



World Food
Programme

SAVING
LIVES
CHANGING
LIVES

A lifeline at risk: food assistance at a breaking point

Niger country report

2025 September

WFP/Emanuel Foukou

Contents

Foreword	3
Acronyms	4
Key messages	5
Introduction	7
Background	8
Food security and nutrition	9
The economy	10
WFP operations	10
Key stakeholders	11
Funding situation	12
Development funding	12
Humanitarian funding	13
WFP funding	13

Implications of funding cuts	14
Impact on the economy and government sectors	14
WFP, local partners and the broader humanitarian sector	14
Food security and nutrition implications of the cuts	17
Impacts beyond food security	19
Averted needs and risk of losing gains	21
Humanitarian reset	22
Conclusions	24
Annex	25
Notes	26
Acknowledgements	27

Foreword

The global humanitarian landscape is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by an unprecedented crisis in international funding. As major donors scale back their commitments, the ripple effects are being felt across the humanitarian system, threatening the ability of organizations like the World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners to deliver life-saving assistance to millions. In 2025 alone, WFP is facing a staggering 40 percent reduction in funding, with projections of USD 6.4 billion compared with USD 9.8 billion in 2024.

In response to this challenge, WFP initiated a study to examine the food security implications of the funding crisis. The first phase of the research revealed alarming projections: dramatic reductions in WFP's reach could severely undermine global food security. Building on these findings, the second phase focused on country-level realities – exploring how reduced foreign aid is reshaping humanitarian operations and affecting the lives of vulnerable populations. The study was conducted in five countries – Afghanistan, Haiti, Niger, South Sudan and Uganda – each offering distinct political, economic and social contexts that reflect the diverse settings in which these cuts are unfolding.

This in-country research explored the impacts of funding reductions through three key questions:

1. How does reduced Official Development Assistance (ODA) affect the economies of aid-dependent countries and specific government sectors?
2. How are funding shortfalls impacting WFP, local partners and the broader humanitarian sector in their efforts to deliver assistance?
3. How are these cuts affecting – or expected to affect – people in need and their food security?

By combining rigorous quantitative analysis with rich qualitative insights, this study aims to provide compelling evidence to support global advocacy. The findings will inform strategic decision-making, guide operational adjustments, and ultimately contribute to safeguarding food security in a time of profound change.

Acronyms

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
AES	Alliance of Sahel States
AMN	Acute Malnutrition
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CCA	Cellule Crises Alimentaires
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFA	Communauté Financière Africaine (currency)
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
CFS	Cellule Filets Sociaux
CNSP	National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland
CP	Cooperating Partner
CPN	Country Portfolio Needs
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DNPGCA	Dispositif National de Prévention et de Gestion des Crises Alimentaires
ECMEN	Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FARN	Foyers d'Apprentissage et de Réhabilitation Nutritionnelle
FFA	Food Assistance for Assets
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FMA	Field Monitoring Assistant
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FTS	Financial Tracking Service (OCHA)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
HQ	Headquarters
IDP	Internally Displaced Person

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
IRP	Integrated Resilience Programme
KII	Key Informant Interview
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MMR	Minimum Monitoring Requirements
MoH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ACRONYM	Acronym spelled out
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PNR	Plan National de Réponse
RAM	Research, Analysis and Mapping
RSF	Resilience and Sustainability Facility
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SAP	Système d'Alerte Précoce
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
TPM	Third Party Monitoring
UN	United Nations
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USD	United States Dollar
WACARO	WFP Western and Central Africa Regional Office
WFP	World Food Programme

Key messages



Cuts amid political and humanitarian shifts

The 2025 funding cuts in Niger must be seen within the broader political, economic, and humanitarian transformations since the July 2023 political transition, which has reshaped the operating environment for humanitarian actors. The result is a funding crisis demanding new strategies for alignment with government and community priorities.



Severe underfunding limits response to seasonal needs and sudden shocks.

By early September 2025, the Humanitarian Response Plan was only 18 percent funded, forcing a reprioritization from 2.6 million people originally targeted to 1.6 million urgently prioritized. The Food Security Cluster registered its lowest coverage in six years, with just 17 percent of requirements met and operational capacity shrinking from 33 partners in 2024 to 15 in 2025.



Reduced resources are driving difficult trade-offs for WFP.

In June, WFP was forced to downsize its assistance to populations affected by protracted displacement – originally covering internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees both in and outside camps, and host communities. The support was narrowed to only refugees in camps, and seasonal assistance was reduced to about one-third of the original caseload. For the second half of 2025, the Rapid Response Mechanism was limited to newly displaced households, while nutrition interventions were restricted to children aged 6–23 months, excluding older children and pregnant or breastfeeding women.



Increased pressure on Nigerien government budget

Of the 2.2 million people projected to be in need of urgent food and livelihood assistance from June to August 2025, only about 500 000 were expected to be supported by Food Security Cluster partners, including WFP, and around 1 million by government mechanisms. This reduced the partner share of the seasonal response from 30 percent in 2024 to 23 percent in 2025, thereby increasing pressure on national capacities and budgets.



Cuts are worsening food insecurity

Vulnerable displaced households that had relied on protracted assistance reported halving food consumption and resorting to unsafe substitutes such as millet husks and wild herbs. Lean season beneficiaries also stressed that without assistance their ability to produce food and meet basic needs would collapse. Monitoring data reinforce these findings: without aid, only 66 percent of displaced households could cover the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB), compared with 86 percent when supported.



Loss of resilience support undermines long-term goal of reducing aid dependency

Between 2018 and 2022, WFP's Integrated Resilience Programme (IRP) contributed to an 8 percent reduction in food insecurity among beneficiaries, even as national trends worsened during that period. Since 2023, however, evidence points to an erosion of these fragile gains as funding disruptions have undermined programme quality and continuity. Reduced beneficiary numbers, scaled-down field teams, and fewer monitoring visits are hampering the delivery of resilience support.



Households face sharper deprivation in the post-harvest dry season and into 2026.

Humanitarian partners caution that the full impact of cuts will only be clear in the coming months. Upcoming food security and nutrition surveys will be critical to capture this evolution. Communities themselves expressed fears that conditions could deteriorate further after the rainy season ends in late September, when seasonal employment opportunities vanish and wild foods are no longer available.



Impacts beyond food security and nutrition

Cuts to assistance strain education access, social cohesion and protection, with reports of gender-based violence, domestic tensions, survival sex and youth recruitment into armed groups, notably in conflict-affected Tillabéri, Tahoua, Maradi and Diffa. Migration pressures are rising and WFP's stabilizing role in fragile security contexts is being eroded.



Humanitarian reset: shifting approaches

The humanitarian reset remains in progress, with agencies adjusting to fewer resources and aligning more closely with government priorities. This shift steers partnerships towards development approaches that strengthen national systems, expand income-generating opportunities and embed responses in community-led initiatives. Women and youth are emerging as central actors, underscoring the importance of ensuring that emergency assistance is strategically connected to sustainable, nationally owned solutions.

Introduction



This report provides evidence on the current humanitarian funding situation as well as the unfolding effects of the cuts on food security and nutrition. It aims to inform decision makers on choices that can safeguard life-saving assistance, protect fragile resilience gains, and deepen government and community ownership in a tighter aid environment.

It draws on findings from a field mission conducted in August 2025, including focus group discussions (FGDs) with rural populations, displaced and host communities in the Diffa and Maradi regions, interviews with government counterparts, NGOs, UN agencies and international financial institutions in Niamey, and analysis of WFP monitoring data.

More than reflecting on how to do more with less, the insights point to how assistance can be rethought to remain effective: through strategic engagement with government and partners, and by embedding humanitarian response within a sustainable development pathway with resilience and local solutions at its core.

Humanitarian operations are shifting toward closer collaboration between partners and local authorities. The focus is on strengthening local food systems rather than relying on outside aid. This requires aid agencies to adjust to local politics, history, and social dynamics that shape people's needs and define how they engage with communities and government.

Background

Despite recent growth driven by agriculture and oil exports, Niger remains one of the least developed countries in the world, ranking 189th out of 193 on the Human Development Index. Poverty is widespread, with the extreme poverty rate standing at 45.3 percent in 2024.¹

Nearly 80 percent of Nigeriens live in rural areas, where livelihoods depend on agriculture, livestock and fishing, but are constrained by land degradation, scarce arable land and water stress, leaving households highly vulnerable to shocks.²

Overall, agricultural productivity is constrained by reliance on seasonal rainfall, weak infrastructure and limited market integration.

Humanitarian needs in the country are significant. In 2025, an estimated 2.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.³ Around 1 million people are displaced – 460 000 internally displaced and 430 000 refugees, hosted mainly in Tillabéri, Diffa and Tahoua⁴ (UNHCR, August 2025).

Armed group activity in the Liptako-Gourma area, covering western Tillabéri and northern Tahoua, has continued to drive violence, population movements, livelihood erosion and abandonment of agricultural land. The Lake Chad Basin in south-east Diffa remains volatile, with Boko Haram and other groups operating across porous borders with Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. In addition, southern Maradi has been affected by cross-border banditry spilling over from north-western Nigeria, marked by cattle theft, kidnappings for ransom and attacks that disrupt livelihoods and local markets.⁵

Climate hazards are a major driver of vulnerability, with recurrent droughts and floods undermining food and nutrition security. In 2024, flooding affected 1.5 million people, damaged 24 000 hectares of crops and caused the loss of 25 000 livestock.^{6,7} Such shocks add to a fragile ecological base already marked by irregular rainfall, desertification and rising temperatures.

At the political level, the transition that began in July 2023 reshaped both Niger's governance and its humanitarian landscape. The transitional authorities, led by the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), have prioritized national development goals with a strong focus on poverty reduction, food sovereignty and climate resilience. At the regional level, Niger, together with Burkina Faso and Mali, formalized its withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025 and established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which has launched joint security operations and integration initiatives.

The political transition has had significant economic and humanitarian implications. International sanctions imposed in 2023, that were subsequently lifted in early 2024, left a legacy of fiscal stress and weakened humanitarian operations in a context of increasing operational challenges.^{8,9} These constraints disrupted supply chains, delayed service delivery, and limited access to affected populations.




Food security and nutrition

According to the latest CH analysis, around 2.2 million people, or 8 percent of the total population, were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) during the 2025 lean season, including about 100 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4). Out of 78 areas analysed, 12 were classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3), mainly in border areas of Tillabéri, Tahoua and Diffa. No area was classified in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CH, December 2024).

This represents an improvement compared with the previous four years largely attributed to a favourable 2024 cereal harvest, the easing of inflation, and an increase in economic activity. Despite these improvements, high levels of acute food insecurity persist, driven by conflict and insecurity that displaced populations and disrupted markets, severe flooding that affected 1.5 million people, and economic shocks related to sanctions, border closures and reduced cross-border trade.¹⁰ See figure 1.

Figure 1: Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in Niger, 2016–2025, in million




Source: CH Niger

The latest IPC acute malnutrition analysis estimated that 1.7 million children aged 6–59 months suffered from acute malnutrition between August 2024 and July 2025, a decrease since the same period of the previous year.

Despite this progress, the situation remained severe: 46 out of 72 areas were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with seven in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4), notably in Tahoua, Zinder and Diffa (IPC, January 2025).

The persistence of these high levels of acute malnutrition among young children and women was linked to recurrent diseases, such as diarrhoea, malaria and acute respiratory infections, inadequate breastfeeding practices, low dietary diversity, and poor services, notably limited access to safe water and latrines.

Seasonal flooding and population displacements further exacerbated poor care practices and reduced access to basic health and nutrition services, leaving already fragile communities at high risk of nutritional deterioration.¹¹



The economy

Niger’s economy has followed a volatile yet generally upward trajectory over the past two decades, reflecting its dependence on climate-sensitive agriculture and a narrow extractive sector. After subdued growth of around 2 percent in 2023 due to sanctions and the political transition, the economy rebounded strongly in 2024 with growth estimated at 8–10 percent.^{12 13} Niger’s nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reached an all-time high of USD 19.5 billion in 2024 and is projected to grow to USD 20.9 billion in 2025 and USD 22.2 billion in 2026.¹⁴ Extreme poverty is expected to decline from 45.3 percent to 36.2 percent by 2027, equivalent to 1.5 million people lifted out of poverty.

This rebound has been driven by the Niger–Benin oil pipeline, which enabled crude exports from May 2024, transforming the country’s export base and fiscal outlook. Oil is expected to remain the main growth driver.^{15 16} Agriculture, which accounts for about 40 percent of GDP and 80 percent of employment also contributed significantly due to favourable harvests. Mining, particularly uranium and gold, remains another source of revenue, though



reliance on these sectors exposes the economy to price volatility, climate shocks and insecurity.¹⁷

Inflation, which reached 15.5 percent in mid-2024 and averaged 9.1 percent in 2024, eased to 3.6 percent in early 2025 thanks to improved food availability, lower global prices, and expectations of the border reopening with Benin. An overall stable CFA franc, pegged to the euro, has contributed to maintain inflation at bay.

The country is at high risk of debt distress, owing to weak revenue mobilization and the accumulation of arrears, though agreements with creditors are supporting arrears clearance, and fiscal reforms are under way to strengthen public financial management.

The 2025 budget aims to create space for priority spending on security and social needs, including healthcare, education and social assistance. While fiscal space will remain limited until arrears are cleared, rising oil revenues and resumed multilateral engagement are expected to ease financing conditions by 2026.

Official Development Assistance (ODA) continues to play an important role. External support remains essential to complement domestic revenues and sustain priority spending. Donor engagement has resumed cautiously, though still below pre-2023 levels. The outlook is positive but fragile.

WFP operations

WFP began its operations in Niger in 1968. Since then, WFP has provided both emergency relief and long-term resilience-building activities, including nutrition programmes, school meals, and food-for-assets initiatives. In 2024, WFP worked in coordination with the Government of Niger to accelerate its food sovereignty agenda, implementing community-led solutions for food systems transformation while simultaneously delivering emergency assistance to address urgent needs across the country.

In 2024, WFP reached approximately 3.1 million people in Niger, with expenditures exceeding USD 180.9 million, despite operating in an extremely challenging context of insecurity, logistical barriers and constrained funding.¹⁸

WFP provides vital logistical support to the UN and humanitarian community through the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), enabling access to regional hubs and remote areas. In 2024, with a two-aircraft fleet, UNHAS transported over 14 500 passengers from 180 organizations, while Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) services supported communities in Diffa.



WFP assisted **3.1M people** in 2024



WFP distributed **45 600 metric tonnes** of food in 2024



WFP disbursed **USD 49M** cash-based transfers

Key stakeholders

The Government of Niger is WFP’s key partner for food security, resilience and social protection programming and monitoring, alongside other UN agencies, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), major donors and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

National Mechanism for the Prevention and Management of Food Crises (DNPGCA)	Within the DNPGCA, the Système d’Alerte Précoce (SAP) conducts food security and nutrition surveys – financially supported by the World Bank and technically by WFP – that underpin the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) acute food insecurity analysis. The Cellule Crises Alimentaires (CCA) oversees the National Response Plan (PNR), coordinating emergency interventions. The Cellule Filets Sociaux (CFS) implements long-term social protection and resilience programmes. WFP’s resilience activities are integrated within this framework, complementing national strategies to strengthen household and community resilience.	UN agencies	UNHCR is among WFP’s main UN partners, with shared operations in the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) that provides support to displaced populations. FAO and UNICEF are also important for the support to agricultural activities and treatment and prevention of malnutrition, respectively. Furthermore, with FAO, WFP co-leads the Food Security Cluster. OCHA is the leading coordinating agency, leading the conversation on the humanitarian reset. ¹⁹
Ministry of Population, Social Action and National Solidarity	Leads national solidarity efforts during humanitarian crises, coordinating emergency assistance to displaced and disaster-affected populations. In 2024, it played a key role in flood response, mobilizing resources and delivering support to over 1 million people.	International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors	Notably the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and partners such as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) provide both financial resources and technical expertise that shape the national food security and resilience agenda.
Ministry of Health (MoH)	The Department of Nutrition within the MoH leads national efforts to prevent and manage malnutrition, with a focus on community-based approaches. Through the Foyers d’Apprentissage et de Réhabilitation Nutritionnelle (FARN) programme, it promotes nutrition education and rehabilitates moderately malnourished children using locally available foods and participatory cooking sessions, in close collaboration with WFP, which supports implementation and integration within broader resilience strategies.	International and national NGOs	These are key implementing partners and enable outreach in hard-to-reach and conflict-affected areas.


Funding situation

Development funding

Official development assistance (ODA) to Niger increased steadily between 2019 and 2022, rising from USD 1.4 billion to USD 2.0 billion, equivalent on average to 12.6 percent of GDP. It then contracted sharply in 2023 to USD 1.3 billion (7.7 percent of GDP), following the political transition (see Table 1).

Before the 2023 downturn, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries accounted for about 40 percent of total ODA, a share that rose to 57 percent in 2023, as multilateral flows declined.

Figure 2: Top bilateral donors in 2023 (USD millions)



The United States was the largest bilateral donor (USD 317 million), followed by Germany (USD 109 million), France (USD 62 million), Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, Japan and Luxembourg. In 2023, the United States increased its contribution while both Germany and France reduced theirs.

Multilateral organizations – including the World Bank, the IMF Concessional Trust Fund, European Union (EU) institutions and the United Nations – accounted for about 60 percent of ODA before the 2023

ODA contributors, 2023




Table 1: Trends of ODA relative to national GDP, 2019-2024

Year	GDP (USD bn.)	ODA (USD bn.)	ODA/GDP
2019	12.89	1.44	11.2%
2020	13.74	1.93	14.1%
2021	14.92	1.81	12.1%
2022	15.43	2.05	13.3%
2023	16.7	1.28	7.7%
2024	19.5	Not available	Not available

Source: OECD; World Bank

crunch. Their share fell to 41 percent in 2023, largely due to the suspension of disbursements from the World Bank and the IMF.²⁰

With the lifting of regional sanctions in early 2024, ODA flows resumed, as multilateral organizations and most DAC members unblocked contributions. Despite a rebound of humanitarian assistance in 2024, grants from IFIs were estimated to fall to 1.7 percent of GDP,

down from an average of 6.3 percent of GDP over 2018–2022 and 4.7 percent in 2023.²¹

This suggests that ODA levels in 2024 remained below pre-2023 levels. In 2025, the OECD projects a further global decline in ODA of between 9 and 17 percent. In Niger, this projection is supported by a sharper fall in humanitarian funding and grants, which are expected to decline further to around 1.5 percent of GDP.

Humanitarian funding

In 2024, the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) required USD 662.2 million to assist about 4.3 million people,²² yet only USD 354.4 million was mobilized or 53.5 percent of requirements. The response relied heavily on a narrow group of donors: the United States accounted for 42 percent of total contributions, followed by Germany (12.1 percent), the European Commission (10.7 percent), and pooled resources through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).²³

In 2025, the HNRP originally called for USD 603.0 million to reach 2.6 million people. A reprioritization exercise identified 1.6 million people in urgent need, with requirements of USD 485.4 million.²³ By early September, just USD 106.9 million had been secured, covering only 18 percent of the plan – the lowest funding level in the past six years. The donor landscape has also shifted: Germany is now the leading contributor (19.3 percent), followed by the European Commission (15.3 percent), Italy (10.6 percent), CERF (8 percent), and the United Kingdom (8 percent). The United States, previously the primary donor, has reduced its share to 7.8 percent.


This sharp reduction in available resources has already forced humanitarian actors to reprioritize and scale back programmes, with critical impacts on food security, nutrition, education, and protection sectors. The situation underlines the increasing pressure on national resources and mechanisms for the delivery of essential food assistance.

WFP funding

In line with the broader tightening of global humanitarian funding, WFP’s budget for Niger has also contracted significantly in 2025, prompting the country office to revise its 2025 Implementation Plan downward by 28.4 percent compared with the original plan and 49.3 percent compared with the current Country Portfolio Needs (CPN).


As a result, WFP’s revised projected expenditure for 2025 stands at USD 151 million. Between August 2025 and January 2026, projected resources fall short by USD 21.4 million, equivalent to a 25.6 percent shortfall. As of August 2025, available funding could sustain operations for less than 6 months, jeopardizing core assistance programmes.²⁴

Figure 3: Funding received through HNRP versus unmet requirements, 2019–2025



Source: FTS (OCHA)

Figure 4: Funding received by WFP Niger versus unmet requirements, 2022–2025



Source: WFP

Implications of funding cuts

Methodology

To assess the effects of reduced funding on food security and beyond, this study draws on desk research, quantitative data analysis and qualitative focus group discussions and interviews conducted in the field by expert WFP staff. More details on the methodology are given in the annex.

Impact on the economy and government sectors

According to the World Bank and Ministry of Finance, the funding cuts to humanitarian operations have not triggered visible macroeconomic disruptions as economic growth in the extractive industry has offset contractions in the social sector. While the humanitarian funding cuts impose fiscal challenges, the government has reiterated its commitment to sustain social spending within the national budget and to cover some of the gaps left by reduced external support.

Although secondary to oil and agriculture, humanitarian operations have been a key source of income and employment.

They bring foreign exchange, create national jobs, and drive local procurement and NGO contracting. Humanitarian actors have also supported services in hubs like Diffa and Maradi and boosted demand for goods and services in Niamey. Their contraction in 2025 has sharply reduced jobs and services in areas once reliant on this support.

For certain government sectors that collaborate closely with humanitarian partners, the impact of reduced funding has been more direct. Ministries such as Agriculture, Health (notably the Nutrition Directorate), and Population, Social Action and National Solidarity have seen gaps in programme financing and support for staff capacity, limiting the advancement of specific initiatives.

WFP, local partners and the broader humanitarian sector

Food Security Cluster

The Food Security Cluster (FSC) in Niger has seen a sharp contraction in its operational capacity in 2025. While in 2024 it counted 33 active partners, only 15 organizations – including national and international NGOs, UN agencies and government institutions – remain engaged. Among them, the DNP-GCA continues to play a central role, serving as the government representative within the FSC.

The funding shortfalls of the FSC mirror those of the HNRP. Within the USD 603 million requested under the HNRP, the FSC accounted for USD 137.6 million, of which only USD 20 million had been mobilized as of August 2025. This left a shortfall of USD 117.6 million – or 85 percent of requirements – severely restricting partners' ability to provide timely and adequate assistance to the most vulnerable households. This is the



lowest coverage levels of the past six years, with only 17 percent of requirements met, compared with 73 percent in 2020 and 37 percent in both 2023 and 2024 (see figure 5).

As of 20 June, 2025, operational plans under the FSC covered only 347 500 people out of the 897 000 prioritized for seasonal assistance (from an original target of 1.1 million people under the HNRP).²⁶ As a result, a significant share of households will not receive support from humanitarian partners during the peak of seasonal needs, requiring increased reliance on the government's national response mechanisms.

Compared with 2024, when WFP and NGO partners covered about 30 percent of the caseload and the government 34 percent (leaving a 36 percent gap), the 2025 outlook reflects a notable shift. In 2025, WFP and NGOs are projected to cover only 23 percent of the caseload, while the government is expected to increase its coverage to 45 percent, leaving a 32 percent gap.²⁷

Beyond the seasonal response, the FSC noted limited contingency capacity to respond to sudden shocks. For instance, partners estimate that only 18 000 people per month could be supported in the event of major floods – well below potential needs.

Partners also flagged the impact of reduced funding on staffing and programming. Several organizations reported closing activities and laying off personnel, contributing to unemployment in the humanitarian and social sectors.

Others are pursuing strategies of mutualization of resources, pooling staff and logistical assets to maintain minimal coverage or to conduct joint assessments.

WFP programme and monitoring

The funding contraction is directly affecting operations, forcing the country office to significantly reprioritize its activities between August 2025 and January 2026.

These reductions are creating challenges for the quality and timeliness of implementation, as fewer staff face heavier workloads, partners struggle with limited capacity, and coordination and follow-up are weakened. Monitoring has also been scaled back.

Crisis response

Coverage has been reduced to approximately 0.6 million people, one-third of the original target, leaving an estimated 0.9 million without crisis response assistance. From September 2025, pipeline breaks are expected for key commodities, in addition to projected cash transfer shortfalls. In this constrained environment, prioritization has been directed towards newly displaced populations and essential nutrition programmes. For example, 16 000 refugees in Sayam Forage camp continue to receive full rations, highlighting the extremely limited margin for broader coverage.

School feeding


School feeding programmes face imminent disruption. From October 2025, shortfalls of cereals and anticipated cash transfer gaps from December will reduce operations by approximately

45 000 rations over four months, affecting more than 40 000 children – particularly adolescent girls whose attendance is strongly correlated with access to school meals. The interruption not only undermines nutrition outcomes but also risks lowering school attendance in crisis-affected areas where education already faces multiple barriers.

Nutrition

Despite scheduled arrivals of further supplies of Super Cereal Plus and Plumpy Sup between September and November, major supply gaps are expected from December. Targeting after the prioritization already excluded children aged 24–59 months and pregnant and breastfeeding women, with resources concentrated on the most vulnerable group – children aged 6–23 months in high-risk areas. Approximately 51 000 children in this age group are projected to be affected by pipeline breaks in December. Assistance will be prioritized for areas with global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence above 15 percent or households in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4), but even there the level of support will remain insufficient.

Figure 5: Evolution of funding of the Food Security Cluster, 2020-2025, USD millions



Source: Food Security Cluster Niger, as of 31 June 2025



Resilience and livelihoods

Lean season support was delivered in July and August 2025, but Food Assistance for Assets (FFA) activities are on hold until at least December due to resource shortfalls. Cash-based transfer activities face funding gaps from December onwards. Staff reductions among co-operating partners have further weakened field monitoring and slowed implementation. The suspension of resilience activities risks reversing fragile gains: communities that had benefitted from asset creation, land restoration, or social protection transfers are now at risk of depleting productive assets to meet food needs.



Capacity strengthening and partnerships

While core capacity strengthening activities with government institutions continue, funding reductions have halved university partnership allocations, significantly limiting research outputs and institutional support. Planned expansions of community feedback mechanisms have also been postponed, eroding WFP's ability to adaptively manage programming based on community input.



Logistics and communications services (UNHAS and ETC)

United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) services remain operational, with a second aircraft contract extended through September 2025 and likely to continue until year-end. However, funding for UNHAS operations in 2026 is uncertain. The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) maintains critical community access points (such as in Diffa), but faces similar financial uncertainties in 2026.



Assessment and monitoring

The internal monitoring capacity by field monitoring assistants (FMA) in WFP has been reduced by approximately 30 percent. Nine out of 30 research, analysis and mapping (RAM) staff members in the sub-offices have been laid off. To compensate for this shortfall, adjustments are being made to increase the coverage of sites assigned to third party monitoring (TPM) partners in order to meet the minimum monitoring requirements (MMR).


Food security and nutrition implications of the cuts

Food security situation up to the cuts

The food security and nutrition situation of the most vulnerable households in Niger, particularly those forcibly displaced, remains extremely fragile and in need of external assistance to close critical gaps. Quantitative evidence from WFP’s post-distribution monitoring (PDM) of food assistance to protracted displaced populations, collected immediately after the suspension of aid in June 2025,²⁸


illustrates the food security situation when assistance is provided and points to imminent risks in the absence of support. Part of the PDM, the Economic Capacity to Meet Essential Needs (ECMEN) indicator underscored the central role of assistance in sustaining food access across the four regions most affected by insecurity (Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua and Tillabéri): 86 percent of beneficiary households reported being able to cover the food Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) with support, compared with only 66 percent without assistance.²⁹ The need for support was especially acute in Diffa and Maradi (see figure 6).

Figure 6: Household’s economic capacity to meet essential needs (ECMEN) with and without assistance, for four regions



Source: WFP

Figure 7: Percentage of protracted assistance beneficiaries facing severe and moderate acute food insecurity (by CARI), 2023-2025



Source: WFP

Looking at the broader Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB), which captures both food and non-food essentials, such as health, education and shelter, results among beneficiaries point to similar patterns and even sharper gaps: with assistance, 40.6 percent of households could meet their overall needs compared with just 25.8 percent without assistance. As food assistance is cut, the economic capacity of households is expected to drop back to levels without assistance, reversing gains in food security.

Furthermore, PDM results show that food insecurity among displaced households and host communities has persisted or worsened since 2023 despite ongoing assistance. Compared with the 2023 baseline, food insecurity increased sharply

in Diffa from 13.3 percent to 35.4 percent and in Maradi from 42.2 to 57.3 percent in August 2025, based on WFP’s Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI). By contrast, it declined in Tahoua (from 65 percent to 44.7 percent) and Tillabéri (from 76.1 to 65.6 percent), though levels in both regions remained critically high (see figure 7).

While some of these changes may be partially attributed to seasonal factors, the persistently high levels of food insecurity underscore the need to double-down on food assistance rather than cutting it. Due to the timing constraints, quantitative measurements on the impact on food security are not reported here, but the expected consequences are likely to be severe.



Voices from affected communities

The PDM findings were echoed in focus group discussions (FGDs) with displaced populations, and host communities as well as returnee populations in both Diffa and Maradi. Two months after the suspension of assistance, households reported growing difficulties in meeting basic food needs and resorting to negative food and livelihood coping strategies. Deteriorating nutrition was also reported alongside increasing social tensions and the erosion of resilience gains.

Food consumption and dietary diversity

Temporary income from agricultural day labour during the rainy season enabled households to earn food or cash, but the seasonal opportunities would vanish after harvest, leaving families without alternatives. Several groups explained how assistance had enabled them to obtain goods on credit from local traders who trusted that rations or transfers would guarantee repayment. Once assistance was suspended, traders withdrew this option, cutting off a vital coping mechanism for households during the leanest months of the year.

“All our savings are in our stomachs..”

FGD participant, Angoual Roundji

In Geskerou, women emphasized how traditional petty trade activities – such as selling fried snacks or processing groundnut oil – were no longer sufficient to sustain households, generating barely 1 000 CFA (USD 1.8) per day, especially in a context of increasingly scarce land and other resources.

In Maradi (Garin Kaka), FGD participants highlighted the particular vulnerability of female-headed households. They typically can only earn 300 CFA (USD 0.54) per day for casual labour, which is far from sufficient to feed themselves and their children, especially when dry rations provided during school holidays have been suspended.

The capacity of women to save money has been eroded as they constantly struggle to make ends meet. Previous efforts to set up and partake in mutual savings systems have stopped.

Livelihood and production constraints

In Diffa and Maradi, displaced households struggled to access arable land. Plots allocated by authorities were often contested by pastoralists, sparking violent clashes, including arrow attacks. Fields farther from settlements were largely inaccessible, as movement outside villages exposed people to armed group threats.

In Geskerou (Diffa), participants explained that before insecurity spread, households could cultivate their fields and cover food needs for up to 6 months. Now, the same plots are shared by multiple families. In Dan Dadji Makao (Maradi), participants noted that even with access to land, following the suspension of assistance they would find themselves spending less time on their fields as they turn to daily casual labour to cover needs.

Fishing, once a key livelihood, was abandoned after deadly attacks by non-state armed groups. Many households turned to cutting firewood for sale despite official bans and risk of sanctions. With traditional livelihoods eroded and agriculture under strain, families are left with very limited and insecure livelihood options and remain heavily reliant on external support for even subsistence needs.

Perceptions of assistance

Despite their hardships, communities stressed that humanitarian aid remains essential for survival. They acknowledged that assistance should not be permanent yet emphasized that “this is not the time to leave”, given their fragile conditions. At the same time, many households expressed the desire to receive assistance that allows them to develop income-generating activities, with a special focus on supporting the youth.

In Mainé-Soroa (Diffa), participants explained that the number of residents often exceeded the number used in targeting exercises. Newly arrived households were not always included, and community leaders sometimes reallocated portions of assistance to cover excluded families. These practices reflect social structures and hierarchies in multi-ethnic communities, which are not always fully considered in the design of distribution systems. As a result, rations reaching each household were often diluted, reducing their protective effect.

Household size further compounded this problem. In camps for refugees and IDPs, polygamous households with four wives and more than ten children often

exceeded the maximum family size covered by assistance. This mismatch meant that even registered families received less food than they needed, reinforcing persistent food insecurity.

In Maradi, FGD participants voiced the importance of assisting both host and refugee communities in an equitable manner to avoid causing friction between the two groups. They emphasized their culture of communal sharing and that beneficiaries would share with those who were not eligible for assistance.

In Geskerou (Diffa), both men and women stressed that seasonal food assistance was not only critical for immediate food access but also an enabler of agricultural recovery. While recognizing that aid cannot be permanent, they highlighted the need for support for income-generating activities and resilience-building measures.

“This assistance allows us to stand on our feet and cultivate again.”

Farmer, Geskerou (Diffa)

Among displaced communities in Diffa and Maradi, perceptions were even more stark. With assistance suspended, households described feeling abandoned in the face of hunger and insecurity. In camps, people reported being at the limit of their coping capacity and unable to protect their families without external support.

“We no longer have the strength to start over again.”

Man, refugee camp, Maradi



Impacts beyond food security

The consequences of reduced assistance extend well beyond food consumption, with significant effects on protection, social cohesion, education, migration and wider stability. Communities describe how the suspension of support has exposed them to heightened risks and vulnerabilities that affect daily life and long-term prospects, especially for women, children, the disabled and elderly.

Protection risks

Communities and local leaders reported growing domestic tensions and gender-based violence, alongside distress migration of adolescents and male-household heads. In Diffa, some girls were pushed into survival sex, while boys faced heightened risks of recruitment by armed groups or for illicit activities. With over 70 percent of Geskerou’s population under 25 years old and few opportunities available, women fear the lack of opportunities could push youth into “maladaptive” survival strategies if assistance were withdrawn. The erosion of livelihoods is pushing families into unsafe coping strategies, including child labour, sending children to insecure areas to collect food or firewood, and other degrading forms of work.

Social cohesion

Perceptions of inequities in assistance distribution and land-use disputes between displaced farmers and pastoralists have, in some cases, escalated into violence. In multi-ethnic settings, reductions in aid are seen as exacerbating existing divisions, undermining fragile community stability. Participants in different FGDs in Maradi often started discussions by mentioning how grateful refugees were to the host community for their acceptance and help and stressed the importance of assisting both groups, given the culture of communal sharing. With reduced assistance, some members of the host community raised concerns of a possible deterioration in social cohesion should their harvest be picked by refugee children out of hunger.

Education


The suspension of school feeding and bursary programmes has contributed to absenteeism, with families – particularly in areas of high vulnerability – reporting that children, especially girls, are being withdrawn from school to help with housework or to reduce expenses. These setbacks threaten to reverse progress made in recent years to expand access to education in food-insecure areas.

Migration and displacement dynamics

Secondary displacement has been observed, as households leave areas where assistance was suspended and move to locations where coverage is still available, creating new pressures on already fragile resources – as reported in Sayam Forage in Diffa. Partners also cautioned that Niger's role as a central hub on West African migration routes means that further deterioration in living conditions could fuel onward movement towards urban centres and the Mediterranean, particularly if durable livelihood solutions are not restored.

Stability and security risks

Regional authorities emphasized that humanitarian assistance has long served as a stabilizing force in volatile regions such as Diffa and Tillabéri, mitigating recruitment risks by non-state armed groups and dampening their influence. The reduction in aid has potential implications for peace and security in the country.




Hard-won gains in resilience risk being lost

Since 2014, Niger has been a flagship country for resilience programming in the West Africa and Sahel region. Over 310 000 hectares of degraded land have been restored in more than 2 000 villages through the Integrated Resilience Programme (IRP) in the Sahel.

Regional analysis of the IRP’s impact shows it has helped reduce humanitarian

needs by mitigating food insecurity among targeted households, even as food insecurity generally worsened in the Sahel. Niger stands out with some of the most notable gains: the share of IRP beneficiaries facing high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) fell by 8 percentage points, from 14 percent in 2018 to 6.³⁰ By contrast, high levels of acute food insecurity among the general population in the same departments rose from 2 percent to 6 percent over the same period. See figure 8.

Figure 8: High levels of acute food insecurity among resilience programme beneficiaries versus general population, 2018–2023



Source: WFP

Since the 2023 political transition, reduced funding for the IRP has begun to erode earlier gains. The share of beneficiary households facing high acute food insecurity rose from 5.5 percent in 2022 to 6 percent in 2023, with preliminary 2024 data suggesting a continuing upward trend. Field visits and discussions with participants point to challenges in sustaining progress, particularly due to gaps in implementation, technical support, supervision and monitoring.

Over the past two years, several intervention sites have faced disruptions, delays, or reductions in input supplies, homestead activities, and complementary packages, weakening households’ ability to protect and strengthen their livelihoods against shocks.

In 2025, lower motivation among beneficiaries and abandoning of resilience sites were reported as beneficiaries did not see the advantage of participating without assistance. In some instances, in Maradi, cereal banks had been emptied out by the community and discontinued. Programme implementation and quality assurance are becoming increasingly difficult.

Some CPs have reduced their field teams, leaving staff responsible for more sites.

Combined with costly mandatory escort fees, this has limited the frequency of monitoring and technical support visits. Regular site visits are critical for timely course correction, yet partners increasingly report arriving too late to address problems as they emerge. As a result, programme implementation and quality assurance are becoming harder to sustain, placing the IRP’s fragile gains in food security and need prevention at risk.

FGDs with beneficiaries in Maradi highlighted the programme’s longer-term benefits. Participants continue to apply and share knowledge and practices that do not depend on ongoing funding, such as composting techniques to improve yields, preparing more nutritious meals using local foods, and vocational skills like sewing. These skills have also strengthened social cohesion, as communities come together to discuss and address shared challenges.

The impact of funding cuts goes beyond immediate needs; it also threatens the gradual erosion of WFP’s hard-won gains. This dynamic is especially important to highlight in the case of Niger.



Humanitarian reset

The political transition of July 2023 marked a turning point for humanitarian operations in Niger. New regulations reshaped the operating framework for international partners, with stricter oversight, increased administrative requirements, and the suspension of certain licenses.

Access to conflict-affected areas now requires military escorts, while cash-based transfers in insecure zones face greater scrutiny to ensure alignment with national priorities. Some organizations, particularly those linked to former colonial powers, were asked to scale down, while others adapted to the new framework by working more closely with national institutions.

The sharp contraction in humanitarian funding since early 2025 has further accelerated reprioritization. Agencies have narrowed coverage to the most urgent needs, reduced staffing, and streamlined coordination structures. These adjustments reflect how the system is beginning to adapt to a tighter aid environment, even if the contours of a new model remain unclear.

Within this evolving landscape, aligning with government priorities has become essential. The authorities privilege sovereignty and “national solidarity” over traditional humanitarian assistance, and partners are expected to harmonize with these principles to maintain operational space and reinforce national mechanisms.

At the same time, there is growing recognition that humanitarian response must shift towards approaches that are more localized, community-based, and sustainable. Ongoing reflections within the humanitarian country team point to the need for deeper engagement with affected communities, not only as beneficiaries but as active participants in planning and implementation.

The Flagship Initiative, piloted in regions such as Diffa and Tillabéri, illustrates this shift: communal coordination committees now bring together local authorities, community representatives, NGOs and donors to integrate humanitarian priorities into communal development plans. While still at an early stage, this initiative demonstrates a possible way forward by creating ownership at the local level and bridging the divide between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors.

Government partners have highlighted the importance of moving away from international agencies “doing the work” on their behalf, towards models where national institutions progressively assume leadership and ownership. Humanitarian agencies are expected to contribute to this process by supporting institutional

capacity, technical skills, and systems that enable ministries and decentralized structures to sustain food security and nutrition interventions. This expectation is particularly relevant for sectors such as agriculture, nutrition and social protection, where ministries have longstanding collaboration with humanitarian actors.



The reset is marked by a stronger emphasis on local leadership, with national public institutions and NGOs playing a greater role and communities positioned at the centre of accountability frameworks. Consultations with local authorities emphasize that humanitarian action must be embedded in local realities, including cultural and social structures, to ensure effectiveness and legitimacy.

Discussions are ongoing about simplifying and harmonizing community feedback

mechanisms, as multiple parallel systems have created confusion. The guiding principle is that if humanitarian action is to have lasting impact, it must be rooted in the perspectives of the communities themselves.

Women and youth are emerging as central to this vision. Women's associations have played a leading role in microcredit initiatives and income-generating activities, while youth groups are increasingly seen as key to stabilization and resilience. Their involvement is critical not only for

programmatic effectiveness but also for strengthening the perception that humanitarian and development work belongs to the people it serves.

The engagement of the private sector, including through early dialogue with the Chamber of Commerce and financial institutions, is opening opportunities for partnerships in livelihoods, service delivery and resilience-building.

While the humanitarian reset in Niger remains a work in progress, its direction is

becoming clearer. It is less about a withdrawal or scale-down of international actors and more about rebalancing their role – towards supporting national priorities, enabling local ownership, and building resilience. For WFP and its partners, this means maintaining presence and operational relevance, even with reduced coverage, while investing in evidence generation, community engagement, and strategic partnerships that can reinforce the government's vision of sovereignty and long-term stability.



Conclusions

The reduction in humanitarian funding in Niger is more than a financial crisis. The immediate effects are visible in the suspension or downsizing of food and nutrition assistance, leaving large gaps in coverage at a time when more than 2.2 million people face high levels of acute food insecurity.

The contraction of resources has undermined fragile gains, particularly for displaced populations and their hosts, and has triggered negative coping strategies that deepen risks to protection, education and social cohesion.

While immediate impacts of the assistance cuts are already reported by interviewed households in the form of reduced food consumption, eroded livelihoods, and rising protection risks, the consequences of the 2025 cuts are expected to extend beyond the lean season and may shape Niger's humanitarian and food security landscape well into 2026. Yet the surveys and analysis needed to track trends in acute food insecurity and malnutrition are increasingly constrained by insecurity, limited access, and shrinking resources.

At the same time, the evolving humanitarian reset shows that the system is adapting. Humanitarian actors are learning to operate with fewer resources, while seeking to align more closely with government priorities and to embed their efforts in local structures.

Government counterparts have repeatedly emphasized the need for humanitarian actors to focus more on strengthening institutional capacities – helping ministries, decentralized structures, and local NGOs take on a greater share of leadership and delivery. This expectation is especially strong in agriculture, nutrition and social protection, where national ownership is seen as the pathway to sustainability. This transition is not yet consolidated and remains fraught with risks: coverage is declining, staff capacity is eroding, and public trust in humanitarian actors may weaken if needs remain unmet.

Yet the current crisis also offers a critical opening to rethink assistance. Strengthening complementarity between humanitarian, development and peace



actors; deepening government ownership of programmes; and ensuring that communities – especially women and youth – are at the centre of planning are not optional add-ons but necessary conditions for sustaining relevance in Niger's rapidly changing context.

Expanding support to income-generating activities, particularly those led by women's and youth groups will reduce reliance on aid and build resilience from the ground up.

For WFP, the way forward lies in maintaining presence and credibility, even with reduced coverage, by reinforcing evidence generation, building strategic partnerships with government and local actors, and ensuring that life-saving programmes continue where they are most urgently needed.

In doing so, WFP and its partners can help prevent a deterioration into more severe crises while laying the groundwork for more resilient, nationally owned pathways to food security.

Annex

Methodology

The mission that led to the drafting of this report followed primarily a qualitative methodology. It also drawn from recent WFP quantitative data, mainly Post-distribution Monitoring data of resilience programs and protracted assistance. It also relied on the review of secondary data and reports by key partners, that allowed the gathering of economic quantitative data and operational information of key partners agencies.

Qualitative

The qualitative data collection, based on Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD), was conducted in the first half of August 2025 to complement the quantitative available data and with the aim to get insights on:

- The food insecurity and nutrition status of populations that received protracted and lean season assistance;
- Community perceptions on assistance and the potential implications of its suspension to their food security and nutrition situation;
- The impacts of funding cuts on the country's economy and the humanitarian operational landscape;
- The Humanitarian Reset and adapting strategies by key UN partners, NGOs and partnering government institutions.

The qualitative data collection was conducted in two regions - Diffa and Maradi – where the mission visited beneficiary communities to conduct FGDs and met with cooperating partners. It was also conducted in Niamey, where most KIIs took place.

Quantitative

Quantitative data complemented the qualitative findings and mostly provided evidence on:

- Macroeconomic indicators;
- Development and Humanitarian Funding;
- Food Security, Nutrition and household vulnerability indicators from WFP's Post-Distribution Monitoring.

Logistics

For the fieldwork in both the Diffa and Maradi regions, two vehicles per region were mobilized, accompanied by military escort in accordance with current security measures. No incidents were reported. Prior to the fieldwork in both the regions and the capital, national, regional, departmental, and traditional authorities were informed and engaged, which facilitated the organization of the sessions. Data collection took place over nine days, from August 5 to 15.

Notes

- 1 The World Bank, 2025. [Country Overview](#).
- 2 WFP, 2025. [Niger country page](#).
- 3 OCHA, 2025. [Overview of the humanitarian response in Niger](#).
- 4 UNHCR, July 2025. [Niger - Map Population of Concern - July 2025](#).
- 5 ISS Africa, May 2022. [Organised banditry is destroying livelihoods in Niger's borderlands](#).
- 6 OCHA, February 2025. [West and Central Africa: Flooding Situation 2024 Overview - as of 10 February 2025](#).
- 7 FEWS NET, October 2024. [Pluies excédentaires, favorables à une bonne production agricole, mais ont conduit à des inondations](#).
- 8 IRC, April 2024. [Crisis in Niger: What you need to know and how to help](#).
- 9 Tout Africa, November 2024. [Niger : Suspension des activités de deux ONG](#)
- 10 FSIN and GNAFC, May 2025. [The Global Report on Food Crises \(GRFC\) 2025](#).
- 11 IPC, January 2025. [Acute Malnutrition Situation for August - November 2024 and Projections for December 2024 - April 2025 and for May - July 2025](#)
- 12 IMF, 2025. [Niger Country Overview](#).
- 13 The World Bank, 2025. [Country Overview](#).
- 14 The World Bank, April 2025. [Niger Economic Update. Special Chapter: Strengthening the Agri-Food System](#).
- 15 IMF, July 2025. [Press Release No. 25/251 on the Seventh Review under the Extended Credit Facility \(ECF\) Arrangement for Niger, and the Third Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility \(RSF\) Arrangement for Niger](#).
- 16 AfDB, May 2025. [African Economic Outlook 2025](#).
- 17 The Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2025.
- 18 WFP, March 2025. [Niger Annual Country Report 2024](#).
- 19 OCHA, April 2025. [Niger Flagship Initiative](#).
- 20 Estimates based on [OECD ODA data available](#) and [World Bank economic indicators](#).
- 21 The World Bank, April 2025. [Niger Economic Update. Special Chapter: Strengthening the Agri-Food System](#).
- 22 OCHA, June 2024. [2024 Sahel Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview, June 2024](#).
- 23 OCHA FTS, 2025. [Niger 2025](#).
- 24 OCHA, May 2025. [Niger Urgently Prioritized Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan \(HNRP\), May 2025](#).
- 25 WFP Niger Pipeline Note, August 7, 2025
- 26 Food Security Cluster Niger. PLANIFICATION DE LA RÉPONSE SOUDURE 2025 DES PARTENAIRES DU GOUVERNEMENT. June, 2025. [Planification soudure 2025 reviewed.pdf](#)
- 27 Food Security Cluster Niger. IMPACT COUPURE DE FINANCEMENT SUR LE CLUSTER SÉCURITÉ ALIMENTAIRE. August 2025.
- 28 As protracted aid ended earlier than planned, PDM was advanced to July instead of December. This timing means results capture conditions at the start of the lean season rather than the post-harvest period, complicating comparability with previous years and making seasonal effects a likely factor in observed trends.
- 29 The MEB defines the average monetary value of goods and services that a household requires in order to meet its essential needs, on a regular or seasonal basis.
- 30 Consolidated dataset of PDM and annual follow up surveys since the post-harvest period of 2018.

Acknowledgements

This study was conducted by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Service of the World Food Programme, under the leadership of Director Jean-Martin Bauer. Arif Husain, WFP Chief Economist and Director of the Analysis, Planning and Performance Division provided guidance and advice throughout the process. Carlos Estevez (HQ), Stefan Meyer (HQ), Anna Ong (HQ), Susanna Sandstrom (HQ), Cheikh Samb (WACARO), Marie-Joe Stoeri (HQ), Mina Suzuki (WACARO) and Katharine Williams (HQ) contributed to the study. It was carried out in close collaboration with WFP Country Offices in Niger. We extend our sincere thanks to Kinday Samba and her team for their invaluable contributions and support, especially Hadiza Aminami, Elin Anderson, Kokou Amouzou, Moussa Chaibou, Gaspard Cirhalwirwa, Emanuel Foukou, Laetitia Gahimbaza, Aboubacar Koisha, Edward Lloyddevans, Oumarou Moussa, Mariama Seybougati, Boucacar Seydi, Sarah Steward, and Martine Uzamugura.

World Food Programme

Via Cesare Giulio Viola 68/70,
00148 Rome, Italy - T +39 06 65131
wfp.org