



# **A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point**

Haiti country report

2025 September



World Food  
Programme

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# Foreword

The global humanitarian landscape is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by an unprecedented crisis in international funding. As major donors scale back their commitments, the ripple effects are being felt across the humanitarian system—threatening the ability of organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners to deliver life-saving assistance to millions. In 2025 alone, WFP is facing a staggering 40 percent reduction in funding, with projections of USD 6.4 billion compared to USD 9.8 billion in 2024.

In response to this challenge, WFP initiated a study to examine the food security implications of the funding crisis. The first phase of the research revealed alarming projections: dramatic reductions in WFP's reach could severely undermine global food security. Building on these findings, the second phase focused on country-level realities—exploring how reduced foreign aid is reshaping humanitarian operations and affecting the lives of vulnerable populations. The study was conducted in five countries—Afghanistan, Haiti, Niger, South Sudan, and Uganda—each offering distinct political, economic, and social contexts that reflect the diverse settings in which these cuts are unfolding.

This in-country research explored the impacts of funding reductions through three key questions:

1. How does reduced Official Development Assistance (ODA) affect the economies of aid-dependent countries and specific government sectors?
2. How are funding shortfalls impacting WFP, local partners, and the broader humanitarian sector in their efforts to deliver assistance?
3. How are these cuts affecting—or expected to affect—people in need and their food security?

By combining rigorous quantitative analysis with rich qualitative insights, this study aims to provide compelling evidence to support global advocacy. The findings will inform strategic decision-making, guide operational adjustments, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding food security in a time of profound change.

# Acronyms

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
BINUH	United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
CAPAC	Centre d'Animation Paysanne et d'Action Communautaire
CBT	Cash-Based Transfer
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFM	Community Feedback Mechanism
CNSA	Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire (National Coordination for Food Security)
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FSC	Food Security Cluster

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
FTS	Financial Tracking Service (OCHA)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HHS	Household Hunger Scale
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person/People
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LCSI	Livelihood Coping Strategy Index

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
MA-PAP	Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince
MARNDR	Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development)
MAST	Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail (Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour)
MSS	Multinational Security Support
mVAM	mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
SBCC	Social and Behaviour Change Communication
SIMAST	Système d'Information du Ministère des Affaires Sociales (national social registry)
SO	Strategic Outcome
UN	United Nations
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USD	United States Dollar
WFP	World Food Programme

# Key messages



## **Over half of Haiti's population faces high levels of acute food insecurity**

Haiti is facing its highest acute food insecurity levels since the 2010 earthquake, with more than half the population or 5.7 million people in IPC Phase 3 or above following years of political instability, escalating gang violence, economic collapse, and repeated climate shocks, which have destroyed livelihoods. Agricultural production has fallen, food prices have soared, and displaced families are struggling to survive with no assets or income. The country is one of five identified as Hunger Hotspots by WFP and FAO, and among six in the world with populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).



## **Haiti's humanitarian plan is among the world's least funded**

As of mid-August, Haiti's 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan was only 9.2 percent funded. This unprecedented gap has left agencies and NGOs with no choice but to halt, suspend, or drastically scale down their operations. The mismatch between soaring needs and collapsing funding is pushing humanitarian actors into impossible choices: prioritizing some groups over others, reducing assistance packages, or withdrawing entirely from hard-to-reach communities.



## **WFP forced to halve rations and suspend hot meals for IDPs**

WFP and partners have been forced to reduce in-kind rations and suspend hot meal provision for displaced families. Local NGOs, which constitute the front line of the response, and are crucial for accessing people living in the most-affected areas, are struggling to sustain operations. While many continue to operate, most reported they have implemented staff cuts and reduced salaries for those who remain.



## **Women, children, and displaced populations are disproportionately affected**

The cuts are exacerbating vulnerabilities in food security, but also triggering a cascade of broader social, economic and geopolitical consequences. Households are consuming less food, skipping meals, and relying on negative coping strategies. Families newly displaced by violence and with no assets are the hardest hit. Reduced rations and suspended services increase risks of child malnutrition, school dropouts and gender-based violence.



### **Cuts to humanitarian programmes are eroding community trust in aid agencies**

In some areas, communities report feeling abandoned, which risks undermining hard-won trust between agencies and local partners. Declining confidence makes humanitarian access more difficult, increases tensions around aid distribution, and jeopardizes the ability to deliver assistance fairly and effectively in the future.



### **Funding cuts are undermining cross-sector humanitarian impact**

Monitoring data show that WFP programmes have been less effective since the cuts, possibly because of cuts in the wider aid system, such as nutrition, health and WASH. On the other hand, reductions in food aid undermine health, nutrition and education outcomes, as families are less able to send children to school, or access healthcare. This underlines the interdependence of humanitarian assistance in Haiti and the need to sustain a coordinated, multi-sectoral response.



### **Preparedness eroded as Haiti loses contingency food stock**

The country remains highly exposed to hurricanes and earthquakes, but lacks the preparedness capacity to respond. For the first time since 2016, it is without a full in-country contingency food stock in case of a sudden-onset crisis. At the same time, the capacity to assist the people most in need is eroded, as hot meals for IDPs have been suspended. These operations are often more costly, highlighting the trade-off between assisting fewer people who have more severe needs or reaching a larger number of people who are experiencing lower levels of acute food insecurity.



### **Humanitarian disruption risks fuelling further instability**

Hunger and frustration are fuelling social tensions, increasing the risk of further unrest at a time of political transition and approaching elections, with possible regional consequences. As livelihoods collapse and assistance shrinks, communities become more vulnerable to recruitment by gangs and drug trafficking networks.




# Introduction

Haiti has had a fraught relationship with international agencies that provide humanitarian aid. Despite its high reliance on international assistance for many years, there is a perception that aid has not always helped. Past challenges have triggered a shift toward more collaborative approaches, with international agencies working closely with Haitian authorities and communities to develop inclusive, sustainable and transparent solutions that build resilience and drive socioeconomic development.

Between 2011 and 2021, the country received USD 1.3 billion in aid each year. As of early 2025, at least 1 million Haitians out of a population of 11.5 million received some form of humanitarian assistance each month.

In 2025, Haiti is facing a prolonged political crisis that has led to large-scale violence and displacement. It is facing its highest level of humanitarian needs since the 2010 earthquake, at the very moment when humanitarian funding is being sharply reduced.



This study employs a mixed-methods approach to provide a comprehensive understanding of how funding cuts are impacting the country, the humanitarian sector, WFP's programmes, and the food security of vulnerable people. We also set out recommendations relevant to humanitarian actors.





# Background



Since the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, Haiti has experienced political instability and a surge in violence and displacement. In 2024, over 5 600 people died as a result of the violence.<sup>1</sup>

The spiral of violence shows no signs of abating. Today, armed groups control virtually all of the capital Port-au-Prince and have spread to the Artibonite and Central Plateau regions.<sup>2</sup> Violence has erupted in the Centre department, as armed groups seek to consolidate control over regions near the border with the Dominican Republic.

The human toll is staggering. The UN estimates that 1.3 million people are internally displaced, a 24 percent increase since December 2024 (IOM, June 2025). Farming, trading and access to social services has declined..

Since November 2024, the Port-au-Prince airport has been closed to passenger traffic, isolating the capital and its population, and presenting a major



**1.3 million people** are internally displaced in 2025

**+ 24% more**  
since December 2024



**9.2% funded**

Appeal of **USD 908M** to support Haiti

**+ 34%**  
year-on-year increase

obstacle for humanitarians. The unrest may keep increasing in coming months in advance of elections that are expected to occur ahead of the planned power transition in February 2026.

Over the years, Haiti has become the largest recipient of humanitarian aid in the Caribbean. In 2025, the UN appealed for a record USD 908 million, a 34 percent year-on-year increase that reflects the deepening crisis. Unfortunately, this appeal is only 9.2 percent funded – among the lowest in the world.<sup>3</sup>




Food security and nutrition

Haiti currently faces a polycrisis, with political, security, environmental and humanitarian dimensions. Its food security crisis is protracted, and food insecurity numbers have risen every year since 2018.<sup>4</sup> Haiti is also the only country in Latin America to have recorded populations in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – the most severe phase of acute food insecurity – in IPC history.

In 2025, according to the IPC, 5.7 million people, or 51 percent of the total population, face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, 2.1 million are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and 8 400 IDPs are in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) (IPC, April 2025). The most severe levels of acute food insecurity are in areas of Port-au-Prince where access is constrained. Over 7 percent of children are suffering from acute malnutrition, with a much higher prevalence in low-access areas of the capital.<sup>5</sup>

The primary driver of acute food insecurity is widespread violence, which has led to the closure of markets, caused mass displacement, severely disrupted livelihoods, limited movement of people and essential goods, prevented access to fields for cultivation, and destroyed crops and cattle. Insecurity has also severely

Figure 1: Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), out of the population in Haiti 2018–2025




constrained humanitarian access to several areas of the country.

The Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince (MA-PAP) is the area of greatest concern as armed groups control most of the capital, triggering mass prison breaks, infrastructure attacks, and a widespread humanitarian crisis.

Nearly 1.3 million people are internally displaced, with children accounting for

more than half of them. In the MA-PAP region, where 57 percent of IDPs reside, the majority are in sites (66 percent vs 34 percent outside of sites/with host families).<sup>6</sup>

Overcrowded sites lack basic services, exposing families to disease, crime and protection risks and catastrophic levels of hunger (IPC, April 2025). In the MA-PAP, IDPs face significantly higher levels of




acute food insecurity than resident households with nearly half (49 percent) having poor food consumption according to the Food Consumption Score<sup>7</sup> (FCS), and 57 percent suffering from severe hunger (Household Hunger Scale<sup>8</sup>). Among residents, the prevalence is still high at 32 percent with poor FCS and 39 percent suffering from severe hunger, but lower than among IDPs.<sup>9</sup>

Figure 2 shows that an estimated 2 800 hectares of cropland have been abandoned between 2023 and 2025 across the departments of Artibonite and Centre.<sup>10</sup>

In Artibonite, (middle left on the map), the security situation has worsened, and the agricultural workforce seems to have moved away. This had led to the abandonment of around 2 200 hectares, i.e., 7.4 percent of the department’s cropland.

Figure 2: Impact of violence on cropland



Source: WFP

In Centre, (bottom right of the map), 600 hectares have been lost, representing 5.5 percent of all cropland area in the department. The primary area of cropland loss is around Lake Péligre, where rising water levels have submerged previously cultivated land. It appears the lake’s power plant may be non-operational or paused – likely due to ongoing security issues in the area – which has led to water accumulation in the reservoir and made cultivation impossible.



### Haiti’s high exposure to natural disasters


Haiti is highly prone to recurrent natural disasters and weather extremes, including earthquakes, hurricanes, droughts and floods, which drive food insecurity by directly affecting crops and/or livestock, cutting off roads and preventing markets from being stocked. Poor harvests contribute to high food prices and diminish agricultural employment opportunities, lowering purchasing power and access to food.

Lack of safe water as a result of these disasters drives high levels of disease, including cholera, and contributes to malnutrition. These disasters often cause severe destruction in towns, exacerbate civil unrest and cause displacement that further deepens people’s vulnerability to food insecurity.

The Nord-Est has been facing long-term drought since 2020, creating additional vulnerability for farming households. The last major hurricane Haiti experienced was Hurricane Matthew in 2016, which caused a surge in food insecurity. Its last major earthquake in 2021 affected over 800 000 people with total economic damage and losses estimated at USD 1.6 billion, or about 10 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (IFRC, February 2025).


The economy

Haiti’s economy has contracted for six consecutive years, shrinking over 4 percent in 2024 – a loss exceeding USD 1 billion in a USD 25 billion GDP.<sup>11</sup> Political instability, armed group violence, economic shocks, and recurring disasters have disrupted production, service provision and exports, forcing business closures and leading to widespread displacement and migration.<sup>12</sup>



Poverty rates are among the highest in the world – over 65 percent of Haitians are estimated to live below the poverty line and more than a third face extreme poverty – as the country’s productive base has eroded over the years.<sup>13</sup> Agriculture – once key to livelihoods – has declined steadily, worsening the availability of local food and eroding households’ incomes.<sup>14</sup> The garment sector – Haiti’s main manufactured export – lost around 30 000 jobs in 2024 due to the complex operating context.<sup>15</sup>


Figure 3: Monthly food inflation in Haiti, January 2022 – July 2025



Source: Trading economics

Inflation in 2025 remains high at 28.4 percent in June 2025, after reaching nearly 50 percent in early 2023. Food inflation – standing at 31.5 percent in June 2025 – disproportionately affects food affordability among poor households and informal workers, who account for 86 percent of the workforce.<sup>16</sup> WFP’s monitoring shows prices are very volatile, with trends differing across regions and products. Armed group activity is restricting market access and leading to price increases in many metropolitan

areas.<sup>17</sup> WFP data for 2024 indicates 64 percent of households cannot cover the minimum food basket and can only afford half of their basic food needs on average.<sup>18</sup>



The local currency (the Haitian Gourde) has stabilized since late 2023 due to central bank interventions and substantial remittances that reached USD 3.6 billion in 2024 – 14 percent of GDP and more than 50 percent of the country’s total imports.<sup>19</sup> However, continuing deportations from the United States – which could affect approximately 500 000 Haitians – and from neighbouring Dominican Republic threatens a key income for many relying on remittances, worsening the economic outlook.<sup>20</sup>

Official development assistance (ODA) stood at 5.4 percent of GDP in 2023.<sup>21</sup> The projected reductions in ODA pose significant risks to the economy. Trade flows affected by tariffs add further stress to foreign accounts. With textiles representing around 90 percent of manufactured exports, the 10 percent United States tariff on Haitian exports jeopardizes a critical foreign income source.<sup>22</sup> Heavy reliance on energy and food imports heightens Haiti’s vulnerability to oil and global food commodity price volatility.

The government’s response to Haiti’s deepening humanitarian crisis is constrained by limited fiscal space, persistent fiscal deficits, and declining donor support. Recent debt relief has



eased immediate pressures, but high external debt risks still restrict the country's ability to finance development priorities.

The outlook remains fragile, with a 2.2 percent GDP contraction projected for 2025.<sup>23</sup> Without significant improvements in security and governance, economic deterioration is likely to persist, further undermining food security and the prospects for recovery.

### Key stakeholders for WFP in Haiti

The Ministries of Education, Agriculture, Health, Social Affairs and Labour are important government counterparts for WFP, and for food security and social protection programming in the country.

As WFP works to transition from humanitarian assistance to social protection long term, it collaborates closely with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. Notably, this Ministry is the custodian of the national unique social registry known as SIMAST (Ministry of Social Affairs Information System), which covers one-third of the population and enables safety net programmes. Around 120 000 people currently receive regular monthly cash transfers as a safety net.

The UN is an important stakeholder in the humanitarian response in Haiti. Leading agencies for humanitarian assistance include UNICEF and IOM. WFP plays an important role in providing logistical support to the entire UN community through the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and maritime services that allow humanitarians to bypass armed group-held areas.

The violence in Port-au-Prince has greatly disrupted social service provision. Funding cuts will only exacerbate this situation. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reports that 39 percent of health centres in Port-au-Prince remain closed because of the violence; before the summer 2025 break, almost 1 000 schools in the Ouest and Artibonite departments were closed, affecting 163 000 children.

WFP also relies heavily on local NGOs such as the Centre d'Animation Paysanne et d'Action Communautaire (CAPAC), Girardel and VivaRio, whose community knowledge and acceptance are critical to ensuring access. The majority of WFP assistance in Haiti is delivered through these Haitian NGOs.

Emerging key stakeholders for WFP's response have been smallholder farmer organizations that supply food for the



school meals programme. In 2024, WFP worked with 219 farmer organizations in the country, representing 33 000 smallholders.

Faith-based organizations historically have a large footprint in the education and health sectors. There are reportedly up to 10 000 NGOs overall in Haiti.<sup>24</sup>

WFP operations

In 2024, WFP reached over 2 million people (50 percent of them women) with food and cash-based transfers (CBT) for emergencies, social protection and resilience activities.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, WFP’s assistance indirectly benefitted 739 000 people with assets, capacity and services, as well as 1.4 million people through national policies and programmes.

In 2024, security issues and late arrival of resources, among other challenges, hindered full implementation of emergency operations.



WFP assisted  
over **2M people**  
in 2024



It distributed over  
**12 600 MT** of food  
in 2024



WFP disbursed  
**USD 35.4M**  
cash-based  
transfers

Despite this, through its emergency interventions, WFP supported 1.15 million people, distributing 9,000 metric tonnes of in-kind food and USD 16.4 million of CBT. In addition, a total of 3.2 million hot meals were distributed to 173 000 deported and repatriated people at two border points and to 181,000 IDPs in the MA-PAP.



WFP implemented urgent nutritional interventions for acutely malnourished children aged under 5 years in areas classified in IPC AMN Phase 3 or above to prevent further deterioration. It also launched a cash-based programme to prevent acute malnutrition among pregnant and breastfeeding women and

children aged under 5 in areas classified in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) acute food insecurity and IDP sites within the metropolitan area. The intervention also included Social and Behaviour Change Communication (SBCC) activities and nutritional screening: 18 000 children were screened, and 61 000 parents and caregivers were reached with sensitization activities.

Through the school meals programme, 603 000 students received food in almost 2 000 schools. Of them, approximately 70 percent were assisted with locally produced food through the Home-Grown School Meal programme. Furthermore, in support of the national social protection system, WFP provided cash transfers and complementary services to vulnerable populations, particularly for women.

A total of USD 12.9 million was distributed to 160 000 individuals, out of whom 110 000 benefitted from the government’s adaptive social protection project for increased resilience. WFP supported 100 000 people through a range of resilience activities, including conditional assistance, livelihood support, trainings for climate-smart solutions, and efforts to support smallholder farmers. The country office has been actively engaged in strengthening national capacities and



delivery systems in social protection, school meals, anticipatory action, and shock responsiveness.

Through UNHAS, WFP provided passenger and light cargo transport for the wider humanitarian community with 1 450 flights to and from areas of crisis in 2024, and led coordination efforts in the logistics and telecommunications sectors, ensuring the broader humanitarian response remains effective and connected.




# Funding situation

## Development funding

In 2023, official development assistance (ODA) allocated to Haiti amounted to USD 1.08 billion, representing 5.4 percent of Haiti’s GDP.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries contributed 54 percent of total ODA in Haiti, led by the United States (USD 340 million), Canada (USD 88 million), France (USD 59 million), Switzerland and Japan. Multilateral organizations accounted for 45 percent, with the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Development Association (World Bank), and the IMF Concessional Trust Fund the largest donors.

45% Multilateral organizations



While detailed numbers for 2024 and 2025 had not been published in time for this report, preliminary data allow for an estimate of the cuts for Haiti.

In 2024, estimations based on preliminary OECD data show a cut of 7 percent in total ODA for Haiti, resulting in USD 960 million.<sup>26</sup>


In 2025, the OECD projects cuts of 9–17 percent globally. Applied to Haiti, this leads to a total ODA of USD 790–870 million.<sup>27</sup> This represents up to a 23 percent decrease or USD 240 million less than in 2023.

## Humanitarian funding

Haiti is one of the world’s least-funded crises. In 2024, the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) called for USD 674 million to target 3.6 million people with multi-sectoral emergency response and resilience strengthening. It was only 44 percent funded.<sup>28</sup>

The United States accounted for two-thirds of the received funding (USD 191 million), underscoring the reliance of Haiti’s coordinated response plan on US support.

Figure 4: Funding received through HNRP versus unmet requirements, 2016–2025



Source: OCHA FTS


In 2025, the HNRP requirements increased to USD 908 million to target 3.9 million people, reflecting the deepening of the crisis. Yet, half-way through the year, the plan is only 9.2 percent funded, with just USD 84 million secured.<sup>29</sup> Of this, the United States has contributed USD 24 million – barely 12 percent of its

2024 contribution. While other donors, including the European Commission and the governments of Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, are planning to increase their support, their shares remain relatively small and even an increased donation is unlikely to fill the significant gap left by the decline in United States funding. While the government of Haiti is the third




largest contributor to humanitarian funding in the country, its funds are contributed outside the HNRP. Within the 2025 HNRP, food security is one of the lowest funded clusters, with contributions amounting to USD 9.3 million out of the USD 425 million required to target 3.4 million people, i.e., only 2.2 percent funded, according to OCHA.

The Food Security Cluster (FSC) reprioritized its 2025 needs, reducing its requirements by 10 percent to USD 383 million, by removing resilience activities, despite worsening food insecurity for thousands of people and catastrophic levels of hunger among displaced populations. It continues to target the same number of people.



Other sectors – including education, emergency shelter and non-food items (NFI), and protection from human trafficking and smuggling – are receiving an increasing share of available funding.

Figure 5: Funding received by WFP Haiti and unmet requirements, 2019–2025



Source: WFP

### WFP funding

WFP funding nearly doubled between 2021 and 2024, reaching USD 169 million in 2024. This increase has tracked with growing humanitarian needs yet still covered only about half of the identified requirements. In 2025, the start of the year was slow with very low funding secured by April.

However, the second quarter has shown encouraging momentum, leading to USD 80 million secured by the end of July 2025. Projections to the end of year indicate that overall funding may reach 2024 levels. While this may help prevent a drop in funding for WFP in 2025, current projections remain far from sufficient to

meet escalating needs. Without a substantial scale-up in support, WFP is unable to respond adequately to the deepening humanitarian crisis currently unfolding in Haiti.

In 2024, the United States was the leading donor to WFP, providing USD 91 million (54 percent of total funding), followed by the Haitian government with USD 24 million (14 percent). Although United States contributions dropped drastically in early 2025, USD 32 million has been secured. In keeping with trends in recent years, the government of Haiti, WFP's second largest donor, has continued to pledge significant support to national safety nets and school meal programming. It had already

contributed USD 20 million by the end of July, with a projected total of USD 72 million by December, triple its 2024 commitment.<sup>30</sup>

While major donors like UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and France have reduced their support to WFP, others such as the EU and Japan have maintained their contributions, and some – including Canada and Switzerland – have increased their funding, contributing with more flexible crisis response funding to the broader humanitarian effort.

Another major challenge facing WFP in Haiti is the high level of earmarking. While Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland have provided flexible funding in 2025, amounting to a total of USD 11.4 million, the proportion of flexible funding is very low and has decreased over the years from 19 percent in 2023 to 14 percent so far in 2025. Nearly all the earmarked support is directed to strategic outcome 1 (emergency assistance, 90 percent) and strategic outcome 5 (logistics support, 10 percent). While these areas are essential, such rigid funding leaves critical gaps across other priorities in WFP's country strategic plan. It severely limits the organization's ability to pivot resources toward sustainable solutions and long-term resilience programmes.

# Implications of funding cuts

## Methodology

To assess the effects of reduced funding on food security and beyond, this study draws on desk research, quantitative data analysis and qualitative interviews conducted in the field by expert WFP staff. More details in the methodology are given in annex.

## Economy and government sectors

With ODA accounting for 5.4 percent of Haiti's GDP in 2023, the reduction in funding poses serious economic risks. A decline in foreign income affects the country's reserves, limiting its ability to import essential goods, such as food and medicine. This can lead to increased currency volatility and depreciation, which in turn drives up the cost of imports and fuels inflation.

In parallel, remittances sent from Haitians abroad, amounting to 14 percent of its GDP, are also under threat. This vital lifeline might be significantly impacted by the termination of the temporary protected status for Haitians in the United States and the rising deportations from there and from the Dominican Republic.

### ODA as a share of GDP, 2023



5.4%

### Remittances as a share of GDP, 2023



14%

If remittance flows decline, the economic shock could be severe, further eroding the economic capacity of households. The simultaneous decline in ODA and remittances creates a vicious cycle: reduced foreign income accelerates inflation, while diminished remittances erode the population's purchasing power, deepening the economic strain.



The violence in Port-au-Prince has greatly disrupted social service provision. Funding cuts will only exacerbate this situation. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reports that 39 percent of the health centres in Port-au-Prince remain closed because of the violence. Before the summer 2025 break, almost 1 000 schools in the Ouest and Artibonite departments were closed, affecting 163 000 children.

An underground economy has flourished in Haiti during the crisis. While not appearing in official statistics, there has been a boom in the narcotics trade; in July 2025 a boat carrying a tonne of cocaine<sup>31</sup> with a street value of at least USD 32 million in the United States or USD 60 million in Europe was seized off Haiti's northwest coast. In 2024, there were over 1 400 reported kidnappings, which are an important source of income for armed groups.

WFP, local partners and the broader humanitarian sector

The humanitarian system’s ability to meet increasing needs in Haiti is being compromised. While some level of aid delivery continues, it is insufficient to meet the mounting needs.


Food Security Cluster

Funding cuts are weakening the capacity of national NGOs, which constitute the front line of the response, and are crucial for accessing people living in the most-affected areas. While many continue to operate, most told us they have implemented staff cuts and reduced salaries for those who remain.

Numerous NGOs have been forced to suspend or delay critical activities due to lack of resources or following the stop-work order from BHA. Some NGOs have also left Port-au-Prince altogether because of insecurity.

According to the Food Security Cluster (FSC), the number of partners reporting food security activities dropped from 17 in 2024 to just 11 in 2025.<sup>32</sup> Several partners have suspended monthly assistance due to lack of operational capacity and at least 22 percent have reduced the size of food rations.

Figure 6: Number of people in need of urgent food assistance versus number targeted and reached




The number of people in need of urgent food assistance grew from 5.4 million in 2024 to 5.7 million in 2025. However, the different partners in the FSC have only been able to reach 1.6 million people between January and June 2025, 45 percent of the 3.4 million targeted.<sup>33</sup> For many of these beneficiaries, the number of months or cycles of assistance has been reduced by up to 50 percent.

Over half of the FSC’s funding has been channeled through WFP, underscoring its critical role as the primary provider of food assistance in Haiti. This reliance means that any reduction in rations or suspension of WFP programmes will have profound consequences for vulnerable communities, as no alternatives exist to fill the resulting gaps.

WFP operations

WFP operations have already been impacted by funding cuts and many more programmes are at risk as funding has not yet been secured. Figure 7 shows an overview as of July 2025.

Figure 7: Overview of impact of cuts on WFP operations




Activity ongoing as planned    Activity partly suspended/ reduced    Activity entirely suspended    Activity at risk (no funding secured yet)



**Contingency stocks and in-kind assistance**

Traditionally, WFP relied on an in-kind contingency stock pre-positioned ahead of the hurricane season (June to November), primarily funded through the United States. This stock enabled WFP to respond rapidly to emergencies, reaching up to 250 000 people within the first month following a shock. However, due to the freeze and subsequent restructuring of United States funding, WFP was unable to secure this critical stock in advance of the 2025 hurricane season. Although the country office has recently secured a new allocation through the Global Food Security Office of the United States Department of State, this stock does not constitute a contingency reserve in the strict sense: it is neither earmarked for hurricane response nor will it be available before October, limiting its relevance for the hurricane season.

In the absence of a dedicated contingency stock, the country office has decided to adapt its implementation to establish a minimal reserve in case of a hurricane. These programmatic adjustments include delaying certain distributions and the implementation of half-rations for all in-kind beneficiaries.



Indeed, from May to September 2025, all in-kind assistance has been cut to half-rations, affecting over 115 000 households – equivalent to approximately 575 000 people. Instead of receiving a ration of 66kg per month, which includes cereals, pulses and oil, beneficiaries now receive only 33kg. This approach aims to preserve a minimal reserve for potential emergency response, while maintaining coverage across all planned distributions and avoiding the exclusion of any households. As the reduced ration cycle has not yet completed a full three-month implementation, the implication on the food security of beneficiaries is still to be quantified. However, the effectiveness of interventions is expected to be significantly compromised, further deepening existing vulnerabilities.



**Hot meals**

Due to gaps in financing, the provision of hot meals to IDPs in the MA-PAP was suspended at the end of April. Since the beginning of 2025, an average of 5 500 hot meals were served daily, offering essential support to people who lost access to basic cooking facilities. For many, these meals were one of the few reliable sources of prepared food. However, the high cost of delivering these meals and limited available resources have led the country office to deprioritize these interventions.

In addition to the interventions targeting IDPs in MA-PAP, the provision of hot meals to the repatriated and deported individuals at the Dominican Republic border is also at risk. If no new financing is secured, this assistance may be suspended by the end of September. Currently, hot meals are distributed at the two main border crossings, Ouanaminthe and Belladère, reaching approximately 860 people per day. For many returnees, these meals represent the first form of support upon arrival, offering immediate relief in a moment of acute vulnerability.



### ***Cash-based transfers***

Cash-based transfers to beneficiaries are under serious threat. The standard emergency response model in Haiti consists of three cycles of assistance over three months: one in-kind distribution followed by two rounds of cash transfers targeting 21 000 IDPs and 81 000 people facing IPC Phase 4 or above levels of acute food insecurity per month. However, a funding shortfall of USD 17 million currently jeopardizes the continuation of these monetary transfers beyond September. Nutrition-related transfers are similarly at risk, with an additional USD 7.5 million needed to avoid a complete suspension starting in October for the 40 000 beneficiaries. Altogether, more than 140 000 people could be cut off from critical cash assistance as of October if no new funding is secured.



### ***School meals***

While school meals have not yet been affected by the funding crisis, a significant shortfall of USD 21 million threatens the continuation of the homegrown school meals programme as of January 2026. These meals have consistently proven effective as they improve enrolment, attendance and learning outcomes for schoolchildren, while simultaneously supporting local smallholder farmers. In Haiti, homegrown school meals account for over 70 percent of all school meals and are currently delivered to approximately 350 000 children, with a planned increase to 415 000 children in January, if funding allows.



### ***Resilience and safety nets***

The funding crisis disrupted resilience programming when the United States Agency for International Development's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA) issued a stop-work order on 12 February 2025, suspending operations until 8 April. This interruption delayed the implementation of key projects focused on asset creation and livelihoods and affected safety net transfers to IDP populations. Distributions initially planned for April only began in July, causing confusion among partners and beneficiaries. The WFP country office was forced to revise and communicate shifting timelines repeatedly, undermining the predictability and coherence of the response.




### ***Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS)***

In the immediate term, EU funding kept UNHAS flights to Port-au-Prince running after budget cuts threatened the service. With armed groups expanding control and road evacuations increasingly unviable, UNHAS remains the only emergency evacuation route. Growing demand now requires diversifying assets and operating models, though this will likely increase local costs.

## Food security and nutrition

### Impact on IDPs

While the impact of suspending hot meal assistance cannot yet be measured through food security indicators, the country office has observed a sharp rise in request for support. Between March and April, 2 300 requests for assistance were recorded. Following the suspension of hot meals at the end of April, the number of requests more than doubled between May and June to 6 100 as people highlighted serious food shortages and urgently called for the resumption of hot meals.



The inability to scale up assistance in response to new displacement is a critical gap. As violence spreads and more families are forced to flee, WFP and partners are unable to provide immediate support. This not only leaves newly displaced populations without food or shelter but also undermines trust in humanitarian actors. The absence of


contingency stocks ahead of the hurricane season further compounds the risk, leaving the country dangerously exposed to climate shocks.

### Impact on food security beyond WFP

Despite WFP's ability to maintain most of its operations during the first half of 2025, the repercussions of the humanitarian funding cuts have been deeply felt by beneficiaries, leading to delays in WFP food assistance and forcing several partners and other NGOs to halt or postpone their interventions.

WFP's latest programme monitoring data revealed a marked decline in the effectiveness of WFP's interventions since the funding cuts. Before the funding cut in late January 2025, the proportion of beneficiaries with a poor Food Consumption Score (FCS) decreased by 26 percentage points following a WFP three-month in-kind assistance intervention (see Figure 8). In the period following the cuts, the same intervention yielded a reduced impact, lowering the proportion of beneficiaries with poor FCS by 17 percentage points between February and June 2025. This decline in effectiveness underscores the broader implications of the funding shortfall, even though WFP's assistance levels remained unchanged.

Figure 8: Effectiveness of WFP food assistance interventions before and after funding cuts




Source:



A similar trend is observed in the Livelihood Coping Strategy Index (LCSI), which measures the severity of coping mechanisms adopted by households facing food insecurity. Before the funding cuts, WFP's support helped reduce the share of beneficiaries resorting to emergency coping strategies from 53 percent to 34 percent, a 19-percentage point improvement.

Post-announcement, however, the effectiveness of these interventions diminished, with only a 9-percentage point reduction. This 10-percentage point drop in impact highlights the growing vulnerability of affected populations and the urgent need for sustained and predictable humanitarian funding. See figure 9.

Figure 9: Employment of livelihood coping strategies (LCS) among WFP beneficiaries



Source:



The diminished impact of WFP interventions observed in early 2025 can be attributed to the broader erosion of the humanitarian support ecosystem. Following the funding cuts, many complementary services – such as healthcare, nutrition and protection – were scaled abruptly back or discontinued by other humanitarian actors. For instance, the closure of UNICEF's nutrition programme removed a critical layer of support that had previously reinforced

WFP's food assistance efforts. As a result, households that once benefited from a holistic package of aid were forced to reallocate limited resources to cover essential needs previously met by other agencies.

This shift diluted the impact of WFP's interventions, as reflected in both the Food Consumption Score and the Livelihood Coping Strategy Index. The data underscore the interdependence of humanitarian actors.



### **Impact on affected people beyond food security**

The suspension is exacerbating vulnerabilities in food security, but also triggering a cascade of broader social, economic and geopolitical consequences.

### ***Protection, gender-based violence, and negative coping strategies***

The suspension of hot meals in displacement sites has not only deprived people of a critical source of nourishment, but also of a safe space that played a key role in reducing tensions and preventing violence. This disruption has created a serious protection gap, particularly for women and adolescent girls.

Over 3 800 incidents of gender-based violence (GBV) were reported between January and May, with 1 000 of them in May alone. Women have reported rising incidents of theft and assault in public spaces. With few alternatives, many are resorting to harmful coping strategies such as begging, child labour, or engaging in transactional sex to access basic necessities. Focus group discussions conducted in Delmas 33 revealed a growing sense of despair among affected communities.

*“Hot meals were our only real meal of the day. Since they were stopped, my children cry from hunger in the evening. I feel helpless.”*

**Internally displaced beneficiary, mother, Delmas 33 site**

*“Receiving a hot meal every day gave me a little strength and dignity. Now I have to beg or search through trash cans. It's as if we've been forgotten.”*

**Internally displaced beneficiary, elderly man, Carrefour site**

Beneficiaries described the suspension of hot meals and the halving of in-kind rations as a “breaking point.” Many reported skipping meals, pulling children out of school, or resorting to negative coping strategies, such as selling productive assets or engaging in high-risk work.

### ***Loss of trust***

The disruptions in resilience activities have affected communities’ trust in humanitarian actors. While WFP’s community feedback mechanism (CFM) remained active and received over 22 300 submissions between March and June, many partner-operated feedback channels were underutilized or

temporarily suspended due to reduced operations. This limited the ability to collect complaints and respond to community concerns. The resulting accountability gap has fuelled frustration and reinforced perceptions of unfairness and favouritism within communities.

### ***Threat to humanitarian data***

Carrying out assessments and collecting monitoring data are cornerstones of WFP’s ability to assess needs, measure impact, and adapt interventions. Without sufficient funding, the collection and analysis of data are at risk. It will become harder to identify emerging vulnerabilities, track deteriorating conditions, or advocate





effectively for resources. In a context as volatile as Haiti, losing access to real-time monitoring data could mean missing early warning signs of Famine.

### ***Deepening instability and violence***

Food insecurity can also be a driver of instability. As basic needs go unmet, tensions rise within communities, particularly in displacement sites where resources are scarce. The suspension of hot meals has removed a key stabilizing

factor, with community leaders warning of increased violence, theft and exploitation. The risk of social unrest is growing, especially in the lead-up to the November 2025 elections.

According to UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Haiti is at the mercy of armed groups and vigilantes, who have killed thousands and are consolidating control, establishing a contested parallel governance. Some have been designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” by the

United States. The country has also become a hub for transnational drug trafficking to the United States and Europe, while the UN warns of a disturbing rise in organ harvesting in the country.<sup>34</sup>

Cutting assistance will further destabilize a country already in crisis. Ignoring Haiti risks repeating the pattern of neglected crises that later escalated into major threats to international peace and security. The crisis in Haiti may not remain within its borders.

Rising food insecurity, violence and economic collapse are likely to fuel irregular migration to neighbouring countries, particularly the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and the United States. This could strain regional capacities and heighten tensions, especially if support to the Haitian security sector – including the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission – remains uncertain.



# Conclusions

## *A missed response with consequences for the country's trajectory*

Haiti is a story of a missed opportunity. The 2025 funding cuts mean the humanitarian community finds itself unable to scale up as one of the world's most complex crises unfolds. The immediate needs of over 1 million IDPs – most of whom are women and children and thousands of whom have faced catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity since 2024 – will go unaddressed.

Aid retrenchment comes at a critical juncture, as Haiti prepares for elections to install an elected government in February 2026. The cuts not only deepen vulnerabilities, but also threaten Haiti's democracy, stability, and that of its neighbours.

Even before the funding cuts, humanitarian actors in Haiti faced severe access constraints and declining public trust, underscored by widespread looting of agencies between 2022 and 2024. Further cuts risk deepening this legitimacy crisis.

## *On the future of the humanitarian system*

The emerging humanitarian vacuum risks being filled by private actors, mirroring the security sector, where insufficient resources for the Haitian Police and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission have opened space for private security contractors.

Under one scenario, this gap in humanitarian aid could be filled by the government, civil society and the diaspora. Under another, private humanitarian entities, such as the ones

that have appeared in Sudan and the Gaza Strip, would step in.

In the short term, the UN in Haiti may focus its remaining resources on acute needs alone, meaning 2–3 large agencies manage most programme delivery on behalf of the system, focusing on the capital Port-au-Prince. But it's important to note that the very nature of the crisis in Haiti – protracted and playing out in a context of high poverty and persistent environmental risk – challenges an overly narrow definition of the humanitarian mandate that seems to be emerging with the humanitarian reset.

With reduced funding, humanitarian agencies may narrow their focus to life-saving work. Yet Haiti's complex crisis underscores the need for broader engagement, as WFP Haiti has important partnership opportunities with international financial institutions (IFIs) and governments.

In countries like Haiti, humanitarian agencies may face split priorities – tightly triaging their more focused humanitarian work funded by Western donors, while simultaneously developing longer-term systems financed by governments.





## Haiti's experience has broader messages for the global humanitarian community



The global rise in populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) will likely persist and more frequent Famines occur if crises like Haiti remain unaddressed. In hunger hotspot countries, humanitarian coordinators must lead national and local Famine prevention efforts, supported by WFP, FAO, the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) and the Food Security Cluster.



The reduction in funding has reduced the effectiveness of food assistance programmes, suggesting complementarities between food and other forms of assistance. This suggests that in a funding-constrained environment, collaboration and coordination between providers of assistance must be enhanced.



UN agencies will need to better engage with the diaspora due to its financial weight and its political influence, while dealing with the fact that it is highly fragmented. The UN in Haiti should make its country-level operational data open and share data about needs and its response with diaspora groups.

# Annex

## Methodology

### *Qualitative*

Key informant interviews took place with stakeholders that include managers of UN agencies, international and local NGOs. The mission spoke to WFP focal points. Due to access constraints, many of these key informant interviews were held remotely.

The team carried out focus groups discussions (FGDs) with approximately 20 beneficiaries of WFP in-kind food assistance at Delmas 33 on 5 July 2025. Two structured FGDs took place, one with men and another with women.

### *Quantitative*

The study quantifying the loss in effectiveness of WFP programmes after the funding cut announcement drew on WFP programme monitoring data. These monitoring data have been collected in person. The study builds on two specific indicators, the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and the Livelihood Coping Strategy Index (LCSI), and the study compared results before and after the official announcement of funding cuts by President D. Trump at the end of January 2025. The Food Consumption Score (FCS) is a composite score based on households' dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and relative nutritional value of different food groups. The FCS is calculated by asking how often households consume food items from the 8 different food groups (plus condiments) during a 7-day reference period. The Livelihood Coping Strategy Index is an indicator used to understand households' medium and longer-term coping capacity in response to lack of food or money to buy food and their ability to overcome challenges in the future. The indicator is derived from a series of questions regarding the households' experiences with livelihood stress and asset depletion to cope with food shortages.



# Notes

- 1** UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2025) [Haiti: Over 5,600 killed in gang violence in 2024, UN figures show | OHCHR](#)
- 2** BINUH (2025). Intensification of criminal violence in lower Artibonite, the Centre department, and regions located East of the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince – Major risk for Haiti and the Caribbean subregion. [Artibonite et Mirebalais EN V3](#)
- 3** OCHA (2025) FTS. [Home | Financial Tracking Service](#)
- 4** FSIN and GNAFC (2025). 2025 Global Report on Food Crises
- 5** UNICEF (2023). Armed violence plunging children into severe acute malnutrition in Haiti.
- 6** IOM DTM (2025). Displacement situation in Haiti – Round 10
- 7** Note: Food Consumption Score (FCS): Composite score based on households' dietary diversity, food consumption frequency, and relative nutritional value of different food groups.
- 8** Note: Household Hunger Scale (HHS): Food deprivation indicator developed by USAID, measuring the severity of hunger in a household based on experiences of food deprivation over the past 30 days.
- 9** WFP (2025). Hunger in Haiti's Capital | The Impact of Gang Violence on Food Insecurity in the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince (mVAM data from June 2025)
- 10** Note: Analysis based on 3-period time scan composite NDVI
- 11** Trading Economics. 2025. [GDP growth](#).
- 12** IMF. December 2024. [Article IV Consultation](#).
- 13** World Bank. April 2025. [Country Macro Poverty Outlook](#). The poverty line refers to the lower-middle income threshold of \$3.65 per person per day, while extreme poverty refers to the \$2.15 threshold.
- 14** World Bank. January 2025. [Country Partnership Framework for Haiti](#).
- 15** World Bank. January 2025. [Country Partnership Framework for Haiti](#).
- 16** Trading Economics. 2025. [Inflation](#) and [food inflation](#). World Bank. January 2025. [Country Partnership Framework for Haiti](#).
- 17** WFP. April 2025. [Haiti Market Monitoring report](#). In April, the national cost of the food basket was 26,387 gourdes.
- 18** CO monitoring data. Data refers to July to September 2024.

- 19** Trading Economics. 2025. [Haitian Gourde to US dollar](#); Banque de la République d'Haïti, [Transferts reçus et expédiés vers l'étranger par pays](#) (remittances); Trading Economics. 2025. [GDP](#); Oxford Economics (2024 imports estimates). Note remittances figures refer to the Fiscal Year 2024 (October 2023 to September 2024).
- 20** Immigrant Legal Resource Center. June 2025. [Another Inhumane Trump Decision: Ending Temporary Protected Status for Haitians](#).
- 21** Note: Calculation based on \$1.08 billion ODA ([OECD](#)) and \$19.85 billion GDP ([Trading Economics](#)) both in 2023.
- 22** World Bank. January 2025. [Country Partnership Framework for Haiti](#).
- 23** World Bank. June 2025. [Global Economic Prospects](#). Note: 2025 refers to 2025 fiscal year ending in September.
- 24** USIP, 2010. [PB 23 Haiti a Republic of NGOs.pdf](#)
- 25** WFP. 2024. [Haiti Annual Country Report](#)
- 26** OECD. April 2025. Preliminary official development assistance levels in 2024.
- 27** OECD. June 2025. Cuts in official development assistance: OECD projections for 2025 and the near term.
- 28** OCHA. July 2025. Financial Tracking Service. Website accessed on 14 August 2025
- 29** This and the following figures correspond to publicly available on OCHA's website which relies on reporting from humanitarian actors and might not reflect the latest donations.
- 30** Note: Government contributions (often sources via IFIs) tend to be multi-year which can partly explain a comparatively low amount in 2024
- 31** CBS News. July 2025. [Shootout on high seas leads to seizure of 2,300 pounds of cocaine, 3 suspects killed off coast of Haiti - CBS News](#)
- 32** Haiti Food Security Cluster & CNSA. June 2025. Analyse qualitative et quantitative de la réponse suite à la coupe budgétaire
- 33** [Food Security Cluster website](#). Accessed on 14 August 2025
- 34** Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime pursuant to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2692 (2023)

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