



WFP EVALUATION



World Food Programme

SAVING LIVES
CHANGING LIVES

Mid-Term Evaluation of WFP's Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising Strategy 2020-2025

Decentralized Evaluation Report
(2020-2022)

Private Partnerships and Fundraising Division (PPF)
United Nations World Food Programme

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Disclaimer

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Acronyms

BCG	Boston Consulting Group
CAGR	Compound Annual Growth Rate
CAM	Communications, Advocacy, and Marketing
CCI	Critical Corporate Initiative
CCS	Country Capacity Strengthening
CO	Country Office
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
DD	Due Diligence
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
DRTV	Direct Response Television
DSM	Dutch State Mines
EB	Executive Board
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
GE	Gender Equality
GO	Global Office
HQ	Headquarters
IAF	Impact Assessment Framework
IF	Individual Fundraising
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFL FORUM	International Fundraising Leadership Forum
IG	Individual Giving
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
INKA	Innovation Accelerator
ISC	Indirect Support Costs
JAWFP	Japan Association for World Food Programme
LAC	Latina America and Caribbean region
LDS	Latter Day Saints

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PPF	Private Partnerships and Fundraising
PPR	Public Partnerships and Resourcing
PSPF	Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising
RB	Regional Bureau
RBN	Regional Bureau for Eastern Africa
SBN	Scaling Up Nutrition Business Network
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SSTC	South-South and Triangular Cooperation
STM	Share The Meal
STR	Strategic Partnerships Division
ToR	Terms of Reference
UHNWI	Ultra-High Net Worth Individuals
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

KEY EVALUATION FEATURES

1. Objectives and Scope: The formative mid-term evaluation of the WFP Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising (PSPF) Strategy (2020-2025), commissioned by the Private Partnerships and Fundraising (PPF) team, served the dual objectives of accountability and learning. Gender equality and broader inclusion considerations were mainstreamed into these objectives. The evaluation was timed to allow for taking stock of results achieved at mid-term of the six-year Strategy and inform course-corrections during the remaining implementation period. The evaluation covered all activities, interventions, and processes under the Strategy from 2020-2022.

2. The three main evaluation questions were:

- EQ1: How good were the Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising strategy and its execution to date?
- EQ2: Are the results of strategy implementation on track to meet 6-year targets?
- EQ3: How have internal and external factors influenced strategy implementation and achievements to date?

3. Primary intended users of the evaluation are the PPF Division and the Partnerships and Advocacy Assistant Executive Director (PA AED). Other users are the Communications, Advocacy and Marketing (CAM) team; Legal Office team, Public Partnerships and Resourcing (PPR) division, and WFP technical units. Additional internal stakeholders are WFP Global Offices (GO), Regional Bureaux (RB), Country Offices (CO), and WFP Leadership Group. External users and stakeholders are WFP Friends organizations in the United States, Japan, and Italy, WFP corporate and foundation partners, and Executive Board members.


4. Methodology: Between April and September 2023, the independent evaluation team implemented an evaluation design consisting of (i) retrospective construction of a theory of change for the Strategy; (ii) development of a typology of private sector partnerships; (iii) development of an evaluation matrix; (iv) review of internal and external documents and relevant literature and datasets; (v) remotely conducted stakeholder interviews with WFP HQ, RB and CO staff, WFP Friends organizations, and WFP technical units; (vi) web-based survey of all WFP COs; (vii) review of nine partnership exemplars and (viii) a review of the comparator organizations UNICEF, UNHCR, and WWF. Due to the nature of the evaluation, no consultations were conducted with populations affected by WFP programming. A dedicated evaluation sub-question addressed gender equality and broader inclusion considerations. The utilization focused and participatory approach engaged stakeholders through interviews, a survey, and remote working sessions.

5. Terminology: Aligned with the PSPF Strategy, the evaluation uses the term ‘private sector’ to refer to individuals, foundations, and businesses.

6. Limitations for the evaluation: included delays in obtaining relevant documents and data and scheduling interviews; lack of data on some Strategy pillars and in relation to gender equality and inclusion; and turnover of PPF leadership during the evaluation process.

Subject of the evaluation

7. The PSPF Strategy was approved in November 2019, two years into implementation of the WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021). It built upon the three mutually supporting pillars of ‘impact’, ‘income’, and ‘innovation’ with related targets shown in the figure below.



8. Compared to previous strategies, the 2020-2025 Strategy introduced the following new dimensions: A corporate approach to investing in individual fundraising (IF); a commitment to grow WFP's private sector partnerships valued at more than USD 1 million, and to increase income generated from foundations; the aim to increase CO engagement with the private sector in support of country strategic plans (CSP); and the intent to develop a methodology for measuring and evaluating the impact of technical partnerships.

9. Sources of funding for Strategy implementation were, for the Individual Fundraising (IF) programme, a USD 52 million Critical Corporate Initiative (CCI) investment, a USD 31.4 million loan from the Capital Budgeting Facility to be repaid by retained IF income by 2030 and retained income from donations generated. Other parts of Strategy implementation were financed through existing PPF PSA budget.

10. Relevant contextual changes included the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Changes within WFP included approval of a new WFP Strategic Plan (2022-2025), and appointment of a new WFP Executive Director in 2023.

MAIN FINDINGS

[EQ 1: Strategy Quality and Investments into Strategy Implementation](#)


11. The PSPF Strategy was, and remained, relevant to WFP corporate priorities to diversify the organization's income sources, expand access to flexible funding, and work in partnership with other actors. It constituted an important milestone by emphasizing the potential of the private sector to act both as a source of flexible and sustainable income for WFP as well as a valued technical and innovation partner in support of WFP impact.

12. It clearly stated WFP's ambition for individual fundraising but provided only limited direction for partnerships and for what 'success' of Strategy implementation would look like at regional and country levels. The Strategy did not articulate explicit gender and broader inclusion considerations and did not elaborate on the specific role of 'innovation' for Strategy implementation. Structuring the Strategy and its targets along the pillars of 'impact', 'income', and 'innovation' provided for a compelling narrative but was less effective for providing integrated strategic direction and prioritizing activities towards Zero Hunger across pillars.

13. The upfront investment into Individual Fundraising, based on a solid business case, was a critical enabler for WFP to effectively tap into the global individual fundraising market. Successful individual fundraising programmes established by peer organizations such as UNICEF and UNHCR are characterised by high levels of up-front and sustained investment in fundraising channels and markets. PPF invested 12% of

investment expenditures into WFP Friends organizations in the US and Japan. This stimulated considerable fundraising growth in both markets, generating significant contributions to WFP. See figure below.

Figure i.i WFP Friends Income 2019-22 and PPF Investment 2020-22



14. To facilitate Strategy implementation, PPF increased its human resource capacity. Growth of the IF programme solely relied on the recruitment of consultants. Modest growth of the Global Partnership team, PPF support functions and regional partnership officers (total of 12 new positions since 2019) was funded through the WFP PSA budget. There were no dedicated financial or human resources to foster innovation, reflecting the absence of a systematic approach to the innovation dimension particularly on the partnership side. (This was less of a challenge for individual fundraising given the innovative nature of the overall IF programme).

[EQ 2: Results of Strategy Implementation](#)

Overarching results

15. At mid-term, WFP is on track to meeting or exceeding several of the PSPF Strategy’s high-level 6-year targets. Strategy targets varied in their level of ambition, and some targets, especially for the ‘impact’ pillar, were not systematically tracked.

16. Total WFP private sector revenue increased by over 400% between 2019-2022, considerably more than that of peer organizations, with the private sector becoming the organization’s fourth largest donor overall and a significant contributor of WFP flexible funding. WFP achieved sector leading growth for both emergency and non-emergency funding during the 2019-2022 period, with 232% year on year increase in emergency funding against a peer average of 151%, and 175% increase in non-emergency income against a peer average of 9%. Private sector contributions to WFP flexible income increased by 120% during 2019-2022, driven especially by growth of individual fundraising. See figures below.

Figure i.ii Flexible Income by Source





Figure i.iii PPF Revenue 2019-22 by Income Stream




17. PPF's contribution to WFP in terms of Indirect Support Costs (ISC) increased by over 500% since 2019, making it a strong net contributor to organizational operational costs. By the end of 2022, PPF had effectively repaid 92% of WFP's USD 74m non-repayable investments for 2020-2022 (USD 52m CCI investment and PSA budget. PPF ISC contributions during this period were USD 64m). The non-repayable WFP investment will deliver a positive return on investment from 2023, while generating sustainable contributions for saving and changing lives.

Individual Fundraising and Global Philanthropy

18. In only three years, WFP succeeded in establishing and achieving sector leading growth of its Individual Fundraising programme, from USD 22m to USD 104m in 2019-2022. This is remarkable when compared to growth trajectories of other UN/peer organizations during the same period. Annual income for growth exceeded the ambitious projection model in 2020 and 2021, despite the IF team still being in start-up mode. In 2022, the programme achieved 94% of the projected annual target. See figure below. Individual Fundraising made significant contributions to both global emergency appeals and to non-emergency causes.


Figure i.iv Actual IF Income in US\$m vs Strategy Projections 2019-2022



19. Growth of the IF programme during the 2020-2022 period was achieved solely through digital channels in a unique global, digital-led approach. This allowed scaling fundraising for WFP globally despite the absence of locally registered fundraising entities, which is the traditional but costly route used by other UN agencies and INGOs to enter new markets. Since 2020, the IF programme increased the value of supporters recruited, average donation levels and shares of regular givers (from 29% in 2020 to 43% in 2022). To ensure continued growth, the IF team is working on further diversifying its fundraising channels to overcome its initial reliance on Meta. At mid-term, Individual Fundraising is on a growth trajectory but may not fully meet all Strategy targets by 2025 because the targets are no longer aligned with WFP's changing context and evolving global operational realities.

20. The Strategy's restrictive and short-termed investment model is posing risks to long-term revenue sustainability of the individual fundraising programme. Retainer income did not grow commensurate with the original investment model as income retained by WFP Friends organizations is re-invested by these (see figure below, which highlights the retainer amount assumed in the investment model was higher than the actual amount retained by the division (22% vs. 15%)). This is leaving a critical gap in retainer income for IF programme activities and for optimisation of the investment. Compared to investments into individual fundraising made by peer organizations (UNICEF, UNHCR), the five-year timeframe of the investment was short.

Figure i.v Retainer Model vs Actual/Estimates



21. While not mentioned in the Strategy, global philanthropy emerged in 2021 as a promising additional individual fundraising stream. Initial successes in 2022 included USD 9m raised from Ultra High Net Worth Individuals (UNHWI) by PPF. PPF is still in the process of developing a systematic approach to pursuing related opportunities in collaboration with other WFP teams and units and Friends organizations.

Corporate and Foundation Partnerships

22. Income generated from corporate partnerships in 2020-2022 regularly exceeded the Strategy target of raising USD 50m annually, achieving USD 198m in 2022. Related success was facilitated by an increasingly systematic and professionalized approach to developing and managing global partnerships, with a focus on partnerships with the greatest financial value (+USD 1m) to WFP (see left figure below). The number of partnerships reporting gifts in-kind remained static, with a gradual decline in their value (see figure on the right).

Figure i.vi Total Revenue 2020-22 by partnership size (USDm)





Figure i.vii Partnerships Cash (USUSD 1m+pa) vs in Kind




23. Existing organizational ambition and steer are not yet clearly focused on leveraging corporate partnerships for Zero Hunger. As of the end of 2022, WFP had not yet developed clear guidance for prioritizing partnership opportunities. Beyond income, monitoring and reporting on partnerships is done on a case-by-case basis, without distinguishing partnership types, values exchanged, or contributions to mission. This limits WFP’s oversight for monitoring performance and risks.

24. Fundraising from foundations exceeded the Strategy’s target of USD 25m annually by more than tenfold. The creation of a dedicated Foundations team within PPF in 2020 contributed to making WFP’s approach to partnering with foundations increasingly proactive and strategic. Since 2020, foundation grants and partnerships grew from 8 grants from 4 donors totalling USD 49m, to 15 grants from 9 donors in 2022

totalling USD 276m. While future income is likely to fluctuate, there is potential for further growth of this channel, especially in the US. See figure below.

Figure i.viii Foundations/NGO Income by Source



25. The spectrum of existing WFP corporate and foundation partnerships is richer and more diverse than indicated in the Strategy, spanning from ‘philanthropic’ (driven by funding to WFP) to ‘shared value’ partnerships (driven by jointly pursuing social or environmental impact in ways that also enable commercial sustainability). Consulted global partners expressed a strong interest in increasingly engaging in mission-driven partnerships towards ‘shared value’ or ‘collective impact’ type partnerships aiming to affect sustainable systems level change. Values exchanged in existing corporate and CO-level partnership include knowledge and information, technical capacity and expertise, and also contributions to WFP or issue profile and branding.

26. WFP is not yet systematically tracking non-financial partnership contributions. This limits its ability to capture the full range of existing partnership benefits and formulate clear strategic guidance for engaging in multi-faceted partnerships in support of Zero Hunger. In contrast, comparators are actively seeking out and managing partnerships on a journey towards large-scale transformational (shared value or collective impact) partnerships.

RB and CO support for, and ownership of, PSPF

27. There is growing interest and diverse experience in private sector partnerships and fundraising among WFP RBx and COs, with several offices pursuing private sector partnerships and fundraising more systematically than a few years ago. While the PSPF Strategy did not initiate this trend, it validated existing RB and CO work and encouraged further private sector engagement. PPF-led activities for Strategy implementation geared towards strengthening RB and CO engagement included investments into private sector partnership and fundraising focal point positions in RBx and creating the Global Partnerships Lab. At mid-term, the Lab’s role and purpose still need to be clarified to ensure that it adds value to the work of RBx and COs.

28. There remains a gap in strategic direction for local level partnerships to help RBx and especially COs manage the sometimes-competing priorities of maximizing funding for WFP and engaging in shared value partnerships for greater impact. In the absence of clearer direction, and due to various factors disincentivizing purely technical partnerships, including WFP support costs, COs and RBx have, until now, tended to prioritize partnership income.

Innovation

29. Numerous elements of Strategy implementation to date have been innovative or have fostered innovation with potential to help WFP better deliver for beneficiaries. This includes various features of the individual fundraising programme, innovation deriving from partnerships with corporations and foundations,

and innovative ways of COs engaging with private sector partners. However, pressure to meet financial Strategy targets and pay back the loan limited PPF's overall ability to experiment and take risks –elements crucial for innovation.

30. WFP has not systematically captured innovation-related successes achieved in and through Strategy implementation. Since 2020, narrative PPF reports provided narrative examples of innovative efforts but did not capture whether and how WFP was maximizing innovation as part of PSPF Strategy implementation.

Gender Equality

31. Private sector partnerships and funds have been used to advance WFP gender, equity and inclusion objectives and to ensure equitable results for vulnerable populations. However, these dimensions are not explicit priorities of WFP partnership prospecting or fundraising, and related achievements have not been systematically pursued or tracked.

EQ 3: Factors affecting Strategy Implementation

32. PPF's evolving internal structure was, overall, appropriate for facilitating Strategy implementation. Strategy implementation to date, especially establishing the IF programme, benefited from PPF leadership and senior staff expertise, experience, and networks. As of mid 2023, there were some concerns about (actual and perceived) duplication of efforts and inefficiencies deriving from limited cross-PPF team integration.

33. PPF made laudable efforts to strengthen its collaboration with other WFP units and teams, and with Friends organization. The distribution of roles and responsibilities between PPF and the others is not yet always clear, however, and there is limited awareness within WFP of existing successes in Strategy implementation. Comparator organizations have relationship management protocols in place that apply across the organization to identify the default lead on a partnership, and expectations for communication across units to facilitate complex partnerships.

34. WFP's comprehensive mandate, global reputation and reach are valuable assets for private sector engagement. WFP's organizational culture and processes, which are deeply shaped by its humanitarian roots, pose challenges though in terms of boldly and flexibly engaging with the private sector and embracing PSPF as a long-term endeavour that requires significant organizational investment.

35. Unexpected and extraordinary developments in the global context both benefited but also posed challenges to Strategy implementation during the 2020-2022 period, especially the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Some of these are likely to also affect PSPF work during the remainder of the Strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

36. Over the first two years of Strategy implementation, WFP demonstrated its potential for generating large scale, diverse, flexible funding from the private sector and leveraging partner contributions for progress towards Zero Hunger. The remainder of the Strategy period provides opportunities to consolidate and build on successes achieved to date, while continuing to optimize performance and secure sustained organizational commitment to private sector partnerships and fundraising.

37. The PSPF Strategy presented a bold organizational ambition and direction to grow individual fundraising. As of end 2022, there remains a gap with regard to articulating a similarly clear and ambitious direction for private sector partnerships and, specifically, their envisioned contributions towards Zero Hunger.

38. Strategy implementation is on track towards meeting, and has in the past two years exceeded, targets for income generation from corporations and foundations. WFP established an innovative individual fundraising programme that demonstrated sector leading growth in percentage terms and potential for financial self-sufficiency and sustainability. Continued success and further growth in private sector revenue generation require long-term organizational commitment and investment.

39. WFP RBx and COs are increasingly pursuing partnerships with global and local private sector actors. During the first three years of Strategy implementation, related progress emerged somewhat independent from the Strategy and has been constrained by a lack of strategic direction for local partnering.

40. Since 2020, PPF has made deliberate and successful efforts to strengthen its collaboration with other WFP units and teams, as well as with Friends organizations. There remains room for further working towards a coherent and deliberate “One WFP” approach to PSPF.

RECOMMENDATIONS

41. The evaluation’s main recommendations to PPF, based on the findings and conclusions, are to:

- Prepare a fresh strategic vision and direction for private sector partnerships and fundraising, aligned with WFP Executive Director priorities, for the remainder of the Strategy period
- Optimize and further invest in Individual Fundraising programme performance for continued growth and self-sustainability
- Provide additional direction for pursuing private sector partnerships that contribute to Zero Hunger by increasingly moving in the direction of shared value and collective impact partnerships
- Work towards a ‘one WFP’ approach to private sector partnerships and fundraising as part of the PA department’s proposed ‘fit for future’ initiative
- Further strengthen localization and professionalization of private sector partnerships and fundraising in collaboration with GOs, RBx, and COs.

1. Introduction

1.1. EVALUATION FEATURES

Evaluation rationale, scope and objectives

1 *Rationale:* The World Food Programme (WFP) is at the halfway point of implementing its Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising (PSPF) Strategy (2020-2025), with three of the six-year period completed. At this time, WFP is keen to assess progress against the targets articulated in the strategy. This voluntary mid-term evaluation commissioned by the Private Partnerships and Fundraising (PPF) team is also timely as it allows for informing course-corrections during the remaining implementation period, if and as necessary. Additionally, the evaluation offers opportunities for PPF to engage with the WFP Executive Board (EB) and key internal stakeholders to both showcase successes of, and identify further opportunities for, WFP's private sector engagement in collaboration with other units.

2 *Objectives and Scope:* The formative evaluation serves the dual objectives of accountability and learning, with an emphasis on the latter given that the evaluation took place at the mid-term of the Strategy period. Gender equality and broader inclusion considerations were mainstreamed into these overarching objectives. As per its ToR, the evaluation covers all activities, interventions, and processes under the PSPF Strategy from 2020 to 2022. Where relevant, it also considers

selected developments up to, and including, August 2023.¹ It covers global, regional, and country levels, and all three pillars of the PSPF Strategy (see [section 1.3](#) below). The evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) are included as Annex 1. See also [Box 1](#).

Box 1: The evaluation largely focused on the work of PPF as the Strategy owner while taking into account the different ways in which other teams/units in WFP as well as WFP Friends organizations were involved in, supported, or were affected by Strategy implementation.

The evaluation did not aim to document or assess the extensive private sector partnership work done by WFP prior to or independent from PPF-led efforts to implement the current Strategy.

3 *Evaluation questions:* The evaluation addressed three main evaluation questions (EQ):

- EQ1: How good were the PSPF Strategy and its execution to date?
- EQ2: Are the results of strategy implementation on track to meet 6-year targets?
- EQ3: How have internal and external factors influenced strategy implementation and achievements to date?

4 *Intended Users:* The primary intended internal users of the evaluation are the PPF Division and the Assistant Executive Director for Partnerships and Advocacy (PA AED). Secondary internal users are the Communications, Advocacy and Marketing (CAM) team; Legal Office team, and Public Partnerships and Resourcing (PPR) division; as well as WFP technical units, including, but not limited to, the Nutrition Division, School-based Programs, Emergencies Operations Division, and Climate and Disaster Risk Reduction Service whose work has benefited from, or could benefit in future, from private sector partnerships and fundraising activities. Additional internal stakeholders are WFP Global Offices (GO), Regional Bureaux (RB), Country Offices (CO), and WFP Leadership Group. Key external users are WFP Friends organizations in the United States, Japan, and Italy. Key external stakeholders are WFP corporate and foundation partners, and WFP Executive Board members.

5 The evaluation was conducted between April and September 2023 by an independent team of two senior evaluation experts, a fundraising expert, a partnerships specialist, and two analysts.

¹ With a focus on recent developments that are relevant for framing the forward-looking recommendations.

Terminology

6 Aligned with the PSPF Strategy, the evaluation uses the term ‘private sector’ to refer to individuals, foundations, and businesses.² Definitions for other key terms are provided in the Glossary in Annex 2 as well as in the Partnership Typology included in Annex 5.

1.2. CONTEXT

1.2.1. EXTERNAL CONTEXT

7 Some developments and changes since 2020 that influenced WFP’s work and had implications for the continued relevance and the implementation of the PSPF Strategy are briefly outlined below. Annex 3 provides further details on these and other relevant contextual developments.


Global Context

8 Since 2020, the ‘polycrisis’ of COVID-19, climate shocks, and conflict – including the war in Ukraine - negatively impacted global poverty and contributed to the worst global hunger crisis in decades.³

9 Public (government and multilateral) funding accounted for 59% of total INGO income raising a total of USD 32.7 billion in 2022. Despite an increase in gross disbursements by OECD DAC donors, total Official Development Assistance (ODA) gross disbursements in 2021 were lower than in 2020 and expected to decline further.⁴

10 Peer INGO Private Sector income has increased by 30% since 2020 from USD 17.3bn in to USD 22.4bn in 2022, when the war in Ukraine mobilized record breaking levels of private sector income from individuals. In 2022, individual fundraising making up 60% (USD 13.4bn) of total private sector income, with corporations and foundations growing their proportion, generating USD 2.9 billion (13%) and USD 1.8 billion (9%) respectively (see figure 1.1). This led to increased investment in private sector funding, with peer organizations’ diversifying their funding and exploring new income generation channels including philanthropy, corporates, alternative finance and accessing new markets.⁵

Figure 1.1 2022 International Fundraising Leadership (IFL) Forum⁶ member private sector Income by channel in USD billion



Source: IFL Forum 2022⁷

² The Strategy (paragraph 9) notes that “While current United Nations guidance defines the private sector in terms of businesses, it can also include NGOs and other organizations.”

³ WFP [Annual Review 2022](#)

⁴ [Development Initiatives](#), 2023

⁵ [Thompson & Aaronson](#), 2021

⁶ The IFL Forum is a peer group of INGO and UN agency fundraising leaders sharing data on fundraising performance and trends. WFP was able to join the forum in 2020 facilitated by PPF leadership negotiation and upon meeting the required income threshold. This provided WFP with access to relevant sector benchmarking and comparison data.

⁷ The category ‘others’ includes NGO income for some organizations, events and community fundraising, sale of merchandise or sales through second-hand stores, sale of assets, investment income, royalties & licencing.

Individual Fundraising

11 Across the INGO sector, individual fundraising revenue grew consistently between 2018-2022 (see Figure 1.1 above). In 2022, top 20 private fundraising markets represented more than 90% of total private sector income (USD 20.5bn), with US, Germany and UK being the largest individual fundraising and corporate markets.⁸

12 The COVID-19 pandemic halted face-to-face fundraising and accelerated the growth of online and digital fundraising. Online giving has grown globally by 41% in the last three years, comprising an average 12% of giving, with gifts to international organizations growing 10% year on year.⁹ For many organizations, the pandemic also led to an increased use of Direct Response Television (DRTV). Legacy income is expected to continue to increase significantly over the next 10 years. Large INGOs have reported 8.3% growth in legacy giving since 2017 with income totalling USD 1.2 billion.¹⁰

13 Inspired by debates around the types of images and stories used in fundraising campaigns to recruit new supporters, many INGOs are moving away from using regressive images and content which may reinforce gender, ethnic, or other stereotypes and racialized power and privilege.¹¹

Philanthropy

14 Out of 32.4m high net worth individuals globally, 392,410 (1.2%) are currently classified as Ultra High Net Worth Individuals (UHNWI) with assets over USD 30m.¹² The US, China, Germany, Japan, and Hong Kong are the top five Ultra High Net Worth markets. While their share is rising, women make up only 11% of the UHNW population.¹³

15 Over the next decade, trillions of dollars are expected to be transferred from baby boomers to the next generation, with about USD 150bn expected to be transferred by 2026.¹⁴ The related shift of decision-making to family members with varying personal and commercial interests may lead to shifts in philanthropic goals.

Foundations

16 US and European Foundations dominate foundation funding and combined account for 94% of foundation spending globally. Agriculture and food security received USD 2.7 billion between 2016-2019, equalling 8.2% of global giving.¹⁵ Climate philanthropy is growing sharply, growing from 2% of global giving in 2020 to 14% by 2022 (compared to 3% overall growth).¹⁶

17 The Black Lives Matter movement and the COVID-19 pandemic renewed and revitalized Grand Bargain pledges towards localization and the decolonization of aid, with key philanthropic foundations seeking to address systemic inequalities. Foundations have also been a driving force in funding gender equality-related efforts.¹⁷

18 Foundations are increasing cross-sector collaboration and pooling funding around specific areas of mutual interest for greater and more coordinated impact on key issues. Donors are investing in a range of

⁸ IFL Forum 2022

⁹ Blackbaud, 2022

¹⁰ IFL Peer Review 2021

¹¹ e.g., [BOND](#), 2020. WFP addressed related issues by developing organization-wide image guidelines in 2022 in an initiative jointly sponsored by CAM and PPF Directors.

¹² [Altrata](#), 2022. Women are more likely than men to have inherited at least some of their wealth and tend to have the highest interest in philanthropy.

¹³ [Altrata](#), 2022

¹⁴ Royal Bank of Canada, 2020

¹⁵ USD 5.8 percent excluding Gates Foundation. Source: [Council of Foundations, 2022](#)

¹⁶ Climateworks, 2022

¹⁷ OECD, 2019

mechanisms including collaboration alliances¹⁸ that share learning and promote collective action, to jointly managed pooled funds to drive system change.

Business/Corporations

19 Corporations are significant, and growing, economic actors that play an increasing role in closing development and humanitarian funding gaps.¹⁹ The United Nations acknowledge the potential of corporations to contribute to social goods by inventing new products, reducing negative externalities and by being channels for positive cross-border impacts.²⁰

20 (I)NGO-Corporate partnerships are increasingly shifting from transactional modes of corporate philanthropy, towards large, strategic multi-faceted partnerships focused on shared value and impact. The sector's leading partnerships are holistic, transformational, larger and/or longer-term, which is seeing corporates partner with fewer organizations, albeit more intensely, with clear joint ambition and targets.²¹

21 Consumer, staff, and investor expectations increasingly demand from businesses to have greater social purpose and be engaged in societal issues,²² and leading companies are increasingly demonstrating that purpose can be a core driver of value creation.²³ Corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks are a business imperative, driven by investors increasingly demanding a focus on Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) measurement alongside their performance on shareholder value. Corporations subscribed to the UN Global Compact commit themselves to adhere to women's empowerment principles, amongst others.²⁴

1.2.2. WFP CONTEXT

22 The review period (2020-2022) falls under two organizational strategy periods with a WFP Strategic Plan for 2017-2021 and 2022-2025 respectively. Both strategic plans reflect WFP's commitment to, and interest in, working with private sector partners, especially the business sector and foundations, and drawing upon these partners' financial as well as their technical/in-kind contributions. The 2022-2025 Strategic Plan, which was developed after approval of the PSPF Strategy, additionally acknowledges individuals as a significant source of funding for WFP. It also highlights the role of the private sector in relation to Strategic Plan Outcome 4 on strengthening national programmes and systems for emergency preparedness and response, and for food and social protection.²⁵

23 During the 2020-2022 period, WFP funding reached the all-time highs of USD 9.6 billion in 2021 (including a record USD 39.4m from the private sector) and USD14.2 billion in 2022 (USD31.9m from private sector) and, in 2022, reached a record 160 million people with food assistance.²⁶ Global hunger and food

¹⁸ e.g., [Women's Funding Network](#)

¹⁹ See, for example: "Is Ukraine a game-changer for aid and the private sector?" [Aid and Policy Podcast](#), June 2022.

²⁰ OECD, 2021. Key frameworks and operational guidance in relation to UN-private sector partnerships include the [UN Global Compact](#) and [United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights](#); the [Addis Ababa Action Agenda](#), which underlines the importance of diversifying funding and unlocking the "transformative potential of people and the private sector, and UN Joint Inspection Unit Guidance on Private Sector Partnership Arrangements in the Context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2017).

²¹ See, for example, a recent [report](#) by UNICEF that indicates how the organization is working jointly with global private sector partners towards the SDGs.

²² [Edelman, 2022](#). Consumers who believe a brand has a strong purpose are four times more likely to purchase from, champion and trust the company in question ([Zeno 2020](#)), and two thirds of millennials take a company's social and environmental commitments into account when deciding where to work (McKinsey 2020).

²³ [Whelan and Fink, 2016](#).

²⁴ <https://unglobalcompact.org/engage-locally/manage/engagement/womens-empowerment-principles>

²⁵ WFP Strategic Plan 2022-2025, section 5.4.

²⁶ WFP Contributions by year. Available at: <https://www.wfp.org/funding> . Accessed in April 2023. And WFP [Annual Review 2022](#).

insecurity also reached new peaks, however, and available resources remained insufficient to meet existing needs.²⁷

24 WFP strategic plans underscore the importance of flexible and multi-year contributions through government and private donors as these “provide WFP with greatest flexibility and predictability to kick start operations, fund neglected crises and ultimately enhance our response to those most in need”.²⁸ Similarly, strategic plans and WFP Annual Performance Reports have emphasized WFP’s intent to further diversify its funding sources to reduce the organization’s dependence on voluntary contributions from donor country governments.

25 During the 2019-2022 period, the WFP Executive Director actively sought to increase contributions to addressing global hunger and food insecurity from businesses, foundations, and high net worth individuals.²⁹ In mid-2023, WFP experienced a change in leadership of the Executive Director. The new ED has indicated that further strengthening WFP’s private sector engagement is among her overarching priorities.³⁰

26 At the time of submitting this report (December 2023), PPF is in the process of recruiting a new PPF Director, with the previous director having departed in July 2023. Until a new director is appointed, the position is filled ad interim by the WFP Director of Innovation, Change and Knowledge Management.

27 [Figure 1.2](#) below maps developments within the broader WFP context against key milestones in WFP’s work on private sector partnerships and fundraising, including changes within the PPF division.


²⁷ In 2022, WFP noted a funding gap of USD 22.2bn required to adequately address the growing global food crisis. See, for example: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140702/download/>

²⁸ WFP Website: what is a flexible contribution? [Flexible Funding | World Food Programme \(wfp.org\)](#). Accessed in April 2023.

²⁹ See, for example: [Act by giving: WFP Executive Director calls for private sector to "step-up" in a world jolted by Europe's war | World Food Programme](#).

³⁰ For example, during the ED’s opening remarks to the 2023 annual session of the WFP Executive Board, which noted the ED’s intent to “be much more ambitious in expanding and ramping up WFP’s partnerships with the private sector, attracting new capital to help fund our programmes”.

Figure 1.2 WFP Internal Context (selected issues relevant to the evaluation)³¹



Source: Evaluation team based on document and web review and stakeholder consultations.

* TNT and the Boston Consulting Group (Source: WFP 2008 private sector partnership strategy, paragraph 7)

** Established in 1999. Source: <https://ja.wfp.org/jawfp>

*** Established in 1995. Source: World Food Program USA - How We Fight Global Hunger: <https://www.wfpusa.org/mission-history/>

**** Besides the Strategic Plan and related Corporate Results Framework, the Integrated Roadmap also introduced Country Strategic Plans (CSP).


³¹ To maximize readability, the figure only includes the two most recent WFP Strategic Plans in place during preparation and implementation of the PSPF Strategy. Similarly, it captures the terms of only the current and previous WFP EDs as the ones in place during the review period since 2020.

1.3. THE PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND FUNDRAISING STRATEGY (2020-2025)

28 The WFP PSPF Strategy was approved in November 2019, two years into implementation of the WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021). It aimed to “transform how WFP works with businesses and other actors – particularly at the local level – to save more lives and change more lives”.³² The Strategy looked to businesses, large and small, primarily for technical partnerships that utilize their expertise, capability and advocacy support to make WFP’s work more impactful, and to individuals to help close WFP’s funding gap.³³ In doing so, it aimed to contribute towards advancing Strategic Objective 5, Partner for SDG Results (in particular SDGs 2 and 17), and Strategic Results 7 and 8 of the WFP Strategic Plan (2017-2021), which addressed the need for diversified resourcing and partnerships that share knowledge, expertise and technology.

29 The Strategy built upon the three mutually supporting pillars of ‘impact’, ‘income’, and ‘innovation’ (see Figure 1.3). In practice, ‘innovation’ has, however, been a cross-cutting principle supporting ‘impact’ and ‘income’ rather than constituting a distinct pillar. This is also reflected in the fact that the PSPF Strategy articulated measurable targets for ‘impact’ and ‘income’ pillars, while outlining a narrative ambition for the ‘innovation’ one.

Figure 1.3 PSPF Strategy Pillars and related targets³⁴



Source: Evaluation team based on the PSPF Strategy

30 Compared to previous strategies, the 2020-2025 Strategy introduced the following new dimensions:

- *Individual fundraising*: An explicit corporate approach to, and business case for investing in individual fundraising.
- *Global partnerships*: An explicit commitment to grow WFP’s larger private sector partnerships valued at more than USD 1 million, and to increase income generated from WFP partnerships with large foundations in North America and Europe.
- *Localization/Decentralization*: The explicit aim to help increase country office engagement with the private sector in support of meeting the needs articulated in country strategic plans (CSP).³⁵

³² PSPF Strategy, p.1.

³³ Ibid, p.2.

³⁴ As articulated in the strategy document.

³⁵ PSPF Strategy, paragraph 17.

- *Measuring partnership 'impact'*: The intent to develop a standardized methodology for measuring and evaluating the impact of technical partnerships.³⁶

31 The Strategy noted in a footnote that inequalities based on gender or disability often underpin vulnerabilities and experiences of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition. It further mentioned that, as stated in WFP's Gender Policy, working with and through local markets in inclusive and equitable ways can enable WFP to improve the lives of rural smallholder farmers and improve food security and nutrition for all. The Strategy entailed no other reflections on gender equality, equity, or broader inclusion considerations.

32 The Strategy named the PPA AED and PPF Director as Strategy focal points, and implementation was led by PPF. The Strategy also indicated that WFP technical units, RBx, COs, CAM and the WFP Legal Office played essential roles in its implementation in their respective areas of responsibility, albeit without clearly defining the boundaries of the respective roles to be played by PPF and other teams or units (see section 2.1 and Annex 13). Sources of funding for strategy implementation were – for the IF programme - a USD 52 million Critical Corporate Initiative (CCI) investment,³⁷ a USD 31.4 million loan from the Capital Budgeting Facility to be repaid retained IF income by 2030 and retained income from donations generated by the investment. Other parts of Strategy implementation were financed through continuation of the existing PSA budget for PPF.³⁸


33 In absence of an explicit logic model or theory of change (ToC), the evaluation team and PPF constructed a high-level overarching ToC for the PSPF Strategy based on document review and discussions with key users. The Strategy's ToC, shown in Figure 1.4, is that increased WFP investments into private sector partnerships and fundraising will allow the organization to raise more funds from and engage in deeper partnerships with private sector partners. This, in turn, will enable both WFP and its partners to work more effectively and efficiently towards Zero Hunger and food security, which will contribute to more lives being saved and more lives changed. In the figure, items in red font identify the three pillars of the Strategy, with 'innovation' depicted as a cross-cutting dimension. The ToC is underpinned by several implicit assumptions that were tested during the evaluation. Annex 4 summarizes these assumptions and comments on the extent to which the evaluation was able to validate them. The evaluation team used the ToC to inform the development of the evaluation matrix, and as a supplementary framework to guide data analysis (see Annex 5).

³⁶ PSPF Strategy, paragraph 18.

³⁷ PPF originally requested a USD 100 million CCI investment but reduced this request based on guidance from senior leadership to USD 50 million. A higher CCI investment may have mitigated against some of the subsequent challenges related to loan repayment – see section 2.2.3.

³⁸ See PSPF Strategy Annexes I and II for details.

Figure 1.4 PSPF Strategy Simplified Theory of Change



1.4. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

Methodology

34 The evaluation was conducted between April and September 2023 by an independent team of two senior evaluation experts, a fundraising expert, a partnerships specialist, and three analysts. It applied the OECD DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency (see Annex 5).

35 A full methodology for the evaluation was set out in the Inception Report (June 2023) and is summarized in Annex 5. The methodology for this mixed- methods, theory-informed³⁹ evaluation was developed by the evaluation team in close collaboration with PPF. Its main features were: (i) retrospective construction of a theory of change for the PSPF Strategy; (ii) development of a typology of private sector partnerships (see below); (iii) development of a full evaluation matrix (Annex 6); (iv) in-depth reviews of internal and external documents and relevant literature and datasets, such as related to individual fundraising metrics (see bibliography in Annex 7); (v) remotely conducted stakeholder interviews with WFP staff at HQ, GO, RB and CO levels, WFP Friends organizations, and WFP technical units; (vi) a web-based survey of all WFP country offices (see Annex 8 for a summary of results); (vii) a review of nine partnership exemplars (Annex 9); and (viii) a review of the comparator organizations UNICEF, UNHCR, and WWF.

36 The evaluation approach was utilization focused and participatory. It included no field missions and stakeholder consultations were conducted remotely (see Annex 10 for a list of the 102 stakeholders consulted - 36 men and 66 women, and Annex 11 for data collection tools). Due to the nature of the evaluation subject, consultations did not include local populations affected by WFP programming. In addition to interviews, the evaluation team also several working sessions with different PPF sub-teams to capture the most relevant data from WFP systems and IFL Forum. The evaluation was able to draw upon complementary lines of evidence for all three evaluation questions (see triangulation and evidence matrix in Annex 12).

37 The evaluation team systematically applied WFP's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) quality criteria, templates, and checklists. Also, it used the services of a Quality Assurance Reviewer who was not involved in data collection or analysis but focused on providing autonomous quality assurance.

Partnership Typology

38 During the inception phase, the evaluation team, in collaboration with PPF and drawing upon the current literature,⁴⁰ developed a typology of private sector partnerships to allow for nuanced and systematic data collection and analysis along three dimensions: (i) positioning of partnerships on a partnership continuum from (more) transactional to (more) transformational⁴¹ (Figure 1.5); (ii) values exchanged in a partnership, such as funding, but also knowledge and information advocacy and policy dialogue, technical capacity and expertise, or profile and branding; and (iii) different arrangements for partnership management (local, global, or global through Friends organizations). See Annex 5 for details.


39 It is important to note that no end of the partnership spectrum depicted below is inherently 'better' than the other but that they depict different foci of what the partnership is focused on and what it is aiming to achieve.

³⁹ The term 'theory *informed*' rather than 'theory *based*' reflects that the reconstructed ToC informed the development of the evaluation matrix but did not constitute the main guiding framework (this function was fulfilled by the evaluation matrix). See section 1.3 and Annex 4 for further information on the ToC and its use in the evaluation.

⁴⁰ See evaluation inception report for details.

⁴¹ Transactional partnership: contributes value 'to WFP' for the delivery of WFP objectives. Transformational partnership: exchange of value(s) by all partners involved 'with WFP' towards the delivery of systems change.

Figure 1.5 Partnership Continuum⁴²



Ethical considerations

40 Team members conducted data collection in ways that were sensitive to the geographic and cultural backgrounds and gender of different respondents.

41 The evaluation was guided by principles of gender equality and equity in alignment with WFP and global ethical practices and codes of conducts for evaluation.⁴³ Gender equality and equity-related questions and indicators were included in the evaluation matrix and in data collection tools.

42 Team members ensured that interactions with stakeholders were appropriate to the socio-cultural contexts, and in relation to gender and other social roles of the respondents. Confidentiality of stakeholder contributions was ensured by avoiding direct attribution of views to specific individuals. There was no indication that existing power imbalances among consulted stakeholders affected stakeholder responses to the evaluation questions.

Limitations

43 The main limitations of the evaluation and related mitigation strategies are noted below. See Annex 5 for additional information.

Limitation	Mitigation Strategy
Delays in obtaining relevant documents and data, and scheduling stakeholder interviews	Close collaboration with the PPF evaluation manager and PPF teams to identify and make accessible relevant data Working sessions with PPF finance and IF teams to ensure accurate interpretation of financial data
Lack of data on performance under the 'impact' pillar	Use of partnership exemplars (based on document review and interviews) to reconstruct likely partnership contributions to 'impact' Use of CO survey to identify types of non-financial benefits of partnerships
Limited data available on the Strategy's 'innovation' pillars	The team used document review and interviews to identify examples of innovation in or because of Strategy implementation
No systematic information available on gender equality and inclusion dimensions	Use of a 'goal' free approach to capture evidence of how gender, equity or inclusion were considered during Strategy implementation
Turnover in PPF leadership during the evaluation process	Engagement of the ad interim PPF Director Expanding WFP stakeholder engagement and time for reviewing the draft evaluation report to ensure inputs from PPF and PA leadership

⁴² Based on Pedersen et al (2020).

⁴³ As described in relevant OEV guidance; OECD-DAC (2010). Evaluation Quality Standards for Development Evaluation; UNEG (2020). Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation; ALNAP (2016). Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide; and Sphere (2015). Sphere for Monitoring and Evaluation, and the EQAS Technical Note on Gender.

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. EQ1: HOW GOOD WERE THE PSPF STRATEGY AND ITS EXECUTION TO DATE?

2.1.1. INTRODUCTION

44 This section provides an analysis of the quality of the PSPF Strategy (evaluation questions 1.1. and 1.2)⁴⁴ and discusses the extent to which WFP investments in Strategy implementation were relevant and coherent (EQ 1.3).⁴⁵ The analysis draws on evidence from document review, data review, the review of comparator organizations, and key informant interviews. The available evidence base was solid and allowed for adequate triangulation of data sources.

2.1.2. EXTENT TO WHICH THE PSPF STRATEGY PROVIDED CLEAR CONCEPTUAL AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND SET CLEAR AND MEASURABLE EXPECTATIONS

45 **A summary of the evaluation team’s overall assessment of Strategy quality is provided in Table 2.1.** The criteria used by the evaluation team to assess strategy quality drew upon the “Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality in WFP” study (2018), several of which also apply to corporate strategies.

46 Overall, the evaluation found that the Strategy provided stronger conceptual and strategic guidance on WFP’s vision for the private sector in relation to individual fundraising and ‘income’ related benefits, and considerably weaker direction about non-financial partnership benefits and the role of innovation. Similarly, it varied in the extent to which it set clear and measurable expectations to internal and external stakeholders. The evidence underlying this assessment is discussed in findings 1 and 2 as well as in Annex 13, which presents an expanded version of the table below. Findings on the implications of Strategy gaps for its implementation are discussed in [section 2.2](#) and [section 2.3](#).

Table 2.1 Assessment of the PSPF Strategy against WFP quality criteria

Strategy Quality Criteria	Does PSPF Strategy meet criterion?
1. Clearly articulates its rationale, priorities, and vision	Partly met
2. Sets clear and measurable expectations to internal and external stakeholders	Partly met
3. Was informed by evidence	Met
4. Was, and continues to be, aligned with WFP corporate priorities	Met
5. Reflected considerations for aligning with partner and/or beneficiary needs and priorities including those of marginalized populations	Partly met
6. Reflected gender equality and/or wider equity and inclusion considerations	Partly met
7. Provides guidance on timelines, institutional arrangements, accountabilities for its implementation	Partly met
8. Included clear and appropriate monitoring, risk management, and reporting frameworks	Partly met
9. Identified the financial and human resources required for its implementation	Met
10. Strategy uses clear and consistent terminology	Partly met

Source: Evaluation team. Criteria based on WFP “Top 10 Lessons for Policy Quality in WFP” (2018).

⁴⁴ To what extent did the Strategy provide conceptual and strategic guidance on WFP’s vision for PSPF? (1.1.) and To what extent did it set clear and measurable expectations to internal and external stakeholders? (1.2).

⁴⁵ Evaluation question 1.4 on the extent to which the Strategy contributed to strengthening support for, and ownership of, PSPF at regional and country levels is being discussed in [section 2.2](#) on results achieved to date.

Finding 1: The PSPF Strategy was, and remained, relevant in relation to WFP corporate priorities. It constituted an important milestone by emphasizing the potential of the private sector to act both as a source of flexible and sustainable income for WFP as well as a valued technical and innovation partner in support of WFP impact.

47 It presented a well-articulated, evidence-based rationale for expanding WFP engagement and investments into private sector partnerships and fundraising and highlighted the potential of private sector partnerships to contribute to saving and changing more lives than WFP could on its own. It highlighted the relevance of PSPF not only for resource mobilization ('income') but also in relation to non-financial benefits ('impact') and innovation, both issues that previous WFP private sector strategies had alluded to but had not formulated as clearly. The need for WFP to further strengthen the 'impact' (technical cooperation) side of private sector partnerships had been specifically highlighted by the 2012 evaluation of WFP's 2008 private sector partnership and fundraising strategy.

48 The Strategy was evidence based, drawing upon relevant research and analysis. It addressed the findings and recommendations from evaluations of WFP's two previous private sector strategies (2008 and 2013-2017), which had noted that WFP's inability to increase its fundraising income stemmed from the absence of a focus on individual giving and related up-front investments. The Strategy also responded to findings of a 2017-18 Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) assessment of WFP, which noted that WFP's approach to private sector partnerships lacked a coherent approach and strategy; and it drew upon comparisons with individual fundraising data for other UN agencies and INGOs. Individual fundraising targets were developed based on a model built during a pro-bono consultancy from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG).

49 The Strategy was at the time of its development, and remained, highly relevant in relation to WFP corporate priorities related to diversifying the organization's income sources and expanding access to flexible funding, as well as in relation to WFP corporate commitments around working in partnership with other actors in accordance with SDG 17. The Strategy continues to be highly relevant in the context of the new WFP Executive Director's indicated corporate priorities, one of which is to further strengthen private sector involvement.⁴⁶

Finding 2: While the Strategy clearly stated WFP's ambition for individual fundraising, it provided only limited direction for partnerships, and what 'success' of Strategy implementation would look like at regional and country levels. It did not prioritize gender and broader inclusion considerations, and remained vague as regards the role of 'innovation' for Strategy implementation.

50 The Strategy varied in the extent to which it clearly articulated WFP's ambition and strategic direction for different dimensions of PSPF. Strategy strengths and gaps in relation to providing clear direction on WFP's organizational ambition and priorities are summarized below. Overall, the Strategy provided considerably stronger guidance in relation to the Individual Fundraising component than in relation to Partnerships, especially as regards the nature of envisioned non-financial partnership benefits. This is not surprising given that the IF programme was a completely new endeavour accompanied by a significant organizational investment and thus by considerable risk for WFP. In comparison, private sector partnerships were, at least to some extent, an expansion of already existing practices and foci, albeit with a new emphasis on 'impact' dimensions and on partnerships with foundations.

⁴⁶ The new ED's priorities are: Efficiency, Innovation, Scaling Up private sector engagement (with a strong emphasis on private sector funding) , and Workplace Culture.

Individual Fundraising

The Strategy...	The Strategy did not...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Articulated a robust financial business case for the required upfront investment into IF • Provided direction on organizational ambition, priority channels, and success criteria for IF • Formulated ambitious targets for the corporate IF programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clearly state the assumptions underlying the IF investment model to allow for future adjustments should contexts change (see section 2.2.3)

Global Partnerships

The Strategy...	The Strategy did not...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulated targets for the growth of foundation and (global) corporate partnerships (in terms of the number of large-scale technical partnerships and in terms of income generated from corporate partners) • Noted the aim to increase support for, and grow CO engagement with the private sector, and emphasized the value of non-financial (technical) partnerships especially at the CO level • Validated the existing private sector partnership work of some WFP technical teams', RBx and COs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Define WFP's strategic ambition and direction for private sector partnerships • Define key terms/concepts such as 'global', 'local', or 'technical' partnerships • Identify different types of partnerships based on their drivers, values exchanged, or purpose • Provide direction for the prioritization of different partnership types at regional and country levels

Cross Cutting

The Strategy did not...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unpack how the three Strategy pillars would jointly contribute to saving and changing more lives. While the Strategy emphasized that the three pillars were mutually supportive, it did not elaborate on how exactly they complemented or overlapped • Define 'success' of Strategy implementation at RB and CO levels (see section 2.2.5) • Provide strategic direction for the Innovation dimension (see section 2.2.6) • Articulate how implementation would incorporate gender equality or broader inclusion considerations in line with the WFP Gender Policy at the time (see section 2.2.7) • Position private sector partnerships and fundraising in relation to other types of WFP partnerships (PPR, STR) or in relation to Country Capacity Strengthening (CCS) and South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) to identify opportunities for synergies, complementarity and to avoid duplication or overlap of efforts (see section 2.3.2).

51 **The noted gaps in strategic direction influenced Strategy implementation**, especially in relation to pursuing and capturing the results of non-financial partnership benefits, strengthening private sector engagement at the local level, systematically integrating innovation into related efforts, and systematically incorporating gender equality and broader inclusion considerations (see [section 2.2](#)).

52 **Overall, structuring the Strategy and its targets along the '3Is' of Impact, Income, and Innovation** was positive in that it highlighted the main drivers of effective PSPF and provided for a compelling, easily memorable narrative. It was less effective, however, for providing integrated strategic direction and prioritizing activities towards Zero Hunger across the three pillars. An unanticipated negative effect of the structure was that it implied private sector partnerships were either 'impact' or 'income' partnerships even though many, especially large-scale global partnerships (can) entail a mix of benefits.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ As discussed under Finding 21, this also influenced the initial decision to structure the Global Partnerships team into 'impact' and 'income' focused sub-teams.

2.1.3. EXTENT TO WHICH WFP INVESTMENTS IN STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION HAVE BEEN RELEVANT AND COHERENT

Finding 3: The upfront investment into Individual Fundraising was a critical enabler for WFP to effectively tap into the global individual fundraising market. Investments into the 'Partnership' side of the Strategy were relevant and coherent but were made more slowly than envisioned in the Strategy. The absence of dedicated financial and human resources to foster innovation both reflected and contributed to the absence of a systematic approach to the innovation dimension.

53 Key WFP investments into Strategy implementation were strategically relevant, and several of them were innovative and reflected good practice as applied by comparator organizations.

Upfront investment into the Individual Fundraising programme⁴⁸

54 Individual fundraising programmes established by peer organizations are characterised by high levels of up-front and sustained investment in fundraising channels and markets to build a sustainable, diverse funding base and enable growth. For example, in 2018, UNHCR estimated that to reach their 2025 fundraising targets of USD 1bn, an estimated investment of USD 250m would be required.⁴⁹ Similarly, UNICEF has a long-standing history of significant and sustained investments into IF, and, between January 2021 and October 2022 alone, invested USD 89m of its own funds into PSPF.⁵⁰

55 PPF designed a strong business case with an innovative loan mechanism to secure the required upfront investment (see [section 1.3](#)). The promise to thereby make the IF programme basically cost-neutral contributed to Executive Board approval of the Strategy. PPF 'front-loaded' the WFP investment expenditure. This was strategic and essential for demonstrating sustainability of the IF programme. The loan model is restrictive, however, particularly in such a nascent programme, and poses risks to the sustainability of the IF programme. See [section 2.2.3](#) for further discussion.

Investments into PPF capacity at HQ and RB levels

56 To facilitate Strategy implementation, PPF increased its human resource capacity. The number of PPF staff almost tripled between 2019-2022 (Figure 2.1). Growth of the IF programme solely relied on the recruitment of consultants, while modest growth of the Global Partnership team and of PPF support functions was funded through the WFP PSA budget. Since 2019, only 12 new staff posts were added (no additional staff recruited in 2020, 7 additional in 2021 and a further 5 in 2022).⁵¹ Annex 14 provides an overview of PPF's internal structure as of 2022.⁵²

⁴⁸ As per evaluation TOR, the evaluation did not analyse the investment model in detail. However, related observations are included where they pertain to past or likely future performance in Strategy implementation.


⁴⁹ [5ba354764.pdf \(unhcr.org\)](#). This was part of a long-term investment plan that started in 2006.

⁵⁰ See, for example, [2023-ABL3-PFP-financial-report-EN-ODS.pdf \(unicef.org\)](#). In addition, UNICEF established a USD 50m revolving investment fund for emerging markets through a World Bank financed bond (The Dynamo Revolving Fund) for investment in private sector fundraising, which aims to generate USD 450m over the 5-year maturity period.

⁵¹ The evaluation team did not obtain details on how staff investments were distributed within PPF or between HQ and the field or on how many full-time or part-time staff were newly hired explicitly for the purpose of Strategy implementation.

⁵² Note that the organigram shown in the Annex includes planned but vacant positions, as well as positions filled by when-actually-employed (WAE) consultants, some of whom may only work a few days per week rather than being full time. Also note that comparing staffing numbers with those of other UN agencies or large INGOs is not meaningful given that organizations such as UNICEF and UNHCR are differently structured and follow different models for PSPF.


Figure 2.1 PPF Staff 2019-2022⁵³



Source: PPF

57 Annex I of the Strategy had outlined that an incremental USD 2.6m would be needed annually by 2025 for the recruitment of new posts to enable the Strategy partnership objectives.⁵⁴ In reality, however, PPF initially saw a PSA budget reduction in 2019 and 2020 (from USD 7.1m to USD 6.9m), with some of the incremental investment only becoming available in 2022 (see Figure 2.2). PPF was able to mitigate the effects of this shortfall through active budget management and investments from PA, which enabled the team to continue with key elements of its partnership and engagement growth plans.

Figure 2.2 Incremental PSA costs Strategy vs Actual



Source: PPF

58 Investments into its internal growth and development allowed PPF to establish specialized teams to support Strategy implementation within and across pillars and organizational levels, including the Global Services team as well as a dedicated Foundations team.

59 PPF investments into expanding the network of private sector focal points across RBx and establishing a global 'Partnership Lab'⁵⁵ were relevant in that they aimed to address the need for more dedicated support

⁵³ Reflecting actual payroll data, determining how many fix term days over a full year were paid and how many FTEs this represents.

⁵⁴ This would cover investment in Global Services and CO support, as well as increased business sector expenditure to manage the new and additional partnerships in line with strategy thresholds.

⁵⁵ As per PSPF Strategy (paragraph 49), the Lab was envisioned to act as a centre of excellence for synthesizing knowledge and sharing best private sector partnering practices from the field.

to country offices to enable partnership growth at the local level, which had been highlighted in previous evaluations of WFP’s private sector partnership work. No additional investments were made into specific PSPF initiatives at regional or local levels (see [section 2.2.5](#)).

60 Recognizing the additional demands placed by Strategy implementation on supporting units, particularly CAM, PPF initially (2020-2022) used the investment to support communications development through CAM, which contributed to establishing a multi-media hub for images and content. PPF and CAM also shared costs for brand and market research studies and content gathering missions. In 2023, based on the realization that IF team content needs were not yet sufficiently met, PPF established an internal communications function within the IF programme to ensure more tailored and timely access to this resource as needed, where previously competing demands led to gaps in capacity. Content developed by IF is available for use by all of WFP.


61 To support Strategy implementation, PPF also consistently invested into internal learning, data and evidence generation and analysis. This included, among other things, the creation of a dedicated Business Intelligence Hub for detailed performance analysis to optimize and maximize the IF programme; engaging the support of BCG for internal review, learning and strategic planning exercises; commissioning an external review of the Due Diligence (DD) process as well as this external mid-term evaluation (which was not mandatory and could have been replaced by an internal review).

Investments into WFP Friends Organizations

62 PPF invested 12% of investment expenditures/of the individual fundraising investment into WFP Friends organizations in the US and Japan (USD 4.7m WFP USA and USD 5.1m JAWFP). These investments were grants, with no expectation of payback. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the investments successfully stimulated considerable fundraising growth in both markets, generating significant contributions to WFP. For example, it allowed WFP USA to establish a new planned giving programme and provided a boost to its use of digital advertising. In 2020-2022, the US market generated 28% (USD 359m) of PPF’s total revenue (see Figure 2.4).

63 Income retained by WFP Friends organizations is not transferred to PPF but re-invested by the Friends organizations themselves. PPF retainer income has therefore not grown commensurate with the model, which is posing challenges, as is further discussed in [section 2.2.3](#).


Figure 2.3 WFP Friends Income 2019-2022 and PPF Investment 2020-2022⁵⁶



Source: PPF

⁵⁶ In 2018 and 2019, PPF had made some preliminary investments (below USD 1m each) into WFP Japan, which contributed to establishing the foundations for IF in Japan.

Figure 2.4 Revenue PPF and WFP Friends 2019-2022



Source: PPF

No dedicated investment into ‘Innovation’ or in relation to gender equality and/or other cross-cutting dimensions

64 One notable gap in investments is the absence of dedicated human and financial resources for furthering the innovation dimension of the Strategy. As noted in [section 1.3](#), PPF never envisioned innovation to constitute a full pillar equal to ‘impact’ and ‘income’. Nevertheless, driving the commitment towards integrating and pursuing innovation within and through PSPF might have benefited from dedicated investments in terms of staff time and/or related responsibilities.⁵⁷ See also [section 2.2.6](#).

65 Similarly, WFP made no investments into exploring or addressing potential benefits of PSPF in relation to WFP (and wider UN) gender equality and broader inclusion objectives. This is not surprising given that, as noted in [section 1.3](#), the Strategy itself had not articulated related objectives, priorities or had indicated the intent to work with the WFP gender office to explore potential synergies. See also [section 2.2.7](#).

2.2. EQ 2: ARE THE RESULTS OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION ON TRACK TO MEET 6-YEAR TARGETS?

2.2.1. INTRODUCTION

66 This section reviews progress made towards achieving the envisaged results outlined or implied by the PSPF Strategy. It addresses all four sub-questions under EQ2 in the evaluation matrix as well as sub-question 1.4.⁵⁸ The analysis draws on evidence from document review, document and data review, the review of comparator organizations, key informant interviews and the survey of WFP country offices. The available evidence base allowed for adequate triangulation of data sources, with the partial exception of findings on innovation and gender equality.

67 **Rather than organizing this section by Strategy pillar (‘income’, ‘impact’, ‘innovation’), it is structured into the following subsections:** Overarching achievements ([section 2.2.2](#)); Individual Fundraising ([2.2.3](#)), Global Partnerships ([2.2.4](#)), RB and CO support for, and ownership of, PSPF ([2.2.5](#)); Innovation ([2.2.6](#)); and Gender equality and Inclusion ([2.2.7](#)). Insights on unanticipated (positive and negative) results of Strategy implementation (evaluation question 2.5) are integrated into these sections. The evaluation team chose this structure to reflect how consulted stakeholders within and outside of PPF conceptualized Strategy implementation in practice; and to avoid replicating the perception of private sector partnerships being either ‘impact’ or ‘income’ related rather than holistic.

⁵⁷ This does not necessarily mean a dedicated position solely for innovation or other cross-cutting issues, but, at a minimum, clearly articulating related expectations for related roles and responsibilities for some staff in several PPF teams. Even without a dedicated budget, there could have been innovation ‘champions’.


⁵⁸ EQ 1.4: Extent to which the strategy contributed to strengthening support for, and ownership of, private sector partnerships and fundraising at regional and country levels.

68 **Overall, WFP is on track to meeting or exceeding several of the PSPF Strategy’s high-level 6-year targets** (see Annex 15). Several of these, especially targets for the ‘impact’ pillar, were not systematically tracked, however. Additionally, while providing some relevant insights, the targets provide an incomplete picture of positive achievements made to date. They considerably varied in their level of ambition (targets for fundraising from foundations and corporations were relatively modest when compared to the 2019 baseline⁵⁹ due to uncertainty at the time about budgets for internal capacity and growth, while IF targets were highly ambitious) and in their degree of precision and relevance (for example, the target ‘number of global needs-driven, multi-year global partnerships’ is neither defined nor explicitly linked to ‘impact’ as a proxy indicator, and it remains unclear how partnerships contribute towards WFP’s mission of Zero Hunger). Furthermore, the Strategy did not include specific targets related to capturing changes at RB and CO levels. Findings in the following sections therefore comment on progress made towards the Strategy targets where related data is available but also capture achievements and areas for improvement beyond those areas addressed by the targets.

69 **Evaluation findings on results achievement need to be interpreted considering the still relatively short history of Strategy implementation.** While the Strategy itself did not outline distinct stages, document review and stakeholder interviews indicate that, since its approval in late 2019, Strategy implementation evolved from an initial start-up and building and a sub-sequent learning and adaptation stage and is now entering a period focused on sustainability and further growth. See [Figure 2.5](#) and [quote](#).

“We had to build the plane while flying it”
 Various PPF staff members on the early stages of Strategy implementation

Figure 2.5 Emerging Phases of Strategy Implementation



Source: Evaluation team based on document review and stakeholder consultations

2.2.2. OVERARCHING ACHIEVEMENTS


Finding 4: Total WFP private sector revenue increased by over 400% between 2019-2022, considerably more than that of peer organizations, with the private sector becoming the organization’s fourth largest donor overall and a significant contributor of WFP flexible funding. Resources raised from private sector actors benefited WFP’s mandate of both saving and changing lives across geographies.

70 **Revenue from the private sector (including both income and in-kind gifts) increased from USD 101m in 2019 to USD 539m at the end of 2022.** Income increased across income streams, reflecting a positive trend in terms of diversifying WFP’s income base. Figure 2.6 shows that there was significant growth across income streams, with strongest increase in income generated from foundations (960% increase), followed by individual fundraising (556% increase) and income from corporate partners (170% increase). From being 12th largest WFP donor in 2019, the private sector moved to becoming the fourth largest donor in 2022.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ See Annex 15 for baseline data.

⁶⁰ EB Report December 2022.

Figure 2.6 PPF Revenue 2019-2022 by Income Stream (in USDm)




Source: PPF

71 **The growth of WFP private sector revenues was considerably steeper than that of peer UN agencies** during the same period (WFP 400%, UNICEF 100%, UNHCR 160%.⁶¹ Total WFP income from the private sector remains considerably lower than that of some other UN organizations though, growing from a lower base.⁶²

72 **Private sector contributions to WFP total flexible income increased by 120% during 2019-2022.** This increase was largely driven by the growth of the individual fundraising programme, which contributed 84% of private sector-generated flexible funding (see Figure 2.7). The proportion of private sector contributions to overall WFP flexible funding, including public funds, increased from 3.5% in 2019 to 7% in 2021. In 2022, due to the war in Ukraine causing unprecedented increase in flexible funding from some government donors, the proportion of private sector contributions to overall WFP flexible funding reduced to 2.4%, however, the private sector remained WFP's sixth largest source of flexible income, the same as in 2021.⁶³ When compared to the reviewed other UN agencies, WFP has the most restricted overall income portfolio, with an average of over 91% income restricted 2018-22 compared to UNICEF average 71% and UNHCR average 77%.⁶⁴

Figure 2.7 WFP Private Sector Flexible Income by Source



Source: PPF

⁶¹ Growth of WFP private sector revenue was higher than that of UN peer organizations both during the 'outlier' year 2022 but also during the 2019-2021 period (WFP 125 percent compared to UNICEF 44 percent and UNHCR 25 percent growth). IFL Forum 2022 Peer Review.

⁶² E.g., in 2022, WFP received USD 0.6bn from private sources compared to USD 3.2bn received by UNICEF and USD 1.1bn by UNHCR.

⁶³ WFP Annual Reports on Flexible Funding 2021 and 2022.

⁶⁴ IFL Forum 2022 Peer Review


73 **WFP achieved sector leading growth for both emergency and non-emergency funding** during the 2019-2022 period, with 232% year on year increase in emergency funding against a peer average of 151%, and 175% increase in non-emergency income against a peer average of 9%.⁶⁵ Since 2019, PPF raised USD652m (55%) for emergency response ('saving lives') and USD543m (45%) for non-emergency ('changing lives') purposes (see Figure 2.8). All three private sector income streams embedded both dimensions of WFP's mandate in their campaigns and proposals, encouraging partners to fund across the humanitarian-development nexus. During 2020-2022, income from corporations was most evenly spread across the two dimensions (see Figure 2.9) while foundations tended to focus on non-emergency objectives, reflecting that many of them tend to seek influencing long-term systems change. See also [Box 2](#).

Box 2: Leveraging existing partnerships for emergency support:

Several consulted global WFP partners noted that having an existing trusted and valued partnership with WFP was a key driver for their organizations to contribute additional funds to WFP during emergencies, including Ukraine, Syria and Türkiye.


The sector experienced a significant peak in funding associated with such emergencies, but UN comparators expect to rest at a higher level of contribution post-peak, due to the increased engagement of private sector partners and supporters.

Figure 2.8 Total Emergency/Non-Emergency Private Sector Revenue 2019-2022⁶⁶



Source: PPF

Figure 2.9 2022 Emergency vs Non-emergency by Income Stream⁶⁷



Source: PPF

74 Resources raised from the private sector were well distributed across geographies, with the highest concentrations in emergency contexts, particularly (in 2022) Ukraine, Yemen and Ethiopia (see Annex 15).

Finding 5: PPF's contribution to WFP in terms of Indirect Support Costs (ISC) increased by over 500% since 2019, making it a strong net contributor to organizational operational cost

75 In 2019, PPF's PSA budget was USD 2m greater than its ISC contribution. The PSA budget remained stagnant during 2019-2021 and grew by 14% in 2022 (Figure 2.10). As revenue increased, PPF ISC contributions rose sharply, making positive net contributions of over USD 46 million in 2020-22.


76 By the end of 2022, PPF had effectively repaid 92% of WFP's USD 74m non-repayable investments for 2020-2022 (USD 52m CCI investment and PSA budget. PPF ISC contributions during this period were USD 64m). The non-repayable WFP investment will deliver a positive return on investment from 2023, while generating sustainable contributions for saving and changing lives.

⁶⁵ IFL Forum 2022 Peer Review.

⁶⁶ Including one-off donation of over USD 200 million from the Famine Relief Fund to Yemen in 2021

⁶⁷ Excluding outlier Famine Relief Fund donation.

Figure 2.10 ISC Contributions against WFP PSA Budget and CCI



Source: PPF

Finding 6: Available metrics measuring changes in WFP’s brand recall and familiarity are positive despite an increasingly competitive global market. It is unclear, however, whether and to what extent PSPF Strategy implementation contributed to related positive changes.

77 In 2021, a comparative brand research study commissioned jointly by PPF, CAM and WFP USA⁶⁸ noted that among respondents in Canada, France, Germany, South Korea, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and the United States WFP’s brand familiarity was the lowest when compared to that of the five comparator organizations UNICEF, Red Cross/Red Crescent, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières, and UNHCR. However, when compared to data from a similar survey conducted in 2018, WFP’s brand familiarity was the only one among the comparators that had not declined despite the challenging global context. Also, since 2018, unaided awareness of the WFP brand and favourability had improved, with the latter growing more than all of the comparators except for Save the Children.⁶⁹ Additionally, a June 2022 CAM-led recall tracking (the latest tracking provided) indicates strong growth in brand recall between 2018-2022 from 6% to 29%. Recall was strongest from news channels, with over 30% respondents recalled seeing/hearing about WFP specifically via Facebook and thus via the key channel for digital advertising for both the IG programme and STM.

78 The PSPF Strategy (p.13) indicated the aim for PPF to, jointly with CAM, contribute to a 12 percent increase in WFP brand familiarity over the strategy period. It did not, however, articulate a specific approach for how PPF and/or CAM would go about achieving this target or how other activities for PSPF Strategy implementation were envisioned to contribute to strengthening brand familiarity. Given this absence of an explicit or even an implicit theory of change and given that PPF has not systematically tracked non-financial benefits deriving from private sector partnerships (see [section 2.2.4](#)) it is not possible to determine whether, to what extent, and how Strategy implementation influenced the observed changes. Neither CAM nor PPF currently have plans to conduct follow-up studies to track future changes in brand familiarity.

2.2.3. INDIVIDUAL FUNDRAISING⁷⁰

79 WFP’s IF programme is constituted by the Individual Giving and ShareTheMeal (STM) streams (see finding 9). The PPF IF team has the autonomy and accountability to design investments globally, across income streams, channels and campaigns to achieve the individual fundraising-related targets articulated

⁶⁸ WFP Brand and Market Segmentation Research

⁶⁹ Favourability of WFP increased by 4 percent among the people aware of it, that of Save the Children by 6 percent, while that of other comparators only grew by 1 or 2 percent.

⁷⁰ Sources for all data in this section, unless otherwise noted: WFP PPF.

under the Strategy's 'income' pillar, with a tolerance of 80% to release further tranches of CCI investment.⁷¹ Performance is closely analysed by the Business Intelligence (BI) Hub in PPF to inform decision making. Additionally, fundraising from individuals is conducted through WFP Friends organizations.


Finding 7: In only three years, WFP succeeded in establishing and achieving sector leading growth of its Individual Fundraising programme.

80 **WFP annual individual fundraising income, which had plateaued in the five previous years, grew from USD 22m to USD 104m in 2019-2022.**⁷² Despite the low starting base, this is remarkable when compared to growth trajectories of other UN/peer organizations during the same period (see [Box 3](#)). Annual income for growth exceeded the ambitious projection model in 2020 and 2021, despite the IF team still being in start-up mode. In 2022, the programme achieved 94% of the projected annual target.

Box 3: IF growth in WFP and comparators

WFP's Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for individual fundraising (2018-2022) was 57.1%, while the average CAGR of peer organizations was around 10%. WFP also demonstrated strong growth in regular giving compared to peers with 32.5% year on year growth in regular giving in 2022, compared to a peer average for 2022 of 3.7%. Source: Forum 2022

Figure 2.11 Actual IF income in US\$m vs Strategy Projections 2019-2022



Source: PPF


81 WFP's IF programme is constituted by the Individual Giving and ShareTheMeal (STM) streams (see finding 9). The PPF IF team has the autonomy and accountability to design investments globally, across income streams, channels and campaigns to achieve the individual fundraising-related targets articulated under the Strategy's 'income' pillar, with a tolerance of 80% to release further tranches of CCI investment.⁷³ Performance is closely analysed by the Business Intelligence (BI) Hub in PPF to inform decision making. Additionally, fundraising from individuals is conducted through WFP Friends organizations.

⁷¹ See section 2.2.4 for progress towards targets for income from corporate partners and foundations.

⁷² IF income had ranged from USD 19.2m in 2013 to USD 17.6m in 2018.

⁷³ See section 2.2.4 for progress towards targets for income from corporate partners and foundations.

Figure 2.12 Average IF Donation by Income Type (2020-2022)




Source: PPF. Legend: RG= Regular Giving, SG = Single/One off gift

82 Individual Fundraising made significant contributions to both global emergency appeals as well as to non-emergency causes. Emergency fundraising included USD22m for Yemen, USD15m for Ukraine and USD11m for Afghanistan and USD9m for Madagascar (see Annex 15).

83 The IF programme strongly contributed to raising levels of WFP flexible funding (see Figure 2.13 and [section 2.2.2](#)), even though WFP’s IF programme is not fully unrestricted.⁷⁴ Although there was not a specific target within the Strategy, investment in and growth of the IF programme has enabled significant growth in flexible funding for WFP to allocate where the need is greatest. Comparator organizations explicitly target unrestricted funding for their organizations to better enable strategic investments and leveraging government funding.

Figure 2.13 IF Flexible Fund Income



Source: PPF

Finding 8: Growth of the IF programme during the 2020-2022 period was achieved solely through digital channels in a unique global, digital-led approach.⁷⁵ To ensure continued growth, the IF team is working on further diversifying its fundraising channels.

84 The IF programme’s innovative digital based approach allowed scaling fundraising for WFP globally despite the absence of locally registered fundraising entities in a wide range of markets, which is the

⁷⁴ STM income is directed to specific projects that contributing individuals choose to support, and some regular giving campaigns are earmarked for the first year of activation. Note that only few organizations have fully unrestricted IF programmes.

⁷⁵ The digital-led approach was taken by both IG and STM. WFP USA also adopted a strong focus on digital fundraising.

traditional but costly route used by other UN agencies and INGOs to enter new markets. PPF was able to capitalise on the shift towards digital fundraising emerging across the sector, accelerated through the COVID-19 pandemic, to recruit a growing and global base of supporters. In 2022, WFP received donations from 655,120 supporters based in 235 markets, with the largest success in USA, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Canada, where peers are also established and demonstrating success.

85 The original strategy and associated financial model for the IF programme envisioned complementing the digital led approach with DRTV and limited face to face fundraising in selected growth markets. The IF team launched DRTV in 2020 but the campaign was paused until corporate story and image guidelines were developed in 2022 through an initiative co-funded and sponsored by CAM and PPF.

Box 4: The collaboration between the IF team and Friends organizations in the US and Japan demonstrated a unique and scalable approach, with Friends organizations successfully developing campaigns to attract supporters in their specific contexts⁷⁶. There is demand within WFP for greater flexibility to fundraise in a broader range of markets and making fundraising products locally relevant (see [section 2.2.5](#)).

Comparator organizations are facing challenges though in coordinating and innovating across their complex global networks. This may point to the benefits of approaching local adaptation of fundraising through a globally coordinated approach.

86 As of mid-2023, aware of the risks inherent in overreliance on one channel, IF is working on launching a new DRTV campaign and is exploring deeper market development for increased channel diversification. Interviews with WFP staff within and outside of PPF further indicate interest in exploring options for expanding the existing network of WFP Friends organizations in key markets and exploring localized approaches to IF (see [Box 4](#)).

Finding 9: Individual Fundraising is on a growth trajectory but is not currently on track to fully meet all Strategy targets by 2025. These targets, and related expectations regarding loan repayment, have remained unchanged despite evolving internal and external contexts.

87 **STM and IG are distinct products recruiting through similar channels**, both, until now, with a strong reliance on META. Following an initial period of investment in the portfolio of two products, budget allocation diverged based on results and interviews indicate a sense of ‘competition’ and siloed working developing. With support from the dedicated BI Hub created in 2022, STM and IG now have clearer analysis and insights on their respective product offers and on donor behaviours. This allows them to better define and distinguish the respective strengths and target audiences for both products, with the aim to further increase complementarity between them. See [Box 5](#). The teams have made increasing, and ongoing, efforts to strengthen cross-team collaboration, synergies, and efficiencies.

Box 5: STM and IG

[ShareTheMeal](#) enjoys high levels of repeat giving, often quickly after initial engagement, and high levels of cross sell,⁷⁷ which is unique compared to other giving channels. STM’s value comes from the high volume of supporters and frequency of gifts, not the value of individual gifts. It has high retention rates, with users enjoying selecting the projects they fund. This is a valuable and innovative alternative to regular giving, of interest to comparators.

The [Individual Giving](#) programme is a digital led fundraising programme, raising primarily unrestricted funding using celebrity ambassadors to recruit new supporters, particularly regular givers and higher value supporters enabled by a dedicated supporter care agency to ensure personalised communication.

88 **Since 2020, both the IG and STM products demonstrated remarkable income growth.** Individual Giving revenue grew from USD 5m to USD 28m in 2022 (increase of 460%) and STM revenue from USD 9m-USD 24m (+166%) in 2022, with STM peaking in 2021 at USD 29m. STM revenue stalled in 2022 due to high cost

⁷⁶ PPF investment in Friends supported them to grow and diversify income, with operational collaboration and sharing between the teams ensuring resources and learning shared (see section 2.1.2).

⁷⁷ Cross-sell = supporters who after their first gift, go on to make donations to other WFP campaigns.

per acquisition rates, fuelled by the introduction of the operating system iOS 14 on iPhones, which reduced the effectiveness of algorithmic targeting. After extensive review, STM is back on a strong growth trajectory.⁷⁸

89 Both IG and STM are on a trajectory of further growth, albeit not at the level the Strategy model had predicted. Based on the strategy model projections (Annex II of the Strategy), reaching growth targets for both ShareTheMeal and Individual Giving would require year on year growth of above 20%-24% during 2023-25. This significantly exceeds growth rates achieved in 2022⁷⁹ and also exceeds the 5-year compound annual growth rates reported by peer organizations 2018-2022 across both regular and single gifts.⁸⁰ While ongoing efforts towards channel diversification and having a stronger regular giving supporter base are likely to foster positive results over time, IG and STM may not be able to fully meet all the original Strategy targets by 2025, although they are on a trajectory towards this and may be within an 80% tolerance threshold.⁸¹ Note, however, that WFP overall may still meet the Strategy target of USD 170m in revenues by 2025 due to growth in the US market⁸² and global philanthropy, i.e. through different channels than envisioned in the Strategy.

90 This points to the fact that several of the assumptions underlying the financial model and related IG and STM targets are no longer aligned with WFP and global operational realities. Predicted supporter acquisition rates were based on digital advertising effectiveness estimated in a global context before the IOS14 changes which negatively influenced the performance of all digital fundraising. Also, predictions assumed that STM and IG supporter behaviours would generally be the same, which has not been the case. Whilst the programme sharpened its focus on regular giving through the strategy, high competition, increased cost and the reliance on a single channel for acquisition, alongside lower than forecast retention rates has meant regular giving levels are lower than forecast. Critically, the Strategy did not build in opportunities along the way of its implementation to adjust performance expectations based on contextual changes and on insights gained during implementation, in particular the significance of the US market and the complexity of working with Friends organizations. While the IF team has been adjusting its internal forecasts based on actual performance and evolving context data, Strategy targets and expectations around loan repayment have remained the same.

Finding 10: WFP's fundraising from individuals has strong potential to achieve self-sufficiency. The PSPF Strategy's restrictive and short-termed investment model is posing risks to long-term revenue sustainability, however.

91 The upfront investment into fundraising from individuals was accompanied by a model developed to ensure that the loan could be repaid in phases between 2025-2030. As there were no sufficiently similar other IF programs globally to draw upon, the model was based on a series of aspirational estimates rather than data. PPF 'front loaded' the investment expenditure, which was strategic in terms of demonstrating sustainability within the Strategy's life. Between 2020-2022, PPF spent USD 71.2m of WFP organizational investment (100% of the CCI) and 60% of the loan to catalyse growth of the IF programme and generate retained income for programme reinvestment from 2023 forward.

92 The repayment model incorrectly assumed that all investments would have retained income (29%) to allow for phased loan repayment between 2025-2030 and budget for reinvestment. In practice, retainer income did not grow commensurate with the original model, as income retained by WFP Friends organizations is re-invested by the Friends organizations in themselves, and as fewer regular givers were recruited or converted from being single givers than assumed in the original model. This is leaving a critical gap in retainer income for IF programme activities and for optimisation of the investment for WFP's income,

⁷⁸ In mid-2023, STM was USD 1.8m ahead of its annual forecast (Source: IF mid-year review 2023).

⁷⁹ 9 percent for IG and 13.5 percent for STM

⁸⁰ These were 4.9 percent for regular giving (2.7 percent for 2017-2021, when excluding 2022 as a likely outlier year) and 16.9 percent for single gifts (2.8 percent during 2017-2021). Source: IFL Forum Peer Review 2022.


⁸¹ Note, however, that the IF programme overall may meet the overall Strategy target of USD 170m due to growth in the US market. The evaluation team did not have sight of WFP USA projects and plans.

⁸² The evaluation team did not have sight of WFP USA projects and plans.

along loan disbursement now that the CCI investment has ended.⁸³ See Figure 2.14. As noted above, the five-year timeframe of the investment is short compared to past and ongoing investments made by peer organizations UNICEF and UNHCR.

93 **Pressure to repay the loan in alignment with the model had unintended negative effects on performance.** It limited the IF team's ability to innovate (see [section 2.2.6](#)) and fuelled competition rather than cooperation between IG and STM, with performance tracking and projections used to release budgets, and funding re-distributed when targets were missed.

Figure 2.14 Retainer Model vs. Actual/Estimates



Source: PPF

Finding 11: While not mentioned in the Strategy, Global Philanthropy emerged as a promising additional individual fundraising stream with potential to contribute to meeting overall Strategy income targets. WFP is still in the process of developing a systematic approach to pursuing related opportunities.⁸⁴

94 Global Philanthropy was not mentioned in the Strategy but emerged in 2021 as new channel driven by the then WFP Executive Director's interest in leveraging the wealth of high-profile individuals to address the global food crisis.⁸⁵ The USA is the leading market for philanthropy globally amongst peer organizations by a significant margin, generating 60% of major donor income in 2022⁸⁶

95 PPF mobilized a short-term team member through the UN secondment process to help build a programme and help leverage philanthropic gifts. In 2022, PPF had some early successes from a small pool of donors and raised USD9m raised from UHNWIs.⁸⁷

96 Global Philanthropy with UHNWIs is a highly relational initiative, requiring commitment from senior (ED) leadership to engage and build relationships in the long-term, particularly in the USA. UN comparators have built on their established Ambassador programmes and infrastructure and are well established. PPF is developing this channel but as of the end of 2022 not yet developed clear value propositions that meet the

⁸³ As noted in section 1.3, the original PPF proposal was for a higher CCI investment, which might have mitigated some of the challenges deriving from loan repayment.

⁸⁴ Within PPF, the Global Philanthropy team reports directly to the PPF director and is not located in either IF or Global Partnerships. It is discussed in this section of the report as it constitutes a form of individual fundraising. However, Global Philanthropy also shares critical success factors with Global Partnerships and Foundations (section 2.2.4).

⁸⁵ See various media articles on a related public exchange between the WFP ED and UHNWI Elon Musk, e.g.: [2% of Elon Musk's wealth could solve world hunger, says director of UN food scarcity organization | CNN Business](#).

⁸⁶ IFL Forum, 2022

⁸⁷ including two USD 1m+ grants secured, one for nutrition and another sponsoring the first humanitarian ship as part of the Black Sea Ukraine Grain Initiative.

needs of the UNHNW audience and clearly signals WFP’s willingness to engage, and has not yet developed a coordinated approach with other WFP teams and units and with Friends organizations.

2.2.4. GLOBAL (CORPORATE AND FOUNDATION) PARTNERSHIPS

97 This section reflects on progress made with regard to income generated from corporations and foundations (as per the Strategy’s ‘income’ pillar), as well as on achievements in relation to targets around increasing the number of large-scale technical partnerships and achieving efficiencies and cost savings through private sector partnerships (‘impact’ pillar). It also reflects on overall progress in growing and leveraging corporate and foundation partnerships beyond issues covered by these Strategy targets.


98 Within PPF, responsibility for these dimensions lies with the PPF Global Partnerships and the Foundations teams who collaborate with WFP technical and functional units, global offices, and RBx and COs. Additionally, JAWFP and, especially, WFP USA play significant roles in business development and partner management in their respective markets. The ambition for partnerships in the Strategy was communicated through funding targets and an increase in the number of partnerships. The key performance indicators were limited, and the ambition was cautious, partly due to the lack of budget and internal capacity for growth.

Finding 12: Income generated from corporate partnerships in 2020-2022 regularly exceeded the Strategy target of raising USD 50m annually, achieving USD 198m in 2022.

99 Corporate partnership income exceeded the USD 50m target every year of the Strategy to date.

As in the wider sector, there is exceptional growth of donations in 2022 driven by the Ukraine crisis, which is unlikely to be maintained at the same high level.⁸⁸ During 2020-2022, the number of partnerships reporting gifts in-kind (an indicator of ‘technical’ partnerships) remained static and with a gradual decline in their value over the last two years (see Figure 2.15). This coincided with the Global Partnerships team’s increasing focus on financial, and de-prioritization of in-kind support from private sector partners. Levels of flexible funding from corporate partners declined from USD 8.3m in 2019 to USD 4.7m in 2022, likely reflecting the strong corporate response to the Ukraine crisis, increasing earmarked funds, and the wider sector trend towards more strategic, shared value partnerships which are more specific in terms of intervention (as also experienced by comparators).

Figure 2.15 Corporate Income Cash (USD 1m+pa) vs In Kind



Source: PPF

100 **Growth of income from corporate partners was driven by a focus on developing large-scale global partnerships with high potential for +USD 1m income cash value to WFP.** Despite the distinct pillars of ‘income’ and ‘impact’ in the strategy, the global partnerships team have pursued multi-faceted


⁸⁸ This is highlighted by the CAGR in corporate income, which grew from 1.6 percent (2017-21) to 28 percent. (2018-22) showing the very significant impact of 2022 on growth. Despite this, WFP have however performed well with CAGR significantly above average peer levels (IFL Forum, 2021 and 2022)

partnerships of high value. WFP does not define “need-driven, multi-year global partnerships”, and the Global Partnerships team does not report on this Strategy target, but, rather, on changes to the partnership portfolio (new, renewed and ended partnerships) managed by the Global Partnerships team. Since 2020, the overall number of PPF-managed global corporate partnerships increased from 20⁸⁹ and is on track to achieve the ‘impact’ pillar target of 25 “multi-year global partnerships”.

101 **The average cash value of partnerships grew from USD 500K in 2019 to USD 1.9m in 2022**, including Friends, regional and global partnerships (one-off and multi-year). The number of USD1m+ cash partnerships increased from 10 in 2019 to 26 partnerships in 2022 with their average value tripling. As illustrated in Figure 2.16, such large partnerships generated 91% of total income derived from corporate partners during the 2020-2022 period, with the largest share (59%) provided by the largest (+USD 10m) partnerships.


102 **WFP partnerships during 2020-2022 also included many smaller (- USD 1m) partnerships** (see Figure 2.17). WFP does not monitor the overall portfolio of partnerships by type, values exchanged, or contributions to WFP and/or mission. Corporate partnerships require intensive, long-term effort to secure and manage, particularly given the general trend towards more multi-faceted partnerships focusing on shared value and collective action. Focusing on high value partnerships is preferable over low value when considering the net contribution to Zero Hunger – taking the large scale of resource generated for multiple programmes and geographic areas with similar or marginally more cost in terms of staff time and engagement. Comparator organizations are clearly directing their complex networks to focus on larger-scale, shared value partnerships and collective action.

Figure 2.16 Total Revenue 2020-2022 by partnership size (USD)



Source: PPF

Figure 2.17 Number of Partnerships by Value 2020-2022⁹⁰



Source: PPF

Finding 13: WFP created an increasingly systematic approach to developing partnerships, with a sector-based approach, and in managing global partnerships to optimise their contributions to WFP. However, the organizational ambition and steer are not yet focused on leveraging partnerships towards the mission of Zero Hunger.

103 **Since 2020, the PPF Global Partnerships business development team built a robust global pipeline of potential future corporate partnerships.** The team uses a sector-based approach, with designated lead partnership managers responsible for conducting research and building the pipeline in their designated sector(s) in consultation and collaboration with WFP technical units. Since 2022, this has included the development of industry strategies for business development and related value propositions that outline


⁸⁹ Since 2020, WFP on-boarded several new global partners, including Mondi, Google, ABInBev, Carrier, and Takeda Pharmaceuticals, and renewed and expanded some existing ones, e.g. with Mastercard and LDS. It also ended a few established partnerships though that were no longer providing value.

⁹⁰ Based on data from the PPF Finance & Business Analysis team, including partnerships data from WFP Friends organizations, regional and global partnerships, one-off and multi-year contributions for both emergency and non-emergency purposes.

opportunities for how potential private sector partners in different sectors can contribute to WFP’s mission by meeting specific organizational needs.⁹¹

104 **WFP increased the number of sectors targeted** for potential corporate partnerships, from 8 in 2019 to at least 12 in early 2023. The existing pipeline prioritises technology, as envisioned in the PSPF Strategy, as well as finance and banking, transport and logistics, fast moving consumer goods (FMCG), and retail, as well as various other sectors. Largest growth occurred in sectors not directly linked to WFP’s core mission, such as manufacturing and engineering. Since 2021, prospecting includes sectors such as mining, extractives and energy.⁹² See Figure 2.18.

Figure 2.18 Global Partnership Pipeline Shortlist by sector 2020 and 2023



Source: PPF

105 **WFP did not articulate explicit direction for prioritizing partnership development to maximise ‘impact’ on Zero Hunger.** An initial BCG analysis of technical needs did not translate into strategic guidance for overall partnership development or to steer partnership contributions to ‘impact’ (see [finding 16](#)). However, it was used in collaboration with technical units to develop value propositions which stimulated partnership business development in key sectors. While the diversification of sectors is positive in terms of creating potential for income generation, the current absence of organizational prioritisation of opportunities towards tackling Zero Hunger and of the absence of clear, WFP-specific ‘red lines’⁹⁴ (e.g., companies or sectors to avoid) poses challenges. See [Box 6](#).

Box 6: Desire for stronger guidance on partnering with controversial sectors

Two of the largest corporate donors to WFP since 2021 have been energy and extractive companies. Consulted WFP staff at HQ, RB and CO levels as well as some global partners expressed a strong desire for more clarity on WFP’s position on whether, why, under what circumstances and for what purposes WFP should, or should not, be partnering with actors from these sectors.⁹³ Some consulted WFP staff also identified sectors with high potential to be part of the solution to Zero Hunger as being potentially problematic, e.g., food, agriculture, FMCGs.

106 **During the 2020-2022 period, WFP made strides towards developing a coordinated approach to global partnership management.**

This included efforts to identify a key relationship managers (in PPF or WFP USA) per large global partnership to lead on facilitating communication and coordination, including with and among relevant WFP technical units, RBx and COs. Achieving this is a challenging task,

Box 7: Consulted global partners expect a ‘one WFP’ approach, with a global team maintaining a professional oversight of contacts and activities. They value the co-ordination brought by partnership management, but also want to directly engage with technical teams, regional bureau, and country offices.

⁹¹ It is too early to assess whether and how these propositions are successful in supporting business development.

⁹² Including a USD 30m donation from Shell in response to the Ukraine crisis.

⁹³ Two of the COs interviewed and several of the COs responding to the survey indicated that they had valued partnerships with corporations in these sectors.

⁹⁴ Beyond ‘red lines’ mandated for all UN agencies by the UN Global Compact.

given the multiple actors involved in complex global partnerships. For example, multiple WFP actors and a Friends organization simultaneously pursued a partnership with a global technology company at both global and regional levels. The desire for coordination and oversight is also adding complexity, e.g., technical teams adding lead representatives. See also [Box 7](#).

107 WFP's current approach to relationship management is on a partnership-by-partnership basis. While some working principles have emerged, e.g., between PPF and WFP USA, the absence of standardized protocols for global partnerships development and management places an additional burden on the involved teams and makes it more difficult to ensure effective negotiation, collaboration, and coordination.

108 Several consulted WFP technical teams noted a lack of clarity as regards roles and responsibilities of technical units, PPF and Friends organizations towards partnership prospects and partner management.

Box 8: Good practice in global corporate partnerships is to have relationship management protocols in place that apply across the organization that, at a minimum, identify the default lead on a partnership, usually based in the country where the partner is headquartered or where specialist capacity is located, as well as expectations for communication across complex global or multi-country partnerships.

Several technical teams have, or are in the process of recruiting, dedicated staff members to help identify and manage (parts of) private sector partnerships.⁹⁵ See [Box 8](#).

109 The US market is significant for WFP, as with comparators, generating 28% (USD 359m) of its total private sector revenue 2020-22.⁹⁶ Consulted stakeholders across WFP recognized growth potential of the US market in corporates, foundations, philanthropy, and individual fundraising, and highlighted the importance of the relationship of WFP and WFP USA. Partnership management in this market is complex. In addition to the supporters and partnerships managed by WFP USA, which has totalled USD 128m 2020-2022, there are some truly global partners with a US HQ but global presence and influence (e.g., some large philanthropic foundations and some US-based organizations who are managed by and transfer funds directly to WFP, as well as donors managed by WFP (PPF) but transferring funds via WFP USA (e.g., ShareTheMeal US supporters). Operationally there is good collaboration around fundraising between the WFP USA and PPF teams, however, as per current MoU, WFP USA does not manage 'technical' partnerships, and there is no shared partnership pipeline between WFP USA and PPF. Relatedly, some consulted US-based foundation partners, while expressing appreciation for both their WFP USA and PPF counterparts, noted a desire for an even better coordinated 'one WFP' approach. Comparator organizations have more complex global networks with established protocols for business development and partnership management between entities.

Finding 14: Fundraising from foundations exceeded the Strategy's target of USD 25m annually by more than tenfold, reflecting WFP's increasingly systematic and strategic approach to engaging with large, global foundations. While future income is likely to fluctuate, there is potential for further growth of this channel, especially in the US.

110 The creation of a dedicated Foundations team within PPF in 2020 contributed to transforming WFP's approach to partnering with foundations from being ad-hoc⁹⁷ to becoming increasingly proactive, strategic, and targeted, prioritising foundations with large-scale funding potential in North America and Europe with interest in funding the humanitarian/development nexus. This approach succeeded in securing new partnerships of significant value to WFP, with an average size of over USD 6.8m. The PPF foundations team grew from initially 1 to 5 by the end of 2022, with two new posts funded through cost recovery from foundation grants.

111 Since 2020, foundation grants and partnerships grew from 8 grants from 4 donors totalling USD 49m, to 15 grants from 9 donors in 2022 totalling USD 276m. WFP was able to uplift income from existing foundation partners, e.g., the Gates and the Howard G. Buffet Foundations, as well as on-boarding new

⁹⁵ The Palantir relationship recently transitioned from a technical team to PPF, but it is still too early to assess the extent to which having centralized partnership oversight is adding value.


⁹⁶ US market – income received from private sector actors this geographical region regardless of where the relationship is managed.

⁹⁷ As noted in the Strategy, paragraph 38.

partners, such as the Mastercard Foundation. Over the 2020-2022 period, WFP raised USD 556m from foundations 2020-2022. 80% of this came from two Foundations. However, even when these outliers are removed, WFP exceeded the PSPF Strategy's USD 25m target by nearly USD 100m. See

112 Figure 2.19. below. Whilst other organizations also experienced strong growth in foundations income in 2022 at 61% year on year (YoY) growth, WFP had the largest growth YoY of +1346%. WFP's CAGR 2018-22 is also the highest compared to peers at 106.9%.⁹⁸

Figure 2.19 Foundations Income by Source



Source: PPF

113 **Foundation partners made significant contributions to both saving and changing lives agendas**, albeit with a focus on the latter (see [section 2.2.2](#)), reflecting that most foundations have their own clearly defined objectives that tend to focus on affecting long-term and systems level change. At present, however, only four of the 28 potential grants listed in WFP's foundation pipeline are multiyear investments. This is a concern for sustainable partnerships development and indicates further potential for developing longer-term partnerships with multi-year grants that can contribute to both dimensions of WFP's mandate. See [Box 9](#).

Box 9: Rewarding but resource- intensive partnerships

Most of WFP's large foundation partnerships engage and benefit multiple WFP technical teams, RBx and COs. Partnership development and subsequent management therefore require a significant amount of time to ensure coordination and communication among the different stakeholders. The scale of income and non-financial benefits (e.g., foundation networks and technical expertise, see [Figure 2.19](#)) flowing from foundation partnerships are significant however and justify the overall investment – even given some partnership proposals will not succeed.

Some WFP stakeholders emphasized the need to engage technical teams and country offices as early as possible during negotiations to ensure that what WFP offers to foundation partners is relevant to existing needs and feasible in terms of WFP implementation capacity. Others felt that PPF should only involve technical teams and COs once it had confidence that the respective foundation was truly willing to engage so as not to invest significant time and effort providing inputs to proposals that ended up not being successful.

114 **The rapid increase in fundraising from foundations experienced over the past three years is not likely to continue at this rate** given foundations tend to make large but infrequent investments into partner organizations. This means that income from foundations is likely to fluctuate.

115 **Nevertheless, consulted stakeholders inside and outside of WFP widely agreed that there is continued potential for further growth of this channel**, given existing appetite among many foundations (both existing and potential WFP partners) for engaging even more in 'big picture', shared value-type partnering. The US is the leading market for fundraising from foundations,⁹⁹ not only for WFP but also comparator organizations. Relationships with several US-based foundations are led by the PPF Foundations team. In parallel, WFP USA is actively fundraising and generating income from US foundations, raising USD

⁹⁸ IFL Forum 2022.

⁹⁹ In 2022, 53 percent of foundation income reported among IFL Forum peers derived from the USA . Peers combined saw an average of 23 percent growth in USA (and 61 percent growth globally). Source: IFL Forum 20

1.5m in 2022.¹⁰⁰ The division of related roles and responsibilities between PPF and WFP USA is not yet clearly established, which may pose risks to further growth of the US market and will require continued close collaboration between PPF and WFP USA to cultivate new partner and effectively manage relationships (see also findings 11 and 13). Comparator organizations who deal with more complex affiliate networks highlight the importance of relationship building and the need for protocols to guide such relationships.

Finding 15: The spectrum of existing WFP corporate and foundation partnerships is richer and more diverse than indicated in the Strategy, with partnerships generating a variety of financial and non-financial benefits towards advancing WFP objectives.

116 **The Strategy distinguishes between local and global partnerships** and implies that the former (should) focus on ‘impact’ and the latter on ‘income’. It further emphasizes the exchange of ‘in-kind’ skills and experience for ‘impact’ (or ‘technical’) partnerships, and the exchange of cash for ‘income’ partnerships, without reflecting on other values exchanged in partnerships, or reflecting on the relevance of these values for progress towards WFP’s mission of Zero Hunger as well as to WFP’s work. As such, the strategy did not serve to direct partnerships towards shared value and collective impact, although this remains a driver of partners sampled.

117 **Existing partnerships are more diverse**, spanning from ‘philanthropic’¹⁰¹ to ‘shared value’¹⁰² partnerships, with many partnerships being multi-faceted. The values exchanged between WFP and its partners go beyond the exchange of cash or in-kind income and technical know-how as is illustrated in Table 2.2, which categorises nine global partnership exemplars based on a sample of available partnership information and supplemented by information supplied in interviews with partners.¹⁰³

Table 2.2 Partnership types of reviewed exemplars

Partnership continuum	B.&M. Gates Foundation	Mastercard foundation	Cargill	DSM	LDS	Mars	Mastercard	Mondi	Palantir
Philanthropic									
Responsibility									
Technical									
Shared Value									
Collective Impact									

Source: Evaluation team based on document review and interviews. Cells in blue indicate the primary partnership type. Annex 9 provides information on additional partnership types that are also reflected in the partnership.

¹⁰⁰ Source: PPF foundations pipeline.

¹⁰¹ The main driver of the partnership is funding and/or fundraising – see partnership typology in Annex 5.

¹⁰² The main partnership driver is pursuing social or environmental impact in a way that also enables commercial sustainability (see Annex 5).

¹⁰³ The foundations reviewed as exemplars are with very large, global partners with their own mission who, while building partnerships based on philanthropy, are seeking shared value with WFP. The corporate partners include long-term partnerships that have evolved and been managed to increase value to WFP over time.

Table 2.3 Illustrative Examples of Values Exchanged in private sector partnerships in support of WFP (corporate and CO) objectives¹⁰⁴

Type of value exchanged	Illustrative Examples
Knowledge and Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mars - shared Food Safety Quality Manual, capturing years of their expert know-how • DSM – created foundational evidence studies to show the benefits of fortification for 10 food products used in WFP global operations, such as Super Cereal Plus.
Advocacy and Policy Dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mars - collaborated with WFP on a global food safety campaign • LDS shared a platform with WFP to raise the profile of hunger-related issues, including the value of school feeding <p>Many partners would like to strengthen the exchange of value in this area, whether sharing platforms with WFP, collaborating with other partners to influence or engage with governments/systems or joint policy and advocacy.</p>
Technical Capacity and Expertise ¹⁰⁵	<p>Global partnerships have de-prioritised technical capacity due to the difficulty for WFP to draw-down' all capacity offered. At a national level, in-kind contributions have been difficult to develop due to the associated financial contributions required to cover costs. Established examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • B.&M. Gates Foundation – complements WFP's own expertise e.g., and WFP are both benefiting from sharing their respective experience and expertise to jointly help mitigate the global food crisis. WFP brings experience e.g., in Cash-based transfers and CCS. Foundation adds expertise related to gender equality • Mars – WFP visit to MARS' facility in Columbus to learn about their canning process and resolve some issues with unstable canned food • Mondi – is sharing its expertise in sustainable packaging to help enhance WFP's packaging solutions • DSM – is sharing its extensive experience and technical know-how around food (e.g., rice) fortification • Palantir - contributes its information technology tools and expertise to support WFP in its digital transformation and data-informed approach¹⁰⁶
Profile and branding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mastercard – promotes WFP programmes to their customers to raise funds for WFP while also strengthening their own branding <p>All reviewed partnerships have (further) potential for increasing both WFP and partner profiles based on their mutual association and visibility of their joint work. However, specific related efforts or results have not been captured neither by WFP nor by partners. Similarly, as discussed under finding 6, available data do not permit assessing whether and to what extent partnerships have contributed to WFP and/or partner brand building.</p>
Funding	<p>All but one of the reviewed exemplar partnerships included significant funding for WFP programmes across various country and functional areas. Partners understand the need for funding, even if they believe that other elements of their partnership with WFP are most valuable, e.g., technical expertise.</p>
Finance	<p>One value not yet exchanged in reviewed partnerships is financing, i.e. leveraging or raising private sector finance for development outcomes through financial instruments such as debt, equity, mezzanine finance and collective investment vehicles.¹⁰⁷</p>

Source: Evaluation team based on document review and stakeholder consultations related to the 9 exemplars

118 Consulted global partners expressed a strong interest in engaging in mission-driven partnerships. Beyond large foundations, corporate partnerships sampled are philanthropic, relationship or technical with limited examples of shared value. This may be a function of the strategy focus on 'technical' contributions to WFP, alongside large-scale funding. All interviewed partners noted their desire for their partnership with WFP to move further towards Shared Value or Collective Impact, and to be multi-faceted. Relatedly, several partners noted room for further strengthening the extent to which WFP's approach to

¹⁰⁴ Based on the review of the nine reviewed exemplars. Additional examples are provided in [section 2.2.5](#) and Annex 9 (Exemplars)

¹⁰⁵ As noted in the PSPF Strategy, WFP and some of its partners, such as Ericsson, have a long history of exchanging technical expertise.

¹⁰⁶ Of the nine exemplars, the partnership with Palantir is the only purely 'technical' partnership i.e. it does not include the transfer of cash.

¹⁰⁷ Comparator organisations are actively developing finance related partnerships. For example, WWF and the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development. UNICEF are advanced in this space, having secured a partnership with the World Bank related to their country investment.

partnership was clearly mission driven (as opposed to driven by the desire to strengthen WFP programming). Some partners also expressed the desire for connection WFP beyond project teams, and potentially with other partners to this end. Income is recognised as an important feature of partnerships but bringing a partner's core business closer to the partnership is seen as adding greatest value to mission.

119 Specifically, interviewed global partners expressed interest in:

- Expanding their knowledge exchange with WFP technical and country teams, and engaging in more shared advocacy agendas towards Zero Hunger
- Obtaining more information from WFP on how their technical capacity and expertise are contributing to progress towards Zero Hunger, e.g., through specific impact reports
- A more deliberate and flexible approach to allowing both WFP and its partners to strengthen their profile and brand through the partnership. In this regard, some partners perceived that WFP tended to be overly cautious in terms of exploring benefits that their respective partners could draw from the collaboration, possibly due to fears of WFP involuntarily aiding in appropriate 'greenwashing' of organizations.
- Engaging with other partners of WFP to work towards greater collective impact.

Finding 16: WFP is not yet systematically tracking non-financial partnership contributions and results. This limits its ability to capture the full range of existing partnership benefits and formulate clear strategic guidance for engaging in multi-faceted partnerships in support of Zero Hunger as well as WFP.

120 **The Strategy emphasized the importance of non-financial partnership benefits.** It built on the assumption that "technical partnerships allow WFP to derive the most value from engagement with the private sector"¹⁰⁸ and committed to increasing the number of "large-scale global technical partnerships created with technical units" by 25% by 2025. PPF is not systematically tracking or reporting on progress against this target.¹⁰⁹ This is understandable given that the target was flawed in assuming that partnerships could be easily categorized as either 'technical' or 'financial' and given that it was of limited value for capturing partnership contributions to WFP's mission (as one WFP staff member noted, "*the number of partnerships does not say anything about their contribution to impact*"). It illustrates the difficulty, however, of how to meaningfully capture non-financial partnership results.

121 **PPF has not systematically tracked 'impact' metrics outlined in the Strategy, with reporting on Strategy implementation focusing on capturing partnership income (in-kind¹¹⁰ and cash).** PPF measures dollar contributions and the time equivalent cost of in-kind contributions, which often misses their real value, e.g Mars sharing years of expert insight in its technical handbook. The Strategy intended to measure are three basic measures of 'impact': beneficiary reach, efficiencies, and cost-savings but during 2020-2022, PPF did not regularly or systematically track any of these metrics.¹¹¹ PPF progress reports include some narrative examples of non-financial partnership benefits, albeit on a case-by-case basis, not across partnerships or over time. The Strategy also noted the intent to develop a standardized methodology for measuring and evaluating the 'impact' of 'technical' partnerships. The Global Partnerships team developed and piloted a draft Impact Assessment Framework (IAF) that outlined a range of measures that partnerships may focus on. During the piloting stage, partnership managers flagged numerous issues with the tool, however, including its complexity and need to significantly tailor it to make it applicable to different partnerships. The IAF has, therefore, not been rolled out and PPF is exploring alternatives for identifying key measures to track across partnerships.

¹⁰⁸ PSPF Strategy, paragraph 8, referencing a finding from a 2012 evaluation of WFP's then private sector strategy.

¹⁰⁹ However, WFP is likely on track to meeting this target, based on the fact that several new global partnerships established since 2020 or in the current pipeline envisage the exchange of both financial and non-financial ('technical') benefits. The evaluation team was unable, however, to obtain information on which partnerships had been included in the Strategy baseline of 20, and which new partnerships PPF considered to 'count' towards this target.

¹¹⁰ By calculating the FTE equivalent time and value of the service/product donated.

¹¹¹ WFP conducted a one-off assessment of cost savings in 2019 that could provide a baseline for an annual review, but this has not yet been repeated.

122 **At mid-term, the absence of a mission driven target for partnerships leaves a void** in terms of bold ambition and direction of partnerships. Additionally, the lack of impact data limits WFP’s strategic oversight of whether and how partnerships are facilitating (faster, greater, more sustainable, more efficient) progress towards Zero Hunger. Core measures such as direct and indirect reach, while they have their limitations, are widely used as proxies for outcomes and impact to complement financial measures and would be expected to be monitored. The bold mission of partnerships and their impact measures are key to articulating organization-wide partnering priorities beyond income, e.g., by sector, types of partners, or types of values exchanged. The absence of such key performance indicators and oversight leaves a strategic gap. This stands in contrast to the desire to engage in multi-faceted, clearly mission-driven partnerships as expressed by consulted corporate and foundation partners as well as by several WFP technical teams, RBx and COs (see [quotes](#)).¹¹²

“It is important to make bigger impact than just the two partners”
“Our aim is to contribute toward the mission they [WFP] have and better fulfil their mission and mandate”
 WFP global partner representatives

123 **Comparators are actively seeking out and managing partnerships on a journey towards large-scale transformational partnerships**, each with their own bold ambitions and strategic directions, supported by their own clearly defined categorisations of partnerships. For example, WWF categorises partnerships as: transforming business practices, communications and awareness raising, and/or philanthropic. Comparators are all focused on maximising mission impact (beyond fundraising), leveraging the purpose and core-business of partners. Impact and income are not considered mutually exclusive, and partners actively negotiate multi-faceted partnerships to maximise value to mission, including significant fundraising asks. Their journey towards more transformational global partnerships is also associated with large-scale, multi-year funding and multi-functional partnerships, while the primary driver is impact. Comparators have established global strategies with supporting policies and protocols to direct and manage partnerships across complex networks.

2.2.5. RB AND CO SUPPORT FOR, AND OWNERSHIP OF, PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND FUNDRAISING¹¹³

Finding 17: There is growing interest in private sector partnerships and fundraising among WFP RBx and COs. While the PSPF Strategy did not stimulate this trend, it validated existing RB and CO work around private sector partnerships and fundraising and encouraged further engagement. As the Strategy did not articulate what ‘success’ would look like at regional and country levels, it is unclear to what extent its implementation is on track with regard to strengthening RB and CO support for, and ownership of PSPF.

124 **Since 2020, PPF-led activities for Strategy implementation included several actions geared towards supporting and strengthening RB and CO engagement.** These included:

- Providing funding for one PSPF position per RB¹¹⁴ to establish a network of focal points, thereby strengthening RBx’ ability to provide tailored support to country offices in terms integrating private sector partnership considerations into new CSPs and Partnership Action Plans (PAP).
- The PPF Global Partnerships team worked with RBx and GOs to strengthen their collaboration and develop or share existing private sector mappings and business development pipelines. To date, regional pipelines still tend to capture confirmed partner engagement (including global corporates and foundations) rather than prospects. Nevertheless, estimates suggest that work planning and related pipeline development begin to provide greater shared oversight of private sector partnerships across WFP, reflect active private sector engagement, and considerable partnership potential across RBx and GOs, albeit with differences by region (see Annex 15).

¹¹² See also finding 23 on WFP’s internal culture, which influences what types of data and evidence generation the organization as a whole tends to value.

¹¹³ Evaluation question 1.4.

¹¹⁴ Or in some cases, such as RBP, the ability to upgrade one of the posts dedicated to private sector fundraising.

- Establishing the Partnerships Lab (hosted by RBN) and creating a knowledge portal¹¹⁵ for RB and CO practitioners to create and support a PSPF community of practice within WFP, facilitate learning and exchange among regions, and help identify RB and CO needs in terms of guidance and support from PPF at HQ. Consultations with WFP staff at HQ and RB levels indicate appreciation for the idea of the Lab and for efforts put into its operationalization to date. There is also broad consensus that the Lab's role and purpose need to be clarified to ensure that it serves not only HQ information needs but equally adds value to the work of RBx and COs, e.g., by playing a stronger role in fostering innovation and learning within and among regions, including by celebrating and sharing insights on good practices. For example, RBx considering B2C (business-to-consumer) approaches to individual fundraising.
- The PPF Global Services team developed various tools, training and guidance materials for RBx and COs¹¹⁶ and provides on demand support related to navigating private sector partnership development and management and related processes and requirements, e.g., related due diligence and contracting, communications and knowledge management.¹¹⁷
- The IF team engaged RB focal points as members of an IF advisory group, and worked with some COs, e.g., in the Philippines, on developing global fundraising campaigns through the STM platform to benefit their CSP implementation. The team also engaged in several IF pilots in the LAC region although these indicated that the market was not yet yield enough to justify further investment.

125 **The PSPF Strategy was not clear, however, on what it aimed to achieve at CO and RB levels. It is therefore not possible to assess to what extent its implementation is 'on track' to achieving envisioned results.** The Strategy articulated the intent to “transform how WFP works with businesses and other actors – particularly at the local level” and to develop a comprehensive, RB-supported approach to increasing country office engagement with the private sector to meet the needs outlined in CSPs. It further indicated that success in local level partnering required sufficient resources and consistent guidance and support. The Strategy did not define related targets though or elaborate on how WFP would go about identifying and addressing specific RB and CO needs and how it would measure related progress (see also [section 2.1.1](#)).

126 **There is growing interest and diverse experience in private sector engagement among RBx and COs.** Consulted WFP staff across levels stated that RBx and COs pursue private sector engagement more systematically, with greater intensity and across more markets than a few years ago¹¹⁸ This trend is also reflected in the review of first and second generation CSPs and country annual reports for six countries (see Annex 16).¹¹⁹ See also [Box 10](#).

Box 10: Modest increases in private sector partnering

6% of surveyed COs (n=31) noted that the number of their local private sector partners was now considerably higher than in 2020, and 31% that it was slightly higher, while 28% noted no difference and 12% reported on having fewer partners than in 2020. (See Annex 8). Note that this reflects CO staff perceptions in absence of verifiable data on CO partnership number.

127 **Primary drivers** for CO interest in the private sector are CSP funding shortfalls, the CO Directors' interest an experience in PSPF and their professional networks in this regard, and the extent to which local contexts are conducive for pursuing partnerships with local private sector actors. For example, in India, the government's CSR policy (2013) requires qualifying businesses to allocate two percent of net profits to social

¹¹⁵ Due to limited use, the knowledge portal was repurposed in 2023 as a PPF document depository, while other guidance for COs and RBx was moved onto the WFPgo platform.

¹¹⁶ The evaluation did not obtain data specifically on whether RBx and COs use the provided materials. However, 16 percent of surveyed COs stated that they were generally 'very satisfied' with the strategic and operational guidance received from HQ, 29 percent that they were 'satisfied', and another 29 percent that they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. See Annex 8.

¹¹⁷ For example, the GS communications team helped design RB-focused value propositions; and the information knowledge management team (IKM) conducted a review of RB and CO IKM needs and helped develop RB-focused live reporting dashboards on Salesforce.

¹¹⁸ "We are increasingly using an integrated approach. We used to just take whatever a private sector donor would give us. Now, we are trying to bring in programmatic teams from the beginning. Work together and see where investment should go" (RB focal point)

¹¹⁹ WFP does not have overview data on whether and how CSPs address PSPF.

causes, which positively influenced the India CO's ability to generate contributions from the private sector.¹²⁰ Additional factors for CO engagement are WFP senior leadership (ED) and Executive Board interest in strengthening WFP partnering overall, including with the private sector (see also [sections 1.2](#) and [2.3](#)). Several of the CO interviewed have deep experience (some for over more than a decade) with different strategies for engaging private sector including cause-related marketing, private sector support for “pilots” or models (especially for addressing chronic malnutrition), establishing CEO committees/CEOs as ambassadors of Zero Hunger, B2C fundraising, and other areas (see below on IF). On the other hand, the CO survey also shows that other COs are in earlier stages of private sector engagement.

128 To (some) RBx and COs, the Strategy's main value was that is validated their existing private sector partnership and fundraising work and encouraged further engagement, including for non-financial ('technical') benefits. Most consulted WFP staff at regional and country levels indicated that, to date, Strategy implementation has not significantly influenced their approach to, or success in, PSPF.

Box 11: The division of roles and responsibilities between PPF at HQ and RB and GO is still work in progress. Consulted focal points noted:

- Uncertainty over the extent to which focal points were expected to actively generate (regional) income versus focusing on technical support to COs and supporting HQ-led business development
- A need for more clarity over the distribution of roles between PPF at HQ, RBx and GOs with regard to either leading on, or supporting the pursuit of large global/regional partnership opportunities, and, relatedly, more clarity over incentives/rewards for both of these roles
- A desire for more clarity regarding the role of RBx and GOs in relation to engaging HNWI in their respective region

They also noted that they are not always clear yet about their expected roles and responsibilities for Strategy implementation (see [Box 11](#)).¹²¹ Nevertheless, they appreciated the Strategy's importance as a signal to both internal and external stakeholders of WFP's desire to deepen its PSPF work.

Finding 18: There is a gap in strategic direction for local level partnerships to help manage the sometimes-competing priorities of maximizing funding for WFP and engaging in shared value partnerships for greater impact.

129 The Strategy aimed for WFP to co-create “best in class technical partnerships” to increase local level impact. It provided no incentives or guidance, however around building impact-focused (shared value or collective impact) partnerships at the country level. It also did not define key terms such as 'global' and 'local' partnerships or outline different types of private sector partnerships based on their primary drivers or values exchanged. This led to a lack of direction on what kinds of partnerships with local private sector actors RBx and COs were expected to pursue, and how. In the absence of clearer direction, COs and RBx have, until now, tended to prioritize partnership income ([see quotes](#) & discussion below).

"At the end of the day, money talks. So if I am able to bring in funding to the region and COs, that justifies my role"
"Countries are driven by emergencies. They are interested in fundraising more than anything else"
 WFP staff members at RB and CO levels

¹²⁰ India CSP 2023-2027, p.20.

¹²¹ In 2021, the PPF Global Services team had worked on helping to define and clarify workflows and focal point roles and responsibilities, including through a presentation to focal points delivered in that year. Interviews indicate though, that current focal points may not/no longer be aware of the available guidance.


130 **Various factors disincentivize purely technical partnerships at the country level.** The Strategy had emphasized the value of ‘technical’ (non-financial) partnership benefits especially at the country level, reflecting related CO interest expressed during the process of Strategy development. While COs consulted during the evaluation confirmed their general interest in this regard, most reported on having given up on trying to develop purely technical partnerships due to WFP cost recovery requirements (see [Box 12](#)), but also the sustained management commitment and associated staff capacity requirements and opportunity cost of managing such relationships. Relatedly, global partnerships have de-prioritized technical contributions as they faced challenges with regard to WFP drawing-down the full technical capacity, and associated value, of its partners.

Box 12: Support Costs

Corporate partners are expected to provide cash contributions for all in-kind contributions worth 6.5% ISC and also country-specific associated costs of up to 14%. While (some) large global businesses are able to adhere with this requirement, most local private sector actors cannot. While WFP’s rules allow for related exceptions (through waivers), consulted COs did not appear to be aware of this. Similarly, while the 2022 classification of private sector donors as non-traditional donors now allows mechanisms such as twinning to meet full cost recovery, this had, at the time of data collection, not yet resulted in clear related guidance to or practical changes for COs. Note, however, that guidance has been added subsequently.

131 **Nevertheless, consulted COs highly value non-financial private sector contributions,** which benefit CSP implementation in several interconnected dimensions:

- **Innovation:** Various COs collaborated with private sector actors to help embed innovative solutions into government systems, e.g., related to supply chain, nutrition, School-based programmes, and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM). 84%¹²² of surveyed COs rated private sector partners as being either highly relevant (45%) or somewhat relevant (39%) for helping them test innovative technologies, partnership modalities (such as the Partnership for Central America), and funding models, such as in RBP (see also [section 2.2.6](#)).



- **Capacity strengthening:** In several COs, private sector partner staff complemented WFP’s inhouse expertise and contributed to strengthening the capacity of local actors (government and non-government) e.g., in relation to food fortification, DRRM, and supply chain issues by providing technology, training, and technical assistance. 63% of surveyed COs selected partners’ technical expertise as one of the main benefits deriving from partnerships. This should not be confused with “technical” partnerships as understood in the strategy, but rather reflects WFP role in leveraging private sector actors in support of country capacity strengthening, which entails brokering or mediating relationships between government and private sector actors. See [Box 13](#).

Box 13: The private sector as a key player for Country Capacity Strengthening

Consulted WFP staff, including from technical units at HQ, emphasized the role of the local private sector for ensuring and contributing to sustainable, government led development. This is also highlighted in WFP’s ‘whole of society’ approach to country capacity strengthening, as outlined in the CCS policy update (May 2022). From a CCS perspective, WFP partnerships with private sector actor can and should aim to strengthen government capacity to determine and effectively lead on addressing national development priorities.

¹²² N=31

- WFP Visibility/Reputation:** Several interviewed CO staff reported that WFP's ability to act as a credible, neutral bridge and facilitator of dialogue between government and private sector actors had strengthened WFP's value proposition in the eyes of both local and international actors. COs also work with private sector partners to enhance visibility and expand effects of different WFP programming areas. For example, the Peru CO worked with a private TV company to secure greater visibility for WFP's nutrition agenda, through shared value micro-programmes such as "*El Secretito Nutritivo*." See also [Box 14](#). 31% of survey respondents noted benefits in terms of WFP branding as positive effects deriving from private sector partnering.
- Advocacy and policy dialogue:** 31% of surveyed COs selected collaboration with private sector partners for advocacy and policy dialogue as one of the top three partnership benefits. Illustrative examples include the Senegal CO mobilizing support from the Group of Friends of School Feeding in Senegal (GAASS) which engaged local public figures throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to advocate for resuming school meals programmes; the India CO and private sector partners jointly advocating for rice fortification across states; Peru Advisory Council and the CO advocating for Zero Hunger, and the Guatemala CO working with a local CSR association to raise awareness of malnutrition in the workplace. See also [Box 15](#).

Box 14: The WFP Trust for India, incubated by WFP in partnership with the Indian government, is a charitable trust that contributes to WFP programmes to combat malnutrition and hunger. The Trust is both a knowledge hub and resource platform. In addition to mobilizing donations from private corporations, it contributes to securing visibility for the CO's work and helps position WFP as a leader on food and nutrition security. This approach may, however, not be replicable in markets without similarly strong national policy requirements around CSR.

132 **Some COs identify private sector engagement as a promising tool for supporting gender equality**, especially women's economic empowerment. The India and Guatemala COs provide examples of how private sector support has been leveraged to support women's self-help groups or mobilize funding for gender-related projects in their CSP. 55% of the CO survey responses find private sector 'very relevant' or 'somewhat relevant' to making progress on gender equality, albeit without providing concrete examples of related private sector contributions or roles.

Box 15: Several COs mentioned the Scaling Up Nutrition Business Network (SBN)¹²³ as a positive example of impact-focused partnering with the private sector. The SBN is a private sector platform co-convened by WFP (Nutrition) and the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition. It works to mobilize business to act, invest, and innovate in responsible and sustainable actions to improve nutrition. To do this, SBN provides a neutral platform to broker partnerships and collaborations between business, government, and other actors on nutrition. The development of national SBNs is demand-driven, which gives the SBN a 'bottom-up' focus and national ownership. WFP COs, with support from the nutrition division, play a facilitation role. In the Philippines, WFP encouraged collaboration between international financial institutions, national gov't (through the Inter-Agency Task force for Zero Hunger) and the private sector, through the SUN Business network, to scale up smallholder production of iron-fortified rice (IFR), with prospects for the IFC to explore how private sector can fill gaps in the funding of production machinery and blending machines.¹²⁴ The SBN also faces challenges, however, in terms of measuring its results and contributions to WFP's mission.

¹²³ WFP's engagement in, and support for, the SBN is managed by the Nutrition division (not PPF) and predates the PSPF Strategy. It is, nevertheless, relevant in the context of this evaluation as numerous WFP staff at HQ and CO levels referred to the SBN as an illustration of 'good' partnering that they were aspiring to engage in. See [SUN Business Network | Scaling Up Nutrition](#) for information on the SBN.

¹²⁴ WFP Thematic Evaluation of WFP Philippines Country Capacity Strengthening Activities July 2018 – June 2022, DE/PHCO/2020/015, August 2022.

133 Success in fundraising from local partners since 2020 varied by region and country but has been limited overall.

There is no comprehensive oversight of the amounts of funds raised from by individual COs from local private sector partners.¹²⁵ 46,8% of surveyed COs noted though that they did not generate any income from partnerships with local private sector actors during 2020-2022, while 15% stated that they generated more, and 13% that they raised about the same amount of income as in 2020. COs that have scaled up engagement with the private sector note the importance of staffing, links to communications team, and full engagement of programme teams in identifying prospects. See also [Box 16](#).

134 Most local level philanthropic partnerships are small scale and well below the USD 1m threshold recommended by PPF for philanthropic partnerships to ensure efficient use of WFP (HQ, RB and CO) staff time.

Consulted CO staff offer mixed views on whether it makes sense for COs to prioritize accessing resources deriving from large, global partnerships over trying to raise (limited) funds from local corporate partners. Some COs prioritize accessing globally generated resources. In this context, some COs noted a lack of clarity, however, over how globally raised private sector funds were distributed and how COs could go about accessing them (see [Box 17](#)). For other COs, local companies' contributions of funding, while at small scale, are part of multi-faceted partnerships that include important non-financial benefits such as the ones outlined above. Overall, there is a lack of direction on how to calculate the NET benefit of local (small scale) private sector partnerships, i.e. weighing a partnership's overall likely contributions towards Zero Hunger against required investments in terms of WFP staff time.

135 RBP and some COs in the LAC region are independently exploring opportunities for individual fundraising within their own country/region.

Related efforts are also inspired by the fact that other UN agencies are implementing similar local IF programmes, the desire to generate more resources for COs in the region, and the perception that existing corporate IF channels were not yet fully leveraging the perceived fundraising potential in the region, e.g., in markets such as Brazil or Chile (see [Box 18](#)).

Box 16: Differences in CO engagement and success in fundraising from local (or global) private sector actors reflect differences in their respective national contexts and related opportunities for resource mobilization, as well as differences in their internal capacity for PSPF.

The Guatemala CO is currently developing an internal strategy for private sector engagement, with the intent to combine fundraising and 'impact' objectives. The Philippines CO is working on a broader partnerships action plan with a focus on PSPF.

The India CO is among the country offices with the longest and most substantial experience in PSPF and had its own related fundraising strategy as early as 2016. CO programme teams are involved in targeted monthly outreach activities to hundreds of actual or potential donors.

Box 17: Need for further information sharing on how COs can access resources from global private sector partners

Several consulted COs perceived that access to resources raised through, for example, STM, was at least partly dependent on personal relationships, i.e. some COs directly approaching the STM team to be featured in resource mobilization campaigns. Consultations with PPF indicate that this ad hoc approach no longer applies, and that STM campaigns are now based on an analysis of which markets or programmes are likely to deliver the best results and return for WFP. COs appear to not yet be fully aware of related information, however.

Box 18: Local IF pilots in the LAC region

In Brazil, RBP is working with an NGO to conduct face-to-face and digital fundraising in exchange for 10% of funds raised, with a commitment to generate at least USD 400K per year.

In Chile, the RB is developing a partnership with a local electricity company to pilot an approach to adding the option to donate to WFP to bills sent to clients in wealthier areas.

In Ecuador, the RB is partnering with a local bank and a telemarketing firm to facilitate donations towards child nutrition.

RBP and the Guatemala CO are working with a private sector partner and NGOs on developing a context-specific individual giving platform.

¹²⁵ As noted in [section 2.2.4](#), the vast majority of WFP's private sector income derived from large global partnerships.

2.2.6. INNOVATION¹²⁶

Finding 19: Numerous elements of Strategy implementation to date have been innovative or have fostered innovation at global and country levels that have potential to help WFP better deliver for beneficiaries. There is considerable room though for capturing and disseminating related successes more systematically and for clarifying WFP objectives and priorities in terms of pursuing innovation within and through PSPF.

136 **WFP has a long history of fostering innovation, including through partnerships with the private sector.**¹²⁷ Innovation is a key priority of the organization overall, as reflected in the work of the dedicated WFP Innovation Accelerator¹²⁸ (INKA) which often engages private sector actors, including some of the large global partners working with PPF, such as the Gates Foundation.¹²⁹ Throughout Strategy implementation to date, PPF has been in conversation with the Innovation Accelerator.¹³⁰

137 **Innovative elements were evident throughout Strategy implementation** to date as described below. Some of these have strong potential to directly benefit WFP beneficiaries.

- As noted in section 2.2.3, WFP's individual fundraising programme with its unique global and 'digital-led' approach is innovative and provides advantages in terms of agility and efficiency. Similarly, the use of a loan mechanism to fund part of the investment into building the IF programme was innovative, as was the establishment of a global customer care agency for IG. STM, which emerged from WFP's Innovation Accelerator, was the sector's first fundraising app and constitutes a highly interactive product that generated significant supporter loyalty with unique giving behaviours. Since 2020, STM incorporated zakat-focused campaigns during Ramadan following accreditation from the Shariah Board of the Islamic Development Bank. The target driven culture of IF is very open to innovation, and there is potential to share learning across teams and markets.
- Innovation was also part of multiple WFP partnerships co-created with corporations and foundations. Illustrative examples include new approaches to tackling critical challenges in Food Safety and Quality deriving from WFP's collaboration with Mars; DSM funding for research and development to support innovation; WFP and Cargill jointly established an innovative agriculture risk management project in Northeastern China combining awareness raising of risk and insurance with sustainable agriculture practices and the application of fertigation technology, to only name a few.
- Examples of innovation within or deriving from PSPF at regional and country levels include the Guatemala CO exploring partnership with a multi-national food packaging and processing company to expand school meals programming by including liquid meals for very young children; and RBP and COs in the region piloting local individual fundraising programmes (see [section 2.2.5](#)). Additionally, the WFP IGNITE [Innovation Hub](#) for Eastern Africa, established by RBN and the WFP Innovation Accelerator in collaboration with CARE Denmark, works to harness local solutions to local problems and nurturing the entrepreneurial ecosystem and includes a pillar focused on entrepreneur and youth innovation. The Innovation Accelerator is also engaged in other innovative partnerships with private sector partners, including, in collaboration with WFP USA, with Google for Startups.¹³¹

138 **Some private sector partnerships and related processes of co-creation also helped WFP to 'think outside the box'**¹³² and/or, as noted by consulted WFP staff at HQ, nudged the organization to embracing innovation in how it works (see [quote](#)). Similarly, co-creation also develops new experience and perspective,

¹²⁶ Evaluation question 2.3: To what extent has WFP explored new modes of engagement to find innovative and collaborative solutions to better deliver for beneficiaries through new technology or new ways of working?

¹²⁷ The PSPF Strategy (paragraph 40) references examples of past collaborations with Ericsson, Alibaba and Facebook.

¹²⁸ <https://innovation.wfp.org/>

¹²⁹ The Gates Foundation identified WFP (Nutrition/Innovation Accelerator) as one of its core technical and innovation partners to advance nutrition for women and children working on large scale food fortification. This collaboration is not related to the partnership agreements and related funding to WFP that are managed by PPF.

¹³⁰ A recent meeting (June 2023) resulted in renewed commitment from both PPF and KIX to continue and further strengthen their collaboration.

¹³¹ For more information, see: [Google.org and WFP USA's Mission for Zero Hunger](#).

¹³² E.g., in relation to addressing issues such as youth employment.

for example partnering with a large philanthropic foundation on youth entrepreneurship, developed activities in a new focus area for WFP.

"One unintended but positive effect of the partnership with [global partner] was that it forced the involved country offices to work in a more integrated way across teams"
WFP technical unit staff at HQ

139 **The absence of a strategic approach to innovation meant, however, that related efforts and successes were not systematically pursued, captured, or celebrated.** With exception of the IF loan mechanism, there is no evidence to indicate that the above-noted examples of innovation were linked to, driven, or otherwise influenced by, Strategy implementation. Since 2020, regular PPF reports to the EB provided narrative examples of innovative efforts but were unable to capture bigger picture insights into whether WFP was doing 'the right thing' and was 'doing things right' in terms of maximizing innovation as part of Strategy implementation. This also reflects the noted absence of dedicated human and financial resources to foster innovation (see [section 2.1.2](#)) which meant that no one inside or outside of PPF was responsible for overseeing related efforts. Additionally, the pressure to meet financial Strategy targets and pay back the loan limited PPF's ability to experiment and take risks – two elements crucial for innovation.

2.2.7. **ADVANCING WFP GENDER AND INCLUSION OBJECTIVES AND ENSURING EQUITABLE RESULTS/ACCESS FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS**¹³³

Finding 20: Private sector partnerships and funds have been used to advance WFP gender, equity and inclusion objectives and to ensure equitable results/access for vulnerable populations. However, these dimensions are not explicit priorities of WFP partnership prospecting or fundraising, and related achievements have not been systematically pursued or tracked.

140 **WFP acknowledges that gender equality and women's empowerment are central to fulfilling its mandate of Zero Hunger.**¹³⁴ While acknowledging this, the PSPF Strategy did not articulate how its implementation would help advance WFP gender equality and/or broader inclusion objectives and did not elaborate on the private sector's potential for advancing gender equality globally and locally.¹³⁵ Similarly, to date, gender equality has not been an explicit emphasis of operationalizing the Strategy. For example, gender equality is not explicitly mentioned in the context of global partnership business development and related sectoral value propositions, and it has not been routinely embedded into individual fundraising campaign language.¹³⁶ Overall, the absence of clear direction with regard to gender equality in line with the WFP Gender Policy and of related monitoring prevent assessing whether and how Strategy implementation contributed to advancing gender equality and broader inclusion.

141 **Some consulted WFP staff at HQ noted that by generating resources,** including flexible funds, to support CSP implementation, PSPF Strategy implementation did benefit the advancement of GE, equity and inclusion objectives given that related objectives are included in all WFP CSPs. While there is some merit to this view, such (potential) contributions were neither deliberately pursued as part of PSPF Strategy implementation nor systematically tracked and reported upon.¹³⁷

142 **There is anecdotal evidence** of global and local partnerships having pursued and contributed to gender equality and/or inclusion-related achievements. Interviews with WFP staff and partners indicate that

¹³³ Evaluation question 2.4

¹³⁴ See, for example: <https://www.wfp.org/gender-equality>

¹³⁵ At the time of Strategy development and approval, the WFP Gender Policy 2015-2020 was in place and could have provided related guidance. Looking forward, relevant direction may derive from the new (2022) Gender Policy.

¹³⁶ The evaluation team conducted a review of STM campaigns as an example. Campaigns tend to use generic terms such as 'families' and 'children'. Of the reviewed 2019 and 2022 sample only one campaign in 2019 referenced women specifically in their descriptors. When supporters chose where to donate, the STM app has gender equality listed as a campaign filter option, although this is not easily found/visible. When selecting the filter (in June 2023), it linked to only one campaign related to Empowering women in Rwanda, Peru and Zambia. STM campaigns do tend to use positive/empowering images of women in girls, which is commendable. The scope of the evaluation did not permit conducting an in-depth analysis also of IG campaigns, however, feedback from PPF indicate various examples of successful IG campaigns focusing on women that depicted actors as having agency.

¹³⁷ Interviews indicate, however, that PPF and the WFP Gender Office have held exploratory discussions to explore opportunities for collaboration and potential for generating private sector resources for WFP gender priorities that lack other funding.

related objectives tend to be addressed if gender equality constitutes a priority for the respective partner, especially foundations such as the Mastercard Foundation and the Gates Foundation. (See Annex 9) Similarly, there are various examples of COs (e.g., India, Guatemala) engaging with private sector partners to jointly advance GE and women's empowerment. However, related efforts predated and were not influenced by implementation of the PSPF Strategy.

2.3. EQ3: HOW HAVE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCED STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE?

2.3.1. INTRODUCTION

143 This section presents evaluation findings on the main internal and external factors that influenced, both positively and negatively, progress in strategy implementation. It addresses sub-questions under EQ3 in the evaluation matrix (Annex 6). The analysis drew on evidence from document, dataset and literature reviews, stakeholder interviews, the survey of COs, and the review of comparator organizations, thereby allowing for triangulation of data sources.

2.3.2. INTERNAL FACTORS

144 This section briefly discusses internal factors within PPF and WFP overall that influenced Strategy implementation in addition to factors already explored in other parts of the report, such as the effects of gaps in the Strategy itself ([section 2.1.1](#)), investments into Strategy implementation ([2.1.2](#)), and effects of contextual changes on Strategy implementation ([sections 2.2.2-2.2.4](#), and [section 2.3.3](#)).

PPF Capacity and Structure

Finding 21: PPF's evolving internal structure was, overall, appropriate for facilitating effective Strategy implementation. Strategy implementation to date, especially work around establishing the IF programme, benefited from PPF leadership and senior staff expertise, experience, and networks. There are some concerns though about (actual and perceived) duplication of efforts and inefficiencies deriving from limited cross-PPS team integration.

145 **Within PPF, establishing specialized teams for IF, Global (corporate) Partnerships; Foundations, and Global Philanthropy was reasonable** given the different targets, ways of operating, and skillsets required for these areas. Factors specifically influencing these teams included the following.

Individual Fundraising

- In 2019, the delay in Strategy sign-off by the Executive Board cut into the lead time before the start of the Strategy period and delayed associated recruitment and investment. This limited PPF's ability to prepare, plan and re-structure ahead of the Strategy launch in January 2020. For the IF programme this meant that recruitment of team members and procurement of key infrastructure services took place whilst launching fundraising campaigns with a view to demonstrating results in time to unlock the next investment. PPF was able to accomplish this at least partly due to the extensive IF experience and professional networks of senior leadership and staff, which helped the team to 'hit the ground running' as of early 2020.
- Largely relying on consultants allowed the IF programme flexibility and agility to recruit specialized expertise as and for as long as needed. At the same time, the lack of dedicated PSA-funded IF positions poses risks to programme sustainability and may be interpreted to signal a lack of corporate commitment to the IF programme.
- The IF programme's robust monitoring and data driven decision-making, which was enabled by the development of an integrated data warehouse for all of IF, ensured continual adjustments in the IG and STM approach to ensure fundraising performance was optimised. The creation of the Business Intelligence Hub in 2022 further strengthened this and ensured deeper analysis of products and performance could be undertaken, particularly where performance dipped. Through WFP's membership in the IFL Forum, the IF team continually benchmarked their performance, providing team with strong understanding of peer performance and global fundraising trends.

- Transitioning STM from being a start-up under the WFP Innovation Accelerator to becoming a part of PPF was strategically appropriate and created opportunities for synergies and mutual learning. The integration of IG and STM as a coherent IF team is still ongoing (see [section 2.2.3](#)) with both sub-teams continuing to work towards maximizing the use of their respective products and collective expertise to create the best possible experience for WFP supporters and generate income.
- Both STM and IG were limited by the fact that, as per Executive Board direction as part of Strategy approval, the IF programme was for most of the 2020-2022 period not permitted to target the previously strong-performing UK market.

Global (corporate) Partnerships and Foundations

- Based on initial concerns about existing internal capacity, e.g., related to business development for global partnerships, and the anticipated time required for a newly established foundation team to gain traction, the Strategy formulated only modest targets for income generated from corporate partners and foundations (see Annex 15 and [section 2.1.1](#)). While this allowed the respective PPF teams to exceed expectations, it contributed to the noted gap in terms of articulating a bold corporate vision for WFP private sector partnerships.
- The initial decision to structure the Global Partnerships team along the Strategy pillars of ‘income’ and ‘impact’ (something that the Strategy had not explicitly suggested) limited its ability to coherently build on, and improve, existing WFP approaches to business development and partnership management. This caused delays in Strategy implementation. Restructuring the team in 2021 was sensible and allowed the team to develop the increasingly systematic approaches described in [section 2.2.4](#).
- Global Partnerships team staffing benefited from an, albeit modest and incremental increase in the PSA budget, which slowed down recruitment at the onset of Strategy implementation. By relying more than the IF programme on (existing) WFP staff, the team also faced challenges as not all individuals assigned to the team had relevant or in-depth private sector partnership experience. This continues to be a challenge. Additionally, the rotational system led to frequent staff turnover which negatively affected the consistency of some partnership relationships. Similar challenges related to staffing were also noted by some cross-cutting teams within PPF (see below), e.g., the Finance and Business Analysis team.
- The Foundations team used revenue generated from foundations to create two new full-time positions for partnership officers dedicated to managing and growing the relationship with the respective foundation and serving as valuable ‘one stop shops’ for all external facing elements of the complex grants, including engagement with other relevant WFP units and teams.
- The current case-by-case approach to managing partnerships led to a lack of data and oversight of partnerships globally both in terms of pipelines and in relation to overall partnership performance (financial and ‘impact’). The Global Partnership and Foundations teams do not (yet) have a function equivalent to the BI Hub that is supporting IF.

Global Philanthropy

- Delays in recruiting staff to fill the planned positions slowed down progress in forming an adequately staffed global philanthropy team to drive development and implementation of a comprehensive WFP approach to engaging with UNHWIs.

146 **Creating cross-cutting teams to support Strategy implementation across PPF were equally reasonable.** These teams supported the division, amongst other responsibilities, on HR-related issues (Operational Excellence), financial oversight and related reporting to the Executive Board (Finance and Business Analysis), and providing operational support to RBx and COs and contributing to strengthening corporate processes (Global Services) e.g., in relation to digitalizing the contracting process through Salesforce, developing guidance for the management of organizational conflicts of interest, development of a dedicated PPF onboarding and training portal, and improving the due diligence process.¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Global Services was established and scaled to support global partnerships. Given that, for example, large individual donors and STM corporate partners should also comply with DD requirements, PPF is exploring whether and how the team could support PSPF more broadly, and what implications this would have for required team capacity.

147 **Consulted WFP staff within and outside of PPF indicated some gaps in relation to overall PPF team integration.**

- To date, Individual Fundraising and Global Partnerships operate in relative isolation from each other with only limited interactions or synergies between them. While, as noted above, their separation makes sense given the different nature of their respective work and the need for them to respond to different market dynamics, this may also mean lost opportunities and efficiencies, e.g., in terms of joint (new) market development.
- PPF has a communications team within Global Services as well as a dedicated Supporter Content Hub within the IF programme. Both teams work in collaboration with CAM and fulfil specific and urgent needs of the IF and Global Partnerships teams respectively, and there is no evidence of duplication of roles and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the division of labour between these teams is not always clear to others within WFP and has fuelled a desire by other WFP teams and divisions to better understand the PPF structure and composition.

148 **Establishing a dedicated unit for RB engagement was an important gesture**, reflecting the Strategy's intent to strengthen RB and CO engagement in and ownership of PSPF. Consultations with WFP staff at HQ and in RBx indicate varying views on whether the Partnerships Lab would be more effective were it located at HQ rather than being hosted by an RB. The question of where the Lab should be located cannot be discussed, however, without clarity over WFP's ambition for 'success' of Strategy implementation at RB and CO levels (see [section 2.1.1](#)), measures of success for partnerships beyond the number of global partnerships and generated income ([section 2.2.4](#)), and in absence of a clearly defined and agreed-upon role for the Partnerships Lab ([section 2.2.5](#)).

Finding 22: PPF made laudable efforts to strengthen its collaboration with other WFP units and teams, and with Friends organization. The distribution of roles and responsibilities between PPF and these others is not yet always clear, however, and there is limited awareness within WFP of existing successes in Strategy implementation.

149 **The Strategy itself provided very limited indication of how responsibilities for its implementation would be shared** between PPF and others. Additionally, PPF carried out no significant activities for internal 'socialization' of the Strategy once it was approved. This is understandable given delays in Strategy approval, high pressure to deliver towards targets and, relatedly, the need for extensive and ongoing engagement with the Executive Board, which considerably added to PPF's workload.¹³⁹ As a result, however, the document largely remained a Strategy for PPF rather than for WFP overall.¹⁴⁰

150 **During the 2020-2022 period, PPF worked on deepening and expanding its collaboration with other technical and functional units in WFP.** Consulted technical teams appreciated related efforts, e.g., joint work around developing value propositions and proposals that were, as discussed in section 2.2.4, part of an increasingly systematic and professionalized approach to business development.

151 **There remain gaps**, however, in terms of clear guidance for PPF and Friends collaboration with WFP technical teams (see also [section 2.2](#)). For example, there are no standardized systems, procedures or protocols for partnership development and management across the different entities. Similarly, the noted absence of clear direction for how to operationalize the intent to increase 'technical' (or 'impact') partnerships, or how to measure non-financial partnership contributions means that the Strategy has not been guiding the longer-term direction of partnerships pursued by or involving technical units. This is reflected in some of these units perceiving that, to date, the Strategy and its implementation have not significantly changed their

¹³⁹ Throughout the first three years, PPF provided extensive quarterly reports to the EB on progress and CCI management, considerably more than common for other WFP strategies.

¹⁴⁰ As is reflected in the evaluations of other cross cutting policies and strategies in WFP and other organizations, ensuring mutual responsibility for their implementation beyond the unit that is the primary custodian is a common challenge. Mitigating measures often include embedding relevant objectives and/or requirements for other actors into existing systems and practices. For PSPF, this is, to some extent, taking place through the fact that CSP development is expected to comment on (private sector) partnerships. There are no similar tools/processes, however, for guiding and facilitating Strategy ownership among other functional and technical units at HQ.

approach to, or successes in, private sector engagement. Comparator organizations have equivalents of business development and partnership management functions in their HQ and market entities in complex networks, with clear responsibilities for development and management of relationships, including coordination. This is recognised as separate from the work of technical, specialist and national functions.

152 **While PPF regularly engaged with other PA divisions (STR, PPR, CAM), collaboration and synergies are not always pursued systematically**, both at HQ (e.g., in relation to joint advocacy with donor governments, private sector, and IFIs),¹⁴¹ and in the field (e.g., in terms of providing RBx and COs with integrated and coherent guidance on different types of partnerships)¹⁴², and in relation to capturing non-financial benefits of partnering. The collaboration with CAM is generally working well, e.g., in relation to coordinating on content for fundraising campaigns and in relation to emergency appeals (also in collaboration with regional and country directors), but there is room for clarifying PPF, CAM and others' roles and responsibilities with regard to WFP brand building (see finding 6).¹⁴³

153 **Overall, there is limited awareness within WFP of what Strategy implementation has entailed** beyond establishing the IF programme, whether and how successful it has been, and how resources mobilized from the private sector were distributed within WFP.¹⁴⁴ Many consulted WFP staff outside of PPF framed private sector engagement solely in terms of resource mobilization unless explicitly prompted to reflect on non-financial benefits of private sector partnerships.¹⁴⁵ This likely reflects the absence of internally focused communication beyond Executive Board reports to summarize and highlight PSPF achievements and lessons learned (both by PPF, as well as by others). See also [Box 19](#).

Box 19: As another cross-cutting dimension, SSTC is facing similar challenges to PSPF in terms of ensuring visibility and ownership of related efforts across WFP. To mitigate this, the SSTC team successfully introduced periodic SSTC newsletter and regional updates to capture and share insights on successes and lessons learned to a wider internal audience. (Source: Evaluation of the WFP SSTC Policy. 2021)

Broader WFP Context

Finding 23: WFP's mandate, global reputation and reach are valuable assets for private sector engagement. WFP's organizational culture and processes, which are deeply shaped by its humanitarian roots, pose challenges though in terms of boldly and flexibly engaging with the private sector and embracing private sector engagement as a long-term endeavour that requires significant organizational investment.

154 Outlined below are several characteristics of, or developments in, WFP's organizational context that influenced Strategy implementation to date, both positively and negatively. Other issues, such as the limiting effects of WFP's ISC policy, were discussed in previous sections.

- **WFP's focus on alleviating hunger and malnutrition, and its mandate of both saving and changing lives**, combined with its vast field presence, ability to innovate at scale and track record in responding to emergencies, make the organization an attractive partner for both private sector actors looking to make contributions to emergency operations as well as

"WFP has the greatest potential among UN agencies [for private sector engagement] as hunger is a universal aim. Nobody thinks that solving hunger is bad, it's such a primal cause. If WFP were serious about this in terms of support and investments, they could easily become leaders of the pack both monetary and in terms of logistics and programme support."
Comparator organization representative

¹⁴¹ While not falling into the 2020-2022 period, a positive example of more recent collaboration between PPF and PPR is their joint advocacy work in the context of COP 28 for government donors and private sector to invest in climate finance.

¹⁴² And whether/how, for example, the Partnerships Lab could play a role in this regard.

¹⁴³ Of note: in July 2023, the Global Services communications team published a guidance on roles and responsibilities on brand partnerships in consultation with CAM.

¹⁴⁴ Some interviews indicated the perception, for example, that funds were primarily benefiting emergency purposes, which, as discussed in section 2.2.2, is incorrect.

¹⁴⁵ While some technical units noted that their focus lies on technical/shared value type partnerships, they considered these relationships to lie outside of the PSPF Strategy's and PPF's remit. The perception that PPF was (only or primarily) about resource mobilization also likely influences critical views regarding the division's size.

partners focusing on longer-term systems change. It also creates potential for WFP in terms of individual fundraising. Consulted PPF and other WFP staff, as well as several of the consulted comparator organizations noted that based on these features WFP had immense potential to further grow its private sector engagement, provided it was willing to commit to and invest in this (see [quote](#)).

- **WFP is still in the process of transitioning from its traditional role as a ‘doer’ to also fulfil that of an ‘enabler’**, especially in stable and middle-income contexts. Several consulted stakeholders noted that while many WFP leaders and employees have fully embraced both of these roles, others are still sceptical and more needs to be done to further enhance skills and experience to adopt the longer-term and development focused role that comes with WFP’s ‘changing lives’ mandate.¹⁴⁶
- This is also reflected in WFP’s organizational culture, which tends to value short term and quantitative results, and which tends to value short-term and quantitative results, and which tends to evaluate corporate investments first and foremost through the lens of how many lives the same amount could save if used for emergency operations instead. While neither of these traits are problematic in themselves, they pose challenges, especially as regards providing internal incentives for pursuing non-financial private sector partnership results, and the need for upfront and sustained investment into PSPF.
- **WFP contracting and due diligence requirements** were not always conducive to Strategy implementation and required (ongoing) work by PPF to review and revise existing frameworks within the limitations feasible within wider UN regulations. Challenges included (i) increased contractual complexity for partnerships that include not only financial but also non-financial partner contributions; (ii) the need to tailor existing templated partnership agreements to the expectations and demands of different partners; (iii) and limitations to WFP’s ability to partner, for example, with academic institutions, or to engage in partnerships with financing (as opposed to funding) benefits. Additionally, while noting some improvements since 2020, almost all consulted WFP staff and global partners described WFP’s DD process as lengthy, resource intensive and top-heavy. As such, it constitutes a hindrance to partnership development in often fast-paced and competitive global and local spaces that required bolder, less risk-averse approaches. (See [Box 20](#) below).

Box 20: Due Diligence. Several consulted stakeholders, both within WFP as well as among global partners, noted that in their experience WFP used to be characterized by an overly cautious, restrictive, and inflexible approach to engaging with the private sector, as reflected in the existing approach to DD. In 2023, PPF, in close coordination with LEG, commissioned a thorough externally conducted review of WFP’s DD process,¹⁴⁷ that included insights on how DD is approached in comparator organizations. The review informed a proposal to the WFP leadership committee in September 2023 calling for significant changes to the DD process to make it less top-heavy, more efficient, and more effective not only for risk management but also as a tool for partnership prospecting, negotiations, and management.¹⁴⁸

- **WFP senior leadership support and engagement** during the 2020-2022 period contributed to raising global WFP visibility, raised the profile of PSPF within WFP, and led to adding global philanthropy as an additional private sector fundraising channel (see [section 2.2.2](#)). During the review period, however, ED and other senior WFP leader engagement with actual and potential private sector partners was not systematic and, thereby, not consistently sending clear messages as regards WFP’s interest in, and commitment to, strengthening its engagement with private sector partners.

¹⁴⁶ Similar observations were made in the evaluations of WFP’s Policy on Capacity Development (2016), Corporate Partnership Strategy (2017), People Strategy (2019), and South-South and Triangular Cooperation Strategy (2021) indicating that progress of the transition has been slow.

¹⁴⁷ Since 2012, the DD function, including research and risk level assessment, has been managed by the WFP legal office, with PPF liaising with WFP offices, units and Friends organizations expected to comply with DD requirements.

¹⁴⁸ Sources: stakeholder consultations and documents and reports deriving from the external review of WFP’s DD process.

155 **Looking ahead to the rest of the Strategy period 2023-2025**, the main factors likely to influence Strategy implementation are an expected decline in overall WFP funding and simultaneously growing global needs deriving from ongoing and new conflicts and the effects of the climate crisis. This will place further emphasis on the need to diversify and grow WFP's funding base. While this may increase pressure on PPF to approach private sector engagement primarily from an 'income for WFP' angle, it will also increase the need to work in partnerships, given that no actor alone will be able to close the existing gap in terms of reaching SDG 2 on Zero Hunger.¹⁴⁹ The PA department's proposed 'Fit for Future' initiative reflects this context. See [Box 21](#).

Box 21: Fit for Future in a changed funding landscape. In early 2023, PA conducted a diagnostic study on "Partnerships Fit for Future" that examined HQ and field interactions around Partnership workstreams across the PA department. The study, along with other reviews, informed the PA department's proposed Fit for Future initiative outlined in the [WFP Management Plan \(2024-2026\)](#), which aims to allow WFP to more effectively secure and increase existing partnerships (including but not limited to the private sector), diversify funding pathways and better support field and regional offices.

2.3.3. EXTERNAL FACTORS

Finding 24: During the 2020-2022 period, unexpected and extraordinary developments in the global context benefited but also posed significant challenges to Strategy implementation. Some of these are likely to also affect private sector engagement during the remainder of the Strategy.

156 The main external factor influencing Strategy implementation were local and global emergencies, each of which refocused and impacted on WFP fundraising and partnership activities for varying amounts of time. The Strategy itself had not explicitly factored in the effect of emergencies on WFP's private sector partnerships and fundraising work. Of relevance during the 2020-2022 period were the following two developments in particular:

- **The COVID-19 pandemic** accelerated the global, and WFP's, transition to digital fundraising and led to a, likely temporary, spike in private sector donations to WFP. It also contributed to global economic challenges, however, including inflation and increases in the cost of living, and led to increased competition on, and increasing costs of, digital social platforms, all of which resulted in challenges for WFP and other organizations to recruit new supporters. Additionally, due to the challenging global economic context, many traditional WFP donor governments are expected to, in future, reduce their contributions to UN organizations and focus on domestic needs.
- **The war in Ukraine.** On the one hand, this led to a (likely short-term) boost in WFP income, both overall and from the private sector, especially from corporations. On the other hand, it intensified the global food crisis and increased demand for WFP support, which, in turn, led to WFP resource requirements increasingly outstripping increases in funding. Looking ahead to the remainder of the Strategy period, demand for WFP assistance and competition over funding are likely to intensify given the increasingly apparent effects of the global climate crisis.

157 **Other developments** that affected Strategy implementation during 2020-2022 were (i) WFP's win of the Nobel Prize in 2020, which generated WFP visibility and led to some existing corporate partners increasing their financial support to the organization; (ii) the iOS update, which negatively affected IF, especially STM, performance (see [section 2.2.3](#)); and (iii) exchange rate fluctuations, which negatively impacted private sector income raised in EUR, GBP or YEN.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ The WFP ED emphasized the organization's commitment to enhancing and broadening its partnerships, including the private sector, during the November 2023 Executive Board meeting.

¹⁵⁰ Around 55 percent of all income received from individuals (IG, STM and Friends) in 2022 were raised in these currencies.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations

3.1. CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion 1: Over the first two years of Strategy implementation, WFP demonstrated its potential for generating large scale, diverse, flexible funding from the private sector and leveraging partner contributions for progress towards Zero Hunger. The remainder of the Strategy period provides opportunities to consolidate and build on successes achieved to date, while continuing to optimize performance and secure sustained organizational commitment to private sector partnerships and fundraising.

158 During the 2020-2022 period, WFP made considerable progress in strengthening and expanding its private sector work, with strong potential to reach other UN agency level of private sector engagement and leverage. This is remarkable especially when considering that this period was both about building teams, systems, and processes as well as working to deliver on the Strategy targets.

159 At mid-term, Strategy implementation is in the process of transitioning from an initial 'building' and subsequent 'learning and adaption' stage into a period focused on sustainability and further growth. This requires continued strong performance and leadership not only from PPF, but also overall organizational commitment, investment, and a shared vision for the envisioned role of private sector partners in supporting progress towards Zero Hunger. The next phase of implementation will further need to take into consideration the various contextual changes that have occurred since approval of the Strategy in late 2019 and that, both positively and negatively, affected WFP's ability to meet Strategy targets within the assigned six-year span. Of particular importance, as recently highlighted by the WFP ED,¹⁵¹ is the continuously widening gap between humanitarian needs and available funding, which places further emphasis on WFP working in partnership with private sector actors.

160 These overarching observations are offered to help frame the following more specific conclusions that point out both specific achievements but also remaining areas for improvement.

Conclusion 2: The PSPF Strategy presented a bold organizational ambition and direction to grow individual fundraising. There remains a strategic gap with regard to articulating similarly clear and ambitious direction for private sector partnerships and, specifically, their envisioned contributions towards Zero Hunger.

161 The PSPF Strategy was at the time of its approval, and has remained, relevant in relation to WFP's ambition to diversify its funding base and expand access to flexible funding, and as regards WFP commitments to working in partnership in alignment with SDG 17. The Strategy put forward a compelling narrative and bold ambition for private sector engagement focused on fundraising. This helped secure the upfront investment and organizational commitment required for launching WFP's IF programme.

162 The Strategy emphasized the relevance of private sector partnerships for 'impact' as well as 'income'. It missed the opportunity though to clearly articulate WFP's organizational ambition for partnerships and the strategic direction to maximise the benefits of private sector partnerships to close the gap towards achieving Zero Hunger and for progress towards WFP's mission of both saving and changing lives. Consequently, WFP has, until now, largely framed and monitored private sector partnerships in terms of their (financial and technical) contributions to WFP rather than in terms of holistically leveraging private sector partnerships for mission 'impact', i.e. progress towards Zero Hunger, food security, and enhanced nutrition. This strategic gap negatively affects WFP overview of partnership risk, potential, and its ability to formulate clear direction for the prioritisation or operationalization of partnerships. Annex 4 illustrates implications of this for the extent to which current evidence allows verifying and demonstrating progress along the reconstructed theory of change for the PSPF Strategy.

163 Existing WFP partnerships with private sector actors are varied and multi-faceted. They span across the partnership spectrum from 'philanthropic' to 'shared value' partnerships, with a variety of values

¹⁵¹ ED opening and closing remarks for the November 2023 WFP Executive Board meeting.

exchanged between the partners. (The Strategy distinguished only between 'income' and 'impact', or 'technical', partnerships, and between 'global' and 'local' partnerships albeit without defining these). There is considerable anecdotal evidence of benefits for WFP programming and for beneficiaries deriving from partners sharing their knowledge, profile, and engaging in advocacy and policy dialogue alongside WFP, in addition to also providing funding. To date, however, WFP has not yet systematically captured progress and achievements in relation to key performance indicators the 'impact' related metrics described in the Strategy of beneficiary reach, efficiencies, and cost-savings. Comparators all struggle to develop organizational wide, standardised impact frameworks to work across the depth, diversity, and complexity of their partnerships. However, the core metrics, as outlined in the Strategy, such as beneficiary reach (direct and indirect) are routinely used across the sector for standardised reporting.

164 This absence of data stands in contrast to the desire among many WFP staff at HQ, RB and CO levels, as well as among WFP global partners to engage in mission-driven, multi-faceted partnerships with clear contributions to sustainable change beyond contributions to WFP. It also limits WFP's ability to obtain strategic oversight over the full range of private sector partnership contributions, considering both financial and non-financial benefits and their combined implications for furthering progress towards WFP (and partner) goals. Limitations in oversight also derive from WFP's current case-by-case approach to partnership acquisition and management. While this has been successful in terms of individual relationship management, it limits WFP's ability to provide forward looking direction in terms of different types of partnerships (by sector, type of organization, or likely benefits) to prioritize going forward.

165 The Strategy clearly marked 'innovation' as one of the drivers of private sector engagement in support of 'income' and 'impact', albeit without describing specific related objectives, approaches, or responsibilities. Several elements of Strategy implementation to date have, nevertheless, been innovative, such as the use of a loan to provide the upfront investment for the IF programme. Additionally, innovations inherent in, or deriving from, several private sector partnerships likely contributed to WFP better delivering for beneficiaries. There remains room though for more systematically pursuing, and for capturing and sharing successes and lessons learned around the notion of 'innovation' in PSPF, and its implications for WFP and partner performance.

166 The Strategy provided no clear guidance on the roles that private sector actors (can) play in furthering WFP and SDG objectives around gender equality, equity, and inclusion. While there are examples of existing global and local partnerships contributing to advancing progress in this regard, there are opportunities for strengthening the extent to which gender equality and broader equity and inclusions considerations are deliberately and systematically integrated into private sector partnership and fundraising, and to which related achievements are captured and analysed to inform future direction.

Conclusion 3: Strategy implementation is on track towards meeting, and has in the past two years exceeded, targets for income generation from corporations and foundations. Additionally, WFP established an innovative individual fundraising programme that demonstrated sector leading growth and potential for financial self-sufficiency and sustainability. Continued success and further growth in private sector revenue generation require long-term organizational commitment and investment.

167 During the 2020-2022 period, WFP made remarkable progress in raising large-scale and flexible funds from individuals, corporate partners, and foundations. WFP's total revenue from the private sector increased over 400% from 2019-2022, making the private sector WFP's 4th largest donor. Private sector contributions to WFP flexible income increased by 120% during the same period and benefited both emergency and non-emergency causes across regions. Despite being in a start-up phase, WFP private sector income generation regularly outperformed that of peer organizations in terms of relative growth.

168 Income generated from corporate and foundation partnerships exceeded Strategy targets every year since 2020, driven by an increasingly strategic focus on large-scale global partnerships and benefiting from the creation of dedicated teams within PPF for global partnership business development and partnership management, and for foundations respectively. Global Philanthropy, while not originally included in the Strategy, emerged as an additional fundraising approach during 2021, with promising initial successes especially in the US. Progress in this area is negatively affected, however, by delays in investing in a fully

equipped global philanthropy team. The collaboration with, and investments into strengthening the capacity of, WFP USA and JAWFP facilitated revenue growth in the US and Japan markets.

169 In less than three years, WFP established a successful Individual Fundraising programme comprising Individual Giving and ShareTheMeal as two increasingly complementary products, using an innovative digital led approach. During 2020-2022, the IF programme achieved remarkable and sector-leading growth and demonstrated its potential for self-sustainability.

170 Both IG and STM are on a trajectory for further growth, supported by ongoing efforts for increasing channel diversification to overcome their initial reliance on META, and a growing focus on regular giving. Growth of both products is, however, not at the level that the Strategy's financial model had predicted. While WFP overall may be able to meet the Strategy target of USD 170m in revenues by 2025, this will depend on growth in the US market (led by WFP USA) and thus through different pathways than anticipated by the Strategy. This reflects that some of the foundational assumptions underlying the financial model and related IF targets are no longer aligned with actual operational realities. There is a need to review the financial model's growth predictions and targets based on actual performance data obtained since 2020 and factoring in contributions by WFP Friends organizations.

171 The loan arrangement put in place was a creative solution to secure the required upfront funding for the IF programme. Compared to the organizational investments into IF made by comparator organizations such as UNICEF and UNHCR, WFP's IF investment model was short term and restrictive, however. This poses a significant risk to further growth and self-sufficiency of the IF programme. Continued investment is essential to ensure that existing momentum can be continued. The need for loan repayment as of 2025, and the fact that income retained by WFP Friends organizations cannot be used for this purpose, will significantly limit what can be invested in 2024 and beyond though, which will negatively impact IF performance and results.

172 Not only WFP's IF programme, but equally its work around engaging corporations, foundations and UHNWIs can benefit from further clarifying, maximizing collaboration with, and contributions by, WFP Friends organizations as well as from sustained, longer-term organizational commitment to PSPF, including through ongoing and visible WFP senior leadership (ED) engagement.

Conclusion 4: WFP RBx and COs are increasingly pursuing partnerships with global and local private sector actors. Related progress emerged largely independent from the PSPF Strategy but has been constrained by a lack of clear guidance for local partnering.

173 The Strategy indicated the intent to focus on strengthening 'technical' partnerships at the local level. It was not clear, however, on what specific changes it aimed to achieve in terms of strengthening RB and CO ownership of and engagement in PSPF. This prevents assessing to what extent Strategy implementation to date is on track to meeting related targets. Nevertheless, since 2020, PPF put in place several actions aiming to support and strengthen RB and CO engagement in, and ownership of, private sector partnerships and fundraising. This included developing CO-specific guidance and training, providing funding for adding or upgrading private sector related positions in all RBx, and establishing a dedicated team (Partnership Lab) for RB engagement. The role of the Partnership Lab is still evolving, with room for strengthening the extent to which it adds value to the work of RBx and COs.

174 There is, nevertheless, growing interest among RBx and COs in private sector engagement, driven by factors like CSP funding shortfalls, country directors' interest and networks, and the desire to engage private sector actors as a key player in relation to WFP's work around both saving and changing lives. COs highly value non-financial partner contributions in relation to innovation, advocacy, or capacity strengthening work, but face related disincentives, including a lengthy due diligence process. Despite the Strategy emphasis on 'technical' partnerships, the local focus has been on 'income' partnerships as well as on enabling and delivering global partnerships. The Strategy did not provide a vision or direction for fundraising for country offices to guide their investments between the different fundraising options, e.g. partnerships versus individual fundraising, and many have developed local partnerships as a fundraising option.

175 Fundraising from local partners has been limited and generally small-scale. While there is agreement that large, global partnerships offer better returns on investment for WFP overall, some COs are unsure how globally raised private sector funds are distributed and how they can access them. The recommended USD

1m threshold for private sector partnerships is often not feasible at the local level, and not all COs are aware of the possibility for related exceptions, leaving COs uncertain about whether, and under what circumstances to pursue partnerships that, while small in terms of generating funding for WFP, may offer significant benefits for WFP objectives and beneficiaries. Additionally, WFP policies (e.g., related to ISC) and process (in particular around due diligence) constitute limiting factors. There is a need for clearer guidance for partnership prioritization and related 'red lines', for prioritizing RB and CO fundraising investments, and for calculating the NET benefit of partnerships by weighing their full (financial and non-financial) expected benefits against time and investment required for partnership development and management.

Conclusion 5: Since 2020, PPF has made deliberate and successful efforts to strengthen its collaboration with other WFP units and teams, as well as with Friends organizations. There remains room for further working towards a coherent and deliberate "One WFP" approach to private sector partnerships and fundraising.

176 PPF worked on deepening its collaboration with WFP technical and functional units, including by jointly developing value propositions for partnership prospecting and collaborating on proposals to corporate or foundation partners. To date, technical units still operate largely independently from PPF, however, with regards to their private sector partnership engagement, and several are unclear about the envisioned division of labour in this regard. PPF also regularly engaged with other PA divisions, and effectively collaborates especially with CAM, although there is room for clarifying PPF and CAM roles and responsibilities, and/or identifying potential for further synergies in brand building. Collaboration with STR and PPR appears to be ad hoc rather than driven by a shared vision and objectives.

177 This reflects that the PSPF Strategy is not widely known within WFP, or that, if is known, is largely regarded as a fundraising-focused strategy 'for PPF' rather than 'for WFP'. It also reflects that the Strategy included very limited indication of how responsibilities for its implementation would be shared between PPF and others. Relatedly, there is limited awareness among WFP staff at HQ, RBx and COs about successes of Strategy implementation to date, as well as, more broadly, awareness of organization-wide activities around, and achievements related to private sector partnerships and fundraising. This is linked to the fact that WFP has not yet developed a vibrant, organization-wide community of practice related to private sector engagement. The existing network of regional focal points provides a promising basis for such as community but does not yet systematically engage staff from technical units, WFP friends, or staff from WFP teams working on issues such as country capacity strengthening or South-South and Triangular Cooperation for whom private sector engagement is important.

178 During the first two years of Strategy implementation, PPF made strides in developing and improving corporate processes, systems, and tools for private sector partnerships and fundraising. Further improvements could be made in terms of clarifying roles and responsibilities as well as protocols for partnership acquisition and management, especially the division of labour and collaboration with WFP USA, which, while generally working well, operates on a case-by-case basis, offering room for further strengthening the relationship. Additionally, there is a need to further strengthen the existing due diligence process to make it more strategic, flexible, and less top-heavy, and increase the transparency of existing processes for distributing globally generated private sector resources among regions and country offices.

3.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

179 The five recommendations below encourage WFP to expand on the positive changes set in motion since 2020. The recommendations are prioritized based on the evaluation team's assessment of their urgency and relevance. Annex 17 maps the recommendations, conclusions, and findings.

A) STRATEGIC VISION FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND FUNDRAISING

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
1	Prepare a fresh strategic vision and direction for Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising, aligned with WFP ED priorities, for the remainder of the strategy period to fill strategic gaps and lay foundations for developing a new or revised Strategy in 2025	PPF Director and Deputy Director	PPF teams CAM	Strategic	High	Q3 2024
1.1	Advocate for clear organizational commitment to, and ambition for, growth and self-sustainability of the Individual Fundraising programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocate for continued organizational investment into IF in line with investments made by peer organizations. This could include extending loan repayment timelines; forgivable loans; or considering ISC contributions or flexible funding as repayments 	PPF Director	PPF IF and Finance & Business Analysis teams Assistant ED PA WFP Chief Financial Officer	Strategic	High	Ongoing, through 2025
1.2	Articulate WFP's organizational direction and ambition for private sector partnerships to contribute to Zero Hunger, including key priorities for the remainder of the Strategy period <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Position private sector partnerships in the context of WFP ED priorities and in relation to other types of partnerships (PPR/STR), country capacity strengthening and South-South and Triangular Cooperation as critical elements of next generation CSPs Set both the direction and ambition for partnerships organizationally to grow towards comparator UN agency levels 	PPF Deputy Director	PPF Global Partnerships, Foundations, Finance & Business Analysis teams WFP Friends RBx and COs CCS, SSTC PPR, STR, CAM WFP technical units	Strategic	High	Q3 2024
1.3	Clarify the nature and extent of WFP's ambition for pursuing Global Philanthropy during the remainder of the Strategy (and beyond) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outline what a successful global philanthropy programme will require in terms of organizational commitment and investments, including ED/senior leadership engagement 	PPF Director	PPF Global Philanthropy and Finance & Business Analysis teams	Strategic	High	Q3 2024

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Clarify the envisioned roles played by WFP (HQ), GOs, RBx, COs and Friends organizations for developing WFP engagement with (U)HNWIs 		Office of the Executive Director Assistant ED PA WFP USA CAM RBx and COs			
1.4	<p>Articulate the envisioned role(s) of private sector actors, and of PSPF, with regard to furthering WFP objectives around gender equality, equity and inclusion</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Systematically integrate related considerations into PSPF products, communication, and processes Explore opportunities for mobilizing private sector support for WFP Gender Policy priorities 	PPF Director	PPF teams WFP Gender Office WFP technical teams CAM	Strategic	Medium	Q1 2025

B) INDIVIDUAL FUNDRAISING

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
2	Optimize Individual Fundraising programme performance for continued growth and self-sustainability	PPF Director	PPF IF team Assistant ED PA	Strategic	High	Ongoing, through 2025
2.1	<p>Undertake a full reforecast of Individual Fundraising targets, including Friends organizations, adjusting targets to reflect context and organizational ambition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Using 2020-2023 performance data and analysis, prepare 3-year income forecasts for IG, STM and Friends on expected levels of investment/budgets Model alternative organizational investment approaches (see #1.1) 	PPF IF team	WFP USA, JAWFP PPF Finance & Business Analysis team	Strategic and Operational	High	Q3 2024

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
2.2	<p>Continue efforts for diversification of and innovation within IF products, channels and markets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diversify IF fundraising channels beyond META to include other digital channels and DRTV Expand collaboration between the IF team and other teams/units in WFP, whilst maintaining a globally co-ordinated approach. This can include developing promising regional/local IF opportunities Explore expansion of WFP Friends network into additional markets 	PPF IF team	WFP Friends organization Other PPF teams RBx and COs CAM	Operational	Medium	Ongoing, through 2025

C) PARTNERSHIPS

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
3.	<p>Provide additional direction for pursuing private sector partnerships that contribute to Zero Hunger by increasingly moving in the direction of shared value and collective impact partnerships</p>	PPF Director and Deputy Director	PPF Global Partnerships and Foundations teams	Operational and Strategic	High	Q3 2024
3.1	<p>Provide guidance on the strategic prioritisation for partnerships to deliver the strategic vision for partnership contributions to mission</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop an overview of the partnerships pipeline and portfolio for leadership oversight and monitoring, including partnership type, sector, and targets beyond financial values, e.g., beneficiary reach Reinforce prioritization of ambitious, large scale (USD 1m+), multi-faceted partnerships with significant potential to contribute to Zero Hunger Clarify that this does not rule out smaller-scale local partnerships that support CSP implementation and offer NET benefits 	PPF Deputy Director	PPF Global Partnerships and Foundations teams	Operational	High	Q4 2024

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
3.2	<p>Accompany the strategic vision with operational guidance to relevant WFP teams/units, RBx and COs, and Friends organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify criteria for determining priority partners and sectors based on their potential to contribute to progress towards WFP's mission, considering the time required to develop and manage relationships Clearly define 'red lines' and establish a 'go/no go' process applicable across WFP units/teams at both HQ and in the field Establish protocols for partnership relationship management applicable across all of WFP and WFP Friends organizations 	PPF Global Partnerships team	PPF Foundations team RBx, COs WFP technical teams WFP Innovation Accelerator WFP Friends	Operational	Medium	Q4 2024
3.3	<p>Continue to invest in ambitious large-scale Foundation partnerships growth and management, diversifying partners, building globally, and agreeing the scope for development of the US market.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build capacity of the Foundations team to manage more large-scale, multi-faceted partnerships Clarify role of WFP USA as regards foundation partnerships (see #4.1) 	PPF Director and Deputy Director	PPF Foundations team WFP Friends	Strategic and Operational	Medium	Ongoing, through 2025

D) ONE WFP APPROACH TO PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS AND FUNDRAISING

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
4.	<p>As part of the PA department's 'Fit for Future' initiative, work towards a 'One WFP' approach to Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising that is shared among and owned by PPF and all relevant units and teams in WFP as well as Friends organizations.</p>	PPF Director	PPF teams Assistant ED PA Technical/ Functional units RBx and COs Gender office CCS, SSTC WFP Friends	Strategic	High	Ongoing, through 2025

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
4.1	<p>Develop a global approach to market opportunities with Friends organizations to fully optimise private sector partnerships and fundraising in country, with incentives to leverage impact and ways of working.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Renegotiate MOU with WFP USA to incentivize multi-faceted partnership development while maximizing US market growth potential Clarify roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities between WFP and all WFP Friends organizations Encourage increased and transparent sharing of data and expertise with and among WFP Friends organizations to optimise global performance 	PPF Director	PPF teams WFP Friends GOs	Strategic and Operational	High	Q4 2024
4.2	<p>Continue to strengthen the WFP enabling environment in support of coherent, integrated and results oriented Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising work</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Invest in technical fundraising and partnership specialists across PPF to enable growth and organizational development Continue the process of making WFP's due diligence process nimbler and more strategic Establish transparent systems, processes, protocols, and standards for PSPF that are applicable to all WFP teams and Friends organizations (see # 2.2, 3.2, 4.1) Proactively share information about private sector partnerships and fundraising work across WFP teams/units and explore potential for synergies 	PPF Director	PPF Global Services team STR, PPR, CAM WFP Legal office GOs, RBx, COs WFP technical units CCS	Operational	Medium	Ongoing, through 2025
5.	<p>Strengthen localization and professionalization of Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising in collaboration with GOs, RBx, and COs</p>	PPF Director and Deputy Director	PPF teams GOs, RBx, COs	Operational	Medium	Ongoing to 2025
5.1	<p>Build a vibrant Private Sector Partnerships and Fundraising Community of Practice throughout WFP, leveraging the existing network of PSPF regional focal points and including relevant actors in Technical and Functional units at HQ, GOs, COs and Friends organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage these stakeholders to identify their information, learning, and capacity strengthening needs and/or contributions 	PPF Deputy Director	PPF teams GOs, RBx, COs WFP Friends Technical/Functional units	Operational	Medium	Q4 2024

#	RECOMMENDATION	LEAD RESPONSIBILITY	OTHER CONTRIBUTING ENTITIES	STRATEGIC/ OPERATIONAL	PRIORITY	BY WHEN
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review the role of the Partnerships Lab and explore whether it could act as facilitator for the community of practice 					
5.2	<p>Ensure that GOs, RBx and COs have access to professionalized support for strategic private sector partnering and fundraising within a One WFP approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen GO, RB and CO access to IF data analysis by the Business Intelligence Hub Explore expanding the BI Hub or creating a comparable function to cover data collection, analysis and sharing on partnerships 	PPF Director Deputy	PPF teams GOs, RBx, COs WFP Friends	Operational	Medium	2025
5.3	<p>Advocate for the establishment of a partnership and fundraising investment fund for WFP teams, RBx and COs and Friends organizations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The fund would provide modest seed funding for promising new or innovative fundraising channels and partnership initiatives at global, regional, or country levels Resources could be part of long-term organizational investments in PSPF (see # 1 and 3) 	PPF Director and Deputy Director	PPF teams GOs, RBx, COs	Operational	Medium	2025

PHOTO CREDIT

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