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SPR Reading Guidance



Special Preparedness Activities in Papua New Guinea
Standard Project Report 2016

World Food Programme in Papua New Guinea, Independent State of (PG)

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Country Context and WFP Objectives



Country Context

In Papua New Guinea (PNG) the vast majority of the 7.7 million people live in rural villages and rely on subsistence farming to meet their economic and nutritional needs [1,2]. Any surplus crops and livestock that subsistence farmers do not consume are sold, accounting for the bulk of personal income [2].

PNG faces high risk of natural hazards such as earthquakes, flooding, landslides and droughts. From April 2015 to January 2016, a stronger-than-average El Niño Southern Oscillation resulted in an intensification of drought, which severely limited the production of staple crops. WFP, in cooperation with the Government of PNG and humanitarian partners, determined that 1.47 million people in PNG were highly affected by the 2015-2016 El Niño, with the most severe cases involving homestead gardens that were completely destroyed and villages reporting deaths related to hunger [3]. Although drought conditions had mostly subsided by February 2016, homestead gardens did not recover in some parts of the country until as late as August 2016, when the El Niño was officially declared as over. Looking to 2017 and beyond, climate change is expected to intensify droughts in the country [2].

In 2016, two trends in agriculture limited the population's access to sufficient, affordable and nutritious food. Firstly, as in previous years, there was a dearth of technical knowledge in pest control and crop management, resulting in low yields of staple crops such as *kaukau* (sweet potato) [4]. Secondly, the prices of food staples mostly doubled between August 2015 and February 2016 following the El Niño drought [3]. Imported foods such as rice, flour, milk and vegetable oil continued to be expensive because of high costs and did little to alleviate urban dependence on food imports [2].

In terms of nutrition, PNG ranks among the countries with the highest prevalence of stunting in the world, with approximately 50 percent or more of children aged 24-59 months suffering from stunting. Predictably, the prevalence of stunting is higher in rural areas (50 percent) than in urban centres (35 percent). Overall, 16 percent of the population suffers from moderate or acute malnutrition, with children aged 24-59 months more likely than other age groups to be malnourished [5].

PNG ranks very low on all indicators of social and economic development and missed the targets for all Millennium Development Goals. According to the latest Human Development Report, PNG ranked 158 out of 188 countries and territories in terms of Human Development Index (HDI). Gender inequality and gender-based violence remain significant challenges—PNG ranked 140 in the Gender Inequality Index (GII) out of 155 countries and territories for which the index has been calculated*. Despite years of rapid economic growth fueled by extractive industries, poverty remains a major issue with 40 percent of the population living on less than USD 1.25 per day [6].

[1] World Bank. Papua New Guinea, Overview, Context. Washington, D.C. 28 September 2016. <<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/png/overview>>. 25 November 2016.

[2] Templeton and Omot 2012. 'Food security in East Timor, Papua New Guinea and Pacific island countries and territories. Australian Government. Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research'. pp.28-39. <http://aciarc.gov.au/files/node/14932/tr080_food_security_in_east_timor_papua_new_guin_11355.pdf>. 25 November 2016.

[3] WFP. 'El Niño food security impact in Papua New Guinea'. March 2016. <http://vam.wfp.org/sites/mvam_monitoring/papua_new_guinea.html>. 25 November 2016.

[4] Gurr, Geoff M. et al. 'Pests, Diseases and Crop Protection Practices in the Smallholder Sweetpotato (sic) Production System of the Highlands of Papua New Guinea.' Ed. Giovanni Benelli. *PeerJ* 4 (2016): e2703. *PMC*. Web. 14 Feb. 2017.

[5] Hou 2015. 'Stagnant stunting rate despite economic growth in Papua New Guinea'. *World Bank*, Washington, D.C. <<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/496871468179050001/>>.

[6] UNDP 2015. 'Human Development Report 2015'. *Work for Human Development*, New York. About Papua New Guinea. <http://www.pg.undp.org/content/papua_new_guinea/en/home/countryinfo.html>.

*Both the HDI and GI rankings for PNG have not been updated by UNDP since 2014, and the Government and partners are taking actions to improve these rankings.

Response of the Government and Strategic Coordination

In 2016, the Government of Papua New Guinea worked with the United Nations (UN) on developing Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets including for SDG 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture and was mainstreaming SDGs into national strategic policies and plans. The Government developed a roadmap for SDG implementation that included strengthening the network of humanitarian partners, improving the quality and availability of reliable statistical data, and reducing its rate of disaster risk through investment in emergency preparedness [1].

The capacity of the Government and partners to respond to disaster risks was tested during the El Niño drought. The Government relied on a decentralised response and allocated PGK 200 million (USD 65 million) to response efforts, with most of the funding being made available before the drought. The Government allocated USD 1.6 million in relief funds to the National Disaster Centre (NDC), the main government body responsible for managing disaster relief. In addition, the Government formally authorised each of the country's 89 districts to spend up to PGK 2 million (USD 0.6 million) of District Services Improvement Programme (DSIP) allocations for drought relief. The Government capped all relief expenses from DSIP at PGK 2 million, despite varying needs across regions. It is estimated that PGK 50 million (about USD 17 million) was budgeted for disaster response.

WFP did not have an established country agreement with the Government and therefore did not have a dedicated country office for its projects. The emergency operation was a unique situation—the Government, upon the findings of the mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping assessment, issued a formal letter through the NDC allowing for a WFP operation to be implemented. However, no formal national disaster was declared as a result of the El Niño drought. WFP worked through the UN Resident Coordinator's Office, interagency partners who are members of the Disaster Management Team (DMT, co-chaired by the NDC director and UN Resident Coordinator) and the NDC to implement drought relief.

With regards to capacity strengthening, WFP coordinated with the relevant humanitarian actors present in the country and provided logistical and food security technical guidance to partners, including the Government, DMT,

the Food Security Cluster, church-based organizations (with capillary presence across the country), international organizations, district and ward level authorities, and private sector actors.

[1] UNDP 2015. 'Human Development Report 2015'. *Work for Human Development*, New York. About Papua New Guinea. <http://www.pg.undp.org/content/papua_new_guinea/en/home/countryinfo.html>.

Summary of WFP Operational Objectives

WFP conducted emergency preparedness activities and an emergency operation for the first time in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in response to the 2015-2016 El Niño. Although WFP had no presence in PNG prior to 2016, WFP had been engaged with other Pacific Island countries, including through a three-month Immediate Response Emergency Preparedness Operation (IR-PREP) and the WFP Vanuatu cyclone response. Lessons learned from these activities indicated that proactive engagement was required to develop productive in-country relationships to facilitate coordination and technical support to an ongoing emergency response. Given these findings, WFP's goal in PNG was to enact preparedness activities in the context of the national response and provide life-saving food assistance to the populations most severely affected by the El Niño phenomenon, in line with WFP Strategic Objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies, and with Sustainable Development Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.

WFP carried out its objectives through two projects:

IR-PREP 200930 lasted from 29 December 2015 to 29 February 2016 with a budget of USD 250,395 to support WFP Asia and the Pacific's special preparedness activities in PNG and to: 1) establish sectorial coordination mechanisms, 2) support national assessment and analysis, 3) provide operational guidance and planning for scaled-up food operations, and 4) provide specialised support to the National Disaster Centre and Provincial Disaster Committees, relevant government departments, NGOs and private sector actors.

Emergency Operation: EMOP 200966 lasted from 15 April to 30 November 2016 with a budget of USD 12.6 million and objectives to: 1) meet the urgent food needs of people who had exhausted other viable means of subsistence, and 2) protect livelihoods and limit the incidence of negative coping strategies.

Country Resources and Results

Resources for Results

Overall funding levels for WFP's Papua New Guinea (PNG) projects were sufficient to meet emergency preparedness and general distribution needs.

In December 2015, WFP secured full funding for the IR-PREP from the Immediate Response Account, a multilateral WFP account for disaster preparedness. All of WFP's proposed emergency preparedness activities for PNG were funded in 2016.

In April 2016, WFP launched an appeal for resources to support an EMOP. Despite having no previous experience in the country, WFP received significant interest in the operation characterised by a robust level of funding (73 percent) at the height of the operation. WFP received funding from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund Rapid Response Window as well as donor governments including the European Union, Japan, and the United States of America.

The EMOP's resourcing success can be attributed to several factors. First, WFP's emergency preparedness initiatives in the country allowed partners to be identified early. Second, WFP provided mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (mVAM) support to further evaluate the food security situation in the country, and the results of the mVAM assessment were made readily available and helped to justify an emergency operation. Third, WFP designed the EMOP to have strong interagency components to accommodate donors' interests and proposed to build capacity of existing stakeholders. Fourth, many donors expressed appreciation of WFP's operational follow-up, which included reports, briefs and updates to donor embassies in Port Moresby.

WFP revised the EMOP four times to adjust for changes in the operation such as an extension of the project timeline and adjustments in beneficiary targets and logistics rates. Only the first revision modified the project's overall budget—WFP determined that EMOP requirements could be decreased by seven percent as a result of reduced security costs.

Achievements at Country Level


The majority of people in Papua New Guinea (PNG) rely on nourishment from food that they grow themselves. When a stronger-than-average El Niño arrived in the country from 2014–2016, the subsequent drought gravely impacted the resilience of the population to meet their basic food needs.

Despite having never worked in the country previously, WFP successfully provided comprehensive emergency preparedness support to the Government of PNG and humanitarian community. The mobile vulnerability analysis and mapping assessment allowed the Government of PNG and partners to identify the populations facing difficulties in meeting their basic food needs after the drought, while WFP's analysis of logistics corridors, aviation assessment, identification of rice suppliers, and information sharing with partners helped lay the groundwork for the general distribution.

From June to October 2016, WFP reached 268,107 of the most vulnerable people facing extreme food shortages. By December, these communities showed substantial improvements in their access to food staples and reported fewer food shortages. Despite WFP's efforts, there are pockets of people who continue to experience food shortages. In 2017, WFP plans to continually monitor the most vulnerable populations to ensure their resilience to future climatic shocks.

Annual Country Beneficiaries

Beneficiaries	Male	Female	Total
Children (5-18 years)	64,346	58,984	123,330
Adults (18 years plus)	75,069	69,708	144,777
Total number of beneficiaries in 2016	139,415	128,692	268,107





Annual Food Distribution in Country (mt)

Project Type	Cereals	Oil	Pulses	Mix	Other	Total
Single Country EMOP	4,707	-	-	-	-	4,707
Total Food Distributed in 2016	4,707	-	-	-	-	4,707

Supply Chain

During the IR-PREP period, WFP worked with logistics sector partners to evaluate the scope of Papua New Guinea (PNG)'s logistics capacities and identify gaps in logistics coordination. Firstly, WFP and partners prioritised the completion of a logistics overview of transportation corridors for use by the Government of PNG and the humanitarian community. Secondly, consultations were held at the provincial level to identify bottlenecks in the supply chain used for the existing distribution of food commodities and to develop solutions for delivery to final distribution points; in some areas, for example, logistics sector partners facilitated the distribution of food that had been procured and paid for but had remained in storage due to a lack of logistics coordination and resourcing. Thirdly, WFP conducted an aviation assessment that identified commercial air-service providers, capacity and areas of operation. Lastly, WFP surveyed the market of vendors and suppliers of rice in the country in preparation for a possible emergency response.

Once the EMOP was underway, WFP utilised its supply chain preparations to conduct its rice distributions, all of which took place in remote areas where road transportation infrastructure was limited or nonexistent. Such conditions necessitated a diverse logistics operation relying on airlifts, transportation on the sea, and, where possible, ground transportation.

WFP delivered fortified rice as the sole commodity. WFP procured fortified rice from local as opposed to international suppliers as a matter of urgency since procuring from international suppliers would have required additional time-consuming clearances. Local suppliers imported the rice from Thailand and Vietnam to the main port of entry of Lae. WFP then relied on local contractors to transport rice from these ports to their final destinations. Any spoiled rice, irrespective of when it was spoiled, was recovered by the supplier. WFP maintained records of spoiled rice to ensure that all of it was recovered and not distributed.

WFP logistics and security officers provided oversight and guidance to reduce the risk of post-delivery loss of rice. Despite these measures, WFP reported a loss of 0.06 percent—3 mt of the overall 4,710 mt of rice received in the country in 2016 under the EMOP. Much of the incurred loss was caused by looting during distributions to insecure areas of the highlands. Improved security measures of distribution sites in the cultural context of highlands communities could minimise losses in the future.

A recurring challenge for WFP was the poor capacity of service providers to guarantee timely transport between locations and accurately tally their stocks of rice. As a consequence, WFP spent more time than expected on managing service providers and was faced with occasional operational delays. An additional challenge was financing—WFP relied on existing partner capacity to process payments for service providers, and these payments were sometimes delayed. Volatile weather conditions also proved to be challenging, with some weather-related incidents causing delays that disrupted the supply chain.

WFP sought a cooperating partner with a more established presence in PNG to conduct the actual distribution of rice in the highlands, where the bulk of the drought-affected populations were located. WFP selected CARE International as its cooperating partner, but in August 2016 CARE withdrew early from the partnership agreement based on security concerns. Despite being without a cooperating partner in August, WFP was determined to reach the highlands populations that still required assistance and decided to directly conduct all aspects of the distribution. As a matter of preparation, WFP studied and implemented lessons learned from the distribution with CARE and updated logistics and operational plans in an effort to increase efficiency for the direct distribution. WFP completed the direct distribution more quickly than planned and under budget.

WFP sought to incorporate local and national government actors at all levels of the supply chain and logistics operation. WFP relied on in-country insight from local Provincial Disaster Committee networks, the National

Maritime Safety Authority, local church networks, the National Disaster Centre and logistics sector partners to conduct its distributions and ensure that the operational situation on the ground was as efficient as possible.



Annual Food Purchases for the Country (mt)

Commodity	Local	Regional/International	Total
Rice	-	4,713	4,713
Total	-	4,713	4,713
Percentage	-	100.0%	

Implementation of Evaluation Recommendations and Lessons Learned

During the Immediate Response Emergency Preparedness Operation (IR-PREP) period, WFP evaluated the food security situation by relying on information obtained from the Church Partnership Programme, agricultural research affiliated with the Australian National University, and consultations with government and humanitarian partners. In light of accruing evidence that the food security situation was deteriorating, the United Nations Resident Coordinator's Office, National Disaster Centre (NDC) and WFP worked together to launch the mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping assessment (mVAM), which included Papua New Guinea (PNG)'s first systematic and country-wide data collection of El Niño effects on food security.

The main lesson learned from the IR-PREP was to ensure that the food security situation is monitored, well-documented with observations from multiple sources—in this case from academia, humanitarian partners, and government actors—and analysed and shared with decision-makers. An additional lesson learned was that logistics and food security coordination mechanisms enhance the flow of information and help to address operational bottlenecks.

Following the IR-PREP and release of mVAM findings, an appeal for international assistance was never officially issued. Despite the efforts of WFP and the greater humanitarian community, WFP rice did not reach drought-affected areas until June 2016, almost a full year after the first food shortages were reported. The Government of PNG provided food assistance to those most affected starting September 2015, but food security conditions continued to deteriorate well into 2016. WFP operated in the country through a specific invitation by the NDC to assist in the Government's national drought response efforts. Given this limited scope, WFP was unable to respond earlier but successfully reached the populations that remained most vulnerable in 2016.

WFP recommends that the Government's work with humanitarian partners to re-evaluate its threshold for declaring that international assistance is needed so as not to delay the deployment of life-saving assistance. WFP recommends that the Government share best practices in emergency response at the national and local administrative levels. WFP found that some local actors (e.g. Provincial Disaster Committees) were fully engaged with humanitarian partners, while others were much less active or non-existent.

Many humanitarian agencies on the ground had significant operational capacity but acknowledged that much of their scope was limited to Port Moresby, the capital city. The One UN system has highlighted that a strengthened field presence for resident agencies could enhance monitoring and response capacity in case of an emergency. Interagency collaboration could also be strengthened as there were gaps in information sharing among humanitarian organizations and partners despite the UN-wide promotion of inter-agency fora.

WFP conducted an internal lessons learned on its emergency operation and identified ways to strengthen its information and communications technology, logistics, administrative services, security, and internal programme support for the next response. WFP also noted that the procurement costs for fortified rice from local suppliers were high; additional lead time is needed for government clearances for cheaper international suppliers. WFP believes that there is sufficient capacity of government agencies in-country to manage basic food security needs. Therefore, WFP did not and does not intend to establish a dedicated country office or maintain food distributions in PNG.

In 2017, WFP plans to work with the Government and partners on a continuous food security monitoring system to address the information and disaster management gaps. WFP also hopes to participate in a government-led lessons learned exercise to prepare for future humanitarian emergencies in the country.

Project Objectives and Results

Project Objectives

The specific objectives of IR-PREP 200930 were to: 1) support a WFP presence in PNG in early 2016, with a focus on assessing existing emergency preparedness capacities and gaps, identification and provision of technical support services to improve coordination, and logistics planning within the context of the national response; 2) enhance coordination mechanisms among governmental and non-governmental actors at the provincial level and national levels, and through the Food Security Cluster and logistics sector; and 3) undertake core preparedness actions in the event that international food assistance is requested.

The IR-PREP was WFP's first involvement in the country and enabled it to further assess the need for an emergency operation. WFP's presence filled existing gaps in technical expertise (emergency logistics and food security) with the aim of strengthening the capacity and readiness of actors, especially as it became evident that the food security of affected populations was likely to deteriorate in the coming months.



Approved Budget for Project Duration (USD)

Cost Category	
Direct Support Costs	234,014
Indirect Support Costs	16,381
Total	250,395

Project Activities

Project activities carried out under IR-PREP 200930 were as follows:

1. Establish coordination mechanisms at national and provincial levels in the a) food security and b) emergency logistics sectors to provide the following tools and services:

- presence and capacity mapping of gaps and existing actors providing or that are able to provide humanitarian assistance in the worst-affected areas;
- sectorial response planning and coordination;
- situation reports and updates relaying consolidated information on the ongoing response; and
- advocacy, consultation and liaison with major donors to identify, plan and allocate resources to respond to existing needs.

2. Support to national assessment and analysis including consolidation of existing assessment data and reports, design and development of future assessments and monitoring systems as agreed with the Government of PNG as a preparedness measure to track a potential worsening of food insecurity among affected, isolated and vulnerable populations.

3. Operational guidance and planning for scaled-up food operations including geographic prioritisation, food tonnages and logistics corridor scenarios in alignment with the Government of PNG's national response to facilitate resource mobilisation and implementation by government and non-government partners.

4. Specialised support to the National Disaster Centre and Provincial Disaster Coordinators, relevant government departments, NGOs and private sector actors to identify:

- key constraints and bottlenecks to the response;
- available national capacities to address constraints; and
- a list of additional WFP services available (response permitting).

This support was focused on enhancing response capacity at the provincial level where weaknesses were identified and, more importantly, where the bulk of operational planning and delivery assistance was taking place.

Operational Partnerships

WFP partners in PNG had light operational capacity on the ground, particularly regarding operations outside of Port Moresby and those regarding food security in general. WFP worked with partners through the Food Security Cluster, which was established with FAO in January 2016. FAO itself was present in the country with a two-person team, and its activities were limited to institutional capacity building with the Department of Agriculture and Livestock and coordination of the Food Security Cluster. Other Food Security Cluster partners had limited scope—World Vision International was active in several parts of the country with agricultural/value chain training, while CARE International and Oxfam conducted a joint agricultural recovery programme in three provinces. Expertise in logistics among these agencies was particularly lacking, and costs were prohibitively expensive to reach the more remote areas of the country. WFP also worked with the academic institutions operating in the area including researchers from the Australian National University and with private sector partners to conduct food security analysis and mapping.

WFP partners agreed that the activation of a formal logistics cluster was not required. Instead, WFP and logistics partners functioned as an informal logistics sector, and logistics information was exchanged among partners as required. Logistics partners included UN agencies, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and private sector organisations that were interested in providing resources to the response. WFP shared information on logistics corridors, aviation mapping, and technical guidance with these partners.

WFP believes that there was sufficient capacity among UN and other agencies as well as the Government of PNG to work towards SDGs. However, there is much room to improve on the emergency preparedness and response capacities of partners, as the response to El Niño drought in 2016 proved that there were gaps in technical expertise and interagency coordination.

Results/Outcomes

Although WFP did not have a physical presence in PNG prior to this IR-PREP, WFP successfully met its preparedness goals within a relatively short, two-month project span. WFP provided technical guidance in logistics and food security and strengthened the readiness and capacity of humanitarian partners and the Government of PNG to respond to an impending drought emergency. WFP also delivered on its promise of supporting the Government of PNG's national assessment, engaging itself in interagency coordination mechanisms and sharing developments with government and non-government stakeholders through the DMT.

WFP provided guidance for the creation of the Food Security Cluster and logistics sector as platforms to improve information sharing among partners, to enhance monitoring and to build overall capacity. WFP helped guide chair agencies with Terms of Reference, a strategic summary, roles and responsibilities, presence mapping and priority actions for 2016.

Once these interagency fora were in place, WFP loaned its mapping expertise to partners—a move that was critical to analyse the impact of the drought on the national food security situation. Prior to WFP involvement in the country, baseline data on food security needs and logistics corridor scenarios in case of an operational scale-up were noticeably lacking. WFP carried out an mVAM assessment, for which WFP corroborated previous reports and databases and through which WFP acquired new insight on the food security of the worst-affected areas. WFP shared the VAM results with government and non-government partners through the DMT and Food Security Cluster. WFP supplemented the VAM results with specialised mapping of drought areas and a subsequent operational overview of the response. Information was also triangulated through the Cluster with international partners, research teams from the Australian National University, Geoscience Australia, and DFAT to provide comprehensive updated drought information and drought mapping.

Although logistics coordination was operational and WFP provided ongoing logistics support and operational information to the relevant humanitarian agencies, the Logistics Cluster was never formally activated, but instead functioned as a 'sector'. This more informal approach allowed WFP to spend less time on formal logistics meetings and instead focus precious time on logistics mapping and other operational priorities that would then be shared with partners. The number of WFP staff on the ground was limited, necessitating more involvement in the field and away from Port Moresby, where logistics partner agencies were primarily based. Through the sector, WFP worked with authorities at the provincial level to identify logistics corridors for food delivery. The sector also conducted an aviation assessment which identified air service providers, capacity, and areas of operation. By 29 February 2016, WFP and partners had mapped existing humanitarian actors, access constraints, logistics corridors, and gaps in the humanitarian response for decision-makers in preparation for an emergency operation.

Overall, WFP delivered on the project's objectives, with deliverables including enhanced cooperation in interagency fora and comprehensive analysis of logistics and food security concerns.

Figures and Indicators

Data Notes

Photo credits: © WFP / Sallyjoy Lloyd

Caption: As part of WFP's emergency preparedness measures, WFP surveyed aviation infrastructure and airstrips in Western Province, where most villages were only accessible by small airstrips. Families often greeted WFP planes arriving in these remote areas. WFP's logistics assessments were critical for WFP and logistics sector partners to assist the Government of Papua New Guinea in its drought response efforts.