFP strengthened the Government's emergency response capacity by introducing data collection methodologies and mapping.

17. The implementation of ambitious plans to support government policy and programming to improve health and nutrition by enhancing diets under strategic outcome 2 was curtailed in scope by funding shortfalls, except in BARMM, where important results were achieved at the institutional level.

18. The multisectoral interventions implemented in BARMM under strategic outcome 3 contributed to peacebuilding and to capacity strengthening for the local government in the areas of policymaking, institutional effectiveness and programme design and delivery. For instance, WFP supported the formulation of a food security and nutrition road map and a regional plan of action for nutrition and co-developed guidelines on the school-based feeding programme for BARMM, with the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education. WFP also supported the piloting of a home-grown school feeding programme adopted in four municipalities in BARMM and the purchase of food from local farmers.

19. Through the convergence framework,<sup>10</sup> which was a result of WFP's efforts to convene the main food and nutrition security actors, WFP successfully contributed to increased coordination and collaboration among government ministries and to peacebuilding and social cohesion. However, as WFP's reporting formats do not include peacebuilding outcomes or indicators, those results are not fully reflected in WFP reporting.

20. WFP also supported the Government's emergency response by providing logistics and supply chain management services under strategic outcome 4 and strengthened communications in emergency preparedness and response systems and information management. However, the scale of those results was limited by funding shortfalls, and the CSP architecture – which separated emergency preparedness from emergency response – presented challenges for WFP when a direct response was needed.

### **Contributions to cross-cutting aims**

#### ***Gender***

21. Gender-responsiveness in WFP programming in the Philippines complies with corporate requirements and has improved during CSP implementation since 2018. The country office is generally reaching its targets as measured through corporate indicators, such as those for women's participation in project committees and household decision-making, and women's receipt of food or cash transfers. Gender and age marker scores have improved over time. However, in BARMM, fewer women participated in committees during the pandemic, when they were forced to take on the home-schooling of their children, which reduced the time available to them.

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<sup>8</sup> WFP. [Annual country reports 2018–2022](#).

<sup>9</sup> WFP. 2022. [HungerMap LIVE](#).

<sup>10</sup> The framework is a set of agreements that guide inter-agency coordination in the Government.

**TABLE 2: REPORTED GENDER AND AGE MARKER SCORES BY STRATEGIC OUTCOME AND YEAR, 2018–2022**

Strategic outcome	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022*
1: Humanitarian response	n.a.	1	1	4	3
2: Nutrition	n.a.	1	4	4	3
3: BARMM	n.a.	1	4	4	0
4: Emergency preparedness and response	n.a.	0	0	4	0

\* The calculation of the gender and age marker score was changed in 2022 to include implementation as well as design. Sources: WFP. [Annual country reports 2018–2022](#).

### ***Protection, accountability to affected populations and environmental concerns***

22. WFP has been compliant with protection guidelines apart from during the response to Typhoon Rai, when it had insufficient in-house capacity; however, there was no evidence of negative consequences. During CSP implementation, WFP improved and revitalized community feedback mechanisms, which enhanced accountability to affected populations during the Typhoon Rai response. Environmental considerations were prominently integrated into strategic outcomes 3 and 4, but there was limited integration of environmental risk assessments into strategic outcome 1 activities.

### ***Humanitarian–development–peace nexus***

23. WFP’s historic engagement in facilitating strategic linkages among the three elements of the triple (humanitarian–development–peace) nexus has continued during CSP implementation. WFP has contributed positively at the nexus, including in peacebuilding, under the umbrella of its work in food security and nutrition in BARMM. WFP’s corporate terminology sometimes led to misconceptions on the part of external stakeholders, including donors, regarding the relevance of WFP’s actions to development or peacebuilding priorities, and their potential contribution to peacebuilding objectives. In addition, the lack of corporate indicators for peacebuilding and social cohesion results minimizes the potential visibility of WFP’s contributions in sectors other than food security and nutrition. To change this perception, WFP had explicitly adopted a humanitarian–development–peace nexus approach in BARMM by the end of 2021 and rolled out associated tools, such as conflict-sensitivity assessments. Despite the limited corporate indicators for measuring WFP’s contributions to peacebuilding, qualitative data suggest that positive contributions are being made in BARMM.

### ***Prospects for the sustainability of country strategic plan achievements***

24. The prospects for the sustainability of achievements varied among strategic outcomes. Primary concerns were a lack of resources and technical capacity at the subnational level. Although strategic outcome 1 included the direct provision of humanitarian assistance, the response to Typhoon Rai was instead complementary to national efforts and therefore strengthened the sustainability of the Government’s own response capacity. Under strategic outcome 2, the shift from nutrition-specific direct assistance to nutrition-sensitive approaches helped to improve the potential sustainability of investments. The sustainability of outcomes achieved under strategic outcome 3 in BARMM is supported through the convergence model. Under strategic outcome 4, emergency preparedness and response outcomes appear more likely to be sustained than those in disaster risk reduction management owing to their higher resourcing levels and the extent of their integration into existing government structures.


## **TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?**

### ***Timeliness and responsiveness***

25. The timeliness of interventions (expressed in terms of annual achievement rates against the implementation plan, as shown in figure 3) varied over the CSP period, but cash transfers were generally more timely than in-kind food distributions and capacity strengthening was the timeliest transfer modality because it is not affected by supply chain challenges. Some inefficiencies arose in the scale-up of the response to Typhoon Rai in December 2021, when it took almost four months to start distributions owing to

a lack of experienced staff and tested systems and difficulty in matching in-kind food distributions with government cash programmes. However, WFP’s provision of trucks, needs assessment capacity and other data support was timely, thereby strengthening the Government’s response.

**Figure 3: Implementation plan and achievement rates for food and cash transfers, 2018–2022**




Source: Country portfolio budget plans vs. actuals report. Data extracted for December 2022.

**Cumulative expenditure rates**

26. Cumulative and annual expenditure rates indicate structural barriers rather than operational inefficiencies because expenditure is high against allocated resources (see figure 4). The low expenditure rates against the needs-based plan suggest that the timing and availability of resources were the most important factors in the implementation rate, particularly under strategic outcome 2.

**Figure 4: Cumulative expenditure rates against the needs-based and implementation plans and the allocated resources, by strategic outcome and transfer modality, 2018–2022\***



\* Comparison of expenditure rates against implementation plans provides another proxy measure of timeliness reflecting the effectiveness and ability of the country office in translating resourcing and plans into implementation. Direct and indirect support costs are not included in this figure.


Source: Country portfolio budget plan vs. actuals report. Data extracted for December 2022.

**Coverage and complementarity**

27. The Government undertakes its own emergency responses and WFP’s support is mainly complementary, taking the form of technical assistance for mapping, assessments and beneficiary registration, apart from during large-scale emergencies such as Typhoon Rai in 2022. During CSP implementation, WFP also assisted by validating the Government’s beneficiary lists and highlighting exclusion and inclusion errors.

28. WFP came closer to achieving its target numbers of beneficiaries in the early years of CSP implementation. Underachievement in 2022 arose largely from funding challenges, with earmarked in-kind food contributions unable to be used to complement the largely cash-based government response, and the earmarking of contributions for immediate response preventing their use for CCS.

**Figure 5: Planned and actual beneficiaries by sex, 2018–2022**



Sources: WFP. [Annual country reports 2018–2022](#).

### Cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness

29. The CSP was implemented within the expected cost parameters, and the country office does not appear to have internal operational inefficiencies, according to analysis of planned versus actual direct support costs (see table 2). The underachievement in terms of output indicators was therefore influenced by factors other than inefficiency, including gaps in financial and human resources. Increases in food transfer costs due to transport and logistics requirements had largely ceased by 2020, when WFP stopped all in-kind food distributions. In-kind distributions were reintroduced during the Typhoon Rai response, partly as a result of specific donor requirements but also owing to concerns about disrupted markets and high inflation rates.

TABLE 3: DIRECT SUPPORT COST EXPENDITURES AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL DIRECT COSTS, 2018–2022					
Cost category	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Direct support costs (USD)	555 804	1 175 304	528 337	791 526	1 995 752
Total direct costs (USD)	5 481 457	9 842 842	4 308 575	4 505 748	22 168 500
<b>Direct support costs as a percentage of total direct costs</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>17.6</b>	<b>9.0</b>

Sources: WFP. [Annual country reports 2018–2022](#).

30. One factor delaying food distributions was the need to merge many donor requirements into a single, coherent response. Cash transfers would have been more in line with the national emergency




response; they would also have been timelier and had greater potential for cost-efficiency and effectiveness. WFP made efforts to adopt cost-effective measures within its operating parameters by, for example, changing from a food provider with a global long-term agreement to a cheaper, national provider and sourcing less costly storage options.

## WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP’S PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED UNDER THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

### Funding

31. The CSP was under-resourced from 2018 to 2021, but the 2021–2022 period saw a more positive funding situation. Nonetheless, high levels of contribution earmarking, excessive reliance on small donations, short project cycles and the large number of donors involved presented challenges for coherence and the achievement of synergies between interventions. The intention underlying the CSP architecture was to provide opportunities for flexible, multi-year funding commitments that would increase WFP’s capacity to adapt its operations to emerging opportunities and align its programming with government priorities, but this did not occur in the Philippines, where more than 62 percent of funding was earmarked at the activity level and only 20 percent at the country level, restricting flexibility. The distribution of resources affected CSP performance, with strategic outcomes 2 and 4 receiving very limited funding, forcing changes in their scope from the original CSP design.

**Figure 6: Allocated resources by level of earmarking**



Source: WFP. Country strategic plan, Philippines Resource Situation Report (2018–2022), FACTory. (Extracted December 2022.)

### Monitoring

32. The monitoring of output and outcome indicators complies with the requirements of the corporate results framework, and there are examples of country office monitoring data informing management decisions, although usually for individual interventions. The gaps in CCS outcome indicators limit the opportunities to identify long-term, high-level CCS results. There is evidence of the country office’s development of improved monitoring that demonstrates progress towards outcomes, but knowledge management limitations present challenges for the maintenance of institutional memory and strategic coherence.

### Partnerships

33. For CCS results, the quality and continuity of relationships were important factors supporting positive outcomes. WFP facilitated good coordination within the United Nations country team. Under the CSP, WFP and the national government have had generally weak strategic relationships owing to vacant management positions in the country office; however, their technical partnerships have been stronger. At the operational level, the country office has had effective partnerships with counterparts in humanitarian response, especially in logistics and supply chain operations. At the subnational level, there are strong strategic, technical and operational partnerships in BARMM, which could serve as models for replication in

other regions. The quality of partnerships in other regions is currently weaker owing to the sporadic nature of WFP's subnational engagement. Private sector partnerships are a priority and have high potential value for CSP implementation, but there are challenges to coherent and strategic coordination.

### **Human resources**

34. The period from 2018 to 2020 was characterized by limited staff numbers, high staff turnover, fixed-term contracts and significant staffing gaps. During the period 2021–2022, staff numbers and contract opportunities increased and gaps in staffing were filled. This has improved the country office's human resources capacity to implement the CSP.

### **Factors affecting performance**

35. As mentioned, the primary factors affecting WFP's performance included the CSP architecture, the limited financial and human resources until 2021, the impact of the pandemic on activity implementation and government priorities, and the lack of alignment between CCS activities and existing corporate frameworks and tools. The decentralized government structure presented both limitations and opportunities for WFP engagement; for example, the "cascading" of national policies, processes and capacity to the subnational level took time but also presented opportunities for WFP to provide support.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

36. The evaluation concluded that the CSP is well aligned with government priorities and WFP is well positioned in all dimensions of the triple nexus, particularly in humanitarian assistance, emergency preparedness and response and peacebuilding. The results from CCS reflect the two phases of CSP implementation. An initial period, characterized by vacant senior management positions, resource constraints, high staff turnover and pandemic disruption, saw limited results, particularly for CCS, but from 2021, the CSP moved into a period of improved resourcing and staffing which led to a re-expansion of its scope, the re-establishment of strategic relationships with the Government and improved results. Cost-efficiency was generally high throughout the period under review.

37. WFP has contributed significantly to outcomes in humanitarian response and emergency preparedness and response under strategic outcomes 1 and 4, and in peacebuilding engagement under strategic outcome 3. The intended improvement of diets and reduction of malnutrition under strategic outcome 2 were hampered by severe funding shortfalls, apart from in BARMM, where significant results were achieved. However, gaps in WFP's outcome indicators for CCS and peacebuilding limited the learning from, and visibility of, WFP's contributions to strategic outcomes in those areas. In addition, the use of food security and nutrition as an entry point for its engagement in the Philippines limited WFP's inclusion in conversations on peacebuilding and social protection with external stakeholders. The CSP did not attract as much flexible funding as envisioned at the corporate level, and donors' continued perception of WFP as primarily an emergency response agency in the Philippines impeded their provision of funding for a CCS-focused CSP.

38. The CSP appropriately anticipated a crisis response option under strategic outcome 1. However, although small-scale interventions based on the direct distribution of assistance occurred throughout the CSP period, there were challenges to the scale-up of operations during the large-scale Typhoon Rai emergency response. This was partly owing to the fact that the country office's response plan had not been annually updated and staff lacked the requisite humanitarian response experience to manage the large-scale response.

39. Under-resourcing, particularly during the first three years of CSP implementation, had effects on both project performance and staffing profiles, which delayed the achievement of CSP results. This created challenges for the building of strategic partnerships and resulted in a reliance on many, disconnected small-scale grants, with a disproportionate degree of earmarking at the activity level, which limited flexibility. Partnerships with humanitarian donors were strong, but those with peacebuilding or social protection donors, including foundations and the private sector, were limited. Short project cycles hampered the continuity of relationships with targeted stakeholders, and the high staff turnover contributed to weak institutional memory, exacerbated by limited knowledge management. Resourcing has improved markedly since 2021, allowing the country office to adjust staffing positions and strengthen partnerships and performance at the strategic and technical levels.

40. Gender considerations were integrated into the CSP design and implementation and included ensuring the adequate representation and participation of women in assistance programmes. The country

office has steadily improved its gender and age marker scores during the CSP period. Environmental risk assessments are part of project implementation under strategic outcomes 3 and 4, but less so under strategic outcome 1. Although the country office is compliant with corporate standards on protection, capacity in that area is insufficient during emergencies.

41. Contributions to social protection were made under the CSP but were dispersed among strategic outcomes and lacked a systematic conceptual framework for strategically positioning WFP in social protection, including shock-responsive social protection. Stakeholders perceive WFP as having a valid role in social protection and identified potential entry points for that role in the national social protection framework. They also perceive WFP's comparative advantages in data, analysis and mapping as potential entry points for refining the Government's targeting and coverage criteria.

42. Through its experience and comparative advantages, WFP is well positioned to expand its subnational presence. WFP is recognized as a major actor in emergency preparedness and response and humanitarian assistance and has a strong field presence and reputation for practical, proactive and flexible responsiveness. The two models applied for CCS provide opportunities for long-term engagement and continuity with a set of subnational actors in BARMM and for the widespread diffusion of work on specific sectoral themes or technical expertise through collaboration with relevant local actors.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

43. Since 2021, the country office has had four major review and evaluation exercises: a Typhoon Rai after-action review, a CSP mid-term review, a decentralized evaluation of capacity strengthening, and a social protection scoping study. The results of those reviews have informed this evaluation, and the following recommendations – three operational and three strategic – affirm and build on their recommendations. The following recommendations are directed mainly to the country office, but also call for contributions from headquarters divisions and the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific.

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1	<p>Systematic use of the country capacity strengthening framework:</p> <p>When developing the next country strategic plan, WFP should strengthen the utilization of the corporate country capacity strengthening and corporate results frameworks to develop a country-specific country capacity strengthening strategy, approach, road map and monitoring framework to guide country office interventions. (This recommendation reaffirms the recommendations from the decentralized evaluation on capacity strengthening.)</p>	Strategic				
1.1	Based on the theory of change developed for the next country strategic plan, map the country capacity strengthening-related needs of different stakeholders to identify approaches for its engagement in country capacity strengthening at the national and subnational levels.			Regional bureau CCS adviser and research, assessment and monitoring unit	High	December 2023
1.2	In consultation with government partners, develop a strategy to guide the implementation of and learning from country capacity strengthening. Relevant national government partners could include the National Economic and Development Authority. Alternatively, in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, form an intergovernmental steering committee that is based on a partnership model, builds on the 2019 capacity needs mapping exercise and can guide the country office's country capacity strengthening activities at the national and subnational levels.		Country office	Regional bureau CCS adviser	High	January 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
2	Social protection strategic positioning: WFP should ensure that the new country strategic plan includes a coherent strategy for social protection, while continuing to expand its social protection strategic positioning, including in nutrition-sensitive social protection. WFP's strategic position should be not only in shock-responsive social protection but also within the larger social protection sphere, and its strategy should include the identification of appropriate pillars and technical approaches for providing support within the Government's social protection strategy and programming framework. In particular, WFP should identify its potential role in supporting subnational government social protection systems. (This recommendation reaffirms the recommendations from the social protection scoping study.)	Strategic				
2.1	Articulate WFP's social protection positioning, with the Government and within the United Nations country team, in relation to national social protection systems, possibly through a disaster risk reduction and mitigation perspective that fosters people's ability to meet their food security, nutrition and other essential needs, including in response to shocks and other stressors.		Country office	Regional bureau	High	December 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
2.2	Identify areas in the national social protection framework and system where the next country strategic plan can contribute to the strengthening and development of a country strategic plan-level social protection strategy and monitoring framework, including for nutrition-sensitive social protection. This work should include the articulation of avenues for providing technical support, such as information management systems, monitoring and evaluation systems or contributions to policies and guidelines.			Regional bureau; headquarters Social Protection Unit	Medium	June 2024
2.3	With a view to contributing to social protection, build a larger overarching programming approach to resilience that can serve as a conceptual framework for broadening WFP's engagement in resilience building, geographically and thematically.			Regional bureau; headquarters Social Protection Unit	Medium	June 2024
3	Internal capacity for humanitarian response: In the next country strategic plan, WFP should build on lessons learned from the Typhoon Rai response so as to sustain the country office's internal capacity to scale up and mobilize an emergency response. (This recommendation reaffirms the recommendations from the Typhoon Rai after-action review.)	Operational				
3.1	Retain and strengthen in-house emergency preparedness and response capacity and prioritize capacity strengthening activities, including by articulating roles and responsibilities in a direct response.		Country office	Regional bureau; headquarters Human Resources Division (HRM) and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	January 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
3.2	Develop rosters of external entities and pre-formulated comprehensive field-level agreements with cooperating partners.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	January 2024
3.3	Develop a response strategy or plan and review its implementation annually.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	June 2024
3.4	Advocate with potential donors for flexible unearmarked funding that will allow WFP to implement efficient emergency and early recovery responses based on evolving needs, including by providing flexibility regarding the transfer modalities used and the geographic areas covered.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	December 2023
4	Subnational engagement in country capacity strengthening: Consistent with the Government's decentralization efforts, and drawing on the best practices from available studies such as the mid-term review of the country strategic plan, the decentralized capacity strengthening evaluation and the social protection scoping study, under the next country strategic plan, WFP should seek to expand its engagement in country capacity strengthening at the subnational level.	Strategic				

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
4.1	Identify two or three localities in which to consider replicating the multisectoral model developed for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The sites could be identified from a combination of relevant vulnerability data (from vulnerability analysis and mapping on climate change and food security, and the Government's Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program modelling) or a capacity needs mapping exercise carried out in collaboration with the Government.			Regional bureau and headquarters Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division (RAM) and Country Capacity Strengthening Unit (PROTC)	High	June 2024
4.2	For subnational country capacity strengthening in emergency preparedness and response under the next country strategic plan, initiate partnerships with relevant national government agencies that can provide country capacity strengthening at the local level. Such agencies may include, but are not limited to, local governance units, mayors' associations and associated government ministries and structures.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	High	January 2024
5	Resource management: Under the next country strategic plan, WFP should continue to refine and diversify its financial and human resources capacities, building on the recently completed workforce review and implementing the recommendations from the country strategic plan mid-term review, decentralized capacity strengthening evaluation and social protection scoping study regarding the need to continue to expand staff capacities and develop an organizational culture consistent with WFP's agenda of saving lives and changing lives, while expanding the partnership and resourcing base.	Operational				



#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	<i>Section 1: Resource diversification</i>					
5.1	Develop a strategy for diversifying the current donor base, with a particular focus on private sector bodies and international financial institutions, such as those in the social protection sphere, and prioritizing flexible, multi-year funding.		Country office	Regional bureau; headquarters Private Partnerships and Fundraising Division and Public Partnerships and Resourcing Division	Medium	December 2023
5.2	Develop a clear strategy for supporting advocacy and communication regarding WFP's technical expertise in the three dimensions of the triple nexus – development, crisis response and peacebuilding. Apply specific examples from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to support the strategy.			Regional bureau; headquarters Private Partnerships and Fundraising Division, Public Partnerships and Resourcing Division and Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes Service	Medium	February 2024
	<i>Section 2: Workforce management</i>					
5.3	Conduct a corporate workforce planning exercise aligned with the needs of the next country strategic plan, including those regarding in-house expertise in social protection, resilience building, and support for cross-cutting themes such as protection.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM	High	December 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
5.4	Ensure that there are adequate human resources and skills available within the country office workforce for a timely scale-up in the event of a large-scale humanitarian response.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM	High	December 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
6	Evidence base and knowledge management: Under the next country strategic plan, WFP should invest further in knowledge management for informing programme decision-making and should strengthen the conceptual linkages between strategic outcomes, track long-term progress under the country strategic plan against country capacity strengthening indicators and strengthen institutional memory.	Operational	Country office			
6.1	Carry out an exercise to identify common indicators across the strategic outcomes in order to increase the internal coherence of the country strategic plan and strengthen the conceptual linkages between the overarching strategic objectives in the new country strategic plan structure.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	Medium	March 2024
6.2	Review the findings of the 2017 zero hunger strategic review to identify progress in capacity strengthening since 2017 and inform the implementation of the next country strategic plan.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC; United Nations country team representatives	Medium	March 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
6.3	Where possible, adapt the corporate country capacity strengthening framework, the 2022 policy update and the corporate results frameworks to the country setting. This work may include identifying country-specific country capacity strengthening indicators for measuring and reporting on the country capacity strengthening process, capturing results over the long term and possibly including indicators for measuring government- and community-based social cohesion and the strengthening of training modalities for country capacity strengthening.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	High	January 2024
6.4	Consider investing financial and human resources in strengthening the internal knowledge management systems that support institutional memory, for learning and advocacy.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	High	March 2024

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. EVALUATION FEATURES

1. In line with World Food Programme (WFP) policy on country strategic plans (CSPs) and WFP evaluation policy, the Office of Evaluation has commissioned an evaluation of the 2018-2023 Country Strategic Plan in the Philippines.<sup>11</sup> The evaluation has dual objectives of learning and accountability, ensuring: i) that evidence and lessons from WFP's performance are collected and used to inform future engagement and programming; and ii) accountability for results to WFP stakeholders. The terms of reference (ToR) are provided in Annex 1.

2. The evaluation was conducted between May 2022 and January 2023 and timed to ensure that inputs inform the design of the new CSP (2024-2028), and the upcoming United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) for the Philippines (2024-2028). The temporal scope covers the CSP design phase in 2017, subsequent budget revisions (BRs), and the implementation of all CSP activities from January 2018 to October 2022.<sup>12</sup> The geographic scope included all areas of activity implementation.<sup>13</sup>

3. The evaluation serves the interests of a range of internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include the WFP Country Office in the Philippines, Office of Evaluation, WFP headquarters and WFP Regional Bureau for Asia and Pacific Region in Bangkok (RBB). External stakeholders include the Government of the Philippines, particularly the departments and agencies engaged in the CSP implementation at national and subnational levels, cooperating partners, donors, other United Nations agencies, and other stakeholders (academia, private sector, and so on). The beneficiaries of CSP activities are key stakeholders of this evaluation and of future WFP actions in the Philippines. The primary users of the evaluation are the country office and RBB. A full list of stakeholders is presented in the ToR, annex 1.

4. A mixed methods approach was used combining document review, quantitative data analysis, key informant interviews, project site visits including interviews, observations, and focus group discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries. The evaluation adhered to the WFP approach to gender equality and women's empowerment (GEWE) and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation. The WFP principles for integration of gender in evaluation were applied across the evaluation process (Annex 3).

## 1.2. CONTEXT

### Overview

5. The Philippines is an archipelagic country composed of around 7,641 islands divided across three main islands groups: Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Internal connectivity is a major challenge<sup>14</sup> negatively affecting access to food and basic services in terms of cost and lead times, particularly during humanitarian crises.

6. The Philippines is a constitutional republic with a presidential system<sup>15</sup> organized into 17 administrative regions and one autonomous region: the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The latter established as an autonomous entity in 2019 under a peace agreement between the Philippine Government and Moro secessionists in Mindanao.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> WFP. 2016. "Policy on Country Strategic Plans" WFP/EB.2/2016/4-C/1/Rev.1

<sup>12</sup> From January 2018 to June 2018, the country office operated under an interim-CSP (i-CSP) before the finalization of the CSP in June 2018. For the purposes of this report, the narrative refers to simply "the CSP" even when presenting data from the January to June 2018 period.

<sup>13</sup> See Figure 7 map for coverage details.

<sup>14</sup> Co Go, E. 2020. Island Hopping for Greater Trade in the Philippines. *Asian Development Bank Blog*. (Accessed 20 June 2022).

<sup>15</sup> Caballero-Anthony, M. 2022. A Marcos returns to power in the Philippines. *Brookings*. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

<sup>16</sup> Harding, B. & Ingram, H.J. 2022. The long road to peace in the southern Philippines. *The United States Institute for Peace*. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

7. The Philippines includes more than 100 different ethnic groups, with the Tagalog people accounting for 24 percent of the total population<sup>17</sup> of just over 111 million people.<sup>18</sup> The most populous regions are Calabarzon, followed by the National Capital Region, Visayas, Luzon and Mindanao.<sup>19</sup> The population is split relatively evenly between urban (47.4 percent) and rural (52.6 percent) areas.<sup>20</sup> Approximately a quarter of Filipinos are adolescents (29 percent) with the majority (65 percent) adults aged 15-64 and less than 10 percent seniors (aged 65+, 6 percent).<sup>21</sup> Life expectancy at birth is 71 years of age, with lower life expectancy for males (67) compared to females (76).<sup>22</sup> The total fertility is 2.52 per woman, while the adolescent birth rate is 52.36 per 1,000 girls.<sup>23</sup>

### National policies and the Sustainable Development Goals

8. The country's longer-term national vision is reflected in the AmBisyon (2040),<sup>24</sup> operationalized at the time of the CSP design through the Philippines Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022.<sup>25</sup> The PDP is aligned with the 2030 Agenda and its commitment of 'Leaving No One Behind' and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) focusing on SDGs 1 (end poverty), 2 (end hunger) and 17 (partnerships). The PDP is organized around three strategic pillars and a cluster of cross-cutting strategies.<sup>26</sup> The PDP was updated following the COVID-19 pandemic<sup>27</sup> with a core focus on resilience and achievement of SDG 3 (good health and well-being).<sup>28</sup> Figure 1 details the PDP 2017-2022 strategies and their interlinkages with the SDGs.

Figure 1: Philippines Development Plan and Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) linkages



Source: NEDA, 2022 Voluntary National Review

9. The PDP 2017-2022 is based on the Philippines' Magna Carta of Women (MCW), the framework establishing the Government's local translation of their commitment to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Committee and recognising human rights guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>17</sup> World Bank, 2020. World Development Index. (Accessed 20 June 2022).

<sup>18</sup> World Bank, 2020. World Development Index. (Accessed 20 June 2022).

<sup>19</sup> Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA) 2021. *Highlights of 2020 CPH*.

<sup>20</sup> PSA. 2020. 2020 Census of Population and Housing.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), 2022. UNFPA Philippines.. (Accessed 20 June 2022).

<sup>22</sup> World Bank, 2020. World Development Index. (Accessed on 20 June 2022).

<sup>23</sup> World Bank, 2020. World Development Index. (Accessed on 20 June 2022).

<sup>24</sup> National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). 2016. About AmBisyon Natin 2040. (Accessed 20 June 2022).

<sup>25</sup> A new PDP for 2023-2028 has subsequently been developed.

<sup>26</sup> NEDA. 2019. Updated Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022.

<sup>27</sup> NEDA. 2019. The 2019 Voluntary National Review of the Philippines.

<sup>28</sup> NEDA. 2019. Updated PDP 2017-2022.

<sup>29</sup> Philippine Commission on Women (PCW). 2009. Republic Act 9711: Magna Carta of Women. (Accessed 22 June 2022).

10. In 2022, the Philippines presented their third Voluntary National Review (VNR) highlighting the ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approach to SDG implementation.<sup>30</sup> The primary challenge identified was the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on equality (SDG 10) and inclusive education (SDG 4).<sup>31</sup>

### Economy and poverty

11. The Philippines is a middle-income country.<sup>32</sup> Growth, dampened by the COVID-19 pandemic, rebounded with the World Bank’s June 2022 Economic Update, which projected growth at 5.7 percent in 2022 and an average of 5.6 percent in 2023-2024. As of December 2022, estimates from the Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA), 95.8 percent of Filipinos were employed.<sup>33</sup> The BARMM has the lowest employment rate (91.9 percent).<sup>34</sup> Women’s labour force participation rates (LFPR) are low (51.5 percent) compared to males (75.1 percent).<sup>35</sup> However, the pandemic and subsequent supply chain crises have contributed to increased inflation. In December 2022 the annual inflation rate was 8.1 percent – the highest rate since 2010.<sup>36</sup>

12. In 2021, the Philippines ranked 107<sup>th</sup> out of 189 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI), a ‘high’ human development category, with a score of 0.718.<sup>37</sup> The HDI value has steadily increased since 1990. Trends in the national Gini index (declining from 44.6 in 2015 to 42.3 in 2018) and poverty rates (declining from 22.3 percent to 16.3 percent in the same period) are positive.<sup>38</sup>

13. Inequality in the Philippines remains high.<sup>39</sup> Poverty rates are higher in rural areas and among farmers, fisherfolk and children (31.6 percent of farmers, 26.2 percent fisherfolk, 24.5 percent rural and 23.9 percent of children).<sup>40</sup> The Mindanao region has the highest poverty rates in the Philippines (26.3 percent in the first semester of 2021 compared to 18 percent nationally).<sup>41</sup> The economic outlook of Mindanao is most substantially damaged by armed conflict.

### Food and nutrition security

14. Ensuring sufficient access to food, and the achievement of SDG 2, remains one of the key development challenges in the Philippines.<sup>42</sup> According to the 2022 Global Hunger Index (GHI), the Philippines has a ‘moderate’ level of hunger, ranking 69<sup>th</sup> out of 121 countries.<sup>43</sup> Figure 2 illustrates the regional patterns of insufficient food consumption across the country.

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<sup>30</sup> NEDA. 2022. 2022 Voluntary National Review of the Philippines (VNR).

<sup>31</sup> NEDA. 2022. 2022 Voluntary National Review of the Philippines (VNR).

<sup>32</sup> World Bank Data, Philippines. <https://data.worldbank.org/country/PH>. (Accessed 22 June 2022).

<sup>33</sup> Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA). 2023 (Release date 6 January 2023). <https://psa.gov.ph/content/unemployment-rate-november-2022-estimated-42-percent>. (Accessed 22 June 2022).

<sup>34</sup> PSA 2022. 2022 Employment rate in April 2022 is estimated at 94.3 percent.. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

<sup>35</sup> PSA, 2022. 2022 Employment rate in April 2022 is estimated at 94.3 percent. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

<sup>36</sup> Trading Economics. December 2022 Philippines Inflation Rate. <https://tradingeconomics.com/philippines/inflation-cpi>

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2021. *Human Development Report 2021*.

<sup>38</sup> The World Bank. 2022. *The World Bank in the Philippines*.

<sup>39</sup> The World Bank. 2021. *Poverty & Equity Brief East Asia & Pacific: Philippines*.


<sup>40</sup> PSA 2020. Farmers, fisherfolks, individuals residing in rural areas and children posted the highest poverty incidences among the basic sectors in 2018. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

<sup>41</sup> PSA, 2021. Proportion of Poor Filipinos Registered at 23.7 percent in the first semester of 2021. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

<sup>42</sup> NEDA. 2019. Updated PDP 2017-2022.

<sup>43</sup> Welt Hunger Hilfe & Concern Worldwide. n.d. Global hunger index scores by 2022 GHI rank.

**Figure 2: Insufficient food consumption prevalence (January 2023)**



Source: WFP, *HungerMap Live*. January 2023. Yellow denotes moderately low insufficient food consumption (10 percent to 20 percent), while light orange represents moderately high insufficient food consumption (20 percent to 30 percent) and dark orange reflecting high insufficient food consumption (30 percent to 40 percent).

15. Two primary drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition nationally are climate change and the lack of affordable access to high-quality food. Climate change has disproportionate effects on poor and vulnerable populations. Trade distortions, inefficient logistics, post-harvest losses and uncompetitive marketing restrict food access.<sup>44</sup> Low agricultural productivity impacts food prices and availability. These impacts have been exacerbated by the acute food, fuel and fertilizer crisis resulting from the conflict in Ukraine.

16. Food security and malnutrition indicators in the BARMM reflect the highest rates of malnutrition in the country. In 2018, approximately 29.1 percent of households were unable to meet their basic food needs<sup>45</sup> which increased since the pandemic, with 34 percent of households as food insecure in 2022.<sup>46</sup> According to the 2021 National Nutrition Survey (NNS), (the latest available data), stunting (45.2 percent of children aged under 5 years) and wasting (8.2 percent) are much higher than national levels (27 percent and 5.5 percent respectively).<sup>47</sup> Stunting is the biggest concern in BARMM, and is most immediately affected by diseases, poor diet and caring practices, which are directly linked to poverty in the regional context.<sup>48</sup>

17. Through the PDP 2017-2022, the Government adopted a 'whole-of-government' approach to address national food security challenges. The Philippine Plan of Action for Nutrition targets 32 provinces with the highest poverty rates and prioritizes them for interventions with a special focus on stunting and teenage pregnancy, health-related interventions, and services for the first 1,000 days of life. Full implementation of the Government's feeding programmes for children in pre-kindergarden through elementary school and provision of nutritious food parcels to children through the Supplementary Feeding

<sup>44</sup> Brain Trust, Inc. 2017. Strategic review on food security and nutrition in the Philippines. WFP.

<sup>45</sup> BARMM Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Agrarian Reform (MAFAR), WFP & FAO. 2020. *Food security and nutrition roadmap: Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao*.

<sup>46</sup> WFP. 2022. *The Philippines Food Security Monitoring: Remote Household Food Security Survey Brief*.

<sup>47</sup> Food and Nutrition Research Institute. 2022. Expanded National Nutrition Survey.

<sup>48</sup> BARMM MAFAR, WFP & FAO. 2020. *Food security and nutrition roadmap: BARMM*.



Program and the School-Based Feeding Program are important strategies to improve nutrition outcomes for vulnerable populations.

18. These approaches have had some effect on improving food and nutrition security. The Philippine's GHI score has steadily improved from 25.0 in 2000 to 16.8 in 2021. The proportion of undernourished children and prevalence of stunting in children has gradually decreased between 2000 and 2019 (the last year of measurement).<sup>49</sup> While rates of mortality for children aged under 5 show a downward trend from 2000,<sup>50</sup> according to the 2022 NNS, child wasting increased slightly from 5.6 percent in 2018 to 5.8 percent in 2019. Rates of stunting and wasting are the worst for poor, rural males. In contrast, overweight and obese children and adults are a growing concern in the Philippines, especially in urban areas. Adult obesity has also increased, especially among women.<sup>51</sup>

### **Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry**

19. The Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (AFF) sector is one of the three major industries in the Philippines. However, it accounts for the least contribution to the country's gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at 9.6 percent in 2021, down from 10.2 percent in 2020.<sup>52</sup> The latest Census of Agriculture and Fisheries in 2012 indicated a total 5.6 million holdings/farms, covering 7.3 million hectares, with more than half covering less than 1 hectare.<sup>53</sup>

20. The agricultural sector employs 24.8 percent of the total workforce (15.0 percent of female workforce, 30.9 percent male).<sup>54</sup> The use of traditional farming techniques reduces productivity and increases income and crop vulnerability to climate- and disaster-related shocks.<sup>55</sup> Women account for approximately one quarter of the AFF sector, though this may be underreported.<sup>56</sup>

21. Government policies to support agricultural development include cross-cutting strategies to reduce AFF vulnerability to climate and disaster risks and mainstreaming disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) strategies into the design of programmes and policies. In response to the food price increases of 2022, President Marcos Jr. has publicly prioritized increasing agricultural production and combatting commodity price increases.<sup>57</sup>

### **Disasters, climate change, and vulnerability**

22. The Philippines ranks as one of the most at-risk countries in the world to natural hazards and climate change.<sup>58</sup> Farmers and fisherfolk are some of the most vulnerable to climate change.<sup>59</sup> Figure 3 provides an overview of the most severe climate-related events since the start of the CSP.

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<sup>49</sup> Food and Nutrition Research Institute (FNRI). 2020. Philippine Nutrition facts and figures 2018: Expanded National Nutrition Survey.

<sup>50</sup> Philippines Statistics Authority (PSA) and Inner City Fund (ICF). 2018. *Philippines DHS 2017*. PSA & ICF

<sup>51</sup> Food and Nutrition Research Institute. 2022. Expanded National Nutrition Survey.

<sup>52</sup> PSA. Agricultural Accounts Division. 2022. AIS: Economic Growth-Agriculture. PSA.

<sup>53</sup> PSA. 2012. Census of Agriculture and Fisheries.

<sup>54</sup> PSA. Agricultural Accounts Division. 2021. AIS: Employment and Wages in the Agricultural Sector.

<sup>55</sup> NEDA. 2019. Updated PDP 2017-2022.


<sup>56</sup> Philippine Commission on Women (PCW). n.d. Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Sector. (Accessed 27 June 2022).

<sup>57</sup> Morales, N.J. 2022. Philippines' President-elect Marcos says he will head agriculture ministry. *Reuters* (Accessed 15 July 2022).

<sup>58</sup> Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft. 2021. *World Risk Report 2022*. INFORM Risk Index 2022.

<sup>59</sup> Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2021. Climate Risk Country Profile-Philippines.

**Figure 3: Summary of the most significant natural disasters in the Philippines (2017-2022)<sup>60</sup>**



Source: Elaborated by Office of Evaluation based on data from Asian Disaster Reduction Center, updated on 1 January 2023.

23. The PDP (2017-2022) includes cross-cutting strategies to address climate change with government investments in DRR and CCA strategies. Strategy documents include the National Framework Strategy on Climate Change (2010-2022) and the National Climate Change Action Plan (2011-2028).

### Education

24. Youth literacy is high (98.4 percent),<sup>61</sup> but challenges remain. The World Bank rated the Philippines education system as “in crisis” with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating pre-existing challenges.<sup>62</sup> The PDP includes several reforms to increase access to quality education, with a particular focus on ‘Last Mile Schools’ in geographically isolated and disadvantaged areas. Education indicators for literacy, enrolment and completion are all lower for males compared to females at all levels (Table 1).

**Table 1: Education indicators for primary and secondary schools**

		Overall	Male	Female
<b>Literacy</b>	Upper secondary	98.4%	97.9%	98.9%
	Primary	89.1%	93.4%	95.2%
<b>Enrolment</b>	Lower secondary	81.5%	70.4%	78.1%
	Primary	82.5%	88.5%	95.1%
<b>Completion rate</b>	Lower secondary	82.1%	75.1%	87.7%
	Upper secondary	69.3%	74.1%	83.3%

Source: NEDA, 2022. *2022 Voluntary National Review of the Philippines (VNR)* and Institute for Statistics. 2019. Philippines. UNESCO. (Accessed 22 June 2022).

### Gender, equity, and inclusion

25. The Philippines has made progress in closing the gender gap. The Philippines is placed 19<sup>th</sup> out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2022, the best performing country in Asia, although with limitations.<sup>63</sup>

26. The Philippines Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Plan 2019-2025 operationalizes PDP priorities regarding the country’s commitments to GEWE.<sup>64</sup> The Government and the United Nations signed the first national-level United Nations Joint Programme on Human Rights in 2022. The joint programme

<sup>60</sup> The names used in this figure depict the international names used for typhoons; the nomenclature is different in the Philippines.

<sup>61</sup> Institute for Statistics. 2019. Philippines. UNESCO. (Accessed 22 June 2022).

<sup>62</sup> NEDA. 2022. *2022 Voluntary National Review of the Philippines (VNR)*.

<sup>63</sup> Hocking, M. 2022. Southeast Asia: Gender parity is not gender equality. *The Interpreter*. The Lowy Institute. (Accessed 22 June 2022).

<sup>64</sup> Philippine Commission on Women (PCW). n.d. Gender Equality and Women Empowerment Plan. (Accessed 28 June 2022).

aims to implement the Human Rights Council (HRC) resolution 45/33, adopted in October 2020, through capacity building and technical cooperation.<sup>65</sup>

### Migration and forced displacement

27. The Philippines is characterized by large-scale natural and conflict-related displacement coupled with large-scale rural to urban migration of Filipinos searching for social and economic opportunities.<sup>66</sup> Conflict, particularly in the Mindanao region, created substantial displacement with a total of three million people displaced between 2008 and 2021.<sup>67</sup> As of October 2022, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 38,000 families (more than 118,000 individuals) remained displaced in Mindanao.<sup>68</sup> Response to internally displaced persons tends to be ad hoc, with limited success in finding durable solutions.<sup>69</sup>

### United Nations Development Assistance Framework

28. The United Nations Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development (PFSD) 2019-2023 included three pillars and corresponding outcomes aligned with government development priorities: People, Prosperity and Planet, and Peace (Table 2).<sup>70</sup>

**Table 2: Key United Nations priorities and outcomes for the Philippines (2019-2023).**

Pillar	Outcome
<b>People</b>	The most marginalized, vulnerable, and at-risk people and groups benefit from more inclusive and quality services, and live in more supportive environments where their nutrition, food security and health are ensured and protected.
<b>Prosperity and Planet</b>	Urbanization, economic growth, and climate change actions are converging for a resilient, equitable, and sustainable development path for communities.
<b>Peace</b>	National and local government and key stakeholders recognize and share a common understanding of the diverse cultural history, identity, and inequalities of areas affected by conflict, enabling the establishment of more inclusive and responsive governance systems, and accelerating sustainable and equitable development for just and lasting peace in conflict affected areas of Mindanao.

Source: PFSD (2019–2023)

## 1.3. WFP'S COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN IN THE PHILIPPINES

29. WFP's CSP programming from 2018-2023 in the Philippines had two separate CSP phases: an initial Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan (T-ICSP) for the first six months of 2018; and the CSP (2018-2023) which was approved by the Executive Board in May 2018 and started in June 2018. In line with WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021), the CSP continued transitioning WFP from an implementation role to an enabling role. This involved providing technical assistance and strengthening government capacities in emergency preparedness, response capacities and food security, and increasing WFP's role in coordination and exchanges.<sup>71</sup>

30. Based on a series of strategic reviews and evaluations,<sup>72</sup> the T-ICSP encompassed a Needs Based Plan of USD 4.85 million, with four strategic outcomes (Sos) designed to improve the resilience of 130,700 direct beneficiaries and to work with the Government to improve response structures and policy frameworks. Informed by the 2017 Strategic Review of Food and Nutrition Security, the CSP (2018-2023) emphasized working with the Government through a country capacity strengthening (CCS) approach to improve response structures and policy frameworks through four Sos and five activities (Table 3).

<sup>65</sup> United Nations Philippines. 2021. PH, UN launch first-ever national joint programme for human rights. (Accessed 24 June 2022).

<sup>66</sup> The World Bank. 2017. *Philippines Urbanization Review Full Report*.

<sup>67</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). 2021. Philippines. (Accessed 28 June 2022).

<sup>68</sup> UNHCR Philippines. 2022. Mindanao Displacement Dashboard, October 2022. Protection Cluster Philippines.

<sup>69</sup> United Nations Philippines. 2021. PH, UN launch first-ever national joint programme for human rights. (Accessed 24 June 2022).

<sup>70</sup> The PFSD was later replaced by the 2020 Socio-Economic Partnership Framework but maintained the same pillars. Further details on this transition described in EQ1.4.

<sup>71</sup> WFP. 2017. *WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021)*.

<sup>72</sup> WFP. 2014. *Philippines PRRO 200296 Support for Returnees and Other Conflict Affected Households in Central Mindanao, and National Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Response: An Operation Evaluation*; WFP. 2016. *Strategic Review of Food and Nutrition Security in the Philippines*; Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). 2014. *IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*.

**Table 3: Summary of the Philippines Country Strategic Plan (CSP) (2018-2023)**

Focus Area	Strategic Outcome	Activities	Modality	Target Group
<b>Crisis response</b>	<b>SO1 (access to food):</b> Crisis-affected people in the Philippines are able to meet their food and nutrition needs during and immediately after an emergency.	<b>Activity 1:</b> Provide unconditional nutrition-sensitive food assistance through the Government's safety nets or partners, and appropriate logistical support to crisis-affected communities following natural hazards or human-induced shocks and disruptions	Food Cash-based-transfers (CBT) Capacity strengthening (CS)	Crisis-affected communities
<b>Root causes</b>	<b>SO2 (improve nutrition):</b> Women, boys and girls in provinces prioritized by the Government have adequate and healthy diets to reduce malnutrition by 2022 in line with government targets.	<b>Activity 2:</b> Provide direct and technical assistance, build evidence and advocate to ensure adequate and healthy diets for the most vulnerable groups through nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive multi-sectoral responses	CS Food	Government institutions
<b>Resilience</b>	<b>SO3 (Country Capacity Strengthening)</b> Vulnerable communities in Mindanao have improved food security and nutrition by 2022 in line with government targets.	<b>Activity 3:</b> Support the government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and local Governments in addressing the food security and nutrition needs of all segments of the population, in an equitable manner, to further consolidate and enhance peace and development	Food CBT CS	Food insecure community in conflict-affected areas
	<b>SO4 (Country Capacity Strengthening)</b> National and local government agencies have enhanced capabilities to reduce vulnerability to shocks by 2022.	<b>Activity 4:</b> Support national and local capacities for disaster risk reduction and management and climate change adaptation	CS	Vulnerable people affected by natural and human-caused disasters, focusing on farmers
		<b>Activity 5:</b> Strengthen and augment the Government's and partners' emergency preparedness and response capacities to include supply chains and emergency telecommunications	CS	National and local governments

Source: CSP document and Line of Sight

31. **Gender and cross-cutting priorities:** The CSP addresses cross-cutting priorities including: i) gender (p. 47); ii) protection (p.48); iii) humanitarian principles including Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) (p. 49); and iv) environment (p. 49). These are covered in section EQ2.2.

32. The CSP emphasizes CCS. Interventions focusing on technical advice, evidence generation, policy dialogue and advocacy to enhance the individual, institutional and enabling environment of the Philippines Government and the BARMM. However, with the increasing impact of natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic, the budget for crisis response increased dramatically through eight budget revisions (BRs),


which increased the overall CSP needs-based plan (NBP) from the original value of USD 33 million to USD 94 million as of December 2022.<sup>73</sup>

33. Basic assumptions embedded in the CSP<sup>74</sup> include that: the country context would remain stable with continued government commitment to humanitarian response and resilience building; donor priorities and mandates among agencies would remain stable over the CSP cycle; and climactic events and shocks would be within acceptable parameters. Implementation was predicated on assumptions that there would be voluntary active participation of beneficiaries, communities and organizations, and that social protection systems would function without disruption. Changes in government priorities were assumed to be present, but not disruptive to ongoing operations. Internally, the CSP assumptions included that a development orientation would remain relevant for the context and there would be sufficient financial and human resources (including technical expertise) required for CSP implementation.<sup>75</sup>

34. The CSP was based on WFP's long-term engagement in the Philippines, beginning in 1968 with humanitarian assistance. WFP re-established its presence in 2006 at the Government's request to provide support and assistance in the conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao. WFP's presence in the country includes a country office in Manila and one sub-office in Cotabato. Following Typhoon Rai, the country office opened sub-offices in Bohol and Southern Leyte and an area office in Caraga, covering Surigao City, Dinagat and Siargao islands as well as a temporary presence in Iligan.

35. WFP's support has gradually shifted from immediate and short-term interventions towards government capacity strengthening through technical support and augmentation of government logistics capacity through support from two Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) and three Immediate Response Emergency Operations (IR-EMOP). WFP's work in the Philippines now includes a diverse portfolio of emergency and development-oriented interventions (Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Timeline – WFP interventions and Philippines country context (2012-2022)**



Source: Elaborated by the evaluation team during immediate response preparation and document review, with support from Office of Evaluation.

36. For direct assistance to beneficiaries, the CSP adopted a combination of transfer modalities (cash, food, and capacity strengthening). Figures 5 and 6 summarize the food and cash transfers for the CSP. Disaggregated discussion of achievements by SO are covered in EQ2.1. During the CSP, the country office had strategically chosen to shift away from in-kind food transfers in favour of cash transfers, and by 2021


<sup>73</sup> A ninth BR has been initiated but is not yet finalized at the time of this evaluation report.

<sup>74</sup> The evaluation team developed a reconstructed theory of change and identified implicit assumptions behind the CSP which were approved by the country office during the inception phase. These are referenced throughout this report.

<sup>75</sup> See Annex III for more details on the reconstructed theory of change and underpinning assumptions.


all food transfers had been halted. However, food transfers resumed in 2022 as part of the Typhoon Rai emergency response.

**Figure 5: Planned versus actual food transfers (mt) by year**



Source: Annual Country reports 2018-2022<sup>76</sup>

**Figure 6: Planned versus actual cash transfers (USD) by year**




Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

37. CSP geographical coverage is primarily at the national level through CCS approaches with a concentration of direct interventions in the southern province of Mindanao in the BARMM in SO3. Throughout the CSP, emergency response interventions have supported government response efforts to major natural disasters, the most recent being the response to Typhoon Rai<sup>77</sup> in December 2021, but with no consistent long-term sub-national presence covering the entirety of the CSP implementation period outside of the BARMM (Figure 7).

<sup>76</sup> The temporal scope of the evaluation is until October 2022, but data presented in all graphs and figures (including in Volume 2) are updated to December 2022.

<sup>77</sup> Referred to as Super Typhoon Odette in the Philippines.

Figure 7: WFP country strategic plan (CSP) intervention areas (2022)



Source: WFP Philippines Country Office, Geographic Information System map created May 2022.

38. **Analytical work:** The country office conducted analytical research throughout the CSP cycle. This involved multiple technical research pieces, including comprehensive food security and vulnerability assessments, methodological assessment, and rapid needs assessments for the pandemic response. Formative analytical work includes the 2022 scoping study on social protection,<sup>78</sup> a 2021 Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening for the WFP Philippines capacity strengthening work, and two case studies articulating WFP’s contributions to Peacebuilding and the Nexus. Important analytical works used by the Government include the Climate Change and Food Security Analysis (CCFSA), the Fill the Nutrient Gap

<sup>78</sup> 2022. WFP. *Social Protection and the World Food Programme in the Philippines – Scoping Study*.

Analysis, and a Cost of Diet Study following the pandemic. Annex 4 summarizes the analytical works conducted.

39. **Funding:** The CSP was approved with an NBP of USD 33,015,920. Nine budget revisions (BR) have occurred during the CSP, with the last one submitted in December 2022. The primary donors are the United States of America (USA), the Philippines, and Japan which together comprise about half of all CSP funding. Substantive earmarking limits funding flexibility (discussed further in EQ4.1). Table 4 profiles the cumulative financial overview of the CSP.

**Table 4: Cumulative financial overview**


Focus Area	Strategic Outcome	Activity	Original Needs Based Plan	Needs Based Plan as per last BR	Allocated Resources	Expenditures	Resourcing Level
Crisis Response	SO1	Activity 1	5,014,244	42,964,776	25,880,811	18,684,552	72.2%
	<b>Subtotal SO1</b>		<b>5,014,244</b>	<b>42,964,776</b>	<b>25,880,811</b>	<b>18,684,552</b>	<b>72.2%</b>
Root Causes	SO2	Activity 2	5,913,694	3,823,023	641,297	585,490	91.3%
	<b>Subtotal SO2</b>		<b>5,913,694</b>	<b>3,823,023</b>	<b>641,297</b>	<b>585,490</b>	<b>91.3%</b>
Resilience Building	SO3	Activity 3	7,008,854	13,786,767	7,438,964	4,100,884	55.1%
	<b>Subtotal SO3</b>		<b>7,008,854</b>	<b>13,786,767</b>	<b>7,438,964</b>	<b>4,100,884</b>	<b>55.1%</b>
	SO4	Activity 4	9,290,518	6,174,888	2,261,431	2,011,177	88.9%
		Activity 5	5,806,187	14,467,449	12,486,903	7,248,207	58.0%
<b>Subtotal SO4</b>		<b>15,096,705</b>	<b>20,642,337</b>	<b>14,748,334</b>	<b>9,259,383</b>	<b>62.8%</b>	
	Non SO Specific	Non Activity Specific		0	1,209,000	0	
<b>Total Direct Operational Cost</b>			<b>33,033,497</b>	<b>81,216,903</b>	<b>49,918,406</b>	<b>32,630,310</b>	<b>65.4%</b>
<b>Direct Support Cost (DSC)</b>				6,985,799	5,837,265	3,731,829	63.9%
<b>Indirect Support Cost (ISC)</b>				5,733,176	2,848,748	2,848,748	100.0%
<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>33,033,497.00</b>	<b>93,935,878</b>	<b>58,604,419</b>	<b>39,210,886</b>	<b>66.9%</b>

Source: Source: CPB Budget; BR08; IRM Analytics. December 2022.

40. The BRs primarily increased resources for crisis response as SO1 increased from 11.5 percent in the original NBP (USD 33,015,920) to 52.1 percent in the latest NBP (USD 93,935,878). Figure 8 summarizes the relative budget share of each SO, while Figure 9 summarizes the NBP against implementation plans and expenditures by year. The overall NBPs increased, with the relative budget share increasing the most for SO1 and SO4. Funding rates are still below half with SO2 being the least funded. Expenditure rates varied among Soss, with SO3 in particular affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.




**Figure 8: Country strategic plan (CSP) strategic outcome (SO) by budget share revisions (in USD) 2018-2022<sup>79</sup>**



Source: CSP Budget Revisions: BR01, BR02, BR03, BR04, BR05, BR06, BR07, BR08

**Figure 9: Original needs-based plan (NBP), BR08 NBP, allocated resources and expenditures (in USD) by strategic outcome (SO) (cumulative figures for the 2018-2022 period)**




Source: CPB Budget; CSP Budget Revisions: BR01, BR02, BR03, BR04, BR05, BR06, BR07, BR08.

41. **Beneficiaries:** In 2018 and 2019, the CSP reached more than 200,000 beneficiaries each year, but declined substantially in 2020 and 2021 due to pandemic-related cancellation of planned activities. This trend was reversed in 2022 by the resumption of field activities post-COVID and the Typhoon Rai response, with 2022 recording the highest total of annual beneficiaries during the CSP (Figure 10). Factors contributing to specific strategic outcome beneficiary achievement patterns (planned versus actual) are covered in EQ2.1b.

<sup>79</sup> Based on the needs-based plan and excludes direct support costs and indirect support costs.

**Figure 10: Planned and actual country strategic plan (CSP) beneficiaries 2018-2022**



Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

#### 1.4. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

42. The evaluation was framed around four evaluation questions and 18 sub-questions contextualized for the Philippines. The evaluation questions, common to all Country Strategic Plan Evaluations, broadly cover relevance and coherence (EQ1), effectiveness and sustainability (EQ2), efficiency (EQ3) and factors explaining performance (EQ4):


- a. EQ1: To what extent is WFP's strategic position, role, and specific contribution based on country priorities and people's needs as well as WFP's strengths?
- b. EQ2: What is the extent and quality of WFP's specific contribution to CSP strategic outcomes in the Philippines?
- c. EQ3: To what extent has WFP used its resources efficiently in contributing to CSP outputs and strategic outcomes?
- d. EQ4: What are the factors that explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?

43. The evaluation employed a theory-based, mixed methodology, as described in Annex 3. An evaluation matrix (Annex 5) summarized the evaluation four evaluation questions including sub-questions, lines of inquiry, indicators, data sources, and data-collection techniques. GEWE considerations are mainstreamed into the evaluation criteria through the inclusion of sub-questions and indicators (Annex 5). A fieldwork calendar was designed for data collection (Annex 6) and a set of interview guides were developed to address the lines of inquiry, drawing on multiple approaches (Annex 7).

44. The inception phase included a field mission to the Philippines, in-depth document review, interviews with selected stakeholders, and a comprehensive stakeholder analysis. A reconstruction of a theory of change (ToC) for the CSP (validated by the country office) was also used to refine the evaluation scope in consultation.

45. The data collection phase included a three-week in-country field mission (October 2022) including subnational site visits, key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with stakeholders at country, regional and headquarters levels (Annex 8). The team visited the Provinces of Albay, Caraga and Cotabato (in the BARMM). Figure 11 depicts the regions visited by the evaluation team and Table 5 highlights the activities assessed within each region.

**Figure 11: Subnational data collection regions**



**Table 5: Activities assessed per region**

Region	Province	Activities assessed				
		1	2	3	4	5
NCR	Manila	X	X	X	X	X
Bicol	Albay				X	
Caraga	Surigao del Norte	X				X
BARMM	Cotabato City		X	X		

46. In total, **262 people were interviewed (49 percent women) including 128 beneficiaries** (Table 6). Data collection tools are described in Annex 6. Detailed descriptions of WFP and country office supplied data on resourcing, expenditures, transfers, indicators, and implementation (and the CSP Line of Sight) are found in Annex 9. Recommendations were developed linked to the recommendations (Annex 10). Documentation was shared with the evaluation team including previous evaluations and reviews (Annex 11).<sup>80</sup>

<sup>80</sup> Annex XII contains a complete list of acronyms.

**Table 6: People interviewed by category**

Category	Number	Percent Women
WFP (country office, regional bureau, headquarters)	51	57%
National Government	16	61%
UN and donors	12	67%
NGOs/civil society	25	56%
Local authorities	30	43%
Beneficiaries (FGDs)	128	45%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>49%</b>

47. The evaluation team engaged with the country office and regional bureau. An initial exit debriefing was conducted with the country office on 19 October 2022, followed by a preliminary findings workshop on 10 November 2022. Both exercises were intended to inform the design of the new CSP by presenting the preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations. In January 2023, two stakeholder workshops, including external and internal stakeholders, tested the feasibility and operationalization of the draft recommendations and ensured that key issues were covered in the final report.

48. Findings were based on triangulation from multiple sources, including cross-referenced document review, interviews, FGDs, observations, and secondary quantitative data. An internal database of interview notes and evidence was used to identify answers to each of the evaluation questions (EQs). Each data collection tool had its own analytical approach. Quantitative data were analysed primarily through Excel spreadsheets and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) descriptive and frequency analysis with cross-tabulation for indicators or criteria of interest. Qualitative analysis was based on an iterative process of identifying key thought units related to each evaluation question from the key informant interviews, organizing these units into clusters and identifying the key themes within each cluster. Document review relied on thematic narrative analysis for highlighting key themes. Annex 3 provides a more detailed discussion of analytical methods.

49. Gender considerations, and principles of inclusion, participation and non-discrimination were included in the design, questioning, data collection and reporting in line with UNEG Guidance on Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation. The evaluation followed the 2020 UNEG Ethical Guidelines. Having signed the Pledge of Ethical Conduct, the evaluation team ensured that ethical standards were adhered to throughout the evaluation through detailed protocols for interviews and field visits (Annex 3).


50. **Evaluability:** The data available from the monitoring and evaluation system, assessments, and pre-existing datasets and evaluations, combined with the primary qualitative data collected during the evaluation, was sufficient to assess the CSP performance, despite some limitations.

51. **Risks and limitations:** There were no serious risks to the evaluation that affected the reliability of the findings. A summary of the main evaluation risks and mitigation measures is presented in Annex 3. Only validated findings are presented in the report.

52. **Assessing CCS contributions through the CCS framework:** WFP corporate CCS framework<sup>81</sup> describes five pathways of change to enhance stakeholder capacities (Figure 12).

<sup>81</sup> From: WFP. 2022. *Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS) Policy Update*, June 2022.

**Figure 12: Country capacity strengthening framework<sup>82</sup>**



Source: Evaluation team elaboration based on WFP country capacity strengthening framework

53. The country office complies with corporate requirements on data availability, including the reporting of outcome, output and cross-cutting indicators as described in the Corporate Results Framework (CRF); however, there are limitations in the CRF itself for tracking long-term development outcomes of WFP projects and for assessing the results of CCS.<sup>83</sup>

54. Although the WFP corporate CCS framework was still under development during the CSP design,<sup>84</sup> the evaluation team found it to be a useful reference to retrospectively align the CSP CCS interventions according to the pathways of change. The evaluation reviewed the available annual country reports (ACRs), coding all references to the respective CCS pathways according to the definitions and examples presented in the WFP June 2022 CCS Policy Update. The activities were aggregated across the entire CSP implementation period to identify the relative distribution of activities against the pathway categories. This exercise identifies the areas that the CSP prioritized and presents opportunities for future consideration of new CCS activities in the next CSP. The patterns cannot be assessed against targets because no targets are required by the CRF based on pathways of change interventions or points of entry (Annex 3).

55. **Quality assurance process:** This evaluation report has undergone a thorough quality assurance process within the evaluation team and the Office of Evaluation. The process has strictly followed Centralized Evaluation Quality Assurance (CEQUAS) and other relevant guidance materials, including the Guidance for Process and Contents for Country Strategic Plan Evaluations.

<sup>82</sup> The CCS framework cites the three fields of individual, organizational, and enabling environment. These are subsequently operationalized through five pathways of change.

<sup>83</sup> The WFP Headquarters Country Capacity Strengthening Unit is in the process of developing revised CCS indicators for the next CRF, which should be available for the implementation of the next CSP cycles.

<sup>84</sup> Instead, the country office performed its own capacity strengthening needs assessment to inform the CSP design via the Zero Hunger Review.

## 2. Evaluation findings

### 2.1. EQ1: TO WHAT EXTENT IS WFP'S STRATEGIC POSITION, ROLE AND SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION BASED ON COUNTRY PRIORITIES AND PEOPLE'S NEEDS AS WELL AS WFP'S STRENGTHS?

**EQ1.1: To what extent was the CSP informed by existing evidence on the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition issues prevailing in the country to ensure its relevance at design stage?**

**EQ1.2: To what extent is the CSP aligned to national policies and plans and to the SDGs?<sup>85</sup>**

#### Summary

The country strategic plan (CSP) design was informed by existing evidence at the time of design and aligned with national policies and strategies, including national priorities on humanitarian response, emergency preparedness and peacebuilding. The CSP focus on SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) and SDG 17 (Partnerships) aligns with national priorities and is relevant for addressing the food security and nutrition challenges outlined in the Strategic Review of Food and Nutrition Security. The CSP contributions to peacebuilding are important as they reflect a crucial priority for the Government. The CSP's de-emphasis on social protection (SP) gives WFP less leverage for national-level engagement on SP, even though SO2, SO3, and SO4 interventions were conceptually aligned with national SP systems.

56. **(EQ1.1) The CSP design was informed by existing evidence at the time of design.** The CSP design used existing evidence in alignment with existing national policies and plans (treated in EQ1.2). The 2017 Strategic Review of Food and Nutrition Security<sup>86</sup> served as the primary evidence informing the CSP design. The Strategic Review identified key gaps and challenges later referenced in the CSP document and linked to specific design components:<sup>87</sup>

- Gaps in planning and policy coherence
- Governance and service delivery fragmentation and gaps
- Lack of resources for food security and nutrition challenges
- Implementation gaps for national food security and nutrition programmes
- Weak accountability related to food security and nutrition
- Unresponsive food systems with trade distortions, and uncompetitive marketing practices.

57. The design incorporated recommendations from prior WFP and United Nations assessments. The 2013 evaluation of the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) 200296<sup>88</sup> recommended integrating disaster risk reduction and livelihood work into local plans and hazard profiling, and to move to more technical advisory work and advocacy in nutrition. The Typhoon Haiyan in 2014 was one of the first coordinated United Nations actions under the new L-3 mechanism and a large-scale response was launched from United Nations agencies, including WFP. The Inter-agency evaluation of the Level-3 response<sup>89</sup> highlighted the importance of harmonizing approaches and leveraging and improving existing national disaster response systems.

58. Finally, the 2017 common country assessment (CCA) conducted by the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) for the elaboration of the United Nations Partnership Framework for Sustainable Development (UNPFSD) identified shortfalls in human development, constraints on national capacities, and the need for increased attention for slow onset impacts due to climate change, affirming the Philippines as one of the most disaster-affected countries in the world.

<sup>85</sup> EQ1.1 and EQ1.2 are presented together as they both pertain to the use of available information at the time of design.

<sup>86</sup> WFP. 2016. *Strategic Review of Food and Nutrition Security in the Philippines*; IASC. 2014.

<sup>87</sup> WFP 2018. CSP document.

<sup>88</sup> WFP. 2014. *Philippines PRRO 200296 Support for Returnees and Other Conflict Affected Households in Central Mindanao, and National Capacity Development in Disaster Preparedness and Response: An Operation Evaluation*.

<sup>89</sup> IASC. 2014. *IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*.

59. **(EQ1.1 and EQ1.2) The collection of evidence informed the CSP strategic outcome (SO) structure.** The recommendations to work with government to improve response structures and policy frameworks in nutrition and emergency preparedness and response were integrated into SO2 and SO4. From the Food Security and Nutrition Review, the CSP design integrated recommendations for enhancing local governance structures, plans and budget allocations for food security and nutrition into SO3, with a particular geographic emphasis in the BARMM region. Finally, given the prominence of natural disasters in the Philippines, WFP maintained a 'dormant' direct emergency response option through SO1, enabling WFP to shift from capacity development to direct implementation to support existing government response programmes if requested. These decisions were in line with the WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021) which emphasized the further transition of WFP from an implementation role towards an enabling role in providing technical assistance and strengthening government capacities. The evidence was used to maintain a direct emergency response option through SO1 which would allow WFP to shift from capacity development to direct implementation to support existing government response programmes.

60. **(EQ1.2) The CSP design considered the national policies and strategies in place at the time and is coherent with national priorities on humanitarian response, emergency preparedness, and peacebuilding.** The CSP design was predicated on the national agendas and strategies in place in 2017 including, among others, the Philippines National Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022. The CSP is aligned with the Philippine Plan of Action for Nutrition (2017-2022) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (2011-2028). The PDP 2017-2022 supported the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a strong focus on SDGs 1, 2, and 17 which positions WFP well to support government in SDGs 2 and 17 given the organization's corporate mandate.<sup>90</sup>

61. **(EQ1.2) The CSP contributions to peacebuilding are aligned with government priorities in BARMM.** The CSP document originally references the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Development Plan (2017-2022), which was in place at the time of design. In 2018, the ARMM region was entering a crucial moment. A plebiscite in 2018 regarding the armed secessionist groups led to the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as part of a peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro secessionist for sharing power. The social, economic, and political development of the BARMM region and general contributions for peacebuilding became a major priority in government and United Nations frameworks. The long-term operational presence of WFP in the ARMM since 2006 positioned the country office well to respond to the emerging attention to the BARMM. In SO3, the geographic focus on the BARMM is aligned with government and United Nations priorities at the time, including contributions to peacebuilding through a food security lens.

62. **(EQ1.1 AND EQ1.2) Social protection's limited coherence in the CSP design resulted in disconnected SP contributions across multiple SOs.** Nationally, WFP has a history of engagement in shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) as evidenced in lessons from a 2016 study identifying WFP contributions to SRSP in the Philippines. However, the potential contributions of WFP's SP work are less visible in the CSP due to the design document's lack of a coherent engagement strategy with national SP. This is partially due to the timing of the CSP design. Corporately, WFP had been transitioning from a previous safety nets policy (in 2017) to an updated social protection policy. The new social protection policy was published in 2019. Because of this timing, the CSP design fell into a gap between policies, and the country office did not have a social protection policy framework to inform design considerations.

63. In the absence of a documented strategy, SP-relevant interventions became disconnected across multiple SOs with other thematic foci. For example, the CSP document proposes to partner with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) on shock-responsive social protection (SO4), collaborate with the ARMM authorities on disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) (SO3), and promote the use of fortified rice in DSWD SP programmes (SO2) or humanitarian responses (SO1). The CSP support to the national school feeding programme as a subset of social protection is similarly dispersed across multiple SOs, with national policy support under SO2 and piloting support to schools managed under SO3. The dispersion of SP-relevant interventions across multiple SOs had implications for WFP's subsequent strategic positioning with the Philippines (discussed in EQ1.5).

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<sup>90</sup> See 'Reconstructed theory of change', Annex III.

**EQ1.3: To what extent is the CSP coherent and aligned with the wider United Nations and includes appropriate strategic partnerships based on the comparative advantage of WFP in the country?**

**EQ1.4: To what extent is the CSP design internally coherent and based on a clear theory of change articulating WFP's role and contributions in a realistic manner and based on its comparative advantages as defined in the WFP strategic plan?<sup>91</sup>**

Summary

The CSP aligns with United Nations Framework priorities at design and subsequent revisions, and contributes based on its comparative advantages. Although no theory of change (ToC) was developed at the time of design, an implicit ToC is logically coherent and relevant to the context. However, the CSP architecture inhibited internal CSP coherence.

64. **(EQ1.3) The CSP is aligned with the United Nations Framework priorities at design and subsequent revisions.** The UNPFSD covered the period from 2019-2023 and served as the mutual accountability framework between the Government and the UNCT. The CSP design contributed to three of the eight WFP corporate Strategic Results (See 'Line of sight' in Annex 9) in alignment with the PFSD – and later the Socio-Economic Partnership Framework (SEPF).<sup>92</sup> The SO3 focus in Mindanao is aligned with the UNCT shift of focus to peacebuilding following the emergence of BARMM. Within the CSP design, WFP's partnership with the Philippines Government falls within the scope of the PFSD (and later SEPF). Each of the CSP SOs are aligned with components in both the PFSD and the PDP (Table 7).

**Table 7: Relationship of country strategic plan (CSP) strategic outcomes (SO), Philippines Development Plan (PDP) and Socio-Economic Partnership Framework (SEPF)**

Strategic Outcome	PDP 2017-2022	PFSD/SEPF
SO1	Reaching 100 percent of individuals affected by natural hazards and man-made calamities with relief assistance.	<b>People Prosperity and Planet</b>
SO2	Reduce levels of childhood stunting and wasting and to reduce micronutrient deficiencies to levels below public health significance (SDG 2.2, WFP Strategic Result (SR) 2)	
SO3	Implementation of the Government's strategic framework for peace and development in Mindanao, the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the development priorities of the Mindanao Development Authority, the ARMM Regional Development Plan 2017-2022 and the ARMM Regional Plan of Action for Nutrition (RPAN) 2019-2022. (SDG 17.9, 5, 16, target 2.1 and 2.2 and WFP SR 5)	<b>Peace</b>
SO4	Providing universal and transformative social protection for all Filipinos and increasing the adaptive capacities and resilience of ecosystems	<b>People Prosperity and Planet</b>

Source: CSP Philippines (2018-2023), Philippine Development Plan (2017-2022), SEPF (2020-2023) for the Philippines

65. **(EQ1.4) The CSP design is aligned with WFP comparative advantages.** Table 8 summarizes the ways WFP comparative advantages are leveraged within the CSP design. Further detail of how WFP's comparative advantages informed implementation is discussed in EQ2 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4).

<sup>91</sup> EQ1.3 and 1.4 are combined in the narrative as they are both focused on the degree to which WFP's comparative advantages are used in the design of the CSP – either in the internal theory of change or the external United Nations and government frameworks and partnerships.

<sup>92</sup> The PFSD was not adjusted to describe the emergence of BARMM until the elaboration of the SEPF in 2020 as part of the pandemic response, which became the de facto PFSD.



**Table 8: Comparative advantages and leverage within country strategic plan (CSP) design**

Comparative Advantage	Leverage within CSP Design
Subnational presence	The subnational comparative advantage is reflected in SO3's specific focus on strengthening local capacities in the BARMM. This is aligned with United Nations support to the Philippines in the implementation of the Bangsamoro Organic Law, which established the BARMM in 2019. The design of the CSP's technical approach also sought to further align with WFP's subnational comparative advantages through focusing on strengthening local capacities for emergency preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptations based on WFP's engagements in previous PRROs. National and subnational government authorities, United Nations sister agency representatives, and donors cited WFP as having a comparative advantage in subnational engagement.
Logistics and delivery (including the last-mile supply chain)	Development of SO4 with technical experience in supply chain, logistics and emergency preparedness. National and subnational government authorities, United Nations sister agency representatives, and donors cited WFP as having a comparative advantage in logistics and delivery.
Data (such as the use of Vulnerability Analysis and (VAM) methodologies and databases such as SCOPE)	Integration of data methodologies and mapping into SO1: humanitarian assistance, SO3: vulnerability mapping, and SO4: emergency preparedness and climate change adaptation. National government authorities in technical positions in the departments cited WFP's comparative advantages related to data.
Technical expertise and advice informing operations on emergency response, supply chain and food security	Development of SO4 with technical experience in supply chain, logistics and emergency preparedness, including in mobile telecommunications during emergency response. Development of SO1 to provide direct humanitarian assistance in alignment with government needs during emergencies. National government authorities in technical positions in the departments and donors cited WFP's comparative advantages related to emergency response.
Convening and coordination roles in technical working groups, councils, and the SO3 convergence model	The coordination and convening capacities are seen in the design through WFP's membership in the United Nations Development Partners Social Protection subgroup and in WFP's membership in four UNCT subgroups. National government and BARMM authorities and UNCT members cited WFP's comparative advantage in convening and coordination.
Providing policy analysis in nutrition and food security	Development of SO2 with ongoing support to the National Nutrition Council (NNC) and SO3 with ongoing support to the BARMM provincial authorities and policy development. NNC stakeholders and BARMM authorities cited WFP's comparative advantages in nutrition – especially related to iron-fortified rice and the support to the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Business Network.
An organizational culture prioritizing pragmatic, proactive engagements, and an openness to innovation and private sector engagements	Openness to innovation is highlighted through WFP's support to cash-based transfer innovations such as Forecast-based Financing (FbF). The CSP document recognized that WFP's expertise in food assistance would continue as needed in SO1 and SO3 support, but that the CSP would focus on alternative cash-based approaches. National and subnational authorities cited WFP's willingness to be pragmatic. WFP regional bureau stakeholders cited WFP's openness to innovation, including private sector engagement.

66. **(EQ1.4) Although no theory of change (ToC) was developed at the time of design, a coherent intervention logic is evident.** WFP did not require an overarching ToC as part of the CSP design, and during the inception phase of the CSP evaluation, the evaluation team developed a reconstructed ToC and validated this with the country office (Annex 3). The CSP has three foundation strategic assumptions (SA) and eight causal assumptions (CA), which link to four impact statements (Table 9). The validity of these assumptions and contributions are covered in EQ2.1.

**Table 9: Country strategic plan (CSP) theory of change (ToC) strategic and causal assumptions and impact statements**

Level	Assumption	
Strategic	SA1: The existence of a national context conducive to WFP operations, including sufficient levels of engagement and openness to WFP on the part of national and subnational governmental authorities	
	SA2: A sufficient orientation towards United Nations--Philippine partnerships in the pursuit of the SDGs for national government structures and United Nations agencies	
	SA3: Continued political support for WFP engagement in the BARMM throughout the evolution of its establishment as an autonomous region	
Causal	CA1: People eat healthy and nutritious food	
	CA2: People use cash to buy healthy and nutritious food	
	CA3: Women and children can access acute malnutrition prevention and treatment services	
	CA4: Women and children in provinces prioritized by government have access to health, low-cost locally produced food	
	CA5: Targeted women and children and care providers use new knowledge and capacities to influence food consumption choices	
	CA6: The Government of Mindanao implements better, more nutrition and food security sensitive plans, including equitable food security and nutrition provision	
	CA7: Gender-transformative, shock-responsive safety nets and climate services are relevant and effective means to enhance national and local government efforts to reduce shock vulnerability	
	CA8: Enhanced supply chain and ICT services are relevant and effective means to enhance national and local government efforts to reduce shock vulnerability	
Outcomes and Impact		
	Outcomes	Impact
SO1	Affected populations meet food and nutrition needs during and after emergencies	Acute malnutrition and food insecurity is prevented or reduced during and after emergencies
SO2	Adequate and healthy diets for women, boys and girls in provinces prioritized by government	Chronic stunting, wasting, and micro-nutrient deficiencies are reduced
SO3	Improved food security and nutrition in Mindanao by 2022 in line with government targets	Peace and development is supported in Mindanao
SO4	National and local governments have enhanced capabilities to reduce vulnerability to shocks by 2022	Vulnerability to shocks is reduced

Source: Evaluation team

67. **(EQ1.4) The strategic areas of intervention in the CSP are relevant to the context, but the CSP architecture inhibited internal CSP coherence.** Interviewed country office respondents reported that the country office encountered challenges to coordination and integrating approaches during CSP implementation, and that the construction of SO pillars created siloed engagement.

68. The establishment of an SO specifically dedicated to direct humanitarian response (SO1) and another on emergency preparedness and supply chain (SO4) was conceptually appropriate, albeit confusing in practice. Theoretically, a specific SO available to channel resources for humanitarian response would allow the country office to pivot from technical assistance to direct emergency response. However, the divided emergency response responsibilities across two SOs reduced the efficiency for scale-up to direct response as part of the Typhoon Rai response (EQ2.1b and EQ3.1).<sup>93</sup>

69. The geographic focus of SO3 specifically on the BARMM was aligned with United Nations and donor interests at the time of the design but subsequently limited the capacity to expand outside the specific geographic area.

70. Finally, the elaboration of the SO2 focus on nutrition reflected WFP's interest but inhibited nutrition sensitivity integration into other SOs. For example, SO4 was described as promoting more nutrition-sensitive local disaster and risk reduction management (DRRM), but it is not flagged in the logical

<sup>93</sup> In earlier direct response opportunities, coordination was further complicated by SO1 interventions in the BARMM region being coordinated by SO3 personnel because of the BARMM geographic focus of SO3.

framework as a nutrition-sensitive result. There is minimal evidence in the annual country reports (ACRs) regarding how nutrition-sensitive approaches informed supply chain or other interventions.

**EQ1.5: To what extent has WFP's strategic positioning remained relevant throughout the implementation of the CSP considering changing context, national capacities, and needs – in particular, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic?**

Summary

WFP strategic positioning responded to changes in the context and national needs but WFP's strategic contributions to country capacity strengthening (CCS) were masked by the absence of an overarching strategic framework and the lack of application of the corporate CCS frameworks and materials. While social protection became a corporate priority, the CSP's de-emphasis on social protection gave WFP less leverage in strategic positioning on national-level social protection, even as there is increasing opportunity for WFP to become more engaged. WFP's subnational strategic positioning is highly valued by stakeholders and operationalized through two programme models. The CSP strategic positioning remained relevant during the pandemic and WFP's pandemic response was in alignment with government priorities.

71. **WFP adapted its strategic positioning to respond to changes in the context and national needs.** The CSP shifted in response to changing national needs. The shift to direct humanitarian response in 2022 in response to Typhoon Rai is the most prominent example, but also includes assuming remote monitoring of the government Social Amelioration Programme (SAP) during the pandemic and the elaboration of the Global Emergency Communication Systems – Mobile Operations Vehicle for Emergencies (GECS-MOVE) (described in EQ2.1b).

72. **The lack of application of the corporate CCS frameworks and materials inhibited WFP's strategic positioning on CCS.** Although there is evidence of strategic positioning throughout the CSP, there is limited documentation describing an underlying Philippines-specific strategic framework for CCS. The Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening noted that the absence of an overarching CCS framework impedes the capacity of WFP to determine effectiveness. This also prevents creating a coherent framework for linking individual, apparently disparate, interventions. Considering the high capacity of national-level government for Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), DRRM, and humanitarian response, interviewed stakeholders noted that WFP support must be predicated on providing 'strategic and surgical' interventions as complementary inputs. The absence of a CSP-wide documentation of a strategy built on capacity needs mapping (CNM) created challenges to ensuring that these individual interventions are coherently linked within a larger CCS framework. Combined with limited resourcing options (EQ4.1) and challenges in workforce technical capacity and turnover in strategic positions (EQ4.4), this led to perceptions that WFP had engaged in more ad hoc interventions that, while conceptually relevant to CCS, lacked a systematic structure.<sup>94</sup>

73. **The reduced prominence of social protection in the CSP gave WFP less leverage for national-level engagement on social protection, including national school meals programming.** Two factors weakened WFP's SP strategic positions. First, the dispersion of SP activities across different SOs prevented WFP from articulating a consolidated strategic position on SP. Second, the fact that activities are not reported against an SP framework, but rather towards food security (SO3), nutrition (SO2), or EPR/CCA (SO4) challenged the country office to describe or document contributions to SP, including school meals programming (see further operational details in Annex 9.8).<sup>95</sup>

74. Stakeholders identified clear potential entry points for WFP in the social protection field. WFP's support was envisioned in bolstering two of the Philippines four pillars within the DSWD Social Protection Programmes – one on Social Safety Nets and the other on anti-poverty, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps).<sup>96</sup> Stakeholders perceived WFP's comparative advantage for supporting the Government's targeting and coverage criteria, assessing transfer values, and providing technical monitoring. Stakeholders noted that the subnational levels, including BARMM, had less access to support, despite perceived United

<sup>94</sup> Details found in Annex 9.8.

<sup>95</sup> Operational details found in Annex 9.8.

<sup>96</sup> A nationwide conditional cash transfer programme for the poorest eligible households.

Nations support for SP and SRSP at the national level. Stakeholders view WFP as being well-positioned to fill this gap, not just in BARMM, but elsewhere. Historically, subnational success was seen in a 2011-2017 PRRO on Disaster Preparedness and Response/Climate Change Adaptation focused on strengthening the capacities of local governments and subnational authorities. The project was not included in the CSP due to a shifting emphasis to national-level CCS.

75. **WFP's subnational strategic positioning is operationalized through two programme models.**

Stakeholders provided a wide-ranging consensus that the decentralized governance structure at the subnational level in the Philippines combined with WFP's experience working in the subnational context provided an important opportunity to focus on subnational capacity strengthening. Evidence in the documentation of project reports and evaluations described two different approaches: i) geographic dependent multisectoral interventions for CCS, similar to the CSP implementation in BARMM; and ii) strengthening local capacities through a national capacities model, which was more common in the previous PRROs but is also reflective of the Anticipatory Action pilot project managed by SO4 (EQ2.1b).<sup>97</sup>

76. **WFP adapted its strategic positioning to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic based on its comparative advantages.** During the pandemic, the Government managed the overall COVID-19 response. Economic support was channelled through Social Amelioration Programme (SAP) as part of the programme's pre-existing distributions. WFP supported the Government response through technical support in data collection, management and analysis, including assessing the impact of the pandemic on food security and essential needs, and providing policy recommendations shared with the DSWD, updating the Cost of Diet study, and supporting the NNC in the design of a rapid nutrition assessment. WFP provided logistical support including supplying trucks and supporting the establishment of temporary medical or disaster response centres.

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<sup>97</sup> Further details are provided on subnational models in Annex 9.8

## 2.2. EQ2: WHAT IS THE EXTENT AND QUALITY OF WFP'S SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN THE PHILIPPINES?

**EQ2.1: To what extent did WFP activities and outputs contribute to the expected outcomes of the CSP and to the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF)? Were there any unintended outcomes, positive or negative?**

### Summary

The activities and outputs have made contributions to the outcomes in WFP's humanitarian response, Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), and peacebuilding engagement, even if the latter is not well captured in the Corporate Result Frameworks.

Food distribution contributed effectively to food security outcomes, although curtailed by insufficient funding and COVID-19 restrictions. WFP annually underachieved its targets for food and cash transfers but overachieved against its capacity strengthening targets. Food transfers were phased out of the CSP until the Typhoon Rai response. Overall, cash transfers represented a substantively greater budget share than food transfers. The CSP has focused the majority of its CCS activities within Programme Design and Delivery.

SO1: WFP has successfully contributed to supporting the Government's response when required through SO1, but the CSP architecture presented challenges for allowing WFP to pivot to direct response when needed. WFP's involvement in the Typhoon Rai response revitalized SO1 capacity and improved overall corporate relationships with the Government.

SO2: Ambitious implementation aspirations were curtailed in scope by resourcing shortfalls. The most substantive contributions have come in CCS Pathway 1 (Policies and Legislation) although the majority of its actions have been in CCS Pathway 4 (Programme Design and Implementation). There is evidence highlighting SO2 linkages to other SOs in reports but limited evidence for scale-up and impact of these policy changes cascading to subnational levels.

SO3: The geographic-based multisectoral intervention approach has contributed to peacebuilding and CCS outcomes. SO3 has made equal investments in Policies, Institutional Effectiveness, and Programme Design and Delivery, with identifiable results in strengthening all three components in the BARM Government. The convergence model has been a success for increasing coordination and collaboration among government ministries and contributing to peacebuilding.

SO4: Activity 4 in SO4 had ambitious implementation aspirations but resourcing shortfalls curtailed its scope. Activity 5 was better resourced. The most frequently cited outcome contribution to national systems involves strengthening communications in EPR systems, supply chain, and information management.

77. Output achievements and their contribution to outcomes for the CSP in general are summarized in EQ2.1a, followed by a discussion of the contribution to outcomes per SO in EQ2.1b. Additional data is provided in Annex 9.7. Patterns in CCS activities and contributions to CCS are assessed against the five pathways of change in the WFP Corporate CCS framework<sup>98</sup> (Annex 9.7). The CSP logical framework indicators are compliant with the WFP Corporate Results Framework (CRF) but there are systemic gaps in measuring WFP's contributions to CCS (Annex 9.6).


78. **The CSP has two distinct phases in terms of availability of resources. This presents complications for aggregating CSP output achievements.** The 2018-2020 period is distinct from the 2021-2022 period in terms of fundamental operational differences in staffing levels, resourcing, and programming approach. This influences annual output achievements and their contribution to outcomes.

<sup>98</sup> WFP. 2022. *Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS) Policy Update*.

## EQ2.1a: CSP output achievements and contributions to outcomes

79. **Beneficiary engagement is in alignment with SO1 and SO3 implementation outcomes, although there are substantive annual variations.** Direct beneficiary targets throughout the CSP are relatively small given the size of the country and CSP budget as the Government manages almost all humanitarian assistance during disasters. Beneficiary distributions are most relevant for SO1 direct humanitarian response and in SO3 as part of the resilience framework in BARMM. Annual achievements against targets vary but with a general pattern of decreasing rates during the COVID-19 pandemic years (Figure 13). Gender distributions are equal across all SOs and activities, suggesting intentional targeting for gender parity (Figure 14). Factors influencing beneficiary achievement rates are disaggregated by SO in EQ2.1b.

**Figure 13: Planned versus actual beneficiaries by strategic outcome (SO) and modality**



Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

**Figure 14: Planned versus actual beneficiaries by gender**



Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

80. **Annual output achievement rates vary with a pattern of underachieving for food and cash transfers and overachieving for capacity strengthening outputs.**<sup>99</sup> These patterns are discussed in detail in EQ2.1b and EQ3.1. Food transfers were the most volatile and underachieving (EQ3.1). Factors depressing achievement rates included unpredictable funding, shifting donor priorities, and the pandemic closing projects. CCS related outputs overachieved compared to planned in all four output categories: training, technical assistance, workshops, and products (EQ3.1) with the nearly half of CCS activities concentrated in the Pathway 4 (Programme Design and Delivery) (Table 10). Factors influencing CCS overachievement included shifts to online training (resulting in expanded attendance) during the pandemic years in 2020 and 2021 (EQ2.1b and EQ3.1).<sup>100</sup>

**Table 10: Country strategic plan (CSP) activities by pathway of change**

Pathway	Number of activities cited	Share of activities per pathway
Direct Assistance	29	13.9%
P1: Policies	36	17.2%
P2: Institutional Effectiveness	38	18.2%
P3: Strategic Planning and Financing	1	0.5%
P4: Programme Design and Delivery	85	40.7%
P5: Engagement of civil society organization (CSO)/Private Sector	20	9.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: ACR narratives 2018-2021 coded by ET.<sup>101</sup> Dark highlight indicates a greater than 40 percent share. Medium highlight indicates between 25-40 percent Share. light highlight is less than 10-25 percent share. Grey denotes less than 10 percent share.

81. **WFP reduced food transfers over the course of the CSP, increasing the budget share to cash transfers.** Both food and cash commodity transfers are appropriate means to achieve the CSP outcomes in the Philippines. They contribute to food security outcomes in SO1 (humanitarian response) and to resilience output indicators in SO3 through Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) and Cash for Assets (CFA) interventions (and to resilience output indicators in SO4). As noted in EQ3.1 and EQ3.3, cash transfers are better aligned with the Government's own assistance programmes, are more cost-efficient, and are the most common option used by the country office. Food transfers are used when requested by donors or when indicated from contextual analysis in direct response. Food distributions were more prominent in the aftermath of direct disaster response in 2018 and 2019, but were phased out until the Typhoon Rai response in 2022 (EQ2.1b). Even at their peak in 2018, total food distributions were relatively small compared to cash transfers in terms of dollar amount (EQ3.1). Planned distributions of nutrition supplements in SO2 were cancelled after 2019 due to lack of donor funding. SO3 food distributions were cancelled during the pandemic (EQ2.1b). Cash transfer amounts nearly tripled in 2022 during the Typhoon Rai response (EQ3.1). Factors influencing output achievements are described in EQ2.1b and EQ3.1.

82. **WFP has contributed to CSP outcomes in humanitarian response, Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), and peacebuilding, although there has been less contribution to nutrition outcomes.** Tracking WFP contributions to CSP outcomes is based on a combination of corporate outcome indicator achievements and qualitative data from the field observations and interviews, compared to the reconstructed theory of change (ToC) (Annex 3.5). Five of the eight ToC causal assumptions are confirmed, and three of the four impact statements show evidence of WFP contributions (Annex 3). The causal assumptions with the least amount of evidence for contributions are associated with the direct beneficiary programming in nutrition during 2018-2019. The contributions of SO3 to peacebuilding are substantive but the absence of CRF peacebuilding indicators reduces the visibility of these contributions.<sup>102</sup> Table 11 summarizes the causal assumptions in the ToC.

<sup>99</sup> When assessed against the needs-based plan. Efficiency rates calculated against implementation plan are discussed in EQ3.1.

<sup>100</sup> Output achievement rates against the needs-based plan (NBP) are recorded in Annex 9.5

<sup>101</sup> In the CCS policy update, an annex is included with definitions and examples specifying which types of actions are to be associated with each pathway of change. This annex was used to code the individual actions cited in the annual country reports.

<sup>102</sup> Peacebuilding contributions and information sources are discussed in more detail in EQ2.1b under SO3.

**Table 11: Theory of change (ToC) causal assumption confirmations**

Assumption	Associated Interventions	Observations
A1: People eat healthy and nutritious food	Interventions include food and cash distributions in SO1 and SO3 and policy and Social and Behaviour Communication Change (SBCC) messaging in SO2.	Confirmation. In terms of budget percentage, the CSP has employed cash-based transfers (CBTs). The cash transfer values are calculated to be sufficient to provide a healthy diet, but it cannot be confirmed that these transfers are being used for health diets (see note on A2). However, based on national Food Security and Nutrition (FSN) assessments, insufficient food consumption affects between 20-30% of the national population <sup>103</sup> but Food Consumption Scores (FCS) in the results frameworks from annual country reports (ACRs) in areas where WFP has provided food and cash assistance, including in BARMM, report good quality food consumption. This is triangulated with beneficiary interviews that show a perception that the difference is due to WFP actions, although this cannot be robustly verified.
A2: People use cash to buy healthy and nutritious food	Interventions include cash distributions through SO1 and SO3.	Mostly confirmation. Cash transfers are made available through WFP humanitarian assistance actions. Coping Strategy Index (CSI) scores from the outcome indicators in the results framework reported in ACRs are generally good (except during the COVID-19 pandemic). Based on Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) reports, cash distributions were mostly for food needs but whether the disbursements were used to buy <i>healthy and nutritious</i> food cannot be confirmed.
A3: Pregnant and lactating women (PLW), and children can access acute malnutrition prevention and treatment services	Intervention associated with early CSP SO2 activities around SBCC messaging and strengthening services.	No evidence for confirmation. SO2 contributions have primarily been to the larger policy environment <sup>104</sup> around fortified food use in social assistance programming and nutrition-sensitive emergency response. Limited evidence from documentation or interviews regarding policy changes cascading to beneficiary services.
A4: Women, boys, and girls in provinces prioritized by government have access to healthy, low cost locally produced food	Associated interventions primarily include food and cash distributions in SO1, but interventions for livelihoods and resilience programming in SO3 are also relevant.	Confirmation. Internal market assessments carried out by WFP during emergency responses show availability of local food (and hence greater suitability for CBTs than WFP direct food assistance). Some islands affected by substantive emergencies had fewer food options available but affected populations could access food from neighbouring islands. Vegetables are less prevalent than fruits in some regions. The exception is the absence of locally available fortified rice, except in BARMM.
A5: Targeted PLW, girls, boys, and care providers use new knowledge and capacities to influence food consumption choices	Associated interventions related to SO2 SBCC messaging – primarily from early years of CSP.	No evidence for confirmation. SO2 contributions have primarily been to the larger policy environment around fortified food use in social assistance programming and nutrition-sensitive emergency response. <sup>105</sup> SBCC actions, to which this is relevant, have not been fully implemented beyond the formative research and action plan development per ACRs. Limited evidence from documentation or interviews regarding policy changes cascading to beneficiary services.
A6: Government of Mindanao implements better, more FSN-sensitive plans, including ensuring equitable FSN provision	Associated interventions related to SO3 policy support for FSN policies and plans.	Confirmed. Peacebuilding case studies of WFP's work in BARMM and the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening as well as Country Strategic Plan Evaluation stakeholder interviews confirm that the BARMM Government has adopted FSN-sensitive plans based on WFP support.
A7: Gender-transformative shock-response social protection	Associated interventions are through SO4 activities	Mostly confirmed. The logic within the causal assumption is that SRSP and CCA are valid entry points for reducing vulnerability to shocks. Document review, including the Social

<sup>103</sup> Source: WFP. 2022. *HungerMap Live*. July 2022.

<sup>104</sup> Key informant interviews, annual country reports, and Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening.

<sup>105</sup> Key informant interviews, annual country reports, and Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening.



(SRSP) safety nets and climate services are relevant and an effective means to enhance national and local government efforts to reduce shock vulnerability	for climate change adaptation (CCA) and safety nets.	Protection Scoping Study and lessons learned from 2016 SRSP, confirm that SRSP is a relevant and effective mechanism. Stakeholder interviews and ongoing projects focused on SRSP triangulated patterns. Incomplete confirmation is due to delays in securing the grants for implementing the CCA programming which were approved in 2022.
A8: Enhanced supply chain and ICT services are relevant and effective means to enhance national and local government efforts to reduce shock vulnerability	Associated interventions are through SO4 activities for supply chain and logistical support to government.	Confirmed. Government and interviews with implementing partners during the evaluation confirm the positive role of supply chain and ICT services in response – including to Typhoon Rai. Triangulated from Typhoon Rai After-Action Review.

Source: Evaluation team synthesis from document review, interviews, field observations and ACR indicators. **Green** indicates confirmation. **Orange** indicates partial confirmation, while **yellow** reflects limited evidence for confirmation.

## EQ2.1b: Contributions to outcomes by SO

83. This section looks at SO-specific contributions (see also Annex 9.7). Table 12 summarizes CSP outcome progress.<sup>106</sup>

**Table 12: Progress towards country strategic plan (CSP) outcomes**

SO	Outcome	Observations
SO1	Affected populations meet food and nutrition needs during and after emergencies	During the CSP, WFP supported the Government's emergency response when requested with direct assistance and ongoing logistical, supply chain, and emergency telecommunications technical support through SO4. Based on national and subnational stakeholder interviews, after action reviews, and focus group discussions with beneficiaries supported by WFP direct assistance, WFP's contributions are confirmed for during emergencies, but the clause 'after' emergencies cannot be confirmed because there are few follow-up studies of WFP assistance measuring post-emergency food insecurity or malnutrition.
SO2	Adequate and healthy diets for women, boys and girls in provinces prioritized by government	Policy changes are observed. <sup>107</sup> Interviewed national nutrition stakeholders in government during the evaluation believed that policy-level changes should improve health status. National studies such as the Expanded National Nutrition Survey show positive changes in nutrition, especially in BARMM. However, it is not possible to link SO2 contributions to these national-level changes.
SO3	Improved Food Security and Nutrition (FSN) in Mindanao by 2022 in line with government targets	Based on the full theory of change (ToC), FSN actions are intended to contribute to peace. There are positive examples of changes in FSN policies, frameworks, plans and government capacities from documentation and interviews. In terms of contributions to peacebuilding, interviews with beneficiaries and local authorities during the evaluation ascribe WFP contributions to FSN in BARMM. There is evidence from the peacebuilding case studies, PRIME indicators, and interviews during the evaluation with BARMM authorities which show that the way FSN interventions are structured in BARMM has positive effects on peacebuilding (described in this section and in EQ2.4).
SO4	National and local governments have enhanced capabilities to reduce vulnerability to shocks by 2022	Positive contributions from ICT and digitalized platforms for reducing vulnerabilities observed in annual country reports, the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening evaluation and After-Action Reviews triangulated from evaluation interviews with national authorities and WFP staff. The Anticipatory Action and Climate Risk adaptation components have contributed to the development of policy and plans. The subsequent mainstreaming of these projects and implementation into national and local government has not yet been achieved.

<sup>106</sup> Strategic Assumptions are discussed in EQ2.3 on Sustainability.

<sup>107</sup> As per annual country reports and the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening.

Source: Evaluation team synthesis from document review, interviews, field observations and annual country report indicators. **Green** indicates confirmation. **Orange** indicates partial confirmation, while **yellow** reflects limited evidence for confirmation.

## SO1: Humanitarian Response

84. SO1 contains a single activity for the provision of direct humanitarian assistance and logistical support to the Government to respond to crisis affected communities following major disasters. The Government handles most disaster responses by using a government cluster system activating departments for coordinated response. The Government only requests United Nations assistance in extreme cases.

85. **There is considerable annual variation in outputs due to the way that SO1 is implemented in the Philippines context.** The data in Annex 9.7 shows that beneficiary, food, and cash transfer targets for SO1 were achieved to a greater frequency in 2018 and 2019, but all three types underachieved substantially in 2020 and 2021.<sup>108</sup> This pattern in 2021 is due to the 'dormant' nature of SO1, implementation delays in the Anticipatory Action (AA) pilot<sup>109</sup> – funded by the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) – and the late timing of Typhoon Rai in 2021 which made landfall in December 2021. The actual assistance distributions were completed in 2022 against a 2021 plan, contributing to an apparent 2021 under-achievement. Among the CCS pathways of change, SO1 WFP CCS engagements focus on needs assessments, price monitoring and food security measurements or coordination platforms (Annex 9.7)<sup>110</sup>

86. **WFP has contributed to supporting the government response when requested through SO1, even if these outcome contributions are not recorded well in corporate reporting.** Corporate indicators for humanitarian response track the number of beneficiaries reached and transfer amounts while the outcome indicators focus on household food security. Although these are logical indicators to track in a response, the way these are reported cannot adequately record intended CSP results.

87. At the outcome level, although the Food Consumption Scores (FCS) and Food Expenditure Scores (FES) are within targets, the volatility in the annual values is due to the dependence on where in the Philippines a disaster strikes. Different regions receive support in different years; thus, the outcome measurements of annual differences cannot be used to determine outcome changes in specific households. The ACR outcome indicators reported are the baseline values of the targeted families during the needs assessment exercises. Therefore, these indicators and their targets do not reflect the degree of *change* in household food consumption due to WFP distributions. Project-specific reports may capture this for a specific intervention, but there is no mechanism for recording the collective contribution of the CSP at a more strategic level within the current ACR corporate logical frameworks. However, document review<sup>111</sup> and stakeholder interviews during the field visits to areas affected by Typhoon Rai suggest that the food distributions improved household food security, even if this is not represented in the ACR indicators.

88. **The CSP architecture and how SO1 was integrated into the CSP presented both opportunities and challenges when WFP needed to pivot to direct response.** SO1 was intended to provide a channel within the CSP for scale-up in the eventuality of a requested direct response – appropriate design in a country that experiences a high volume of natural disasters, especially typhoons. However, two challenges affected 'pivoting' from a capacity strengthening to direct assistance approach. First, while there is a conceptual overlap between the SO4 emergency preparedness and direct response activities within SO1, the After-Action Review (AAR) of the Typhoon Rai response and stakeholder interviews highlighted challenges in coordination, due to the distribution of roles and responsibilities across the two SOs. Second, the workforce capacities are different for supporting CCS versus direct response, therefore requiring two different skillsets if workforce from SO4 were to be 'surged' to SO1 activities. Also, not all SO4 staff had the requisite skills to shift to a direct response role. The AAR highlighted these workforce challenges, which partially contributed to a 2022 organizational alignment and workforce review exercise

<sup>108</sup> Defined for the purposes of this report as meeting at least 90 percent of target per year.

<sup>109</sup> Although the AA pilot is managed by SO4, the number of beneficiaries planned to receive cash transfers through the pilot are allocated to SO1 and reported here with the quantities of cash transfers involved. The AA project has not been activated for a typhoon response, but pilot cash disbursements have been planned to be carried out as part of the project start-up. These planned and actual AA transfers are recorded under SO1 achievement rates.

<sup>110</sup> Activities described here are based on the definitions and examples presented in the annex to the CCS Policy Update which outlines what types of actions are to be considered related to each pathway of change.

<sup>111</sup> The review included annual country reports and internal situation reports from the Typhoon Rai response.

which included a reconsideration of required responsibilities. The overall number of staff needed to implement the response may not have been sufficient to achieve the intended targets for food and cash transfers as well, given the low achievement rates (EQ2.1b). These structural challenges were exacerbated by the pandemic which coincided with the Typhoon Rai response. Government visa and COVID-19 clearance processes made it difficult to mobilize typical surge staff from the regional bureau or headquarters.

**89. WFP's involvement in the Typhoon Rai response revitalized SO1 capacity and improved overall corporate relationships with the national government after initial delays in scaling up SO1.**

For Typhoon Rai, WFP provided a timely response for logistical materials and assessments through SO4, but faced challenges for timely SO1 food and cash transfers. In SO4, a small flexible donor allocation to SO4 allowed for the rapid provision of trucks for transportation and the development of needs-based assessments and other data support. However, due to resourcing constraints and transition of personnel, a number of important systems and processes for implementing the cash and food transfers needed to be restarted. This led to delays in setting up the personnel, systems, and relationships for the food and cash distribution. This situation was further complicated because WFP did not have a field presence in the region where direct assistance was needed, and this required establishing new relationships with local actors and government subnational authorities. Finally, donor contributions to support WFP in the response often came with stipulations regarding modality use. These 'tailored' donor requirements complicated WFP's ability to quickly organize a coherent response in line with government processes (which is only through cash transfers).

90. Although initially delayed, stakeholders perceived WFP's engagement as successful. Stakeholders at the subnational level in affected areas perceived WFP to operate more quickly than other actors – especially with supply chain and logistics support (See EQ3.1). There were few complaints from focus group discussions (FGDs) with Typhoon Rai response beneficiaries regarding targeting, coverage, and timeliness of WFP's response – corroborated with the low percentage of hotline complaints (See EQ2.2).

**91. During the Typhoon Rai response, early-recovery Cash for Assets (CFA) and coordination with local governance had positive, unintended consequences for social cohesion.**

Interviewed beneficiaries and local authorities involved in the Typhoon Rai response viewed the conditional transfers<sup>112</sup> as successful interventions. This was due to the support that affected populations received for early recovery. Also, these conditional actions unintentionally contributed positively to social cohesion by bringing community members together to work on community infrastructure projects and community gardens – improving intra-community relationships. Field interviews also noted that WFP's close coordination with the Local Governance Units (LGUs) improved relationships between the affected communities and their units.

## SO2: Nutrition

92. The SO2 (Activity 2) employed three different focal points: i) capacity strengthening; ii) nutrition supplement transfers; and iii) Social and Behaviour Communication Change (SBCC). This served as a cross-cutting activity, providing support for nutrition sensitivity in SO1 and SO3 interventions (Annex 9.7).

93. **SO2 implementation aspirations were curtailed by resourcing shortfalls.** ACRs consistently reported that few donors were willing to fund SO2 activities. Even with reductions in the SO2 needs-based plan (NBP) from its original design, allocated resources for SO2 were still less than 17 percent of the SO2 NBP (see Table 4). This underfunding shifted the SO2 approach to a greater focus on national-level policies, internally providing technical support for nutrition sensitivity in SO1 and SO3 activities, and cancelling provision of specialized nutritious foods. In ACRs, there was a shift in the SO2 coverage from nutrition-specific themes (2018-2019) to nutrition-sensitive themes (2021-2022).

94. **Although the majority of CCS actions are in Pathway 4 (Programme Design and Delivery), the most substantive outcome contributions have come in Pathway 1 (Policies and Legislation).** SO2 CCS activities are concentrated in Pathway 1 (Policies) (29 percent) and Pathway 4 (Programme Design) (41 percent) (Annex 9.7). SO2 CCS contributions cited in the ACRs included policy-level inputs and guidelines on nutrition sensitive programming in government emergency response (Nutrition in Emergencies Manual)

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<sup>112</sup> Conditional actions included community gardens, infrastructure rehabilitation, and Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) asset construction.

and development (Philippines Plan of Action for Nutrition). The Pathway 4 contributions to programme design and delivery received the most actions but cannot be attributed to as many outcome changes. For example, WFP worked jointly with the Food and Nutrition Research Institute (FNRI) and UNICEF to conduct the Fill the Nutrient Gap Analysis. Stakeholder interviews noted that these results were used in meetings with line agencies to advocate for increased investment in nutrition-sensitive programming, although there is limited evidence of increased government investment in such programming. WFP had more success through involvement in supporting coordination and collective platforms. The Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening noted that the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Business Network emerged as a direct result of WFP's engagement and technical guidance since early 2020, including continued engagement with private sector partners for scale-up considerations. Through SO2, WFP provided technical assistance to the DSWD's Enhanced Partnership Against Hunger and Poverty, which led to strengthened rural extension services, improved credit access and the development of insurance to smallholder farmer, including the pilot of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) Gulayan Sa Pamayanan (community gardens). Finally, WFP's advocacy led to the Government joining the school meals coalition and committing to universal school feeding.<sup>113</sup>

95. **A focus in Pathway 1 has been on the promotion of iron fortified rice (IFR), but with a shifting focus to its use in social protection programmes for more positive outcomes.** Government stakeholder interviews noted that WFP's involvement in the promotion of IFR pre-dates the CSP. IFR promotion efforts are led by the National Nutrition Council (NNC) with support of relevant national agencies as members of the Food Fortification Technical Working Group. Respondents viewed WFP as the major stakeholder in IFR promotion in the Philippines, and WFP support maintained the IFR focus even as the tactics used shifted. Originally, efforts promoted the use of IFR for household consumption and advocated for the establishment of national production. However, this had minimal effects on IFR share in national rice consumption, and few national industries were producing IFR. WFP shifted efforts to mitigating bottlenecks impeding the integration of IFR into government social assistance programmes (such as using IFR in the National School Feeding Programme). This shift led to more positive outcomes in IFR promotion through increased purchase and distribution of IFR through social assistance programmes.<sup>114</sup>

96. **There is evidence highlighting SO2 linkages to other SOs in reports but limited evidence for scale-up and impact of these policy changes cascading to subnational levels and beneficiary nutrition status changes.** Examples of SO2 contributions to informing nutrition sensitivity in SO1 and SO3 programming include shaping of the emergency response guidelines manual and the use of IFR in the school feeding programme. Currently there is less evidence for sponsored pilots and policies being scaled up or cascaded downwards to subnational levels beyond the school feeding programme commitments.

### SO3: Country Capacity Strengthening (in BARMM)

97. SO3 employs a specific geographic focus (on BARMM) for using food security and nutrition to contribute to peacebuilding. The retrofitted Line of Sight exercise in 2021 included contributions to social protection sector support – filling an important gap in the original CSP design (Annex 9.7). At the output level, the SO3 has over-achieved on capacity strengthening activities across all four years of operations, although the food and cash transfers have not met annual output targets. Given the orientation and approach embedded in the convergence model, outputs related to capacity strengthening activities are of greater priority than the food and cash transfers for achieving overall SO3 objectives. Outcome level indicators on number of policies and programmes met targets, although this does not reflect the extent of WFP contributions in BARMM for CCS and peacebuilding (described below).

98. **The SO3 has made equal investments in Policies, Institutional Effectiveness, and Programme Design and Delivery based on a systematic use of CCS materials.** SO3 is the only SO that shows a relatively equal distribution of percentages among multiple pathways of change activities as extracted from the pathway of change coding exercise (Annex 9.7). Three of the five pathways of change had between 20 percent and 30 percent of SO3 CCS activities (Policies, Institutional Effectiveness, and Programme Design). SO3 is also the only SO where there is evidence that capacity needs mapping was completed at the start of

<sup>113</sup> ACR 21, Key informant interview.

<sup>114</sup> Key informant interviews with NNC representatives and triangulated from the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening report.

the CSP to provide a strategic overview of CCS investments. This mapping may have facilitated the equal investment across multiple pathways.

99. **The geographic-based multisectoral intervention approach has contributed to peacebuilding and CCS outcomes.** Despite limitations to measuring peacebuilding and CCS contributions, interviewed respondents perceived positive contributions towards both peacebuilding and CCS and could cite multiple examples, ranging from village interventions to region-wide establishment of policy roadmaps. Two case studies triangulate these patterns, affirming WFP's contributions to peacebuilding.<sup>115</sup>

100. There is evidence of cross-sectoral linkages with the other SOs which supported the establishment of multisectoral interventions (leading to the BARMM region being described as a 'mini-CSP'<sup>116</sup>) including SO2 support for nutrition-sensitivity in programming. In collaboration with SO2, the BARMM SO3 team supported the formulation of a Regional Plan of Action for Nutrition (RPAN) as the basis for all government sectors that had some degree of intersection with nutrition (such as agriculture, school feeding, or social protection) to work together. This was approved in 2018 and relaunched in 2021 (SO3 Activity 3). WFP is a member of the Regional Nutrition Council (RNC) as a representative of the international actors working on nutrition and nutrition-related programmes, projects and activities operating within the region. BARMM-level advocacy used the Fill the Nutrition Gap report results for increased government investment in nutrition programmes. However, there is limited evidence that these actions led to changes in the level of investments in nutrition programmes. Finally, WFP conducted a series of workshops with the Bangsamoro Food Sufficiency Task Force for the formulation of the 2023-2028 Food Security and Nutrition Plan and a Gender and Development Code of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City.

101. 33lloWith the Ministry of Basic, Higher and Technical Education, WFP developed the School-Based Feeding Program guidelines for BARMM of which facilitated universal school feeding in target schools as well as institutionalization of the use of IFR for school meals. WFP also supported piloting a Home-Grown School Feeding (HGSF) adoption in four municipalities in BARMM, including purchasing food from local farmers.

102. **The Convergence Framework has been a success for increasing coordination and collaboration among government ministries and contributing to food security and peacebuilding.** According to interviews with BARMM authorities in the Ministry of Agriculture and nutrition authorities, and triangulated with documentary evidence,<sup>117</sup> WFP has supported extensive contributions to food security and peacebuilding. WFP supported the development of the FSN Roadmap in 2018 and hosted a series of key consultation meetings/workshops with BARMM ministries. These led to increased support for BARMM initiatives and further ensured integration of food security and nutrition into local planning. In 2019, WFP initiated a brainstorming discussion with the Bangsamoro Planning and Development Authority (BPDA), Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Agrarian Reform (MAFAR), Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Energy (MENRE) and Ministry of the Interior and Local Government (MILG) on how to achieve food security and nutrition in BARMM, later evolving into a Food Sufficiency Task Force to facilitate coordination among BARMM ministries for improved collective action towards food security, peacebuilding and DRR/CCA. The Task Force later ratified the Convergence Framework as a set of agreements for Inter-agency coordination within the Government (Figure 15).


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<sup>115</sup> Including: WFP. 2021. *Operationalizing the HDP Nexus in WFP*. Case Study 4: The Philippines; and ForumZFD. 2020. *Articulating World Food Programme's Contributions to Peace in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)*.

<sup>116</sup> From key informant interviews with six different country office leaders.

<sup>117</sup> Citations found in the peacebuilding case study, the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening, and annual country reports.

Figure 15: BARMM Convergence Framework



Source: WFP country office, Powerpoint presentation.

103. WFP continued to support BARMM initiatives through the Food Sufficiency Task Force using this convergence approach. In 2020, WFP trained regional and municipal BARMM staff members as facilitators to formulate Convergence Area Development Plans and partnered with MAFAR, the Department of the Interior, and local governance units to develop a seasonal livelihood programming calendar at the provincial level to assist agency planning and coordination. In 2021, the creation of the Bangsamoro Food Sufficiency Task Force took responsibility for formulating and approving regional policies, plans and programmes on food security.

104. **The SO3 potential contributions to peacebuilding and CCS are positive, but poorly captured in the corporate ACR indicators.** Although positive contributions are cited from stakeholder interviews and other reviews, these outcome contributions are not easily seen within WFP's ACR reporting due to gaps in the corporate reporting framework. Corporately, outcome level indicators are limited to a single indicator on policy changes and there are no CCS-relevant outcome indicators for assessing government capacities in respective pathways of change, nor social cohesion indicators that might measure contributions to peacebuilding. However, stakeholder interviews and documentation widely cited CCS contributions as one of the primary WFP contributions to BARMM. To increase peacebuilding outcome visibility, the country office, with support from headquarters, implemented a pilot on People-Centred Risk Indicator Measurement and Engagement (SCOPE) in the BARMM to reflect the positive contributions to social cohesion and peacebuilding.

#### SO4: Disaster Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness and Response

105. SO4 contains two activities: Activity 4 supports government capacities for DRRM and CCA, while Activity 5 focuses on EPR with an emphasis on supply chain, logistics, and telecommunications systems. SO4 does not include cash or food transfers. Annex 9.7 summarizes outcome and output achievements.

106. **CCS outputs have generally exceeded targets, although ACR indicators cannot fully record outcome contributions.** The P4 Programme Design and Delivery, and P2 Institutional Effectiveness comprise over 80 percent of SO4 CCS investments, suggesting a strong technical orientation (compared to policy work in other SOs, such as SO2). Outputs have overachieved against targets throughout the CSP, except in 2020, when the pandemic resulted in activity cancellations. At the outcome level, few indicators available in the framework can capture the entirety of the CCS work. The Emergency Preparedness Capacity Index indicator provided an opportunity for insights into WFP contributions to outcomes, but it was only measured twice during the CSP, with the last measurement in 2020. In addition, the framework does not show the extent of operational logistical support to the Government. A policy-level outcome indicator is less useful for demonstrating technical contributions.

107. **Activity 4 in SO4 had ambitious implementation aspirations but resourcing shortfalls severely curtailed its scope to almost a single project.** Although intended to occupy a significant proportion of CSP investment, resourcing shortfalls reduced Activity 4's 'footprint' in the CSP (—see Table 4). Underfunding resulted in a single project – the AA pilot – assuming a disproportionate share of Activity 4. From mid-2021 onwards, Activity 4 engagements increased due to the approval of relevant major donor grants. WFP received funding from the Green Climate Fund to support multi-hazard early warning systems. Activity 5 has better resourcing – budget revisions (BRs) nearly tripled Activity 5's share of the NBP – although much of this resourcing is from the Government Emergency Communication System – Mobile Operations Vehicle for Emergencies (GECS-MOVE) project sponsored by the Philippines Government (described below).

108. **The most frequently cited achievements involve strengthening communications in EPR systems, and anticipatory actions.** Although the ACRs report a range of achievements in SO4, interviewed stakeholders highlighted four primary SO contributions: i) the GECS-MOVE project; ii) the AA project; iii) food packing facility; and iv) SCOPE and beneficiary information management.<sup>118</sup>

109. The GECS-MOVE project emerged from the collaboration between WFP and the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT). The project promoted the development and provision of mobile communications platforms to support emergency response. The units were deployed during the Typhoon Rai response. Evaluation respondents considered them successful in improving coordination and communications in the response.

110. The CERF-funded Anticipatory Action (AA) project emerged from a global initiative to support Forecast Based Financing (FbF) whereby affected populations receive blanket multi-purpose cash assistance to initiate preparatory actions. In the Philippines, the CSP supported FbF/AA initiatives since 2015 and the CERF AA project was based on previous FbF investments from 2015-2020. In terms of the AA project itself, the evaluation team observed different perceptions between national and subnational governments regarding the feasibility of using anticipatory actions in typhoons. Subnational stakeholders were more sceptical. WFP is engaged in technical discussions with DSWD and Office of Civil Defence to institutionalize AA.

111. Evaluation stakeholders highlighted WFP's comparative advantages in supporting information management. Supporting beneficiary management information systems emerged in the CSP when WFP and DSWD signed an agreement in 2018, (updated in December 2021), stipulating the provision of technical assistance to enhance existing ITC to improve beneficiary management to ensure shock responsiveness and enhance social protection delivery systems and programmes. Support to government through the use of SCOPE for data management in some operations was considered to be a temporary solution rather than to be used at scale.

112. **SO4 plays an important role in WFP's humanitarian responsiveness.** SO4 supply chain support is used as part of the overall direct assistance to emergency response. WFP often provides equipment, such as trucks, to complement existing government resources. WFP has a competitive advantage in terms of responsiveness because procurement and equipment contracting is managed in a different way than within government procurement systems. The availability of a predictable and flexible funding (albeit small) from one donor for Activity 5 supply chain support allowed WFP to pivot to provide direct assistance and support to government, as highlighted in respondent interviews and the Typhoon Rai AAR.

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<sup>118</sup> Operational details on these factors are described in Annex 9.7

## EQ2.2 To what extent did WFP contribute to achievement of cross-cutting aims?<sup>119</sup>

### Summary

Gender responsiveness in WFP programming complies with corporate requirements and has improved within CSP implementation since 2018. The CSP performs well in the cross-cutting protection indicators found in the CSP results framework and reported in ACR tables. In protection, CSP performance was compliant with protection, except in the case of the Typhoon Rai response where capacity challenges led to lapses in the full implementation of protection safeguards during the scaled-up response – though there is no evidence of negative protection consequences. The CSP has improved its indicator achievements against targets on the cross-cutting indicators for Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP). Cross-cutting environmental indicators perform well in SO3 and SO4, though there is limited evidence of SO1 activities integrating environmental risk assessments.

### Gender

113. **Gender responsiveness in WFP programming has improved since 2018.** The CSP document received a Gender and Age Marker (GAM) score of 3, reflecting good gender responsiveness. Starting in 2019, the ACRs began reporting on GAM scores for the individual SOs. Initial GAM scores were low but improved throughout the subsequent reporting period, with a significant jump in reported GAM scores in 2021 (Table 13).<sup>120</sup>

**Table 13: Reported Gender and Age Marker (GAM) scores by strategic outcome (SO) and year**

Strategic Outcome	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022 <sup>121</sup>
SO1: Humanitarian Response	n.a.	1	1	4	3
SO2: Nutrition	n.a.	1	4	4	3
SO3: BARMM	n.a.	1	4	4	0
SO4: EPR	n.a.	0	0	4	0

Source: Annual country reports 2018-2021

114. In 2019, the country office conducted a gender review and elaborated a Gender Action Plan (GAP). A gender results network of targeted country office focal points reviews and continually updates the GAP. In 2022, the country office contracted a dedicated gender specialist to replace the gender focal point system, and a gender consultant was engaged in 2022 to conduct a gender analysis feeding into the country office programmes. These actions appear to have influenced integrating gender considerations in programming (see Table 14).











<sup>119</sup> Disaggregated data for all cross-cutting indicators are in Annex 9 and referenced as relevant.

<sup>120</sup> The United Nations changed the GAM scoring template in 2022 to a GAM-M scoring system, which led to discontinuity between 2022 scores and those from earlier years.

<sup>121</sup> In 2022 the GAM score was calculated differently than previous years, by using GAM-M scoring.



**Table 14: Gender considerations by strategic outcome (SO)**

Gender equality and women empowerment and protection considerations		
SO1		Beneficiary selection informed by gender equality and protection considerations.
		Address Gender Inequalities in line with the Philippines Harmonized Gender and Development Guidelines as they relate to disaster risk reduction and management.
		Monitoring food security and nutrition concerns in community and gender development plans.
SO2		Nutrition specific and nutrition sensitive analysis of barriers to adequate and healthy diets for the most vulnerable groups.
		Activities to strengthen health services capacity to provide gender -equality and age – specific nutrition messaging and growth monitoring.
		Monitoring for discriminatory sociocultural norms restricting access to services/assets/opportunities for women and girls.
SO3		Capacity strengthening for BARMM in enhanced participatory and beneficiary-centered multisector planning and implementation of government programmes.
		Selection of seasonal livelihood programming considers the specific needs and interests of women (particularly female heads of household)
SO4		Strategic Partnerships and Advocacy to shape and support gender-transformative food security and nutrition policies.
		Technical assistance to design of a more hunger preventive and gender transformative government social protection program.

Source: CSP design document and annual country reports 2018-2021

115. **The CSP complies with WFP corporate gender requirements on reporting, indicators, beneficiary inclusion and financial tracking which is used to adjust programming.** ACR reporting includes three corporate gender indicators to track women’s participation in project committees, household decision making, and receiving transfers. The project disaggregated ACR data generally shows meeting targets for all three indicators (Annex 9) with two exceptions: Women’s participation in committees in 2020 in BARMM, and women’s inclusion in transfers (and household decision making) in the AA project in 2021. Evaluation FGDs with AA stakeholders suggested that the lower inclusion of women in transfers has implications for reconsidering the Government’s coverage and targeting criteria for AA distributions. Lower participation rates in BARMM committees appears to have resulted from the pandemic, which forced women to take on an expanded household role (such as supporting home schooling of children) which constrained the time they had available to participate in committees.

116. The country office carried out gender responsive actions in BARMM. In 2019, WFP conducted a gender review of FFA/CFA activities to understand implementation effects on gender dynamics. The results suggested that women’s participation in FFA/CFA did not disrupt households and positively contributed to men’s participation in household routines. Post-distribution monitoring of the CFA/FFA activities in 2019 highlighted an increase in joint decision making on the use of the transfer assets (Annex 9). In 2020, WFP included a section on gender empowerment in the Food Security and Nutrition Roadmap for the Bangsamoro Region.

**Protection**

117. **The CSP performs well in the cross-cutting protection indicators in the results framework, but these are based on the implementation of small projects. When required to scale up for the**

**Typhoon Rai response, there was insufficient in-house capacity to ensure the full implementation of protection safeguards within the Typhoon Rai response.** ACRs measure protection through four indicators assessing protection, access, safety, and dignity elements. For all four indicators, the reported values across the period of CSP implementation are nearly 100 percent (Annex 9.6). Because direct humanitarian response is rarely required as part of the CSP, protection considerations are either part of ongoing development distributions (such as in SO3), or in EPR projects such as the anticipatory actions. WFP transfers are integrated closely into existing DSWD emergency responses, which have their own protection protocols. Consequently, a relatively junior focal point in the Research, Assessment and Monitoring (RAM) unit handles the necessary CSP protection considerations. However, the Typhoon Rai After Action Review and WFP staff, donors, and United Nations sister agencies noted that these smaller protection structures and systems struggled to scale up to respond to the Typhoon Rai requirements, leading to gaps in timely training and monitoring of newly contracted cooperating partners on WFP protection guidelines and systems. This led to lapses in the full implementation of protection safeguards. Based on the post-distribution monitoring data and the hotline data, these lapses in the Typhoon Rai response did not result in major protection consequences. Beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation only identified one issue – a community where a cooperating partner was replaced due to potential political engagements.

### Accountability to Affected Populations

118. **The CSP improved its performance on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) indicators.** The results framework measures the AAP cross-cutting theme through two indicators: assessing the proportion of assisted people informed about the programme; and the proportion of project activities which have documented beneficiary feedback that AAP project indicators usually reached or exceeded targets (Annex 9). Because direct humanitarian response is rarely required, AAP considerations are concentrated in the (relatively small) beneficiary-oriented activities in SO3 or the WFP transfers are integrated closely into the existing DSWD emergency response, which have their own AAP protocols. During the Typhoon Rai response, WFP revitalized its community feedback mechanisms to increase AAP, although not to the corporate standards of having three different community feedback mechanisms.

119. Data from the country office toll-free hotline number<sup>122</sup> triangulates with AAP indicator data in the ACRs and reflects improvements in performance. From 2018-2021, the average number of calls ranged between 200-300 per year, except for 2020 which saw a 50 percent drop in calls due to pandemic-related cancellation of project activities (Table 15). The combined proportion of negative feedback and requests for assistance peaked in 2020 at nearly 40 percent, linked to the additional strains imposed by the pandemic, but then declined substantively in 2021 and 2022. During the Typhoon Rai response in 2022, the number of calls increased by nearly 1,500 percent, but the percentage of negative feedback and requests for assistance combined dropped to less than 3 percent. This latter pattern triangulates with observations from interviews (EQ3.1) and the AAP indicator data that the country office was able to successfully scale up AAP mechanisms during the Typhoon Rai response, and that beneficiaries were generally satisfied with WFP's response.

**Table 15: Hotline feedback data by year**

Hotline Data	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Total number of calls	205	252	92	293	4377
Negative feedback or assistance requests	35%	15%	39%	21%	3%
Cases closed	87%	99%	97%	98%	98%

Source: WFP country office CFM Database, November 2022.

### Environment

120. **Environmental considerations are prominent in the CSP due to the SO3 and SO4 focus on climate change adaptation (CCA) and disaster risk reduction (DRR), but there is limited integration of environmental risk assessments into SO1 activities.** The ACR narratives highlight an environmental focus on the many contributions to CCA and DRRM that are part of the CSP implementation activities. This is logical given the degree to which CCS engagement with government supersedes direct WFP project implementation. However, these environmental considerations are not measured in the results framework

<sup>122</sup> The country office conducted an assessment of the viability of using a hotline and found that, because of the high degree of cell and internet penetration in the Philippines, beneficiaries almost universally preferred the hotline option over physical travel or other alternatives.

which contains one environment-related cross-cutting indicator – the proportion of activities for which environmental risks have been screened.

121. This environmental cross-cutting indicator assesses SO1 and SO3 activities.<sup>123</sup> As per the ACR reports, 100 percent of CSP activities have been screened for environmental risks – except for SO1 activity in 2020 (67 percent). WFP staff noted that environmental risk assessments are systematically integrated into SO3 FFA/CFA projects in BARMM. However, there is limited evidence that these project-level environmental risk assessments are integrated into SO1 activities. For example, in the Typhoon Rai response, no documentation describes whether environmental risk assessments had been part of asset selections. However, evaluation FGD respondents were satisfied with the early recovery assets.

**EQ2.3 To what extent are the achievements of the CSP likely to be sustained, in particular from a financial, social, institutional, and environmental perspective?**

**Summary**

Sustainability progress varies among the SOs with resourcing and technical capacities at the subnational level as the primary concerns. Though SO1 was developed to anticipate direct humanitarian assistance, the way that SO1 responses operate within the overall government response can be considered to contribute to governmental institutional sustainability. In SO2, the shift from nutrition-specific direct assistance to nutrition-sensitive approaches helped improve the sustainability of SO2 investments. The sustainability of the SO3 BARMM outcome achievements are supported through the convergence model. Under SO4, prospective sustainability of EPR outcomes appears more likely than for the DRRM component, due to higher resourcing levels and the extent of integration into existing government structures.

122. **For the CSP, there is progress towards sustainability, with primary concerns involving ongoing public resourcing and the technical capacities at the subnational level.** The evaluation defines sustainability (Annex 5 Evaluation Matrix) as institutional sustainability – the degree to which project activities were integrated into existing systems through five dimensions: i) how CSP activities have strategic integration in government programmes; ii) the extent that government is likely to fund continuation of programmes; iii) the technical capacity within government to manage and implement programmes; iv) existence of a plan with WFP to transition away from WFP support; and v) the degree of government prioritization in programmes.<sup>124</sup> See Table 16 for an overview of this assessment. The evaluation team developed a sustainability rubric based on these dimensions to assess each of the SO contributions to sustainability (Annex 3). The rubric assessment is built on an analysis from document review, interviews, and field site observations (Annex 3).

123. The five pathways of change present a second approach for assessing sustainability: the level of investment in each pathway. See Table 17 for this approach. In both frameworks, overall sustainability is good, with the most challenges in resourcing and technical capacities at the subnational levels. Project cycle limitations have prevented WFP from maximizing follow-up on its own direct assistance (except in BARMM). The following paragraphs provide details for each SO.

**Table 16: Sustainability spotlight rating**

Sustainability Rating	SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4
Strategic integration	Time-bound humanitarian response and early recovery assistance	Green	Green	Green
Resourcing		Orange	Light green	Green
Technical capacity		Light green	Yellow	Light green
Alignment with priorities		Yellow	Green	Green
Transition strategy		Light green	Light green	Yellow

Source: Evaluation team from document review and interviews and compared against the sustainability rubric described in Annex 3. **Green** = significant progress. **Light green** = some progress. **Yellow** = limited progress and **Orange** = very limited progress.

<sup>123</sup> In the absence of a corporate standard template for screening projects’ environmental risks, country offices develop their own tools to report on the indicator.

<sup>124</sup> Annex 3 provides details on the classification rubric.

**Table 17: Sustainability spotlight rating by pathways of change**

Sustainability Rating	SO1	SO2	SO3	SO4
P1: Policies	Time-bound humanitarian response and early recovery assistance	Green	Green	Green
P2: Institutional Effectiveness		Yellow	Light green	Light green
P3: Strategic Planning and Financing		Orange	Light green	Light green
P4: Programme Design and Delivery		Light green	Light green	Yellow
P5: Engagement of civil society organization (CSO)/Private Sector		Light green	Yellow	Orange

Source: Evaluation team from document review and interviews. **Green** = significant progress. **Light green** = some progress. **Yellow** = limited progress and **Orange** = very limited progress.

### SO1: Humanitarian Assistance

124. **The implementation of SO1 responses contributes to institutional sustainability.** In the Philippines, SO1 direct assistance is organized as part of the larger government direct assistance. Coverage, targeting criteria and beneficiary identification are built on existing government platforms, and there is evidence from documentation and stakeholder interviews of a consultation process with subnational authorities on the modality of assistance to ensure compliance with government plans. Although a direct humanitarian response has fewer expectations for sustainability, these factors help ensure the appropriateness of the assistance and integration within the government’s broader shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) frameworks. The primary constraint on WFP direct assistance is that WFP’s assistance is time-bound to the response and early recovery phases based on donor resourcing. Also, there are fewer opportunities (except in BARMM) to build a spectrum of support with beneficiaries from immediate response to early recovery and stabilization.

### SO2: Nutrition

125. **The shift from nutrition-specific direct assistance to nutrition-sensitive approaches has helped improve the sustainability of SO2 investments.** Policies are in place for nutrition-sensitive programming and there has been progress in sustaining nutrition-sensitivity in emergency response actions. The promotion of iron fortified rice (IFR) has a good policy base, but is not yet institutionalized for DSWD procurement. However, a pilot in BARMM for IFR use in school feeding is reported to have positive results – although it is not yet scaled up. Limited public resourcing for approaches to nutrition presents the largest bottleneck for SO2 sustainability, although there are positive changes in private sector resourcing through the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Business Network. Technical capacities have improved as the SO2 has made the most progress in providing technical assistance to the technical working group (TWG) on Food Fortification and Sub-TWG on Rice Fortification. The initial specialized nutritious food distributions in the early part of the CSP were less connected to sustainability and follow-up. However, the early advocacy actions with Department Of Health contributed to the sustainable results including the SUN Business Network and the Nutrition in Emergencies Manual cited in EQ2.1b.

### SO3: Country Capacity Strengthening (BARMM)

126. **The sustainability of the BARMM investments is strong because of implementation through the convergence model.** WFP investments in capacity development of BARMM authorities has been strengthened through the integration of the Bangsamoro Food Sufficiency Task Force and the convergence model to orient collective programming (15). The model allows for strategic integration within government structures and ensures alignment with government mandates, although it is still considered an ad hoc body. Furthermore, there is the possibility of ongoing follow-up of these activities due to the long-term, continual presence of WFP in BARMM. The BARMM geographic focus provides one of the few examples of CSP support continuity from preparedness to humanitarian assistance, to early recovery, to peacebuilding. The technical capacities at the subnational level of BARMM government authorities, especially below the provincial level, requires continued WFP attention.

### SO4: Disaster Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness and Response

127. **Activity 5 Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) shows more progress to sustainability than Activity 4 Disaster and Risk Reduction Management (DRRM).** Resourcing constraints and personnel transitions curtailed much of the intended engagements under Activity 4 with the CERF-funded AA project assuming a large share of Activity 4 attention until now.<sup>125</sup> The FbF/AA project experienced delays in start-up and was affected by pandemic restrictions. Currently, the FbF/AA has policy support at the national level but other factors relevant for sustainability, including government resourcing, institutional systems, and programme design are yet to be resolved. Relevant design elements include developing transition strategies for handover to government management and integration into existing government SRSP programmes. In contrast, Activity 5 has benefited from greater resourcing, especially through the GECS-MOVE project, and is more closely integrated into existing government programmes and frameworks. There are constraints in providing ongoing monitoring and follow-up of the GECS-MOVE products after transfer to government.

#### **EQ2.4: To what extent did the CSP facilitate more strategic linkages between humanitarian action, development cooperation and, where appropriate, contributions to peace?**

##### Summary

WFP's historic engagement in facilitating strategic linkages within the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus continued during the CSP. Specifically, WFP positively contributed to the nexus and peacebuilding through its Food Security and Nutrition (FSN) approaches in BARMM. However, WFP corporate terminology sometimes led to misconceptions by external stakeholders (including donors) regarding the perceived relevance of WFP actions to development or peacebuilding priorities.

128. **Historically, WFP facilitated strategic linkages within the nexus which has continued during the CSP.** Prior to CSP establishment, WFP engaged in all three dimensions of the nexus in the Philippines, including prior engagements in the then ARMM region. The specific peacebuilding focus in SO3 has elevated the visibility of this component in WFP programming. WFP has coordinated actively within the UNCT as part of working groups involved in multiple sectors across the nexus. These engagements continued during the CSP period through active involvement in coordination platforms and working groups.

129. **WFP has made positive contributions to the nexus and peacebuilding through its FSN approaches in BARMM.** In ACRs, the SO3 FSN contributions are important for peacebuilding. However, until 2021, achievements were reported based on FSN objectives (and indicators) rather than peacebuilding. In late 2020, in collaboration with a local peacebuilding organization, WFP commissioned a study, *Articulating World Food Programme's Contributions to Peace in the BARMM*, which highlighted WFP's potential contributions to peace. By the end of 2021, WFP had explicitly adopted a Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus approach in the BARMM and had rolled out tools to support local authorities in the design and development of FSN initiatives that would contribute to peace and development. This included integrating a conflict-sensitivity assessment into the design of initiatives to identify the risk of the projects creating inter- and intra- community conflicts with an attention to improving local social cohesion. Although limited corporate indicators exist for measuring WFP contributions to peacebuilding, the results of a RED (relevance, extent, duration) analysis conducted with BARMM convergence partners, and the piloting of the PRIME indicators mentioned in SO3 in Table 12 highlighted positive results to peacebuilding.

130. **WFP corporate terminology sometimes led to misconceptions by external stakeholders (including donors) regarding the perceived relevance of WFP actions to development or peacebuilding priorities.** Food security-based language in SO3 can prevent internal and external stakeholders from understanding WFP's potential contribution to peacebuilding objectives. The lack of corporate peacebuilding or social cohesion indicators minimizes the potential visibility of WFP contributions to sectors outside of FSN. The same is true for social protection and shock-responsive social protection (SRSP) discussed in EQ1.5. The corporate social protection policy and its focus on SRSP can provide a conceptual bridge linking different elements of the nexus. However, the social protection (SP) language and framework remains limited in the CSP cycle. This unintentionally reduced WFP's perceived relevance to national priorities or donor strategies.

<sup>125</sup> In 2022, a Climate Change and Food Security Analysis was finalized and shared with government as well.

131. This dynamic affected donor perceptions of WFP's potential contributions to peacebuilding and development. Interviewed donors appreciated WFP's ability to engage in rapid response, data and coordination, but often stated that they did not see supporting WFP as relevant to their other long-term strategic plans within peacebuilding and development. The country office has developed a plan to map the donor landscape and review donor strategic plans to identify opportunities for WFP to provide potential inputs into these areas.

## 2.3. EQ3: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS WFP USED ITS RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY IN CONTRIBUTING TO COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN OUTPUTS AND STRATEGIC OUTCOMES?

### EQ3.1 To what extent were outputs delivered within the intended timeframe?

#### Summary

Timeliness – defined as meeting annual targets – varies from year to year. Cash transfers met annual targets more frequently than food transfers. Capacity strengthening outputs perform better on timeliness than food or cash transfers. Cumulative and annual expenditure rates suggest context barriers rather than operational inefficiencies. The timing and predictability of resourcing affected timeliness and perceived cost efficiency. Beneficiaries have a more positive perception of WFP responsiveness than the indicators are showing.

132. Based on the Office of Evaluation technical note for efficiency, timeliness is assessed in three ways in this evaluation. The first is through a comparison of annual output achievements against annual targets (EQ2.1).<sup>126</sup> The second approach involves tracking actual annual expenditure rates against planned annual expenditure rates as reported in annual implementation plans.<sup>127</sup> A third approach, based on a line of inquiry outlined in the Office of Evaluation technical note on efficiency, are the perceptions of how responsive WFP has been in an emergency by measuring how rapidly direct cash and food assistance (or other materials) are delivered following an emergency (such as a typhoon landfall).<sup>128</sup> For the following narrative, output indicators are clustered according to commodity transfers (food and cash transfers) and capacity strengthening activities (training, workshops, and so on). For measures of timeliness and efficiency, expenditures are compared to implementation plans rather than against needs-based plans (NBPs).

#### Output achievements


133. **Timeliness as defined by annual achievements of planned outputs against targets varies from year to year, but cash transfers generally have higher achievement rates than food transfers.** Annual achievement rates for the food and cash transfers tend to vary from year to year and between SOs, but cash transfers had higher annual achievement rates (Figure 16) and were more consistent from SO to SO (Figure 17) than food transfers. Presentation of achievement rates (annex 9.5) are misleading because food transfer amounts are small compared to the cash transfers and are context dependent on specific situations – including donor requests. The country office strategy had been to phase out direct implementation and food transfers and to use cash to top up government SRSP programmes as needed. Food transfers re-emerged in 2022 during the Typhoon Rai response as part of the overall WFP direct assistance, partly as a result of specific donor requirements, but also in some situations where it was deemed that the local markets had been so disrupted that cash transfers would not have allowed for food purchases.

<sup>126</sup> Looking at whether outputs were delivered as planned within an implementation year.

<sup>127</sup> Whether planned expenditures were implemented in a timely manner.


<sup>128</sup> This is primarily assessed through key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

**Figure 16: Implementation plan food and cash achievement rates<sup>129</sup>**



Source: Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) Plan vs. Actuals Report. Data extracted for December 2022.

**Figure 17: Implementation plan food and cash achievement rates by strategic outcome (SO)<sup>130</sup>**



Source: Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) Plan vs. Actuals Report. Data extracted for December 2022.

134. In SO1 and SO3 food transfers, factors affecting transfer timeliness are discussed in EQ2.1 including: i) no emergencies; ii) funding limitations; and iii) the outbreak of the pandemic. For SO2, the under-resourcing of SO2 reduced the scope of the planned nutrition supplement activities in 2018 and led to a subsequent cancellation of these activities in the CSP. For SO3, the pandemic caused cancellations of planned activities in 2020. Funding availability factors are covered in EQ4.1.

135. **Capacity Strengthening (CS) outputs have higher annual achievements against targets than food or cash transfers.**<sup>131</sup> For CS outputs, ACRs include four indicators. Annual achievement rates for all four category of outputs meets or exceeds annual targets, except for the number of tools and products produced (Figure 18). Even in this dimension, annual achievement rates against targets improved each year, suggesting improved timeliness. This pattern is triangulated with data from key informant interviews where


<sup>129</sup> Values calculated from CPB as commodity value in implementation plan compared to commodity value in actuals.

<sup>130</sup> Values calculated from CPB as commodity value in implementation plan compared to commodity value in actuals.

<sup>131</sup> Based on the Office of Evaluation technical note definition of timeliness as annual achievement rates against annual targets.

respondents considered WFP support in CS technical outputs to have been well achieved on an annual basis and did not specify any criticisms regarding the delivery of CS outputs.<sup>132</sup>

**Figure 18: Country capacity strengthening (CCS) outputs annual achievement percentages by strategic outcome (SO)**



Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022


### Expenditure rates

136. **Cumulative and annual expenditure rates suggest structural barriers rather than operational inefficiencies.** Expenditure rates against the implementation plans can provide another proxy measure of timeliness defined as the effectiveness for translating resourcing and plans into implementation. Figure 19 presents cumulative expenditure rates per SO, while Figure 20 disaggregates SO expenditure rates by year. The figures illustrate that SO1 performance is generally aligned with planned activities, while SO2, SO3 and SO4 patterns vary annually due to context shifts. Cumulatively, SO2, SO3 and SO4 expenditure rates range between 44 percent and 60 percent of implementation plans with year-to-year variations. Based on the analyses in EQ4.1 (resourcing) and EQ3.3 (cost efficiency), the primary factors influencing expenditure rates pertained to the timing and predictability of resourcing and gap years in leadership during the CSP when operational costs were maintained at minimal levels. Details are presented in EQ4.1 and EQ3.3.

<sup>132</sup> CS outputs by SO presented in Annex 9.5




**Figure 19: Cumulative expenditure rates against the implementation plan by activity**



Source: Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) Plan vs. Actuals Report. Data extracted for December 2022. Direct and indirect support costs are not included in this figure.

**Figure 20: Expenditure rates against implementation plan by activity and year**



Source: Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) Plan vs. Actuals Report. Data extracted for December 2022. Direct and indirect support costs are not included in this figure.

### Responsive timeliness

137. **Beneficiaries and subnational stakeholders have a more positive perception of commodity responsiveness than other stakeholders.** The final measure of timeliness is responsiveness – the speed of implementing transfers in the aftermath of an immediate emergency. One potential measure is the time between the emergency appeal and first response, but this does not present a full picture for two reasons. First, there are different types of interventions within a response – each with its own calendar. In the Typhoon Rai response, the loan of trucks happened immediately, while distributing food and cash interventions happened later – including at different times in different places. Second, measuring the degree of time lapse does not tell how WFP performed in comparison to others. As noted earlier, WFP was able to respond immediately in terms of lending trucks and equipment to support the government response. There was a longer delay (about four months) between emergency appeal and the first cash and food transfers. Although this seems longer, the qualitative data suggest that WFP performed well compared to other actors. Key informant interviews with subnational authorities and other stakeholders were positive

in terms of WFP's responsiveness in the event of an emergency. Although food transfers have lower annual achievement rates against annual targets than cash transfers, they were distributed first during the Typhoon Rai response because of delays in setting up cash services. Evaluation FGDs with beneficiaries who were part of the WFP assistance in the Typhoon Rai response considered WFP to have acted more quickly than other actors for both food and cash. This pattern is triangulated from the hotline call patterns wherein negative feedback, including about timeliness, is a very small percentage of calls. Hotline calls following the Typhoon Rai response were particularly positive, with nearly half rated as positive feedback as opposed to previous years (see Table 13).

### 3.2 To what extent does the depth and breadth of coverage ensure that the most vulnerable to food insecurity benefit from the programme?

#### Summary

Coverage considerations are less pressing for a CCS-oriented CSP. Considerations employed in the CSP are appropriate for the type of CSP in the Philippines. Coverage *complementarity* with government is a greater challenge than coverage *criteria*.

138. **The CSP employs appropriate coverage considerations for the Philippines.** With a CCS oriented CSP, coverage of direct response is less relevant, although coverage considerations related to WFP direct assistance are applicable to SO1 humanitarian assistance and SO3 in BARMM. The CSP supported government coverage through technical assistance in mapping, sponsoring assessments, and modelling (such as the elaboration of the Climate Change and Food Security Analysis (CCFSA) or the use of SCOPE as a temporary solution for data registration in direct assistance). For WFP, identification of beneficiaries and programme coverage is carried out in consultation with the DSWD (or equivalent authorities in BARMM) and based on complementing existing DSWD coverage. As noted in EQ2.1, WFP validation of beneficiary lists during humanitarian response and updating government lists is an important service for ensuring appropriate coverage.

139. **Coverage complementarity with government is a more relevant concern than coverage criteria with the CSP.** For the direct assistance activities in SO1 and SO3, collaborations with Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and Ministry of Social Services and Development (MSSD) respectively are appropriate for ensuring aligned criteria. WFP conducted validation exercises to ensure that exclusion and inclusion errors from government lists are addressed. Coverage issues identified in evaluation interviews pertained more to coverage *complementarity* with government assistance as described in EQ2.1, exemplified with how the Anticipatory Action (AA) pilot project and Typhoon Rai response were to be aligned within the existing post-disaster government response.

### EQ3.3 To what extent w're WFP's activities cost-efficient in delivery of its assistance?

#### Summary

The share of direct support costs (DSC) is consistent and appropriate for a CCS-oriented CSP. The CSP operated within expected cost parameters. Based on the cost-efficiency calculations, the country office does not appear to have internal operational inefficiencies. Underachievement of output indicators are therefore influenced by other factors such as financial and human resources. Food transfers come with inherently greater inefficiency compared to the other modalities because of the transportation and logistical requirements, and therefore have higher transfer costs per beneficiary than cash transfers. Capacity strengthening efficiency is harder to determine because the only CCS costs recorded are the amounts transferred to partners. WFP staff and salary costs related to CCS are not tracked.

140. Cost-efficiency is examined from four perspectives: i) direct support costs (DSC) as a percentage of total direct costs, which implies a general operational efficiency on recurring costs; ii) comparing the percentage of commodity value to total costs between the implementation plan and actuals, which implies whether the country office identified efficiencies during operations; iii) identifying the commodity transfer value as a percentage of the total transfer costs which implies which type of commodity is more cost

efficiently distributed by WFP; and iv) identifying commodity transfer costs per beneficiary for a given amount of food or cash distributed which implies distribution efficiency.

141. **Direct support costs (DSC) share is annually consistent.** Total direct costs and the share of DSC can provide an assessment on annual consistency in efficiency. For the Philippines, the average annual DSC was around 12 percent (Table 18). The share of DSC held relatively constant during the 2018-2020 period. Even when there was a substantive increase in direct costs in 2019 due to an influx in commodity transfer resources. In 2021, a workforce review and expansion, combined with anticipated incoming grants and the surge staffing required for the Typhoon Rai response increased DSC share. This declined again in 2022 as the resourcing from the grants increased overall resourcing (see EQ4.1).

**Table 18: Direct support costs (DSC) expenditures as percentage of total direct costs**

Cost category	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Direct support costs	555,804	1,175,304	528,337	791,526	1,995,752
Total direct costs	5,481,457	9,842,842	4,308,575	4,505,748	22,168,500
<b>DSC as percentage of total direct costs</b>	<b>10.1%</b>	<b>11.9%</b>	<b>12.3%</b>	<b>17.6%</b>	<b>9.0%</b>

Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

142. **The CSP processes and systems do not appear to have significant inefficiencies as estimated costs and actual costs are closely aligned.** Implicit in EQ3.3 is whether operational inefficiencies are affecting the cost of delivery of planned outputs and commodity transfers. The country portfolio budget (CPB) report disaggregates commodity value from ancillary costs to three categories: food, cash, and capacity strengthening. The CPB has limitations for tracking efficiency because of how third-party resourcing is allocated, and because not all costs associated with a particular transfer can be linked. For example, allocations from headquarters are reported in a different system and recorded as zero in the CPB, implementation costs (another CPB category) cover general activity management but cannot be linked to a specific modality. Staff costs are only recorded as actuals without implementation plan rates. Even with these limitations, comparing the relative share of commodity value against total costs can highlight where the country office took actions to improve implementation efficiency. Specific actions could include a wide range of potential sectors, including operational items such as switching providers, product substitution, scaling up distributions or context factors such as inflation, supply chain disruptions, or infrastructure breakdowns. Table 19 profiles the commodity values as a percentage of total costs, comparing the implementation plan against the actual costs. Actual percentages higher than IP percentages implies efficiency gains and therefore highlight times when the CO may have taken actions during the implementation that improved cost efficiency compared to plan estimates.

**Table 19: Commodity values as a percentage of total costs: implementation plan (IP) vs. actuals<sup>133,134</sup>**

SO	Modality	2018	2018	2019	2019	2020	2020	2021	2021	2022	2022
		IP	Actual	IP	Actual	IP	Actual	IP	Actual	IP	Actual
SO1	Food	93	42	69	59					70	71
	Cash	84	85	90	92	92	93	92	92	89	92
	CS		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	79
SO2	Food		84	87							
	Cash										
	CS	100	100	100	100	100		100	100	100	100
SO3	Food		50	52	56						
	Cash	83	97		55	97	97	97	97	97	97
	CS	73	91	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SO4/A4	CS	27	92	100	77	100	98	100	73	91	100
SO4/A5	CS		98	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: CPB – Plan vs Actuals Report, Data extracted for December 2022. **Orange** = Actual commodity value percentages were higher than in the implementation plan, implying increased inefficiencies. **Green** = Actual commodity value percentages were

<sup>133</sup> Calculations are based on food and cash values divided by total food and cash costs reported. Calculations do not include adjusted DSC because this is not disaggregated by modality. Calculations do not include staff costs because these are only recorded as actuals, reducing comparability efficiencies. Calculations do not include implementation costs because these are associated with overall activity management and cannot be ascribed to specific modalities.

<sup>134</sup> Blank cells occur when no food, cash or CS value is recorded. This can happen if the costs are allocated to another party, even if a distribution happened, because no distribution happened, or if no distribution was in the implementation plan but then a distribution occurred because of an emerging need.

lower than in the implementation plan, implying increased efficiencies. Grey = actual costs were in line with what was planned (values within 3 percentage points are considered neutral) blank cells are when there is no data available.

143. Even when there was under-achievement of ACR-recorded annual outputs, the comparative operational costs generally remained aligned with the planned value of the commodity delivered. This suggests that system processes or external factors (such as the pandemic) drove output under-performance rather than country office operational inefficiencies. As in the Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) report, inefficiencies in SO1 food allocations in 2018 and 2019 were most affected by unanticipated storage and port costs. Capacity strengthening (CS) inefficiencies can only be assessed against cooperating partner costs, as other costs related to CS delivery are not linked within the CPB. There were three instances of CS inefficiencies due to higher-than-anticipated cooperating partner costs (SO1 in 2022 and SO4/Act. 4 in 2019 and 2021).

144. **Food transfers are, as expected, less cost-efficient than the other modalities.** Table 20 presents the percentage of commodity value to total costs per year (Annex 9 includes the direct costs and percentage of commodity value). The more cost-efficient a commodity, the higher the percentage will be in the table (because fewer funds need to be diverted to ancillary costs). Food transfers were almost 50 percent less efficient compared to cash transfers and CS. For the CSP as a whole, food value comprised just 54 percent of food costs, while CS commodity value was 81 percent of total CS costs, and cash was 91 percent of all cash transfer costs.

**Table 20: Food, cash and capacity strengthening (CS) values as a percentage of total modality costs<sup>135</sup>**

SO	Modality	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
		%	%	%	%	%
Food	SO1	39%	53%			64%
	SO2	78%	0%			
	SO3	36%	51%			
Cash	SO1	85%	89%	91%	87%	93%
	SO3	97%	38%	97%	97%	96%
CS	SO1	100%	51%	73%	82%	86%
	SO2	76%	70%			
	SO3	77%	100%	58%	69%	73%
	SO4/A4	58%	66%	76%	50%	62%
	SO4/A5	86%	96%	84%	81%	87%

Sources: CPB – Plan vs Actuals Report, Data extracted December 2022

145. **CS efficiency was the most annually volatile among the three modalities, but also the least appropriate to measure for cost-efficiency from Country Portfolio Budget (CPB) reports.** Cash transfers were the most consistent year to year, with around 90 percent commodity value as share of total costs, indicating good cost efficiency. Food transfers were low, but generally consistent. In contrast, the CS commodity value shifted from year to year within an SO, and the commodity value percentages varied among SOs. Annual volatility is partially explained by CS costs. SO1 had the highest CS percentages (varying between 80 percent and 100 percent) while Activity 4 had the lowest (varying between 50 percent and 60 percent). Low-cost CS products (such as a training or workshop) would have a lower percentage of total costs – and therefore with a correspondingly higher proportion of costs coming from staff salaries and time – thus appearing less efficient. This partially explains the differences between Activity 5 – with a large, expensive product-based CS activity as the GECS-MOVE vehicle – and the less costly knowledge-oriented Activity 4 products, such as a forecasting tool.

146. **Food costs per beneficiary are higher than cash transfer costs per beneficiary.** The value of cash distributions (USD 15.4 million) is much higher than food (USD 1.7 million).<sup>136</sup> For the entire CSP, food and cash costs per beneficiary are almost exactly the same (roughly USD 1.62 per beneficiary). However, when comparing annually, the food transfer costs per beneficiary are almost always higher than the same year cash transfer costs per beneficiary (Figure 21).<sup>137</sup> Cash transfers only cost more than food transfers for each SO once – a cash outlier in 2019. The 2019 SO3 cash transfer costs (up to USD 23 per beneficiary) were


<sup>135</sup> Calculations are based on food and cash values divided by total food and cash costs, and including associated staff salaries. Calculations cannot include adjusted DSC because this is not disaggregated by modality nor implementation costs because these are associated with overall activity management and cannot be ascribed to specific modalities.

<sup>136</sup> CPB – Plan vs Actuals Report. Data extracted for December 2022.

<sup>137</sup> Capacity strengthening transfers cannot be calculated on a cost per beneficiary basis.

due to a new project starting near the end of 2019. As a result, while all start-up costs for cash-based transfer (CBT) management were charged to 2019, very few beneficiaries were reached, leading to minimal average annual costs (down to just 5 US cents per beneficiary) in 2020 with roll-over effects into 2021 as the high 2019 values continued to 'subsidize' transfer costs.

**Figure 21: Transfer costs per beneficiary by year and activity (in USD)** <sup>138</sup>



Sources: CPB – Plan vs Actuals Report. Data extracted for December 2022. Beneficiary numbers are from Annual Country Report 2018-2022.

### 3.4 To what extent were alternative, more cost-effective measures considered?

#### Summary

Donor requirements primarily limited macro-level cost-effective measures. The country office explored cost-effective measures within its operating parameters – especially at the project level.

147. **Macro-level cost-effective measures are less relevant for a CCS-oriented CSP and are primarily limited by donor requirements.** Within a CCS-oriented CSP, alternative cost-effectiveness measures are less prominent because of the relatively low amounts of commodities that are transferred, and the fact that upstream work is inherently much more cost effective than direct assistance. Based on the discussions in EQ3.3, there are some cost-effectiveness measures related to transfers that could be assessed including prioritizing cash over food transfers or exploring local procurement for food distributions. As noted in EQ4.1, the CSP is supported by a large number of relatively small donors (24). The Typhoon Rai After-Action Review (AAR) and interviewed WFP staff and donors noted that merging donor requirements into a single, coherent response was one factor that delayed starting distributions. As noted in EQ3.1 and the analysis in EQ3.3, cash transfers would be more in line with the DSWD emergency response, be more timely, and have greater costs effectiveness. However, the flexibility of the country office to align with DSWD is restricted by differences in donor requirements or situational assessments (See EQ4.1).

148. **The country office explored cost-effective measures within its operating parameters.** Interviews and reports cite project-level cost-effective adjustments. For example, within the Anticipatory Action (AA) project, cash transfers were originally intended to be provided through a cash provider who had a global-level long-term agreement with WFP. However, WFP staff who were interviewed reported that, when they did the internal analysis, they found that these costs were much higher than alternative providers. This led to efforts in 2022 to set up alternative national providers. Other examples included

<sup>138</sup> Calculation based on division of cost of transfer by the number of beneficiaries reached in each modality (not including the commodity value but including staff costs. Excluding adjusted direct support costs or implementation costs, as these are not disaggregated by modality).

switching to online platforms during the pandemic for many activities. Food storage costs during humanitarian assistance frequently exceeded implementation plan costs, leading to AAR citations of cost-reduction options. At the national level, the country office initiated a task force to focus on reducing recurring costs, leading to sharing premises with other United Nations Agency colleagues to reduce office expenses.

## 2.4. EQ4: WHAT ARE THE FACTORS THAT EXPLAIN WFP PERFORMANCE AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT HAS MADE THE STRATEGIC SHIFT EXPECTED BY THE COUNTRY STRATEGIC PLAN?

### EQ4.1 To what extent has WFP been able to mobilize adequate, timely, predictable, and flexible resources to finance the CSP?

#### Summary

The CSP was under-resourced from 2018-2021. However, the 2021-2022 period is in a more positive resourcing situation. A surge in resourcing in 2022 distorts how well resourced the CSP has been on average. High levels of earmarking and excessive reliance on small, numerous donors present challenges for coherence and aggregated strategic actions. The distribution of resourcing affected CSP performance, with some SOs receiving very limited funding, forcing changes in scope from the original CSP design.

149. **The CSP was under-resourced from 2018-2021 but experienced a resourcing surge in 2021 from the Typhoon Rai response plus large new grants. This creates a perception of better overall CSP resourcing than was the case.** When CSPs were first rolled out in WFP, two assumptions regarding these new CSP structures were that: i) donors would be more willing to fund a CSP (rather than the previous WFP mechanisms); and ii) donors would be more willing to provide resourcing at the CSP level (rather than earmarking at the activity level). In the Philippines, these assumptions did not hold true – donors did not provide increased funding, and what funding there was came with a high degree of earmarking (discussed in following paragraph). Consequently, the CSP was under-resourced, and it had limited flexibility in shifting resources among the SOs. These implications are discussed in the following sections. Currently, the CSP is 65.6 percent funded against the needs-based plan (NBP) with Japan, Philippines, and the USA comprising the largest share (Table 21). Average annual resourcing varied between USD 6 million and USD 8 million between 2018-2021 before a major increase in resourcing in 2022 (Figure 22).

**Table 21: Resourcing by donor<sup>139</sup>**


Needs-based Plan (NBP) (US Dollars)			
93,935,878			
Donor	Allocated contributions (USD)	Share of NBP(%)	Share of the total contributions to the CSP (%)
Japan	\$11,879,001.10	12.6%	18.4%
USA	\$9,600,000.00	10.2%	14.9%
Philippines	\$9,462,554.65	10.1%	14.7%
Flexible funding	\$7,253,929.08	7.7%	11.2%
United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)	\$4,227,242.50	4.5%	6.6%
Private donors	\$4,787,129.44	5.1%	7.4%
Australia	\$2,415,453.70	2.6%	3.7%
Canada	\$2,206,461.80	2.3%	3.4%
France	\$893,162.53	1.0%	1.4%
Miscellaneous income	\$1,441,672.17	1.5%	2.2%
Regional or Trust Fund allocations	\$1,376,294.00	1.5%	2.1%
Emerging donor matching fund (EDMF)	\$1,000,000.00	1.1%	1.6%
Republic of Korea	\$600,000.00	0.6%	0.9%
European Commission	\$490,089.30	0.5%	0.8%

<sup>139</sup> Values include 2023 partial commitments. Does not include WFP internal resources.

World Bank	\$487,781.10	0.5%	0.8%
Ireland	\$829,373.33	0.9%	1.3%
UN Other Funds and Agencies (excl. CERF)	\$419,091.10	0.4%	0.6%
New Zealand	\$627,109.53	0.7%	1.0%
Italy	\$245,398.80	0.3%	0.4%
Germany	\$412,693.70	0.4%	0.6%
Luxembourg	\$266,524.52	0.3%	0.4%
Asian Development Bank	\$100,000.00	0.1%	0.2%
Switzerland	\$203,701.80	0.2%	0.3%
<b>NBP funded:</b>	<b>\$64,483,170</b>		
<b>% NBP funded:</b>	<b>68.65%</b>		

Source: CSP Philippines Resource Situation Report (2018-2022), FACTory. Extracted February 2023.


**Figure 22: Annual resourcing situation**



Source: CSP Philippines Resource Situation Report (2018-2022), FACTory. Extracted for December 2022.

150. **The CSP resourcing is challenged by high levels of earmarking to the activity level.** One of the intentions of the CSP architecture was to provide opportunities for flexible, multi-year funding commitments that would increase WFP's capacity to adapt to emerging opportunities and align programming with government priorities. However, this result has not been achieved in the Philippines. Only 20 percent of resourcing is earmarked to the country level while over 62 percent is earmarked to the activity level (Figure 23). Almost all donors provided some degree of activity-level earmarking. Even the flexible funding cited earlier as an important positive factor in the Typhoon Rai response was earmarked to Activity 5 for supply chain interventions and could not be applied to other interventions. Donors that did contribute at the country level tended to do so with relatively small amounts, and only one donor had no activity-level earmarking and contributed significant resourcing to the country level (Annex 9).

Figure 23: Allocated resources by earmarking level




Source: CSP Philippines Resource Situation Report (2018-2022), FACTory. Extracted for December 2022.

151. **Donor diversity presents challenges for coherence and aggregated strategic actions.** CSP resourcing is from a large number of donors who contribute relatively small amounts each year (Figure 24). Private donors as a group represent the fifth largest share of overall resourcing contributions (7 percent) but include nearly 20 different private donors. Annually, the CSP was resourced by 10 to 20 donors. In 2022, this number more than doubled to 43. This is mostly contributions to the Typhoon Rai response. According to WFP staff, donors, and national government authorities, the large number of small donors had several unintended negative consequences. First, as noted in EQ2.1 and EQ3.4, during the Typhoon Rai response, donor-specific modality (and sometimes geography) requirements delayed country office development of a timely and coherent response package. Second, the small grants, combined with high levels of earmarking, created an implementation environment dominated by many individual projects with limited inter-connectedness. This can be seen in the large number of pilot projects with few examples cited in documentation of subsequent scale-up. The short project implementation periods resulted in an array of projects being implemented in different geographic areas, with different personnel and targeting different stakeholders, resulting in disrupted relationships and continuity, according to subnational authorities, beneficiary, and WFP staff interviews. Engagement in the BARMM was notably different where the long-term geographic subnational focus allowed for the longer-term WFP personnel to provide a strategic overview, merging the collective action of multiple individual projects.



**Figure 24: Number of donors per year**



Source: CSP Philippines Resource Situation Report (2018-2022), FACTory. Extracted for December 2022.

152. **The distribution and predictability of resourcing affected CSP performance.** For the entire CSP, annual resource allocations are close to the annual NBP requirement (Table 22). However, this masks disparities among individual SO resourcing, which had a greater correlation with SO implementation achievements. The overall expenditure rates against implementation plan patterns vary among SOs (Table 23). As noted in EQ4.1, the high percentage of earmarked funds prevented internal CSP adjustments among SOs. SO1 expenditure rates rely on the occurrence of a natural disaster large enough to require government request for WFP assistance. Funding limitations led to SO2 expenditures gradually declining from the cancellation of the nutrient supplement transfers and shifting to a nutrition-sensitive programming support emphasis. SO3 and SO4 rates were driven by pandemic-related activity cancellations.

**Table 22: Annual country report (ACR) annual allocations against needs-based plan (NBP)**

Year	SO	NBP (USD)	Allocated Resources (USD)	Percentage
2018	1	6,923,922	5,048,767	73%
	2	758,860	533,718	70%
	3	1,188,333	1,150,013	97%
	4	900,995	1,795,881	199%
	Total	11,162,429	10,179,420	91%
2019	1	9,088,390	7,573,368	83%
	2	2,150,033	577,626	27%
	3	2,967,628	1,872,458	63%
	4	3,112,571	6,074,401	195%
	Total	20,440,804	19,167,531	94%
2020	1	11,832,700	8,541,076	72%
	2	2,804,157	577,626	21%
	3	4,562,853	2,573,896	56%
	4	6,966,476	11,290,694	162%
	Total	30,899,046	27,376,381	89%
2021	1	15,035,961	10,685,446	71%
	2	3,117,519	599,493	19%
	3	7,094,914	4,237,777	60%
	4	10,029,093	12,018,994	120%
	Total	42,073,918	36,556,448	87%
2022	1	27,535,471	21,469,592	78%
	2	554,196	494,692	89%
	3	5,815,128	8,230,644	141%
	4	9,717,887	6,814,498	70%
	Total	48,583,632	37,866,559	78%

Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

**Table 23: Annual country report (ACR) expenditure rates against implementation plan by activity**

Activity	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
1	55%	144%	177%	110%	81%
2	80%	45%	0.3%	1.3%	76%
3	81%	181%	19%	403%	15%
4	26%	208%	117%	102%	42% <sup>140</sup>
5	11%	363%	34%	30%	

Source: Annual country reports 2018-2022

153. **Since 2021, there is a more positive resourcing situation.** Several factors in 2021 contributed to a more positive resourcing outlook for the remainder of the CSP (2021-2023). According to interviews, and triangulated with ACR reports, the country office began a concerted effort to cultivate larger, more strategic, multi-year contributions to address earmarking and other resourcing challenges. The Typhoon Rai response set a precedence for resourcing opportunities for WFP to engage in subnational programming. The emergence of three new, large grants recorded in the annual resourcing situation report allowed for country office workforce expansion, as seen in the elaboration of the workforce capacity review and revised organigram. According to stakeholder interviews, this workforce expansion contributed to a positive cascade effect on strategic relationship building. DSWD stakeholders in particular highlighted that the quality of relationships with WFP had improved in the past two years.

#### EQ4.2 To what extent were the monitoring and reporting systems useful to track and demonstrate progress towards expected outcomes and to inform management decisions?

##### Summary

Monitoring of output and outcome indicators comply with Corporate Results Framework (CRF) requirements and there are examples of non-corporate monitoring data informing management decisions, although usually at the project level. The gaps in CCS outcome indicators limit the opportunities to identify high-level, long-term CCS contributions. There is evidence of country office development of improved monitoring to demonstrate progress towards outcomes. Even so, knowledge management limitations present challenges for maintaining institutional memory and strategic coherence.

154. **Monitoring of output and outcome indicators comply with CRF requirements and there are examples of monitoring data informing management decisions, although usually at the project level.** The country office complies with corporate requirements in ACR reporting on data availability, including the reporting of the corporate outcome, output and cross-cutting indicators described in the CRF. There is limited evidence that the monitoring systems for reporting on CSP CRF outputs and outcomes contributed to informing management decisions. However, there are examples of other forms of monitoring informing decisions for adjustments – particularly from the After-Action Reviews (AARs) or assessment data. In 2019, an AAR following a typhoon response noted specific challenges to communications, limited storage capacities, the importance of pre-positioning, and the need to develop improved logistics coordination. Activities including the GECS-MOVE initiative, contributions to warehouse capacities, logistics capacity assessments, and piloting financial pre-positioning were all subsequently integrated into SO4 activities. ACR reports cite an assessment on the impact of transfers on beneficiary households as leading to the adaptation of participation criteria to maximize impact.

155. **Gaps in CCS outcome indicator definition and tracking limit the opportunities to identify high-level long-term CCS contributions.** One of the challenges for monitoring and reporting on the CRF to inform decision making is that, as described in EQ2.1, there are limitations on the ability of the CRF to track contributions to long-term CCS outcomes, which can be a challenge for a CCS-oriented CSP. First, although the CSP is oriented to CCS activities, most indicators concern household beneficiary levels (such as FCS or CSI measures). The single CCS indicator used in the ACR reporting (*number of policies influenced by WFP*) cannot capture the nuance and diversity of engagements of CCS-related work. Second, the monitoring methodology limits tracking long-term effects of WFP interventions, further reducing the applicability of these corporate indicators to inform decision making in a CCS-oriented CSP.

156. **There is evidence of the country office developing improved monitoring to demonstrate progress towards outcomes, but knowledge management limitations present challenges for**

<sup>140</sup> ACR 2022 financial report did not include Activity level differentiation.

**maintaining institutional memory and strategic coherence.** ACRs and stakeholder interviews cited examples of elaborating new mechanisms to track contributions to CCS outcomes. Among these are the social cohesion survey to better track unintended effects related to WFP asset creation support in SO1 and SO3 FFA/CFA modalities and the piloting of the PRIME system to better understand WFP's effects on peacebuilding. However, there are opportunities to expand the knowledge management base in terms of developing a systematic CCS strategy based on evidence, and subsequently used to track progress. Only SO3 has documented evidence of capacity needs mapping at design and relatively few project-level or post-hoc impact evaluations. When combined with the high staff turnover discussed in EQ4.4, the lack of documentation inhibits maintaining institutional memory as cited by respondents who confirmed challenges in the first half of the CSP period in maintaining project continuity and ongoing strategic relationships.

### **EQ4.3: How did the partnerships and collaborations with other actors influence performance and results?**

#### Summary

For CCS contributions, the quality and continuity of relationships were important factors supporting positive outcomes. WFP facilitated good coordination within the United Nations Country Team (UNCT). With the national government, the CSP has had generally weaker strategic relationships but stronger technical partnerships. Operationally, the CSP has had effective partnerships with counterparts in humanitarian response, especially related to logistics and supply chain operations. At the subnational level, there are strong partnerships in BARMM in strategic, technical, and operational dimensions, which could serve as opportunities for replication in other regions. The quality of partnerships currently in other regions is weaker due to the episodic nature of WFP's subnational engagements. Private sector partnerships are a point of priority and represent high potential in the CSP, but there are challenges to coherent and strategic coordination.

157. **The quality and continuity of relationships supported positive CCS outcomes.** Partnerships and collaborations are influenced by the type of relationships (strategic, technical, operational), the type of partner (national government, subnational government, civil society/non-governmental organizations), and the continuity of relationships (long-term or sporadic). As noted in Section 1.3 and EQ2.1b, WFP has had a long history of engagements in the Philippines and many interviewed stakeholders identified this long-term presence as an important positive factor in supporting CCS (in spite of high staff turnover cited in EQ4.4 and institutional memory loss cited in EQ4.2). The level of technical expertise is another important factor in promoting positive outcomes. For example, based on interviewed stakeholders, SO2 personnel were considered national experts on nutrition and had good strategic relationships with nutrition-related government bodies such as the National Nutrition Council. Their technical expertise, combined with the continuity of relationships, allowed for substantive inputs into nutrition policy, even as SO2 experienced severe under-funding. The long-term continuity of WFP personnel operating in the BARMM was cited by BARMM authorities as one of the important success factors behind the development of the convergence model.

158. **WFP has facilitated good coordination within the UNCT.** WFP has a reputation for being actively engaged and for coordinating with a range of other United Nations agencies, including UNICEF, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations Development Programme. Interviewed UNCT members highlight positive relationships with WFP and an appreciation of WFP's contribution. WFP is seen as active in the various technical working groups and coordination platforms, particularly with respect to humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding (in BARMM). Stakeholders cited WFP's capacity to identify synergies for action in BARMM, triangulated from the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus case study.

159. **WFP has strong technical partnerships at national level, but strategic level partnerships only started gathering strength again in 2021.** Based on government interviews, WFP is historically seen to have had a strong, strategic partnership with national-level government. However, due to significant gaps in senior management positions in the country office prior to 2021, combined with resourcing shortfalls that meant reducing the scope of SO engagement (cited in EQ2.1), interviewed stakeholders perceived that WFP's strategic partnerships with government had been weakened during the 2018-2020

period. The type of resourcing available from multiple small donors with activity-level earmarking created multiple small-scale, technical projects, providing a specific technical input. These technical relationships remained positive but often episodic in nature without an overarching strategic relationship. In 2021, the country office was able to staff its senior management positions after a long gap. Combined with an intentional relationship-building exercise with government partners (and United Nations), this has improved government stakeholder perceptions regarding WFP's partnerships.

160. **Operationally, the CSP has good partnerships with government counterparts in humanitarian response, especially related to logistics and supply chain operations.** Interviewed government stakeholders and other partners consistently noted WFP's strengths in providing technical and operational support within supply chain and logistics operations, including providing training, carrying out assessments or contributing to revising systems. At the design stage, the CSP positioning was intended to provide technical assistance and support to the Philippines in Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), peacebuilding, CCA/DRRM, and nutrition. An important foundation of the corporate assumptions around CSP structure is that, given the existing government resources and capacity, WFP could be resourced by the Government itself to provide these technical assistance and CCS activities. While corporately not achieved to the level anticipated, the Philippines Government is the third largest donor to the CSP and much of this contribution is through the operational partnership with SO4 in the development of the GECS-MOVE project discussed in EQ2.1.

161. **At the subnational level, the BARMM office has strong partnerships in strategic, technical, and operational dimensions. Although outside of BARMM, partnerships are weaker due to the episodic nature of WFP's subnational programming.** Interviewed stakeholders perceived the long-term staff and multisectoral interventions implemented in BARMM as important factors in establishing strong partnerships in the region with examples (cited throughout EQ2.1) regarding WFP contributions to policy, systems, and community levels, responsiveness to emerging opportunities and building synergies with local actors. Annual country reports and the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus case study affirm interview observations. In contrast, the episodic, short-term nature of WFP's engagements in other areas at the subnational level through SO1 (and SO4 via the AA project) have led to weaker 'one-off' partnerships. The high staff turnover linked to short-term responses (or project) limits the sustainability of partnerships (EQ4.4). In the aftermath of the Typhoon Rai response, WFP is seen as having established strong partnerships in the affected regions. However, interviewed staff and partners noted concerns that, as the response winds down, this would weaken WFP's capacity to continue to support the area and maintain support to stakeholders in early recovery actions, or to build on the successes of the response itself.

162. **Private sector partnerships represent high potential and priority in the CSP but there are challenges to coherent and strategic coordination.** Private sector partnerships have become an increasing priority for strategic engagements representing (collectively) the fifth largest CSP donor (see Table 22) comprising nearly 20 private sector organizations. There is evidence of private sector partnerships in technical and operational arenas, especially in the nutrition sector where the country office has engaged with the private sector through the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Business Network around discussions on ongoing scale up of iron fortified rice (IFR). Private sector representatives have been involved in simulation exercises for logistics in humanitarian response. There are currently limited examples of aggregated private sector partnerships, except for the SUN Business Network, but such partnerships could potentially provide more strategic resourcing to the CSP beyond disparate individual private sector contributions. Table 24 summarizes the partnerships based on available evidence from interviews and document review.

**Table 24: Summary of country strategic plan (CSP) partnership quality by level**

Level	Type	Comments
National	Strategic	Staffing gaps reduced quality but has improved since 2021
National	Technical	Good long-term technical relationships
National	Operational	Good long-term operational relationships
Subnational	Strategic	Good in BARRM but weak elsewhere subnationally due to episodic nature of WFP engagements
Subnational	Technical	Good in BARRM but weak elsewhere subnationally due to episodic nature of WFP engagements
Subnational	Operational	Good in BARRM but weak elsewhere subnationally due to episodic nature of WFP engagements
Private sector	Strategic	Limited examples of strategic relationships with private sector
Private sector	Technical	Limited examples of technical relationships with private sector but this is a point of interest since 2021
Private sector	Operational	Good positive operational relationships with private sector based on resourcing of humanitarian response actions
NGO/CSO	Strategic	Limited evidence of WFP participation in strategic national coalitions or platforms of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/civil society organizations (CSOs), except in BARRM
NGO/CSO	Technical	Evidence of technical relationships with NGOs/CSOs in technical assistance activities including in BARRM
NGO/CSO	Operational	Strong partnerships in BARRM and during humanitarian response actions elsewhere. Episodic partnerships in the humanitarian action field.

Source: Evaluation team compiled based on interviews and document review. **Green** = good relationships. Light green = somewhat good or inconsistencies. **Yellow** = weak relationships. **Orange** = negative relationships.

#### **EQ4.4 To what extent did the country office have appropriate human resources capacity to deliver on the CSP?**

##### Summary

The CSP human resources capacity can be characterized by two different phases within the CSP. The 2018-2020 period had limited staff numbers, high turnover, limited contracts, and significant staffing gaps. The 2021-2022 period saw increased staff numbers, expanded contract opportunities, and filled staffing gaps. This has improved the human resources capacity to deliver in the CSP.

163. **The CSP staffing structure from 2018-2020 experienced high turnover and staff members were sometimes placed in positions not suitable for their expertise.** Annual country reports and evaluation interviews highlight that, during the 2018-2020 period, the CSP was characterized by a combination of staff reductions due to limited resourcing and frequent turnover of existing staff. The nature of the staffing challenges differed between BARRM and Manila. In Manila, challenges involved high turnover, while in BARRM, the challenges included that there were not enough staff to take on strategic responsibilities. In both situations, the turnover and the limited staffing sometimes led to placing staff members in positions not commensurate with their expertise.

164. **Gaps in key positions reduced coherence, expertise, and implementation throughout the CSP cycle.** Among the senior management positions, there were long-term gaps in the positions of Country Director, Deputy Country Director, Head of Programme, and SO managers on different occasions. Among senior management, SO3 was the only SO that had had a single, continuous manager throughout the CSP period. These senior-level gaps were one factor cited by WFP and government stakeholders as influencing the decline in the quality of strategic relationships with key government departments during the first three years of the CSP.

165. **In 2021-2022, organizational realignment processes began to better position human resource capacity to respond to the CSP aspirations.** Facilitated by the surge in resourcing following the Typhoon Rai response, the country office undertook a workforce realignment review in 2021, leading to recommendations around workforce alignment. This included expanding the level of technical expertise in existing positions, opening new positions to attract new technical expertise, and restructuring national contracts to better recognize existing national staff technical expertise. An organizational alignment

implementation plan, published in April 2022, outlines a two-wave recruitment approach to adequately staff the recommended workforce alignment. The first wave prioritized senior positions and vacated positions. The second recruitment wave targeted expanded capacity to meet operational demands, particularly in Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), climate change adaptation (CCA), and cash transfers. Of more than 90 positions in the country office, nearly half will be newly created, or have changed contract grades or contract modalities.<sup>141</sup> These structural changes are too recent to provide evidence of changes in CSP performance, but there is an expectation from WFP staff that these will provide enhanced CSP performance. Furthermore, WFP staff note that there has been an improvement in morale since the re-alignment.

#### **EQ4.5: What are the other factors that can explain WFP performance and the extent to which it has made the strategic shift expected by the CSP?**

##### Summary

Primary factors affecting WFP performance include the CSP architecture, impact of the pandemic on activity implementation and government priorities, and misalignment of CCS efforts with existing corporate processes and reporting formats. Strong national interests and capacities for CSP-related components and the decentralization structure in government presented both limitations and opportunities for WFP CSP engagement.

166. **Factors affecting results have already been cited throughout the narrative.** Previously identified factors included: the CSP architecture creating segmented working and limiting opportunities for synergies (EQ1.3); the pandemic affecting WFP planned activities; the necessity to develop new activities and shifts in donor and government priorities (EQ2.1); and the shortfalls in aligning a CCS-oriented CSP with existing corporate processes and reporting formats (EQ4.2). Two other factors affected WFP performance – the first was positive, and the second had both positive and negative implications.

167. **Strong alignment of CSP-related components with national priorities combined with high government capacities enable robust engagement with WFP.** The Philippines Government has a strong interest in the key components of the CSP, including emergency response, DRRM, CCA, EPR. This interest, combined with high government capacity, provides a solid, enabling environment for WFP to engage. For example, the government has an extensive and well-structured disaster response programme under the DSWD and a structured ‘national cluster’ system to coordinate government departments and agencies during a disaster response. The Government manages nearly all disaster responses without international assistance. Consequently, there is significant support and interest within government for shock-responsive social protection and disaster response capacity development. The vulnerability of the Philippines to climactic shocks results in the Government being highly supportive of, and interested in, strengthening systems around CCA and DRRM.

168. **The decentralization structure in government presented both a limitation and opportunity for WFP engagement within the CSP.** There are bottlenecks in cascading national-level policies, processes, and capacities to subnational levels in EPR, DRRM, CCA, and disaster response. Interviewed respondents cited the decentralized structure of subnational government as one contributing factor to bottlenecks. The degree of regional autonomy was seen to limit the degree of uptake of national-level policies, systems, or processes. This is triangulated with observations from the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening and noted in annual country reports. WFP was also perceived by respondents to have the potential to play a strong role in supporting subnational capacity building by working directly with subnational authorities within their own contexts. This was evidenced by its historical engagements at the subnational level before the CSP development and its current work in the BARRM.

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<sup>141</sup> WFP. 2022. Outcome of Workforce Planning Exercise PHCO. 7 April 2022. PPT presentation.

# 3. Conclusions and recommendations

## 3.1. CONCLUSIONS

**Conclusion 1: The shift to the CSP has somewhat facilitated WFP's strategic positioning, at least from 2021 and collaboration with the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) in supporting the Government to achieve its Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets. It has contributed to increased strategic engagement across the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus, particularly in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and improved operational flexibility and responsiveness, but did not result in expanded resource mobilization.<sup>142</sup>**

169. The shift to the country strategic plan (CSP) facilitated WFP strategic positioning for country capacity strengthening (CCS) as part of the overall UNCT approach for supporting the Philippine Government in achieving its SDG targets. The strategic positioning is relevant for contributions across the entire nexus. Although the CSP contributed to increased engagement with government, particularly at technical levels, the country office had limited senior-level expertise in CCS. WFP's focus on food security limited its inclusion in conversations around peacebuilding, except in BARMM. When first rolled out, two corporate assumptions behind CSPs were that: i) donors would be more willing to fund a CSP (rather than the previous single operation approach); and ii) donors would be more willing to provide resourcing at the level of the CSP or strategic outcome rather than earmarking). In the Philippines, these assumptions did not hold true – donors did not provide increased funding, and what funding there was came with a high degree of earmarking at activity level. Donors' continued perception of WFP as a primarily emergency response agency in the Philippines has impeded fundraising for a primarily CCS-focused CSP. This, combined with contributions heavily earmarked at the activity level, resulted in the CSP being under-resourced for the first three years, and with limited flexibility to shift resources among the strategic outcomes (SOs). Alongside other vacant senior management positions, this reduced strategic partnership opportunities.

**Conclusion 2: CSP interventions are aligned with existing priorities of relevant government partners. The CSP has primarily supported policies (Pathway 1) and programme design (Pathway 4) with less investment in strategic planning and financing (Pathway 3) and engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs)/private sector (Pathway 5).**

170. Given the high national-level capacity of government partners, the CSP interventions are complementary to existing government interventions, and align with existing priorities and policies. The CSP technical assistance has focused on policies and programme design. There has been less focus on strategic planning and financing and the engagement of CSOs/private sector. The CSP has invested most in national-level partnerships, with more limited expansion into subnational capacity strengthening, with the exception of BARMM. Until 2021, the limited and highly earmarked CSP resourcing reduced WFP's capacity and ability to provide follow-up support for use of products transferred to government partners – ranging from study results to databases or material products such as the Government Emergency Communication System – Mobile Operations Vehicle for Emergencies (GECS-MOVE) vehicles.

**Conclusion 3: There are substantive contributions to CCS through technical assistance related to food security and emergency response that reflect two distinct phases period of the CSP. Gaps in WFP's indicator definitions and tracking limit opportunities to identify the contributions to strategic outcomes of WFP interventions.**

171. CCS contributions can be identified in vulnerability analysis, food security analysis, data mapping, and logistical and supply chain technical assistance. The patterns in CSP CCS performance reflect a 'two-phase' period within the CSP. An initial 'stagnation' period characterized by resource constraints, high staff turnover, and pandemic disruptions, necessitated significant reductions in the scope of some of the SOs

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<sup>142</sup> The expanded resourcing in 2022 was not due to the CSP architecture but the occurrence of a major emergency. Since this funding could have been managed through a traditional emergency operations, the CSP architecture cannot be given credit for improving the 2022 resourcing.

against original plans, leading to fewer CCS contributions. From 2021, the CSP moved into a period of increased resourcing and staffing, which led to a re-expansion of CSP scope and re-established strategic relationships with government. Even with short-term underachievement of food and cash transfers, there is evidence of long-term contributions to outcomes. WFP is recognized by partners for strengthening government capacity in vulnerability mapping, food security analysis, and extensive data mapping and analysis. However, WFP's own evidence base for outcome-level achievements in peacebuilding, social cohesion and CCS capacity strengthening is impeded by the absence of strong outcome-level indicators related to these dimensions within the current Corporate Results Framework.

**Conclusion 4: The CSP appropriately anticipated a crisis response option, however, the response mechanisms in place were not effective to support a timely large-scale response.**

172. The initial expectation of the CSP design was to be focused on technical assistance and not direct distributions. The intention had been to move SO4 staff to humanitarian assistance if required. Although small-scale interventions in direct distribution occurred throughout the CSP, there were challenges to scaling up during the large-scale Typhoon Rai emergency response. This was partly because the country office response plan had not been maintained annually and SO4 staff sometimes lacked the requisite humanitarian response experience to manage the large-scale response.

**Conclusion 5: Under-resourcing, particularly during the first three years of the CSP, created a cascade effect on project performance and staffing profiles, which delayed achieving CSP results.**

173. The resourcing situation in the first three years disrupted CSP functioning. Challenges in strategic partnership building resulted in most funding commitments coming from small-scale grants, with a disproportionate share of earmarking to the activity level, which limited flexibility. Partnerships are strong with humanitarian donors but lack sufficient sectoral diversity, concentrating much of WFP assistance for humanitarian response. There is limited funding from peacebuilding or social protection donors including foundations or outreach to private sector. Consequently, the early years of the CSP saw a plethora of smaller, individual projects with weak interconnections and an inability to scale up or institutionalize studies and pilots. Short project cycles reduced the potential for continuity with targeted stakeholders, regions, or sectors. The resourcing characteristics led to staffing shortfalls with substantive gaps in staffing positions and frequent turnover contributing to weak institutional memory (exacerbated by limited knowledge management to mitigate these transitions). Resourcing improved markedly beginning in 2021 due to the Typhoon Rai response and the approval of three large grants. This has allowed the country office to re-align staffing positions and take measures to reduce turnover.

**Conclusion 6: There is improvement in gender responsiveness over the CSP period. Accountability to affected populations was ensured, and environmental risks mitigated, but there were gaps in addressing protection during large-scale assistance.**

174. Gender considerations and broader equity and inclusion dimensions were integrated into the CSP design and implementation, including ensuring adequate representation and participation of women in assistance programmes. The country office has steadily improved on Gender and Age Marker (GAM) scores since the beginning of the CSP, and the country office has strengthened gender support with the addition of a gender advisor position. Hotline data illustrate increased improvements in Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) with high feedback closure rates. Environmental risks are part of project implementation in SO3 and SO4. Although protection scores well on the standard corporate quantitative data, the qualitative data suggests that there are some concerns with how protection standards are applied, especially in the context of large-scale emergencies. Protection support is under-resourced at the country office.

**Conclusion 7: Country capacity strengthening in social protection is present but dispersed across multiple SOs, which impedes coherent engagement in the field.**

175. Contributions to social protection were made during the CSP but dispersed among different SOs. This lacked the systematic conceptual framework to strategically position WFP in social protection (SP) and shock-responsive social protection (SRSP). Stakeholders perceive WFP to have a valid role in SP, and identified potential entry points for SRSP and SP, including in the social safety nets and the pillars of the government's Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) SP framework. Stakeholders also viewed WFP's comparative advantages in data, analysis, and mapping as potential entry into refining government SP and SRSP targeting and coverage criteria, assessing transfer values, and monitoring government programmes



(such as with the Social Amelioration Programme in 2020). Finally, stakeholders perceived that WFP's primary advantage in SP and SRSP would be in strengthening subnational capacities.

**Conclusion 8: WFP's experience and comparative advantages make it well positioned to expand its subnational presence.**

176. WFP is recognized as a major actor in Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) and humanitarian assistance programming, and brings a field presence and a reputation for practical, proactive, and flexible responsiveness. At the subnational level, the CSP employed two models for CCS: the first was an integrated cross-sectoral approach in a single geographic location (BARMM); and the second strengthened local capacities in a single institutional component across a wider geographic region. The 'geographic dependent' multisectoral interventions for CCS found in BARMM provided opportunities for long-term engagement and continuity, with a focused set of subnational actors in a particular region. The second model allowed for widespread diffusion of a specific sectoral theme or technical expertise through collaborations with the department responsible for supporting vertical cohesion within the government. WFP is well-positioned to expand its subnational presence: WFP has experience with both CCS approaches; it has a strong reputation among government and United Nations agencies; and there is government interest in WFP expanding its subnational outreach..

### 3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

177. During the past calendar year, the country office has had four major review or evaluation events: i) the Typhoon Rai After Action Review; ii) the CSP Mid-Term Review (MTR); iii) the Decentralized Evaluation of Capacity Strengthening; and iv) the Social Protection Scoping Study. Each of these studies presented a set of recommendations to the country office for response (summarized in Annex 9). Table 25 affirms the previous recommendations. The evaluation makes three operational and three strategic recommendations to address key issues for the Philippines in the next CSP. Annex 10 links conclusions to recommendations.

**Table 25: Recommendations**

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
1	Systematic use of the country capacity strengthening framework: When developing the next country strategic plan, WFP should strengthen the utilization of the corporate country capacity strengthening and corporate results frameworks to develop a country-specific country capacity strengthening strategy, approach, road map and monitoring framework to guide country office interventions. (This recommendation reaffirms the recommendations from the decentralized evaluation on capacity strengthening.)	Strategic				
1.1	Based on the theory of change developed for the next country strategic plan, map the country capacity strengthening-related needs of different stakeholders to identify approaches for its engagement in country capacity strengthening at the national and subnational levels.			Regional bureau CCS adviser and research, assessment and monitoring unit	High	December 2023
1.2	In consultation with government partners, develop a strategy to guide the implementation of and learning from country capacity strengthening. Relevant national government partners could include the National Economic and Development Authority. Alternatively, in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim		Country office	Regional bureau CCS adviser	High	January 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	Mindanao, form an intergovernmental steering committee that is based on a partnership model, builds on the 2019 capacity needs mapping exercise and can guide the country office's country capacity strengthening activities at the national and subnational levels.					
2	Social protection strategic positioning: WFP should ensure that the new country strategic plan includes a coherent strategy for social protection, while continuing to expand its social protection strategic positioning, including in nutrition-sensitive social protection. WFP's strategic position should be not only in shock-responsive social protection but also within the larger social protection sphere, and its strategy should include the identification of appropriate pillars and technical approaches for providing support within the Government's social protection strategy and programming framework. In particular, WFP should identify its potential role in supporting subnational government social protection systems. (This recommendation reaffirms the recommendations from the social protection scoping study.)	Strategic				
2.1	Articulate WFP's social protection positioning, with the Government and within the United Nations country team, in relation to national social protection systems, possibly through a disaster risk reduction and mitigation perspective that fosters people's ability to meet their food security, nutrition and other essential needs, including in response to shocks and other stressors.		Country office	Regional bureau	High	December 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
2.2	Identify areas in the national social protection framework and system where the next country strategic plan can contribute to the strengthening and development of a country strategic plan-level social protection strategy and monitoring framework, including for nutrition-sensitive social protection. This work should include the articulation of avenues for providing technical support, such as information management systems, monitoring and evaluation systems or contributions to policies and guidelines.			Regional bureau; headquarters Social Protection Unit	Medium	June 2024
2.3	With a view to contributing to social protection, build a larger overarching programming approach to resilience that can serve as a conceptual framework for broadening WFP's engagement in resilience building, geographically and thematically.			Regional bureau; headquarters Social Protection Unit	Medium	June 2024
3	Internal capacity for humanitarian response: In the next country strategic plan, WFP should build on lessons learned from the Typhoon Rai response so as to sustain the country office's internal capacity to scale up and mobilize an emergency response. (This recommendation reaffirms the recommendations from the Typhoon Rai after-action review.)	Operational				
3.1	Retain and strengthen in-house emergency preparedness and response capacity and prioritize capacity strengthening activities, including by articulating roles and responsibilities in a direct response.		Country office	Regional bureau; headquarters Human Resources Division (HRM) and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	January 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
3.2	Develop rosters of external entities and pre-formulated comprehensive field-level agreements with cooperating partners.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	January 2024
3.3	Develop a response strategy or plan and review its implementation annually.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	June 2024
3.4	Advocate with potential donors for flexible unearmarked funding that will allow WFP to implement efficient emergency and early recovery responses based on evolving needs, including by providing flexibility regarding the transfer modalities used and the geographic areas covered.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM and Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch	High	December 2023
4	Subnational engagement in country capacity strengthening: Consistent with the Government's decentralization efforts, and drawing on the best practices from available studies such as the mid-term review of the country strategic plan, the decentralized capacity strengthening evaluation and the social protection scoping study, under the next country strategic plan, WFP should seek to expand its engagement in country capacity strengthening at the subnational level.	Strategic				

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
4.1	Identify two or three localities in which to consider replicating the multisectoral model developed for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The sites could be identified from a combination of relevant vulnerability data (from vulnerability analysis and mapping on climate change and food security, and the Government's Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program modelling) or a capacity needs mapping exercise carried out in collaboration with the Government.			Regional bureau and headquarters Research, Assessment and Monitoring Division (RAM) and Country Capacity Strengthening Unit (PROTC)	High	June 2024
4.2	For subnational country capacity strengthening in emergency preparedness and response under the next country strategic plan, initiate partnerships with relevant national government agencies that can provide country capacity strengthening at the local level. Such agencies may include, but are not limited to, local governance units, mayors' associations and associated government ministries and structures.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	High	January 2024
5	Resource management: Under the next country strategic plan, WFP should continue to refine and diversify its financial and human resources capacities, building on the recently completed workforce review and implementing the recommendations from the country strategic plan mid-term review, decentralized capacity strengthening evaluation and social protection scoping study regarding the need to continue to expand staff capacities and develop an organizational culture consistent with WFP's agenda of saving lives and changing lives, while expanding the partnership and resourcing base.	Operational				

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
	<i>Section 1: Resource diversification</i>					
5.1	Develop a strategy for diversifying the current donor base, with a particular focus on private sector bodies and international financial institutions, such as those in the social protection sphere, and prioritizing flexible, multi-year funding.		Country office	Regional bureau; headquarters Private Partnerships and Fundraising Division and Public Partnerships and Resourcing Division	Medium	December 2023
5.2	Develop a clear strategy for supporting advocacy and communication regarding WFP's technical expertise in the three dimensions of the triple nexus – development, crisis response and peacebuilding. Apply specific examples from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to support the strategy.			Regional bureau; headquarters Private Partnerships and Fundraising Division, Public Partnerships and Resourcing Division and Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Programmes Service	Medium	February 2024
	<i>Section 2: Workforce management</i>					
5.3	Conduct a corporate workforce planning exercise aligned with the needs of the next country strategic plan, including those regarding in-house expertise in social protection, resilience building, and support for cross-cutting themes such as protection.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM	High	December 2023

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
5.4	Ensure that there are adequate human resources and skills available within the country office workforce for a timely scale-up in the event of a large-scale humanitarian response.			Regional bureau; headquarters HRM	High	December 2023



#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
6	Evidence base and knowledge management: Under the next country strategic plan, WFP should invest further in knowledge management for informing programme decision-making and should strengthen the conceptual linkages between strategic outcomes, track long-term progress under the country strategic plan against country capacity strengthening indicators and strengthen institutional memory.	Operational	Country office			
6.1	Carry out an exercise to identify common indicators across the strategic outcomes in order to increase the internal coherence of the country strategic plan and strengthen the conceptual linkages between the overarching strategic objectives in the new country strategic plan structure.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	Medium	March 2024
6.2	Review the findings of the 2017 zero hunger strategic review to identify progress in capacity strengthening since 2017 and inform the implementation of the next country strategic plan.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC; United Nations country team representatives	Medium	March 2024

#	Recommendation	Recommendation type	Responsible WFP offices and divisions	Other contributing entities	Priority	Deadline for completion
6.3	Where possible, adapt the corporate country capacity strengthening framework, the 2022 policy update and the corporate results frameworks to the country setting. This work may include identifying country-specific country capacity strengthening indicators for measuring and reporting on the country capacity strengthening process, capturing results over the long term and possibly including indicators for measuring government- and community-based social cohesion and the strengthening of training modalities for country capacity strengthening.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	High	January 2024
6.4	Consider investing financial and human resources in strengthening the internal knowledge management systems that support institutional memory, for learning and advocacy.			Regional bureau and headquarters RAM and PROTC	High	March 2024

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