Social Assessment and Social Development Plan

Sudan SANAD – Emergency Crisis Response Safety Nets Project (P505963)

WFP
World Food Programme

SAVING LIVES
CHANGING LIVES

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SANAD: Social Assessment and Social Development Plan

Executive Summary

A Social Assessment (SA) and Social Development Plan (SDP) is a disbursement requirement under the SANAD Environmental and Social Commitment Plan. The SA and SDP seek to assess the risks and impacts of the project on indigenous and vulnerable communities, including Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities, and to provide mitigation measures for those risks. The risks were identified through a desk-based research process, drawing on previous social assessment research for other World Bank, AfDB and USAID funded projects as well as a literature review and a small number of key informant interviews.

The legal review highlighted no affirmative action for minorities, and some stigmatization of religious minorities. Customary mechanisms managing land and governance structures prioritize 'native' tribes and create significant obstacles to 'settler' tribes, with the result that 'settler' tribes may be disproportionately more marginalized and impoverished vis-à-vis 'native' counterparts. The 8 states targeted by the project – Northern, River Nile, Kassala, Gederef, Red Sea, Blue Nile, White Nile and West Darfur – have a wide mix of 'native' and 'settler' tribes, and in some of these states there is significant conflict between some tribal groups. In some states the tribes are settled in specific geographical zones. There is a risk that the selection of localities may be misinterpreted as favouring certain tribes over others.

Women face major violations of their rights and freedoms which vary by tribe, with controls on women affecting their ability to leave the house / village, engage in consultation, access financial institutions, and benefit from this project. There are similarly variations in women's ability to control / influence household expenditure. There is a risk that men may try to control the decision making over expenditure linked to transfers from this project. Or conversely that efforts to economically empower women through this project could result in tensions within the household.

There are over 11m IDPs in Sudan, of which approx. 1/3 were displaced prior to the outbreak of war in April 2023. Many have been displaced more than once. During 2024 Gederef, Blue Nile and River Nile received very large numbers of IDPs – Gederef and River Nile states have over 1m IDPs each.

Interviews with Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) highlighted that many people living with disabilities (PLWD) do not have phones due to economic hardship, and thus do not have access to bankak. The OPDs are very well connected to the PLWD and have strong data

and ability to create linkage. There are risks of exclusion of PLWD from the project due to barriers that cut across all programming.

A pre-war study of financial inclusion by the World Bank (2021) showed a low level of 'banked' populations, that men were twice as likely to be 'banked' compared to women, and similarly that urban dwellers were twice as likely rural population to be 'banked' and four times as likely compared to nomads. Particularly high levels of financial exclusion were found in Kassala, West Darfur and White Nile. The destruction of and data centres and operations in Khartoum has had a major effect on access to banks and financial services, and mobile money apps (such as Bankak) are dependent on phone network availability, which has been cut off at times, and sometimes deliberately targeted as a military strategy. Informal withdrawal fees range from 10-50% depending on local liquidity. In some areas (particularly RSF controlled) internet access has been provided through Starlink, thought this is technically illegal in Sudan, and is likely caught up in war economies. In West Darfur Starlink is likely the only option for accessing digital banking.

Drawing from the document review and key informant interviews, a range of risks were identified, with a particular view on vulnerable and underserved traditional local communities. These vulnerable communities are typically 'settlers' from West Sudan or West Africa, who do not have land access or representation in local governance structures, but also pastoralists and women are particularly vulnerable groups. Mitigation measures have been identified to manage these risks. These are set out in part 2: Social Risks and Development Plan.

I. Introduction

Project description and components

The SANAD project aims to provide Emergency Safety Nets support to vulnerable and food insecure populations in selected areas of the Republic of Sudan. It has a total funding of US$85m, which will provide unconditional cash support to 552,500 individuals for 12 months each. The project has a two-year lifecycle. The project has two components:

Component 1: Unconditional Cash Transfers (US$66.3m) is implemented by WFP in areas classified as IPC4 and IPC3 to help cope with multiple shocks protecting human capital in the short term. It will be implemented in 16 food insecure localities across Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Northern, River Nile, White Nile, West Darfur, North Kordofan, Khartoum and Red Sea States. It will be targeted towards high-risk areas that are exposed to natural / climate disaster, and within areas that have a minimum level of accessibility to enable community-based targeting.

It will provide cash transfers of US$10 equivalent in SDG per beneficiary per month, for 12 months per person. There is no household size cap. The cash transfers will use a range of delivery mechanisms – direct cash (approx. 65%), e-vouchers (approx. 25%), and mobile money, bank account transfers (approx. 10%). The delivery mechanism will be determined according to access, financial delivery assets and infrastructures and functional markets. It will build on and enhance social protection system development under SFSP[1] and SESNP[2], with a particular focus on systems building in Grievance Redress Mechanism, electronic biometric registration and accountability through third party monitoring. All beneficiaries to be served through bank agents will receive a SCOPE Card or QR Card.

Community-based targeting will apply targeting criteria to support female / child headed households, households with children under 5, households with disabled person(s). WFP's Co-operating Partners will facilitate the community mobilisation and targeting process. 50% of primary grant recipients (household member receiving the benefits on behalf of the household) should be women. Emergency Food Security Assessments may be undertaken if there are significant changes from the IPC classification. The transfer of $10 per person per month is meant to support individuals cope with the effect of multiple shocks it also enhances feasibility of sustainability in the event of the GoS managing the project. Financial service providers will be contracted to deliver the cash transfer to beneficiaries.

Component 2: Human capital sensitive cash transfers (US$11.7m) is implemented by UNICEF providing cash transfers to vulnerable and food insecure pregnant and lactating women (PLW) linked with health and nutrition services. It will provide cash transfers to pregnant and lactating women of $30 per month for 1 year, in Red Sea, River Nile and Kassala States. The project will also work with Mothers Support Groups as a platform for social and behavioural change.

The Social Assessment (SA) and Social Development Plan (SDP) is a disbursement requirement within the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP), under ESS 7: Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities. The ESCP states: Consistent with ESS1 prepare a Social Assessment (SA) including Social Development Plan (SDP) to identify and engage Indigenous Peoples/ Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities (SSAHUTLCs) for meaningful consultation, targeting, and implementing project activities. The SA shall address the risk of

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[1] Sudan Family Support Programme
[2] Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Programme

exclusion of SSAHUTLCs, ethnic minorities and vulnerable groups and ensure that the project activities account for and are inclusive of the needs and aspirations of SSAHUTLCs.

The objective of this SA is to assess the potential impact and risks of the proposed SANAD project activities on Project Affected Peoples in the project area, with a particular focus on effects on Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities (SSAHUTLC), vulnerable and disadvantaged groups to enhance their project benefit sharing mechanism. It includes a mapping of tribal groups (including SSAHUTLC), (see table 1) and describes the social context (baseline) in each of the 8 targeted states, including the vulnerable social sub groups relevant to the project: women, IDPs, settlers, people living with disabilities.

The document identifies potential social impacts and risks of the project on project affected persons and in particular on any specific vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, including indigenous peoples / SSAHUTLC. This is captured in table 3 as a detailed, context and project specific set of social risks and mitigation measures. The roles and responsibilities for implementation are documented in the Social Development Action plan (see 4). Community consultations will be undertaken following disbursement, and this document will be updated following those consultations, which will be cleared and disclosed.

The SA & SDP are part of a larger package of Environmental and Social Safeguards Instruments, including:

1. Environmental and Social Commitment Plan
2. Stakeholder Engagement Plan
3. Labour Management Procedures
4. GBV/SEA/SH Action Plan
5. Security Management Plan

The approach taken is to avoid repetition / duplication between documents, and to cross reference as much as possible.

Social risk rating

The World Bank's Appraisal Environmental and Social Review classified the SANAD project as **high** risk (social risks) due to risks relating to

1. exclusion of most vulnerable groups including ethnic minorities and IDPs, and beneficiaries in remote areas;
2. security concerns for project staff, workers of Payment service providers, and beneficiaries;
3. rejection of selection criteria for project benefits;

4. weak and insufficient community engagement during preparation and implementation which could result in elite capture,
5. conflict and social tensions between the host communities and IDPs;
6. illegal activities, such as violence, extortion, theft, armed assault, looting, and vandalism of food, project materials and properties;
7. risks related to unexploded ordinances due to past and an ongoing active conflcit in some of project area,
8. risk of gender-based violence (GBV), including sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment (SEA/SH)
9. intra-household tensions between wife and husband over the use of cash trasfered for the hosuhold
10. inadequate monitoring and supervision due to remoteness and insecurity
11. Fragile, conflict-affected volatile context of the country and an ongoing active conflict in Sudan that could affect project implementation and staff.

II. Methodology

This Social Assessment and Social Development Plan has been rapidly developed through desk-based research in order to fit a tight schedule for programme start up. The Stakeholder Engagement Plan (approved and disclosed) noted that no consultations would be carried out prior to project start up due to the urgency of the project. It also noted that in the early stages of project implementation there would be initial consultations to engage key stakeholders, and a social assessment which would consult on project design, risks and mitigation measures with community members, identifying project affected parties and vulnerable groups. Thus a two-phase approach is being followed for the social assessment – phase 1: a desk review during project design (this document), followed by phase 2: community consultations during project start up, *following disbursement.*

Phase 1 social assessment – desk review in design stage
This phase 1 social assessment has drawn on previous social assessment research conducted for the SOMOUD Enhancing Community Resilience Project as well as social assessments for the USAID Productive Safety Nets Project and African Development Bank funded SEWPP project. It also draws on a number of cash-based transfer feasibility assessments conducted by WFP over 2023-24 covering relevant project areas White Nile State, Gederef, Northern and West Darfur as well as rapid retailer/wholesale market assessments for Gederef, Kassala and Port Sudan. It also draws on a wider review of available literature on the specific contexts of the 8 states targeted through by the SANAD project as well as of specific social issues in Sudan, including financial inclusion. The desk based research has been supplemented by a small number of key informant interviews focusing on financial inclusion.

Phase 2 social assessment – community consultations during start up
Once the project reaches start up (following disbursement) community consultations will be conducted via two different mechanisms.

Rapid assessments integrated into project introductory meetings with the communities – these assessments will be conducted in *all* locations to feed into any needed adaptations to targeting. They will be conducted by CPs.

Enhanced community consultations will be undertaken within 3 months of disbursement (as described in the SEP) in a sample of project locations. The enhanced community consultations will drill down on the known social risks of the project, to draw deeper insights, understanding variance of risks across different population groups, and ground truth / enhance mitigation measures. The assessment will also seek to understand the constraints on stakeholder engagement for vulnerable / disadvantaged groups, including indigenous / SSAHUTLC.

The following table sets out key lines of enquiry, which will be further developed into key informant interview and focus group discussion guides.

Table 1: Phase 2 social assessment

Rapid assessments – key lines of enquiry ALL LOCATIONS
Tribes: Clarifications on tribes present and inclusion in community governance structures Tensions: understanding local drivers of conflict / tensions Communications: Understanding local languages, and preferred methods of communication
Social assessment - community consultations – key lines of enquiry SAMPLE OF LOCATIONS
Project design: understanding community perspectives on the project and suggestions for adaptations Financial exclusion: Understanding who does not have access to banking institutions (banks / mobile money) and why Cash out: Understanding options and costs of cashing out bankak transfers and value vouchers through informal cash providers Criminality: Understanding perceptions of safety when moving with cash Household power relations: Understanding decision making within the household over use of income, and any linked tensions / violence

A purposive sample will be identified for the social assessment - community consultations. The sample will be selected on the basis of the following sampling criteria:

- Sampling for communities with majority 'native' tribe and minority 'settler' tribes, to understand the level of inclusion of minority tribes in community decision-making, which may affect community-based targeting
- Sampling specifically among tribes that have different levels of controls on women (Arab / West Sudanese) as this may have a bearing on financial inclusion of women
- Sampling across urban – rural divide, to identify additional constraints for rural populations and feasibility of mitigation measures

- Sampling across areas of differing levels of liquidity constraints, to understand variation of risks and feasibility of mitigation measures.

This social assessment will be updated following the community consultations, re-submitted for clearance and disclosed.

III.   Legal and institutional frameworks

Inclusion and empowerment of ethnic minorities, indigenous people, Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities

There are over 500 ethnic groups, speaking numerous languages and dialects in Sudan. Sudanese

 formal law does not identify specific indigenous groups. The 2019 Constitution, developed under the Transitional Government, includes provision 66 on ethnic and cultural groups which states: *"All ethnic and cultural groups have the right to enjoy their own private culture and develop it freely. The members of such groups have the right to exercise their beliefs, use their languages, observe their religions or customs, and raise their children in the framework of such cultures and customs."*[3]

Under the Constitutional Declaration (2019) of the Transitional Government committed to combat discrimination under Article 48 (Equality before the Law) of the Bill of Rights which states that *'[p]eople are equal before the law and have the right to the protection of the law without discrimination between them on the basis of ethnicity, colour, gender, language, religious faith, political opinion, racial or ethnic origin, or any other reason'.* The Criminal Act of 1991, which discriminated against certain sects and groups, was also amended under the Transitional Government period. The Juba Peace Agreement of Oct 2020 committed to respect ethnic, religious and cultural diversity without discrimination and should be managed *"in accordance with the standards that reflect national unity"*[4]

The Interim Constitution committed to social and economic programmes to empower marginalized groups, in particular women and youth, including the provision of healthcare, education housing and social security. Article 32 stated *"women and men have equal entitlement to all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights"* while Article 15 stated *"the State shall emancipate women from injustice, promote gender equality and encourage the role of women in family and public life".*[5] However despite these commitments Sudanese women continue to suffer from discrimination, exclusion and subordination at all levels, with many existing discriminatory laws failing to be revised to conform to the Interim Constitution.

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[3] See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019
[4] Saeed, S., (Jan 2023) Diversity Management in Sudan's Democratic Transitional Arrangements International IDEA p10
[5] Cited in Elkarib, A (Dec 2017) Gender analysis in the context of food security WFP Sudan

The 2008 Sudanese National Elections Act takes no affirmative action for minorities: *"The act embodied no particular provisions or measures for minority representation, and no proportionate representation of minority groups was provided for. Thus, the long-lasting political exclusion of some minority groups was not addressed. This legislative shortcoming negatively affected, among other reasons, efforts to build peace and peaceful coexistence in Sudan."*[6] Similarly the 2003 Local Government Act provides no guidance on ethnic or religious groups: *"Sudanese. Article 27(1)(2) of the Local Government Act details the process for electing local assemblies but does not address the issue of diversity management, and article 27(2) on seat allocation mentions nothing about minorities; instead, it mentions only the system for the special and direct election of women."* [7] In 2007, one renown political commentator described Government of Sudan (GoS) approach to 'indigenous' tribes thus: *"The Sudanese state has unwittingly maintained some colonial coercive institutions and brutally deployed them against its indigenous peoples (Salih 1999, p. 1) as part of its relentless endeavour aiming at building a socio-culturally homogeneous society".*[8]

Article 6 of the 2005 Interim National Constitution provides for religious rights, and the Bill of Rights within that interim constitution re-affirms this under Freedom of Creed and Worship. However the GoS has not been neutral towards different religious groups, and some have been stigmatized. Under Article 47 'Rights of ethnic and cultural communities' the Bill of Rights states: Ethnic and cultural communities shall have the right to freely enjoy and develop their particular culture: members of such communities shall have the right to practice their beliefs, use their languages, observe their religions and raise their children within the framework of their respective cultures and customs."[9]

However customary mechanisms relating to tribal homelands and native administration do provide specific protections for access to land and governance to 'native' tribes, and significant obstacles to other 'settler' tribes, creating significant vulnerabilities for these 'settlers.' Customary tribal homeland provided the initial basis of rights and access to land in Sudan, providing security of tenure to settled communities and access to rangelands for specific pastoralists. These tribal homelands are synonymous with 'indigenous peoples' but are not formally recognized as such. These tribal homelands were accompanied by a Native Administration – formally recognized by the British colonial authorities in a three-tiered system of customary governance (Sheikh, Omda, Chief), playing a role in local justice and natural resource management.

However in 1970 the Unregistered Land Act effectively nationalized all unregistered land, denying legitimacy to customary property rights, and entitled the GoS to use force to 'safeguard' its land. At the same time the Native Administration were abolished as part of an

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[6] Saeed op cit p5
[7] Saeed op cit p7
[8] Komey, G., (2007) <u>The denied land rights of the indigenous peoples and their endangered livelihood and survival: the case of the Nuba of Sudan</u> Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol 31, Issue 5
[9] Redress (Jan 2014) <u>The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in Sudan: Challenges and Future Perspectives</u> P37

agenda to 'modernise' governance, replacing traditional authorities with administrative councils.

The Native Administrations were re-instated under the NCP but were significantly politicised, and the 2018-29 revolution highlighted the tensions between the Native Administration and other, youth-led initiatives such as Resistance Committees.

Social Protection

The following table sets out social protection legislation and policy in Sudan

Table 2: Social policy legislation in Sudan

Legal Legislation/Policy	Provisions
Social Insurance and Pension Act (2016)	The act established the Social Insurance and Pension Fund, a merger of the Social Insurance Fund (private and public sector) and the National Pension Fund (government sector).
Health Insurance Act (2016)	The act establishes that every Sudanese is covered by a health insurance or has access to health care services without facing financial risk. The Act also expands the right to health access to all, including non-nationals.
Zakat Act (2001)	The act is the principle guiding legal document for Zakat and establishes the Zakat Fund as a socio-economic institution charged with providing safety nets. Protection, health, and social service provision for vulnerable groups and the population
Persons with Disabilities Act (2017)	The act is consistent with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and is the legal basis for persons with disabilities protections
Child Act (2010)	The Child Act (2010) cancels and replaces the 2004 Child Act and provides children with certain rights, including the right to primary healthcare and free primary education.
National Council for Child Protection Act (2008)	The act establishes the Council and its functions.
National Students Welfare Fund Act (2005)	The act was amended in 2010 and establishes the Fund and its functions.
Presidential Decree No.	The 2019 Presidential Decree No. 07 defines the functions of all

07 (2019)	ministries, including the Ministry of Social Development.
Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (2020)	The 2020 Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan outlines priority issues under social protection, and the governance framework at a national level and in conflict areas - Darfur states, South Kordofan and Blue Nile State.

World Bank Environmental and Social Standards

The Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP) was structured based on the World Bank's Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) and stipulates the development of instruments as per the Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs) relevant to the project. Due to lack of a proper gap analysis, WFP's ESS approach is largely not acknowledged in the ESCP, and thus the WB ESSs are applied. Since the WFP ESS framework is not being utilised, it is not presented here. The ESCP identifies the following standards as relevant to the project:

ESS 1: Assessment and management of environmental and social risks and impacts

ESS 2: Labour and working conditions

ESS 4: Community health and safety

ESS 7: Indigenous peoples / Sub-Saharan African historically underserved traditional local communities

ESS 10: Stakeholder engagement and information disclosure

These require:

1 Instruments

- Labor Management Procedures (LMP)
- Prevention of GBV/SEA/SH Action Plan (PSEA Action Plan)
- Security Risk Assessment and Security Management Plan (SRA/SMP)
- Social Assessment and Social Development Plan (SA/SDP)
- Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP)

2 Processes and Structures

- Project Implementation Unit with ESS capacity, and ESS capacity at field level;
- Integration of ESS commitments into contracts with contractors;
- Establishment of Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM);
- Capacity building to deliver all of the above;
- Bi-annual ESS reports, commencing from effectiveness; and
- Incident / accident reporting process.

IV. Baseline socio-economic characteristics of Sudan

Food security in the targeted states

According to the latest IPC, released in December 2024, 24.6 million people, or 51 percent of the population, are acutely food insecure (IPC Phase 3 and above). Of this, 637,000 people are in IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe), 8.1 million people, or 17 percent of the population, are in IPC Phase 4 and 15.9 million are in IPC Phase 3. In addition, famine has been projected in 10 areas in North Darfur and Western Nuba Mountains, with 17 additional areas at risk of Famine (Central Nuba Mountains, North, East and South Darfur, Al Gazira and Khartoum) if the conflict continues and humanitarian access remains constrained. The key drivers of this food insecurity include conflict, displacement, hampered agricultural production, impediments to humanitarian access and high food prices.

In Blue Nile, 46 percent, amounting to 670,000 people, are acutely food insecure (IPC Phase 3 and above), with 11 percent (162,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 35 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). All localities are classified in IPC Phase 3, but the cluster of Blue Nile IDPs are classified in IPC Phase 4. In addition, food prices remain high, with the price of the local food basket having reached 2,349 SDG in December 2024, which is 12 percent above the national average and 149 percent higher compared to one year ago.

In Gedaref, 29 percent, amounting to 925,000 people are acutely food insecure, with 2 percent (61,000 people) in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 27 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). All localities in Gedaref have been classified in IPC Phase 3. While food prices have increased compared to the previous year by 124 percent, the price of the local food basket is 18 percent below the national average, having reached 1,708 SDG in December 2024. This is due to agricultural production in the state which has improved food availability.

In Kassala, 44 percent, amounting to 360,000 people are acutely food insecure, with 12 percent in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 32 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). All localities, apart from Hamashkoreib and North Delta, have been classified in IPC Phase 3. While food prices have increased compared to the previous year by 91 percent, the price of the local food basket is 19 percent below the national average, having reached 1,695 SDG in December 2024.

In Northern, 48 percent, amounting to 692,000 people are acutely food insecure, with 8 percent in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 40 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). All localities have been classified in IPC Phase 3. In addition, prices in Northern remains atypicalyl high, with the price of the local food basket having reached 2,308 SDG in December 2024, which is 10 percent above the national average.

In River Nile, 25 percent, amounting to 589,000 people are acutely food insecure, with 2 percent in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 23 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). All localities have

been classified in IPC Phase 3. In addition, prices in River Nile have increased, with the price of the local food basket having reached 1,949 SDG in November 2024.

In White Nile, 45 percent, amounting to 1.4 million people are acutely food insecure, with 11 percent in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 34 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). Al Gitaina has been classified in IPC Phase 4, while the remaining has been classified in IPC Phase 3. In addition, prices in White Nile remains atypical high, with the price of the local food basket having reached B SDG in December 2024.

In West Darfur, 58 percent, amounting to 756,000 people are acutely food insecure, with 2 percent – 20,600 people - in IPC Phase 5 (catastrophe), 23 percent in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 33 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). All localities have been classified in IPC Phase 4. In addition, prices in West Darfur remains atypical high, with the price of the local food basket having reached B SDG in December 2024.

In Red Sea, 27 percent, amounting to 494,000 people are acutely food insecure, with 4 percent in IPC Phase 4 (emergency) and 23 percent in IPC Phase 3 (crisis). Both Port Sudan and Sawakin are classified in IPC Phase 2 while the remain

ing are classified in IPC Phase 3. In addition, prices in Red Sea remains atypical high, with the price of the local food basket having reached B SDG in December 2024.

Tribes - Natives and Settlers

All eight states in the project area have experienced waves of migrations going back over hundreds of years, mostly from within Sudan, but also a significant population from West Africa. There are very significant differences between designation as 'native' or 'settler' in Sudan, and even migrants from other parts of Sudan are considered 'settlers' (or at least 'non-native') if they are from other tribes. Settlers face significant exclusions and vulnerabilities: there is a strong cultural code prohibiting sales of land to non 'natives' in many states and settlers do not have representation within the Native Administration – they must instead defer to the host tribe 'native' structures. There is also some racism towards African farming tribes, who are perceived as former slaves, a legacy of a slave trade in the 1800s where African tribes were taken from the Nuba Mountains and Darfur by Arab traders to work in Sennar and River Nile States. There is more trust towards these longer-term settlers, but there is no intermarriage, they are considered lower class. There is significant sensitivity around this issue.

In some states settlers are in satellite camps referred to as 'seasonal labour' – although these settlements are permanent and have often been present for over 40 years. In other locations they live within the 'native' community. 'Settler' communities are disproportionately disadvantaged and vulnerable. There is a risk that selection of localities on the basis of vulnerability might inadvertently focus targeting on specific tribes, and be misinterpreted as favouring certain tribes over other.

Table 3: Tribal mapping of eight states in the SANAD project

Northern	**Shaigiya / Shawiga** – largest tribe in this state, and most of this tribe are found in this state. Many are settled with land growing dates and citrus fruits. Strongly conservative towards women. Some inter-marriage with Nubians. **Shawiyahad**– minor sub-branch **Bederia** – Ed Debba area	**Nubian tribes:** • **Halfaween** • **Danagla** • **Mahas** less conservative towards women compared to Arab tribes.	
River Nile State	**Jaalian** – largest tribe in this state. Very strongly conservative towards women. **Shagigya** – minority tribe in this state. Have land. Some intermarriage with Jaalian. **Robatap –** A subtribe of Jaalian. Large tribe in this area. Also, very strongly conservative towards women **Manasir –** Significantly affected by the Merowe dam **Hamdab –** Also significantly affected by the Merowe dam **Amri** **Bushareen –** fully nomadic with camels, not settled anywhere but use land. **Haraween –** fully nomadic with camels, not settled anywhere but use land. **Kebabish**		**Berber –** historically settled from North Africa but are largely now perceived as Arab tribe.
Kassala	**Beja** – considered 'indigenous' with several important sub-tribes: • **Hadendawa -** This is the largest group, mainly in North Kassala in the Gash delta and pastoral land. • **Bani Amer** – there is some debate over whether they are a sub-tribe or not. They are derogatorily regarded as 'foreigners' from Eritrea. They received citizenship	**Nuba Halfawiyyan** (Sub-tribe of Nuba) mainly based in Khasm al Girba / Half Al Jedidah **Fur** – Darfuri farmers who settled since 1950s.	**Hausa –** settled from Nigeria **Fulani Malu** from Mali **Fulani** from Nigeria

	under Bashir's regime and are close to the NCP. They are spread from Eritrean border to Atbara River • **Bisharin** • **Amarer** • **Halenga** – small subtribe mainly in Kassala town **Badawit** – from Northern state **Rashida** – Bedouin nomads, settled from Saudi Arabia. Land was granted to Rashida. **Shagiyya –** settled in 19th century, mainly in towns and in Gash basin **Jaalian –** as for Shagiyya **Zebadiaya –** nomads with camels and small ruminents **Habab** **Shukriyya**	**Zagawa** - Darfuri farmers who settled since 1950s. **Bargo** **Barno** **Taisha**	
Gederef	**Shukkriyya** – in North and central Gederef, were recognized as the 'lords of Butana' and have several subtribes: • **Lahawiyyan** - became a sub tribe of the Shukriyya, and have their own sub-tribe of **Jawamis** • **Boadra –** recently established their own native adminstrtion separate from the Shukriyya tribe • **Kawalia** • **Miayahadat** **Shagiyya –** settled in 19th century, mainly in towns / mechanaised agriculture in Gederef **Jaalian –** as for Shagiyya **Rashayda** – settled from Saudi Arabia **Boadra** **Bani Amer** **Habab** **Hadendowa**	**Maasalit –** the majority tribe in the Southern area between Gederef city and the Ethiopia border **Borgo** – the dominant tribe in Western Gederef **Fur** – Darfuri farmers who settled since 1950s **Zagawa** - Darfuri farmers who settled since 1950s **Nuba –** including sub-tribe: • **Halfawiyyan**	**Hausa –** settled from Nigeria, a significant concentration in Western Galabat **Ethiopians** – who settled in 196s and now are Sudanese citizens
Red Sea State	**Beja** with subtribes: • **Hadendowa** • **Amar'ar**	**Nuba**	

	• **Bisharin** **Bani Amer** **Habab** **Rashiyda**		
Blue Nile	**Kennana** **Rufa'a al Hoi** **Watawit -** Mixed Arab group (not a specific tribe) associated to NCP	**Ingessana –** largest group with 4 sub tribes in Ingessana Mountains, significant backing to SPLA-M **Kadalo-** Roseires **Gumuz –** Roseires and Ethiopia **Al Regareeg** – East BNS **Al Hamaj –** East BNS **Fonj –** North Kurmuk **Keili –** North Kurmuk **Uduk –** A Christian tribe, Chali area Kurmuk, significant backing to SPLA-M **Jumjum** - Wadaka **Burun** - South **Al Berta** – Geissan, East Kurmuk, Ethiopia, significant backing to SPLA-M **Al Duwala** **Al Hawassa** **Koma & Ganza –** Southern Forest	**Fellata** – Also known as Fulani from West Africa **Hausa**
White Nile	Large tribes: **Sabaha** **Hassaniya** **Ajimi** **Al Selaim**	**Tamer** **Fur** **Bernot** **Bergot** **Berti**	

	Al Ahamdaa **Kenana** Smaller tribes: **Hammar, Reizigat, Miseriya, Jaafra, Taisaha, Kawahla, Husseinat, Hassaniya, Magdiya, Shuweihat, Beni Halba, Habania, Kurtan, Messellemiya, Shenabla**	**Daago** **Maasalit**	
West Darfur	Large tribes **Aulad Rashid** **Beni Halba** **Hiamat** **Miseriya** **Nawaiba** **Salamat** Medium tribes **Kuzum** **Mahadi** **Mahareya** **Naja** **Targam** Small tribes: **Arab Zagawa, Aulad Idd, Awatifa, Bani Hazam, Bedria, Hotia, Juami, Mahamid, Saada, Sharaffa, Ziadia**	Large tribes, considered 'indigenous' **Fur** **Maasalit** **Zaghawa** Medium tribes **Dajo** **Gimir** **Tama** Small tribes: **Asangor, Barnow, Borgo, Dagal, Eringa, Fungaro, Kajakassa, Mararit, Meseriya Jebel, Mimi, Rongar, Singar, Tunjur**	Small tribes: **Fellata** **Hausa**
North Kordofan	**Beggara** **Dar Hamid** **Kebabsh** **Kawahla** **Al-Hamar** **Al-Bedariah** **Al-Majdain** **Joamaah** **Rekabiah**	**Nuba** **Shilluk** **Dinka**	
Khartoum	Mixed – all tribes are represented within Khartoum		

Red Sea State

Prior to the war, Red Sea State was mainly populated by Beja tribes, made up of three subtribes – Hadendowa (largest – mainly in South between Sinkat and Gash Delta), the Amar'ar (around Port Sudan) and the Bisharin (mainly in North). There are also Bani Amer (Southeast) and it is hotly disputed if the Bani Amer are part of the Beja or not (there is significant conflict between these two tribes). There are also Habab, Rashiayda (nomadic), and Nuba tribes. The Beja are indigenous and established their own Beja Congress political party to address their political and economic marginalisation following independence.

Many Bani Amer moved into Eastern Sudan during the Eritrean war 1960s, and following the coup in 1989 the NCP built relations with the Bani Amer, in response to the Beja Congress supported training for the Beja in Eritrea. By the late 1990s the NCP was actively encouraging Bani Amer to immigrate to Sudan, offering citizenship for electoral support, and provoking conflict with the Beja over land and resources.[10]

Conflict between the Nuba and Bani Amer began in 1986 in Port Sudan over Sharia law and political competition. The violence re-ignited in May 2019, triggered by a dispute in Gederef over water, and again in August 2019 following an incident of harassment of a woman, leading into on-going violence causing casualties and burning of houses in Nuba and Bani Amer tribal neighbourhoods. Following the conflict in Port Sudan in 2019/20, Port Sudan and Suakin became divided along tribal lines, with some neighbourhoods entirely mono-ethnic, with the Bani Amer and Nuba moving to tribal enclaves – Dar Naim became exclusively Bani Amer, and Philip exclusively Nuba. (Nuba communities live mainly in Philip, Sadaqa and Al Ingaz neighbourhoods). Key drivers of the conflict between Nuba and Bani Amer include cultural prejudice - some treat Nuba as former slaves, while some Nuba view Bani Amer as foreigners aligned to the Islamists. The Nuba in Port Sudan have a low socio-economic status & poor condition, many living in the outskirts of town without electricity or water, although the main water pipeline passes their neighbourhood.

The transitional government's peace process leading to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), exacerbated tensions in Eastern Sudan - the Beja felt excluded from the peace process, as the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) did not include representatives of the Beja Congress. In November 2019 rallies in support of the peace process in Port Sudan led to violence between Bani Amer and Hadendowa. A peace agreement 'Galad' was established but was not implemented. [11] The Beja formed a new Beja High Council (BHC) initially to challenge the JPA Eastern Track agreement, later shifting to self-determination for the Beja, demarcation of Beja tribal lands and a review of the citizenship of Bani Amer from Eritrea. Tensions & violence between Bani Amer and Beja increased with the appointment of Bani Amer tribesmen to roles

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[10] RVI (2022) What next for Sudan's peace process? Political and security dynamics in the East
[11] RVI (2022) What next for Sudan's peace process? Political and security dynamics in the East

of Governor in Kassala and Gaderef, and when the Bani Amer Governor of Kassala[12] was later dismissed in Oct 2020 violence erupted in Suakin.

Kassala

There have been many waves of settlers in Kassala. The Beja trace their roots back to 4,000 BC, and as such are considered 'indigenous' tribe. Other Arab tribes have settled over several centuries, with the Shagiyya and Jaalin in 19th century especially in the Gash basin and South of Kassala town.

Western Sudanese, West Africans and Eritreans began settling as landless waged labour principally after the railway 1930s, and from 1960s-70s to work on the new large irrigated and mechanized farms. In 1964 there was a large resettlement of Nubians from Old Nubia to Halfa Al Jedidah, and during Eritrean war 1960s-70s there was a large influx of Eritrean refugees, including Bani Amer, Baria, Saho, Maria, Bilen and Tigrayen. In the 1980s there were several waves of IDPs who came from the Nuba mountains during drought to settle in Kassala. The Nubians do not own land, and similarly agricultural labour from Darfur (Zagawa, Fur) which came to work on sugar cane plantations do not own land. In some locations these settlers live in satellite villages described as 'temporary agricultural labour' or 'seasonal labour camps' although they have remained present for some decades, such as at New Halfa. The agricultural labour from Darfur are particularly marginal and vulnerable communities. In Girba locality field research has shown some 'seasonal labour camps' which the state which had refused to recognize, had faced the threat of eviction over a long period, and without service provision.

While Kassala is principally Beja, there is much ethnic diversity, especially around the irrigated schemes of Khasm Al Girba (Halfa Al Jadida) and Rahad. However, there is a strong tendency for clustering in rural and urban areas with communities in mono-ethnic groups (in towns there are tribal quarters), with local languages maintained. The Hausa community in particular are often in completely separate locations. There are several significant tribal groups in Kassala, and these are mirrored in Red Sea State (but with different proportions) with the result that tribal clashes in Kassala often spill over into Red Sea State and vice versa. There have been intermittent tribal conflicts over the past years, which increased since April 2019 linked to the Eastern Track of the JPA (see above under Red Sea State). The State Government of Kassala declared a state of emergency several times 2020-1 due to urban clashes in New Halfa, Kassala City and North Delta localities. The major divisions in this recent past have been for Kassala:

- Bani Amer in conflict Hadendowa, linked to the Bani Amer Governor (see above)
- Bani Amer in conflict with Nuba.
- Bani Amer and Habab near Ed Sidna, in Reifi Kassala, over the demarcation of borders among tribal areas
- El Sudieira village, Aroma locality, over land

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[12] Salah Ammar

Gederef

There have been many waves of settlers in Gederef also. Arab tribes settled particularly in North/Central Gederef 8th-14th century. The largest tribe is the Shukriyya, along with their sub tribes. Similar to Kassala, Western Sudanese, West Africans and Eritreans began settling as landless waged labour after the railway 1930s, and from 1960s-70 the development of large irrigated and mechanized farms, with Southern Gederef having more tribal diversity, although similar to Kassala there is tendency for clustering, with local languages maintained.

Conflict among tribal groups in Gederef has not been as extensive as Red Sea State and Kassala, some key conflict events include:

- Maasalit and Hasua in a conflict related to the role of young Hausa girls working as domestic labour in the houses of other tribes (2012)
- Hasua and Jawamis / Lahaween, in which the latter tribes tried to establish a village on land claimed by Hausa (2017). This conflict continues until now.
- Nuba and Bani Amer, triggered over water sales but quickly escalating to tribal level conflict

In Gederef in Nov 2023 there were large scale demonstrations against the removal of IDPs from schools.

Northern and River Nile States

in the 1980s famine many nomads of the Batuda desert who lost their cattle settled in satellite villages near existing settlements in Northern and River Nile. They provide cheap agricultural and general labour. There are strong cultural codes prohibiting land sales to non 'natives', although there is some inter-marriage and mixing with the 'native' community. Some specific tensions have emerged over land 'loaned' to settlers, and tensions can emerge between waves of settlers, due to resource competition. Field research in Northern State identified a satellite village of Nuba / West Sudanese tribes without land, indicating the existence of 'seasonal labour camp' in this area.

The current conflict has led to an ethnic polarization in River Nile and Northern State, with a significant shift against settler communities. As SAF has sought to mobilise and arm the youth in these two states against the RSF there has been much media coverage denouncing the RSF and using ethnic language and discussing sleeper cells of RSF support (referred to as 'social incubators'). All people from Western Sudan are now assumed to be supporters of RSF, irrespective of their tribal origin, completely ignoring the violence of Arab tribes against African tribes in and around El Geniena in West Darfur. This is having significant effects on ethnic relations in River Nile State in particular and is also making settlers from Western Sudan collectively vulnerable including to arrest: there has been a significant increase in arrests of people from Darfur by police who want to run identity checks. This polarization appears to be having some perverse outcomes: Some IDPs from Darfur did join the RSF, their motivation understood to be due to a sense of marginalization prior to April 2023. Following an

intervention by Minni Minawi with the Wali of River Nile State, a committee was established to verify the identity of settled Darfuris and public statements made to counter widespread rumours. Longer term 'settlers' are more likely to be able to prove their identity, meaning that IDPs since April 2023 are mostly likely to face difficulties proving they are not associated with the RSF.

Northern State has fewer tribes and lower tribal tensions. Sudan's political elite in Khartoum were principally drawn from Northern State tribes. In River Nile State additional localised conflicts emerge over gold mining, particularly in the use of mercury and cyanide by unregulated artisanal miners.

Blue Nile State

Within Blue Nile State there are 'indigenous' tribes: Ingessana, Uduk, Jumjum and Burun (approx 50%), and 'newcomers': Fellata[13] and Hausa[14] (approx 30%) and Arab pastoralists (approx. 20%).[15] There are 7 localities, which were developed along ethnic lines, so administrative territories intersect with ethnic divisions. The divisions between 'indigenous' and 'newcomer' are deep – the 'indigenous' tribes sided with the rebels during the civil wars, notably many Nuba lost land to large mechanised farms owned by Northerners resulting from the 1970 Unresgistered Land Act, while the 'newcomers' sided with the GoS particularly into pro-government militias.

The 1983-2002 civil war which led to the secession of South Sudan played out especially in Blue Nile State. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) which led to secession of South Sudan did not give the Nuba Mountains or Blue Nile the right to self determination but a weaker mechanism for popular consultations, but even these were not carried out. In 2011 war restarted as a result of frustrations that the promised consultations had not been undertaken, with the Ingessana Hills and Maban refugee camps key flashpoints. Blue Nile experienced aerial bombardment, mass displacement, (81,000 IDPs particularly within Damazin and Roseires towns) severe hunger and the blocking of aid. Explosive remnants of war and landmines remain in central, Eastern and Southern regions. There were also 13,000 refugees in Damazin at that time.

The SPLM split in 2017 along ethnic lines resulting in 2 rival factions – one led by Malik Agar (Ingessana) – based in Blue Nile State, and the other by Abdel Azziz Al Hilu – based in Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan. SPLM-Agar joined the peace talks as a member of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in Oct 2020. In Jan 2020 WFP Executive Director David Beasley brokered talks between Civilian arm of the Transitional

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[13] Pastoralists, also known as Fulani
[14] Farming community
[15] UNITAMS/UNCT Joint Field Trip Report to the Blue Nile Region 10-17 May 2022 (unpublished)

Government and al-Hilu, although later these stalled and the SPLM al-Hilu did not sign the JPA. There are perceptions that aid has favoured al-Hilu controlled areas at the expense of others.[16]

Beyond the SPLM conflict against the state, there are other conflicts in Blue Nile State:

- Increasing conflict between farmers and herders due to changes in migration routes resulting from the flooding of grazing land (Rosaries dam expansion) and expansion of gum Arabic production;
- Significant land grabbing, allocated to private investors and Sudanese military, displacing farmers and affecting pastoralist resource access. Land claimed by Ingessana was re-allocated to the Fellata, feeding polarisation polarisation between groups. Following the JPA returnees found their land had been re-allocated;
- Discontent over resettlement due to Roseires dam, aggravated by sense that best land was allocated to pro-NCP 'newcomers' and electricity generated from dam being directed to Khartoum;
- Artisanal gold mining has significantly increased, including with the use of cyanide, with significant community protest against the environmental damage caused.

White Nile State

There is much tribal diversity in White Nile State, due in part to significant migration during and after the collapse of Mahdi's regime in Khartoum (1899), especially from Darfur and Kordofan States. Settlers in this period often gained land, although those settling near 'native' Hassaniya tribes often led to conflict.

Prior to the outbreak of war in 2023, White Nile State (WNS) was hosting the country's largest South Sudanese refugee population[17] as well as a protracted caseload of approx. 100,000 returnees following the secession of South Sudan in 2011, and approx. 6,000 people from Blue Nile State following conflict there in 2022[18]. Approx 17% of the population of WNS were in crisis and above levels of food insecurity (IC 3 and IPC 4) prior to the war in April 2023. There are 10 refugee camps in the As Salam and A Jabalain localities. There have been major disease outbreaks in these refugee camps over the recent years

In May 2023 fighting erupted between Hausa and Nuba tribes in Kosti, part of a longer conflict between the tribes over water and land between farmers and herders. In December 2024 RSF attacked Al-Awaj, near Ad Douiem, and in Nov attacked Ad Douiem, triggering displacements. In June 2024 there were RSF drone attacks on SAF military targets in WNS in Kosti, Rabak and Kenana airbase

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[16] UNITAMS Blue Nile Report op cit
[17] 283,900,000 refugees as at July 2022 – See UNHCR Population Dashboard
[18] See OCHA Sudan: White Nile State Profile (September 2022)
https://www.unocha.org/attachments/043b6bf3-1483-421b-a796-368c8cd763b3/OCHA%20Sudan_White%20Nile%20State%20Profile_September%202022.pdf

West Darfur

Most of the state of Western Darfur covers the historical Dar Masalit and Dar Gimir Sultanates, and thus much area, including El Geneina, is considered the historical homeland of the Masalit tribe. The majority of the population in El Geneina, Kereneik and Beida are Masalit, also the Fur and Zaghawa are large tribes. Overall the Masalit make up approximately 60% of West Darfur's population. There are also significant populations of other African tribes (Dajo, Gimir, Tama) and a small number of many other African tribes.

Most, but not all, African tribes are farmers, and some also engage in some herding. In 1970s-80s major droughts resulted in mass movements into IDP camps South of El Geneina, and from 1990s onwards these African tribes resettled in Um Dhukun and Umdafuk. African tribes (Tama and Gimir especially) were allowed to settle but were given the less fertile lands. When conflict erupted in 2003 many of the 'newer' arrivals among the African tribes chose not to side with the traditional African tribes of the area, but instead to work with Arab pro-govt tribes, probably in an effort to get land. The GoS created 'model' villages for IDP refugee return in 2004, under the assertion that services and security could more easily be provided. However, it also allowed nomads to take over the abandoned villages, which had better water and land access, and undermined the returnees from re-engaging in farming.

There are also significant numbers of Arab tribes, the largest numbers being from amongst the Aulad Rashid, Beni Halba, Hiamat, Miseriya, Naiwaba, and Salamat. Some Arab leaders and politicians in West Darfur arrived in the 1960s – 70s who allied themselves with Bashir and in return were granted newly created Amir positions in the Native Administration in West Darfur. Arabs arriving from Chad 2003-2008 were recruited into armed groups and were rewarded with Sudanese citizenship, as well as provided with land claimed by non-Arab refugees and IDPs. To some IDPs the conflict is specifically with this newer wave of nomadic Arabs, and the accompanying intentional Arabization of West Darfur.

Violence in West Darfur has been particularly extensive, and thus a brief overview of the drivers of conflict is included:

Land - Land is at the heart of the conflict across much of West Darfur. Land was allocated under the *hakura system* to settled tribes and administered by the traditional leaders (Native Administration), principally Masalit tribes. Pastoralists were provided usage rights only. The 1970s Unregistered Land Act enabled the state to claim ownership customary land already allocated under the *hakura* system and redistribute it, and in 1995 the Emirate Act of W Darfur divided up Masalit land allocating a significant territory to Arab tribes. In some locations nomads have settled on lands claimed by Masalit and other African-farmer groups displaced through conflict, and this is referred to as 'occupied land' by non-Arabs. The JPA (Aug 2020) included provisions for land restitution, with anticipated winners and losers, contributing to increased tensions, recruitment into armed groups, and hate speech.

Livelihoods - There is competition between nomadic and farming livelihoods, over livestock migration, involving crop damage by livestock, farm expansion into migratory routes, and delineation of migratory corridors. This has been intensified by climate change and desertification: nomads arrive earlier with cattle, before harvest.

Ethnic polarization - Tribal conflict has been simplified into 'Arab vs Masalit' or 'nomad vs farmer' but this masks some nuance and shifts attention from the political elements of the conflict. When marginalised groups rebelled against the GoS in 2000s, the GoS armed and supported Arab militia to fight a proxy war against the uprising, accelerating a deep polarisation among communities along ethnic and livelihood lines. Tribes have become stereotyped, with Arabs labelled as 'newcomers' or janjaweed, and racial terms used against Africans, or referring to them as slaves.

Exclusion and marginalization - At a local level Arabs felt politically marginalized and unrepresented as they could only have low ranking representation prior to the abolition of the Native Administration in 1971. Arab nomadic communities seek access to water, electricity, education and healthcare –International aid has principally focussed on IDPs, feeding this sense of exclusion. Conversely the Maasalit community has felt politically unrepresented and neglected at the national level, and thus were strong supporters of the 2019 revolution.

There are several armed movements in West Darfur, including the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) with a support base from the Zaghawa community, which supported the JPA, with Minnawi taking the role of Governor of Darfur in 2021, and supporting the Oct 2021 coup. SLA-MM is part of Joint Protection Forces fighting against RSF in Darfur. There is also another faction – the Sudan Liberation Army – Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) with a support base from the Fur community, which rejected the JPA, and retains a neutral position in the current war, holding an island of peace in Jebel Marra in Darfur, and some other areas in central and South Darfur. There is also the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) which, similar to SLA-MM, participated in the JPA, held a post in the Transtional Government, and supported the 2021 coup.

There were significant violent episodes over the 2020-2022 including in El Geneina, Kulbus and Kreneik– West Darfur was the most violent region since the JPA. Following the outbreak of war in April 2023, violence quickly escalated in West Darfur, with the targeting of ethnic Masalit community has been widely documented, including those fleeing along the road to Chad, similarly widespread sexual and gender-based violence against women has been documented. Entire Masalit sections of the city have been destroyed. Mass graves of Maasalit men were discovered outside El Geneina in July 2023.

North Kordofan

North Kordofan is a logistical hub, with key roads connecting Darfur, Khartoum and the Eastern States. The capital city, El Obeid, has been under siege for much of the war since April 2023. The use of heavy weaponry has critically damaged much civilian infrastructure, and attacks have been

made on the El Obeid oil refinery, which was vandalaised and looted, as also were banks and financial institutions. There are also gold mines in N Kordofan.

North Kordofan is has significant pastoral activity, with mainly Arab tribes with camels, sheep and goats. Pastoral competition and conflict is more common and frequent in the northern and northwestern parts of North Kordofan. The pastoralists (notably the Kababish, Kawahla and Shanabla) keep both camels and sheep, and undertake long range nomadic movements. During the rainy season they spread wide to make use of distant pastures and wadis, reaching as far north as the outskirts of Dongola along the Nile in Northern State.

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023 The Kababish militia (an armed group predominantly comprising pastoralist camel farmers) has taken up arms to protect civilians against the RSF. Its members have clashed with RSF. Other Arab tribal militias from the Dar Hamid and Jawma communities have also clashed with the RSF in North Kordofan. Conversely Baggara Arabs, also from North Kordofan, have previously been widely recruited into the RSF.

Khartoum

Khartoum has been a major battleground for the fighting since April 2023. Many residents fled the city to become IDPs including elsewhere within Khartoum or refugees. There has been widescale destruction of civilian infrastructure, and currently the city faces major water supply crisis, leading to cholera in all localities, including Bahri and Sharg al Neel (supported by SANAD). There are also risks posed by explosive remnants of war.

As the capital city of Sudan, Khartoum has benefitted from extractive relationships across the states of the periphery, significantly contributing to anger at marginalisation and conflict between the different tribal groups of these periphery states and the state at the centre.

There is a complex mix of tribal/ethnic groups living in KHT, with some groups concentrated in particular areas. In a small number of places tribal affiliation really matters, where one group is dominant, and tribal grouping/ethnicity may also be linked to politics. These are often areas that have only recently been incorporated into the expanding city of KHT, rather than areas that have been urbanized for a long time, where historical tribal concentrations have lost their vibrancy. Within the selected localities these include El Haj Yousif and Alkhoglab in Khartoum Bahri, and El Aylafun and Soba East in Eastern Nile.

There are also many ghettos of new comers, IDPs and refugees in KHT. Some of these are officially designated IDP sites, others are slums that have grown over time, particularly due to an influx of IDPs resulting from war or climate change in Sudan. These poorest sections of society have been least able to flee the city as these IDPs, refugees and slum dwellers were already extremely vulnerable prior to the crisis, also have been excluded from much of the development of KHT, and face much discrimination as the slum dwellers are viewed collectively as criminals and the areas they live in commonly referred to as the 'triangle of terror'. Within the selected localities these include El Haj Yousif and El Barraka

Civil society in Khartoum played a central role in the overthrow of Omer Bashir. Resistance Committees were re-established as neighbourhood units to organise and mobilise communities, particularly the youth. Separate from the Resistance Committees are the Emergency Response Rooms which exist widely across Khartoum. Initially established for the covid response, they came back into action since the war began in April 2023, and have been supporting local communities principally through the provision of communal kitchens and creating a space for people to gather and for children to play. They have supported remainees as well as IDPs within their area.

Gender and cultural controls on women

Women face major violations of their rights and freedoms which vary by tribe, with controls on women which affect their ability to leave the house / village, engage in consultation, access markets and financial institutions, and benefit from this project. There are variations between different states, and within states, and these have also evolved since the major displacements following the outbreak of war in April 2023. Kassala is known as the most conservative state in Sudan, in which women's rights are severely constrained for Arab tribes in particular – in some areas women cannot even leave their home unaccompanied (Hameshkoreib) while among other Arab tribes women may be allowed to work in their own kitchen gardens or the family field but not as agricultural labour on the fields of others, while women from West Sudanese 'settler' communities in Kassala can work as agricultural labour on the fields of others.

The ability of women to influence household expenditure / control cash that they earn is mixed. Research by WFP in Kassala and Gederef (2024) found significant problems with certain communities in Kassala where men expected to retain 50% of income generated by women[19], while in other communities in Kassala and Gederef women and men both stated women can control income they generate. There is a risk that men may try to control the decision making over expenditure linked to transfers from this project. Or conversely that efforts to economically empower women through this project could result in tensions within the household.

Due to the long-running war there is a disproportionately high number of women-headed households in BNS, and a high proportion of widows and orphans. Early marriage and illiteracy among women is higher than the national average. It is estimated that 80% of female returnees are heads of households.

Sexual and Gender Based Violence is extremely widespread in Sudan, although data is scarce, and reporting is limited since this usually triggers reprisals. This topic is discussed in the GBV/SEA/SH Action Plan – see that document for a discussion of forms and prevalence.

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[19] WFP Sudan (2024) Environmental and Social Assessment of WFP USAID Productive Safety Nets Project – Kassala and Gederef, Sudan

IDP populations

As of 17 December 2024, there were 11,532,822 IDPs within Sudan, of which 8,795, 824 were displaced since April 2023[20]. During 2024 Gederef, North Darfur, South Darfur, River Nile and Blue Nile experienced the biggest increase in IDPs. Major displacement events were linked to:

- Major confrontations in Al Jazeira state Dec 2023/Jan 2024 and again in Oct/Nov 2024
- Clashes in North Darfur
- Escalation of conflict in Sennar June/July 2024
- Flooding May-Aug

Many IDPs have been displaced more than once. 28% of those who were displaced *before* April 2023 have since experienced secondary or tertiary displacement.

Table 4: IDP populations across eight states of the project

State	IDP population as at December 2024	Percentage change Dec 2023 to Dec 2024
Blue Nile	487,741	83%
Gederef	1,100,840	178%
Kassala	354,527	122%
Khartoum	98,331	160%
Northern	553,708	42%
North Kordofan	202,960	14%
Red Sea	282,421	21%
River Nile	1,017,942	49%
West Darfur	312,247	19%
White Nile	656,463	22%

Source: IOM (2025) A Year in Review: Displacement in Sudan

IDPs have concentrated in specific localities within each state. The maps below show the concentrations of IDPs within each state, as well as the main source locations of those IDPs.

Red Sea hosted an estimated 282,153 IDPs across 306 locations in 10 localities. IDPs in Red Sea were displaced primarily from Khartoum (47%) and Aj Jazirah (25%).

River Nile hosted an estimated 1,030,534 IDPs across 1,252 locations in 7 localities. IDPs in River Nile were primarily displaced from Khartoum (75%), followed by Aj Jazirah (15%).

[20] Data in section drawn from IOM (2025) A Year in Review: Displacement in Sudan

Gedaref hosted an estimated 1,119,074 IDPs across 656 locations in 12 localities. IDPs in Gedaref were displaced primarily from Khartoum (48%), Aj Jazirah (32%), and Sennar (11%).

Kassala hosted an estimated 355,017 IDPs across 325 locations in 11 localities. IDPs in Kassala were primarily displaced from Khartoum (44%) and Aj Jazirah (50%).

West Darfur hosted an estimated 312,887 IDPs across 134 locations in 8 localities. IDPs in West Darfur were primarily displaced from other locations within West Darfur (88%).

Northern hosted an estimated 574,168 IDPs across 569 locations in 7 localities. IDPs in Northern were displaced primarily from Khartoum (85%) and Aj Jazirah (9%).

White Nile hosted an estimated 656,943 IDPs across 1,308 locations in 9 localities. IDPs in White Nile were primarily displaced from Khartoum (76%), Aj Jazirah (10%), and other locations in White Nile (7%).

Blue Nile hosted an estimated 494,241 IDPs across 240 locations in 7 localities. IDPs in Blue Nile were primarily displaced from other locations within Blue Nile (46%), Khartoum (26%), and Sennar (19%).

Khartoum hosted an estimated 98,021 IDPs across 405 locations in 7 localities. IDPs in Khartoum were displaced primarily from other locations in Khartoum (90%), followed by Aj Jazirah (9%).

North Kordofan hosted an estimated 205,185 IDPs across 639 locations in 8 localities. IDPs in North Kordofan were displaced primarily from Khartoum (61%), South Kordofan (19%), and other locations in North Kordofan (15%).

| | < 10,000 | | 10,001 - 25,000 | | 25,001 - 50,000 | | 50,001 - 100,000 | | > 100,000 |

People Living with Disabilities

Interviews with Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) in Atbara, Northern and Kassala highlight a very strong linkage of these organisations to people with disabilities among the host community and within IDP gathering sites, they are clearly well connected to PLWD, and have sound data. In Atbara, interviews with representatives from Deaf, Blind and Physical Disability Unions all noted that many PLWD do not have phones due to economic hardship, and thus many PLWD do not have direct access to bankak. In Kassala the Council for People living with Disabilities highlighted that, due to social stigma, some families did not get birth certificates / national IDs for offspring with disabilities. This could lead to financial exclusion also. The OPD also noted the compounded effects of war on PLWD, particularly IDPs who fled from Khartoum, who were already living in poverty and lost all their devices / equipment in flight, have no assets, and find it harder to get work than people without disabilities.

Sudan-specific research on disability inclusion and cash based programming could not be found. Drawing from global experience on disability inclusion within cash and voucher assistance, there are a range of possible barriers to inclusion

- Institutional: complex, inaccessible or discriminatory procedures, inaccurate data, lack of technical capacity to promote the inclusion of persons with disabilities, lack of accountability
- Attitudinal: assumptions about / negative attitudes towards persons with disabilities, discriminatory treatment from vendors / FSPs
- Environmental: Inaccessible markets / distribution points / transportation, unavailable assistive devices or accessible technology, lack of accessible banks
- Communication: Lack of awareness, absence of accessible information & inclusive communication techniques.

Access to financial institutions / financial inclusion

The most extensive pre-war data for Sudan comes from a World Bank financial inclusion study in 2021.[21] The study defines financial inclusion as follows:

Financially included people refers to people who have/use financial products and/or services, both formal and informal, while **financially excluded** people refers to those who do not have/use any financial products and/or services, either formal or informal. Of those who are financially included, they may be **formally served**, meaning they have/use formal financial products and/or bank services provided by a financial institution (bank or non-bank), or they may be **informally served**, meaning they have/use financial products or services which are not regulated. Of those who are formally served, they may be **banked**, meaning they have/use financial products/services provided by a bank that is regulated by the Central Bank of Sudan, or they may be **served by other formal financial institutions.**

Chart 1: Status of financial inclusion % (with overlaps)

Formally served	64
Banked	15
Other formal (non-bank)	61
Informal	9
Excluded	34

The bar charts shows a low level of 'banked' population. The high level of population that is formally served through non-bank services (yellow) are largely involved in health insurance.

Source: Finmark Trust, Sudan MultiPartner Fund, World Bank (Jan 2024) Sudan 2021 National Financial Inclusion Survey Highlights

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[21] Finmark Trust, Sudan MultiPartner Fund, World Bank (Jan 2024) Sudan 2021 National Financial Inclusion Survey Highlights

Chart 2: Financial inclusion by gender, location and age

FINANCIAL ACCESS STRAND OVERALL (%)

	Banked	Other formal (non-bank)	Informal only	Excluded
Total	15	49	2	34

FINANCIAL ACCESS STRAND GENDER (%)

	Banked	Other formal (non-bank)	Informal only	Excluded
Male	20	46	3	31
Female	11	51	2	36

FINANCIAL ACCESS STRAND BY LOCATION (%)

	Banked	Other formal (non-bank)	Informal only	Excluded
Nomads	5	49	2	44
Rural	10	51	2	37
Urban	24	44	1	31

FINANCIAL ACCESS STRAND BY AGE GROUP (%)

	Banked	Other formal (non-bank)	Informal only	Excluded
61 years and older	18	48	2	32
45 to 60 years	17	49	2	32
36 to 44 years	17	51	2	30
25 to 35 years	13	49	2	36
18 to 24 years	9	49	2	40

● Banked   ● Other formal (non-bank)   ● Informal only   ● Excluded

Source: Finmark Trust, Sudan MultiPartner Fund, World Bank (Jan 2024) Sudan 2021 National Financial Inclusion Survey Highlights

The data shows that men are more likely than women to be banked, and that overall women are more likely to be financially excluded. It also shows that urban populations are more likely to be banked that rural populations (although experience from programming does indicate this disparity is much greater than the data shows here), and nomads in particular are excluded. Older populations are also more likely to be banked than younger populations.

Chart 3: Financial inclusion by state

STATE FINANCIAL ACCESS STRAND (%)

State	Banked	Other formal (non-bank)	Informal only	Excluded
Northern State	25	60		15
Khartoum	24	32	2	42
Blue Nile	22	60	2	16
White Nile	17	38	1	44
Algadarif	15	60	2	23
West Kordofan	15	47		38
Gazera	15	28	4	52
North Kordofan	14	58	3	25
River Nile	13	56	1	30
South Kordofan	12	52		36
Red Sea	11	61	1	27
Sinar	11	49	4	36
Kassala	10	36	2	52
North Darfour	9	71	1	19
South Darfour	9	60	1	30
Central Darfour	9	39	3	49
East Darfour	8	83	3	6
West Darfour	4	49	1	46

● Banked ● Other formal (non-bank) ● Informal only ● Excluded

Source: Finmark Trust, Sudan MultiPartner Fund, World Bank (Jan 2024) Sudan 2021 National Financial Inclusion Survey Highlights

There are also regional variations, with particularly high levels of financial exclusion found in the following states in the project:

- Kassala 52%
- West Darfur 46%
- White Nile 44%
- Khartoum 42%

Out of a sample of 9,337 the unbanked were 7,976. There are significant variations:

- The unbanked were 40% male and 60% female
- The unbanked were 30% urban, 64% rural, and 6% nomads.

Chart 4: Barriers to banking

85% of adults are not banked

Barrier	Value
Not enough money to use financial institutions	59
Do not know how to open an account	56
Financial institutions are too far away	24
Financial services are too expensive	15
No need for financial services at a formal institution	11
Lacking necessary documentation (ID, wage slip, etc.)	11
Other reasons	6
Do not trust financial institutions	4
Someone else in the family already has an account	2
Religious reasons	1

Source: Finmark Trust, Sudan MultiPartner Fund, World Bank (Jan 2024) Sudan 2021 National Financial Inclusion Survey Highlights

The profiles of the financially excluded were identified as:

- Female
- Rural
- With a primary education (or none)
- Farmer or main income source from dependents
- Under 35 years
- Married

Chart 5: Account ownership in Sudan (2011-2021)

Account Ownership in Sudan - Global Findex Database
Chart: FinDev Gateway

Pre-war statistics from Global Findex database similarly show very low numbers of people with a bank account.

Source: Financial inclusion in Sudan (undated) FinDev Gateway https://www.findevgateway.org/country/financial-inclusion-in-sudan

Chart 6: Gender gap in account ownership in Sudan

Gender Gap in Account Ownership in Sudan- Global Findex Database
Chart: FinDev Gateway

The data also shows a gender gap between men and women - the percentage of people aged 15+ with an account is lower for women than men.

Source: Financial inclusion in Sudan (undated) FinDev Gateway
https://www.findevgateway.org/country/financial-inclusion-in-sudan

Previous cash-based programming experience in West Darfur, prior to the outbreak of war, highlighted how rural communities had particularly low rates of account ownership compared to their urban counterparts. Some organisations have piloted proxy mechanisms, with one person in a community who holds a bank account receiving funds for a wider group and distributing locally, but this has protection risks.

Mobile banking

Since 2014 the Bank of Khartoum established Bankak – a digital money app, which was widely taken up in cities and in particular in Khartoum. Bankak is Sudan's largest fintech service, allowing bill payments and money transfer up to a daily limit of 3m SDG (approx. $5,000) per customer. It has 7m users, with a steep increase since the start of the war. The Bankak app also requires a bank account, although there are also some other mobile digital wallets such as MiCash and RittalPay, which do not require a formal bank account, instead only requiring a phone handset.

Access to mobile banking in Sudan is limited due to a significant number of beneficiaries lacking smartphones and the widespread issue of limited internet connectivity. To address these challenges, the CBT unit has initiated data collection for beneficiaries who have active bank accounts and can access bank branches. Additionally, beneficiaries with smartphones and the ability to cash out their entitlements through the mobile banking app are also prioritized for digital cash.

For those without bank accounts, smartphones, or access to bank branches—particularly in areas without internet connectivity—entitlements will continue to be provided through alternative modalities such as Cash-in-Hand (CiH), in-kind distributions, or vouchers.

WFP will be conducting a Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) across Sudan in January-February 2025. Information relating to financial inclusion has been integrated into the questionnaire and will provide better understanding of financial inclusion amongst various groups. This data can be integrated into the updated social assessment.

A pre-war study on digital financial services[22] considered blockages to the use of digital financial services in Sudan. One important supply-side barrier was the lack of money agents allowing people to cash out, and that where these did exist there were disincentives to support mobile money since these providers operate informal credit transfers through the use of airtime: people buy and send airtime to the end user, who then transfers the airtime to the money agent in exchange for cash. Money agents are unregulated in this transaction, and can charge higher fees. It is a widely used approach in Sudan (survey showed 68% of population and 46% of population in White Nile using airtime credit transfers).

The same study also considered the demand side blockages, and identified the following:

- Men are more likely to own a smartphone, with women less likely to own any form of phone
- Younger populations are more digital-ready
- The major blockages to owning a phone relate to cost of the phone, airtime, and lack of network coverage
- Women face additional barriers, including lack of knowledge of how to use a mobile phone (this came out in West Darfur), families not approving women of either owning a phone or having access to the internet

Evolution in financial services and inclusion since the outbreak of war 2023

Available financial services have changed significantly over the course of the war. Damage to data centres and operations based in Khartoum affects the availability of financial services even in areas away from fighting. The Central Bank of Sudan itself was set alight in April 2023. The Electronic Banking Services Company, which oversees governmental e-banking services and is the national switch connecting all banks and financial institutions in Sudan, lost the ability to oversee clearing services, and this remains unresolved. On 31st May 2023 SAF bombed the country's only currency printing press to prevent it falling into RSF hands.

Bank transfers depend heavily on Bankak and through informal airtime transfers through mobile phone network operators. Informal withdrawal fees range between 10-50% depending on location and liquidity. Frequent telecoms breakdowns and blackouts, part of a war strategy in some situations, leave people unable to use the apps. For instance, in Feb 2024 the RSF seized control of internet service providers in Khartoum and imposed a telcomms blackout. Two internet service providers re-established in Port Sudan in March 2024 and connectivity began to recover, however have not been able to re-establish in areas under RSF control including Khartoum and Al Jaziera. In RSF controlled territories many have turned to Starlink for internet access, and there are credible reports that the RSF is profiteering from this[23] and similarly reports of SAF generating profits from renting it out as a service. There is also

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[22] Strategic Impact Advisors (August 2022) Supporting digital payments in cash programming Sudan
[23] See for instance Advox (20 Aug 2024) Starlink in Sudan: a lifeline or a war facilitator?
https://globalvoices.org/2024/08/20/starlink-in-sudan-a-lifeline-or-war-facilitator/

significant evidence of Starlink being used by RSF for military operations.[24] Starlink is technically illegal in Sudan as there is no official authorisation, but equipment has been smuggled into the country. In RSF controlled areas there have been incidents when civilians using starlink have been accused of providing co-ordinates to SAF for military targeting. This is relevant for programming in West Darfur where Starlink may be the only option for accessing online digital banking.

A recent policy to replace old 1,000 SDG currency notes requires that individuals have a bank account and must deposit the currency being replaced. This means that people without accounts must open accounts to exchange their currency. This typically means visiting a bank branch and presenting an official ID. Women are less likely to possess these IDs and are less able to make the long journeys to cities where banks are present. RSF banned the new notes in RSF controlled areas, leading to parallel economies. Some places have little to no commercial bank presence – before the war South Darfur had no commercial bank branches for instance. More simplified Know-Your-Customer requirements are being utilised (for instance remote account opening) but these still require National ID, require mobile phone network, and are slower to establish. The more vulnerable people may not have a National ID at all.

In practice there have been significant controls on the amount that can be withdrawn when an individual brings currency to the bank for replacement, thus the replacement policy is shifting the circulation of cash to within the banking sector. There are often long queues at banks, meaning that any over-the-counter transaction at a bank can take several hours. Banks have reduced their hours and have restricted the number of people accessing services per day in order to manage the limited cash available. These issues have contributed to a loss of confidence in the banking sector. Prior to the war approximately 95% of currency was held outside banks.

Pervasive insecurity means that carrying cash creates significant risks, and people have shifted to online transactions where possible to avoid the risks of carrying physical currency, and to cope with the limitations on accessing cash through physical banks. The increase in digitialisation of cash also shifts control over financial transactions into the banking sector. A number of banks have been looted by the RSF.

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[24] See Mnejja,K (19 Sept 2024) Internet in conflict: Sudan's Battle for Connection
https://timep.org/2024/09/19/internet-in-conflict-sudans-battle-for-connection/

V. Social risks and mitigation measures

The social assessment was triggered by a concern for risks that are specific to indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities. The social assessment shows that the notion of 'indigenous' or 'native' identity confers significant benefits to tribes in the project area – these groups have better access to land and to representation, vis-à-vis 'settler' groups. Tribal identities are bound up in conflict in different ways in different locations, and thus tribes are considered in term of risks and mitigation measures. However, the discussion of financial inclusion – which is highly pertinent to this project - highlights that the most salient dimensions of financially excluded populations are females as well as rural & nomadic communities. Thus, the analysis of risks and mitigation measures takes an expanded view, considering risks not only to indigenous peoples / SSAHUTLCs, but also to other vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, including women and pastoralists in particular.

The following table sets out identified risks, and proposed mitigation and monitoring measures concerning indigenous peoples / SSAHUTLCs, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. Some risks are handled elsewhere (SGBV / SEA risks are handled in the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Action Plan, and labour risks are handled in the Labour Management Plan) so are excluded here. There are also actions that are handled under the Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) which are cross referenced rather than duplicated here.

Table 5: Social risks and mitigation measures

Risks	Risk description	Mitigation measure	Action Plan item	Monitoring
Financial exclusion of vulnerable groups	Marginal &/or rural populations may not have access to banking institutions (banks or mobile money). In some locations, bank accounts cannot be opened (eg W Darfur) due to a lack of network connectivity. Some individuals (especially IDPs and refugees)	Affirmative action for financially excluded groups, providing a) financial literacy activities and b) practical support to open bank accounts, including remotely – to be included in FSP activities The feasibility of different modalities will be assessed for each selected location, leading to context-specific approaches.	Integrate affirmative action Analysis See SEP	Affirmative action provided reported in regular ESS reporting. Regular engagement with the FSP to track any new changes on valid/accepted documentation to open bank accounts.

	may not have the relevant documents to open an account. Returnees in Blue Nile State especially unlikely to have national ID for opening an account. People with disabilities may be financially excluded.	Electronic and value vouchers can be used in the most connectivity and access constrained locations. Engage with Organisations of Persons with Disabilities to identify the location of People Living with Disabilities for inclusion within the project. The CBS (Central Bank of Sudan) has approved the use of invalid (expired) documentation (e.g., national IDs and passports) to open bank accounts for the selected beneficiaries.		
Urban bias in programming	FSPs largely operate in urban areas and reach of phone mobile network is limited in many locations (especially rural areas) – project support may focus on urban areas.	On-going engagement with mobile network providers to be ready to take advantage of any expansion of mobile network coverage. Use of mobile money technology that can be accessed through simple mobile device and without internet. Selected locations without mobile phone network coverage can use Value Vouchers, which do not require network connectivity.	Positioning to take advantage of expanded network coverage	Feasibility assessments completed
Financial intermediaries may demand a share of transfers	People receiving bankak transfers or value vouchers and seeking to cash out may be	Community consultations will assess the costs of informal fees for cash payout. This will inform future	Analysis	Updated Social Assessment and Social Development Plan GRM.

	charged a significant fee by the informal cash provider.	programme planning, and if fees become very high will trigger a discussion with the WB on modalities		Community consultations throughout project
People receiving cash may be targeted by criminals	Beneficiaries may be targeted by criminals following cash distribution.	See Security Management Plan		See Security Management Plan
Confusion or misunderstanding of differing transfer values	Household size will determine the transfer value, and thus larger households will receive more. This may be misunderstood.	Extensive sensitisation activities to explain targeting and transfer values by CPs.

FSPs to also use posters and other information communication materials to explain targeting and transfer values.

SANAD will not be implemented in locations where WFP is implementing regular emergency response programming, to avoid confusion between different transfer values for SANAD and emergency response programming. | See SEP

See SEP

Mapping of selected localities | GRM

Reporting on stakeholder engagement

Geographical mapping of SANAD vis-à-vis other WFP emergency response programming. |
| Men may try to control the access of female relatives to benefits, or efforts to economically empower women may result in backlash | Decision making within the household over expenditure may be controlled by men.

Deliberate targeting of women as named beneficiaries, to economically empower women, | Naming women as beneficiary may strengthen women's agency and decision making. The project will aim to have 50% of named beneficiaries as women

Awareness raising sessions to community members (men and women) on women's | Affirmative action

See PSEA Action Plan

See PSEA Action Plan

Analysis | GRM

FGD with women integrated into regular project post-distribution monitoring exercises

Research report included in ESS regular reporting |

	could result in tensions within the household	rights, economic violence, and the positive outcomes for the community of women's economic empowerment Key messages communicated to key opinion formers on women's rights, economic violence, and the positive outcomes for the community of women's economic empowerment. Research to understand women's ability to retain control over income received, relative bargaining power within the household, and effective mechanisms to avoid backlash		
FSP may not recognise the importance of gender sensitive approaches	FSP may not recognise the importance of providing female tellers to engage with women in communities with severe controls on women. High staff turn over in FSPs may result in lack of understanding of, and buy-in to social safeguards among frontline staff	Regular capacity building of FSP staff in social safeguards. This risk to be discussed with FSPs to ensure FSPs: - maintain minimum threshold of trained staff; - Maintain minimum threshold of female teller staff	CP and FSP on-boarding	Assessment of FSP teller gender balance and staff capacities integrated into routine distribution monitoring
Some communities may not communicate in Arabic.	Local languages are used in many places, and returnee children in Blue Nile State	Stakeholder Engagement Plan – identify local languages and ensure communications are in	See SEP See SEP	GRM Reporting on stakeholder engagement

	may not speak Arabic	appropriate language. CPs to ensure that distribution site staff are proficient in the local language to effectively communicate with the community.		
Community based targeting may be discriminatory.	Community based targeting will use selection panels. In mixed communities these panels may be from the majority tribe only, and select only majority tribe beneficiaries, excluding vulnerable people from the minority tribes. Or the panel may prioritse their own friends / family over the vulnerable within the community	Clear targeting criteria for both geographical and household targeting, which is widely communicated Inclusion of minority representatives within selection panels for community-based targeting Oversight of community-based targeting processes by CP The selected list is shared publicly, with adequate time and opportunity for community to challenge inclusion and exclusion errors, which are investigated, resulting in adjustments (both to add and to remove people from list) *Beneficiary selection and targeting is described in Section 2 of the PIM*	See SEP Ensure community based targeting is non-discriminatory	Monitoring visits / spot checks by WFP GRM
Selection of localities may be interpreted as discriminatory.	In some locations there is a strong coincidence between geographical boundaries of a locality, and tribal groups – in	Defining clear targeting criteria for both geographical and household targeting, which is widely communicated. Internal check of selected localities to	See SEP Analysis	

	particular in Blue Nile State. Selection of localities may be perceived to be driven by tribal identity.	determine if any specific tribe(s) is disproportionately supported or excluded.		
Sourcing of cash or commodities (for value voucher redemption) may clear the market.	In a context of liquidity constraints, and shortage of commodities, there is a risk that the project activities may result in either clearing the market of specific commodities or absorbing very high proportion of locally available cash.	This risk to be discussed with FSPs and large retailers, leading to clear SOPs to ensure markets are not cleared. Regular monitoring of prices and commodities to assess the project's impact on market availability and commodity prices.	CP and FSP on-boarding	Existence of SOPs Integrated into regular post-distribution monitoring and monthly commodity and price monitoring
	For risks relating to SGBV / SEA please see separate GBV/SEA/SH Action Plan, and risks relating to wider criminality / violence see SRA/SMP. NOTE that some of the mitigation measures above form part of the Stakeholder Engagement Plan, including: • Engaging with PLWD to ensure inclusion within the project • Providing information / education / communication materials to convey specific risk mitigation actions such as to encourage people to move in groups when returning from distribution sites, especially women • Providing information to communities about targeting and transfer values to avoid confusion and enable people to actively engage in beneficiary list verification • Understanding local languages to ensure communications are in the right language Thus these measures serve the purposes of both stakeholder engagement and preventing / managing social risks related to the project.			

VI. Social Development Action Plan

Mitigation measures described in table 5 - Social risks and mitigation measures – are unpacked in table 6 below.

Table 6: Social Development Action Plan

Action	Tasks	Time frame (tentative)	Responsibility	Means of verification
Mapping of selected localities	Check of selected localities to determine if any specific tribe is disproportionately supported / excluded	Jan 2025	WFP PIU	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Check for overlap with other programming and possible confusion over transfer values	Jan 2025	WFP PIU	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
CP & FSP on-boarding	ESS capacity assessment of CPs and FSPs, including identification of remedial measures[25]	Feb-Apr 2025	WFP PIU	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Capacity building of CPs & FSPs in social safeguards	Feb 2025 onwards	WFP PIU	Capacity building workshop NFR
	Contract amendments with CPs and FSPs to include ESS flow down	Mar-Apr 2025	WFP PIU + CPs + FSP	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
Analysis	Rapid assessments - Initial contact with target communities to include questions to understand financial inclusion, and ground truth tribal mapping and local conflict analysis	Integrated into initial contact with community	WFP PIU + CPs	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Social assessment -	Within 3	WFP PIU + CPs	Updated Social

[25] See Annex 2 Labour Management Procedures for ESS capacity assessment tool for CPs and FSPs

	community consultations in a sample of project locations to drill down on known risks	months of disbursement		Assessment & Social Development Plan
	Research to understand women's ability to retain control over income received, relative bargaining power within the household, and effective mechanisms to avoid backlash	Mar-May 2025	WFP PIU	Research report
	Develop and implement actions to strengthen women's ability to retain control over income received on the basis of research findings	May onwards	WFP PIU	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Integration of ESS into other assessments: 1) feasibility of different modalities, 2) selection of distribution sites	Feb -May 2025	WFP PIU, CBT, VAM	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
Ensure community based targeting is non-discriminatory	Communications plan developed and implemented on targeting criteria and community-based targeting approach	Jan-Mar 2025	WFP AAP + CP	Meetings / outreach reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Accompaniment of community-based targeting process, and inclusion of minority representatives within panels	Mar-May 2025	CP	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Public verification of lists	Mar-May 2025	CP + WFP VAM	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
Establish functional and	Clarify processes WFP / CP	Jan-Mar 2025	WFP GRM + CP	

accessible GRM (The GRM is described in full in the Stakeholder Engagement Plan – see section 6.1, and annex 2 SEP for indicators and reporting on GRM)	Inform community about GRM (see SEP on community awareness on GRM)	Jan-Mar 2025	CP	
	GRM functioning receiving and processing complaints (see SEP annex for indicators of GRM functionality)	Mar 2025 onwards	WFP CFM + CP	
Develop & share information communications	See Stakeholder engagement plan			
Integrate affirmative action for financially excluded groups	Design & implement financial literacy activities	Mar 2025 onwards	FSPs	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
	Provision of support to 'unbanked' targeted individuals to open bank accounts	Mar 2025 onwards	FSPs	Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting
Positioning to take advantage of expanded network coverage	Engage regularly with mobile network providers to understand possible expansion of coverage	May 2025 onwards		Reported in ESS bi-annual reporting

Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
BHC	Beja High Council
CP	Co-operating Partner
ESCP	Environmental and Social Commitment Plan
FSPs	Financial Service Providers
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoS	Government of Sudan
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IPC	Integrated Phase Classification
JPA	Juba Peace Agreement
OPD	Organisations of Persons with Disabilities
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
PLWD	People Living with DIsabilities
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SA	Social Assessment
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SDP	Social Development Plan
SDG	Sudanese currency
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SESNP	Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Programme
SFSP	Sudan Family Support Programme
SH	Sexual Harassment
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRF	Sudan Revolutionary Front
SSAHULTCs	Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities
WNS	White Nile State