



WFP EVALUATION

Final evaluation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) project in Senegal January 2020 - October 2024

Decentralised evaluation report

WFP Senegal

February 2025



World Food Programme

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Acronyms

ACC	Adaptation to climate change
ANACIM	Agence Nationale de l'Aviation Civile et de la Météorologie (National Civil Aviation and Meteorology Agency)
ANCAR	Agence Nationale de Conseil Agricole et Rural (National Agricultural and Rural Consultancy Agency)
ANR	Assisted natural regeneration
APR	Annual performance report
C	Component
CC	Climate change
CDN	Contribution determined at national level
CNAAS	Compagnie Nationale d'Assurance Agricole du Sénégal (National Agricultural Insurance Company of Senegal)
CO	Country office
COFIL	Steering committee
CP	Cooperating partner
CPA	Community-based participatory approach
CSA	Climate-smart agriculture
CSP	Country strategic plan
DA	Department of Agriculture
DAC	Development Aid Commission
DAPSA	Direction de l'Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques Agricoles (Agricultural Analysis, Forecasting and Statistics Directorate)
DFS	Decentralised financial systems
DTS	Decentralised technical service
EIG	Economic interest group
EQ	Evaluation question
ET	Evaluation team

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCFA	CFA Franc
FCS	Food consumption score
FFA	Food for asset
FGD	Focus group discussion
FNS	Food and nutritional security
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHI	Global Hunger Index
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human resources
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGA	Income-generating activity
IRAM	Institut de recherche et d'applications des méthodes de développement / <i>Institute of Research and Application of development Methods</i>
IRS	Intensive rice-growing system
ITW	Insurance through work
LOASP-2004	Loi d'orientation agrosylvopastorale (Agricultural and livestock guidance act)
LPSEDDTE	Lettre de politique du secteur de l'environnement, du développement durable et de la transition écologique (Letter of policy for the environment, sustainable development and ecological transition)
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MFI	Microfinance institutions
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PADAER	Programme d'Appui au Développement Agricole et à l'Entreprenariat Rural (Agricultural Development and Rural Entrepreneurship Support Programme)
PANA	Plan d'Action National d'Adaptation aux changements climatiques (National Action Plan for Adaptation to climate change)
PCP	Participatory community planning

PDC	Plan de développement communal (Local development plan)
PNDL	Programme National de Développement Local (National Local Development Programme)
PNDN	Politique Nationale de Développement de la Nutrition (National Nutrition Development Policy)
PP	Procurement plan
PRES	Programme de Résilience Economique et Social (Economic and Social Resilience Programme)
PSE	Plan Sénégal Emergent (Emerging Senegal Plan)
RB	Regional Bureau
RG	Reference group
SDG	Sustainable development goal
SE-CNSA	Secrétariat Exécutif du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire (Executive Secretariat of the National Food Security Council)
SfC	Saving for Change
SLP	Seasonal livelihoods-based programming
SNEEG	Stratégie Nationale pour l'Équité et l'Égalité de Genre (National Strategy for Gender Equity and Equality)
SNPS	Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale (National Social Protection Strategy)
SNR	Single national register
SNSAR	Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Résilience (National Strategy for Food Security and Resilience)
SO	Sub-office
TOR	Terms of reference
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union)
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UNS	United Nations System
USD	US Dollar
VCB	Village cereal banks
VSCA	Village savings and credit association
WFP	World Food Programme
WII	Weather index insurance
WPAB	Work programme and annual budget
3PA	3-pronged approach

Summary

1 - Introduction

Characteristics of the evaluation

1. This decentralised evaluation report presents the results of the final evaluation of the WFP's Green Climate Fund (GCF) project in Senegal titled "Building the climate resilience of food insecure smallholder farmers through integrated management of climate risks (the R4 Rural Resilience Initiative)", which was deployed in five regions of Senegal (Kolda, Tambacounda, Kaffrine, Fatick and Kaolack) between the 14th of January 2020 and the 14th of October 2024. The end of project was initially scheduled for the 14th of January 2024 and extended to 14th July 2024¹ and then to the 14th of October 2024² at no additional cost.

2. The evaluation has two main objectives: accountability and learning (for future orientations)³. It was carried out by a team of four consultants, two women (one being the team leader expert on climate resilience and one expert in agricultural assurance and food security) and two men (experts in rural development and financial services, supported by the IRAM consultancy office). Data collection took place in October 2024, in Dakar as well as in the five regions and eight departments⁴ targeted.

Context

3. Senegal has become a lower middle-income country, with its gross domestic product (GDP) growing strongly (+4.2% in 2022). The country has a moderate hunger index, ranking 72nd out of 127 countries analysed and showing a significant improvement in recent years⁵. The effects of climate change are exacerbating the phenomenon of food insecurity and the vulnerability of poor households. The country's economy and most of its population depend on sectors that are sensitive to climate change (the agricultural sector) while financial services in rural areas suffer from shortcomings that are detrimental to economic initiatives, particularly for women. Moreover Senegal is highly vulnerable to shocks associated with climate change, which has a negative impact on productive resources (reduced biodiversity, land degradation, coastal erosion, etc.), and lowers agricultural productivity. As a result, the poverty of rural populations, food insecurity and the nutritional situation of populations mainly located in rural areas are worsening.

Subject of the evaluation

4. The project follows a pilot project conducted between 2012 and 2015 by Oxfam America and the World Food Programme in Kolda and Tambacounda. The R4 initiative is an integrated project aimed at building the adaptive capacity and resilience of vulnerable farmers by improving food security and incomes.

The project has four components: risk reduction (Component 1), risk transfer (Component 2), risk reserves and prudent risk-taking (Component 3) and support for the government in managing climate risks (Component 4). It is gender sensitive. A total of 438,291 direct beneficiaries were reached, exceeding the target of 405,000. The total grant expenditure is of 9,623,171 USD that also includes 3,844 USD from the remediation grant.

Methodology

5. The evaluation matrix is structured around seven evaluation questions, incorporating the 12

1 Reference number of the extension side letter: DPM/2024/001

2 Reference number of the extension side letter: DPM/2024/339

³ Clause 15.02 (b) of the AMA provides that the final evaluation report scope is to provide with... "an assessment of the performance of the Funded Activity against the Fund's investment framework criteria, including financial/economic performances as part of the Funded Activity efficiency and effectiveness criterion, as well as the sustainability and scalability of results, evaluation criteria and impacts and lessons learned, during the relevant period."

4 Kolda, Médina Yoro Foulah, Tambacounda, Koumpentoum, Goudiry, Kounghoul, Nioro du Rip, Fatick

5 GHI - Global Hunger Index, 2024

questions formulated by the GCF⁶ and the six DAC/OECD criteria. The evaluation team used a mixed approach to data collection (e.g. interviews with key informants, focus groups, field observations).

2 - Evaluation findings

Relevance

6. The project is well aligned with national priorities and strategies in terms of food and nutritional security, adaptation to climate change, territorialisation of public policies, gender equality, social protection and financial inclusion (Reco2).

7. It adapted to the needs of the communities thanks to the relevance of the integrated package of activities and the 3PA approach⁷, enabling an analysis of opportunities and needs through to the direction taken by land development to be planned in the form of community assets. (Reco2, Reco4)

8. Institutionally speaking, the project was anchored to the SE-CNSA, attached to the Prime Minister's Office – the advantage being its capacity to mobilise the ministries, but the disadvantage being its lack of involvement in the operational implementation of the project. Anchoring the project to a Ministry, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture, would have facilitated the involvement of the decentralised structures attached to it while fostering better coordination of programming (Reco2.4).

9. The design of the project is relevant. The household approach allows members to be involved according to their interest and availability, while the complementary nature of the interventions enhances their effectiveness. The sequential deployment of activities facilitates a gradual build-up of the cooperating partners and consolidates what has been achieved. The integration of new beneficiaries in the last year of the project, does not allow beneficiaries to take full ownership of the activities. The logical framework, reviewed midway through the project, shifted the focus from warrantage to village cereal banks. The theory of change was incomplete (no context analysis and associated assumptions), unspecific (came from the R4 model but no specificity, reference to the deployment context) and not promoted (was not communicate to the team), (appendix 8) (Reco2.1.4).

10. The main targeting criteria are vulnerability to food insecurity and climate shocks, the distribution of aid and opportunities. However, there is a risk of scattering the aid. Beneficiaries were targeted in a participatory and inclusive way, making the most of pre-existing mechanisms. The list was well accepted.

Coherence

11. R4 is consistent with the GCF's strategic orientations (Reco2, Reco4)

12. R4 is consistent with the WFP's Country Strategic Plan for Senegal, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Senegal and the WFP Strategic Plan 2022-2025 (Reco2, Reco4). Indeed WFP is recognised for over a decade as an experienced key player in strengthening the climate resilience of vulnerable small-scale producers.

13. The project's monitoring tools are insufficiently integrated into national monitoring and evaluation, which makes it difficult for the authorities to understand and take ownership of the project, and thus to ensure its sustainability systems (Reco6.4).

Efficiency (Reco2, Reco4)

Component 1 (Risk Reduction activities)

14. Participatory community planning (PCP) made it possible to identify the specific needs of communities but was little used beyond the project.

6 Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Consistency, Gender equity, Country ownership, Innovation, Sustainability, Replicability, Scalability, Positive and negative unintended outcomes

7 The 3PA approach is a consultative process that puts people and partners at the centre of joint planning and programming by bringing together information on food security trends, shocks, livelihoods and seasonality at national, regional and community levels.

15. Training in climate-smart farming techniques was unequally appreciated (very useful for rice growing, much less so for pre-existing crops). The project sought to overcome rainfall deficits (promotion of rice farming, market gardening, improved seeds and water conservation techniques).

16. Cash transfers were mainly used to buy food, as it happened precisely during the lean season, to protect means of production. The main sources of complaints were mainly related to operators. The training provided on land management techniques was appreciated by the beneficiaries and the decentralised structures.

Component 2 (Risk Transfer)

17. Agricultural insurance evolved considerably: the insurance product became a hybrid (rainfall and yield indices); verification and distribution strategy (via economic interest groups - EIGs). The total number of subscribers exceeded the target, with 54% of them subscribing from their own funds (4% of whom are women).

Component 3 (risk reserves and prudent risk-taking)

18. The savings for change groups (SfCs) were successfully adopted, widely replicated, and strongly promoted financial inclusion of beneficiaries. Targets for the number of groups created and amounts saved were well exceeded. There was little monitoring of the use of the loans, and it would appear that the majority of them were not used to develop income-generating activities. More awareness-raising would have been necessary to strengthen the opportunities of SfC to develop income-generating activities (Reco3.3).

19. The "SfC federating EIG" model helped to increase savings and credit capacity and social cohesion between villages. The "EIG insurance distributor" model had its limitations due to a lack of training, and it would seem that the product did not spread much beyond the group's borders.

20. The very high interest rates, around 25%, offered by MFIs to small agricultural producers (Reco5.4) and the fact that the existing VCBs did not meet the conditions required to provide sufficient guarantees to MFIs led the project to redirect these activities towards support for 39 village cereal banks, in conjunction with the national programme. Activities included setting up management committees; training members; construction of 7 buildings (none had been handed over at the time of data collection in October 2024).

Component 4 (Capacity Building and support to social safety net policies)

21. The project partly met the government's capacity-building objectives but lost sight of the objective of supporting social safety net policies. There were two main obstacles to this: i) the lack of local and national technical capacities regarding climate change to support policy- and decision-making; ii) insufficient budget allocations for disaster risk and adaptation mechanisms (Reco3.2).

22. The R4 project ensures good synergy between activities, e.g. SfC groups using their savings for climate information subscriptions, EIGs record agricultural insurance subscriptions, the use of increased production thanks to project activities to feed village cereal banks, etc. However, the approach is not very market-oriented (Reco3.3).

23. The project was adjusted on a regular basis, in terms of coordination; administration (e.g. increasing the duration of memoranda of understanding); operations (e.g. development of climate services; emergence of the hybrid index for agricultural insurance; development of the warrantage system towards support for village cereal banks).

24. A complaints mechanism exists, consisting of an unknown and therefore unused freephone number. However, complaints were referred to the project facilitators who dealt with those they could resolve and passed on the few remaining ones to the project manager who managed to resolve them.

Efficiency + scalability

25. Numerous delays were noted with the cooperating partners (CPs) during the renewal of the memoranda of understanding and the transfer of funds by the WFP (Reco5.2). The negative effects were limited in cases where partners were able to provide advances from their own funds. The extension of the duration of the memoranda from 12 to 18 months is a step forward but remains insufficient (Reco5.2). The cooperating partners with the status of a government agency or programme had some specific constraints (eg. weak decision-making power regarding potential integration into public policies; lack of synergy between national and local level). The responsiveness of the sub-offices was praised.

26. Five project coordinators came and went, weakening the project. The WFP's recent institutional change, from consultant status to a fixed-term contract in this post, meets the needs. There is good complementarity between the WFP (R4 expert) and the cooperating partners (technical and field experts) as well as between those deployed at community level and those based in Dakar, thereby reinforcing their skills. The sub-offices ensured good coordination with the partners. Three telephone operators were recruited due to a lack of prior diagnosis (Reco5.4).

27. The project does not have a dashboard for monitoring consolidated indicators (Reco6.1). The project did not harmonise the WFP's monitoring frameworks with those of the GCF and with the national system (Reco6.4). The indicators are not particularly oriented towards the changes made for the population (Reco6.2, Reco6.3). Relevant gender studies have been carried out.

28. The WFP largely lacked capitalisation and communication tools during the first three years of the project (out of a total duration of four years), due to limited resources, which affected the visibility of the evidence generated, hindering appropriation by the authorities and therefore dissemination and advocacy opportunities relating to social safety nets. (Reco1)

29. Climate information, support for village cereal banks in existing infrastructures, SfC groups, SfC federating EIGs and EIGs distributing insurance products are activities implemented by the project that could easily be scaled up at no (or low) additional cost (Reco2).

Impact, innovation (Reco2, Reco4)

30. The project has strengthened social cohesion and solidarity in the villages. It has strengthened the ability of men and women to work together, women's decision-making power and self-esteem while reducing the risk of conflict between farmers and herders. All contributing to strengthen adaptation to climate change, through a better ability to cooperate in the face of increasingly violent hazards as well as to reduce risks generated by climate change (herders forced to graze their herds on new lands).

31. The project has increased and diversified agricultural production, improving food and nutritional security. The "cash transfers" and "support for village cereal banks" activities have reduced the hunger gap. The government plans to incorporate certain elements of R4 into its next resilience strategy.

32. The project has had a positive economic impact on beneficiaries, enabling them to increase their income, improve their savings and investment capacity, reduce their expenditure and/or better manage their budget.

33. The rehabilitation of ponds and degraded land, the planting of trees and the introduction of protected areas have helped to increase biodiversity, rehabilitate the soil, improve rainwater management and encourage the natural regulation of areas.

34. The project is innovative in terms of the synergy of activities created around climate risk management, hybrid agricultural insurance, the provision of climate information in five local languages coupled with agricultural advice and associated with a voice server, and the involvement of men in the SfC funds.

Gender (Reco7)

35. A gender action plan was drawn up for 2021, but not all the planned activities could be carried out, due to time and resources constraints, somewhat limiting the impact of the interventions.

36. Female heads of household account for most cash transfer recipients. They are heavily involved in savings groups, but their access to insurance other than WFP subsidies remain limited, particularly as the insurance products on offer relate to cash crops, which are traditionally managed by men. It is also important to stress that, although rice farming is covered by insurance policies, this crop is often grown collectively or on very small areas, making individual cover of little relevance. Overall, however, the project includes and is of particular interest to women.

37. Women beneficiaries report an improvement in their living conditions and a strengthening of their community status thanks to the savings groups. The project nevertheless lacks specific impact indicators for women.

38. The specific needs of young people were not sufficiently studied or integrated into the project, despite the fact that these individuals represent a significant proportion of the population. People living with

disabilities were included through the household approach, but few cases were mentioned in the villages.

Sustainability / country ownership / replicability

39. The project has strengthened community dynamics, thereby fostering sustainability prospects, but remains fragile, mainly because the management committees receive too little support. Climate information and SfC groups offer good prospects for sustainability. The sustainability of agricultural insurance remains to be demonstrated, as subscribing to insurance is often perceived as a condition for accessing WFP aid. Furthermore, there is still a great deal of misunderstanding about the types of cover, the thresholds for triggering compensation, and other issues. Nothing can be said about village cereal banks.

40. The project was well received by the authorities (Reco2.1). However, the sustainability of the interventions could be compromised by the lack of an effective budget for the municipalities. The departmental monitoring committee, chaired by the prefect, has not been involved in monitoring the project. (Reco5.1)

41. Here are some of the key factors for success: a participatory, community-based approach, ongoing community outreach, a good understanding of the issues by the communities, interest in the activities and the simplicity of the techniques disseminated.

42. The R4 project is fully replicable and has already been replicated on several occasions (Reco2, Reco4).

3 - Conclusions

43. Conclusion 1: The relevance and coherence of the R4 project's approach are widely acknowledged. In addition, the project is recognised as incorporating several innovative interventions that are particularly interesting to study and promote (e.g. climate services, agricultural insurance). Scaling-up is recommended.

44. Conclusion 2: The R4 project has strengthened social cohesion within and between villages, improved food security for beneficiary households, diversified their sources of income and preserved part of their natural resources. All of which has contributed to strengthening their collective organization, their livelihoods, their natural resources (thus reducing risks of occurrence and impacts due to climate change). Conclusion 3: The WFP is recognised as an experienced key player in strengthening the climate resilience of vulnerable small-scale producers.

45. Conclusion 4: The project lacked communication and capitalisation on all its positive effects.

46. Conclusion 5: The R4 project lacked the foresight to plan for scaling-up in other regions beyond the project and also to ensure the sustainability of the project's interventions.

47. Conclusion 6: Despite the relevance of the approaches inherent to the R4 project model, it could still be improved in order to facilitate its appropriation, sustainability and orientations for change.

48. Conclusion 7: The project was very successful in surrounding itself with experienced cooperating partners but lacked integration with existing state dynamics. The WFP's administrative and financial procedures towards its cooperating partners also led to delays which had serious consequences such as delays in delivering activities not adapted anymore to the agricultural calendar.

49. Conclusion 8: The project's results framework lacked a focus on change and the monitoring indicators were often without perspective, several data inconsistencies were noted, and a steering table seems to have been missing.

50. Conclusion 9: There was a high turnover in the post of project coordinator, which destabilised the project. Although women are well represented in the WFP team, this is less the case in the teams of the cooperating partners.

51. Conclusion 10: The project largely incorporated the issue of gender into its activities.

52. Lessons learned

53. Good practices or lessons learned have been formulated to support subsequent deployments of the R4 project elsewhere in Senegal and in other countries. They are incorporated directly into the report by evaluation criterion at the end of each section. They cover the strengths deployed as part of this project as well as the shortcomings to be considered.

Recommendations

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Reco1: Improve knowledge management, make the most of the experience and evidence generated and share expertise in integrated climate risk management. (Conclusion4&5)
Reco1.1: Capitalise on the project Reco1.2: Develop a communication strategy Reco1.3: Share knowledge and feedback Reco1.4: Support national consultation frameworks relating to adaptation to climate change
Reco2: Scale-up the project in new areas of Senegal. (Conclusion1&2&3)
Reco2.1: Support the government in duplicating the project Reco2.2: Lobby donors Reco2.3: Strengthen the government's operational deployment tools Reco2.4: Anchor the R4 project within a Ministry
Reco3: Refine the R4 model to make it more responsive to ambitions for change. (Conclusion6)
Reco3.1: Develop the global approach to change Reco3.2: Further reflection on component 4 Reco3.3: Incorporate a "market" orientation Reco3.4: Strengthen the integration of youth and inclusion issues
Reco4: Replicate the R4 project in new countries. (Conclusion1&2&3)
Reco4.1: Lobby donors Reco4.2: Strengthen the skills of members of the relevant POs and ROs
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Reco5: Strengthen the quality of partnerships, reinforce their strategic and operational capacities and anticipate the sustainability of interventions. (Conclusion7)
Reco5.1: Enhance existing state institutional dynamics Reco5.2: Ensure that memoranda of understanding (duration, funding arrangements, programme content) do not hinder the progress of operations Reco5.3: Strengthen training for partners Reco5.4: Strengthen preliminary diagnostics
Reco6: Improve the quality of the S&E system by integrating tools that facilitate project management and are linked to national systems. (Conclusion8)
Reco6.1: Ensure the overall consistency of results frameworks Reco6.2: Ensure the relevance of output indicators Reco6.3: Define change-oriented outcome indicators Reco6.4: Ensure proper integration with the national S&E system
Reco7: Strengthen the integration of gender and inclusion issues to maximise the project's impact (conclusions 9&10)
Reco7.1: Include specific diagnostics at the planning stage Reco7.2: Set gender quotas for leadership and management positions in cooperating partners Reco7.3: Increase men's awareness of gender issues Reco7.4: Encourage the inclusion of people living with a disability Reco7.5: Develop clear indicators to measure gender impacts.

54. NB. Appendix 7 presents a map of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

1. Introduction

1.1. Characteristics of the evaluation

55. This decentralised evaluation report presents the results of the final evaluation of the World Food Programme (WFP) Green Climate Fund (GCF) project in Senegal titled " Building the climate resilience of food insecure smallholder farmers through integrated management of climate risks (R4)", which was implemented in five regions of Senegal (Kolda, Tambacounda, Kaffrine, Fatick and Kaolack) and eight departments (Kolda, Médina Yoro Foulah, Tambacounda, Koumpentoum, Goudiry, Kounghoul, Nioro du Rip, Fatick) over the period from January 2020 to October 2024 (end of project initially scheduled for January 2024, extended to October 2024 at no additional cost). The first year of the project covered the regions of Tambacounda and Kolda (previously targeted by the former R4 project), then each year included new localities in the new targeted regions (Fatick, Kounghoul and Nioro du Rip).

56. The evaluation covers this integrated risk management project as a whole, including risk reduction activities (component 1), risk transfer (component 2), risk reserves and prudent risk-taking (component 3) for beneficiaries and communities vulnerable to climate shocks, and enabling the Government of Senegal to incorporate climate, climate change adaptation (CCA) and climate risk management into its safety net and protection programmes (component 4). Table 1 provides a description of the activities included in each component.

57. The evaluation has two main objectives: accountability (to the donor, partners and beneficiaries) and learning (to draw lessons that will inform future R4 project rollouts, in Senegal or in other Country Offices). Particular attention has been paid to the dimensions of gender, women's empowerment and inclusion (see the summary of the terms of reference for the evaluation in appendix 1), with a dedicated evaluation question (EQ 6). These aspects were also central to defining the methodology and the choice of case studies (see appendices 2 and 12).

58. The stakeholders in this evaluation work are the direct beneficiaries of the activities: the communities, the WFP Country Office (CO) and Sub-office (SO) team, the cooperating partners (CP) based in Dakar or in the regions, the national and local authorities, the decentralised technical services (DTS) and the aid actors involved in the same domain (see list in Appendix 3).

59. The evaluation was carried out at the end of the project (October 2024) in order to help identify lessons for future deployments. The main user of this report is the CO, which will learn lessons from it in order to improve its next climate resilience programme as part of its Country Strategic Plan (CSP). The results of the evaluation could also provide the GCF to better align with Government National strategies on Climate Adaptation (eg. NAPs, NDCs etc..) and support in the achievement of National climate targets. The results could also provide certain United Nations partners, field operators and state partners with information enabling them to improve the alignment of WFP interventions with the objectives of national strategies and work towards a transfer of skills and sustainability of activities. The other WFP COs will also be able to use these results if they wish to deploy the R4 project and, more generally, to strengthen their programmes relating to climate risks.

60. The evaluation was commissioned by the CO. It was carried out by a four-member evaluation team (one national consultant and three international consultants, including two men and two women) with experience of evaluation, particularly with the WFP. The work was carried out by the IRAM international consultancy office. Quality assurance was provided by the CO and the WFP Regional Bureau (RB).

61. The evaluation work ran from the end of July 2024 (kick-off meeting on 26 July 2024) to the beginning of February 2025 (see detailed evaluation timetable and schedule of field activities in appendices 4 and 5). It is divided into three phases:

62. The TORs were produced by WFP⁸, which also selected the consulting firm. The inception phase (26 July - 30 September 2024), led to the production of an inception report validated by the CO and the RB.

63. The data collection phase (30 September to 16 October 2024) in Dakar and the five regions targeted by the project, culminating in a presentation by the ET of the initial results in Dakar to the WFP and its partners.

64. The report-writing phase (from 21 October 2024 to 4 March 2025), comprising the writing and submission of four versions of the evaluation report (revised by the CO, the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) and the GCF) and a remote presentation of the conclusions and recommendations. The report will be validated by the CO, the RO and the GCF and will be shared with the partners for information purposes.

65. At the end of the criteria analysis sections (relating to effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability), the evaluation report includes a list of good practices/lessons learned so that any COs and ROs planning to roll out the R4 project after this evaluation can benefit from this list and continue to develop qualitatively.

1.2. Context

66. Senegal is situated on the West African coast and covers an area of 196,712 km². It shares borders with Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Mauritania. The population is estimated at 18.2 million⁹, unequally distributed between the regions: 23% live in the Dakar region and 60% in rural areas. Senegal's population is young (half are under 18).

67. **Politically**, although the country is considered to be one of the most stable on the continent, it went through a period of turmoil from 2021 to 2024, leading to the resignation of incumbent President Macky Sall (elected in 2012 and re-elected in 2019) and the election of Bassirou Diomaye Faye, the incumbent's main opponent.

68. **On the social front**, the country's stability and strong democratic background have a positive impact on its image with development partners. Gender inequality is a major concern. Since 2006, the country has implemented a National Strategy for Gender Equity and Equality (SNEEG II), which aims to incorporate gender equality into various sectors of activity. Women's access to education is lower than that of men, as is their participation in the labour market¹⁰, they have little access to factors of production (e.g. agricultural land, services) and are poorly integrated into decision-making systems (e.g. families, socio-professional organisations, communities, local government).

69. **Economically**, Senegal is a lower middle-income country¹¹ with a gross national income per capita of USD 1,640 in 2022 and a gross domestic product (GDP) of USD 27.68 billion in 2023, according to the World Bank. GDP growth in 2022 was 4.2%, with the primary agricultural sector contributing around 15.2%. For 75% of farmers, the area farmed varies between 1 and 5 hectares and the main crops grown are groundnuts, millet, rice and maize¹². COVID-19 had a depressing effect on economic growth, but the government's efforts through the Economic and Social Resilience Programme (PRES) facilitated recovery¹³. Barrier measures were introduced by the government to limit the health crisis, which necessarily had an impact on the implementation of the project¹⁴. Both COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine led to an increase in the price of basic foodstuffs, impacting vulnerable rural populations.

70. **In terms of food and nutritional security (FNS)**, Senegal displayed a moderate level of hunger in

⁸ The TORs were not shared with the GCF, based on WFP's understanding of GCF's Evaluation Operational Procedures and Guidelines (page 20), this step is optional.

⁹ Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie.2023: "RGPH-5" - "Senegal in brief".

¹⁰ Luxembourg Development Agency, 2021, "Gender equality in Senegal".

¹¹ Republic of Senegal. Ministry of Finance and Budget. <https://www.finances.gouv.sn/classementsnbm/>

¹² World Bank 2023, "SENEGAL ECONOMIC UPDATE 2023: Addressing the needs of vulnerable groups for national development".

¹³ World Bank 2023, "SENEGAL ECONOMIC UPDATE 2023: Addressing the needs of vulnerable groups for national development".

¹⁴ PAM. Minutes of the first meeting of the R4 project Steering Committee (COPIL). September 2020

2021 (GHI - Global Hunger Index) and the prevalence of undernourishment fell considerably, from 17.2% between 2004 and 2006 to 7.5% between 2018 and 2020. However, child malnutrition remains high: in 2020, 17.2% of children under the age of 5 suffered from stunted growth and 8.1% from emaciation¹⁵. Treating chronic malnutrition is made more difficult by the uneven distribution of infrastructures and health personnel, to the detriment of endemic areas that are often rural and isolated.

71. Microfinance plays a key role in **the financial inclusion of rural communities**. Decentralised financial systems (SFD) in Senegal will have grown by 10% by 2022. Of the savings mobilised by the SFDs, 43.4% are allocated to men, 22.2% to women and 34.4% to groups, and the rate of portfolio deterioration has also fallen to 8.4%¹⁶. It should be noted, however, that financial services for the population, particularly in rural areas, suffer from shortcomings or inadequacies that are detrimental to the economic initiatives of rural people, particularly women.

72. **In terms of climate**, Senegal is ranked 70th out of 182 countries in the Global Climate Risk Index¹⁷. It is vulnerable to droughts, irregular rainfall and disruptions to agricultural calendars, locusts, floods and related health risks, rising sea levels, coastal erosion and bush fires. The effects of climate change exacerbate food insecurity and the vulnerability of poor households. This situation is even more worrying given that Senegal's economy and most of its population depend largely on sectors and activities that are sensitive to CC. The populations of the eastern groundnut basin and the Casamance region are among those most affected. Adaptation to climate change (ACC) is therefore becoming a vital issue, and strengthening the climate resilience of small-scale farmers has become a priority challenge for the country through effective management of climate risks.

73. **In terms of equity and gender**, many inequalities persist in various sectors. For example, only 11.1% of adult women have reached at least secondary education, compared with 21.4% of men, while participation in the labour market is 35.2% for women and 58.6% for men. Access to land, financing mechanisms, extension services and other factors of production, as well as the impacts of CC, remain the main challenges to women's empowerment.

74. The country has **related strategies and policies**, such as the National Food Security and Resilience Strategy (SNSAR 2015-2035), the Agricultural and Livestock Guidance Act (LOASP-2004), the National Determined Contribution (NDC), the National Action Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (PANA 2006), the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS 2005-2015 ; 2015-2035), the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE, 2012-2035), the National Gender Equity and Equality Strategy (SNEEG 2015-2026) and the National Nutrition Development Policy (PNND 2015-2025).

75. **A second national review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Senegal** was carried out in 2022. It highlighted progress on the social front, such as growth averaging 6% per year since 2015, one of the highest levels in sub-Saharan Africa; a fall in extreme poverty from 12.2% in 2011 to 6.8% in 2018, the lowest rate in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); and a decline in food insecurity. It also pointed to major persistent challenges, particularly the need to strengthen resilience in the face of rising energy and food prices by seeking to mobilise financing and investment and increase the capacity to mobilise domestic resources.

76. **In terms of the operational deployment of the R4 project**, this project follows an initial project implemented between 2012 and 2015 by Oxfam America and the WFP during a pilot phase in the regions of Tambacounda and Kolda. Although the project that concerns us here has been closed since October 2024, discussions are underway between the WFP and the Great Green Wall project in Senegal with a view to incorporating its model and the approaches that underpin it into the roll-out of the reforestation project covering an area of 700 ha in the Ferlo area, for which a partnership was recently signed between the WFP and the Great Green Wall project. The R4 project also complements the project financed by the MasterCard foundation and deployed in the same areas by the WFP, as well as several national programmes (PADAER), the Adaptive Social Protection Programme in the Sahel funded by the World Bank, and several initiatives

15 Welt Hunger Hilfe, 2023, "World Hunger Index".

16 SFD Regulation and Supervision Department (DRS) 2023, "2022 consolidated data".

17 Global Climate Risk Index, 2021.

supported by the UNDP and UN Women.

1.3. Subject of the evaluation

77. The Rural Resilience Initiative (R4 project) is the product of a strategic collaboration between the WFP and OXFAM America. Initially launched in Ethiopia, the project model subsequently evolved to include all 4 components and was first tested in this form in Senegal before being extended to other countries. It is an innovative, systemic approach to integrated climate risk management. The project aims to help smallholders reduce their vulnerability to the effects of climate change through an integrated system of tools enabling them to respond rapidly to climate shocks. Evidence from phase 1 (pilot phase) of the R4 project in Senegal between 2012 and 2015⁷ showed that WFP farmers involved in R4 were able to i) improve their food security compared to farmers living in the same area and exposed to the same shocks, ii) increase their rice production ten times more than non-participants and iii) strengthen social cohesion as well as women's decision-making capacity. Senegal's SPP Resilience Programme is an extension of the R4 initiative, funded by the GCF. From 2020, the project was implemented in the same towns as the previous pilot phase (Kolda, Médina Yoro Foulah, Koumpentoum, Tambacounda and Goudiry), with the same partners and the same participants (12,000 beneficiaries), to consolidate results and impacts from phase 1. From 2021, the project was extended to new areas (8,000 additional beneficiaries in Fatick, Koungeul and Nioro du Rip).

78. The project's **strategic paradigm shift objective** is increased sustainable development that is resilient to climate change. Overall, the project contributes to strengthening the adaptive capacity and resilience of vulnerable farmers, a key priority for the Government of Senegal.

79. **The overall objective of the project** is to improve the food security and incomes of 405,000 people from vulnerable smallholder households, including households headed by women/widows/daughters in the regions of Kaffrine, Kolda, Tambacounda, Fatick and Kaolack in Senegal, by strengthening their resilience in the face of increasingly difficult situations and recurrent climate shocks while adapting to the adverse effects of climate change.

80. The project aims to have a direct impact on two (of the four) **GCF Strategic Outcome areas for adaptation**, namely: increased resilience of health, water and food security and increased resilience of people's and communities' livelihoods.

81. The project is based on an **integrated approach**, combining rural development and climate disaster risk management. It is organised around four components and six outputs, each of which incorporates several of the activities described below:

Table 1: Summary logical framework

C1 - Risk reduction	Output 1.1: Training of farmers on innovative, climate-smart agricultural practices and support of community-based disaster risk reduction assets, such as water and soil conservation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activity 1.1.1: Seasonal Livelihoods and Community-Based Participatory Planning (SLCBPP) - Activity 1.1.2: Training on assets creation and Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) and dissemination of Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) good practices - Activity 1.1.3: Assets creation that reduce the impacts of climate change and help households to adapt to the effects of CC built or rehabilitated
	Output 1.2: Provision of climate services, enabling farmers to access reliable climate information via their mobile phones and radio programs, as well as advisory services.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activity 1.2.1: Training on climate services - Activity 1.2.2: Delivery of climate information

C2 – Risk transfer	Output 2.1: WFP, in partnership with the local agricultural insurance company, Compagnie Nationale d'Assurance Agricole du Sénégal (CNAAS), provides smallholders with Weather Index Insurance (WII).	- Activity 2.1.1: Index design - Activity 2.1.2: Insurance policy delivery and enrolment - Activity 2.1.3: End of the season assessment and payouts
C3 - Risk reserve and prudent risk-taking	Output 3.1: WFP, in partnership with OXFAM America, supports vulnerable rural populations in building up savings and accessing small loans through the Savings for Change (SfC)	- Activity 3.1.1: Recruitment and training of field teams for savings groups. - Activity 3.1.2: Formation and training of savings groups
	Output 3.2: During good years, farmers have the opportunity to store their surplus production in WFP Village Cereal Banks (VCBs) and use their stocks as warranty to receive credit from Savings for Change groups. ¹⁸	Activity 3.2.1: Create favourable conditions to make VCB creditworthy ¹⁹ . This activity has been replaced by the establishment of VCBs and the strengthening of management capacities. ²⁰
C4 - Enabling the Government of Senegal to mainstream climate change adaptation and climate risk management into its safety net and protection programmes	Output 4.1: Build national capacities to scale-up rural resilience and adaptation measures linked to national social protection programmes, supporting the government to implement its adaptation actions and reinforce national capacities.	- Activity 4.1.1: Capacity building of national and local government Activity 4.1.2: Integration of climate risk management tools in government safety net

82. The project takes **gender, equity and social inclusion** dimensions into account, with project documents stating that at least 50% of the interventions must benefit women. According to the communities, they are the main people mobilised by the project. In addition, women are involved in selecting beneficiaries, choosing community assets to be rehabilitated and building these assets; barriers to accessing financial and climate services are reduced for women (savings, credit, climate services and information); a gender action plan was developed as well as gender monitoring indicators and qualitative gender studies.

83. **The project was extended from January 2024 to October 2024** at no additional cost, in order to complete the construction of the VCDs defined during the project. This meant that the entire budget could be spent. The table below shows expenditure by year between 2020 and 2023.

¹⁸ Originally Output 3.2 was called “During good years, farmers have the opportunity to store their surplus production in WFP Village Cereal Banks (“VCBs”) and use their stocks as collateral to receive credit from local Micro Finance Institutions (“MFIs”)”. The Output was renamed following a restructuring proposal (Side Letter No.1 to the FFA, 2 June 2023, DMA/2023/139)

¹⁹ This project activity was modified during implementation. It was replaced by the establishment of village cereal banks and the strengthening of existing structures, where appropriate.

²⁰ Originally Activity 3.2.1 was called “set up and roll out of warrantage systems”. The Activity was renamed following a restructuring proposal (Side Letter No.1 to the FFA, 2 June 2023, DMA/2023/139)

Table 2: Financial resources by year²¹

	2020	2021	2022	2023	TOTAL
Initial budget (USD)	2,495,900	2,415,917	2,519,897	2,551,806	9,983,521
Revised budget (USD)	2,495,900	2,415,917	2,519,897	2,187,614	9,619,328
Actual budget (USD)	2,495,900	2,415,917	2,519,897	2,187,614	7,431,714

Source: ET based on the FLA

84. **The total budget amount spent** by the project is USD 9,623, 172, that also includes 3,844 USD from the remediation grant. This corresponds to the revised budget. The revision during the project slightly modified the allocated budget. At the end of the project, two extensions were accepted at no additional cost, mainly due to delays in completing the VCBs. The budget can be broken down as follows:

Table 3: Budget breakdown by year (USD)²²

	2020	2021	2022	2023	Total
C1	1,291,549	1,253,721	1,252,848	1,216,679	5,014,797
C2	582,787	545,397	601,676	601,666	2,331,526
C3	340,124	357,484	415,009	470,705	1,583,322
C4	100,162	75,911	64,807	75,021	315,901

Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023


85. The aim of the project was to target 405,000 individuals **as direct beneficiaries**, but it reached 438,291, thereby exceeding the target. However, the project adopted a household approach, i.e. the households and not the beneficiaries were selected and received the package of activities (C1, C2, C3 - except for the VCBs, which are community-based), each household being free to position the individuals that make up the household according to each person's interests and availability. The project planned to reach 27,000 households, i.e. an estimate of 9 members per household compared with 405,000. However, the assumptions underlying this correlation between the number of households and the number of direct beneficiaries reached were not explained, and we question the fact that all members of the targeted households were considered to be direct beneficiaries. It would therefore be more appropriate to speak of households targeted / reached rather than direct beneficiaries targeted / reached. In addition, the number of women expected to be reached by the end of the project was set at 202,500, i.e. an estimated 50% of women beneficiaries. However, the communities indicated that the project was most often considered to target women, who benefited most from the activities due to their greater interest and involvement in the project. The data available shows how the number of direct beneficiaries changed over the years, but the basis for these figures raises questions. The same graph exists for the number of direct female beneficiaries, but it

²¹ This table does not consider the final data for 2024 as these were not available during the evaluation mission and the drafting of the evaluation report (4th quarter 2024).

²² This table does not consider the final data for 2024 as these were not available during the evaluation mission and the drafting of the evaluation report (4th quarter 2024). Final data will be integrated when the CO has transmitted them to the evaluation team.

shows the same figures simply divided by two.

Figure 1: Number of direct beneficiaries reached by the project between 2020 and 2023



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

86. There is no added value in analysing the number of beneficiaries per year and per component, insofar as the household approach means that each household benefits identically from each component, so the graph would be identical to that of the number of direct beneficiaries.

1.4. Evaluation methodology, limitations and ethical considerations

87. The **evaluation matrix** (see appendix 6) presents all the evaluation questions (EQs) developed by the ET and then validated with the CO and RB during the inception phase. It is based on the 12 evaluation criteria defined by the GCF (as mentioned in the ToR for this evaluation) and the associated sub-questions, as well as the 6 OECD/DAF evaluation criteria. In the interests of simplification and therefore greater visibility, the matrix has retained 7 evaluation criteria, based on the 6 OECD/DAF criteria and incorporating all the other EQs defined by the GCF, to which a specific criterion on gender (defined by the GCF) has been added, even though gender is also incorporated into all the criteria. The matrix shows the titles of these 7 EQs, the references to the EQs proposed by the GCF, and all the associated sub-questions.

88. The methodology as applied by the ET is explained in detail in Appendix 2. Particularly, this appendix describes the changes proposed by the ET in relation to the ToR, as well as the justification for the sampling and analysis methods. The ET used a **mixed-methods approach to data collection in order to ensure a good triangulation of information**, combining different data collection tools and interview techniques, as well as quantitative and qualitative data, as summarised in the table below and presented in detail in Appendix 2. By way of example, we can cite data collected during interviews with cooperating partners which are cross-referenced with data collected during focus groups and with data observed in the field.

Table 4: Methodological approach to the data collection phase

Interviews with key informants	Focus groups and individual interviews with local people	Direct observations in the field	Case studies
<p>Interviews with resource persons at national, regional and local level (see appendix 3):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional and Country Offices: 13 interviews / 14 people (5 women / 9 men) Sub-offices: 6 interviews / 8 people (3 women / 5 men) Other national institutions (central level): 2 interviews / 2 people (1 woman / 1 man) Local authorities (rural communes) and decentralised institutions: 17 interviews / 19 people (19 men) Cooperating partners: 16 interviews / 11 partners / 28 people (4 women / 24 men) Partner agencies of the United Nations system - UNS (Dakar): 3 interviews / 4 people (4 men) 	<p>Focus group (FGD) or individual interviews with beneficiaries, support structures and community leaders:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> C1/C2/C3 beneficiaries: SfC & EIG groups, management committees for developed sites and VCBs, agricultural insurance, climate information: 39 regional FGDs Community relays, cooperating partners (facilitators, coordinators): 24 interviews (5 women / 19 men) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Market garden areas: 7 Lowland: 1 Rice paddies: 7 Stone cordons: 8 Zai and half-moons: 1 Pastoral ponds: 3 Reforestation sites: 2 Village cereal banks: 4 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beneficiaries / committee chairs, community relays (6 women, 2 men)

Source: ET

Ethical considerations, risk management and Evaluation limits

89. The evaluation process **complied with WFP and United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) requirements**. Evaluation contractors were responsible for safeguarding and ensuring ethical considerations at all stages of the evaluation cycle. Particularly, the ET ensured i) that the participants fully understood the purpose of the evaluation and gave their free and informed consent, ii) that the testimonies and data collected were anonymised, iii) that the data collected was robust by triangulating the information in an evidence matrix. The ET also ensured the participation of all beneficiary groups, including women, and adapted the methods/timing of the interviews to cultural and religious particularities.


Table 5 : Limitations encountered during the Evaluation and mitigation measures

Limits	Description	Mitigation measures and/or type of support required
Physical access in remote areas	The state of the roads made access to certain areas difficult, especially given the size of the intervention areas and the time available for the mission.	Rearrangements were made, in collaboration with WFP's SOs, in order to prioritise the most accessible sites and reduce transport times as much as possible, without compromising the initially planned work schedule.
Limited availability of high-level resources and staff turnover	The available contacts, particularly among the decentralised government agencies interviewed, were not always the focal points responsible for monitoring operations with the WFP and were unable to provide the ET with accurate information. The replacement of many managers within decentralised government institutions and town halls led to a loss of institutional memory and reduced the quality of the information collected.	Maintaining close communication between the ET and the SOs, as well as fully mobilising the cooperating partners to inform the stakeholders well in advance that the team would be arriving maximised their availability. Two interviews with resource persons took place remotely, after the return from the mission. In order to reduce the impact of the loss of institutional memory, the ET sought the participation of other (village) members of the PCPs.

Limits	Description	Mitigation measures and/or type of support required
Focus group with a large number of beneficiaries	Group meetings with beneficiaries were sometimes held with more than 20 people (in almost one meeting out of two), without the ET having any control over the number of participants, which meant that data collection was not optimal.	The ET tried to share the floor fairly among the participants, paying particular attention to the opinions of women and young people. The methodology deployed, which combined different tools and sources of information, guaranteed a satisfactory level of validity of the results, despite these few difficulties.
Biases in the reconstruction of the Theory of Change (ToC)	The ToC was a key element of the evaluation framework for testing the quality of programme implementation. A ToC had been developed at the time the project was formulated, but it did not highlight the four components of the project, and did not have associated assumptions and context analyses. A ToC was drawn up a posteriori by the ET (see below), but this was not the subject of a co-construction workshop with the CO due to a lack of relevance (project completed and low level of ownership of this tool by the CO).	An initial version of the ToC was developed by the ET to highlight the 4 components of the project (which the version of the shared ToC did not). It was quickly presented to some of the CO's key personnel for feedback. In addition, the ET paid particular attention to the measurement of change, in all the components of the project, identifying the actors of change and reconstructing the trajectories of change with the beneficiaries interviewed.
Data availability	Project data for 2024 was not available, nor were a large number of capitalisation documents.	The ET carried out a review of the documentation and data made available during the inception phase. The list of missing documents and data was added to as the interviews/briefings progressed and would continue to be added to until the data collection phase. The ET clearly stated in the report when the data was incomplete, or when there were doubts about its reliability.

Source: ET

Figure 2: ToC reconstituted by the ET



Source: ET

The initial **work plan**, in terms of regions/departments sampled and number of sites visited, was adhered to. The criteria used for the sampling were as follows: i) the existence of a significant volume of activities; ii) the diversity of operational partners; iii) where applicable, conflict situations that may have had an impact on WFP interventions; and iv) areas with a particularly positive impact or practices with a high potential for replicability. This report is structured according to the seven evaluation questions, one per section. Each evaluation sub-question is summarised in a box at the beginning of the sub-section (in brown). Good practices/lessons learned for future deployment are also proposed throughout the text, in dedicated boxes. The good practices/lessons learned concern operational aspects and have been formalised for the criteria of effectiveness/efficiency/gender/sustainability. They constitute a list of good practices for other COs wishing to deploy R4 in the future.

2. Findings of the Evaluation

2.1. To what extent is the project based on national guidelines and the needs of vulnerable populations, and has it been built based on a clear and appropriate concept and resources? - RELEVANCE (EQ1)

2.1.1 Relevance to national priorities and strategies

90. All the stakeholders interviewed confirmed that the project was well aligned with national priorities and strategies in terms of food and nutrition security (FNS), adaptation to climate change, territorialisation of public policies, gender equality, social protection and financial inclusion. (Reco2)

91. In fact, the project was well aligned with the reference framework for economic and social policy in the medium and long term: the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE) drawn up in 2014, which sets out a vision of development for 2035, namely "an emerging Senegal in 2035 with a society based on solidarity and the rule of law", and focuses on (i) creating wealth and jobs, (ii) strengthening governance, (iii) developing strategic sectors (including an efficient and resilient agricultural and agri-food sector), which will have a significant impact on improving the well-being of the population, particularly by protecting vulnerable groups and guaranteeing access to essential services.

92. In this context, the project has made a significant contribution to:

93. The objectives of the main national strategic documents relating to **adaptation to climate change** (ACC), particularly i) the contribution determined at national level (CDN, 2020), which constitutes Senegal's commitment under the 2015 Paris Agreement, and ii) the Letter of Policy for the Environment, Sustainable Development and Ecological Transition (LPSEDDTE) 2022-2026, in which Senegal expresses its commitment in these areas. These two policies reflect the country's commitment to resilient, low-emission development models. The project contributed to these policies by strengthening the resilience of vulnerable households and communities, preserving productive resources through the watershed approach and rehabilitating community dynamics for managing common resources. The activities promoted include assisted natural regeneration (ANR), agro-climatic information, good farming practices including organic fertility management, the intensive rice-growing system (IRS), water and soil conservation and soil defence and restoration in the valleys and the rehabilitation of ponds, which contribute to the rehabilitation of ecosystems, raising community awareness and empowering women. The agricultural insurance programme also met the country's adaptation objectives, particularly those of the CDN.

94. The objectives of the **National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS 2015-2035)**, which sets out the country's vision and direction for social protection through its three pillars: the contributory system, the non-contributory system and the mixed system. The rationale of the project covers all the components of the social protection strategy, from assistance (cash transfers, support for resilience) to insurance and prevention (agricultural insurance, support for storage, support for savings). The project contributed to this adaptive social protection strategy, particularly through specific objective 5 entitled "Strengthening community resilience to shocks and disasters", which corresponds to Senegal's vision of adaptive social protection in the face of shocks. The project's achievements include i) greater economic power among women (e.g. income-generating activities, culture of productive savings, etc.) to improve their access to basic social services, (e.g. health, education), ii) facilitation of the creation of productive assets for vulnerable households, iii) development of the culture of agricultural insurance which strengthens the resilience of vulnerable households; iv) non-contributory transfers in support of highly vulnerable households; v) the promotion of local stocks through VCBs; vi) improved availability of animal drinking water via the rehabilitation of pastoral ponds; vii) the protection of human habitats through the installation of specific structures (gabions/stone barriers). The preliminary results of the project have already demonstrated its relevance to the commitments made by the State, which plans to extend the R4 programme "to ensure the scaling up of a flagship rural resilience programme combining four risk management strategies (R4 programme)" (SNPS 2015-2035, page 50).

95. The objectives of the **National Strategy for Food Security and Resilience (SNSAR-2015 - 2035)** and the **National Nutrition Development Policy (PNDN 2015-2025)** include strengthening food availability and accessibility, improving people's nutritional status and developing multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral approaches. The project has contributed to this by i) strengthening the productive capacity of communities (reclaiming degraded land and increasing the production capacity of existing arable land, boosting rice production) and of women (savings for change - SfC, mostly invested in the production of wealth in food systems), ii) promoting the community participatory approach (CPA) conducive to the development of "resilient terroirs"; iii) securing food production through agricultural insurance; iv) improving women's and children's access to community care by increasing women's economic power; and v) strengthening food reserves through village cereal banks.

96. The objectives of gender equality policies through the **National Strategy for Gender Equity and Equality II (SNEEG2 2016-2026)** as a means of achieving gender equality and equity together with sustainable development in Senegal. The project has contributed to this policy through i) the massive empowerment of women, especially in economic terms; ii) the change in perception of women, whose productive roles are more widely recognised by communities; iii) the strengthening of social cohesion within households and communities; iv) the emergence of a female elite capable of leading the fight for gender equality.

97. To the objectives of **decentralisation policies and strategies** through Act no. 2013-10 of 28 December 2013 relating to the General Code of Local Authorities (Act 3 of decentralisation), focusses on an economic approach by aiming to organise Senegal into "territories that are viable, competitive and conducive to sustainable development". The territorialisation of public policies under Act 3 of decentralisation means that local authorities are taking greater responsibility for driving endogenous development. In this respect, the project has contributed by promoting the CPA as a lever for the development of local and regional development dynamics.

98. The orientations of the national strategy for financial inclusion (2022-2026), which targets rural populations and seeks, through two of its four strategic axes, to promote adapted financial services and to improve the financial culture. The project was aligned with this strategy by helping to i) develop, via the SfC groups, a savings and credit culture among rural populations, particularly women, ii) strengthen the culture of agricultural insurance, iii) strengthen women's entrepreneurial spirit via the credit provided by the SfC groups. In addition, by facilitating the grouping of SfC groups into EIGEIGs, the project has contributed, in part, to the formalisation of financial services.

Overall, the project results are a solid foundation for the achievement of the NDC. Indeed, it is noted that the project offers a wide range of social (taking into account the nexus of women, youth, social inclusion, social safety nets and climate change), organizational (community dynamics and natural resource management), economic (risk transfer, food security, poverty) and environmental (ecosystem rehabilitation, development of good agricultural practices such as SRI and organic amendments, fight against water erosion) evidence which shows that scaling up the 4R pillars will have significant effects on achieving the NDC commitments both from the point of view of the multi-actor and multi-dimensional approach and the proposed gender-sensitive adaptation measures.

2.1.2 Relevance to beneficiaries' needs

98. The project was able to adapt its interventions to local needs thanks to the lessons learned from the pilot phase (2013-2015) and the involvement of beneficiaries in participatory community plans. However, despite the relevance of the activities in terms of climate resilience and financial inclusion, the adequacy of the amounts of the transfers in relation the real needs of households remained insufficiently evaluated, especially in the face of rising food prices. (Reco2, Reco4)

99. The project under evaluation draws its relevance from the lessons learned from the **R4 pilot phase** carried out in the Tambacounda and Kolda regions between 2013 and 2015. This first stage was essential in refining our understanding of the real needs of beneficiaries, thereby enabling us to find ways of adapting the interventions to specific local circumstances. By collecting field data on beneficiary households, the pilot phase helped identify priorities and adjust deployment strategies and activities.

100. **The household approach** must also allow for differences in needs and priorities within households,

particularly between members according to their gender, age and role in the family. The 2017 gender diagnosis²³ sets out the specific needs of women in terms of access to agricultural inputs, financial inclusion and relief from the burden of reproductive tasks to invest in IGAs, but remains relatively undocumented, with no specific analysis by region.

101. **The WFP's 3-pronged approach** (3PA) enabled a specific analysis of opportunities and needs at different levels, and particularly with regard to beneficiaries through participatory community planning (15 PCPs carried out in the 5 target regions), from which most of the project's activities derive. The expression of the needs of households according to their level of income, as well as the needs of specific groups including young people and women, is the focus of the first part of the diagnosis, which then leads to concrete proposals for activities. The result is a diverse range of agricultural assets that are well suited to local constraints. The project is generally considered by the beneficiaries to respond well to their priorities in terms of CC and FNS.

102. The project's **objectives and expected results** were relevant and realistic in relation to the context. Capacity building in terms of learning and applying CSA techniques, market gardening and the use of climate information in agricultural decision-making is highly relevant to supporting small-scale farmers on the road to resilience in the face of CC.

103. It is difficult to assess whether the **amounts of the transfers** meet the needs of the target groups. Conditional transfer depend on the number of days of work and the amount is based on the daily labour cost of a worker in Senegal (1450 FCFA per day). During implementation, the amounts initially defined were not revalued to take account of the increase in food prices on the market. However, according to the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie - ANSD (2023), the price index for "food products and non-alcoholic beverages" in Senegal rose by 40 points between 2020 and 2023.

104. Activities to support the creation of **savings and credit groups** were particularly relevant in the target areas, where financial inclusion remained low, and people needed access to credit to support agricultural campaigns or create IGAs. These groups and the training they received strengthened the financial autonomy of their members (mainly women) and, by extension, helped reduce the vulnerability of households, while enhancing their ability to cope with climatic and economic hazards.

2.1.3 Relevance of the institutional base

105. The institutional base of the project was partly relevant, but the operational dimension of this base was lacking, and several public institutions did not support the legitimacy of this base. (Reco2.4)

106. While not foreseen at the outset of the project, the institutional base of the project at the level of the Executive Secretariat of the National Food Security Council (**SE/CNSA**) **had the following main advantages:** i) it was under the supervision of the Prime Minister, who had the necessary authority to mobilise all the sectoral ministries concerned by the project, thus ensuring a high degree of cross-sectoral coordination; ii) it had national prerogatives in the area of food security and the multi-sectoral composition of the CNSA, enabling it to provide institutional support for the project for the benefit of all stakeholders.

107. However, it should be noted that the choice of anchoring the project within the SE/CNSA was contested by a number of institutions, due to the cumbersome nature of anchoring it at the level of the Prime Minister's Office, and also because the SE/CNSA did not seem to adopt the project's approach; its role seems to have been more ceremonial than providing real steering, with a **lack of involvement in the operational implementation** of the project. Anchoring at the level of a sectoral Ministry, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture (Direction of Agriculture) and Ministry of Environment (Direction of Environment), was expected

²³ GCF. September 2017. Building the climate resilience of food-insecure smallholder farmers through integrated management of climate risk (R4). Senegal | WFP | B.18/04

from the FAA and latter recommended in the mid-term evaluation. It would have facilitated the mobilisation of the decentralised structures attached to it and would have enabled better coordination with the other programmes relating to this sector.

2.1.4 Relevance of the project design

108. The household-centred approach proved effective in strengthening household resilience, but showed its limitations in terms of community resilience, requiring collective capacity building in the face of shocks. The abandonment of the warrantage activity, in the absence of an upstream financial diagnosis, illustrated shortcomings in strategic planning, leading to a late revision of the logical framework. Finally, the project suffered from inadequate monitoring of impact and sustainable change indicators, limiting accurate evaluation of its real effects on beneficiaries.

109. **The household approach** was particularly relevant to building community resilience by addressing needs and vulnerabilities at a fundamental level. By targeting the household as the unit of intervention, the project made it possible to better identify internal dynamics, particularly in terms of resource management, decision-making and the sharing of responsibilities. By acting directly at household level, the household approach also encouraged greater ownership of activities and better integration of resilient practices into families' daily lives.

110. Although households are the foundation of community development, acting solely at this level is insufficient to ensure community resilience. The impact evaluation of the pilot phase of the R4 programme²⁴ revealed shortcomings in this respect, showing that while the programme helped households reduce their risks, it would have benefited from strengthening the capacity for collective response to emergencies. The report states that despite progress in organisation and solidarity, community resilience remains insufficient due to the lack of mechanisms for collective responses to unforeseen shocks. Although recommended integration of the **organisational and collective dimension** was not fully integrated into the R42020-2024 R4 project or into the WFP's partnership strategy.

111. **The strategy of graduation** through a staggered deployment over time aimed to reinforce the achievements of the R4 model, particularly in terms of geographical coverage and number of beneficiaries, while facilitating the gradual strengthening of partnerships. This approach effectively enabled the project's achievements to be consolidated and the CPs to gradually gain momentum (ownership of the mandate, deployment of activities). However, the roll-out in the final year of the project did not enable the new beneficiaries to take full ownership of the activities, due to a lack of support and time to familiarise themselves with these activities.

112. The activities of **components C1, C2 and C3** showed strong complementarity, with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness and coherence of interventions across different dimensions of the project. However, the market-centred economic approach was not sufficiently integrated into the R4 model, thereby limiting the opportunities for strengthening value chains and economic empowerment of beneficiaries. **Component C4** played a cross-cutting role by supporting the activities of components C1, C2 and C3, making it an essential lever for the sustainability of actions. It consolidated the achievements of the other components, ensuring continuity of impact beyond the end of the project.

113. **The project's logical framework underwent** a major revision in 2022-2023, when the warrantage activity was replaced by the VCB support activity. The gender indicators were also strengthened in 2021 through the development of a specific logical framework. The project's logical framework evolved over the course of implementation, with several indicators initially tracked eventually being dropped. This was partly due to a revision of the CSP's monitoring system, linked to the 4R project, which made the alignment between ACRs and APRs sometimes difficult to achieve. Moreover, gender-related indicators were not integrated into the overall logical framework, resulting in the need to navigate multiple monitoring and evaluation systems. As a result, while narrative reports provided comprehensive information, tracking progress against the logical

²⁴ WFP, Oxfam, Dalberg, June 2015. Impact evaluation of the R4 programme for rural resilience in Senegal.

framework proved challenging due to changes in reference indicators during implementation, as well as shifts in planned activities (e.g., moving from warrantage to VSLAs). Additionally, few outcome-level indicators were included in the logframe, which primarily focused on activity implementation rather than measuring impact.

114. **The theory of change** developed at the start of the project was not particularly suited to the Senegalese context. Indeed, it was more of a general theory of change, the assumptions and external factors of which had not been explicitly defined for the local context. This tool was not used during implementation, which is regrettable for a project that is supposed to initiate significant change-oriented transformations. This lack of appropriation of the theory of change also seems to be linked to the lack of change indicators in the project's logical framework, limiting the precise measurement of its transformative impacts.

115. **Project funding** did not seem to be a hindrance to the development of activities. A priori, there was a good match between the funding and the expected results.

2.1.5 Relevance of coverage/targeting

116. The strategy of gradual targeting made it possible to consolidate the increased skills of partners and the achievements of beneficiaries. The regions, departments and communes targeted were based on several criteria, including vulnerability to food insecurity and climatic shocks, the distribution of aid and development opportunities. By selecting a single department from three separate regions, the risk of dispersal was highlighted. Beneficiaries were targeted by communities in a participatory and inclusive way, making the most of pre-existing targeting mechanisms. The list of beneficiaries was well recognised and validated by the local population, the administrative authorities, the cooperating partners and the WFP.

117. **The territories were selected on** the basis of several criteria: i) the former R4 sites from phase 1 were included; ii) the level of food and nutritional insecurity was analysed on the basis of the results of the harmonised framework; iii) the results of the prospecting and identification mission carried out in October 2020 on the potential and existence of organisational infrastructures in the various municipalities of the targeted regions for carrying out FFA activities; and iv) the presence or absence of potential cooperating partners. Each of the three new regions had a single department covered by the project, a low number that includes a risk of dispersal, especially as no approach was adopted to increase the number of interventions and thus ensure that deployment in one department benefited all the others in the same region.

118. **The municipalities in the departments were selected** on the basis of seasonal livelihoods-based programming (SLP), which followed on from the integrated analysis of shocks and trends conducted at national level. It was also based on a number of criteria, including: i) household size of more than 50²⁵; ii) farming as the main economic activity of households; iii) a high level of food insecurity confirmed by studies and administrative authorities (mayors); iv) limited aid from social programmes or non-governmental organisations (NGOs); v) past or present existence of savings and credit group initiatives; vi) coverage by an automatic rainfall index or satellite index; and vii) a high level of degradation of arable land. A total of 3 municipalities were selected per department.

119. **Households were targeted** using a participatory and inclusive approach, taking advantage of pre-existing dynamics. Households were selected by a six-member targeting committee set up in each village, drawn from the social grants targeting committee set up as part of the Single National Register (SNR)²⁶. Care was taken to include women (an average of two per committee) and young people (an average of one per committee) and to ensure that no local councillors sat on the committee, thereby avoiding any political influence. Checks carried out by the cooperating partner identified any anomalies and ensured that the list complied with the selection criteria pre-established with the committees. Validation by the local authorities allowed a few minor adjustments to be made to ensure greater territorial equity. This approach facilitated

²⁵ Source: official data from Senegalese villages

²⁶ The overall aim of the SNR (created in Senegal in 2015 and institutionalised in 2021 by presidential decree) is to objectively identify all the country's poor households and to enable them to access social safety net programmes in a fair and transparent manner. This will reduce targeting and selection costs and enable the rapid deployment of social safety net programmes (eleven to date).

good ownership and acceptance of the targeting by the communities and was much appreciated.

120. The needs of **young people** were not specifically studied and therefore not considered as part of the project. Although they were not the priority target of the project, as members of the community, their specific needs could have been analysed. **People living with disabilities** were included in the vulnerability criteria for the households selected, but their specific needs and opportunities for integration into the project were not considered, no needs assessment was carried out ([Reco3.4](#)).

2.2. To what extent is the project consistent with the guidelines of the GCF, the WFP and other multilateral bodies? COHERENCE (EQ5)

121. The WFP has been positioning itself for over a decade and has since acquired the legitimacy to be a major player in the field of strengthening adaptation and, more generally, resilience to climate change in rural areas of Senegal. It has succeeded in mobilising considerable resources to work in this field, which is receiving increasing attention from all institutional players, who now see it as a central area of intervention.

2.2.1 Consistency with GCF guidelines

122. The R4 project is consistent with the strategic orientations of the Green Climate Fund, which aims to support livelihoods and food security through climate change adaptation interventions.

123. The GCF is an operational entity of the financial mechanism of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), dedicated to helping developing countries move towards low-emission and CC-resilient development paths. It aims for an equal budget allocation between mitigation and adaptation, with each of these two axes incorporating four results areas. As far as adaptation is concerned, two associated results are consistent with the R4 project, namely support for food security and the livelihoods of populations and communities. ([Reco2](#), [Reco4](#))

2.2.2 Consistency with the WFP guidelines

124. The R4 project is fully consistent with the WFP Senegal Country Strategic Plan, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Senegal and, more generally, with the WFP 2022-2025 Strategic Plan.

125. The R4 project financed by the GCF corresponds to Strategic Outcome 3 of the **WFP Country Strategic Plan (CSP) for Senegal 2019-2023**. SO3 has only one associated activity, which is activity 5. The R4 project is therefore fully integrated into the WFP's guidelines. SO3 is defined as "Food insecure populations and communities exposed to climate shocks and other risks, in targeted areas, have resilient livelihoods and sustainable food systems throughout the year" and Activity 5 as "Provide livelihood and climate change adaptation support to targeted groups through integrated risk management and market linkages", which fully corresponds to the R4 project. SO3 / Activity 5 represented 21% of the budget defined on the basis of the *need-based plan* (NBP) after the two budget revisions. SO3 is receiving strong and increasing attention from donors "EDS3 is receiving more attention from donors²⁷". ([Reco2](#))

126. The CSP is aligned and structured in line with the strategic orientations of the **UNDAF for Senegal (2019-2023)**, which is the reference planning framework for humanitarian and development interventions by the United Nations system in Senegal. The UNDAF is structured around eight outcomes divided into three strategic areas, one of which is defined as "Vulnerable communities strengthen their resilience to the effects of climate change and contribute to the protection of ecosystems", which corresponds precisely to SO3 of

²⁷ WFP. October 2023. Evaluation of the WFP Country Strategic Plan for Senegal 2018 - 2022. Centralised evaluation report.

the WFP CSP. The R4 project is therefore fully consistent with the UNDAF (Reco2).

127. The project is also fully aligned and coherent with the **WFP Strategic Plan 2022 - 2025**, which has among its five defined SOs one that aims at "people have improved and sustainable livelihoods" and which envisages having integrated programmes made up of activities relating particularly to the creation of community assets and climate risk management). Indeed, strengthening climate resilience is an expertise integrated at WFP institutional level for over a decade.

2.2.3 Consistency with national monitoring and evaluation tools

128. There was consistency with national monitoring and evaluation tools, but these were not sufficiently integrated into national monitoring and evaluation systems to enable data to be aggregated at the level of the Ministry of Agriculture.

129. The PCP approach was consistent with the **local planning guide** used to draw up local development plans (LDC), which advocates a participatory, inclusive, empowering, multi-stakeholder and multi-sectoral approach. Coherence also involves analysing the vulnerability of resources (physical and human), and considering CC, inequalities and social dynamics. The PCP is therefore a coherent instrument that should be considered not only for the diagnosis of territories but also for the implementation of PDCs at terroir/community level.

130. Implementation of the project was consistent with the **monitoring tools used for public projects and programmes** through the mid-term evaluation and the participatory monitoring carried out particularly by the COPILs. However, although exhaustive executive reports were produced by the cooperating partners and the WFP, the project's consistency with certain monitoring tools could not be proven ([Reco6.4](#)). There were no proven links with the Ministry of Agriculture's monitoring and evaluation system.

2.2.4 Complementarity with other initiatives

131. The project's activities complemented several national initiatives.

132. The WFP is stepping up its commitment alongside the Ministry of the Environment, and the new CSP has just been presented at WFP headquarters in Rome in the presence of the Minister of the said Ministry. The WFP is seeking to strengthen the coherence and complementarity of its interventions in this sector, to which the R4 is particularly committed.

133. In relation to the national programmes supported by the United Nations system or development partners, the project was strongly complementary to i) PADAER 2, which targets the most vulnerable populations, particularly women, by strengthening their economic and decision-making autonomy, ii) the World Bank's Adaptive Social Protection Programme in the Sahel, which aims to increase the access of poor and vulnerable populations in the Sahel to effective adaptive social protection systems. The project implemented it (through the national programme for productive inclusion and empowerment of women) with knowledge of the integrated approach to climate risk management, iii) the project complemented initiatives by the UNDP and the United Nations (UN) Women focussing on the empowerment of women (e.g. in Casamance, in the groundnut basin and in northern Senegal: EWASME and "LEAVE NO WOMAN BEHIND" programmes).

134. The project complemented the project financed by the MasterCard Foundation and deployed by the WFP, which at the time of the evaluation was in its second year of implementation. This project helps to create jobs and food sovereignty. It is based on the R4 project and uses, for example, EIGs to support IGAs. Its geographical coverage is broader than that of the R4 project.

135. The dynamics of the SFC groups were complementary to the many endogenous initiatives to organise women for savings and solidarity credit (solidarity calabashes, Village savings and Credit Association (VSCA), etc.). The project also complemented all women's empowerment initiatives, particularly in the area of strengthening their economic power and their production role via IGAs. It also complemented initiatives to combat soil degradation and improve soil health by proposing a community-based approach and sustainable

solutions for soil protection and restoration using organic soil builders, better water management, measures to combat salinity, etc.

2.3. What is the scope and quality of the project's achievements, and were the implementation methods appropriate and adaptable? - EFFECTIVENESS (EQ2)

2.3.1 Performance of the project as per the logical framework

136. The performance of the project as per the logical framework for both GCF and project-specific indicators has been monitored by WFP and are presented below. Targets planned have all been reached.

Paradigm Shift Objectives and Impacts at the Fund level				
Expected Result	Indicator	Baseline	Final Target	Results
<i>GCF core indicator (Adaptation)</i>	Number of direct and indirect beneficiaries	Direct 59,400 Male 48,600 Female 108,000 Total Indirect 17,820 Male 14,580 Female 32,400 total	Direct 222,750 Male 182,250 Female <u>405,000 Total</u> Indirect 66,825 Male 54,675 Female <u>121,500 Total</u>	Direct 214,763 Male 223,528 Female 438,291 Total Indirect 64,400 Male 67,027 Female 131,427 Total
	Number of beneficiaries relative to total population	6% of total population	<u>22.6 % of total population</u>	24.45% of total population of 8 departments targeted
<i>A1.0 Increased resilience and enhanced livelihoods of the most vulnerable people, communities, and regions</i>	A1.2 Number of male and females benefitting from the adoption of diversified, climate resilient livelihoods options (including fisheries, agriculture, tourism, etc.)	59,400 Male 48,600 Female 108,000 Total	222,750 Male 182,250 Female <u>405,000 Total</u>	214 763 Male 223 528 Female 438,291 Total
<i>A2.0 Increased resilience of health and well-being and food and water security</i>	A2.2 Number of food-secure households (in areas/periods at risk of climate change impacts)	% participating HHs with "acceptable" Food Consumption Score (FCS)	60% of participant HHs have "acceptable" FCS	72.4%

Outcomes and Outputs at Project level				
Expected Result	Indicator	Base line	Final Target	Results
Project outcomes	Outcomes that contribute to Fund-level impacts			
A5.0 Strengthened institutional and regulatory systems for climate-responsive planning and development	A5.1 Institutional and regulatory systems that improve incentives for climate resilience and their effective implementation	/	50% of beneficiaries of the PNBf reached by climate risk management tools such as insurance.	77% of beneficiaries of the PNBf reached by climate risk management tools such as insurance
A7.0 Strengthened adaptive capacity and reduced exposure to climate risks	A7.1 Use by vulnerable households, communities, business and public-sector services of Fund supported tools,	0	8,500 ha of natural resource areas (NRA) brought under	5575 ha in total (882 ha planted with 56,493 trees, 107 ha of garden, 2500 ha Niouli,

	instruments, strategies and activities to respond to climate change and variability		improved climate resilient management practices	560 ha restored with stone lines, 327 with diguettes et 1200 ha on RNA)
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Project/Programme Performance Indicators				
Expected Result	Indicator	Baseline	Final Target	Results
Component 1: “Risk Reduction” Increase adaptive capacity of food insecure smallholder farmers and their families by increasing the resilience of their environment and reducing the risk and impacts deriving from climate change				
Output 1.1 Training of farmers on innovative, climate smart agricultural practices and support of community-based disaster risk reduction assets creation, such as water and soil conservation	- Proportion of the population (%) in targeted communities reporting benefits from an enhanced livelihood asset base (ABI) - % of supported farmers using at least one climate adapted agricultural technique	20% 30%	60% 80%	80.8% 86%
Output 1.2 Provision of climate services, enabling farmers to access reliable climate information via their mobile phones and radio programs, as well as advisory services	% of reached HH using agro climatic advice to make livelihood decisions	27.7%	70%	96%
Outcome 2: “Risk transfer” Protect food insecure smallholder farmers from the impact of covariate climate shocks and provide them with the confidence to invest in agricultural inputs and diversified Income Generating Activities (IGAs)				
Output 2.1 WFP, in partnership with the local agricultural insurance company, Compagnie Nationale d'Assurance Agricole ("CNAAS"), provides smallholders with weather index insurance ("WII").	% of farmers contributing in cash to the insurance premium	10%	60%	79%
Outcome 3: “Risk reserves and prudent risk taking” Increase the adaptive capacity of food insecure smallholders by gradually building savings, while improving their ability to produce and sell surpluses, and diversifying their income sources through investments in IGAs that are climate sensitive				
Output 3.1 WFP, in partnership with Oxfam America ("OA"), supports vulnerable rural populations in building up savings and accessing small loans through the Savings for Change ("SfC") program	Number of saving groups (total members) / total capital held Average savings amount per farmer per month Number of GIE (<u>economic interest groups</u>) investing into community-based assets for IGA	414 groups (9,814 members) / 16.000 USD 1.5 USD At least 2 GIE	1,090 savings groups (25,070 members) / 35.000 USD 4 USD At least 4 GIE	1103 groups (17,924 members) / 191,000 USD 1.44 USD 19 GIE
Output 3.2 During good years, farmers have the opportunity to store their surplus production in WFP Village Cereal Banks ("VCBs") and use their stocks as warranty to receive credit from Savings for Change groups	% women and youth in leadership roles in the Village Cereal Banks Production stored in Warehouse Number of VCB with an improved storage facility complying with storage condition standards Total of loans accessed	10% 63 tons 0 0	20% 135 tons At least 10 BCVs USD 7,500	41.56% 224.5 tons 39 BCVs with strengthened capacities and 7 BCVs with renovated infrastructure USD 13,136
Outcome 4: Enabling the Government of Senegal (GoS) to mainstream climate change adaptation and climate risk management into its safety net and social protection programmes				

Output 4. Build national capacity to scale up rural resilience and adaptation measures linked to national social protection programs, supporting the government to implement its adaptation actions and reinforce national capacities	% of PNBF beneficiaries accessing climate risk management tools	0.5%	50%	77%
	Average level of change in knowledge, awareness and perception (KAP) on climate resilience by national and local authorities, on a scale from 1-4	Average level of KAP is 0 to 1	Average level of KAP is 3 to 4	Average level of KAP on climate resilience is 3

2.3.1 Analysis of the "Risk Reduction" component (C1)

137. Participatory Community Planning (PCP) made it possible to identify the specific needs of the communities, but little use was made of this by the communities beyond the scope of the project.

138. The CSA training courses disseminated did not incorporate a wide range of climate-sensitive techniques. They were not uniformly appreciated, depending on whether they enabled the development of new crops (rice) or were based on existing crops (the techniques were often considered to be already acquired by the local population).

139. The vast majority of cash transfers were used to meet household food and nutrition security (FNS) needs. There were many complaints about the transfers and the operators. The training provided on land management techniques was greatly appreciated by the communities and the decentralised technical services (DTS). The positive effects on the environment were widely noted (e.g. preservation of biodiversity, soil regeneration). There was little support for the management committees.

140. The weather information combined with farming advice was much appreciated. Voice messages in local languages and radio broadcasts were also popular.

141. C1 concerns "harm reduction" and is made up of the major groups of activities presented below. In these sections, the quantitative analysis is often weak and limited due to missing data (Reco6.1, Reco6.2). In addition, the little data that does exist is not very change-oriented (Reco3.1), which means that we are unable to derive quantified effects for the communities (Reco6.3). However, the effectiveness of the activities carried out supports the interest in scaling them up (Reco2, Reco4).

Participatory community planning (PCP)

142. PCPs were carried out on each terroir selected (corresponding to a larger scale than the village). Together with the Seasonal Livelihoods-based Programming (SLP) and Integrated Context Analysis (ICA) tools, they form **the WFP's three-pronged approach (3PA)**, which was well developed as part of the project. This approach places people and partners at the centre of planning (at national, departmental and territorial level) and lays the foundations for defining, designing, coordinating and implementing the resilience projects supported by WFP. The PCP approaches defined as part of this project followed the prescribed community-based approach, through the mobilisation of a multi-actor committee made up of communities, local stakeholders and customary authorities, which was much appreciated by the communities and partners. However, the mapping of the PCPs could be more detailed.


143. The PCP approaches incorporated all the needs expressed, across all sectors, and developed a specific action plan for the agriculture, food and environment sectors to guide action under the R4 project. **LDCs** were developed by the authorities at municipal level, integrating all sectors (e.g. education, transport, health) and following a normative plan defined at national level. They were less operational than PCPs and did not include a budget. Both PDCs and PCPs were developed in line with the priorities of local authorities. Although these two tools were complementary, a lack of coordination was noted, particularly due to a lack of communication on the part of the WFP and its PCPs. However, the PCPs supported by the WFP could be used and promoted more within the framework of the CDPs (Reco5.1).

Training in climate-smart agricultural techniques (CSA)

144. CSA training courses were given to a total of 22,286 beneficiariesⁱ, the vast majority of whom were concentrated in the final two years of the project. The courses were adapted to the main crops in the target

regions (e.g. rice growing in Fatick, millet growing in Tambacounda). As shown in the figure below, the number of women trained in the last year was not specified in the *Annual Performance Reports* (APRs) that monitor the project indicators. (Reco6.1)

Figure2 2: Number of beneficiaries trained in agricultural practices adapted to climate change²⁸



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

145. Training in CSA **techniques** was conducted using the farmer field school approach, offering practical training with directly observable results, which were appreciated by the communities. The main techniques disseminated were composting, adding organic matter, mulching, seed starting, sowing in rows and weeding. These techniques are essential but still appear to be too unambitious given the climatic challenges. Other techniques, such as agroforestry, crop associations, crop rotation diversification, the introduction of legumes into rotations and sowing under plant cover, could have been added to this training to go even further in reducing soil erosion, improving soil fertility, conserving water resources, increasing functional biodiversity and thus better adapting to the effects of climate change.

146. **The crops supported** were mainly those already grown in the area (e.g. millet, maize), while others were reintroduced thanks to the project (rice). The crops supported by the project that were already being grown seem to have aroused little interest among the communities. The dissemination of rice-growing techniques led to a much-appreciated reappropriation of old practices from "grandma's time". Appreciation of the utility of the technical agricultural training provided by the project was therefore very uneven, depending on whether the crops were already grown in the area (little added value from the project according to the beneficiaries) or not (high added value because new production techniques were adopted). Techniques presented were focussing on climate resilience, but most beneficiaries considered they knew most of them already.

147. The project led to an increase in the **area sown with rice**, as shown by the output monitoring indicator. Up to 2,200 ha of rice were harvested in 2021, compared with 1,668 ha in 2020 and 1,507 ha in 2022. Unfortunately, the data for 2023 in terms of hectares of rice harvested is not available, nor are the annual targets, which makes it impossible to say whether the targets were achieved. This is a very interesting result in itself, as it concerns land that was previously unused due to the silting up of the valleys. However, the project did not accurately monitor changes in yields, which would have been essential if we were to know what changes were actually achieved by the project. According to the beneficiaries, the increase in yields due to the project was not significant. Support for production techniques certainly enabled the introduction of a

²⁸ Data for 2023 is not available in the APR.

new crop (rice, in the Fatick region), but the increase in millet and maize yields does not seem conclusive.

148. The project distributed short-cycle certified **seed** to help farmers adapt better to late rainfall and promoting genetic diversification to help them adapt better to rainfall variations.

149. The project and the WFP promoted **organic fertilisers** and the non-use of synthetic inputs. This continued to raise people's awareness of the possibility of doing without and responded to the challenges posed by the increase in the price of agrochemicals (due to the international economic situation), and therefore of the importance of practices that increase soil fertility, reduce soil erosion and promote ecosystem services, in order to maintain soil productivity while reduce the dependence on synthetic products. These orientations were well understood and appreciated by the communities.

Cash transfers and asset creation

150. The cash transfers were made at the end of the lean period, which meant that the short-term FNS needs, which was the main objective of the transfer, could be met. In fact, the vast majority of the money was used to buy food and also to pay school fees at the start of the new school year, which reduced the risks of selling off production facilities to meet temporary food needs. A very few rare cases of beneficiaries using money for non-priority needs were mentioned. Prior to the transfer, the project had raised awareness of the importance of using this money for food, but did not suggest that part of the extra money freed up should be used to invest in IGAs (for those who had the means to do so). This would have strengthened household FNS in the medium and long term and thus increased resilience to CC.

151. The cash **transfer method** chosen was the telephone. Most complaints expressed by the communities as part of this project concerned cash transfers. The main difficulties encountered in the first two years were the operators not providing satisfaction (Free lacked relay points for withdrawals and Orange sent too many messages, with the message relating to the transfer being lost in the middle). Difficulties were reported to the moderators, who tried to resolve the problem. The telephone operators were too often unreactive. The WFP, on the other hand, was reactive and came to pay the people affected. Greater awareness was raised the following year about the procedures for receiving transfers. Not all the problems could be resolved, but the overwhelming majority.

152. **Community schemes**, also known as rehabilitation/asset creation, involved soil development (e.g. gabions, dikes, half-moons) (in all regions), pastoral ponds (especially in the Kaolack region), rice fields (mainly in Casamance and the Fatick region), market gardens and tree plantations (in all regions). These developments were recognised as being effective in reducing climate risks. They were greatly appreciated by the communities, the decentralised technical services (DTS) and the authorities, all of whom were particularly interested in having acquired these techniques that were new to them (including the DTS). On the other hand, the depth of the technical analysis of the catchment areas by the WFP in the form of a preliminary diagnosis was questioned by some stakeholders, and more thorough studies would have been worthwhile.²⁹


153. **The land tenure status of rehabilitated land was** not systematically secured as part of the project. The rehabilitated land was intended for community use. However, not all of it was secured in terms of land tenure (via land tenure agreements), which did not guarantee their collective use beyond the project (in the case of the land visited belonging to the village chief, rehabilitated via improvements as part of the project, and made available to the beneficiaries only for the project period).

154. **Management committees** were set up to oversee the various community assets created, their upkeep, the associated collective dynamics, and any distribution of the resources generated and associated expenditure. They often lacked support and training, and the results were uneven.

155. The graph below shows changes in the number of recipients of cash transfers. This data raises questions about the proportion of households headed by women (Reco7.1). These cases are still in the minority in the communities, and even if this family situation was a priority selection criterion for the project, it seems unlikely that 76% of beneficiary households were headed by a woman in the last year.

²⁹ WFP. 2023. Evaluation of WFP's Country Strategic Plan (CSP) in Senegal 2018 - 2023. Centralised evaluation report.

Figure 3 : Number of households receiving cash transfers to compensate for the creation of agricultural assets




Sources: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

Climate information

156. This activity was often cited as one of the most significant of the project. It was **unanimously appreciated** by the local population. It was widely adopted thanks to the adaptations made to meet needs as closely as possible, such as the sharing of information in the form of voice messages in local languages (five languages available), supplemented by agricultural advice deemed particularly useful by farmers.

157. The graph below shows changes in the number of people who benefited from direct access to weather information by SMS, according to the data available. However, the reliability of this data is questionable. Indeed, it is surprising to see the number decreasing over the course of the project. This low number could be explained by the fact that the project assumed that the direct beneficiaries of the climatic information had to share the information received with their relatives/neighbours. Unfortunately, as the project did not carry out a survey to estimate the actual number, it is difficult to know the true extent of the number of people who received this information (via different channels) (Reco6.2).

Figure 4 : Number of people with direct access to climate risk information via mobile phones and/or SMS services




Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

158. **The radio broadcasts** were also greatly appreciated and followed. Like the climate information by telephone, they were managed by Jokalante, which mobilises institutional players and communities and is recognised as an experienced operator. Several requests were made to rebroadcast the programmes and to ensure that they were broadcast at a slower speed so that the information could be better understood and integrated, proof of the interest aroused by this information.

159. The graph below shows changes in the number of direct beneficiaries of information on climate issues via the radio. It shows that the project multiplied the number of people reached by almost one hundred in relation to the planned objectives, and the extent to which this information was followed up and shared.

Figure 5 : Number of people with direct access to information on climate risks via radio




Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

160. **Subscription** to climate information, initially carried out by the CPs, was transferred to the EIGs with a view to ensuring sustainability. To reduce costs, subscriptions were most often made through the SFC, and members then shared the information received, which worked well. However, the proposed subscription period of May-June was not suitable, as it corresponded to a period when households lacked financial resources. December and January would have been more appropriate.

161. Component 1 included a large number of output indicators, illustrating the diversity of the support provided. However, as the activities were not carried out uniformly from one year to the next, it is often difficult to obtain a consolidated view of the cumulative results over the entire duration of the project (*Reco6*). The annual objectives were not clearly stated, and as the agricultural assets were very different in nature, the results were numerous and not always easy to measure. For example, more than 45,000 m of stone barriers were created, an interesting result, but the annual targets are not available, except for 2023. On the other hand, other forms of support were far less successful, such as the establishment of two fish farming ponds within market gardening areas, which were supplied with fry but produced almost no fish as the ponds were not operational.

Figure 6 : Stone barriers created



Source: APR 2020,2021,2022, 2023

162. In addition, the monitoring of progress in relation to changes often remained inadequate, limiting a precise assessment of the project's effects. For example, the agricultural yield indicator was not included in the APRs or ACRs, and the adoption of agricultural practices was also poorly documented in the general reports. During field visits, the ET was able to observe that IRS practices were only partially adopted, if at all, particularly in Casamance. The reasons put forward by beneficiaries (often women) included lack of access to agricultural equipment, which is the preserve of men. It is essential for the project to understand why, and to act on these barriers to adoption for the next phases of the project. Although the technical reports of the cooperating partners mention these aspects, the consolidated results remain unavailable, which may have been detrimental to the project management (Reco6.1).

163. **C1 best practices / lessons learned for future deployments**

164. Participatory Community Planning (PCP): finding a good link between PCP and PDC and improving the appropriation of PCP as a development aid tool*.

165. Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) training: continue training using the farmer field school approach / incorporate more climate-sensitive practices (e.g. agroforestry, sowing under plant cover) * / make short-cycle, certified, reproducible, genetically diverse seeds available * / raise awareness, make organic fertilisers available and eliminate dependence on synthetic inputs*.

166. Cash transfers: incorporate the proposal to use part of the money for IGAs into awareness-raising campaigns on the use of money for food * / carry out an in-depth diagnosis to select the telephone operator* / make beneficiaries very aware of the procedure for receiving messages and money, and the terms and conditions of compensation*.

167. Asset creation: systematically ensure that the land to be developed is secure* / train the decentralised technical services (DTS) in the techniques deployed / integrate the existing local monitoring committee throughout the project to ensure proper ownership* / adopt a catchment area analysis to define the location and types of works to be carried out* / make the most of the potential offered by local charters and agreements on the uses and users of common areas*.

168. Climate information: deploy voice messages in local languages combined with farming advice / deploy radio broadcasts rooted in local realities / suggest that communities pool subscriptions (e.g. via SFC) to ensure the project's long-term future.

2.3.2 Analysis of the "Risk transfer" component (C2)


Agricultural insurance has developed strongly since 2020, with a variety of products, but feedback from beneficiaries remains mixed, particularly in terms of satisfaction with compensation and understanding of the types of cover. Although the number of subscribers has increased, problems remain, such as the limited inclusion of women, difficulties for vulnerable households to pay premiums, and uncertain long-term take-up after the end of the project. In addition, subscribing to the insurance is often seen as a condition for accessing WFP grants, compromising the sustainability of the scheme.

169. Agricultural insurance is one of the components of the project that evolved the most, both in terms of the insurance product itself and the verification and dissemination strategy. From 2020, the agricultural insurance product evolved significantly. Initially, two solutions were proposed by CNAAS and Inclusive Guarantee: a satellite index based on NOAA³⁰ data for Tambacounda and a rainfall index using ANACIM data for Kolda. Following mixed feedback from users, a yield index for crops such as maize, sorghum, groundnuts and millet was tested in Tambacounda from 2021. The Central regions were also able to benefit from insurance from 2021. In 2022, a hybrid index combining the yield index and the rainfall index was launched to provide better cover for agricultural losses. This product was extended in 2023 to cover all five intervention regions. At the end of the season, the Kenyan company PULA carried out yield measurements based on sampling. Compensation under a yield-based index-based agricultural insurance scheme is triggered when the predetermined index, calculated on the basis of average production history, falls below a set threshold. At the start of the project, most of the insurance products were distributed by CNAAS agents. In the interests of efficiency, the EIGs gradually became interested in the number of insurance policies sold to the tune of 10% of the total amount. This 10% was shared with the facilitators and community relays, with the EIGs only receiving around 5% of the total amount. This approach made it possible to reach a large number of households in the communities supported by the project, while enabling the EIGs to generate income.

170. This is one of the only components of the project, along with climate services, for which an exit strategy was drawn up, involving a reduction in the WFP's contribution over 5 years, and a gradual increase in payments from own funds until complete autonomy is achieved in the fifth year. Insurance through work (ITW) corresponds to a number of days worked to create community assets, in return for which an amount is allocated by the WFP to finance the insurance premium.

³⁰ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the United States of America.


Figure 7 : Number of policyholders by year and gender



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

171. The total number of subscribers increased linearly between 2020 and 2023, reaching 51,602 subscribers in 2023. The total number of subscribers exceeded the target of 45,000 households at the end of the project. Between 24% and 35% of all policyholders are women.


Figure 8 : Beneficiaries of insurance through work, by year and sex



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

172. Most of the women who signed up did so via the ITW. The number of people benefiting from ITW rose steadily during the project, reaching the targets set for all years except 2024 (23,700 beneficiaries reached against a target of 25,000, i.e. 95% of the target). The number of days of ITW per beneficiary decreased from year to year, in line with the graduation strategy, making it possible to gradually increase the number of beneficiaries for a constant budget of around USD 165,000 (15,000 beneficiaries targeted in 2021 compared with 25,000 beneficiaries in 2023).


Figure 9 : Policyholders who paid the insurance premium exclusively out of their own funds, by year, by gender



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

173. The number of equity-only subscribers increased over the four years of implementation, from 1,325 to 27,903 subscribers. This represents 54% of all policyholders. The number of women taking out insurance on their own was very low, not exceeding 4% in 2023 (Reco7).

Figure 10 : Number of people receiving compensation and average amount of compensation



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

174. The interviews did not demonstrate that insurance encourages beneficiaries to take the risk of increasing investment in agriculture. No qualitative studies were carried out, nor were there any indicators on this issue in the project monitoring system (Reco3.1, Reco6). Compensation was, however, well received by beneficiaries when it was triggered, although not everyone was satisfied with the amounts released.

Indeed, many felt that the compensation did not cover their losses. One possible explanation could be the type of product adopted by the people surveyed, but they were unable to indicate precisely the type of cover they had.

175. While the principle of insurance by type of crop and surface area was well understood by beneficiaries, there were still some misunderstandings about the compensation criteria, and particularly about the reasons why some people received compensation while others were not entitled to it in the same area, for the same crop. One possible explanation could be a failure of certain measuring devices, in the case of the rainfall index. It should also be noted that beneficiaries were not aware of the maximum amount of compensation, set at 100,000 CFA francs, or of the notion of yield loss thresholds, above which they are compensated.

176. In relation to the number of people, the average amount of compensation per subscriber was USD 33 in 2021 and USD 7 in 2023. Data disaggregated by gender is only available for 2022 and 2023, but it can be seen that the amount of compensation received by women was lower than that received by men. This is partly explained by the type of crop compensated, with women working mainly on rice (not a cash crop), but would merit further investigation.

177. The graduation strategy did not take sufficient account of the difficulties faced by the most vulnerable households, for whom payment of the CFAF 8,000 insurance premium in the final year proved difficult. In some cases, this amount was even taken from their cash transfers, as shown in case study 1 entitled "C2", which illustrates the effect of the WFP's request for a contribution from own funds to pay the insurance premium, reducing the share of transfers (Annex 12).

178. Overall, the project beneficiaries were familiar with the concept of insurance. However, most of them did not fully understand the distinction between the different types of indexes (rainfall, satellite, hybrid), or how the sampling control process worked. Although the WFP set up a peer training system in the second half of the project, these awareness-raising efforts remained insufficient in relation to the number of subscribers, especially in the context of a product launch (less than 10% of subscribers are trained).

179. Several cases encountered during the field visits show that the individual aspect of insurance was poorly understood by beneficiaries. Some pooled the purchase of the policy at the time of subscription and shared the compensation when it was paid out. As a result, the amounts received were very low in relation to the damage suffered, which prevented insurance from playing its role as envisaged in the R4 project.

180. The subscription period was problematic because it fell in the middle of the lean season, which represents a real barrier to entry for many producers. An early subscription period could remove this constraint.

181. In some villages, particularly in the Tambacounda and Kolda regions, beneficiaries saw insurance as a prerequisite for accessing WFP assistance, particularly FFA activities, which provide significant financial support for households. As a result, these households agreed to pay a few thousand CFA for the premium in order to take part in the programme. This system certainly gave them the opportunity to test the product, but this perception posed a risk to the sustainability of the insurance scheme. According to the interviews, many subscribers would not renew their insurance once the project is over: *"We took out the insurance to be able to benefit from the project, but once the project is over, we will stop subscribing"*.

182. The encouraging results of this component in terms of the number of policyholders must be put into perspective because of persistent shortcomings, particularly in terms of the inclusion of women and sustainability. The indicators used do not allow for a reliable assessment of the long-term adoption of the product by the population, and no qualitative study has yet confirmed the effects of taking out insurance on household strategies.

183. C2 best practice / lessons learned for future deployments

184. Innovation: development of an innovative hybrid insurance tool based on regional experience (particularly in Kenya). Formation of a multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder group to design the indices.

185. Gradual geographical expansion of insurance product coverage, from the initial two regions to five.

186. Use of partners to verify yields: collaboration with specialist companies (e.g. PULA) to carry out yield measurements based on sampling.

187. Incentives for distributors and diversification of players: involvement of EIGs, community leaders and relays in the distribution of insurance products, while sharing revenues to encourage performance and maximise cover.

188. Implementation of an exit strategy: planning for a gradual reduction in external subsidies (WFP) to encourage beneficiaries to become self-sufficient through payments from their own funds.

189. Insurance through Work (ITW) strategy: integration of ITW as an innovative mechanism to enable households to finance their insurance premiums while participating in community projects. Gradual reduction in the number of working days required per beneficiary, making it possible to increase the total number of beneficiaries for a constant budget.

190. Training and awareness-raising for beneficiaries: Introduction of a long-term training system, in addition to a peer training system to strengthen understanding of insurance products and compensation mechanisms over the long term.

Monitoring and evaluation of subscriptions: Regular collection of data on the number of subscribers and beneficiaries, including disaggregation by gender to identify disparities.

2.3.3 Analysis of the "Risk reserve and prudent risk-taking" component (C3)

191. The "savings for change" (SfC) groups were well received by the beneficiaries, widely duplicated, and greatly promoted the financial inclusion of beneficiaries. The objectives concerning the number of groups created (1,103 groups in total, with 17,924 members at the end of the project) and the amount of savings collected were reached (largely and from the 2nd year for the amount saved). The SfC groups also made it possible to grant a large volume of credit (USD 174,000 in 2023), which should encourage investment and the creation of IGAs. However, there was little monitoring of the actual use of the loans, and it would appear that most of them were not used to develop IGAs (Reco3.3).

192. As regards economic interest groupings (EIGs), with 19 EIGs operational by October 2024, the project far exceeded its objective. The "SfC federating EIG" model enabled beneficiaries to increase their savings and credit capacities and has fostered social cohesion between villages. The members of these EIGs also benefited from a 6-month incubation programme, a wide range of technical training courses and the provision of processing units, enabling the development of IGAs.

193. The "EIG insurance distributor" model has definite advantages, but the EIGs were not sufficiently trained and supported to fully assume this role, and it would appear that the distribution of insurance products did not extend much beyond the group's borders.


194. The warrantage system initially planned was replaced in 2022 by support for the 39 village cereal banks involved in the national programme through i) the formation of management committees, ii) training for members in stock management, VCB governance and the guaranteed system, and iii) the construction of 7 buildings. Regarding the management committees that were formed, the results were uneven in terms of formalisation, governance rules and land tenure security. As far as infrastructure is concerned, not a single building had been handed over by October 2024 (unfinished or non-compliant structures) but they were planned to be finished after the end of the project.

Savings for Change groups (SfC)

195. The SfC groups, which had been in existence since 2006, greatly promoted the financial inclusion of beneficiaries through easier access to loans, at below-market interest rates (10% in general in the SfCs compared with 25% in the MFIs in these areas), and accessible directly in the villages.


196. The SfC concept was well received by the beneficiaries and was widely duplicated, generating significant amounts of savings and the granting of substantial loans. The targets for the number of groups created and the amount of savings collected were largely met, as illustrated in the figures below. The success of this approach was mainly due to the fact that, as well as meeting an important need, the SfC concept is based on traditional savings mobilisation practices that are widespread in Senegal.

Figure 11 : Number of SFCs established per year



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

Figure 12 : Cumulative amounts saved (USD)



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

197. Regarding the cumulative value of savings, it should be noted that the final objective was exceeded as early as the 2nd year of implementation, reflecting on the one hand an underestimation of the savings capacity of the SFC groups when the project was designed, but also the success of this activity.


198. In addition to the "credit funds", a majority of SFC groups set up "solidarity funds", enabling their members to receive donations to help them cope with difficulties.

199. The evaluation team found that the groups operated in very different ways (length of cycle, frequency of collections, amounts collected per person per collection, maximum amount that could be borrowed, number of tills in the group, etc.). This variety of arrangements clearly illustrates the appropriation of the SFC concept by the beneficiaries. But it also highlights the importance of regular reminders of the SFC methodology to ensure that the spirit of the scheme is maintained.

200. The project also led to the emergence of men's savings groups and mixed groups (11% of members are men), which represents an innovation compared with similar existing schemes.

201. As regards the number of SFC group members, after a rapid roll-out, with 14,615 members in 2020, then 16,033 in 2021 and a peak of 20,750 members in 2022, the project finally ended 2023 with 17,924 functional SFC group members.

Figure 13 : Number of SFC members



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

202. Regarding the average amount saved per month, the indicators monitored and reported in the APR were modified during the project. Whereas until 2022, the indicator reported concerned the average amount saved per SFC group, the indicator reported for the 2023 APR concerned the average amount saved per member. The 2020, 2021 and 2022 APRs clearly show a strong upward trajectory, with average monthly savings per group rising from USD 4.3 in 2020, to USD 10 in 2021 and finally to USD 25 in 2022, far exceeding the final target of USD 4 (which was achieved in the first year of the project). This reflects the significant potential of these cooperatives in terms of generating savings, the fact that the SFC concept was well accepted by the beneficiaries and the good prospects for the sustainability of these groups.

203. In addition to the amounts saved, the SFC groups also enabled a significant volume of loans to be granted. At the end of 2023, the cumulative value of loans granted amounted to USD 174,000. As one of the WFP's objectives was to direct loans towards climate-insensitive IGAs, beneficiaries were made very aware of how to use the loans. However, there was little monitoring of the actual use of the loans granted, and it would appear that most of the money was not used to develop IGAs but rather to cover household needs ([Reco3.3](#)).

204. The same limitation was noted regarding the lack of use of the savings redistributed at the end of the cycles for IGAs. Interviews with beneficiaries showed that while the savings recovered could be used to develop economic activities, they were most often used for tabaski-related expenses or to meet household needs (food during the lean season, school fees, health costs, etc.).

205. The date of the end of the cycle seemed to be a lever relating to the orientation of savings. From the point of view of short-term resilience or food security, making beneficiaries aware of the fact that the cooperative cycles end in the 2nd half of the rainy season would allow households to have cash at a time when they have many needs. Conversely, if the aim is to direct savings more towards IGAs, an end of cycle at a non-critical time for households could encourage economic investment.

206. Finally, training in the management and operation of the SFCs, in financial education and in saponification was provided to the majority of SFC members. Although some beneficiaries indicated that they had received training in financial education from several projects (up to 4), reflecting a lack of coordination between the various initiatives at work, the training provided by the project was in most cases greatly appreciated by the beneficiaries. Case study 2, entitled "SFC", describes a man who became a member of a mixed SFC thanks to the project and the many benefits it brought him (Appendix 12).

Economic interest groups (EIGs)

207. With 19 EIGs operational by October 2024, the project has far exceeded its target (4).

208. The "SFC federating EIG" model, promoted by the project, enabled beneficiaries' savings and credit capacities to grow and fostered social cohesion between villages. It should be noted, however, that this model was only put into operation in the 2 regions in which phase 1 of the R4 initiative was deployed, which

underlines the fact that several years of implementation, allowing the groups to reach a certain level of maturity, are necessary for the deployment of this model.

209. The members of these EIGs also benefited from a 6-month incubation programme aimed at strengthening their entrepreneurial capacities and business management skills. A wide range of technical training courses was offered (processing cereal products, processing fruit into juice, saponification, natural detergent, dyeing, packaging). This training was appreciated by the beneficiaries and led to the development of IGAs.

210. However, one risk identified regarding these incubation programmes is that they could lead to the formation of "elite groups" of women, who will benefit from a number of support programmes, with no guarantee of subsequent dissemination within the SfCs. If the representatives of the village SFC groups that make up the EIGs only have "woman leader" profiles in their villages, and if the training provided by the project is not then sufficiently replicated by these women in the villages, there is a risk that this support will only benefit a minority, which would not be in line with the project's objectives for change.

211. Finally, the EIGs signed agreements with CNAAS to take on the role of distributors of the insurance product. While this model offers definite advantages for the roll-out of low-cost insurance, it would appear that not all the EIGs received sufficient training and support to fully assume this role (particularly in the central zone, the area most recently integrated into the project) and that the distribution of the insurance product has not extended much beyond the borders of the group.

Village cereal banks (VCB)

212. The very high interest rates offered by the MFIs to small agricultural producers (around 25%) and the fact that the existing VCBs did not meet the conditions required to provide sufficient guarantees to the MFIs led the project to review this activity.

213. At the same time, a national programme launched in 2019 provided for the rehabilitation of 700 existing VCBs throughout Senegal, including 39 in the project intervention areas. The warrantage system initially planned was therefore replaced in 2022 by support for the VCBs in partnership with the Directorate of Agriculture (DA), with access to credit by the VCBs now having to go through the SfCs and no longer through the MFIs.

214. The project therefore supported the 39 VCBs involved in the national programme by i) setting up management committees, ii) training members in stock management, VCB governance and the guaranteed system, and iii) constructing 7 buildings.

215. Regarding the management committees that were set up, the results of the organisation of the VCBs to date have been rather uneven, particularly in terms of formalisation, rules of governance and land tenure security.

216. Regarding infrastructure, the time remaining before the end of the project and the failure of the company awarded the contract to honour certain commitments created additional difficulties and, by October 2024, not a single building had been handed over, either because they were unfinished or because they did not yet meet the specifications (roofing problems highlighted). They were planned to be finished after the end of the project,

217. It is clear from these elements that a more in-depth diagnosis prior to the project would probably have made it possible to identify these barriers (rates charged by MFIs, status of the "guarantor" VCBs) and opportunities (inclusion of the DA programme in the national budget plan in 2021) and would have made it possible to avoid this late reorientation of activities, which meant that the infrastructure had not yet been completed at the end of the project ([Reco5.4](#)).

218. It also emerged from the interviews and visits that, on the one hand, the VCBs are eagerly awaited by beneficiaries and meet several important needs of the population (securing seed stocks, food security reserve, reducing selloffs and post-harvest losses, etc.). It should also be noted that the relevance and positive impact of BCVs apply even more in the context of adaptation to climate change by creating a better buffer against slow-onset and extreme weather events. On the other hand, however, these systems also present risks in terms of stock security and food security, insofar as the establishment of a VCB in unsuitable premises or a failure on the part of the people in charge of stock management could lead to major crop and seed losses, with potentially very negative impacts on the food security of the population. This demonstrates both

the relevance of this activity and the need for the support provided to take account of this concentration of risks. Case study 3, entitled "C3/VCB", presents an example of a VCB supported by the project, its integration into pre-existing community dynamics, its operation and its effects (e.g. food availability, reduction in wastage, etc.).

219. **C3 best practices / lessons learned for future deployments:**

220. Saving for change funds (SFC): encourage and support the emergence of men's savings groups and mixed groups, which promote social cohesion in the villages / define with members the start and end periods of the cycle to meet their priority needs * / raise awareness among members of SFC groups on how to use the loans granted to promote economic investment and IGAs rather than loans to cover current needs *.

221. Economic interest groups (EIGs): support the deployment of the "SFC federating EIG" model, which enables beneficiaries' savings and credit capacities to be increased and strengthens inter-village social cohesion / couple the granting of credit with a number of technical training courses and the provision of a processing unit, This will give substance to the desire to direct funds towards IGAs / provide sufficient training and support for EIG members in their role as insurance distributors and identify the right people to contact at village level to raise awareness, take out policies, register and report *.

222. Village cereal banks (VCB): being linked to the national programme run by the Department of Agriculture (DA) enabled the project to adapt to the constraints encountered with warrantage and to maintain the "spirit" of the initial activity in the deployment of the revised activity.

* R4 best practices, which are also areas for improvement for CO Senegal

2.3.4 Analysis of the "Support to the Government of Senegal to integrate climate change adaptation and risk management into its safety net and social protection programmes" component (C4)

223. To achieve its government capacity-building objectives, the R4 project relied on a relevant institutional architecture from the national to the local level i) **by giving responsibility at the national level** to an institution with broad prerogatives on food security and resilience issues (SE/CNSA) and by involving the environment and agriculture departments; ii) **by targeting as a priority at the local level** key players such as administrative authorities, mayors, public projects and programmes as well as civil society development organisations (NGOs).

224. Despite the project's achievements, they were not sufficiently integrated into national and local social safety net policies (clearly mentioned in the project title).

225. Component 4 (C4) aimed to "Enable the Government of Senegal to integrate climate change adaptation and climate risk management into its safety net and social protection programmes".

226. The desired outcome (output 4.1) is "Strengthened national capacities to scale up rural resilience and adaptation measures linked to national social protection programmes".

227. Two activities were selected: i) Activity A.1.1: capacity building for national and local government; ii) Activity 4.1.2: integration of climate risk management tools into the government's safety net. These activities were not explained in detail within the framework of component 4 of the project.

228. In terms of the quality of implementation, the project met the government's capacity-building objectives through a coherent approach at national and local levels:

229. **At local level**, through i) the involvement of decentralised technical services (agriculture and water and forestry) in key activities such as socialisation of the R4 project, community planning, technical training and participatory monitoring; ii) the involvement of national public projects and programmes and development NGOs as cooperating partners (Agence nationale de conseil agricole et rural - ANCAR, PROVAL

CV, PASALuMaKaf, CARITAS, LA LUMIERE); iii) the involvement of mayors on behalf of their local authorities; iv) the involvement of administrative authorities, particularly sub-prefects and prefects.

230. **At the national level**, the R4 project empowered the SE/CNSA to co-pilot the project with the WFP. In addition, the project facilitated the involvement in participatory monitoring of all the ministries concerned.

231. All these institutions were informed and made aware of the project's issues, were involved in the participatory monitoring of the project and some were involved in the operational implementation of the activities.

232. However, despite these significant gains in terms of government capacity building, the project's achievements were not effectively integrated into national and local policies on social safety nets and social protection.

233. The project did not develop specific activities to strengthen the technical capacities of local authorities to incorporate the integrated management approach to rural resilience to climate risks into territorial projects. Furthermore, the lessons learned did not become systematic to facilitate their integration into national and local policies. (Reco3.2)

234. **C4 best practices / lessons learned for future deployments**

235. Operational support: involve decentralised technical departments in operational roles in line with their core missions*; make civil society organisations (NGOs) responsible for implementation; recruit national projects and programmes as CPs.

Political support: ensure that the institutional anchoring is properly socialised with the structures concerned in order to guarantee greater legitimacy for the chosen institution*; empower key public institutions by entrusting them with operational roles in line with their missions*; strengthen the political capacities of local authorities so that they are in a position to make the necessary representations*. Monitoring and evaluation: develop participatory monitoring and evaluation and ensure a link with national and local monitoring and evaluation systems*.

2.3.5 Synergy between components

236. The household approach enabled the various members of a household to take part in all the activities in the integrated R4 package. Coordination between the cooperating partners (CPs) involved facilitated the complementarity of activities in terms of their implementation. In the communities, many synergies between activities were observed (e.g. the SFC funds made it possible to pool subscriptions to climate information).

237. **The household approach** allowed members of the same household to position themselves as they wish, according to their interest and availability, to take part collectively in all the activities of the integrated R4 package. This made it easier for each household to take part in all of the project's activities (insofar as involvement is shared between the members of the household and does not rest on a single person), thus creating synergy between all of the project's activities within the household. However, collaboration between members of a household was sometimes limited due to the distribution of activities within the household. For example, cases of insurance premiums being financed by individual loans to SFC groups observed in the field are still very rare. This is explained particularly by the fact that men generally take out insurance on the cash crop plots they manage, while women are the majority of those who participate in SFC groups.

238. **Good coordination between the CPs** ensured that they spoke to the communities in the same way and facilitated collaboration between the two facilitators (C1 manager and C2 + C3 manager) involved in the same municipality (working together on planning tools, taking part in each other's training courses). This facilitated the integration of activities. There was also good coordination between the CPs working in the communities and those based in Dakar (Agence nationale de l'aviation civile et de la météorologie - Anacim, Jokalante, CNAAS), with the former facilitating the operational deployment of the latter.

239. **Good coordination between the WFP's CPs and SOs** also facilitated good synergy between

activities thanks to the quarterly meetings organised by the SOs, as well as the discussions that took place between the CO and the Dakar-based CPs. The steering committees (COPIL) ensured that information is shared with all stakeholders.

240. **At community level**, the project was designed to ensure that the activities were synergistic: increasing agricultural production (C1) (e.g. by restoring soil fertility or supporting rice production) fed the VCBs (C3); agricultural insurance (C2) aimed to secure production (C1); access to climate information (C1) strengthened agricultural production (C1). In addition, decisions taken during the course of the project further strengthened these synergies: the EIGs acted as distributors of agricultural insurance products for CNAAS; the SfCs facilitated the pooling of funding for climate information. These synergies, which are rooted in the very structure of the R4 project, were strengthened by the continuous presence of coordinators in the municipalities.

241. 2.3.6 Adaptability

242. The project displayed a good capacity to adapt, both in terms of good coordination and administration (e.g. increase in the duration of memoranda of understanding), and in terms of the activities carried out (e.g. change of telephone operator, development of Jokalante services, emergence of the hybrid index for agricultural insurance, development of the warrantage system towards support for village cereal banks).

243. The project showed a good capacity to adapt in its implementation, thereby significantly improving the quality of interventions. This applies both to coordination and to the administrative and financial aspects, with the **increase in the duration of the memoranda of understanding** from 12 to 18 months, which posed major difficulties for the CPs. In terms of the activities carried out, some examples are given below:

244. C1: change of telephone operators for money transfers, from Free to Orange, then from Orange to Wave / evolution of the services provided by Jokalante for climate information, with the introduction of two new local languages and the development of the interactive voice server.

245. C2: evolution of the agricultural insurance product, from a rainfall index to a hybrid index, implemented in 2022 and now generalised to the entire CNAAS portfolio.

246. C3: the evolution of the warrantage system towards support for the VCBs, in partnership with the DA, through the creation and training of management committees, the construction of 7 buildings and access for the VCBs to loans provided by the SfCs;

247. It should be noted, however, that several recommendations from the interim evaluation were not considered (Recommendation 2: *"Support the integration of the CBPP methodology into the preparation of the Local Development Plan (PDC). This will help to achieve the objectives of component 4 in terms of capacity building for local authorities and governance of climate risks"*, recommendation 6: *"The project should include the planting and maintenance of a certain number of trees per beneficiary. This would make it possible to plant and maintain a minimum of 450,000 trees, which would be equivalent to the number of direct beneficiaries of the project"*, recommendation 7: *"Introduction of energy-saving stoves using rice husks as an alternative to wood and charcoal. The rice husk stove is an energy-efficient model that is cheap and easy to manufacture, using husked rice residues as fuel. As the project has introduced rice production in some villages and increased yields in some villages that traditionally produced rice, increasing the rice husk offers the opportunity to reduce the use of wood and charcoal for cooking. This offers prospects for technology transfer, training for local craftsmen in its manufacture and job creation for young craftsmen"*). These recommendations had nevertheless been deemed relevant, with a "high" or "medium" level of priority, and had been validated (in whole or in part) by the WFP Country Office at the end of the interim evaluation (see "Annex 1 Management Response from WFP Senegal" in the interim evaluation report). The final evaluation team also agreed with these recommendations, which it considered relevant. It would have been desirable for these recommendations to have been taken more into account in the final years of implementation.

2.3.7 Complaints mechanisms

248. A complaints mechanism existed, consisting of a toll-free number that was not effective and a complaints collection table that recorded the few complaints that the facilitators were unable to resolve themselves with the communities. There were very few complaints relating to targeting.

249. There was a toll-free number for reporting complaints, but it was neither known nor used. Most of the complaints which were reported to the facilitators and mainly concerned cash transfers. The facilitators usually dealt with the problem directly and did not record the complaints handled. However, there was a complaints table, which only listed complaints that the facilitators were unable to deal with themselves (e.g. lost SIM cards). As regards the resolution of unresolved problems relating to transfers, in this case the WFP came directly to give the money to those who had not received it in a relatively reactive manner. Complaints about targeting were virtually non-existent, as the targeting was carried out by the communities (with validation of the criteria by the PCs and overall validation by the authorities).

2.4 To what extent did the project meet the deadlines, was it cost-effective, and were the deployment arrangements appropriate? - EFFICIENCY (EQ3) + SCALABILITY (EQ11)

2.4.1 Meeting deadlines

250. The extension of the project enabled all the planned activities to be carried out, with the budget fully implemented by October 2024 (the disbursement rate at the end of 2023 was 87%). When it came to dealing with operational issues, the responsiveness of the SOs was widely praised. However, regarding contractual aspects, there were numerous delays in renewing memoranda of understanding and transferring funds from the WFP. The negative effects of these delays on the implementation of activities were limited when the cooperating partners were able to make advances from their own funds.

251. The project was delayed in the first year due to the COVID-19 health crisis. The schedule had to be reorganised, postponing all planning activities (PSME, PCP) until the end of 2020, while winter and off-season activities were maintained.

252. The project was initially scheduled for completion in January 2024. At the end of 2023, the project's budget execution rate was 87%. The extension of the project until October 2024 enabled the remaining activities to be carried out and the entire budget to be implemented.

253. The responsiveness of the SB contacts was praised on several occasions and facilitated the handling of operational problems encountered during the implementation of activities.

254. However, there were delays in the start-up of agricultural campaigns, as a result of which activities have had to be cancelled or modified (for example, in some communes, millet seed was received in mid-July whereas planting should have been completed in June). (Reco5.2)

255. There were also delays in the renewal of memoranda of understanding and the transfer of funds by the WFP, which had a negative impact on the implementation of activities. On several occasions, CPs received the annual memorandum of understanding signed in March or April, and then the corresponding funds a few weeks later. The activities were supposed to cover the period from January to December. And a significant proportion of the funds had to be disbursed before the start of the agricultural season.

256. The negative effects of these delays were limited in cases where the CPs were able to pre-finance the activities from their own funds. However, this was not the case for all partners. On the other hand, even for those who were able to pre-finance, these situations generated risks and additional internal administrative burdens that were detrimental to the smooth running of the activities (pre-financing requiring validation by line managers, arbitration to be carried out by activity, etc.). It should be noted that these pre-financings mainly concerned C1.

2.4.2 Administrative and financial management

257. The duration of the memoranda of understanding created difficulties in implementing the activities. The change from 12 to 18 months was appreciated by the partners, but this revised duration remained insufficient in relation to the duration of the project (Reco5.2). Regarding cooperating partners (CPs) with the status of a government agency or programme, the project did not take sufficient account of their constraints in terms of procurement procedures.

258. The duration of the memoranda of understanding created difficulties in implementing the activities. This was changed during the course of the project, from 12 to 18 months, which represented a step forward. These procedures nevertheless remained cumbersome, time-consuming and a source of delays. A framework agreement, with a lifespan similar to that of the project, would have provided the CPs with a more secure framework, particularly if they had to pre-finance activities, and would have prevented annual budgetary and operational adjustments from becoming periods of contractual uncertainty that could interfere with the deployment of activities (Reco5.2).

259. CPs with the status of an agency or government programme were subject to specific procurement procedures which were not sufficiently taken into account. The articulation between these two frameworks - "national procedures" and "WFP procedures" - was difficult for the CPs concerned and led to delays in the execution of certain contracts. For example, the periods for renewing memoranda of understanding with the WFP could be disconnected from the timetables for submitting annual procurement plans to the Regional Unit and then to the Central Procurement Department. Partners may then have had to wait until the following calendar year to be able to carry out contracts provided for in the annual Programme of Work and Budget (WPAB), as they would first have had to have them validated in their next Procurement Plan (PPM).

260. Regarding the control mechanisms put in place, during field visits (approximately once a year in each intervention zone), the WFP checked the supporting documents for the expenditure incurred by the CPs (sometimes by sample, but most often exhaustively) and asked the partner for corrections if necessary. There was no specific external audit of expenditure for this project. The WFP CO was the subject of a "country audit", which included all the projects carried out, including the R4 project, but the project was not the subject of a specific "project audit".

2.4.3 Human resources (HR) factors

261. The project suffered from a discontinuity in the position of coordinator. The sub-offices (SOs) performed their coordination role well.

262. The project experienced discontinuity in coordination, which hampered its successful roll-out. The main reason for this was the consultant status given to the coordinator's position, which weakened his or her long-term commitment, with a high turnover in this key position. There were five coordinators in all (two women and three men). The main reasons for leaving were family moves and other professional opportunities. Contracts could be terminated two weeks before departure, whereas recruitment would take four to six weeks³¹. The gap periods were covered by the heads of the units. At the start of the project, only consultant status was available for the coordinator position³². Over the final year and a half, a new type of contract was introduced, a fixed-term contract with a maximum duration of four years, to meet the specific needs of the project coordinator over a limited period (Reco7.1).

263. Good coordination was ensured by the Sub-offices (Kolda and Kaolack), bringing together all the CPs involved on a regular basis (every three or four months). This enabled uniform sharing of information, a presentation of the progress made by each structure, and collective reflection on the difficulties encountered and possible solutions.

31 Publication of the job description, interviews with the CO and RB, verification of documents, contractualization

32 Unlike component managers, who had long-term fixed contracts

264. **2.4.4 Performance of the monitoring and evaluation system**

265. The project lacked a consolidated table for monitoring indicators. The indicators were not very focused on the changes made and the effects on the population. It was difficult to harmonise the monitoring frameworks of the WFP and the GCF. Gender studies were carried out, but they could have been extended to other themes of interest/other areas of intervention. (Reco6)

266. The project did not have a consolidated indicators monitoring dashboard enabling clear and concise monitoring of changes by activity, by component and by year. Most of the indicators were presented in the APR and results monitoring reports, but these documents rarely provided an overview of their progress, their evolution over time, with targets to be reached, which could be a good steering tool for the project managers. Furthermore, some logical framework indicators were not reported (e.g. percentage of CFA practices adopted). Activities, results, and progress were well documented each year. However, differences in grouping/sampling and formats made it more difficult to track indicators over the project's lifetime. The narrative explanations included in the APRs were useful in understanding how the project evolved despite these changes in data monitoring.

267. The indicators recorded did not represent an excessive burden for the CPs. However, they were mainly relatively simple output indicators, which did not allow the partners to question the changes brought about by the project on households and communities. In the absence of indicators geared towards results or changes in the situation, the evaluation of the direct effect of the interventions on the well-being and resilience of the target populations remained limited. In addition, the CP reporting frameworks were not sufficiently standardised, making it difficult to aggregate and monitor changes in the indicators,

268. The monitoring of results (outcomes) remained limited. Although the surveys were carried out with large samples, their content focused on collecting the information required for the indicators requested (in the APRs and annual country reports). This approach limited the scope of the analysis, as the surveys did not aim to provide a more in-depth assessment of the effects and changes brought about by the activities. For example, there was no monitoring of the use of funds granted under the SFC groups.

2.4.5 Quality of partnerships

269. The project was built on the basis of good complementarity between the WFP, the CPs in the field and those in Dakar. The CPs often mentioned that they had increased their skills thanks to the project. The identification of mobile phone operators lacked an in-depth diagnosis beforehand. The WFP was well recognised and integrated among the actors committed to the resilience of the UNS. (Reco5)

270. The operational set-up was based on good complementarity between the WFP and its Cs: the WFP being recognised for its expertise in the R4 approach (theoretical and operational) and the partners for their knowledge of the target areas (involved in these areas as part of previous projects) and their expertise in the issues addressed. In addition, the CPs deployed in the field complement those based in Dakar (e.g. CNAAS, Jokalanté, ANACIM), with the latter benefiting from the deployment of the former, thereby optimising operations and reducing costs.

271. In addition, skills development has been introduced as part of the project between CPs: those with in-depth expertise in an activity were asked to train other partners in charge of the same activity in other departments (e.g. La Lumière trained Caritas in SFC, ANCAR trained Provale/CV in agricultural advisory services). This enabled the partners to increase their skills. More generally, the empowerment of public institutions and civil society organisations as CPs in this project strengthened their skills. On the other hand, the WFP did not organise any technical meetings bringing together all the partners responsible for the same component in the five regions, although this would have enabled greater sharing of experience and skills at a technical level (Reco5.3).

272. The partnership with the National Programme for Local Development (PNDL) did not materialise as envisaged when the project was designed. This would have made it possible (via the regional development agencies) for local authorities to take greater ownership of the PCP tool and incorporate it into their PDCs, as

well as introducing resilience-sensitive budgets and appropriate monitoring mechanisms.

273. More specifically, the selection of mobile phone operators (in charge of cash transfers) was not optimal due to a lack of initial diagnosis. Three operators came and went: the first (Free) had poor geographical coverage of distribution points in the project area, the second (Orange money) sent numerous advertising text messages, increasing the risk of confusion in relation to the message relating to the transfer; the third (Wave) did not have the disadvantages of the first two and was therefore more satisfactory. These changes could have been avoided by better prior diagnosis ([Reco5.4](#)).

274. Partnerships were in place with several other United Nations entities, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). There were many significant opportunities to strengthen coordination and operational synergies, particularly with the other Rome-based agencies.

2.4.6 Communication and capitalisation

275. The WFP largely lacked capitalisation and communication tools (e.g. videos, practical information sheets, case studies). This prevented the project's effects from being exploited and hampered its multiplication by other players and its appropriation by the authorities. It prevented the WFP from carrying out advocacy work on social safety nets, which was one of the project's activities. In addition, the WFP did not sufficiently share the reports, analyses and studies produced with its partners, mainly due to oversight (cooperating partners - PCs, authorities, communities). ([Reco1](#))

276. **The WFP did too little to develop tools for capitalising on** the project. However, it is essential to capitalise on this approach, this technical expertise and these organisational methods ([Reco1.1](#)), both internally for the WFP (for the benefit of the CO and beyond for any other CO wishing to deploy R4), and for partners working with communities on these same issues, as well as for national and local authorities ([Reco1.3](#)). Four short videos (one to four minutes each) were developed to present the SfCs, the farmers' rain gauges and the half-moons, with a special focus on how these initiatives contribute to a better adaptation to climate change. However distribution of these videos remained low and there is still very little to show for the many activities carried out and the interesting lessons to be learned. The WFP plans to share its expertise on soil rehabilitation techniques with the Government for the benefit of a national manual, which would be an interesting initiative to replicate in many other areas (e.g. training on AIC; protocol linked to climate services and associated agricultural advice, etc.) ([Reco2.3](#)). The project also lacked capitalisation tools from the previous phase.

277. **The project lacked visibility** in terms of its existence, objectives, approach, activities and results. The communication component was included too late, and the communication strategy and tools (e.g. videos, practical fact sheets, case studies) were among the project's major shortcomings ([Reco1.2](#)). It should be noted that they were not budgeted for in the project funding. Although SECNSA and the designated national authority in charge of the GCF publicly recognised the relevance of scaling up this programme at national level, these shortcomings in terms of capitalisation and communication on a more continuous and broader basis did not enable the authorities (at national and local level), aid actors (national programmes and civil society) and the general public to be sufficiently informed, so that they were able to know, understand and take ownership of the project's actions, results and best practices, and so that they could help multiply these interventions. Overall, the project's achievements were not capitalised on, making it difficult to integrate them into social protection policies at local and national level ([Reco1.4](#)).

278. **Furthermore, the WFP did not regularly share the reports produced with its partners** (the CPs and local authorities), which can be seen as a lack of accountability towards them (the WFP asked the CPs to send them data regularly but did not always share the data and information compiled in return, mainly due to oversight). As far as the local authorities were concerned, this would have given them a better understanding of the interventions carried out, and therefore a greater capacity to incorporate the monitoring of these initiatives at the end of the project. The WFP also failed to share the PCPs with the communities, so that they would be in a position to take ownership of this tool for use beyond the scope of the project.

279. **Finally, the absence of a communication strategy affected the visibility of the evidence**

generated by the project and limited the opportunities for institutional appropriation. For example, the project's regional monitoring committees and the SE/CNSA were not promoted as strategic bodies for learning by doing and for making the most of the project's achievements in social protection policies at local and national level. In addition, frequent institutional changes prevented the proposal that the COPILs should be led by the Secretary General of the Government from being implemented. As a result, the WFP was unable to play an advocacy role with the government. However, this could have enabled the project's impact on social safety nets to be enhanced (e.g. SFC resources that could support health, the presence of facilitators who support community dynamics) and would thus have provided the authorities with elements to be incorporated into local and national policies on social safety nets, as provided for in the C4.

2.4.7 Scaling up at no additional cost

280. Climate information, dissemination of the VCB methodology in existing infrastructures and the concepts of "SFC" funds, "SFC federating EIGs" and "EIGs distributing insurance products" offer good potential for scaling up at no (or low) additional cost.

281. A large proportion of the activities implemented by the project have good potential for scaling up at no additional cost:

282. Climate information can be disseminated widely at no additional cost. Several testimonies of information sharing by subscribers at religious, social and cultural events, at SFC and EIG meetings, and by the village chief or through a WhatsApp group were collected.

283. The concept of EIGs distributing insurance products could also be deployed more widely without further project intervention, provided that the EIGs are sufficiently trained and supported by CNAAS.

284. The "SFC" and "EIG federating SFC" concepts also have very good potential for scaling up. The fact that these mechanisms have been taken on board by the beneficiaries is a positive sign and could encourage them to spread. However, the major role played by facilitators in the deployment of these schemes shows that it will be difficult to roll them out on a large scale if there is no project or structure to take on the role of trainer and facilitator.

285. Finally, as a complement to the creation of cereal banks, the dissemination of the methodology for setting up VCBs in existing infrastructures also seems particularly efficient and duplicable at lower cost.

286. **Efficiency best practices / lessons learned for future rollouts**

287. Offer a fixed-term status to the WFP coordinator for the duration of the project to ensure a long-term commitment. *

288. Define memoranda of understanding for the duration of the project to reduce red tape and the resulting delays. *

289. Select cooperating partners recognised for their knowledge of the area and their technical expertise, from among civil society players and government programmes and agencies.

290. Opt for a gradual targeting strategy that will enable the skills of the cooperating partners and the achievements of the beneficiaries to be strengthened.

291. Ensure good coordination between cooperating partners (CPs) working in the same area and with WFP sub-offices (SOs).

292. Do not enrol new beneficiaries in the final year of the project.

293. Deploy a communication and capitalisation strategy and tools throughout the project and from the outset in order to highlight the project's results, support the duplication of the project and facilitate the integration of the project's achievements into social protection policies (at national and local level). *

294. Share documents produced by the WFP with cooperating partners, decentralised technical services and the authorities (e.g. annual reports, studies, presentation documents) *.

295. Include indicators for monitoring the effects of the project (e.g. percentage of trees planted that are still alive after two years of the project) and not just output indicators (e.g. number of trees distributed) *.
296. Implement a consolidated dashboard that allows clear and concise monitoring of changes in indicators. *
297. Carry out an in-depth diagnosis before selecting a telephony operator for money transfers. *

* R4 best practices, which are also areas for improvement for the CO Senegal

2.5. To what extent has the project generated positive or negative impacts, intended or unintended, in the medium and long term and has it been innovative? - IMPACT (EQ4) + POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESULTS (EQ11) + INNOVATION (EQ8)

298. Case study 4, entitled "Impacts of the project collected from a woman beneficiary", presents a beneficiary of the rice-growing support, the contributions of the project and the many positive social, food, economic and environmental impacts (Appendix 12).

2.5.1 Social impact

299. The project strengthened social cohesion and solidarity in the villages. It also strengthened the ability of men and women to work together, the decision-making power of women within their community and the self-esteem of many beneficiaries. All this contributing to increase resilience to CC of communities targeted. Moreover the project considerably reduced the risk of conflict between farmers and herders around water points and strengthened cohesion between Indigenous and transhumant herders, both largely exacerbated by CC. (Reco2, Reco4) It was noted that there was a lack of clear qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the project's impacts (particularly at community and environmental level).

300. The project enabled the renewal of pre-existing collective organisational skills, which had been weakened for several years as a result of the demographic increase in the villages and the new dynamics that have been put in place (e.g. men and young people often leave to find work in town for a significant period of the year), such as the management of savings and loan associations, VCBs and EIGs. Support for the SFC funds helped to strengthen understanding between members: "We work together more, there is better understanding between members" (Medina Sally). As part of the FFA activity, new techniques, which the local people found useful, were taught using a community-based approach, which greatly strengthened the links between participants: "the work to develop the pastoral pond has generated inter-village solidarity" (Sally Escale). Similarly, the collective fields (millet, rice, market gardens) strengthened cohesion between members, and sometimes between villages and ethnic groups: "Before (the creation of the collective field with the project) there was no friendship between our ethnic groups (Peul and Mandingue), now we invite each other over" (Saré Gayo). This community dynamic, deployed through the project's three operational components, greatly strengthened social cohesion and solidarity between members. The impact study had already highlighted this positive aspect of the R4 project: "Solidarity is increasing in the villages concerned, catalysed by the community activities organised by the programme under the FFA component and the savings groups under the SFC component"³³. This reinforcement of social cohesion strengthens communities' ability to organize themselves in the face of shocks risks, particularly those related to climate change.

301. It also strengthened the understanding and ability of men and women in the same community to work together, as demonstrated by the creation of mixed SFC groups in many villages, which did not exist

³³

Dalberg. Impact evaluation of the R4 programme for rural resilience in Senegal. 2015.

before. By systematically requiring gender diversity in the committees, it supports (e.g. EIG, VCB, targeting committee), the project strengthened the ability of men and women to work together. "The project has raised awareness of the role of women in households... now men and women can be together in meetings... men listen to women" (Port Dramé). Strengthening women's economic empowerment through the SFCs increased women's recognition within the communities, boosting their self-confidence and decision-making power (e.g. many villages reported that they now seek women's opinions on community initiatives, whereas this was not the case before the project). It also helped to boost self-esteem by strengthening participants' skills in the various activities on offer. Support for rice-growing also helped to restore a sense of 'pride' among the whole community, as they rediscovered the practices of their elders, and benefited from the nutritional benefits of cultivated rice compared with imported rice, which is considered to be of poor quality. This better integration of women into community initiatives and restoration of the sense of pride, strengthens the capacities of the communities and hence their ability to cope with shocks such as climate shocks.

302. The project led to the emergence of new community dynamics, such as community management of the pastoral ponds rehabilitated by the project, which prevent local and transhumant livestock farmers from taking their herds to drink from boreholes located in crop-growing areas. This considerably reduces the risk of conflict between farmers and breeders: "the waterhole prevents transhumant herders and local breeders from going to the borehole near the fields, which reduces conflict between farmers and breeders". (Ida Mouride). It also strengthened cohesion between local and transhumant herders, who now have a common interest in the proper management of the waterhole, "even the transhumant herders have asked when they can help to develop the waterhole" (Ida Mouride). This is all the more important as climate change increases risks of conflicts between farmers and herders due to access to natural resources. Communal deliberations and decrees are to be signed by the mayor and sub-prefect respectively to prohibit the installation of agricultural fields and the cutting of wood within a 500m perimeter, with the aim of reducing the risk of conflict and protecting the waterhole, which had been achieved in only two of the four waterholes visited.

2.5.2 Impacts on food security

303. The project encouraged increased agricultural production and food diversification, generating positive impacts in terms of food and nutritional security and increased resiliency and food security of the beneficiaries against climate shocks. The "cash transfers" and "support for village cereal banks" activities also helped to reduce the impact of the hunger gap on households and thus to better cope with climate risks. These results have led the government to plan to incorporate certain elements of the R4s into its next resilience strategy. (Reco2, Reco4)

304. The project has had a significant impact on food security. The improvements (e.g. stone barriers, dykes and market gardening areas), climate information and training in AIC and soil conservation have created favourable conditions for increasing agricultural production through better adaptation to climatic variability and extreme events. What's more, by retaining branches, the landscaping helps to increase the area under cultivation. Moreover, wild animals (e.g. monkeys) now come to drink from the pastoral pools and leave the market gardening areas, thus reducing the destruction of market garden crops. This increase in productivity and production, coupled with the training provided on reducing post-harvest losses and techniques related to climate change adaptation, has led to an increase in food availability and resilience against climate shocks.

305. Other developments, such as reforestation sites to combat salinisation and reintroduce rice growing in certain areas, and market gardens, have helped to diversify agricultural production and household food supplies and to reduce consequences of climate change. This food diversification has had a positive impact on nutrition and health. In some villages, the project has had a significant impact on reducing child malnutrition. This impact on nutrition is also well illustrated by the example of rice growing, where locally grown rice is recognised as being of much better quality than rice purchased from China, locally produced it also contribute to climate mitigation.


306. The impact of the lean period on households has also been reduced by the introduction of food reserve mechanisms through the VCBs and cash transfers, that will strengthen food security resilience against climate shocks and increased variability.

307. The impact evaluation of the R4 project, phase 1 in Senegal, showed that "Despite the negative

change in the Food Consumption Score (FCS) for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (due to a drop in rainfall), the programme helped beneficiaries to limit the drop compared with non-beneficiaries: the SCA level fell from 56.2 to 28.6 points (-49.1%) for non-beneficiaries, the change was from 59.02 to 56.24 points (-8.1%) for beneficiaries.”

308. In the case of the phase 2 project that interests us here, monitoring of the Food Consumption Score (FCS) shows that the percentage of households with an acceptable FCS exceeds the targets set, both at the mid-term and end of the project.

Figure 14 : Beneficiary households with an acceptable food consumption score (FCS), by year



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

309. These convincing results have led the government to plan to incorporate certain elements of the R4 into its next Resilience strategy related to climate change adaptation.

2.5.3 Economic impact

310. The increase in agricultural production, the deployment of "savings for change" funds, economic interest groups and incubation programmes, the possibility of mobilising credit for the development of income-generating activities, the various training courses provided and support for village cereal banks are all activities that have had a positive economic impact on beneficiaries, enabling them to increase their income, improve their savings and investment capacity, reduce their expenditure and/or better manage their budget. (Reco2, Reco4)

311. The activities implemented by the project have had a positive economic impact on households thanks to several levers:

312. The increase in agricultural production, which has led to both an increase in income from sales and a reduction in expenditure on food through self-consumption.

313. The SfCs and EIGs, which have enabled their members to access loans at rates well below market rates, thereby reducing the need for very costly loan sharking. The APR 2023 indicates that, by the end of 2023, the cumulative value of loans granted amounted to USD 174,000.

314. To a certain extent (see the limitations mentioned in section 2.3.3 of this report), these loans have enabled beneficiaries to invest in IGAs. The 2023 APR indicates that, by the end of 2023, the loans granted had enabled the creation of 2040 climate-insensitive IGAs, thus exceeding the target of 1000 climate-insensitive IGAs created that the WFP had set itself in 2022. However, the target of 1,000 IGAs and the result of 2,040 IGAs seem very low given the number of direct beneficiaries and households targeted by the project.

315. The emergence of these IGAs has also been encouraged by incubation programmes, entrepreneurship training and the processing units deployed with the EIGs.

316. The financial education training provided to SfCs, which, according to the beneficiaries interviewed, has enabled households to improve their control over household budgets.

317. Lastly, support for the VCBs, which has enabled beneficiaries to gain greater control over the harvest sales calendar and to reduce dumping.

318. All the activities mentioned above have enabled producers to increase their income, demonstrating that the project has had a positive impact in terms of economic development.

2.5.4 Environmental impact

319. Rehabilitating ponds, reclaiming degraded land, planting trees and establishing set-aside areas have helped to increase biodiversity, rehabilitate soil, improve rainwater management and encourage natural regulation of the area. (Reco2, Reco4)

320. Although the time between the development work and the evaluation is too short to measure the environmental impacts generated by the project, some major trends can clearly be discerned from the field observations and information collected. **In the vicinity of the rehabilitated pastoral pools, set-aside areas** have been defined, allowing for natural regeneration favourable to reforestation, thus restructuring the land to encourage water infiltration into the soil, preserving biodiversity and recharging the water table. The landscaping and set-aside areas also increase water retention upstream of the villages, thereby reducing the risk of flooding in residential areas. According to the implementing partners' reports, the resilience-building activities "have contributed to the conservation of natural resources and the resilience of ecosystems.³⁴". It should be noted, however, that not all the rehabilitated ponds have had such an impact. One of the ponds visited, for example, did not have a buffer zone and, at the end of the rainy season, the water was only very partially visible (it had apparently not been dug deep enough).

321. Similarly, by carrying out water and soil conservation, soil defence and restoration (CES-DRS) work, **FFA activities** help to reduce soil erosion and thus **restore soil fertility, reduce silting up of rivers** and thus **preserve river ecosystems, improve rainwater management** and thus **recharge the water table** and **reduce the risk of flooding**. The planting of trees (for those that have survived) on rehabilitated land, in the form of living hedges around market gardening areas or the edges of rice fields, helps to diversify the mosaic of ecosystems, improve the soil's water retention capacity and promote agro-ecosystem regulation functions (e.g. temperatures, diseases). This is even more essential given that the country is experiencing a 15% drop in rainfall (compared with the 1920-1965 period) and a 0.9°C rise since 1975, increasing the risk of drought³⁵. Lastly, the construction of ring dikes and bunds around rice fields will help to reduce the salinisation of the land and make it productive once again.

2.5.5 Unexpected impacts

322. The only unexpected impact noted was positive and concerned hybrid agricultural insurance, which came into being during the project and produced unexpected effects in terms of beneficiary satisfaction and appropriation by other institutions working in agricultural insurance. The trend is for it to become widespread.

2.5.6 Innovations

323. The project is innovative in its overall approach of bringing together complementary activities around climate risk management. It is also innovative in terms of the agricultural insurance it offers, popularising the insurance culture among the target populations and developing a hybrid insurance product

³⁴ PAM. 2023. Evaluation of the Senegal Country Strategic Plan (CSP) 2018 - 2022. Centralised evaluation report.

³⁵ USGS. 2012. A climate trend analysis of Senegal.

hitherto unavailable in Senegal. Climatic information combined with agricultural advice is also innovative, as is the development of an interactive voice server for continuous access. Finally, the involvement of men in the "Savings for Change" (SFC) funds is also an innovation of the project. (Reco2, Reco4)

324. One of the innovations of the R4 project is the **synergy between** diversified and complementary **activities** designed to help producers vulnerable to food insecurity adapt more effectively to climate risks. The **household approach** offers greater flexibility to participants in the activities.

325. **The agricultural insurance** included in this project is a particularly innovative activity. On the one hand, it has enabled the small-scale producers targeted to discover and experiment with the principles of agricultural insurance, and thus to familiarise themselves with the culture of insurance. Secondly, by developing a hybrid insurance product (based on both yields and satellite data), which is an innovation for the whole country, and even for the sub-region.

326. **The climate information** shared as part of the project is innovative in that it is coupled with agricultural advice. The radio programmes developed on climate issues around themes defined by the listeners and via decentralised broadcasts in the field are also innovations of the project. Finally, the development of an interactive voice server to provide information continuously via a call-in number (cost of a local call), for producers enrolled in the project (access to climate information plus associated agricultural advice) and for all others (access to climate information only). This interactive voice server is a technological innovation in the system.

327. The emergence of new collective dynamics associated with the SFCs should also be highlighted, whether in the form of collective subscriptions to climate information, such as a **collective subscription for all the members** of an SFC fund, enabling expenses to be pooled and making this service accessible to the group, or the **involvement of men in the SFC funds** and solidarity schemes (which did not exist before).

2.4. To what extent has the project integrated gender equity, equality and the empowerment of women, and has it also considered the specific needs of young people and marginalised groups? - GENDER (EQ7)

2.4.1. Integration into design and planning

328. The project's initial monitoring and evaluation framework was deemed inadequate after the first year of implementation, leading to the development of a Gender Action Plan in 2021 with more precise objectives and indicators. However, the implementation of this plan remained partial, the objectives of integrating women into management positions and inclusion in community processes were not fully achieved, and some of the actions planned, particularly for young women, were not carried out.

329. At the start of the project, the monitoring and evaluation framework (dating from 2017) did not allow satisfactory monitoring of the activities developed and their effects on women. A Gender Action Plan was drawn up in 2021 to remedy this, proposing new, more precise objectives and indicators, as well as additional actions to better incorporate the gender dimension into the various components.

330. The revised gender action plan included many cross-cutting activities aimed at raising gender awareness and training networks of women leaders and community relays. However, it seems that these actions have not been implemented, and the corresponding indicators have not all been reported in the activity reports.

331. The project also set targets for the integration of women into management positions, both in social work and technical management. However, the target of 50% women in these positions does not seem to have been achieved. Within the WFP, the positions of Project Coordinator and main positions of responsibility have always been held by men, except for the heads of the SFC/Gender and Insurance components, as well as the Deputy Country Director, who are women. At the level of the cooperating partners, many women have joined the teams in support functions (accounting, communication, secretariat, etc.), but they are less present in the field than men, particularly in matters of technical advice.

332. The project did not sufficiently highlight the role of women as agents of change, which had a direct impact on the effectiveness of the activities implemented, particularly in the cash transfer component. During the project evaluation, 3 out of 12 FGDs conducted with beneficiaries of the activity package mentioned several cases where cash transfers, intended to improve the food and nutritional security of households so that they could concentrate their efforts on creating IGAs, had been allocated to other expenses. Some of the aid was not allocated to essential needs such as FNS or school fees, which may have compromised the intended impact of the project. Faced with these difficulties, several groups of women beneficiaries suggested reverting to the distribution of food or vouchers rather than cash transfers, so that they could better control the allocation of aid and ensure that it was used for FNS.

333. It is difficult to quantify the extent of this phenomenon, as the project's indicators do not allow for accurate and transparent monitoring of the use of transfers, a shortcoming that limits the evaluation of the real impact of this aid on the ground. This lack of an adequate monitoring mechanism raises a broader question about the WFP's ability to correctly identify the agents of change in its projects. A clear and targeted identification of beneficiaries, considering their specific role in the household and community, with a particular focus on women as key actors in the management of reproductive activities, is crucial to maximising the effectiveness of interventions and ensuring a sustainable impact.

334. Efforts were made to include women and marginalised groups in the targeting committees and during the community planning phase. However, the objective of including 50% of women in PCPs was not achieved, reaching a maximum of 25%. It appears that youth representatives were involved in the PCPs, but the evaluation team was unable to determine the precise extent of this participation.

335. Despite explicit requests from certain communities during the participatory community planning phase, the project did not introduce any specific incentives to integrate young women into the activities. However, young women face particular challenges, such as lack of access to resources, which sometimes leads them to migrate seasonally to urban areas, and early marriage. Taking their specific needs into account could have led to the implementation of certain specific activities, such as systematic inclusion procedures or measures to monitor their situation.

2.6.2 Integration into the implementation

336. Female heads of household represented a majority of recipients of cash transfers linked to asset creation activities (76% in 2023), but they did not always receive these funds directly, which may have limited their autonomy in their use.

337. They were heavily involved in savings groups, in line with social norms in rural communities. On the other hand, their access to insurance remained limited, with a low proportion of women subscribing to products that do not always correspond to their farming activities, raising doubts about the sustainability of their participation once project support has ended.

338. The project has made progress in including women, but the lack of ongoing awareness-raising sessions on the role of women and gender equity risks overburdening women by giving them new responsibilities without lightening their current workload.


339. According to project monitoring data, female-headed households made up a significant proportion of the beneficiaries of asset creation activities against cash transfers, representing 76% of participating households in 2023. However, until that date, the number of women receiving cash transfers directly remained lower than the total number of female beneficiary households. The reliability of the data may be questioned, particularly in view of the abnormally high percentage of female-headed households among the beneficiaries. If these figures are accurate, this raises concerns about their real autonomy in the use of the funds, as there is no guarantee that these sums will be allocated according to their priorities.

340. Furthermore, women were the main beneficiaries of savings and credit group activities, systematically accounting for over 80% of participants. However, this high level of participation largely reflects the social norms already established in rural communities, where women traditionally play a central role in microfinance initiatives. However, it is important to note the emergence of mixed or male savings groups. Although they represented a minority among the beneficiaries and, according to the cooperating partners,

were often less dynamic than the women's groups, their existence bears witness to a change in mentality.

341. As far as insurance is concerned, the situation was different: women accounted for only a quarter to a third of total subscriptions over the four years of the project, and most of them accessed insurance through work-related mechanisms. This raises concerns about the sustainability of their cover, as it is likely that once the project's support ends, many of them will stop taking out insurance policies due to a lack of financial resources or suitable products.

Figure 15 : Women who took out insurance, by type of cover



Source: APR 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023

342. Most of the insurance products on offer related to cash crops, which are traditionally managed by men, limiting women's access to these services. It is important to stress that, although rice growing was covered by insurance policies, this crop is often grown collectively, or on very small areas, making individual cover of little relevance. Market gardening, which is the main off-season activity for many women, was not included in the insurance options. This raises the question of the significant number of women taking out insurance, perhaps because of the perception that this is necessary in order to continue to benefit from the project, even if the insurance does not always correspond to their actual farming activities.

343. Overall, the project has made progress in including women in its various activities, particularly through training sessions. However, it should be noted that although community awareness-raising sessions on the role of women and gender equity were organised in 2020 and 2021, no such sessions took place in 2022 and 2023. Raising the awareness of all communities, including men, remains crucial to strengthening the project's achievements. Without this comprehensive approach, there is a risk of overburdening women by giving them new responsibilities, particularly financial ones, without lightening their already heavy workload.

2.6.3 Impact on women's empowerment

344. Beneficiaries reported an improvement in their living conditions and a strengthening of their community status thanks to the savings groups. Several cases demonstrate that access to credit and economic resources has transformed the situation of beneficiaries, propelling them to the rank of influential community leaders, although this position comes with additional responsibilities.

345. The project suffered from a lack of specific impact indicators focused on women, making it difficult to assess its real effects on their situation. Although two qualitative studies carried out in 2023 provided valuable analyses of social and financial changes, their limited scope prevented the conclusions

from being generalised to all the intervention areas.

346. In addition, the project did not take account of the differentiated impact of its activities according to the gender of the head of household.

347. Aside from participation indicators (such as the number of women trained or benefiting), there is a lack of impact indicators specifically focused on women, which severely limits the ability to truly assess the effects of the project on their situation.

348. In 2023, two qualitative studies were carried out: the first explored whether the WFP's intervention (R4) had fostered psychosocial conditions conducive to a structural change in social norms, particularly in men's perception of women's land ownership, with a focus on a village in Tambacounda; the second examined the financial behaviour of men and women in mixed savings groups. These studies provided a valuable qualitative analysis, which was not included in the gender action plan indicators. However, due to the limited size of the samples and their concentration on specific areas, they did not allow general conclusions to be drawn for all the project's intervention areas.

349. The beneficiaries interviewed during the evaluation reported a general improvement in household living conditions, and some mentioned an increase in their status within the communities, thanks particularly to their participation in savings groups and EIGs. However, changes in women's status within households are more complex to assess in a global way. The case studies illustrate a diversity of cases, some of which mention seeing no change in terms of the division of labour within their household (see section 2.3.2).

350. It is important to note that, while increasing women's economic power strengthens their influence within communities, it can also result in increased pressure in the form of demands for financial contributions to support collective expenditure. This additional burden, if not well managed, could undermine the long-term sustainable development of these groups. Case study 5 entitled "Effects on women's empowerment" presents a beneficiary and the economic, social and leadership benefits she derives from her integration into an SFC (Appendix 12).

The project did not explore the differentiated impact of its package of activities according to the gender of the head of household, whether female or male. However, such an analysis would be invaluable in refining targeting and adapting interventions to the specific needs of each type of household, thereby improving the effectiveness of the activities deployed.

2.6.4 Taking account of young people and people with disabilities

351. The specific needs of young people were not sufficiently studied or integrated into the project. The inclusion of people living with disabilities was achieved through the household approach, although little mention was made of this during the focus groups in the villages.

352. Young people were not particularly targeted by the project, although through the household approach they were able to participate in the proposed activities. Their specific needs and solutions were not studied, despite the major issues at stake, particularly in terms of access to land and interest in and opportunities for IGAs. Concerns about a lack of inclusion of young women in the SFCs and of young people in collective work were raised. This was a common demand in the villages, mentioned in the PCPs, but insufficiently considered in the implementation of the project. ([Reco3.4](#)) The Salouma project, which operates partly in the same communes, has made this a priority objective.

353. It might have been possible, for example, to offer them the use of market garden plots during the main season, as the women mainly cultivate in the off-season. However, this scenario was not observed anywhere, even in the market gardens that were in operation.

354. The inclusion of people living with a disability did not seem to be particularly emphasised by the project, according to the information gathered during the group interviews. However, according to the 2020 results monitoring report, statistics show that 25% of beneficiary households included a disabled person. Villages had an average of 18% of households with a disabled member. Data for the central regions is not available.

355. **Good gender practice / lessons learned for future deployments:**

356. Provide training on women's empowerment, their role as agents of change and gender equality, taking care to include men, women and young people throughout the project.

357. Carry out an in-depth analysis of the causes of women's low take-up of insurance in order to remove the barriers. *

358. Analyse and consider the specific needs of young people (including the specific needs of young women) and people with disabilities so that the project also meets their needs *.

359. Propose specific interventions to include more households with no savings capacity (e.g. in SFC funds, village cereal banks - VCB) and young women *.

360. Set up a qualitative and quantitative monitoring and evaluation framework to measure the effects of activities on gender dynamics *.

* R4 best practices, which are also areas for improvement for the CO Senegal

2.5. Are the interventions deployed sustainable, appropriated by the authorities and communities and replicable in other departments of the country? - SUSTAINABILITY (EQ9) + OWNERSHIP OF THE PROJECT BY THE COUNTRY (EQ7) + REPLICABILITY (EQ10)

2.7.1 Community ownership

361. The project has strengthened community dynamics, which is encouraging in terms of the sustainability of activities but remains fragile. Although the techniques taught relating to community assets were well integrated and appropriated, the associated management committees often lacked training, weakening the prospects for maintenance beyond the project. The climatic information and associated agricultural advice, as well as the SFCs, have good prospects for sustainability, given the convincing results obtained and the associated reduced costs. The sustainability of agricultural insurance remains to be demonstrated. Nothing can be said about the village cereal banks (VCB).

362. Thanks to its community-based approach and the ongoing presence of a facilitator in each commune, the project enabled communities to take ownership of the project and to rehabilitate community mechanisms that were previously developed but had been weakened for several years. These dynamics were strengthened through the support of the SFC groups and the VCBs, as well as the collective initiatives put in place as part of the work to create community assets.

363. The **assets created** concerned the development of land for better management of natural resources, such as DRS-CES techniques and the development of pastoral ponds. This work was carried out collectively, and the benefits of better management of these common assets were clearly perceived. The techniques deployed are now well mastered and appropriated by the communities (and the DTS), making it possible to envisage maintenance beyond the project, in cases where no expenditure is involved. In such cases, maintenance can only be carried out if the local population derives sufficient direct economic or food benefit from it (e.g. rehabilitation of bunds in rice fields).

364. The **management committees** for each community asset rehabilitated/created have always been trained, or when they were trained there was a lack of foresight, thereby weakening maintenance capacity beyond the project and thus the proper management of natural resources in the long term.

365. In addition, the beneficiaries often did not associate the **cash transfers** they received with the development work carried out, because of the unconditional support they had previously received from the WFP. The advantage of this is that local people perceived the development work carried out as community

mobilisation in the collective interest, and this is a factor in mobilising citizens at the end of the project.

366. The **CSA techniques** taught did not significantly modify practices, except for rice-growing techniques, although the adoption of new techniques (e.g. IRS) does not always seem to have been achieved according to field observations. As far as seeds are concerned, links with seed producers were not established.

367. **Climate information** combined with agricultural advice was much appreciated, deemed useful and perceived as an agricultural input, and therefore well appropriated by the communities. Despite the inadequate subscription period, the large number of subscriptions made on a pooled basis by the SfCs, and the tenor of the comments gathered, testify to good appropriation and underpin good prospects for sustainability.

368. The sustainability of **agricultural insurance** remains to be demonstrated. The cumulative sums spent over the years, which in most cases were much higher than the amounts received, do not seem to have convinced the producers interviewed of the value of the product in its current state. The number of subscriptions taken out in 2024 is not sufficient to determine the sustainability of the activity. Several people interviewed said they had subscribed to meet implicit expectations but planned to stop once the project was over. However, the project made it possible to discover the existence of agricultural insurance products, which contributed to the appropriation of the principle, even if in its current state it is unlikely to be adopted on a large scale.

369. **SfCs** have good prospects for sustainability. The rules of governance are well defined by the group beforehand; the members are assiduous, and the funds are being implemented well and even multiplying. In fact, there are many cases of new groups asking for training and support to set up an SFC, a sign of great interest in this activity. This support is provided by the facilitators with the help of an SFC fund on hand. Overall, the groups are operating well, thanks particularly to the close support provided by the facilitators, although this raises the question of the groups' sustainability beyond the facilitators' contracts.

370. However, the potential of the **PCP** as a tool for change-oriented development beyond the framework of the R4 project does not seem to have been realised. The approach was limited to identifying the needs of local people in order to find links with the R4 project guidelines. There was a lack of leadership to bring the PCPs to life beyond the project guidelines, and a lack of ownership of the PCPs by the communities. The PCPs can serve as an advocacy tool for the communities, presenting their specific needs, available resources and budgets. Little use was made of the PCPs beyond the R4 project, which is regrettable and does not sufficiently recognise the value of all the community work undertaken. They did not play their transformative role to the full.

371. It is not yet possible to assess the sustainability of the **VCBs**, as the activity has not yet produced effective results in terms of implementation.

2.7.2 Ownership by the authorities

372. The regular participation of the authorities shows that they have partly taken ownership of the project at various levels (ministries, administrative authorities, local authorities, STDs).

373. The project was well received by the mayors, who made a commitment at the last COPIL meeting to incorporate the project's work into their local policies. However, there is a risk that the sustainability of the initiatives will be compromised by the fact that the local authorities do not have the budget to apply the guidelines.

374. The Departmental Monitoring Committee, chaired by the Prefect, was not involved in monitoring the project; discussions were initiated at the end of the project, i.e. late in the process to ensure its continuity.

375. The lack of accountability on the part of decentralised institutions risks affecting their involvement in supporting the sustainability of the project.

376. The WFP played a key role in providing technical support to enable CNASS to develop and manage index insurance products effectively, promoting sustainable insurance systems and ensuring that local stakeholders are empowered to take over these initiatives beyond the end of the project.

377. The SE-CNSA plans to integrate elements of the R4s into its next food security, nutrition and resilience strategy, but the lack of operational involvement at national and regional level may limit implementation. (Reco2.1)

378. The institutional players recognised the simplicity of the approaches and technologies proposed, which is conducive to their replicability.

379. The WFP could make greater use of decentralised government structures to design and monitor interventions.³⁶

2.7.3 Key factors of success and failure

380. The key success factors include: the participatory and community-based approach, local leadership, good understanding of the issues by the communities, interest in the areas concerned by the project, and the simplicity of the techniques disseminated. And there are several failure factors: the lack of training for management committees, high turnover in key positions, poor communication and capitalisation on the project's achievements, lack of land tenure security, poor understanding of insurance compensation procedures.

381. A number of success factors contributed to the sustainability of the project, the main ones being:

382. Informing and raising awareness among communities and other stakeholders of the importance of social mobilisation and participation by all.

383. The participatory approach (e.g. PCP), which has given rise to promising community dynamics.

384. The household approach, which facilitates the synergy of activities within households and the interest of participants in the chosen activity, thus ensuring the sustainability of the action.

385. A good understanding of climate issues and the stakes involved has encouraged interest in the measures taken as part of the project and their importance in the medium and long term.

386. The recognised interest/utility of the interventions in terms of improving FNS, household incomes, social and community dynamics and natural resources by the beneficiaries, the communities and the other stakeholders (authorities, CPs and DTS, who found the interventions to be consistent with their regular missions/activities) encouraged the communities to take ownership of the interventions.

387. Local leadership, which made it easier to take ownership of the dynamics and learn about the actions.

388. The simplicity of the methods and techniques disseminated which encouraged their adoption, low-cost maintenance and the maintenance of the associated social dynamics.

389. Involvement of mayors at various stages of the project (PCP, COPIL, information sharing), which stimulated the mobilisation of communities and other partners.

2.7.4 Replicability

390. The R4 initiative is replicable and has already been replicated several times. Most of the project's activities (development, climate information, agricultural insurance, SFC funds, economic interest groupings (EIGs), training and village cereal banks (VCBs)) are easily replicable. The participatory community planning (PCP) approach and the strengthening of community dynamics are also easily replicable. The aim of this evaluation was more to identify good practice with a view to improving future replication than to assess the replicability of the intervention.

391. In terms of insurance, wider deployment of the product would enable the Compagnie nationale

³⁶ WFP. October 2023. Evaluation of the WFP Strategic Plan in Senegal 2018 - 2022. Decentralised evaluation report.

d'assurance agricole du Sénégal (CNAAS) to achieve significant economies of scale and reduce the cost of insurance premiums. One limit to the replicability of the assets concerns the most substantial developments, requiring greater mobilisation of manpower and equipment. Without WFP support, it may be difficult for communities to maintain and replicate the largest schemes.

392. In terms of set-up, relying on innovative players in the private sector seems to be a virtuous and replicable practice insofar as these players, who are based in Dakar and who will continue to develop their activities at the end of the project, will be able to replicate these activities easily in other regions of the country. In terms of replicability in other countries, however, this will mean being able to rely in the same way on private companies offering similar services in future intervention areas. (Reco2, Reco4)

393. The R4 initiative is replicable and has already been replicated on several occasions in several countries (Ethiopia, Malawi, Zambia). The aim of this evaluation was therefore more to identify best practices with a view to improving future replications than to assess the replicability of the initiative.

394. For the most part, the developments carried out require simple techniques that are easily mastered and replicated by the communities, and whose utility has been demonstrated, which favours their replicability. There is a limit to what can be done in the case of more substantial developments (e.g. large stone barriers, ponds), which require more manpower and equipment, and whose replicability may be compromised by the financial and technical resources they require. However, most of the projects carried out can be replicated without any particular difficulty.

395. The other main activities implemented by the project - climate information, agricultural insurance, SfCs, EIGs, training and VCBs - also show good potential for replication. As do the PCP approach and the strengthening of community dynamics.

396. As far as agricultural insurance is concerned, the product itself can already be deployed on a large scale. Wider deployment of the product would also enable CNAAS to achieve significant economies of scale, increase the profitability of the product and reduce the cost of insurance premiums. The model implemented, with partnerships established between CNAAS and the EIGs and facilitators, seems likely to play an important role in scaling up the insurance product supported by CNAAS. However, major barriers also need to be removed if the insurance system is to play its role (see section 2.3.2 above).

397. In terms of institutional set-up, the project relied on NGOs (La Lumière, Symbiose), national agencies and programmes (ANCAR, Pas LouMaKaf, Provale-CV) and innovative partners from the private sector (Jokalante, CNAAS) to implement the activities. Forging partnerships with national agencies and programmes made it possible to build the capacity of long-term players who will continue their activities after the project ends and who are perceived as relevant and legitimate by the beneficiaries, thereby promoting the sustainability and replicability of the activities implemented by the project, particularly in the event of replication in other regions of Senegal. Relying on innovative entities from the private sector is also an element that can promote the sustainability and replicability of the interventions insofar as these actors, who are based in Dakar and who will continue to develop their activities at the end of the project, will be in a position to easily replicate these activities in other regions of the country. In terms of replicability in other countries, however, it will be necessary to be able to rely in the same way on private companies offering similar services.

398. Sustainability best practice / lessons learned for future deployments:

399. From the very project design stage, propose an exit strategy that incorporates easy scaling of the project. *

400. Strengthen and anticipate the development of skills and support for community asset management committees, with a view to improving group management, maintenance capacity and the sustainability of facilities.

401. Deploy one coordinator per area throughout the project to provide local support for community dynamics.

402. Strengthen the capacities and support of community relays in the villages so that they are able to lead the activities at the end of the project (aim for a good balance between men and women, avoid the

accumulation of several roles for the same person). *

403. Direct more of the amounts made available under the project towards IGAs, such as amounts transferred (when assets are created), amounts saved, and loans granted via SfCs. *

404. Bring farmers into contact with producers of varied, high-quality, reproducible seeds.

405. Integrate the monitoring committee led by the local authorities to present and share progress reports and anticipate the resumption of project monitoring.

406. Forging partnerships with national agencies and programmes has enabled us to build the capacity of long-term players who will continue their activities after the project ends and who are perceived as relevant and legitimate by the beneficiaries, thereby promoting the sustainability of the activities implemented by the project.

407. Relying on innovative players in the private sector seems to be a virtuous and replicable practice insofar as these players, who are based in Dakar and will continue to develop their activities at the end of the project, will be in a position to easily replicate these activities in other regions of the country. In terms of replicability in other countries, however, this will mean being able to rely in the same way on private companies offering similar services in future intervention areas.

* R4 best practices, which are also areas for improvement for the CO Senegal

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1. Conclusions

Based on the results of the evaluation: ten priority conclusions emerge and refer to the recommendations.

Conclusion 1 (cf. Relevance / Consistency / Impacts - innovation) : **The relevance and coherence of the R4 project's approach are widely recognised. In addition, the project is recognised as incorporating several innovative interventions that are particularly interesting to study and promote (e.g. climate services, agricultural insurance). Its scaling up is recommended.** The project is in line with government, GCF and WFP policies and strategies (at national and institutional level). The R4 model is recognised as being relevant for strengthening the climate resilience of small-scale producers who are vulnerable to food insecurity, thanks to an integrated climate risk management approach, a household approach, a strong participatory approach and the synergy between the various interventions deployed by the project. The innovative interventions have also been widely praised. The R4 model is recognised as being able to adapt to the specific characteristics of a variety of contexts, and is expected to be scaled up ([Reco2](#), [Reco4](#)).

Conclusion 2 (see Impacts): **The R4 project has strengthened social cohesion within and between villages, improved food security for beneficiary households, diversified their sources of income and preserved part of their natural resources.** Although the indicators cannot show this, the feedback from the communities unanimously points to these effects of the project, which have been very beneficial in strengthening their climate resilience. These effects were observed throughout the implementation of the project. ([Reco2](#), [Reco4](#))

Conclusion 3 (cf. Effectiveness / Efficiency - partnerships / Sustainability - replicability): **The WFP is recognised as an experienced key player in strengthening the climate resilience of vulnerable small-scale producers.** Governmental, UN and civil society partners all recognise the WFP's considerable expertise in this field and the relevance of promoting the project on a national scale. As a result, the Great Green Wall project has already exchanged views with the WFP on how to make the most of its expertise in this field and incorporate it into the project. ([Reco2](#), [Reco4](#))

Conclusion 4 (cf. Efficiency - capitalisation) / Impacts - innovation): **The project lacked communication and capitalisation in order to make the most of all its positive effects.** Despite the acknowledged relevance of the R4 project and the effects noted by the various stakeholders, too little communication and associated tools were formalised to highlight them. This is recognised as one of the main shortcomings of the project. This is a pity, as the R4 integrated approach is innovative and widely recognised, and the field of climate risk management is increasingly mobilising stakeholders, including donors. For the WFP, communicating and capitalising on all its in-house expertise would ensure that all the skills acquired during the project are not lost and that they are made available to new colleagues in the CO but also in other CO that would like to deploy it ([Reco1](#), [Reco4.2](#)).

Conclusion 5 (cf. Efficiency - Capitalisation / Sustainability): **The R4 project lacked the foresight to plan for scaling up in other regions beyond the project and to make the project's interventions sustainable.** The project evaluated followed an initial pilot phase and envisaged a subsequent phase covering a wider area of the country, but this was not anticipated due to a lack of involvement of the national authorities at the project design stage and a failure to produce capitalisation documents highlighting the results obtained on the basis of tangible indicators of change, which would have been very useful for advocacy purposes ([Reco1.1](#), [Reco6.2](#), [Reco6.4](#), [Reco2.2](#)). Also, the project's anchoring at the SE-CNSA level is more strategic than operational, as the SE-CNSA is attached to the Prime Minister's Office, with a strategic level of coordination for food security, which does not allow for proper ownership of the project by the Government, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture ([Reco2.4](#)). Selecting of national agencies and programmes as cooperating partners

(e.g. PASA LouMaKaf, PROVALE CV, ANCAR) enabled these national players to be involved and to take ownership of the project. At local level, the administrative authorities and the decentralised technical services (DTS) were not sufficiently involved throughout the project (e.g. the development committees at local, departmental and regional level were not very involved), which made it difficult to mobilise them to monitor and maintain the activities implemented ([Reco5.1](#)). However, the mayors were involved throughout the project, including during the design phase.

Conclusion 6 (cf. Relevance - needs of beneficiaries / Effectiveness / Sustainability - ownership by communities): **Despite all the relevance of the approaches inherent in the R4 project model, the model could still be improved to facilitate its appropriation, sustainability and change directions.** The community-based participatory approach deployed as part of the R4 project enables interventions to be tailored to the specific needs of each community, and to their opportunities and constraints, which is a recognised factor in effective ownership. The household approach, for its part, makes it easier for the various members of the household to take ownership of the various activities proposed, according to their interest and availability, and thus enables the integrated package to be rolled out within the household. On the other hand, ownership by the authorities is still low, even though it is included in a specific component (C4). The mayors have been included. The question remains as to whether support for the authorities should remain a component or whether it should become an overall project approach ([Reco3.2](#)). This weakens the sustainability of interventions. In this respect, the "market" dimension is little or not integrated into the project, even though this would offer additional economic opportunities and could therefore promote the sustainability of the initiatives concerned ([Reco3.3](#)). Finally, the specific needs of young people and people living with disabilities are not sufficiently studied to be considered ([Reco3.4](#)).

Conclusion 7 (cf. Efficiency - partnerships & administrative and financial management / Sustainability - ownership by the authorities): **The project was very successful in surrounding itself with experienced cooperating partners (CPs) but lacked integration with existing state dynamics. As a result, the WFP's administrative and financial procedures for its CPs led to delays which had serious consequences.** The CPs were selected mainly on the basis of their knowledge of the area and their technical and organisational skills. The integration of national programmes and agencies alongside civil society organisations facilitated the sharing of expertise between each, the appropriation of R4 by national bodies and good integration with the national programmes for which they are already responsible. The partners greatly appreciated the training/skills enhancement they received, and these are still in demand ([Reco5.3](#)). The graduation strategy (integration of new additional beneficiaries each year) facilitated the capacity building of the CPs and the ownership of the households (enrolled over several years), with the limitation of the integration of new beneficiaries and the construction of new assets in the last year of the project, who will not be able to benefit from the same monitoring. On the other hand, the project did not integrate well with existing government bodies, such as the monitoring committees at municipal and departmental level, which are responsible for monitoring the infrastructure. This would have made it easier for them to take ownership and better maintain the assets created by the project. Even though the mayors committed themselves to guaranteeing the sustainability of the projects during the last COPIL meetings, there has been no prior integration into the existing bodies ([Reco5.1](#)). In addition, the PCPs developed as part of the project were not sufficiently developed as part of municipal PDCs ([Reco5.1](#)). In addition, the WFP's cumbersome administrative and financial procedures repeatedly caused delays that did not comply with the requirements of the agricultural calendar, jeopardising the activity ([Reco5.2](#)). The selection of the telephony partner in charge of cash transfers lacked prior diagnosis ([Reco5.4](#)).

Conclusion 8 (cf. Efficiency - M&E System): **The project's results framework lacked a change orientation and the monitoring indicators often lacked perspective, several data inconsistencies were noted, and a steering table seems to have been lacking.** Although the strategic objective of the project was a change-oriented paradigm shift, this was not reflected to any great extent in the project management tools. Little use was made of the theory of change and the monitoring indicators were not very change-oriented ([Reco3.1](#), [Reco6.3](#)).

Conclusion 9 (cf. Efficiency - HR & deployment methods / Gender): **There was a high turnover in the post of project coordinator, which destabilised the project. Although women were well represented in the WFP team, this was less the case in the CP teams.** The three changes of co-ordinator at WFP level

prevented continuity in exchanges and relations with partners and overloaded the team of component managers responsible for ensuring the co-ordination gaps. The new type of fixed-term contract introduced by the WFP two years ago offers a new status for this post (until now, the only possibility was consultant status, which was more volatile) (Reco7.1). Most of the people we met among the CPs were men and community workers. However, it is women who are most interested in the project, so it is important that 50% of the facilitator positions be held by women, as well as 30% of the positions of responsibility among the CPs (Reco7.2). Finally, it is important to promote the recruitment of people with disabilities (Reco7.3).

Conclusion 10 (cf. Gender): The project largely incorporated the gender dimension into its activities.

Women were more involved in the deployment of the project than men. Most women were integrated into the SFC funds, and for the first time in these localities, men's funds and mixed funds were also created. Women participated very satisfactorily in all activities, except for insurance products, some of which are still unsuited to women's needs. However, major gaps remain, limiting the effectiveness and impact of the project in terms of gender equality and inclusion. For example, the specific needs of female heads of household were not fully addressed. Furthermore, parity in management positions, and particularly in leadership positions, was not achieved. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, the project strengthened gender mainstreaming by drawing up a complementary action plan for 2021. However, this seems to have been only partially implemented, and the indicators defined did not fully measure the real effects/impacts of the activities on gender dynamics and women's empowerment. Finally, the specific needs of young people and people living with disabilities were not sufficiently considered or included. (Reco7)

3.2. Recommendations

Table 6 : Recommendations

#	Recommendation	Classification of recommendations	Responsibility (one main office or entity)	Priority: high/medium	Deadline
1	<p>Recommendation 1 - Reco1: Improve knowledge management by better capitalising on the experience and evidence generated by the project and sharing the WFP's expertise in CC adaptation and, more specifically, integrated risk management (R4s) via a communication and advocacy strategy aimed at stakeholders involved in these issues.</p> <p>Reco1.1: Capitalise on the project, its approach, results, good practice, favourable and limiting factors and evidence generated. For each category of target stakeholder (WFP, national authorities, local authorities, civil society organisations) identify the most appropriate formats (e.g. propose to take part in the formalisation of a national technical manual for soil management; develop operational technical sheets; explain good practice promoting synergy between interventions; etc.).</p> <p>Reco1.2: Design and develop a communication strategy targeting a wide range of stakeholders such as the general public (e.g. TV programmes, videos), national authorities (e.g. analysis of evidence of changes produced) and civil society stakeholders (e.g. practical information sheets, case studies). Develop social communication on the project and on the evidence of change generated. Communication with national authorities and donors could be coupled with advocacy work to support the multiplication of interventions in the relevant frameworks.</p> <p>Reco1.3: Share knowledge and experience feedback relating to the R4s with key players (donors, government, UNS, civil society), based on capitalisation documents, in order to help strengthen the quality of interventions deployed in the field of climate resilience across the country.</p> <p>Reco1.4: Support national consultation frameworks linked to ACC in order to</p>	Strategic	CO + RB + CF	High	1st half 2025

	contribute to the strategic orientations, strengthen the sharing of experience between players involved in the subject as well as the complementarity between projects at national level.				
2	<p>Recommendation 2 - Reco2: Scale up the project in new areas of Senegal, to support the deployment of measures to promote integrated climate risk management.</p> <p>Reco2.1: Support the government, via the Ministry of Agriculture, in replicating the project in new regions/departments of the country, with the government and key aid players involved in strengthening climate resilience. Support the design, implementation, monitoring and coordination of the replicated project.</p> <p>Reco2.2: Lobby donors in Senegal to support the replication of project 4, carried out by the government together with the WFP, in new areas of the country.</p> <p>Reco2.3: Strengthen the Government's operational deployment tools, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture, in the field of climate resilience, by sharing WFP's expertise and facilitating the development/formalisation of associated tools (e.g. technical manual for CES/DRS facilities).</p> <p>Reco2.4: After analysing programmatic and operational complementarities and holding consultations with stakeholders, anchor the R4 project within a Ministry that can guarantee its full operationalisation.</p>	Strategic	CO + GCF	Medium	During 2025
3	<p>Recommendation 3 - Reco3: Refine the model/structure of the R4 project so that, while retaining its fundamentals, it responds better to the ambitions for long-term change.</p> <p>Reco3.1: Deepen the overall change-oriented approach for the project as a whole, by systematically integrating it into the planning and management tools. This approach will make it possible to clarify the long-term objectives and establish a logical framework for achieving them. Monitoring and evaluation should focus on change-oriented indicators, in order to measure not only immediate results, but also sustainable social, economic and environmental impacts.</p> <p>Reco3.2: Consider component 4 in greater depth, either strengthening it as a pillar in its own right with dedicated resources, or integrating it across the board as a means of supporting all the operational community support components.</p>	Strategic	CO + RB + HQ + GCF	High	1st quarter 2025

	<p>Reco3.3: Integrate a "market" orientation into the project's components in order to strengthen the empowerment of beneficiaries and sustain the gains made. This includes directing more of the amounts transferred, amounts saved and credits towards the creation or development of income-generating activities (IGAs), developing the skills of market garden management committees to generate and manage income, promoting contracts between local producers and school canteens, and setting up IGAs for members of SfCs and ElGs.</p>				
4	<p>Recommendation 4 - Reco4: Duplicate the R4 project in new countries, to support the deployment of interventions in favour of integrated climate risk management throughout the world.</p> <p>Reco4.1: Lobby donors on the basis of formalised capitalisation documents (e.g. those presenting the approach and highlighting the results of the project).</p> <p>Reco4.2: Strengthen the skills of the members of the COs and ROs concerned, based on formalised capitalisation documents (e.g. technical documents), organise direct experience sharing with experts from the COs who have already deployed the project.</p>	<u>Strategic</u>	<u>HQ + GCF</u>	<u>Medium</u>	During 2025
5	<p>Recommendation 5 - Reco5: Strengthen the quality of partnerships, to reinforce their strategic and operational capacities and anticipate the sustainability of initiatives.</p> <p>Reco5.1: Ensure that existing state institutional dynamics are enhanced. Greater efforts to ensure complementarity with existing initiatives (e.g. consider signing a memorandum of understanding with the PNDL at national level to make better use of PCPs in CDPs) and programmes, and the inclusion of the project at local level in the monitoring committee led by the sub-prefect would increase the chances of making use of and sustaining interventions.</p> <p>Reco5.2: Ensure that the memoranda of understanding (duration, funding arrangements, programme content) with the cooperating partners (CPs) do not hinder the progress of operations, taking into account the constraints linked to the agricultural calendar (e.g. sign framework agreements with the CPs covering the entire duration of the project or, if the memoranda of understanding are maintained for a shorter duration than the project, anticipate the renewal of the memoranda; if necessary, provide for a budget advance to avoid cash flow shortfalls if the financial procedures cannot guarantee payment on time).</p> <p>Reco5.3: Strengthen the training of partners (CPs, national and devolved authorities)</p>	Operational	CO + SO	<u>Medium</u>	Next R4 roll-out

	<p>together with the WFP team, at the very start of the project, to harmonise understanding of the issues and encourage dynamic multi-stakeholder conditions.</p> <p>Reco5.4: Strengthen preliminary diagnostics to ensure the feasibility of planned activities. For example, a diagnosis of the existing MFIs in the intervention areas and the interest rates applied, or a diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of the telephone operators present (in terms of coverage, risk of confusion in messages received, responsiveness) in order to support the choice of partner.</p>				
6	<p>Recommendation 6 - Reco6: Improve the quality of the M&E system by integrating tools that facilitate project management and are linked to national systems.</p> <p>Reco6.1: Ensure that the results frameworks are consistent overall, particularly between the project's logical framework and the various WFP results frameworks, mainly those relating to the CSP (e.g. ACR) and those specific to the project (e.g. APR).</p> <p>Reco6.2: Ensure the relevance of output indicators as data to support management (e.g. prefer to monitor the survival rate of trees planted after 1 or 2 years of the project rather than the number of trees distributed).</p> <p>Reco6.3: Define change-oriented outcome indicators (e.g. include monitoring of the use and usefulness of the funds granted).</p> <p>Reco6.4: Ensure proper integration with the national M&E system. Define the project's M&E system (including indicators, data collection and sharing methods, etc.) together with the government partners from the sectoral ministries involved, upstream of the project, to ensure that the project's M&E system is fully integrated into the national M&E system and thus serves to inform the level of operationalisation of the national policies and strategies concerned.</p>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>CO + RB</u>	<u>Medium</u>	Next R4 roll-out
7	<p>Recommendation 7 - Reco7: <u>Strengthen the integration of gender and inclusion issues to maximise the project's impact.</u></p> <p>Reco7.1: As early as the planning phase, carry out specific diagnoses to identify the needs of young people, women (beneficiaries and heads of household) and people living with disabilities. These assessments should guide the development of activities and indicators.</p> <p>Reco7.2: Require from cooperating partners a minimum of 50% women in community</p>	<u>Operational</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>Medium</u>	Next R4 roll-out

	<p>leadership positions and at least 30% in positions of responsibility to promote parity. Adapt recruitment procedures to support applications from people living with disabilities and ensure that the infrastructure of new offices is accessible.</p> <p>Reco7.3: Make men more aware of gender issues in all the components of the R4 model, in order to involve them actively in promoting gender equality.</p> <p>Reco7.4: Include people living with a disability in certain activities, such as SfCs, and encourage their participation through specific adapted measures.</p> <p>Reco7.5: Define clear objectives and precise indicators to evaluate changes linked to gender and inclusion. These indicators should make it possible to measure the impact on social roles, the empowerment of women and the improvement of living conditions.</p>				
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